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Argentina

Executive Summary

Argentina presents significant investment and trade opportunities, particularly in infrastructure, health, agriculture, information technology, energy, and mining. In 2018, President Mauricio Macri continued to reform the market-distorting economic policies of his immediate predecessors. Since entering office in December 2015, the Macri administration has taken steps to reduce bureaucratic hurdles in business creation, enacted some tax reforms, courted foreign direct investment, and attempted to implement labor reforms through sector-specific agreements with unions. However, Argentina’s economic recession coupled with the political stagnation of an election year have reduced the Macri administration’s ability to enact pro-business reforms and have choked international investment to Argentina.

In 2018, Argentina´s economy suffered from stagnant economic growth, high unemployment, and soaring inflation: economic activity fell 2.6 percent and annual inflation rate reached 47.6 percent by the end of year. This deteriorating macroeconomic situation prevented the Macri administration from implementing structural reforms that could address some of the drivers of the stagflation: high tax rates, high labor costs, access to financing, cumbersome bureaucracy, and outdated infrastructure. In September 2018, Argentina established a new export tax on most goods through December 31, 2020, and in January 2019, began applying a similar tax of 12 percent on most exports of services. To account for fluctuations in the exchange rate, the export tax on these goods and services may not exceed four pesos per dollar exported. Except for the case of the energy sector, the government has been unsuccessful in its attempts to curb the power of labor unions and enact the reforms required to attract international investors.

The Macri administration has been successful in re-establishing the country as a world player. Argentina assumed the G-20 Presidency on December 1, 2017, and hosted over 45 G-20 meetings in 2018, culminating with the Leaders’ Summit in Buenos Aires. The country also held the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) presidency for 2017-2018 and served as host of the WTO Ministerial in 2017.

In 2018, Argentina moved up eight places in the Competitiveness Ranking of the World Economic Forum (WEF), which measures how productively a country uses its available resources, to 81 out of 140 countries, and 10 out of the 21 countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region. Argentina is courting an EU-MERCOSUR trade agreement and is increasing engagement with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with the goal of an invitation for accession this year. Argentina ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement on January 22, 2018. Argentina and the United States continue to expand bilateral commercial and economic cooperation, specifically through the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), the Commercial Dialogue, the Framework to Strengthen Infrastructure Investment and Energy Cooperation, and the Digital Economy Working Group, in order to improve and facilitate public-private ties and communication on trade and investment issues, including market access and intellectual property rights. More than 300 U.S. companies operate in Argentina, and the United States continues to be the top investor in Argentina with more than USD $14.9 billion (stock) of foreign direct investment as of 2017.

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings

Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 85 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2019 119 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings
Global Innovation Index 2018 80 of 126 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 $14,907 http://www.bea.gov/international/factsheet/
World Bank GNI per capita 2017 $13,030 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

The Macri government actively seeks foreign direct investment. To improve the investment climate, the Macri administration has enacted reforms to simplify bureaucratic procedures in an effort to provide more transparency, reduce costs, diminish economic distortions by adopting good regulatory practices, and increase capital market efficiencies. Since 2016, Argentina has expanded economic and commercial cooperation with key partners including Chile, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, Spain, Canada, and the United States, and deepened its engagement in international fora such as the G-20, WTO, and OECD.

Over the past year, Argentina issued new regulations in the gas and energy, communications, technology, and aviation industries to improve competition and provide incentives aimed to attract investment in those sectors. Argentina seeks tenders for investment in wireless infrastructure, oil and gas, lithium mines, renewable energy, and other areas. However, many of the public-private partnership projects for public infrastructure planned for 2018 had to be delayed or canceled due to Argentina’s broader macroeconomic difficulties and ongoing corruption investigations into public works projects.

Foreign and domestic investors generally compete under the same conditions in Argentina. The amount of foreign investment is restricted in specific sectors such as aviation and media. Foreign ownership of rural productive lands, bodies of water, and areas along borders is also restricted.

Argentina has a national Investment and Trade Promotion Agency that provides information and consultation services to investors and traders on economic and financial conditions, investment opportunities, Argentine laws and regulations, and services to help Argentine companies establish a presence abroad. The agency also provides matchmaking services and organizes roadshows and trade delegations. The agency’s web portal provides detailed information on available services (http://www.produccion.gob.ar/agencia). Many of the 24 provinces also have their own provincial investment and trade promotion offices.

The Macri administration welcomes dialogue with investors. Argentine officials regularly host roundtable discussions with visiting business delegations and meet with local and foreign business chambers. During official visits over the past year to the United States, China, India, Vietnam, and Europe, among others, Argentine delegations often met with host country business leaders.

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Foreign and domestic commercial entities in Argentina are regulated by the Commercial Partnerships Law (Law 19,550), the Argentina Civil and Commercial Code, and rules issued by the regulatory agencies. Foreign private entities can establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity in nearly all sectors.

Full foreign equity ownership of Argentine businesses is not restricted, for the most part, with exception in the air transportation and media industries. The share of foreign capital in companies that provide commercial passenger transportation within the Argentine territory is limited to 49 percent per the Aeronautic Code Law 17,285. The company must be incorporated according to Argentine law and domiciled in Buenos Aires. In the media sector, Law 25,750 establishes a limit on foreign ownership in television, radio, newspapers, journals, magazines, and publishing companies to 30 percent.

Law 26,737 (Regime for Protection of National Domain over Ownership, Possession or Tenure of Rural Land) establishes that a foreigner cannot own land that allows for the extension of existing bodies of water or that are located near a Border Security Zone. In February 2012, the government issued Decree 274/2012 further restricting foreign ownership to a maximum of 30 percent of national land and 15 percent of productive land. Foreign individuals or foreign company ownership is limited to 1,000 hectares (2,470 acres) in the most productive farming areas. In June 2016, the Macri administration issued Decree 820 easing the requirements for foreign land ownership by changing the percentage that defines foreign ownership of a person or company, raising it from 25 percent to 51 percent of the social capital of a legal entity. Waivers are not available.

Argentina does not maintain an investment screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment. U.S. investors are not at a disadvantage to other foreign investors or singled out for discriminatory treatment.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

Argentina was last subject to an investment policy review by the OECD in 1997 and a trade policy review by the WTO in 2013. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has not done an investment policy review of Argentina.

Business Facilitation

Since entering into office in December 2015, the Macri administration has enacted reforms to normalize financial and commercial transactions and facilitate business creation and cross-border trade. These reforms include eliminating capital controls, reducing some export taxes and import restrictions, reducing business administrative processes, decreasing tax burdens, increasing businesses’ access to financing, and streamlining customs controls.

In October 2016, the Ministry of Production issued Decree 1079/2016, easing bureaucratic hurdles for foreign trade and creating a Single Window for Foreign Trade (“VUCE” for its Spanish acronym). The VUCE centralizes the administration of all required paperwork for the import, export, and transit of goods (e.g., certificates, permits, licenses, and other authorizations and documents). Argentina subjects imports to automatic or non-automatic licenses that are managed through the Comprehensive Import Monitoring System (SIMI, or Sistema Integral de Monitoreo de Importaciones), established in December 2015 by the National Tax Agency (AFIP by its Spanish acronym) through Resolutions 5/2015 and 3823/2015. The SIMI system requires importers to submit detailed information electronically about goods to be imported into Argentina. Once the information is submitted, the relevant Argentine government agencies can review the application through the VUCE and make any observations or request additional information. The number of products subjected to non-automatic licenses has been modified several times, resulting in a net decrease since the beginning of the SIMI system.

The Argentine Congress approved an Entrepreneurs’ Law in March 2017, which allows for the creation of a simplified joint-stock company (SAS, or Sociedad por Acciones Simplifacada) online within 24 hours of registration. Detailed information on how to register a SAS is available at: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/crear-una-sociedad-por-acciones-simplificada-sas . As of April 2019, the online business registration process is only available for companies located in Buenos Aires. The government is working on expanding the SAS to other provinces. Further information can be found at http://www.produccion.gob.ar/todo-sobre-la-ley-de-emprendedores/.

Foreign investors seeking to set up business operations in Argentina follow the same procedures as domestic entities without prior approval and under the same conditions as local investors. To open a local branch of a foreign company in Argentina, the parent company must be legally registered in Argentina. Argentine law requires at least two equity holders, with the minority equity holder maintaining at least a five percent interest. In addition to the procedures required of a domestic company, a foreign company establishing itself in Argentina must legalize the parent company’s documents, register the incoming foreign capital with the Argentine Central Bank, and obtain a trading license.

A company must register its name with the Office of Corporations (IGJ, or Inspeccion General de Justicia). The IGJ website describes the registration process and some portions can be completed online (http://www.jus.gob.ar/igj/tramites/guia-de-tramites/inscripcion-en-el-registro-publico-de-comercio.aspx ). Once the IGJ registers the company, the company must request that the College of Public Notaries submit the company’s accounting books to be certified with the IGJ. The company’s legal representative must obtain a tax identification number from AFIP, register for social security, and obtain blank receipts from another agency. Companies can register with AFIP online at www.afip.gob.ar or by submitting the sworn affidavit form No. 885 to AFIP.

Details on how to register a company can be found at the Ministry of Production and Labor’s website: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/produccion/crear-una-empresa . Instructions on how to obtain a tax identification code can be found at: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/obtener-el-cuit .

The enterprise must also provide workers’ compensation insurance for its employees through the Workers’ Compensation Agency (ART, or Aseguradora de Riesgos del Trabajo). The company must register and certify its accounting of wages and salaries with the Directorate of Labor, within the Ministry of Production and Labor.

In April 2016, the Small Business Administration of the United States and the Ministry of Production of Argentina signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to set up small and medium sized business development centers (SBDCs) in Argentina. The goal of the MOU is to provide small businesses with tools to improve their productivity and increase their growth. Under the MOU, in June 2017, Argentina set up the first SBDC pilot in the province of Neuquen.

The Ministry of Production and Labor offers a wide range of attendance-based courses and online training for businesses. The full training menu can be viewed at: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/produccion/capacitacion 

Outward Investment

Argentina does not have a governmental agency to promote Argentine investors to invest abroad nor does it have any restrictions for a domestic investor investing overseas.

2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties

Argentina has a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States, which entered into force on October 20, 1994. The text of the Argentina-United States BIT is available at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/43475.pdf .

As of April 2019, Argentina has 50 BITs in force. Argentina has signed treaties that are not yet in force with six other countries: Greece (October 1999), New Zealand (August 1999), the Dominican Republic (March 2001), Qatar (November 2016), United Arab Emirates (April 2018), and Japan (December 2018).

During 2018 and the first quarter of 2019, Argentina continued discussions to strengthen bilateral commercial, economic, and investment cooperation with a number of countries, including China, Denmark, India, Mexico, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, South Korea, Russia, Vietnam, and the United States. Argentina and the United States established a bilateral Commercial Dialogue and a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in 2016. Bilateral talks are ongoing through both mechanisms. Argentina does not have a Free Trade Agreement with the United States.

Argentina is a founding member of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), which includes Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela (currently suspended). Through MERCOSUR, Argentina has Free Trade Agreements with Egypt, Israel, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru. MERCOSUR has Trade Framework Agreements with Morocco and Mexico, and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), India, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and Ecuador. MERCOSUR is currently pursuing a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and has initiated free trade discussions with Canada, South Korea, and Japan. The bloc is also in talks to expand on its agreements with SACU and India.

Argentina has Economic Complementarity Agreements with Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Chile that were established before MERCOSUR and thus, grandfathered into Mercosur. Argentina is engaged in ongoing negotiations to expand the PTA agreement with Mexico. Argentina also has an economic association agreement with Colombia signed in June 2017. In January 2019, the expanded Economic Complementation Agreement (ECA) between Chile and Argentina entered into effect. The new ECA was signed in November 2017, approved by the Argentine Congress in December 2018, and ratified by the Chilean Congress in January 2019. The new deal includes trade facilitation regulation and development programs directed to supporting SMEs, and adds chapters on e-commerce, trade in services, and government procurement.

Argentina does not have a bilateral taxation treaty with the United States. In December 2016, Argentina signed a Tax Information Exchange Agreement with the United States, which increases the transparency of commercial transactions between the two countries to aid with combating tax and customs fraud. The Agreement entered into force on November 13, 2017. The United States and Argentina have initiated discussions to sign a Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) inter-governmental agreement.

In 2014, Argentina committed to implementing the OECD single global standard on automatic exchange of financial information. According to media sources, Argentina had been set to make its first financial information exchange in September 2018, but it was postponed to 2019.

In June 2018, AFIP and the OECD signed an MOU to establish the first Latin American Financial and Fiscal Crime Investigation Academy.

Argentina has signed 18 double taxation treaties, including with Germany, Canada, Russia, and the United Kingdom. In November 2016, Argentina and Switzerland signed a bilateral double taxation treaty. In November 2016, Argentina signed an agreement with the United Arab Emirates, which has not yet entered into force. In July 2017, Argentina updated a prior agreement with Brazil, which also has not yet been implemented. Argentina also has customs agreements with numerous countries. A full listing is available at: http://www.afip.gov.ar/institucional/acuerdos.asp .

In general, national taxation rules do not discriminate against foreigners or foreign firms (e.g., asset taxes are applied to equity possessed by both domestic and foreign entities).

3. Legal Regime

Transparency of the Regulatory System

The Macri administration has taken measures to improve government transparency. President Macri created the Ministry of Modernization, tasked with conducting quantitative and qualitative studies of government procedures and finding solutions to streamline bureaucratic processes and improve transparency. In September 2018, the Ministry of Modernization was downgraded into a Secretariat due to a budget-oriented streamlining of the Cabinet.

In September 2016, Argentina enacted a Right to Access Public Information Law (27,275) that mandates all three governmental branches (legislative, judicial, and executive), political parties, universities, and unions that receive public funding are to provide non-classified information at the request of any citizen. The law also created the Agency for the Right to Access Public Information to oversee compliance.

Continuing its efforts to improve transparency, in November 2017, the Treasury Ministry launched a new website to communicate how the government spends public funds in a user-friendly format. Subsections of this website are targeted toward policymakers, such as a new page to monitor budget performance (http://www.aaip.gob.ar/hacienda/sechacienda/metasfiscales ), as well as improving citizens’ understanding of the budget, e.g. the new citizen’s budget “Presupuesto Ciudadano” website (https://www.minhacienda.gob.ar/onp/presupuesto_ciudadano/). This program is part of the broader Macri administration initiative led by the Secretariat of Modernization to build a transparent, active, and innovative state that includes data and information from every area of the public administration. The initiative aligns with the Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency (GIFT) and UN Resolution 67/218 on promoting transparency, participation, and accountability in fiscal policy.

During 2017, the government introduced new procurement standards including electronic procurement, formalization of procedures for costing-out projects, and transparent processes to renegotiate debts to suppliers. The government also introduced OECD recommendations on corporate governance for state-owned enterprises to promote transparency and accountability during the procurement process. (The link to the regulation is at http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=306769 .)

Argentine government efforts to improve transparency were recognized internationally. In its December 2017 Article IV consultation, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Executive Board noted that “Argentina’s government made important progress in restoring integrity and transparency in public sector operations,” and agreed with the staff appraisal that commended the government for the progress made in the systemic transformation of the Argentine economy, including efforts to rebuild institutions and restore integrity, transparency, and efficiency in government.

On January 10, 2018, the government issued Decree 27 with the aim of curbing bureaucracy and simplifying administrative proceedings to promote the dynamic and effective functioning of public administration. Broadly, the decree seeks to eliminate regulatory barriers and reduce bureaucratic burdens, expedite and simplify processes in the public domain, and deploy existing technological tools to better focus on transparency.

In April 2018, Argentina passed the Business Criminal Responsibility Law (27,041) through Decree 277. The decree establishes an Anti-Corruption Office in charge of outlining and monitoring the transparency policies with which companies must comply to be eligible for public procurement.

Under the bilateral Commercial Dialogue, Argentina and the United States discuss good regulatory practices, conducting regulatory impact analyses, and improving the incorporation of public consultations in the regulatory process. Similarly, under the bilateral Digital Economy Working Group, Argentina and the United States share best practices on promoting competition, spectrum management policy, and broadband investment and wireless infrastructure development.

Legislation can be drafted and proposed by any citizen and is subject to Congressional and Executive approval before being passed into law. Argentine government authorities and a number of quasi-independent regulatory entities can issue regulations and norms within their mandates. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. Rulemaking has traditionally been a top-down process in Argentina, unlike in the United States where industry organizations often lead in the development of standards and technical regulations.

Ministries, regulatory agencies, and Congress are not obligated to provide a list of anticipated regulatory changes or proposals, share draft regulations with the public, or establish a timeline for public comment. They are also not required to conduct impact assessments of the proposed legislation and regulations.

Since 2016, the Office of the President and various ministries has sought to increase public consultation in the rulemaking process; however, public consultation is non-binding and has been done in an ad-hoc fashion. In 2017, the Federal Government of Argentina issued a series of legal instruments that seek to promote the use of tools to improve the quality of the regulatory framework. Amongst them, Decree 891/2017 for Good Practices in Simplification establishes a series of tools to improve the rulemaking process. The decree introduces tools on ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of regulation, stakeholder engagement, and administrative simplification, amongst others. Nevertheless, no formal oversight mechanism has been established to supervise the use of these tools across the line of ministries and government agencies, which make implementation difficult and limit severely the potential to adopt a whole-of-government approach to regulatory policy, according to a 2019 OECD publication on Regulatory Policy in Argentina.

Some ministries and agencies have developed their own processes for public consultation, such as publishing the draft on their websites, directly distributing the draft to interested stakeholders for feedback, or holding public hearings. In 2016 the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights launched the digital platform Justicia2020 (https://www.justicia2020.gob.ar/ ), to foster public involvement in the Judiciary reform process projected by 2020. Once the draft of a bill is introduced into the Argentine Congress, the full text of the bill and its status can be viewed online at the Chamber of Deputies website (http://www.diputados.gov.ar/), and that of the Senate (http://www.senado.gov.ar/ ).

All final texts of laws, regulations, resolutions, dispositions, and administrative decisions must be published in the Official Gazette (https://www.boletinoficial.gob.ar ), as well as in the newspapers and the websites of the Ministries and agencies. These texts can also be accessed through the official website Infoleg (http://www.infoleg.gob.ar/ ), overseen by the Ministry of Justice. Interested stakeholders can pursue judicial review of regulatory decisions.

Argentina requires public companies to adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Argentina is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures.

International Regulatory Considerations

Argentina is a founding member of MERCOSUR and has been a member of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI for Asociacion Latinoamericana de Integracion) since 1980.

Argentina has been a member of the WTO since 1995 and it ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement in January 2018. Argentina notifies technical regulations, but not proposed drafts, to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Argentina has sought to deepen its engagement with the OECD and submitted itself to an OECD regulatory policy review in March 2018, which was released in Mach 2019. Argentina participates in all 23 OECD committees and seeks an accession invitation before the end of 2019.

Additionally, the Argentine Institute for Standards and Certifications (IRAM) is a member of international and regional standards bodies including the International Standardization Organization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the Panamerican Commission on Technical Standards (COPAM), the MERCOSUR Association of Standardization (AMN), the International Certification Network (i-Qnet), the System of Conformity Assessment for Electrotechnical Equipment and Components (IECEE), and the Global Good Agricultural Practice network (GLOBALG.A.P.).

Legal System and Judicial Independence

According to the Argentine constitution, the judiciary is a separate and equal branch of government. In practice, there have been instances of political interference in the judicial process. Companies have complained that courts lack transparency and reliability, and that Argentine governments have used the judicial system to pressure the private sector. A 2017 working group review of Argentina’s application to join the OECD noted the politicization of the General Prosecutor’s Office created a lack of prosecutorial independence. The OECD working group said the executive branch, prior to the Macri government, had pressured judges through threatened or actual disciplinary proceedings. Media revelations of judicial impropriety and corruption feed public perception and undermine confidence in the judiciary.  

The Macri administration has publicly expressed its intent to improve transparency and rule of law in the judicial system, and the Justice Minister announced in March 2016 the “Justice 2020” initiative to reform the judiciary.

Argentina follows a Civil Law system. In 2014, the Argentine government passed a new Civil and Commercial Code that has been in effect since August 2015. The Civil and Commercial Code provides regulations for civil and commercial liability, including ownership of real and intangible property claims. The current judicial process is lengthy and suffers from significant backlogs. In the Argentine legal system, appeals may be brought from many rulings of the lower court, including evidentiary decisions, not just final orders, which significantly slows all aspects of the system. The Justice Ministry reported in December 2018 that the expanded use of oral processes had reduced the duration of 68 percent of all civil matters to less than two years.  

Many foreign investors prefer to rely on private or international arbitration when those options are available. Claims regarding labor practices are processed through a labor court, regulated by Law 18,345 and its subsequent amendments and implementing regulations by Decree 106/98. Contracts often include clauses designating specific judicial or arbitral recourse for dispute settlement.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

According to the Foreign Direct Investment Law 21,382 and Decree 1853/93, foreign investors may invest in Argentina without prior governmental approval, under the same conditions as investors domiciled within the country. Foreign investors are free to enter into mergers, acquisitions, greenfield investments, or joint ventures. Foreign firms may also participate in publicly-financed research and development programs on a national treatment basis. Incoming foreign currency must be identified by the participating bank to the Central Bank of Argentina (www.bcra.gov.ar). There is no official regulation or other interference in the court that could affect foreign investors.

All foreign and domestic commercial entities in Argentina are regulated by the Commercial Partnerships Law (Law No. 19,550) and the rules issued by the commercial regulatory agencies. Decree 27/2018 amended Law 19,550 to simplify bureaucratic procedures. Full text of the decree can be found at (http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/305000-309999/305736/norma.htm ). All other laws and norms concerning commercial entities are established in the Argentina Civil and Commercial Code, which can be found at: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/235000-239999/235975/norma.htm 

Further information about Argentina’s investment policies can be found at the following websites:

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

The National Commission for the Defense of Competition and the Secretariat of Commerce, both within the Ministry of Production and Labor, have enforcement authority of the Competition Law (Law 25,156). The law aims to promote a culture of competition in all sectors of the national economy. In May 2018, the Argentine Congress approved a new Defense of the Competition Law (Law 27,442). The new law incorporates anti-competitive conduct regulations and a leniency program to facilitate cartel investigation. The full text of the law can be viewed at: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=310241 .

Expropriation and Compensation

Section 17 of the Argentine Constitution affirms the right of private property and states that any expropriation must be authorized by law and compensation must be provided. The United States-Argentina BIT states that investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized except for public purposes upon prompt payment of the fair market value in compensation.

Argentina has a history of expropriations under previous administrations, the most recent of which occurred in March 2015 when the Argentine Congress approved the nationalization of the train and railway system. A number of companies that were privatized during the 1990s under the Menem administration were renationalized under the Kirchner administrations. Additionally, in October 2008, Argentina nationalized its private pension funds, which amounted to approximately one-third of total GDP, and transferred the funds to the government social security agency.

In May 2012, the Fernandez de Kirchner administration nationalized the oil and gas company Repsol-YPF. Although most of the litigation was settled in 2016, a small percentage of stocks owned by an American hedge fund remain in litigation in U.S. courts.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

Argentina is signatory to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards, which the country ratified in 1989. Argentina is also a party to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention since 1994.

There is neither specific domestic legislation providing for enforcement under the 1958 New York Convention nor legislation for the enforcement of awards under the ICSID Convention. Companies that seek recourse through Argentine courts may not simultaneously pursue recourse through international arbitration. In practice, the Macri administration has shown a willingness to negotiate settlements to valid arbitration awards.

In March 2012, the United States suspended Argentina’s designation as a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) beneficiary developing country because it had not acted in good faith in enforcing arbitration awards in favor of United States citizens or a corporation, partnership, or association that is 50 percent or more beneficially owned by United States citizens. Effective January 1, 2018, the United States ended Argentina’s suspension from the GSP program.  Following Congressional reauthorization of the program, as of April 22, 2018, Argentina’s access was restored for GSP duty-free treatment for over 3,000 Argentine products.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

The Argentine government officially accepts the principle of international arbitration. The United States-Argentina BIT includes a chapter on Investor-State Dispute Settlement for U.S. investors.

In the past ten years, Argentina has been brought before the ICSID in 54 cases involving U.S. or other foreign investors. Argentina currently has four pending arbitration cases filed against it by U.S. investors. For more information on the cases brought by U.S. claimants against Argentina, go to: https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx# .

Local courts cannot enforce arbitral awards issued against the government based on the public policy clause. There is no history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors.

Argentina is a member of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).

Argentina is also a party to several bilateral and multilateral treaties and conventions for the enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments, which provide requirements for the enforcement of foreign judgments in Argentina, including:

Treaty of International Procedural Law, approved in the South-American Congress of Private International Law held in Montevideo in 1898, ratified by Argentina by law No. 3,192.

Treaty of International Procedural Law, approved in the South-American Congress of Private International Law held in Montevideo in 1939-1940, ratified by Dec. Ley 7771/56 (1956).

Panamá Convention of 1975, CIDIP I: Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, adopted within the Private International Law Conferences – Organization of American States, ratified by law No. 24,322 (1995).

Montevideo Convention of 1979, CIDIP II: Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, adopted within the Private International Law Conferences – Organization of American States, ratified by law No. 22,921 (1983).

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms can be stipulated in contracts. Argentina also has ADR mechanisms available such as the Center for Mediation and Arbitrage (CEMARC) of the Argentine Chamber of Trade. More information can be found at: http://www.intracen.org/Centro-de-Mediacion-y-Arbitraje-Comercial-de-la-Camara-Argentina-de-Comercio—CEMARC–/#sthash.RagZdv0l.dpuf .

Argentina does not have a specific law governing arbitration, but it has adopted a mediation law (Law 24.573/1995), which makes mediation mandatory prior to litigation. Some arbitration provisions are scattered throughout the Civil Code, the National Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, the Commercial Code, and three other laws. The following methods of concluding an arbitration agreement are non-binding under Argentine law: electronic communication, fax, oral agreement, and conduct on the part of one party. Generally, all commercial matters are subject to arbitration. There are no legal restrictions on the identity and professional qualifications of arbitrators. Parties must be represented in arbitration proceedings in Argentina by attorneys who are licensed to practice locally. The grounds for annulment of arbitration awards are limited to substantial procedural violations, an ultra petita award (award outside the scope of the arbitration agreement), an award rendered after the agreed-upon time limit, and a public order violation that is not yet settled by jurisprudence when related to the merits of the award. On average, it takes around 21 weeks to enforce an arbitration award rendered in Argentina, from filing an application to a writ of execution attaching assets (assuming there is no appeal). It takes roughly 18 weeks to enforce a foreign award. The requirements for the enforcement of foreign judgments are set out in section 517 of the National Procedural Code.

No information is available as to whether the domestic courts frequently rule in cases in favor of state-owned enterprises (SOE) when SOEs are party to a dispute.

Bankruptcy Regulations

Argentina’s bankruptcy law was codified in 1995 in Law 24,522. The full text can be found at: http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/25000-29999/25379/texact.htm . Under the law, debtors are generally able to begin insolvency proceedings when they are no longer able to pay their debts as they mature. Debtors may file for both liquidation and reorganization. Creditors may file for insolvency of the debtor for liquidation only. The insolvency framework does not require approval by the creditors for the selection or appointment of the insolvency representative or for the sale of substantial assets of the debtor. The insolvency framework does not provide rights to the creditor to request information from the insolvency representative but the creditor has the right to object to decisions by the debtor to accept or reject creditors’ claims. Bankruptcy is not criminalized; however, convictions for fraudulent bankruptcy can carry two to six years of prison time.

Financial institutions regulated by the Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA) publish monthly outstanding credit balances of their debtors; the BCRA and the National Center of Debtors (Central de Deudores) compile and publish this information. The database is available for use of financial institutions that comply with legal requirements concerning protection of personal data. The credit monitoring system only includes negative information, and the information remains on file through the person’s life. At least one local NGO that makes microcredit loans is working to make the payment history of these loans publicly accessible for the purpose of demonstrating credit history, including positive information, for those without access to bank accounts and who are outside of the Central Bank’s system. Equifax, which operates under the local name “Veraz” (or “truthfully”), also provides credit information to financial institutions and other clients, such as telecommunications service providers and other retailers that operate monthly billing or credit/layaway programs.

The World Bank’s 2018 Doing Business Report ranked Argentina 101 among 189 countries for the effectiveness of its insolvency law. This is a jump of 15 places from its ranking of 116 in 2017. The report notes that it takes an average of 2.4 years and 16.5 percent of the estate to resolve bankruptcy in Argentina.

4. Industrial Policies

Investment Incentives

Government incentives do not make any distinction between foreign and domestic investors.

The Argentine government offers a number of investment promotion programs at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels to attract investment to specific economic sectors such as capital assets and infrastructure, innovation and technological development, and energy, with no discrimination between national or foreign-owned enterprises. They also offer incentives to encourage the productive development of specific geographical areas. The Investment and International Trade Promotion Agency provides cost-free assessment and information to investors to facilitate operations in the country. Argentina’s investment promotion programs and regimes can be found at: http://www.investandtrade.org.ar/?lang=en  http://www.inversionycomercio.org.ar/en/where_tax_benefits.php?wia=1&lang=en<http://www.inversionycomercio.org.ar/docs/pdf/Doing_Business_in_Argentina-2018.pdf, and http://www.produccion.gob.ar.

The National Fund for the Development of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises provides low cost credit to small and medium-sized enterprises for investment projects, labor, capital, and energy efficiency improvement with no distinction between national or foreign-owned enterprises. More information can be found at https://www.argentina.gob.ar/produccion/financiamiento 

The Ministry of Production and Labor supports numerous employment training programs that are frequently free to the participants and do not differentiate based on nationality.

Some of the investment promotion programs require investments within a specific region or locality, industry, or economic activity. Some programs offer refunds on Value-Added Tax (VAT) or other tax incentives for local production of capital goods.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

Argentina has two types of tax-exempt trading areas: Free Trade Zones (FTZ), which are located throughout the country, and the more comprehensive Special Customs Area (SCA), which covers all of Tierra del Fuego Province and is scheduled to expire at the end of 2023.

Argentine law defines an FTZ as a territory outside the “general customs area” (GCA, i.e., the rest of Argentina) where neither the inflows nor outflows of exported final merchandise are subject to tariffs, non-tariff barriers, or other taxes on goods. Goods produced within a FTZ generally cannot be shipped to the GCA unless they are capital goods not produced in the rest of the country. The labor, sanitary, ecological, safety, criminal, and financial regulations within FTZs are the same as those that prevail in the GCA. Foreign firms receive national treatment in FTZs.

Merchandise shipped from the GCA to a FTZ may receive export incentive benefits, if applicable, only after the goods are exported from the FTZ to a third country destination. Merchandise shipped from the GCA to a FTZ and later exported to another country is not exempt from export taxes. Any value added in an FTZ or re-export from an FTZ is exempt from export taxes. For more information on FTZ in Argentina see: http://www.afip.gob.ar/zonasFrancas/ .

Products manufactured in an SCA may enter the GCA free from taxes or tariffs. In addition, the government may enact special regulations that exempt products shipped through an SCA (but not manufactured therein) from all forms of taxation except excise taxes. The SCA program provides benefits for established companies that meet specific production and employment objectives.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

Employment and Investor Requirements

The Argentine national government does not have local employment mandates nor does it apply such schemes to senior management or boards of directors. However, certain provincial governments do require employers to hire a certain percentage of their workforce from provincial residents. There are no excessively onerous visa, residence, work permit, or similar requirements inhibiting mobility of foreign investors and their employees. Under Argentine Law, conditions to invest are equal for national and foreign investors. As of March 2018, citizens of MERCOSUR countries can obtain legal residence within five months and at little cost, which grants permission to work. Argentina suspended its method for expediting this process in early 2018.

Goods, Technology, and Data Treatment

Argentina has local content requirements for specific sectors. Requirements are applicable to domestic and foreign investors equally. Argentine law establishes a national preference for local industry for most government procurement if the domestic supplier’s tender is no more than five to seven percent higher than the foreign tender. The amount by which the domestic bid may exceed a foreign bid depends on the size of the domestic company making the bid. On May 10, 2018, Argentina issued Law 27,437, giving additional priority to Argentine small and medium-sized enterprises and, separately, requiring that foreign companies that win a tender must subcontract domestic companies to cover 20 percent of the value of the work. The preference applies to procurement by all government agencies, public utilities, and concessionaires.  There is similar legislation at the sub-national (provincial) level.

On September 5, 2018, the government issued Decree 800/2018, which provides the regulatory framework for Law 27,437. On November 16, 2016, the government passed a public-private partnership (PPP) law (27,328) that regulates public-private contracts. The law lowered regulatory barriers to foreign investment in public infrastructure projects with the aim of attracting more foreign direct investment. Several projects under the PPP initiative have been canceled or put on hold due to an ongoing investigation on corruption in public works projects during the last administration. The PPP law contains a “Buy Argentina” clause that mandates at least 33 percent local content for every public project.

Argentina is not a signatory to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), but it became an observer to the GPA in February 1997.

On July 5, 2016, the Ministry of Production and Labor and the Ministry of Energy and Mining issued Joint Resolutions 123 and 313, which allow companies to obtain tax benefits on purchases of solar or wind energy equipment for use in investment projects that incorporate at least 60 percent local content in their electromechanical installations.  In cases where local supply is insufficient to reach the 60 percent threshold, the threshold can be reduced to 30 percent. The resolutions also provide tax exemptions for imports of capital and intermediate goods that are not locally produced for use in the investment projects.

On August 1, 2016, Argentina passed law 27,263, implemented by Resolution 599-E/2016, which provides tax credits to automotive manufacturers for the purchase of locally-produced automotive parts and accessories incorporated into specific types of vehicles. The tax credits range from 4 percent to 15 percent of the value of the purchased parts.  The list of vehicle types included in the regime can be found here: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/260000-264999/263955/norma.htm . On April 20, 2018, Argentina issued Resolution 28/2018, simplifying the procedure for obtaining the tax credits. The resolution also establishes that if the national content drops below the minimum required by the resolution because of relative price changes due to exchange rate fluctuations, automotive manufacturers will not be considered non-compliant with the regime. However, the resolution sets forth that tax benefits will be suspended for the quarter when the drop was registered.

The Media Law, enacted in 2009 and amended in 2015, requires companies to produce advertising and publicity materials locally or to include 60 percent local content. The Media Law also establishes a 70 percent local production content requirement for companies with radio licenses. Additionally, the Media Law requires that 50 percent of the news and 30 percent of the music that is broadcast on the radio be of Argentine origin. In the case of private television operators, at least 60 percent of broadcast content must be of Argentine origin. Of that 60 percent, 30 percent must be local news and 10 to 30 percent must be local independent content.

Argentina establishes percentages of local content in the production process for manufacturers of mobile and cellular radio communication equipment operating in Tierra del Fuego province.  Resolution 66, issued July 12, 2018, replaces Resolution 1219/2015 and maintains the local content requirement for products such as technical manuals, packaging, and labeling. Resolution 66 eliminated the local content requirement imposed by Resolution 1219 for batteries, screws, and chargers. The percentage of local content required ranges from 10 percent to 100 percent depending on the process or item. In cases where local supply is insufficient to meet local content requirements, companies may apply for an exemption that is subject to review every six months. A detailed description of local content percentage requirements can be found here .

There are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption, nor does the government prevent companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the country’s territory.

Argentina does not have forced localization of content in technology or requirements of data storage in country.

Investment Performance Requirements

There is no discrimination between domestic and foreign investors in investment incentives. There are no performance requirements. A complete guide of incentives for investors in Argentina can be found at: http://www.inversionycomercio.org.ar/invest_argentina.php .

5. Protection of Property Rights

Real Property

Secured interests in property, including mortgages, are recognized in Argentina. Such interests can be easily and effectively registered. They also can be readily bought and sold. Argentina manages a national registry of real estate ownership (Registro de la Propiedad Inmueble) at http://www.dnrpi.jus.gov.ar/ . No data is available on the percent of all land that does not have clear title. There are no specific regulations regarding land lease and acquisition of residential and commercial real estate by foreign investors. Law 26,737 (Regime for Protection of National Domain over Ownership, Possession or Tenure of Rural Land) establishes the restrictions of foreign ownership on rural and productive lands, including water bodies. Foreign ownership is also restricted on land located near borders.

Legal claims may be brought to evict persons unlawfully occupying real property, even if the property is unoccupied by the lawful owner. However, these legal proceedings can be quite lengthy, and until the legal proceedings are complete, evicting squatters is problematic. The title and actual conditions of real property interests under consideration should be carefully reviewed before acquisition.

Argentine Law 26.160 prevents the eviction and confiscation of land traditionally occupied by indigenous communities in Argentina, or encumbered with an indigenous land claim. Indigenous land claims can be found in the land registry. Enforcement is carried out by the National Institute of Indigenous Affairs, under the Ministry of Social Development.

Intellectual Property Rights

The government of Argentina adheres to some treaties and international agreements on intellectual property (IP) and belongs to the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization. The Argentine Congress ratified the Uruguay Round agreements, including the provisions on intellectual property, in Law 24425 on January 5, 1995.

The U.S. Trade Representative’s 2019 Special 301 Report identified Argentina on the Priority Watch List. Trading partners on the Priority Watch List present the most significant concerns regarding inadequate or ineffective IP protection or enforcement or actions that otherwise limit market access for persons relying on IP protection. For a complete version of the 2019 Report, see: https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/april/ustr-releases-2018-special-301-report .

Argentina continues to present longstanding and well-known challenges to IP-intensive industries, including from the United States. A key deficiency in Argentina’s legal framework for patents is the unduly broad limitations on patent eligible subject matter. Pursuant to a highly problematic 2012 Joint Resolution establishing guidelines for the examination of patents, Argentina rejects patent applications for categories of pharmaceutical inventions that are eligible for patentability in other jurisdictions, including in the United States. Additionally, to be patentable, Argentina requires that processes for the manufacture of active compounds disclosed in a specification be reproducible and applicable on an industrial scale. Stakeholders assert that Resolution 283/2015, introduced in September 2015, also limits the ability to patent biotechnological innovations based on living matter and natural substances. Such measures have interfered with the ability of companies investing in Argentina to protect their IP and may be inconsistent with international norms. Another ongoing challenge to the innovative agricultural, chemical, and pharmaceutical sectors is inadequate protection against the unfair commercial use, as well as unauthorized disclosure, of undisclosed test or other data generated to obtain marketing approval for products in those sectors. Argentina struggles with a substantial backlog of patent applications resulting in long delays for innovators seeking patent protection in the market, a problem compounded by a reduction in the number of patent examiners in 2018 primarily due to a government-wide hiring freeze.

Enforcement of IP rights in Argentina continues to be a challenge and stakeholders report widespread unfair competition from sellers of counterfeit and pirated goods and services. La Salada in Buenos Aires remains the largest counterfeit market in Latin America. Argentine police generally do not take ex officio actions, prosecutions can stall and languish in excessive formalities, and, when a criminal case does reach final judgment, infringers rarely receive deterrent sentences. Hard goods counterfeiting and optical disc piracy is widespread, and online piracy continues to grow as criminal enforcement against online piracy is nearly nonexistent. As a result, IP enforcement online in Argentina consists mainly of right holders trying to convince cooperative Argentine ISPs to agree to take down specific infringing works, as well as attempting to seek injunctions in civil cases. Right holders also cite widespread use of unlicensed software by Argentine private enterprises and the government.

Over the last year, Argentina made limited progress in IP protection and enforcement. Beset with economic challenges, Argentina’s government agencies were strapped by a reduction of funding and a government-wide hiring freeze, and many of Argentina’s IP-related initiatives that had gained momentum last year did not gain further traction due to a lack of resources. Despite these circumstances, the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) revamped its procedures and began accepting electronic filing of patent, trademark, and industrial designs applications as of October 1, 2018. Argentina also improved registration procedures for trademarks and industrial designs.  On trademarks, the law now provides for a fast track option that reduces the time to register a trademark to four months. The United States continues to monitor this change as INPI works on the implementing regulation. For industrial designs, INPI now accepts multiple applications in a single filing and applicants may substitute digital photographs for formal drawings. To further improve patent protection in Argentina, including for small and medium-sized enterprises, the United States urges Argentina to ratify the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).

Argentina’s efforts to combat counterfeiting continue, but without systemic measures, illegal activity persists.  Argentine authorities arrested the alleged operators of the market La Salada as well as numerous associates in 2017, but vendors continue to sell counterfeit and pirated goods at the market and throughout Buenos Aires. The United States has encouraged Argentina to create a national IP enforcement strategy to build on these successes and move to a sustainable, long-lasting initiative. The United States also has encouraged legislative proposals to this effect, along the lines of prior bills introduced in Congress to provide for landlord liability and stronger enforcement on the sale of infringing goods at outdoor marketplaces such as La Salada, and to amend the trademark law to increase criminal penalties for counterfeiting carried out by criminal networks. In November 2017, Argentina entered into an agreement with the Chamber of Medium-Sized Enterprises and the Argentine Anti-Piracy Association to create a National Anti-Piracy Initiative focusing initially on trademark counterfeiting. The United States encourages Argentina to expand this initiative to online piracy. In March, revisions to the criminal code, including certain criminal sanctions for circumventing technological protection measures (TPMs), were submitted to Congress. While Argentina has moved forward with the creation of a federal specialized IP prosecutor’s office, the office is not yet in operation. In November 2018, following a constructive bilateral meeting earlier in the year, Argentina and the United States held a DVC under the bilateral Innovation and Creativity Forum for Economic Development, part of the U.S.-Argentina Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), to continue discussions and collaboration on IP topics of mutual interest. The United States intends to monitor all the outstanding issues for progress, and urges Argentina to continue its efforts to create a more attractive environment for investment and innovation.

For statistics on illegal sales in Argentina, go to the following link: http://redcame.org.ar/seccion/relevamiento-venta-ilegal 

6. Financial Sector

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

The Macri administration has enacted a series of macroeconomic reforms (unifying the exchange rate, settling with holdout creditors, annulling most of the trade restrictions, lifting capital controls, to mention a few) to improve the investment climate. In May 2018, the Congress approved a new capital markets law aimed at boosting economic growth through the development and deepening of the local capital market. The law removed over-reaching regulatory intervention provisions introduced by the previous government and eased restrictions on mutual funds and foreign portfolio investment in domestic markets. Argentina also signed several bilateral agreements and MOUs with other countries aimed to increase foreign direct investment. There are no restrictions on payments and transfers abroad (in accordance with IMF Article VIII).

The Argentine Securities and Exchange Commission (CNV or Comision Nacional de Valores) is the federal agency that regulates securities markets offerings. Securities and accounting standards are transparent and consistent with international norms. Foreign investors have access to a variety of options on the local market to obtain credit. Nevertheless, the domestic credit market is small – credit is 16 percent of GDP, according to the World Bank. The Buenos Aires Stock Exchange is the organization responsible for the operation of Argentina’s primary stock exchange, located in Buenos Aires city. The most important index of the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange is the MERVAL (Mercado de Valores).

U.S. banks, securities firms, and investment funds are well-represented in Argentina and are dynamic players in local capital markets. In 2003, the government began requiring foreign banks to disclose to the public the nature and extent to which their foreign parent banks guarantee their branches or subsidiaries in Argentina.

Money and Banking System

Argentina has a relatively sound banking sector based on diversified revenues, well-contained operating costs, and a high liquidity level. The main challenge for banks is to rebuild long-term assets and liabilities. Due to adverse international and domestic conditions with the economy entering into a recession with high inflation and interest rates, credit to the private sector in local currency (for both corporations and individuals) decreased 18 percent in real terms in 2018. In spite of falling credit, banks remain well equipped to weather weak economic conditions. The largest bank is the Banco de la Nacion Argentina. Non-performing private sector loans constitute less than four percent of banks’ portfolios. The ten largest private banks have total assets of approximately ARS 2,643 billion (USD 64 billion). Total financial system assets are approximately ARS 5,506 billion (USD 134 billion). The Central Bank of Argentina acts as the country’s financial agent and is the main regulatory body for the banking system.

Foreign banks and branches are allowed to establish operations in Argentina. They are subject to the same regulation as local banks. Argentina’s Central Bank has many correspondent banking relationships, none of which are known to have been lost in the past three years.

The Central Bank has enacted a resolution recognizing cryptocurrencies and requiring that they comply with local banking and tax laws. No implementing regulations have been adopted. Blockchain developers report that several companies in the financial services sector are exploring or considering using blockchain-based programs externally and are using some such programs internally. One Argentine NGO, through funding from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), is developing blockchain-based banking applications to assist low income populations.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

President Macri has issued a number of regulations that lifted all capital controls and reduced trade restrictions. In November 2017, the government repealed the obligation to convert hard currency earnings on exports of both goods and services to pesos in the local foreign exchange market.

Per Resolution 36,162 of October 2011, locally registered insurance companies are mandated to maintain all investments and cash equivalents in the country. The BCRA limits banks’ dollar-denominated asset holdings to 10 percent of their net worth.

In June 2018, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Argentina announced a Standby Arrangement agreement (SBA). Three months after agreeing to a USD 50 billion SBA, Argentina and the IMF announced in September 2018 a set of revisions, including an increase of the line of credit by USD 7.1 billion and front loading the disbursement of funds. The revised program sought to erase any doubts about the government’s ability to cover its financing needs for 2018 and 2019 and in turn, Argentina committed to meeting strict new budget and monetary policy targets. On the monetary side, the BCRA replaced inflation targeting with a policy to ensure zero growth of the monetary base through December 2019. The BCRA also allows the exchange rate to float freely between a floor and ceiling of 34 and 44 pesos per dollar (at the time of introducing the framework).

Originally, the BCRA hoped that the floor and ceiling bounds would avoid a real appreciation of the peso; the adjustment started with a 3 percent monthly increase for the last quarter of 2018, and would drop to a monthly 1.75 percent increase for the second quarter of 2019. However, in mid-April 2019, the BCRA announced that the floor and ceiling will remain constant until the end of 2019, at 39.8 and 51.5 pesos per dollar, respectively. Under this framework, the BCRA may only sell up to USD 150 million reserves per day when trading above the ceiling.

Remittance Policies

According to Resolutions 3,819/2015 and 1/2017, companies and investors have no official restrictions on money conversion, remittances, or repatriation of their earnings.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

The Argentine Government does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund.

7. State-Owned Enterprises

The Argentine government has state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or significant stakes in mixed-capital companies in the following sectors: civil commercial aviation, water and sanitation, oil and gas, electricity generation, transport, paper production, satellite, banking, railway, shipyard, and aircraft ground handling services.

By Argentine law, a company is considered a public enterprise if the state owns 100 percent of the company’s shares. The state has majority control over a company if the state owns 51 percent of the company’s shares. The state has minority participation in a company if the state owns less than 51 percent of the company’s shares. Laws regulating state-owned enterprises and enterprises with state participation can be found at http://www.saij.gob.ar/13653-nacional-regimen-empresas-estado-lns0001871-1955-03-23/123456789-0abc-defg-g17-81000scanyel .

Through the government’s social security agency (ANSES), the Argentine government owns stakes ranging from one to 31 percent in 46 publically-listed companies. U.S. investors also own shares in some of these companies. As part of the ANSES takeover of Argentina’s private pension system in 2008, the government agreed to commit itself to being a passive investor in the companies and limit the exercise of its voting rights to 5 percent, regardless of the equity stake the social security agency owned. A list of such enterprises can be found at: http://fgs.anses.gob.ar/participacion .

State-owned enterprises purchase and supply goods and services from the private sector and foreign firms. Private enterprises may compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, products/services, and incentives. Private enterprises also have access to financing terms and conditions similar to SOEs. SOEs are subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors. SOEs are not currently subject to firm budget constraints under the law, and have been subsidized by the central government in the past; however, the Macri administration is reducing subsidies in the energy, water, and transportation sectors. Argentina does not have regulations that differentiate treatment of SOEs and private enterprises. Argentina has observer status under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement and, as such, SOEs are subject to the conditions of Argentina’s observance.

Argentina does not have a specified ownership policy, guideline or governance code for how the government exercises ownership of SOEs. The country generally adheres to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs. The practices for SOEs are mainly in compliance with the policies and practices for transparency and accountability in the OECD Guidelines.

Argentina does not have a centralized ownership entity that exercises ownership rights for each of the SOEs. The general rule in Argentina is that requirements that apply to all listed companies also apply to publicly-listed SOEs.

In 2018, the OECD released a report evaluating the corporate governance framework for the Argentine SOE sector relative to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs, which can be viewed here: http://www.oecd.org/countries/argentina/oecd-review-corporate-governance-soe-argentina.htm .

Privatization Program

The current administration has not developed a privatization program.

8. Responsible Business Conduct

There is an increasing awareness of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and responsible business conduct (RBC) among both producers and consumers in Argentina. RBC and CSR practices are welcomed by beneficiary communities throughout Argentina. There are many institutes that promote RBC and CSR in Argentina, the most prominent being the Argentine Institute for Business Social Responsibility (http://www.iarse.org /), which has been working in the country for more than 17 years and includes among its members many of the most important companies in Argentina.

Argentina is a member of the United Nation’s Global Compact. Established in April 2004, the Global Compact Network Argentina is a business-led network with a multi-stakeholder governing body elected for two-year terms by active participants. The network is supported by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Argentina in close collaboration with other UN Agencies. The Global Compact Network Argentina is the most important RBC/CSR initiative in the country with a presence in more than 20 provinces. More information on the initiative can be found at: http://pactoglobal.org.ar .

Foreign and local enterprises tend to follow generally accepted CSR/RBC principles. Argentina subscribed to the Declaration on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in April 1997.

Many provinces, such as Mendoza and Neuquen, have or are in the process of enacting a provincial CSR/RBC law. There have been many previously unsuccessful attempts to pass a CSR/RBC law. Distrust over the State’s role in private companies had been the main concern for legislators opposed to these bills.

In February 2019, the Argentine government joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

9. Corruption

Argentina’s legal system incorporates several measures to address public sector corruption. The government institutions tasked with combatting corruption include the Anti-Corruption Office (ACO), the National Auditor General, and the General Comptroller’s Office. Public officials are subject to financial disclosure laws, and the Ministry of Justice’s ACO is responsible for analyzing and investigating federal executive branch officials based on their financial disclosure forms. The ACO is also responsible for investigating corruption within the federal executive branch or in matters involving federal funds, except for funds transferred to the provinces. While the ACO does not have authority to independently prosecute cases, it can refer cases to other agencies or serve as the plaintiff and request a judge to initiate a case.

Argentina enacted a new Corporate Criminal Liability Law in November 2017 following the advice of the OECD to comply with its Anti-Bribery Convention. The full text of Law 27,401 can be found at: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/295000-299999/296846/norma.htm . The new law entered into force in early 2018. It extends anti-bribery criminal sanctions to corporations, whereas previously they only applied to individuals; expands the definition of prohibited conduct, including illegal enrichment of public officials; and allows Argentina to hold Argentines responsible for foreign bribery. Sanctions include fines and blacklisting from public contracts. Argentina also enacted an express prohibition on the tax deductibility of bribes.

Corruption has been an issue in Argentina. In its March 2017 report, the OECD expressed concern about Argentina’s enforcement of foreign bribery laws, inefficiencies in the judicial system, politicization and perceived lack of independence at the Attorney General’s Office, and lack of training and awareness for judges and prosecutors. According to the World Bank’s worldwide governance indicators, corruption remains an area of concern in Argentina. In the latest Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) that ranks countries and territories by their perceived levels of corruption, Argentina ranked 85 out of 180 countries in 2018, an improvement of 10 places versus 2016. Allegations of corruption in provincial as well as federal courts remained frequent. Few Argentine companies have implemented anti-foreign bribery measures beyond limited codes of ethics.

Since assuming office, President Macri made combating corruption and improving government transparency a priority objective for his administration. In September 2016, Congress passed a law on public access to information. The law explicitly applies to all three branches of the federal government, the public justice offices, and entities such as businesses, political parties, universities, and trade associations that receive public funding. It requires these institutions to respond to citizen requests for public information within 15 days, with an additional 15-day extension available for “exceptional” circumstances. Sanctions apply for noncompliance. The law also mandates the creation of the Agency for Access to Public Information, an autonomous office within the executive branch. President Macri also proposed a series of criminal justice and administrative reforms. Chief among these are measures to speed the recovery of assets acquired through corruption, plea-bargaining-type incentives to encourage judicial cooperation, and greater financial disclosure for public servants. In early 2016, the Argentine government reaffirmed its commitment to the Open Government Partnership (OGP), became a founding member of the Global Anti-Corruption Coalition, and reengaged the OECD Working Group on Bribery.

Argentina is a party to the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Convention against Corruption. It ratified in 2001 the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Anti-Bribery Convention). Argentina also signed and ratified the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and participates in UNCAC’s Conference of State Parties. Argentina also participates in the Mechanism for Follow-up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (MESICIC).

Since Argentina became a party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, allegations of Argentine individuals or companies bribing foreign officials have surfaced. A March 2017 report by the OECD Working Group on Bribery indicated there were 13 known foreign bribery allegations involving Argentine companies and individuals as of that date.  According to the report, Argentine authorities investigated and closed some of the allegations and declined to investigate others.  The authorities determined some allegations did not involve foreign bribery but rather other offenses.  Several such allegations remained under investigation. 

Resources to Report Corruption

Laura Alonso
Director
Government of Argentina Anti-Corruption Office
Oficina Anticorrupción, Tucumán 394, C1049AAH, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires.
Phone: +54 11 5167 6400
Email: anticorrupcion@jus.gov.ar and http://denuncias.anticorrupcion.gob.ar/ 

Poder Ciudadano (Local Transparency International Affiliate)
Phone: +54 11 4331 4925 ext 225
Fax: +54 11 4331 4925
Email: comunicaciones@poderciudadano.org
Website: http://www.poderciudadano.org 

10. Political and Security Environment

Demonstrations are common in metropolitan Buenos Aires and in other major cities and rural areas. Political violence is not widely considered a hindrance to the investment climate in Argentina.

Protesters regularly block streets, highways, and major intersections, causing traffic jams and delaying travel. Public demonstrations, strikes, and street blocking barricades increased in 2018 in response to economic and political issues. While demonstrations are usually non-violent, individuals sometimes seek confrontation with the police and vandalize private property. Groups occasionally protest in front of the U.S. Embassy or U.S.-affiliated businesses. In February 2016, the Ministry of Security approved a National Anti-Street Pickets Protocol that provides guidelines to prevent the blockage of major streets and public facilities during demonstrations. However, this protocol did not often apply to venues within the City of Buenos Aires (CABA), which fall under the city’s jurisdiction.  The CABA government often did not enforce security protocols against illegal demonstrations.

In December 2017, while Congress had called an extraordinary session to address the retirement system reforms, several demonstrations against the bill turned violent, causing structural damage to public and private property, injuries to 162 people (including 88 policemen), and arrests of 60 people. The demonstrations ultimately dissipated, and the government passed the bill.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

Argentine workers are among the most highly-educated and skilled in Latin America. Foreign investors often cite Argentina’s skilled workforce as a key factor in their decision to invest in Argentina. Argentina has relatively high social security, health, and other labor taxes, however, and high labor costs are among foreign investors’ most often cited operational challenges. The unemployment rate was 9.1 percent in the fourth quarter of 2018, according to official statistics. The government estimated unemployment for workers below 29 years old as roughly double the national rate. Analysts estimate one-third of Argentina’s salaried workforce was employed informally. Though difficult to measure, analysts believe including self-employed informal workers in the estimate would drive the overall rate of informality to 40 percent of the labor force.

Labor laws are comparatively protective of workers in Argentina, and investors cite labor-related litigation as an important factor increasing labor costs in Argentina. There are no special laws or exemptions from regular labor laws in the Foreign Trade Zones. Organized labor plays an important role in labor-management relations and in Argentine politics. Under Argentine law, the Secretariat of Labor recognizes one union per sector per geographic unit (e.g., nationwide, a single province, or a major city) with the right to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement for that sector and geographic area. Roughly 40 percent of Argentina’s formal workforce is unionized. The Secretariat of Labor ratifies collective bargaining agreements. Collective bargaining agreements cover workers in a given sector and geographic area whether they are union members or not, so roughly 70 percent of the workforce was covered by an agreement. While negotiations between unions and industry are generally independent, the Secretariat of Labor often serves as a mediator. Argentine law also offers recourse to mediation and arbitration of labor disputes.

Tensions between management and unions occur. Many managers of foreign companies say they have good relations with their unions. Others say the challenges posed by strong unions can hinder further investment by their international headquarters. Depending on how sectors are defined, some activities such as oil and gas production or aviation involve multiple unions, which can lead to inter-union power disputes that can impede the companies’ operations.

During 2017, the government helped employers and workers agree on adjustments to collective bargaining agreements covering private sector oil and gas sector workers in Neuquen Province for unconventional hydrocarbon exploration and production. The changes were aimed at reducing certain labor costs and incentivizing greater productivity. Employers and unions reached similar agreements in the construction and automotive sectors. The government intends to adapt such agreements to other sectors, while it seeks to advance broader labor reforms through new legislation.

The government presented to the Congress in November 2017 a labor reform bill, including four broad thrusts: (1) a labor amnesty that would aim to reduce informality by encouraging employers to declare their off-the-books workers to the authorities without penalties or fines; (2) a National Institute of Worker Education to develop policies and programs aimed at workers’ skills development, as well as a system of workplace-based educational programs specifically for secondary, technical, and university students; (3) a technical commission to limit costs for union healthcare programs by evaluating drugs and medical treatments to determine which ones the union plans must cover; and (4) modifications to the labor contract law to reduce employers’ costs, incentivize hiring, and improve competitiveness. Union resistance to the fourth area led the government to divide the bill into three separate proposals covering the first three reform areas, respectively, and to resubmit the new bills to the congress in May 2018. The three labor reform bills remained pending before congress as of March 2019.

Labor-related demonstrations in Argentina occurred periodically in 2018. Reasons for strikes include job losses, high taxes, loss of purchasing power, and wage negotiations. Labor demonstrations may involve tens of thousands of protestors. Recent demonstrations have essentially closed sections of the city for a few hours or days at a time. Demonstrations by airline employees caused significant flight delays or cancellations in recent months as well.

The Secretariat of Labor has hotlines and an online website to report labor abuses, including child labor, forced labor, and labor trafficking. The Superintendent of Labor Risk (Superintendencia de Riesgos del Trabajo) has oversight of health and safety standards. Unions also play a key role in monitoring labor conditions, reporting abuses and filing complaints with the authorities. Argentina has a Service of Mandatory Labor Conciliation (SECLO), which falls within the Secretariat of Labor, Employment and Social Security. Provincial governments and the city government of Buenos Aires are also responsible for labor law enforcement.

The minimum age for employment is 16. Children between the ages of 16 and 18 may work in a limited number of job categories and for limited hours if they have completed compulsory schooling, which normally ends at age 18. The law requires employers to provide adequate care for workers’ children during work hours to discourage child labor. The Department of Labor’s 2016 Worst Form of Child Labor for Argentina can be accessed here: https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/argentina 

The Department of State’s 2018 Human Rights Report for Argentina can be accessed here

Argentine Law prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, nationality, religion, political opinion, union affiliation, or age. The law also prohibits employers, either during recruitment or time of employment, from asking about a worker’s political, religious, labor, and cultural views or sexual orientation. These national anti-discrimination laws also apply to labor relations and other social relations.

Argentina has been a member of the International Labor Organization since 1919.

12. OPIC and Other Investment Insurance Programs

The Argentine government signed a comprehensive agreement with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in 1989. The agreement allows OPIC to insure U.S. investments against risks resulting from expropriation, inconvertibility, war or other conflicts affecting public order. In November 2018, OPIC and the Government of Argentina signed six letters of interest to advance several projects in support of Argentina’s economic growth. The agreements will support sectors ranging from infrastructure to energy to logistics and total USD 813 million dollars in U.S. support that will catalyze additional private investment.

OPIC is open for business in all Latin American and Caribbean countries except Venezuela and Cuba. Argentina is also a member of the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).

13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2018 $451,443 2017 $637,430 www.worldbank.org/en/country  
Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 N/A 2017 $14,907 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data  

www.bcra.gov.ar

Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 N/A 2017 $1,020 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data  
Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2017 N/A 2017 12.2% UNCTAD data available at

https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx  

* https://www.indec.gob.ar/uploads/informesdeprensa/pib_03_19.pdf ;  www.bcra.gov.ar 


Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions)
Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment
Total Inward $80,373 100% Total Outward N/A 100%
United States $17,713 22% N/A N/A
Spain $13,874 17% N/A N/A
Netherlands $9,300 12% N/A N/A
Brazil $4,983 6% N/A N/A
Chile $4,650 6% N/A N/A
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.

No information from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) for Outward Direct Investment is available for Argentina.


Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

Data not available.

14. Contact for More Information

Economic Section
U.S. Embassy Buenos Aires
Avenida Colombia 4300
(C1425GMN)
Buenos Aires, Argentina
+54-11-5777-4747
ECONBA@state.gov

Brazil

Executive Summary

Brazil is the second largest economy in the Western Hemisphere behind the United States, and the eighth largest economy in the world, according to the World Bank.  The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) named Brazil the fourth largest destination for global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows in 2017.  In recent years, Brazil received more than half of South America’s total incoming FDI, and the United States is a major foreign investor in Brazil. The Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) reported the United States had the largest single-country stock of FDI by final ownership, representing 22 percent of all FDI in Brazil (USD 118.7 billion) in 2017, the latest year with available data.  The Government of Brazil (GoB) prioritized attracting private investment in infrastructure during 2017 and 2018.

The current economic recovery, which started in the first quarter of 2017, ended the deepest and longest recession in Brazil’s modern history.  The country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) expanded by 1.1 percent in 2018, below most initial market analysts’ projections of 3 percent growth in 2018.  Analysts forecast a 2 percent growth rate for 2019. The unemployment rate reached 11.6 percent at the end of 2018. Brazil was the world’s fourth largest destination for FDI in 2017, with inflows of USD 62.7 billion, according to UNCTAD.  The nominal budget deficit stood at 7.1 percent of GDP (USD132.5 billion) in 2018 and is projected to end 2019 at around 6.5 percent of GDP (USD 148.5 billion). Brazil’s debt-to-GDP ratio reached 76.7 percent in 2018 with projections to reach 83 percent by the end of 2019.  The BCB has maintained its target for the benchmark Selic interest rate at 6.5 percent since March 2018 (from a high of 13.75 percent at the end of 2016).

President Bolsonaro took office on January 1, 2019, following the interim presidency by President Michel Temer, who had assumed office after the impeachment of former President Dilma Rousseff in August 2016.  Temer’s administration pursued corrective macroeconomic policies to stabilize the economy, such as a landmark federal spending cap in December 2016 and a package of labor market reforms in 2017. President Bolsonaro’s economic team pledged to continue pushing reforms needed to help control costs of Brazil’s pension system, and has made that issue its top economic priority.  Further reforms are also planned to simplify Brazil’s complex tax system. In addition to current economic difficulties, since 2014, Brazil’s anti-corruption oversight bodies have been investigating allegations of widespread corruption that have moved beyond state-owned energy firm Petrobras and a number of private construction companies to include companies in other economic sectors.  

Brazil’s official investment promotion strategy prioritizes the automobile manufacturing, renewable energy, life sciences, oil and gas, and infrastructure sectors.  Foreign investors in Brazil receive the same legal treatment as local investors in most economic sectors; however, there are restrictions in the health, mass media, telecommunications, aerospace, rural property, maritime, and air transport sectors.  The Brazilian Congress is considering legislation to liberalize restrictions on foreign ownership of rural property and air carriers.

Analysts contend that high transportation and labor costs, low domestic productivity, and ongoing political uncertainties hamper investment in Brazil.  Foreign investors also cite concerns over poor existing infrastructure, still relatively rigid labor laws, and complex tax, local content, and regulatory requirements; all part of the extra costs of doing business in Brazil.  

 

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings

Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 105 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2019 109 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings
Global Innovation Index 2018 64 of 126 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical-cost basis) 2017 $68,272 http://www.bea.gov/international/factsheet/
World Bank GNI per capita 2017 $8,600 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

Brazil was the world’s fourth largest destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2017, with inflows of USD 62.7 billion, according to UNCTAD.  The GoB actively encourages FDI – particularly in the automobile, renewable energy, life sciences, oil and gas, and transportation infrastructure sectors – to introduce greater innovation into Brazil’s economy and to generate economic growth.  GoB investment incentives include tax exemptions and low-cost financing with no distinction made between domestic and foreign investors. Foreign investment is restricted in the health, mass media, telecommunications, aerospace, rural property, maritime, insurance, and air transport sectors.  

The Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX) plays a leading role in attracting FDI to Brazil by working to identify business opportunities, promoting strategic events, and lending support to foreign investors willing to allocate resources to Brazil.  APEX is not a one-stop-shop for foreign investors, but the agency can assist in all steps of the investor’s decision-making process, to include identifying and contacting potential industry segments, sector and market analyses, and general guidelines on legal and fiscal issues.  Their services are free of charge. The website for APEX is: http://www.apexbrasil.com.br/en  .

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

A 1995 constitutional amendment (EC 6/1995) eliminated distinctions between foreign and local capital, ending favorable treatment (e.g. tax incentives, preference for winning bids) for companies using only local capital.  However, constitutional law restricts foreign investment in the healthcare (Law 13097/2015), mass media (Law 10610/2002), telecommunications (Law 12485/2011), aerospace (Law 7565/1986 a, Decree 6834/2009, updated by Law 12970/2014, Law 13133/2015, and Law 13319/2016), rural property (Law 5709/1971), maritime (Law 9432/1997, Decree 2256/1997), insurance (Law 11371/2006), and air transport sectors (Law 13319/2016).  

Screening of FDI

Foreigners investing in Brazil must electronically register their investment with the BCB within 30 days of the inflow of resources to Brazil.  In cases of investments involving royalties and technology transfer, investors must register with Brazil’s patent office, the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI).  Investors must also have a local representative in Brazil. Portfolio investors must have a Brazilian financial administrator and register with the Brazilian Securities Exchange Commission (CVM).  

To enter Brazil’s insurance and reinsurance market, U.S. companies must establish a subsidiary, enter into a joint venture, acquire a local firm, or enter into a partnership with a local company.  The BCB reviews banking license applications on a case-by-case basis. Foreign interests own or control 20 of the top 50 banks in Brazil. Santander is the only major wholly foreign-owned retail bank remaining in Brazil.  Brazil’s anti-trust authorities (CADE) approved Itau bank’s purchase of Citibank’s Brazilian retail banking operation in August 2017. In June 2016, CADE approved Bradesco bank’s purchase of HSBC’s Brazilian retail banking operation.  

Currently, foreign ownership of airlines is limited to 20 percent.  Congressman Carlos Cadoca (PCdoB-PE) presented a bill to Brazilian Congress in August of 2015 to allow for 100 percent foreign ownership of Brazilian airlines (PL 2724/2015).  The bill was approved by the lower house, and since March 2019, it is pending a Senate vote. In 2011, the United States and Brazil signed an Air Transport Agreement as a step towards an Open Skies relationship that would eliminate numerical limits on passenger and cargo flights between the two countries.  Brazil’s lower house approved the agreement in December 2017, and the Senate ratified it in March 2018. The Open Skies agreement has now entered into force.

In July 2015, under National Council on Private Insurance (CNSP) Resolution 325, the Brazilian government announced a significant relaxation of some restrictions on foreign insurers’ participation in the Brazilian market, and in December 2017, the government eliminated restrictions on risk transfer operations involving companies under the same financial group.  The new rules revoked the requirement to purchase a minimum percentage of reinsurance and eliminated a limitation or threshold for intra-group cession of reinsurance to companies headquartered abroad that are part of the same economic group. Rules on preferential offers to local reinsurers, which are set to decrease in increments from 40 percent in 2016 to 15 percent in 2020, remain unchanged.  Foreign reinsurance firms must have a representation office in Brazil to qualify as an admitted reinsurer. Insurance and reinsurance companies must maintain an active registration with Brazil’s insurance regulator, the Superintendence of Private Insurance (SUSEP) and maintaining a minimum solvency classification issued by a risk classification agency equal to Standard & Poor’s or Fitch ratings of at least BBB-.

In September 2011, Law 12485/2011 removed a 49 percent limit on foreign ownership of cable TV companies, and allowed telecom companies to offer television packages with their service.  Content quotas require every channel to air at least three and a half hours per week of Brazilian programming during primetime. Additionally, one-third of all channels included in any TV package have to be Brazilian.  

The National Land Reform and Settlement Institute administers the purchase and lease of Brazilian agricultural land by foreigners.  Under the applicable rules, the area of agricultural land bought or leased by foreigners cannot account for more than 25 percent of the overall land area in a given municipal district.  Additionally, no more than 10 percent of agricultural land in any given municipal district may be owned or leased by foreign nationals from the same country. The law also states that prior consent is needed for purchase of land in areas considered indispensable to national security and for land along the border.  The rules also make it necessary to obtain congressional approval before large plots of agricultural land can be purchased by foreign nationals, foreign companies, or Brazilian companies with majority foreign shareholding. Draft Law 4059/2012, which would lift the limits on foreign ownership of agricultural land,

has been awaiting a vote in the Brazilian Congress since 2015.

Brazil is not a signatory to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), but became an observer in October 2017.  By statute, a Brazilian state enterprise may subcontract services to a foreign firm only if domestic expertise is unavailable. Additionally, U.S. and other foreign firms may only bid to provide technical services when there are no qualified Brazilian firms.  U.S. companies need to enter into partnerships with local firms or have operations in Brazil in order to be eligible for “margins of preference” offered to domestic firms to participate in Brazil’s public sector procurement to help these firms win government tenders.  Foreign companies are often successful in obtaining subcontracting opportunities with large Brazilian firms that win government contracts. Under trade bloc Mercosul’s Government Procurement Protocol, member nations Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay are entitled to non-discriminatory treatment of government-procured goods, services, and public works originating from each other’s suppliers and providers.  However, only Argentina has ratified the protocol, and per the Brazilian Ministry of Economy website, this protocol has been in revision since 2010, so it has not yet entered into force.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) 2018 Brazil Economic Survey of Brazil highlights Brazil as a leading global economy.  However, it notes that high commodity prices and labor force growth will no longer be able to sustain Brazil’s economic growth without deep structural reforms.  While praising the Temer government for its reform plans, the OECD urged Brazil to pass all needed reforms to realize their full benefit. The OECD cautions about low investment rates in Brazil, and cites a World Economic Forum survey that ranks Brazil 116 out of 138 countries on infrastructure as an area in which Brazil must improve to maintain competitiveness.  

The OECD’s March 15, 2019 Enlarged Investment Committee Report BRAZIL: Position Under the OECD Codes of Liberalisation of Capital Movements and of Current Invisible Operations noted several areas in which Brazil needs to improve.  These observations include, but are not limited to: restrictions to FDI requiring investors to incorporate or acquire residency in order to invest; lack of generalized screening or approval mechanisms for new investments in Brazil; sectoral restrictions on foreign ownership in media, private security and surveillance, air transport, mining, telecommunication services; and, restrictions for non-residents to own Brazilian flag vessels.  The report did highlight several areas of improvement and the GoB’s pledge to ameliorate several ongoing irritants as well.

The IMF’s 2018 Country Report No. 18/253 on Brazil highlights that a mild recovery supported by accommodative monetary and fiscal policies is currently underway.  But the economy is underperforming relative to its potential, public debt is high and increasing, and, more importantly, medium-term growth prospects remain uninspiring, absent further reforms.  The IMF advises that against the backdrop of tightening global financial conditions, placing Brazil on a path of strong, balanced, and durable growth requires a committed pursuit of fiscal consolidation, ambitious structural reforms, and a strengthening of the financial sector architecture.  The WTO’s 2017 Trade Policy Review of Brazil notes the country’s open stance towards foreign investment, but also points to the many sector-specific limitations (see above). All three reports highlight the uncertainty regarding reform plans as the most significant political risk to the economy.  These reports are located at the following links:

http://www.oecd.org/brazil/economic-survey-brazil.htm  ,

https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/Code-capital-movements-EN.pdf ,

https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2017/cr17216.ashx  , and https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp458_e.htm  .

Business Facilitation

A company must register with the National Revenue Service (Receita) to obtain a business license and be placed on the National Registry of Legal Entities (CNPJ).  Brazil’s Export Promotion and Investment Agency (APEX) has a mandate to facilitate foreign investment. The agency’s services are available to all investors, foreign and domestic.  Foreign companies interested in investing in Brazil have access to many benefits and tax incentives granted by the Brazilian government at the municipal, state, and federal levels. Most incentives target specific sectors, amounts invested, and job generation.  Brazil’s business registration website can be found at http://receita.economia.gov.br/orientacao/tributaria/cadastros/cadastro-nacional-de-pessoas-juridicas-cnpj  .  

Outward Investment

Brazil does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad, and APEX-Brasil supports Brazilian companies’ efforts to invest abroad under its “internationalization program”: http://www.apexbrasil.com.br/como-a-apex-brasil-pode-ajudar-na-internacionalizacao-de-sua-empresa  .  Apex-Brasil frequently highlights the United States as an excellent destination for outbound investment.  Apex-Brasil and SelectUSA (the U.S. government’s investment promotion office at the U.S. Department of Commerce) signed a memorandum of cooperation to promote bilateral investment in February 2014.

2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties

Brazil does not have a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States.  In the 1990s, Brazil signed BITs with Belgium, Luxembourg, Chile, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela.  The Brazilian Congress has not ratified any of these agreements. In 2002, the Executive branch withdrew the agreements from Congress after determining that treaty provisions on international Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) were unconstitutional.  

In 2015, Brazil developed a state-to-state Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement (CFIA) which, unlike traditional BITs, does not provide for an ISDS mechanism.  CFIAs instead outline progressive steps for the settlement of “issue[s] of interest to an investor,” including: 1) an ombudsmen and a Joint Committee appointed by the two governments will act as mediators to amicably settle any dispute; 2) if amicable settlement fails, either of the two governments may bring the dispute to the attention of the Joint Committee; 3) if the dispute is not settled within the Joint Committee, the two governments may resort to interstate arbitration mechanisms.”  The GOB has signed several CFIAs since 2015 with: Mozambique (April 2015), Angola (May 2015), Mexico (May 2015), Malawi (October 2015), Colombia (October 2015), Peru (October 2015), Chile (November 2015), Iran (November 2016), Azerbaijan (December 2016), Armenia (November 2017), Ethiopia (April 2018), Suriname (May 2018), Guyana (December 2018), and the United Arab Emirates (March 2019). The following CFIAs are in force: Mexico, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Peru. A few CFIAs have received Congressional ratification in Brazil and are pending ratification by the other country: Mozambique, Malawi, and Colombia (https://concordia.itamaraty.gov.br/ ).  Brazil also negotiated an intra-Mercosul protocol similar to the CFIA in April 2017, which was ratified on December 21, 2018.  (See sections on responsible business conduct and dispute settlement.)

Brazil does not have a double taxation treaty with the United States, but it does have such treaties with 34 other countries, including: Japan, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Spain, Portugal, and Argentina.  Brazil signed a Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) with the United States in March 2007, which entered into force on May 15, 2013. In September 2014, Brazil and the United States signed an intergovernmental agreement to improve international tax compliance and to implement the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).  This agreement went into effect in August 2015.

3. Legal Regime

Transparency of the Regulatory System

In the 2019 World Bank Doing Business report, Brazil ranked 109th out of 190 countries in terms of overall ease of doing business in 2018, an improvement of 16 positions compared to the 2018 report.  According to the World Bank, it takes approximately 20.5 days to start a business in Brazil. Brazil is seeking to streamline the process and decrease the amount to time it takes to open a small or medium enterprise (SME) to five days through its RedeSimples Program.  Similarly, the government has reduced regulatory compliance burdens for SMEs through the continued use of the SIMPLES program, which simplifies the collection of up to eight federal, state, and municipal-level taxes into one single payment.  

The 2019 World Bank study noted that the annual administrative burden for a medium-size business to comply with Brazilian tax codes is an average of 1,958 hours versus 160.7 hours in OECD high-income economies.  The total tax rate for a medium-sized business in Rio de Janeiro is 69 percent of profits, compared to the average of 40.1 percent in the OECD high-income economies. Business managers often complain of not being able to understand complex, and sometimes contradictory, tax regulations, despite their housing large local tax and accounting departments in their companies.  

Tax regulations, while burdensome and numerous, do not generally differentiate between foreign and domestic firms.  However, some investors complain that in certain instances the value-added tax collected by individual states (ICMS) favors locally-based companies that export their goods.  Exporters in many states report difficulty receiving their ICMS rebates when their goods are exported. Taxes on commercial and financial transactions are particularly burdensome, and businesses complain that these taxes hinder the international competitiveness of Brazilian-made products.  

Of Brazil’s ten federal regulatory agencies, the most prominent include:

  • ANVISA, the Brazilian counterpart to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, which has regulatory authority over the production and marketing of food, drugs, and medical devices;
  • ANATEL, the country’s telecommunications agency, which handles telecommunications, and licensing and assigning of radio spectrum bandwidth;
  • ANP, the National Petroleum Agency, which regulates oil and gas contracts and oversees auctions for oil and natural gas exploration and production, including for offshore pre-salt oil and natural gas;
  • ANAC, Brazil’s civil aviation agency;
  • IBAMA, Brazil’s environmental licensing and enforcement agency; and
  • ANEEL, Brazil’s electric energy regulator that regulates Brazil’s power electricity sector and oversees auctions for electricity transmission, generation, and distribution contracts.

In addition to these federal regulatory agencies, Brazil has at least 27 state-level regulatory agencies and 17 municipal-level regulatory agencies.  

The Office of the Presidency’s Program for the Strengthening of Institutional Capacity for Management in Regulation (PRO-REG) has introduced a broad program for improving Brazil’s regulatory framework.  PRO-REG and the U.S. White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) are collaborating to exchange best practices in developing high quality regulations that mandate the least burdensome approach to address policy implementation.  

Regulatory agencies complete Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) on a voluntary basis.  The Senate has approved a bill on Governance and Accountability for Federal Regulatory Agencies (PLS 52/2013 in the Senate, and PL 6621/2016 in the Chamber) that is pending Senate Transparency and Governance Committee approval after the Lower House proposed changes to the text in December 2018.  Among other provisions, the bill would make RIAs mandatory for regulations that affect “the general interest.” PRO-REG is drafting enabling legislation to implement this provision. While the legislation is pending, PRO-REG has been working with regulators to voluntarily make RIAs part of their internal procedures, with some success.  

The Chamber of Deputies, Federal Senate, and the Office of the Presidency maintain websites providing public access to both approved and proposed federal legislation.  Brazil is seeking to improve its public comment and stakeholder input process. In 2004, the GoB instituted a Transparency Portal, a website with data on funds transferred to and from the federal, state and city governments, as well as to and from foreign countries.  It also includes information on civil servant salaries.

In 2018, the Department of State found Brazil to have met its minimum fiscal transparency requirements in its annual Fiscal Transparency Report.  The Open Budget Index ranked Brazil on par with the United States in terms of budget transparency in its most recent (2017) index. The Brazilian government demonstrates adequate fiscal transparency in managing its federal accounts, although there is room for improvement in terms of completeness of federal budget documentation.  Brazil’s budget documents are publically available, widely accessible, and sufficiently detailed. They provide a relatively full picture of the GoB’s planned expenditures and revenue streams. The information in publicly available budget documents is considered credible and reasonably accurate.

International Regulatory Considerations

Brazil is a member of Mercosul – a South American trade bloc whose full members include Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay – and routinely implements Mercosul common regulations, but still adheres to Brazilian regulations.

Brazil is a member of the WTO, and the government regularly notifies draft technical regulations, such as agricultural potential barriers, to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).  

Legal System and Judicial Independence

Brazil has a civil legal system structured around courts at the state and federal level.  Investors can seek to enforce contracts through the court system or via mediation, although both processes can be lengthy.  The Brazilian Superior Court of Justice (STJ) must accept foreign contract enforcement judgments for the judgments to be considered valid in Brazil.  Among other considerations, the foreign judgement must not contradict any prior decisions by a Brazilian court in the same dispute. The Brazilian Civil Code, enacted in 2002, regulates commercial disputes, although commercial cases involving maritime law follow an older, largely superseded Commercial Code.  Federal judges hear most disputes in which one of the parties is the Brazilian State, and also rule on lawsuits between a foreign state or international organization and a municipality or a person residing in Brazil.

The judicial system is generally independent.  The Supreme Federal Court (STF), charged with constitutional cases, frequently rules on politically sensitive issues.  State court judges and federal level judges below the STF are career officials selected through a meritocratic examination process.  The judicial system is backlogged, however, and disputes or trials of any sort frequently require years to arrive at a final resolution, including all available appeals.  Regulations and enforcement actions can be litigated in the court system, which contains mechanisms for appeal depending upon the level at which the case is filed. The STF is the ultimate court of appeal on constitutional grounds; the STJ is the ultimate court of appeal for cases not involving constitutional issues.  

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

Foreigners investing in Brazil must electronically register their investment with the BCB within 30 days of the inflow of resources to Brazil.  Investors must register investments involving royalties and technology transfer with Brazil’s patent office, the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI).  Investors must also have a local representative in Brazil. Portfolio investors must have a Brazilian financial administrator and register with the Brazilian Securities Exchange Commission (CVM).  

Brazil does not offer a “one-stop-shop” for international investors.  There have been plans to do so for several years, but nothing has been officially created to facilitate foreign investment in Brazil.  The BCB website offers some useful information, but is not a catchall for those seeking guidance on necessary procedures and requirements.  The BCB’s website in English is: https://www.bcb.gov.br/en#!/home .

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

The Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), which falls under the purview of the Ministry of Justice, is responsible for enforcing competition laws, consumer protection, and carrying out regulatory reviews of mergers and acquisitions.  Law 12529 from 2011 established CADE in an effort to modernize Brazil’s antitrust review process and to combine the antitrust functions of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance into CADE. The law brought Brazil in line with U.S. and European merger review practices and allows CADE to perform pre-merger reviews, in contrast to the prior legal regime that had the government review mergers after the fact.  In October 2012, CADE performed Brazil’s first pre-merger review.

In 2018, CADE conducted 74 formal investigations of cases that allegedly challenged the promotion of the free market.  It also approved 390 merger and/or acquisition requests and rejected an additional 14 requests.

Expropriation and Compensation

Article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution assures property rights of both Brazilians and foreigners that live in Brazil.  The Constitution does not address nationalization or expropriation. Decree-Law 3365 allows the government to exercise eminent domain under certain criteria that include, but are not limited to, national security, public transportation, safety, health, and urbanization projects.  In cases of eminent domain, the government compensates owners in cash.

There are no signs that the current federal government is contemplating expropriation actions in Brazil against foreign interests.  Brazilian courts have decided some claims regarding state-level land expropriations in U.S. citizens’ favor. However, as states have filed appeals to these decisions, the compensation process can be lengthy and have uncertain outcomes.  

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

In 2002, Brazil ratified the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards.  Brazil is not a member of the World Bank’s International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).  Brazil joined the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 2010, and its membership will expire in 2022.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

Article 34 of the 1996 Brazilian Arbitration Act (Law 9307) defines a foreign arbitration judgment as any judgment rendered outside the national territory.  The law established that the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) must ratify foreign arbitration awards. Law 9307, updated by Law 13129/2015, also stipulates that a foreign arbitration award will be recognized or executed in Brazil in conformity with the international agreements ratified by the country and, in their absence, with domestic law.  A 2001 Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (STF) ruling established that the 1996 Brazilian Arbitration Act, permitting international arbitration subject to STJ Court ratification of arbitration decisions, does not violate the Federal Constitution’s provision that “the law shall not exclude any injury or threat to a right from the consideration of the Judicial Power.”

Contract disputes in Brazil can be lengthy and complex.  Brazil has both a federal and a state court system, and jurisprudence is based on civil code and contract law.  Federal judges hear most disputes in which one of the parties is the State, and rule on lawsuits between a foreign State or international organization and a municipality or a person residing in Brazil.  Five regional federal courts hear appeals of federal judges’ decisions. The 2019 World Bank Doing Business report found that on average it takes 12.5 procedures and 731 days to litigate a breach of contract.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

Brazil ratified the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama Convention) and the 1979 Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitration Awards (Montevideo Convention).  Law 9307/1996 provides advanced legislation on arbitration, and provides guidance on governing principles and rights of participating parties. Brazil developed a new Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement (CFIA) model in 2015 (https://concordia.itamaraty.gov.br/ ), but it does not include ISDS mechanisms.  (See sections on bilateral investment agreements and responsible business conduct.)

Bankruptcy Regulations

Brazil’s commercial code governs most aspects of commercial association, while the civil code governs professional services corporations.  In 2005, bankruptcy legislation (Law 11101) went into effect creating a system modeled on Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code. Critics of Law 11101 argue it grants equity holders too much power in the restructuring process to detriment of debtholders.  Brazil is drafting an update to the bankruptcy law aimed at increasing creditor rights, but it has not yet been presented in Congress. The World Bank’s 2019 Doing Business Report ranks Brazil 77th out of 190 countries for ease of “resolving insolvency.”

4. Industrial Policies

Investment Incentives

The GoB extends tax benefits for investments in less developed parts of the country, including the Northeast and the Amazon regions, with equal application to foreign and domestic investors.  These incentives were successful in attracting major foreign plants to areas like the Manaus Free Trade Zone in Amazonas State, but most foreign investment remains concentrated in the more industrialized southern states in Brazil.  

Individual states seek to attract private investment by offering tax benefits and infrastructure support to companies, negotiated on a case-by-case basis.  Competition among states to attract employment-generating investment leads some states to challenge such tax benefits as beggar-thy-neighbor fiscal competition.  

While local private sector banks are beginning to offer longer credit terms, the state-owned Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) is the traditional Brazilian source of long-term credit as well as export credits.  BNDES provides foreign- and domestically-owned companies operating in Brazil financing for the manufacturing and marketing of capital goods and primary infrastructure projects. BNDES provides much of its financing at subsidized interest rates.  As part of its package of fiscal tightening, in December 2014, the GoB announced its intention to scale back the expansionary activities of BNDES and ended direct Treasury support to the bank. Law 13483, from September 2017, created a new Long-Term Lending Rate (TLP) for BNDES, which will be phased-in to replace the prior subsidized loans starting on January 1, 2018.  After a five-year phase in period, the TLP will float with the market and reflect a premium over Brazil’s five-year bond yield (a rate that incorporates inflation). The GoB plans to reduce BNDES’s role further as it continues to promote the development of long-term private capital markets.

In January 2015, the GoB eliminated the industrial products tax (IPI) exemptions on vehicles, while keeping all other tax incentives provided by the October 2012 Inovar-Auto program.  Through Inovar-Auto, auto manufacturers were able to apply for tax credits based on their ability to meet certain criteria promoting research and development and local content. Following successful WTO challenges against the trade-restrictive impacts of some of its tax benefits, the government allowed Inovar-Auto program to expire on December 31, 2017.  Although the government has announced a new package of investment incentives for the auto sector, Rota 2030, it remains at the proposal stage, with no scheduled date for a vote or implementation.

On February 27, 2015, Decree 8415 reduced tax incentives for exports, known as the Special Regime for the Reinstatement of Taxes for Exporters, or Reintegra Program.  Decree 8415 reduced the previous three percent subsidy on the value of the exports to one percent for 2015, to 0.1 percent for 2016, and two percent for 2017 and 2018.

Brazil provides tax reductions and exemptions on many domestically-produced information and communication technology (ICT) and digital goods that qualify for status under the Basic Production Process (PPB).  The PPB is product-specific and stipulates which stages of the manufacturing process must be carried out in Brazil in order for an ICT product to be considered produced in Brazil. The major fiscal benefits of the National Broadband Plan (PNBL) and supporting implementation plan (REPNBL-Redes) have either expired or been revoked.  In 2017, Brazil held a public consultation on a National Connectivity Plan to replace the PNBL, but has not yet published a final version.

Under Law 12598/2013, Brazil offers tax incentives ranging from 13 percent to 18 percent to officially classified “Strategic Defense Firms” (must have Brazilian control of voting shares) as well as to “Defense Firms” (can be foreign-owned) that produce identified strategic defense goods.  The tax incentives for strategic firms can apply to their entire supply chain, including foreign suppliers. The law is currently undergoing a revision, expected to be complete in 2018.

Industrial Promotion

The InovAtiva Brasil and Startup Brasil programs support start-ups in the country.  The GoB also uses free trade zones to incentivize industrial production. A complete description of the scope and scale of Brazil’s investment promotion programs and regimes can be found at: http://www.apexbrasil.com.br/en/home  .  

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

The federal government grants tax benefits to certain free trade zones.  Most of these free trade zones aim to attract investment to the country’s relatively underdeveloped North and Northeast regions.  The most prominent of these is the Manaus Free Trade Zone, in Amazonas State, which has attracted significant foreign investment, including from U.S. companies.  Constitutional amendment 83/2014 came into force in August 2014 and extended the status of Manaus Free Trade Zone until the year 2073.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

Government Procurement Preferences:  The GoB maintains a variety of localization barriers to trade in response to the weak competitiveness of its domestic tech industry.

  1. Tax incentives for locally sourced information and communication technology (ICT) goods and equipment (Basic Production Process (PPB), Law 8248/91, and Portaria 87/2013);
  2. Government procurement preferences for local ICT hardware and software (2014 Decrees 8184, 8185, 8186, 8194, and 2013 Decree 7903); and the CERTICS Decree (8186), which aims to certify that software programs are the result of development and technological innovation in Brazil.

Presidential Decree 8135/2013 (Decree 8135) regulated the use of IT services provided to the Federal government by privately and state-owned companies, including the provision that Federal IT communications be hosted by Federal IT agencies. In 2015, the Ministry of Planning developed regulations to implement Decree 8135, which included the requirement to disclose source code if requested.  On December 26, 2018, President Michel Temer approved and signed the Decree 9.637/2018, which revoked Decree 8.135/2013 and eliminated the source code disclosure requirements.

The Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI) mandated the localization of all government data stored on the cloud during a review of cloud computing services contracted by the Brazilian government in Ordinance No. 9 (previously NC 14), this was made official in March 2018.  While it does provide for the use of cloud computing for non-classified information, it imposes a data localization requirement on all use of cloud computing by the Brazil government.

Investors in certain sectors in Brazil must adhere to the country’s regulated prices, which fall into one of two groups: those regulated at the federal level by a federal company or agency, and those set by sub-national governments (states or municipalities).  Regulated prices managed at the federal level include telephone services, certain refined oil and gas products (such as bottled cooking gas), electricity, and healthcare plans. Regulated prices controlled by sub-national governments include water and sewage fees, vehicle registration fees, and most fees for public transportation, such as local bus and rail services.  As part of its fiscal adjustment strategy, Brazil sharply increased regulated prices in January 2015.

For firms employing three or more persons, Brazilian nationals must constitute at least two-thirds of all employees and receive at least two-thirds of total payroll, according to Brazilian Labor Law Articles 352 to 354.  This calculation excludes foreign specialists in fields where Brazilians are unavailable.

Decree 7174 from 2010, which regulates the procurement of information technology goods and services, requires federal agencies and parastatal entities to give preferential treatment to domestically produced computer products and goods or services with technology developed in Brazil based on a complicated price/technology matrix.  

Brazil’s Marco Civil, an Internet law that determines user rights and company responsibilities, states that data collected or processed in Brazil must respect Brazilian law, even if the data is subsequently stored outside the country.  Penalties for non-compliance could include fines of up to 10 percent of gross Brazilian revenues and/or suspension or prohibition of related operations. Under the law, Internet connection and application providers must retain access logs for specified periods or face sanctions.  While the Marco Civil does not require data to be stored in Brazil, any company investing in Brazil should closely track its provisions – as well provisions of other legislation and regulations, including a data privacy bill passed in August 2018 and cloud computing regulations.

5. Protection of Property Rights

Real Property

Brazil has a system in place for mortgage registration, but implementation is uneven and there is no standardized contract.  Foreign individuals or foreign-owned companies can purchase real property in Brazil. Foreign buyers frequently arrange alternative financing in their own countries, where rates may be more attractive.  Law 9514 from 1997 helped spur the mortgage industry by establishing a legal framework for a secondary market in mortgages and streamlining the foreclosure process, but the mortgage market in Brazil is still underdeveloped, and foreigners may have difficulty obtaining mortgage financing.  Large U.S. real estate firms, nonetheless, are expanding their portfolios in Brazil.

Intellectual Property Rights

The last year brought increased attention to IP in Brazil, but rights holders still face significant challenges.  Brazil’s National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) streamlined procedures for review processes to increase examiner productivity for patent and trademark decisions.  Nevertheless, the wait period for a patent remains nine years and the market is flooded with counterfeits. Brazil’s IP enforcement regime is constrained by limited resources.  Brazil has remained on the “Watch List” of the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 report since 2007. For more information, please see: https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/intellectual-property/Special-301 .

Brazil has no physical markets listed on USTR’s 2017 Review of Notorious Markets, though the report does acknowledge a file sharing site popular among Brazilians that is known for pirated digital media.  For more information, please see: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2017 percent20Notorious percent20Markets percent20List percent201.11.18.pdf .

For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)’s country profiles: http://www.wipo.int/directory/en 

6. Financial Sector

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

The Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) embarked in October 2016 on a sustained monetary easing cycle, lowering the Special Settlement and Custody System (Selic) baseline reference rate from a high of 14 percent in October 2016 to 6.5 percent in December 2018.  Inflation for 2018 was 3.67 percent, within the 1.5 percent plus/minus of the 4 percent target. In June 2018, the National Monetary Council (CMN) set the BCB’s inflation target to 4.25 percent in 2019, 4.5 percent in 2020, and 3.75 percent for 2021. Because of a heavy public debt burden and other structural factors, most analysts expect the “neutral policy rate will remain higher than target rates in Brazil’s emerging-market peers (around five percent) over the forecast period.  

After a boom in 2004-2012 that more than doubled the lending/GDP ratio (to 55 percent of GDP), the recession and higher interest rates significantly decreased lending.  In fact, the lending/GDP ratio remained below 55 percent at year-end 2017. Financial analysts contend that credit will pick up again in the medium term, owing to interest rate easing and economic recovery.  

The role of the state in credit markets grew steadily beginning in 2008, with public banks now accounting for over 55 percent of total loans to the private sector (up from 35 percent).  Directed lending (that is, to meet mandated sectoral targets) also rose and accounts for almost half of total lending. Brazil is paring back public bank lending and trying to expand a market for long-term private capital.  

While local private sector banks are beginning to offer longer credit terms, state-owned development bank BNDES is a traditional Brazilian source of long-term credit.  BNDES also offers export financing. Approvals of new financing by BNDES increased 27 percent year-over-year, with the infrastructure sector receiving the majority of new capital.

The Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA) is the sole stock market in Brazil, while trading of public securities takes place at the Rio de Janeiro market.  In 2008, the Brazilian Mercantile & Futures Exchange (BM&F) merged with the BOVESPA to form what is now the fourth largest exchange in the Western Hemisphere, after the NYSE, NASDAQ, and Canadian TSX Group exchanges.  As of April 2019, there were 430 companies traded on the BM&F/BOVESPA. The BOVESPA index increased 15.03 percent in valuation during 2018. Foreign investors, both institutions and individuals, can directly invest in equities, securities, and derivatives.  Foreign investors are limited to trading derivatives and stocks of publicly held companies on established markets.

Wholly owned subsidiaries of multinational accounting firms, including the major U.S. firms, are present in Brazil.  Auditors are personally liable for the accuracy of accounting statements prepared for banks.

Money and Banking System

The Brazilian financial sector is large and sophisticated.  Banks lend at market rates that remain relatively high compared to other emerging economies.  Reasons cited by industry observers include high taxation, repayment risk, and concern over inconsistent judicial enforcement of contracts, high mandatory reserve requirements, and administrative overhead, as well as persistently high real (net of inflation) interest rates.  According to BCB data collected from 2011 through the first quarter of 2019, the average rate offered by Brazilian banks was 9.22 percent, with an average monthly high of 11.34 percent in July 2016, and an average monthly rate of 7.7 percent for March 2019.

The financial sector is concentrated, with BCB data indicating that the four largest commercial banks (excluding brokerages) account for approximately 70 percent of the commercial banking sector assets, totaling USD 1.59 trillion as of Q1, 2019.  Three of the five largest banks (by assets) in the country – Banco do Brasil, Caixa Economica Federal, and BNDES – are partially or completely federally owned. Large private banking institutions focus their lending on Brazil’s largest firms, while small- and medium-sized banks primarily serve small- and medium-sized companies.  Citibank sold its consumer business to Itau Bank in 2016, but maintains its commercial banking interests in Brazil. It is currently the sole U.S. bank operating in the country.

In recent years, the BCB has strengthened bank audits, implemented more stringent internal control requirements, and tightened capital adequacy rules to reflect risk more accurately.  It also established loan classification and provisioning requirements. These measures apply to private and publicly owned banks alike. In April 2018, Moody’s upgraded a collection of 20 Brazilian banks and their affiliates to stable from negative.  The Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) independently regulates the stock exchanges, brokers, distributors, pension funds, mutual funds, and leasing companies with penalties against insider trading.

Foreigners may find it difficult to open an account with a Brazilian bank.  The individual must present a permanent or temporary resident visa, a national tax identification number issued by the Brazilian government (CPF), either a valid passport or identity card for foreigners (CIE), proof of domicile, and proof of income.  On average, this process from application to account opening lasts more than three months

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

Brazil’s foreign exchange market remains small, despite recent growth.  The latest Triennial Survey by the Bank for International Settlements, conducted in December 2016, showed that the net daily turnover on Brazil’s market for OTC foreign exchange transactions (spot transactions, outright forwards, foreign-exchange swaps, currency swaps and currency options) was USD 19.7 billion, up from USD 17.2 billion in 2013.  This was equivalent to around 0.3 percent of the global market in both years.

Brazil’s banking system has adequate capitalization and has traditionally been highly profitable, reflecting high interest rates and fees.  Per an April 2018 Central Bank Financial Stability Report, all banks exceeded required solvency ratios, and stress testing demonstrated the banking system has adequate loss absorption capacity in all simulated scenarios.  Furthermore, the report noted 99.9 percent of banks already met Basel III requirements, and possess a projected Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio above the minimum 7 percent required at the beginning of 2019.

There are few restrictions on converting or transferring funds associated with a foreign investment in Brazil.  Foreign investors may freely convert Brazilian currency in the unified foreign exchange market where buy-sell rates are determined by market forces.  All foreign exchange transactions, including identifying data, must be reported to the BCB. Foreign exchange transactions on the current account are fully liberalized.

The BCB must approve all incoming foreign loans.  In most cases, loans are automatically approved unless loan costs are determined to be “incompatible with normal market conditions and practices.”  In such cases, the BCB may request additional information regarding the transaction. Loans obtained abroad do not require advance approval by the BCB, provided the Brazilian recipient is not a government entity.  Loans to government entities require prior approval from the Brazilian Senate as well as from the Economic Ministry’s Treasury Secretariat, and must be registered with the BCB.

Interest and amortization payments specified in a loan contract can be made without additional approval from the BCB.  Early payments can also be made without additional approvals, if the contract includes a provision for them. Otherwise, early payment requires notification to the BCB to ensure accurate records of Brazil’s stock of debt.

In March 2014, Brazil’s Federal Revenue Service consolidated the regulations on withholding taxes (IRRF) applicable to earnings and capital gains realized by individuals and legal entities resident or domiciled outside Brazil.  The regulation states that the cost of acquisition must be calculated in Brazilian currency (reais). Also, the definition of “technical services” was broadened to include administrative support and consulting services rendered by individuals (employees or not) or resulting from automated structures having clear technological content.

Upon registering investments with the BCB, foreign investors are able to remit dividends, capital (including capital gains), and, if applicable, royalties.  Investors must register remittances with the BCB. Dividends cannot exceed corporate profits. Investors may carry out remittance transactions at any bank by documenting the source of the transaction (evidence of profit or sale of assets) and showing payment of applicable taxes.

Remittance Policies

Under Law 13259/2016 passed in March 2016, capital gain remittances are subject to a 15 to 22.5 percent income withholding tax, with the exception of capital gains and interest payments on tax-exempt domestically issued Brazilian bonds.  The capital gains marginal tax rates are: 15 percent up to USD 1.5 million in gains; 17.5 percent for USD 1.5 million to USD 2.9 million in gains; 20 percent for USD 2.9 million to USD 8.9 million in gains; and 22.5 percent for more than USD 8.9 million in gains.

Repatriation of a foreign investor’s initial investment is also exempt from income tax under Law 4131/1962.  Lease payments are assessed a 15 percent withholding tax. Remittances related to technology transfers are not subject to the tax on credit, foreign exchange, and insurance, although they are subject to a 15 percent withholding tax and an extra 10 percent Contribution for Intervening in Economic Domain (CIDE) tax.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

Law 11887 established the Sovereign Fund of Brazil (FSB) in 2008.  It was a non-commodity fund with a mandate to support national companies in their export activities and to offset counter-cyclical development, promoting investment in projects of strategic interest to Brazil both domestically and abroad.  The GoB also had the authority to use money from this fund to help meet its fiscal targets when annual revenues were lower than expected, and to invest in state-owned companies. In May 2018, then-President Temer signed an executive order abolishing the fund.  The money in the fund was earmarked for repayment of foreign debt.

7. State-Owned Enterprises

The GoB maintains ownership interests in a variety of enterprises at both the federal and state levels.  Typically, boards responsible for state-owned enterprise (SOE) corporate governance are comprised of directors elected by the state or federal government with additional directors elected by any non-government shareholders.  Although Brazil, a non-OECD member, has participated in many OECD working groups, it does not follow the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs. Brazilian SOEs are concentrated in the oil and gas, electricity generation and distribution, transportation, and banking sectors.  A number of these firms also see a portion of their shares publically traded on the Brazilian and other stock exchanges.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the GoB privatized many state-owned enterprises across a broad spectrum of industries, including mining, steel, aeronautics, banking, and electricity generation and distribution.  While the GoB divested itself from many of its SOEs, it maintained partial control (at both the federal and state level) of some previously wholly state-owned enterprises. This control can include a “golden share” whereby the government can exercise veto power over proposed mergers or acquisitions.  

Notable examples of majority government owned and controlled firms include national oil and gas giant Petrobras and power conglomerate Eletrobras.  Both Petrobras and Eletrobras include non-government shareholders, are listed on both the Brazilian and NYSE stock exchanges, and are subject to the same accounting and audit regulations as all publicly-traded Brazilian companies.  Brazil previously restricted foreign investment in offshore oil and gas development through 2010 legislation that obligated Petrobras to serve as the sole operator and minimum 30 percent investor in any oil and gas exploration and production in Brazil’s prolific offshore pre-salt fields.  As a result of the GoB’s desire to increase foreign investment in Brazil’s hydrocarbon sector, in October 2016 the Brazilian Congress granted foreign companies the right to serve as sole operators in pre-salt exploration and production activities and eliminated Petrobras’ obligation to serve as a minority equity holder in pre-salt oil and gas operations.  Nevertheless, the 2016 law still gives Petrobras right-of-first refusal in developing pre-salt offshore fields before those areas are available for public auction.  Industry estimates project bonuses of USD 26.3 billion by opening the Brazilian oil and gas market to foreign investment.

Privatization Program

Given limited public investment funding, the GoB has focused on privatizing state–owned energy, airport, road, railway, and port assets through long-term (up to 30 year) infrastructure concession agreements.  Eletrobras successfully sold its six principal, highly-indebted power distributors. The SOE is currently working to begin a capitalization process to reduce the GoB’s share holdings in the company to less than 50 percent.  The process cannot move forward, however, until Congress passes a bill authorizing the reduction. In 2018, Petrobras faced criticism over its daily fuel adjustment policy and a major 12-day truckers strike hit Brazil and forced the resignation of Petrobras’ CEO Pedro Parente.  To end the strike, the GoB eliminated the collection of the CIDE tax over diesel and gave a USD 3 billion subsidy to diesel producers (mainly Petrobras) to reduce the prices to consumers (primarily truckers).

In 2016, Brazil launched its newest version of these efforts to promote privatization of primary infrastructure.  The Temer administration created the Investment Partnership Program (PPI) to expand and accelerate the concession of public works projects to private enterprise and the privatization of some state entities.  PPI covers federal concessions in road, rail, ports, airports, municipal water treatment, electricity transmission and distribution, and oil and gas exploration and production contracts. Between 2016 and 2018, PPI auctioned off 124 projects and collected USD 62.5 billion in investments.  The full list of PPI projects is located at: https://www.ppi.gov.br/schedule-of-projects 

While some subsidized financing through BNDES will be available, PPI emphasizes the use of private financing and debentures for projects.  All federal and state-level infrastructure concessions are open to foreign companies with no requirement to work with Brazilian partners. In 2017, Brazil launched the Agora é Avançar initiative for promoting investments in primary infrastructure, and this has supported several projects.  Details can be found at: www.avancar.gov.br .The latest information available about Avançar Parcerias is from September 30, 2018.  From over 7,000 projects, the program has completed 36.5 percent and 92.2 percent are in progress.

In 2008, the Ministry of Health initiated the use of Production Development Partnerships (PDPs) to reduce the increasing dependence of Brazil’s healthcare sector on international drug production and the need to control costs in the public healthcare system, services that are an entitlement enumerated in the constitution.  The healthcare sector accounts for 9 percent of GDP, 10 percent of skilled jobs, and more than 25 percent of research and development nationally. These agreements provide a framework for technology transfer and development of local production by leveraging the volume purchasing power of the Ministry of Health. In the current administration, there is increasing interest in PDPs as a cost saving measure.  U.S. companies have both competed for these procurements and at times raised concerns about the potential for PDPs to be used to subvert intellectual property protections under the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).

8. Responsible Business Conduct

Most state-owned and private sector corporations of any significant size in Brazil pursue corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities.  Brazil’s new CFIAs (see sections on bilateral investment agreements and dispute settlement) contain CSR provisions. Some corporations use CSR programs to meet local content requirements, particularly in information technology manufacturing.  Many corporations support local education, health and other programs in the communities where they have a presence. Brazilian consumers, especially the local residents where a corporation has or is planning a local presence, expect CSR activity.  Corporate officials frequently meet with community members prior to building a new facility to review the types of local services the corporation will commit to providing. Foreign and local enterprises in Brazil often advance United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as part of their CSR activity, and will cite their local contributions to MDGs, such as universal primary education and environmental sustainability.  Brazilian prosecutors and civil society can be very proactive in bringing cases against companies for failure to implement the requirements of the environmental licenses for their investments and operations. National and international nongovernmental organizations monitor corporate activities for perceived threats to Brazil’s biodiversity and tropical forests and can mount strong campaigns against alleged misdeeds.

The U.S. diplomatic mission in Brazil supports U.S. business CSR activities through the +Unidos Group (Mais Unidos), a group of more than 100 U.S. companies established in Brazil.  Additional information on how the partnership supports public and private alliances in Brazil can be found at: www.maisunidos.org 

9. Corruption

Brazil has laws, regulations, and penalties to combat corruption, but their effectiveness is inconsistent.  Several bills to revise the country’s regulation of the lobbying/government relations industry have been pending before Congress for years.  Bribery is illegal, and a bribe by a local company to a foreign official can result in criminal penalties for individuals and administrative penalties for companies, including fines and potential disqualification from government contracts.  A company cannot deduct a bribe to a foreign official from its taxes. While federal government authorities generally investigate allegations of corruption, there are inconsistencies in the level of enforcement among individual states. Corruption is problematic in business dealings with some authorities, particularly at the municipal level.  U.S. companies operating in Brazil are subject to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

Brazil signed the UN Convention against Corruption in 2003, and ratified it in 2005.  Brazil is a signatory to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and a participating member of the OECD Working Group on bribery.  It was one of the founders, along with the United States, of the intergovernmental Open Government Partnership, which seeks to help governments increase transparency.  

In 2018, Brazil ranked 105th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.  The full report can be found at: https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 

Since 2014, the federal criminal investigation known as Operação Lava Jato (Operation Car Wash) has uncovered a complex web of public sector corruption, contract fraud, money laundering, and tax evasion stemming from systematic overcharging for government contracts, particularly at parastatal oil company Petrobras.  The ongoing investigation led to the arrests of Petrobras executives, oil industry suppliers including executives from Brazil’s largest construction companies, money launderers, former politicians, and political party operatives. Many sitting Brazilian politicians are currently under investigation.  In July 2017, former Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (Lula) was convicted of corruption and money laundering charges stemming from the Lava Jato investigation.  The Brazilian authorities jailed Lula in April 2018, and the courts sentenced him in February 2019 to begin serving an almost 13-year prison sentence.  In March 2019, authorities arrested former President Michel Temer on charges of corruption.

In December 2016, Brazilian construction conglomerate Odebrecht and its chemical manufacturing arm Braskem agreed to pay the largest FCPA penalty in U.S. history and plead guilty to charges filed in the United States, Brazil, and Switzerland that alleged the companies paid hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes to government officials around the world.  The U.S. Department of Justice case stemmed directly from theLava Jatoinvestigation and focused on violations of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.  Details on the case can be found at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/odebrecht-and-braskem-plead-guilty-and-agree-pay-least-35-billion-global-penalties-resolve 

In January 2018, Petrobras settled a class-action lawsuit with investors in U.S. federal court for USD 3 billion, which was one of the largest securities class action settlements in U.S. history.  The investors alleged that Petrobras officials accepted bribes and made decisions that had a negative impact on Petrobras’ share value. In September 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that Petrobras would pay a fine of USD 853.2 million to settle charges that former executives and directors violated the FCPA through fraudulent accounting used to conceal bribe payments from investors and regulators.

In 2015, GoB prosecutors announced Operacão Zelotes (Operation Zealots), in which both domestic and foreign firms were alleged to have bribed tax officials to reduce their assessments.  The operation resulted in a complete closure and overhaul of Brazilian tax courts, including a reduction in the number of courts and judges as well as more subsequent rulings in favor of tax authorities.  

Resources to Report Corruption

Petalla Brandao Timo Rodrigues
International Relations Chief Advisor
Brazilian Federal Public Ministry
contatolavajato@mpf.mp.br

Transparencia Brasil
Bela Cintra, 409; Sao Paulo, Brasil
+55 (11) 3259-6986
http://www.transparencia.org.br/contato 

10. Political and Security Environment

Strikes and demonstrations occasionally occur in urban areas and may cause temporary disruption to public transportation.  Occasional port strikes continue to have an impact on commerce. Brazil has over 60,000 murders annually, with low rates of success in murder investigations and even lower conviction rates.  Brazil announced emergency measures in 2017 to counter a rise in violence in Rio de Janeiro state, and approximately 8,500 military personnel deployed to the state to assist state law enforcement.  In February, 2018, then-President Temer signed a federal intervention decree giving the federal government control of the state’s entire public security apparatus under the command of an Army general.  The federal intervention ended on December 31, 2018, with the withdrawal of the military. Shorter-term and less expansive deployments of the military in support of police forces also occurred in other states in 2017, including Rio Grande do Norte and Roraima.  The military also supported police forces in 11 states and nearly 500 cities for the 2018 general elections.

In 2016, millions peacefully demonstrated to call for and against then-President Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment and protest against corruption, which was one of the largest public protests in Brazil’s history.  Non-violent pro- and anti-government demonstrations have occurred regularly in recent years.

Although U.S. citizens are usually not targeted during such events, U.S. citizens traveling or residing in Brazil are advised to take common-sense precautions and avoid any large gatherings or any other event where crowds have congregated to demonstrate or protest.  For the latest U.S. State Department guidance on travel in Brazil, please consult www.travel.state.gov

11. Labor Policies and Practices

The Brazilian labor market is composed of approximately 124 million workers of whom 32.9 million (26.5 percent) work in the informal sector.  Brazil had an unemployment rate of 12 percent as of March 2019, although that percentage was nearly double (22.6 percent) for young workers ages 18-29.  Foreign workers made up less than one percent of the overall labor force, but the arrival of 160,000 economic migrants and refugees from Venezuela since 2016 has led to large local concentrations of foreign workers in the border state of Roraima and the city of Manaus.  Migrant workers from within Brazil play a significant role in the agricultural sector. There are no government policies requiring the hiring of Brazilian nationals.

Low-skilled employment dominates Brazil’s labor market.  During the country’s economic recession (2014-2016), eight low-skilled occupations – such as market attendants and janitors – accounted for half of the roughly 900,000 job openings added to the market.  The number of professionals working as biomedical and information analysts – however small – also increased, while that of bill collectors, cashier supervisors, and welders saw declines. Sectors such as information technology services stood out among those that generated job vacancies between 2011 and 2016.

Workers in the formal sector contribute to the Time of Service Guarantee Fund (FGTS) that equates to one month’s salary over the course of a year.  If a company terminates an employee, the employee can access the full amount of their FGTS contributions or 20 percent in the event they leave voluntarily.  Brazil’s labor code guarantees formal sector workers 30 days of annual leave and severance pay in the case of dismissal without cause. Unemployment insurance also exists for laid off workers equal to the country’s minimum salary (or more depending on previous income levels) for six months.  A labor law that went into effect in November 2017 modified 121 sections of the national labor code (CLT). The law introduced flexible working hours, eased restrictions on part-time work, relaxed how workers can divide their holidays and cut the statutory lunch hour to 30 minutes. The government does not waive labor laws to attract investment; they apply uniformly across the country.  

Collective bargaining is common, and there were 11,587 labor unions operating in Brazil in 2018.  Labor unions, especially in sectors such as metalworking and banking, are well organized in advocating for wages and working conditions, and account for approximately 19 percent of the official workforce according to the Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA).  Unions in various sectors engage in collective bargaining negotiations, often across an entire industry when mandated by federal regulation. The November 2017 labor law ended mandatory union contributions, which has reduced union finances by as much as 90 percent according to the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socio-economic Studies (DIESSE).  DIESSE reported a significant decline in the number of collective bargaining agreements reached in 2018 (3,269) compared to 2017 (4,378).

Employer federations also play a significant role in both public policy and labor relations.  Each state has its own federation, which reports to the National Confederation of Industry (CNI), headquartered in Brasilia, and the National Confederation of Commerce (CNC), headquartered in Rio de Janeiro.  

Brazil has a dedicated system of labor courts that are charged with resolving routine cases involving unfair dismissal, working conditions, salary disputes, and other grievances.  Labor courts have the power to impose an agreement on employers and unions if negotiations break down and either side appeals to the court system. As a result, labor courts routinely are called upon to determine wages and working conditions in industries across the country.  The labor courts system has millions of pending legal cases on its docket, although the number of new filings has decreased since the November 2017 labor law went into effect. Nevertheless, pending legal challenges to the 2017 labor law have resulted in considerable legal uncertainty for both employers and employees.

Strikes occur periodically, particularly among public sector unions.  A strike organized by truckers unions protesting increased fuel prices paralyzed the Brazilian economy in May 2018, and led to billions of dollars in losses to the economy.

Brazil has ratified 97 International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions.  Furthermore, Brazil is party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and major ILO conventions concerning the prohibition of child labor, forced labor, and discrimination.  For the past eight years (2010-2018), the Department of Labor, in its annual publication Findings on the Worst forms of Child Labor, has recognized Brazil for its significant advancement in efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor.  The Ministry of Labor (MTE), in 2018, inspected 231 properties, resulting in the rescue of 1,133 victims of forced labor. Additionally, MTE rescued 1,409 children working in violation of child labor laws.

On January 1, 2019, newly elected President Jair Bolsonaro extinguished MTE and divided its responsibilities between the Ministries of Economy, Justice and Social Development.  

12. OPIC and Other Investment Insurance Programs

Programs of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) are fully available.  Brazil has been a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) since 1992.

13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($ USD) 2017 $2,053 trillion 2017 $2.056 trillion www.worldbank.org/en/country  
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions)

BCB data, year-end.

2017 $95,100 2017 $68,300 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data  

*U.S. is historical-cost basis

Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 $16,070 2017 ($2,030) BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data  

*U.S. is historical-cost basis

Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2017 26.29% 2017 36.4% UNCTAD data available at

https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx    

* IBGE and BCB data, year-end.


Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, billions)
Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment
Total Inward 635.12 100% Total Outward 254.23 100%
Netherlands 158.42 24.9% Cayman Islands 72.58 28.5%
United States 109.61 17.3% British Virgin Islands 46.73 18.4%
Luxembourg 60.12 6.5% Bahamas 37.21 14.6%
Spain 57.98 9.1% Austria 32.14 12.6%
France 33.30 5.2% United States 14.92 5.9%
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.


Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

Portfolio Investment Assets
Top Five Partners (billions, US Dollars)
Total Equity Securities Total Debt Securities
All Countries 40.13 100% All Countries 31.11 100% All Countries 9.02 100%
United States 13.84 34.5% United States 10.37 33.3% United States 3.47 38.5%
Bahamas 6.80 16.9% Bahamas 6.76 21.7% Spain 2.64 29.3%
Cayman Islands 4.25 10.6% Cayman Islands 3.93 12.6% Korea, South 0.50 5.5%
Spain 3.72 9.3% Switzerland 2.01 6.5% Switzerland 0.41 4.5%
Switzerland 2.42 6.0% Luxembourg 1.69 5.4% Denmark 0.38 4.2%

 

14. Contact for More Information

Economic Section
U.S.  Embassy Brasilia
BrasiliaECON2@State.gov
+55-61-3312-7000

Chile

Executive Summary

As the seventh largest economy in the Western Hemisphere, Chile enjoys levels of stability and prosperity that are among the highest in the region.  Chile’s solid macroeconomic policy framework has smoothed adjustment to economic cycles, contributing to relatively low unemployment, resilient household consumption, and a stable financial sector.  Due to its attractive investment climate, trade openness, and reputation for strong financial institutions and sound policies, Chile also boasts the strongest sovereign bond rating in Latin America. The country’s economy grew 4 percent in 2018, and the forecast for Chile’s economic growth in 2019 is in the range of 3 percent to 4 percent. 

Chile has successfully attracted Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) despite its relatively small domestic market.  The country’s market-oriented policies have created significant opportunities for foreign investors to participate in the country’s economic growth.  Chile has a sound legal framework and there is general respect for private property rights. Sectors that attract significant FDI include mining, finance/insurance, chemical manufacturing, and wholesale trade.  Mineral, hydrocarbon, and fossil fuel deposits within Chilean territory are restricted from foreign ownership, but companies may enter into contracts with the government to extract these resources. Corruption exists in Chile but on a much smaller scale than in most Latin American countries, ranking of 27 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index.

Although Chile is an attractive destination for foreign investment, challenges remain. Despite a general respect for intellectual property (IP) rights, Chile has not fully complied with its IP obligations set forth in the U.S.-Chile FTA.  Environmental permitting processes, indigenous consultation requirements, and cumbersome court proceedings have made large project approvals increasingly time consuming and unpredictable, especially in cases with political sensitivities. The current administration has prioritized attracting foreign investment and is implementing measures to streamline the process, including the creation of an investment projects management office in the Ministry of Economy.

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings

Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 27 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2019 56 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings
Global Innovation Index 2018 47 of 126 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator 
U.S. FDI in partner country (USD million, stock positions) 2017 $25,884 http://www.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ 
World Bank GNI per capita (USD) 2017 $13,610 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

Policies towards Foreign Direct Investment

Chile has a successful track record of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), despite the relatively small size of its domestic market.  For nearly four decades, promoting FDI has been an essential part of the Chilean government’s national development strategy. The country’s market-oriented economic policies create significant opportunities for foreign investors to participate. Laws and practices are not discriminatory against foreign investors, who receive treatment similar to Chilean nationals. While Chile’s business climate is generally straightforward and transparent, the permitting process of infrastructure, mining and energy projects has become increasingly contentious, especially regarding politically sensitive environmental impact assessments and indigenous consultations.

InvestChile is the government agency that implements various types of initiatives aimed to foster the entry and retention of FDI into Chile. It provides services in four categories:

  1. attraction (information provision about Chile’s business climate and specific investment opportunities in both public and private projects);
  2. pre-investment (sector-specific legal advisory services and information for decision-making);
  3. landing (advice for installation of the company, foreign investor certificates, access to funds and regional support networks), and
  4. after-care (management of inquiries, assistance for exporting and information for re-investment).

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Foreign investors have access to all productive activities, except for the internal waterways freight transportation sector, in which there is a cap on foreign equity ownership of companies of 49 percent. In 2019, Chile loosened maritime cabotage rules and began allowing large foreign cruise ships to move between Chilean ports. Some international reciprocity restrictions exist for fishing.

Most enterprises in Chile may be 100 percent owned by foreigners.  Chile only restricts the right to private ownership or establishment in what it defines as certain “strategic” sectors, such as nuclear energy and mining.  The Constitution establishes the “absolute, exclusive, inalienable and permanent domain” of the Chilean state over all mineral, hydrocarbon, and fossil fuel deposits within Chilean territory.  However, Chilean law allows the government to grant concession rights to individuals and companies for exploration and exploitation activities, and to assign contracts to private investors, without discrimination against foreign investors.

FDI is subject to pro forma screening by InvestChile.  Businesses in general do not consider these screening mechanisms as barriers to investment because approval procedures are expeditious and investments are usually approved.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

The World Trade Organization (WTO) has not conducted a Trade Policy Review for Chile since June 2015 (available here: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp415_e.htm  ). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has not conducted an Investment Policy Review for Chile since 1997, and the country is not part of the countries covered to date by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) Investment Policy Reviews.

Business Facilitation

The Chilean government took significant steps towards business facilitation during the present decade, including introducing digital processes to start a company.  According to the World Bank, Chile has one of the smoothest and shortest processes among Latin American and Caribbean countries – 11 procedures over an average of 29 days – to establish a foreign-owned limited liability company (LLC). Drafting corporate statutes and obtaining an authorization number can be done online at the platform www.tuempresaenundia.cl  .  Electronic signature and electronic invoicing allow one to register a company, obtain a taxpayer ID number, and get legal receipts, invoices, credit and debit notes, and accountant registries.  A company typically needs to register with Chile’s Internal Revenue Service, obtain a business license from a municipality, and register either with the Institute of Occupational Safety (public) or with one of three private nonprofit entities that provide work-related accident insurance, which is mandatory for employers.  In addition to the steps required of a domestic company, a foreign company establishing a subsidiary in Chile must authenticate the parent company’s documents abroad and register the incoming capital with the Central Bank. This procedure, established under Chapter XIV of the Foreign Exchange Regulations, requires a notice of conversion of foreign currency into Chilean pesos when the investment exceeds USD 10,000.00.  The registration process at the Registry of Commerce of Santiago is available online.

Outward Investment

The Government of Chile does not have an active policy of promotion or incentives for outward investment, nor does it impose restrictions on it.

2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties

According to ICSID, Chile has signed 50 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), 37 of which are in force to date. There are agreements in force with Argentina, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Italy, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and Venezuela.

Chile has 26 FTAs with 64 countries. On January 1, 2004, the United States and Chile brought into force the investment chapter in our bilateral FTA.  Chile has additional investment chapters in force under FTAs with Australia, Canada, China (Supplementary Investment Agreement to the FTA), Colombia, Japan, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Peru and the Pacific Alliance (composed of four countries: Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru).  Chile also signed a new generation bilateral investment agreement with Uruguay that entered into force in 2012. FTAs with investment chapters that are signed but have not entered into force include the Investment Agreement with Hong Kong SAR (Supplementary Investment Agreement to the FTA), the Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP) –which currently awaits ratification from the Senate-, and the Chile-Argentina FTA.  Chile is currently negotiating investment chapters that are part of FTA negotiations between the Pacific Alliance and Associated States (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore), and between Chile and the European Union.

Chile and the United States signed the U.S.-Chile Treaty to Avoid Double Taxation in 2010.  In May 2012, it was submitted to the U.S. Senate and is still pending ratification. The Chilean Congress ratified the treaty in September 2015. Chile has 33 double taxation treaties in force with Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom and Uruguay.  Apart from the U.S.-Chile Treaty to Avoid Double Taxation, Chile has signed double taxation treaties with the Pacific Alliance countries (Colombia, Mexico and Peru) and with China, which have not yet entered into force.

Chile’s 2014 tax reform increased the effective marginal income tax rate on dividends or profits earned by Chilean residents in other countries up to 44.45 percent.  This change is only applied to residents from countries without a bilateral taxation treaty in force with Chile (such as the United States), while residents from the 32 countries with such a treaty maintain a maximum marginal tax rate of 35 percent.

3. Legal Regime

Transparency of the Regulatory System

Chile’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and provide clear rules for competition and a level playing field for foreigners.  They are consistent with international norms; however, environmental regulations, approvals, mandatory indigenous consultation required by the International Labor Organization’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (ILO 169), and other permitting processes have become lengthy and unpredictable, especially in politically sensitive cases.

Four institutions play key roles in the rule-making process in Chile: the Ministry General-Secretariat of the Presidency (SEGPRES), the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy, and the General Comptroller of the Republic.  However, Chile does not have a regulatory oversight body in its institutional setup. Most regulations come from the national government; however, some, in particular those related to land use, are decided at the local level. Both levels get involved in environmental permits.  Regulatory processes are managed by governmental entities. NGOs and private sector associations may participate in public hearings or comment periods. The OECD’s April 2016 “Regulatory Policy in Chile” report asserts that Chile took steps to improve its rule-making process, but still lags behind the OECD average in assessing the impact of regulations, consulting with outside parties on their design, and evaluating them over time.

In Chile, non-listed companies follow norms issued by the Accountants Professional Association, while publicly listed companies use the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  Since January 1, 2018, IFRS 9 entered into force for companies in all sectors except for banking, in which IFRS 15 will be applied. IFRS 16 entered into force in 2019.

The legislation process in Chile allows for public hearings during discussion of draft bills in both chambers of Congress.  Draft bills submitted by the Executive Branch to the Congress are readily available for public comment. Ministries and regulatory agencies are required by law to give notice of proposed regulations, but there is no formal requirement in Chile for consultation with the public, conducting regulatory impact assessments of proposed regulations, requesting comments, or reporting results of consultations.  For lower-level regulations or norms that do not need congressional approval, there are no formal provisions for public hearing or comment. As a result, Chilean regulators and rulemaking bodies normally consult with stakeholders, but in a less regular manner.

All decrees and laws are published in the Diario Oficial (National Gazette), but other types of regulations will not necessarily be found there.  There are no other centralized online locations for published regulations in Chile, similar to the Federal Register in the United States.

According to the OECD, compliance rates in Chile are generally high.  The approach to enforcement remains punitive rather than preventive, and regulators still prefer to inspect rather than collaborate with regulated entities on fostering compliance.  Each institution with regulation enforcement responsibilities has its own sanction procedures. Law 19.880 from 2003 establishes the principles for reversal and hierarchical recourse against decisions by the administration.  An administrative act can be challenged by lodging an action in the ordinary courts of justice, or by administrative means with a petition to the Comptroller General of the Republic. Affected parties may also make a formal appeal to the Constitutional Court against a specific regulation.

Chile still lacks a comprehensive, “whole of government” regulatory reform program.  However, the National Productivity Commission, created in 2014, includes among its main functions the identification of regulatory constraints to increase productivity and recommendations to overcome them.

Chile’s level of fiscal transparency is excellent.  Information on the budget and debt obligations, including explicit and contingent liabilities, is easily accessible online.

International Regulatory Considerations

Chile does not share regulatory sovereignty with any regional economic bloc.  However, several international norms or standards from multilateral organizations (UN, WIPO, ILO, among others) are referenced or incorporated into the country’s regulatory system.  As a member of the WTO, the government notifies draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).

Legal System and Judicial Independence

Chile bases its legal system on civil law.  Chile’s legal and regulatory framework provides for effective means for enforcing property and contractual rights.

Laws governing issues of interest to foreign investors are found in several statutes, including the Commercial Code of 1868, the Civil Code, the Labor Code and the General Banking Act.  Chile has specialized courts for dealing with tax and labor issues.

The judicial system in Chile is generally transparent and independent.  The likelihood of government intervention in court cases is low. If a state-owned firm is involved in the dispute, the Government of Chile may become directly involved through the State Defense Council.

Regulations can be challenged before the court system, the General Comptroller, or the Constitutional Court, depending on the nature of the claim.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

See the section on Policies towards Foreign Direct Investment.

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

Chile’s anti-trust law prohibits mergers or acquisitions that would prevent free competition in the industry at issue.  An investor may voluntarily seek a ruling by an Antitrust Court that a planned investment would not have competition implications.  The National Economic Prosecutor (FNE) is a very active institution conducting investigations in competition-related cases and filing complaints before the Free Competition Tribunal (TDLC), which rules on those cases.

In February 2019, the TDLC fined supermarket chains Walmart, Cencosud, and SMU USD 4.2 million, USD 5.1 million and USD 3.1 million, respectively.  The TDLC ruled in a collusion case introduced by the FNE in 2016 establishing that these retailers set up a minimum prices agreement in the market for fresh poultry meat.

In November 2018, the TDLC fined two laboratories (Biosano and Sanderson, subsidiary of Fresenius Kabi Chile) USD 25.6 million and USD 2.1 million, respectively. The TDLC ruled in a case brought by the FNE in 2012 regarding collusion by these labs in public procurement from the National Central Procurement System for Health Services (CENABAST).

In April 2019, the FNE asked the Supreme Court to overturn the TDLC’s decision in October 2018 to authorize alliances between the Chilean airline Latam and British Airways, Iberia, and American Airlines.  The FNE argued that such alliances would impermissibly reduce competition over the main air routes to Europe and North America.

In April 2018, Oracle agreed to an FNE-proposed plan to improve its information sharing practices. This was the result of an FNE investigation in 2015 into Oracle’s potential abuse of its market dominance in database management systems (DBMS software).

In 2018, the FNE approved the merger between Linde Aktiengesellschaft and Praxair Inc., and the acquisition by Turner International Latin America, Inc (Turner) of all shares in Football Channel (CDF).  On March 20, 2019, the FNE approved acquisition of all shares in Twenty- First Century Fox, Inc. by The Walt Disney Company (Disney.  On May 31, 2018, the FNE approved the acquisition of Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. (BBVA) by Scotiabank Chile.

Expropriation and Compensation

Chilean law grants the government authority to expropriate property, including property of foreign investors, only on public interest or national interest grounds, on a non-discriminatory basis and in accordance with due process.  The government has not nationalized a private firm since 1973. Expropriations of private land take place in a transparent manner, and typically only when the purpose is to build roads or other types of infrastructure. The law requires the payment of immediate compensation at fair market value, in addition to any applicable interest.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

Since 1991, Chile has been a member state to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention). In 1975 Chile became a signatory to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention).

National arbitration law in Chile includes the Civil Procedure Code (Law Num. 1552, modified by Law Num. 20.217 of 2007), and the Law Num. 19.971 on International Commercial Arbitration.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

Apart from the New York Convention, Chile is also a party to the Pan-American Convention on Private International Law (Bustamante Code) since 1934; the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama Convention) since 1976; and the Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States since 1992.

The U.S.-Chile FTA, in force since 2004, includes an investment chapter that provides the right for investors to submit claims under the ICSID Convention; the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration rules; or any other mutually agreed upon arbitral institution.  So far, no U.S. investors have filed claims under the agreement.

Over the past 10 years, there were only two investment dispute cases brought by foreign investors against the state of Chile before the World Bank’s International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal. The first relates to a Spanish-Chilean citizen regarding the expropriation of Chilean newspaper El Clarin in 1975 by Chile’s military regime.  On September 13, 2016, ICSID issued a final ruling in favor of the Chilean state, rejecting the claimant’s request for financial compensation. However, the same person brought a new case in April 2017, related to the State’s actions following a 2008 judgment of the Santiago court in relation to the confiscation of the Goss printing press, as well as the alleged lack of remedy for the deprivation of their property rights in El Clarin.  The case is now pending resolution.

The second case was brought in 2017 by Colombian firm Alsacia, which holds concession contracts as operators of Transantiago, the public transportation system in Santiago de Chile. Claims are that the Government’s actions in relation to Transantiago allegedly created unfavorable operating conditions for the claimants’ subsidiaries and resulted in bankruptcy proceedings.  The case is pending resolution.

Local courts respect and enforce foreign arbitration awards, and there is no history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

Mediation and binding arbitration exist in Chile as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.  A suit may also be brought in court under expedited procedures involving the abrogation of constitutional rights.  The U.S.-Chile FTA investment chapter encourages consultations or negotiations before recourse to dispute settlement mechanisms.  If the parties fail to resolve the matter, the investor may submit a claim for arbitration. Provisions in Section C of the FTA ensure that the proceedings are transparent by requiring that all documents submitted to or issued by the tribunal be available to the public, and by stipulating that proceedings be public.  The tribunal must also accept amicus curiae submissions. The FTA investment chapter establishes clear and specific terms for making proceedings more efficient and avoiding frivolous claims. Chilean law is generally to be applied to all contracts. However, arbitral tribunals decide disputes in accordance with FTA obligations and applicable international law.

In Chile, the Judiciary Code and the Code of Civil Procedure govern domestic arbitration. Local courts respect and enforce foreign arbitral awards and judgments of foreign courts.  Chile has a dual arbitration system in terms of regulation, meaning that different bodies of law govern domestic and international arbitration. International commercial arbitration is governed by the International Commercial Arbitration Act that is modeled on the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.  In addition to this statute, there is also Decree Law Number 2349 that regulates International Contracts for the Public Sector and sets forth a specific legal framework for the State and its entities to submit their disputes to international arbitration.

No Chilean state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been involved in investment disputes in recent decades.

Bankruptcy Regulations

Chile’s Insolvency Law from 1982 was updated in October 2014.  The current law aims to clarify and simplify liquidation and reorganization procedures for businesses to prevent criminalizing bankruptcy.  It also established the new Superintendence of Insolvency and created specialized insolvency courts. The new insolvency law requires creditors’ approval to select the insolvency representative and to sell debtors’ substantial assets.  The creditor also has the right to object to decisions accepting or rejecting creditors’ claims. However, the creditor cannot request information from the insolvency representative. The creditor may file for insolvency of the debtor, but for liquidation purposes only.  The creditors are divided into classes for the purposes of voting on the reorganization plan; each class votes separately, and creditors in the same class are treated equally.

4. Industrial Policies

Investment Incentives

The Chilean government generally does not subsidize foreign investment, nor does it issue guarantees or joint financing for FDI projects.  There are, however, some incentives directed to isolated geographical zones and to the information technology sector. These benefits relate to co-financing of feasibility studies as well as to incentives for the purchase of land in industrial zones, the hiring of local labor, and the facilitation of project financing.  Other important incentives include accelerated depreciation accounting for tax purposes and legal guarantees for remitting profits and capital. Additionally, the Start-Up Chile program provide selected entrepreneurs with grants for USD 15,000 to USD 80,000, along with a Chilean work visa to develop a “startup” business in Chile over a period of 4 to 7 months.  Chile has other special incentive programs aimed at promoting investment and employment in remote regions, as well as other areas that suffer development lags.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

Chile has two free trade zones: one in the northern port city of Iquique (Tarapaca Region) and the other in the far south port city of Punta Arenas (Magallanes Region).  Merchants and manufacturers in these zones are exempt from corporate income tax; value added tax (VAT) – on operations and services that take place inside the free trade zone – and customs duties. The same exemptions also apply to manufacturers in the Chacalluta and Las Americas Industrial Park in Arica (Arica and Parinacota Region).  Mining, fishing, and financial services are not eligible for free zone concessions. Foreign-owned firms have the same investment opportunities in these zones as Chilean firms. The process for setting up a subsidiary is the same inside as outside the zones, regardless of whether the company is domestic or foreign-owned. Zofri is the main FTZ located in Iquique.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

Chile mandates that 85 percent of workforces must be local employees.  Exceptions are described in Section 11. The costs associated with migration regulations do not significantly inhibit the mobility of foreign investors and their employees.

Chile does not follow “forced localization.”  A draft bill that moved forward in Congress and is currently pending final approval could result in additional requirements (owner’s consent) for international data transfers in cases involving jurisdictions with data protection regimes below Chile’s standards.  The bill also proposes the creation of an independent Chilean Data Protection Agency that would be responsible for enforcing data protection standards. Private sector legal experts believe that this draft legislation would impose fewer restrictions on the international transfer of commercial data compared to current U.S. law.

Neither Chile’s Foreign Investment Promotion Agency nor the Central Bank applies performance requirements in their reviews of proposed investment projects.  The investment chapter in the U.S.–Chile FTA establishes rules prohibiting performance requirements that apply to all investments, whether by a third party or domestic investors.  The FTA investment chapter also regulates the use of mandatory performance requirements as a condition for receiving incentives and spells out certain exceptions. These include government procurement, qualifications for export and foreign aid programs, and non-discriminatory health, safety, and environmental requirements.

5. Protection of Property Rights

Real Property

Secured interests in real property are recognized and generally enforced in Chile.  Chile ranked 61 out of 190 economies in the “Registering Property” category of the World Bank’s 2019 Doing Business report.  There is a recognized and generally reliable system for recording mortgages and other forms of liens.

There are no restrictions on foreign ownership of buildings and land, and property rights do not expire.  The only exception, based on national security grounds, is for land located in border territories, which may not be owned by nationals or firms from border countries, without prior authorization of the President of Chile.  There are no restrictions to foreign and/or non-resident investors regarding land leases or acquisitions. In the Doing Business specific index for “quality of land administration” (which includes reliability of infrastructure, transparency of information, geographic coverage and land dispute resolution), Chile obtains a score of 14 out of 30.

Unoccupied properties can always be claimed by their legal owners and, as usurpation is criminalized, several kinds of eviction procedures are allowed by the law.

Intellectual Property Rights

According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s International IP Index, Chile’s legal framework provides for fair and transparent use of compulsory licensing; extends necessary exclusive rights to copyright holders and voluntary notification system; and provides for civil and procedural remedies.  However, intellectual property (IP) protection challenges remain. Private stakeholders have deemed Chile’s framework for trade secret protection insufficient. Pharmaceutical and agrochemical products suffer from relatively weak patenting procedures, there is an absence of an effective patent enforcement and resolution mechanism, and gaps exist in regulations governing data protection.

According to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Country Profile study, no new IP-related laws were enacted in 2018.  A draft bill submitted to Congress in October 2018 would reform Chile’s Industrial Property Law. The new IP bill aims to reduce timeframes, modernize procedures and increase legal certainty for patents and trademarks registration.  On April 9, 2019, the Lower Chamber passed the bill, and it moved to the Senate for a vote.

The Chilean Senate passed a Pharmaceutical Law (Farmacos II) bill in January 2018 “to further modernize local pharmaceutical regulations and provide greater and more informed pharmaceutical access to the Chilean population.”  In addition to problematic provisions related to labeling and prescriptions, the bill introduced for the first time the concept of “economic accessibility” as a criterion that could be used to justify importation of generic medicines despite the existence of a patented drug in the market.

On March 9, 2018, on the last working day of the Bachelet government, the outgoing Minister of Health issued a resolution that allows the government to issue compulsory licenses (CLs) for patent-protected hepatitis C drugs.  Resolution 399 stipulates a “public interest” that justifies granting one or more CLs for the exploitation of patents protecting the active ingredient Sofosbuvir, useful for the treatment of chronic hepatitis C. The Ministry of Health subsequently upheld Resolution 399 through Resolution 1165.

As of April 2019, the Farmacos II bill is still pending Chamber approval.  Although the Piñera administration revised the bill to address several problematic trademark-related provisions in May 2018, members of the Chamber’s opposition-controlled Health Committee reincorporated most of these provisions through the amendment process.  The committee then took the more troubling step of introducing into Farmacos II, for the first time, amendments that stipulate the criteria and process for issuance of a compulsory license.

The Intellectual Property Brigade (BRIDEPI) of the Chilean Investigative Police (PDI) reported that in 2018 Chile seized 1,041,708 items which amounted to USD 9.4 million (a 32.6 percent increase compared to 2017), and arrested 56 individuals on charges related to IPR infringement.  The National Customs Service seized more than 7 million counterfeit products in 2018, worth a total of nearly USD 103 million. These seizures included 113.5 million cigarette boxes and 3.3 million products that violated health regulations (medicines, cosmetics, toys and food).

Chile’s IPR enforcement, according to the WIPO report mentioned above, remains relatively lax, particularly in relation to piracy, copyright and patent protection, while prosecution of IP infringement is hindered by gaps in the legal framework and a lack of expertise in IP law among judges.  Rights holders indicate a need for greater resources devoted to customs operations and a better-defined procedure for dealing with small packages containing infringing goods. The legal basis for detaining and seizing suspected transshipments is also insufficiently clear.

Chile has been included on the Special 301 Priority Watch List (PWL) since January 8, 2007, and remains on the 2019 Priority Watch List.  In October 2018, Chile’s Congress successfully passed a law that criminalizes satellite piracy. However, other big challenges remain, related to longstanding IPR issues under the U.S.-Chile FTA: the implementation of measures against circumvention of technological protection; pending implementation of UPOV 91; the implementation of effective patent linkage in connection with applications to market pharmaceutical products; adequate protection for undisclosed data generated to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical products; and amendments to Chile’s Internet Service Provider liability regime to permit effective action against internet piracy.

Chile is not listed in the USTR’s Notorious Markets List.  For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/  

6. Financial Sector

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

Chile’s authorities are committed to developing capital markets and keeping them open to foreign portfolio investors.  Foreign firms offer services in Chile in areas such as financial information, data processing, financial advisory services, portfolio management, voluntary saving plans and pension funds.  Under the U.S.-Chile FTA, Chile opened up its insurance sectorwith very limited exceptions. The Santiago Stock Exchange is Chile’s dominant stock exchange, and the third largest in Latin America.  However, when compared to other OECD countries, it does not rank high in terms of market liquidity.

Existing policies facilitate the free flow of financial resources into Chile’s product and factor markets and adjustment to external shocks in a commodity-dependent economy.  Chile accepts the obligations of Article VIII (sections 2, 3 and 4) and maintains a free-floating exchange rate system, free of restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.  Credit is allocated on market terms and its various instruments are available to foreigners. The Central Bank does reserve the right to restrict foreign investors’ access to internal credit if a credit shortage exists.  To date, this authority has not been exercised.

Money and Banking System

Nearly a quarter of Chileans have a credit card from a bank and nearly one third have a non-bank credit card, but a lower proportion (16 percent) has a checking account.  However, financial inclusion is higher than banking penetration: a large number of lower-income Chilean residents have a CuentaRut, which is a commission-free card with an electronic account available for all, launched by the state-owned Banco Estado, also the largest provider of microcredit in Chile.

The Chilean banking system is healthy and competitive, and many Chilean banks already meet Basel III standards, which are part of a reform to the General Banking Law, enacted in January 2019 (Basel III standards will be introduced gradually over the next several years). Capital adequacy ratio of the system is slightly above 13 percent as of January 2019 and remains robust even when including discounts due to market and/or operational risks. Non-performing loans are below two percent when measured by the standard 90 days past due criterion.

The Chilean banking system’s total assets, as of February 2019, amounted to USD 371.9 billion, according to the Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions.  The largest four banks account for approximately 65 percent of banking assets (Banco Santander-Chile, Banco de Credito e Inversiones, Banco de Chile and Banco Estado).  Chile’s Central Bank conducts the country’s monetary policy, is constitutionally autonomous from the government, and is not subject to regulation by the Superintendence of Banks.

Foreign banks have an important presence in Chile.  Out of 18 banks currently in Chile, five are foreign-owned but legally established in Chile and four are branches of foreign banks.  Both categories are subject to the requirements set out under the Chilean banking law. There are also 21 representative offices of foreign banks in Chile.  There are no reports of correspondent banking relationships withdrawal in Chile.

In order to open a bank account in Chile, a foreigner must present his/her Chilean ID Card or passport, Chilean tax ID number, proof of address, proof of income/solvency, photo, and fingerprints.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

Law 20.848, which regulates FDI (described in section 1), prohibits arbitrary discrimination against foreign investors and guarantees access to the formal foreign exchange market, as well as the free remittance of capital and profits generated by investments.  There are no other restrictions or limitations placed on foreign investors for the conversion, transfer or remittance of funds associated with an investment.

Investors, importers, and others have unrestricted access to foreign exchange in the official inter-bank currency market.  The Central Bank reserves the right to deny access to the inter-bank currency market for royalty payments in excess of five percent of sales.  The same restriction applies to payments for the use of patents that exceed five percent of sales. In such cases, firms would have access to the informal market.  The Chilean tax service reserves the right to prevent royalties of over five percent of sales from being counted as expenses for domestic tax purposes.

Chile has a free-floating (flexible) exchange rate system.  Exchange rates of foreign currencies are fully determined by the market.  The Central Bank reserves the right to intervene (and seldom uses it in practice) under exceptional circumstances to correct significant deviations of the currency from its fundamentals.

Remittance Policies

Remittances of profits generated by investments are allowed at any time after tax obligations are fulfilled; remittances of capital can be made after one year since the date of entry into the country.  In practice, this permanency requirement does not constitute a restriction for productive investment, because projects normally need more than one year to mature. Under the investment chapter of the U.S.–Chile FTA, the parties must allow free and immediate transfer of covered investments into and out of its territory.  These include transfers of profits, royalties, sales proceeds, and other remittances related to the investment. However, for certain types of short-term capital flows this chapter allows Chile to impose transfer restrictions for up to 12 months as long as those restrictions do not substantially impede transfers. If restrictions are found to impede transfers substantially, damages accrue from the date of the initiation of the measure.  In practice, these restrictions have not been applied in the last two decades.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

Chile has two sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) where the government deposits savings from effective fiscal surpluses.  The Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (FEES) was established in 2007 and was valued at USD 14.2 billion as of February 2019.  The FEES seeks to fund public debt payments and temporary deficit spending, in order to keep a countercyclical fiscal policy. The Pensions Reserve Fund (FRP) was built up in 2006 and amounted to USD 10 billion as of February 2019.  The purpose of the FRP is to anticipate future needs of payments to those eligible to receive pensions, but whose contributions to the private pension system fall below a minimum threshold.

Chile is a member of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) and adheres to the Santiago Principles.

Chile’s government policy is to invest SWFs abroad into instruments denominated in foreign currencies.  As of February 2019, FEES’ portfolio consisted of 55.5 percent of sovereign bonds, 3.5 percent of inflation-indexed sovereign bonds, 33.8 percent of money market instruments and 7.2 percent of stocks.  At the same date, FRP’s portfolio consisted of 38.0 percent of sovereign bonds and related instruments, 10.8 percent of inflation-indexed sovereign bonds, 21.0 percent of corporate and high-yield bonds, 5.9 percent of mortgage backed securities from U.S. agencies and 24.3 percent of stocks.

7. State-Owned Enterprises

Chile had 28 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in operation as of 2017.  They are all commercial companies. Twenty-five SOEs are not listed on any stock exchange and are fully owned by the government. The remaining three are majority government owned.  Ten Chilean SOEs operate in the port management sector; seven in the services sector, three in the defense sector, three in the mining sector (including CODELCO, the world’s largest copper producer); two in transportation; one in the water sector; one TV station; one is an oil and gas company –ENAP-; and one state-owned bank (Banco Estado).  The state also holds a minority stake in four water companies as a result of a privatization process. Total assets of SOEs amounted to USD 73.7 billion in 2017. Total net income of SOEs in 2017 was USD 2.2 billion. SOEs employed 51,564 people in 2017.

Twenty SOEs in Chile fall under the supervision of the Public Enterprises System (SEP), a state holding in charge of overseeing SOE governance, as well as exercising minority rights in four water companies.  The rest – including CODELCO, ENAP and Banco Estado – have their own supervisory structures outside of SEP jurisdiction, but report to government ministries. All 28 SOEs are accountable to Congress, the President and the General Comptroller Office.  Allocation of seats on the boards of Chilean SOEs is determined by the SEP, as described above, or outlined by the laws that regulate them. In CODELCO’s corporate governance, there is a mix between seats appointed by recommendation from an independent high-level civil service committee, and seats allocated by political authorities in the government.

A list of SOEs made by the Budget Directorate, including their financial management information, is available at the following link:  http://www.dipres.gob.cl/599/w3-propertyvalue-20890.html .

In general, Chilean SOEs work under hard budget constraints and compete under the same regulatory and tax frameworks than private firms.  For instance, CODELCO and Banco Estado compete with many private copper mines and private banks, respectively. However, there are specific areas where SOEs enjoy special advantages.  For example, ENAP is the only company allowed to refine oil in Chile. As an OECD member, Chile adheres to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs.

Privatization Program

Chile does not have a privatization program in place at this time.

8. Responsible Business Conduct

Awareness of the need to ensure corporate social responsibility has grown over the last two decades in Chile.  However, NGOs and academics who monitor this issue believe that risk mapping and management practices still do not sufficiently incorporate its importance.

The government of Chile encourages foreign and local enterprises to follow generally accepted Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) principles and uses the United Nations’ Rio+20 Conference statements as its principal reference.  Chile adhered in 1997 to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. It also recognizes the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy; the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; the UN Global Compact’s Ten Principles and the ISO 26000 Guidance on Social Responsibility.  The government established a National Contact Point (NCP) for OECD MNE guidelines located at the General Directorate for International Economic Relations, and recently created the Responsible Business Conduct Department, whose chief is also the NCP. On August 21, 2017 Chile released its National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights based on the UN Guiding Principles.  Separately, the Council on Social Responsibility for Sustainable Development, coordinated by Chile’s Ministry of Economy, is currently developing a National Policy on Social Responsibility.

Regarding procurement decisions, ChileCompra, the agency in charge of centralizing Chile’s public procurement, incorporates the existence of a Clean Production Certificate and an ISO 14001-2004 certificate on environmental management as part of its criteria to assign public purchases.

No high profile, controversial instances of corporate impact on human rights have occurred in Chile in recent years.

The Chilean government effectively and fairly enforces domestic labor, employment, consumer, and environmental protection laws.  There are no dispute settlement cases against Chile related to the Labor and Environment Chapters of the Free Trade Agreements signed by Chile.

Regarding the protection of shareholders, the Superintendence of Securities and Insurance (SVS) has the responsibility of regulating and supervising all listed companies in Chile.  Companies are generally required to have an audit committee, a directors committee, an anti-money laundering committee and an anti-terrorism finance committee. Laws do not require companies to have a nominating/corporate governance committee or a compensation committee.  Compensation programs are typically established by the board of directors and/or the directors committee.

Independent NGOs in Chile promote and freely monitor RBC.  Examples include NGO Accion RSE: http://www.accionrse.cl/, the Catholic University of Valparaiso’s Center for Social Responsibility and Sustainable Development VINCULAR: http://www.vincular.cl/ , ProHumana Foundation and the Andres Bello University’s Center Vitrina Ambiental.

Chile is an OECD member, but is not participating actively in the implementation of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas.

Chile is not part of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

9. Corruption

Chile applies, in a non-discriminatory manner, various laws to combat corruption of public officials, including the 2009 Transparency Law that mandated disclosure of public information related to all areas of government and created an autonomous Transparency Council in charge of overseeing its application.  In 2018, a new provision of law expanded the number of public trust positions required to release financial disclosure, mandated disclosure in greater detail, and allowed for stronger penalties for noncompliance.

Anti-corruption laws do extend to family members of officials, in particular mandatory asset disclosure, and a draft bill incorporating restrictions on appointments and incompatibilities for family members of public officials has been submitted to Congress.  Political parties are subject to laws that limit campaign financing and require transparency in party governance and contributions to parties and campaigns.

Regarding government procurement, the website of ChileCompra (central public procurement agency) allows users to anonymously report irregularities in procurement.  There is a decree that defines sanctions for public officials who do not adequately justify direct contracts.

The Corporate Criminal Liability Law provides that corporate entities can have their compliance programs certified.  Chile’s Securities and Insurance Superintendence (SVS) authorizes a group of local firms to review companies’ compliance programs and certify them as sufficient. Certifying firms are listed on the SVS website.

Private companies have increasingly incorporated internal control measures, as well as ethics committees as part of their corporate governance, and compliance management sections.  Additionally, Chile Transparente (Chilean branch of Transparency International) developed a Corruption Prevention System to provide assistance to private firms to facilitate their compliance with the Corporate Criminal Liability Law.

Chile signed and ratified the Organization of American States (OAS) Convention against Corruption.  The country also ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention on September 13, 2006. Chile is also an active member of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) and, as an OECD member, adopted the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.

NGO’s that investigate corruption operate in a free and adequately protected manner.

U.S. firms have not identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI.

Resources to Report Corruption

Raul Ferrada
Director General
Consejo para la Transparencia
Morande 360 piso 7
(+56)-(2)-2495-2000
rferrada@consejotransparencia.cl

Alberto Precht
Executive Director
Chile Transparente (Chile branch of Transparency International)
Perez Valenzuela 1687, piso 1, Providencia, Santiago de Chile
(+56)-(2)-2236 4507
chiletransparente@chiletransparente.cl

Renata Avila
Executive Director
Ciudadania Inteligente (Founder NGO of the Anticorruption Observatory)
Holanda 895, Providencia, Santiago, Chile
(+56)-(2)-2419-2770

10. Political and Security Environment

Since Chile’s return to democracy in 1990, the incidence of political violence and civil disturbance has been generally low, and has had little impact on the Chilean economy.   During the last 20 years, there have been few incidents of politically motivated attacks on investment projects or installations with the exception of the southern Araucania region and its neighboring Arauco province in the southwest of Bio-Bio region. This area, home to nearly half million indigenous inhabitants, has seen a growing trend of politically motivated violence.  Land claims and conflicts with forestry companies are the main grievances underneath the radicalization of a relatively small number of indigenous Mapuche communities, which has led to the rise of organized groups that pursue their demands by violent means. Incidents include arson attacks on churches, farms, facilities at forestry plantations, and forestry contractors’ machinery and vehicles, as well as occupation of private lands, resulting in over a half-dozen deaths (including some by police forces), injuries, and damage to property. In 2018, the government announced special measures and policies towards the Araucania region. However, the indigenous issue has been further politicized due to anger among landowners, forestry transport contractors and farmers affected by violence, as well as the illegal killing of a young Mapuche activist by special police forces in 2018 and the controversy over accusations of fraud by the police during the investigation of indigenous organized groups.

Since 2011, there have been occasional incidents of vandalism of storefronts and public transport during student and labor groups’ protests, some of which included violent incidents.  Since 2007, Chile has experienced a number of small-scale attacks with explosive and incendiary devices, targeting mostly banks, police stations and public spaces throughout Santiago, including ATM’s, metro stations, universities and churches.  Anarchist groups often claim responsibility for these acts, as they also have been involved in incidents during student and labor protests. In January 2017, an eco-terrorist group claimed responsibility for a parcel bomb that detonated at the home of the chairman of the board of Chilean state-owned mining giant CODELCO.  The same group detonated a bomb of similar characteristics on January 4, 2019 at a bus stop in downtown Santiago, causing five injuries. The investigation of both crimes is still ongoing at the time of this report.

On occasions, illegal activity by striking workers resulted in damage to corporate property or a disruption of operations. Some firms have publically expressed concern that during a contentious strike, law enforcement has appeared to be reluctant to protect private property.

Civil disturbance is not present at levels that could put investments at risk or destabilize the government.  Chilean civil society is active and demonstrations occur frequently. Although the vast majority of demonstrations are peaceful, on occasion protestors have veered off pre-approved routes.  In a few instances, criminal elements have taken advantage of civil society protests to loot stores along the protest route and have clashed with the police. Demonstrations on March 29, the Day of the Young Combatant, and September 11, the anniversary of the 1973 coup against the government of President Salvador Allende, have in the past resulted in damage to property.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

Unemployment in Chile averaged 6.9 percent of the labor force during 2018, while the labor participation rate was 59.7 percent of the working age population.  Immigrants account for nearly nine percent of the labor force. Chilean workers are adequately skilled and some sectors such as mining, agriculture, and fishing employ highly skilled workers.  In general, there is an adequate availability of technicians and professionals. Data on informality are not available for Chile in the ILO databases, but recent estimations made by the National Institute of Statistics suggest informal employment in Chile constitutes 30 percent of the workforce.

Article 19 of the Labor Code stipulates that employers must hire Chileans at least for 85 percent of their staff, except in the case of firms with less than 25 employees. However, Article 20 of the Labor Code includes several provisions under which foreign employees can exceed 25 percent, independent of the size of the company. 

In general, employees who have been working for at least one year are entitled to a statutory severance pay, upon dismissal without cause, equivalent to 30 days of the last monthly remuneration earned, for each year of service.  The upper limit is 330 days (11 years of service) for workers with a contract in force for one year or more. The same amount is payable to a worker whose contract is terminated for economic reasons. Upon termination, regardless of the reason, domestic workers are entitled to an unemployment insurance benefit funded by the employee and employer contributions to an individual unemployment fund equivalent to three percent of the monthly remuneration.  The employer’s contributions shall be paid for a maximum of 11 years by the same employer. Another fund made up of employer and government contributions is used for complementary unemployment payments when needed.

Labor and environmental laws are not waived in order to attract or retain investments.

According to the Labor Directorate, 1,139,955 workers (13.9 percent of Chilean workers) belonged to a trade union in the last quarter of 2016 (latest data available), when 11,653 unions were active.  In the same period, 347,142 workers (4.2 percent of Chilean workers) were covered by collective bargaining agreements. Collective bargaining coverage rates are higher in the financial, mining, and manufacturing sectors.  Unions can form nationwide labor associations and can affiliate with international labor federations. Contracts are normally negotiated at the company level. Workers in public institutions do not have collective bargaining rights, but national public workers’ associations undertake annual negotiations with the government.

The Labor Directorate under the Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing labor laws and regulations.  Both employers and workers may request labor mediation from the Labor Directorate, which is an alternate dispute resolution model aimed at facilitating communication and agreement between both parties.

According to a report from the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES), during 2017, 128 legal strikes took place in sectors where collective bargaining is permitted (a smaller number in comparison to 2017 when there were 198 strikes).  31,799 workers were involved in total in strikes during 2016 (latest data available from the Labor Directorate). As legal strikes in Chile have a restricted scope and duration, in general they do not present a risk for foreign investment.

Chile has and generally enforces laws and regulations in accordance with internationally recognized labor rights of: freedom of association and collective bargaining; the elimination of forced labor; child labor, including the minimum age for work; discrimination with respect to employment and occupation; and acceptable conditions of work related to minimum wage, occupational safety and health, and hours of work.  The maximum number of labor hours allowed per week in Chile is 45. In September 2018, Congress approved a minimum wage increase, by which beginning March, 2019 the national minimum wage is CLP 301,000 – USD 444 – a month for all occupations, including domestic servants, more than twice the official poverty line. There is a special minimum wage of CLP 224,704 (USD 331) a month for workers age 65 and older and age 18 and younger.  There are no gaps in compliance with international labor standards that may pose a reputational risk to investors.

Collective bargaining is not allowed in companies or organizations dependent upon the Defense Ministry or whose employees are prohibited from striking, such as in health care, law enforcement, and public utilities.  Labor courts can require workers to resume work upon a determination that a strike causes serious risk to health, national security, the supply of goods or services to the population, or to the national economy.

The United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force on January 1, 2004.  The FTA requires the United States and Chile to maintain effective labor and environmental enforcement.

12. OPIC and Other Investment Insurance Programs

Since 2013, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) partnered with U.S. solar energy developers to finance five large-scale power facilities throughout the Atacama Desert in northern Chile.  Other OPIC-financed projects in the country include the run-of-river hydropower project Alto Maipo, and the toll road Vespucio Norte Express.

An OPIC Bilateral Investment Agreement between Chile and the United States took effect in 1984.  Chile is a party to the convention of the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).

13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (USD million) 2017 $281,452 2017 $277,076 www.worldbank.org/en/country   
Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
U.S. FDI in partner country (USD million, stock positions) 2017 $32,266 2017 $25,884 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data  
Host country’s FDI in the United States (USD million, stock positions) 2017 $10,334 2017 $2,097 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data  
Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2017 100.3% 2017 109.6% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx  

* Source for Host Country Data: Central Bank of Chile.


Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

According to the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS), total stock of FDI in Chile in 2017 amounted to USD 274.7 billion, compared to USD 248.6 billion in 2016.  The United States remains the main source of FDI to Chile with USD 31.7 billion, representing 12 percent of the total. The following top sources (Canada, Spain and the Netherlands) accounted for 25 percent of Chile’s inward FDI stock.  Cayman Islands, a tax haven, is Chile’s fifth source of FDI. Chile’s outward direct investment stock in 2017 remains concentrated in South America, where Brazil, Peru and Argentina together represented 31 percent of total Chilean outward FDI.  The United States accounted for 9 percent of the total.

Direct Investment From/in Counterpart Economy Data
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions)
Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment
Total Inward 274,653 100% Total Outward $123,643 100%
United States 31,750 12% Brazil $18,234 15%
Canada 26,647 10% Panama $15,232 12%
Spain  22,170 8% Peru $11,122 9%
Netherlands  17,899 7% United States $9,818 8%
Cayman Islands 9,179  4% Argentina $9,142 7%
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.


Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

According to the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), total stock of portfolio investment in Chile as of June 2018 amounted to USD 180.6 billion, of which USD 139 billion were equity and investment funds shares, and the rest were debt securities. The United States are the main source of portfolio investment to Chile with USD 55.6 billion, representing 31 percent of the total.  The following top source is Luxembourg (a tax haven), which is also the main source of equity investment, with 40 percent of the total. Ireland, the United Kingdom and Germany are the following top sources of total portfolio investment to Chile, while Mexico and Japan are among the top five sources of debt securities investment.

Portfolio Investment Assets
Top Five Partners (Millions, US Dollars)
Total Equity Securities Total Debt Securities
All Countries $180,621 100% All Countries $138,958 100% All Countries $41,663 100%
United States $55,613 31% Luxembourg $55,007 40% United States $15,571 37%
Luxembourg $55,214 31% United States $40,042 29% Mexico $5,450 13%
Ireland $11,459 6% Ireland $11,412 8% Japan $4,239 10%
United Kingdom $6,743 4% United Kingdom $5,120 4% Germany $2,192 5%
Germany $6,556 4% Germany $4,364 3% United Kingdom $1,623 4%

14. Contact for More Information

Alexis Gutierrez
Economic Specialist
Avenida Andres Bello 2800, Las Condes, Santiago, Chile
(56-2) 2330 3485
gutierrezaj@state.gov

Colombia

Executive Summary

With markedly improved security conditions, a market of 49 million people, an abundance of natural resources, and an educated and growing middle-class, Colombia continues to be an attractive destination for foreign investment in Latin America.  In the World Bank’s 2019 Doing Business Report, Colombia ranked 65 out of 190 countries in the “Ease of Doing Business” index.

Colombia’s legal and regulatory systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms.  The country has a comprehensive legal framework for business and foreign direct investment (FDI). The U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA), which took effect on May 15, 2012, has strengthened bilateral trade and investment.  Through the CTPA and several international conventions and treaties, Colombia’s dispute settlement mechanisms have improved. Weaknesses include protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), as Colombia has yet to implement certain IPR-related provisions of the CTPA.  Colombia was on the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 Priority Watch List in 2018.

The Colombian government has made a concerted effort to develop efficient capital markets, attract investment, and create jobs.  However, the government has struggled both to replace the lost energy-sector revenues after the price of oil, its largest export, collapsed in 2014, and to adjust to a concomitant devaluation of the peso.  President Ivan Duque took office in August 7, 2018. The new administration passed a tax reform on December 2018, aimed at alleviating the tax burden on companies, increasing private investment, and strengthening economic growth.

Restrictions on foreign ownership in specific sectors still exist.  FDI decreased 20.4 percent from 2017 to 2018, with more than half of the 2018 inflow dedicated to the extractives, finance, and transportation sectors.  Roughly half of the Colombian workforce is in the informal economy, and unemployment registered at 9.7 percent for 2018.

Security in Colombia has improved significantly in recent years, with kidnappings down from 3,572 cases in 2000 to 170 cases in 2018.  Since the 2016 peace agreement between the government and the country’s largest terrorist organization, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia has experienced a significant decrease in terrorist activity.  Negotiations between the National Liberation Army (ELN), another terrorist organization, and the government have stalled, and the ELN continues its attacks on energy infrastructure and security forces. The ELN is one of several powerful narco-criminal operations that poses a threat to commercial activity and investment, especially in rural zones outside of government control.  Despite improved security conditions, coca production is at the highest levels since the 1990s.

Corruption remains a significant challenge in Colombia.  The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (2018) ranked Colombia 60 out of 137 countries.  The Colombian government continues to work on improving its business climate, but U.S. and other foreign investors have voiced complaints about non-tariff and bureaucratic barriers to trade and investment at the national, regional, and municipal levels.

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings

Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 99 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2019 65 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings
Global Innovation Index 2018 63 of 126 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator 
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 $ 7,200 http://www.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ 
World Bank GNI per capita 2017 $ 5,890 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

The Colombian government actively encourages foreign direct investment (FDI).  In the early 1990s, the country began economic liberalization reforms, which provided for national treatment of foreign investors, lifted controls on remittance of profits and capital, and allowed foreign investment in most sectors.  Colombia imposes the same investment restrictions on foreign investors that it does on national investors. Generally, foreign investors may participate in the privatization of state-owned enterprises without restrictions. All FDI involving the establishment of a commercial presence in Colombia requires registration with the Superintendence of Corporations (‘Superintendencia de Sociedades’) and the local chamber of commerce.  All conditions being equal during tender processes, national offers are preferred over foreign offers. Assuming equal conditions among foreign bidders, those with major Colombian national workforce resources, significant national capital, and/or better conditions to facilitate technology transfers are preferred.

ProColombia is the Colombian government entity that promotes international tourism, foreign investment, and non-traditional exports.  ProColombia assists foreign companies that wish to enter the Colombian market by addressing specific needs, such as identifying contacts in the public and private sectors, organizing visit agendas, and accompanying companies during visits to Colombia.  All services are free of charge and confidential. Business process outsourcing, software and IT services, cosmetics, health services, automotive manufacturing, textiles, graphic communications, and electric energy are priority sectors. ProColombia’s “Invest in Colombia” web portal offers detailed information about opportunities in agribusiness, manufacturing, and services in Colombia (www.investincolombia.com.co/sectors).

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Foreign investment in the financial, hydrocarbon, and mining sectors is subject to special regimes, such as investment registration and concession agreements with the Colombian government, but is not restricted in the amount of foreign capital.  The following sectors require that foreign investors have a legal local representative and/or commercial presence in Colombia: travel and tourism agency services; money order operators; customs brokerage; postal and courier services; merchandise warehousing; merchandise transportation under customs control; international cargo agents; public service companies, including sewage and water works, waste disposal, electricity, gas and fuel distribution, and public telephone services; insurance firms; legal services; and special air services, including aerial fire-fighting, sightseeing, and surveying.

According to the World Bank’s Investing Across Sectors indicators, among the 14 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean covered, Colombia is one of the economies most open to foreign equity ownership.  With the exception of TV broadcasting, all other sectors covered by the indicators are fully open to foreign capital participation. Foreign ownership in TV broadcasting companies is limited to 40 percent. Companies publishing newspapers can have up to 100 percent foreign capital investment; however, there is a requirement for the director or general manager to be a Colombian national.

According to the Colombian constitution and foreign investment regulations, foreign investment in Colombia receives the same treatment as an investment made by Colombian nationals.  Any investment made by a person who does not qualify as a resident of Colombia for foreign exchange purposes will qualify as foreign investment. Foreign investment is permitted in all sectors, except in activities related to defense, national security, and toxic waste handling and disposal.  There are no performance requirements explicitly applicable to the entry and establishment of foreign investment in Colombia.

Foreign investors face specific exceptions and restrictions in the following sectors:

Media:  Only Colombian nationals or legally constituted entities may provide radio or subscription-based television services.  For National Open Television and Nationwide Private Television Operators, only Colombian nationals or legal entities may be granted concessions to provide television services.  Colombia’s national, regional, and municipal open-television channels must be provided at no extra cost to subscribers. Foreign investment in national television is limited to a maximum of 40 percent ownership of the relevant operator.  Satellite television service providers are obliged to include within their basic programming the broadcast of government-designated public interest channels. Newspapers published in Colombia covering domestic politics must be directed and managed by Colombian nationals.

Accounting, Auditing, and Data Processing:  To practice in Colombia, providers of accounting services must register with the Central Accountants Board; have uninterrupted domicile in Colombia for at least three years prior to registry; and provide proof of accounting experience in Colombia of at least one year.  No restrictions apply to services offered by consulting firms or individuals. A legal commercial presence is required to provide data processing and information services in Colombia.

Banking:  Foreign investors may own 100 percent of financial institutions in Colombia, but are required to obtain approval from the Financial Superintendent before making a direct investment of ten percent or more in any one entity.  Portfolio investments used to acquire more than five percent of an entity also require authorization. Foreign banks must establish a local commercial presence and comply with the same capital and other requirements as local financial institutions.  Foreign banks may establish a subsidiary or office in Colombia, but not a branch. Every investment of foreign capital in portfolios must be through a Colombian administrator company, including brokerage firms, trust companies, and investment management companies.  All foreign investments must be registered with the central bank.

Fishing:  A foreign vessel may engage in fishing and related activities in Colombian territorial waters only through association with a Colombian company holding a valid fishing permit.  If a ship’s flag corresponds to a country with which Colombia has a complementary bilateral agreement, this agreement shall determine whether the association requirement applies for the process required to obtain a fishing license.  The costs of fishing permits are greater for foreign flag vessels.

Private Security and Surveillance Companies:  Companies constituted with foreign capital prior to February 11, 1994 cannot increase the share of foreign capital.  Those constituted after that date can only have Colombian nationals as shareholders.

Telecommunications:  Barriers to entry in telecommunications services include high license fees (USD 150 million for a long distance license), commercial presence requirements, and economic needs tests.  While Colombia allows 100 percent foreign ownership of telecommunication providers, it prohibits “callback” services.

Transportation:  Foreign companies can only provide multimodal freight services within or from Colombian territory if they have a domiciled agent or representative legally responsible for its activities in Colombia.  International cabotage companies can provide cabotage services (i.e. between two points within Colombia) “only when there is no national capacity to provide the service,” according to Colombian law. Colombia prohibits foreign ownership of commercial ships licensed in Colombia and restricts foreign ownership in national airlines or shipping companies to 40 percent.  FDI in the maritime sector is limited to 30 percent ownership of companies operating in the sector. The owners of a concession providing port services must be legally constituted in Colombia and only Colombian ships may provide port services within Colombian maritime jurisdiction; however, vessels with foreign flags may provide those services if there are no capable Colombian-flag vessels.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

In the past three years, the government has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews (IPRs) through a multilateral organization such as the OECD, WTO, or UNCTAD.

Business Facilitation

New businesses must first register with the chamber of commerce of the city in which the company will reside.  Applicants also register using the Colombian tax authority’s portal at www.dian.gov.co. Apart from the registration with the chamber and the tax authority, companies must register a unified form to self-assess and pay social security and payroll contributions.  The unified form can be submitted electronically to the Governmental Learning Service (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje, or SENA), the Colombian Family Institute (Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar, or ICBF), and the Family Compensation Fund (Caja de Compensación Familiar).  After that, companies must register employees for public health coverage, affiliate the company to a public or private pension fund, affiliate the company and employees to an administrator of professional risks, and affiliate employees with a severance fund.

Colombia went down six spots from 59 to 65 in the World Bank’s 2019 “Ease of Doing Business” index.  According to the report, starting a company in Colombia requires eight procedures and takes an average of 11 days.  Information on starting a company can be found at www.ccb.org.co/en/Creating-a-company/Company-start-up/Step-by-step-company-creation ; http://www.investincolombia.com.co/how-to-invest.html#slider_alias_steps-to-establish-your-company-in-colombia ; and www.dian.gov.co. 

Outward Investment

ProColombia, the government’s FDI promotion agency, also promotes Colombian investment abroad.  The “Colombia Invests” web portal (http://www.colombiainvierte.com.co/ ) offers detailed information for opportunities in the priority sectors of agribusiness, manufacturing, and services for Colombian investors in a range of countries.  ProColombia also offers a network of foreign contacts and plans commercial missions.

2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties

BITs or FTAs:

Colombia has 13 free trade agreements or agreements of economic cooperation that include investment chapters with: the United States, the European Union, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico, South Korea, CAN (Andean Community of Nations – Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia), the Pacific Alliance (Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Peru), EFTA (European Free Trade Area –Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland), Mercosur (Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina), and Central America’s Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala).  Colombia has subscribed trade agreements with Panama and Israel, but they are not yet in effect. There are ongoing FTA negotiations with Japan and Turkey. Through the Pacific Alliance, Colombia is also participating in negotiations with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore to extend “associate state” status to these countries. Additionally, Colombia has stand-alone bilateral investment treaties in force with China, India, Peru, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Japan.

 Bilateral Taxation Treaties:

Colombia has double taxation treaties with Bolivia, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Peru, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.  Colombia is currently negotiating double taxation agreements with Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and Panama, and has expressed strong interest in renewing negotiations with the United States.

3. Legal Regime

Transparency of the Regulatory System

The Colombian legal and regulatory systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms.  The commercial code and other laws cover broad areas, including banking and credit, bankruptcy/reorganization, business establishment/conduct, commercial contracts, credit, corporate organization, fiduciary obligations, insurance, industrial property, and real property law.  The civil code contains provisions relating to contracts, mortgages, liens, notary functions, and registries. There are no identified private-sector associations or non-governmental organizations leading informal regulatory processes. The ministries generally consult with relevant actors, both foreign and national, when drafting regulations.  Proposed laws are typically published as drafts for public comment.

Enforcement mechanisms exist, but historically the judicial system has not taken an active role in adjudicating commercial cases.  The Constitution establishes the principle of free competition as a national right for all citizens and provides the judiciary with administrative and financial independence from the executive branch.  Colombia has transitioned to an oral accusatory system to make criminal investigations and trials more efficient. The new system separates the investigative functions assigned to the Office of the Attorney General from trial functions.  Lack of coordination among government entities as well as insufficient resources complicate timely resolution of cases.

Colombia is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures (see http://www.businessfacilitation.org/ and Colombia’s website http://colombia.eregulations.org/).  Foreign and national investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations including the number of steps, name, and contact details of the entities and people in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal bases justifying the procedures.

International Regulatory Considerations

OECD countries agreed on May 25, 2018, to invite Colombia as the 37th member of the Organization.  With Law 1950 of January 8, 2019, President Duque ratified the Colombian accession to the oOECD. Colombia’s Constitutional Court must now review and uphold the law before accession is completed.  Colombia is part of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The government generally notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. In December 2017, the legislature ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA).  The TFA is now also pending constitutional court review before Colombia can deposit its letter of acceptance with the WTO. Regionally, Colombia is a member of organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the Pacific Alliance.

Legal System and Judicial Independence

Colombia has a comprehensive legal system.  Colombia’s judicial system defines the legal rights of commercial entities, reviews regulatory enforcement procedures, and adjudicates contract disputes in the business community.  The judicial framework includes the Council of State, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Justice, and various departmental and district courts, which collectively are overseen administratively by the Superior Judicial Council.  The 1991 constitution provided the judiciary with greater administrative and financial independence from the executive branch. Colombia has a commercial code and other laws covering broad areas, including banking and credit, bankruptcy/reorganization, business establishment/conduct, commercial contracts, credit, corporate organization, fiduciary obligations, insurance, industrial property, and real property law.  Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable through the different stages of legal court processes in Colombia. The judicial system is generally regarded as competent, fair, and reliable, but it did suffer reputational damage in 2017 following the arrest of an official in the Attorney General’s office on corruption charges, which led to the uncovering of a judicial influence-peddling scandal linked to the Supreme Court. 

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

Colombia has a comprehensive legal framework for business and FDI that incorporates binding norms resulting from its membership in the Andean Community of Nations as well as other free trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties.  Colombia’s judicial system defines the legal rights of commercial entities, reviews regulatory enforcement procedures, and adjudicates contract disputes in the business community. The judicial framework includes the Superintendence of Industry and Commerce (SIC), the Council of State, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Justice, and the various departmental and district courts, which are also overseen for administrative matters by the Superior Judicial Council.  The 1991 Constitution provided the judiciary with greater administrative and financial independence from the executive branch. However, except for the SIC’s efficient exercise of judicial functions, the judicial system in general remains hampered by time-consuming bureaucratic requirements and corruption.  

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

The SIC, Colombia’s national competition authority, has been strengthened over the last five years with the addition of personnel, including economists and lawyers.  The SIC issued landmark anti-competitiveness fines in 2015, including against a sugar cartel. More recently the SIC has sanctioned a rice cartel, three of the biggest telecommunication companies in the region, and truck transport operators for anticompetitive practices.  The SIC has imposed sanctions of over USD 400 million on approximately 400 individuals and companies in the last four years for unfair competition practices. In 2016, the SIC sanctioned cartels operating in the diaper, paper, and notebook sectors, imposing fines of over USD 150 million.  The SIC also imposed sanctions in several sectors for violations of consumer rights including for misleading advertising and noncompliance with warranty agreements. These sanctions included the telecommunications, furniture and home appliances, tourism, technology, automotive, and construction sectors.  In the last five years, the SIC has imposed fines of over USD 300 million for “business cartelization.”

Expropriation and Compensation

Article 58 of the Constitution governs indemnifications and expropriations and guarantees owners’ rights for legally-acquired property.  For assets taken by eminent domain, Colombian law provides a right of appeal both on the basis of the decision itself and on the level of compensation.  The Constitution does not specify how to proceed in compensation cases, which remains a concern for foreign investors. The Colombian government has sought to resolve such concerns through the negotiation of bilateral investment treaties and strong investment chapters in free trade agreements, such as the CTPA.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

Colombia is a member of the New York Convention on Investment Disputes, the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.  Colombia is also party to the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. In October 2012, the new National and International Arbitration Statute (Law 1563), modeled after the UNCITRAL Model Law, took effect.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

Domestic law allows contracting parties to agree to submit disputes to international arbitration, provided that: the parties are domiciled in different countries; the place of arbitration agreed to by the parties is a country other than the one in which they are domiciled; the subject matter of the arbitration involves the interests of more than one country; and the dispute has a direct impact on international trade.  The law permits parties to set their own arbitration terms, including location, procedures, and the nationality of rules and arbiters. Foreign investors have found the arbitration process in Colombia complex and dilatory, especially with regard to enforcing awards. However, some progress has been made in the number of qualified professionals and arbitrators with ample experience on transnational transactions, arbitrage centers with cutting-edge infrastructure and administrative capacity (there are approximately 340 arbitration and conciliation centers in Colombia), and courts that are progressively more accepting of arbitration processes.  The Chamber of Commerce of Bogota handles 75 percent of arbitration cases in Colombia. All arbitration tribunals combined handle around 600 cases a year.

There were 12 pending investment disputes in Colombia in 2019.  The pending cases include but are not limited to:

  • A case initiated in 1994 involving a U.S. marine salvage company that claims rights to a shipwreck.  The company sued the Colombian government for not allowing it access to its property in Colombian waters, a process that resulted in a Colombian Supreme Court decision in 2007, but has not yet been resolved.
  • A case involving a U.S. plane allegedly abandoned in Colombian territory in 2010.  The U.S. owner has been trying to claim his property since 2012. Colombian authorities maintain that the plane is now the property of the Colombian government according to national regulations on abandoned aircraft and have requested that U.S. authorities deregister the aircraft as it had become Colombia’s property.
  • A case involving an American citizen alleging lack of restitution for land seized by the government in the course of an investigation into a prior owner.
  • A case involving a U.S. agro-industrial company that acquired state land in Colombia.  The Colombian government asserts the land was acquired in violation of state lands law.
  • A case, initiated in 2016 by a U.S. mining company, in which the company alleges the wrongful expropriation of a gold mining concession.  

Separately, a Spanish energy company that is the majority owner of a Colombian utility company initiated arbitration proceedings before the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in March 2017 after the government ordered the liquidation of the electricity supplier.  The company asserted that the move constituted expropriation without compensation, though the government cited mismanagement, an inability to service its debts, and failure to provide reliable electricity to the northern coast of Colombia as justification for its actions. The Colombian government also has pending cases in the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (https://bit.ly/2D0OtLb).

According to the Doing Business 2019 report, the time from the moment a plaintiff files a lawsuit until actual payment and enforcement of the contract averages 1288 days, the same as in the previous two years.  Traditionally, most court proceedings are carried out in writing and only the evidence-gathering stage is carried out through hearings, including witness depositions, site inspections, and cross-examinations. The government has accelerated proceedings and reduced the backlog of court cases by allowing more verbal public hearings and creating alternative court mechanisms.  The new Code of General Procedure that entered into force in June 2014 also establishes oral proceedings that are carried out in two hearings, and there are now penalties for failure to reach a ruling in the time limit set by the law. Enforcement of an arbitral award can take between six months and one and a half years; a regular judicial process can take up to seven years for private parties and upwards of 15 years in conflicts with the State.  Thus, arbitration results are cheaper and much more efficient. According to the Doing Business report, Colombia has made enforcing contracts easier by simplifying and speeding up the proceedings for commercial disputes. In 2019, Colombia’s ranking in the enforcing contracts category of the report held at 177.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

Foreign judgments are recognized and enforced in Colombia once an application is submitted to the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court.  In 2012, Colombia approved the use of the arbitration process when new legislation based on the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law was adopted.  The statute stipulates that arbitral awards are governed by both domestic law as well as international conventions (New York Convention, Panama Convention, etc.). This has made the enforcement of arbitral awards easier for all parties involved.  Arbitration in Colombia is completely independent from judiciary proceedings, and, once arbitration has begun, the only competent authority is the arbitration tribunal itself. The CTPA protects U.S. investments by requiring a transparent and binding international arbitration mechanism and allowing investor-state arbitration for breaches of investment agreements if certain parameters are met.  The judicial system is notoriously slow, leading many foreign companies to include international arbitration clauses in their contracts.

Bankruptcy Regulations

Colombia’s 1991 Constitution grants the government the authority to intervene directly in financial or economic affairs, and this authority provides solutions similar to U.S. Chapter 11 filings for companies facing liquidation or bankruptcy.  Colombia’s bankruptcy regulations have two major objectives: to regulate proceedings to ensure creditors’ protection, and to monitor the efficient recovery and preservation of still-viable companies. This was revised in 2006 to allow creditors to request judicial liquidation, which replaces the previous forced auctioning option.  Now, inventories are valued, creditors’ rights are taken into account, and either a direct sale takes place within two months or all assets are assigned to creditors based on their share of the company’s liabilities. The insolvency regime for companies was further revised in 2010 to make proceedings more flexible and allow debtors to enter into a long-term payment agreement with creditors, giving the company a chance to recover and continue operating.  Bankruptcy is not criminalized in Colombia. In 2013, a bankruptcy law for individuals whose debts surpass 50 percent of their assets value entered into force.

Restructuring proceedings aim to protect the debtors from bankruptcy.  Once reorganization has begun, creditors cannot use collection proceedings to collect on debts owed prior to the beginning of the reorganization proceedings.  All existing creditors at the moment of the reorganization are recognized during the proceedings if they present their credit. Foreign creditors, equity shareholders including foreign equity shareholders, and holders of other financial contracts, including foreign contract holders, are recognized during the proceeding.  Established creditors are guaranteed a vote in the final decision. According to the Doing Business 2019 report Colombia is ranked 40th for resolving insolvency and it takes an average of 1.7 years—the same as OECD high-income countries—to resolve insolvency; the average time in Latin America is 2.9 years.

4. Industrial Policies

Investment Incentives

The Colombian government offers investment incentives, such as income tax exemptions and deductions in specific priority sectors, including the so-called “orange economy,” which refers to the creative industries, as well as agriculture and entrepreneurship.  More recently, the government has offered additional incentives in an effort to generate investments in former conflict municipalities. Investment incentives through free trade agreements between Colombia and other nations include national treatment and most favored nation treatment of investors; establishment of liability standards assumed by countries regarding the other nation’s investors, including the minimum standard of treatment and establishment of rules for investor compensation from expropriation; establishment of rules for transfer of capital relating to investment; and specific tax treatment.

The government offers tax incentives to all investors, such as preferential import tariffs, tax exemptions, and credit or risk capital.  Some fiscal incentives are available for investments that generate new employment or production in areas impacted by natural disasters and former conflict-affected municipalities.  Companies can apply for these directly with participating agencies. Tax and fiscal incentives are often based on regional, sector, or business size considerations. Border areas have special protections due to currency fluctuations in neighboring countries which can impact local economies.  National and local governments also offer special incentives, such as tax holidays, to attract specific industries.

Special tax exemptions have existed since 2003 and range from 10 to 30 years.  Income tax exemptions for investments in tourism cover new hotels constructed between 2003 and 2017, and remodeled and/or expanded hotels though 2017, for a period of 30 years.  Investments in ecotourism services benefit from income tax exemptions through 2023. New forestry plantations and sawmills also have benefitted from income tax exemptions since 2003.  Late yield crops planted through 2014 are tax exempt for 10 years from the beginning of the harvesting. Electricity from wind power, biomass, and agricultural waste were tax exempt until January 1, 2018, as were river-based transportation services provided with certain shallow draft vessels and barges.  Certain printing and publishing companies can benefit from tax exemptions through 2033. Software developed in Colombia has been tax exempt for up to five years since 2013. To meet exemption requirements, the software must have its intellectual property rights protected, be based upon a high concentration of national scientific and technological research, and be certified by Colciencias (Colombia’s agency for promoting science, technology, and innovation).

Foreign investors can participate without discrimination in government-subsidized research programs, and most Colombian government research has been conducted with foreign institutions.  R&D incentives include Value-Added Tax (VAT) exemptions for imported equipment or materials used in scientific, technology, or innovation projects, and qualified investments may receive tax credits up to 175 percent.  A 2012 reform of Colombia’s royalty system allocates 10 percent of the government’s revenue to science, technology, and innovation proposals executed by subnational governments. Although only subnational governments can submit a project, anyone, including foreigners, can partner with them.

In a tax reform passed in December 2016, the Colombian government created two tax incentives to support investment in the 344 municipalities most affected by the armed conflict (ZOMAC).  Small and microbusinesses that invest in ZOMACs and meet a series of other criteria will be exempt from paying any taxes from 2017 to 2021, while medium and large-sized businesses will pay 50 percent of their normal taxes.  The second component is entitled “works for taxes” (“Obras por Impuestos”), a program through which the private sector can directly fund infrastructure investment in lieu of paying taxes.

In the financing law of 2019 (tax reform), the Colombian government introduced exemption incentives in the payment of income tax for the new orange economy companies that invest more than COP 150 million in three years and that generate at least three jobs.  In addition, it created incentives for new projects in the agricultural sector which will be exempt from income taxes for seven years. Finally, the law created an incentive for the tourism sector for the construction of new hotel infrastructure, and the benefits were extended to projects such as boat docks, theme parks, and eco and agro-tourism projects.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

To attract foreign investment and promote the importation of capital goods, the Colombian government uses a number of drawback and duty deferral programs.  One example is free trade zones (FTZs). As of the end of 2018, there were 112 FTZs (including permanent, single company, and special types). These have generated development of new industry infrastructure for more than 840 companies in 63 municipalities and 19 geographic departments.  While DIAN oversees requests to establish FTZs, the Colombian government is not involved in their operations.

Decree 2147 of 2016 integrated the regulatory framework for FTZs dating back to 2007 in one document, and made clarifications to certain processes without significant changes.  The government revised tax treatment of companies operating FTZs with the December 2016 tax reform, maintaining a preferential corporate income tax for FTZs while increasing it from 15 to 20 percent.  FTZ users with contracts of legal stability will continue to pay 15 percent. Other changes include VAT exemption for raw materials, inputs, and finished goods sold from the national customs territory to the FTZs, as long as those purchases are directly related to the corporate purpose.  By contrast, no matter the purpose of the purchase, companies not located in the FTZs are affected by VAT. The 2016 tax reform increased VAT from 16 to 19 percent, and eliminated the Income Tax for Equality (CREE), a nine percent tax on company profits over COP 800 million (approximately USD 275,000) designed to contribute to employment generation and social investments.

In return for these and other incentives, every permanent FTZ must meet specific investment and direct job creation commitments, depending on their total assets, during the first three years.  Special FTZs are required to generate a certain number of direct jobs depending on the economic sector. According to the figures of the Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), FTZs reached cumulative exports valuing USD 28,346 million between 2005 and 2018.  Between January and December of 2018, exports amounted to USD 2,812 million.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

Performance requirements are not imposed on foreigners as a condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding investments.  The Colombian government does not have performance requirements, impose local employment requirements, or require excessively difficult visa, residency, or work permit requirements for investors.  Under the CTPA, Colombia grants substantial market access across its entire services sector.

In 2017, Colombia issued implementing regulations of its Data Protection Law 1581 of 2012.  The SIC, under the Deputy Office for Personal Data Protection, is the Data Protection Authority (DPA) and has the legal mandate to ensure proper data protection.  The SIC issued a circular on August 10, 2017 defining adequate data protection and responsibilities of data controllers with respect to international data transfers.  The circular details several general criteria reflecting the SIC’s view of adequate data protection and also provides a list of countries, which includes the United States, that meet the SIC’s data protection guidelines.

In Colombia, software and hardware are protected by IPR (Dirección Nacional de Derecho de Autor – DNDA – http://www.derechodeautor.gov.co/).  There is no obligation to submit source code for registered software. However, if the IT provider is contracting with the Colombian government, through a clause of the service contract, the source code must be provided to the entity that the government IT provider is contracting.  The SIC launched a national database registry in November 2015 to implement Law 1581 pertaining to personal information protection and management. It requires data storage facilities that hold personal data to comply with government requirements for security and privacy, and data storage companies have one year to register. The SIC enforces the rules on local data storage within the country through audits/investigations and imposed sanctions.

5. Protection of Property Rights

Real Property

The 1991 Constitution explicitly protects individual rights against state actions and upholds the right to private property.

Secured interests in real property, and to a lesser degree movable property, are recognized and generally enforced after the property is properly registered.  In terms of protecting third-party purchasers, existing law is inadequate. The concepts of a mortgage, trust, deed, and other types of liens exists, as does a reliable system of recording such secured interests.  Deeds, however, present some legal risk due to the prevalence of transactions that have never been registered with the Public Instruments Registry.

According to Amnesty International, as of November 2015, eight million hectares of land had been abandoned or acquired illegally, equivalent to 14 percent of the Colombian territory.  The government estimates that approximately 6.5 million hectares of land are affected by violent usurpation. Around 18 percent of land owners do not have clear title. The Colombian government is working to title these plots and has started a formalization program for land restitution.

In the seven years that the Law on Victims and Land Restitution has been in force (2011-2018), the government has received nearly 112,000 restitution claims, corresponding to 99,155 properties and approximately 290,000 hectares.  Of these, the “Land Restitution Unit” (URT) created by the 2011 law has studied 58,291 cases and has transferred 14,851 cases for review by a restitution judge. As of March 2018, there have been 6,986 cases resolved by these judges, covering 5,598 properties.  With the entry into force of the 2016 peace deal with the FARC, the government is confident restitution efforts will be more effective as former violent areas become more accessible, although security in some of those areas remains a challenge. While some landowners who received their formal land titles have been threatened by illegal armed groups, the government confirms that the vast majority of land restitution beneficiaries have returned and stayed on their parcels, accessing a two-year subsidy for the implementation of productive projects provided by the URT.

The URT’s work is complementary to the work of the National Land Agency, which deals with property titles for lower income and minority communities.  The Agency was created at the end of 2015 to implement many of the commitments established in the peace deal with the FARC on formalization of rural land and aimed to formalize the property of 50,000 Colombian families in 2017.  Thanks to the implementation of a massive strategy to formalize rural property, the agency formalized the properties of 71,000 rural families by the end of 2017.

In March 2017, the Colombia’s Prosecutor’s Office announced the recovery of 277,000 hectares of land from dissidents and ex-combatants of the FARC and from narcotraffickers.  Colombia ranked 59 out of 190 economies for ease of registering property, according to the 2019 Doing Business report.

Intellectual Property Rights

In Colombia, the granting, registration, and administration of IPR are carried out by four primary government entities.  The SIC acts as the Colombian patent and trademark office. The Colombian Agricultural Institute (ICA) is in charge of issuing plant variety protections and data protections for agricultural products.  The Ministry of Interior administers copyrights through the National Copyright Directorate (DNDA). The Ministry of Health and Social Protection handles data protection for products registered through the National Food and Drug Institute (INVIMA).  Colombia is subject to Andean Community Decision 486 on trade secret protection, which is fully implemented domestically by the Unfair Competition Law of 1996.

Colombia made no significant changes to the distribution of responsibilities for IPR protection in 2018.  Decree 1162 of 2010 created the National Intellectual Property Administrative System and the Intersectoral Intellectual Property Commission (CIPI).  The CIPI serves at the interagency technical body for IPR issues, but has not issued any recent policy documents. The last comprehensive interagency policy for IPR issues (Conpes 3533) was issued by the National Planning Department in 2008.  Colombia’s National Development Plan (NDP) for 2018-2022 contains a requirement to update this policy.

The patent regime in Colombia currently provides for a 20-year protection period for patents, a 10-year term for industrial designs, and 20- or 15-year protection for new plant varieties, depending on the species.  Colombia has been on the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 Watch List every year since 1991, and in 2018 was downgraded to “Priority Watch List” status. Special 301 reports can be found at https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/intellectual-property/Special-301.

The CTPA improved standards for the protection and enforcement of a broad range of IPR.  Such improvements include state-of-the-art protections for digital products such as software, music, text, and videos; stronger protection for U.S. patents, trademarks, and test data; and prevention of piracy and counterfeiting by criminalizing end-use piracy.  Colombia is a member of the Inter-American Convention for Trademark and Commercial Protection. Various procedures associated with industrial property, patent, and trademark registration are available at http://www.sic.gov.co/propiedad-Industrial

Colombia has outstanding CTPA commitments related to IPR.  In January 2013, the constitutional court declared Law 1520 of 2012 implementing several of these requirements (specifically related to copyright law and internet service provider liability) unconstitutional on procedural grounds.  In the case of copyright law reform, the Santos administration then introduced the legislation to congress in October 2017; it was subsequently enacted in July 2018. The bill extends the term of copyright protection, imposes civil liability for circumvention of technological protection measures, and strengthens enforcement of copyright and related rights.

Regarding other CTPA requirements, Colombian officials are discussing with the United States a draft of legislation regulating internet service providers on issues such as compulsory takedown of online content and the protection of intermediaries with “safe harbor” provisions for unintentional copyright infringement.  The legislation has not yet been introduced to congress. Colombia did not make progress in 2018 on an international agreement that it needs to sign in order to comply with CTPA provisions: the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV 91). Colombia’s constitutional court declared accession to UPOV 91 unconstitutional in December 2012 due to lack of consultation with Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities.  Colombia also maintains that the existing Andean Community Decision 345 is in effect and equivalent to UPOV 91.

Colombia’s success combating counterfeiting and IPR violations remains limited.  A 2015 law increased penalties for those involved in running contraband, but more effective implementation is needed.  Colombian law continues to limit the ability of law enforcement (police, customs, and prosecutors) to effectively combat counterfeiting because they do not have the requisite authorities to effectively inspect, seize, and investigate smugglers and counterfeiters.  Colombian authorities did make a number of high-profile seizures of contraband (including counterfeit) goods in 2018. However, counterfeit goods remain widely available in Colombia’s “San Andresitos” markets, as a number of industry stakeholders have noted. Enforcement in the digital space remains weak as well.

Resources for Rights Holders

Embassy point of contact:

U.S. Embassy Bogota
Economic Section
Carrera 45 #22B-45
Bogota, Colombia
(571) 275-2000
Email: BogotaECONShared@state.gov

Country/Economy resources:

6. Financial Sector

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

The Colombian Stock Exchange (BVC) is the main forum for trading and securities transactions in Colombia.  The BVC is a private company listed on the stock market. The BVC, as a multi-product and multi-market exchange, offers trading platforms for the stock market, along with fixed income and standard derivatives.  The BVC also provides listing services for issuers. The BVC is part of the Latin American Integrated Market (MILA) along with the Mexican Stock Exchange, the Lima Stock Exchange, and the Santiago Stock Exchange.  BVC market capitalization has risen from USD 14 billion in 2003 to USD 126 billion in the first quarter of 2019. In the face of a lame-duck government and inflexible spending commitments, Standard & Poor’s downgraded Colombia’s credit rating to BBB- in December 2017.  Moody’s maintained their lowest investment-grade evaluation but modified the outlook from “stable” to “negative” in February 2018. Foreign investors can participate in capital markets by negotiating and acquiring shares, bonds, and other securities listed by the Foreign Investment Statute.  These activities must be conducted by a local administrator, such as trust companies or Financial Superintendence-authorized stock brokerage firms. Foreign investment capital funds are forbidden from acquiring more than 10 percent of the total amount of a Colombian company’s outstanding shares.  Foreigners can establish a bank account in Colombia as long as they have a valid visa and Colombian government identification.

The market has sufficient liquidity for investors to enter and exit sizeable positions.  The central bank respects IMF Article VIII and does not restrict payments and transfers for current international transactions.  The financial sector in Colombia offers credit to nationals and foreigners that comply with the requisite legal requirements.

Money and Banking System

In 2005, Colombia consolidated supervision of all aspects of the banking, financial, securities, and insurance sectors under the Financial Superintendence.  Colombia has an effective regulatory system that encourages portfolio investment. According to the Financial Superintendence, as of December 2018, the combined estimated assets of Colombia’s major banks totaled USD 219 billion.

Colombia’s financial system is strong by regional standards.  The financial sector as a whole is investing in new risk assessment and portfolio management procedures.  As of December 2018, two private financial groups, the Sarmiento Group (Grupo Aval) and the Business Group of Antioquia (Bancolombia), together own over half of all Colombian banking assets.  Grupo Aval controls about 27 percent of the sector and Bancolombia controls about 26 percent. No foreign bank is a major player in the Colombian financial sector.

Commercial banks are the principal source of long-term corporate and project finance in Colombia.  Loans rarely have a maturity in excess of five years. Unofficial private lenders play a major role in meeting the working capital needs of small and medium-sized companies.  Only the largest of Colombia’s companies participate in the local stock or bond markets, with the majority meeting their financing needs either through the banking system, by reinvesting their profits, or through credit from suppliers.

Colombia’s central bank is charged with managing inflation and unemployment through monetary policy.  Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in the country. No block chain technology use in financial transactions is approved by the Financial Superintendence as of the end of 2018.  In order to operate in Colombia, foreign banks must set up a Colombian branch. The Colombian central bank has a variety of correspondent banks abroad. No correspondent banking relationships are in jeopardy.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

There are no restrictions on transferring funds associated with FDI.  Foreign investment into Colombia must be registered with the central bank in order to secure the right to repatriate capital and profits.  Direct and portfolio investments are considered registered when the exchange declaration for operations channeled through the official exchange market is presented, with few exceptions.  The official exchange rate is determined by the central bank. The rate is based on the free market flow of the previous day. Colombia does not manipulate its currency to gain competitive advantages.

Remittance Policies

The government permits full remittance of all net profits regardless of the type or amount of investment.  Foreign investments must be channeled through the foreign exchange market and registered with the central bank’s foreign exchange office within one year in order for those investments to be repatriated or reinvested.  There are no restrictions on the repatriation of revenues generated from the sale or closure of a business, reduction of investment, or transfer of a portfolio. Colombian law authorizes the government to restrict remittances in the event that international reserves fall below three months’ worth of imports.  International reserves have remained well above this threshold for decades.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

In 2012, Colombia began operating a sovereign wealth fund called the Savings and Stabilization Fund (FAE), which is administered by the central bank with the objective of promoting savings and economic stability in the country.  The fund can administer up to 30 percent of annual royalties from the extractives industry. The fund was valued at USD 3.1 billion in 2018 from an initial value of USD 500 million in 2012. The government transfers royalties not dedicated to the fund to other internal funds to boost national economic productivity through strategic projects, technological investments, and innovation.  At the end of 2018, the FAE was invested in 67 percent AAA sovereign bonds. There are no known negative ramifications for U.S. investors in the Colombian market. According to the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (http://www.ifswf.org/our-members), Colombia is not one of the 30 nations that voluntarily upholds the Santiago Principles.

7. State-Owned Enterprises

Since 2015, the Government of Colombia has concentrated its industrial and commercial enterprises under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance.  By the end of 2018, the number of state-owned companies reached 109, with a combined value of USD 23 billion. The 109 companies under government ownership fall under the following sectors: agricultural, energy, financial, hydrocarbons, health, telecommunications, transport, and tourism.  The government is the majority shareholder of 39 companies and a minority shareholder in the remaining 70. Among the most notable companies with a government stake are Ecopetrol (Colombia’s majority state-owned and privately-run oil company), ISA, Banco Agrario de Colombia, Bancoldex, and La Previsora.  The asset value of the majority state-owned companies stands at USD 84 billion. SOEs competing in the Colombian market do not receive non-market based advantages from the government. The Ministry of Finance updates their annual report on SOEs every June.

Privatization Program

Colombia has privatized state-owned enterprises under article 60 of the Constitution and Law Number 226 of 1995.  This law stipulates that the sale of government holdings in an enterprise should be offered to two groups: first to cooperatives and workers’ associations of the enterprise, then to the general public.  During the first phase, special terms and credits have to be granted, and in the second phase, foreign investors may participate along with the general public. Colombia’s main privatizations have been in the electricity, mining, hydrocarbons, and financial sectors, and in January 2016, the government sold its majority stake in Isagen, the country’s third-largest energy generator, to Canadian firm Brookfield Asset Management for USD 2 billion.  The government views stimulating private-sector investment in roads, ports, electricity, and gas infrastructure as a high priority. The government is increasingly turning to concessions and utilizing public-private partnerships (PPPs) as a means for securing and incentivizing infrastructure development.

The Colombian government prioritized a fourth-generation infrastructure program (4G) focused on highway construction with PPP opportunities valued at USD 17 billion.  In order to attract investment and promote PPPs, on November 22, 2013, the Colombian government signed a new infrastructure law clarifying provisions for frequently-cited obstacles to participate in PPPs, including environmental licensing, land acquisition, and the displacement of public utilities.  The law puts in place a civil procedure that facilitates land expropriation during court cases, allows for expedited environmental licensing, and clarifies that the cost to move or replace public utilities affected by infrastructure projects falls to private companies. Foreign investment has played a substantial role in the 4G program, and the program, with the exception of the Odebrecht scandal mentioned below, has thus far been praised for its transparency and competitiveness.

Municipal enterprises operate many public utilities and infrastructure services.  These municipal enterprises have engaged private sector investment through concessions.  There are several successful concessions involving roads. These kinds of partnerships have helped promote reforms and create a more attractive environment for private, national, and foreign investment.

8. Responsible Business Conduct

In December 2015, the Colombian government released their National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights, which responds to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/un-guiding-principles/implementation-tools-examples/implementation-by-governments/by-type-of-initiative/national-action-plans ).  Colombia also adheres to the corporate social responsibility (CSR) principles outlined in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. CSR cuts across many industries and Colombia encourages public and private enterprises to follow OECD CSR guidelines. Beneficiaries of CSR programs include students, children, populations vulnerable to Colombia’s armed conflict, victims of violence, and the environment.  Larger companies structure their CSR programs in accordance with accepted international CSR principles. Companies in Colombia have been recognized on an international level for their CSR initiatives, including by the State Department.

Overall, Colombia has adequate environmental laws, is proactive at the federal level in enacting environmental protections, and does not waive labor or environmental regulations to attract investors.  However, the Colombian government struggles with enforcement, particularly in more remote areas. Geography, lack of infrastructure, and lack of state presence all play a role, as does a general shortage of resources in national and regional institutions.  The Environmental Chapter of the CTPA requires Colombia to maintain and enforce environmental laws, protect biodiversity, and promote opportunities for public participation

In parallel with its OECD accession process, the Colombian government has been working with the organization in a series of assessments in order to develop the implementation the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas, especially related to gold mining.  The Colombian government faces challenges in formalizing illegal gold mining operations throughout the country. The government is also taking steps to address mercury use in mining, banning the use of mercury in mining as of July 2018. Colombia will phase out mercury use from all other industries by 2023. Colombia ratified the Minamata Convention on Mercury in March 2018, and is in the final stages of its accession to the treaty.  In March 2018, the Governments of the United States and Colombia signed a comprehensive memorandum of understanding to formalize existing cooperation on reducing illegal gold mining and its negative social, health, and environmental impacts.

Buyers, sellers, traders, and refiners of gold may wish to conduct additional due diligence as part of their risk management regimes to account for the influx of illegally-mined Colombian gold into existing supply chains.  Throughout the country, Colombian authorities have taken steps to dismantle illegal gold mining operations that are responsible for negative environmental, criminal, and human health impacts. The Colombian government has focused its efforts on transnational criminal elements involved in the production, laundering, and sale of illegally- mined gold, and the fraudulent documentation that is used to obscure the origin of illegally- mined gold.

9. Corruption

Corruption has been reported as a serious obstacle for companies operating or planning to invest in Colombia.  Analyses of the business environment, such as the WEF Global Competitiveness Index, consistently cite corruption as a problematic factor, along with high tax rates, inadequate infrastructure, and inefficient government bureaucracy.  Transparency International’s latest “Corruption Perceptions Index” released in January 2019 assigned Colombia a score of 36/100, down one point from 2018. The group’s analysis noted that corruption in the judiciary contributed to the drop.  Overall, Colombia placed 99th of the 180 countries surveyed, a drop of three spots.  Among OECD member states, only Mexico ranked lower. Customs, taxation, and public works contracts are commonly-cited areas where corruption exists.

In December 2016, one of the biggest corporate corruption cases in history broke when the U.S. Department of Justice announced that Brazil-based construction conglomerate Odebrecht had paid USD 800 million in bribes over six years regionally, including USD 11 million in Colombia, in order to win infrastructure contracts.  The latter figure was subsequently increased to USD 37 million. Two high-priority infrastructure projects are on hold as a result of the corruption revelations, though other highway modernization projects critical to implementation of the peace accord continue. At least 23 Colombian officials have been implicated in the scandal.  The judicial influence–peddling scandal mentioned above, commonly known as the “Cartel of the Robe,” and numerous other reports of official corruption made public over the past year have kept the subject in the public discourse.

Colombia has adopted the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and is a member of the OECD Anti-Bribery Committee.  It also passed a domestic anti-bribery law in 2016. It has signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention. Additionally, it has adopted the OAS Convention against Corruption.  The CTPA protects the integrity of procurement practices and criminalizes both offering and soliciting bribes to/from public officials. It requires both countries to make all laws, regulations, and procedures regarding any matter under the CTPA publicly available.  Both countries must also establish procedures for reviews and appeals by any entities affected by actions, rulings, measures, or procedures under the CTPA.

Resources to Report Corruption

Useful resources and contact information for those concerned about combating corruption in Colombia include the following:

  • The Transparency and Anti-Corruption Observatory is an interactive tool of the Colombian government aimed at promoting transparency and combating corruption available at http://www.anticorrupcion.gov.co/.
  • The National Civil Commission for Fighting Corruption, or Comisión Nacional Ciudadana para la Lucha Contra la Corrupción (CNCLCC), was established by Law 1474 of 2011 to give civil society a forum to discuss and propose policies and actions to fight corruption in the country.  Transparencia por Colombia is the technical secretariat of the commission. http://ciudadanoscontralacorrupcion.org/es/inicio
  • The national chapter of Transparency International, Transparencia por Colombia: http://transparenciacolombia.org.co/ 
  • The Presidential Secretariat of Transparency advises and assists the president to formulate and design public policy about transparency and anti-corruption.  This office also coordinates the implementation of anti-corruption policies. http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/secretaria-transparencia/Paginas/default.aspx/ .

10. Political and Security Environment

Security in Colombia has improved significantly over the past 17 years.  Colombia experienced a significant decrease in terrorist activity, due in large part to a bilateral ceasefire between government forces and Colombia’s largest terrorist organization, the FARC.  On November 26, 2016, President Santos signed a peace agreement with the FARC to end half a century of confrontation. Congressional approval of a peace accord between the government and the FARC on November 30, 2016 put in motion a six-month disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process, which granted the FARC status as a legal political organization.  FARC demobilization could bring greater development opportunities to rural regions.  Since the November 2016 peace accord with the FARC, 7,000 guerrillas have disarmed (over 11,000 are participating in the process, including militia and former prisoners); key implementing legislation has passed; and a UN special political mission has begun verifying security guarantees and FARC reintegration. Security forces estimate roughly 1,000 combatants (FARC dissidents) have chosen not to participate in the process. Currently the peace negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN), which began in February 2017, are suspended.  This terrorist group continues a low-cost, high-impact asymmetric insurgency. ELN attacks, alongside powerful narco-criminal group operations, are posing a threat to commercial activity and investment, especially in some rural zones where government control is weak. The ELN often focuses attacks on oil pipelines, mines, roads, and electricity towers to disrupt economic activity and pressure the government. The ELN also extorts businesses in their areas of operation, kidnaps personnel, and destroys property of entities that refuse to pay for protection.  The Colombian government estimates the ELN has 1,500 to 2,000 armed members.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

An OECD report on Colombia’s labor market and social policies was published in January 2016.  The report mentions progress on labor market reforms, but cites large income inequality and structural flaws in labor market policies, despite relatively low unemployment and high labor force participation.  In 2018, the unemployment rate according to official government figures was 9.7 percent, a slight increase relative to the 2017 rate of 9.4 percent. According to DANE, 48.2 percent of the workforce was working in the informal economy at the end of 2018.  Colombia has a wide range of skills in its workforce, as well as managerial-level employees who are often bilingual.

Labor rights in Colombia are set forth in its Constitution, the Labor Code, the Procedural Code of Labor and Social Security, sector-specific legislation, and ratified international conventions, which are incorporated into national legislation.  Colombia’s Constitution guarantees freedom of association and provides for collective bargaining and the right to strike (with some exceptions). It also addresses forced labor, child labor, trafficking, discrimination, protections for women and children in the workplace, minimum wages, working hours, skills training, and social security.  Colombia has ratified all eight of the International Labor Organization’s (ILO’s) fundamental labor conventions, and all are in force, including those related to freedom of association, equal remuneration, right to organize and collectively bargain, discrimination, minimum working age, forced labor, and prohibition of the worst forms of child labor.  Colombia has also ratified conventions related to hours of work, occupational health and safety, and minimum wage. In 2013, Law 1636 was passed to increase protections and opportunities for Colombia’s unemployed population.

The 1991 Constitution protects the right to constitute labor unions.  Pursuant to Colombia’s labor law, any group of 25 or more workers, regardless of whether they are employees of the same company or not, may form a labor union.  Employees of companies with fewer than 25 employees may affiliate themselves with other labor unions. About four percent of the country’s labor force is unionized.  The largest and most influential unions are composed mostly of public-sector employees, particularly of the majority state-owned oil company and the state-run education sector.  Only 6.2 percent of all salaried workers are covered by collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), according to the OECD. The Ministry of Labor has expressed commitment to working on decrees to incentivize sectoral collective bargaining, and to strengthen union representation within companies and regulate strikes in the essential public services sector (i.e. hospitals).

Strikes, when held in accordance with the law, are recognized as legal instruments to obtain better working conditions, and employers are prohibited from using strike-breakers at any time during the course of a strike.  After 60 days of strike action, the parties are subject to compulsory arbitration. Strikes are prohibited in certain “essential public services,” as defined by law, although Colombia has been criticized for having an overly-broad interpretation of “essential.”

Foreign companies operating in Colombia must follow the same hiring rules as national companies, regardless of the origin of the employer and the place of execution of the contract.  No labor laws are waived in order to attract or retain investment. In 2010, Law 1429 eliminated the mandatory proportion requirement for foreign and national personnel; 100 percent of the workforce, including the board of directors, can be foreign nationals.  Labor permits are not required in Colombia, except for minors of the minimum working age. Foreign employees have the same rights as Colombian employees. Employers may use temporary service agencies to subcontract additional workers for peaks of production. Employers must receive advance permission from the Ministry of Labor before undertaking permanent layoffs.  The Ministry of Labor typically does not grant permission to lay off workers who have enhanced legal protections (those with work-related injuries or union leaders, for example). The Ministry of Labor has been cracking down on using temporary or contract workers for jobs that are not temporary in nature.

Reputational risks to investors come with a lack of effective and systematic enforcement of labor law, especially in rural sectors.  Homicides of unionists (social leaders) remain a concern. In January 2017, the U.S. Department of Labor issued a public report of review in response to a submission filed under Chapter 17 (the Labor Chapter) of the CTPA by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations and five Colombian workers’ organizations that alleged failures on the part of the government to protect labor rights in line with CTPA commitments.  In January 2018, the Department of Labor published the first periodic review of progress to address issues identified in the submission report. For additional information on labor law enforcement see Section 7 of Colombia’s Human Rights Report (https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/), and the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor (http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/colombia.htm ) and Lists of Goods Produced with Child or Forced Labor (http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods/ ).

12. OPIC and Other Investment Insurance Programs

OPIC made its first investment in Colombia in 1985 and has supported more than 70 projects in Colombia since 2005.  OPIC has seven active projects and is exploring several more. OPIC’s largest project in Colombia is a USD 250 million toll road project in the southern part of Colombia known as the Rumichaca-Pasto road.  As of end 2018, OPIC’s active investments in Colombia totaled USD 718 million. Additional information can be found at www.opic.gov .

13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) N/A N/A 2018 $336.940   https://www.imf.org   
Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2018 $2.482 2017 -$66 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data  
Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2018 $516 N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data  
Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2018 3.3% 2017 18.8% UNCTAD data available at

https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx  

*Data from the Colombian Statistics Departments, DANE, (https://www.dane.gov.co/  )  and the Colombian central bank (http://www.banrep.gov.co  ).


Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI – 2018

Direct Investment From/in Counterpart Economy Data 2018
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) 2018
Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment
Total Inward 11,010 100% Total Outward 5,121 100%
United States 2,482.6 23% Mexico 880.5 17%
Spain 1,445.2 13% Holland 681.0 13%
England 1,351.7 12% Panama 557.1 11%
Panama 1,149.4 10% United States 516.7 10%
Switzerland 891.6 8% Chile 457.4 9%
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.

Data from the Colombian central bank (http://www.banrep.gov.co).


Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

Portfolio Investment Assets
Top Five Partners (Millions, US Dollars) (June 2017)
Total Equity Securities Total Debt Securities
All Countries 38,963 100% All Countries 24,228 100% All Countries 14,735 100%
United States 25,654 66% United States 17,699 73% United States 7,955 54%
Luxembourg 4,649 12% Luxembourg 4,573 19% Mexico 1,025 7%
Mexico 1,040 3% Ireland 650 3% International Organizations 994 7%
International Organizations 1,006 3% United Kingdom 302 1% Canada 715 5%
Canada 783 2% Cayman Islands 237 1% France 711 5%

Data from IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey. Source: http://data.imf.org/?sk=B981B4E3-4E58-467E-9B90-9DE0C3367363&sId=1481568994271  

14. Contact for More Information

U.S. Embassy Bogota
Economic Section
Carrera 45 #22B-45
Bogota, Colombia
(571) 275-2000
Email: BogotaECONShared@state.gov

Costa Rica

Executive Summary

Costa Rica is the oldest continuous democracy in Latin America with moderate but falling economic growth rates (4.2 percent in 2016, 3.4 percent in 2017, 2.7 percent in 2018) and moderate inflation (2 percent in 2018) providing a stable investment climate.  The country’s relatively well-educated labor force, relatively low levels of corruption, physical location, living conditions, dynamic investment promotion board, and attractive free trade zone incentives also offer strong appeal to investors. Costa Rica’s continued popularity as an investment destination is well illustrated by strong yearly inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) as recorded by the Costa Rican Central Bank, reaching an estimated USD 2.7 billion in 2017 (4.7 percent of GDP) and USD 2.1 billion in 2018 (3.6 percent of GDP).

Costa Rica’s technology and tourism sectors serve as “clusters” of economic growth in which each new exporter, service provider, sector employee, or university course of study adds depth to the sector as a whole and makes it more attractive for new entrants.  Costa Rica has had remarkable success in the last two decades in establishing and promoting an ecosystem of export-oriented technology companies, suppliers of input goods and services, associated public institutions and universities, and a trained and experienced workforce.  A similar transformation took place in the tourism sector, now characterized by a plethora of smaller enterprises handling a steadily increasing flow of tourists eager to visit despite Costa Rica’s relatively high prices. Costa Rica is doubly fortunate in that these two sectors positively reinforce each other as they both require and encourage English language fluency, openness to the global community, and Costa Rican government efficiency and effectiveness.   Costa Rica’s ongoing accession to the OECD has also pushed the country to address its economic weaknesses through executive decrees and legislative reforms in a process that began in 2015.

The Costa Rican investment climate is nevertheless threatened by a high and persistent government fiscal deficit capable of squeezing domestic credit and forcing government budget cuts, a complex and often-inefficient bureaucracy, high energy costs, and basic infrastructure – ports, roads, water systems – in need of major upgrading.  The Costa Rican business sector is feeling particularly buffeted in 2018 and 2019 by an unusual number of new requirements or challenges, stemming from the government’s anti-money laundering (AML) initiatives and continued efforts to address the fiscal imbalance through increased taxes. On the AML side, companies must register their beneficial ownership in a dedicated data base, banks will soon be using a single centralized Know-Your-Customer database to vet companies and individuals, and companies in industries identified as susceptible to money laundering activity will have their own registry and heightened reporting requirements.  All retail businesses must now accept credit cards or other alternative digital payment and all income tax reporting entities must now issue electronic invoices through a system controlled by the tax authority. On the fiscal front, tax calculations change in a number of ways in 2019, including a sales tax previously applied just to goods replaced by a Value Added Tax of up to 13 percent that applies to services as well; modified tax brackets; an increase in the tax of dividends from cooperatives; and an expansion and increase of the capital gains tax.

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings

Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 48 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2018 67 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings
Global Innovation Index 2018 54 of 126 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator 
U.S. FDI in partner country (USD M USD, stock positions) 2017 19,924 http:/data.imf.org/CDIS
World Bank GNI per capita (USD) 2017 11,120 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

Costa Rica actively courts foreign direct investment (FDI), placing a high priority on attracting and retaining high-quality foreign investment.  There are some limitations to both private and foreign participation in specific sectors, as detailed in the following section.

The Foreign Trade Promotion Corporation (PROCOMER) as well as the Costa Rican Investment and Development Board (CINDE) lead Costa Rica’s investment promotion efforts.  CINDE has had great success over the last several decades in attracting and retaining investment in specific areas, currently services, advanced manufacturing, life sciences, light manufacturing, and the food industry.  In addition, the Tourism Institute (ICT) attends to potential investors in the tourism sector. CINDE and ICT are strong and effective guides and advocates for their client companies, prioritizing investment retention and maintaining an ongoing dialogue with investors.

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Costa Rica recognizes and encourages the right of foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in most forms of remunerative activity.  The exceptions are in sectors that are reserved for the state (legal monopolies – see #7 below “State Owned Enterprises, first paragraph) or that require participation of at least a certain percentage of Costa Rican citizens or residents (electrical power generation, transport services, professional services, and aspects of broadcasting).  Properties in the Maritime Zone (from 50 to 200 meters above the mean high-tide mark) may only be leased from the state and with residency requirements. In the areas of medical services, telecommunications, finance and insurance, state-owned entities dominate, but that does not preclude private sector competition. Costa Rica does not have an investment screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment, beyond those applied under anti-money laundering procedures.  U.S. investors are not disadvantaged or singled out by any control mechanism or sector restrictions; to the contrary, U.S. investors figure prominently among the various major categories of FDI.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

The OECD accession process for Costa Rica beginning in 2015 has produced a series of changes by Costa Rica and recommendations by the OECD; within that context the OECD in April 2018 published the “OECD Economic Surveys Costa Rica 2018.” http://www.oecd.org/countries/costarica/oecd-economic-surveys-costa-rica-2018-eco-surveys-cri-2018-en.htm   .

In the same context, the OECD offers a number of recent publications relevant to investment policy: http://www.oecd.org/countries/costarica/  . As of April 2019, Costa Rica has passed 12 of the 22 technical bodies required for OECD accession, with the Investment Committee being one of the ten that remain.

Business Facilitation

Costa Rica’s single-window business registration website, crearempresa.go.cr  , brings together the various entities – municipalities and central government agencies – which must be consulted in the process of registering a business in Costa Rica.  A new company in Costa Rica must typically register with the National Registry (company and capital registry), Internal Revenue Directorate of the Finance Ministry (taxpayer registration), National Insurance Institute (INS) (basic workers’ comp), Ministry of Health (sanitary permit), Social Security Administration (CCSS) (registry as employer), and the local Municipality (business permit).  Crearempresa is rated 17th of 32 national business registration sites evaluated by “Global Enterprise Registration” (www.GER.co  ), which awards Costa Rica a relatively lackluster rating because Crearempresa has little payment facility and provides only some of the possible online certificates.

Traditionally, the Costa Rican government’s small business promotion efforts have tended to focus on participation by women and underserved communities.  The women’s institute INAMU, vocational training institute INA, MEIC, and the export promotion agency PROCOMER through its supply chain initiative have all collaborated extensively to promote small and medium enterprise with an emphasis on women’s entrepreneurship. In 2019, INA will launch a network of centers to support small and medium enterprises based upon the U.S. Small Business Development Center (SBDC) model.

The World Bank’s “Doing Business” evaluation for 2018, http://www.doingbusiness.org  , states that business registration takes nine steps in 22.5 days.  Notaries are a necessary part of the process and are required to use the Crearempresa portal when they create a company.  Women do not face explicitly discriminatory treatment when establishing a business.

Outward Investment

The Costa Rican government does not promote or incentivize outward investment.  Neither does the government discourage or restrict domestic investors from investing abroad.

2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties

Costa Rica has bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in force with Argentina, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, South Korea, the Netherlands, Paraguay, Qatar, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan and Venezuela.  Treaty texts are on the COMEX website (http://www.comex.go.cr/Tratados  ).  The investment chapter of CAFTA-DR includes all aspects of a BIT thereby making a separate BIT with the United States unnecessary.   United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu  ) features a parallel list of both signed investment treaties and those entered into force.

Costa Rica has in-force free trade agreements (FTA) with five groupings of countries.  The Central American Free Trade Agreement CAFTA-DR is with the United States, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Dominican Republic.  The European Union Association Agreement with Central America is with all EU members, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama. The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) free trade agreement is with Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, Panama and Guatemala.  The free trade agreement with the Caribbean nations of CARICOM is with Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Barbados, Belize, and Jamaica.    With Costa Rica’s March 2019 ratification of the South Korea Central American Free Trade Agreement between South Korea, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, that FTA is now in force between Costa Rica and South Korea.  Costa Rica also has individual FTAs with Canada, Mexico, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Chile, China, and Singapore. Costa Rica in recent years has slowed the pace at which it has negotiated and signed new free trade agreements.

Costa Rican and U.S. tax authorities currently coordinate under the terms of two agreements, a Taxation Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) signed in 1989, and a U.S-Costa Rica intergovernmental agreement titled “Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica to Improve International Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA” signed in December 2013 and expected to enter-into-force (EIF) during 2019.  Costa Rica has active bilateral or regional tax information exchange agreements with 16 other jurisdictions, in addition to a number of signed agreements that are not yet in force; see the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes for the full list: http://www.eoi-tax.org/jurisdictions/CR#agreements  .  Of those 16 agreements, two (Germany, Spain) are “Double Tax Conventions” that address overlapping tax obligations in addition to simple information exchange.  Costa Rica is also a party to the OECD “Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters,” which entered into force in August 2013: http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/Status_of_convention.pdf .

In accordance with its international commitments to address the use of corporate tax havens, the Costa Rican government in 2013 adopted a new set of transfer pricing rules, followed by their implementation regulations [DGT-R-44-2016 published by the internal revenue department (DGT) of the Finance Ministry] in September 2016.  Large transnational companies must declare and justify the transfer-pricing methods they are using in a manner consistent with international norms.

3. Legal Regime

Transparency of the Regulatory System

Costa Rican laws, regulations, and practices are generally transparent and foster competition in a manner consistent with international norms, except in the sectors controlled by a state monopoly, where competition is explicitly excluded.  Publicly-traded companies adhere to International Accounting Standards Board standards under the supervision of SUGEVAL, the stock and bond market regulator.

Rule-making and regulatory authority is housed in any number of agencies specialized by function (telecom, financial, health, environmental) or location (municipalities, port authorities). Tax, labor, health, and safety laws, though highly bureaucratic, are not seen as unfairly interfering with foreign investment.  It is common to have Professional Associations that play a regulatory role. For example the Coffee Institute of Costa Rica (ICAFE), a private sector organization, promotes standardization of production models among national producers, roasters and exporters, as well as setting minimum market prices.

Costa Rica is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures (http://www.businessfacilitation.org  ). Within that context, the Ministry of Economy compiled the various procedures needed to do business in Costa Rica:  https://costarica.eregulations.org/  .  Foreign and national investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations including the number of steps, name, and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal basis justifying the procedures.

Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms.  The Costa Rican College of Public Accountants (Colegio de Contadores Públicos de Costa Rica -CCPA) is responsible for setting accounting standards for non-regulated companies in Costa Rica and adopted full International Financial Reporting Standards.  For more, see the international federation of accountants IFAC: https://www.ifac.org/about-ifac/membership/country/costa-rica  .

Regulations must go through a public hearing process when being drafted.  Draft bills and regulations are made available for public comment through public consultation processes that will vary in their details according to the public entity and procedure in question, generally giving interested parties sufficient time to respond.  The standard period for public comment on technical regulations is 10 days. As appropriate, this process is underpinned by scientific or data-driven assessments.

Regulations and laws, both proposed and final, for all branches of government are published digitally in the government registry “La Gaceta”:  https://www.imprentanacional.go.cr/gaceta/  .  The Costa Rican American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham – http://amcham.co.cr   ) and other business chambers closely monitor these processes and often coordinate responses as needed.

The government has mechanisms to ensure laws and regulations are followed.  The Comptroller General’s Office conducts operational as well as financial audits and as such provides the primary oversight and enforcement mechanism within the Costa Rican government to ensure that government bodies follow administrative processes.  Each government body’s internal audit office and, in many cases, the customer-service comptroller (Contraloria de Servicios) provide additional support.

There are several independent avenues for appealing regulatory decisions, and these are frequently pursued by persons or organizations opposed to a public sector contract or regulatory decision.  The avenues include the Comptroller General (Contraloria General de la República), the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes), the public services regulatory agency (ARESEP), and the constitutional review chamber of the Supreme Court.  The State Litigator’s office (Procuraduria General) is frequently a participant in its role as the government’s attorney.

The review and enforcement mechanisms described above have kept the regulatory system relatively transparent and free of abuse, but have also rendered the system for public sector contract approval exceptionally slow and litigious.  There have been several cases in which these review bodies have overturned already-executed contracts, thereby interjecting uncertainty into the process. Bureaucratic procedures are frequently long, involved and can be discouraging to new investors.

A similarly transparent process applies to proposed laws.  The Legislative Assembly generally provides sufficient opportunity for supporters and opponents of a law to understand and comment upon proposals.  To become law, a proposal must be approved by the Assembly by two plenary votes. The signature of ten legislators (out of 57) is sufficient after the first vote to send the bill to the Supreme Court for constitutional review within one month, although the court may take longer. 

International Regulatory Considerations

While Costa Rica does consult with its neighbors on some regulations through participation in the Central American Integration System SICA (http://www.sica.int/sica/sica_breve.aspx  ), Costa Rica’s lawmakers and regulatory bodies habitually refer to sample regulations or legislation from OECD members and others.  Costa Rica’s commitment to the OECD accession process accentuated this traditional use of best-practices and model legislation. Costa Rica regularly notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers in Trade (TBT).

Legal System and Judicial Independence

Costa Rica uses the civil law system. The fundamental law is the country’s political constitution of 1949, which grants the unicameral legislature a particularly strong role.  Jurisprudence or case law does not constitute legal precedent but can be persuasive if used in legal proceedings. For example, the Chambers of the Supreme Court regularly cite their own precedents.  The civil and commercial codes govern commercial transactions. The courts are independent, and their authority is respected. The roles of public prosecutor and government attorney are distinct: the Chief Prosecuting Attorney or Attorney General (Fiscal General) operates a semi-autonomous department within the judicial branch while the government attorney or State Litigator (Procuraduria General) works within the Ministry of Justice and Peace in the Executive branch. Judgments and awards of foreign courts and arbitration panels may be accepted and enforced in Costa Rica through the exequatur process.  The Constitution specifically prohibits discriminatory treatment of foreign nationals.

The Costa Rican Judicial System is comprised of the civil, administrative, and criminal court structure.  The judicial system generally upholds contracts, but caution should be exercised when making investments in sectors reserved or protected by the Constitution or by laws for public operation.  Investments in state-protected sectors under concession mechanisms can be especially complex due to frequent challenges in the constitutional court of contracts permitting private participation in state enterprise activities. Furthermore, independent government agencies, including municipal governments, which grant construction permits, can issue permits or requirements that may contradict the decisions of other independent agencies, causing significant project delays.

Costa Rica’s commercial code details all business requirements necessary to operate in Costa Rica.  The laws of public administration and public finance contain most requirements for contracting with the state.

The legal process to resolve cases involving squatting on land can be especially cumbersome. Land registries are at times incomplete or even contradictory.  Buyers should retain experienced legal counsel to help them determine the necessary due diligence regarding the purchase of property.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

Costa Rican websites are useful to help navigate laws, rules and procedures including that of the investment promotion agency CINDE, http://www.cinde.org/en   (labor regulations), the export promotion authority PROCOMER, http://www.procomer.com/ (incentive packages), and the Health Ministry, https://www.ministeriodesalud.go.cr/   (product registration and import/export).  In addition, the State Litigator’s office (www.pgr.go.cr   – the “SCIJ” tab) compiles relevant laws.

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

Several public institutions are responsible for consumer protection as it relates to monopolistic and anti-competitive practices.  The “Commission for the Promotion of Competition” (COPROCOM), a semi-autonomous agency housed in the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce, is charged with investigating and correcting anti-competitive behavior across the economy. SUTEL, the Telecommunications Superintendence, shares that responsibility with COPROCOM in the Telecommunications sector.  Both agencies are charged with defense of competition, deregulation of economic activity, and consumer protection. COPROCOM is considered to be underfunded and weak; the OECD has repeatedly emphasized the need to reform COPROCOM in order to assure regulatory independence and sufficient operating budget. The government’s draft law to strengthen COPROCOM and give it more autonomy has faced considerable opposition.

Expropriation and Compensation

The three principal expropriating ministries in recent years have been the Ministry of Public Works – MOPT (highway rights-of-way), the Costa Rican Electrical Institute – ICE (energy infrastructure), and the Ministry of Environment and Energy – MINAE (National Parks and protected areas).  Expropriations generally conform to Costa Rica’s laws and treaty obligations, but there are allegations of expropriations of private land without prompt or adequate compensation.

Article 45 of Costa Rica’s Constitution stipulates that private property can be expropriated without proof that it is done for public interest.  The 1995 Law 7495 on expropriations further stipulates that expropriations require full and prior payment. The law makes no distinction between foreigners and nationals.  Provisions include: (a) return of the property to the original owner if it is not used for the intended purpose within ten years or, if the owner was compensated, right of first refusal to repurchase the property back at its current value; (b) a requirement that the expropriating institution complete registration of the property within six months; (c) a two-month period during which the tax office must appraise the affected property; (d) a requirement that the tax office itemize crops, buildings, rental income, commercial rights, mineral exploitation rights, and other goods and rights, separately and in addition to the value of the land itself;  (e) provision that upon full deposit of the calculated amount the government may take possession of land despite the former owner’s dispute of the price; and (f) provisions providing for both local and international arbitration in the event of a dispute. The expropriations law was amended in 1998, 2006, and 2015 to clarify and expedite some procedures, including those necessary to expropriate land for the construction of new roads.

There is no discernible bias against U.S. investments, companies, or representatives during the expropriations process.  Costa Rican public institutions follow the law as outlined above and generally act in a way acceptable to the affected landowners.  However, there are currently several cases in which landowners and government differ significantly in their appraisal of the expropriated lands’ value; in those cases, judicial processes took years to resolve.  In addition, landowners have, on occasion, been prevented from developing land which has not yet been formally expropriated for parks or protected areas; the courts will eventually order the government to proceed with the expropriations but the process can be long.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

In 1993, Costa Rica became a member state to the convention on International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention).  Costa Rica paid the awards resulting from unfavorable ICSID rulings, most recently in 2012 regarding private property belonging to a German national within National Park boundaries.

Costa Rica is a signatory of the convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention).  Consequently, within the Costa Rican legal hierarchy the Convention ranks higher than local laws although still subordinate to the Constitution. Costa Rican courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards.  Judgments of foreign courts are recognized and enforceable under the local courts and the Supreme Court.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

Disputes between investors and the government grounded in the government’s alleged actions or failure to act – termed investment disputes ‒ may be resolved administratively or through the legal system.

Under Chapter 10 of the CAFTA-DR agreement, Costa Rica legally obligated itself to answer investor arbitration claims submitted under ICSID or UNCITRAL, and accept the arbitration verdict.  To date there have been two claims by U.S. citizen investors under the provisions of CAFTA-DR. Extensive documentation for both cases is filed on the Foreign Trade Ministry (COMEX) website:  http://www.comex.go.cr/tratados/cafta-dr/  , under “documentos relevantes”. No local court denies or fails to enforce foreign arbitral awards issued against the government.

In some coastal areas of Costa Rica, there is a history of invasion and occupation of private property by squatters who are often organized and sometimes violent.  The Costa Rican police and judicial system have at times failed to deter or to peacefully resolve such invasions. It is not uncommon for squatters to return to the parcels of land from which they were evicted, requiring expensive and potentially dangerous vigilance over the land.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

The right to solve disputes through arbitration is guaranteed in the Costa Rican Constitution. For years, the practical application was regulated by the Civil Procedural Code, which made it ineffective with no arbitration cases until 1998, the year the local arbitration law #7727 was enacted.  A 2011 law on International Commercial Arbitration (Law 8937), drafted from the UNCITRAL model law (version 2006), brought Costa Rica to a dual arbitration system, with two valid laws, one law for local arbitration and one for international arbitration. Under the local act, arbitration has to be conducted in Spanish and only attorneys admitted to the local Bar Association may be named as arbitrators.  All cases brought before an arbitration panel, under the rules of local arbitration centers, must be resolved within 155 days after the complaint is served to the defendant; if the case does not fall under such arbitration centers’ rules then the award must be rendered within two months of final statements of the parties.  Parties can withdraw their case or reach an out-of-court settlement before the arbitral tribunal delivers an award.  If the award meets the review criteria, the losing party has the option to request that the Costa Rican Supreme Court examine the award, but only on procedural matters and never on the merits.  Under the UNCITRAL Law for International Arbitration, proceedings may be held in English and foreign attorneys are authorized to serve as arbitrators. The following arbitration centers are in operation in Costa Rica:

  • Centro de Conciliacion y Arbitraje. Costa Rican Chamber of Commerce
  • Centro de Resolución de Controversias. Costa Rican Association of Engineers and Architects
  • Centro Internacional de Conciliación y Arbitraje. Costa Rican American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM)
  • Centro de Arbitraje y Mediación/Centro Iberoamericano de Arbitraje (CIAR).  Costa Rican Bar Association.

Beyond such arbitration options, law #7727 also facilitates courts’ enforcement of conciliation agreements reached under the law.  Some universities and municipalities operate “Casas de Justicia” (Justice Houses) open to the public and offering mediation and conciliation at no cost.  Law #8937 empowered local arbitration centers, beginning with that pertaining to the Engineers and Architects’ Association, to implement Dispute Board regulations, as a method to address construction disputes.

Outcomes in local courts do not appear to favor state-owned enterprises (SOEs) any more or less than other actors.  SOEs can sign arbitral agreements, but must follow strict public laws to obtain the permissions necessary and follow correct procedures, otherwise the agreement could be voided.  Once SOEs find themselves in arbitration, they are subject to the same standards and treatment as any other actor.

The most frequently heard complaint about Costa Rican court process is that litigation can be long and costly.  U.S. companies cite the unpredictability of outcomes as a source of rising judicial insecurity in Costa Rica. The legal system is significantly backlogged, and civil suits may take several years from start to finish.  Some U.S. firms and citizens satisfactorily resolved their cases through the courts, while others see proceedings drawn out over a decade without a final resolution.  Commercial arbitration has consequently become an increasingly common dispute resolution mechanism.

Bankruptcy Regulations

The Costa Rican bankruptcy law, addressed in both the commercial code and the civil procedures code, is similar to corresponding U.S. law, according to local experts.  Title V of the civil procedures code outlines creditors’ rights and the processes available to register outstanding credits, administer the liquidation of the bankrupt company’s assets, and pay creditors according to their preferential status.  The Costa Rican system also allows for successive alternatives to full bankruptcy: “convenion preventivo” or arrangement with creditors; “administracion por intervencion” or administration through judicial intervention; “reorganizacion con intervencion judicial” or reorganization through judicial intervention; and finally bankruptcy.  As in the United States, penal law will also apply to criminal malfeasance in some bankruptcy cases. In the World Bank’s “resolving insolvency” ranking within the 2018 “Doing Business” report, Costa Rica ranked #134 of 190 (http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings  ).

4. Industrial Policies

Investment Incentives

Four investment incentive programs operate in Costa Rica: the free trade zone system, an inward-processing regime, a duty drawback procedure, and the tourism development incentives regime.  These incentives are available equally to foreign and domestic investors, and include tax holidays, training of specialized labor force, and facilitation of bureaucratic procedures. Costa Rica’s Foreign Trade Promotion Authority (PROCOMER) is in charge of the first three programs and companies may choose only one of the three.  As of early 2019, 453 companies are in the free trade zone regime, 90 in the inward processing regime, and 10 in duty drawback.

The Costa Rican Tourism Board (ICT) administers the tourism incentives; over 1,000 tourism firms are declared as such with access to incentives of various types depending on the firm’s operations (hotels, rent-a-car, travel agencies, airlines and aquatic transport).  The free trade zone regime is based on the 1990 law #7210, updated in 2010 by law #8794 and attendant regulations, while inward processing and duty drawback derive from the General Customs Law #7557. Tourism incentives are based on the 1985 law #6990, most recently amended in 2001.

The inward-processing regime suspends duties on imported raw materials of qualifying companies and then exempts the inputs from those taxes when the finished goods are exported. The goods must be re-exported within a non-renewable period of one year.  Companies within this regime may sell to the domestic market if they have registered to do so and pay applicable local taxes. The drawback procedure provides for rebates of duties or other taxes that were paid by an importer for goods subsequently incorporated into an exported good.  Finally, the tourism development incentives regime provides a set of advantages, including duty exemption – local and customs taxes – for construction and equipment to tourism companies, especially hotels and marinas, which sign a tourism agreement with ICT.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

Individual companies are able to create industrial parks that qualify for free trade zone (FTZ) status by meeting specific criteria and applying for such status with PROCOMER.  Companies in FTZs receive exemption from virtually all taxes for eight years and at a reduced rate for some years to follow. Established companies may be able to renew this exemption through additional investment.  In addition to the tax benefits, companies operating in FTZs enjoy simplified investment, trade, and customs procedures, which provide a convenient way to avoid Costa Rica’s burdensome business licensing process. Call centers, logistics providers, and software developers are among the companies that may benefit from FTZ status but do not physically export goods. Such service providers have become increasingly important participants in the free trade zone regime.

PROCOMER and CINDE are traditionally proactive in working with FTZ companies to streamline and improve law, regulation and procedures touching upon the FTZ regime.  Current initiatives include a proposal suggested by the OECD to eliminate the current requirement that service firms in FTZ regime may sell no more than 50 percent into the local market, and a proposal to work with the Customs agency to simplify the procedures that FTZ companies must follow to recycle or donate materials.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

Costa Rica does not impose requirements that foreign investors transfer technology or proprietary business information or purchase a certain percentage of inputs from local sources. However, the Costa Rican agencies involved in investment and export promotion do explicitly focus on categories of foreign investor who are likely to encourage technology transfer, local supply chain development, employment of local residents, and cooperation with local universities.  The export promotion agency PROCOMER operates an export linkages department focused on increasing the percentage of local content inputs used by large multinational enterprises; one recent program is dedicated to helping small and medium enterprises (SME) obtain international certifications such as ISO9000.

Costa Rica does not have excessively onerous visa, residence, work permit, or similar requirements designed to inhibit the mobility of foreign investors and their employees, although the procedures necessary to obtain residency in Costa Rica are often perceived to be long and bureaucratic.  Existing immigration measures do not appear to have inhibited foreign investors’ and their employees’ mobility to the extent that they affect foreign direct investment in the country. The government is responsible for monitoring so that foreign nationals do not displace local employees in employment, and the Immigration Law and Labor Ministry regulations establish a mechanism to determine in which cases the national labor force would need protection.  However, investors in the country do not generally perceive Costa Rica as unfairly mandating local employment. The Labor Ministry prepares a list of recommended and not recommended jobs to be filled by foreign nationals. Costa Rica does not have government/authority-imposed conditions on any permission to invest.

Costa Rica does not require Costa Rican data to be stored on Costa Rican soil.  With entry into force of law #8968 ‒ Personal Data Protection Law and its corresponding regulation ‒ in 2014, companies must notify the Data Protection Agency (PRODHAB) of all existing databases  from which personal information is sold or traded. The notification requirement applies in some cases to employee databases maintained, used, or accessed by third parties. Databases pay an annual registration fee.

Costa Rica does not require any IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to encryption.  The regulation associated with law #8968 did originally mandate that PRODHAB be given “super-user” privileges in databases registered with the agency, but that requirement was never acted upon and was reversed by a new regulation effective December 2016.

Costa Rica does not impose measurements that prevent or unduly impede companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the economy/country’s territory.   The measures that do apply under the data privacy law and regulation are equally applicable to data managed within the country.

5. Protection of Property Rights

Real Property

The laws governing investments in land, buildings, and mortgages are generally transparent.  Secured interests in both chattel and real property are recognized and enforced. Mortgage and title recording are mandatory and the vast majority of land in Costa Rica has clear title.  However, there are continuing problems of overlapping title to real property and fraudulent filings with the National Registry, the government entity that records property titles. In addition, squatters do have rights under Costa Rican law such that legally purchased and registered property if left unoccupied long enough and under certain circumstances may revert to the person occupying the land rather than the registered owner.  Potential investors in Costa Rican real estate should also be aware that the right to use traditional paths is enshrined in law and can be used to obtain court-ordered easements on land bearing private title; disputes over easements are particularly common when access to a beach is an issue. Costa Rica is ranked 47th of 190 for ease of “registering property” within the World Bank 2018 Doing Business Report.

Foreigners are subject to the same land lease and acquisition laws and regulations as Costa Ricans with the exception of concessions within the Maritime Zone (Zona Maritima Terrestre – ZMT).  Almost all beachfront is public property for a distance of 200 meters from the mean high tide line, with an exception for long-established port cities and a few beaches such as Jaco. The first 50 meters from the mean high tide line cannot be used for any reason by private parties.  The next 150 meters, also owned by the state, is the Maritime Zone and can only be leased from the local municipalities or the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (ICT) for specified periods and particular uses, such as tourism installation or vacation homes. Concessions in this zone cannot be given to foreigners or foreign-owned companies.

Intellectual Property Rights

Costa Rica’s legal structure for protecting intellectual property rights (IPR) is quite strong, but enforcement is sporadic and does not always get the attention and resources required to be effective.  As a result, infringement of IPRs is relatively common in both physical and online markets. Costa Rica is a signatory of many major international agreements and conventions regarding intellectual property.  Building on the existent regulatory and legal framework, CAFTA-DR required Costa Rica to further strengthen and clarify its IPR regime, with several new IPR laws added to the books in 2008.  Prior to that, the GATT agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) took effect in Costa Rica on January 1, 2000.  Costa Rica in 2002 ratified the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) internet treaties pertaining to Performances and Phonograms (WPPT) and Copyright (WCT).

The Ministry of Foreign Trade (COMEX) and Costa Rica’s National Registry agreed in 2017 to amend the country’s treatment of geographic indicators (GI) to require that any GI identify a generic term in a compound name.  On February 27, 2019, through Executive Decree 41572-JP-COMEX, Costa Rica’s updated GI decree entered into force.

Online piracy is another major concern for the country with poor enforcement of online IPR infractions and lengthy notice and takedown procedures.  On February 8, 2019, Costa Rica passed and published in La Gaceta, Executive Decree #41557-COMEX-JP with modifications to the existing regulation on Internet Service Providers -ISP’s- (Executive Decree #36880-COMEX-JP) that significantly shorten the 45 days previously allowed for notice and takedown of pirated online content.  Amendments of Articles 12 and 13 of the regulation effectively create an expeditious safe harbor system for ISP’s in Costa Rica without requiring new legislation or changes to the General Law of Public Administration.

During 2018, the Registry of Industrial Property implemented a series of tools to support the services provided by the Patent Office.  As of December 3, 2018, the Patent Office began accepting electronic filing of international applications through ePCT-filing. Since 2016, Costa Rica has been a member of the Cooperation Systems on Aspects of Operational Information and Industrial Property (PROSUR), and as part of its activities has implemented a pilot program of Accelerated Patent Procedure, PPH by its acronym in Spanish.

While Costa Rica is not listed in the Notorious Market Report, it is and has been listed in the USTR’s Special 301 Watch List since 1995.  However, the 2018 Special 301 Report noted that Costa Rica has taken steps to increase intragovernment coordination on IP matters resulting in a significant increase in the number of criminal investigations and prosecutions. The Costa Rican government does not release official statistics on the seizure of counterfeit goods, but the Chamber of Commerce compiles the following from Costa Rican government sources: http://observatorio.co.cr/.  Costa Rica’s Economic Crimes Prosecutor investigated 75 cases as of September 2018, on pace for a similar number to the 99 cases investigated in 2017. As in years past, prosecutors ultimately dismissed a number of cases due to lack of interest, collaboration, and follow-up by the representatives of trademark rights holders.  The Costa Rican government continues to publish statistics on IPR criminal enforcement at http://www.comex.go.cr/estad percentC3 percentADsticas-y-estudios/otras-estad percentC3 percentADsticas/  .

Costa Rica has made less progress on implementing a systematic solution to ensure that government entities use licensed software.  Only one person currently compiles and tracks the data, stalling the effort to fully monitor compliance.

For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/  .

Resources for Rights Holders

Contact at Mission:

Attention:  Investment Climate Statement
Economics Section
Embassy San Jose, Costa Rica
2519-2000
Email: SanJoseEcon@state.gov

Country/Economy resources:

  • Costa Rican American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham):  http://www.amcham.co.cr/  
  • The U.S. Embassy in Costa Rica (Consular Section) maintains an extensive list of legal service providers, including some firms engaged in intellectual property law.  This list does not represent an endorsement on the part of the U.S. government: https://cr.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/attorneys/).
  • The Department of Commerce also maintains a list of Business Service Providers that includes law firms specializing in IPR, under the Business Service Provider tab at: http://www.export.gov/costarica  .

Observatory of Illicit Trade:  http://observatorio.co.cr/  

6. Financial Sector

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

The Costa Rican government’s general attitude towards foreign portfolio investment is cautiously welcoming, seeking to facilitate the free flow of financial resources into the economy while minimizing the instability that might be caused by the sudden entry or exit of funds.  The securities exchange (Bolsa Nacional de Valores) is small and is dominated by trading in bonds. Stock trading is of limited significance and involves less than 20 of the country’s larger companies, resulting in an illiquid secondary market. There is a small secondary market in commercial paper and repurchase agreements.  The Costa Rican government has recently explicitly welcomed foreign institutional investors purchasing significant volumes of Costa Rican dollar-denominated government debt in the local market. The securities exchange regulator SUGEVAL is generally perceived to be effective.

Costa Rica accepted the obligations of IMF Article VIII, agreeing not to impose restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions or engage in discriminatory currency arrangements, except with IMF approval.  There are no controls on capital flows in or out of Costa Rica or on portfolio investment in publicly-traded companies. However, law #9227 adopted in 2014 allows the Central Bank, in coordination with the executive branch, to discourage short-term investments through the imposition of taxes on interest earned by foreign non-residents on Costa Rican bonds and also provides for a special reserve requirement of up to 25 percent of the value of those bonds.  The Central Bank has never used the powers given it by law #9227, and within the context of OECD-recommended reforms the Costa Rican government has committed to abrogating it. Some capital flows are subject to a withholding tax (see section on Foreign Exchange and Remittances).

Within Costa Rica, credit is largely allocated on market terms, although long-term capital is scarce.  Favorable lending terms for USD-denominated loans compared to colon-denominated loans have made USD-denominated mortgage financing popular and common. Foreign investors are able to borrow in the local market; they are also free to borrow from abroad, although withholding tax may apply.

Money and Banking System

Costa Rica’s financial system boasts a relatively high financial inclusion rate, estimated by the Central Bank at 75 percent (the percentage of adults over the age of 15 holding a bank account).  As part of an ongoing financial inclusion campaign, the Costa Rican government in early 2016 began allowing non-resident foreigners to open what are termed “simplified accounts” in Costa Rican financial institutions.  Resident foreigners have full access to all banking services.

The banking sector is healthy.  Non-performing loans have risen over the past year but remained low at 2.14 percent of total loans as of December 2018; the state-owned banks had a higher 3.12 percent average.  The country hosts a large number of smaller private banks, credit unions, and factoring houses, although the four state-owned banks are still dominant, accounting for just under 50 percent of the country’s financial system assets.  Consolidated total assets of the country’s public commercial banks were approximately USD 27 billion in December 2018, while consolidated total assets of the eleven private commercial and cooperative banks were over USD 20 billion Combined assets of all bank groups (public banks, private banks and others) were approximately USD 58.1 billion as of December 2018.

Costa Rica’s Central Bank performs the functions of a central bank while also providing support to the four autonomous financial superintendencies (Banking, Securities, Pensions and Insurance) under the supervision of the national council for the supervision of the financial system (CONASSIF).   The Central Bank developed and operates the financial system’s transaction settlement mechanism “SINPE.” In addition to managing all transaction settlement between banks, SINPE allows all financial institutions to offer clients the opportunity to transfer money to and from accounts with any other account in the financial system.  Such direct bank transfer has become a common means of payment in the country.

Foreign banks may establish operations in the country under the supervision of the banking regulator SUGEF and as such are subject to the same regulatory burden as locally owned banks.   The Central Bank has a good reputation and has had no problem in maintaining sufficient correspondent relationships. Costa Rica is steadily improving its ability to ensure the efficacy of anti-money-laundering and anti-terrorism-finance and was removed from intensive monitoring by the Financial Action Task Force in 2017.  The Costa Rican financial sector in broad terms appears to be satisfied to date with the available correspondent banking services.

Cyber currencies are currently legal in Costa Rica, but Costa Rica’s Central Bank has taken a cautious approach to them in general, warning Costa Ricans that such currencies do not enjoy any formal backing.  The financial authorities have also noted that cyber currencies are a potential avenue for money laundering.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

No restrictions are imposed on expatriation of royalties or capital except when these rights are otherwise stipulated in contractual agreements with the government of Costa Rica.  However, Costa Rican sourced rents and benefits remitted overseas, including royalties, are subject to a withholding tax (see below). When such remittances are paid to a parent company or related legal entity, transfer pricing rules and certain limitations apply.

There are no restrictions on receiving, holding, or transferring foreign exchange.  There are no delays for foreign exchange, which is readily available at market clearing rates and readily transferable through the banking system.  Dollar bonds and other dollar instruments may be traded legally. Euros are increasingly available in the market. Costa Rica has a floating exchange rate regime in which the Central Bank is ready to intervene, if necessary, to smooth any exchange rate volatility.

Remittance Policies

Costa Rica does not have restrictions on remittances of funds to any foreign country; however, all funds remitted are subject to applicable withholding taxes that are paid to the country’s tax administration.  The default level of withholding tax is 30 percent with royalties capped at 25 percent, dividends at 15 percent, professional services at 25 percent from July 1 2019, transportation and communication services at 8.5 percent, and reinsurance at 5.5 percent (different withholding taxes also apply for other types of services).  By Costa Rican law, in order to pay dividends, procedures need to be followed that include being in business in the corresponding fiscal year and paying all applicable local taxes.  Those procedures for declaring dividends in effect put a timing restriction on them.  Withholding tax does not apply to payment of interest to multilateral and bilateral banks that promote economic and social growth, and companies located in free trade zones pay no dividend withholding tax.  Both Spain and Germany have double-taxation tax treaties with Costa Rica, lowering the withholding tax on dividends paid by companies from those countries.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

Costa Rica does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund.

7. State-Owned Enterprises

Costa Rica’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are commonly known by their abbreviated names.  They include monopolies in petroleum-derived fuels (RECOPE), lottery (JPS), railroads (INCOFER), local production of ethanol (CNP/FANAL), water distribution (AyA), and electrical distribution (ICE, CNFL, JASEC, ESPH).  SOES have market dominance in insurance (INS), telecommunications (ICE, RACSA, JASEC, ESPH), and finance (BNCR, BCR, BanCredito, Banco Popular, BANHVI, INVU, INFOCOOP). They have significant market participation in parcel and mail delivery (Correos), and ports operation (INCOP and JAPDEVA).  Six of those SOEs hold significant economic power with revenues exceeding 1 percent of GDP: ICE, RECOPE, INS, BNCR, BCR and Banco Popular. Audited returns for each SOE may be found on each company’s website, while basic revenue and costs for each SOE are available on the General Controller’s Office “Sistema de Planes y Presupuestos” https://www.cgr.go.cr/02-consultas/consulta-pp.html  . The Costa Rican government does not currently hold minority stakes in commercial enterprises.

No Costa Rican state-owned enterprise currently requires continuous and substantial state subsidy to survive.  Many SOEs turn a profit, which is allocated as dictated by law and boards of directors. Financial allocations to and earnings from state-owned enterprises may be found in the “Sistema de Informacion de Planes y Presupuestos (SIPP)” within the General Controller’s Office (CGR) site: https://cgrweb.cgr.go.cr/pr02/f?p=150220:2:::NO:::  

U.S. investors and their advocates cite some of the following ways in which Costa Rican SOEs competing in the domestic market receive non-market-based advantages because of their status as state-owned entities.

Electricity generated privately must be distributed through the public entities (including rural electricity cooperatives not strictly classified as SOEs) and is limited to 30 percent of total electrical generation in the country: 15 percent to small privately-owned renewable energy plants and 15 percent to larger “build-operate-transfer” (BOT) operations.

Telecoms and technology sector companies have called attention to the fact that government agencies overwhelmingly choose SOEs as their telecom services providers despite a full assortment of private-sector telecom companies.  The information and telecommunications business chamber (CAMTIC) has been advocating for years against what its members feel to be unfair use by government entities of a provision (Article 2) in the public contracting law that allows non-competitive award of contracts to public entities when functionaries of the awarding entity certify the award to be an efficient use of public funds.  CAMTIC asserts that since 2016, the government has used Article 2 in 135 separate instances for a total contracted amount of over USD 400 million in information and communications technology (ICT) goods and services.

– The state-owned insurance provider National Insurance Institute (INS) has been adjusting to private sector competition since 2009 but in 2018 still registered 72 percent percent of total insurance premiums paid; 13 insurers are now registered with insurance regulator SUGESE: (https://www.sugese.fi.cr/SitePages/index.aspx  ).  New market entrants point to unfair advantages enjoyed by the state-owned insurer INS, including a strong tendency among SOE’s to contract their insurance with INS.

Costa Rica is not a party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) although it is registered as an observer.  Costa Rica strives to adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs (www.oecd.org/daf/ca/oecdguidelinesoncorporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises.htm  ).

Privatization Program

Costa Rica does not have a privatization program and the markets that have been opened to competition in recent decades – banking, telecommunications, insurance and Atlantic Coast container port operations – were opened without privatizing the corresponding state-owned enterprise(s).

8. Responsible Business Conduct

Corporations in Costa Rica, particularly those in the export and tourism sectors, generally enjoy a positive reputation within the country as engines of growth and practitioners of Responsible Business Conduct (RBC).  The Costa Rica government actively highlights its role in attracting high-tech companies to Costa Rica; the strong RBC culture that many of those companies cultivate has become part of that winning package. Large multinational companies commonly pursue RBC goals in line with their corporate goals and have found it beneficial to publicize RBC orientation and activities in Costa Rica.  Many smaller companies, particularly in the tourism sector, have integrated community outreach activities into their way of doing business. There is a general awareness of RBC among both producers and consumers in Costa Rica.

The Costa Rican government maintains and enforces laws with respect to labor and employment rights, consumer protection and environmental protection.  Costa Rica has no mineral extraction industry with its accompanying issues. Costa Rica encourages foreign and local enterprises to follow generally accepted RBC principles such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNE) and maintains a national contact point for OECD MNE guidelines within the Ministry of Foreign Trade (see http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/ncps.htm  ).

Some Costa Rican government agencies took the principles of public-private partnership to heart by working with private companies in addressing specific social issues.  For example, since 2003 the Foundation Paniamor (www.paniamordigital.org  ) is the designated lead agency in Costa Rica guiding the network of 428 (through December 2018) tourism-related businesses which are signatories to the “Code of Conduct” an initiative of the Costa Rican Tourism Board (ICT).  The purpose of this code is to organize and direct the private sector’s work against the sexual commercial exploitation of children and adolescents.

9. Corruption

Costa Rica has laws, regulations, and penalties to combat corruption.  Though the resources available to enforce those laws are limited, Costa Rica’s institutional framework is strong, such that those cases that are prosecuted are generally perceived as legitimate.  Anti-corruption laws extend to family members of officials, contemplate conflict-of-interest in both procurement and contract award, and penalizes bribery by local businessmen of both local and foreign government officials.  Public officials convicted of receiving bribes are subject to prison sentences up to ten years, according to the Costa Rican Criminal Code (Articles 340-347). Entrepreneurs may not deduct the costs of bribes or any other criminal activity as business expenses.  In recent years, Costa Rica saw several publicized cases of firms prosecuted under the terms of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

Costa Rica ratified the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption in 1997.  This initiative of the OECD and the Organization of American States (OAS) obligates subscribing nations to implement criminal sanctions for corruption and implies a series of follow up actions: http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cri.htm  .  Costa Rica also ratified the UN Anti-Corruption Convention in March 2007, has been a member of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) since 2012, and as of July 2017 is a party to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials.

The Costa Rican government has encouraged civil society interest in good governance, open government and fiscal transparency, with a number of NGO’s operating unimpeded in this space.  While U.S. firms do not identify corruption as a major obstacle to doing business in Costa Rica, some have made allegations of corruption in the administration of public tenders and in approvals or timely processing of permits.  Developers of tourism facilities periodically cite municipal-level corruption as a problem when attempting to gain a concession to build and operate in the restricted maritime zone.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact within government Anti-Corruption Agency:

Armando López Baltodano
Procurador Director de la Area de la Etica Publica, PGR
Procuraduria General de la Republica (PGR)
Avenida 2 y 6, Calle 13.  San Jose, Costa Rica
Telephone:  2243-8330, 2243-8394
Email: RocioCHT@PGR.go.cr

Contact at “watchdog” organization:

Evelyn Villarreal F.
Asociación Costa Rica Íntegra
Telephone: (506) 8355 3762
Email 1: evelyn.villarreal@cr.transparency.org
Email 2: crintegra.vice@gmail.com

10. Political and Security Environment

Since 1948, Costa Rica has not experienced significant domestic political violence. There are no indigenous or external movements likely to produce political or social instability.  However, Costa Ricans occasionally follow a long tradition of blocking public roads for a few hours as a way of pressuring the government to address grievances; the traditional government response has been to react slowly, thus giving the grievances time to air.  This practice on the part of peaceful protesters can cause logistical problems.

Crime increased in Costa Rica in recent decades and U.S. citizen visitors and residents are frequent victims.  While petty theft is the main problem, criminals show an increased tendency to use violence.   Please see the State Department’s Travel Advisory page for Costa Rica for the latest information —  https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/costa-rica-travel-advisory.html

11. Labor Policies and Practices

The Costa Rican labor force is relatively well-educated.  The country boasts an extensive network of publicly-funded schools and universities while Costa Rica’s national vocational training institute (INA) and private sector groups provide technical and vocational training.  According to the National Statistics Institute (INEC), as of December 2018, informal employment rose significantly from 41 percent in 2017 to 44.9 percent of total employment in 2018; 37.7 percent of the economically active population in the nonagricultural sector is in the informal economy.  The overall unemployment rate was 12 percent in 2018 while youth unemployment (between 15 and 24) reached 31.7 percent that year.

Several factors influenced Costa Rica’s labor market during 2018, including deceleration of the economy stemming from nation-wide public sector strikes, a drop in consumer confidence which reduced consumption, and the conflict in Nicaragua, which affected regional trade.  The Labor Ministry described the labor market in 2018 as a paradox: while the unemployment rate rose, the number of individuals employed also rose. Costa Rica has invested heavily in education and training, but the government recognizes it needs to focus on getting better results from its investment.  The government announced in November 2018 the creation of the National Qualifications Framework for Vocational Education and Training, a strategy to organize vocational education and to standardize and raise the quality of education.

The rapid growth of Costa Rica’s service, tourism, and technology sectors has stimulated demand for English-language speakers and prompted the Costa Rican government to declare English language and computer literacy to be a national priority at all levels of education.  In August 2018, the government announced an “Alliance for Bilingualism,” a public-private initiative to increase English teaching in the country. Several public and private institutions are also active in Costa Rica’s drive to English proficiency, including the 60-year-old U.S.-Costa Rican binational center (the Centro Cultural Costarricense Norteamericano), which offers general and business English courses to as many as 5,000 students annually, and receives U.S. government funding.  In 2010, the Peace Corps initiated a program in Teaching English as a Foreign Language and maintains an active program. While the presence of numerous multinational companies operating shared-services and call centers draw down the supply of speakers of fluent business and technical English, the pool of job candidates with English and technical skills in the Central Valley is sufficient to meet current demand.

The government does not keep track of shortages or surpluses of specialized labor skills.  Foreign nationals have the same rights, duties, and benefits as local employees. The government is responsible for monitoring that foreign nationals do not displace local employees in employment.  Labor law provisions apply equally across the nation, both within and outside free trade zones. The Immigration Law and the Labor Ministry regulations establish a mechanism to determine in which cases the national labor force would need protection.  The Labor Ministry prepares a list of recommended and not recommended jobs to be filled by foreign nationals.

There are no restrictions on employers adjusting employment to respond to fluctuating market conditions.  The law does not differentiate between layoffs and dismissal without cause. There are concepts established in the law related to unemployment and dismissals such as the mandatory savings plan (Fondo de Capitalizacion Laboral), as well as the notice of termination of employment (preaviso) and severance pay (cesantia).  Costa Rican labor law requires that employees released without cause receive full severance pay, which can amount to close to a full year’s pay in some cases.  Although there is no insurance for workers laid off for economic reasons, employers may establish voluntarily an unemployment fund.

Costa Rican labor law and practice allows some flexibility in alternate schedules but is nevertheless based on a 48-hour week made up of 8-hour days.  Workers are entitled to one day of rest after six consecutive days of work. The labor code stipulates that the workday may not exceed 12 hours. Use of temporary or contract workers for jobs that are not temporary in nature in order to lower labor costs and avoid payroll taxes does occur, particularly in construction and in agricultural activities dedicated to domestic (rather than export) markets.  No labor laws are waived to attract or retain investment‒all labor laws apply in all Costa Rican territory, including free trade zones. 

Costa Rican law guarantees the right of workers to join labor unions of their choosing without prior authorization.  Unions operate independently of government control and may form federations and confederations and affiliate internationally.  The vast majority of unions developed in the public sector, including state-run enterprises. “Permanent committees of employees” informally represent employees in some enterprises of the private sector and directly negotiate with employers; these negotiations are expressed in “direct agreements,” which have a legal status.  Based on 2018 statistics, 90.4 percent of government employees are union members as compared to 3.2 percent in the private sector. In 2018, the Labor Ministry reported 112 collective bargaining agreements, 80 with public sector entities and 32 within the private sector, covering 10.1 percent of the working population. The Ministry reported a total of 155 “direct agreements” in different sectors (agriculture, industry and transportation) during 2018.   The government continued in 2018 with the renegotiation of collective labor agreements in the public sector that began in 2016.

In the private sector, many Costa Rican workers join “solidarity associations,” under which employers provide easy access to saving plans, low-interest loans, health clinics, recreation centers, and other benefits.  A 2011 law solidified that status by giving solidarity associations constitutional recognition comparable to that afforded labor unions. Solidarity associations and labor unions coexist at some workplaces, primarily in the public sector.  Business groups claim that worker participation in permanent committees and/or solidarity associations provides for better labor relations compared to firms with workers represented only by unions. However, some labor unions allege that private businesses use permanent committees and solidarity associations to hinder union organization while permanent workers’ committees displace labor unions on collective bargaining issues in contravention of internationally recognized labor rights.

The Ministry of Labor has a formal dispute-resolution body and will engage in dispute-resolution when necessary; labor disputes may also be resolved through the judicial process.  The Ministry of Labor regulations establish that conciliation is the mechanism to solve individual labor disputes, as defined in the Alternative Dispute Resolution Law (No. 7727 dated 9 December 1997).  The Labor Code and ADR Law establish the following mechanisms: dialogue, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration. The Labor Law promotes alternate dispute resolution in judicial, administrative and private proceedings.  The law establishes three specific mechanisms: arbitration to resolve individual or collective labor disputes (including a Labor Ministry’s arbitrator roster list); conciliation in socio-economic collective disputes (introducing private conciliation processes); and arbitration in socio-economic collective disputes (with a neutral arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators issuing a decision). The Labor Ministry also participates as mediator in collective conflicts, facilitating and promoting dialogue among interested parties.  The law provides for protection from dismissal for union organizers and members and requires employers found guilty of anti-union discrimination to reinstate workers fired for union activities.

The law provides for the right of workers to conduct legal strikes, but it prohibits strikes in public services considered essential (police, hospitals and ports).  Strikes affecting the private sector are rare and do not pose a risk for investment. Public sector labor unions paralyzed government services with strikes in September 2018 to protest against a fiscal reform bill that became law in December 2018.  The government enforced the law by lifting blockades and clearing port entrances to guarantee the free transit of citizens and goods. Labor courts declared most of the strikes in the public sector illegal and most workers returned to work after four weeks (except for teachers’ union, which continued to strike for three months).

Child and adolescent labor is uncommon in Costa Rica.  The government has implemented a strategy to eliminate any remaining child labor by 2020 through programs to encourage school attendance, awareness campaigns on social media, increased inspections by the Labor Ministry, and improvements to child care in targeted areas.  Between 2011 and 2016, employment by minors under 15 fell by 76 percent from 34,494 to 8,071, or 1.1 percent of the population, according to Department of Labor reporting.

Chapter 16 of the U.S.-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) obliges Costa Rica to enforce its laws that defend core international labor standards. The government, organized labor, employers organizations, and the International Labor Organization signed a memorandum of understanding to launch a Decent Work Program for the period 2019-2023, which aims to improve labor conditions and facilitate employability for vulnerable groups through government-labor-business tripartite dialogue.

In December 2018, the government enacted a law to cut the fiscal deficit which amends and regulates legal provisions on public sector employment.  There are several bills pending before the National Assembly, including a reform to provisions regulating strikes, a bill expanding the list of essential services in which employees are prohibited from striking, and a bill facilitating internships, apprenticeships, and vocational education.

12. OPIC and Other Investment Insurance Programs

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) offers both financing and insurance coverage against expropriation, war, revolution, insurrection and inconvertibility for eligible U.S. investors in Costa Rica. OPIC can provide insurance for U.S. investors, contractors, exporters, and financial institutions.  Financing is available for overseas investments that are wholly owned by U.S. companies or that are joint ventures in which the U.S. company is a participant.

In Costa Rica, OPIC’s 2018 portfolio exposure totaled USD 151 million across 15 projects in financial services, real estate/construction, and utility sectors.  OPIC continues to be active in Costa Rica. For more information, see OPIC’s master list of projects by year: https://www.opic.gov/opic-action/all-project-descriptions  .   Costa Rica is a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, a member of the World Bank group.

13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2018 $60,126 2017 $57,286 www.worldbank.org/en/country   
Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 $19,924 2017 $19,924 IMF CDIS data available at http:/data.imf.org/CDIS 
Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 $117 2017 $117 IMF CDIS data available at http:/data.imf.org/CDIS  
Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2017 63.2% 2017 62.5% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx  

* For 2017 GDP in dollars with National Accounts exchange rate, the Costa Rican Central Bank (BCCR) is “Host Country Statistical Source”.  http://indicadoreseconomicos.bccr.fi.cr/indicadoreseconomicos/Cuadros/frmVerCatCuadro.aspx?idioma=1&CodCuadro= percent202999  

* For 2017 US FDI stock in Costa Rica, and Costa Rican FDI stock in the US, the Costa Rican Central Bank (BCCR) is “Host Country Statistical Source

* For “Total Inbound Stock of FDI as  percent host GDP”, local statistical source is BCCR.  GDP for 2017 was USD 58,174.6 million; total Inbound FDI stock in 2017 was USD 36,742.7.


Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

Costa Rica’s open and globally integrated economy receives FDI principally from the United States followed by Europe and Latin America.   Costa Rica’s outward FDI is more regionally focused on its neighbors Nicaragua, Guatemala and Panama, with the U.S. and Colombia following.

Direct Investment From/in Counterpart Economy Data – 2017
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions)
Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment
Total Inward 36,743 100% Total Outward 3,023 100%
USA 19,924 54% Nicaragua 955 32%
Spain 2,490 7% Guatemala 907 30%
Mexico 1,872 5% Panama 650 22%
Netherlands 1,443 4% USA 117 4%
Switzerland 1,395 4% Colombia 70 2%
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.

Stock Positions.  IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) site: (http:/data.imf.org/CDIS)


Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

Portfolio Investment Assets
Top Five Partners (Millions, US Dollars)
Total Equity Securities Total Debt Securities
All Countries 1,816 100% All Countries 1,017 100% All Countries 799 100%
USA 924 50.9%% USA 492 48.4% USA 432 54.1%
Ireland 356 19.6% Ireland 354 34.8% UK 85 10.6%
Luxembourg 151 8.3%% Luxembourg 143 14.1% Sweden 74 9.3%
UK 89 4.9%% China PR 3 .3%% Mexico 25 3.1%
Sweden 74 4.1% Canada 3 .3% Australia 20 2.5%

14. Contact for More Information

Investment Climate Statement
Economics Section
Embassy San Jose, Costa Rica
Telephone: 2519-2000
Email: SanJoseEcon@state.gov