Strategic Goal 2: Counterterrorism

Prevent Attacks Against the United States, our Allies, and our Friends, and Strengthen Alliances and International Arrangements to Defeat Global Terrorism

I. Public Benefit

The tragic events of 9/11 demonstrated the gravity of the threat international terrorists pose to the United States and its citizens, at home and abroad. With a presence in some 60 countries, Al-Qaeda continues to be of great concern, although it has been significantly weakened by U.S. actions. The Department has the lead in international aspects of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), which remains its top priority, and receives important counterterrorism assistance from USAID.   In every corner of the globe, the Secretary, the USAID Administrator, other senior officials, Ambassadors, and USAID mission directors have pressed their counterparts for expanded cooperation and intensified efforts against terrorists. Through such effective bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, the U.S. has developed and leads a worldwide coalition that acts to suppress terrorism on all fronts: military, intelligence, law enforcement, public diplomacy and financial. In collaboration with its partners in other agencies, international organizations, and in other countries, the Department will remain committed to combating terrorist networks wherever they exist, until the mission is accomplished and Americans are secure from such threats. To date, the Department has mobilized some 180 countries and territories in the GWOT to identify, disrupt and destroy international terrorist organizations. Over 3,000 terrorist suspects have been arrested, and over $138 million in terrorists' assets have been blocked by over forty foreign governments. In an effort to deny weapons to terrorists, 8,500 Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) have been destroyed. Key to the ability to mobilize effective action by our foreign partners is the provision of training to those who want to help but lack the means. Since 9/11, these programs, including anti-terrorist assistance, terrorist interdiction, anti-terrorist finance, and long-term USAID efforts to increase stability have significantly improved our partners' counterterrorism capabilities.

II. Resource Summary ($ in Thousands)

	FY 2004 Actual	FY 2005 Estimate	FY 2006 Request	Change From FY 2005	
				Amount	%
Staff [1]	898	903	903	0	0.0%
Funds [2]	$1,138,602	$1,408,297	$1,524,683	$116,386	8.3%

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[1] Department of State direct-funded positions.
[2] Funds include both Department of State Appropriations Act Resources and Foreign Operations Resources, where applicable.

III. Strategic Goal Context

Shown below are the performance goals, initiatives/programs, and the resources, bureaus and partners that contribute to accomplishment of the "Counterterrorism" strategic goal. Acronyms are defined in the glossary at the back of this publication.

Strategic Goal	Performance Goal (Short Title)	Initiative/Program	Major Resources	Lead Bureau(s) [1]	Partners
Counterterrorism	Active Anti-Terrorist Coalitions	Diplomatic Engagement	CIO, D&CP, NADR	S/CT, IO	UN
		Anti-Terrorism Assistance	D&CP, NADR	S/CT, DS	N/A
		Terrorist Interdiction Program	NADR	S/CT	N/A
		Meeting International Standards	CIO, D&CP	S/CT, IO	UN
		FMF/IMET in WHA	FMF, IMET	WHA, PM	DoD
	Freezing Terrorist Financing	Combating Terrorist Financing	D&CP	EB, S/CT, INL, INR	Treasury, DOJ
	Prevention and Response to Terrorism	Foreign Emergency Support Team	D&CP	S/CT	DoD, DOE, FBI, CIA, DHS
		Terrorist Financing Assistance Initiative	D&CP, NADR	S/CT, EB	Treasury
		Frontline States in the Global War on Terrorism	D&CP, NADR	SA, S/CT	NSC, DoD, FBI, CIA, Treasury and DoJ
		Top Officials Exercise	D&CP	S/CT	DHS, DoD, FBI, CIA, DOE
		Bioterrorism Response	ESF	OES	DHS, HHS, WHO
		Reduction and Security of MANPADS	D&CP, NADR	PM	NSC, OSD, DTRA, JCS, DoD, intelligence community
	Diminished Terrorism Conditions	Diminish Potential Underlying Conditions of Terrorism in Iraq	DA, ESF	*ANE, PPC/P*	NSC, DoD, NGOs, S/CT, INL, Treasury, Justice, IFI
		Diminish Potential Underlying Conditions of Terrorism in Afghanistan	DA, ESF	SA, *ANE, PPC/P*	NSC, DoD, NGOs, S/CT, INL, Treasury, Justice, IFI
		Diminish Conditions Exploited by Terrorist Recruitment in Other Frontline States	DA, ESF, TI	*AFR, ANE, E&E, LAC, PPC/P*	NSC, DoD, NGOs, S/CT, INL, Treasury, Justice, IFI
		Diminish Conditions Exploited for Terrorist Sanctuary in Frontline States	DA, TI	*AFR, ANE, E&E, LAC, PPC/P*	NSC, DoD, NGOs, S/CT, INL, Treasury, Justice, IFI

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[1] USAID components are shown in blue italicized fonts.

IV. Performance Summary

For each Initiative/Program that supports accomplishment of this strategic goal, the most critical FY 2006 performance indicators and targets are shown below.

Annual Performance Goal #1
COALITION PARTNERS IDENTIFY, DETER, APPREHEND AND PROSECUTE TERRORISTS

I/P #1: Diplomatic Engagement		
Ensure that the policies, plans, and activities of foreign governments sustain and strengthen the United States' objectives in the Global War on Terrorism through international cooperation and negotiation.		
Input Indicator		
Indicator #1: Number of Completed Bilateral and Multilateral Counterterrorism (CT) Meetings and Conferences		
TARGETS	**FY 2006**	1. 35 completed bilateral and multilateral CT conferences and workshops. 2. Establish five new projects with a funding split of 50% U.S. and 50% partner funding (including regional projects with more than one partner).
	FY 2005	27 completed bilateral and multilateral CT meetings, conferences, and workshops.
RESULTS	2004	Total of 27: Four (4) counterterrorism regional workshops, twenty (20) bilateral meetings, and three (3) multilateral counterterrorism conferences.
	2003	Total of 25: Three (3) multilateral counterterrorism conferences and twenty-two (22) bilateral conferences.
	2002	Total of 13 multilateral and bilateral counterterrorism conferences and workshops.
	2001	Total of 9 multilateral and bilateral counterterrorism conferences and workshops.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Bilateral and multilateral CT negotiations and conferences allow us to increase cooperation in all areas of the GWOT to include diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, military, and intelligence.
	Data Source	Embassy reporting, intelligence/law enforcement reporting, after-action reports by regional bureau area offices, country assessments, and international organizations such as the G-8 counterterrorism committee assessments.

I/P #2: Anti-Terrorism Assistance
(PART Program)

Develop the capacity of priority Counterterrorism countries to combat terrorism.

Efficiency Indicator

Indicator #2: Average Length of Time a Country Spends in Basic Training Programs Before Achieving Sustainment of Basic Anti-Terrorism Capacities

| TARGETS | FY 2006 | 8 Years |
| | FY 2005 | 9 Years |

RESULTS	2004	9 Years
	2003	9 Years
	2002-2001	N/A

| DATA QUALITY | Indicator Validation | Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) not only provides quality training to priority counterterrorism countries, but also enables each country to achieve sustainment by providing them with the capability to incorporate anti-terrorism curriculum into their own training methods over a set course of time, thereby optimizing USG cost efficiency for each nation's participation in the ATA program. |
| | Data Source | Embassy reporting, intelligence/law enforcement reporting, after-action reports by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security/ATA program implementers and regional bureau area offices and individual country assessments. |

Output Indicator

Indicator #3: Number of Participant Countries That Achieve and Sustain a Capability to Effectively Deter, Detect, and Counter Terrorist Organizations and Threats

| TARGETS | FY 2006 | Turkey and Kazakhstan ascend from basic through advanced training in order to sustain competence in countering terrorist activities and threats. |
| | FY 2005 | Egypt and Morocco ascend from basic through advanced training in order to sustain competence in countering terrorist activities and threats. |

| RESULTS | 2004 | Israel and South Africa ascended from basic through advanced training and have attained competence in countering terrorist activities and threats. |
| | 2003-2001 | N/A |

| DATA QUALITY | Indicator Validation | Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) not only provides quality training to priority counterterrorism countries but enables each country to achieve sustainment by providing them with the capability to incorporate anti-terrorism curriculum into their own training methods over a set course of time, thereby optimizing USG cost efficiency of each nation's participation in the ATA program. |
| | Data Source | Embassy reporting, intelligence/law enforcement reporting, after-action reports by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security/ATA program implementers and regional bureau area offices and individual country assessments. |

I/P #3: Terrorist Interdiction Program
(PART Program)

Bolster the border security of countries at a high risk of terrorist transit.

Efficiency Indicator

Indicator #4: Number of Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluations System (PISCES) Phased Installations Completed per Yearly Appropriation

TARGETS	FY 2006	17-19 phased installations with an appropriation of $15M.
	FY 2005	6-7 phased installations with an appropriation of $5M.
RESULTS	2004	6 phased installations with an appropriation of $5M.
	2003	Baselines: Installations : 6 Appropriation : $5M Measure: 1.2
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator provides a key annual measurement of progress toward the program's long-term goal. Since annual progress will be directly affected by the annual program appropriation, this indicator also provides a clear and continuing means to evaluate progress and an overall indication of program efficiency.
	Data Source	Joint program office reports obtained from field installations.

Note: In FY 2003, the Terrorist Interdiction Program completed 12 installations of the PISCES border control system overseas, but S/CT appropriations provided for only 6 of the FY 2003 installations (TIP is a joint USG agency program). These installations represented either the initial installation in a country or an expansion of the program, i.e. installations at additional ports of entry. Installation costs will vary widely due to external factors including geography, political environment and terrorist threat. The expected decline in efficiency between 2003 and 2004 is due to more challenging installation conditions (expanding installations from the main airport to the country's periphery).

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #5: Percentage of the Highest Priority Countries Capable of Screening for Terrorists Through Implementation of the Terrorist Interdiction Program

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	67% (40 out of 60 countries)
	FY 2005	45% (27 out of 60 countries)

RESULTS		
	2004	32% (19 out of 60 countries)
	2003	20% (12 out of 60 countries)
	2002	Baseline: 5% (3 out of 60 countries)
	2001	N/A

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	This indicator provides a key annual measurement of progress toward the program's long term goal of establishing terrorist screening capabilities in all countries where terrorists who pose a threat to the United States exist or are likely to use as transit points.
	Data Source	Currently, 60 countries worldwide have been assessed through a U.S. interagency process as the highest priorities for establishment of terrorist screening capabilities.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #6: Percentage of Travelers Screened by Participating Foreign Governments with the Terrorist Interdiction Program's Watchlisting System

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	79%
	FY 2005	72%

RESULTS		
	2004	68%
	2003	58%
	2002	Baseline: 45% (estimate)
	2001	N/A

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	A key element of this program is maximizing the usage of the terrorist watchlisting system to screen travelers passing through ports of entry at which it is installed. U.S. counterterrorism strategic objectives are not served if participating nations do not maximize their use of the watch listing system provided by this program. The program strives for steadily increasing levels of system usage in countries participating in the program. Stagnant or decreasing levels of usage provide red flags for program management action.
	Data Source	Percentages were derived from informal feedback from U.S. personnel charged with program oversight in each country, as well as reporting from program personnel in the course of visits to perform system maintenance, software upgrades, or follow-on operator training.

Output Indicator	
Indicator #7: Number of Highest Priority Foreign Ports of Entry Equipped to Conduct Terrorist Watchlisting in Cooperation with the United States	

TARGETS	FY 2006	85 ports out of 180.
	FY 2005	65 ports out of 180.

RESULTS	2004	54 ports out of 180.
	2003	25 ports out of 180.
	2002	<u>Baseline</u>: 3 ports out of 180.
	2001	N/A

DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	The Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) is focused on using annual appropriations to provide a high quality terrorist watch listing capability to be used at the maximum number of ports of entry in the maximum number of highest priority countries threatened by terrorist transit. The program is focused on maximizing system coverage, and maximizing system utilization in order to deter or disrupt terrorist planning and operations. This indicator provides a clear and continuing means by which progress towards the program's key and overarching goal can be measured on an annual basis. It is an indicator of program outcome vice output performance.
	Data Source	TIP Joint Program Office monitoring of installations.

I/P #4: Meeting International Standards

Encourage countries to become parties to the 12 International Counterterrorism Conventions and meet their obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1373.

Output Indicator

Indicator #8: Compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	1. All willing countries complete Stage A of the UN Counterterrorism Committee process. 2. At least 150 countries are in Stage B. 3. At least 100 countries are in Stage C. 4. Regular CTC field missions conducted to ensure compliance and provide training to "willing-but-unable" countries. 5. Tangible sanctions developed to be applied by the UN Security Council to recalcitrant countries that decline to meet obligations under UNSCR 1373 even with technical assistance.
	FY 2005	Member States continue* to submit follow-up reports as requested by the CTC.

RESULTS		
	2004	Total of 507 reports received from UN member states, including 191 initial reports, 160 second reports, 116 third reports, and 40 fourth reports. Seventy-one states were delinquent in submission of a follow-up report requested by the CTC.
	2003	191 (all member states of the United Nations)
	2002	174
	2001	UN CTC established to monitor and assist members in implementing UNSCR 1373.

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	Repeated reporting by countries indicates progress in meeting UNSCR 1373's requirements.
	Data Source	UN CTC reports and reporting from U.S. Embassies.

* As a measurable method of describing the status of a state's counterterrorism capacity, the CTC has identified three stages of development. In "Stage A," a state has *legislation in place* covering all aspects of UNSCR 1373 and a process in hand for *becoming party as soon as possible to the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism*, and *effective executive machinery for preventing and suppressing terrorist financing.* A state in "Stage B," in addition to meeting Stage A criteria, will have *effective and coordinated executive machine*ry *covering all aspects of UNSCR 1373,* in particular preventing recruitment to terrorist groups, the movement of terrorists, the establishment of terrorist safe havens, and any other form of passive or active support for terrorists or terrorist groups. A state in "Stage C," in addition to meeting Stage A and B criteria, will be able to (1) effectively manage counterterrorism cooperation on bilateral, regional and international levels, including exchange of information; (2) pursue judicial cooperation with other States on bringing terrorists and their supporters to justice (e.g., via prosecution or extradition, exchange of information and early-warning, and law enforcement cooperation); and, (3) address links between terrorism and other threats to international security (e.g., arms trafficking, drugs, organized crime, money laundering, and illegal movement of CBN weapons).

I/P #5: Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) in the Western Hemisphere (PART Program)

Ensure that regional military and security forces are equipped and professionally trained to exert effective control over their national territory, control the maritime approaches to the U.S., and participate in coalition and peacekeeping operations.

Efficiency Indicator

Indicator #9: Ratio of FMF Program Costs to the Number of Personnel in the Colombian Armed Forces

TARGETS	**FY 2006**	$531/Service person.
	FY 2005	$540/Service person.
RESULTS	2004	$495/Service person.
	2003	$503/Service person.
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	With several effectiveness measures for Colombia FMF in the PART and Mission Performance Plan, this measure will indicate the relative efficiency of FMF support by measuring FMF support per member of the armed forces.
	Data Source	Official foreign government reports, verified through embassy reporting and further confirmed by the bureaus of Western Hemisphere Affairs and Political-Military Affairs officials.

Annual Performance Goal #2
U.S. AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ACTIVELY COMBAT TERRORIST FINANCING

I/P #6: Combating Terrorist Financing

Combat terrorist financing by designating Foreign Terrorist Organizations, designating supporters of terrorism under Executive Order 13224, and submitting al-Qaeda-related individuals and entities to the UN 1267 Committee.

Output Indicator

Indicator #1: Yearly Number of Names Designated Under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 for Terrorist Asset Freezing

TARGETS	FY 2006	Designation of additional terrorist-related individuals and entities in accordance with the precepts of E.O. 13224.
	FY 2005	Designation of additional terrorist-related individuals and entities in accordance with the precepts of E.O. 13224.
RESULTS	2004	Sixty-five terrorist-related individuals and entities were added to the E.O. 13224 list.
	2003	Eighty additional terrorist-related individuals and entities were named.
	2002	Eighty-nine names were designated.
	2001	Baseline: 136 names were designated by the U.S.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Public designations of global terrorists freeze the designated organizations' and individuals' assets that fund operations; stigmatize and isolate designated terrorists and their organizations internationally; provide the basis for prosecutions of supporters in the U.S.; and deter donations or contributions to and economic transactions with named organizations and terrorist individuals.
	Data Source	Data is derived from United States Government 13224 designation process. Complete designations can be found on the Treasury (Office of Foreign Asset Control) website.

Output Indicator

Indicator #2: Number of Groups Designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) Pursuant to U.S. Law and Timeliness of Review of Such Groups

| TARGETS | FY 2006 | 100% of FTO reviews completed; no new addition pending for more than 4 months. |
| | FY 2005 | Complete all FTO reviews; no new addition pending for more than 4 months. |

RESULTS	2004	1. Three new FTO were designated, bringing the total to forty. Two FTO designations were amended to reflect name changes. 2. All six FTO designations due to expire were reviewed and re-designated on time.
	2003	1. Two more new FTO were designated, bringing the total to thirty-five. One FTO designation was amended to reflect its name change. 2. All 27 FTO designations due to expire were reviewed and re-designated on time.
	2002	1. Six more organizations designated as FTOs, bringing the total to thirty-three. 2. Five groups were under review for possible FTO designation.
	2001	1. Thirty-one groups designated as FTOs. 2. Twenty-eight FTOs reviewed for re-designation, twenty-five groups re-designated and two other groups dropped from the list.

| DATA QUALITY | Indicator Validation | Public designations of global terrorists freeze the designated organizations' and individuals' assets that fund operations; stigmatize and isolate designated terrorists and their organizations internationally; provide the basis for prosecutions of supporters in the U.S.; and deter donations or contributions to and economic transactions with named organizations and terrorist individuals. |
| | Data Source | Public designations of FTOs are published in the Federal Registry and can be compared for content and accuracy. |

Output Indicator

Indicator #3: Number of Foreign Countries Submitting Names to the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee's Consolidated List

| TARGETS | FY 2006 | Foreign governments submit additional names per the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee's (1267 Committee) Consolidated List criteria. |
| | FY 2005 | Foreign governments submit additional names per the UN 1267 Committee's Consolidated List criteria. |

RESULTS	2004	Fifty (50) individuals and entities submitted to the UN for listing by five states other than the U.S., either individually or in cooperation with other states; Nine co-designations by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.
	2003	Forty-three (43) countries submitted al-Qaeda-related names to the 1267 Committee.
	2002	Sixty-eight (68) foreign countries submitted al-Qaeda-related names to the 1267 Committee.
	2001	Baseline: No foreign countries submitted names to the 1267 Committee.

| DATA QUALITY | Indicator Validation | Submission of al-Qaeda related names to the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee is a voluntary activity and thus an indicator of political and bureaucratic commitment. It has varied with the occurrence of terrorist incidents such as the Bali bombing and 9/11, itself. |
| | Data Source | Data is derived from the UN 1267 Committee process. Complete designations can be found on the Treasury (Office of Foreign Asset Control) website. |

Output Indicator		
	Indicator #4: Number and Effectiveness of U.S. Training and Assistance Programs and Assessments Delivered to Priority States to Help Combat the Financing of Terrorists	
TARGETS	FY 2006	1. Three countries assessed by financial systems assessment teams (FSAT) and three training and technical assistance plans developed. 2. Six countries at least partially implement technical assistance and training plans (training received in at least three of the five functional areas). 3. Eight countries fully implement technical assistance and training plans (training received in at least all five of the functional areas). 4. At least five countries undergo comprehensive review of the effectiveness of technical assistance and training.
	FY 2005	1. Six countries assessed by FSATs and six training and technical assistance plans developed. 2. Eight countries at least partially implement technical assistance and training plans (training received in at least three of the five functional areas). 3. Seven countries fully implement technical assistance and training plans (training received in at least all five of the functional areas).
RESULTS	2004	1. Four countries assessed by FSATs and six training and technical assistance plans developed. 2. Four countries fully implement technical assistance and training plans (training received in at least all five of the functional areas). 3. Six countries at least partially implemented technical assistance and training plans (training received in at least three of the five functional areas). 4. Six new countries were added to the priority assistance list.
	2003	Fifteen assessments completed. Fifteen of the targeted nineteen states received training and technical assistance.
	2002	1. Ten of the nineteen CT finance priority assistance countries were assessed by U.S. interagency FSAT and ten training and technical assistance plans developed. 2. Some form of training and technical assistance delivered to fifteen of the nineteen countries (training in one of the five functional areas: legal framework, financial/regulatory, financial intelligence unit, prosecutorial/judicial, financial investigations).
	2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	CT finance capacity building is one mechanism for the U.S. to engage its allies to provide early warning, detection and interdiction of terrorist financing.
	Data Source	Embassy reporting, intelligence/law enforcement reporting, after-action reports, country assessments and international institution assessments.

Annual Performance Goal #3
COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE TO TERRORISM, INCLUDING BIOTERRORISM

I/P #7: Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST)

Provide U.S. Ambassadors with advice, assistance, and assessments concerning terrorism-related issues.

Input Indicator

Indicator #1: The Department's Ability to Respond to Terrorist Incidents and Exercise Its Lead Agency Responsibilities with the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST)

TARGETS	**FY 2006**	1. All FEST members can respond to Andrews AFB within 2 hours and are prepared to deploy within 4 hours to meet the National Security Council-directed FEST deployment criteria. 2. All FEST members are trained and organized to respond to Chiefs of Missions' ongoing counterterrorism (CT) requirements in support of the GWOT. (A tailored FEST structure, which is a smaller, task-organized team that does not normally deploy on a no-notice basis, would normally be used in this type of situation). 3. FEST and interagency players are fully integrated and participate in 2 of the Combatant Commanders' full-scale, National- and International-Level CT exercises. (2-4 exercises scheduled by DoD each year). 4. FEST and interagency players are fully integrated and participate in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-sponsored, no-notice CT exercise.
	FY 2005	1. Integrate and participate in 2 of the Combatant Commanders' full-scale, National- and International-Level CT exercises. (2-4 exercises scheduled by DoD each year). 2. Integrate and participate in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-sponsored, no-notice CT exercise. 3. Integrate and participate in the National Level Top Officials (TOPOFF) Exercise co-chaired by DHS and DOS.
RESULTS	2004	FEST participated in an abbreviated version of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff no-notice counterterrorist exercise. FEST participated in European Command's Level III counterterrorism exercise with Embassy Athens in preparation for the 2004 Olympic Games. In August, a tailored FEST deployed to Athens to assist the Embassy with counterterrorism support during the Summer Olympics.
	2003	FEST participated in Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff no-notice counterterrorist exercise. The Department participated in TOPOFF II. FEST participated in U.S. Pacific Command's counterterrorist exercise.
	2002	1. No exercises scheduled because of Operation Enduring Freedom. 2. Co-chaired the CSG Exercise Sub-Group and developed the next 18 month, National- and International-Level exercise schedule. 3. Finalized Exercise Sub-Group's Operating Charter.
	2001	FEST participated in two National- and International-level counterterrorist exercises and the CJCS-sponsored, no-notice counterterrorist exercise.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Four hour no-notice deployment exercises ensure the President and Secretary of State can quickly deploy U.S. response assets to an international terrorist incident if required. FEST exercises enhance readiness and provide a unique opportunity to develop and validate new operations-related CT policies and procedures.
	Data Source	Embassy reporting and Department of Defense Combatant Command and interagency after-action reports.

I/P #8: Terrorist Financing Assistance Initiative

Support the Counterterrorist Finance Initiatives of the G-7 Financial Action Task Force.

Output Indicator

Indicator #2: Number of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Members Evaluated; if Approved, Number of Evaluations Successfully Conducted by the USG on Behalf of FATF

TARGETS	**FY 2006**	1. Evaluate twelve FATF members against the Eight Special Recommendations. 2. Evaluate four non-FATF members against the Eight Special Recommendations. 3. Complete studies on cash couriers, non-governmental organizations and alternative remittance systems.
	FY 2005	1. Develop comprehensive anti-money laundering regimes in 5 TF priority countries designated in FY 2002. 2. Provide training to all 2003 designated TF priority countries. 3. Four FATF members are evaluated against the FATF Eight Special Recommendations. FATF agrees to study terrorist financing through non-governmental organizations, cash couriers and alternative remittance systems (ARS).
RESULTS	**2004**	1. Two Training and Technical Assistance Evaluations of Non-FATF Members (Morocco and UAE) were conducted with U.S. participation on behalf of the FATF. 2. FATF conducted a Terrorist financing typology (study) of the use of non-governmental organizations, cash couriers and alternative remittance systems. 3. Ten FATF members completed self-assessments on their non-governmental organization sectors. 4. As a result of these accomplishments, the FATF issued a new "Terrorist Financing Special Recommendation 9" on cash couriers.
	2003	The U.S. government (USG) conducted in-country assessments of 6 of the 19 priority countries most heavily involved in funding al-Qaeda and conducted a tabletop assessment of 1 priority country. The USG provided technical assistance to 15 of the 19 priority countries, with 3 of these countries receiving technical assistance in at least 3 of the 5 functional areas.
	2002	Baseline: USG assessed institutional/legal deficiencies on nine of the nineteen priority countries most heavily involved in funding al-Qaeda. The USG provided technical assistance to two of these countries.
	2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Completed evaluations increase capabilities of FATF members to effectively detect, deter and seize financial accounts and records associated with terrorist activities and organizations; thus, U.S interests at home and abroad are safer from the threat of terrorism.
	Data Source	Embassy reporting, intelligence/law enforcement reporting, after-action reports, country assessments and international institution assessments.

I/P #9: Frontline States in the Global War on Terrorism

Terrorism is eliminated and prevented in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #3: Capacity of the Afghan National Army to Defend the Credibly Elected Afghan Government and Its Territory from External and Internal Threats

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	1. Afghan National Army (ANA) units conduct routine operational deployments throughout Afghanistan as needed; continued fielding of regional corps with at least one brigade at each location. 2. Ministry of Defense (MOD) and General Staff (GS) assumes, with limited international community support, policy, planning, budget and operational responsibilities; institutional training base completed; functional commands provide increasing support for regional commands. Ministry of defense personnel reform process complete; includes ethnically balanced and increasingly professional staff. 3. Afghan National Police, Highway Patrol and Border Police are increasingly capable of enforcing law and securing transportation routes and borders. All Border Police brigades have undergone training and been provided with individual and basic unit equipment.
	FY 2005	1. ANA presence, influence and capability continue to grow in Kabul. 2. Border command, MOD and GS continue to develop capability for managing ongoing operations. 15-25 trainers assigned to each battalion to develop U.S. training and operational standards. Additional trainers assigned to help develop an ANA training base. 3. Ministry of Interior reform/restructuring completed by June. 4. Continue disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of regional militias. Some members join ANA. 5. MOD and GS begin to manage their own policy, planning, budget and operations. 6. Central Corps units conduct operational deployments to remaining provinces, as well as routine operational deployments in provinces named in FY 2004 target. 7. Barracks, headquarters, ranges and unit facilities constructed for 12 new infantry battalions and 6 new CS and CSS battalions; 18 new battalions operational and mobile.

RESULTS	2004	1.	Coalition training of ANA continued successfully and on target. Phase I of ANA training was completed. The ANA Central Corps stood at over 100% strength at end of FY 2004 and core facilities were complete, with all Kabul garrison facilities on track for completion 1st quarter FY 2005.
		2.	Fielding of equipment for the ANA was ongoing, though infrastructure cost increases reduced equipment buys.
		3.	Ministry of Defense reform occurred on track. A reformed MOD/GS was functioning with new multi-ethnic tier I and II leadership; Tier III staff had been selected and was being trained.
		4.	Deployment of ANA was successful. Eight battalions (kandaks) were deployed in 15 provinces for OEF and internal stability operations, contributing to OEF operations to quell factional fighting in the north and west, and quell insurgents in the south and east. By end 2004, the ANA had deployed to Paktiya, Nangarhar, Balkh, Ghowr, Kandahar, Kunduz, Herat, Helmand, Faryab, Paktika, Uruzgan, Zabol, Kabul, Wardak, and Badghis provinces. No security requirements existed for Bamiyan (central) and Kunduz (northeast), although the ANA has conducted training missions in Bamiyan.
	2003	1.	The coalition continued to train ANA battalions, graduating the 11th Battalion on October 1, 2003. Afghan non-commissioned officers were gradually taking over aspects of the training. Two brigades were activated in March, and these units, augmented by the addition of a third brigade, were organized as the Central Corps on September 1, 2003. Elements of the ANA began operations in February, and in July six companies, numbering approximately 1,000 soldiers, participated in the ANA's first major operation (Operation Warrior Sweep) in southeastern Afghanistan. By October, ANA strength reached approximately 6,000 men in 11 battalions.
		2.	The ANA continued to face challenges in recruiting, desertions, and maintaining a balance among the competing ethnic groups. Warlord support remained questionable, although militias were gradually turning in their weapons to the central government.
	2002	1.	U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) drove the Taliban from power and began to destroy the country's terrorist networks.
		2.	The Bonn agreement requested international assistance to build an ANA to achieve internal security, extend the central Government's authority and prevent the regrouping of Taliban, al-Qaeda or other potential terrorist organizations or operations.
		3.	Initial planning to create the ANA began in December 2001 followed by a February 2002 assessment; U.S. Special Forces soldiers began training in early May 2002.
		4.	Three kanaks (battalions) completed basic training at the Kabul Military Training Center and one began training. However, none were fully equipped nor completed the full training due to lack of weapons, munitions and demined training sites. Other challenges included lack of warlord support, recruiting difficulties, and funding. No Border Guard battalions were trained.
		5.	France, UK, and Romania made the only international pledges and donations of cash, training and military equipment.
	2001	1.	In early 2001, the Taliban controlled approximately 80% of Afghanistan.
		2.	The country was fractured into regional fiefdoms controlled by leaders with personal militias.
		3.	Significant presence and influence of al-Qaeda and other terrorist elements.
		4.	9/11 terrorist attacks led to U.S. resolve to disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation		The training and deployment of, and expansion of influence by, the ANA indicates progress towards establishing sustainable security in Afghanistan, without which the war on terrorism will not succeed.
	Data Source		Embassy reporting, intelligence/law enforcement reporting, Department of Defense Combatant Command after-action reports and country assessments.

I/P #10: Top Officials Exercise (TOPOFF)

Ensure that the United States government is prepared to handle the foreign policy implications of major domestic terrorist incidents.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #4: The Department's Ability to Provide the International Component to the DHS Top Officials National Exercise Plan

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	Develop international component of the National Exercise Plan for the fourth major Top Officials Exercise (TOPOFF IV) to be conducted in April/May of 2007.
	FY 2005	The Department's Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) participates with DHS in the third Top Officials Exercise (TOPOFF III) in April of 2005.

RESULTS		
	2004	S/CT coordinated the award of an Inter Agency Agreement with another U.S. government agency to obtain the services of a consulting firm working under an existing GSA contract. S/CT worked with the consultant to develop the international component of the TOPOFF III National Exercise Plan that will become part of the overall exercise plan being developed by the Department of Homeland Security.
	2003	S/CT co-directs with DHS the second Top Officials Exercise (TOPOFF II) in May 2003, the largest domestic counterterrorism exercise ever conducted and the first major effort of this kind for the newly established Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
	2002-2001	N/A

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	These exercises increase the capabilities of the various U.S government agencies, foreign partners and local law enforcement communities to effectively detect, deter, and defend against domestic terrorist events.
	Data Source	DHS after-exercise and lessons learned reports.

I/P #11: Bioterrorism Response

Effectively contain and mitigate the consequences of international bioterrorism attacks.

Input Indicator

Indicator #5: Status of the Global Health Security Action Group (GHSAG)

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	Strengthened ability to offer GHSAG strategies, methodologies, and other products in interested countries, and to broaden international preparation and responsiveness.
	FY 2005	GHSAG develops "lessons learned" and strategies for sharing with countries outside of GHSAG. GHSAG lab network develops safe and secure transport protocols, ensures that biosafety procedures are in place at all GHSAG labs, and promotes voluntary adoption of improved standards. GHSAG implements bioterrorism-related training programs and simulations for both GHSAG and non-GHSAG members. GHSAG develops rapid response methodologies for preventing and responding to bioterrorism.

RESULTS		
	2004	GHSAG conducted a workshop on the transportation of infectious substances (participants included ICAO, IATA, and the UN Subcommittee of Experts on the Transportation of Dangerous Goods); implemented a workshop to evaluate the effectiveness of anthrax detection assays; created an around-the-clock Emergency Contact Network and protocol for emergency communications; hosted a workshop that assessed the use of anti-viral drug strategies, their impact and cost effectiveness and related research gaps in preparedness and response for pandemic influenza; and, hosted a workshop on field epidemiology, including outbreak investigation.
	2003	GHSAG formed technical working groups. In December 2002, GHSAG formed a new technical working group on Pandemic influenza. During the GHSAG working meeting in September 2003 in Ottawa, GHSAG members decided to add SARS to the topic of the Influenza technical working group. GHSAG has tested Incident Scale. GHSAG members were prepared to submit Terms of Reference.
	2002	General terms of reference for the GHSAG creation of a pharmaceutical and biotech industry anti-terrorism code of conduct were developed.
	2001	Baseline: The U.S., Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, and the United Kingdom form GHSAG for cooperative, international efforts to counter bioterrorism.

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	GHSAG is an important component of U.S. strategy to strengthen international cooperation to combat bioterrorism.
	Data Source	GHSAG Secretariat supplemented by embassy and the Department's Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, and Office of International Health Affairs reporting.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #6: Status of National and Global Reserves of Medical Countermeasures for International Use in Responding to Bioterrorism

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	1. Private industry and international community support creation of global reserves of medical countermeasures. 2. Multilateral organizations (e.g., APEC, G-8, GHSAG) advocate both national and international stockpiles. 3. Continue bilateral discussions for mutual assistance to share medical countermeasures in response to bioterrorism. 4. U.S. mechanism(s) identified for creation and management of a U.S. international stockpile of medical countermeasures for responding to emergency foreign requests.
	FY 2005	1. Initiate bilateral discussions about mutual assistance agreements for sharing of medical countermeasures in response to bioterrorism. 2. Initiate bilateral discussion to encourage key countries to develop national stockpiles for sharing of medical countermeasures. 3. Begin discussions with the World Health Organization (WHO) or another international organization to develop global reserve of medical countermeasures other than smallpox vaccine. 4. Establish U.S. standard operating procedures for fielding foreign emergency requests for medical countermeasures.

RESULTS		
	2004	The U.S. announced a contribution of 20 million doses of smallpox vaccine to the WHO Global Smallpox Vaccine Reserve. WHO developed a framework for the Global Smallpox Vaccine Reserve, articulating in particular the legal and liability issues for countries wishing to contribute. This framework marks an important milestone in facilitating country support for the reserve. France announced a contribution of 5,000,000 doses of smallpox vaccine for the reserve.
	2003	Baseline: 1. WHO had very limited reserve of smallpox vaccine. 2. Few countries had sufficient stockpiles to respond to bioterrorism attack. 3. No countries had reserves for use to respond to international requests.
	2002-2001	N/A

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	National and international stockpiles of medical countermeasures will help mitigate the consequences of an international bioterrorism attack.
	Data Source	Information provided by WHO will be verified by U.S. government personnel working with WHO on the global reserve.

I/P #12: Reduction and Security of MANPADS

Reduce the number of excess, loosely secured and obsolete MANPADS worldwide through destruction, security, and production reduction efforts.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #7: Number of Foreign Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) Reduced as a Result of Implementation of International Commitments

TARGETS	FY 2006	7,000
	FY 2005	<u>Baseline</u>: 7,000

RESULTS	2004	8,500
	2003	4,500
	2002-2001	N/A

DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator measures the impact of the implementation of commitments by foreign nations on the reduction and security of MANPADs.
	Data Source	Implementing partners, and embassy and the Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement staff who witness the destructions.

Annual Performance Goal #4
DIMINISHED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS THAT PERMIT TERRORISM TO FLOURISH

I/P #13: Diminish Potential Underlying Conditions of Terrorism in Iraq

Ensure that both public and private institutions are developed and strengthened to be able to prevent the reoccurrence of terrorist infiltration.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #1: Level of Economic Aid to Iraq

TARGETS	**FY 2006**	Consistent with the United States' National Counterterrorism Strategy, USAID is actively supporting the U.S. Government-wide interagency process of developing and implementing Regional Action Plans for at-risk states and regions to diminish the underlying conditions exploited by terrorist organizations. Given the current state of affairs in Iraq, it would be inappropriate for USAID to set targets in these areas prematurely, as this would also circumvent the on-going interagency process. Targets for this indicator will be established in the future, when the outcome of the interagency process becomes clearer.
	FY 2005	Consistent with the United States' National Counterterrorism Strategy, USAID is actively supporting the U.S. Government-wide interagency process of developing and implementing Regional Action Plans for at-risk states and regions to diminish the underlying conditions exploited by terrorist organizations. Given the current state of affairs in Iraq, it would be inappropriate for USAID to set targets in these areas prematurely, as this would also circumvent the on-going interagency process. Targets for this indicator will be established in the future, when the outcome of the interagency process becomes clearer.
RESULTS	**2004**	Thirty-eight individual countries pledged in Madrid, plus the European Community (EC), World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a total of 41 countries/organizations Total pledged for 2004-2007 from non-U.S. donors at Madrid totaled over $8 billion from donor governments including loan assistance (e.g., Japan pledged $5 billion of which $3.5 billion was in the form of concessional lending), and another $5.5 billion in potential lending from the World Bank and the IMF. OTI/Iraq Provided 25 grants to support women's centers in Iraq Provided 84 grants to support schools Provided 10 grants to rehabilitate clinics Provided 12 grants to rehabilitate libraries Provided 20 grants to support youth centers The OTI Iraq program did 1524 small grants for $114 million dollars in FY 2004. $3.3 billion in U.S aid fixed schools, vaccinated millions of children, restored electricity, and created Iraq's first democratic councils.
	2003	Baseline: N/A (New Indicator for FY 2004)
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator will measure U.S. government (USG) efforts to encourage the international community to share in the costs of reconstructing and rehabilitating Iraq; as well as demonstrating to citizens the commitment of the USG and the international community to improve the welfare of all Iraqis.
	Data Source	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/DAC database.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #2: Progress of Alternative Education System Establishment in Iraq

TARGETS	FY 2006	Consistent with the United States' National Counterterrorism Strategy, USAID is actively supporting the U.S. Government-wide interagency process of developing and implementing Regional Action Plans for at-risk states and regions to diminish the underlying conditions exploited by terrorist organizations. Given the current state of affairs in Iraq, it would be inappropriate for USAID to set targets in these areas prematurely, as this would also circumvent the on-going interagency process. Targets for this indicator will be established in the future, when the outcome of the interagency process becomes clearer.
	FY 2005	Consistent with the United States' National Counterterrorism Strategy, USAID is actively supporting the U.S. Government-wide interagency process of developing and implementing Regional Action Plans for at-risk states and regions to diminish the underlying conditions exploited by terrorist organizations. Given the current state of affairs in Iraq, it would be inappropriate for USAID to set targets in these areas prematurely, as this would also circumvent the on-going interagency process. Targets for this indicator will be established in the future, when the outcome of the interagency process becomes clearer.
RESULTS	2004	2,405 schools rehabilitated or built. Over 33,000 secondary school teachers and administration staff trained. Over 8.7 million textbooks printed and distributed.
	2003	Baselines: 1. 2,358 schools rehabilitated or built. 2. Over 32,000 secondary school teachers and administration staff trained. 3. Over 8 million textbooks printed and distributed.
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator will measure the efforts to support peaceful and democratic community revitalization at the grassroots levels; as well as demonstrating to citizens the effectiveness and benefits of democratic participation in decision-making.
	Data Source	USAID Annual Reporting process and ANE Bureau contributions.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #3: Extent of Expanded Economic Opportunity in Iraq

| TARGETS | FY 2006 | Consistent with the United States' National Counterterrorism Strategy, USAID is actively supporting the U.S. Government-wide interagency process of developing and implementing Regional Action Plans for at-risk states and regions to diminish the underlying conditions exploited by terrorist organizations. Given the current state of affairs in Iraq, it would be inappropriate for USAID to set targets in these areas prematurely, as this would also circumvent the on-going interagency process. Targets for this indicator will be established in the future, when the outcome of the interagency process becomes clearer. |
| | FY 2005 | Consistent with the United States' National Counterterrorism Strategy, USAID is actively supporting the U.S. Government-wide interagency process of developing and implementing Regional Action Plans for at-risk states and regions to diminish the underlying conditions exploited by terrorist organizations. Given the current state of affairs in Iraq, it would be inappropriate for USAID to set targets in these areas prematurely, as this would also circumvent the on-going interagency process. Targets for this indicator will be established in the future, when the outcome of the interagency process becomes clearer. |

RESULTS	2004	1. Developed 10 laws and/or regulations processes relating to private sector development. 2. Implemented Financial Management Information System (FMIS) at Ministry of Finance; implementation in progress at six key Ministries.
	2003	With the Ministry of Finance, the new national currency, the Iraqi dinar, was introduced.
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator will measure USAID's efforts to create jobs and support to strengthen overall trade, investment, and enterprise growth programs throughout the country. This will help support stability and security.
	Data Source	USAID field mission annual reports; other USAID reports; the USAID Iraq Database.

Outcome Indicator		
Indicator #4: Progress of Local Governance Establishment in Iraq		
TARGETS	FY 2006	Consistent with the United States' National Counterterrorism Strategy, USAID is actively supporting the U.S. Government-wide interagency process of developing and implementing Regional Action Plans for at-risk states and regions to diminish the underlying conditions exploited by terrorist organizations. Given the current state of affairs in Iraq, it would be inappropriate for USAID to set targets in these areas prematurely, as this would also circumvent the on-going interagency process. Targets for this indicator will be established in the future, when the outcome of the interagency process becomes clearer.
	FY 2005	Consistent with the United States' National Counterterrorism Strategy, USAID is actively supporting the U.S. Government-wide interagency process of developing and implementing Regional Action Plans for at-risk states and regions to diminish the underlying conditions exploited by terrorist organizations. Given the current state of affairs in Iraq, it would be inappropriate for USAID to set targets in these areas prematurely, as this would also circumvent the on-going interagency process. Targets for this indicator will be established in the future, when the outcome of the interagency process becomes clearer.
RESULTS	2004	Ninety-five percent of districts with local governance established.
	2003	<u>Baseline</u>: Ninety percent of districts with local governance established.
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This will measure progress made in establishing good governance at the local and national levels. In order to local governance to be established, community members must be engaged and active participants, and national government structures must support local decision-making.
	Data Source	USAID annual reports from operating units; other USAID reports; the USAID Iraq Database.

I/P #14: Diminish Potential Underlying Conditions of Terrorism in Afghanistan

Ensure that both public and private institutions are developed and strengthened to be able to prevent the reoccurrence of terrorist infiltration.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #5: Moderate Government Strength in Afghanistan

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	Consistent with the United States' National Counterterrorism Strategy, USAID is actively supporting the U.S. Government-wide interagency process of developing and implementing Regional Action Plans for at-risk states and regions to diminish the underlying conditions exploited by terrorist organizations. Given the current state of affairs in Afghanistan, it would be inappropriate for USAID to set targets in these areas prematurely, as this would also circumvent the on-going interagency process. Targets for this indicator will be established in the future, when the outcome of the interagency process becomes clearer.
	FY 2005	Consistent with the United States' National Counterterrorism Strategy, USAID is actively supporting the U.S. Government-wide interagency process of developing and implementing Regional Action Plans for at-risk states and regions to diminish the underlying conditions exploited by terrorist organizations. Given the current state of affairs in Afghanistan, it would be inappropriate for USAID to set targets in these areas prematurely, as this would also circumvent the on-going interagency process. Targets for this indicator will be established in the future, when the outcome of the interagency process becomes clearer.

RESULTS		
	2004	1. USAID provided critical assistance for December's Loya Jirga, which led to ratification of the constitution; supported for the September 2004 elections. 2. Seven judicial facilities built/rehabilitated. 3. 443 judicial experts trained. 4. 10.5 million people registered to vote; approximately 95 percent of eligible voters registered to vote, although it is difficult to know exact percentage because there are no reliable demographic figures for Afghanistan.
	2003	N/A
	2002-2001	N/A

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	The establishment of a stable and moderate government in Iraq is critical to eliminating safe havens for terrorists.
	Data Source	USAID field reports and assessments.

		Outcome Indicator
		Indicator #6: Progress of Rural Economic Opportunity Expansion in Afghanistan
TARGETS	FY 2006	Consistent with the United States' National Counterterrorism Strategy, USAID is actively supporting the U.S. Government-wide interagency process of developing and implementing Regional Action Plans for at-risk states and regions to diminish the underlying conditions exploited by terrorist organizations. Given the current state of affairs in Afghanistan, it would be inappropriate for USAID to set targets in these areas prematurely, as this would also circumvent the on-going interagency process. Targets for this indicator will be established in the future, when the outcome of the interagency process becomes clearer.
	FY 2005	Consistent with the United States' National Counterterrorism Strategy, USAID is actively supporting the U.S. Government-wide interagency process of developing and implementing Regional Action Plans for at-risk states and regions to diminish the underlying conditions exploited by terrorist organizations. Given the current state of affairs in Afghanistan, it would be inappropriate for USAID to set targets in these areas prematurely, as this would also circumvent the on-going interagency process. Targets for this indicator will be established in the future, when the outcome of the interagency process becomes clearer.
RESULTS	2004	1. 567,806 (cumulative) farmers served by extension through USAID assistance. 2. 310,500 (cumulative) hectares received improved irrigation through USAID assistance. 3. 8,400 (cumulative) microfinance loans disbursed totaling $1.26 million.
	2003	1. 100,000 (cum.) farmers served by extension through USAID assistance. 2. 8,000 irrigation/ water works projects completed.
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator will measure USAID's efforts to create jobs and support to strengthen overall rural growth programs throughout the country. This will help support stability and security.
	Data Source	TBD through AIOG metrics process.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #7: Rehabilitation Status of Afghan Educational Infrastructure

TARGETS	**FY 2006**	Consistent with the United States' National Counterterrorism Strategy, USAID is actively supporting the U.S. Government-wide interagency process of developing and implementing Regional Action Plans for at-risk states and regions to diminish the underlying conditions exploited by terrorist organizations. Given the current state of affairs in Afghanistan, it would be inappropriate for USAID to set targets in these areas prematurely, as this would also circumvent the on-going interagency process. Targets for this indicator will be established in the future, when the outcome of the interagency process becomes clearer.
	FY 2005	Consistent with the United States' National Counterterrorism Strategy, USAID is actively supporting the U.S. Government-wide interagency process of developing and implementing Regional Action Plans for at-risk states and regions to diminish the underlying conditions exploited by terrorist organizations. Given the current state of affairs in Afghanistan, it would be inappropriate for USAID to set targets in these areas prematurely, as this would also circumvent the on-going interagency process. Targets for this indicator will be established in the future, when the outcome of the interagency process becomes clearer.
RESULTS	**2004**	1. 81 – Number of schools built or rehabilitated in 2004 through USAID assistance. 2. 169,716 – Students enrolled/ trained (in three provinces) through USAID assistance. 3. 35,819 – Number of teachers trained in 2004 through USAID assistance. 4. 8.7 Million – textbooks printed/ distributed through USAID assistance.
	2003	Baselines: 1. 188 schools rehabilitated/built through USAID assistance. 2. 15,282 students enrolled/trained (in 3 provinces) through USAID assistance. 3. 7,900 teachers trained through USAID assistance. 4. 10.3 million textbooks printed/ distributed through USAID assistance.
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator will measure the efforts to build or rehabilitate Afghanistan's education system, with a focus on providing support to secular schools and education; as well as promote democratic values through education in Frontline states.
	Data Source	USAID annual reports from operating units; other USAID reports; the USAID Afghanistan Database.

I/P #15: Diminish Conditions Exploited by Terrorist Recruitment in Other Frontline States

Policies, programs, and activities establish attractive alternatives to terrorist indoctrination and recruitment.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #8: Extent of Support for Alternative Education Systems

TARGETS	FY 2006	1. 5,160,409 students enrolled in secular basic education programs in schools (disaggregated by type of school, e.g. madras, other). 2. 12,157 students graduating from vocational training programs.
	FY 2005	1. 4,792,618 students enrolled in secular basic education programs in schools. 2. 12,701 students graduating from vocational training programs.
RESULTS	2004	1. 4,343,994 students enrolled in secular basic education programs in schools. 2. 14,196 students graduating from vocational training programs.
	2003-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator will measure the efforts to support alternatives to radical schools; as well as promote democratic values in Frontline states.
	Data Source	USAID annual reports from operating units; other USAID reports.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #9: Progress of Civilian Livelihood Opportunities Expansion

TARGETS	FY 2006	826,898 jobs created through USAID-funded works projects.
	FY 2005	743,155 jobs created through USAID-funded works projects.
RESULTS	2004	674,434 jobs created through USAID-funded works projects.
	2003-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator will measure USAID's efforts to create jobs and support to strengthen overall economic growth programs throughout Frontline countries. As well, it will measure USAID efforts to reintegrate former combatants back into civilian livelihoods. This will help support stability and security.
	Data Source	USAID annual reports from operating units; other USAID reports.

I/P #16: Diminish Conditions Exploited for Terrorist Sanctuary in Other Frontline States

Policies, programs, and activities promote responsive and transparent governance to diminish opportunities for terrorist establishing sanctuary.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #10: Progress of Stable and Moderate Governments Establishment

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	1. 18,756 targeted communities engaged in effective participatory decision-making. 2. 15,396 community-identified activities completed through community participation (e.g., rehabilitate roads, build markets, build playgrounds, etc.)
	FY 2005	1. 17,804 targeted communities engaged in effective participatory decision-making. 2. 11,346 community-identified activities completed through community participation.

RESULTS		
	2004	1. 17,207 targeted communities engaged in effective participatory decision-making. 2. 14,933 community-identified activities completed through community participation. In Sierra Leone, 144 community organizations effectively managed and implemented self-selected development projects, like the Yengema carpentry project; 34 high-impact infrastructure projects were completed. In Uganda, 3,585 formerly abducted children were assisted with psycho-social rehabilitation and reintegration, of whom 1,796 are not enrolled in school or vocational training exceeding the target of 495. On both sides of the Kenya/Somali border, pastoral groups have always resorted to violence to resolve water disputes, one of the root causes of conflict in this volatile region. During the past three years, USAID has funded private agencies working together (PACT) to work with the Wajir South Development Association (WASDA) to reduce conflict by improving water sources through drilling bore holes, building dams, and assisting groups to negotiate joint use and management agreements for water points. WASDA has also helped establish Peace Committees that monitor the level of tension in communities and harmonize the needs of neighborhoods. As a result, communities in the region are experiencing peace for the first time, food security has improved, and small businesses flourished. Asia and Near East (ANE) region: With other donors, USAID has worked with hundreds of communities on thousands of small-scale activities in Afghanistan, including constructing wells, local roads, and market centers. Exact number of activities not currently available.
	2003-2001	N/A

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	This will measure progress made in establishing good governance at the local and community levels. The more that community decisions are made through participatory and transparent means, the less terrorist groups and shadow governance groups will be able to successfully offer viable alternatives.
	Data Source	USAID annual reports from operating units; other USAID reports.

V. Illustrative Examples of FY 2004 Achievements

Counterterrorism	
Afghan National Army (ANA)	Approximately 10,000 soldiers in 15 battalions of the ANA are now operational. Over 4,000 soldiers were deployed throughout Afghanistan to support elections security, stability operations and counter-insurgency operations.
Terrorist Interdiction Program	During FY 2004, the number of countries cooperating with the United States in conducting effective terrorist watch listing at key ports of entry continued to expand beyond the 12 that were partners in FY 2003, with six additional countries indicating their interest in, and willingness to participate in the program. Initial or expanded deployments of the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) watch listing system were carried out in five countries in FY 2004. In some countries, the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP)/PISCES program has served as the cornerstone of the U.S. mission's counterterrorism relationship with the host government and, as a result, has fostered increased counterterrorism cooperation and action on the part of that government.
"3+1" Counterterrorism Dialogue	Measured diplomatic CT engagement with Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay has led to the creation of the "3+1" Counterterrorism Dialogue including the U.S. The grouping serves to maintain the goals of the war on terrorism as a priority issue among participating states and as an avenue for mutual CT capacity-building efforts. The United States has already delivered regional CT finance seminars in Paraguay and Panama to strengthen regional abilities to identify suspicious financial activity and to take appropriate action.
USAID Counterterrorism Strategy	USAID's strategy is to deny recruits from terrorist organizations by offering better alternatives, such as basic education vs. radical madrasas, and skills training vs. unemployment. USAID targets areas where terrorist recruiting conditions are the strongest: large Muslim communities, relatively poor communities, areas characterized by high youth unemployment, and where there are large pockets of disaffected groups. USAID works on the frontlines of many countries hardest hit by terrorism by increasing public services and stability, and helping to establish good governance, the rule of law and administration of justice, conflict mitigation, and public communication. An excellent example of USAID's efforts in the area of public communication includes conducting a full day seminar for press correspondents. Participants included representatives from Al-Ahram; Algerian Press Services; Saudi Press Agency; Kuwait News Agency and Annahar. Also attending were journalists representing leading Arab-American publications, community newspapers and Arab correspondents. "USAID's new public diplomacy initiative is committed to presenting a more accurate image of America to the greater Middle East, and promoting a better understanding of the policy goals of Presidential Initiatives and the mission of USAID," says Director, Walid Maalouf.
Muslim Mindanao	The Alliance for Mindanao Off-Grid Renewable Energy (AMORE) provides solar-powered compact fluorescent lights and street lamps in the southern Philippines. By allowing work and study to extend into the evening hours, AMORE is helping to increase business and educational opportunities in a region where extreme lack of development has contributed to a rise in recruitment by militant and international terrorist groups. AMORE joins USAID with the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, Mirant Philippines Corporation, and Philippine Department of Energy, who together contributed $3.7 million to augment USAID's $2.4 million of funding. Together, the alliance partners have established sustainable, renewable solar energy and micro-hydro systems in at least 160 remote rural communities, serving 5,000 homes.

VI. Resource Detail

Table 1: State Appropriations by Bureau ($ Thousands)

Bureau	FY 2004 Actual	FY 2005 Estimate	FY 2006 Request
European and Eurasian Affairs	$57,782	$58,126	$56,895
Near Eastern Affairs	23,580	24,024	33,578
East Asian and Pacific Affairs	27,279	27,993	29,115
African Affairs	22,837	24,966	23,468
Other Bureaus	45,069	46,009	48,332
Total State Appropriations	**$176,547**	**$181,118**	**$191,388**

Table 2: Foreign Operations by Account ($ Thousands)

Title/Accounts	FY 2004 Actual	FY 2005 Estimate	FY 2006 Request
Title I – Export and Investment Assistance			
Export-Import Bank			
Overseas Private Investment Corporation			
Trade and Development Agency			
Title II – Bilateral Economic Assistance			
USAID	120,647	26,945	7,499
Global HIV/AIDS Initiative			
Other Bilateral Economic Assistance	52,273	38,925	41,060
Independent Agencies			
Department of State	149,634	137,144	189,941
Department of Treasury			
Conflict Response Fund			
Millennium Challenge Account			
Title III – Military Assistance			
International Military Education and Training	7,770	12,127	11,598
Foreign Military Financing	577,737	943,464	1,007,443
Peacekeeping Operations	53,000	67,483	74,404
Title IV – Multilateral Economic Assistance			
International Development Association			
International Financial Institutions			
International Organizations and Programs	994	1,091	1,350
Total Foreign Operations	**$962,055**	**$1,227,179**	**$1,333,295**

	FY 2004 Actual	FY 2005 Estimate	FY 2006 Request
Grand Total	**$1,138,602**	**$1,408,297**	**$1,524,683**