U.S. Department of State

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON September 14, 2015

Presidential Determination No. 2015-12

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2016

Pursuant to Section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228) (FRAA), I hereby identify the following countries as major drug transit and/or major illicit drug producing countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.

A country’s presence on the foregoing list is not a reflection of its government’s counternarcotics efforts or level of cooperation with the United States. Consistent with the statutory definition of a major drug transit or drug producing country set forth in section 481(e)(2) and (5) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), the reason major drug transit or illicit drug producing countries are placed on the list is the combination of geographic, commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs to transit or be produced, even if a government has carried out the most assiduous narcotics control law enforcement measures.

Pursuant to Section 706(2)(A) of the FRAA, I hereby designate Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela as countries that have failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and take the measures set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the FAA. Included in this report are justifications for the determinations on Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela, as required by Section 706(2)(B) of the FRAA. Explanations for these decisions are published with this determination.

I have also determined, in accordance with provisions of Section 706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that support for programs to aid Burma and Venezuela are vital to the national interests of the United States.

This determination also highlights the importance of international cooperation and certain countries of particular concern to the United States relevant to our drug-control policies and programs.

International Framework for Narcotics and Crime Control

The United States remains a leader in galvanizing international efforts to cooperate in addressing the full range of negative consequences tied to the drug trade and its links to criminal enterprise. The global framework for this cooperation is articulated in the three U.N. drug-control conventions as well as the U.N. conventions against transnational organized crime and corruption. The United States defines its priorities in this field in the annual National Drug Control Strategy, the 2011 U.S. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, and other Federal public policy guidelines.

The United States shares the view of the international community that the U.N. drug-control conventions are resilient enough to unify countries that often hold divergent views about the international narcotics problem, while at the same time providing a framework upon which to build the best solutions to it. The U.N. drug-control conventions allow sovereign nations the flexibility to develop and adapt the most appropriate policies and programs in keeping with their own national circumstances, while also achieving the conventions’ aims. These aims include ensuring the availability of controlled substances for medical and scientific purposes, preventing drug abuse and addiction, and suppressing drug trafficking and related criminal activities.

In April 2016, member states, the scientific community, and civil society will assemble in New York City for the U.N. General Assembly Special Session on drugs (UNGASS) to assess the successes and shortcomings of drug policy and to identify ways to meet new challenges in the future. The UNGASS is an opportunity to improve and develop international drug-control policies, in particular with regard to (1) increasing international efforts to address the world drug problem from a public health perspective; (2) sharing best practices in criminal justice reform; and (3) strengthening international law enforcement cooperation.

The world drug problem is complex and dynamic. This determination focuses selectively on those countries in Asia and the Americas that have been designated as major drug producing or transit countries that significantly impact the United States. The global challenges also include sophisticated crime networks that traffic narcotics along coastal regions of Africa, across the steppes of Central Asia, and into developed markets in Europe, East Asia, and Oceania.

Illegal poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is among the most difficult international drug-control problems. For 15 of the last 16 years, Afghanistan has been the world’s largest producer of opium poppy. The United States Government estimated that in 2014 Afghanistan cultivated 211,000 hectares of opium poppy and produced 6,300 metric tons of opium (up 7 percent and 15 percent over 2013 levels, respectively).

A number of U.S. programs, in collaboration with multinational partners, have had positive results in developing economically viable alternatives for Afghan farmers. Successful programs include the U.S.-funded Good Performers Initiative that rewards provinces demonstrating verifiable counternarcotics achievements against defined standards with development assistance for alternative livelihood projects. The program promotes holistic and integrated action on counternatcotics and encourages farmers to forgo poppy cultivation by strengthening and diversifying alternatives to illegal poppy cultivation. United States funds also support the development of the specialized drug interdiction units of the Afghan Counternarcotics Police. In 2014, the Afghan police seized 23 metric tons of opium poppy. At the December 2014 London Conference on Afghanistan, the Kabul government pledged to intensify its drug-control efforts. United States and international experts agree that political resolve is integral in efforts to combat the production and trade of Afghan-sourced opiates. President Ghani has expressed a clear commitment to address Afghanistan’s narcotics crisis comprehensively. Most recently, the Afghan Ministry of Counternarcotics shared with United States Government officials its draft National Drug Action Plan, which covers the full spectrum of government efforts for interdiction, eradication, treatment, education, and alternative development.

The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific is an organization of 21 countries dedicated to providing technical assistance on drug-control issues to Afghanistan and the region. The Colombo Plan has taken the lead in strengthening Afghanistan’s drug treatment services, especially for vulnerable populations such as women, children, and the homeless.

The Golden Triangle, which includes Burma and Laos, is also central to the Colombo Plan’s regional focus. Burma and Laos are the second and third largest illegal opium poppy cultivation countries, respectively. As in Afghanistan, countering illegal drug cultivation in Burma and Laos will require strengthening of state institutions and sustainable economic development.

The international community is also taking steps to focus attention on illegal drug activity in China, especially precursor chemicals produced in China that are diverted from legitimate commerce to criminal elements for the production of illicit plant-based and synthetic drugs.

Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America

Through the Merida Initiative, the United States and Mexico have engaged in an unprecedented partnership to break the power and impunity of transnational criminal organizations; strengthen border, air, and maritime controls; expand the capabilities and professionalism of Mexican law enforcement at the federal, state, and local levels; and improve the capacity of justice systems to investigate and prosecute cases. The two countries also collaborate to further respect for human rights and the rule of law, increase citizen security, and reduce the demand for drugs. The Merida Initiative is guided by four goals: (1) disrupt the capacity of organized crime to operate; (2) institutionalize the capacity to sustain the rule of law; (3) create a 21^st century border; and (4) build strong and resilient communities. Each of these goals has a positive impact on our countries’ ability to combat narcotics trafficking. For example, the United States has provided scanners, x-ray machines, other non-intrusive inspection equipment, as well as trained canines, to enhance Mexican authorities’ ability to detect illicit goods at key checkpoints and ports of entry along the border, resulting in significant seizures of illicit drugs, currency, weapons, and explosives. The Mexican government has also undertaken innovative efforts to implement alternatives to incarceration for non-violent, low-level, drug-use offenders by instituting drug treatment courts in many Mexican states.

The seven Central American and four Caribbean nations are included in this year’s determination as major drug transit countries that impact illegal drug activities and consumption in the United States. According to seizure data of cocaine destined for U.S. markets, an estimated 86 percent transited through the Central American corridor and the remaining 14 percent traveled via the Caribbean in 2014.

In recent years, Haiti has demonstrated serious political will as a regional partner to counter transnational criminal activity. In 2014, for example, with U.S. technical assistance and financial support, Haiti took meaningful steps to enhance the capabilities of its Police Brigade in the Fight against Narcotics Trafficking (BLTS). United States assistance continues to help improve Haiti’s ability to address the drug problem, in particular by strengthening the operational capacity of its national law enforcement; providing infrastructure and equipment enhancements; and, facilitating training opportunities. Institution building is also being carried out to strengthen Haiti’s maritime interdiction capabilities, which is a fundamental tool given the large percentage of drugs smuggled via its surrounding waterways. Working with the U.S. Coast Guard and the Drug Enforcement Administration, two operations in Haiti resulted in the seizure of almost a metric ton of cocaine and nearly five metric tons of marijuana. In 2014, Haiti also signed a law formally criminalizing public corruption, establishing standard penalties for corrupt practices by Haiti’s officials.

South America

Within South America, Colombia and Peru demonstrate highly effective leadership in countering illegal drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. While Peru remains the top cocaine producer in the world, the Peruvian government has a comprehensive 5-year counternarcotics strategy to aggressively eradicate illicit coca, implement alternative development programs, interdict illicit narcotics, and reduce domestic drug abuse. With support from the United States, Peru exceeded its historic 2014 goal to eradicate 30,000 hectares of illicit coca, eradicating a total of 31,205 hectares. Peru has achieved success establishing state institutions and building infrastructure in coca-producing regions, and developing alternative livelihoods for farmers previously dependent on illicit cultivation. Peru has also achieved historic results in seizures of cocaine, netting nearly 30 metric tons in 2014. In total, 300 metric tons of cocaine was removed from global supply through Peruvian interdiction and eradication.

Colombia also continues to be a strong partner on counternarcotics. Annually, Colombian authorities seize well over 100 metric tons of cocaine. Due to sustained coca eradication efforts and drug enforcement activity, coca cultivation dropped 52 percent between 2007 and 2013, and cocaine production potential declined by 58 percent for the same time period. The government made substantial gains in establishing a state presence in remote areas, developing alternatives for coca producers, and improving the capacity of its law enforcement and judicial institutions. Calendar year 2014, however, saw a reversal in illegal crop cultivation, due primarily to increased cultivation in areas off limits to aerial eradication. Colombia is also exporting its hard-won security expertise to third countries. From 2009 to 2014, the Colombian National Police reported training nearly 26,500 international police personnel from over 61 countries from Latin America, Africa, and Europe.

The Way Forward

The United States will continue to expand and enhance collaborative counternarcotics and anti-crime partnerships to advance common goals and increase citizen security. The United States will also continue to support like-minded nations through evidence-based technical assistance to modernize law enforcement, reform justice systems, support training, and develop drug demand reduction and treatment programs. Such global undertakings aim to build sustainable national capacity and permanent international partnerships to counter the threat to international security posed by the world drug trade and other illegal activities associated with transnational organized crime.

You are hereby authorized and directed to submit this report, with the enclosed memoranda of justification regarding Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela, under Section 706 of the FRAA, to the Congress, and publish it in the Federal Register.

/S/

Barack Obama

MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION FOR MAJOR ILLICIT DRUG TRANSIT OR ILLICIT DRUG PRODUCING COUNTRIES FOR FY 2016

Bolivia

During the past 12 months, the Bolivian government has failed demonstrably to make sufficient efforts to meet its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements or to uphold the counternarcotics measures set forth in Section 489 (a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended.

Bolivia is one of the world’s three largest producers of coca leaf for cocaine and other illegal drug products. Due to a lack of sufficient cooperation from the Bolivian government on counternarcotics activities, the United States government closed the Department of State’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs section at U.S. Embassy La Paz in 2013. Bolivia compromised its ability to interdict drugs and prosecute major traffickers and to cooperate with transnational criminal investigations when the country expelled the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration personnel in 2009.

Bolivia has netiher maintained adequate controls over licit coca markets to prevent diversion to illegal narcotics production, nor has it closed illegal coca markets. Unlike other coca growing countries, Bolivia has not implemented many of the

UN-mandated controls over coca. In 2011, Bolivia also withdrew from the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, one of the essential cornerstones of international cooperation in drug-related matters, and re-acceded in 2013 with a reservation permitting coca to be used only within Bolivia and for traditional, cutural and medicinal purposes. Nonetheless, Bolivia continues to promote the worldwide cultivation and comercialization of coca leaf products, contrary to the conventions’ foundational premises and Bolivia’s own reservation. Given the substantial number of coca crops already grown in Bolivia, the difficulty the country has had policing illegally grown coca, and the diversion from licit coca markets to illicit ones, this reservation adds to the complication of distinguishing between illegally and legally grown coca. The United States remains concerned about Bolivia’s intent by this action to limit, redefine, and circumvent the scope and control for illegal substances as they appear in the UN Schedule I list of narcotics.

Bolivian government policies and actions are not in line with international drug control standards. Such policies include Bolivia’s promotion of the idea that coca leaf can be used generally for commercial products, as well as its de facto allowance of 20,000 hectares of legal cultivation, 8,000 hectares over the 12,000 hectare limit set by the country’s own law and roughly 6,000 more than a European Union-sponsored study concluded was needed for Bolivia’s legal internal consumption.

The United States encourages Bolivia to strengthen its efforts to achieve tighter controls over the trade in coca leaf to stem diversion to cocaine processing, in line with international treaties; to protect its citizens from the deleterious effects of drugs, corruption, and drug trafficking; and to reduce coca cultivation significantly.

To diminish Bolivia’s appeal as a convenient trafficking venue for drug smuggling, further government action is required. In particular, Bolivia needs to improve the legal and regulatory environment for security and justice sector institutions to effectively combat drug production and trafficking, money laundering, corruption, and other transnational crime effectively, and to bring criminal enterprise to justice through the rule of law. In addition, Bolivia should increase its level of international cooperation to prevent the production and transit of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals.

In accord with U.S. legislation, the determination that Bolivia has failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts to adhere to its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and to take counternarcotics measures set forth in the FAA, does not result in the withholding of humanitarian and counternarcotics assistance.

Burma

During the past 12 months, the Burmese government has failed demonstrably to make sufficient efforts to meet its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements or to uphold the counternarcotics measures set forth in Section 489 (a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961(FAA) , as amended. A national interest waiver for Burma permits support for programs in the national interest of the United States, such as democratization and human rights.

According to the 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Burma remains the second largest cultivator of illegal opium poppy in the world. Recent estimates show that Burma had 57,600 hectares under cultivation in 2014, a 0.3 percent increase reported over 2013. Although opium poppy and/or heroin are trafficked through all of Burma’s porous borders, the most significant routes lead to Laos, China and Thailand. The Mekong River is also a vital trafficking route and there are growing signs of new routes to the western part of Burma for onward trafficking to South Asia. Since 1996, there has been a sharp increase in production, consumption, and export of synthetic drugs, especially amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS). ATS attributed to Burma are trafficked along routes to Thailand, China, Laos, and Bangladesh. Reports from India, Nepal, and Bangladesh indicate that South Asia is also increasingly affected by the trafficking of methamphetamine pills originating in Burma.

According to Burmese statistics, law enforcement officers destroyed 15,188 hectares of opium poppies in 2014 compared to 12,288 hectares in 2013 and 23,584 hectares in 2012. Such government statistics cannot be independently verified. Furthermore, U.S. and U.N. reporting often reflect the fact that eradication occurs after the poppies have been harvested.

The Government of Burma has intensified its focus on increasing the country’s capacity to conduct counternarcotics activities. For example, the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC), chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs, is in the process of multi-year restructuring and expansion of its counternarcotics law-enforcement entity, the Drug Enforcement Division (DED). The DED has expanded from 26 to 50 task force units – with a greater presence throughout the country, including high-traffic areas such as Shan and Rakhine states. In addition to expanding the presence of DED, managerial reforms included creating regional coordinators, at the lieutenant colonel level, within three critical areas of the country. These officers support coordination efforts and information sharing among police, forestry, customs, and immigration units.

Notwithstanding these efforts, counternarcotics police officers still lack adequate training and resources to sufficiently address the breadth of the country’s narcotics problems. The task force units are still not fully staffed, many officers have no prior experience or exposure to narcotics-related crimes, and many units lack a decision-making authority. Overall, Burmese police and prosecutors continue to focus on interdiction and low-level traffickers with no demonstrable effort to investigate higher-level criminal trafficking and money laundering syndicates. Because of this strategy, there is no substantive reduction in the production or supply of illicit drugs in Burma.

Burma has indicated a willingness to work regionally on counternarcotics law enforcement and demand reduction initiatives, including those coordinated through the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other partners, including the United States. In March 2015, the United States Government, the World Health Organization, UNODC, and the Colombo Plan, in partnership with the government of Burma, organized the first Stakeholders Meeting for Drug Demand Reduction in Burma. The conference brought together the government and the nongovernmental organization community to discuss the challenges represented by drug use and to translate scientific research into practice.

Despite these improvements, Burma’s current counternarcotics performance is not sufficient to meet its international counternarcotics cooperation obligations. The Burmese government needs to dedicate adequate resources to its counternarcotics efforts, reduce illegal crop cultivation in a timely and comprehensive manner, and redouble its efforts to obtain and maintain ceasefires with ethnic minorities – which would allow for increased access to areas with high drug cultivation, trafficking, and use. In addition, credible reporting from non-governmental organizations and the media claim that military officers and government officials are engaged in drug-related corruption, though no military officer above the rank of colonel has ever been charged with drug-related corruption. As a matter of policy, the Burmese government does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of drugs, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions.

In accordance with Section 481 (e)(4) of the FAA, the determination that Burma has failed demonstrably does not result in the withholding of humanitarian and counternarcotics assistance. It is in the vital interest of the United States to grant a national interest waiver to Burma.

Venezuela

During the past 12 months, the Venezuelan government failed demonstrably to make sufficient efforts to meet its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements or to uphold the counternarcotics measures set forth in section 489(a) (1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended. A national interest waiver for Venezuela permits support for programs vital to the national interests of the United States, such as democracy building and human rights advocacy.

Venezuela’s porous western border with Colombia, weak judicial systems, selective and inadequate international counternarcotics cooperation, and permissive and corrupt environment make the country one of the preferred trafficking routes for illegal drugs leaving South America. As a matter of government policy, Venezuela does not encourage or facilitate illegal activity involving drug trafficking. Credible reporting indicates that individual members of the government and security forces, however, engaged in or facilitated drug trafficking activities. In 2014, President Maduro continued Venezuela’s existing operational procedures for the Venezuelan Armed Forces to intercept and disable aircraft in Venezuelan territory believed to be trafficking drugs, and to disable clandestine airstrips, in accordance with the 2012 Integral Airspace Defense Law. According to media reports, some of these aircraft were disabled while in service (as defined by the Montreal Convention of 1971); such an action is contrary to international civil aviation conventions to which Venezuela is a signatory.

Venezuelan authorities reported seizing 46 metric tons of illegal drugs in 2014 compared to 46.8 metric tons in 2013. While Venezuela publically reports such seizures, it does not systematically share the data or evidence needed to verify the destruction of the drugs. The government also published statistics on arrests and convictions for drug possession and trafficking, though it did not provide information on the nature or severity of the drug arrests or convictions.

Venezuela is party to all relevant international drug and crime control agreements, including the 1988 UN Convention.

Since ceasing formal cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in 2005, the Venezuelan government has maintained only limited counternarcotics cooperation with the United States. Cooperation consists mainly of coordination of fugitive deportations from Venezuela to the United States and bilateral maritime interdiction operations. For maritime interdictions, however, Venezuela did not provide follow-up information to the United States on the drug trafficking organizations involved or the legal disposition of suspects. Venezuela’s limited and ad hoc international counternarcotics cooperation casts doubt on the government’s intent to uphold its international commitment to combat drug trafficking.

In 2014, the Venezuelan government reduced what had been a year-long trend of growing bilateral law enforcement cooperation with the United States on drug seizures following the arrest and subsequent release of retired Venezuelan general Hugo Carvajal in Aruba, who was indicted in the United States in 2011 and 2013 for alleged drug trafficking.

Pursuant to section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003, while Venezuela has failed demonstrably, a national interest waiver under the FAA allows the continuation of U.S. bilateral assistance programs to Venezuela; counternarcotics and humanitarian assistance can be provided without a national interest waiver.