Reform of the United Nations

During 1999, UN Secretary General Annan continued to move forward with his program of administrative and budgetary reforms. The 2000–2001 UN budget came in at virtually the same level as the initial budget approved for the previous biennium, 1998–1999; administrative overhead costs were steadily reduced; and the Office of Internal Oversight Services identified millions of dollars in cost savings.

Many of the Secretary General’s “Track One” and “Track Two” reforms were implemented, improving the efficiency of UN activities in the areas of development, humanitarian relief, human rights, and peacekeeping. By the end of 1999, however, the General Assembly had not yet acted on some other recommendations put forward by the Secretary General that are priorities for the United States: results–based budgeting, which uses performance indicators to assess progress toward specific objectives, and sunset provisions for new UN programs. The United States continues to press for implementation of these measures.

Apart from these efforts, discussions continued on reforming peacekeeping operations and possibly expanding the Security Council to 20 or 21 members, including permanent seats for Germany and Japan.

Secretary General’s Reform Initiatives

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan incorporated many U.S. ideas on improving UN economic and social institutions, activities, and programs into his two 1997 reform packages (“Track One” and “Track Two” reforms). The United States worked to generate member state support for their prompt implementation. In December 1997, the General Assembly adopted the Track One measures and most of the Track Two recommendations by consensus.

Track One In March 1997, the Secretary General announced ten administrative, budgetary, managerial, and personnel reforms that he could undertake on his own authority. The budget of the United Nations has remained essentially flat for several years; over 900 personnel positions have been abolished within the United Nations; a Code of Conduct has been adopted; and administrative costs are being reduced.
Track Two In July 1997, the Secretary General proposed a more comprehensive set of reforms which streamlined some departments; improved administrative activities; and effected major improvements in development, humanitarian relief, human rights, and peacekeeping activities. Key measures in effect include creating a Deputy Secretary General position; adopting a cabinet–style management structure that brings together senior officials responsible for core UN functions; enhancing coordination of UN development activities at headquarters and in the field; improving delivery of humanitarian assistance; and integrating human rights concerns throughout all UN activities.

U.S. View Overall, the United States supports the Secretary General’s proposals as a major contribution to the ongoing UN reform process. Action is still needed on two Track Two management proposals: results–based budgeting, which focuses on expected results by using performance indicators to measure achievement of those results, and sunset provisions for new UN programs. Getting these provisions implemented will be a top U.S. reform priority for the 55th General Assembly.

Reforms in International Organizations: UN Headquarters

As approved by the General Assembly in December 1999, the UN budget for 2000–2001 amounts to $2,535.7 million and reflects a nominal increase of 0.1 percent over the target level for zero nominal growth ($2,533.0 million). The United States disassociated from, but did not block, the consensus adoption of the 2000–2001 budget. As approved, the budget is well below the Secretary General’s request of $2,655.0 million, which if adopted would have represented a nominal increase of 4.8 percent. The approved 2000–2001 UN budget continues the trend of essentially straight–line budgets since the mid–1990s.

I. Maintenance of Budget Levels

Under UN procedure, UN budget levels are revised annually to take account of updated rates of exchange and inflation, as well as other factors that affect budgeted appropriations, e.g., changes in staff vacancy rates, or decisions taken by UN governing bodies. The revised budget levels must be approved by the General Assembly. It has been the practice of the General Assembly to take such decisions by consensus. The United Nations can expend funds only up to the level authorized by the General Assembly, and it does not have the authority to borrow externally.

II. Program Evaluation and Sunset Procedures

During 1999, the UN’s Central Evaluation Unit conducted its normal evaluations of management in several program areas. In addition, the General Assembly and the Secretariat took steps to require managers to evaluate programs in terms of their impact or progress toward objectives. For example, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that focused attention on Secretariat–wide implementation of the existing rules for pro-
gram evaluation, the principle that program objectives should be concrete and time–limited, and the need for information on program accomplishments and effectiveness. Accordingly, the Office of Internal Oversight Services notified managers that, for the 1998–1999 report, they must provide qualitative assessments of programs that include a summary of program objectives and outcomes, the criteria used to assess quality, and an evaluation of each program’s impact on clients or target groups.

Peacekeeping Reform

The phase–out of the Gratis Military Officer program at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was completed early in the year, hindering its capacity to plan for and initiate new operations. This shortcoming was particularly pronounced given the surge in UN Security Council–mandated peacekeeping operations and especially evident in the planning done for East Timor and Sierra Leone. Despite repeated requests from the United States and other member nations, the United Nations did not undertake a comprehensive review of peacekeeping organization and functions to identify core requirements and eliminate duplication of work with other Secretariat departments. Consequently, such a review remained a part of the U.S. strategy for addressing DPKO issues throughout the year.

It was a pivotal year for building consensus at the United Nations on the need for civilian police (CIVPOL) reform. A trend that had become increasingly apparent during the decade came sharply into focus as large policing operations were approved for UN missions in Kosovo and East Timor. The additional CIVPOL requirement from those two missions alone, over 6,000 personnel, overshadowed substantial gains in contributions of police made by member nations during 1999. Furthermore, conditions in Kosovo and East Timor changed the character of CIVPOL operations from that of simply monitoring to actual law enforcement, with an accompanying emphasis on establishing a functioning criminal justice system. At year’s end, it was clear that much greater acceleration was needed in building CIVPOL capacity within the international community.

In July, DPKO conducted a CIVPOL workshop to build on progress made during two conferences held in 1998. Representatives from 64 member states and several other organizations attended. The conferences in 1998 had called for improved quality among recruits, increased capacity in the UN CIVPOL Unit to plan for and manage operations, development of international standards for policing, and establishment of a standby mechanism to reduce response times. Advancements in these areas were highlighted during the 1999 workshop. These included the creation of a standby system, replacement of the five gratis officers in the CIVPOL Unit with five permanent hires, and development of an International Civilian Police Planning Guide, authored by the United States and Argentina, to aid police commissioners in establishing new missions.

These steps toward improvement were put to the test, however, as worldwide demand for CIVPOL expanded. Despite systemic improve-
ments and notable gains in recruiting. UN missions depending on CIVPOL encountered chronic shortcomings such as insufficient planning capacity, delayed deployments, logistical problems, and severe personnel shortages. On a positive note, improvement in the overall quality of police was achieved, particularly in Kosovo, as a result of higher recruiting standards.

**Security Council Reform**

The United States supports a strengthened and expanded Security Council, including permanent seats for Germany and Japan. The United States is also willing to consider three new permanent seats for representatives from the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean. There should be no change in the status or privileges of the existing permanent members, and the integrity of the veto must remain intact.

During 1999, the General Assembly debated the reform and expansion of the Security Council extensively. The Open–Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council (OEWG) met for the sixth consecutive year but failed to reach consensus on a framework resolution. The OEWG will continue its deliberations.

In the General Assembly’s plenary debate on Security Council reform, the United States proposed that the future efforts of the OEWG might be more productive if they were redirected to include a thorough and analytical examination of proposals for an expanded Council of different sizes and compositions. Such analyses would focus primarily on the likely effectiveness of each Council structure. The United States expressed its willingness to be an active and engaged participant in that effort.

The United States views the strengthening of the Council as only one element in the larger process of strengthening the United Nations in its entirety. The United States will also continue its efforts to increase the overall efficiency of the United Nations, to limit its financial dependence on a small number of members, and to support the Secretary General’s ongoing reform efforts.