The Palestinian Authority Security Sector Reform Program (PA SSRP) evaluation report was approved in October 2016. The evaluation began in October 2015 with field work conducted in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Jordan from mid-February to mid-March 2016.


SSG Advisors was hired by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (DoS/INL) to assess the processes and procedures used to design, implement, and monitor the Palestinian Authority Security Sector Reform Program (PA SSRP), and to identify opportunities for program improvement. PA SSRP uses International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding to support the National Security Forces (NSF), Civil Defense (CD), and Presidential Guard (PG), collectively known as the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF). The scope of work for the evaluation includes 10 evaluation questions (EQs) broken into 20 sub-questions. To avoid repetition in the response, the Evaluation Team grouped the EQs into key topics.



– EQ#1(a): What specific program goals and objectives have been established, if any?

– EQ#1(b): Is the program on track to achieve its intended goals and objectives from the evidence uncovered?

Effectiveness and Relevance—Equipment and Infrastructure Components

– EQ#2(a): What PA security needs are being met, and to what degree, by the INL-funded SSRP training, equipping, infrastructure development, and other capacity-building activities for the PASF?

– EQ#2(b): How well, according to quantitative data, are these needs being met?

Effectiveness and Relevance—Training Component

– EQ#3(a): How effective is the training delivered by the Jordanians in Jordan and the Palestinians in the West Bank and overseen by the DynCorp Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) in both locations?

– EQ#4(a): How appropriate is the curriculum to meet the PA’s security needs?

– EQ#4(b): Is the material at a level the trainees can effectively engage in?

– EQ#4(c): Is the curriculum achieving its intended learning objectives?


– EQ#3(b): Does the program have adequate measures and data to determine the effectiveness of the training?

– EQ#6: What measures have been identified to assess how effective the U.S. security assistance to the PA has been?

– EQ#7(a): Has the program established appropriate measurable outcome targets for assessing progress toward program objectives?

– EQ#7(b): Are adequate data available for verifying these outcomes and is the program making use of the data?


– EQ#8(a): What are the current capacities of the NSF, PG, and CD to assume responsibilities for the training and assistance efforts currently being provided by INL?

– EQ#8(b): Is there a timeline for transition of such responsibilities to the PA?

– EQ#9: What are the prospects for the maintenance and sustainability of this program?

Impact and ROI

– EQ#5(a): How has the West Bank security situation changed in the past five years?

– EQ#5(b): What are the indications that INL-funded assistance has changed the situation?


– EQ#10(a): Should any program activities be expanded or reduced in scope?

– EQ#10(b): What is the rationale for these findings and conclusions?

– EQ#10(c): Are there aspects of the program that would benefit from a different approach or redesign based on the evidence depicted in the evaluation?


The Evaluation Team used a mixed-methods approach to data collection. The data sources and methods include: desk/literature review of 101 documents; 47 key informant interviews (KIIs) in Washington, D.C., Jerusalem, Ramallah, Jericho, and Amman; 2 group interviews; 2 focus group discussions; observations at facilities and training sites; and 61 individual surveys of training participants. The Evaluation Team is confident in the findings, conclusions, and recommendations, yet it is important to note that there are limitations to the collection and analysis of the data. These include limited availability of activity-level performance monitoring and budgetary data, lack of a control group required to measure program impact, and the possibility of selection bias for KIIs.


1. Goals/Objectives: Most members of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) and INL believe the program is achieving its immediate objectives.

2. Effectiveness and Relevance—Equipment and Infrastructure Components: The equipment and infrastructure development support provided by PA SSRP are relevant to PASF needs and have increased its capabilities over the past nine years.

3. Effectiveness and Relevance—Training Component: The training delivered by the Jordanians and endogenous trainers at the Jordanian International Police Training Center (JIPTC) and the Academy for Civil Protection (ACP) is considered successful.

4. Measurement: The program as a whole has not established a set of comprehensive outcome targets for assessing progress and effectiveness.

5. Sustainability: The PASF demonstrates capacity to manage some aspects of its own development, but is not currently able to bear the full costs that the PA SSRP now covers.

6. Impact and Return on Investment: It is not possible to credit PA SSRP solely with improving the security situation, but as a significant and longstanding security sector program, it has contributed to the positive trend.

7. Challenges: PA SSRP should continue to focus on capacity development as a major program element. There are internal program management issues that require acknowledgment and joint consideration of new approaches to improve communication between relevant parties.


Recommendation #1: Establish a unified set of program goals and objectives.

Recommendation #2: Establish a joint annual planning event involving all relevant actors.

Recommendation #3: Include funding for maintenance programs in the budgets developed for infrastructure projects.

Recommendation #4: Strengthen the PASF’s training management systems by advising the PASF on an internal management structure and best practices for training management and training databases.

Recommendation #5: Institute pre- and post-training skills tests for individuals, as well as unit-wide assessments, so that progress can be tracked over time.

Recommendation #6: Continue train-the-trainer programs to ensure PASF training capability.

Recommendation #7: Examine and address the root causes around a high turnover rate of Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to ensure institutional knowledge within training.

Recommendation #8: Establish a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan that includes all program components, collects and disaggregates data by gender, and measures impact as well as output.

Recommendation #9: Have the INL, USSC, NSF, PG, and CD jointly develop, publish, and share a clear timeline for transition of training to the West Bank at the Central Training Institute (CTI) and the Palestinian Officers Academy (POA), and set clear timelines for the transition of training management capabilities.

Recommendation #10: Include sustainability goals in all plans for all services across all components.

Recommendation #11: Establish a tracker to follow security situations in the West Bank and how each PASF service responds to each incident in order to gauge changes in effectiveness over time.

Recommendation #12: Make capacity development the unifying theme and focus of programs.

Recommendation #13: Discuss and resolve the question of future funding for equipment purchases and infrastructure development.

Recommendation #14: Establish internal program management protocols to jointly troubleshoot and resolve internal communications issues.

U.S. Department of State

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