2015/INCLE-CBSI Activities - Summative Evaluation (Summary)

This report was prepared by DevTech Systems, Inc., at the request of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State. The evaluation was conducted by Dr. Jennifer Gauck, Chareen Stark, Hugo Navarro, Dr. Jim Jones and Virginia Lambert of DevTech Systems, Inc., with the assistance of Dr. Marlon Anatol, Dr. Mark Kirton and Dr. Dianne Williams of the University of the West Indies, Dr. Luis Dominguez of Evaluaciones Psicológicas Sistémicas, S.A., and Nia Nanan.

Cover photo: Focus group, Bahamas Department of Correctional Services, Nassau, The Bahamas

A SUMMATIVE EVALUATION OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (INCLE)-FUNDED CARIBBEAN BASIN SECURITY INITIATIVE (CBSI) ACTIVITIES

September 18, 2015

DISCLAIMER
The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the Department of State, or the United States Government.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The primary purpose of this evaluation is to evaluate progress relative to the goals of the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)-funded activities under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). The goals of CBSI are to reduce illicit trafficking, to advance public safety and security, and to promote social justice in 13 Caribbean countries: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Christopher and Nevis (hereafter “St. Kitts”), St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines (hereafter “St. Vincent”), Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.

While funding for CBSI is derived from five foreign assistance accounts,[1] the scope of this evaluation covers only International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)-funded activities implemented between 2010 and the present, primarily those falling under Development Objectives 1 and 2 of the CBSI Results Framework. Since 2010, CBSI INCLE funds have supported training, equipment provision, mentoring and other technical assistance to partner countries’ police forces, prisons, financial intelligence/investigation units (FIUs), directors of public prosecutions, and customs, among others.

This evaluation aims to provide INL decision-makers with information on the extent to which INL projects and activities have been implemented as intended, what problems or issues have arisen, and how programs might be modified to ensure successful implementation. It also examines, in broad terms, the return on investment for the INL interventions. Therefore, this evaluation is intended to serve as a management tool for INL staff in Washington and at INL Posts and Sections in the CBSI region.

This summative evaluation of the INL-funded CBSI activities builds on the formative evaluation of the same program completed by DevTech Systems, Inc. in October 2014.[2] It includes analysis of factors related to program implementation, examines questions related to impact and effectiveness relative to CBSI objectives, and return on investment. The 2014 evaluation was based on document review and interview/focus group data collected in seven countries (The Bahamas, Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts, and St. Vincent). The present evaluation utilizes these data in addition to comparable data collected in the remaining CBSI partner countries (Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago), and a cross-national survey that the Evaluation Team conducted in 2015 of a sample of direct beneficiaries of INL-funded activities in 12 of the 13 CBSI partner countries.[3]

During the first stage of fieldwork (February-August 2014), the Team conducted key informant interviews with INL Directors and staff, and with 20 United States government (USG) partner agencies in four INL Posts, as well as semi-structured interviews and/or focus group discussions with 331 individuals in a total of 100 interviews and focus groups with INL partner country institutions. The Team repeated this process during the second stage of data collection (January-March 2015) in Antigua, Dominica, Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago, including interviews with staff in each INL section and with representatives from USG partner agencies. The Team also met with 102 individuals included in 45 interviews and/or focus groups in INL partner country institutions. Therefore, the combined sample from the two years of fieldwork included a total of 145 meetings with 433 people.

The evaluation is organized around four clusters of evaluation questions focused on 1) the impact of INL assistance, 2) unintended consequences of the activities, 3) return on investment, and 4) lessons learned and best practices. The Evaluation Team deliberately clustered similar evaluation questions together. Therefore, findings, conclusions and recommendations should be understood as a response to the theme of each question cluster. The recommendations are listed by order of priority for WHP after the presentation of the conclusions and findings.[4]

Question 1: Impact and Attribution

(A) What impact (outcomes) has INL’s assistance had on the goals, objectives and results laid out in the CBSI Results Framework? (B) Has INL’s assistance promoted greater regional integration and coordination to address security in the Caribbean? (C) Does INL’s assistance alone explain the observed impacts, or did other factors contribute?

Conclusion: (A) Based on the survey data, INL’s assistance has had a positive impact on both individual and institutional outcomes, and (B) on regional integration and coordination. These positive effects can be linked to results and objectives laid out in the CBSI Results Framework. (C) Most outcomes at the individual and institutional levels can be explained by INL’s assistance, while outcomes at the country and regional levels are also affected by other factors, such as partner governments’ political will for reform. Lack of adequate monitoring data hinders INL’s efforts to link assistance directly to goals, objectives, and results.

Findings: (A) At the individual level, more than 90% (n=238) of survey respondents who received training said the training allowed them to be more efficient and effective in their work, while just under 90% (n=156) of respondents who received CBSI-funded equipment noted the same effect. Respondents also suggested that the training and equipment had a positive effect on their perception of their level of individual professionalism. Almost 80% of training recipients reported feeling more valued as professionals, and 72% of those with CBSI-sponsored equipment reported similar gains. For those who received training, 72% reported that CBSI assistance helped them advance professionally, as did 75% of those receiving equipment.

(B) Regionally, survey respondents reported a positive effect in terms of coordination and collaboration: 85% of training participants said that training facilitated the creation of informal networks of professionals, and that these networks enabled respondents to better perform their duties. Among Eastern Caribbean interviewees, a second reason cited for an increase in regional cooperation was the support provided by the Regional Security System (RSS). Joint training exercises held under the auspices of RSS over the years have contributed to the establishment of common standards of operation and increased regional cooperation.

(C) Linkages can also be made between INL’s assistance and indicators related to some of the other intended results in the CBSI Results Framework, although other factors also contribute to such results.

For example, from FY2010 to FY2014, INL obligated an estimated $53.56 million to counternarcotics programming, which supported training, mentoring and equipment provision aimed at reducing illicit trafficking (DO1).[5] The direct effect of this funding was improved operational capacity and information-sharing, which, in turn, likely contributed to an increase in the kilos of narcotics seized in the CBSI region between 2011 and 2013, from about 90,000 in 2011 to nearly 340,000 in 2013.[6] This increase is consistent with INL’s hypothesis that increased capacity to detect illicit narcotics should contribute to an initial increase in seizures,[7] although other unmeasured and uncontrolled factors (e.g., shifts in trafficking routes and unique discoveries of particular operations) also are reflected in these results.

Likewise, from FY10 to FY14, INL obligated an estimated $16.6 million to money laundering and financial crimes (ML/FC) programming, primarily for training and mentoring aimed at reducing transnational crime.[8] The direct effect of this funding was increased capacity for investigating and prosecuting financial crimes. This capacity contributed to the 208 criminal prosecutions and 15 criminal convictions for money laundering in the CBSI countries between 2011 and 2013.

(C) In the process of determining these findings, the Evaluation Team also found that a lack of monitoring data hampers INL’s efforts to link its assistance directly to the goals, objectives and results laid out in the CBSI Results Framework. In addition, results within the Framework are not clearly linked to the assistance provided to specific partner institutions. For example, it is not clear if “Improved Management” (Sub-IR 2.2.1) and “Improved Operational Capacity” (Sub-IR 2.2.3) refer to improvement within the police departments, prisons, or both. In order to more easily determine the impact of INL's assistance, the Evaluation Team recommends that a clear linkage be made between financial and programmatic inputs and the expected results of these inputs, as outlined in the CBSI Results Framework.

Question 2: Unintended Consequences and Attribution

(A) Were there any unintended consequences of INL’s assistance that were observed? (B) Does INL’s assistance alone explain the unintended consequences, or did other factors contribute?

Conclusion: (A, B) INL's CBSI assistance has contributed directly to some unintended consequences, such as an increase in the perception of professional value among recipients of training and equipment. Political and economic factors outside of INL's sphere of influence also have contributed to some of these unintended consequences, such as partner institutions' dependence upon INL funding for specialized training and equipment.

Findings: (A, B) Several unintended consequences were identified in training programs. Survey data showed that one unintended consequence was an increase in the perception of professional value among recipients of training and equipment. Almost 80% (n=238) of training recipients reported feeling more

valued as professionals as a result of training, and 72% (n=156) of those who work with CBSI-sponsored equipment reported similar gains. Nearly three-fourths of those in both groups also reported that the CBSI assistance helped them advance professionally, and 85% and 74% of those receiving training and equipment, respectively, reported that they now feel more dedicated to their organizations. A second unintended consequence, reported in several focus groups and echoed in discussions with some INL Directors, is the perception that despite the controls in place to prevent it, some partner institutions have used training as a perk, whereby attendees are chosen based on rank rather than merit, especially for training in the United States.[9]

A related unintended consequence is that criminals adapt to new detection techniques, which reduces the anticipated effects of INL-funded training or commodities aimed at surveilling or capturing criminals. Law enforcement officials in all countries spoke of needing to stay “a step ahead” of criminals, given that they tend to change their modus operandi when they become aware of new technology being employed. For example, interviewees in St. Kitts noted that since the introduction of the Advanced Fingerprint Information System (AFIS), criminals have taken to wearing gloves when they commit crimes. INCLE funds provided to one port unit included detection equipment and security cameras for the workspace. These cameras, along with the moving of operations to an enclosed space, have helped to ensure that those operations are conducted in a secure and controlled environment, precluding the exposure to others of the detection methods and equipment used.

Weak sustainability of INL-supported inputs in some cases may be due to a situation reported by some INL staff, whereby once INL has provided substantial funding to an agency, the partner government is reluctant to provide its own resources to that department/agency to sustain CBSI programs. In at least 47% of meetings, interviewees suggested that in the absence of INL funding, it is unlikely that partner country governments would provide sufficient resources to allow programming initiated by INL to continue. While this is not the case across all the CBSI partner institutions, it remains a concern in the wake of the restrictive fiscal environment that many CBSI countries are facing. Many CBSI partner country counternarcotics institutions face a lack of adequate staff and resources to confront increased demands, despite the significant resources that INL has invested.

Question 3: Return on Investment

(A) What has been the return on investment (ROI) of INL’s programs? (B) What programs, projects or activities represent the best use of INL resources, in terms of continued or increased funding? Which programs, projects or activities are not good uses of INL’s resources?

Conclusion: (A) The survey responses (cited above) strongly suggest that INL’s training and commodity investments have led to increases in individual knowledge and institutional capacity. These positive outcomes suggest a positive return on INL’s investment, particularly as INL was the only, or the major, funder of training in these institutions. Likewise, it is possible to estimate an (ROI) for some program areas at the macro-level, and (B) to identify examples of more and less effective uses of INL funds.

Findings: (A) The survey data suggest that INL's investments in training yielded a positive return. More than 90% (n=238) of respondents who received training said that the training allowed them to be more efficient and effective in their work, and increased their knowledge of topics within their area of job responsibility, and 90% reported applying the training lessons to their work. The absence of activity-specific (e.g., training, commodities) budget data across program areas precludes a specific quantitative estimate of the ROI for training and commodities per se.

The ROI for procurement of equipment is not straight-forward. INL reports that equipment purchases generally complement training and advisory support, especially for maritime programming. In some cases identified in the field, however, equipment procured with INCLE funds was ill-suited to its purpose, with negative operational consequences, reflecting a clear need to ensure the relevant specifications of commodities are identified and integrated into purchase orders.

  • In one country, for example, the ability of the law enforcement agency to conduct its work was reportedly hindered by the fact that the vehicles provided by INL were all the same brand and color, and easily identified by criminals.
  • As noted in the 2014 Evaluation, equipment was sometimes delivered without necessary ancillary and replacement parts. For example, one law enforcement agency received night vision goggles from INL, and staff was trained on how to maintain the equipment. Focus group participants noted, however, that the agency lacked the necessary maintenance equipment and therefore had to send the goggles for maintenance through the US Embassy. The process took several months and left the agency without the goggles, which were deemed to have "made a major difference" in its operations as they "changed night into day for us," according to one focus group participant.
  • Another law enforcement agency received new information technology and other technical equipment dependent upon electricity, yet when the office was set up, with INCLE funds, the new electrical wiring was not adequate to accommodate the new equipment or the essential air conditioning. An assessment estimated that fixing the electrical power supply would cost $4,000 and take three days, but the national government has given no indication that it will assist. Interviewees noted that the electrical issues also could have legal ramifications if, for example, the lack of electricity were to mean that the agency could not process cases adequately within the legal time limit for holding a suspect.

At the level of outcomes by program area, some data allow for an illustrative estimate of ROI, but these examples must be viewed with a keen awareness of the limitations of the data and other contributing factors. Examples include:

1. Counternarcotics Control: Data show that a total of 36,000 kilos of cocaine were seized in the CBSI region over a three-year period, 2011-2013 according to one database and 2012-2014 according to another.[10] In 2010, the estimated wholesale value of a kilo of cocaine in the U.S. was $48,885; in 2014, the average was $27,320.[11] Given that INL invested an estimated $53.56 million in the counternarcotics program, this represents an excellent ROI, even if only a fraction of the kilos seized is directly attributed to INL assistance.[12]

2. LEPS: As noted under Question 1, examples of LEPS-related ROI include the number of cases resolved using techniques taught in training, but this information is not consistently tracked across all the CBSI countries. Two examples from FY2014 were cited by INL-Trinidad and Tobago. Post reported that participants in the INCLE-funded Gang Investigations and Prosecutions program applied knowledge and techniques taught in the program to arrest and charge one of Port of Spain’s biggest gang leaders, Anton “Boombay” Boney, and two of his lieutenants, for various criminal offenses, including being members of a gang, attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit murder. In addition, in the first quarter of FY2014, police investigators made several quick breakthroughs in a highly visible kidnapping and murder case by applying interview and interrogation techniques, intelligence gathering, and crime scene processing skills learned through INCLE-funded law enforcement capacity-building programs.[13] INL has invested an estimated $39.3 million in LEPS from FY2010 to FY2014, but it is difficult to assign a monetary value to the type of illustrative results reported above, and hence, to calculate a return on investment.[14]

3. ML/FC: INL's assistance in anti-money/laundering and financial crimes shows a positive return on INL's investment, not only for INL but for the CBSI partner countries as well. In Dominica, which has been the most active Eastern Caribbean country for cash seizures, the efforts of the INL-funded Financial Crimes Advisor (FCA) in the Eastern Caribbean have led to EC$10 million in seizures (approximately US$3.7 million), EC$140,000 (US$51,851) of which has been subject to final forfeiture orders. Given that INL invested an estimated $16.6 million into ML/FC programming between FY2010 and FY2014—only 13% of the total CBSI bulk obligation funding—this represents an excellent ROI.[15]

4. ROL/AC: INL has invested an estimated $14.5 million in Rule of Law/Anti-Corruption programming between FY2010 and FY2014, representing 12% of the total CBSI bulk obligation funding.[16] One example of a positive return on INL's ROL/AC investment is the establishment of the first polygraph corps in the Eastern Caribbean (EC), the RSS Polygraph Corps, which certified 28 polygraphists from the EC during a course in 2014. Other positive examples are the successes of the police Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) and the Major Organized Crime and Anti-Corruption Task Force as well as those of the new agency formed by the 2014 merger of these two agencies, the Major Organized Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA). MOCA reports that between January and December 2014, its efforts lead to the arrest of 589 individuals, 307 of whom were charged in a total of 284 operations.[17]

Given these findings and analysis, it is possible to identify examples of more and less effective uses of INL’s resources in CBSI:

1. One of the more effective uses of INL’s resources is to support programs that have an explicit sustainability component.

2. A less effective use of INL’s resources is providing commodities without concomitant training or auxiliary parts.

Question 4: Best Practices and Lessons Learned

(A) What lessons have been learned from the program experience? (B) What programs, projects or activities represent a “best practice” for INL?[18]

Conclusion: (A and B) Many of the findings and conclusions outlined above represent lessons that INL has already identified, and some of these lessons have been incorporated into the CBSI programming and represent best practices that should be replicated in all future programming.

Findings: (A) Based on the findings and conclusions noted in Questions 1-3, there have been several lessons learned that have influenced INL's practices. In terms of training, the following best practices, which draw upon lessons learned, should continue to be replicated in all future INL programming:

1. Promoting hands-on training that teaches practical skills, such as forensic investigation techniques or necessary language skills, over purely theoretical or awareness-raising training. Indeed, DevTech pointed out in the formative evaluation report that the Royal Bahamas Police Force (RBPF) Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) faced Creole language barriers in investigating Haitian and Haitian-Bahamian organizations involved in illicit trafficking. INL-Bahamas has since funded language-immersion training in Haiti for two DEU officers over a four-month period, which should be a boon for their investigations;

2. Ensuring that training enables the participation of individuals from across the CBSI countries to facilitate information exchange and the development of cross-country relationships;

3. Fostering opportunities that allow for diffusion of knowledge gained in training, including training-the-trainers (T3) programming and courses that provide select individuals with professional, skills-based certification;

4. Developing specific trainee profiles to ensure that the appropriate individuals are sent to training, based upon merit and job function rather than rank or seniority; and

5. Bringing U.S. expert trainers to the region as much as possible, especially when they are able to teach to the specific country context, rather than sending trainees to U.S-based training.

Lessons learned about the long-term ineffectiveness of providing commodities without concomitant training have led INL to ensure that equipment purchases generally complement training and advisory support, especially in terms of maritime programming. For example, maritime equipment donations in The Bahamas and Jamaica are paired with the sharing of maintenance logs, and INL's Tradewinds and TAFT projects pair training with maintenance equipment support. In cases where equipment is co-funded with FMF funds, INL should ensure continued coordination with USG counterparts on complementary training and advisory support.

(B) One area in which lessons learned have not yet been fully incorporated as best practices is programmatic monitoring, as noted in Recommendations 1 and 2 of Question 1. Most INL staff recognize the crucial role that monitoring plays in the program cycle, and the constraints that limited monitoring data impose upon their ability to provide a complete picture of the impact of INL's programs.

Recommendations (in order of priority):

1. Expand civil asset forfeiture programming, whether through expanding advisory services, providing support for legislative capacity building and drafting, or increasing training opportunities related to investigating and prosecuting financial crimes. This expanded or continued support is especially key given the ever-changing nature of the field of civil asset forfeiture, the need for greater specialized capacity in many CBSI partner countries, as well as the transnational nature of much of the organized crime in the Caribbean.[19] Expanding civil asset forfeiture programming will assist in the achievement of Objectives 2.1—and, where such programming takes a regional approach (as in the EC), Objectives 3.1-3.4—of INL's FY14-16 Functional Bureau Strategy and is in line with the INL Guide to Anticorruption Policy and Programming.[20] (Question 3A, Recommendation 5).[21]

2. In communication with partner USG agencies as needed, INL should build on its current efforts to ensure that any commodity provision is linked to long-term projects, and that the necessary training and adequate auxiliary parts are provided with larger commodities (i.e. boats, such as SafeBoat donations by INL, should be accompanied by the provision of boat lifts, which should also be appropriate both for the boat and for the size of the roads in the receiving country, and sufficient training on the use and maintenance of both commodities should be provided). This will contribute to achieving Objectives 4.1 and 4.4 of INL's FY14-16 Functional Bureau Strategy and reflects guidance provided in INL's Project Design Guide (Project Design Step 5: Implementation Plan and Mechanism(s)).[22] (Question 3A, Recommendation 6).

3. Prioritize improving internal monitoring capacity. Ideally several regional monitoring and evaluation (M&E) officer positions would be created. If this is not feasible, ensure that at least one existing staff member at each INL Post/section can devote a significant and sufficient portion of his/her time to complete all monitoring tasks, and is thoroughly trained to do so. At a minimum, these tasks should include tracking more complete and comprehensive output data than is currently captured by the Performance Progress Reports (PPRs), such as information on INCLE-funded trainings that go beyond the number of law enforcement officials trained and their sex to include details on instructors (names, biographies, courses taught), trainees (names, ranks, law enforcement entity and unit, length of service in the entity and unit); logs of agendas and of training materials used and distributed to trainees; collecting outcome data, including pre/post-test results and follow-on survey data from partner institutions and other sources; and, ensuring that all quarterly reports and relevant data are submitted to the CBSI Performance Monitoring System that DevTech is currently developing in coordination with INL/Washington. Dedicating adequately trained staff to conduct M&E will assist in achieving Objectives 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4 of INL's FY14-16 Functional Bureau Strategy and is consistent with guidance outlined in INL's Project Design Guide (Project Design Step 7: Develop A Performance Measurement and Evaluation Plan).[23] (Question 1A, Recommendation 2).

4. Update the CBSI Results Framework to explicitly reflect the four main CBSI program areas to ensure outcomes associated with ongoing and planned INL projects are adequately captured. Each INL Post should have a Logical Framework (LF) that captures anticipated outcomes resulting from activities implemented under each of the four CBSI program areas. The LF will thereby link discrete project-level indicators to higher-level outcomes at the IR, DO, and Goal levels. Indicators included in Letters of Agreement (LOAs), Amendments to Letter of Agreement (ALOAs), Inter-Agency Agreements (IAAs), and other agreements should be aligned with those included in the LF and updated Results Framework. A set of proposed indicators applicable to all of the CBSI countries is included in Annex XI. This approach to strategic planning will contribute to achieving Objectives 4.1 and 4.2 of INL's FY14-16 Functional Bureau Strategy and is embedded in INL's Project Design Guide (including in terms of Project Design Step 2: Formulate a Project Results Framework, and Project Design Step 7: Develop A Performance Measurement and Evaluation Plan).[24] (Question 1C, Recommendation1).

5. Disaggregate and track budget/financial data in each country at the level of discrete activities (i.e. the amount devoted to training versus commodity provision in each institution) to improve analyses of impact and return on investment by type of activity and institution. INL/RM will be responsible for setting up this system, which will be based on delineation of contract line item numbers (CLINs), to be implemented for each program area by WHP. (Question 1C, Recommendation 3). Conducting detailed and comprehensive budgeting will assist in achieving Objectives 4.1 and 4.2 of INL's FY14-16 Functional Bureau Strategy and is in line with INL's Project Design Guide (Project Design Step 6: Define a Life of Project Budget and Financial Management Plan).[25]

6. INL should initiate a strategic approach to training to avoid some of the observed, unintended consequences of training. The 2014 formative evaluation recommended that INL utilize the services of a curriculum development specialist to develop an integrated and progressive regional training strategy. Given the diversity of capacity among countries, institutions and individuals across CBSI, the observed importance of regional training in building regional coordination, and the strengths and interests of the various regional training centers, a multi-faceted strategic plan may be more feasible than a centralized regional strategy. The recommended approach should involve a country-level multi-year training strategy linked to country-specific objectives and results. Drawing on these country strategies, the regional training centers should develop a multi-year plan and schedule to meet the requirements of the country strategies. A coordinated approach among the regional centers is required to ensure that country strategies are adequately addressed, without duplication, and to fully utilize and capitalize on the strengths of each center. Each regional training center should share its training plan and schedule with all INL Posts/sections annually. Implementing a progressive training strategy that addresses these concerns will contribute to several of INL’s objectives, as outlined in INL's FY14-16 Functional Bureau Strategy, including Objectives 1.2, 3.1 and 3.2. A curriculum development specialist may be useful in developing this process. A CBSI training strategy should:

a. Comprehensively map existing and planned training opportunities;

b. Ensure that trainings provide basic skills training as needed for specific law enforcement agencies. Throughout the CBSI region, INL and USG agencies stressed the importance of basic training for effective law enforcement—such as basic computer skills, statement or report writing (including standardization across a police force), and basic narcotics agent training;

c. Ensure that trainings cover law enforcement techniques to identify and counter emerging threats and changing criminal tactics in order to stay "one step ahead" of criminals, such as the use of: commercial gift cards and prepaid credit cards in money laundering; the Internet, including social media networking; self-propelled semi-submersibles; and drones;

d. Identify best practices in distance learning, so that the new MetroStar Systems technology (used in the CBSI Connect courses), a state-of-the-art video teleconferencing system that allows for video-based training, can be fully exploited; and

e. Incorporate the use of regional training centers as an alternative to expensive, U.S.-based training.

Implementation has begun on some of these items. For example, (T3) Train-the-Trainer systems are the default mode for training implementation, as illustrated by the programs with the Pan American Development Foundation and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, and for some training courses at the Trinidad and Tobago Police Academy. INL is also empowering RSS personnel and ICITAP to utilize CBSI Connect for distance training, and has increased the focus on regional rather than U.S.-based training, except in unique circumstances.

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[1] Other sources of CBSI funding are the Economic Support Fund (ESF), Development Assistance (DA), Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR); and Foreign Military Financing (FMF).

[2] According to the “Evaluation Guidance for the Department of State,” March 29, 2012, a summative evaluation focuses primarily on outcomes and impacts, but they often include effectiveness, and they are conducted when an effort has ended or is soon to end. The essence of summative evaluations lies in establishing that the changes have occurred as a result of the intervention, or at least the latter has substantially contributed to them. A process or formative evaluation focuses on the performance of an effort and examines its implementation, inputs, outputs and likely outcomes.

[3] The Team did not conduct fieldwork in St. Lucia because of the ban on law enforcement officers from the Royal St. Lucia Police Force participating in USG-funded training programs. See www.stlucianewsonline.com/us-action-against-st-lucian-police-stems-from-operation-restore-confidence-pm/.

[4] Annex II contains a chart that shows the relationship among the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations for each question.

[5] Total funding amounts through FY14 are estimates given that program funding data provided by WHP cover FY10-FY14 for DC-managed funds and FY10-FY13 for Post-managed funds (see further, Table 9). This Counternarcotics Control figure is broken down as follows: $20.48 million in DC-managed funds obligated over FY10-FY14 and $33.08 million in Post-managed funds obligated over FY10-FY13.

[6] These estimates are based on estimates derived from the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2014 (INCSR), and from the Organization of American States (OAS) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) databases.

[7] This hypothesis is explicit in the 2014 PPR in the discussion of setting targets for seizures, where targets are justified on the basis of INL-supported improvements in interagency communications and intelligence, policing, surveillance, and equipment for sea patrols.

[8] Total funding amounts through FY14 are estimates given that program funding data provided by WHP cover FY10-FY14 for DC-managed funds and FY10-FY13 for Post-managed funds (see further, Table 9). This ML/FC figure is broken down as follows: $11.56 million in DC-managed funds obligated over FY10-FY14 and $5.05 million in Post-managed funds obligated over FY10-FY13.

[9] According to interviews with INL Directors and INL's training providers, trainee profiles are clearly laid out and communicated to ensure that participants are selected according to background, experience, and other merit-based criteria. However, INL does not have complete control over the selection process, given that partner country institutions ultimately choose the trainees.

[10] Two separate estimates are presented, one using UNODC data (2011-13) and the other PPR data (2012-2014). UNODC estimates (www.unodc.org/unodc/secured/wdr/Cocaine_Heroin_Prices.pdf) and DEA estimates from recent seizures (www.dea.gov/pr/top-story/Cocaine.shtml).

[11] The wholesale price of cocaine on the U.S. market fluctuates widely in response to many factors, only one of which is the amount entering the market through the CBSI region. These prices are cited only to estimate the ROI and not to show impact of seizures on the market.

[12] Total funding amounts through FY14 are estimates given that program funding data provided by WHP cover FY10-FY14 for DC-managed funds and FY10-FY13 for Post-managed funds (see further, Table 9). This Counternarcotics Control figure is broken down as follows: $20.48 million in DC-managed funds obligated over FY10-FY14 and $33.08 million in Post-managed funds obligated over FY10-FY13.

[13] INL-Trinidad and Tobago, Trinidad and Tobago CBSI Quarterly Report (2nd Quarter FY 2014), Embassy Cable (Reference 13 STATE 69706), May 14, 2014; "Men in court on murder charge," Trinidad Express, 27 May 2014, www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Men-in-court-on-murder-charge-260864831.htm

[14] Total funding amounts through FY14 are estimates, given that program funding data provided by WHP cover FY10-FY14 for DC-managed funds and FY10-FY13 for Post-managed funds (see further, Table 9). This LEPS figure is broken down as follows: $ 9.63 million in DC-managed funds obligated over FY10-FY14 and $29.69 million in Post-managed funds obligated over FY10-FY13.

[15] Total funding amounts through FY14 are estimates, given that program funding data provided by WHP cover FY10-FY14 for DC-managed funds and FY10-FY13 for Post-managed funds (see further, Table 9). This ML/FC figure is broken down as follows: $11.56 million in DC-managed funds obligated over FY10-FY14 and $5.05 million in Post-managed funds obligated over FY10-FY13.

[16] Total funding amounts through FY14 are estimates, given that program funding data provided by WHP cover FY10-FY14 for DC-managed funds and FY10-FY13 for Post-managed funds (see further, Table 9). This ROL/AC figure is broken down as follows: $2.75 million in DC-managed funds obligated over FY10-FY14 and $11.76 million in Post-managed funds obligated over FY10-FY13.

[17] MOCA, MOCA Performance Report December 2014, 17 February 2014, p. 1, www.moca.gov.jm/publications/moca-performance-report-december-2014

[18] Because Question 4 deals with best practices and lessons learned, separate recommendations were judged to be redundant.

[19] Many factors affect the level of expansion or extension. The evaluation can only point to the effectiveness of this action and recommend and justify additional investment because it is not privy to other factors that may affect the quantity.

[20] See Part IV, "Incorporating Anticorruption Into Project Design and Implementation," pp. 18-19, of INL, INL Guide To Anticorruption Policy and Programming, June 2015, www.state.gov/documents/organization/244730.pdf

[21] Numbers in parentheses refer to the order of the recommendations in the text of the report, where they are listed by question rather than in order of priority for implementation.

[22] INL, Doctrine Tier II Program Management Guides, Project Design Guide.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.