HomeReportsInvestment Climate Statements...Custom Report - 0c91e6ca79 hide Investment Climate Statements Custom Report Excerpts: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia +167 more Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs Sort by Country Sort by Section In this section / Albania Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Algeria Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Andorra Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Angola Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Antigua and Barbuda Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Argentina Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Armenia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Australia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Austria Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Azerbaijan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Bahrain Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment Bangladesh Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Barbados Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Belarus 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Belgium Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Belize Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Benin Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Bolivia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Bosnia and Herzegovina Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Botswana Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Brazil Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment Brunei Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Bulgaria Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Burkina Faso Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Burma Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Burundi Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Cabo Verde Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment Cambodia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment Cameroon Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment Canada Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment Chad Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Chile Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics China Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Colombia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Costa Rica Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Côte d’Ivoire Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Croatia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Cyprus Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Czechia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Democratic Republic of the Congo Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment Denmark Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Djibouti Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Dominica Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Dominica Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Dominican Republic Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Ecuador Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Egypt Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics El Salvador Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Equatorial Guinea Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Eritrea Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment Estonia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment Eswatini Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime Ethiopia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Fiji Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Finland Executive Summary 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment France and Monaco Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Gabon Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Georgia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Germany Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Ghana Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Greece Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Grenada Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Guatemala Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Guinea Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Guyana Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Haiti Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Honduras Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Hong Kong Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Hungary Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment Iceland Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment India Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Indonesia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Iraq Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Ireland Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment Israel Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Italy Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment Jamaica Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Japan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Jordan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Kazakhstan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Kenya Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Kosovo Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Kuwait Executive Summary 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Kyrgyz Republic Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Laos Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Latvia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Lebanon Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment Lesotho Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Liberia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Libya Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Lithuania Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Luxembourg Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Macau Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Malawi Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Maldives Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment Mali Executive Summary Title 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Malta Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Mauritania Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime Mauritius Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Mexico Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Micronesia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Moldova Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Mongolia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Montenegro Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Morocco Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment Mozambique Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Namibia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Nepal Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics New Zealand Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Nicaragua Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Niger Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Nigeria Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics North Macedonia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Norway Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Oman Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Pakistan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Palau Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Panama Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Papua New Guinea Executive Summary 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Paraguay Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Peru Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Poland Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Portugal Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Qatar Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Republic of the Congo Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Romania Executive Summary Title 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Rwanda Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Saint Kitts and Nevis Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Saint Lucia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Samoa Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Sao Tome and Principe Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment Saudi Arabia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Senegal Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Serbia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Seychelles Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment Sierra Leone Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Singapore Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Slovakia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment Slovenia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Somalia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment South Africa Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment South Korea Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment South Sudan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Spain Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Sri Lanka Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Sudan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Suriname Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Sweden Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Switzerland and Liechtenstein Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Taiwan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Tajikistan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Tanzania Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Thailand Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics The Bahamas Executive Summary Title 1. Openness to and Restrictions Upon Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics The Gambia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics The Netherlands Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics The Philippines Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Timor-Leste Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Togo Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Trinidad and Tobago Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Tunisia Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Turkey Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Turkmenistan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Uganda Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment United Arab Emirates Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment United Kingdom Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime Uruguay Executive Summary Title 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Uzbekistan Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Vietnam Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment West Bank and Gaza Executive Summary Title 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Zambia Executive Summary 1. Openness To and Restrictions Upon Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Zimbabwe Executive Summary 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment 3. Legal Regime 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises 10. Political and Security Environment Albania Executive Summary Albania is an upper middle-income country with a gross domestic product (GDP) of USD 16.77 billion (2021 IMF estimate) and a population of approximately 2.9 million people. In 2020, the economy contracted by 4 percent in the height of COVID-19 and in 2021 re-bounded with a growth rate of 8.7 percent. The increase was fueled by construction, easing of pandemic related restrictions, recovery of tourism sector, increase in the real estate sector, record domestic electricity production, and continued budgetary, monetary, and fiscal policy support, including IMF and EU pandemic and earthquake related support. The initial growth projection for 2022 was 4.1 percent, despite uncertainties related to the pandemic, elevated fiscal deficits and public debt, and external and internal inflationary pressures. However, uncertainties due to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, surging energy prices, and inflationary pressures, coupled with limited room for fiscal maneuvering due to high public debt that exceeded 80 percent at the end of 2021, present challenges to the Albanian economy. Albania joined NATO in 2009 and has been a member of WTO since 2000. The country signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union in 2006, received the status of the EU candidate country in 2014, and began accession negotiations with the EU in July 2022. Albania’s legal framework is in line with international standards in protecting and encouraging foreign investments and does not discriminate against foreign investors. The Law on Foreign Investments of 1993 outlines specific protections for foreign investors and allows 100 percent foreign ownership of companies in all but a few sectors. The U.S.-Albanian Bilateral Investment Treaty, which entered into force in 1998, ensures that U.S. investors receive national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment. Albania and the United States signed a Memorandum of Economic Cooperation in October 2020 with an aim of increasing trade and investment between the two countries. Since the signing multiple U.S. companies have signed agreements for major projects in the country. As a developing country, Albania offers large untapped potential for foreign investments across many sectors including energy, tourism, healthcare, agriculture, oil and mining, and information and communications technology (ICT). In the last decade, Albania has been able to attract greater levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). According to the UNCTAD data, during 2010-2020, the flow of FDI has averaged USD 1.1 billion and stock FDI at the end of 2020 reached USD 10 billion or triple the amount of 2010. According to preliminary data of the Bank of Albania the FDI flow in 2021 is expected to reach USD 1 billion. Investments are concentrated in extractive industries and processing, real estate, the energy sector, banking and insurance, and information and communication technology. Switzerland, the Netherlands, Canada, Italy, Turkey, Austria, Bulgaria, and France are the largest sources of FDI. The stock FDI from United States accounts for a small, but rapidly growing share. At the end of Q3 2021, the United States stock FDI in Albania reached USD168 million, up from USD 99 million at the end of 2020, nearly a 70 percent increase. Despite a sound legal framework, foreign investors perceive Albania as a difficult place to do business. They cite endemic corruption, including in the judiciary and public procurements, unfair competition, informal economy, frequent changes of the fiscal legislation, and poor enforcement of contracts as continuing challenges for investment and business in Albania. Reports of corruption in government procurement are commonplace. The continued use of public private partnership (PPP) contracts has reduced opportunities for competition, including by foreign investors, in infrastructure and other sectors. Poor cost-benefit analyses and a lack of technical expertise in drafting and monitoring PPP contracts are ongoing concerns. U.S. investors are challenged by corruption and the perpetuation of informal business practices. Several U.S. investors have faced contentious commercial disputes with both public and private entities, including some that went to international arbitration. In 2019 and 2020, a U.S. company’s attempted investment was allegedly thwarted by several judicial decisions and questionable actions of stakeholders involved in a dispute over the investment. The case is now in international arbitration. Property rights continue to be a challenge in Albania because clear title is difficult to obtain. There have been instances of individuals allegedly manipulating the court system to obtain illegal land titles. Overlapping property titles is a serious and common issue. The compensation process for land confiscated by the former communist regime continues to be cumbersome, inefficient, and inadequate. Nevertheless, parliament passed a law on registering property claims on April 16, 2020, which will provide some relief for title holders. In an attempt to limit opportunities for corruption, the GoA embarked on a comprehensive reform to digitalize all public services. As of March 2021, 1,200 services or 95 percent of all public services to citizens and businesses were available online through the E-Albania Portal . However, Albania continues to score poorly on the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. In 2021, Albania declined to 110th out of 180 countries, a fall of six places from 2020. Albania continues to rank low in the Global Innovation Index, ranking 84 out of 132 countries. To address endemic corruption, the GOA passed sweeping constitutional amendments to reform the country’s judicial system and improve the rule of law in 2016. The implementation of judicial reform is underway, heavily supported by the United States and the EU, including the vetting of judges and prosecutors for unexplained wealth. More than half the judges and prosecutors who have undergone vetting have been dismissed for unexplained wealth or ties to organized crime. The EU expects Albania to show progress on prosecuting judges and prosecutors whose vetting revealed possible criminal conduct. The implementation of judicial reform is ongoing, and its completion is expected to improve the investment climate in the country. The Albanian parliament voted overwhelmingly and unopposed to extend this vetting mandate in February 2022. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 110 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 84 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2018 $35 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $ 5,210 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Albanian government leaders have acknowledged that private sector development and increased levels of foreign investment are critical to supporting sustainable economic development. Albania maintains a liberal foreign investment regime designed to attract FDI. The Law on Foreign Investment outlines specific protections for foreign investors and allows 100 percent foreign ownership of companies, except in the areas of domestic and international air passenger transport and television broadcasting. Albanian legislation does not distinguish between domestic and foreign investments. The Law on Strategic Investments approved in 2015 offers incentives and fast-track administrative procedures, depending on the size of the investment and number of jobs created, to both foreign and domestic investors who apply before December 31, 2023. The Albanian Investment Development Agency (AIDA) is the entity responsible for promoting foreign investments in Albania. Potential U.S. investors in Albania should contact AIDA to learn more about services AIDA offers to foreign investors ( http://aida.gov.al/ ). The Law on Strategic Investments stipulates that AIDA, as the Secretariat of the Strategic Investment Council, serves as a one-stop-shop for foreign investors, from filing the application form to granting the status of strategic investment/investor. Despite supporting legislation, very few foreign investors have benefited from the “Strategic Investor” status, and almost all projects have been granted to domestic companies operating in the tourism sector. Foreign and domestic investors have equal rights of ownership of local companies, based on the principle of “national treatment.” There are only a few exemptions regarding ownership restrictions: Domestic and international air passenger transport: foreign interest in airline companies is limited to 49 percent ownership by investors outside the Common European Aviation Zone, for both domestic and international air transportation. Audio and audio-visual broadcasting: An entity, foreign or domestic, that has a national audio or audio-visual broadcasting license cannot hold more than 20 percent of shares in another audio or audio-visual broadcasting company. Additional restrictions apply to the regional or local audio and audio-visual licenses. Agriculture: No foreign individual or foreign incorporated company may purchase agricultural land, though land may be leased for up to 99 years. However, if the company registers in Albania, this limitation on agricultural land does not apply. Albania currently lacks an investment-review mechanism for inbound FDI. However, in 2017, the government introduced a new provision in the Petroleum Law, which allows the government to reject a petroleum-sharing agreement or the sale of shares in a petroleum-sharing agreement to any prospective investor due to national security concerns. Albanian law permits private ownership and establishment of enterprises and property. To operate in certain sectors, licenses are required but foreign investors do not require additional permission or authorization beyond that required of domestic investors. Commercial property may be purchased, but only if the proposed investment is worth three times the price of the land. There are no restrictions on the purchase of private residential property. Foreigners can acquire concession rights on natural resources and resources of the common interest, as defined by the Law on Concessions and Public Private Partnerships. Foreign and domestic investors have numerous options available for organizing business operations in Albania. The 2008 Law on Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies and Law Establishing the National Business Center (NBC) allow for the following legal types of business entities to be established through the NBC: sole proprietorship; unlimited partnership; limited partnership; limited liability company; joint stock company; branches and representative offices; and joint ventures. The World Trade Organization (WTO) completed a Trade Policy Review of Albania in May 2016 ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp437_e.htm ). In November 2017, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) completed the first Investment Policy Review of South-East European (SEE) countries, including Albania ( http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1884 ). The National Business Center (NBC) serves as a one-stop shop for business registration. All required procedures and documents are published online http://www.qkb.gov.al/information-on-procedure/business-registration/ . Registration may be done in person or online via the e-Albania portal. Many companies choose to complete the registration process in person, as the online portal requires an authentication process and electronic signature and is only available in the Albanian language. When a business registers in the NBC it is also automatically registered with the Tax Office, Labor Inspectorate, Customs, and the respective municipality. According to the 2020 World Bank Doing Business Report, it takes 4.5 days and five procedures to register a business in Albania. Albania neither promotes nor incentivizes outward investment, nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Albania’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems have improved in recent years, but there are still many serious challenges. Endemic corruption, uneven enforcement of legislation, cumbersome bureaucracy, distortion of competition, and a lack of transparency all hinder the business community. Albanian legislation includes rules on disclosure requirements, formation, maintenance, and alteration of firms’ capitalization structures, mergers and divisions, takeover bids, shareholders’ rights, and corporate governance principles. The Competition Authority ( http://caa.gov.al ) is an independent agency tasked with ensuring fair and efficient competition in the market. However, business groups have raised concerns about unfair competition and monopolies, rating the issue as one of the most concerning items damaging the business climate. The Law on Accounting and Financial Statements includes reporting provisions related to international financial reporting standards (IFRS) for large companies, and national financial reporting standards for small and medium enterprises. Albania meets minimum standards on fiscal transparency, and debt obligations are published by the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Albania’s budgets are publicly available, substantially complete, and reliable. In August 2020, Albania approved the law for the establishment of the register of the Ultimate Beneficiary Owners. The law aims to ensure transparency on the ultimate beneficiary owners, who directly and indirectly own more than 25 percent of shares, voting rights, or ownership interests in all entities registered to do business in Albania, and was adopted following the recommendations of MONEYVAL. The rulemaking process in Albania meets the minimum requirements of transparency. Ministries and regulatory agencies develop forward regulatory plans that include changes or proposals intended to be adopted within a set timeframe. The law on notification and public consultation requires the GoA to publish draft laws and regulations for public consultation or notification and sets clear timeframes for these processes. Such draft laws and regulations are published at the following page: http://www.konsultimipublik.gov.al/ . The business community frequently complains that final versions of laws and regulations fail to address their comments and concerns and that comment periods are frequently not respected. The Albania Assembly ( www.parlament.al ) publishes a list of both proposed and adopted legislation. All laws, by-laws, regulations, decisions by the Council of Ministers (the government), decrees, and any other regulatory acts are published at the National Publication Center at the following site: https://qbz.gov.al/ Independent agencies and bodies, including but not limited to, the Energy Regulatory Entity (ERE), Agency for Electronic and Postal Communication (AKEP), Financial Supervising Authority (FSA), Bank of Albania, Competition Authority (CA), National Agency of Natural Resources (NARN), and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), oversee transparency and competition in specific sectors. Albania acceded to the WTO in 2000 and the country notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade of all draft technical regulations. Albania signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in 2006. The EU agreed to open accession talks on March 25, 2020, and the country is awaiting to hold the first Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC), which would mark the official opening of accession talks. Albania has long been involved in the gradual process of legislation approximation with the EU acquis. This process is expected to accelerate with the opening of accession negotiations. The Albanian legal system is a civil law system. The Albanian constitution provides for the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial branches, thereby supporting the independence of the judiciary. The Civil Procedure Code, enacted in 1996, governs civil procedures in Albania. The civil court system consists of district courts, appellate courts, and the High Court (the supreme court). The district courts are organized in specialized sections according to the subject of the claim, including civil, family, and commercial disputes. The administrative courts of first instance, the Administrative Court of Appeal, and the Administrative College of the High Court adjudicate administrative disputes. The Constitutional Court, reviews cases related to the constitutionality of legislation and, in limited instances, protects and enforces the constitutional rights of citizens and legal entities. Parties may appeal the judgment of the first-instance courts within 15 days of a decision, while appellate court judgments must be appealed to the High Court within 30 days. A lawsuit against an administrative action is submitted to the administrative court within 45 days from notification and the law stipulates short procedural timeframes, enabling faster adjudication of administrative disputes. Investors in Albania are entitled to judicial protection of legal rights related to their investments. Foreign investors have the right to submit disputes to an Albanian court. In addition, parties to a dispute may agree to arbitration. Many foreign investors complain that endemic judicial corruption and inefficient court procedures undermine judicial protection in Albania and seek international arbitration to resolve disputes. It is beneficial to U.S. investors to include binding international arbitration clauses in any agreements with Albanian counterparts. Albania is a signatory to the New York Arbitration Convention and foreign arbitration awards are typically recognized by Albania. However, the government initially refused to recognize an injunction from a foreign arbitration court in one high-profile case in 2016. The Albanian Civil Procedure Code outlines provisions regarding domestic and international commercial arbitration. Albania does not have a specific commercial code but has a series of relevant commercial laws, including the Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies Law, Bankruptcy Law, Public Private Partnership and Concession Law, Competition Law, Foreign Investment Law, Environmental Law, Law on Corporate and Municipal Bonds, Transport Law, Maritime Code, Secured Transactions Law, Employment Law, Taxation Procedures Law, Banking Law, Insurance and Reinsurance Law, Concessions Law, Mining Law, Energy Law, Water Resources Law, Waste Management Law, Excise Law, Oil and Gas Law, Gambling Law, Telecommunications Law, and Value-Added Law. There is no one-stop-shop that lists all legislation, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. However, foreign investors should visit the Albania Investment Development Agency webpage ( www.aida.gov.al ), which offers broad information for foreign investors. Major laws pertaining to foreign investments include: Law on Foreign Investments Law on Strategic Investments: Defines procedures and rules to be observed by government authorities when reviewing, approving, and supporting strategic domestic and foreign investments in Albania Law on Foreigners Law on Concessions and Public Private Partnerships: Establishes the framework for promoting and facilitating the implementation of privately financed concessionary projects Law on Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies: Outlines general guidelines on the activities of companies and the legal structure under which they may operate Law on Cross-Border Mergers: Determines rules on mergers when one of the companies involved in the process is a foreign company Law on Protection of Competition: Stipulates provisions for the protection of competition, and the concentration of commercial companies; and Law on Collective Investment Undertakings: Regulates conditions and criteria for the establishment, constitution, and operation of collective investment undertakings and of management companies. The Law on Foreign Investments seeks to create a hospitable legal climate for foreign investors and stipulates the following: No prior government authorization is needed for an initial investment. Foreign investments may not be expropriated or nationalized directly or indirectly, except for designated special cases, in the interest of public use and as defined by law. Foreign investors enjoy the right to expatriate all funds and contributions in kind from their investments. Foreign investors receive most favored nation treatment according to international agreements and Albanian law. There are limited exceptions to this liberal investment regime, most of which apply to the purchase of real estate. Agricultural land cannot be purchased by foreigners and foreign entities but may be leased for up to 99 years. Investors can buy agricultural land if registered as a commercial entity in Albania. Commercial property may be purchased, but only if the proposed investment is worth three times the price of the land. There are no restrictions on the purchase of private residential property. To boost investments in strategic sectors, the government approved a new law on strategic investments in May 2015. Under the new law, a “strategic investment” may benefit from either “assisted procedure” or “special procedure” assistance from the government to help navigate the permitting and regulatory process. Despite supporting legislation, very few foreign investors have benefited from the “Strategic Investor” status, and almost all projects have been granted to domestic companies operating in the tourism sector. Authorities responsible for mergers, change of control, and transfer of shares include the Albanian Competition Authority ACA: http://www.caa.gov.al/laws/list/category/1/page/1 , which monitors the implementation of the competition law and approves mergers and acquisitions when required by the law; and the Albanian Financial Supervisory Authority FSA: http://www.amf.gov.al/ligje.asp , which regulates and supervises the securities market and approves the transfer of shares and change of control of companies operating in this sector. Albania’s tax system does not distinguish between foreign and domestic investors. Informality in the economy, which may be as large as 40 percent of the total economy, presents challenges for tax administration. Visa requirements to obtain residence or work permits are straightforward and do not pose an undue burden on potential investors. Generally, U.S. passport holders are entitled to a one year stay in Albania without a residence permit, a special provision the GoA reaffirmed in March 2022. The government approved a new Law on Foreigners in July 2021, which partially aligns the domestic legislation, including that on migration, with the EU Directives. The new law introduces a single application procedure for permits in general. For investors there is a special permit called “Unique Investor Permit.” Foreign investors are issued a 2-year unique investor permit if they invest in Albania and meet certain criteria, including a quota ratio of one to five, of foreign and Albanian workers. In addition, same ratio should be preserved in the Board of Directors and other leading and supervisory structures of the company. Salaries of the Albanian workers should match the average of last year for equivalent positions. The permit can be renewed for an additional three years and after that the investor is eligible to receive a permanent permit provided that they fulfil the criteria outlined above and prove that the company is properly registers, has paid taxes and is not incurring losses. The Council of Ministers approves the annual quota of foreign workers following a needs assessment by sector and profession. However, work permits for staff that occupy key positions, among other categories, can be issued outside the annual quota. Foreign investors can obtain the single permit by the immigration authorities following the initial approval for employment from the National Agency for Employment and Skills https://www.akpa.gov.al/ . U.S. citizens along with EU, Western Balkans, and Schengen-country citizens are exempt from this requirement. In addition, U.S., EU, and Kosovo citizens when applying for residency permit for the first time, have a term of 5 years. The new law also introduced the National Electronic Register for Foreigners (NERF), which is a state database on foreigners, who enter or intend to enter Albania, with purpose of staying, transiting, working, or studying in Albania. NERF will register data on foreign nationals, who have an entry visa, stay, or transit in the Republic of Albania, have a temporary or permanent residence permit, and have a have a unique permit (residence and employment) in Albania. The Law on Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies sets guidelines on the activities of companies and the legal structure under which they may operate. The government adopted the law in 2008 to conform Albanian legislation to the EU’s Acquis Communitaire. The most common type of organization for foreign investors is a limited liability company. The Law on Public Private Partnerships and Concessions establishes the framework for promoting and facilitating the implementation of privately financed concessionary projects. According to the law, concession projects may be identified by central or local governments or through third party unsolicited proposals. To limit opportunities for corruption, the 2019 amendments prohibited unsolicited bids, beginning in July 2019, on all sectors except for works or services in ports, airports, generation and distribution of electricity, energy for heating, and production and distribution of natural gas. In addition, the 2019 amendments removed the zero to 10 percent bonus points for unsolicited proposals, which gave companies submitting unsolicited bids a competitive advantage over other contenders. Instead, if the party submitting the unsolicited proposal does not win the bid, it will be compensated by the winning company for the cost of the feasibility study, which in no case shall exceed 1 percent of the total cost of the project. The Albanian Competition Authority http://www.caa.gov.al/?lng=en is the agency that reviews transactions for competition-related concerns. The Law on Protection of Competition governs incoming foreign investment whether through mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, or green-field investments, irrespective of industry or sector. In the case of share transfers in insurance, banking and non-banking financial industries, the Financial Supervisory Authority ( http://amf.gov.al/ ) and the Bank of Albania https://www.bankofalbania.org/ may require additional regulatory approvals. Transactions between parties outside Albania, including foreign-to-foreign transactions, are covered by the competition law, which states that its provisions apply to all activities, domestic or foreign, that directly or indirectly affect the Albanian market. Parties can appeal the decision of the CA to the Tirana First Instance Court within 30 days of receiving the notification. The appeal does not suspend the enforcement of the decision that authorize concentrations and the temporary measures. The Albanian constitution guarantees the right of private property. According to Article 41, expropriation or limitation on the exercise of a property right can occur only if it serves the public interest and with fair compensation. During the post-communist period, expropriation has been limited to land for public interest, mainly infrastructure projects such as roads, energy infrastructure, water works, airports, and other facilities. Compensation has generally been reported as being below market value and owners have complained that the compensation process is slow, and unfair. Civil courts are responsible for resolving such complaints. Changes in government can also affect foreign investments. Following the 2013 elections and peaceful transition of power, the new government revoked, or renegotiated numerous concession agreements, licenses, and contracts signed by the previous government with both domestic and international investors. This practice has occurred in other years as well. There are many ongoing disputes regarding property confiscated during the communist regime. Identifying ownership is a longstanding problem in Albania that makes restitution for expropriated properties difficult. The restitution and compensation process started in 1993 but has been slow and marred by corruption. Many U.S. citizens of Albanian origin have been in engaged in long-running restitution disputes. Court cases go on for years without a final decision, causing many to refer their case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg, France. A significant number of applications are pending for consideration before the ECHR. Even after settlement in Strasbourg, enforcement remains slow. To address the situation, the GOA approved new property compensation legislation in 2018 that aims to resolve pending claims for restitution and compensation. The 2018 law reduces the burden on the state budget by changing the cash compensation formula. The legislation presents three methods of compensation for confiscation claims: restitution; compensation of property with similarly valued land in a different location; or financial compensation. It also set a ten-year timeframe for completion of the process. In February 2020, the Albanian parliament approved a law “On the Finalization of the Transitory Process of Property Deeds in the Republic of Albania,” which aims to finalize land allocation and privatization processes contained in 14 various laws issued between 1991 and 2018. The GOA has generally not engaged in expropriation actions against U.S. investments, companies, or representatives. There have been limited cases in which the government has revoked licenses, specifically in the mining and energy sectors, based on contract violation claims. The Law on Strategic Investments, approved in 2015, empowers the government to expropriate private property for the development of private projects deemed special strategic projects. Despite the provision that the government would act when parties fail to reach an agreement, the clause is a source of controversy because it entitles the government to expropriate private property in the interest of another private party. The expropriation procedures are consistent with the law on the expropriation, and the cost for expropriation would be incurred by the strategic investor. The provision has yet to be exercised. Albania maintains adequate bankruptcy legislation, though corrupt and inefficient bankruptcy court proceedings make it difficult for companies to reorganize or discharge debts through bankruptcy. A 2016 law on bankruptcy aimed to close loopholes in the insolvency regime, decrease unnecessary market exit procedures, reduce fraud, and ease collateral recovery procedures. The Bankruptcy Law governs the reorganization or liquidation of insolvent businesses. It sets out non-discriminatory and mandatory rules for the repayment of the obligations by a debtor in a bankruptcy procedure. The law establishes statutory time limits for insolvency procedures, professional qualifications for insolvency administrators, and an Agency of Insolvency Supervision to regulate the profession of insolvency administrators. Debtors and creditors can initiate a bankruptcy procedure and can file for either liquidation or reorganization. Bankruptcy proceedings may be invoked when the debtor is unable to pay the obligations at the maturity date or the value of its liabilities exceeds the value of the assets. According to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Law, the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings suspends the enforcement of claims by all creditors against the debtor subject to bankruptcy. Creditors of all categories must submit their claims to the bankruptcy administrator. The Bankruptcy Law provides specific treatment for different categories, including secured creditors, preferred creditors, unsecured creditors, and final creditors whose claims would be paid after all other creditors were satisfied. The claims of the secured creditors are to be satisfied by the assets of the debtor, which secure such claims under security agreements. The claims of the unsecured creditors are to be paid out of the bankruptcy estate, excluding the assets used for payment of the secured creditors, following the priority ranking as outlined in the Albanian Civil Code. Pursuant to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Law, creditors have the right to establish a creditors committee. The creditors committee is appointed by the Commercial Section Courts before the first meeting of the creditor assembly. The creditors committee represents the secured creditors, preferred creditors, and the unsecured creditors. The committee has the right (a) to support and supervise the activities of the insolvency administrator; (b) to request and receive information about the insolvency proceedings; (c) to inspect the books and records; and (d) to order an examination of the revenues and cash balances. If the creditors and administrator agree that reorganization is the company’s best option, the bankruptcy administrator prepares a reorganization plan and submits it to the court for authorizing implementation. According to the insolvency procedures, only creditors whose rights are affected by the proposed reorganization plan enjoy the right to vote, and the dissenting creditors in reorganization receive at least as much as what they would have obtained in a liquidation. Creditors are divided into classes for the purposes of voting on the reorganization plan and each class votes separately. Creditors of the same class are treated equally. The insolvency framework allows for the continuation of contracts supplying essential goods and services to the debtor, the rejection by the debtor of overly burdensome contracts, the avoidance of preferential or undervalued transactions, and the possibility of the debtor obtaining credit after commencement of insolvency proceedings. No priority is assigned to post-commencement over secured creditors. Post-commencement credit is assigned over ordinary unsecured creditors. The creditor has the right to object to decisions accepting or rejecting creditors’ claims and to request information from the insolvency representative. The selection and appointment of insolvency representative does not require the approval of the creditor. In addition, the sale of substantial assets of the debtor does not require the approval of the creditor. According to the law on bankruptcy, foreign creditors have the same rights as domestic creditors with respect to the commencement of, and participation in, a bankruptcy proceeding. The claim is valued as of the date the insolvency proceeding is opened. Claims expressed in foreign currency are converted into Albanian currency according to the official exchange rate applicable to the place of payment at the time of the opening of the proceeding. The Albanian Criminal Code contains several criminal offenses in bankruptcy, including (i) whether the bankruptcy was provoked intentionally; (ii) concealment of bankruptcy status; (iii) concealment of assets after bankruptcy; and (iv) failure to comply with the obligations arising under bankruptcy proceeding. According to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, Albania ranked 39th out of 190 countries in the insolvency index. A referenced analysis of resolving insolvency can be found at the following link: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/255991574747242507/Doing-Business-2020-Comparing-Business-Regulation-in-190-Economies-Economy-Profile-of-Albania 6. Financial Sector The government has adopted policies to promote the free flow of financial resources and foreign investment in Albania. The Law on “Strategic Investments” is based on the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination, and protection of foreign investments. Foreign investors have the right to expatriate all funds and contributions of their investment. In accordance with IMF Article VIII, the government and Central Bank do not impose any restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions. Despite Albania’s shallow foreign exchange market, banks enjoy enough liquidity to support sizeable positions. Portfolio investments continue to be a challenge because they remain limited mostly to company shares, government bonds, and real estate as the Tirana stock market remains non-operational In recent years, the constant reduction of non-performing loans has allowed commercial banks to loosen lending standards and increase overall lending especially as the economy has recovering from the severe COVID-19 economic disruption in 2020. Non-performing loans (NPL) at the end of 2021 dropped to 5.65 percent compared to 8.1 percent one year ago. Overall lending has steadily increased since 2019 and at the end of 2021 reached about USD 6 billion marking a 10 percent increase compared to 2020. The credit market is competitive, but interest rates in domestic currency can be high. Most mortgage and commercial loans are denominated in euros because rate differentials between local and foreign currency average 1.5 percent. Commercial banks operating in Albania have improved the quality and quantity of services they provide, including a large variety of credit instruments, traditional lines of credit, and bank drafts, etc. In the absence of an effective stock market, the country’s banking sector is the main channel for business financing. The sector is sound, profitable, and well capitalized. The Bank of Albania, the country’s Central Bank, is responsible for the licensing and supervision of the banking sector in Albania. The banking sector is 100 percent privately owned and its total assets have steadily increased over the years reaching USD 17 billion at the end of 2021 mostly based on customers deposits. The banking sector has continued the consolidation process as the number of banks decreased from 16 in 2018 to 11 at the end of 2021 when the Greek Alpha Bank was purchased by OTP Bank. As of December 2021, the Turkish National Commercial Bank (BKT) was the largest bank in the market with 26 percent market share, followed by Albanian Credins Bank with 15.8 percent, and Austrian Raiffeisen Bank third with 15.3 percent. The American Investment Bank is the only bank with U.S. shareholders and ranks sixth with 5.5 percent percent of the banking sector’s total assets. The number of bank outlets has also decreased over the recent years also due to the consolidation. In December 2021, Albania had 417 bank outlets, down from 446 from 2019 and the peak of 552 in 2016. Capital adequacy, at 18 percent in December 2021, remains above Basel requirements and indicates sufficient assets. At the end of 2021, the return on assets increased to 1.42 percent compared to 1.2 percent one year ago. As part of its strategy to stimulate business activity, the Bank of Albania has adopted a plan to ease monetary policy by continuing to persistently keep low interest rates. However, due to the recent inflationary pressure in March 2021, Bank of Albania increased the base interest rate to 1 percent, up from a historical low rate of 0.5 percent which was in place since June 2018. Many of the banks operating in Albania are subsidiaries of foreign banks. Only three banks have an ownership structure whose majority shareholders are Albanian. However, the share of total assets of the banks with majority Albanian shareholders has increased because of the sector’s ongoing consolidation. There are no restrictions for foreigners who wish to establish a bank account. They are not required to prove residency status. However, U.S. citizens must complete a form allowing for the disclosure of their banking data to the IRS as required under the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act. Parliament approved a law in October 2019 to establish the Albanian Investment Corporation (AIC). The law entered in force in January 2020. The AIC would develop, manage, and administer state-owned property and assets, invest across all sectors by mobilizing state owned and private domestic and foreign capital, and promote economic and social development by investing in line with government-approved development policies. The GoA plans to transfer state-owned assets, including state-owned land, to the AIC and provide initial capital to launch the corporation. In December 2021, the GoA transferred to the AIC close to USD 20 million. There is no publicly available information about the activities of the AIC for 2020 or 2021. The IMF https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/11/26/mcs11262019-albania-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2019-article-iv-mission Staff Concluding Statement of November 26, 2019, warned that the law would allow the government to direct individual investment decisions, which could make the AIC an off-budget spending tool that risks eroding fiscal discipline and circumventing public investment management processes. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are defined as legal entities that are entirely state-owned or state-controlled and operate as commercial companies in compliance with the Law on Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies. SOEs operate mostly in the generation, distribution, and transmission of electricity, oil and gas, railways, postal services, ports, and water supply. There is no published list of SOEs. The law does not discriminate between public and private companies operating in the same sector. The government requires SOEs to submit annual reports and undergo independent audits. SOEs are subject to the same tax levels and procedures and the same domestic accounting and international financial reporting standards as other commercial companies. The High State Audit audits SOE activities. SOEs are also subject to public procurement law. Albania is yet to become party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the WTO but has obtained observer status and is negotiating full accession (see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm ). Private companies can compete openly and under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, products and services, and incentives. SOE operation in Albania is regulated by the Law on Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies, the Law on State Owned Enterprises, and the Law on the Transformation of State-Owned Enterprises into Commercial Companies. The Ministry of Economy and Finance and other relevant ministries, depending on the sector, represent the state as the owner of the SOEs. SOEs are not obligated by law to adhere to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines explicitly. However, basic principles of corporate governance are stipulated in the relevant laws and generally accord with OECD guidelines. The corporate governance structure of SOEs includes the supervisory board and the general director (administrator) in the case of joint stock companies. The supervisory board comprises three to nine members, who are not employed by the SOE. Two-thirds of board members are appointed by the representative of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and one-third by the line ministry, local government unit, or institution to which the company reports. The Supervisory Board is the highest decision-making authority and appoints and dismisses the administrator of the SOE through a two-thirds vote. The privatization process in Albania is nearing conclusion, with just a few major privatizations remaining. Entities to be privatized include OSHEE, the state-run electricity distributor; 16 percent of ALBtelecom, the fixed-line telephone and mobile company; and state-owned oil company Albpetrol. Other sectors might provide opportunities for privatization in the future. The bidding process for privatizations is public, and relevant information is published by the Public Procurement Agency at www.app.gov.al . Foreign investors may participate in the privatization program. The Agency has not published timelines for future privatizations. 10. Political and Security Environment Political violence is rare, the more recent instances being an attempt led by a former Albanian leader designated by the USG for corruption to breach a party headquarters in January 2022 that required police intervention and political protests in 2019 that included instances of civil disobedience, low-level violence and damage to property, and the use of tear gas by police. Albania’s April 2021 elections and transition to a new government were peaceful, as were its June 2019 local elections. On January 21, 2011, security forces shot and killed four protesters during a violent political demonstration. In its external relations, Albania has usually encouraged stability in the region and maintains generally friendly relations with neighboring countries. Algeria Executive Summary Algeria’s state enterprise-dominated economy is challenging for U.S. businesses, but multiple sectors offer opportunities for long-term growth. The government is prioritizing investment in agriculture, information and communications technology, mining, hydrocarbons (both upstream and downstream), renewable energy, and healthcare. Following his December 2019 election, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune launched a series of political reforms, which led to the adoption of a new constitution in December 2020 and the election of a new parliament in June 2021. Tebboune has declared his intention to focus on economic issues in 2022 and beyond. In 2020, the government eliminated the so-called “51/49” restriction that required majority Algerian ownership of all new businesses, though it retained the requirement for “strategic sectors,” identified as energy, mining, defense, transportation infrastructure, and pharmaceuticals manufacturing (with the exception of innovative products). In the 2021 Finance Law, the government reinstated the 51/49 ownership requirement for any company importing items into Algeria with an intent to resell. The government passed a new hydrocarbons law in 2019, improving fiscal terms and contract flexibility in order to attract new international investors. The new law encourages major international oil companies to sign memorandums of understanding with the national hydrocarbons company, Sonatrach. Though the 43 regulatory texts enacting the legislation have not been formally finalized, the government is using the new law as the basis for negotiating new contracts with international oil companies. In recent years, the Algerian government took several steps, including establishing a standalone ministry dedicated to the pharmaceutical industry and issuing regulations to resolve several long-standing issues, to improve market access for U.S. pharmaceutical companies. The government is in the process of drafting and finalizing a new investment law. Algeria has established ambitious renewable energy adoption targets to reduce carbon emissions and reduce domestic consumption of natural gas. Algeria’s economy is driven by hydrocarbons production, which historically accounts for 95 percent of export revenues and approximately 40 percent of government income. Following the significant drop in oil prices at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, the government cut budgeted expenditures by 50 percent and significantly reduced investment in the energy sector. The implementation of broad-based import reductions coupled with a recovery in hydrocarbon prices in 2021 led to Algeria’s first trade surplus since 2014. Though successive government budgets have boosted state spending, Algeria continues to run a persistent budget deficit, which is projected to reach 20 percent of GDP in 2022. Despite a significant reduction in revenues, the historically debt-averse government continues to resist seeking foreign financing, preferring to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to boost employment and replace imports with local production. Traditionally, Algeria has pursued protectionist policies to encourage the development of local industries. The import substitution policies it employs tend to generate regulatory uncertainty, supply shortages, increased prices, and a limited selection for consumer goods. The government depreciated the Algerian dinar approximately 5% in 2021 after a 10% depreciation in 2020 to conserve its foreign exchange reserves, contributing to significant food inflation. The government has taken measures to minimize the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, including delaying tax payments for small businesses, extending credit and restructuring loan payments, and decreasing banks’ reserve requirements. Though the government has lifted domestic COVID_19 related confinement measures, continued restrictions on international flight volumes complicate travel to Algeria for international investors. Economic operators deal with a range of challenges, including complicated customs procedures, cumbersome bureaucracy, difficulties in monetary transfers, and price competition from international rivals particularly the People’s Republic of China, France, and Turkey. International firms operating in Algeria complain that laws and regulations are constantly shifting and applied unevenly, raising commercial risk for foreign investors. An ongoing anti-corruption campaign has increased weariness regarding large-scale investment projects and put a chill on bureaucratic decision making. Business contracts are subject to changing interpretation and revision of regulations, which has proved challenging to U.S. and international firms. Other drawbacks include limited regional integration, which hampers opportunities to rely on international supply chains. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 117 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 120 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 20xx USD Amount https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $3,570 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Algerian economy is challenging yet potentially highly rewarding. While the Algerian government publicly welcomes FDI, a difficult business climate, an inconsistent regulatory environment, and sometimes contradictory government policies complicate foreign investment. There are business opportunities in nearly every sector, including agribusiness, consumer goods, conventional and renewable energy, healthcare, mining, pharmaceuticals, power, recycling, telecommunications, and transportation. The urgency for Algeria to diversify its economy away from reliance on hydrocarbons has increased amid low and fluctuating oil prices since mid-2014, a youth population bulge, and increased domestic consumption of energy resources. The government reiterated its intention to diversify in its August 2020 plan to recover from the COVID-19 crisis. The government has sought to reduce the country’s persistent trade deficit through import substitution policies, currency depreciation, and import tariffs as it attempts to preserve rapidly diminishing foreign exchange reserves. On January 29, 2019, the government implemented tariffs, known as DAPs, between 30-200 percent on over 1,000 goods it assessed were destined for direct sale to consumers. In January 2022, the Ministry of Commerce said it would expand the number of items subject to DAPs to 2,600; it has yet to publish the new list of affected goods. Companies that set up local manufacturing operations can receive permission to import materials the government would not otherwise approve for import if the importer can show materials will be used in local production. Certain regulations explicitly favor local firms at the expense of foreign competitors, and frequent, unpredictable changes to business regulations have added to the uncertainty in the market. There are two main agencies responsible for attracting foreign investment, the National Agency of Investment Development (ANDI) and the National Agency for the Valorization of Hydrocarbons (ALNAFT). ANDI is the primary Algerian government agency tasked with recruiting and retaining foreign investment. ANDI runs branches in Algeria’s 58 states (wilayas) which are tasked with facilitating business registration, tax payments, and other administrative procedures for both domestic and foreign investors. U.S. companies report that the agency is understaffed and ineffective. Its “one-stop shops” only operate out of physical offices and do not maintain dialogue with investors after they have initiated an investment. The agency’s effectiveness is undercut by its lack of decision-making authority, particularly for industrial projects, which is exercised by the Ministry of Industry in general, the Minister of Industry specifically, and in many cases the Prime Minister. While the government operates an ombudsman’s office (Mediateur de la Republique), the office’s activities are not explicitly targeted toward investment retention. ALNAFT is charged with attracting foreign investment to Algeria’s upstream oil and gas sector. In addition to organizing events marketing upstream opportunities to potential investors, the agency maintains a paid-access digital database with extensive technical information about Algeria’s hydrocarbons resources. Establishing a presence in Algeria can take any of four basic forms: 1) a liaison office with no local partner requirement and no authority to perform commercial operations, 2) a branch office to execute a specific contract, with no obligation to have a local partner, allowing the parent company to conduct commercial activity (considered a resident Algerian entity without full legal authority), 3) a local company with 51 percent of capital held by a local company or shareholders, or 4) a foreign investor with up to 100% ownership in non-strategic sectors. A business can be incorporated as a joint stock company (JSC), a limited liability company (LLC), a limited partnership (LP), a limited partnership with shares (LPS), or an undeclared partnership. Groups and consortia are also used by foreign companies when partnering with other foreign companies or with local firms. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. However, the 51/49 rule requires majority Algerian ownership in all projects involving foreign investments in the “strategic sectors” of energy, mining, defense, transportation infrastructure, and pharmaceuticals (with the exception of innovative products), as well as for importers of goods for resale in Algeria. The 51/49 investment rule poses challenges for investors. For example, the requirement hampers market access for foreign small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as they often do not have the human resources or financial capital to navigate complex legal and regulatory requirements. Large companies can find creative ways to work within the law, sometimes with the cooperation of local authorities who are more flexible with large investments that promise significant job creation and technology and equipment transfers. SMEs usually do not receive this same consideration. There are also allegations that Algerian partners sometimes refuse to invest the required funds in the company’s business, require non-contract funds to win contracts, and send unqualified workers to job sites. Manufacturers are also concerned about intellectual property rights (IPR), as foreign companies do not want to surrender control of their designs and patents. Several U.S. companies have reported they have policies that preclude them from investing overseas without maintaining a majority share, out of concerns for both IPR and financial control of the local venture, which thus prevent them from establishing businesses in Algeria. Algerian government officials defended the 51/49 requirement as necessary to prevent capital flight, protect Algerian businesses, and provide foreign businesses with local expertise. For sectors where the requirement remains, officials contend a range of tailored measures can mitigate the effect of the 51/49 rule and allow the minority foreign shareholder to exercise other means of control. Some foreign investors use multiple local partners in the same venture, effectively reducing ownership of each individual local partner to enable the foreign partner to own the largest share. The Algerian government does not officially screen FDI, though Algerian state enterprises have a “right of first refusal” on transfers of foreign holdings to foreign shareholders in identified strategic industries. Companies must notify the Council for State Participation (CPE) of these transfers. In addition, initial foreign investments remain subject to approvals from a host of ministries that cover the proposed project, most often the Ministries of Commerce, Health, Pharmaceutical Industry, Energy and Mines, Telecommunications and Post, and Industry. U.S. companies have reported that certain high-profile industrial proposals, such as for automotive assembly, are subject to informal approval by the Prime Minister. In 2017, the government instituted an Investments Review Council chaired by the Prime Minister for the purpose of “following up” on investments; in practice, the establishment of the council means FDI proposals are subject to additional government scrutiny. According to the 2016 Investment Law, projects registered through the ANDI deemed to have special interest for the national economy or high employment generating potential may be eligible for extensive investment advantages. For any project over 5 billion dinars (approximately USD 35 million) to benefit from these advantages, it must be approved by the Prime Minister-chaired National Investments Council (CNI). The CNI previously met regularly, though it is not clear how the agenda of projects considered at each meeting is determined. Critics allege the CNI is a non-transparent mechanism which could be subject to capture by vested interests. In 2020 the operations of the CNI and the CPE were temporarily suspended pending review by the former Ministry of Industry, and in November 2021 the Prime Minister reported that almost 2,500 projects are awaiting approval from the council once it resumes activities. Algeria has not conducted an investment policy review through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the World Trade Organization (WTO). The last investment policy review by a third party was conducted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 2003 and published in 2004. Civil society organizations have not provided reviews of investment policy-related concerns. Algeria offers an online information portal dedicated to business creation, www.jecreemonentreprise.dz, though the business registration website www.cnrc.org.dz is under maintenance and has been for more than two years. The Ministry of Commerce is currently developing a new electronic portal at https://cnrcinfo.cnrc.dz/qui-somme-nous/ . The websites provide information about several business registration steps applicable for registering certain kinds of businesses. Entrepreneurs report that additional information about requirements or regulation updates for business registration are available only in person at the various offices involved in the creation and registration process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also recently established an Information Bureau for the Promotion of Investments and Exports (BIPIE) to support Algerian diplomats working on economic issues abroad, as well as provide local points of contact for Algerian companies operating overseas. Algeria does not restrict domestic investors from investing overseas, though the process for accessing foreign currency for such investments is heavily regulated. The exchange of Algerian dinars outside of Algerian territory is illegal, as is the carrying abroad of more than 10,000 dinars in cash at a time (approximately USD 72; see section 7 for more details on currency exchange restrictions). Algeria’s National Agency to Promote External Trade (ALGEX), housed in the Ministry of Commerce, is the agency responsible for supporting Algerian businesses outside the hydrocarbons sector that want to export abroad. ALGEX controls a special promotion fund to promote exports, but the funds can only be accessed for limited purposes. For example, funds might be provided to pay for construction of a booth at a trade fair, but travel costs associated with getting to the fair – which can be expensive for overseas shows – would not be covered. The Algerian Company of Insurance and Guarantees to Exporters (CAGEX), also housed under the Ministry of Commerce, provides insurance to exporters. In 2003, Algeria established a National Consultative Council for Promotion of Exports (CCNCPE) that is supposed to meet annually. Algerian exporters claim difficulties working with ALGEX including long delays in obtaining support funds, and the lack of ALGEX offices overseas despite a 2003 law for their creation. The Bank of Algeria’s 2002 Money and Credit law allows Algerians to request the conversion of dinars to foreign currency in order to finance their export activities, but exporters must repatriate an equivalent amount to any funds spent abroad, for example money spent on marketing or other business costs incurred. 3. Legal Regime The national government manages all regulatory processes. Legal and regulatory procedures, as written, are considered consistent with international norms, although the decision-making process is at times opaque. Algeria implemented the Financial Accounting System (FAS) in 2010. Though legislation does not make explicit references, FAS appears to be based on International Accounting Standards Board and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Operators generally find accounting standards follow international norms, though they note that some particularly complex processes in IFRS have detailed explanations and instructions but are explained relatively briefly in FAS. There is no mechanism for public comment on draft laws, regulations, or regulatory procedures. Copies of draft laws are generally not made publicly accessible before enactment, although the Ministry of Finance published drafts of the 2021 and 2022 Finance Laws in advance of consideration by Parliament. Government officials often give testimony to Parliament on draft legislation, and that testimony typically receives press coverage. Occasionally, copies of bills are leaked to the media. All laws and some regulations are published in the Official Gazette (www.joradp.dz ) in Arabic and French, but the database has only limited online search features and no summaries are published. Secondary legislation and/or administrative acts (known as “circulaires” or “directives”) often provide important details on how to implement laws and procedures. Administrative acts are generally written at the ministry level and not made public, though may be available if requested in person at a particular agency or ministry. Public tenders are often accompanied by a book of specifications only provided upon payment. The government does not specifically promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. In some cases, authority over a matter may rest among multiple ministries, which may impose additional bureaucratic steps and the likelihood of either inaction or the issuance of conflicting regulations. The development of regulations occurs largely away from public view; internal discussions at or between ministries are not usually made public. In some instances, the only public interaction on regulations development is a press release from the official state press service at the conclusion of the process; in other cases, a press release is issued earlier. Regulatory enforcement mechanisms and agencies exist at some ministries, but they are usually understaffed, and enforcement remains weak. The National Economic, Social, and Environmental Council (CNESE) studies the effects of Algerian government policies and regulations in economic, social, and environmental spheres. CNESE provides feedback on proposed legislation, but neither the feedback nor legislation are necessarily made public. Information on external debt obligations up to fiscal year 2019 is publicly available online via the Central Bank’s quarterly statistical bulletin. The statistical bulletin describes external debt and not public debt, but the Ministry of Finance’s budget execution summaries reflect amalgamated debt totals. The Ministry of Finance is planning to create an electronic, consolidated database of internal and external debt information, and in 2019 published additional public debt information on its website. A 2017 amendment to the 2003 law on currency and credit covering non-conventional financing authorizes the Central Bank to purchase bonds directly from the Treasury for a period of up to five years. The Ministry of Finance indicated this would include purchasing debt from state enterprises, allowing the Central Bank to transfer money to the treasury, which would then provide the cash to, for example, state owned enterprises in exchange for their debt. In September 2019, the Prime Minister announced Algeria would no longer use non-conventional financing, although the Ministry of Finance stressed the program remains available until 2022. In 2021, the non-profit Cercle d’Action et de Réflexion pour l’Entreprise (CARE) launched an online dashboard compiling key economic figures published by various ministries within the Algerian government. Algeria is not a member of any regional economic bloc or of the WTO. The structure of Algerian regulations largely follows European – specifically French – standards. Algeria’s legal system is based on the French civil law tradition. The commercial law was established in 1975 and most recently updated in 2007 ( www.joradp.dz/TRV/FCom.pdf). The judiciary is nominally independent from the executive branch, but U.S. companies have reported allegations of political pressure exerted on the courts by the executive. Organizations representing lawyers and judges have protested during the past year against alleged executive branch interference in judicial independence. Regulation enforcement actions are adjudicated in the national courts system and are appealable. Algeria has a system of administrative tribunals for adjudicating disputes with the government, distinct from the courts that handle civil disputes and criminal cases. Decisions made under treaties or conventions to which Algeria is a signatory are binding and enforceable under Algerian law. The 51/49 investment rule requires a majority Algerian ownership in “strategic sectors” as prescribed in the 2020 Complementary Finance Law (see section 2), as well as for importers of goods available for resale domestically as prescribed in the 2021 Finance Law. There are few other laws restricting foreign investment. In practice, the many regulatory and bureaucratic requirements for business operations provide officials avenues to informally advance political or protectionist policies. The investment law enacted in 2016 charged ANDI with creating four new branches to assist with business establishment and the management of investment incentives. ANDI’s website (www.andi.dz/index.php/en/investir-en-algerie ) lists the relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. Much of the information lacks detail – particularly for the new incentives elaborated in the 2016 investments law – and refers prospective investors to ANDI’s physical “one-stop shops” located throughout the country. There is an ongoing effort by the customs service, under the Ministry of Finance, to establish a new digital platform featuring one-stop shops for importers and exporters to streamline bureaucratic processes. The Ministry announced the service would begin in 2021, but the Ministry of Industry clarified in February 2022 that the one-stop shop would be set up with the approval of the new investment law. The National Competition Council (www.conseil-concurrence.dz/) is responsible for reviewing both domestic and foreign competition-related concerns. Established in late 2013, it is housed under the Ministry of Commerce. Once the economic concentration of an enterprise exceeds 40 percent of a market’s sales or purchases, the Competition Council is authorized to investigate, though a 2008 directive from the Ministry of Commerce exempted economic operators working for “national economic progress” from this review. The Algerian state can expropriate property under limited circumstances, with the state required to pay “just and equitable” compensation to the property owners. Expropriation of property is extremely rare, with no reported cases within the last 10 years. In late 2018, however, a government measure required farmers to comply with a new regulation altering the concession contracts of their land in a way that would cede more control to the government. Those who refused to switch contract type by December 31, 2018, lost the right to their land. Algeria’s bankruptcy system is underdeveloped. While bankruptcy per se is not criminalized, management decisions (such as company spending, investment decisions, and even procedural mistakes) can be subject to criminal penalties including fines and incarceration, so decisions that lead to bankruptcy could be punishable under Algerian criminal law. However, bankruptcy cases rarely proceed to a full dissolution of assets. The Algerian government generally props up public companies on the verge of bankruptcy via cash infusions from the public banking system. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business report, debtors and creditors may file for both liquidation and reorganization. Since the resignation of former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in early 2019, the courts have given the government authority to put several companies in receivership and have appointed temporary heads to direct them following the arrests of their CEOs as part of a broad anti-corruption drive. The government has since nationalized some of the companies following the conviction of the owners. 6. Financial Sector The Algiers Stock Exchange has five stocks listed – each at no more than 35 percent equity. There is a small and medium enterprise exchange with one listed company. The exchange has a total market capitalization representing less than 0.1 percent of Algeria’s GDP. Daily trading volume on the exchange averages around USD 2,000. Despite the lack of tangible activity, the market is regulated by an independent oversight commission that enforces compliance requirements on listed companies and traders. Government officials have previously expressed their desire to reach a capitalization of USD 7.8 billion and enlist up to 50 new companies. Attempts to list additional companies have been stymied by a lack both of public awareness and appetite for portfolio investment, as well as by private and public companies’ unpreparedness to satisfy due diligence requirements that would attract investors. Proposed privatizations of state-owned companies have also been opposed by the public. Algerian society generally prefers material investment vehicles for savings, namely cash. Public banks, which dominate the banking sector (see below), are required to purchase government securities when offered, meaning they have little leftover liquidity to make other investments. Foreign portfolio investment is prohibited – the purchase of any investment product in Algeria, whether a government or corporate bond or equity stock, is limited to Algerian residents only. The banking sector is roughly 85 percent public and 15 percent private as measured by value of assets held and is regulated by an independent central bank. Publicly available data from private institutions and U.S. Federal Reserve Economic Data show estimated total assets in the commercial banking sector in 2017 were roughly 13.9 trillion dinars (USD 116.7 billion) against 9.2 trillion dinars (USD 77.2 billion) in liabilities. In response to liquidity concerns caused by the oil price decline and COVID-19 crisis, the bank progressively decreased the reserve requirement from 12 percent to 3 percent between March and September 2020. The IMF and Bank of Algeria have noted moderate growth in non-performing assets since 2015, currently estimated between 12 and 13 percent of total assets. The quality of service in public banks is generally considered low as generations of public banking executives and workers trained to operate in a statist economy lack familiarity with modern banking practices. Most transactions are materialized (non-electronic). Many areas of the country suffer from a dearth of branches, leaving large amounts of the population without access to banking services. ATMs are not widespread, especially outside the major cities, and few accept foreign bankcards. Outside of major hotels with international clientele, hardly any retail establishments accept credit cards. Algerian banks do issue debit cards, but the system is distinct from any international payment system. The Minister of Commerce has announced multiple plans to require businesses to use electronic payments for all commercial and service transactions, though the most recent government deadline for all stores to deploy electronic payment terminals by the end of 2021 was indefinitely delayed. In addition, analysts estimate that between one-third and one-half of the money supply circulates in the informal economy. Foreigners can open foreign currency accounts without restriction, but proof of a work permit or residency is required to open an account in Algerian dinars. Foreign banks are permitted to establish operations in the country, but they must be legally distinct entities from their overseas home offices. In 2015, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) removed Algeria from its Public Statement, and in 2016 it removed Algeria from the “gray list.” The FATF recognized Algeria’s significant progress and the improvement in its anti-money laundering/counter terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regime. The FATF also indicated Algeria has substantially addressed its action plan since strategic deficiencies were identified in 2011. Algeria’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF) is the “Fonds de Regulation des Recettes (FRR).” The Finance Ministry’s website shows the fund decreased from 4408.2 billion dinars (USD 37.36 billion) in 2014 to 784.5 billion dinars (USD 6.65 billion) in 2016. The data has not been updated since 2016. Algerian media reported the FRR was spent down to zero as of February 2017. Algeria is not known to have participated in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on SWFs. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) comprise more than half of the formal Algerian economy. SOEs are amalgamated into a single line of the state budget and are listed in the official business registry. To be defined as an SOE, a company must be at least 51 percent owned by the state. Algerian SOEs are bureaucratic and may be subject to political influence. There are competing lines of authority at the mid-levels, and contacts report mid- and upper-level managers are reluctant to make decisions because internal accusations of favoritism or corruption are often used to settle political and personal scores. Senior management teams at SOEs report to their relevant ministry; CEOs of the larger companies such as national hydrocarbons company Sonatrach, national electric utility Sonelgaz, and airline Air Algerie report directly to ministers. Boards of directors are appointed by the state, and the allocation of these seats is considered political. SOEs are not known to adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance. Legally, public and private companies compete under the same terms with respect to market share, products and services, and incentives. In reality, private enterprises assert that public companies sometimes receive more favorable treatment. Private enterprises have the same access to financing as SOEs, but they work with private banks, and they are less bureaucratic than their public counterparts. Public companies generally refrain from doing business with private banks and a 2008 government directive ordered public companies to work only with public banks. The directive was later officially rescinded, but public companies continued the practice. However, the heads of Algeria’s two largest state enterprises, Sonatrach and Sonelgaz, both indicated in 2020 that given current budget pressures they are investigating recourse to foreign financing, including from private banks. SOEs are subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors, but business contacts report that the government favors SOEs over private sector companies in terms of access to land. SOEs are subject to budget constraints. Audits of public companies can be conducted by the Court of Auditors, a financially autonomous institution. The constitution explicitly charges it with “ex post inspection of the finances of the state, collectivities, public services, and commercial capital of the state,” as well as preparing and submitting an annual report to the President, heads of both chambers of Parliament, and Prime Minister. The Court makes its audits public on its website, for free, but with a time delay, which does not conform to international norms. The Court conducts audits simultaneously but independently from the Ministry of Finance’s year-end reports. The Court makes its reports available online once finalized and delivered to the Parliament, whereas the Ministry withholds publishing year-end reports until after the Parliament and President have approved them. The Court’s audit reports cover the entire implemented national budget by fiscal year and examine each annual planning budget that is passed by Parliament. The General Inspectorate of Finance (IGF), the public auditing body under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance, can conduct “no-notice” audits of public companies. The results of these audits are sent directly to the Minister of Finance, and the offices of the President and Prime Minister. They are not made available publicly. The Court of Auditors and IGF previously had joint responsibility for auditing certain accounts, but they are in the process of eliminating this redundancy. Further legislation clarifying whether the delineation of responsibility for particular accounts which could rest with the Court of Auditors or the Ministry of Finance’s General Inspection of Finance (IGF) unit has yet to be issued. There has been limited privatization of certain projects previously managed by SOEs, and so far restricted to the water sector and possibly a few other sectors. However, the privatization of SOEs remains publicly sensitive and has been largely halted. 10. Political and Security Environment Following nearly two months of massive protests, known as the hirak, former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika resigned on April 2, 2019, after 20 years in power. His resignation launched an eight-month transition, resulting in the election of Abdelmadjid Tebboune as president in December 2019. Voter turnout was approximately 40 percent and the new administration continues to focus on restoring government authority and legitimacy. Following historically low turnout of 24 percent in the November 2020 constitutional referendum and President Tebboune’s lengthy medical absences in late 2020 and early 2021, hirak protests resumed in February 2021 before government security services brought them to a halt in May 2021. Demonstrations have taken place in Algeria’s major wilayas (states) and have focused largely on political reform, as protestors continue to call for an overhaul of the Algerian government. President Tebboune dissolved parliament in February 2021 and Algeria held parliamentary elections in June 2021 and local elections in November 2021. Prior to the hirak, which began in 2019, demonstrations in Algeria tended to concern housing and other social programs and were generally smaller than a few hundred participants. While most protests were peaceful, there were occasional outbreaks of violence that resulted in injuries, sometimes resulting from efforts of security forces to disperse the protests. Hirak protests were relatively peaceful, though security forces occasionally use heavy-handed tactics to suppress protesters. In 2021, the government adopted laws that give authorities more leeway to arrest political opponents. In 2013, a terrorist group now known as al-Murabitoun claimed responsibility for the attack against the Tiguentourine gas facility near In Amenas, in southeastern Algeria. More than 800 people were taken hostage during the four-day siege, resulting in the deaths of 39 civilians, including 3 U.S. citizens, and resulting in damage to the facilities. Seven other U.S. citizens escaped. Since the attack, the Algerian government has increased security personnel and preventative security procedures in Algeria’s oil and gas producing regions. Government reactions to public unrest typically include tighter security control on movement between and within cities to prevent further clashes, significant security presence in anticipated protest zones, temporary detention of protestors, and promises of either greater public expenditures on local infrastructure or increased local hiring for state-owned companies. During the first few months of 2015, there were a series of protests in several cities in southern Algeria against the government’s program to drill test wells for shale gas. These protests were largely peaceful but sometimes resulted in clashes, injury, and rarely, property damage. Government pronouncements in 2017 that shale gas exploration would recommence did not generate protests. On April 27, 2020, an Algerian court sentenced an expatriate manager and an Algerian employee of a large hotel to six months in prison on charges of “undermining the integrity of the national territory” for allegedly sharing publicly available security information with corporate headquarters outside of Algeria. The Algerian government requires all foreign employees of foreign companies or organizations based in Algeria to contact the Foreigners Office of the Ministry of the Interior before traveling in the country’s interior so that the government can evaluate security conditions. The Algerian government also requires U.S. Embassy employees to coordinate travel with the government on any trip outside of the Algiers wilaya (state). The Algerian government continues to limit the weekly number of authorized international flights in response to the COVID-19 outbreak, and they remain at less than 40 percent of pre-COVID levels two years after the onset of the pandemic. In February 2020, ISIS claimed responsibility for a suicide bomber who attacked a military barrack in southern Algeria, killing a soldier. This was met with a swift response by Algerian security services against the militants responsible for the attacks, and the Algerian army continues to carry out counterterrorism operations throughout the country. According to official Defense Ministry announcements, Algerian security forces “neutralized” 37 terrorists (21 killed, 9 arrested, and 7 surrendered) and arrested an additional 108 “supporters” of terrorism in 2020. Army detachments also destroyed 251 terrorist hideouts and seized a large quantity of ammunition and explosives during the year. In 2021, the government broadened the definition of terrorism to include any act – peaceful or otherwise – that undermines Algeria’s national unity, prompting a slew of terrorism arrests for acts not necessarily in line with the internationally recognized definition of terrorism. U.S. citizens living or traveling in Algeria are encouraged to enroll in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) via the State Department’s travel registration website, https://step.state.gov/step, to receive security messages and make it easier to be located in an emergency. Andorra Executive Summary Andorra is an independent principality with a population of about 79,000 and area of 181 square miles situated between France and Spain in the Pyrenees mountains. It uses the euro as its national currency. Andorra is a popular tourist destination visited by over 8 million people each year (pre-pandemic) who are drawn by outdoor activities like hiking and cycling in the summer and skiing and snowshoeing in the winter, as well as by its duty-free shopping of luxury products. Andorra’s economy is based on an interdependent network of trade, commerce, and tourism, which represent nearly 60% of the economy, followed by the financial sector. Andorra has also become a wealthy international commercial center because of its integrated banking sector and low taxes. As part of its effort to modernize its economy, Andorra has opened to foreign investment and engaged in other reforms, including advancing tax initiatives. Andorra is actively seeking to attract foreign investment and to become a center for entrepreneurs, talent, innovation, and knowledge. The Andorran economy is undergoing a process of digitalization and diversification that accelerated due to the impact pandemic-related border closures had on its dominant tourist sector. In 2006, the Government began sweeping economic reforms. The Parliament approved three main regulations to complement the first phase of economic openness: the law of Companies (October 2007), the Law of Business Accounting (December 2007), and the Law of Foreign Investment (April 2008 and June 2012). From 2011 to 2017, the Parliament approved direct taxes in the form of a corporate tax, tax on economic activities, tax on income of non-residents, tax on capital gains, and personal income tax. Andorra joined the IMF in October 2020, providing it access to additional resources for managing its economy. Also, as part of the post-pandemic economic recovery plan, Andorra passed Horizon 23, a comprehensive roadmap backed by 80 million euros of public funds to accelerate economic diversification into sectors like fintech, sports tech, esports, and biotech. These regulations aim to establish a transparent, modern, and internationally comparable regulatory framework. These reforms aim to attract investment and businesses that have the potential to boost Andorra’s economic development and diversification. Prior to 2008, Andorra limited foreign investment, worried that large foreign firms would have an oversized impact on its small economy. For example, previous regulations allowed non-citizens with less than 20 years residence in Andorra to own no more than 33 percent of a company. While foreigners may now own 100 percent of a trading enterprise or a holding company, the Government must approve the establishment of any private enterprise. The approval can take up to one month, which can be rejected if the proposal is found to negatively impact the environment, the public order, or the general interests of the principality. Andorra is a microstate that accounts for .001 percent of global emissions and has demonstrated its ambition to the fight against climate change by establishing a national strategy that commits to reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) by a minimum of 37 percent by 2030 and pursuing carbon neutrality by 2050. In addition to implementing an energy transition law, Andorra approved the Green Fund and a hydrocarbon tax to promote climate change mitigation and adaptation initiatives. Andorra’s per capita income is above the European average and above the level of its neighbors. The country has developed a sophisticated infrastructure including a one-of-a-kind micro-fiber-optic network for the entire country that provides universal access for all households and companies. Andorra’s retail tradition is well known around Europe, thanks to more than 1,400 shops, the quality of their products, and competitive prices. Products taken out of the Principality are tax-free up to certain limits; the purchaser must declare those that exceed the allowance. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Data not available 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Andorra has established an open framework for foreign investments, allowing non-residents to create companies in the country, open businesses, and invest in all kinds of assets. The Foreign Investment Law came into force in July 2012, completely opening the economy to foreign investors. Since then, foreigners, whether resident or not, may own up to 100 percent of any Andorra-based company. The law also liberalizes restrictions on foreign professionals seeking to work in Andorra. Previously, a foreigner could only begin to practice in Andorra after twenty years of residency. Under the current regulations, any Andorran legal resident from a country that has a reciprocal standard can work in Andorra, although special working permits are required for specific professions. The government of Andorra created Andorra Business ( https://www.andorrabusiness.com ), Andorra’s economic development and promotion office, to provide counseling services to both Andorran companies looking to grow and foreign investors wanting to start new businesses in Andorra. Andorra Business’ mission is to increase competitiveness, innovation, and the sustainability of the economy. Andorra Business’ five key objectives are: Promoting key sectors for the diversification of the economy. Being a motor in the improvement of the public sector and microeconomic environment. Attracting and supporting both foreign and local investment in key sectors. Providing support to Andorran businesses to be more competitive on a National and International scale. Creating favorable conditions for innovation and entrepreneurship, in both the public and private sectors, to create an environment for testing new innovations at the country level. The Andorran Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Services of Andorra ( https://www.ccis.ad/ ) aims to promote and strengthen Andorra’s financial and business activity as well as provide services to foreign companies. The Chamber’s activities include organizing a census of commercial, industrial, and service activities; the protection of the general interests of commerce, industry, and services; promoting fair competition; and issuing certificates of origin and other commercial documents. The Andorran Business Confederation (CEA) provides support to national companies to navigate within Andorra’s new legal, labor, and fiscal framework and facilitates companies’ international expansion projects. CEA also works to foster international investment into the country through its Iwand project , which provides information about Andorra’s economic and fiscal environment ( www.cea.ad ). The Andorran legal framework has also adapted to international standards. The most relevant laws passed by Parliament to accompany the economic openness include the law of Companies (October 2007), the Law of Business Accounting (December 2007), and the Law of Foreign Investment (April 2008 and June 2012). The OECD removed Andorra from its “tax haven list” in 2009 after the country signed the Paris Declaration, formally committing to sharing fiscal information outlined by the agreement. With the approval of the Law 19/2016, of November the 30th, on automatic exchange of information on tax matters, Andorra will exchange financial information with signatories of the “Common Reporting Standard” (CRS), developed by the G20 and approved by the OECD Council in July 2014. From 2011 to 2019, the Parliament approved direct corporate, non-resident, capital gains, and personal income taxes. At 10 percent, well below the European average, Andorra’s corporate tax is more competitive than rates in neighboring Spain or France. While foreigners may own 100 percent of a trading enterprise or a holding company, the Government must approve the establishment of any private enterprise. The approval can take up to one month and can be rejected if the proposal is found to negatively impact the environment, the public order, or the general interests of the principality. On June 2021, the IMF released a report detailing Andorra’s macro-economic trends and investment climate. In the past five years the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), World Trade Organization (WTO), or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have not conducted an investment policy review. The government of Andorra, in responding to the economic downturn of COVID, released Horizon 23, an economic recovery roadmap to increase investment competitiveness In the past five years, civil society organizations have not provided reviews of investment policy-related concerns. Andorra established Andorra Business, a public/private agency, made up of several ministries, government agencies, associations, and organizations from the private sector. It aims to increase competitiveness, innovation, and sustainability. It provides counseling services to Andorran companies and potential foreign investors to facilitate investment and economic diversification. Andorran regulations allow for two types of commercial companies: Limited Liability Company (Societat de Responsabilitat Limitada – SL), which has a minimum capital requirement of 3,000 euros; and Joint Stock Company (Societat Anonima – SA) which is normally required for multiple shareholders and has a minimum capital requirement of 60,000 euros. The business establishment procedures and for share acquisitions or transfers are quite similar to those of other countries, requiring the filling of a simple application form, with the additional unique condition of the presentation of any prior investment authorization received in the country. This same procedure is applicable for incorporation, establishment, extension, branching, or other form of business expansion. Once the company is registered, the foreign investment is established, and the investor is required to deposit the share capital with an Andorran banking entity and proceed to public deed of incorporation before a notary. The Government’s Andorra Business programs provide grants, counseling, and online resourced to small and medium size companies to foster competitiveness and facilitate internationalization. The Andorran Chamber of Commerce ( www.ccis.ad ) helps companies search for business opportunities abroad and organizes, with the government, trade missions to explore international business exchanges. 3. Legal Regime Andorra set out transparent policies and laws, which have significantly liberalized all economic sectors in Andorra. New foreign-owned businesses must be approved by the government and the process can take up to a month. Andorra is committed to a transparent process. Andorra has begun to relax labor and immigration standards; previously, foreign professionals had to establish 20 years of residency before being eligible to own 100 percent of their business in Andorra. This restriction has been lifted for nationals coming from countries that have reciprocal standards for Andorran citizens. Following approval of the new Accounting Law in 2007, individuals carrying out business or professional activities, trading companies, and legal persons or entities with a profit purpose must file financial statements with the administration. Although not a member of the European Union (EU), Andorra is a member of the European Customs Union and is subject to all EU free trade regulations and arrangements regarding industrial products. Concerning agriculture, the EU allows duty free importation of products originating in Andorra. Andorra is negotiating a new association agreement with the European Union alongside Monaco and San Marino that will allow Andorrans to establish themselves in Europe and Andorran companies will be able to trade in the EU market. Andorra holds observer status at the WTO, although it took steps in the past for full membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Andorra became the 190th member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in October 2020. Andorra has a mixed legal system of civil and customary law with the influence of canon law. The judiciary is independent from the executive branch. The Supreme Court consists of a court president and eight judges, organized into civil, criminal, and administrative chambers. Four magistrates make up the Constitutional Court. The Tribunal of Judges and the Tribunal of the Courts are lower courts. Regulations and enforcement actions can be appealed in the national court system. The Law on Foreign Investment (10/2012) entered into force in 2012, opening the country’s economy by removing the sectorial restrictions stipulated in the prior legislation. In this way, Andorra has positioned itself on equal terms with neighboring economies, enabling it to become more competitive for new sectors and enterprises. On March 2022, Andorra approved a sanctions package in line with EU sanctions against designated Russian and Belarusian individuals and entities. Andorra Business is responsible for economic promotion and provides information on relevant laws, rules, procedures to set up a business in Andorra, as well as reporting requirements to investors. The organization also provides other services to facilitate foreign and local investments in strategic sectors. The Law on Effective Competence and Consumer Protection (13/2013) protects investors against unfair practices. The Ministry of Economy is responsible for administering anti-trust laws and reviews transactions for both domestic and international competition-related concerns. The Law of Expropriation (1993) allows the Government to expropriate private property for public purposes in accordance with international norms, including appropriate compensation. We know of no incidents of expropriation involving the U.S. entities in Andorra. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Andorra became a party to the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in September 2015, requiring Andorran courts to enforce financial awards. Andorra is not a member of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Investor-State Dispute Settlement Andorran legislation establishes mechanisms to resolve disputes if they arise and its judicial system is transparent. The constitution guarantees an independent judiciary branch, overseen by a High Council of Justice. The prosecution system allows for successive appeals to higher courts. The European Court of Justice is the ultimate arbiter of unsettled appeals. Contractual disputes between U.S. individuals or companies and Andorran entities are rare, but when they arise are handled appropriately. There have been no reported cases of U.S. investment disputes. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Parties to a dispute can also resolve disputes contractually through arbitration. The Arbitration Court of the Principality of Andorra (TAPA) was established in July 2020 by the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Services and the Andorran Bar Association in accordance with Law 16/2018. The main goal of this institution is to mediate both national and international business disputes to reach a fair settlement for both parties without having to go to court. Andorra’s bankruptcy decree dates to 1969. Other laws from 2008 and 2014 complement the initial text and further protect workers’ rights to fair salaries and sets up mechanisms to monitor the implementation of judicial resolutions. Additionally, Law 8/2015 outlines urgent measures allowing Government intervention of the banking sector in a crisis. 6. Financial Sector The Andorran financial sector is efficient and is one of the main pillars of the Andorran economy, representing 20 percent of the country’s GDP and over 5 percent of the workforce. Created in 1989, and redefined with more responsibilities in 2003, the Andorran Financial Authority (AFA; www.afa.ad ) is the supervisory and regulatory body of the Andorran financial system and the insurance sector. The AFA is a public entity with its own legal status, functionally independent from the Government. AFA has the power to carry out all necessary actions to ensure the correct development of its supervision and control functions, disciplinary and punitive powers, treasury and public debt management services, financial agency, international relations, advice, and studies. The Andorran Financial Intelligence Unit (UIFAND) was created in 2000 as an independent organ to deal with the tasks of promoting and coordinating measures to combat money laundering, terror financing, and the proliferation of weapons ( www.uifand.ad ). The State Agency for the Resolution of Banking Institutions (AREB) is a public-legal institution created by Law 8/2015 to take urgent measures to introduce mechanisms for the recovery and resolution of banking institutions ( www.areb.ad ). Andorra adopted the use of the Euro in 2002 and in 2011 signed a Monetary Agreement with the EU making the Euro the official currency. Since July 1, 2013, Andorra has had the right to mint Euro coins. The Andorra banking system is sound and considered the most important part of the financial sector. It represents 20 percent of the country’s GDP. The Andorran banks offer a variety of services at market rates. The main lines of business in the banking sector are retail banking, private banking, and asset management and insurance. The country also has a sizeable and growing market for portfolio investments. The country does not have a central bank. The sector is regulated and supervised by the Andorran Financial Authority (AFA). The U.S. Internal Revenue Service has certified all the Andorran banks as qualified intermediaries. Founded in 1960, the Association of Andorran Banks (ABA; https://www.andorranba nking.ad/) represents Andorran banks. Among its tasks are representing and defending interests of its members, watching over the development and competitiveness of Andorran banking at national and international levels, improving sector technical standards, cooperation with public administrations, and promoting professional training, particularly dealing with money laundering prevention. At present, all five Andorran banking groups are ABA members, totaling an estimated 51.7 billion Euros in combined assets for 2021. Foreign Exchange Andorra adopted the Euro in 2002 and in 2011 signed a Monetary Agreement with the EU making the Euro the official currency. Since 2013, Andorra has the authority to mint Euro coins. Remittance Policies There are no limits or restrictions on remittances provided that they correspond to a company’s official earning records. Andorra has no Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). 10. Political and Security Environment Andorra has not experienced any politically motivated damage to projects or installations, or destruction of private property. There are no nascent insurrections, belligerent neighbors, or other politically motivated activities. The likelihood of widespread civil disturbances is very low. Civil unrest is generally not a problem in Andorra. No anti-American sentiment is evident in the country. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Data unavailable. Data unavailable. Angola Executive Summary The Angolan economy emerged from five straight years of recession with slight GDP growth of 0.7 percent in 2021, thanks primarily to growth in the non-oil sector. The government forecasts more substantial growth of 2.4 percent in 2022. The oil and gas sector remains the key source of government revenue despite declining oil production and the government should benefit from higher than budgeted oil prices in 2022. The growth in non-oil sectors such as manufacturing, agriculture, transportation will be bolstered by increased demand from the lifting of COVID restrictions in late 2021 and early 2022. The Angolan government has maintained a reform agenda since the 2017 election of President Joao Lourenço. His administration has adopted measures to improve the business environment and make Angola more attractive for investment. Angola completed the IMF’s Extended Fund Facility in December 2021, demonstrating an ability to commit to and carry out difficult fiscal and macroeconomic reforms, despite the COVID-19 pandemic. The government received three credit rating upgrades between September 2021 and early 2022. In addition to the Privatization Program (PROPRIV), revision of the Private Investment Law, and updated Public Procurement law, the government has taken steps to recover misappropriated state assets – the Attorney General’s Office claims just under $13 billion since 2018 – and to uproot corruption. Through the Private Investment and Export Promotion Agency (AIPEX), Angola seeks to connect foreign investors with opportunities across the private sector, with PROPRIV, and a wide range of available state-owned enterprises and other assets. The public procurement process has also become more transparent. Angola plans to present its candidacy to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in 2022 to increase transparency in the oil, gas, and mineral resource sectors. Despite the government’s efforts to address corruption, its prevalence remains a key issue of concern for investors. Angola’s infrastructure requires substantial improvement; which the government is seeking to address by attracting investment public-private partnerships to improve and manage of ports, railroads, and key energy infrastructure. The justice system and other administrative processes remains bureaucratic and time-consuming. Unemployment (32.9 percent in the fourth quarter of 2021) and inflation (which reached 27 percent in 2021) remain high. There is limited technical training, English-speaking skills are generally low. Skilled labor levels are also low, though the government has attempted to address the issue through training and apprenticeship programs. Overall FDI increased by $2.59 billion in 2020, the last full year of reporting, from 2019. The government has committed to reaching 70 percent installed renewable energy by 2025 and has recognized the risks of climate change for Angola. To reach its renewable energy goal, the government has signed deals with U.S. companies on the installation of solar and hydro capacity worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 136 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 132 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $-578 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $2140 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Angola is actively seeking FDI to diversify capital inflows, boost economic growth, and diversify the country’s economy. Angola has maintained its privatization program (PROPRIV), started in 2019, despite the difficulty attracting investment during the COVID-19 pandemic. PROPRIV offers investment opportunities for foreign investment in state-owned enterprises and other publicly owned assets as the government seeks to liquidate its stake in assets across sectors such as transportation, telecommunications, and banking. Angola has also modernized its tendering process to make it more transparent. Despite the increased openness and concerted effort to attract foreign investors, Angola passed local content regulations for the oil sector in October 2020 restricting the concept of “national company” to companies fully owned by Angolan citizens, as opposed to a companies with at least 51 percent ownership by Angolan entities. The regulation has three regimes determining the types of services that must be contracted with local entities and which can be contracted with foreign entities. The local content regulations apply to all companies providing goods and services to oil sector as well as oil companies. Angola’s trade and investment promotion agency AIPEX provides an online investment window platform for investors to register their investment proposals. AIPEX and the Institute of State Assets and Shares work together on roadshows to promote PROPRIV for foreign investors. AIPEX is also responsible for providing institutional support and monitoring investment project execution. Foreign and domestic private entities can establish and own business enterprises with limitations on foreign entities holding the majority stake in companies in specific sectors. The 2018 Private Investment Law (PIL) establishes the general principles of private investment in Angola for domestic and foreign investors and applies to private investments of any value. Under the PIL, the acquisition of shares of an Angolan entity by a foreign investor is deemed to be a private investment operation. If the investor wishes to transfer funds abroad, the private investment project must be properly registered and executed, and appropriate taxes must be paid before transferring. Majority foreign shareholding restrictions persist in specific industries such as the oil and gas sector (49 percent cap) and the maritime sector, specifically for shipping, due to their significance in the Angolan economy. Mining rights are granted to private investors by the national diamond company ENDIAMA. The PIL lifted restrictions on having Angolan partners for several strategic sectors such as he telecommunications, hospitality and tourism, transportation and logistics, and information technology. At the government’s request, the last Investment Policy Review (IPR) of Angola’s business and economic environments was completed in 2019 by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The full report and policy recommendations are accessible at UNCTAD TPR . The WTO’s last IPR was more than five years ago; OECD has never conducted an IPR of Angola. There are no recent policy recommendations by civil society organizations based on reviews of investment policy related concerns. Presidential Decree No 167/20, of June 15, 2020, created the “ Single Investment Window ” (Janela Única de Investimento, or JUI), which is aimed at simplifying the contact between the investor and all the public entities involved in the approval of foreign investment projects. To incorporate a company, investors must obtain a certificate of availability of the corporate name from the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights; deposit share capital and show proof of deposit to a notary; submit a draft incorporation deed, articles of association, and shareholder documents. The company must then register with the Commercial Registrar to register the company’s incorporation in the Angola’s Official Gazette (Diário da República). Despite efforts to reduce the bureaucracy related to incorporating a business, it still takes around 30 days to incorporate. The business then must register with Tax Authority , the National Institute for Statistics , and the National Institute for Social Security . The business can then initiate licensing procedures. Angola is also negotiating with the EU on a Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreement , the EU’s first bilateral agreement on investment facilitation. The sides have had two rounds of negotiations in June and December 2021. The agreement intends to simplify procedures and encourage e-governance and public-private dialogue, while diversifying Angola’s economy and helping small and medium sized enterprises invest. Its goal is to support Angola’s ability to attract and retain investment by improving the investment climate for foreign and local investors. The Angolan government does not promote or incentivize outward investment, nor does it restrict Angolans from investing abroad. Investors are free to invest in any foreign jurisdiction. Domestic investors often prefer to invest in Portuguese-speaking countries, with few investing in neighboring countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The bulk of investment is in real estate, fashion, fashion accessories, and domestic goods. Due to foreign exchange constraints, there has been very limited investment abroad by domestic investors. 3. Legal Regime Angola’s regulatory system is complex, vague, and inconsistently enforced. In many sectors, no effective regulatory system exists due to a lack of institutional and human capacity. The banking system is slowly beginning to adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). SOEs are still far from practicing IFRS. The public does not participate in draft bills or regulations formulation, nor does a public online location exist where the public can access this information for comment or hold government representatives accountable for their actions. The Angolan Communications Institute (INACOM) is the regulatory authority for the telecommunications sector and regulates prices for telecommunications services such as mobile telephone, internet, and TV services, particularly in sectors without much competition. Revised energy-sector licensing regulations have permitted some purchase power agreements (PPA) participation. Overall, Angola’s regulatory system does not conform to other international regulatory systems. Angola became a member of the WTO in 1996. However, it is not party to the Plurilateral Agreements on Government Procurement, or the Trade in Civil Aircraft Agreement and it has not yet notified the WTO of its state-trading enterprises under Article XVII of the GATT. A government procurement management framework introduced in late 2010 stipulates a preference for goods produced in Angola and/or services provided by Angolan or Angola-based suppliers. Technical Barriers to Trade regimes are not coordinated. Angola conducts distinct bilateral negotiations with seven of the nine full members of the Community of Portuguese Language countries (CPLP), Cuba, and Russia and extends trade preferences to China due to previously negotiated credit facilitation terms, while attempting to encourage and protect local content. Regulatory reviews are based on scientific, or data driven assessments or baseline surveys. Evaluations are based on data, but not made available for public comment. The state reserves the right to have the final say in all regulatory matters and relies on sectorial regulatory bodies for supervision of institutional regulatory matters concerning investment. The Economic Commission of the Council of Ministers oversees investment regulations that affect the country’s economy including the ministries in charge. Other major regulatory bodies responsible for getting deals through include: The National Petroleum, Gas and Biofuels Agency (ANPG) is the government regulatory and oversight body responsible for regulating oil exploration and production activities. On February 6, 2019, the parastatal oil company Sonangol launched ANPG through Presidential decree 49/19. The ANPG is the national concessionaire of hydrocarbons in Angola, authorized to conduct, execute, and ensure oil, gas, and biofuel operations run smoothly, a role previously held by state owned Sonangol. The ANPG must also ensure adherence to international standards and establish relationships with other international agencies and sector relevant organizations. The Regulatory Institute of Electricity and Water Services (IRSEA) is the regulatory authority for renewable energies and enforcing powers of the electricity regulatory authority. Revised energy-sector licensing regulations have improved legal protection for investors to attract more private investment in electrical infrastructure, such as dams and hydro distribution stations. The Angolan Communications Institute (INACOM) is the regulatory authority for the telecommunications sector including for prices for telecommunications services. As of October 1, 2019, a 14 percent VAT regime came into force, replacing the existing 10 percent Consumption Tax. For The General Tax Administration (AGT) oversees tax operations and ensures taxpayer compliance. The new VAT tax regime aimed to boost domestic production and consumption and reduce the incidence of compound tax for businesses unable to recover the consumption tax. The government introduced a temporary reduction of the VAT in October 2021 for key items in the basic basket of goods to 7 percent. The temporary measure should run at least through 2022. Corporate taxpayers can be reimbursed for the VAT on the purchase of good and services, including imports. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations, and the government does not allow the public to engage in the formulation of legislation or to comment on draft bills. Procurement laws and regulations are unclear, little publicized, and not consistently enforced. Oversight mechanisms are weak, and no audits are required or performed to ensure internal controls are in place or administrative procedures are followed. Inefficient bureaucracy and possible corruption frequently lead to payment delays for goods delivered, resulting in an increase in the price the government must pay. No regulatory reform enforcement mechanisms have been implemented since the last ICS report. The Diário da República (the Federal Register equivalent) publishes official regulatory action. The Ministry of Finance’s Debt Management Unit has a portal with quarterly public debt reports, debt strategy, annual debt plan, bond reports, and other publications in Portuguese and in English for the quarterly reports and the debt plan, though it does not have regular reporting on contingent liabilities. Regionally, Angola is a member of SADC and ECCAS, though it is not a member of SADC’s Free Trade Area or of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) the customs union associated with ECCAS. New regulations are generally developed in line with regulatory provisions set by AfCTA, SADC, and ECCAS. Standards for each organization can be found at their respective websites: AfCTA: https://au.int/en/cfta ; SADC: SADC Standards and Quality Infrastructure ; ECCAS: https://ceeac-eccas.org/en/#presentation Angola is a WTO member but does not notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) regimes are not coordinated and often trade regulations are passed and implemented without the due oversight of the WTO. Angola’s legal system follows civil law tradition and is heavily influenced by Portuguese law, though customary law often prevailed in rural areas. Legislation is the primary source of law. Precedent is accepted but not binding as it is in common-law countries. The Angolan Constitution is at the top of the hierarchy of legislation and establishes the general principle of separation of powers between the judicial, executive, and legislative power. Primary judicial authority in Angola is vested in its courts, which have institutional weaknesses that include lack of independence from political influence in the decision-making process at times. The Angolan justice system is slow, arduous, and often partial. Legal fees are high, and most businesses avoid taking commercial disputes to court in the country. The World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 survey ranked Angola 186 out of 190 countries on contract enforcement, and estimated that commercial contract enforcement, measured by time elapsed between filing a complaint and receiving restitution, takes an average of 1,296 days, at an average cost of 44.4 percent of the claim. Angola has commercial legislation that governs all contracts and commercial activities but no specialized court. On August 5, 2020, the Economic Council of Ministers approved the opening of the Court for Litigation on Commercial, Intellectual, and Industrial Property Matters, at the Luanda First Instance Court. With the introduction of this commercial court, the GRA hopes the business environment and trust in public institutions will improve. Prior to this arrangement, trade disputes were resolved by judges in the Courts of Common Pleas. The commercial legislation provides that before going to court, investors can challenge the decision under the terms of the administrative procedural rules, either through a complaint (to the entity responsible for the decision) or through an appeal (to the next level above the entity responsible for the decision). In the new system, investors will be able, in general, to appeal to civil and administrative courts. Investors exercising their right to appeal, however, should expect decisions to take months, or even years, in the case of court decisions. Angola enacted a new Criminal Code and a new Criminal Procedure Code which entered into force on February 9, 2021, to better align the legal framework with internationally accepted principles and standards, with an emphasis on white-collar crimes and corruption. The legal reforms extend criminal liability for corruption offenses and other crimes to legal entities; provide for private sector corruption offenses to face similar fines and imprisonment to the punishments applicable to the public sector, and modernize and broaden the list of criminal offenses against the financial system. The legal system lacks resources and independence, limiting the effectiveness of the reforms. There is a general right of appeal to the Court of First Instance against decisions from the primary courts. To enforce judgments/orders, a party must commence executive proceedings with the civil court. The main methods of enforcing judgments are: Execution orders (to pay a sum of money by selling the debtor’s assets). Seizure of assets from the party and Provision of information on the whereabouts of assets. The Civil Procedure Code also provides for ordinary and extraordinary appeals. Ordinary appeals consist of first appeals, review appeals, interlocutory appeals, and full court appeals, while extraordinary appeals consist of further appeals and third-party interventions. Generally, an appeal does not operate as a stay of the decision of the lower court unless expressly provided for as much in the Civil Procedure Code. Angola’s legal system is becoming more favorable to FDI and has generally not allowed FDI in specific sectors such as military and security, activities of the Central Bank, and key infrastructure port and airport infrastructure. Under PROPRIV the government has encouraged FDI in ports and airports through management and operation tenders. Investment values exceeding $10 million require an investment contract that needs to be authorized by the Council of Ministers and signed by the President. AIPEX, Angola’s investment and export promotion agency, maintains the Janela Única do Investimento (Single Investment Window), which serves as Angola’s one-stop-shop for investment. Mergers and acquisitions, including those which take place through the sale of state-owned assets, are reviewed by the Institute of Asset Management and State Holdings (IGAPE) and competition related concerns receive oversight by the Competition Regulatory Authority (the “CRA”) which is also responsible for prosecuting offenses. Competition is also regulated by the Competition Act of 2018, which prohibits cartels and monopolistic behavior. A leniency regime was added in September 2020 to reduce fines for the first party to come forward under specific conditions. CRA decisions are subject to appeal, though Angola does not have special courts of jurisdiction to deal with competition matters. Angola’s Competition Act creates a formal merger control regime. Mergers are subject to prior notification to the CRA, and they must meet certain specified requirements. The thresholds requiring prior notification are the following: the creation, acquisition, or reinforcement of a market share which is equal to or higher than 50 percent in the domestic market or a substantial part of it; or the parties involved in the concentration exceeded a combined turnover in Angola of 3.5 billion Kwanzas in the preceding financial year; or the creation, acquisition, or reinforcement of a market share which is equal to or higher than 30 percent, but less than 50 percent in the relevant domestic market or a substantial part of it, if two or more of the undertakings achieved more than 450 million Kwanzas individual turnover in the preceding financial year. Mergers must not hamper competition and must be consistent with public interest considerations such as: a particular economic sector or region. the relevant employment levels. the ability of small or historically disadvantaged enterprises to become competitive; or the capability of the industry in Angola to compete internationally. Under the revised Law of Expropriations by Public Utility (LEUP), which came into force in October 2021, real property and any associated rights can be expropriated for specific public purposes listed in the LEUP in exchange for fair and prompt compensation to be calculated pursuant to the act. Only property strictly indispensable to achieve the relevant public purpose can be expropriated. The LEUP does not apply to compulsory eviction, nationalization, confiscation, easements, re-homing, civil requisition, expropriation for private purpose, temporary occupation of buildings, destruction for public purpose and revocation of concessions. Save for the urgent expropriation instances specifically set forth in the act, the LEUP enshrines the primacy of acquisition through private-law mechanisms, providing for a negotiation process between the expropriating entity – national or local government – and the relevant citizen or private-law entity. Despite the reforms, expropriation without compensation remains a common practice with idle or underdeveloped areas frequently reverting to the state with little or no compensation to the claimants who paid for the land, who in most cases allege unfair treatment and at times lack of due process. Angola’s Law on Corporate Restructuring and Insolvency went into force on May 10, 2021, representing the first amendment to bankruptcy legislation since 1961. The law regulates the legal regime of extrajudicial and judicial recovery of the assets of natural and legal persons in economic distress or imminent insolvency, provided recovery is viable and the legal regime of insolvency proceedings of natural and legal persons. The law permits the conservation of national and foreign investment since investors know they have a legal remedy that has as its purpose the preservation of the company. 6. Financial Sector Foreign portfolio investment is still new in Angola, but the government is seeking to increase it. The National Bank of Angola (BNA) abolished the licensing previously required to import capital from foreign investors allocated to the private sector and export income associated with such investments. This measure compliments the need to improve the capture of FDI and portfolio investment and it is in line with the privatization program for public companies (PROPRIV) announced through Presidential Decree No. 250/19 of August 5, 2019, which encourages foreign companies to purchase state-owned assets the government is liquidating. BNA has also stopped requiring a license to export capital resulting from the sale of investments in securities traded on a regulated market and the sale of any investment, in which the buyer is also not – foreign exchange resident, pursuant to Notice No. 15/2019. The BNA is increasingly removing restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Angola’s Debt and Securities Stock Exchange (BODIVA), planned to be privatized by 2022, trades an equivalent in local currency (kwanzas) of USD 2 billion a year. In view of policies adopted by the institution, BODIVA predicts an increase in the volume of trades. The stock exchange has 23 commercial banks and two brokerages as members, which operate mainly in government denominated Treasury Bonds. BODIVA allows the trading of different types of financial instruments through an electronic auction platform to investors with rules (self-regulation), systems (platforms), and procedures that assure market fairness and integrity to facilitate portfolio investment. The Capital Markets Commission, the regulator, is updating its own supervisory framework while looking to provide new services and attract more individual investors to the capital markets. Presently, only local commercial banks can list on the nascent stock exchange. According to the Capital Markets Commissioner, portfolio investment by individuals only represents 16 percent of BODIVA’s equity. Through the ongoing privatization program, the government announced in February its intent to sell 30 percent of the stocks it has invested in BODIVA by the end of 2022, with plans to sell the rest in phases in 2023 and 2024. Credit is partially allocated on market terms. Since the revision of the PIL in 2021, domestic credit is accessible to foreign investors and companies that are majority foreign held (this was previously only possible after implementation of the investment project). For Angolan investors, credit access remains limited. In 2020, however the BNA directed commercial banks to increase the minimum amount of subsidized credit that they must make available to borrowers 2 percent of their assets to 2.5 percent by the end of 2020 to accelerate the diversification of domestic production. The private sector has access to a variety of conventional credit instruments provided by commercial banks. Forty-seven percent of Angola’s income-earners utilize banking services, with 80 percent being from the urban areas. Angola is over-banked for the size of its economy. Although four banks have been closed since 2018, 26 banks still operate in Angola. The banking market remains marked by concentration and limited financial inclusion. The top six banks control nearly 80 percent of sector assets, loans and deposits, but the rest of the sector includes many banks with minimal scale and weak franchises. The total number of customers in the six largest banks is 9.9 million. Angola’s largest bank Banco Angolano de Investimentos has an asset value of approximately USD 5.5 billion. Angola has a central banking system. The banking sector largely depends on monetary policies established by Angola’s central bank, the National Bank of Angola (BNA). Thanks to the ongoing IMF economic and financial reform agenda, the BNA is adopting international best practices and slowly becoming more autonomous. On February 13, 2021, President Joao Lourenco issued a decree granting autonomy to the BNA in line with IMF recommendations. Since that time, the bank has made decision on monetary, financial, credit, and foreign exchange policies without political influence, while also maintaining its oversight, regulatory, and supervisory role of the institutions in the financial system. The reforms taken under the Lourenco administration have lessened the political influence over the BNA and allowed it to more freely adopt strategies to build resilience from external shocks on the economy. As Angola’s economy depends heavily on oil to fuel its economy, so does the banking sector. The BNA periodically monitors minimum capital requirements for all banks and orders the closure of non-compliant banks. Credit availability is limited and often supports government-supported programs. The GRA obliges banks to grant credit more liberally in the economy, notably by implementing a Credit Support Program (PAC). For instance, the BNA first issued a notice obliging Angolan commercial banks to grant credit to national production equivalent at a minimum to 2.5 percent of their net assets in 2020 and extended the notice through the end of 2022. Although the RECREDIT Agency purchased non-performing loans (NPLs) of the state’s parastatal BPC bank, NPLs remain high at 23 percent, a decrease of 9 percent since 2017. The country has not lost any additional correspondent banking relationships since 2015. At the time of issuing this report no correspondent banking relationships were in jeopardy. The Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group is evaluating Angola’s anti-money laundering regime. A positive result could lead private foreign banking institutions to reestablish correspondent banking relationships. Most transactions go via third party correspondent banking services in Portugal banks, a costly option for all commercial banks. Foreign banking institutions are allowed to operate in Angola and are subject to BNA oversight. The Angolan Sovereign Wealth Fund (FSDEA) was established in 2012 with $5 billion USD in support from the petroleum sector. The fund was established in accordance with international governance standards and best practices as outlined in the Santiago Principles. As of March 2021, the FSDEA reported $2.97 billion USD. Angola is a full member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are currently 81 public enterprises listed on the State Institute of Asset and Shares Management website; 70 are wholly owned by the state, 8 with majority-ownership for the state and 3 with minority stakes for the government. A list of all of Angola’s SOEs can be found at the following link: https://igape.minfin.gov.ao/PortalIGAPE/#!/sector-empresarial-publico/universo-do-sep . Based on the IMF definition of government owning at least 50 percent equity and revenue being greater than 1 percent of GDP, SONANGOL, the state oil company, and Sodiam, the state diamond company qualify as SOEs. There is no law mandating preferential treatment to SOEs, but in practice they have access to inside information and credit. Currently, SOEs are not subject to budgetary constraints and quite often exceed their capital limits. All SOEs in Angola are required to have boards of directors, and most board members are affiliated with the government. Other public enterprises operate in the agribusiness, oil and gas, financial services, and construction sectors as well as others. The GRA considers SOE debt as indirect public debt, and only accounts in its state budget for direct government debt, thus effectively not reflecting some substantial obligations in fact owed by the government. President Lourenço has launched various reforms to improve financial sector transparency, enhance efficiency in the country’s SOEs as part of the National Development plan 2018-2022 and Macroeconomic Stability Plan Angola is not a party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Angola does not adhere to the OECD guidelines on corporate governance for SOEs. Angola began its privatization program (PROPRIV) in 2019, with an aim to privatize 195 assets by 2022. By January, the government had privatized 73 assets and raised $1.7 billion in revenue through the program despite COVID-19 pandemic-imposed hurdles. The program is supervised by State Institute of Asset and Shares Management (IGAPE) and will implemented through the Angolan Debt and Securities Exchange Market (BODIVA). The government plans to partially privatize the state-owned telecommunications company and the national oil company Sonangol, as well as the national airline TAAG, and companies in the extractives sector, health, manufacturing, and agriculture. The privatization process is open to interested foreign investors and the government has improved the transparency of the bidding process. The government has an “electronic auction” site where investors can submit their bids for the various tenders: https://leilaoigape.minfin.gov.ao/ . 10. Political and Security Environment Angola maintains a stable political environment, though demonstrations and workers strikes occur with regularity, particularly in the last two years due to increased socio-economic difficulty. Politically motivated violence is not a high risk, and incidents are rare. The Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda—Military Position (FLEC MP) based in the northern province of Cabinda threatened Chinese workers in Cabinda in 2015 and claimed in 2016 that they would return to active armed struggle against the Angolan government forces. No attacks have since ensued and the FLEC has remained relatively inactive to date. Local elections were anticipated to take place in 2020 but have not yet occurred due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the lack of key legislation governing the elections. General elections are scheduled to occur in August 2022. Young people take to the streets occasionally to protest economic hardship and what they view as unrealized political pledges. Large pockets of the population live in poverty without adequate access to basic services. Crimes of opportunity such as muggings, robberies and car-jackings occur across the country. Antigua and Barbuda Executive Summary Antigua and Barbuda is a member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). According to Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) statistics, Antigua and Barbuda’s 2021 estimated gross domestic product (GDP) was $1.47 billion (3.97 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars). This represents an approximate 5.3 percent growth from 2020. The ECCB forecasts 2022 growth at 4.7 percent. Unanticipated spending on pandemic response measures, coupled with sharp declines in government revenues, forced the government to increase borrowing in 2020. As of December 2021, Antigua and Barbuda reported total public sector debt of $1.3 billion representing 89 percent of GDP. Unlike other Eastern Caribbean (EC) countries, Antigua and Barbuda did not have the resources to significantly increase spending on social support payments to vulnerable populations. Following several years of operating losses, the government became the sole source of financing for regional airline Leeward Islands Air Transport (LIAT) in mid-2020. Based in Antigua and Barbuda, LIAT was heavily overstaffed and therefore a major employer, but is now under the supervision of a bankruptcy trustee. Antigua and Barbuda ranks 113th out of 190 countries rated in the 2020 World Bank Doing Business Report. The scores remain relatively unchanged from the 2019 report, though some improvements in the ease of starting a business were highlighted. Through the Antigua and Barbuda Investment Authority (ABIA), the government encourages foreign direct investment, particularly in industries that create jobs and earn foreign exchange. The ABIA facilitates and supports foreign direct investment in the country and maintains an open dialogue with current and potential investors. All potential investors are afforded the same level of business facilitation services. While the government welcomes all foreign direct investment, tourism and related services, manufacturing, agriculture and fisheries, information and communication technologies, business process outsourcing, financial services, health and wellness services, creative industries, education, yachting and marine services, real estate, and renewable energy have been identified by the government as priority investment areas. There are no limits on foreign control of investment and ownership in Antigua and Barbuda. Foreign investors may hold up to 100 percent of an investment. Antigua and Barbuda’s legal system is based on British common law. There is currently an unresolved dispute regarding the alleged expropriation of an American-owned property. For this reason, the U.S. government recommends continued caution when investing in real estate in Antigua and Barbuda. In 2017, the government signed an intergovernmental agreement in observance of the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), making it mandatory for banks in Antigua and Barbuda to report the banking information of U.S. citizens. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index N/A N/A http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 7.0 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2019 16,420 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Antigua and Barbuda encourages foreign direct investment, particularly in industries that create jobs, enhance economic activity, earn foreign currency, and have a positive impact on its citizens. Diversification of the economy remains a priority. Through the ABIA, the government facilitates and supports foreign direct investment in the country and maintains an open dialogue with current and potential investors. All potential investors are afforded the same level of business facilitation services. ABIA offers complementary support services to investors exploring business opportunities, including facilitation of incentives and concessions, project monitoring, and general assistance. The government launched an additional website in early 2021 to serve as a “business hub for potential investors,” http://antiguabarbuda.com . While the government welcomes all foreign direct investment, it has identified tourism and related services, manufacturing, agriculture and fisheries, information and communication technologies, business process outsourcing, financial services, health and wellness services, creative industries, education, yachting and marine services, real estate, and renewable energy as priority investment areas. Uncertainty about the trajectory of economic recovery of the tourism, commercial aviation, and cruise industries impacts the potential for projects in those sectors. Local laws do not place any limits on foreign control of investment and ownership in Antigua and Barbuda. Foreign investors may hold up to 100 percent of an investment. Local and foreign entrepreneurs need approximately 40 days from start to finish to transfer the title on a piece of property. In 1995, the government established a permanent residency program to encourage high-net-worth individuals to establish residency in Antigua and Barbuda for up to three years. As residents, their income is free of local taxation. In 2020, the government established the Nomad Digital Residence Visa program in which eligible remote workers can apply for a two-year special resident authorization. Under this program, the visa holders are also exempt from paying local income taxes. These programs are separate from the Citizenship by Investment program. The ABIA evaluates all foreign direct investment proposals applying for government incentives and provides intelligence, business facilitation, and investment promotion to establish and expand profitable business enterprises. The ABIA also advises the government on issues that are important to the private sector and potential investors to increase the international competitiveness of the local economy. The government of Antigua and Barbuda treats foreign and local investors equally with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory. The OECS, of which Antigua and Barbuda is a member, has not conducted a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review since 2014. There have also not been any investment policy reviews by civil society organizations in the past five years. Established in 2006, the ABIA facilitates foreign direct investment in priority sectors and advises the government on the formation and implementation of policies and programs to attract investment. The ABIA provides business support services and market intelligence to all investors. It also offers an online guide that is useful for navigating the laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors. The guide is available at https://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/antiguabarbuda . All potential investors applying for government incentives must submit their proposals for review by the ABIA to ensure the project is consistent with national interests and provides economic benefits to the country. To register a business. the general practice is to retain a local attorney who prepares all the relevant incorporation documents. A business must register with the Intellectual Property and Commercial Office, the Inland Revenue Department, the Medical Benefits Scheme, the Social Security Scheme, and the Board of Education. The Antigua and Barbuda Science Innovation Park (ABSIP) launched in 2019 to support and create business startup opportunities that will generate sustainable business enterprises. ABSIP provides business incubation and financing, access to business financing, branding, training, partnership establishment, and other services. ABSIP’s website is http://absip.gov.ag . The Prime Minister’s Entrepreneurial Development Programme (EDP) supports the creation of micro and small businesses with the intent of increasing the Antiguan and Barbudan ownership share of the country’s economy. Priority sectors in which EDP grants loans are agriculture and agro-processing, manufacturing, information technology, e-business, and tourism. Although the government of Antigua and Barbuda prioritizes investment return as a key component of its overall economic strategy, there are no formal mechanisms in place to achieve this. To sustain future economic growth, Antigua and Barbuda’s economy depends on significant foreign direct investment. Local laws do not place any restrictions on domestic investors seeking to do business abroad. Local companies in Antigua and Barbuda are actively encouraged to take advantage of export opportunities specifically related to the country’s membership in the OECS Economic Union and the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy (CSME). 3. Legal Regime The government of Antigua and Barbuda publishes laws, regulations, administrative practices, and procedures of general application and judicial decisions that affect or pertain to investments or investors in the country. Where the government establishes policies that affect or pertain to investments or investors that are not expressed in laws and regulation or by other means, the national government has committed to make them publicly available. Rulemaking and regulatory authority lie with the bicameral parliament of the government of Antigua and Barbuda. The House of Representatives has 19 members, 17 of whom are elected for a five-year term in single-seat constituencies, one of whom is an ex-officio member, and one of whom is Speaker. The Senate has 17 appointed members. Respective line ministries develop relevant national laws and regulations, which are then drafted by the Ministry of Legal Affairs. Laws relating to the ABIA and the Citizenship by Investment program are the main laws relevant to foreign direct investment. This website contains the full text of laws already in force, as well as those Parliament is currently considering. While some draft bills are not subject to public consideration, input from stakeholder groups may be considered. The government encourages stakeholder organizations to support and contribute to the legal development process by participating in technical committees and providing comments on drafts. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The International Financial Accounting Standards, which stem from the General Accepted Accounting Principles, govern the accounting profession. The constitution provides for the independent Office of the Ombudsman to guard against abuses of power by government officials. The Ombudsman is responsible for investigating complaints about acts or omissions by government officials that violate the rights of members of the public. The ABIA has primary responsibility for investment supervision, and the Ministry of Finance, Corporate Governance and Public-Private Partnerships monitors investments to collect information for national statistics and reporting purposes. The ABIA can revoke an issued Investment Certificate if the holder fails to comply with certain stipulations detailed in the Investment Authority Act and its regulations. Antigua and Barbuda’s membership in regional organizations, particularly the OECS and its Economic Union, commits the state to implement all appropriate measures to fulfill its various treaty obligations. The eight member states and territories of the ECCU tend to enact laws uniformly, though minor differences in implementation may exist. The enforcement mechanisms of these regulations include penalties and other sanctions. The February 2022 Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) Mutual Evaluation assessment found Antigua and Barbuda to be largely compliant. The ECCB is the supervisory authority over financial institutions in Antigua and Barbuda registered under the Banking Act of 2015. As a member of the OECS and the ECCU, Antigua and Barbuda subscribes to principles and policies outlined in the Revised Treaty of Basseterre. The relationship between national and regional systems is such that each participating member state is expected to coordinate and adopt, where possible, common national policies aimed at the progressive harmonization of relevant policies and systems across the region. Thus, Antigua and Barbuda is obligated to implement regionally developed regulations such as legislation passed under the authority of the OECS, unless it seeks specific concessions to do otherwise. As a member of the WTO, Antigua and Barbuda is a signatory to the WTO Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade and is obligated to notify the Committee of any draft new and updated technical regulations. The Antigua and Barbuda Bureau of Standards is a statutory body that prepares and promulgates standards in relation to goods, services, processes, and practices. Antigua and Barbuda ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2017. The TFA is intended to improve the speed and efficiency of border procedures, facilitate trade costs reduction, and enhance participation in the global value chain. Antigua and Barbuda has implemented a number of TFA requirements, but it has also missed two implementation deadlines. Antigua and Barbuda bases its legal system on the British common law system. The Attorney General, the Chief Justice of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, junior judges, and magistrates administer justice. The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Act establishes the Supreme Court of Judicature, which consists of the High Court and the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal. The High Court hears criminal and civil matters and rules on constitutional law issues. Parties may appeal first to the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, an itinerant court that hears appeals from all OECS members. The final appellate authority is the Judicial Committee of the UK Privy Council. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) has original jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. Antigua and Barbuda is only subject to the original jurisdiction of the CCJ. As a member of the WTO, Antigua and Barbuda is a party to the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body which resolves disputes over WTO agreements. Courts of appropriate jurisdiction in both countries resolve private disputes. Antigua and Barbuda brought a case before the WTO against the United States concerning the cross-border supply of online gambling and betting services. The WTO ruled in favor of Antigua and Barbuda, but agreement on settlement terms remains outstanding. The ABIA provides guidance on the relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. These are available at http://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/antiguabarbuda . The ABIA may grant concessions as specified in the Investment Authority Act Amended 2019. These concessions are listed on Antigua and Barbuda’s iGuide website. Investors must apply to ABIA to take advantage of these incentives. Under the Citizenship by Investment program, foreign individuals can obtain citizenship in accordance with the Citizenship by Investment Act of 2013, which grants citizenship (without voting rights) to qualified investors. Applicants are required to undergo a due diligence process before citizenship can be granted. The minimum contribution for investors under the program is $100,000 (270,225 Eastern Caribbean dollars) to the National Development Fund for a family of up to four people and $125,000 (337,818 Eastern Caribbean dollars) for a family of five, with additional contributions of $15,000 (40,538 Eastern Caribbean dollars) per person for up to four additional family members. Individual applicants can also qualify for the program by buying real estate valued at $400,000 (1,081,020 Eastern Caribbean dollars) or more or making a business investment of $1.5 million (4,053,825 Eastern Caribbean dollars). Alternatively, at least two applicants can propose to make a joint investment in an approved business with a total investment of at least $5 million (13.5 million Eastern Caribbean dollars). Each investor must contribute at least $400,000 (1,081,020 Eastern Caribbean dollars) to the joint investment. Citizenship by investment investors must own real estate for a minimum of five years before selling it. A fourth option involves a contribution of $150,000 (405,383 Eastern Caribbean dollars) to the University of the West Indies (UWI) Fund for a family of six people, which entitles one member of the family to a one-year tuition-only scholarship at UWI’s Five Islands campus. All applicants must also pay relevant government and due diligence fees, and provide a full medical certificate, police certificate, and evidence of the source of funds. Chapter 8 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas outlines the competition policy applicable to CARICOM states. Member states are required to establish and maintain a national competition authority for implementing the rules of competition. CARICOM established a Caribbean Competition Commission (CCC) to rule on complaints of anti-competitive cross-border business conduct. CARICOM competition policy addresses anti-competitive business conduct such as collusion between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises, and concerted practices by enterprises that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the Community, and actions by which an enterprise abuses its dominant position within the Community. Antigua and Barbuda does not have any legislation regulating competition. The OECS agreed to establish a regional competition body to handle competition matters within its single market. The draft OECS bill has been submitted to the Ministry of Legal Affairs for review. According to the Investment Authority Act of 2006, investments in Antigua and Barbuda will not be nationalized, expropriated, or subject to indirect measures having an equivalent effect, except as necessary for the public good, in accordance with the due process of law, on a non-discriminatory basis, and accompanied by prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. Compensation in such cases is the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation or the impending expropriation became public knowledge, whichever is earlier. Compensation includes interest from the date of dispossession of the expropriated property until the date of payment and is required to be paid without delay. There is an unresolved dispute regarding the 2007 expropriation of an American-owned property. Following the expropriation, the owners initiated legal action to enforce their rights under Antigua and Barbuda’s Land Acquisition Act. A 2014 Privy Council court decision ordered the Government of Antigua and Barbuda to pay the former property owners $39.8 million in compensation. The government has only paid approximately $20 million as of June 2021, and the property owners have continued to pursue multiple legal remedies to compel the government to pay the outstanding balance. Antigua and Barbuda appealed a 2018 court decision in favor of the claimants; legal proceedings are ongoing. The government has not made any additional payments to the claimants since 2015. The claimants continue to pursue recourse in other jurisdictions and in Antigua and Barbuda, with the latest legal filings in 2020. The outstanding debt is currently $19.1 million with daily accruing interest. Because of Antigua and Barbuda’s failure to fully compensate the owners as required by its own laws, the U.S. government recommends continued caution when investing in real estate or any other venture in Antigua and Barbuda. Under the Bankruptcy Act (1975), Antigua and Barbuda has a bankruptcy framework that grants certain rights to debtors and creditors. The full text of the legislation can be found on the government’s website . 6. Financial Sector As a member of the ECCU, Antigua and Barbuda is also a member of the Eastern Caribbean Stock Exchange (ECSE) and the Regional Government Securities Market. The ECSE is a regional securities market established by the ECCB and licensed under the Securities Act of 2001, a uniform regional body of legislation governing securities market activities. As of March 2021, there were 164 securities listed on the ECSE, comprising 140 sovereign debt instruments, 13 equities, and 11 corporate debt securities. Market capitalization stood at $703 million (1.9 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars), representing a 6.9 percent increase from 2020. Antigua and Barbuda is open to portfolio investment. Antigua and Barbuda accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund Agreement Sections 2, 3, and 4, and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on making international payments and transfers. The government normally does not grant foreign tax credits except in cases where taxes are paid in a Commonwealth country that grants similar relief for Antigua and Barbuda taxes, or where an applicable tax treaty provides a credit. The private sector has access to credit on the local market through loans, purchases of non-equity services, and trade credits, as well as other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. Antigua and Barbuda is a signatory to the 1983 agreement establishing the ECCB. The ECCB controls Antigua and Barbuda’s currency and regulates its domestic banks. The Banking Act (2015) is a harmonized piece of legislation across the ECCU member states. The ECCB and the Ministers of Finance of member states jointly carry out banking supervision under the act. The Minsters of Finance usually act in consultation with the ECCB with respect to those areas of responsibility within the Minister of Finance’s portfolio. Domestic and foreign banks can establish operations in Antigua and Barbuda. The Banking Act requires all commercial banks and other institutions to be licensed. The ECCB regulates financial institutions. As part of supervision, licensed financial institutions are required to submit monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports to the ECCB. In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector as stable. Assessments including effects of the pandemic are not yet available. Assets of commercial banks totaled $2.07 billion (5.6 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) at the end of December 2019 and remained relatively consistent during the previous year. The reserve requirement for commercial banks was 6 percent of deposit liabilities. Antigua and Barbuda is well-served by bank and non-bank financial institutions. There are minimal alternative financial services offered. Some people still participate in informal community group lending, but the practice is declining. The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S., Canadian, and European banks due to risk management concerns. CARICOM remains committed to engaging with key stakeholders on the issue and appointed a Committee of Ministers of Finance on Correspondent Banking to continue to monitor the issue. Antigua and Barbuda’s Digital Assets Business Bill 2020 created a comprehensive regulatory framework for digital asset businesses, clients, and customers. The bill states that all digital asset businesses in the country must obtain a license for issuing, selling, or redeeming virtual coins, operating as a payment service or electronic exchange, providing custodial wallet services, among other activities. The government aspires to develop Antigua and Barbuda into a regional center for blockchain and cryptocurrency. At the end of 2020, over 40 major businesses accepted bitcoin cash. Bitt, a Barbadian company, developed digital currency DCash in partnership with the ECCB. The first successful DCash retail central bank digital currency (CDBC) consumer-to-merchant transaction took place in Grenada in February 2021 following a multi-year development process. The CBB and the FSC established a regulatory sandbox in 2018 where financial technology entities can do live testing of their products and services. This allowed regulators to gain a better understanding of the product or service and to determine what, if any, regulation is necessary to protect consumers. Bitt completed its participation and formally exited the sandbox in 2019. Bitt launched DCash in Antigua and Barbuda in March 2021. In January 2022, the platform experienced a system interruption, and its operation was suspended. The platform regained full functionality at the end of March 2022 following system upgrades. Neither the government of Antigua and Barbuda nor the ECCB, of which Antigua and Barbuda is a member, maintains a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Antigua and Barbuda are governed by their respective legislation and do not generally pose a threat to investors, as they are not designed for competition. The government established many SOEs to create economic activity in areas where the private sector is perceived to have little interest. SOEs are headed by boards of directors to which senior managers report. In 2016, Parliament passed the Statutory Corporations (General Provisions) Act, which specifies ministerial responsibilities in the appointment and termination of board members, decisions of the board, and employment in these SOEs. To promote diversity and independence on SOE boards, professional associations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society may nominate directors for boards. Antigua and Barbuda does not have a targeted privatization program. 10. Political and Security Environment Antigua and Barbuda does not have a recent history of politically motivated violence or civil disturbance. Elections are peaceful and regarded as being free and fair. The next general elections are constitutionally due by May 2023. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2019 $1,668 2019 1,687.5 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 7 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/ international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 5 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 81.4 UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Eastern Caribbean Central Bank: https://www.eccb-centralbank.org/statistics/gdp-datas/comparative-report/1 Table 3 Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Argentina Executive Summary Argentina presents investment and trade opportunities, particularly in agriculture, energy, health, infrastructure, information technology, and mining. However, economic uncertainty, interventionist policies, high inflation, and persistent economic stagnation have prevented the country from maximizing its potential. The economy fell into recession in 2018, the same year then-President Mauricio Macri signed a three-year $57 billion Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). President Alberto Fernandez and Vice President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner’s (CFK) took office on December 10, 2019, and reversed fiscal austerity measures, suspended the IMF program, and declared public debt levels unsustainable. In September 2020, Argentina restructured $100 billion in foreign and locally issued sovereign debt owed to international and local private creditors. Together, these transactions provide short-term financial relief by clearing principal payments until 2024. Unable to access international capital markets, the government relied on Central Bank money printing to finance the deficit, further fueling inflation. Although Argentina’s economy rebounded 10.3 percent in 2021, offsetting a 10 percent decline in 2020, the economy remains below pre-recession levels. In 2021, the Argentine peso (official rate) depreciated 17 percent, inflation reached 50.9 percent, and the poverty rate reached 37.3 percent. Even as the pandemic receded and economic activity rebounded, the government cited increased poverty and high inflation as reasons to continue, and even expand, price controls, capital controls, and foreign trade controls. Agricultural and food exports such as beef, soy, and flour were frequent targets for government intervention. Beginning in May 2021, the government introduced bans and other limits on beef exports to address increasing domestic prices. However, the government also implemented incentives for exporters and investors in other industries. It eliminated export taxes for specific businesses and industries, including small and medium sized enterprises; auto and automotive parts exports over 2020 volumes; and information technology service exports from companies enrolled in the knowledge-based economy promotion regime. There were also investment promotion incentives in key export sectors such as agriculture, forestry, hydrocarbons, manufacturing, and mining. The high cost of capital affected the level of investments in developing renewable energy projects, despite the potential for both wind and solar power. In an effort to expand production of oil and natural gas, the current administration provides benefits to the fossil fuel industry that impact the cost-competitiveness of renewable energy technologies. The government has encouraged the use of biofuels and electric vehicles. A proposed Law for the Promotion of Sustainable Mobility includes incentives and 20-year timelines to promote the use of technologies with less environmental impact in transportation. After the first COVID-19 case was confirmed in Argentina in March 2020, the country imposed a strict nationwide quarantine that became one of the longest in the world. Argentina reopened its borders to tourists and non-residents on November 21, 2021. Hotel and lodging, travel and tourism, and entertainment activities have reopened, although many businesses went bankrupt during the shutdown. Most of the pandemic-related economic relief measures were phased out during 2021. Both domestic and foreign companies frequently point to a high and unpredictable tax burden and rigid labor laws as obstacles to further investment in Argentina. In 2021, Argentina ranked 73 out of 132 countries evaluated in the Global Innovation Index, which is an indicator of a country’s ability to innovate, based on the premise that innovation is a driver of a nation’s economic growth and prosperity. In the latest Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Argentina ranked 96 out of 180 countries in 2021, dropping 18 places compared to 2020. As a Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) member, Argentina signed a free trade and investment agreement with the European Union (EU) in June 2019. Argentina has not yet ratified the agreement. During 2021 there was little progress on trade negotiations with South Korea, Singapore, and Canada. Argentina ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement on January 22, 2018. Argentina and the United States continue to expand bilateral commercial and economic cooperation to improve and facilitate public-private ties and communication on trade, investment, energy, and infrastructure issues, including market access and intellectual property rights. More than 265 U.S. companies operate in Argentina, and the United States continues to be the top investor in Argentina with more than USD $8.7 billion (stock) of foreign direct investment as of 2020. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 96 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 73 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $8.7 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $9,070 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Argentina identified its top economic priorities for 2022 as reaching an agreement with the IMF to renegotiate the 2018 Stand-By Arrangement, controlling inflation, and continuing the post-pandemic economic recovery. When the Fernandez administration took office in late 2019, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade, and Worship became the lead governmental entity for investment promotion. The Fernandez administration does not have a formal business roundtable or other dialogue established with international investors, although it does engage frequently with domestic and international companies. Market regulations such as capital controls, trade restrictions, and price controls enhance economic distortion that hinders the investment climate in the country. Foreign and domestic investors generally compete under the same conditions in Argentina. However, foreign investment is restricted in specific sectors such as aviation and media. Foreign ownership of rural productive lands, bodies of water, and areas along borders is also restricted. Argentina has a National Investment and Trade Promotion Agency that provides information and consultation services to investors and traders on economic and financial conditions, investment opportunities, and Argentine laws and regulations. The agency also helps small and medium- sized companies (SMEs) export their products, provides matchmaking services, and organizes roadshows and trade delegations. Upon the change of administration, the government placed the Agency under the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to improve coordination between the Agency and Argentina´s foreign policy. The Under Secretary for Trade and Investment Promotion of the MFA works as a liaison between the Agency and provincial governments and regional organizations. The new administration also created the National Directorate for Investment Promotion under the Under Secretary for Trade and Investment Promotion, making the Directorate responsible for promoting Argentina as an investment destination. The Directorate´s mission also includes determining priority sectors and projects and helping Argentine companies expand internationally and/or attract international investment. The agency’s web portal provides information on available services ( https://www.inversionycomercio.org.ar/ ). The 23 provinces and the City of Buenos Aires also have their own provincial investment and trade promotion offices. Foreign and domestic commercial entities in Argentina are regulated by the Commercial Partnerships Law (Law 19,550), the Argentina Civil and Commercial Code, and rules issued by the regulatory agencies. Foreign private entities can establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity in nearly all sectors. Full foreign equity ownership of Argentine businesses is not restricted, for the most part, with exceptions in the air transportation and media industries. The share of foreign capital in companies that provide commercial passenger transportation within the Argentine territory is limited to 49 percent per the Aeronautic Code Law 17,285. The company must be incorporated according to Argentine law and domiciled in Buenos Aires. In the media sector, Law 25,750 limits foreign ownership in television, radio, newspapers, journals, magazines, and publishing companies to 30 percent. Law 26,737 (Regime for Protection of National Domain over Ownership, Possession or Tenure of Rural Land) establishes that a foreigner cannot own land that allows for the extension of existing bodies of water or that are located near a Border Security Zone. In February 2012, the government issued Decree 274/2012 further restricting foreign land ownership to a maximum of 30 percent of national land and 15 percent of productive land. Foreign individuals or foreign company ownership is limited to 1,000 hectares (2,470 acres) in the most productive farming areas. In June 2016, the Government of Argentina issued Decree 820 easing the requirements for foreign land ownership by changing the percentage that defines foreign ownership of a person or company, raising it from 25 percent to 51 percent of the social capital of a legal entity. Waivers are not available. Argentina does not maintain an investment screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment. U.S. investors are not at a disadvantage to other foreign investors or singled out for discriminatory treatment. Argentina was last subject to an investment policy review by the OECD in 1997 and the fifth trade policy review by the WTO in September 2021 ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp512_e.htm ). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has not done an investment policy review of Argentina. In 2019, automotive sector representatives, including the Association of Automobile Manufacturers (ADEFA, or Asociación de Fábricas de Automotores) and the Asociación of Auto Parts Manufacturers (AFAC, or Asociación de Fábricas Argentinas de Componentes), published Plan 2030, a strategic plan for investment and development in the automotive sector. (http://www.cafas.org.ar/assets/img/noticias/Plan2030.pdf ) In 2022, the Industrial Union of Argentina (UIA, or Unión Industrial Argentina) published a White Book of recommendations to promote development and increase productivity in Argentina. (https://www.uia.org.ar/general/3889/propuestas-para-un-desarrollo-productivo-federal-sustentable-e-inclusivo-libro-blanco/ ) The Rosario Board of Trade (BCR, or Bolsa de Comercio de Rosario) published regular reports and recommendations for agricultural trade and investment policies. ( https://www.bcr.com.ar/es ) In 2019, stemming from the country’s deteriorating financial and economic situation, the Argentine government re-imposed capital controls on businesses and consumers, limiting their access to foreign exchange. The government continued to update and increase both capital controls and taxes on imports and exports throughout 2021, generating continued uncertainty in the business climate. With the stated aim of keeping inflation under control and avoiding production shortages during the COVID-19 pandemic, the government increased market interventions in 2020, creating further market distortions that may deter investment. During 2021, bans and other limits on beef exports were introduced to address rising domestic prices. Argentina currently has s a consumer goods price control program, “Precios Cuidados,” a voluntary program established in 2014.The Argentine Congress also passed the Shelves Law (No. 27,545), which regulates the supply, display, and distribution of products on supermarket shelves and virtual stores. Key articles of the Law are still pending implementing regulations. Private companies expressed concern over the final regulatory framework of the Law, which could affect their production, distribution, and marketing business models. In August 2020, the government issued an edict freezing prices for telecommunication services (mobile and land), cable and satellite TV, and internet services until December 2020, later extending the measure into 2021. Some telecommunication companies appealed through the courts and were granted protection from the edict. The health sector was also subject to limits on price increases. In February 2021, the Secretary of Trade took administrative action against major consumer firms and food producers for purportedly causing supermarket shortages by withholding production and limiting distribution. Companies are currently contesting this decision. In March 2021, the Secretary of Domestic Trade issued Resolution 237/2021 establishing a national registry to monitor the production levels, distribution, and sales of private companies. If companies fail to comply, they could be subject to fines or closure. Tighter import controls imposed by the Fernandez administration have affected the business plans of private companies that need imported inputs for production. The private sector noted increased discretion on the part of trade authorities responsible for both approving import licenses and obtaining access to the foreign exchange market to pay for imports. The Ministry of Production eased bureaucratic hurdles for foreign trade through the creation of a Single Window for Foreign Trade (“VUCE” for its Spanish acronym) in 2016. The VUCE centralizes the administration of all required paperwork for the import, export, and transit of goods (e.g., certificates, permits, licenses, and other authorizations and documents). The Argentine government has not fully implemented the VUCE for use across the country. Argentina subjects imports to automatic or non-automatic licenses that are managed through the Comprehensive Import Monitoring System (SIMI, or Sistema Integral de Monitoreo de Importaciones), established in December 2015 by the National Tax Agency (AFIP by its Spanish acronym) through Resolutions 5/2015 and 3823/2015. The SIMI system requires importers to submit detailed information electronically about goods to be imported into Argentina. Once the information is submitted, the relevant Argentine government agencies can review the application through the VUCE and make any observations or request additional information. The list of products subject to non-automatic licensing has been modified several times since the beginning of the SIMI system. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the government reclassified goods needed to combat the health emergency previously subject to non-automatic import licenses to automatic import licenses. During 2021, the number of non-automatic import licenses did not significantly change, although obtaining dollars from the Argentine Central Bank to pay for imports was often difficult for importers. Approximately 1,500 tariff lines are currently subject to non-automatic licenses. The Argentine Congress approved an Entrepreneurs’ Law in March 2017, which allows for the creation of a simplified joint-stock company (SAS, or Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada) online within 24 hours of registration. However, in March 2020, the Fernandez administration annulled the 24-hour registration system. Industry groups said this hindered the entrepreneurship ecosystem by revoking one of the pillars of the Entrepreneurs’ Law. In December 2020, the government issued the regulatory framework for the Knowledge Based-Economy Law, which was passed in October 2020. The Law establishes tax benefits for entrepreneurs until December 2029. The complete list of activities included in the tax benefit can be found at: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do;jsessionid=56625A2FC5152F34ECE583158D581896?id=346218 . Foreign investors seeking to set up business operations in Argentina follow the same procedures as domestic entities without prior approval and under the same conditions as local investors. To open a local branch of a foreign company in Argentina, the parent company must be legally registered in Argentina. Argentine law requires at least two equity holders, with the minority equity holder maintaining at least a five percent interest. In addition to the procedures required of a domestic company, a foreign company establishing itself in Argentina must legalize the parent company’s documents, register the incoming foreign capital with the Argentine Central Bank, and obtain a trading license. A company must register its name with the Office of Corporations (IGJ, or Inspección General de Justicia). The IGJ website describes the registration process, and some portions can be completed online (https://www.argentina.gob.ar/justicia/igj/guia-de-tramites ). Once the IGJ registers the company, the company must request that the College of Public Notaries submit the company’s accounting books to be certified with the IGJ. The company’s legal representative must obtain a tax identification number from AFIP, register for social security, and obtain blank receipts from another agency. Companies can register with AFIP online at www.afip.gob.ar or by submitting the sworn affidavit form No. 885 to AFIP. Details on how to register a company can be found at the Ministry of Productive Development’s website: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/produccion/crear-una-empresa . Instructions on how to obtain a tax identification code can be found at: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/obtener-el-cuit-por-internet . The enterprise must also provide workers’ compensation insurance for its employees through the Workers’ Compensation Agency (ART, or Aseguradora de Riesgos del Trabajo). The company must register and certify its accounting of wages and salaries with the Secretariat of Labor, within the Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Security. The Ministry of Productive Development offers attendance-based courses and online training for businesses. The training menu can be viewed at: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/produccion/capacitacion . The National Directorate for Investment Promotion under the Under Secretary for Trade and Investment Promotion at the MFA assists Argentine companies in expanding their business overseas, in coordination with the National Investment and Trade Promotion Agency. Argentina does not have any restrictions regarding domestic entities investing overseas, nor does it incentivize outward investment. 3. Legal Regime The Secretary of Strategic Affairs under the Cabinet is in charge of transparency policies and the digitalization of bureaucratic processes as of December 2019. Argentine government authorities and a number of quasi-independent regulatory entities can issue regulations and norms within their mandates. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. Rulemaking has traditionally been a top-down process in Argentina, unlike in the United States where industry organizations often lead in the development of standards and technical regulations. The Constitution establishes a procedure that allows for citizens to draft or propose legislation, which is subject to Congressional and Executive approval before being passed into law. Ministries, regulatory agencies, and Congress are not obligated to provide a list of anticipated regulatory changes or proposals, share draft regulations with the public, or establish a timeline for public comment. They are also not required to conduct impact assessments of the proposed legislation and regulations. All final texts of laws, regulations, resolutions, dispositions, and administrative decisions must be published in the Official Gazette (https://www.boletinoficial.gob.ar ), as well as in the newspapers and the websites of the Ministries and agencies. These texts can also be accessed through the official website Infoleg (http://www.infoleg.gob.ar/ ), overseen by the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. Interested stakeholders can pursue judicial review of regulatory decisions. In September 2016, Argentina enacted a Right to Access Public Information Law (27,275) that mandates all three governmental branches (legislative, judicial, and executive), political parties, universities, and unions that receive public funding are to provide non-classified information at the request of any citizen. The law also created the Agency for the Right to Access Public Information to oversee compliance. During 2017, the government introduced new procurement standards including electronic procurement, formalization of procedures for costing-out projects, and transparent processes to renegotiate debts to suppliers. The government also introduced OECD recommendations on corporate governance for state-owned enterprises to promote transparency and accountability during the procurement process. The regulation may be viewed at: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=306769 . In April 2018, Argentina passed the Business Criminal Responsibility Law (27,041) through Decree 277. The decree establishes an Anti-Corruption Office in charge of outlining and monitoring the transparency policies with which companies must comply to be eligible for public procurement. The Argentine government has sought to increase public consultation in the rulemaking process; however, public consultation is non-binding and has been done in an ad-hoc fashion. In 2017, the Government of Argentina issued a series of legal instruments that seek to promote the use of tools to improve the quality of the regulatory framework. Amongst them, Decree 891/2017 for Good Practices in Simplification establishes a series of tools to improve the rulemaking process. The decree introduces tools on ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of regulation, stakeholder engagement, and administrative simplification, amongst others. Nevertheless, no formal oversight mechanism has been established to supervise the use of these tools across the line of ministries and government agencies, which make implementation difficult and severely limit the potential to adopt a whole-of-government approach to regulatory policy, according to a 2019 OECD publication on Regulatory Policy in Argentina. Some ministries and agencies developed their own processes for public consultation by publishing drafts on their websites, directly distributing the draft to interested stakeholders for feedback, or holding public hearings. In November 2017, the Government of Argentina launched a new website to communicate how the government spends public funds in a user-friendly format (https://www.argentina.gob.ar/economia/transparencia/presupuesto ). The Argentine government also made an effort to improve citizens’ understanding of the budget, through the citizen’s budget “Presupuesto Ciudadano” website: https://www.economia.gob.ar/onp/presupuesto_ciudadano/seccion6.php . The initiative aligns with the Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency (GIFT) and UN Resolution 67/218 on promoting transparency, participation, and accountability in fiscal policy. Argentina requires public companies to adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Argentina is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. The government of Argentina does not promote or require environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers distinguish between high and low-quality investments. Argentina is a founding member of MERCOSUR and has been a member of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI for Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración) since 1980. Once any of the decision-making bodies within MERCOSUR agrees to apply a certain regulation, each of the member countries must incorporate it into its legislation according to its own legislative procedures. Once a regulation is incorporated in a MERCOSUR member’s legislation, the country must notify MERCOSUR headquarters. Argentina has been a member of the WTO since 1995, and it ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement in January 2018. Argentina notifies technical regulations, but not proposed drafts, to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Argentina submitted itself to an OECD regulatory policy review in March 2018, which was released in March 2019. The Fernandez administration has not actively pursued OECD accession. Argentina participates in all 23 OECD committees. Additionally, the Argentine Institute for Standards and Certifications (IRAM) is a member of international and regional standards bodies including the International Standardization Organization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the Pan-American Commission on Technical Standards (COPAM), the MERCOSUR Association of Standardization (AMN), the International Certification Network (i-Qnet), the System of Conformity Assessment for Electrotechnical Equipment and Components (IECEE), and the Global Good Agricultural Practice network (GLOBALG.A.P.). Argentina follows a Civil Law system. In 2014, the Argentine government passed a new Civil and Commercial Code that has been in effect since August 2015. The Civil and Commercial Code provides regulations for civil and commercial liability, including ownership of real and intangible property claims. The current judicial process is lengthy and suffers from significant backlogs. In the Argentine legal system, appeals may be brought from many rulings of the lower courts, including evidentiary decisions, not just final orders, which significantly slows all aspects of the system. The Justice Ministry reported in December 2018 that the expanded use of oral processes had reduced the duration of 68 percent of all civil matters to less than two years. According to the Argentine constitution, the judiciary is a separate and equal branch of government. In practice, there are continuous instances of political interference in the judicial process. Companies have complained that courts lack transparency and reliability, and that the Argentine government has used the judicial system to pressure the private sector. Media revelations of judicial impropriety and corruption feed public perception and undermine confidence in the judiciary. Many foreign investors prefer to rely on private or international arbitration when those options are available. Claims regarding labor practices are processed through a labor court, regulated by Law 18,345 and its subsequent amendments, and implementing regulations by Decree 106/98. Contracts often include clauses designating specific judicial or arbitral recourse for dispute settlement. According to the Foreign Direct Investment Law 21,382 and Decree 1853/93, foreign investors may invest in Argentina without prior governmental approval, under the same conditions as investors domiciled within the country. Foreign investors are free to enter into mergers, acquisitions, greenfield investments, or joint ventures. Foreign firms may also participate in publicly financed research and development programs on a national treatment basis. Incoming foreign currency must be identified by the participating bank to the Central Bank of Argentina (www.bcra.gob.ar ). All foreign and domestic commercial entities in Argentina are regulated by the Commercial Partnerships Law (Law No. 19,550) and the rules issued by the commercial regulatory agencies. Decree 27/2018 amended Law 19,550 to eliminate regulatory barriers and reduce bureaucratic burdens, expedite and simplify processes in the public domain, and deploy existing technological tools to better focus on transparency. Full text of the decree can be found at: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/305000-309999/305736/norma.htm. All other laws and norms concerning commercial entities are established in the Argentina Civil and Commercial Code, which can be found at: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/235000-239999/235975/norma.htm Further information about Argentina’s investment policies can be found at the following websites: Ministry of Productive Development (https://www.argentina.gob.ar/produccion ) Ministry of Economy (https://www.argentina.gob.ar/economia ) The Central Bank of the Argentine Republic (http://www.bcra.gob.ar/ ) The National Securities Exchange Commission (https://www.argentina.gob.ar/cnv ) The National Investment and Trade Promotion Agency (https://www.inversionycomercio.org.ar/ ) Investors can download Argentina’s investor guide through this link: https://www.investargentina.org.ar/ The National Commission for the Defense of Competition and the Secretariat of Domestic Trade, both within the Ministry of Productive Development, have enforcement authority of the Competition Law (Law 25,156). The law aims to promote a culture of competition in all sectors of the national economy. In May 2018, the Argentine Congress approved a new Defense of Competition Law (Law 27,442), which would have, among other things, established an independent competition agency and tribunal. The new law incorporates anti-competitive conduct regulations and a leniency program to facilitate cartel investigation. The full text of the law can be viewed at: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=310241 . The Government of Argentina, however, has thus far not taken steps to establish the independent agency or tribunal. In February 2021, a bill introducing amendments to the Defense of Competition Law was passed by the Senate and is currently under study in the Lower House. The main changes are related to the removal of the “Clemency Program,” which encourages public reports of collusive and cartel activities, and the elimination of public hearings to appoint members of the Competition Office. The private sector has expressed concern over this bill, stating these changes are contrary to transparency standards embodied in the Law. In September 2014, Argentina amended the 1974 National Supply Law to expand the ability of the government to regulate private enterprises by setting minimum and maximum prices and profit margins for goods and services at any stage of economic activity. Private companies may be subject to fines and temporary closure if the government determines they are not complying with the law. Although the law is still in effect, the U.S. Government has not received any reports of it being applied since December 2015. However, the Fernandez administration has expressed its potential use when resisted compliance with price control programs, even if the program was supposed to be voluntary. In March 2020, the Government of Argentina enacted the Supermarket Shelves Law (Law 27,545) that states that any single manufacturer and its associated brands cannot occupy more than 30 percent of a retailer’s shelf space devoted to any one product category. The law’s proponents claim it will allow more space for domestic SME-produced products, encourage competition, and reduce shortages. U.S. companies have expressed concern over the pending regulations, seeking clarification about issues such as whether display space percentages would be considered per brand or per production company, as it could potentially affect a company’s production, distribution, and marketing business model. Section 17 of the Argentine Constitution affirms the right of private property and states that any expropriation must be authorized by law and compensation must be provided. The United States-Argentina BIT states that investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized except for public purposes upon prompt payment of the fair market value in compensation. Argentina has a history of expropriations under previous administrations. The most recent expropriation occurred in March 2015 when the Argentine Congress approved the nationalization of the train and railway system. A number of companies that were privatized during the 1990s under the Menem administration were renationalized under the Kirchner administrations. Additionally, in October 2008, Argentina nationalized its private pension funds, which amounted to approximately one-third of total GDP and transferred the funds to the government social security agency. In May 2012, the Fernandez de Kirchner administration nationalized oil and gas company Repsol-YPF. Most of the litigation between the Government of Argentina and Repsol was settled in 2016. An American hedge fund still holds a claim against YPF and is in litigation in U.S. courts. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Argentina is signatory to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards, which the country ratified in 1989. Argentina is also a party to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention since 1994. There is neither specific domestic legislation providing for enforcement under the 1958 New York Convention nor legislation for the enforcement of awards under the ICSID Convention. Companies that seek recourse through Argentine courts may not simultaneously pursue recourse through international arbitration. Investor-State Dispute Settlement The Argentine government officially accepts the principle of international arbitration. The United States-Argentina BIT includes a chapter on Investor-State Dispute Settlement for U.S. investors. In the past ten years, Argentina has been brought before the ICSID in 7 cases involving U.S. or other foreign investors. Argentina currently has seven pending arbitration cases, three of them filed against it by U.S. investors. For more information on the cases brought by U.S. claimants against Argentina, go to: https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx #. Local courts cannot enforce arbitral awards issued against the government based on the public policy clause. There is no history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors. Argentina is a member of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Argentina is also a party to several bilateral and multilateral treaties and conventions for the enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments, which provide requirements for the enforcement of foreign judgments in Argentina, including: Treaty of International Procedural Law, approved in the South American Congress of Private International Law held in Montevideo in 1898, ratified by Argentina by law No. 3,192. Treaty of International Procedural Law, approved in the South American Congress of Private International Law held in Montevideo in 1939-1940, ratified by Dec. Ley 7771/56 (1956). Panama Convention of 1975, CIDIP I: Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, adopted within the Private International Law Conferences – Organization of American States, ratified by law No. 24,322 (1995). Montevideo Convention of 1979, CIDIP II: Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, adopted within the Private International Law Conferences – Organization of American States, ratified by law No. 22,921 (1983). International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms can be stipulated in contracts. Argentina also has ADR mechanisms available such as the Center for Mediation and Arbitrage (CEMARC) of the Argentine Chamber of Trade. More information can be found at: http://www.intracen.org. Argentina does not have a specific law governing arbitration, but it has adopted a mediation law (Law 24.573/1995), which makes mediation mandatory prior to litigation. Some arbitration provisions are scattered throughout the Civil Code, the National Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, the Commercial Code, and three other laws. The following methods of concluding an arbitration agreement are non-binding under Argentine law: electronic communication, fax, oral agreement, and conduct on the part of one party. Generally, all commercial matters are subject to arbitration. There are no legal restrictions on the identity and professional qualifications of arbitrators. Parties must be represented in arbitration proceedings in Argentina by attorneys who are licensed to practice locally. The grounds for annulment of arbitration awards are limited to substantial procedural violations, an ultra petita award (award outside the scope of the arbitration agreement), an award rendered after the agreed-upon time limit, and a public order violation that is not yet settled by jurisprudence when related to the merits of the award. On average, it takes around 21 weeks to enforce an arbitration award rendered in Argentina, from filing an application to a writ of execution attaching assets (assuming there is no appeal). It takes roughly 18 weeks to enforce a foreign award. The requirements for the enforcement of foreign judgments are set out in section 517 of the National Procedural Code. No information is available as to whether the domestic courts frequently rule in cases in favor of state-owned enterprises (SOE) when SOEs are party to a dispute. Argentina’s bankruptcy law was codified in 1995 in Law 24,522. The full text can be found at: http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/25000-29999/25379/texact.htm . Under the law, debtors are generally able to begin insolvency proceedings when they are no longer able to pay their debts as they mature. Debtors may file for both liquidation and reorganization. Creditors may file for insolvency of the debtor for liquidation only. The insolvency framework does not require approval by the creditors for the selection or appointment of the insolvency representative or for the sale of substantial assets of the debtor. The insolvency framework does not provide rights to the creditor to request information from the insolvency representative, but the creditor has the right to object to decisions by the debtor to accept or reject creditors’ claims. Bankruptcy is not criminalized; however, convictions for fraudulent bankruptcy can carry two to six years of prison time. Financial institutions regulated by the Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA) publish monthly outstanding credit balances of their debtors; the BCRA National Center of Debtors (Central de Deudores) compiles and publishes this information. The database is available for use of financial institutions that comply with legal requirements concerning protection of personal data. The credit monitoring system only includes negative information, and the information remains on file through the person’s life. At least one local NGO that makes microcredit loans is working to make the payment history of these loans publicly accessible for the purpose of demonstrating credit history, including positive information, for those without access to bank accounts and who are outside of the Central Bank’s system. Equifax, which operates under the local name “Veraz” (or “truthfully”), also provides credit information to financial institutions and other clients, such as telecommunications service providers and other retailers that operate monthly billing or credit/layaway programs. 6. Financial Sector The Argentine Constitution sets as a general principle that foreign investors have the same status and the same rights as local investors. Foreign investors have free access to domestic and international financing. After a three-year recession (2018-2020), the economy rebounded with 10.3 percent growth in 2021. However, the government did not ease the capital controls introduced in September 2019 to slow the outflow of dollars. Central Bank capital controls prohibiting transfers and payments are likely in conflict with IMF Article VIII. The government has maintained trade restrictions, price controls, distortive taxes, and high spending. Unable to access international capital markets (despite restructuring private debt in 2020) and with a shallow domestic market, the government relied on Central Bank money printing to finance the deficit. The excessive liquidity resulted in high inflation (50.9 percent in 2021) and deteriorating social conditions, with the poverty rate exceeding 40 percent. In August 2020, the government of Argentina formally notified the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of its intent to renegotiate $45 billion due to the Fund from the 2018 Stand-By Arrangement. On March 3, 2022, IMF Staff and Argentine authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the economic and financial policies required for an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement. In broad terms, the key objectives of the new EFF include a reduction in the fiscal deficit and monetary financing, tackling inflation, and the accumulation of foreign reserves. The IMF Executive Board approved the EFF on March 25, after the Argentine National Congress approved the measure. The Argentine Securities and Exchange Commission (CNV or Comisión Nacional de Valores) is the federal agency that regulates securities markets offerings. Securities and accounting standards are transparent and consistent with international norms. Foreign investors have access to a variety of options on the local market to obtain credit. Nevertheless, the domestic credit market is small – credit is 11 percent of GDP. Private sector credit gained some momentum in 2021, driven by the reopening of the economy after the pandemic and government support measures such as subsidized credit lines for businesses. Nevertheless, the stock of credit shrank in real terms as the nominal credit growth increased by 41 percent in 2021, below the inflation rate of 50.7 percent. The Buenos Aires Stock Exchange is the organization responsible for the operation of Argentina’s primary stock exchange, located in Buenos Aires city. The most important index of the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange is the MERVAL (Mercado de Valores). U.S. banks, securities firms, and investment funds are well-represented in Argentina and are dynamic players in local capital markets. In 2003, the government began requiring foreign banks to disclose to the public the nature and extent to which their foreign parent banks guarantee their branches or subsidiaries in Argentina. Argentina has a relatively sound banking sector based on diversified revenues, well-contained operating costs, and a high liquidity level. Argentina’s banking sector has been resilient in the face of a multi-year economic recession (2018-2020). Limited financial intermediation combined with high inflation and interventionist interest rate regulations (mainly for small businesses) dented bank profitability in 2021. Banks compensated for this by controlling expenses and increasing digitalization of the sector. Non-performing private sector loans constitute 4.4 percent of banks’ portfolios. During 2021, financial entities maintained adequate solvency indicators. The banking sector is well positioned due to macro and micro-prudential policies introduced since 2002 that have helped to reduce asset-liability mismatches. The sector is highly liquid and its exposure to the public sector is modest, while its provisions for bad debts are adequate. Private banks have total assets of approximately ARS 8.4 trillion (USD $83.3 billion). Total financial system assets are approximately ARS 13.7 trillion (USD $135.7 billion). The Central Bank of Argentina acts as the country’s financial agent and is the main regulatory body for the banking system. Foreign banks and branches can establish operations in Argentina. They are subject to the same regulation as local banks. Argentina’s Central Bank has many correspondent banking relationships, none of which are known to have been lost in the past three years. In November 2020, the Central Bank launched a new payment system, “Transfers 3.0,” seeking to reduce the use of cash. This system will boost digital payments and further financial inclusion in Argentina, expanding the reach of instant transfers to build an open and universal digital payment ecosystem. The government has expressed support for the process of digitization of payments to improve efficiency, reduce costs, and safeguard financial stability. The Central Bank has enacted a resolution recognizing cryptocurrencies and requiring that they comply with local banking and tax laws. No implementing regulations have been adopted. Block chain developers report that several companies in the financial services sector are exploring or considering using block chain-based programs externally and are using some such programs internally. Foreign Exchange Beginning in September 2019, the Argentine government and Central Bank issued a series of decrees and norms to extend or amend the government’s ability to regulate and restrict access to foreign exchange markets. As of October 2019, the Central Bank (Notice A6815) limits cash withdrawals made abroad with local debit cards to foreign currency bank accounts owned by the client in Argentina. Pursuant to Notice A6823, cash advances made abroad using local credit cards are limited to a maximum of USD $50 per transaction. As of September 2020, and pursuant to Notice A7106, Argentine individuals must limit purchases of foreign currency (or of goods and services denominated in foreign currency) to no more than USD $200 per month on a rolling monthly basis. Individuals must receive Central Bank approval to purchase foreign currency in excess of the $200 quota. Purchases of goods and services abroad with credit and debit cards issued by Argentine banks count against the USD $200 per month quota. Although no limit on credit or debit card purchases is imposed, if monthly expenditures surpass the USD $200 limit, the card owner will be prevented from purchasing foreign currency in Argentina for the number of months needed to cover the amount of excess spending. Also, the regulation prohibits individuals who receive government assistance and high-ranking federal government officials from purchasing foreign exchange. Pursuant to Public Emergency Law 27,541, issued December 23, 2019, all dollar purchases and individual expenses incurred abroad, in person or online, including international online purchases from Argentina, paid with credit or with debit cards will be subject to a 30 percent tax. Pursuant to AFIP Resolution 4815 a 35 percent withholding tax in advance of the payment of income and/or wealth tax is also applied. Non-Argentine residents are required to obtain prior Central Bank approval to purchase more than USD $100 per month, except for certain bilateral or international organizations, institutions and agencies, diplomatic representation, and foreign tribunals. Companies and individuals need to obtain prior clearance from the Central Bank before transferring funds abroad. In the case of individuals, if transfers are made from their own foreign currency accounts in Argentina to their own accounts abroad, they do not need to obtain Central Bank approval. Per Notice A6869 issued by the Central Bank in January 2020, companies will be able to repatriate dividends without Central Bank authorization equivalent to a maximum of 30 percent of new foreign direct investment made by the company in the country. To promote foreign direct investment the Central Bank announced in October 2020 (Notice A7123) that it will allow free access to the official foreign exchange market to repatriate investments as long as the capital contribution was transferred and sold in Argentine Pesos through the foreign exchange market as of October 2, 2020, and the repatriation takes place at least two years after the transfer and settlement of those funds. Exporters of goods are required to transfer the proceeds from exports to Argentina and settle in pesos in the foreign currency market. Exporters must settle according to the following terms: exporters with affiliates (irrespective of the type of good exported) and exporters of certain goods (including cereals, seeds, minerals, and precious metals, among others) must convert their foreign currency proceeds to pesos within 15 days (or 30 days for some products) after the issuance of the permit for shipment; other exporters have 180 days to settle in pesos. Despite these deadlines, exporters must transfer the funds to Argentina and settle in pesos within five business days from the actual collection of funds. Argentine residents are required to transfer to Argentina and settle in pesos the proceeds from services exports rendered to non-Argentine residents that are paid in foreign currency either in Argentina or abroad, within five business days from collection of funds. Payment of imports of goods and services from third parties and affiliates require Central Bank approval if the company needs to purchase foreign currency. Since May 2020, the Central Bank requires importers to submit an affidavit stating that the total amount of payments associated with the import of goods made during the year (including the payment that is being requested). The total amount of payments for importation of goods should also include the payments for amortizations of lines of credit and/or commercial guarantees. In September 2020, the Central Bank limited companies’ ability to purchase foreign currency to cancel any external financial debt (including other intercompany debt) and dollar denominated local securities offerings. Companies were granted access to foreign currency for up to 40 percent of the principal amount coming due from October 15, 2020, to December 31, 2020. For the remaining 60 percent of the debt, companies had to file a refinancing plan with the Central Bank. In February 2021, the Central Bank extended the regulation through 2021, and in March 2022 extended it again to include maturities through December 31, 2022. Indebtedness with international organizations or their associated agencies or guaranteed by them and indebtedness granted by official credit agencies or guaranteed by them are exempted from this restriction. The Central Bank (Notice A7001) prohibited access to the foreign exchange market to pay for external indebtedness, imports of goods and services, and saving purposes for individuals and companies that have made sales of securities with settlement in foreign currency or transfers of these to foreign depositary entities within the last 90 days. They also should not make any of these transactions for the following 90 days. Pre-cancellation of debt coming due abroad in more than three business days requires Central Bank approval to purchase dollars. Per Resolution 36,162 of October 2011, locally registered insurance companies are mandated to maintain all investments and cash equivalents in the country. The Central Bank limits banks’ dollar-denominated asset holdings to 5 percent of their net worth. In December 2021, the Central Bank presented its monetary, financial, lending, and foreign exchange program. On monetary policy, the Central Bank committed to I) manage liquidity to prevent any imbalances that may directly or indirectly affect the disinflation process; II) set the path of the policy interest rate to obtain positive real returns on investments in domestic currency and preserve monetary and foreign exchange stability; and III) contribute to the development of the capital market and adjust minimum reserve requirements to strengthen the channel of monetary policy transmission. On foreign exchange, the Central Bank will maintain the gradual crawling peg of the exchange rate consistent with the pace of inflation. With the goal of strengthening international reserves, the Central Bank will manage capital control regulations to ensure monetary and foreign exchange stability. The credit policy objectives include encouraging financial intermediation and promoting the growth of the peso credit market to boost lending to micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) and to the sectors most affected by the pandemic. Remittance Policies In response to the economic crisis in Argentina, the government introduced capital controls in September 2019 and tightened them in 2020. Under these restrictions, companies in Argentina (including local affiliates of foreign parent companies) must obtain prior approval from the Central Bank to access the foreign exchange market to purchase foreign currency and to transfer funds abroad for the payment of dividends and profits. In January 2020, the Central Bank amended the regime for the payment of dividends abroad to non-residents. The new regime allows companies to access the foreign exchange market to transfer profits and dividends abroad without prior authorization of the Central Bank, provided the following conditions are met: (1) Profits and dividends are to be declared in closed and audited financial statements. (2) The dividends in foreign currency should not exceed the dividends determined by the shareholders’ meeting in local currency. (3) The total amount of dividends to be transferred cannot exceed 30 percent of the amount of new capital contributions made by non-residents into local companies since January 2020. (4) The resident entity must be in compliance with filing the Central Bank Survey of External Assets and Liabilities. The Argentine government does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund. 10. Political and Security Environment Demonstrations are common in metropolitan Buenos Aires and in other major cities and rural areas. Nevertheless, political violence is not widely considered a hindrance to the investment climate in Argentina. Protesters regularly block streets, highways, and major intersections, causing traffic jams and delaying travel. While demonstrations are usually non-violent, individuals sometimes seek confrontation with the police and vandalize private property. Groups occasionally protest in front of the U.S. Embassy or U.S.-affiliated businesses. In March 2022, thousands protested in front of Congress against a bill approving a new agreement with the IMF. In December 2017, while Congress had called an extraordinary session to address the retirement system reforms, several demonstrations against the bill turned violent, causing structural damage to public and private property, injuries to 162 people (including 88 policemen), and arrests of 60 people. The demonstrations ultimately dissipated, and the government passed the bill. Union disputes and politicized worker movements are common in CABA and the Provinces. In 2019 and early 2020, foreign-owned diamond mining companies in Neuquén were targeted by work stoppages and insider attacks in failed attempts to intimidate and force employers to increase salaries and benefits. These protesters were seemingly allowed to act without fear of response from local police forces, even after direct requests for assistance had been made. The companies believe the unions and protesters feel emboldened by the government’s stance towards Western companies and were forced to shut down operations for weeks in December 2019 and January 2020, in fear of the safety of their personnel at the local headquarters. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $389,064 2020 $383.10 www.worldbank.org/en/country www.indec.gob.ar Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2020 $8.730 billion BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2020 $627 million BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 N/A 2020 1.0% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Not available Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (through 2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 84,319 100% Total Outward 40,985 100% United States 20,015 23.74% Uruguay 19,715 48.10% Spain 4,013 13.58% United States 5,242 12.79% Netherlands 9,997 11.86% Paraguay 2,439 5.95% Brazil 4,614 5.47% Mexico 1,323 3.23% Chile 4,237 5.02% Brazil 649 1.58% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Armenia Executive Summary Over the past several years, Armenia has received consistently respectable rankings in international indices that review country business environments and investment climates. Projects representing significant U.S. investment are present in Armenia, most notably ContourGlobal’s Vorotan Hydroelectric Cascade and Lydian’s efforts to develop a major gold mine. U.S. investors in the banking, energy, pharmaceutical, information technology, and mining sectors, among others, have entered or acquired assets in Armenia. Armenia presents a variety of opportunities for investors, and the country’s legal framework and government policy aim to attract investment, but the investment climate is not without challenges. Obstacles include Armenia’s small market size, relative geographic isolation due to closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, weaknesses in the rule of law and judiciary, and a legacy of corruption. Net foreign direct investment inflows are low. Armenia had commenced a robust recovery from a deep 2020 recession prior to the introduction of new sanctions against Russia. GDP growth reached five percent in 2021 and had been expected to continue to grow in 2022 by at least five percent. As a result of the war and sanctions imposed on Russia, Armenia’s 2022 GDP growth forecast is now just above one percent. In May 2015, Armenia signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the United States. This agreement established a United States-Armenia Council on Trade and Investment to discuss bilateral trade and investment and related issues. Since 2015, Armenia has been a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, a customs union that brings Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia into a single integrated market. In November 2017, Armenia signed a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the European Union, which aimed in part to improve Armenia’s investment climate and business environment. Armenia imposes few restrictions on foreign control and rights to private ownership and establishment. There are no restrictions on the rights of foreign nationals to acquire, establish, or dispose of business interests in Armenia. Business registration procedures are generally straightforward. According to foreign companies, otherwise sound regulations, policies, and laws are sometimes undermined by problems such as the lack of independence, capacity, or professionalism in key institutions, most critically the judiciary. Armenia does not limit the conversion and transfer of money or the repatriation of capital and earnings. The banking system in Armenia is sound and well-regulated, but investors note that the financial sector is not highly developed. The U.S.-Armenia Bilateral Investment Treaty provides U.S. investors with a variety of protections. Although Armenian legislation offers protection for intellectual property rights, enforcement efforts and recourse through the courts are in need of improvement. Armenia experienced a dramatic change of government in 2018, when a democratically elected leader came to power on an anti-corruption platform after street protests toppled the old regime. Following the 2020 NK hostilities, in June 2021, the incumbent retained power in snap parliamentary election that met most international democracy standards. The government continues to push forth with economic and anti-corruption reforms that have improved the business climate. Overall, the competitive environment in Armenia is improving, but several businesses have reported that broader reforms across judicial, tax, customs, health, education, military, and law enforcement institutions will be necessary to shore up these gains. Despite improvements in some areas that raise Armenia’s attractiveness as an investment destination, investors claim that numerous issues remain and must be addressed to ensure a transparent, fair, and predictable business climate. A number of investors have raised concerns about the quality of dialogue between the private sector and government. Investors have also flagged issues regarding government officials’ ability to resolve problems they face in an expeditious manner. An investment dispute in the country’s mining sector has attracted significant international attention and remains outstanding after several years. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 58 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 69 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 USD 6 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,220 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The government of Armenia officially welcomes foreign investment. The Ministry of Economy is the main government body responsible for the development of investment policy in Armenia. Armenia has achieved respectable rankings on some global indices measuring the country’s business climate. Armenia’s investment and trade policy is relatively open; foreign companies are entitled by law to the same treatment as Armenian companies. Armenia has strong human capital and a well-educated population, particularly in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics fields, leading to significant investment in the high-tech and information technology sectors. Many international companies have established branches or subsidiaries in Armenia to take advantage of the country’s pool of qualified specialists and position within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). However, many businesses have identified challenges with Armenia’s investment climate in terms of the country’s small market (with a population of less than three million), limited consumer buying power, relative geographic isolation due to closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and concerns related to weaknesses in the rule of law. Following a peaceful revolution in 2018 fueled in large measure by popular frustration with endemic corruption, Armenia’s government launched a high-profile anti-corruption campaign. The fight against corruption needs to be institutionalized in the long term, especially in critical areas such as the judiciary, tax and customs operations, and health, education, military, and law enforcement sectors. Foreign investors remain concerned about the rule of law, equal treatment, and ethical conduct by government officials. U.S companies have reported that the investment climate is tainted by a failure to enforce intellectual property rights. There have been concerns regarding the lack of an independent and strong judiciary, which undermines the government’s assurances of equal treatment and transparency and reduces access to effective recourse in instances of investment or commercial disputes. Representatives of U.S. entities have raised concerns about the quality of stakeholder consultation by the government with the private sector and government responsiveness in addressing concerns among the business community. Government officials have publicly responded to private sector concerns about perceptions of slow movement in the government bureaucracy as a function of needing to guard against corruption-related risks. The Armenian National Interests Fund and Investment Support Center (Enterprise Armenia) are responsible for attracting and facilitating foreign direct investment. There are generally very few restrictions on foreign ownership or control of commercial enterprises. There are some restrictions on foreign ownership within the media and commercial aviation sectors. Local incorporation is required to obtain a license for the provision of auditing services. The Armenian government does not maintain investment screening mechanisms in general, and for foreign direct investment, in particular. Government approval is required to take advantage of certain tax and customs privileges, and foreign investors are subject to the same requirements as domestic investors where regulatory approvals may be involved. An Armenian ecological NGO recently published an article claiming that many mines in Armenia do not have corporate social responsibility obligations, which are required by law. However, it was unclear from the article if the mines in question were still actively operating. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/?&language=en Link to Global Witness country-specific reports: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/all-countries-and-regions/ Link to conflicts listed on Environmental Justice Atlas, under “basic data,” select country: https://ejatlas.org/ In 2019, the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) published its first investment policy review for Armenia. The World Trade Organization (WTO) published a Trade Policy Review for Armenia in 2018. Companies can register electronically here. This single window service was launched in 2011 and allows individual entrepreneurs and companies to complete name reservation, business registration, and tax identification processes all at once. The application can be completed in one day. An electronic signature is needed in order to be able to register online. Foreign citizens can obtain an e-signature and more detailed information from the e-signature portal. In 2019, the government launched an e-regulations platform that provides a step-by-step guide for business and investment procedures. The platform is available at https://armenia.eregulations.org/ . According to the latest estimates, it takes four days to complete the company registration process in Armenia. The Armenian government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The Armenian government increasingly makes efforts to uses transparent policies and laws to foster competition. Some contacts have reported that over the last few years the Armenian government has pursued a more consistent execution of these laws and policies in an effort to improve market competition and remove informal barriers to market entry, especially for small- and medium-sized enterprises. Armenia’s legislation on the protection of competition has been improved with clarifications regarding key concepts. There have been some procedural improvements for delivering conclusions and notifications of potential anti-competitive behavior via electronic means. However, companies regard the efforts of the State Commission for the Protection of Economic Competition (SCPEC) alone as insufficient to ensure a level playing field. They indicate that improvements in other state institutions and authorities that support competition, like the courts, tax and customs, public procurement, and law enforcement, are necessary. Numerous studies observe a continuing lack of contestability in local markets, many of which are dominated by a few incumbents. Banking supervision is relatively well developed and largely consistent with the Basel Core Principles. The Central Bank of Armenia (CBA) is the primary regulator of the financial sector and exercises oversight over banking, securities, insurance, and pensions. Armenia has adopted IFRS as the accounting standard for enterprises. Data on Armenia’s public finances and debt obligations are broadly transparent, and the Ministry of Finance publishes periodic reports that are available online. Safety and health requirements, many of them holdovers from the Soviet period, generally do not impede investment activities. Nevertheless, investors consider bureaucratic procedures to be sometimes burdensome, and discretionary decisions by individual officials may present opportunities for petty corruption. A unified online platform for publishing draft legislation was launched in March 2017. Proposed legislation is available for the public to view. Registered users can submit feedback and see a summary of comments on draft legislation. However, the time period devoted to public comments is often regarded as insufficient to solicit substantive feedback. The results of consultations have not been reported by the government in the past. The government maintains other portals, including http://www.e-gov.am and http://www.arlis.am, that make legislation and regulations available to the public. The governmental https://www.aipa.am/en/ portal is a comprehensive platform for a range of services including registering intellectual property, opening a company, or applying for a construction permit. It also provides links to key regulatory institutions and laws and regulations. The government does not require environmental and social disclosures to help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. Some regulations that affect Armenia are developed within the Eurasian Economic Commission, the executive body for the EAEU. Armenia is a member of the EAEU and adheres to relevant technical regulations. Armenia’s entry into CEPA will lead it to pursue harmonization efforts with the EU on a range of laws, regulations, and policies relevant to economic affairs. Armenia is also a member of the WTO, and the Armenian government notifies draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Armenia is a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement and has already sent category “A”, “B,” and “C” notifications to the WTO. Armenia has a hybrid legal system that includes elements of both civil and common law. Although Armenia is developing an international commercial code, the laws regarding commercial and contractual matters are currently set forth in the civil code. Thus, because Armenia lacks a commercial court, all disputes involving contracts, ownership of property, or other commercial matters are resolved by litigants in courts of general jurisdiction, which handle both civil and criminal cases. Judges that handle civil matters may be overwhelmed by the volume of cases before them and are frequently seen by the public as corrupt. Despite the ability of courts to use the precedential authority of the Court of Cassation and the European Court of Human Rights, many judges who specialize in civil cases do not do so, increasing the unpredictability of court decisions in the eyes of investors. Businesses tend to perceive that many Armenian courts suffer from low levels of efficiency, independence, and professionalism, which drives a need to strengthen the judiciary. Very often in proceedings when additional forensic expertise is requested, the court may suspend a case until the forensic opinion is received, a process that can take several months. Businesses have noted that many judges at courts of general jurisdiction may be reluctant to make decisions without getting advice from higher court judges. Thus, the public opinion is that decisions may be influenced by factors other than the law and merits of individual cases. In general, the government honors judgments from both arbitration proceedings and Armenian national courts. Due to the nature and complexity of commercial and contractual issues and the caseload of judges who specialize in civil cases, many matters involving investment or commercial disputes take months or years to work their way through the courts. In addition, businesses have complained of the inefficiencies and institutional corruption of the courts. Even though the Armenian constitution provides investors the tools to enforce awards and their property rights, investors claim that there is little predictability in what a court may do. Basic legal provisions covering foreign investment are specified in the 1994 Law on Foreign Investment. Foreign companies are entitled by law to the same treatment as Armenian companies. A Law on Public-Private Partnership (PPP), adopted in 2019, establishes a framework for the government to attract investment for projects focused on infrastructure. In 2021, the Law on PPP has been amended to introduce clear criteria for PPP project selection by the Government, as well as enabled investors to apply to the government with PPP project proposals. The Investment Support Center (Enterprise Armenia) is Armenia’s national authority for investment and export promotion. It provides information to foreign investors on Armenia’s business climate, investment opportunities, and legislation; supports investor visits; and serves as a liaison for government institutions. More information is available via the Investment Support Center’s website. SCPEC reviews transactions for competition-related concerns. Relevant laws, regulations, commission decisions, and more information can be found on SCPEC’s website. Concentrations, including mergers, acquisitions of shares or assets, amalgamations, and incorporations, are subject to ex ante control by SCPEC in accordance with the law. Whenever a concentration gives rise to concerns about harm to competition, including the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, SCPEC can prohibit such a transaction or impose certain remedies. Armenia’s Law on Protection of Economic Competition has been amended several times in recent years to bring Armenia’s competition framework into alignment with EAEU and CEPA requirements. The law was changed in 2020 to improve SCPEC’s capabilities to investigate anti-competitive behavior, in collaboration with Armenia’s investigative bodies, whereas before SCPEC had to rely primarily on document studies and request information from other state bodies. Amendments to the competition law made in 2021 strengthened SCPEC’s preventive measures by allowing private sector representatives to obtain SCPEC’s advisory opinion on market concentration risks prior to a planned transaction or activity (formerly available only to state bodies). The most recent changes to competition law also defined the order to conduct sectoral market studies to identify potential competition violations and enlarged the scope of market transactions that can be assessed as market concentrations. Under Armenian law, foreign investment cannot be confiscated or expropriated except in extreme cases of natural or state emergency upon obtaining an order from a domestic court. According to the Armenian constitution, equivalent compensation is owed prior to expropriation. According to the Law on Bankruptcy adopted in 2006, creditors and equity and contract holders (including foreign entities) have the right to participate and defend their interests in bankruptcy cases. Armenia decided with the passage of a new Judicial Code in 2018 to adopt a new, specialized bankruptcy court, which began operations in 2019. Creditors have the right to access all materials relevant to cases, submit claims to court, participate in meetings of creditors, and nominate candidates to administer cases. Monetary judgments are usually made in local currency. The Armenian Criminal Code defines penalties for false and deliberate bankruptcy, concealment of property or other assets of the bankrupt party, or other illegal activities during the bankruptcy process. UNCTAD observes that Armenia’s framework for bankruptcy procedures needs improvement, adding that insolvency cases are expensive and almost always result in liquidation. Armenia amended its bankruptcy law in December 2019 to reduce the cost of bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, premiums have been set for bankruptcy managers for submitting financial recovery plans, as well as for the recovery of a bankrupt person, with the aim of raising rates of financial recovery. In 2020, the debt threshold to launch bankruptcy proceedings was raised to grant companies a greater ability to pay off debts rather than having their assets frozen. 6. Financial Sector The banking system in Armenia is sound and well-regulated, but the financial sector is not highly developed, according to investors. Banking sector assets account for over 80 percent of total financial sector assets. Financial intermediation tends to be poor. Nearly all banks require collateral located in Armenia, and large collateral requirements often prevent potential borrowers from entering the market. U.S. businesses have noted that this creates a significant barrier for small- and medium-sized enterprises and start-up companies. The Armenian government welcomes foreign portfolio investment and there is a supporting system and legal framework in place. Armenia’s securities market is not well developed and has only minimal trading activity through the Armenia Securities Exchange, though efforts to grow capital markets are underway. Liquidity sufficient for the entry and exit of sizeable positions is often difficult to achieve due to the small size of the Armenian market. The Armenian government hopes that as a result of pension reforms in 2014, which brought two international asset managers to Armenia, capital markets will play a more prominent role in the country’s financial sector. Armenia adheres to its IMF Article VIII commitments by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms and foreign investors are able to access credit locally. Since 2020, the banking sector has withstood the twin shocks created by COVID-19 and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Indicators of financial soundness, including capital adequacy and non-performing loan ratios, have remained broadly strong. The sector is well capitalized and liquid. Non-performing loans have ticked upward slightly from rates of around five percent of all loans. Dollarization, historically high for deposits and lending, has been falling in recent years. Seventeen commercial banks operate in Armenia. In 2021, all commercial banks in Armenia generated net profits and all had a positive return on average equity (the financial ratio that measures the performance of a bank based on its average shareholders’ equity outstanding). Total bank assets in Armenia at the end of 2021 were $14 billion; Armenia’s 2021 GDP was approximately $13.6 billion. As such, the ratio of banks’ total assets to GDP – approximately one-to-one – is average compared to peer countries. Concentration of banks’ assets is considered to be very low, with the three largest banks holding less than fifty percent of total banking sector assets. Market share of the largest five banks was 56 percent in 2021. Overall, Armenia’s banking sector is viewed by international financial institutions (IFIs) as relatively healthy. The minimum capital requirement for banks is 30 billion AMD (around $59 million). There are no restrictions on foreigners to open bank accounts. Residents and foreign nationals can hold foreign currency accounts and import, export, and exchange foreign currency relatively freely in accordance with the Law on Currency Regulation and Currency Control. Foreign banks may establish a subsidiary, branch, or representative office, and subsidiaries of foreign banks are allowed to provide the same types of services as domestically owned banks. The CBA is responsible for the regulation and supervision of the financial sector. The authority and responsibilities of the CBA are established under the Law on the Central Bank of Armenia. Numerous other articles of legislation and supporting regulations provide for financial sector oversight and supervision. Armenia does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Most of Armenia’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were privatized in the 1990s and early 2000s, but SOEs are still active in a number of sectors. SOEs in Armenia operate as state-owned closed joint stock companies that are managed by the Department of State Property Management and state non-commercial organizations. There are no laws or rules that ensure a primary or leading role for SOEs in any specific industry. Armenia is party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, and SOEs are covered under that agreement. SOEs in Armenia are subject to the same tax regime as their private competitors, and private enterprises in Armenia can compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions. The Department of State Property Management maintains a public list of state-owned closed joint stock companies on its website. Most of Armenia’s SOEs were privatized in the 1990s and early 2000s. Many of the privatization processes for Armenia’s large assets were reported to be neither competitive nor transparent, and political considerations in some instances prevailed over fair tender processes. The most recent law on privatization, the fifth, is the Law on the 2017-2020 Program for State Property Privatization, which lists 48 entities for privatization. The Department of State Property Management oversees the management of the state’s shares in entities slated for privatization. Details of the privatization program are available on the Department of State Property Management website. 10. Political and Security Environment Armenia has a history of political demonstrations, most of which have remained peaceful. There have been some instances, however, of violent confrontations between police and protesters, or of attacks on government officials. The last major violent protest occurred in November 2020 following the release of a tripartite ceasefire statement by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia, which brought an end to the fall 2020 intensive fighting in and around NK. Individuals and groups displeased with the announcement stormed government buildings and destroyed property. Protestors assaulted the speaker of parliament in the streets of Yerevan and broke into the prime minister’s residence. Since the release of the tripartite statement, groups opposed to the government have organized regular marches and rallies in Yerevan that have remained largely peaceful and caused minimal disruption to ordinary business. Pro-government groups have also organized peaceful rallies, although less frequently. Throughout Armenia, protestors use road blockades as a common tactic to register discontent, most often with the government over community-level issues. The disruption created by such road blockades is usually minimal. Protests have not resulted in any damage to projects of installations of international businesses. It is unlikely that civil disturbances, should they occur, would be directed against U.S. businesses or the U.S. community. During 44 days of intensive fighting from September 27 to November 10 in 2020 involving Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Armenia-supported separatists, significant casualties and atrocities were reported by all sides. After Azerbaijan, with Turkish support, reestablished control over four surrounding territories controlled by separatists since 1994, a Russian-brokered ceasefire arrangement announced by Azerbaijan and Armenia on November 9 resulted in the peaceful transfer of control over three additional territories to Azerbaijan, as well as the introduction of Russian peacekeepers to the region. The ceasefire has largely held, with frequent but localized violations. Tensions remain high, particularly along the international border, which has not been fully demarcated. Russian forces have played a role in controlling access along highways near the border and into the Nagorno-Karabakh region from Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani government has suspended or threatened to suspend the operations of U.S. companies in Azerbaijan whose products or services are provided in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh currently under the administration of the Russian peacekeepers and has banned the entry into Azerbaijan of some persons who have visited NK. The U.S. government is unable to provide emergency services to U.S. citizens in and around NK as access is restricted. Australia Executive Summary Australia is generally welcoming to foreign investment, which is widely considered to be an essential contributor to Australia’s economic growth and productivity. The United States is by far the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) for Australia. According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the stock of U.S. FDI totaled USD 170 billion in January 2020. The Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force in 2005, establishes higher thresholds for screening U.S. investment for most classes of direct investment. While welcoming toward FDI, Australia does apply a “national interest” test to qualifying investment through its Foreign Investment Review Board screening process. Various changes to Australia’s foreign investment rules, primarily aimed at strengthening national security, have been made in recent years. This continued in 2020 with the passage of the Foreign Investment Reform (Protecting Australia’s National Security) Act 2020, which broadens the classes of foreign investments that require screening, with a particular focus on defense and national security supply chains. All foreign investments in these industries now require screening, regardless of their value or national origin. The Foreign Investment Reform legislation commenced in January 2021. Despite the increased focus on foreign investment screening, the rejection rate for proposed investments has remained low and there have been no cases of investment from the United States having been rejected in recent years, although some U.S. companies have reported greater scrutiny of their investments in Australia. In response to a perceived lack of fairness, the Australian government has tightened anti-tax avoidance legislation targeting multi-national corporations with operations in multiple tax jurisdictions. While some laws have been complementary to international efforts to address tax avoidance schemes and the use of low-tax countries or tax havens, Australia has also gone further than the international community in some areas. Australia has increased funding for clean technology projects and both local and international companies can apply for grants to implement emission-saving equipment to their operations. Australia adopted a net-zero emissions target at the national level in November 2021 although made no change to its short-term goal of a 26-28 percent emission reduction by 2030 on 2005 levels. Australia’s eight states and territories have adopted both net-zero targets and a range of interim emission reduction targets set above the federal target. Various state incentive schemes may also be available to U.S. investors. The Australian government is strongly focused on economic recovery from the COVID-driven recession Australia experienced in 2020, the country’s first in three decades. In addition to direct stimulus and business investment incentives, it has announced investment attraction incentives across a range of priority industries, including food and beverage manufacturing, medical products, clean energy, defense, space, and critical minerals processing. U.S. involvement and investment in these fields is welcomed. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 18 of 179 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 25 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 170 billion https://www.bea.gov/data/ intl-trade-investment/direct-investment- country-and-industry World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 53,690 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Australia is generally welcoming to foreign direct investment (FDI), with foreign investment widely considered to be an essential contributor to Australia’s economic growth. Other than certain required review and approval procedures for designated types of foreign investment described below, there are no laws that discriminate against foreign investors. A number of investment promotion agencies operate in Australia. The Australian Trade Commission (often referred to as Austrade) is the Commonwealth Government’s national “gateway” agency to support investment into Australia. Austrade provides coordinated government assistance to promote, attract, and facilitate FDI, supports Australian companies to grow their business in international markets, and delivers advice to the Australian Government on its trade, tourism, international education and training, and investment policy agendas. Austrade operates through a number of international offices, with U.S. offices primarily focused on attracting foreign direct investment into Australia and promoting the Australian education sector in the United States. Austrade in the United States operates from offices in Boston, Chicago, Houston, New York, San Francisco, and Washington, DC. In addition, state and territory investment promotion agencies also support international investment at the state level and in key sectors. Within Australia, foreign and domestic private entities may establish and own business enterprises and may engage in all forms of remunerative activity in accordance with national legislative and regulatory practices. See Section 4: Legal Regime – Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment below for information on Australia’s investment screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment. Other than the screening process described in Section 4, there are few limits or restrictions on foreign investment in Australia. Foreign purchases of agricultural land greater than AUD 15 million (USD 11 million) are subject to screening. This threshold applies to the cumulative value of agricultural land owned by the foreign investor, including the proposed purchase. However, the agricultural land screening threshold does not affect investments made under the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA). The current threshold is AUD 1.25 billion (USD 925 million) for U.S. non-government investors. Investments made by U.S. non-government investors are subject to inclusion on the foreign ownership register of agricultural land and to Australian Tax Office (ATO) information gathering activities on new foreign investment. The Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), which advises Australia’s Treasurer, may impose conditions when approving foreign investments. These conditions can be diverse and may include: retention of a minimum proportion of Australian directors; certain requirements on business activities, such as the requirement not to divest certain assets; and certain taxation requirements. Such conditions are in keeping with Australia’s policy of ensuring foreign investments are in the national interest. Australia has not conducted an investment policy review in the last three years through either the OECD or UNCTAD system. The WTO reviewed Australia’s trade policies and practices in 2019, and the final report can be found at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp496_e.htm . The Australian Trade Commission compiles an annual “Why Australia Benchmark Report” that presents comparative data on investing in Australia in the areas of Growth, Innovation, Talent, Location, and Business. The report also compares Australia’s investment credentials with other countries and provides a general snapshot on Australia’s investment climate. The 2021 Benchmark Report can be found at: http://www.austrade.gov.au/International/Invest/Resources/Benchmark-Report . Australia’s private sector frequently provides policy recommendations to the government, including as part of annual federal budget reviews and ad hoc policy reviews. In 2021 the American Chamber of Commerce in Australia published a report titled “The Opportunity is Now: Attracting U.S. Investors to Australia,” which provides a range of recommendations to government relating to Australia’s investment screening and general investment environment. The report is available via the following link: https://www.pwc.com.au/amcham-pwc-opportunity-is-now.html Business registration in Australia is relatively straightforward and is facilitated through a number of government websites. The government’s business.gov.au website provides an online resource and is intended as a “whole-of-government” service providing essential information on planning, starting, and growing a business. Foreign entities intending to conduct business in Australia as a foreign company must be registered with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). As Australia’s corporate, markets, and financial services regulator, ASIC’s website provides information and guides on starting and managing a business or company in the country. In registering a business, individuals and entities are required to register as a company with ASIC, which then gives the company an Australian Company Number, registers the company, and issues a Certificate of Registration. According to the World Bank “Starting a Business” indicator, registering a business in Australia takes two days, and Australia ranks 7th globally on this indicator. Australia generally looks positively towards outward investment as a way to grow its economy. There are no restrictions on investing abroad. Austrade, Export Finance Australia (EFA), and various other government agencies offer assistance to Australian businesses looking to invest abroad, and some sector-specific export and investment programs exist. The United States is the top destination, by far, for Australian investment overseas. 3. Legal Regime The Australian Government utilizes transparent policies and effective laws to foster national competition and is consultative in its policy making process. The government generally allows for public comment of draft legislation and publishes legislation once it enters into force. Details of the Australian government’s approach to regulation and regulatory impact analysis can be found on the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet’s website: https://www.pmc.gov.au/regulation Regulations drafted by Australian Government agencies must be accompanied by a Regulation Impact Statement when submitted to the final decision maker (which may be the Cabinet, a Minister, or another decision maker appointed by legislation.) All Regulation Impact Statements must first be approved by the Office of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR) which sits within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, prior to being provided to the relevant decision maker. They are required to demonstrate the need for regulation, the alternative options available (including non-regulatory options), feedback from stakeholders, and a full cost-benefit analysis. Regulations are subsequently required to be reviewed periodically. All Regulation Impact Statements, second reading speeches, explanatory memoranda, and associated legislation are made publicly available on Government websites. Australia’s state and territory governments have similar processes when making new regulations. The Australian Government has tended to prefer self-regulatory options where industry can demonstrate that the size of the risks are manageable and that there are mechanisms for industry to agree on, and comply with, self-regulatory options that will resolve the identified problem. This manifests in various ways across industries, including voluntary codes of conduct and similar agreements between industry players. The Australian Government has recognized the impost of regulations and has undertaken a range of initiatives to reduce red tape. This has included specific red tape reduction targets for government agencies and various deregulatory groups within government agencies. In 2019, the Australian Government established a Deregulation Taskforce within its Treasury Department, stating its goal was to “drive improvements to the design, administration and effectiveness of the stock of government regulation to ensure it is fit for purpose.” The taskforce’s work is ongoing. Australian accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international standards. Accounting standards are formulated by the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB), an Australian Government agency under the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001. Under that Act, the statutory functions of the AASB are to develop a conceptual framework for the purpose of evaluating proposed standards; make accounting standards under section 334 of the Corporations Act 2001, and advance and promote the main objects of Part 12 of the ASIC Act, which include reducing the cost of capital, enabling Australian entities to compete effectively overseas and maintaining investor confidence in the Australian economy. The Australian Government conducts regular reviews of proposed measures and legislative changes and holds public hearings into such matters. Australian government financing arrangements are transparent and well governed. Legislation governing the type of financial arrangements the government and its agencies may enter into is publicly available and adhered to. Updates on the Government’s financial position are regularly posted on the Department of Finance and Treasury websites. Issuance of government debt is managed by the Australian Office of Financial Management, which holds regular tenders for the sale of government debt and the outcomes of these tenders are publicly available. The Australian Government also publishes and adheres to strict procurement guidelines. Australia formally joined the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement in 2019. Environmental Social Governance (ESG) reporting is not currently mandated for companies in Australia. However, companies are required to disclose any information that shareholders may deem relevant in assessing the performance of value of the company and this may include ESG components. Companies are also increasingly disclosing ESG aspects of their operations in response to shareholder demands and in order to secure an advantage over competitors. Further, financial services companies are required to disclose their exposure to climate risk as part of their standard risk disclosures (see further detail here: https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/speeches/corporate-governance-update-climate-change-risk-and-disclosure/ ) Australia is a member of the WTO, G20, OECD, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and became the first Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) Dialogue Partner in 1974. While not a regional economic block, Australia’s free trade agreement with New Zealand provides for a high level of integration between the two economies with the ultimate goal of a single economic market. Details of Australia’s involvement in these international organizations can be found on the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s website: https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/organisations/Pages/wto-g20-oecd-apec The Australian legal system is firmly grounded on the principles of equal treatment before the law, procedural fairness, judicial precedent, and the independence of the judiciary. Strong safeguards exist to ensure that people are not treated arbitrarily or unfairly by governments or officials. Property and contractual rights are enforced through the Australian court system, which is based on English Common Law. Australia’s judicial system is fully independent and separate from the executive branch of government. Information regarding investing in Australia can be found in Austrade’s “Guide to Investing” at http://www.austrade.gov.au/International/Invest/Investor-guide . The guide is designed to help international investors and businesses navigate investing and operating in Australia. Foreign investment in Australia is regulated by the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 and Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy. The Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) is a non-statutory body, comprising independent board members advised by a division within the Treasury Department, established to advise the Treasurer on Australia’s foreign investment policy and its administration. The FIRB screens potential foreign investments in Australia above threshold values, and based on advice from the FIRB the Treasurer may deny or place conditions on the approval of particular investments above that threshold on national interest grounds. In January 2021 new legislation, the Foreign Investment Reform (Protecting Australia’s National Security) Act 2020, took effect. This legislation tightened Australia’s investment screening rules by introducing the concept of a “national security business” and “national security land,” the acquisition of which trigger a FIRB review. Further details on national security considerations, including the definitions of national security businesses, are available on the FIRB website: https://firb.gov.au/guidance-resources/guidance-notes/gn8. The Australian Government applies a “national interest” consideration in reviewing foreign investment applications. “National interest” covers a broader set of considerations than national security alone and may include tax or competition implications of an investment. Further information on foreign investment screening, including screening thresholds for certain sectors and countries, can be found at FIRB’s website: https://firb.gov.au/ . Under the AUSFTA agreement, all U.S. greenfield investments are exempt from FIRB screening. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) enforces the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 and a range of additional legislation, promotes competition, and fair trading, and regulates national infrastructure for the benefit of all Australians. The ACCC plays a key role in assessing mergers to determine whether they will lead to a substantial lessening of competition in any market. The ACCC also engages in consumer protection enforcement and has, in recent years, been given expanded responsibilities to monitor energy assets, the national gas market, and digital industries. Private property can be expropriated for public purposes in accordance with Australia’s constitution and established principles of international law. Property owners are entitled to compensation based on “just terms” for expropriated property. There is little history of expropriation in Australia. Bankruptcy is a legal status conferred under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 and operates in all of Australia’s states and territories. Only individuals can be made bankrupt, not businesses or companies. Where there is a partnership or person trading under a business name, it is the individual or individuals who make up that firm that are made bankrupt. Companies cannot become bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act though similar provisions (called “administration and winding up”) exist under the Corporations Act 2001. Bankruptcy is not a criminal offense in Australia. Creditor rights are established under the Bankruptcy Act 1966, the Corporations Act 2001, and the more recent Insolvency Law Reform Act 2016. The latter legislation commenced in two tranches over 2017 and aims to increase the efficiency of insolvency administrations, improve communications between parties, increase the corporate regulator’s oversight of the insolvency market, and “improve overall consumer confidence in the professionalism and competence of insolvency practitioners.” Under the combined legislation, creditors have the right to: request information during the administration process; give direction to a liquidator or trustee; appoint a liquidator to review the current appointee’s remuneration; and remove a liquidator and appoint a replacement. The Australian parliament passed the Corporations Amendment (Corporation Insolvency Reforms) Act 2020 in December 2020. The legislation is a response to the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and is designed to both assist viable businesses remain solvent and simplify the liquidation process for insolvent businesses. The new insolvency process under this legislation came into effect in January 2021. Australia ranks 20th globally on the World Bank’s Doing Business Report “resolving insolvency” measure. 6. Financial Sector The Australian Government takes a favorable stance towards foreign portfolio investment with no restrictions on inward flows of debt or equity. Indeed, access to foreign capital markets is crucial to the Australian economy given its relatively small domestic savings. Australian capital markets are generally efficient and able to provide financing options to businesses. While the Australian equity market is one of the largest and most liquid in the world, non-financial firms face a number of barriers in accessing the corporate bond market. Large firms are more likely to use public equity, and smaller firms are more likely to use retained earnings and debt from banks and intermediaries. Australia’s corporate bond market is relatively small, driving many Australian companies to issue debt instruments in the U.S. market. Foreign investors are able to obtain credit from domestic institutions on market terms. Australia’s stock market is the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Australia’s banking system is robust, highly evolved, and international in focus. Bank profitability is strong and has been supported by further improvements in asset performance. Total assets of Australian banks at the end of 2020 was USD4.2 trillion and the sector has delivered an annual average return on equity of around 10 percent (only falling to six percent in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, before rebounding to 11 percent in 2021). According to Australia’s central bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), the ratio of non-performing assets to total loans was approximately one percent at the end of 2021, having remained at around that level for the last five years after falling from highs of nearly two percent following the Global Financial Crisis. The RBA is responsible for monitoring and reporting on the stability of the financial sector, while the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) monitors individual institutions. The RBA is also responsible for monitoring and regulating payments systems in Australia. Further details on the size and performance of Australia’s banking sector are available on the websites of the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) and the RBA: https://www.apra.gov.au/statistics https://www.rba.gov.au/chart-pack/banking-indicators.html Foreign banks are allowed to operate as a branch or a subsidiary in Australia. Australia has generally taken an open approach to allowing foreign companies to operate in the financial sector, largely to ensure sufficient competition in an otherwise small domestic market. Australia’s main sovereign wealth fund, the Future Fund, is a financial asset investment fund owned by the Australian Government. The Fund’s objective is to enhance the ability of future Australian Governments to discharge unfunded superannuation (pension) liabilities. As a founding member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF), the Future Fund’s structure, governance, and investment approach is in full alignment with the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Sovereign Wealth Funds (the “Santiago principles”). The Future Fund’s investment mandate is to achieve a long-term return of at least inflation plus 4-5 percent per annum. As of December 2021, the Fund’s portfolio consists of: 23 percent global equities, 8 percent Australian equities, 25 percent private equity (including 8 percent in infrastructure and 7 percent in property), and the remaining 37 percent in debt, cash, and alternative investments. In addition to the Future Fund, the Australian Government manages five other specific-purpose funds: the DisabilityCare Australia Fund; the Medical Research Future Fund; the Emergency Response Fund; the Future Drought Fund; and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land and Sea Future Fund. In total, these five funds have assets of AUD 50 billion (USD 37 billion), while the main Future Fund has assets of AUD 204 billion (USD 150 billion) as of December 31, 2021. Further details of these funds are available at: https://www.futurefund.gov.au/ 7. State-Owned Enterprises In Australia, the term used for a Commonwealth Government State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) is “government business enterprise” (GBE). According to the Department of Finance, there are nine GBEs: two corporate Commonwealth entities and seven Commonwealth companies. (See: https://www.finance.gov.au/resource-management/governance/gbe/ ) Private enterprises are generally allowed to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to markets, credit, and other business operations, such as licenses and supplies. Public enterprises are not generally accorded material advantages in Australia. Remaining GBEs do not exercise power in a manner that discriminates against or unfairly burdens foreign investors or foreign-owned enterprises. Australia does not have a formal and explicit national privatization program. Individual state and territory governments may have their own privatization programs. Foreign investors are welcome to participate in any privatization programs subject to the rules and approvals governing foreign investment. 10. Political and Security Environment Political protests (including rallies, demonstrations, marches, public conflicts between competing interests) form an integral, though generally minor, part of Australian cultural life. Such protests rarely degenerate into violence. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $1.33 trillion 2020 $1.50 trillion www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $170 billion 2019 $158 billion BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $98 billion 2019 $112 billion BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises -comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 59% 2019 53% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ EconomicTrends/Fdi.html * Source for Host Country Data: Australian Bureau of Statistics Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 790,655 100% Total Outward 627,680 100% USA 151,171 19% USA 127,563 20% Japan 101,508 13% UK 103,597 17% UK 95,093 12% New Zealand 55,338 9% Netherlands 40,660 5% Canada 26,500 4% Canada 35,554 4% Singapore 13,934 2% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Austria Executive Summary Austria has a well-developed market economy that welcomes foreign direct investment, particularly in technology and R&D. The country benefits from a skilled labor force, and a high standard of living, with its capital, Vienna, consistently placing at the top of global quality-of-life rankings. With more than 50 percent of its GDP derived from exports, Austria’s economy is closely tied to other EU economies, especially that of Germany, its largest trading partner. The United States is one of Austria’s top two-way trading partners, ranking fifth in overall trade according to provisional data from 2021. The economy features a large service sector and an advanced industrial sector specialized in high-quality component parts, especially for vehicles. The agricultural sector is small but highly developed. The COVID-19 crisis deeply affected Austria’s economy, contributing to a GDP decrease of 6.7% in 2020 with the unemployment rate increasing to a peak of 5.4% at the end of 2020. Austria’s economy rebounded with 4.5% GDP growth in 2021 and unemployment lower than before the onset of the pandemic, but forecasters recently lowered expectations to 3.8% growth for 2022 due to instability stemming from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, Austria is experiencing a record number of vacancies, largely stemming from a shortage of skilled labor. The country’s location between Western European industrialized nations and growth markets in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) has led to a high degree of economic, social, and political integration with fellow European Union (EU) member states and the CESEE. Some 220 U.S. companies have investments in Austria, represented by around 300 subsidiaries, and many have expanded their original investment over time. U.S. Foreign Direct Investment into Austria totaled approximately EUR 11.6 billion (USD 13.7 billion) in 2020, according to the Austrian National Bank, and U.S. companies support over 16,500 jobs in Austria. Austria offers a stable and attractive climate for foreign investors. The most positive aspects of Austria’s investment climate include: Relatively high political stability; Harmonious labor-management relations and low incidence of labor unrest; Highly skilled workforce; High levels of productivity and international competitiveness; Excellent quality of life for employees and high-quality health, telecommunications, and energy infrastructure. Negative aspects of Austria’s investment climate include: A high overall tax burden; A large public sector and a complex regulatory system with extensive bureaucracy; Low-to-moderate innovation dynamics; Low levels of digitalization; Low levels of private venture capital. Key sectors that have historically attracted significant investment in Austria: Automotive; Pharmaceuticals; ICT and Electronics; Financial. Key issues to watch: Due to a strong reliance on Russian natural gas and the third-highest banking exposure to Russia among EU Member States, Austria could be one of the hardest countries hit by sanctions against Russia. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and sanctions are expected to cause a 0.4-0.5% decrease in Austria’s GDP. However, the impact is likely to be greater if natural gas supplies are disrupted. Austria relies on Russian imports for approximately 80% of its natural gas demand. At the same time, Austria’s export-oriented economy makes it particularly sensitive to events affecting trade, which could include potential setbacks in the pandemic, particularly during the winter months. The tourism sector, which, together with hotels and restaurants, accounts for 15 percent of the country’s GDP is still struggling, currently operating at two-thirds of its pre-crisis output levels. Many companies are also struggling to find skilled labor, which is hindering the economy from reaching its full output potential. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 13 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 18 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 4.95 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 48,350 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Austrian government welcomes foreign direct investment, particularly when such investments have the potential to create new jobs, support advanced technology fields, promote capital-intensive industries, and enhance links to research and development. There are limited restrictions on foreign investment. American investors have not complained of discriminatory laws against foreign investors. Austria’s investment screening law, which requires government approval of transactions leading to 10 percent or more foreign ownership in sensitive sectors, has resulted in an increase in the number of investments screened, from less than three per year, to 50 completed screenings from July 2020 to July 2021, the first full year law has been in effect. The majority of these screenings (31 in total) were for U.S.-based investments. Please see the “Laws and Regulations on Foreign Investment” section below for further details on the law and its applications. The corporate tax rate, a 25 percent flat tax, is above the EU average. The government is planning to reduce it to 24 percent in 2023 and 23 percent in 2024. U.S. citizens and investors have occasionally reported that it is difficult to establish and maintain banking services since the U.S.-Austria Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) Agreement went into force in 2014, as some Austrian banks have been reluctant to take on this reporting burden. Potential investors should also be aware of Austria’s lengthy environmental impact assessments in their investment decision-making. Some sectors also suffer from heavy regulation that may affect certain investments. For example, the requirement that over 50 percent of energy providers must be publicly owned places a potential cap on investments in the energy sector. Strict liability and co-existence regulations in the agriculture sector restrict research and virtually outlaw the cultivation, marketing, or distribution of biotechnology crops. The mining and transportation sectors are also heavily regulated. Austria’s national investment promotion organization, the Austrian Business Agency (ABA), is a useful first point of contact for foreign companies interested in establishing operations in Austria. It provides comprehensive information about Austria as a business location, identifies suitable sites for greenfield investments, and consults in setting up a company. ABA provides its services free of charge. The Austrian Economic Chamber (WKO) and the American Chamber of Commerce in Austria (Amcham) are also good resources for foreign investors. Both conduct annual polls of their members to measure their satisfaction with the business climate, thus providing early warning to the government of problems identified by investors. There is no principal limitation on establishing and owning a business in Austria. A local managing director must be appointed to any newly established enterprise. For non-EU citizens to establish and own a business, the Austrian Foreigner’s Law mandates a residence permit that includes the right to run a business. Many Austrian trades are regulated, and the right to run a business in regulated trade sectors is only granted when certain preconditions are met, such as certificates of competence, and recognition of foreign education. There are limited restrictions on foreign ownership of private businesses. Austria’s investment screening law, requires an investment screening process to review potential foreign acquisitions of 25 percent or more of a company essential to the country’s infrastructure, lowering the threshold to 10 percent for sensitive sectors (see the “Laws and Regulations on Foreign Investment” section below for further details). In April 2019, the EU Regulation on establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union entered into force. It creates a cooperation mechanism through which EU countries and the European Commission will exchange information and raise concerns related to specific investments which could potentially threaten the security of EU countries. The American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) commented on Austria’s strengthened investment screening law following implementation in 2020, that the two-month screening process takes too long and places an undue administrative burden on companies. The AmCham advocated for expedited screenings for proposed investments with no clear threat to national security. Business interest groups, such as the Austrian Economic Chamber and the Federation of Austrian Industries also commented during the legislation’s draft and review process that the strengthened screening measures would impose an undue administrative burden on businesses, the definition of sectors requiring screening was too wide, and the updated legislation would reduce the attractiveness of Austria as an investment location. Austria generally ranked in the top 30 countries in the world in the past World Bank “Ease of Doing Business” reports, but starting a business takes time. The average time to set up a company is 21 days, while the average time in OECD high income countries is 9.2 days. To register a new company or open a subsidiary in Austria, a company must first be listed on the Austrian Companies Register at a local court. The next step is to seek confirmation of registration from the Austrian Economic Chamber (WKO) establishing that the company is really a new business. The investor must then notarize the “declaration of establishment,” deposit a minimum capital requirement with an Austrian bank, register with the tax office, register with the district trade authority, register employees for social security, and register with the municipality where the business will be located. Finally, membership in the WKO is mandatory for all businesses in Austria. For sole proprietorships, it is possible under certain conditions to use an online registration process via government websites in German to either found or register a company: https://www.usp.gv.at/Portal.Node/usp/public/content/gruendung/egruendung/269403.html, or www.gisa.gv.at/online-gewerbeanmeldung. It is advisable to seek information from ABA or the WKO before applying to register a firm. The website of the ABA contains further details and contact information and is intended to serve as a first point of contact for foreign investors in Austria: https://investinaustria.at/en/starting-business/. The Austrian government encourages outward investment. Advantage Austria, the “Austrian Foreign Trade Service,” is a special section of the WKO that promotes Austrian exports and also supports Austrian companies establishing an overseas presence. Advantage Austria operates five offices in the United States (Washington D.C., New York, Atlanta, Los Angeles, and San Francisco). Overall, it has about 100 trade offices in 70 countries across the world, reflecting Austria’s strong export focus and the important role the WKO plays. (https://www.wko.at/service/aussenwirtschaft/aussenwirtschaftscenter.html#heading_aussenwirtschaftscenter) The Ministry for Digital and Economic Affairs and the WKO run a joint program called “Go International,” providing services to Austrian companies that are considering investing for the first time in foreign countries. The program provides grants for market access costs and provides “soft subsidies,” such as counseling, legal advice, and marketing support. 3. Legal Regime Austria’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. The government does not provide assistance in distinguishing between high- and low-quality investments, leaving this up to the market. Federal ministries generally publish draft laws and regulations, including investment laws, for public comment prior to their adoption by Austria’s cabinet and/or Parliament. Relevant stakeholders such as the “Social Partners” (Economic Chamber, Agricultural Chamber, Labor Chamber, and Trade Union Association), the Federation of Industries, and research institutions are invited to provide comments and suggestions on draft laws and regulations, directly online, which may be taken into account before adoption of laws. These comments are publicly available. Austria’s nine provinces can also adopt laws relevant to investments; their review processes are generally less extensive, but local laws are less important for investments than federal laws. The judicial system is independent from the executive branch, helping ensure the government follows administrative processes. The government is required to follow administrative processes and its compliance is monitored by the courts, primarily the Court of Auditors. Individuals can file proceedings against the government in Austria’s courts, if the government did not act in accordance with the law. Similarly, the public prosecution service can file cases against the government. Draft legislation by ministries (“Ministerialentwürfe”) and resulting government draft laws and parliamentary initiatives (“Regierungsvorlagen und Gesetzesinitiativen”) can be accessed through the website of the Austrian Parliament: https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/ (all in German). The parliament also publishes a history of all law-making processes. All final Austrian laws can be accessed through a government database, partly in English: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/defaultEn.aspx. The effectiveness of regulations is not reviewed as a regular process, only on an as-needed basis. Austrian regulations governing accounting provide U.S. investors with internationally standardized financial information. In line with EU regulations, listed companies must prepare their consolidated financial statements according to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IAS/IFRS) system. Public finances are transparent and easily accessible, through the Finance Ministry’s website, Austria’s Central Bank, and various economic research institutes. Overall, Austria has no legal restrictions, formally or informally, that discriminate against foreign investors. Austria is a member of the EU. As such, its laws must comply with EU legislation and the country is therefore subject to European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction. Austria is a member of the WTO and largely follows WTO requirements. Austria has ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) but has not taken specific actions to implement it. The Austrian legal system is based on Roman law. The constitution establishes a hierarchy, according to which each legislative act (law, regulation, decision, and fines) must have its legal basis in a higher legislative instrument. The full text of each legislative act is available online for reference. All final Austrian laws can be accessed through a government database, partly in English: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/defaultEn.aspx. Commercial matters fall within the competence of ordinary regional courts except in Vienna, which has a specialized Commercial Court. The Commercial Court also has nationwide competence for trademark, design, model, and patent matters. There is no special treatment of foreign investors, and the executive branch does not interfere in judicial matters. The legal system provides an effective means for protecting property and contractual rights of nationals and foreigners. Sensitive cases must be reported to the Ministry of Justice, which can issue instructions for addressing them. Austria’s civil courts enforce property and contractual rights and do not discriminate against foreign investors. Austria allows for court decisions to be appealed, first to a Regional Court and in the last instance, to the Supreme Court. Austria has restrictions on investments in industries designated as critical infrastructure, technology, resources, and industries with access to sensitive information and involved in freedom and plurality of the media. The government must approve any foreign acquisition of a 25 percent or higher stake in any companies that generally fall within these areas. The threshold is 10 percent for sensitive sectors, defined as military goods and technology, operators of critical energy or digital infrastructure and water, system operators charged with guarding Austria’s data sovereignty and R&D in medicine and pharmaceutical products. Additional screenings are required when an investor in the above categories plans to increase the stake above the thresholds of 25 percent or 50 percent. The investment screening review period generally takes 2 months. The number of filed applications has increased significantly since the law was implemented, from three per year to 50 completed screenings in the first 12 months after the updated investment screening law went into effect (from July 2020 to July 2021). None of the completed screenings were rejected, and two were approved with amendments to safeguard domestic supply of the product/service in question. There is no discrimination against foreign investors, but businesses are required to follow numerous local regulations. Although there is no requirement for participation by Austrian citizens in ownership or management of a foreign firm, at least one manager must meet Austrian residency and other legal requirements. Expatriates may deduct certain expenses (costs associated with moving, maintaining a double residence, education of children) from Austrian-earned income. The “Law to Support Investments in Municipalities” (published in the Federal Law Gazette, 74/2017, available online in German only on the federal legal information system www.ris.bka.gv.at), allows federal funding of up to 25 percent of the total investment amount of a project to “modernize” a municipality. The Austrian Business Agency serves as a central contact point for companies looking to invest in Austria. It does not serve as a one-stop-shop but can help answer any questions potential investors may have (https://investinaustria.at/en/). Austria’s Antitrust Act (ATA) is in line with European Union antitrust regulations, which take precedence over national regulations in cases concerning Austria and other EU member states. The Austrian Antitrust Act prohibits cartels, anticompetitive practices, and the abuse of a dominant market position. The independent Federal Competition Authority (FCA) and the Federal Antitrust Prosecutor (FAP) are responsible for administering antitrust laws. The FCA can conduct investigations and request information from firms. The FAP is subject to instructions issued by the Justice Ministry and can bring actions before Austria’s Cartel Court. Additionally, the Commission on Competition may issue expert opinions on competition policy and give recommendations on notified mergers. The most recent amendment to the ATA was in 2017. This amendment facilitated enforcing private damage claims, strengthened merger control, and enabled appeals against verdicts from the Cartel Court. Companies must inform the FCA of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Special M&A regulations apply to media enterprises, such as a lower threshold above which the ATA applies, and the requirement that media diversity must be maintained. A cartel court is competent to rule on referrals from the FCA or the FCP. For violations of antitrust regulations, the cartel court can impose fines of up to the equivalent of 10 percent of a company’s annual worldwide sales. The independent energy regulator E-Control separately examines antitrust concerns in the energy sector but must also submit cases to the cartel court. Austria’s Takeover Law applies to friendly and hostile takeovers of corporations headquartered in Austria and listed on the Vienna Stock Exchange. The law protects investors against unfair practices, since any shareholder obtaining a controlling stake in a corporation (30 percent or more in direct or indirect control of a company’s voting shares) must offer to buy out smaller shareholders at a defined fair market price. The law also includes provisions for shareholders who passively obtain a controlling stake in a company. The law prohibits defensive action to frustrate bids. The Shareholder Exclusion Act allows a primary shareholder with at least 90 percent of capital stock to force out minority shareholders. An independent takeover commission at the Vienna Stock Exchange oversees compliance with these laws. Austrian courts have also held that shareholders owe a duty of loyalty to each other and must consider the interests of fellow shareholders in good faith. According to the European Convention on Human Rights and the Austrian Civil Code, property ownership is guaranteed in Austria. Expropriation of private property in Austria is rare and may be undertaken by federal or provincial government authorities only based on special legal authorization “in the public interest” in such instances as land use planning, and infrastructure project preparations. The government can initiate such a procedure only in the absence of any other alternatives for satisfying the public interest; when the action is exclusively in the public interest; and when the owner receives just compensation. For example, in 2017-18, the government expropriated Hitler’s birth house in order to prevent it from becoming a place of pilgrimage for neo-Nazis, paying the former owner EUR 1.5 million (USD 1.8 million) in compensation. The expropriation process is non-discriminatory toward foreigners, including U.S. firms. There is no indication that further expropriations will take place in the foreseeable future. The Austrian Insolvency Act contains provisions for business reorganization and bankruptcy proceedings. Reorganization requires a restructuring plan and the debtor to be able to cover costs or advance some of the costs up to a maximum of EUR 4,000 (USD 4,720). The plan must offer creditors at least 20 percent of what is owed, payable within two years of the date the debtor’s obligation is determined. The plan must be approved by a majority of all creditors and a majority of creditors holding at least 50 percent of all claims. If the restructuring plan is not accepted, a bankruptcy proceeding is begun. Bankruptcy proceedings take place in court upon application of the debtor or a creditor; the court appoints a receiver for winding down the business and distributing proceeds to the creditors. Bankruptcy is not criminalized, provided the affected person performed all his documentation and reporting obligations on time and in accordance with the law. Austria’s major commercial association for the protection of creditors in cases of bankruptcy is the “KSV 1870 Group”, www.ksv.at, which also carries out credit assessments of all companies located in Austria. Other European-wide credit bureaus, particularly “CRIF” and “Bisnode”, also monitor the Austrian market. 6. Financial Sector Austria has sophisticated financial markets that allow foreign investors access without restrictions. The government welcomes foreign portfolio investment. The Austrian National Bank (OeNB) regulates portfolio investments effectively. Austria has a national stock exchange that currently includes 64 companies on its regulated market and several others on its multilateral trading facility (MTF). The Austrian Traded Index (ATX) is a price index consisting of the 20 largest stocks on the market and forms the most important index of Austria’s stock market. The size of the companies listed on the ATX is roughly equivalent to those listed on the MDAX in Germany. The market capitalization of Austrian listed companies is small compared to the country’s western European counterparts, accounting for 31 percent of Austria’s GDP, compared to 59 percent in Germany or 194 percent in the United States. Unlike the other market segments in the stock exchange, the Direct Market and Direct Market Plus segments, targeted at SMEs and young, developing companies, are subject only to the Vienna Stock Exchange’s general terms of business, not more stringent EU regulations. These segments have lower reporting requirements but also greater risk for investors, as prices are more likely to fluctuate, due to the respective companies’ low level of market capitalization and lower trading volumes. Austria has robust financing for product markets, but the free flow of resources into factor markets (capital, raw materials) could be improved. Overall, financing is primarily available through banks and government-sponsored funding organizations with very little private venture capital available. The Austrian government is aware of this issue but has taken few tangible steps to improve the availability of private venture capital. Austria is fully compliant with IMF Article VIII, all financial instruments are available, and there are no restrictions on payments. Credit is available to foreign investors at market-determined rates. Austria has one of the most fragmented banking networks in Europe with more than 3,800 branch offices registered in 2021. The banking system is highly developed, with worldwide correspondent banks and representative offices and branches in the United States and other major financial centers. Large Austrian banks also have extensive networks in Central and Southeast European (CESEE) countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union. Total assets of the banking sector amounted to EUR 1.0 trillion (USD 1.2 trillion) in 2020 (approximately 2.5 times the country’s GDP). Approximately EUR 460 billion (USD 543 billion) of banking sector assets are held by Austria’s two largest banks, Erste Group and Raiffeisen Bank International (RBI). The Austrian banking sector is considered one of the most stable in the world. Austria’s banking sector is managed and overseen by the Austrian National Bank (OeNB) and the Financial Market Authority (FMA). Four Austrian banks with assets in excess of EUR 30 billion (USD 34 billion) are subject to the Eurozone’s Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), as is Sberbank Europe AG, a Russian bank subsidiary headquartered in Austria (which was declared insolvent in March 2022, and its operations are now being wound down in a bankruptcy proceeding), and Addiko Bank AG due to their significant cross-border assets, as well as Volksbank Wien AG, due to its importance for the economy. All other Austrian banks continue to be subject to the country’s dual-oversight banking supervisory system with roles for the OeNB and the FMA, both of which are also responsible for policing irregularities on the stock exchange and for supervising insurance companies, securities markets, and pension funds. Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in the country with no legal restrictions that place them at a disadvantage compared to local banks. Due to U.S. government financial reporting requirements, Austrian banks are very cautious in committing the time and expense required to accept U.S. clients and U.S. investors without established U.S. corporate headquarters. Austria has no sovereign wealth funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Austria has two major wholly state-owned enterprises (SOEs): The OeBB (Austrian Federal Railways) and Asfinag (highway financing, building, maintenance, and administration). Other government industry holding companies are bundled in the government holding company OeBAG (http://www.oebag.gv.at) The government has direct representation in the supervisory boards of its companies (commensurate with its ownership stake), and OeBAG has the authority to buy and sell company shares, as well as purchase minority stakes in strategically relevant companies. Such purchases are subject to approval from an audit committee consisting of government-nominated independent economic experts. OeBAG holds a 53 percent stake in the Post Office, 51 percent in energy company Verbund, 33 percent in the gambling group Casinos Austria, 31.5 percent in the energy company OMV, 28 percent in the Telekom Austria Group, as well as a handful of smaller ventures. Local governments own most utilities, the Vienna International Airport, and more than half of Austria’s 270 hospitals and clinics. Private enterprises in Austria can generally compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to market access, credit, and other such business operations as licenses and supplies. While most SOEs must finance themselves under terms similar to private enterprises, some large SOEs (such as OeBB) benefit from state-subsidized pension systems. As a member of the EU, Austria is also a party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the WTO, which indirectly also covers the SOEs (since they are entities monitored by the Austrian Court of Auditors). The five major OeBAG-controlled companies (Postal Service, Verbund AG, Casinos Austria, OMV, Telekom Austria), are listed on the Vienna Stock Exchange. Senior managers in these companies do not directly report to a minister, but to an oversight board. However, the government often appoints management and board members, who usually have strong political affiliations. The government has not privatized any public enterprises since 2007. Austrian public opinion is skeptical regarding further privatization, and there are no indications of any government privatizations on the horizon. In prior privatizations, foreign and domestic investors received equal treatment. Despite a historical government preference for maintaining blocking minority rights for domestic shareholders, foreign investors have successfully gained full control of enterprises in several strategic sectors of the Austrian economy, including in telecommunications, banking, steel, and infrastructure. 10. Political and Security Environment Generally, civil disturbances are rare and the overall security environment in the country is considered to be safe. There have been no incidents of politically motivated damage to foreign businesses. Austria suffered a terrorist attack on November 2, 2020, when a gunman shot and killed four civilians and injured 23 in the center of Vienna. Azerbaijan Executive Summary The overall investment climate in Azerbaijan continues to improve, although significant challenges remain. Azerbaijan’s government has sought to attract foreign investment, undertake reforms to diversify its economy, and stimulate private sector-led growth. The Azerbaijani economy, however, remains heavily dependent on oil and gas output, which account for roughly 88 percent of export revenue and over half of the state budget. The economy of Azerbaijan grew 5.6% year-on-year in 2021, compared to a 4.3% contraction in the previous year. Both oil and gas (1.7%) and the non-oil and gas (7.2%) sectors of the economy expanded as the economy continued to recover from the pandemic. While the oil and gas sector has historically attracted the largest share of foreign investment, the Azerbaijani government has targeted four non-oil sectors to diversify the economy: agriculture, tourism, information and communications technology (ICT), and transportation/logistics. Measures taken in recent years to improve the business climate and reform the overall economy include eliminating redundant business license categories, empowering the popular “Azerbaijan Service and Assessment Network (ASAN)” government service centers with licensing authority, simplifying customs procedures, suspending certain business inspections, and reforming the tax regime. Community spread of COVID-19 is occurring in Azerbaijan, and COVID-19 infections are present in all regions the country. The special quarantine regime was extended until May 1, 2022, according to a February 2022 decision by Azerbaijan’s Cabinet of Ministers. Masks are no longer required in outdoor spaces but remain obligatory indoors. In 2021, Azerbaijan allocated AZN 800.8 million (USD 471 million) from the state budget to support COVID-19 mitigation measures, including vaccine purchases, bonus payments to healthcare workers, and the operation of modular hospitals. Despite substantial efforts to open the business environment, progress remains slow on structural reforms required to create a diversified and competitive private sector, and corruption remains a major challenge for firms operating in Azerbaijan. A small group of government-connected holding companies dominates the economy, intellectual property rights enforcement is improving but remains insufficient, and judicial transparency is lacking. Under Azerbaijani law, foreign investments enjoy complete and unreserved legal protection and may not be nationalized or appropriated, except under specific circumstances. Private entities may freely establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises. Foreign citizens, organizations, and enterprises may lease, but not own, land. Azerbaijan’s government has not shown any pattern of discriminating against U.S. persons or entities through illegal expropriation. The Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between the United States and Azerbaijan provides U.S. investors with recourse to settle investment disputes using the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The average time needed to resolve international business disputes through domestic courts or alternative dispute resolution varies widely. Following the release in November of a tripartite ceasefire declaration by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia, which brought an end to the fall 2020 intensive fighting in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Azerbaijani government is seeking new investments in the territories around Nagorno-Karabakh that were previously under the control of Armenian-backed separatists. Azerbaijan’s 2022 budget includes an allocation of AZN 2.2 billion (USD 1.3 billion) for the restoration and reconstruction of these territories. These funds will be reportedly used to restore road infrastructure, electricity, gas, water, communications infrastructure, and the education and healthcare sectors, along with the restoration of cultural and historical monuments. The government is also pursuing green energy projects in this region. Reconstruction is expected to continue over the coming years, along with continued special budget allocations provided for rebuilding and resettling these territories. Demining these territories as part of reconstruction efforts remains a priority of the Azerbaijani government. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 130 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 80 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 N/A http://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $4,480 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Azerbaijani government actively seeks foreign direct investment. Flows of foreign direct investment to Azerbaijan have risen steadily in recent years, primarily in the energy sector. Foreign investment in the government’s priority sectors for economic diversification (agriculture, transportation, tourism, and ICT) has thus far been limited. Foreign investments enjoy complete and unreserved legal protection under the Law on the Protection of Foreign Investment, the Law on Investment Activity, and guarantees contained within international agreements and treaties. In accordance with these laws, Azerbaijan will treat foreign investors, including foreign partners in joint ventures, in a manner no less favorable than the treatment accorded to national investors. Azerbaijan’s Law on the Protection of Foreign Investments protects foreign investors against nationalization and requisition, except under specific circumstances. The Azerbaijani government has not shown any pattern of discriminating against U.S. persons or entities through illegal expropriation. Azerbaijan’s primary body responsible for investment promotion is the Azerbaijan Export and Investment Promotion Agency (AzPromo). AzPromo is a joint public-private initiative, established by the Ministry of Economy and Industry in 2003 to foster the country’s economic development and diversification by attracting foreign investment into the non-oil sector and stimulating non-oil exports. A January 2018 decree called for new legislation, which has not yet been introduced, to ensure Azerbaijan conforms to international standards to protect foreign investor rights. The Azerbaijani government meets regularly with the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) to solicit the input from the business community, particularly as part of AmCham’s biennial white paper process. In June 2021, AmCham Azerbaijan organized a press conference for publicly presenting subsequent publication of its White Paper on observations and recommendations for improving Azerbaijan’s business climate. The 2021 White Paper covered issues in several fields, including taxation, customs procedures, finance, and information and communications technology. Foreigners are allowed to register business entities by opening a fully owned subsidiary, acquiring shares of an existing company, or by creating a joint venture with a local partner. Foreign companies are also permitted to operate in Azerbaijan without creating a local legal entity by registering a representative or branch office with the tax authorities. Foreigners are not permitted to own land in Azerbaijan but are permitted to lease land and own real estate. Under Azerbaijani laws, the state must retain a controlling stake in companies operating in the mining, oil and gas, satellite communication, and military arms sectors, limiting foreign or domestic private ownership to a 49 percent share of companies in these industries. Foreign ownership in the media sector is also strictly limited. Furthermore, a special license to conduct business is required for foreign or domestic companies operating in telecommunications, sea and air transportation, insurance, and other regulated industries. Azerbaijan does not screen inbound foreign investment, and U.S. investors are not specifically disadvantaged by any existing control mechanisms. Azerbaijan has not conducted an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) investment policy review, a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) investment policy review, or a WTO Trade Policy Review. Azerbaijani law requires all companies operating in the country to register with the tax authorities. Without formal registration, a company may not maintain a bank account or clear goods through customs. Registration takes approximately three days for commercial organizations. Companies may e-register at http://taxes.gov.az. Azerbaijan does not actively promote or incentivize outward investment, though Azerbaijani entities, particularly the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) and the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), have invested in various countries, including the United States. SOFAZ investment is typically limited to real estate, precious metals, and low-yield government securities. SOCAR has invested heavily in oil and gas infrastructure and petrochemicals processing in Turkey and Georgia, as well as gas pipeline networks in Greece, Albania, and Italy as part of the Southern Gas Corridor that transports Azerbaijani gas to European markets. The government does not restrict domestic investors from investing overseas. 3. Legal Regime Azerbaijan’s central government is the primary source of regulations relevant to foreign businesses. Azerbaijan’s regulatory system has improved in recent years, although enforcement is inconsistent, and decision-making remains opaque. Private sector associations do not play a significant role in regulatory processes. The draft legislation process typically does not include public consultations and draft legislation text is rarely made available for public comment. The government has in some cases engaged business organizations, such as AmCham, and consulting firms on various draft laws. The website of Azerbaijan’s National Parliament, http://meclis.gov.az/ lists all the country’s laws, but only in the Azerbaijani language. Legal entities in Azerbaijan must adhere to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). These are only obligatory for large companies. Medium-sized companies can choose between reporting based on IFRS or IFRS-SME standards, which are specially designed for large and medium enterprises. Small and micro enterprises can choose between reporting based on IFRS, IFRS-SME, or simplified accounting procedures established by the Finance Ministry. Several U.S. companies with operations and investments in Azerbaijan previously reported they had been subjected to repeated tax audits, requests for prepayment of taxes, and court-imposed fines for violations of the tax code. These allegations have markedly decreased since 2017. On October 19, 2015, Azerbaijan suspended inspections of entrepreneurs for two years, but inspections still may occur if a complaint is lodged. This suspension was subsequently extended through January 1, 2023. Medicine quality and safety, taxes, customs, financial markets, food safety, fire safety, construction and safe usage of hazardous facilities, radioactive substances, and mining fields are not subject to this suspension order and are inspected for quality and safety. The government has also simplified its licensing regime. All licenses are now issued with indefinite validity through ASAN service centers and must be issued within 10 days of application. The Economy Ministry also reduced the number of activities requiring a license from 60 to 32. Azerbaijan has held observer status at the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1997 but has not made significant progress toward joining the WTO for the past several years. A working party on Azerbaijan’s accession to the WTO was established on July 16, 1997 and Azerbaijan began negotiations with WTO members in 2004. The WTO Secretariat reports Azerbaijan is less than a quarter of the way to full membership. In 2016, Azerbaijan imposed higher tariffs on a number of imported goods, including agricultural products, to promote domestic production and reduce imports. In February 2020, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev made public remarks outlining Azerbaijan’s “cautious” approach to the WTO, saying that “the time [had] not come” for Azerbaijan’s membership. Currently, Azerbaijan is negotiating bilateral market access with 19 economies. Azerbaijan’s legal system is based on civil law. Disputes or disagreements arising between foreign investors and enterprises with foreign investment, Azerbaijani state bodies and/or enterprises, and other Azerbaijani legal entities, are to be settled in the Azerbaijani court system or, upon agreement between the parties, in a court of arbitration, including international arbitration bodies. The judiciary consists of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the appellate courts of the Republic of Azerbaijan, trial courts, and other specialized courts. Trial court judgments may be appealed in appellate courts and the judgments of appellate courts can be appealed in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is the highest court in the country. Under the Civil Procedure Code of Azerbaijan, appellate court judgments are published within three days of issuance or within ten days in exceptional circumstances. The Constitutional Court has the authority to review laws and court judgments for compliance with the constitution. Businesses report problems with the reliability and independence of judicial processes in Azerbaijan. While the government promotes foreign investment and the law guarantees national treatment, in practice investment disputes can arise when a foreign investor or trader’s success threatens well-connected or favored local interests. Foreign investment in Azerbaijan is regulated by a number of international treaties and agreements, as well as domestic legislation. These include the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between the United States and Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijan-European Commission Cooperation Agreement, the Law on Protection of Foreign Investment, the Law on Investment Activity, the Law on Investment Funds, the Law on Privatization of State Property, the Second Program for Privatization of State Property, and sector-specific legislation. Azerbaijani law permits foreign direct investment in any activity in which a national investor may also invest, unless otherwise prohibited (see “Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment” for further information). A January 2018 Presidential decree called for drafting a new law on investment activities to conform to international standards. The decree also established mechanisms to protect investor rights and regulate damages, including lost profit caused to investors. The details of the proposed new law have not been publicized as of April 2022. The State Service for Antimonopoly Policy and Consumer Protection under the Economy Ministry is responsible for implementing competition-related policy. The law on Antimonopoly Activity was amended in April 2016 to introduce regulations on price fixing and other anti-competitive behavior. Parliament began revising a new version of the Competition Code in late 2014, but it has not yet been adopted. Azerbaijan’s antimonopoly legislation does not constrain the size or scope of the handful of large holding companies that dominate the non-oil economy. The Law on the Protection of Foreign Investments forbids nationalization and requisition of foreign investment, except under certain circumstances. Nationalization of property can occur when authorized by parliamentary resolution, although there have been no known cases of official nationalization or requisition against foreign firms in Azerbaijan. By a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers, requisition is possible in the event of natural disaster, an epidemic, or other extraordinary situation. In the event of nationalization or requisition, foreign investors are legally entitled to prompt, effective, and adequate compensation. Amendments made to Azerbaijan’s Constitution in September 2016 enabled authorities to expropriate private property when necessary for social justice and effective use of land. In one recent case U.S. citizen property owners were pressured by local authorities to relinquish property rights at rates perceived to be well below fair market value. The case has not yet been tested in the courts and the owners maintained their property, resisting government communications regarding an imminent takeover and indicating that the attempted expropriation was not being lawfully carried out under the terms of the Bilateral Investment Treaty or Azerbaijani law. The Azerbaijani government has not shown any pattern of discriminating against U.S. persons by way of direct expropriations. Azerbaijan’s Bankruptcy Law applies only to legal entities and entrepreneurs, not to private individuals. Either a debtor facing insolvency or any creditor may initiate bankruptcy proceedings. In general, the legislation focuses on liquidation procedures. The bankruptcy law in Azerbaijan is underdeveloped, which restricts private sector economic development by deterring entrepreneurship. Amendments to Azerbaijan’s bankruptcy law adopted in 2017 extended the obligations of bankruptcy administrators and defined new rights for creditors. 6. Financial Sector Access to capital is a critical impediment to business development in Azerbaijan. An effective regulatory system that encourages and facilitates portfolio investment, foreign or domestic, is not fully in place. Though the Baku Stock Exchange opened in 2000, there is insufficient liquidity in the market to enter or exit sizeable positions. The Central Bank assumed control over all financial regulation in January 2020, following disbandment of a formerly independent regulator. Non-bank financial sector staples such as capital markets, insurance, and private equity are in the early stages of development. The Capital Market Modernization Project is an attempt by the government to build the foundation for a modern financial capital market, including developing market infrastructure and automation systems, and strengthening the legal and market frameworks for capital transactions. One major hindrance to the stock market’s growth is the difficulty in encouraging established Azerbaijani businesses to adapt to standard investor-friendly disclosure practices, which are generally required for publicly listed companies. Azerbaijan’s government and Central Bank do not restrict payments and transfers for international transactions. Foreign investors are permitted to obtain credit on the local market, but smaller companies and firms without an established credit history often struggle to obtain loans on reasonable commercial terms. Limited access to capital remains a barrier to development, particularly for small and medium enterprises. The country’s financial services sector – of which banking comprises more than 90 percent – is underdeveloped, which constrains economic growth and diversification. The drop in world oil prices in 2014-2015 and the resulting strain on Azerbaijan’s foreign currency earnings and the state budget exacerbated existing problems in the country’s banking sector and led to rising non-performing loans (NPLs) and high dollarization. Subsequent reforms have improved overall sector stability. President Aliyev signed a decree in February 2019 to provide partial relief to retail borrowers on foreign-currency denominated loans that meet certain criteria. As of January 1, 2022, 26 banks were registered in Azerbaijan, including 12 banks with foreign capital and two state-owned banks. These banks employ 20,601 people and have a combined 480 branches and 2,920 ATMs nationwide. Total banking sector assets stood at approximately USD 22.3 billion as of January 2022, with the top five banks holding almost 60 percent of this amount. In December 2019, Azerbaijan carried out a banking management reform that gave the Central Bank of Azerbaijan control over banks and credit institutions, closing the Chamber for Control over Financial Markets, which had held regulatory powers following Azerbaijan’s 2014/2015 economic crisis and resulting currency devaluations. Concurrently, the Central Bank announced “recovery of the banking sector” would be one of the main challenges it would tackle in 2020. The Central Bank closed four insolvent banks (Atabank, AGBank, NBCBank, and Amrah Bank) in April/May 2020, bringing the number of banks in the country down from 30 to 26. Only six banks are able to conduct correspondent banking transactions with the United States. Foreign banks are permitted in Azerbaijan and may take the form of representative offices, branches, joint ventures, and wholly owned subsidiaries. These banks are subject to the same regulations as domestic banks, with certain additional restrictions. Foreign individuals and entities are also permitted to open accounts with domestic or foreign banks in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s sovereign wealth fund is the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ). Its mission is to transform hydrocarbon reserves into financial assets generating perpetual income for current and future generations and to finance strategically important infrastructure and social projects of national scale. While its main statutory focus is investing in assets outside of the country, since it was established in 1999 SOFAZ has financed several socially beneficial projects in Azerbaijan related to infrastructure, housing, energy, and education. The government’s newly adopted fiscal rule places limits on pro-cyclical spending, with the aim of increasing hydrocarbon revenue savings. SOFAZ publishes an annual report which it submits for independent audit. The fund’s assets totaled USD 45 billion as of January 1, 2022. 7. State-Owned Enterprises In Azerbaijan, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are active in the oil and gas, power generation, communications, water supply, railway, and air passenger and cargo sectors, among others. There is no published list of SOEs. While there are no SOEs that officially have been delegated governmental powers, companies such as the SOCAR, Azerenerji (the national electricity utility), and Azersu (the national water utility) – all of which are closed joint-stock companies with majority state ownership and limited private investment – enjoy quasi-governmental or near-monopoly status in their respective sectors. SOCAR is wholly owned by the government of Azerbaijan and takes part in all oil and gas activities in the country. It publishes regular reports on production volumes, the value of its exports, estimates of investments in exploration and development, production costs, the names of foreign companies operating in the country, production data by company, quasi-fiscal activities, and the government’s portion of production-sharing contracts. SOCAR is also responsible for negotiating PSAs with all foreign partners for hydrocarbon development. SOCAR’s annual financial reports are audited by an independent external auditor and include the consolidated accounts of all SOCAR’s subsidiaries, although revenue data is incomplete. There have been instances where state-owned enterprises have used their regulatory authority to block new entrants into the market. SOEs are, in principle, subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors. However, in sectors that are open to both private and foreign competition, SOEs generally receive a larger percentage of government contracts or business than their private sector competitors. While SOEs regularly purchase or supply goods or services from private sector firms, domestic and foreign private enterprises have reported problems competing with SOEs under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, information, products and services, and incentives. Private enterprises do not have the same access (including terms) to financing as SOEs. SOEs are also afforded material advantages such as preferential access to land and raw materials – advantages that are not available to private enterprises. There is little information available on Azerbaijani SOEs’ budget constraints, due to the limited transparency in their financial accounts. A renewed privatization process started with the May 2016 presidential decree implementing additional measures to improve the process of state property privatization and the July 2016 decree on measures to accelerate privatization and improve the management efficiency of state property. The State Committee on Property Issues launched a portal to provide privatization information in July 2016. The portal contains information about the properties, their addresses, location, and initial costs with the aim of facilitating privatization. Azerbaijan’s current privatization efforts focus on smaller state-owned properties. While there are no immediate plans to privatize large SOEs, Azerbaijan is moving 21 major government-owned companies to a new state holding company tasked to improve efficiency and corporate governance as well as prepare them for possible privatization. However, the government has no plans to sell stakes in state companies in 2022, including in state oil company SOCAR. 10. Political and Security Environment On multiple occasions in 2019 and 2020, authorities selectively blocked mobile and fixed-line internet access, temporarily restricted access to foreign media and social networking sites and imposed blocks on virtual private network (VPN) services, apparently in response to political protests and as part of national restrictions during and after Azerbaijan’s armed conflict with Armenian forces in September-November 2020. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty are among the sites permanently blocked in Azerbaijan. The increase in frequency and lack of transparency regarding internet disruptions raise serious concerns about future Azerbaijani government efforts to control access to information in ways that impede foreign business interests. There have been no known acts of political violence against U.S. businesses or assets, nor against any foreign owned entity. It is unlikely that civil disturbances, should they occur, would be directed against U.S. businesses or the U.S. community. During 44 days of intensive fighting from September 27 to November 10, 2020, involving Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Armenia-supported separatists, significant casualties and atrocities were reported by all sides. After Azerbaijan, with Turkish support, reestablished control over four surrounding territories controlled by separatists since 1994, a Russian-brokered ceasefire arrangement announced by Azerbaijan and Armenia on November 9 resulted in the peaceful transfer of control over three additional territories to Azerbaijan, as well as the introduction of Russian peacekeepers to the region. The ceasefire has largely held, but tensions remain high, particularly along the international border, which has not been fully demarcated. Russian forces have played a role in controlling access along highways near the border and into the Nagorno-Karabakh region from Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani government has suspended or threatened to suspend the operations of U.S. companies in Azerbaijan whose products or services are provided in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh in which Russian peacekeepers are currently deployed and has banned the entry into Azerbaijan of some persons who have visited Nagorno-Karabakh. The U.S. government is unable to provide emergency services to U.S. citizens in and around Nagorno-Karabakh as access is restricted. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $42,607 2019 $48,048 . Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP No reliable data 2020 77% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx * Source for Host Country Data: Azerbaijan State Statistical Committee Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Thousands) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $4,795,271 100% Total Outward $825,793 100% United Kingdom $1,586,614 33% Turkey $280,542 34% Turkey $700,186 14.6% United Kingdom $122,306 15% United States $507,391 5 10.6% United States $65,967 8% Malaysia $416,620 9% Georgia $64,111 8% Cyprus $317,602 6.6% Malta $48,503 6% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. *Source: Central Bank of Azerbaijan Bahrain Executive Summary The investment climate in the Kingdom of Bahrain is positive and relatively stable. Bahrain maintains a business-friendly attitude and liberal approach to attracting foreign investment and business. In an economy dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOE), Bahrain aims to foster a greater role for the private sector to promote economic growth. Government of Bahrain (GOB) efforts focus on encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI) in the manufacturing, logistics, information and communications technology (ICT), financial services, tourism, health, and education sectors. Bahrain’s total FDI stock reached BD 11.537 billion ($30.683 billion) in 2020. Annual FDI inflows dropped from BD 603 million ($1.6 billion) in 2018 to BD 355 million ($942 million) in 2019 and BD 333 million ($885 million) in 2020. The financial services, manufacturing, logistics, education, healthcare, real estate, tourism, and ICT sectors have attracted the majority of Bahrain’s FDI. Bahrain’s economy saw a major recovery in 2021, following the slowdown of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the rise in global oil prices. In addition, the continuity of some key provisions from the BD 4.3 billion ($11.4 billion) financial relief package, that was launched in 2020 to help support businesses and individuals, helped boost Bahrain’s revenues and economic growth. In November 2021, the government announced a new economic recovery plan focused on five pillars: (1) creating quality jobs for citizens; (2) streamlining commercial procedures to attract $2.5 billion in yearly FDI by 2025; (3) launching $30 billion in major strategic projects; (4) developing strategic priority sectors; and (5) achieving fiscal sustainability and economic stability, including by extending Bahrain’s Fiscal Balance Program to 2024. Since then, the government has released detailed development strategies for the industrial, tourism, financial services, oil and gas, telecommunications and logistics sectors and identified 22 signature infrastructure projects, including the creation of five new island cities, that will stimulate post-pandemic growth and drive the economic recovery plan. The government has not identified funding sources to finance these projects or its sector modernization strategies. Bahrain’s Vision 2030 outlines measures to protect the natural environment, reduce carbon emissions, minimize pollution, and promote sustainable energy. Bahrain’s Sustainable Energy Authority (SEA), within the Ministry of Electricity and Water Affairs, designs energy efficiency policies and promotes renewable energy technologies that support Bahrain’s long-term climate action and environmental protection ambitions. Endorsed by Bahrain’s Cabinet and monitored by SEA, the National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP) and the National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP) set national energy efficiency and national renewable energy 2025 targets of 6 and 5 percent, respectively, with the NREAP target increasing to 10 percent by 2035. To strengthen Bahrain’s position as a regional startup hub and to enhance its investment ecosystem, the GOB launched Bahrain FinTech Bay in 2018; issued new pro-business laws; and established several funds to encourage start-up investments including the $100 million Al Waha Fund of Funds and the Hope Fund to support startup growth. Since 2017, the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) has operated a financial technology regulatory sandbox to enable startups in Bahrain, including cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies, and regulate conventional and Sharia-compliant businesses. The U.S.-Bahrain Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) entered into force in 2001 and protects U.S. investors in Bahrain by providing most-favored nation treatment and national treatment, the right to make financial transfers freely and without delay, international law standards for expropriation and compensation cases, and access to international arbitration. Bahrain permits 100 percent foreign ownership of new industrial entities and the establishment of representative offices or branches of foreign companies without Bahraini sponsors or local partners. In 2017, the GOB expanded the number of sectors in which foreigners are permitted to maintain 100 percent ownership in companies to include tourism services, sporting events production, mining and quarrying, real estate, water distribution, water transport operations, and crop cultivation and propagation. In May 2019, the GOB loosened foreign ownership restrictions in the oil and gas sector, allowing 100 percent foreign ownership in oil and gas extraction projects under certain conditions. The U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force in 2006. Under the FTA, Bahrain committed to world-class Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection. Despite the GOB’s transparent, rules-based government procurement system, U.S. companies sometimes report operating at a disadvantage compared with other firms. Many ministries require firms to maintain a local commercial registration or pre-qualify prior to bidding on a local tender, often rendering firms with little or no prior experience in Bahrain ineligible to bid on major tenders. In February 2022, Bahrain’s Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and Tourism broke ground on the United States Trade Zone (USTZ) to incentivize U.S. companies to build out full turnkey industrial manufacturing, logistics, and distribution facilities in Bahrain to access the wider GCC market. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 78 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 78 of 129 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $571 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $19,900 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GOB has a liberal approach to foreign investment and actively seeks to attract foreign investors and businesses. Increasing FDI is a top GOB priority. The GOB permits 100 percent foreign ownership of a business or branch office, without the need for a sponsor or local business partner. The GOB does not tax corporate income, personal income, wealth, capital gains, withholding or death/inheritance. There are no restrictions on repatriation of capital, profits or dividends, aside from income generated by companies in the oil and gas sector, where profits are taxable at the rate of 46 percent. Bahrain Economic Development Board (EDB), charged with promoting FDI in Bahrain, places particular emphasis on attracting FDI to the manufacturing, logistics, ICT, financial services, tourism, health, and education sectors. As a reflection of Bahrain’s openness to FDI, the EDB won the 2019 United Nations Top Investment Promotion Agency in the Middle East award for its role in attracting large-scale investments. U.S. investors have never alleged any legal or practical discrimination against them based on nationality. In January 2021, the U.S. Commerce Secretary and the Bahraini Commerce Minister signed an MOU to establish the United States Trade Zone (USTZ) in Bahrain. Located near Bahrain’s critical port, aviation, and logistics facilities, the USTZ will enable U.S. companies to own and operate full turnkey industrial manufacturing, logistics, and distribution facilities in a unified commercial zone in order to access the wider GCC market. In February 2022, the Bahraini government allocated a small land plot and organized an expedited groundbreaking ceremony to formally open the USTZ to accommodate initial U.S. company interest. The Bahraini government must now tender out dredging and other construction services to reclaim land from the sea before building out the bulk of the USTZ’s infrastructure, which could take up to three years. The GOB permits foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. The GOB imposes only minimal limits on foreign control, and the right of ownership and establishment of a business. The Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and Tourism (MoICT) maintains a small list of business activities that are restricted to Bahraini ownership, including press and publications, Islamic pilgrimage, clearance offices – such as expeditors and document clearance companies — and workforce agencies. The U.S.-Bahrain FTA outlines all activities in which the two countries restrict foreign ownership. U.S citizens may own and operate companies in Bahrain, though many such individuals choose to integrate influential local partners into the ownership structure to facilitate quicker resolution of bureaucratic issues such as labor permits, issuance of foreign visas, and access to industrial zones. The most common challenges faced by U.S firms are those related to bureaucratic government processes, lack of market information, customs clearance, and preregistration requirements to bid on local tenders. The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted a Trade Policy Review of Bahrain in November 2021. Bahrain ranked 43 out of 190 countries on the World Bank’s overall Ease of Doing Business Indicator in 2020. The CBB’s regulatory sandbox allows local and international FinTech firms and digitally focused financial institutions to test innovative solutions in a regulated environment, allowing successful firms to obtain licensing upon successful product application. The MoICT operates the online commercial registration portal “Sijilat” ( www.sijilat.bh ) to facilitate the commercial registration process. Through Sijilat, local and foreign business owners can obtain a business license and requisite approvals from relevant ministries. The business registration process normally takes two to three weeks, from start to finish, but can take longer if a business requires specialized approvals. In practice, some business owners retain an attorney or clearing agent to assist them through the commercial registration process. In addition to obtaining primary approval to register a company, most business owners must also obtain licenses from the following entities to operate their businesses: MoICT Electricity and Water Authority The Municipality in which their business will be located Labour Market Regulatory Authority General Organization for Social Insurance National Bureau for Revenue (Mandatory if the business revenue exceeds BD 37,500) To incentivize foreign investment in Bahrain’s targeted sectors and investment zones, the GOB provides industrial lands at reduced rental rates; customs duty exemptions for industrial and manufacturing projects, including imports of raw material, plant machinery equipment, and spare parts; and a five-year exemption of the “Bahrainization” recruitment restriction. The GOB neither promotes nor incentivizes outward investment. The GOB does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime In 2018, the GOB issued a competition law, a personal data protection law, a bankruptcy law, and a health insurance law to enhance the country’s investment eco-system. The Law of Commerce (Legislative Decree No. 7, passed in 1987) addresses the concept of unfair competition and prohibits acts that would have a damaging effect on competition. Companies also are forbidden from undertaking practices detrimental to their competitors or from attracting the customers of their competitors through anti-competitive means. There is no official competition authority in Bahrain and the country has yet to institute comprehensive anti-monopoly laws or an independent anti-corruption agency. Bahrain’s industrial sector is dominated by state-controlled companies such as Aluminum Bahrain (ALBA), Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), and Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (GPIC). De facto monopolies also exist in some industries led by individuals or family-run businesses. The GOB uses International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as part of its implementation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). IFRS are used by domestic listed and unlisted companies in their consolidated financial statements for external financial reporting. Bahrain adopted International Accounting Standard 1 (IAS 1) in 1994 in the absence of other local standards. Non-listed banks and other business enterprises use IASs in the preparation of financial statements. The 2001 Bahrain Commercial Companies Law requires each registered entity to produce a balance sheet, a profit-and-loss account and the director’s report for each financial year. All branches of foreign companies, limited liability companies and corporations, must submit annual audited financial statements to the Directorate of Commerce and Company Affairs at the MoICT, along with the company’s articles and /or articles of association. Depending on the company’s business, financial statements may be subject to other regulatory agencies such as the Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA) and the Bahrain Stock Exchange (banks and listed companies). Bahrain encourages firms to adhere to both the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and Bahrain’s Code of Corporate Governance. Bahrain-based companies by and large remain in compliance with IAS-1 disclosure requirements. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. According to the World Bank, the GOB does not have the legal obligation to publish the text of proposed regulations before their enactment but bills that are discussed by Parliament may be reported in the local news. The text of the proposed regulations is publicly available one day, two weeks or thirty days after it is published in the Official Gazette. Bahrain, therefore, ranks among the countries with low rule-making transparency. Bahrain’s laws can be drafted or proposed by the Cabinet or originate in the bicameral National Assembly, comprised of an elected, lower house Council of Representatives (COR) and an appointed, upper house Consultative Council (“Shura”). The independent Legislation and Legal Opinion Commission drafts legislation based on the proposals. The King’s signature is required to ratify any laws following parliamentary approval; laws are in force once published in the Official Gazette. The King may issue royal orders and royal decrees that are immediately effective once issued. For matters deemed urgent, the King can also decree-laws when COR is in recess. These decree-laws must be approved by both chambers with no changes within a month of the COR resuming session, or they are considered null. GOB ministers and heads of agencies are authorized to issue regulations that pertain to the administration of their respective bodies. Bahrain is a member of the GCC, which created a Unified Economic Agreement to expedite trade and the movement of people and goods within GCC borders. The GCC has also adopted several unified model laws, such as the GCC Trademark Law. Bahrain is a signatory to the Apostille Convention and is a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. It is a dualist state, therefore, international treaties are not directly incorporated into its law and must be approved by the National Assembly and ratified by the King. Commercial regulations can be proposed by the EDB, MoICT, Cabinet, or COR. Draft regulations are debated within the COR and Shura Council. The Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry board of directors may raise concerns over draft legislation at committee meetings or send written comments for review by Members of Parliament; bills are otherwise not available for public comment. The Cabinet issues final approval of regulations. The e-Government portal and the Legislation and Legal Opinion Commission website list laws by category and date of issuance. Some laws are translated into English. The National Audit Office publishes results of its annual audits of government ministries and parastatals. As a GCC member, Bahrain has agreed to enforce GCC standards and regulations where they exist, and not to create any domestic rules that contradict established GCC-wide standards and regulations. In certain cases, the GOB applies international standards where domestic or GCC standards have not been developed. Bahrain is a member of the WTO and notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Bahrain ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in September 2016 through Law No. 17 of 2016. Bahrain’s Constitution defines the Kingdom as a sovereign, independent, Arab Muslim State. Article 2 of the Constitution states that Islamic Sharia (Islamic law) is the main source of legislation; however, general matters and private transactions are governed mainly by laws derived from international law. Three types of courts are present in Bahrain: civil, criminal, and family (Sharia) courts. The civil court system consists of lower courts, courts of appeal, and the Court of Cassation – the highest appellate court in the Kingdom, hearing a variety of civil, criminal, and family cases. Civil courts deal with all administrative, commercial, and civil cases, as well as disputes related to the personal status of non-Muslims. Family courts deal primarily with personal status matters, such as marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance. High-ranking judges in Bahrain are often from prominent families but may be non-Bahraini citizens. On January 19, 2022, the king appointed nine English-speaking foreign judges and legal experts to the Court of Cassation, all of whom are commercial arbitration specialists. Bahraini law borrows elements from European or other Arab states’ legal codes. Bahrain has a long-established framework of commercial law. English is widely used, and several well-known international (including U.S.) law firms, working in association with local partners, are authorized to practice law in Bahrain and provide expert legal services nationally and regionally. Fees are charged according to internationally accepted practices. Non-Bahraini lawyers can represent clients in Bahraini courts. In April 2007, the government permitted international law firms to be established in Bahrain. These firms provide services such as commercial and financial consultancy in legal matters. Investors report general satisfaction with government cooperation and support. Foreign competitors have occasionally perceived that legal interpretation and application varied between Ministries and was influenced by prominent local business interests or the stature and connections of an investor’s local partner. Such departures from the consistent, transparent application of regulations and the law are uncommon. The GOB is eager to develop its legal framework. The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP) has conducted training and capacity-building programs in Bahrain for years, in cooperation with the National Assembly; Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs, and Endowments; Supreme Judicial Council; Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution; Judicial and Legal Studies Institute; and MoICT. Judgments of foreign courts are recognized and enforceable under local courts. Article nine of the U.S.-Bahrain BIT outlines the disposition of U.S. investment cases within the Bahraini legal system. The most common investment-related concern in Bahrain has been the slow or incomplete application of the law. Although some international law and human rights monitoring organizations have collected anecdotal evidence pointing to a lack of transparency, the judicial process in civil courts is generally considered fair, and cases can be appealed. The U.S.-Bahrain BIT provides benefits and protection to U.S. investors in Bahrain, such as most-favored nation and national treatment, the right to make financial transfers freely and immediately, the application of international legal standards for expropriation and compensation cases, and access to international arbitration. The BIT guarantees national treatment for U.S. investments across most sectors, with exceptions of a limited list of activities, including ownership of television, radio or other media, fisheries, real estate brokerages, and land transportation. Bahrain provides most-favored nation or national treatment status to U.S. investments in air transportation, the purchase or ownership of land, and the purchase or ownership of shares traded on the Bahrain Bourse. The national treatment clause in the BIT ensures American firms interested in selling products exclusively in Bahrain are no longer required to appoint a commercial agent, though they may opt to do so. A commercial agent is any Bahraini party appointed by a foreign party to represent the foreign party’s product or service in Bahrain. Bahrain generally permits 100 percent foreign ownership of new industrial entities and the establishment of representative offices or branches of foreign companies without local sponsors or business partners. Wholly foreign-owned companies may be set up for regional distribution services and may operate within the domestic market provided they do not exclusively pursue domestic commercial sales. Private investment (foreign or Bahraini) in petroleum extraction is permitted. Expatriates may own land in designated areas in Bahrain. Non-GCC nationals, including Americans, may own high-rise commercial and residential properties, as well as properties used for tourism, banking, financial and health projects, and training centers. Bahrain issued Bankruptcy Law No. 22 in May 2018 governing corporate reorganization and insolvency. The law is based on U.S. Chapter 11 insolvency legislation and provides companies in financial difficulty with an opportunity to restructure under court supervision. Below is a link to a site designed to assist foreign investors to navigate the laws, rules, and procedures related to investing in Bahrain: http://cbb.complinet.com/cbb/microsite/laws.html The GOB issued Competition Law No. 31 in July 2018 to prevent the formation of monopolies or the practice of anti-competitive behavior. This law makes it easier for new businesses to enter existing markets and compete with significant players. MoICT’s Consumer Protection Directorate is responsible for ensuring that the law determining price controls is implemented and that violators are punished. There have been no expropriations in recent years, and there are no cases in contention. The U.S.-Bahrain BIT protects U.S. investments by banning all expropriations (including “creeping” and “measures tantamount to”) except those for a public purpose. Such transactions must be carried out in a non-discriminatory manner, with due process, and prompt, adequate, effective compensation. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Bahrain uses multiple international and regional conventions to enhance its commercial arbitration legal framework. Bahrain is a party to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, the New York Convention, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and the GCC Convention for Execution of Judgments, among others. These conventions and international agreements established the foundation for the GCC Arbitration Centre, and the Bahrain Chamber for Disputes & Resolution (BCDR). Bahrain’s Constitution stipulates international conventions and treaties have the power of law. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Article 9 of The U.S.-Bahrain BIT provides for three dispute settlement options: Submitting the dispute to a local court or administrative tribunals of the host country. Invoking dispute-resolution procedures previously agreed upon by the foreign investor or company and the host country government; or, Submitting the dispute for binding arbitration to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or, the Additional Facility of ICSID, or ad hoc arbitration using the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), or any other arbitral institution or rules agreed upon by both parties. Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution Court The Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution (BCDR) Court was established by Legislative Decree No. 30 of 2009. It operates in partnership with the American Arbitration Association (AAA). BCDR’s casework emanates from disputes brought before the BCDR Court and BCDR’s international arbitration wing, BCDR-AAA. The BCDR Court administers disputes in excess of 500,000 Bahraini Dinars (approximately $1.3 million) in which at least one party is a financial institution licensed by the Central Bank of Bahrain, or the dispute is of an international commercial nature. Since its establishment in 2010, BCDR has administered more than 350 cases under its jurisdiction as a court with monetary claims totaling over $6.2 billion. In February 2022, the Minister of Justice clarified the use of travel bans against insolvent debtors (individuals and companies). The new Enforcement Law in Civil and Commercial Matters 22/2021 stated that the insolvent debtor must disclose any owned assets, within seven days from the beginning of the judicial proceedings. Companies can settle their debts within 21 days. The justice ministry said it would coordinate with debt collectors from the private sector to expedite the enforcement process. BCDR-AAA International Arbitration Center BCDR-AAA is an international arbitration center with jurisdiction over disputes with respect to which the parties have agreed in writing that the BCDR-AAA Arbitration Rules shall apply. As of December 2020, BCDR-AAA registered 17 cases under its jurisdiction as an international arbitration center, one in 2013, one in 2015, three in 2016, five in 2017, two in 2019, and five in 2020. Of these cases, only seven are ongoing: one that was filed in 2017 and one filed in 2019, five that were filed in 2020. The remainder were awarded or settled. Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution Suite 301, Park Plaza Bldg. 247, Road 1704 P.O. Box 20006 Manama, Kingdom of Bahrain Tel: + (973) 17-511-311 Website: www.bcdr-aaa.org The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported that Bahrain faced its first known Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) claim in 2017. The case involved investor claims over the CBB’s 2016 move to close the Manama branch of Future Bank, a commercial bank whose shareholders included Iranian banks. Bahrain and Iran are party to a BIT. UNCTAD reported another investor-state dispute case involving Qatar Airways in 2020. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Arbitration procedures are largely a contractual matter in Bahrain. Disputes historically have been referred to an arbitration body as specified in the contract, or to the local courts. In dealings with both local and foreign firms, Bahraini companies have increasingly included arbitration procedures in their contracts. Most commercial disputes are resolved privately without recourse to the courts or formal arbitration. Resolution under Bahraini law is generally specified in all contracts for the settlement of disputes that reach the stage of formal resolution but is optional in those designating the BCDR. Bahrain’s court system has adequately handled occasional lawsuits against individuals or companies for nonpayment of debts. Bahrain Law No. 9 of 2015 promulgating the Arbitration Law (the “New Arbitration Law”) came into effect on August 9, 2015. The law provides that the UNCITRAL 1985 Model Law with its 2006 amendments on international commercial arbitration (the “UNCITRAL Law”) will apply to any arbitration, taking place in Bahrain or abroad, if the parties to the dispute agreed to be subject to the UNCITRAL Law. The GCC Commercial Arbitration Center, established in 1995, serves as a regional specialized body providing arbitration services. It assists in resolving disputes among GCC countries or between other parties and GCC countries. The Center implements rules and regulations in line with accepted international practice. Thus far, few cases have been brought to arbitration. The Center conducts seminars, symposia, and workshops to help educate and update its members on any new arbitration-related matters. GCC Commercial Arbitration Center P.O. Box 2338 Manama, Kingdom of Bahrain Arbitration Boards’ Secretariat Tel: + (973) 17278000 Email: case@gcccac.org Website: http://www.gcccac.org/en/ The GOB enacted its original bankruptcy and insolvency law through Decree by Law No. 11 in 1987. In May 2018, the GOB issued and ratified Law No. 22, updating the original legislation. Modeled on U.S. Chapter 11 legislation, the law introduces reorganization whereby a company’s management may continue business operations during the administration of a case. The Bankruptcy Law also includes provisions for cross-border insolvency, and special insolvency provisions for small and medium-sized enterprises that were further amended in July 2020 and enhanced creditors rights and expediting liquidation proceedings. The Bahrain credit reference bureau, known as “BENEFIT,” is licensed by the CBB and operates as the credit monitoring authority in Bahrain. As part of a wider effort to promote sustainability and transparency in Bahrain’s capital market, Bahrain’s national stock market, the Bahrain Bourse (BHB), announced in 2020 new Environmental Social & Governance (ESG) reporting guidelines for listed companies . The voluntary reporting guidance aims to assist listed companies to integrate ESG issues in their reporting cycle and better meet the demands of institutional investors for material ESG information. The ESG reporting guidance encourages listed companies to disclose a set of 32 ESG metrics and indicators in alignment with the recommendations of the Sustainable Stock Exchanges (SSE) initiative and the World Federation of Exchanges, Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) standards, and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The guidance explains the key regional and international drivers for adoption of ESG reporting, the importance of ESG reporting, the ways to report on ESG, and emphasizes Bahrain Bourse’s efforts in promoting sustainability. 6. Financial Sector Consistent with the GOB’s liberal approach to foreign investment, government policies facilitate the free flow of financial transactions and portfolio investments. Expatriates and Bahraini nationals have ready access to credit on market terms. Generally, credit terms are variable, but often are limited to 10 years for loans under $50 million. For major infrastructure investments, banks often offer to assume a part of the risk, and Bahrain’s wholesale and retail banks have shown extensive cooperation in syndicating loans for larger risks. Commercial credit is available to private organizations in Bahrain but has been increasingly crowded out by the government’s local bond issuances. In 2016, the GOB launched a new fund designed to inject greater liquidity in the Bahrain Bourse, worth $100 million. The Bahrain Liquidity Fund is supported by several market participants and acts as a market maker, providing two-way quotes on most of the listed stocks with a reasonable spread to allow investors to actively trade their stocks. Despite these efforts, the market remains small in comparison to others in the region. In October 2019, the GOB established a BD 130 million ($344 million) Liquidity Fund to assist distressed companies in restructuring financial obligations, which was expanded in March 2020 to BD 200 million ($530 million) in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The GOB and the CBB are members of the IMF and fully compliant with Article VIII. The CBB is the single regulator of the entire financial sector, with an integrated regulatory framework covering all financial services provided by conventional and Islamic financial institutions. Bahrain’s banking sector remained healthy despite sustained lower global oil prices. Bahrain’s banks are well capitalized, and there is sufficient liquidity to ensure a healthy rate of investment. Bahrain remains a financial center for the GCC region, though many financial firms moved their regional headquarters to Dubai over the last decade. The GOB continues to drive innovation and expansion in the Islamic finance sector. In 2021, Bahrain ranked as the second in the MENA Islamic finance market and placed fourth globally, according to the ICD-Thomson Reuters Islamic Finance Development Indicator (IFDI). Bahrain has an effective regulatory system that encourages portfolio investment. The CBB has fully implemented Basel II standards and is attempting to bring Bahraini banks into compliance with Basel III standards. Bahrain’s banking sector includes 89 banks, of which 30 are retail banks, 59 are wholesale banks, 17 are branches of foreign banks, and 13 are locally incorporated. Of these, nine are representative offices, and 16 are Islamic banks. There are no restrictions on foreigners opening bank accounts or corporate accounts. Bahrain is home to many prominent financial institutions, among them Citibank, American Express, and JP Morgan Chase. Ahli United Bank is Bahrain’s largest bank with total assets estimated at $41.9 billion as of December 2021. Bahrain implemented the Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System and the Scripless Securities Settlement (SSS) System in 2007 to enable banks to carry out their payment and securities-related transactions securely on a real time basis. In 2017, Bahrain became the first in the GCC to introduce fintech “sandbox” regulations that enabled the launch of cryptocurrency and blockchain startups. The same year, the CBB released additional regulations for conventional and Sharia-compliant financing-based crowdfunding businesses. Any firm operating electronic financing/lending platforms must be licensed in Bahrain under the CBB Rulebook Volume 5 – Financing Based Crowdfunding Platform Operator. In February 2019, the CBB issued cryptocurrency regulations. Foreign Exchange Bahrain has no restrictions on the repatriation of profits or capital and no exchange controls. Bahrain’s currency, the Bahraini Dinar (BD), is fully and freely convertible at the fixed rate of USD 1.00 = BD 0.377 (1 BD = USD 2.659). There is no black market or parallel exchange rate. There are no restrictions on converting or transferring funds, regardless of whether they are associated with an investment. Remittance Policies The CBB is responsible for regulating remittances, and its regulations are based on the Central Bank Law ratified in 2006. Foreign workers comprise most of the labor force in Bahrain and many remit significant quantities of funds to their countries of origin. Commercial banks and currency exchange houses are licensed to provide remittances services. Commercial banks and currency exchange houses require two forms of identification before processing a routine remittance request, and any transaction exceeding $10,000 must include a documented source of the income. Bahrain enables foreign investors to remit funds through a legal parallel market, with no limitations on the inflow or outflow of funds for remittances of profits or revenue. The GOB does not engage in currency manipulation tactics. The GCC is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Bahrain is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) which is headquartered in Bahrain. Participating countries commit to combat the financing of terrorist groups and activities in all its forms and to implement FATF recommendations. Bahrain established a sovereign wealth fund, Mumtalakat, in 2006. Mumtalakat, which maintains an investment portfolio valued at roughly BD 6.6 billion ($17.6 billion) as of 2020, issues an annual report online. The annual report follows international financial reporting standards and is audited by external auditing firms. By law, subsidiaries of Mumtalakat are audited and monitored by the National Audit Office. In 2020, Mumtalakat received the highest-possible ranking in the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index for the seventh consecutive year, which specializes in ranking the transparency of sovereign wealth funds. However, Bahrain’s sovereign wealth fund does not follow the Santiago Principles. Mumtalakat holds majority stakes in several firms. Mumtalakat invests 62 percent of its funds in the Middle East, 30 percent in Europe, and eight percent in the United States. The fund is diversified across a variety of business sectors including real estate and tourism, financial services, food and agriculture, and industrial manufacturing. Mumtalakat acts more like an active asset management company than a sovereign wealth fund, including by taking an active role in managing SOEs. Most notably, Mumtalakat has been instrumental in helping Gulf Air, Bahrain’s state-owned airline, restructure and contain losses. A significant portion of Mumtalakat’s portfolio is invested in 29 Bahrain-based SOEs. Mumtalakat did not directly contribute to the State Budget through 2016. However, beginning in September 2017, Mumtalakat annually contributed $53 million to the State Budget, which was increased to $106 million in the 2021-2022 State Budget. 10. Political and Security Environment Bahrain is an open, liberal Gulf state that enjoys close diplomatic ties with the United States. Bahrain has experienced intermittent cycles of violence, with the most recent period of unrest taking place in 2011-2014. In 2017 and 2018, the GOB dissolved the country’s two largest opposition political societies and closed the country’s only opposition-leaning independent newspaper in 2017. On May 13, 2018, the Parliament passed a law banning members of political societies dissolved by the GOB from running in elections that took place later that year. Since 2017, protests centered on sociopolitical or economic demands have occurred in isolated neighborhoods but have largely been controlled by GOB authorities. Elections of the popularly elected lower house of the National Assembly, also known as the Council of Representatives, are scheduled for November 2022. Neither demonstrators nor violent extremists have generally targeted Americans or other Western expatriates. American citizens visiting Bahrain and companies interested in investing in Bahrain should visit the Embassy’s website to receive the most up-to-date information about the security situation and register with the Embassy’s consular section. Bangladesh Executive Summary Bangladesh is the most densely populated non-city-state country in the world, with the eighth largest population (over 165 million) within a territory the size of Iowa. Bangladesh is situated in the northeastern corner of the Indian subcontinent, sharing a 4,100 km border with India and a 247-kilometer border with Burma. With sustained economic growth over the past decade, a large, young, and hard-working workforce, strategic location between the large South and Southeast Asian markets, and vibrant private sector, Bangladesh will likely continue to attract increasing investment, despite severe economic headwinds created by the global outbreak of COVID-19. Buoyed by a young workforce and a growing consumer base, Bangladesh has enjoyed consistent annual GDP growth of more than six percent over the past decade, with the exception of the COVID-induced economic slowdown in 2020. Much of this growth continues to be driven by the ready-made garment (RMG) industry, which exported $35.81 billion of apparel products in fiscal year (FY) 2021, second only to China, and continued remittance inflows, reaching a record $24.77 billion in FY 2021. (Note: The Bangladeshi fiscal year is from July 1 to June 30; fiscal year 2021 ended on June 30, 2021.) The country’s RMG exports increased more than 30 percent year-over-year in FY 2021 as the global demand for apparel products accelerated after the COVID shock. The Government of Bangladesh (GOB) actively seeks foreign investment. Sectors with active investments from overseas include agribusiness, garment/textiles, leather/leather goods, light manufacturing, power and energy, electronics, light engineering, information and communications technology (ICT), plastic, healthcare, medical equipment, pharmaceutical, ship building, and infrastructure. The GOB offers a range of investment incentives under its industrial policy and export-oriented growth strategy with few formal distinctions between foreign and domestic private investors. Bangladesh’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock was $20.87 billion through the end of September 2021, with the United States being the top investing country with $4.1 billion in accumulated investments. Bangladesh received $2.56 billion FDI in 2020, according to data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The rate of FDI inflows was only 0.77 percent of GDP, one of the lowest of rates in Asia. Bangladesh has made gradual progress in reducing some constraints on investment, including taking steps to better ensure reliable electricity, but inadequate infrastructure, limited financing instruments, bureaucratic delays, lax enforcement of labor laws, and corruption continue to hinder foreign investment. Government efforts to improve the business environment in recent years show promise but implementation has yet to materialize. Slow adoption of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and sluggish judicial processes impede the enforcement of contracts and the resolution of business disputes. As a traditionally moderate, secular, peaceful, and stable country, Bangladesh experienced a decrease in terrorist activity in recent years, accompanied by an increase in terrorism-related investigations and arrests following the Holey Artisan Bakery terrorist attack in 2016. A December 2018 national election marred by irregularities, violence, and intimidation consolidated the power of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her ruling party, the Awami League. This allowed the government to adopt legislation and policies diminishing space for the political opposition, undermining judicial independence, and threatening freedom of the media and NGOs. Bangladesh continues to host one of the world’s largest refugee populations. According to UN High Commission for Refugees, more than 923,000 Rohingya from Burma were in Bangladesh as of February 2022. This humanitarian crisis will likely require notable financial and political support until a return to Burma in a voluntary and sustainable manner is possible. International retail brands selling Bangladesh-made products and the international community continue to press the Government of Bangladesh to meaningfully address worker rights and factory safety problems in Bangladesh. With unprecedented support from the international community and the private sector, the Bangladesh garment sector has made significant progress on fire and structural safety. Critical work remains on safeguarding workers’ rights to freely associate and bargain collectively, including in Export Processing Zones (EPZs). The Bangladeshi government has limited resources devoted to intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and counterfeit goods are readily available in Bangladesh. Government policies in the ICT sector are still under development. Current policies grant the government broad powers to intervene in that sector. Capital markets in Bangladesh are still developing, and the financial sector is still highly dependent on banks. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 147 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 116 of 129 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 723 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 2,030 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Bangladesh actively seeks foreign investment. Sectors with active investments from overseas include agribusiness, garment and textiles, leather and leather goods, light manufacturing, electronics, light engineering, energy and power, ICT, plastic, healthcare, medical equipment, pharmaceutical, ship building, and infrastructure. It offers a range of investment incentives under its industrial policy and export-oriented growth strategy with few formal distinctions between foreign and domestic private investors. Foreign and domestic private entities can establish and own, operate, and dispose of interests in most types of business enterprises. Four sectors, however, are reserved for government investment: Arms and ammunition and other defense equipment and machinery. Forest plantation and mechanized extraction within the bounds of reserved forests. Production of nuclear energy. Security printing (items such as currency, visa foils, and tax stamps). The Bangladesh Investment Development Authority (BIDA) is the principal authority tasked with supervising and promoting private investment. The BIDA Act of 2016 approved the merger of the now-disbanded Board of Investment and the Privatization Committee. BIDA is directly supervised by the Prime Minister’s Office and the Executive Chairman of BIDA holds a rank equivalent to Senior Secretary, the highest rank within the civil service. BIDA performs the following functions: Provides pre-investment counseling services. Registers and approves private industrial projects. Issues approval of branch/liaison/representative offices. Issues work permits for foreign nationals. Issues approval of royalty remittances, technical know-how, and technical assistance fees. Facilitates import of capital machinery and raw materials. Issues approvals of foreign loans and supplier credits. Provides aftercare facilities. BIDA’s website has aggregated information regarding Bangladesh investment policies, incentives, and ease of doing business indicators: http://bida.gov.bd/ In addition to BIDA, there are three other Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) responsible for promoting investments in their respective jurisdictions. Bangladesh Export Processing Zone Authority (BEPZA) promotes investments in Export Processing Zones (EPZs). The first EPZ was established in the 1980s and there are currently eight EPZs in the country. Website: Bangladesh Economic Zones Authority (BEZA) plans to establish approximately 100 Economic Zones (EZs) throughout the country over the next several years. Site selections for 97 EZs have been completed as of February 2022, of which 10 private EZs are already licensed and operational while development of several other public and private sector EZs are underway. While EPZs accommodate exporting companies only, EZs are open for both export- and domestic-oriented companies. Website: Bangladesh Hi-Tech Park Authority (BHTPA) is responsible for attracting and facilitating investments in the high-tech parks Bangladesh is establishing across the country. Website: Foreign and domestic private entities can establish and own, operate, and dispose of interests in most types of business enterprises. Bangladesh allows private investment in power generation and natural gas exploration, but efforts to allow full foreign participation in petroleum marketing and gas distribution have stalled. Regulations in the area of telecommunication infrastructure currently include provisions for 60 percent foreign ownership (70 percent for tower sharing). In addition to the four sectors reserved for government investment, there are 17 controlled sectors that require prior clearance/ permission from the respective line ministries/authorities. These are: Fishing in the deep sea. Bank/financial institutions in the private sector. Insurance companies in the private sector. Generation, supply, and distribution of power in the private sector. Exploration, extraction, and supply of natural gas/oil. Exploration, extraction, and supply of coal. Exploration, extraction, and supply of other mineral resources. Large-scale infrastructure projects (e.g., elevated expressway, monorail, economic zone, inland container depot/container freight station). Crude oil refinery (recycling/refining of lube oil used as fuel). Medium and large industries using natural gas/condensate and other minerals as raw material. Telecommunications service (mobile/cellular and land phone). Satellite channels. Cargo/passenger aviation. Sea-bound ship transport. Seaports/deep seaports. VOIP/IP telephone. Industries using heavy minerals accumulated from sea beaches. While discrimination against foreign investors is not widespread, the government frequently promotes local industries, and some discriminatory policies and regulations exist. For example, the government closely controls approvals for imported medicines that compete with domestically manufactured pharmaceutical products and it has required majority local ownership of new shipping and insurance companies, albeit with exemptions for existing foreign-owned firms. In practical terms, foreign investors frequently find it necessary to have a local partner even though this requirement may not be statutorily defined. In certain strategic sectors, the GOB has placed unofficial barriers on foreign companies’ ability to divest from the country. BIDA is responsible for screening, reviewing, and approving investments in Bangladesh, except for investments in EPZs, EZs, and High-Tech Parks, which are supervised by BEPZA, BEZA, and BHTPA respectively. Both foreign and domestic companies are required to obtain approval from relevant ministries and agencies with regulatory oversight. In certain sectors (e.g., healthcare), foreign companies may be required to obtain a No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the relevant ministry or agency stating the specific investment will not hinder local manufacturers and is in line with the guidelines of the ministry concerned. Since Bangladesh actively seeks foreign investments, instances where one of the Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) declines investment proposals are rare. In 2013 Bangladesh completed an investment policy review (IPR) with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=756 A Trade Policy Review was done by the World Trade Organization in April 2019 and can be found at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp485_e.htm In February 2018, the Bangladesh Parliament passed the “One Stop Service Bill 2018,” which aims to streamline business and investment registration processes. The four IPAs – BIDA, BEPZA, BEZA, and BHTPA – are mandated to provide one-stop services (OSS) to local and foreign investors under their respective jurisdictions. Expected streamlined services include company registration, taxpayer’s identification number (TIN) and value added tax (VAT) registration, work permit issuance, power and utilities connections, capital and profit repatriation, and environment clearance. In 2019 Bangladesh made reforms in three key areas: starting a business, getting electricity, and getting credit. BIDA offers 56 services under its OSS as of February 2022and has a plan to expand to 154 services covering 35 agencies. The GOB is also planning to integrate the services of all four investment promotion agencies under a single online platform. Progress on realizing a comprehensive OSS for businesses has been slowed by bureaucratic delays and a lack of interagency coordination. Companies can register their businesses at the Office of the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies and Firms (RJSC): www.roc.gov.bd . However, the online business registration process, while improving, can at times be unclear and inconsistent. Additionally, BIDA facilitates company registration services as part of its OSS, which is available at: https://bidaquickserv.org . BIDA also facilitates other services including office set-up approval, work permits for foreign employees, environmental clearance, outward remittance approval, and tax registration with National Board of Revenue. Other agencies with which a company must typically register are: City Corporation – Trade License. National Board of Revenue – Tax & VAT Registration. Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments – Employment of Workers Notification. It takes approximately 20 days to start a business in the country according to the World Bank. The company registration process at the RJSC generally takes one or two days to complete. The process for trade licensing, tax registration, and VAT registration required as of 2021 seven days, one day, and one week respectively. Outward foreign direct investment is generally restricted through the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1947. As a result, the Bangladesh Bank plays a key role in limiting outbound investment. In September 2015, the government amended the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1947 by adding a “conditional provision” that permits outbound investment for export-related enterprises. Private sector contacts note the few international investments approved by the Bangladesh Bank have been limited to large exporting companies with international experience. However, the government is considering an overseas investment guideline to allow outbound investment opportunities for local exporters and any company operating in the domestic market for 10 years. This will allow local companies and NGOs with outbound investments to enlist in foreign stock markets. However, Bangladesh’s total outbound investment in a single fiscal year would be capped at 5 percent of the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves for that fiscal year under the regulation being considered. Bangladesh Investment Development Authority (BIDA) has been working to formulate a workable policy regarding this since 2016. 3. Legal Regime Since 1989, the government has gradually moved to decrease regulatory obstruction of private business. Various chambers of commerce have called for privatization and for a greater voice for the private sector in government decisions, but at the same time many chambers support protectionism and subsidies for their own industries. The result is policy and regulations which are often unclear, inconsistent, or little publicized. Registration and regulatory processes are frequently alleged by businesses to be used as rent-seeking opportunities. The major rule-making and regulatory authority exists at the national level under each Ministry with many final decisions being made at the top-most levels, including the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). The PMO is actively engaged in directing policies, as well as foreign investment in government-controlled projects. Bangladesh has made incremental progress in using information technology both to improve the transparency and efficiency of some government services and develop independent agencies to regulate the energy and telecommunication sectors. Some investors cited government laws, regulations, and lack of implementation as impediments to investment. The government has historically limited opportunities for the private sector to comment on proposed regulations. In 2009, Bangladesh adopted the Right to Information Act providing for multilevel stakeholder consultations through workshops or media outreach. Although the consultation process exists, it is still weak and in need of further improvement. The Environment Conservation Act 1995 (ECA ’95) as amended in 2010 and the Biodiversity Act of 2018 are the main acts governing environmental protection in Bangladesh. The ECA ’95 replaced the earlier environment pollution control ordinance of 1992 and provides the legal basis for Environment Conservation Rules, 1997 (ECR’97). The objective of the Biodiversity Act is equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use of biological resources. The main objectives of ECA’95 are conservation of the natural environment, improvement of environmental standards, and control and mitigation of environmental pollution. According to the act, all industrial projects require before being undertaken an Environmental Clearance Certificate from the Director General. In issuing the certificate, the projects are classified into the following four categories – Green, Orange-A, Orange-B, and Red. Environmental Clearance for the Green category is through a comparatively simple procedure. In the case of Orange-A, Orange-B and Red Categories, site clearance is mandatory at the beginning, then Environmental Impact Assessment approval and finally Environmental Clearance is issued. The Environment Clearance is to be renewed after three years for the Green category and one year for Orange-A, Orange-B and Red categories. Red Category projects require an Environmental Impact Statement prior to approval. Ministries and regulatory agencies do not generally publish or solicit comments on draft proposed legislation or regulations. However, several government organizations, including the Bangladesh Bank (the central bank), Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission, BIDA, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Bangladesh Telecommunications Regulatory Commission have occasionally posted draft legislation and regulations online and solicited feedback from the business community. In some instances, parliamentary committees have also reached out to relevant stakeholders for input on draft legislation. The media continues to be the main information source for the public on many draft proposals. There is also no legal obligation to publish proposed regulations, consider alternatives to proposed regulation, or solicit comments from the general public. The government printing office, The Bangladesh Government Press ( http://www.dpp.gov.bd/bgpress/ ), publishes the “Bangladesh Gazette” every Thursday and Extraordinary Gazettes as and when needed. The Gazette provides official notice of government actions, including issuance of government rules and regulations and the transfer and promotion of government employees. Laws can also be accessed at http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/ . Bangladesh passed the Financial Reporting Act of 2015 which created the Financial Reporting Council in 2016 aimed at establishing transparency and accountability in the accounting and auditing system. The country follows Bangladesh Accounting Standards and Bangladesh Financial Reporting Standards, which are largely derived from International Accounting Standards and International Financial Reporting Standards. However, the quality of reporting varies widely. Internationally known firms have begun establishing local offices in Bangladesh and their presence is positively influencing the accounting norms in the country. Some firms can provide financial reports audited to international standards while others maintain unreliable (or multiple) sets of accounting records. Regulatory agencies do not conduct impact assessments for proposed regulations; consequently, regulations are often not reviewed based on data-driven assessments. Not all national budget documents are prepared according to internationally accepted standards. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) aims to integrate regional regulatory systems among Bangladesh, India, Burma, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Nepal, and Bhutan. However, efforts to advance regional cooperation measures have stalled in recent years and regulatory systems remain uncoordinated. Local laws are based on the English common law system but most fall short of international standards. The country’s regulatory system remains weak and many of the laws and regulations are not enforced and standards are not maintained. Bangladesh has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1995. WTO requires all signatories to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) to establish a National Inquiry Point and Notification Authority to gather and efficiently distribute trade-related regulatory, standards, and conformity assessment information to the WTO Member community. The Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institute (BSTI) has been working as the National Enquiry Point for the WTO-TBT Agreement since 2002. There is an internal committee on WTO affairs in BSTI and it participates in notifying WTO activities through the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Industries. General Contact for WTO-TBT National Enquiry Point: Email: bsti_std@bangla.net; bsti_ad@bangla.net Website: http://www.bsti.gov.bd/ Focal Point for TBT: Mr. Md. Golam Baki,Deputy Director (Certification Marks), BSTI Email: bakibsti@gmail.comTel: +88-02-48116665Cell: +8801799828826, +8801712240702 Focal Point for other WTO related matters, except sanitary and phytosanitary systems: Mr. Md. Hafizur Rahman,Director General, WTO Cell, Ministry of Commerce Email: dg.wto@mincom.gov.bdTel: +880-2-9545383Cell: +88 0171 1861056 Mr. Mohammad Ileas Mia,Director-1, WTO Cell, Ministry of Commerce Email: director1.wto@mincom.gov.bdTel: +880-2-9540580Cell: +88 01786698321 Bangladesh is a common law-based jurisdiction. Many of the basic laws, such as the penal code, civil and criminal procedural codes, contract law, and company law are influenced by English common law. However, family laws, such as laws relating to marriage, dissolution of marriage, and inheritance are based on religious scripts and therefore differ among religious communities. The Bangladeshi legal system is based on a written constitution and the laws often take statutory forms that are enacted by the legislature and interpreted by the higher courts. Ordinarily, executive authorities and statutory corporations cannot make any law, but can make by-laws to the extent authorized by the legislature. Such subordinate legislation is known as rules or regulations and is also enforceable by the courts. However, as a common law system, the statutes are short and set out basic rights and responsibilities but are elaborated by the courts in the application and interpretation of those laws. The Bangladeshi judiciary acts through: (1) The Superior Judiciary, having appellate, revision, and original jurisdiction; and (2) The Sub-Ordinate Judiciary, having original jurisdiction. Since 1971, Bangladesh has updated its legal system concerning company, banking, bankruptcy, and money loan court laws, and other commercial laws. An important impediment to investment in Bangladesh is its weak and slow legal system in which the enforceability of contracts is uncertain. The judicial system does not provide for interest to be charged in tort judgments, which means procedural delays carry no penalties. Bangladesh does not have a separate court or court division dedicated solely to commercial cases. The Joint District Judge court (a civil court) is responsible for enforcing contracts. Some notable commercial laws include: The Contract Act, 1872 (Act No. IX of 1930). The Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (Act No. III of 1930). The Partnership Act, 1932 (Act No. IX of 1932). The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Act No. XXVI of 1881). The Bankruptcy Act, 1997 (Act No. X of 1997). The Arbitration Act, 2001 (Act No. I of 2001). The judicial system of Bangladesh has never been completely independent from interference by the executive branch of the government. In a significant milestone, the government in 2007 separated the country’s judiciary from the executive but the executive retains strong influence over the judiciary through control of judicial appointments. Other pillars of the justice system, including the police, courts, and legal profession, are also closely aligned with the executive branch. In lower courts, corruption is widely perceived as a serious problem. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable under the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. Major laws affecting foreign investment include: the Foreign Private Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act of 1980, the Bangladesh Export Processing Zones Authority Act of 1980, the Companies Act of 1994, the Telecommunications Act of 2001, and the Bangladesh Economic Zones Act of 2010. Bangladesh industrial policy offers incentives for “green” (environmental) high-tech or “transformative” industries. It allows foreigners who invest $1 million or transfer $2 million to a recognized financial institution to apply for Bangladeshi citizenship. The GOB will provide financial and policy support for high-priority industries (those creating large-scale employment and earning substantial export revenue) and creative industries – architecture, arts and antiques, fashion design, film and video, interactive laser software, software, and computer and media programming. Specific importance is given to agriculture and food processing, RMG, ICT and software, pharmaceuticals, leather and leather products, and jute and jute goods. In addition, Petrobangla, the state-owned oil and gas company, has modified its production sharing agreement contract for offshore gas exploration to include an option to export gas. In 2019, Parliament approved the Bangladesh Flag Vessels (Protection) Act 2019 with a provision to ensure Bangladeshi flagged vessels carry at least 50 percent of foreign cargo, up from 40 percent. In 2020, the Ministry of Commerce amended the digital commerce policy to allow fully foreign-owned e-commerce companies in Bangladesh and remove a previous joint venture requirement. The One Stop Service (OSS) Act of 2018 mandated the four IPAs to provide OSS to local and foreign investors in their respective jurisdictions. The move aims to facilitate business services on behalf of multiple government agencies to improve ease of doing business. In 2020, BIDA issued time-bound rules to implement the Act of 2018. Although the IPAs have started to offer a few services under the OSS, corruption and excessive bureaucracy have held back the complete and effective roll out of the OSS. BIDA has a “one-stop” website that provides information on relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors at: http://www.bida.gov.bd/ . Aside from information on relevant business laws and licenses, the website includes information on Bangladesh’s investment climate, opportunities for businesses, potential sectors, and how to do business in Bangladesh. The website also has an eService Portal for Investors which provides services such as visa recommendations for foreign investors, approval/extension of work permits for expatriates, approval of foreign borrowing, and approval/renewal of branch/liaison and representative offices. Bangladesh formed an independent agency in 2011 called the “Bangladesh Competition Commission (BCC)” under the Ministry of Commerce. Parliament then passed the Competition Act in 2012. However, the BCC has not received sufficient resources to operate effectively. In 2018, the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) finalized Significant Market Power (SMP) regulations to promote competition in the industry. In 2019, BTRC declared the country’s largest telecom operator, Grameenphone (GP), the first SMP based on its revenue share of more than 50 percent and customer shares of about 47 percent. Since the declaration, the BTRC has attempted to impose restrictions on GP’s operations, which GP has challenged in the judicial system. Since the Foreign Investment Act of 1980 banned nationalization or expropriation without adequate compensation, Bangladesh has not nationalized or expropriated property from foreign investors. In the years immediately following independence in 1971, widespread nationalization resulted in government ownership of more than 90 percent of fixed assets in the modern manufacturing sector, including the textile, jute and sugar industries and all banking and insurance interests, except those in foreign (but non-Pakistani) hands. However, the government has taken steps to privatize many of these industries since the late 1970s and the private sector has developed into a main driver of the country’s sustained economic growth. Many laws affecting investment in Bangladesh are outdated. Bankruptcy laws, which apply mainly to individual insolvency, are sometimes disregarded in business cases because of the numerous falsified assets and uncollectible cross-indebtedness supporting insolvent banks and companies. A Bankruptcy Act was passed by Parliament in 1997 but has been ineffective in addressing these issues. Some bankruptcy cases fall under the Money Loan Court Act-2003 which has more stringent and timely procedures. 6. Financial Sector Capital markets in Bangladesh are still developing, and the financial sector remains highly dependent on bank lending. Current regulatory infrastructure inhibits the development of a tradeable bond market. Bangladesh is home to the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and the Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE), both of which are regulated by the Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC), a statutory body formed in 1993 and attached to the Ministry of Finance. The DSE market capitalization stood at $64.8 billion at the end of January 2022, rising 16.3 percent year-over-year as stock prices rose amid speculative behavior and increased liquidity due to relaxed monetary policy. Although the Bangladeshi government has a positive attitude toward foreign portfolio investors, participation in the exchanges remains low due to what is still limited liquidity for shares and the lack of publicly available and reliable company information. The DSE has attracted some foreign portfolio investors to the country’s capital market. However, the volume of foreign investment in Bangladesh remains a small fraction of total market capitalization. As a result, foreign portfolio investment has had limited influence on market trends and Bangladesh’s capital markets have been largely insulated from the volatility of international financial markets. Bangladeshi markets continue to rely primarily on domestic investors. In 2019, BSEC undertook a number of initiatives to launch derivatives products, allow short selling, and invigorate the bond market. To this end, BSEC introduced three rules: Exchange Traded Derivatives Rules 2019, Short-Sale Rules 2019, and Investment Sukuk Rules 2019. Other recent, notable BSEC initiatives include forming a central clearing and settlement company – the Central Counterparty Bangladesh Limited (CCBL) – and promoting private equity and venture capital firms under the 2015 Alternative Investment Rules. In 2013, BSEC became a full signatory of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Memorandum of Understanding. BSEC has taken steps to improve regulatory oversight, including installing a modern surveillance system, the “Instant Market Watch,” providing real time connectivity with exchanges and depository institutions. As a result, the market abuse detection capabilities of BSEC have improved significantly. A mandatory Corporate Governance Code for listed companies was introduced in 2012 but the overall quality of corporate governance remains substandard. Demutualization of both the DSE and CSE was completed in 2013 to separate ownership of the exchanges from trading rights. A majority of the members of the Demutualization Board, including the Chairman, are independent directors. Apart from this, a separate tribunal has been established to resolve capital market-related criminal cases expeditiously. However, both domestic and foreign investor confidence on the stock exchanges’ governance standards remains low. The Demutualization Act 2013 also directed DSE to pursue a strategic investor who would acquire a 25 percent stake in the bourse. Through a bidding process DSE selected a consortium of the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges in China as its strategic partner, with the consortium buying the 25 percent share of DSE for taka 9.47 billion ($112.7 million). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bangladesh is an Article VIII member and maintains restrictions on the unapproved exchange, conversion, and/or transfer of proceeds of international transactions into non-resident taka-denominated accounts. Since 2015, authorities have relaxed restrictions by allowing some debits of balances in such accounts for outward remittances, but there is currently no established timetable for the complete removal of the restrictions. The Bangladesh Bank (BB) acts as the central bank of Bangladesh. It was established through the enactment of the Bangladesh Bank Order of 1972. General supervision and strategic direction of the BB has been entrusted to a nine-member Board of Directors, which is headed by the BB Governor. A list of the bank’s departments and branches is on its website: https://www.bb.org.bd/aboutus/dept/depts.php . According to the BB, four types of banks operate in the formal financial system: State Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs), Specialized Banks, Private Commercial Banks (PCBs), and Foreign Commercial Banks (FCBs). Some 61 “scheduled” banks in Bangladesh operate under the control and supervision of the central bank as per the Bangladesh Bank Order of 1972. The scheduled banks, include six SOCBs, three specialized government banks established for specific objectives such as agricultural or industrial development or expatriates’ welfare, 43 PCBs, and nine FCBs as of February 2021. The scheduled banks are licensed to operate under the Bank Company Act of 1991 (Amended 2013). There are also five non-scheduled banks in Bangladesh, including Nobel Prize recipient Grameen Bank, established for special and definite objectives and operating under legislation enacted to meet those objectives. Currently, 34 non-bank financial institutions (FIs) are operating in Bangladesh. They are regulated under the Financial Institution Act, 1993 and controlled by the BB. Of these, two are fully government-owned, one is a subsidiary of a state-owned commercial bank, and the rest are private financial institutions. Major sources of funds for these financial institutions are term deposits (at least three months’ tenure), credit facilities from banks and other financial institutions, and call money, as well as bonds and securitization. Unlike banks, FIs are prohibited from: Issuing checks, pay-orders, or demand drafts. Receiving demand deposits. Involvement in foreign exchange financing. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) remain the dominant players in rural financial markets. The Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA), the primary regulator of this sector, oversees 746 licensed microfinance institutions as of October 2021, excluding Grameen Bank which is governed under a separate law. In 2020, the MRA-listed microfinance institutions had 33.3 million members while Grameen Bank had an additional 9.3 million members. The banking sector has had a mixed record of performance over the past several years. Industry experts have reported a rise in risky assets because of poor governance as well as the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. Total domestic credit stood at 50.4 percent of gross domestic product at end of November 2021. The state-owned Sonali Bank is the largest bank in the country while Islami Bank Bangladesh and Standard Chartered Bangladesh are the largest local private and foreign banks respectively. The gross non-performing loan (NPL) ratio was 8.1 percent at the end of September 2021, down from 8.9 percent in September 2020. However, the decline in the NPLs was primarily caused by regulatory forbearance rather than actual reduction of stressed loans. At 20.1 percent SCBs had the highest NPL ratio, followed by 11.4 percent of Specialized Banks, 5.5 percent of PCBs, and4.1 percent of FCBs as of September 2021. In 2017, the BB issued a circular warning citizens and financial institutions about the risks associated with cryptocurrencies. The circular noted that using cryptocurrencies may violate existing money laundering and terrorist financing regulations and cautioned users may incur financial losses. The BB issued similar warnings against cryptocurrencies in 2014. Foreign investors may open temporary bank accounts called Non-Resident Taka Accounts (NRTA) in the proposed company name without prior approval from the BB to receive incoming capital remittances and encashment certificates. Once the proposed company is registered, it can open a new account to transfer capital from the NRTA account. Branch, representative, or liaison offices of foreign companies can open bank accounts to receive initial suspense payments from headquarters without opening NRTA accounts. In 2019, the BB relaxed regulations on the types of bank branches foreigners could use to open NRTAs, removing a previous requirement limiting use of NRTA’s solely to Authorized Dealers (ADs). In 2015, the Bangladesh Finance Ministry announced it was exploring establishing a sovereign wealth fund in which to invest a portion of Bangladesh’s foreign currency reserves. In 2017, the Cabinet initially approved a $10 billion “Bangladesh Sovereign Wealth Fund,” (BSWF) to be created with funds from excess foreign exchange reserves but the plan was subsequently scrapped by the Finance Ministry. 10. Political and Security Environment Prime Minister Hasina’s ruling Awami League party won 289 parliamentary seats out of 300 in a December 30, 2018 election marred by wide-spread vote-rigging, ballot-box stuffing and intimidation. Intimidation, harassment, and violence during the pre-election period made it difficult for many opposition candidates and their supporters to meet, hold rallies, and/or campaign freely. The clashes between rival political parties and general strikes that previously characterized the political environment in Bangladesh have become far less frequent in the wake of the Awami League’s increasing dominance and crackdown on dissent. Many civil society groups have expressed concern about the trend toward a one-party state and the marginalization of all political opposition groups. Americans are advised to exercise increased caution due to crime and terrorism when traveling to Bangladesh. Travel in some areas have higher risks. For further information, see the State Department’s travel website for the Worldwide Caution, Travel Advisories, and Bangladesh Country Specific Information. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical Source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020-21 $354,242 2020 $323,057 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical Source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020-21 $4055 2020 $723 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $2 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020-21 5.71% 2020 6.01% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report *Host Country Source: Bangladesh Bank, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (December 2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $18,439 100% Total Outward $314 100% The United States $3,823 20.7% United Kingdom $88 28.0% The United Kingdom $2,140 11.6% China, P.R. Mainland $49 15.6% The Netherlands $1,608 8.7% India $47 15.0% Singapore $1,504 8.2% Nepal $47 15.0% China, P.R. Mainland $986 5.3% United Arab Emirates $39 12.4% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Barbados Executive Summary With a $4.4 billion economy, Barbados is the largest economy in the Eastern Caribbean. The shutdown of the tourism sector in 2020 due to the pandemic led to an 18 percent GDP contraction. The economy began to recover in 2021 with 1.4 percent growth, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts 2022 growth at 8.5 percent. Unemployment was estimated at approximately 40 percent in the first quarter of 2021, representing a 30 percent increase from the same period last year. The Government of Barbados entered a standby arrangement with the IMF in late 2018. The $290 million ($580 million Barbados dollars) Barbados Economic Recovery and Transformation (BERT) program aims to decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio, strengthen the balance of payments, and stimulate growth. While the government was on track to meet its IMF targets pre-pandemic, the program dampened income and spending power due to public sector layoffs, the introduction of new indirect taxes, and a decline in the construction sector. The impact of the pandemic required the IMF to adjust the program targets downwards several times. The IMF also approved additional lending into the program twice in 2020. The country’s services sector continues to hold the largest growth potential, especially in the areas of international financial services, information technology, global education services, health, and cultural services. The gradual decline of the sugar industry has opened land for other agricultural uses. Investment opportunities exist in the areas of agricultural processing and alternative and renewable energy. Uncertainty about the trajectory of economic recovery of the tourism, commercial aviation, and cruise industries impacts the potential for projects in those sectors. The government has identified renewable energy and climate resilience projects as top priorities. In 2021, Barbados joined the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) framework seeking to harmonize global corporate minimum tax rates at 15 percent. Barbados bases its legal system on the British common law system. It does not have a bilateral investment agreement with the United States, but it does have a double-taxation treaty and a tax information exchange agreement. In 2015, Barbados signed an intergovernmental agreement in observance of the United States’ Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), making it mandatory for banks in Barbados to report the banking information of U.S. citizens. Table 1 Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 29 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 14,350 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Barbados, through Invest Barbados, welcomes foreign direct investment with the stated goals of creating jobs, earning foreign exchange, transferring technology, enhancing skills, and contributing to economic growth. In 2021, the government announced plans to focus on encouraging foreign direct investment in renewable energy, manufacturing, technology, and biogenetic engineering. According to Invest Barbados, Barbados encourages investment in the following key sectors: international financial services, information technology, and ship registration, as well as emerging sectors like financial technology, creative industries, agricultural processing, medical schools, medical tourism, and renewable energy. In the international financial services sector, the government maintains regulatory oversight via the Central Bank of Barbados to prevent money laundering and tax evasion. Through Invest Barbados, the government facilitates domestic and foreign private investment. Invest Barbados’ mandate is to actively promote Barbados as a desirable investment location, to provide advice, and to assist prospective investors. Invest Barbados also provides customized support for investors to assist with the expansion and sustainability of the initial investment. It also serves as the primary liaison for existing investors. In 2021, the government announced plans to establish a Barbados Free Economic Zone to help attract foreign direct investment. Investors interested in doing business in Barbados must register with the country’s Corporate Affairs and Intellectual Property Office (CAIPO). In 2021, the Government of Barbados fully digitized the registration process and all other services provided by CAIPO. Local laws do not place any limits on foreign control in Barbados. Nationals and non-nationals may establish and own private enterprises and private property in Barbados. These rights extend to the acquisition and disposition of interests in private enterprises. No industries are closed to private enterprise, although the government reserves the right not to allow certain investments. Some activities, such as telecommunications, utilities, broadcasting, franchises, banking, and insurance require a government license. There are no quotas or other restrictions on foreign ownership of a local enterprise or participation in a joint venture. In 2012, the government introduced a special entry permit for high net-worth individuals who wish to reside in Barbados while working remotely. Individuals must have one of the following to apply: a net worth of USD five million, property valued above USD two million, and skills of critical need to the development of the country. Applicants must generally be 60 years or older although special provisions can be made for applicants under 60 years of age. The program is administered by the Barbados Immigration Department. In 2020, the government introduced the Barbados Welcome Stamp visa program, which allows eligible remote workers to apply for special residency status for up to one year. Under this program, the visa holder is exempt from local income taxes. The visa holder can also apply for an extension of the visa with the repayment of applicable fees. The program is administered through the Ministry of Tourism and International Transport. Barbados has not conducted a trade policy review in the last three years. No civil society organization has provided a review of investment policy-related concerns in the past five years. Invest Barbados is the main investment promotion agency that attracts and facilitates foreign investment. Invest Barbados offers guidance and direction to new and established investors seeking to pursue investment opportunities in Barbados. The process is transparent and considers the size of capital investment as well as the economic impact of a proposed project. Invest Barbados offers a website that is useful for navigating applicable laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors. This is available at http://www.investbarbados.org . Invest Barbados’ iGuide website is an online guide that provides local and foreign investors with up-to-date information required to make certain investment decisions, including steps for setting up a business, opportunities for investment, labor and other business costs, and legal requirements, among other data. This is available at https://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/barbados . The Corporate Affairs and Intellectual Property Office (CAIPO) maintains an online e-registry filing service for matters pertaining to the Corporate Registry. It is available to registered agents, who are usually attorneys. Information is available at www.caipo.gov.bb . In general, when starting a business, companies retain an attorney to prepare relevant incorporation documents. The business must register with CAIPO, the Barbados Revenue Authority, the Customs and Excise Department, and any relevant sector-specific licensing agencies. The Government of Barbados continues to facilitate programs and partnerships to assist entrepreneurs who are women and/or people with disabilities. The Government of Barbados remains committed to working with civil society and other organizations to meet the UN Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. While no incentives are offered, Barbados generally encourages local companies to invest in other countries, particularly within the Caribbean region. The government actively encourages local companies in Barbados to take advantage of export opportunities related to the country’s membership in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME). The Barbados Investment Development Corporation provides market development support for domestic companies seeking to enhance their export potential. 3. Legal Regime Barbados’ legal framework establishes clear rules for foreign and domestic investors regarding tax, labor, environmental, health, and safety concerns. These regulations are in accord with international standards. The Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs, and Investment and Invest Barbados provide oversight aimed at ensuring the transparency of investment. Rulemaking and regulatory authority rest with the bicameral parliament of the Government of Barbados. The House of Assembly consists of 30 members who are elected in single-seat constituencies. The Senate consists of 21 members who are appointed by the President. Responsibility for Senate appointments shifted in 2021 when Barbados removed the UK’s Queen Elizabeth as head of state and became a republic. Foreign investment into Barbados is governed by a series of laws and implementing regulations. These laws and regulations are developed with the participation of relevant ministries, drafted by the Office of the Attorney General, and enforced by the relevant ministry or ministries. Additional compliance supervision is delegated to specific agencies, by sector, as follows: Banking and financial services – Central Bank of Barbados (CBB) Insurance and non-banking financial services – Financial Services Commission (FSC) International business – International Business Unit, Ministry of International Business and Industry Business incorporation and intellectual property – CAIPO The Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Investment monitors investments to collect information for national statistics and reporting purposes. All foreign businesses must be registered or incorporated through CAIPO and will be regulated by one of the other agencies depending on the nature of the business. Although Barbados does not have formal legislation that guarantees access to information or freedom of expression, access to information is generally available. The government maintains a website and an information service to facilitate the dissemination of information such as government office directories and press releases. The government also maintains a parliamentary website at http://www.barbadosparliament.com where it posts legislation prior to parliamentary debate and live streams House sittings. The government budget is also available on this website. Although some bills are not subject to public consultation, input from various stakeholder groups and agencies is enlisted during the initial drafting of legislation. Public awareness campaigns, through print and electronic media, are used to inform the public. Copies of regulations are circulated to stakeholders and are published in the Official Gazette after passage in parliament. The Official Gazette is available at https://gisbarbados.gov.bb/the-official-gazette . Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent. Publicly listed companies publish annual financial statements and changes in portfolio shareholdings, including share value. Service providers are required to adhere to international best practice standards including International Financial Reporting Standards, International Standards on Auditing, and International Public Sector Accounting Standards for government and public sector bodies. They must also comply with the provisions of the Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Prevention and Control Act. Accounting professionals must engage in continuous professional development. The Corporate and Trust Service Providers Act regulates Barbados financial service providers. Failure to adhere to these laws and regulations may result in the revocation of a company’s business license and/or cancellation of work permit(s). The most recent Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) Mutual Evaluation assessment found Barbados to be largely compliant. The government does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance disclosures. The Office of the Ombudsman is established by the constitution to guard against abuses of power by government officers in the performance of their duties. The Office of the Ombudsman aims to provide quality service in an impartial and expeditious manner when investigating complaints by Barbadian nationals or residents who consider the conduct of a government body or official unreasonable, improper, inadequate, or unjust. The Office of the Auditor General is also established by the constitution and is regulated by the Financial Administration and Audit Act. The Auditor General is responsible for the audit and inspection of all public accounts of the Supreme Court, the Senate, the House of Assembly, all government ministries, government departments, government-controlled entities, and statutory bodies. The Office of the Auditor General’s annual reports can be found on the Barbados Parliament website. The OECD recognized Barbados as largely compliant with international regulatory standards. Barbados is a signatory to the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement, and the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Matters to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Sharing. The Barbados National Standards Institution (BNSI) oversees a laboratory complex housing metrology, textile, engineering, and chemistry/microbiology laboratories. The primary functions of the BSNI include the preparation, promotion, and implementation of standards in all sectors of the economy, including the promotion of quality systems, quality control, and certification. The Standards Act (2006) and the Weights and Measures Act (1977) and Regulations (1985) govern the work of the BNSI. As a signatory to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement to Technical Barriers to Trade, Barbados is obligated to harmonize all national standards through the BNSI to international norms to avoid creating technical barriers to trade. Barbados ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement in 2018. The Agreement improves the speed and efficiency of border procedures, facilitates trade costs reduction, and enhances participation in the global value chain. In 2019 Barbados implemented the Automated System for Customs Data, which streamlined document compliance and inspections by port authorities. The government also increased issuance fees for certificates of origin, making trade more expensive. Barbados’ legal system is based on the British common law. Modern corporate law is modeled on the Canadian Business Corporations Act. The Attorney General, the Chief Justice, junior judges, and magistrates administer justice in Barbados. The Supreme Court consists of the Court of Appeal and the High Court. The High Court hears criminal and civil (commercial) matters and makes determinations based on interpretation of the constitution. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is the regional judicial tribunal. The CCJ has original jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC). In 2005, Barbados became a full member of the CCJ, making the body its final court of appeal and original jurisdiction of the RTC. The United States and Barbados are both parties to the WTO. The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body resolve disputes over WTO agreements, while courts of appropriate jurisdiction in both countries resolve private disputes. Invest Barbados’ foreign direct investment policy is to promote Barbados as a desirable investment location, to provide advice, and to assist prospective investors. The main laws concerning investment in Barbados are the Barbados International Business Promotion Act (2005), the Tourism Development Act (2005), and the Companies Act. There is also a framework of legislation that supports the jurisdiction as a global hub for business including insurance, shipping registration, and wealth management. All proposals for investment concessions are reviewed by Invest Barbados to ensure proposed projects are consistent with the national interest and provide economic benefits to the country. Invest Barbados provides complimentary “one-stop shop” facilitation services for investors to guide them through the investment process. It offers a website useful for navigating the laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors: http://www.investbarbados.org . Chapter 8 of the RTC outlines the competition policy applicable to CARICOM states. Member states are required to establish and maintain a national competition authority for facilitating the implementation of the rules of competition. At the CARICOM level, a regional Caribbean Competition Commission (CCC) applies the rules of competition. The CARICOM competition policy addresses anticompetitive business conduct such as agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises, and concerted practices by enterprises that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the Community and actions by which an enterprise abuses its dominant position within the Community. The Fair Competition Act codified the establishment of the Barbados Fair Trading Commission (FTC) in 2001. The FTC is responsible for the promotion and maintenance of fair competition participates in the CCC. The FTC regulates the principles, rates, and standards of service for public utilities and other regulated service providers. The Telecommunications Act regulates competition in the telecommunications sector. The Barbados constitution and the Companies Act (Chap. 308) contain provisions permitting the government to acquire property for public use upon prompt payment of compensation at fair market value. U.S. Embassy Bridgetown is not aware of any outstanding expropriation claims or nationalization of foreign enterprises in Barbados. Under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (2002), Barbados has a bankruptcy framework that recognizes certain debtor and creditor rights. The act gives a potentially bankrupt company three options: bankruptcy (voluntary or involuntary), receivership, or reorganization of the company. The Companies Act provides for the insolvency and/or liquidation of a company incorporated under this act. In 2019, the Supreme Court of Judicature Act was amended to include the establishment of a commercial division in the High Court which will oversee proceedings connected to bankruptcy and insolvency. 6. Financial Sector Barbados has a small stock exchange, an active banking sector, and opportunities for portfolio investment. Local policies seek to facilitate the free flow of financial resources, although some restrictions may be imposed during exceptional periods of low liquidity. The CBB independently raises or lowers interest rates without government intervention. There are a variety of credit instruments in the commercial and public sectors that local and foreign investors may access. Barbados continues to review legislation in the financial sector to strengthen and improve the regulatory regime and attract and facilitate retention of foreign portfolio investments. The government continues to improve its legal, regulatory, and supervisory frameworks to strengthen the banking system. The Anti-Money Laundering Authority and its operating arm, the government’s Financial Intelligence Unit, review anti-money laundering policy documents and analyze prudential returns. The Securities Exchange Act of 1982 established the Securities Exchange of Barbados, which was reincorporated as the Barbados Stock Exchange (BSE) in 2001. The BSE operates a two-tier electronic trading system comprised of a regular market and an innovation and growth market (formerly the junior market). Companies applying for listing on the regular market must observe and comply with certain requirements. Specifically, they must have assets of at least $500,000 (1 million Barbados dollars) and adequate working capital based on the last three years of their financial performance, as well as three-year performance projections. Companies must also demonstrate competent management and be incorporated under the laws of Barbados or another regulated jurisdiction approved by the Financial Services Commission. Applications for listing on the innovation and growth market are less onerous, requiring minimum equity of one million shares at a stated minimum value of $100,000 (200,000 Barbados dollars). Reporting and disclosure requirements for all listed companies include interim financial statements and an annual report and questionnaire. Non-nationals must obtain exchange control approval from the CBB to trade securities on the BSE. The BSE has computerized clearance and settlement of share certificates through the Barbados Central Securities Depository Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the BSE. Under the Property Transfer Tax Act, the FSC can accommodate investors requiring a traditional certificate for a small fee. The FSC also regulates mutual funds in accordance with the Mutual Funds Act. The BSE adheres to rules in accordance with International Organization of Securities Commissions guidelines designed to protect investors; ensure a fair, efficient, and transparent market; and reduce systemic risk. Public companies must file audited financial statements with the BSE no later than 90 days after the close of their financial year. The authorities may impose a fine not exceeding $5,000 (10,000 Barbados dollars) for any person under the jurisdiction of the BSE who contravenes or is not in compliance with any regulatory requirements. The BSE launched the International Securities Market (ISM) in 2016. It is designed to operate as a separate market, allowing issuers from Barbados and other international markets. To date, the ISM has four listing sponsors. The BSE collaborates with its regional partners, the Jamaica Stock Exchange and the Trinidad and Tobago Stock Exchange, through shared trading software. The capacity for this inter-exchange connectivity provides a wealth of potential investment opportunities for local and regional investors. The BSE obtained designated recognized stock exchange status from the UK in 2019. It is also a member of the World Federation of Exchanges. Barbados has accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the IMF Articles of Agreement and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on current account transactions. The government established the CBB in 1972. The CBB manages Barbados’ currency and regulates its domestic banks. The Barbados Deposit Insurance Corporation (BDIC) provides protection for depositors. Oversight of the entire financial system is conducted by the Financial Oversight Management Committee, which consists of the CBB, the BDIC, and the FSC. The private sector has access to financing on the local market through short-term borrowing and credit, asset financing, project financing, and mortgage financing. Commercial banks and other deposit-taking institutions set their own interest rates. The CBB requires banks to hold 17.5 percent of their domestic deposits in stipulated securities. Bitt, a Barbadian company, developed digital currency DCash in partnership with the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. The first successful DCash retail central bank digital currency consumer-to-merchant transaction took place in Grenada in 2021 following a multi-year development process. The CBB and the FSC established a regulatory sandbox in 2018 where financial technology entities could do live testing of their products and services. This allowed regulators to gain a better understanding of the product or service and to determine what, if any, regulation is necessary to protect consumers. Bitt completed its participation and formally exited the sandbox in 2019. According to Bitt, it has no immediate plans to launch DCash in Barbados and focused first on Barbados’ Eastern Caribbean neighbors. Bitt also offers a digital access exchange, remittance channel, and merchant-processing gateway available via mMoney, a mobile application. In early 2022, the DCash platform crashed for almost two months, raising questions about the initiative’s long-term prospects. The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S., Canadian, and European banks in recent years due to concerns that the region is high-risk. Currently, the CBB does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund. In the past, the government announced plans to create a sovereign wealth fund to ensure national wealth is available for present and future generations of Barbados. Barbadians 18 years and older are expected to gain a stake in the fund after it is established. It is envisioned that the fund will hold governmental assets, including on- and offshore real property, revenues from oil and gas products, and non-tangible assets such as trademarks, patents, and intellectual property. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Barbados work in partnership with ministries, or under their remit, and carry out certain ministerial responsibilities. There are 33 SOEs in Barbados operating in areas such as travel and tourism, investment services, broadcasting and media, sanitation services, sports, and culture. Pre-pandemic total net income was estimated at $60 million (120 million Barbados dollars). SOEs in Barbados are not found in the key areas earmarked for investment. They are all wholly owned government entities. They are headed by boards of directors to which their senior management reports. As part of the ongoing IMF BERT program, the Government of Barbados is addressing the expenditure position of the SOEs by defining clear objectives for SOE reforms, reducing the wage bill of these entities, and implementing other necessary reform measures. Barbados does not currently have a targeted privatization program. The government has announced plans for public-private partnerships in airport management and broadcasting services, which will still see the government retaining ownership of these entities. The process remains open to foreign investors and is transparent. More information can be obtained at http://www.gisbarbados.gov.bb . 10. Political and Security Environment Barbados does not have a recent history of politically motivated violence or civil unrest. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2 Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $4,690 2020 $4,418 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $45,400 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $57,053 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 186% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Central Bank of Barbados (CBB) http://www.centralbank.org.bb Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. Belarus 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Attracting FDI is one of the government’s stated foreign policy priorities. Net inflows of FDI have been included in the list of government performance targets since December 2015. The GOB plans to attract a total of $5.5 billion net FDI in 2021-2025, largely through the China-Belarus “Great Stone” industrial park and Belarus’ six free economic zones. The imposition of wide-ranging sanctions by the United States and many likeminded countries due to Belarus’ facilitation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine has made Belarus a less attractive destination for FDI. So, too, have the numerous restrictions and fees placed on investments from “unfriendly countries” by the GOB. An official decree signed by Lukashenka on March 14 provides for special fees for any early termination of contracts; prevents business partners from “unfriendly” countries from selling their shares in Belarusian joint stocks; increases taxation on any income of foreign partners, including dividends, royalties, and interests; and orders all debts to foreign partners be paid in Belarusian rubles. Belarus does not have any specific requirements for foreigners wishing to establish a business. On paper, investors, whether Belarusian or foreign, receive legal protections and have the same right to conduct business operations in Belarus by incorporating legal entities. However, selective application of existing laws and practices often discriminate against the private sector, including foreign investors, regardless of the country of their origin. Belarus’ investment promotion agency is the National Agency of Investments and Privatization (NAIP). The NAIP is tasked with representing the interests of Belarus as it seeks to attract FDI. The NAIP is a one-stop shop with services available to all investors, including: organizing fact-finding missions to Belarus; assisting with visa formalities; providing information on investment opportunities, special regimes and benefits, and procedures necessary for making investment decisions; selecting investment projects; and providing solutions and post-project support. NAIP has a 24/7 support hotline service via a Telegram channel and email account to help foreign investors address their problems and concerns in Belarus. To maintain an ongoing dialogue with investors, Belarus has established the Foreign Investment Advisory Council (FIAC), chaired by the Prime Minister. FIAC activities include developing proposals to improve investment legislation; participating in examining corresponding regulatory and legal acts; and approaching government agencies for the purpose of adopting, repealing or modifying the regulatory and legal acts that restrict the rights of investors. FIAC includes the heads of government agencies and other state organizations subordinate to the GOB, as well as heads of international organizations and foreign companies and corporations. According to representatives of major foreign investors in Belarus, there were no reports of FIAC taking any meaningful effort to promote the FDI agenda in 2021 or 2022. While the GOB claims foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity, in reality the GOB imposes limits on a case-by-case basis. The limits on foreign equity participation in Belarus in terms of the size of individual investments are above average for the 20 countries covered by the World Bank Group’s Investing Across Borders indicators for Eastern Europe and the Central Asia region. In particular, Belarus limits foreign equity ownership in service industries. Sectors such as fixed-line telecommunications services, electricity generation, transmission and distribution, and railway freight transportation are closed to foreign equity ownership. In addition, a comparatively large number of sectors are dominated by government monopolies, including, but not limited to, those mentioned above. These monopolies make it difficult for foreign companies to invest in Belarus. Finally, the government may restrict investments in the interests of national security (including environmental protection, historical, and cultural values), public order, morality protection, and public health, as well as rights and freedoms of people. While Belarus has no formal national security investment screening mechanism, it retains significant elements of a Soviet-style command economy and screens investments through an informal and hierarchical process that escalates through the bureaucracy depending on the size of the investment or the size of incentives an investor seeks from the GOB. Lukashenka and his administration review and approve even multi-million-dollar foreign investments. Additionally, Belarus’ Ministry of Antimonopoly Regulation and Trade is responsible for reviewing transactions for competition-related concerns (whether domestic or international). The UN Conference on Trade and Development reviewed Belarus’ investment policy in 2009 and made recommendations regarding the improvement of its investment climate: http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaepcb200910_en.pdf Individuals and legal persons can apply for business registration via the web portal of the Single State Register ( http://egr.gov.by/egrn/index.jsp?language=en ) – a resource that includes all relevant information on establishing a business and provides a single window for securing all necessary clearances and permissions from municipal authorities, tax and social security administrations, etc. Business registration normally takes no more than one day. Belarus has a regime allowing for a simplified taxation system for all foreign-owned businesses. Under the 2010 law on supporting small and medium-sized entrepreneurship Belarus defines enterprises as follows: Micro enterprises – fewer than 15 employees; Small enterprises – from 16 to 100 employees; Medium-sized enterprises – from 101 to 250 employees. The government does not promote or incentivize outward investment, nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. According to government statistics, Belarusian businesses’ outward investments in January-June 2021 totaled USD 2.78 billion, of which FDI was 94 percent. The GOB classified investment data following this period and no further investment information is publicly available. 3. Legal Regime According to Belarusian law, drafts of laws and regulations pertaining to investment and doing business are subject to public discussion, though authorities rarely pay heed to public views. The government alleges its policies are transparent, and the implementation of laws is consistent with international norms to foster competition and establish clear rules of the road. However, independent economic experts note that private sector businesses are often discriminated against in favor of public sector businesses. In particular, SOEs often receive government subsidies, benefits, and exemptions like cheaper loans and debt forgiveness that are generally unavailable to private sector companies unless such companies have close connections with Belarus’ ruling circles. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have been a part of Belarus’ legislative framework since 2016. Public-interest entities, which include banks, insurance companies, and public corporations with subsidiary companies, are required to publish their financial statements, which comply with the IFRS. Such statements are subject to statutory audit. The IFRS in Belarus can be accessed at http://www.minfin.gov.by/ru/accounting/inter_standards/docs/ Belarus’ Ministry of Finance posts regular updates and information on budgetary policy, public finances, and debt obligations on its website: http://www.minfin.gov.by/en/budgetary_policy/ and http://www.minfin.gov.by/en/public_debt/ . On March 24, 2022, the WTO announced it had suspended Belarus’ application to join the organization because of the GOB’s support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Belarus had been working to join the WTO since 1993. Belarus is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU); EAEU regulations and decisions supersede the national regulatory system. Belarus has a civil law system with a legal separation of branches and institutions and with the main source of law being legal acts, not precedent. For example, Article 44 of Belarus’ Constitution guarantees the inviolability of property. Article 11 of the Civil Code officially safeguards property rights, but presidential edicts and decrees, controlled exclusively by Lukashenka, typically carry more force than legal acts adopted by the legislature. This weakens investor protections and incentives previously passed into law. There is sometimes a public comment process during drafting of legislation or presidential decrees, but the process is not transparent or sufficiently inclusive of investors’ concerns. Belarus has broadly codified commercial laws, but the laws contain inconsistencies and are not considered business friendly. According to the 2021 Human Rights Report, “The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but authorities did not respect judicial independence and impartiality. Observers believed corruption, inefficiency, and political interference with judicial decisions were widespread.” Businesses complain the authorities selectively enforce regulations and criminal laws and that cases are often politically motivated. At the February 2021 All Belarusian People’s Assembly, for example, Lukashenka announced he had ordered the closure of over 200 private businesses because of their “illegal support” for the political opposition. Each of Belarus’ six regions and the capital city of Minsk have economic courts to address commercial and economic issues. In addition, the Supreme Court has a judicial panel on economic issues. In 2000, Belarus established a judicial panel to enforce intellectual property rights. Under the Labor Code, any claims of unfair labor practices are heard by regular civil courts or commissions on labor issues. However, the judiciary’s lack of independence from the executive branch prevents it from acting as a reliable and impartial mechanism for resolving disputes, whether labor, economic, political, commercial, or otherwise. According to Freedom House’s 2021 Nations in Transit report, for example, thousands of people were brutally repressed by Belarusian authorities following the fraudulent August 2020 presidential elections. No security officials were ever investigated for wrongdoing and none of the protestors who were prosecuted by the state received a fair trial. Local economic court proceedings normally do not exceed two months. Court cases involving foreign persons are typically resolved within seven months unless an international agreement signed by Belarus dictates the resolution must take place sooner. Foreign investment in Belarus is governed by the 2013 laws “On Investments” and “On Concessions,” the 2009 Presidential Decree No. 10 “On the Creation of Additional Conditions for Investment Activity in Belarus,” and other legislation as well as international and investment agreements signed and ratified by Belarus. Issued in 2016, Presidential decree number 188 authorizes the Ministry of Antimonopoly Regulation and Trade to counteract monopolistic activities and promote market competition. According to Article 12 of the Investment Code, neither party may expropriate or nationalize investments both directly and indirectly by means of measures similar to expropriation or nationalization, for other purposes than for the public benefit and on a nondiscriminatory basis; according to the appropriate legal procedure; and on conditions of compensation payment. However, Belarus has no law provisions that establish clear procedures for fair and timely compensation of an investor’s nationalized property. Belarus has signed 70 bilateral agreements on the mutual protection and encouragement of investments which include obligations regarding expropriation. In 2021, there were no nationally-reported cases of nationalization, and there have been no instances of confiscation of business property as a penalty for violations of law. It should be noted, however, an official decree signed by Lukashenka on March 14 provides for special fees and penalties for businesses from “unfriendly” countries, including the United States, looking to leave the Belarusian market. Belarus’ recent actions in response to Western sanctions indicate the government is prepared to violate its commitments under international agreements and domestic law. However, Belarus is party to the following dispute resolution mechanisms: Belarus and the United States signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), but entry into force is pending exchange of instruments of ratification. This is unlikely to take place in the near future given the breakdown of relations between the two countries over Belarus’ continued human rights abuses and support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Most of the BITs concluded by Belarus include a provision on international investment arbitration as a mechanism for settling investor-State disputes and recognize the binding force of the awards issued by tribunals. Under Belarusian law, if an international treaty signed by Belarus establishes rules other than those established by local law, the rules of the international treaty prevail. Since 2017, Belarus has faced three investment arbitration claims involving investors from the Netherlands and Russia. There were no known investment disputes between Belarusian government authorities and U.S. investors in 2021. Judgments of foreign courts are accepted and enforced if there is a relevant international agreement signed by Belarus. Courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards. The Belarusian Chamber of Commerce and Industry has an International Arbitration Court. The 2013 “Law on Mediation,” as well as codes of civil and economic procedures, established various alternative ways of addressing investment disputes. Belarus’ 2012 bankruptcy law, related presidential edicts, and government resolutions are not always consistently applied. Additional legal acts, such as the Civil Code and Code of Economic Procedures, also include certain regulations on bankruptcy-related issues. Under the bankruptcy law, foreign creditors have the same rights as Belarusian creditors. Belarusian law criminalizes false and intentional insolvency as well as concealing insolvency. According to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Index, Belarus was ranked 74 in Resolving Insolvency. 6. Financial Sector The Belarusian government officially claims to welcome portfolio investment. There have been no reports in 2021 on any impediments to such investment. In 2019 and 2020, Belarus received $500 million and $1.34 billion worth of portfolio investments, respectively. The Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange is open to foreign investors, but it is still largely undeveloped because the government only allows companies to trade stocks if they meet certain and often burdensome criteria. Private companies must be profitable and have net assets of at least EUR 1 million. In addition, any income from resulting operations is taxed at 24 percent. Finally, the state owns more than 70 percent of all stocks in the country, and the government appears hesitant and unwilling to trade in them freely. Bonds are the predominant financial instrument on Belarus’ corporate securities market. In 2001, Belarus joined Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, undertaking to refrain from restrictions on payments and transfers under current international transactions. Loans are allocated on market terms and are available to foreign investors. However, the discount rate of 12 percent established in March, 2022 makes credit too expensive for many private businesses, which, unlike many SOEs, do not receive subsidized or reduced-interest loans. Belarus’ National Bank had predicted a rate of 9-10 percent in 2022 but the war in Ukraine, which prompted the fall of the Belarusian ruble against major foreign currencies, combined with a year-on-year inflation rate of 10 percent in January-February forced the National Bank to revise its outlook. Businesses buy and sell foreign exchange at the Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange through their banks. Belarus used to require businesses to sell 10-20 percent of foreign currency revenues through the Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange; however, in late 2018 the National Bank abolished the mandatory sale rule. The Belarus Affairs Unit at U.S. Embassy Vilnius Economic Section telephone: +370 (5) 266-5500; e-mail: usembassyminsk@state.gov Sanctions imposed by the United States have prohibited any commercial activity with some Belarusian banks, including Dabrabyt Bank and Belinvestbank. Belarusian subsidiaries of sanctioned Russian banks are also under sanctions and include Bel/VEB, VTB Bank Belarus, and Sberbank Belarus. Potential investors should review the Department of Treasury website at https://home.treasury.gov/ for updates as trade restrictions on Belarusian banks continue to develop. Sanctions introduced by the EU prohibit contact with the National Bank of Belarus and have blocked access to the SWIFT secure messaging system for a number of banks, including Dabrabyt Bank, the Development Bank of Belarus, and Belagroprombank. Potential investors should review the website of the European Commission for updates and further details at https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en . Belarus has a central banking system led by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus, which represents the interest of the state and is the main regulator of the country’s banking system. The president of Belarus appoints the chair and members of the Board of the National Bank, designates auditing organizations to examine its activities, and approves its annual report. Although the National Bank officially operates independently from the government, there is a history of government interference in monetary and exchange rate policies. In February 2021, the banking system of Belarus included 23 commercial banks and three non-banking credit and finance organizations. According to the National Bank, the share of non-performing loans in the banking sector was 5.3 percent as of January 1, 2022. At the beginning of 2022, the country’s six largest commercial banks of systemic importance, all of which have some government share, accounted for 85 percent of the approximately 92.3 billion Belarusian rubles in total assets across the country’s banking sector. There are five representative offices of foreign banks in Belarus, with China’s Development Bank opening most recently in 2018. Regular banking services are widely available to customers regardless of national origin. Belarusian law does not allow foreign banks to establish branches in Belarus. Subsidiaries of foreign banks are allowed to operate in Belarus and are subject to prudential measures and other regulations like any Belarusian bank. The U.S. Embassy is not aware of Belarus losing any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years. Foreign nationals are allowed to establish a bank account in Belarus without establishing residency status. According to the IMF, Belarus’ state-dominated financial sector faces deep domestic structural problems and external sector challenges. Domestic structural problems include heavy state involvement in the banking and corporate sector, the lack of hard budget constraints for SOEs given state support, and high dollarization. Externally, Belarus’ economy remains exposed to spillovers from the Russian economy and Belarus’ foreign currency reserves offer a limited buffer to potential external shocks. The banking sector remains vulnerable to external shocks, given the high level of dollarization and the exposure to government and SOE debt. In March 2022, S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s ratings services all downgraded Belarus’ debt rating to CCC or Ca “highly vulnerable to defaults.” Belarus does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund. The GOB manages the State Budget Fund of National Development, which supports major economic and social projects in the country. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Although SOEs are outnumbered by private businesses, SOEs dominate the economy in terms of value. According to the Belarusian ministry of taxes and duties, the share of small and medium-sized private enterprises in the revenues of the country’s consolidated budget was 35 percent in 2021, the same as in 2020. Belarus does not consider joint stock companies, even those with 100 percent government ownership of the stocks, to be state-owned and generally refers to them as part of the non-state sector, rendering official government statistics regarding the role of SOEs in the economy misleading. According to media reports, SOEs receive preferential access to government contracts, subsidized credits, and debt forgiveness. While SOEs are generally subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors, private enterprises do not have the same preferential access to land and raw materials. Since Belarus is not a WTO member, it is not a party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). The GOB officially claims to welcome “strategic investors,” including foreign investors, and says that any state-owned or state-controlled enterprise can be privatized. However, Belarus’ privatization program is extremely limited in practice as the government only sells enterprises which operate at a loss and in which the state holds a minority share of less than 25 percent. Lukashenka has expressed skepticism of privatization and during the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly in February 2021 claimed privatization in Belarus was only in the interests of his political opposition. Notably, in April 2020, the government sold its controlling share in Belarus’ fifteenth-largest bank, Paritetbank. Otherwise, there was no privatization of state-controlled companies from 2018 to 2020. The State Property Committee occasionally organizes and holds privatization auctions. Many of the auctions organized by the State Property Committee have low demand as the government often places strict requirements on privitizations, including preserving or creating jobs, continuing in the same line of work or production, or launching a successful business project within a limited timeframe. In 2016, Belarusian joint stocks were allowed trans-border placement via issuing depositary receipts, but to date this instrument of attracting investments has not been used in Belarus. Belgium Executive Summary According to its most recent report, the Belgian central bank expects gross domestic product (GDP) to grow 2.6% in 2022 despite economic headwinds linked to global supply chain bottlenecks, spiking energy costs, and uncertainty related to COVID-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Experts project that Belgium’s growth rate will slow but remain above potential, dipping slightly to 2.4% in 2023 and further to 1.6% in 2024. The labor market remains strong as overall job numbers continue to increase, and analysts anticipate that the unemployment rate will decline steadily to 5.7% by 2024. The inflation rate will likely continue to increase, largely driven by rising energy prices. The Belgian central bank expects the rate to peak in 2022 at 4.9% and then decline as energy markets stabilize. Belgium’s budget deficit is projected to reach 6.3% of GDP for 2021 – down from a high of 9.1% in 2020 – and will likely remain above 4% of GDP through 2024. The level of government debt will hold steady, with most experts projecting 108.9% of GDP in 2021, 106.3% in 2022 and 107.5% in 2023. Belgium is a major logistical hub and gateway to Europe, a position that helps drives its economic growth. Since June 2015, the Belgian government has undertaken a series of measures to reduce the tax burden on labor and to increase Belgium’s economic competitiveness and attractiveness to foreign investment. A July 2017 decision to lower the corporate tax rate from 35% to 25% further improved the investment climate. The current coalition government has not signaled any intention to revise this tax rate. Belgium boasts an open market well connected to the major economies of the world. As a logistical gateway to Europe, host to major EU institutions, and a central location closely tied to the major European economies, Belgium is an attractive market and location for U.S. investors. Belgium is a highly developed, long-time economic partner of the United States that benefits from an extremely well-educated workforce, world-renowned research centers, and the infrastructure to support a broad range of economic activities Belgium has a dynamic economy and attracts significant levels of investment in chemicals, petrochemicals, plastics and composites; environmental technologies; food processing and packaging; health technologies; information and communication; and textiles, apparel and sporting goods, among other sectors. In 2021, Belgian exports to the U.S. market totaled $27.7 billion, registering the United States as Belgium’s fourth largest export destination. Key exports included chemicals (37.6%), machinery and equipment (10.9%), and precious metals and stones (5.9%). In terms of imports, the United States ranked as Belgium’s fourth largest supplier of imports, with the value of imported goods totaling $27.6 billion in 2021. Key imports from the United States included chemicals (38.8%), machinery and equipment (11%), and plastics (10.7%). Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 18 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 22 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A USD Amount https://apps.bea.gov/ international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 45,750USD https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Belgium maintains an open economy, and its prosperity is highly dependent on international trade. Since WWII, making Belgium attractive to foreign investors has been the cornerstone of successive Belgian governments’ foreign and commercial policy. Competence over policies that weigh on the attractiveness of Belgium as a destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) lie predominantly with the federal government, which is responsible for developing domestic competition policy, wage setting policies, labor law, and most of the energy and fiscal policies. Attracting FDI, however, is the responsibility of Belgium’s three regional governments in Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels-Capital Region. Flanders Investment and Trade (FIT), Wallonia Foreign Trade and Investment Agency (AWEX) and Brussels Invest and Export (BIE) are the three investment promotion agencies responsible for attracting FDI to Belgium. One of their most visible activities is organizing the Royal Trade Missions, which are led by Princess Astrid (the king’s sister), as well as the economic part of the state visits by King Philippe. In June 2022, Princess Astrid plans to lead a Royal Trade Mission to Atlanta, New York City, and Boston with more than 500 participants. Neither the federal nor the regional governments currently maintain a formal dialogue with investors. There are no laws in place that discriminate against foreign investors. [While U.S. companies continue to play key and long-standing roles in the development of the Belgian economy, a major U.S.-based multinational firm operating in the chemical cluster near the Port of Antwerp has raised concerns that Flemish government officials have unfairly regulated the company and subjected it to strict limitations not applied to other companies operating in the same sector and space. The firm and the Flemish government remain in regular contact to seek a fair and equitable solution; however, the perceived lack of regulatory certainty could lead to a reduction of industry investment and operations in Belgium if unresolved. There are currently no limits on foreign ownership or control in Belgium, and there are no distinctions between Belgian and foreign companies when establishing or owning a business or setting up a remunerative activity. Belgian authorities are, however, developing a national security-based investment screening law that will likely establish certain restrictions based on national security concerns. The draft law is not expected to be finalized and delivered to Parliament for vote before the end of 2022. In July 2019 the OECD published an in-depth productivity review of Belgium: https://www.oecd.org/belgium/in-depth-productivity-review-of-belgium-88aefcd5-en.htm . Belgium was included in the WTO Trade Policy Review of the European Union which took place February 18-20, 2020: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp495_e.htm . In June 2021, Belgium was subject of an IMF Article IV mission: https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/06/29/mcs062921-belgium-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2021-article-iv-mission To set up a business in Belgium, one must: 1. Deposit at least 20% of the initial capital with a Belgian credit institution and obtain a standard certification confirming that the amount is held in a blocked capital account; 2. Deposit a financial plan with a notary, and sign the deed of incorporation and the by-laws in the presence of a notary, who authenticates the documents and registers the deed of incorporation. The authentication act must be drawn up in French, Dutch, or German (Belgium’s three official languages); and 3. Register with one of the Registers of legal entities, VAT and social security at a centralized company docket and obtain a company number. In most cases, the business registration process can be completed within one week. https://www.business.belgium.be/en/setting_up_your_business Based on the number of employees, the projected annual turnover, and the shareholder class, a company will qualify as a small or medium-sized enterprise (SME) according to the terms of the Promotion of Independent Enterprise Act of February 10, 1998. For a small or medium-sized enterprise, registration is possible once a certificate of competence has been obtained. The person in charge of the daily management of the company must prove his or her knowledge of business management with diplomas and/or practical experience. A company is expected to allow trade union delegations when employing 20 or more full-time equivalents (FTEs). The three Belgian regions each have their own investment promotion agency, whose services are available to all foreign investors. Flanders: Flanders Investment & Trade, https://www.flandersinvestmentandtrade.com/en Wallonia: Invest in Wallonia, http://www.investinwallonia.be/home Brussels: Why Brussels, http://why.brussels/ Belgium does not actively promote outward investment. There are no restrictions for domestic investors to invest in certain countries, other than those that fall under UN or EU sanction regimes. In June 2022, the Belgian government plans to lead a Royal Trade Mission to Atlanta, New York City, and Boston with more than 500 participants. The mission will promote both Belgian investment into the United States and encourage foreign direct investment into Belgium. 3. Legal Regime The Belgian government has adopted a generally transparent competition policy. The government has implemented tax, labor, health, safety, and other laws and policies to avoid distortions or impediments to the efficient mobilization and allocation of investment, comparable to those in other EU member states. While U.S. companies continue to play key and long-standing roles in the development of the Belgian economy, a major U.S.-based multinational firm operating in the chemical cluster near the Port of Antwerp has raised concerns that Flemish government officials have unfairly regulated the company and subjected it to strict limitations not applied to other companies operating in the same sector and space. The firm and the Flemish government remain in regular contact to seek a fair and equitable solution; however, the perceived lack of regulatory certainty could lead to a reduction of industry investment and operations in Belgium if unresolved. Political competences in Belgium are shared between the federal government, the three regions – Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels-Capital – and the French and German linguistic communities. (Note. Flanders merged the Flemish linguistic community into its regional government. End Note.) Notwithstanding the fact that the regions in Belgium are responsible for attracting foreign investors, most regulations impacting the business environment (taxes, labor market, energy) are controlled at the federal level. In contrast, environmental regulations are developed mostly at the regional level. A regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is mandatory for all primary and some subordinate legislation submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers at the federal level and is usually shared with social partners as a basis for consultation. Belgium publishes all its relevant legislation and administrative guidelines in an official Gazette, called Het Staatsblad/Le Moniteur Belge (https://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi/welcome.pl ). Recognizing the need to streamline administrative procedures in many areas, in 2015 the federal government set up a special task force to simplify official procedures. Traditionally, scientific studies or quantitative analysis conducted on the impact of regulations are made publicly available for comment. However, not all stakeholder comments received by regulators are made public. Accounting standards are regulated by the Belgian law of January 30, 2001, and balance sheet and profit and loss statements are in line with international accounting norms. Cash flow positions and reporting changes in non-borrowed capital formation are not required. However, contrary to IAS/IFRS standards, Belgian accounting rules do require an extensive annual policy report. Regarding Environmental, Social and Governance Impacts reporting (ESG), the EU’s Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD) was transposed into Belgian law in 2017. The NFRD requires very large public interest entities (PIEs) to report environmental, social and employee, human rights, anti-bribery, and corruption information on an annual basis. On April 21, 2021, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), which will update the NFRD. The CSRD aims to be applicable as of fiscal year 2023 and will significantly extend the scope of reporting requirements to all large companies and all companies listed on regulated markets (except listed micro-enterprises). Regarding oversight or enforcement mechanisms to ensure governments follow administrative processes, local courts are expected to enforce foreign arbitral awards issued against the government. Recourse to the courts is available if necessary. Public finances and debt obligations are generally transparent. Details on government budgets are available online, and the debt agency (https://www.debtagency.be/en ) publishes all relevant data concerning government debt. Belgium is a founding member of the EU, whose directives and regulations are enforced. On May 25, 2018, Belgium implemented the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (EU) 2016/679, an EU regulation on data protection and privacy for all individuals within the European Union. Through the European Union, Belgium is a member of the WTO, and notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Belgium does not maintain any measures that are inconsistent with the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) obligations. Belgium’s (civil) legal system is independent of the government and is a means for resolving commercial disputes or protecting property rights. Belgium has a wide-ranging codified law system since 1830. There are specialized commercial courts which apply the existing commercial and contractual laws. As in many countries, the Belgian courts labor under a growing caseload and ongoing budget cuts causing backlogs and delays. There are several levels of appeal. Payments and transfers within Belgium and with foreign countries require no prior authorization. Transactions may be executed in euros as well as in other currencies. Belgium has no debt-to-equity requirements. Dividends may be remitted freely except in cases in which distribution would reduce net assets to less than paid-up capital. No further withholding tax or other tax is due on repatriation of the original investment or on the profits of a branch, either during active operations or upon the closing of the branch. Belgian authorities are currently developing a national security-based investment screening law that will likely establish certain restrictions based on national security concerns. The law likely will not be finalized and delivered to Parliament for a vote before the end of 2022. There are three different regional Investment Authorities: Flanders: http://www.flandersinvestmentandtrade.com Wallonia: http://www.awex.be Brussels: https://be.brussels/brussels The contact address for competition-related concerns: Federal Competition Authority City Atrium, 6th floor Vooruitgangsstraat 50 1210 Brussels tel: +32 2 277 5272 fax: +32 2 277 5323 email: info@bma-abc.be EU member states are responsible for competition and anti-trust regulations if there are cross-border dimensions. If cross-border effects are present, EU law applies, and European institutions are competent. There are no outstanding expropriation or nationalization cases in Belgium with U.S. investors. There is no pattern of discrimination against foreign investment in Belgium. When the Belgian government uses its eminent domain powers to acquire property compulsorily for a public purpose, current market value is paid to the property owners. Recourse to the courts is available if necessary. The only expropriations that occurred during the last decade were related to infrastructure projects such as port expansions, roads, and railroads. Belgian bankruptcy law falls is under the jurisdiction of the commercial courts. The commercial court appoints a judge-auditor to preside over the bankruptcy proceeding and whose primary task is to supervise the management and liquidation of the bankrupt estate, in particular with respect to the claims of the employees. Belgian bankruptcy law recognizes several classes of preferred or secured creditors. A person who has been declared bankrupt may subsequently start a new business unless the person is found guilty of certain criminal offences that are directly related to the bankruptcy. The Business Continuity Act of 2009 provides the possibility for companies in financial difficulty to enter into a judicial reorganization. These proceedings are to some extent similar to Chapter 11 as the aim is to facilitate business recovery. In the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Index, Belgium ranks number 9 (out of 190) for the ease of resolving insolvency. 6. Financial Sector Belgium has policies in place to facilitate the free flow of financial resources. Credit is allocated at market rates and is available to foreign and domestic investors without discrimination. Belgium is fully served by the international banking community and is implementing all relevant EU financial directives. Bruges established the world’s first stock market almost 600 years ago, and the Belgian stock exchange is well-established today. On Euronext, a company may increase its capital either by capitalizing reserves or by issuing new shares. An increase in capital requires a legal registration procedure, and new shares may be offered either to the public or to existing shareholders. A public notice is not required if the offer is to existing shareholders, who may subscribe to the new shares directly. An issue of bonds to the public is subject to the same requirements as a public issue of shares: the company’s capital must be entirely paid up, and existing shareholders must be given preferential subscription rights. In 2016, the Belgian government passed legislation to improve entrepreneurial financing through crowdfunding and more flexible capital venture rules. Because the Belgian economy is directed toward international trade, more than half of its banking activities involve foreign countries. Belgium’s major banks are represented in the financial and commercial centers of dozens of countries by subsidiaries, branch offices, and representative offices. The country does have a central bank, the National Bank of Belgium (NBB), whose governor is also a member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB). Being a Eurozone member state, the NBB is part of the Euro system, meaning that it has transferred the sovereignty over monetary policy to the ECB. Since 2017, the supervision of systemically important Belgian banks lies with the ECB. The country has not lost any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years, nor are there any correspondent banking relationships currently in jeopardy. The Belgian non-performing Loan Ratio stood at 0.7% in 2021. Total bank assets amount to about 90% of GDP. Opening a bank account in the country is linked to residency status. The U.S. FATCA (Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act) requires Belgian banks to report information on U.S. account holders directly to the Belgian tax authorities, who then release the information to the IRS. Belgium implemented a basic banking service law in 2021 which aims to give entrepreneurs otherwise unable to open a bank account the right to do so. For example, companies that have been refused the ability to open a bank account by three credit institutions are entitled to a basic banking service. According to the law, a basic banking service room – administered by the government – will confirm evidence of three refusals, and designate a credit institution in Belgium that must offer the basic banking service to the company. Even though the law is still not fully implemented, authorities anticipate nationwide implementation in 2022. Belgium has a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) in the form of the Federal Holding and Investment Company (FPIM-SFPI), a quasi-independent entity created in 2006 and now mainly used as a vehicle to manage the banking assets which were taken on board during the 2008 banking crisis. The SWF has a board whose members reflect the composition of the governing coalition and are regularly audited by the “Cour des Comptes” or national auditor. At the end of 2020, its total assets amounted to €1.96 billion. Most of the funds are invested domestically. Its role is to allow public entities to recoup their investments and support Belgian banks. The SWF is required by law to publish an annual report and is subject to the same domestic and international accounting standards and rules. The SWF routinely fulfills all legal obligations. However, it is not a member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Belgium has around 80,000 employees working in SOEs, mainly in the railways, telecoms and general utility sectors. There are also several regional-owned enterprises where the regions often have a controlling majority. Private enterprises are allowed to compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions, but since the EU started to liberalize network industries such as electricity, gas, water, telecoms and railways, there have been regular complaints in Belgium about unfair competition from the former state monopolists. Complaints have ranged from lower salaries (railways) to lower VAT rates (gas and electricity) to regulators with a conflict of interest (telecom). Although these complaints have now largely subsided, many of these former monopolies are now market leaders in their sector, due mainly to their ability to charge high access costs to legacy networks that were fully amortized years ago. Belgium currently has no scheduled privatizations. There are no indications that foreign investors would be excluded from eventual privatizations. 10. Political and Security Environment Belgium is a peaceful, democratic nation comprised of federal, regional, and municipal political units: the Belgian federal government, the regional governments of Flanders, Wallonia, the Brussels-Capital region, and communes (municipalities). Political divisions do exist between the Flemish and the Walloons, but they are addressed in democratic institutions and generally resolved through compromise. The Federal Council of Ministers, headed by the prime minister, remains in office as long as it retains the confidence of the lower house (Chamber of Representatives) of the bicameral parliament. In 2021, a seven-year-long investigation into an attempted sabotage of the Doel nuclear power plant – perpetrated in 2014 – ended inconclusively in 2021. Investigators concluded that the incident was likely carried out by a plant employee or subcontractor who had a legitimate reason to be in the area where the sabotage occurred. Belize Executive Summary Belize has the smallest economy in Central America, with a gross domestic product (GDP) of US $1.3 billion in 2021, a 12.5 percent expansion over the previous year. Due to mounting fiscal pressures and a need to diversify and expand its economy, the Government of Belize (GoB) is open to, and actively seeks, foreign direct investment (FDI). However, the small population of the country (2021 estimate – 432,516 persons), high cost of doing business, high public debt, bureaucratic delays, often insufficient infrastructure, and corruption constitute investment challenges. The Central Bank of Belize projects the country’s GDP will likely expand 6.0 percent in 2022 while the IMF’s projects 6.5 percent growth, led by a rebound of activity in the construction, retail and wholesale trade, transport and communication, and tourism sectors. Public debt declined from 133 percent of GDP in 2020 to 108 percent in 2021. This was in large part due to the Blue Bond Agreement, a successful marine protection and conservation-driven financial transaction. International reserves increased from US $348 million (3.8 months of imports) in 2020 to US $420 million (3.9 months of imports) in 2021, partly due to the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 25.6 million allocation, which the authorities are keeping as reserve. Belize’s government encourages FDI to relieve fiscal pressure and transform the economy. The Central Bank of Belize recorded increased inflows of FDI at US $152.25 million in 2021 and outflows at US $24.4 million in the same period. FDI inflows were concentrated primarily in real estate, construction, financial intermediation, and the hotel and restaurant industries. Generally, Belize has no restrictions on foreign ownership and control of companies; however, foreign investments must be registered with the Central Bank of Belize and adhere to the Exchange Control Act and related regulations. The Government of Belize (GoB) made progress on the ease of doing business through trade license, stamp duty, exchange control, and land reforms to streamline business applications and related processes. The banking system remains stable but fragile. Since January 2020, a domestic bank and an international bank each lost a correspondent banking relationship, a significant portion of the sector. In March 2022, the GoB lowered the business tax on the net interest income charged to banks and financial institutions to encourage lending in strategic foreign exchange earning sectors such as tourism, agriculture, and the Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) sectors. There were incidents of property destruction at two American companies involved in sugar cane industry in the last year. In response, a prominent agro-productive organization wrote to the Government in January 2022 expressing concerns that the Belizean government’s failure to protect and support private sector investors in these instances led to damaging the investment climate and the Belizean economy. Belize is categorized as a small island developing state (SIDS) that is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change and is a relatively minor contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions. Belize’s updated National Determined Contributions (NDC) is nonetheless committed to developing a long-term strategy aligned with achieving net zero global emissions by 2050. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 N/A http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 64 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,110 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Belize’s government encourages FDI to relieve fiscal pressure and transform the economy. In November 2021, the Government of Belize hosted its first national Investment Summit under the theme “Belize: Open for Business.” The Government of Belize also conducted trade missions to the United States to promote itself as an investment destination and credible export market. In April 2022, senior Belizean government representatives hosted a diaspora tour in the United States to encourage Belizean-Americans to invest in Belize. The estimated Belize diaspora is 300,000 persons. While the government is interested in attracting FDI, certain bureaucratic and regulatory requirements impede investment and growth. Public debt declined from 133 percent of GDP in 2020 to 108 percent in 2021. This was in large part due to the Blue Bond Agreement, a successful marine protection and conservation-driven financial transaction. Under this deal, The Nature Conservancy (TNC) lent funds to Belize to buy back its Superbond (totaling US $553 million or 30 percent of GDP) at a discounted price of 55 cents per dollar. In exchange, Belize committed to increase expenditure on marine conservation until 2041 and to expand its Biodiversity Protection Zones to 30 percent by 2026. There are no laws that explicitly discriminate against foreign investors. In practice, however, investors complain that lack of transparency, land insecurity, bureaucracy, delays, and corruption are factors that make it difficult to do business in Belize. U.S. firms have identified challenges in participating and competing in areas related to the bidding, procurement, and dispute settlement processes, in particular relating to State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The Belize Trade and Investment Development Service (BELTRAIDE; www.belizeinvest.org.bz ) is the investment and export promotion agency. It promotes FDI through various incentive packages and identified priority sectors. Export-orientated businesses operating in less developed areas also receive preferential treatment. The Economic Development Council, https://edc.gov.bz , is a public-private sector advisory body established to advance public sector reforms, to promote private sector development and to inform policies for growth and development. Belize acknowledges the right for foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in remunerative activities. Foreign and domestic entities must first register their business before engaging in business. They must also register for the appropriate taxes, including business tax and general sales tax, as well as obtain a social security number and trade license. Generally, Belize has no restrictions on foreign ownership and control of companies; however, foreign investments must be registered with the Central Bank of Belize and adhere to the Exchange Control Act and related regulations. To register a business name, foreigners must apply with a Belizean partner or someone with a permanent residence. Requirements differ based on the applicant’s residency status and whether the individual is seeking to establish a local or foreign currency account. Foreign investments must be registered and obtain an “Approved Status” from the Central Bank to facilitate inflows and outflows of foreign currency and repatriate funds gained from profits, dividends, loan payments, and interest. The Exchange Control Regulation Act was amended in 2020 to relax the requirement for non-residents to obtain prior permission from the Central Bank to conduct transaction in securities and real estate. The amendment now requires for prior written notice to the Central Bank with full particulars of the transaction. Some investment incentives show preference to Belizean-owned companies. For example, to qualify for a tour operator license, a business must be majority-owned by Belizeans or permanent residents of Belize ( http://www.belizetourismboard.org ). This qualification is negotiable, particularly where a tour operation would expand into a new sector of the market and does not result in competition with local operators. The government does not impose any intellectual property transfer requirements. Foreign investors seeking to avail themselves of various incentives programs are required to adhere to screening guidelines outlined in the specific program. These may include updating their shareholders registry, obtaining requisite Central Bank of Belize approvals, and fulfilling performance requirements. Foreign investors undertaking large capital investments are also advised to adhere to environmental laws and regulations. The government requires developers to prepare an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for certain projects. When purchasing land or planning to develop in or near an ecologically sensitive zone, the government recommends the EIA fully address any measures by the investor to mitigate environmental risks. The Department of Environment website, http://www.doe.gov.bz has more information on the Environmental Protection Act and other regulations, applications, and guidelines. In the past three years, there has been no investment policy review of Belize by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Belize concluded its third Trade Policy Review in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2017. In the past five years, civil society organizations concerned with investment policy lobbied directly with government. As an example, the Belize Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Belize Network of NGOs, and the opposition were represented on the National Oversight Committee during the height of the COVID- 19 pandemic. BELTRAIDE ( http://www.belizeinvest.org.bz ), a statutory body of the Government of Belize, operates as the country’s investment and export promotion agency. Its investment facilitation services are open to all investors, foreign and domestic. While there are support measures to advance greater inclusion of women and minorities in entrepreneurial initiatives and training, the business facilitation measures do not generally distinguish by gender or economic status. The GoB made progress on the ease of doing business through trade license, stamp duty, exchange control, and land reforms to streamline business applications and related processes. Myriad government services are going digital. Business and personal income tax offices amalgamated into the Belize Tax Service which launched an online tax payment system. Belize’s Financial Inclusion Strategy also expands access of financial services to underserved populations. Businesses must register with the tax department and local government to pay business and general sales tax and obtain a trade license. An employer should also register employees for social security. Permission from the Central Bank is required for all overseas investments between residents and non-residents The Belize Companies and Corporate Affairs Registry (tel: +501 822 0421; email: info@belizecompaniesregistry.gov.bz ; website: https://belizecompaniesregistry.gov.bz ) is responsible for the registration process of all local businesses and companies. Belize does not promote or incentivize outward investments. The government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. However, the Central Bank places currency controls on investment abroad, with Central Bank approval required prior to foreign currency outflows. 3. Legal Regime There are no reports of government policies, processes, or laws significantly distort or discriminate against foreign investors. Nonetheless, some investors have complained of systematic shortfalls such as unreliable land titles and bureaucratic delays or corruption, which hinder doing business in Belize. U.S. firms have also identified challenges in participating and competing in areas related to the bidding, procurement, and dispute settlement processes, particular to State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). There are no nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or private sector associations that manage regulatory processes. NGOs and private sector associations do lobby on behalf of their members but have no statutory authority. Regulatory authority exists both at the local and national levels with national laws and regulations being most relevant to foreign businesses. The cabinet dictates government policies that are enacted by the legislature and implemented by the various government authorities. Some quasi-governmental organizations are also mandated by law to manage specific regulatory processes, e.g., the Belize Tourism Board, BELTRAIDE, and the Belize Agricultural Health Authority. Regulations exist at the local level, primarily relating to property taxes and registering for trade licenses to operate businesses in the municipality. Some supra-national organizations and regulatory structures exist. For example, some elements of international trade affecting U.S. businesses are affected by CARICOM treaties, as in the case of the export of sugar within CARICOM. Accounting, legal, and regulatory systems are consistent with international norms. Publicly owned companies generally receive audits annually, and the reports are in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards and International Standards on Auditing. The government does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social and governance disclosure to facilitate transparency or help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. Draft bills or regulations are generally made available for public comment through a public consultation process. Once introduced in the House of Representatives, draft bills are sent to the relevant standing committee, which then meet and invite the public and interested persons to review, recommend changes, or object to draft laws prior to further debate. The mechanism for drafting bills, and enacting regulations and legislation generally applies across the board and includes investment laws and regulations. Public comments on draft legislation are not generally posted online nor made publicly available. In a few instances, laws are passed quickly without meaningful publication, public review, or public debate. The government does not generally disclose the basis on which it reviews regulations. Some government agencies make scientific studies publicly available. Printed copies of the Belize Government Gazette contain proposed as well as enacted laws and regulations and are publicly available for a subscription fee. Additionally, enacted laws are published free of cost on the website of the National Assembly or Parliament, but there is a delay in updating the website. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable with regulatory decisions subject to judicial review. The Office of the Ombudsman also may investigate allegations of official wrongdoing but has no legal authority to bring judicial charges. Reports of wrongdoing are submitted to the affected ministry. Additionally, the Annual Report of the Ombudsman is presented to the National Assembly and is a publicly available document. The offices for business and personal income tax amalgamated into the Belize Tax Service, which launched an online tax payment system in August 2021. The Companies Registries, along with the court system, are being digitized to facilitate e-filing of documents and online payment of fees. In March 2022, the government lowered business tax on the net interest income charged to banks and financial institutions with a view to incentivizing lending in strategic foreign exchange earning sectors and at the same time increased the tax on specific sectors to disincentivize personal and distribution loans. The amendments to the tax system will improve tax collection and a stem leakage. Other anticipated reforms are expected to improve the ease of doing business, provide greater transparency and stimulate economic growth with lending to foreign exchange earning sectors. Information on public finance, both the government’s budget and its debt obligations (including explicit and contingent liabilities) are widely accessible to the public, with most documents available online. The budget documents do not include information on contingent or state-owned enterprise (SOE) debt unless the GoB guarantees or is paying these debts. Nonetheless, the audited annual reports of all major SOEs were publicly available on their websites. The Auditor General’s report on government spending, however, is often significantly delayed. As a full member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Belize’s foreign, economic and trade policies vis-a-vis non-member states are coordinated regionally. The country’s import tariffs are largely defined by CARICOM’s Common External Tariff. Besides CARICOM, Belize is a member of the Central American Integration System (SICA) at a political level, but is not a part of the Secretariat of Central American Economic Integration (SIECA) that supports economic integration with Central America. Belize is also a member of the WTO and adheres to the Organization’s agreements and reporting system. The Belize Bureau of Standards (BBS) is the national standards body responsible for preparing, promoting, and implementing standards for goods, services, and processes. The BBS operates in accordance with the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and the CARICOM Regional Organization for Standards and Quality. The BBS is also a member of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and Codex Alimentarius. As a former British colony, Belize follows the English Common Law legal system. The Belize Constitution is the supreme law and founded on the principle of a separation of powers with independence of the judiciary from the executive and legislative branches of government. Belize has a written Contract Act, but no specialized courts to deal with commercial disputes or cases. The judicial system remains generally independent of the executive branch. Case law exists where the judiciary has ruled against the government, and its judgements are respected and authoritative. The highest appellate court exists outside of Belize at the Caribbean Court of Justice, providing a level of independence for the judiciary. The judiciary remains underfunded and understaffed resulting in frequent adjournments, delays, poor case-flow management and a backlog of cases. General information relating to Belize’s judicial and legal system, including links to Belize’s Constitution, Laws and judicial decisions are available at the Judiciary of Belize website www.belizejudiciary.org . Businesses and citizens may appeal regulations and enforcement actions. Regulatory decisions are also subject to judicial review. Judgments by the Belize Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal are available at http://www.belizejudiciary.org . The Caribbean Court of Justice has two jurisdictions, appellate and original, in relation to CARICOM Members States. In its appellate jurisdiction, the CCJ is the final court of appeal for both civil and criminal matters emanating from CARICOM Member States. In its original jurisdiction, this Court is responsible for interpreting and applying the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, the treaty establishing the Caribbean Community and CARICOM Single Market and Economy. The country has an English Common Law legal system supplemented by local legislation and regulations. The legal system does not generally discriminate against foreign investment and there are no restrictions to foreign ownership. The Exchange Control Act and its subsidiary laws and regulations, however, provide the legal framework that applies to foreign ownership and control. Other laws stipulate that foreign investment can qualify for incentives; citizens have the right to private property; contracts are legally binding and enforceable, and regulations are subject to judicial review among other provisions favorable to foreign investment. Major laws enacted or amended are generally available in the National Assembly’s website at www.nationalassembly.gov.bz . For the previous year, these include the Blue Bond Loan Act, 2021; Companies (Amendment) Act, 2021; Data Protection Act, 2021; Electronic Evidence Bill, 2021; Electronic Transactions Act, 2021; Electronic Transfer of Funds Crime Act, 2021; Immigration (Amendment) Act,, 2021; Patents (Amendment) Act, 2021; Public Sector Data Sharing Act, 2021; Securities Industry Act, 2021; Stamp Duties (Amendment) Act, 2021; Sugar Industry (Amendment) Act, 2021; Trademarks (Amendment) Act, 2021; Tax Administration and Procedures (Amendment) Act, 2021; Central Bank of Belize (Amendment) Act, 2022; and Income and Business Tax (Amendment) Act, 2022. There is no “one-stop-shop” website for investment, and the laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements related to investors differ depending on the nature of the investment. BELTRAIDE provides advisory services for foreign investors relating to procedures for doing business in Belize and what incentives might be available to qualifying investors. Further information is available at the BELTRAIDE website: http://www.belizeinvest.org.bz Belize does not have any laws governing competition, but there are attempts to limit outside competition in certain industries (such as food and agriculture) by levying high import duties and import licensing requirements. The government used the right of eminent domain in several cases to expropriate private property, including land belonging to foreign investors. There were no new expropriation cases in 2021. However, claimants in previous cases of expropriation assert the GoB failed to honor agreements entered into by a previous administration. Belizean law requires that the government assess and compensate according to fair market value. Expropriation cases can take several years to settle and there are a few cases where compensation is still pending. Belize nationalized two companies in public-private partnership: Belize Electricity Limited and Belize Telemedia Limited. These actions were challenged in the courts and resolved in 2015 and 2017, respectively. The Caribbean Court of Justice delivered a judgment relating to the Belmopan Land Development Corporation Limited (BLDCL) in January 2022, wherein it upheld the decision of the trial judge in favor of BLDCL. The case pertained to compensation owed by the government for 1,394 acres of land expropriated in 2013. After negotiations for market value failed, the matter was taken before local courts. The CCJ upheld the trial judge’s quantum of damages to BLDCL for just over US $8 million. The Bankruptcy Act of Belize provides for bankruptcy filings. The Act provides for the establishment of receivership, trustees, adjudication, and seizures of the property of the bankrupt. The court may order the arrest of the debtor as well as the seizure of assets and documents in the event the debtor may flee or avoid payment to creditors. The Director of Public Prosecutions may institute proceedings for offenses related to the bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy law generally outlines actions a creditor may take to recoup losses. Bankruptcy protections are not as comprehensive as U.S. bankruptcy law. 6. Financial Sector Belize’s financial system is small with little to no foreign portfolio investment transactions. It does not have a stock exchange and capital market operations are rudimentary. In 2021, Belize passed the Securities Industry Act for the modernization of the laws on securities and capital markets. The Central Bank of Belize must approve capital transactions, such as the purchase and sale of land, company shares, financial assets, and other investments that the transfer of assets between foreign and local entities. The Central Bank advised that, effective April 2022, it would only accept electronic applications for the approval of portfolio and capital investments and land transfers. Belize accepted the obligations of Article VIII, and the exchange regime is free of restrictions or multiple currency practices. Credit is made available on market terms with interest rates largely set by prevailing local market conditions within the commercial banks. The credit instruments accessible to the private sector include loans, overdrafts, lines of credit, credit cards, and bank guarantees. Foreign investors can access credit on the local market. Under the International Banking Act, foreign investors/nonresidents may access credit from international banks registered and licensed in Belize. However, permission to access credit from the domestic banks requires Central Bank approval. The Belize Development Finance Corporation (DFC), a state-owned development bank, offers loan financing services in various sectors. To qualify for a loan from DFC, an individual must be a Belizean resident or citizen, while a company must be majority 51 percent Belizean owned. The National Bank of Belize is a state-owned bank that provides concessionary credit primarily to public officers, teachers, and low-income Belizeans. A financial inclusion survey undertaken by the Central Bank of Belize in 2019 showed that approximately 65.5 percent of adult Belizeans had access to a financial account. In response, the banking sector has begun introducing digital wallet solutions to reach “unbanked” segments of the population. Belize’s financial system remains underdeveloped with a banking sector that may be characterized as stable but fragile. International reserves increased from US $348 million (3.8 months of imports) in 2020 to US $420 million (3.9 months of imports) in 2021, partly due to the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 25.6 million allocation, which Belizean authorities are keeping as reserve. Regulatory capital is still well above minimum requirements, while the gross non-performing loan (NPL) ratio at the end of February 2022 stood at 5.58 percent of loans. However, the Central Bank is reviewing domestic banks and credit unions self-assessments as the expired forbearance measures from 2020 could represent a risk as a fraction of their loan portfolio could turn into NPLs. The Central Bank of Belize (CBB) ( https://www.centralbank.org.bz ) is responsible for formulating and implementing monetary policy focusing on the stability of the exchange rate and economic growth. Generally, there are no restrictions on foreigners opening bank accounts in Belize. Regulations differ based on residency status and whether the individual is seeking to establish a local bank account or a foreign currency account. Foreign banks and branches are allowed to operate in the country with all banks subject to Central Bank measures and regulations. Since January 2020 to present, a domestic bank and an international bank each lost a correspondent bank. Belize’s financial system comprises five domestic banks, three international banks, and ten credit unions. Correspondent banks discontinued offered correspondent banking relationships (CBR) to Scotiabank (Belize) Limited following the acquisition of the Scotiabank (Belize) Limited by the Caribbean International Holdings Limited. As of February 2022, the estimated total assets of the country’s largest bank were US $1.09 billion. In the last few years, Belize continues reforms to strengthen the anti-money laundering and counterterrorism-financing regime, including conducting an interagency national money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risk assessment. Belize does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) exist largely in the utilities sectors, generally as a result of nationalization. The government is the majority shareholder in the Belize Water Services Limited, the country’s sole provider of water services, the Belize Electricity Limited, the sole distributor of electricity, and the Belize Telemedia Limited, the largest telecommunications provider in the country. The Public Utilities Commission regulates all utilities. SOEs usually select senior government officials, members of local business bureaus and chambers of commerce, labor organizations, and quasi-governmental agencies to staff these companies’ boards of directors. The board serves to direct policy and shape business decisions of the ostensibly independent SOE. Current and previous administrations have been accused of nepotism and cronyism and criticized for having conflicts of interest when board members or directors are also represented in organizations that do business with the SOEs. There is no published list of SOEs. The following are the major SOEs operating in the country. Information relating to their operations is available on their websites: Belize Electricity Limited http://www.bel.com.bz ; Belize Telemedia Limited at https://www.livedigi.com ; Belize Water Services Limited http://www.bws.bz There is no public third-party market analysis that evaluate whether SOEs receive non-market advantages by the government. The Belize Electricity Limited and the Belize Water Services Limited are the only service providers in their respective sectors. The Belize Telemedia Limited, on the other hand, competes with one other provider for mobile connectivity and there are multiple players that provide internet and data services. U.S. firms have identified challenges in participating and competing in areas related to the bidding, procurement and dispute settlement processes, particular to SOEs. The Government of Belize does not currently have a privatization program. 10. Political and Security Environment Belize has traditionally enjoyed one of the most stable political environments in the region, having held peaceful and transparent democratic elections since gaining independence on September 21, 1981. In general elections, the two major political parties usually trade leadership. The current People’s United Party gained an overwhelming majority in the November 2020 General Elections, winning twenty-six of the thirty-one electoral divisions. The few times political candidates have questioned the result of elections, these have been settled by the court. There were incidents of property destruction at two American companies involved in sugar cane industry in the last year. In December 2021, cane farmers from Belize’s largest cane farmers association blockaded the access road to a major American investment in Orange Walk for three days, preventing other farmers from delivering cane to the factory. An impasse between the cane farmer association and the sugar mill for a contract to deliver cane sparked the incident. The American investment subsequently initiated two legal suits against the cane farmer’s association for destruction to property and economic losses incurred. The second company located in the Cayo District, suffered arson in January 2022, presumably related to a conflict associated with land rights. Over 1,200 acres of sugar cane was lost in the fire, an estimated loss of US $1.15 million. In response, a prominent agro-productive organization wrote to the Government in January 2022 expressing concerns that the Belizean government’s failure to protect and support private sector investors in these instances led to damaging the investment climate and Belizean economy still further. Neighboring Guatemala’s long-standing territorial claim on Belize has persisted for almost two centuries. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is currently deliberating the territorial dispute. In December 2020, Guatemala filed its claim to Belize’s continental land, islands, and seas, and Belize will file its counter claim in June 2022. Despite legal efforts to resolve the claim, the Friends for Conservation and Development (FCD), a local Belizean NGO, continues to document illegal encroachments and settlements in and beyond the adjacency zone in Belize. In July 2021, FCD rangers accompanied by Belize Defence Force (BDF) members were fired upon by Guatemalan civilians as the former attempted to destroy illegal plantations in the Chiquibul forest reserve in Belize. The BDF retaliated, which in turn instigated the response of the Guatemalan Armed Forces (GAF). The incident did not escalate further and there were no casualties. The second major security concern is the high level of crime countrywide. While Belize has a high murder rate per capita, it is primarily focused on the urban areas of Belize City. Corruption, human and drug trafficking, money laundering (institutional and trade-based), and local criminal gang activity remain significant problems exacerbated by the low conviction rate. Benin Executive Summary Benin transitioned to a democracy in 1990, enjoying a reputation for regular, peaceful, and, until recently, inclusive elections. In 2019 and 2021, the government held legislative and presidential elections, respectively, which were not fully inclusive nor competitive. Elections-related unrest in 2019 and 2021 resulted in several deaths. In April 2021, President Patrice Talon was re-elected for a second, and pursuant to Benin’s constitution, final five-year term. Benin’s overall macroeconomic conditions were positive in 2020, though growth declined compared to previous years. According to the World Bank, GDP growth slowed from 6.9 percent in 2019 to 3.8 percent in 2020. Most of the slowdown in 2019 and 2020 was driven by the COVID-19 pandemic and Nigeria’s partial closure of its borders that lasted from August 2019 to December 2020. In December 2021, Benin’s National Assembly unanimously passed the Government of Benin (GOB) 2022 budget, which projects economic growth to accelerate to seven percent in 2022, higher than estimates from multilateral institutions. The IMF projection for growth in 2022 is 6.5 percent, and the African Development Bank projects a growth rate recovery from 4.8 in 2021 to 6.5 percent in 2022 if Covid-19 is brought under control. Port activity and the cotton sector are the largest drivers of economic growth. Telecommunications, agriculture, energy, cement production, and construction are other significant components of the economy. Benin also has a large informal sector. The country’s GDP is roughly 51 percent services, 26 percent agriculture, and 23 percent manufacturing. In January 2022, the Talon administration released its second government action plan (French acronym-PAG) estimated at $20.6 billion. The PAG lists 342 projects (half of which are carried forward from the Talon administration’s first PAG covering 2016-2021) across 23 sectors. With the goals of strengthening the administration of justice, fostering a structural transformation of the economy, and improving living conditions, the projects are concentrated in infrastructure, agriculture and agribusiness, tourism, health, energy, telecomuncation, and education. The government estimates that full implementation of the PAG will result in the creation of 500,000 new jobs and a leap in national economic and social conditions. The government intended that 48 percent of the PAG be funded through public funds and the remainder through public-private partnerships (PPPs). Through the end of 2021 a limited number of public-private partnerships had been secured. Government critics allege that the Talon administration is using the PAG in part to channel resources and contracts to administration insiders. Benin continues efforts to attract private investment in support of economic growth amidst reports of high-level corruption among government insiders and occasional failure to respect foreign investment contracts. The Investment and Exports Promotion Agency (APIEX) is a one-stop-shop for promoting new investments, business startups, and foreign trade. In 2020, APIEX worked with foreign companies to facilitate new investments, though some companies reported that the agency was under-resourced and hamstrung by bureaucratic red tape in other agencies and ministries. APIEX reported that business creation increased to 40,000 in 2020 from 13,000 in 2015. The construction of a Special Economic Zone, located at Glo-Djigbé, is also a major component of the second PAG. Located 30 miles north of Benin’s capital Cotonou, the Glo-Djigbé Industrial Zone (GDIZ) is currently in the works under the direction of Benin’s Industry Promotion and Investment Company (SIPI), a public private partnership. The GDIZ is structured such that the GOB owns a 35 percent stake in it with the the Mauritanian-Singaporean firm Arise Integrated International Platfoms (Arise-IIP) owning 65 percent. Glo-Djigbé seeks to transform numerous locally produced agricultural products and high-tech goods for export. Though no businesses have started operating in GDIZ yet, approximately 25 have signed contracts to begin operations there, including Oryx and JNP (both petroleum services); NKS (cashew processing), Groupe Aigle (cotton processing), and SIDDIH (pharmaceuticals). The GDIZ is expected to increase Benin’s GDP by $7 billion over the next decade and boost export revenues. The primary target markets will be the United States, the European Union, and other African countries. The GDIZ covers 1,640 hectares with 400 hectares being developed currently. Benin’s second MCC power compact, valued at $391million entered into force in June 2017. This compact aims to strengthen the national power utility, attract private sector investment into solar power generation, and fund infrastructure investments in electricity distribution as well as off-grid electrification for poor and unserved households. It is also advancing policy reforms to bolster financing for the electricity sector and strengthen regulation and utility management. Through the compact MCC is expanding the capacity and increasing the reliability of Benin’s power grid in southern and northern Benin. As two thirds of Benin’s population does not have access to electricity, the compact also includes a significant off-grid electrification project via a clean energy grant facility that supports private sector investment in off-grid power systems. Benin’s second MCC compact follows its first compact (2006-2011) which modernized the Port of Cotonou and improved land administration, the justice sector, and access to credit. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 78 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 96 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 USD 2 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 1,280 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Beninese government encourages foreign investment, which it views as critical for economic development and successful implementation of the $20.6 billion PAG. In 2021 alone, the GOB raised €1.5 billion on the international Eurobond market. APIEX is dedicated to increasing Beninese exports and foreign direct investment and reducing administrative barriers to doing business. APIEX serves as the single investment promotion center and conduit of information between foreign investors and the Beninese government. It is the technical body responsible for reviewing applications for approval under the Investment Code and the administrative authority for SEZs. The agency has significantly reduced processing times for registering new companies (from 15 days to one day) and issuing construction permits (from 90 to 30 days). In practice, APIEX faces capacity constraints, processing times can be longer than stated, and its website is often out of date and lacks information on the latest regulations and laws. The Investment Code, amended in 2020, establishes conditions, advantages, and rules applicable to domestic and foreign direct investment. Additional information on business startup is available at https://monentreprise.bj/ . Beninese law guarantees the right to own and transfer private property. The court system enforces contracts, but the judicial process is inefficient and suffers from corruption. Enforcement of rulings is problematic. Most firms entering the market work with an established local partner and retain a competent Beninese attorney. In 2015, the Beninese government conducted the most recent joint investment policy review (IPR), with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Further to a 2016 fact-finding mission, the UNCTAD Report on the Implementation of the IPR of Benin assesses progress in implementing the original recommendations of the IPR and highlights policy issues to be addressed in the investment climate. The full report may be found at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-review/23/benin In an effort to facilitate business travel and tourism, Benin implements a visa-free system for African nationals and an online e-visa system for other foreign nationals. The country is working to open four new trade offices abroad to enhance Benin’s international business opportunities. One is already underway in Shenzhen, China Benin’s 2017 Property Code made property registration simpler and less expensive in order to boost the real estate market, improve access to credit, and reduce corruption in the registration process. The measures apply to real personal property, estate and mortgage taxes, and property purchase receipts. In order to register property, individuals and businesses must present a taxpayer identification number (registration for which is free). Land registration and property purchase certifications are free, but there is a fee for obtaining a property title. The GOB has announced that as of 2023 real personal property transactions cannot take place without producing a land title. Benin Control is charged with expediting customs clearances and minimizing processing barriers to clearing cargo at the Port of Cotonou. Benin Control makes it possible to obtain cargo clearance within as little as 48 hours after its off-loading at the Port, though in practice this can take longer. The reinstitution of the cargo inspection and scanning program known as PVI, first tried in 2012, resumed operations at the Port in 2017. Under the PVI program, Benin Control scans between 30 and 45 randomly selected shipping containers per hour. Benin Control bills all containers exiting the Port– regardless of whether they are selected for scanning – at the rate of $60 (XOF 35,400) for a 20-foot container and $79 (XOF 47,200) for a 40-foot container (https://benincontrol.com/services/scanning). The government, through the state-owned Benin Water Company (SONEB) and Beninese Electric Energy Company (SBEE), provides service connections to potable water and electricity free of charge to small and medium size enterprises and industries. Eligible companies are responsible for paying the water and electricity meter installation fees. Online application is available at https://www.soneb.bj/soneb15/pme-pmi-raccordement-gratuit and https://www.sbee.bj/site/demande-de-raccordement-des-pme-pmi-conditions/. The Beninese government has no policies or incentives in place to encourage Beninese businesspeople to invest abroad. The Beninese government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Benin is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. Foreign and domestic investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations at https://unctad.org/news/how-un-helped-benin-become-worlds-fastest-place-start-business-mobile-phone , including the number of steps, name and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal bases justifying the procedures. There is no rule to prevent a monopoly over a particular business sector. The Benin Private Investment Council ( http://www.cipb.bj/ ) is the only business-related think-tank or body that advocates for investors. Generally, draft bills are not available for public comment though promulgated laws are available at https://sgg.gouv.bj/documentheque/lois/ . Individuals, including non-citizens, have the option to file appeals about or challenge enacted laws with the Constitutional Court. Benin is a member of WAEMU and the Organization for the Harmonization of African Business Law (OHADA) and has adopted OHADA’s Universal Commercial Code (codified law) to manage commercial disputes and bankruptcies within member countries. Benin is also a member of OHADA’s Common Court of Justice and Arbitration and the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). OHADA provisions govern bankruptcy. Debtors may file for reorganization only, and the creditors may file for liquidation only. Benin is a member of the WTO and notifies all draft technical regulations to the organization’s Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Benin has a civil law system. The legal framework includes various legislative and regulatory texts covering family law, land law, labor law, criminal law, criminal procedure, and civil, commercial, social, and administrative proceedings. The Cotonou commercial court, created in 2017, enforces commercial laws and regulations. In 2018, Benin created an anti-terrorism, drugs, and economic crimes court (CRIET), which until recently lacked a mechanism for substantive appeal. The CRIET has convicted and sentenced numerous government detractors and political opponents, raising concerns about its independence. In February 2020, Benin created an appeals chamber within the CRIET. In general, judicial processes are slow, and challenges to the enforcement of court decisions are common. Magistrates and judges are appointed by the President of the Republic. Benin’s courts enforce rulings of foreign courts and international arbitration. The Investment Code provides the legal framework for foreign direct investment. The Code establishes conditions, advantages, and rules applicable to domestic and foreign direct investment. The GOB websites https://benindoingbusiness.bj/ and https://gdiz-benin.com/ make available online information on foreign direct investment regulations and procedures, though at times these websites may be out of date. Benin is a member of OHADA’s Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA) and the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Investors may include arbitration provisions in their contracts in order to avoid prolonged entanglements in the Beninese courts. The United Nations investment guide for Benin ( https://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/benin/ ) provides a general guide for foreign direct investment steps and procedures. Benin’s legal framework does not address anti-trust or competition issues. The government does not have an agency or office that reviews transactions for competition-related concerns. Local laws forbid the government from nationalizing private enterprises operating in Benin. In July 2020 West African hotel developer Teyliom International filed a request for arbitration with the World Bank International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in relation to the Beninese government’s expropriation of a hotel the company had been constructing in Cotonou. This arbitration case is currently pending at ICSID. OHADA provisions govern bankruptcy. Debtors may file for reorganization only, and creditors may file for liquidation only. 6. Financial Sector Government policy supports free financial markets, subject to oversight by the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). Foreign investors may seek credit from Benin’s private financial institutions and the WAEMU Regional Stock Exchange (Bureau Regional des Valeurs Mobilieres – BRVM) headquartered in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, with local branches in each WAEMU member country. There are no restrictions for foreign investors to establish a bank account in Benin and obtain loans on the local market. However, proof of residency or evidence of company registration is required to open a bank account. The banking sector is generally reliable. Twelve private commercial banks operate in Benin in addition to the BCEAO; planning is under way to open a subsidiary of the African Development Bank. Taking into account microfinance institutions, roughly 31.2 percent of the population had access to banking services in 2020, the latest year for which data is available. In recent years, non-performing loans have been growing; 15 percent of total banking sector assets are estimated to be non-performing. The BCEAO regulates Beninese banks. Foreign banks are required to obtain a banking license before operating branches in Benin. They are subject to the same prudential regulations as local or regional banks. Benin has lost no correspondent banking relationships during the last three years. There is no known current correspondent banking relationship in jeopardy. Foreigners are required to present proof of residency to open bank accounts. Benin does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund. 10. Political and Security Environment Benin transitioned to a democracy in 1990, enjoying a reputation for regular, peaceful, and, until recently, inclusive elections. In 2018, the National Assembly adopted, and the government implemented stringent rules for political parties to qualify to participate in legislative elections. In 2019 and 2021 the government held legislative and presidential elections, respectively, neither of which was fully competitive. The National Assembly is currently made up exclusively by two pro-government parties. Elections-related unrest in 2019 and 2021 resulted in several deaths. In April 2021, President Patrice Talon was re-elected for a second and final five-year term, pursuant to Benin’s constitution. The largest security issues facing Benin are the threat of terrorism spilling across its porous northern borders and piracy offshore in the Gulf of Guinea. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2018 $14,262 2020 $15,650 www.worldbank.org/en/country/benin Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $2 BEA: https://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA: https://www.bea.gov/international/di1fdibal Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 18.6% UNCTAD: https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Recent GOB data not available Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $3,429 100% Total Outward $541 100% France $1,219 35.54% France $146 26.98% India $420 12.24% Togo $81 14.97% Nigeria $381 11.11% Niger $72 13.30% China PR: Mainland $342 9.97% Côte-d’Ivoire $65 12.01% Côte d’Ivoire $215 6.27% Gabon $45 8.31% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Bolivia Executive Summary In general, Bolivia is open to foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2021, gross FDI flows received reached USD 440 million, higher than in 2020 when Bolivia registered a significant divestment of USD 1,018 million. FDI flows were greatest in the sectors of hydrocarbons, manufacturing, industry, and commerce, together representing over 80 percent of the total. Additional sectors receiving some FDI included the transport sector, storage and communications, insurance companies, and real estate services. The year 2021 was economically characterized as a rebound after the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, in which Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell by 8.9 percent, the largest contraction in over 50 years. The leading sectors were mining, construction, and transport, registering double digit growth rates. International financial institutions estimated GDP growth between 5-5.5 percent for 2021. Bolivia was the fastest growing economy in the continent from 2014-2016 and in the top three until the start of the pandemic. Bolivia abrogated the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) it had with the United States and several other countries in 2012. The Bolivian government claimed the abrogation was necessary for Bolivia to comply with the 2009 Constitution. Companies that invested under the U.S. – Bolivia BIT will be covered by its terms until June 10, 2022, but investments made after June 10, 2012, are not covered. Notwithstanding the uncertain political situation, Bolivia’s investment climate has remained relatively steady over the past several years. Lack of legal security, corruption allegations, and unclear investment incentives are all impediments to investment in Bolivia. There is no significant FDI from the United States in Bolivia, and there are no initiatives designed to encourage U.S. investment specifically. Bolivia’s current macroeconomic stability, abundant natural resources, and strategic location in the heart of South America make it a prospective country for investment. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Bolivian government took several economic measures to support families, such as authorizing postponement in the payment of basic services (water, electricity, natural gas, telecommunications) and credit payment deferral for the private sector. These measures ended in 2021. Bolivia’s Mother Earth Law stipulates climate change mitigation and adaptation. Bolivia last updated its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) for implementing the Paris Agreement in 2015. Bolivia does not have any regulatory “green” incentives for investment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 128/ 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 104/ 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 USD 432 https://www.bea.gov/data/economic-accounts/international World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 3,180 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD In 2021, the investment rate as a percentage of GDP (18 percent) was in line with regional averages. There has also been a shift from private to public investment. In recent years, private investment was particularly low because of the deterioration of the business environment. From 2006 to 2021, private investment, including local and foreign investment, averaged 7 percent of GDP. During the same period, public investment grew significantly, reaching an annual average of 12 percent of GDP. FDI is highly concentrated in natural resources, especially hydrocarbons and mining, which account for nearly two-thirds of FDI in Bolivia. Since 2006, the net flow of FDI averaged 1.6 percent of GDP. Before 2006, it averaged around 6.7 percent of GDP. 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment In general, Bolivia remains open to FDI. The 2014 Investment Law guarantees equal treatment for national and foreign firms. However, it also stipulates that public investment has priority over private investment (both national and foreign) and that the Bolivian government will determine which sectors require private investment. Bolivia abrogated the BIT it signed with the United States in 2012. The government under former president Evo Morales claimed the abrogation was necessary for Bolivia to comply with the 2009 Constitution. Companies that invested under the U.S.–Bolivia BIT will be covered under its terms until June 10, 2022, but investments made after June 10, 2012, are not covered. Pursuant to Article 320 of the 2009 Constitution, Bolivia no longer recognizes international arbitration forums for disputes involving the government. The parties also cannot settle the dispute in an international court. Specifically, Article 320 of the Bolivian Constitution states: Bolivian investment takes priority over foreign investment. Every foreign investment will be subject to Bolivian jurisdiction, laws, and authorities, and no one may invoke a situation for exception, nor appeal to diplomatic claims to obtain more favorable treatment. Economic relations with foreign states or enterprises shall be conducted under conditions of independence, mutual respect, and equity. More favorable conditions may not be granted to foreign states or enterprises than those established for Bolivians. The state makes all decisions on internal economic policy and will not accept demands or conditions imposed on this policy by states, banks or Bolivian/foreign financial institutions, multilateral entities, or transnational enterprises. Public policies will promote internal consumption of products made in Bolivia. Article 262 of the Constitution states: “The fifty kilometers from the border constitute the zone of border security. No foreign person, individual, or company may acquire property in this space, directly or indirectly, nor possess any property right in the waters, soil or subsoil, except in the case of state necessity declared by express law approved by two-thirds of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly. The property or the possession affected in case of non-compliance with this prohibition will pass to the benefit of the state, without any indemnity.” The judicial system faces a huge backlog of cases, limited staffing, scarce resources. It is also believed to be influenced by political actors. Swift resolution of cases, either initiated by investors or against them, is unlikely. The Marcelo Quiroga Anti-Corruption law of 2010 makes companies and their signatories criminally liable for breach of contract with the government, and the law can be applied retroactively. Authorities can use this threat of criminal prosecution to force settlement of disputes. Commercial disputes can often lead to criminal charges, and cases are often processed slowly. See our Human Rights Report as background on the judicial system, labor rights, and other important issues. Article 129 of the Bolivian Arbitration Law No. 708, established that all controversies and disputes that arise regarding investment in Bolivia will have to be addressed inside Bolivia under Bolivian laws. Consequently, international arbitration is not allowed for disputes involving the Bolivian government or state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Bolivia does not have an investment promotion agency to facilitate foreign investment. There is a right for foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in remunerative activity. Investors may judge that preferential treatment is being given to their Bolivian competitors, for example, in key sectors where private companies compete with state-owned enterprises. Additionally, foreign investment is not allowed in matters relating directly to national security. The Constitution specifies that all hydrocarbon resources are the property of the Bolivian people and that the state will assume control over their exploration, exploitation, industrialization, transport, and marketing (Articles 348 and 351). Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) is an SOE that manages hydrocarbons transport and sales and is responsible for ensuring that the domestic market demand is satisfied at prices set by the hydrocarbons regulator before allowing any hydrocarbon exports. YPFB benefitted from government action in 2006 that required operators to turn over their production to YPFB and to sign new contracts that gave YPFB control over the distribution of gasoline, diesel, and liquid petroleum gas (LPG) to gas stations. The law allows YPFB to enter joint venture contracts with national or foreign individuals, and with companies wishing to exploit/trade hydrocarbons or their derivatives. For companies working in the industry, contracts are negotiated on a service-contract basis, and there are no restrictions on ownership percentages of the companies providing the services. The Constitution (Article 366) specifies that every foreign enterprise that conducts activities in the hydrocarbons production chain will submit to the sovereignty of the state, and to the laws and authority of the state. No foreign court case or foreign jurisdiction will be recognized, and foreign investors may not invoke any exceptional situation for international arbitration, nor appeal to diplomatic claims. According to the Constitution, no concessions or contracts may transfer the ownership of natural resources or other strategic industries to private interests. Instead, temporary authorizations to use these resources may be requested at the pertinent ministry (mining, water and environment, public works, etc.). The Bolivian government needs to renegotiate commercial agreements related to forestry, mining, telecommunications, electricity, and water services, to comply with these regulations. The Telecommunications, Technology and Communications General Law from 2012 (Law 164, Article 28) stipulates that the licenses for radio broadcasts will not be given to foreign persons or entities. Further, in the case of broadcasting associations, the share of foreign investors cannot exceed 25 percent of the total investment, except in those cases approved by the state or by international treaties. The Central Bank of Bolivia is responsible for registering all foreign investments. According to the 2014 Investment Law, any investment will be monitored by the relevant ministry for each sector. Each Ministry assesses industry compliance with the incentive objectives. To date, only the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy proposed incentives that were enacted by Congress to incentivize the exploration and production of hydrocarbons. Bolivia underwent a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review in 2017. In his concluding remarks, the WTO Chair noted several WTO members raised challenges impacting investor confidence in Bolivia, due primarily to Bolivia’s abrogation of 22 BITs following the passage of its 2009 constitution. However, some WTO members also commended Bolivia for enacting a new investment promotion law in 2014 and a law on conciliation and arbitration, both of which increased legal certainty for investors, according to those members. As of April 2022, the functions of FUNDEMPRESA, which used to register and certify new businesses, were turned over to the Servicio Plurinacional de Registro de Comercio (SEPREC). SEPREC is a public entity overseen by the Ministry of Productive Development and Plural Economy. The steps to register a business are: (1) register and receive a certificate from SEPREC; (2) register with the Bolivian Internal Revenue Service (Servicio de Impuestos Nacionales) and receive a tax identification number; (3) register and receive authorization to operate from the municipal government in which the company will be established; (4) if the company has employees, it must register with the national health insurance service and the national retirement pension agency in order to contribute on the employees’ behalf; and (5) register with the Ministry of Labor (if the company has employees). The process takes about 30 days from start to finish. All steps are required, and there is no simplified business creation regime. A user can download the required forms from the website and fill them out online but then must either mail or deliver the completed forms to the relevant offices. The forms ask for a national identification card, but foreign users can enter their passport numbers instead. The registration process takes between 2-4 working days after all requirements are submitted. Bolivia does not have a national investment screening mechanism. The Bolivian government does not promote or incentivize outward investment. Nor does the government restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Bolivia has no laws or policies that directly foster competition on a non-discriminatory basis. However, Article 66 of the Commercial Code (Law 14379, 1977) states that unfair competition, such as maintaining an import, production, or distribution monopoly, should be penalized according to criminal law. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. Regulatory authority regarding investment exists solely at the national level in Bolivia. There are no subnational regulatory procedures. The Commercial Code requires that all companies keep adequate accounting records and legal records for transparency. However, there is a large informal sector that does not follow these practices. Most accounting regulations follow international principles, but the regulations do not always conform to international standards. Large private companies and some government institutions, such as the Central Bank and the Banking Supervision Authority, have transparent and consistent accounting systems. Formal bureaucratic procedures have been reported to be lengthy, difficult to manage and navigate, and sometimes debilitating. Many firms complain that a lack of administrative infrastructure, corruption, and political motives impede their ability to perform. The one exception has been when registering a new company in Bolivia. There is no established public comment process allowing social, political, and economic interests to provide advice and comment on new laws and decrees. However, the government generally — but not always — discusses proposed laws with the relevant sector. The lack of laws to implement the 2009 Constitution creates legal discrepancies between constitutional guarantees and the dated policies currently enforced, and thus an uncertain investment climate. Online regulatory disclosures by the Bolivian government can be found in the Official Gazette ( http://www.gacetaoficialdebolivia.gob.bo/ ). Supreme Decree 71 in 2009 created a Business Auditing Authority (AEMP), which is tasked with regulating the business activities of public, private, mixed, or cooperative entities across all business sectors. AEMP’s decisions are legally reviewable through appeal. However, should an entity wish to file a second appeal, the ultimate decision-making responsibility rests with the Bolivian government ministry with jurisdiction over the economic sector in question. This has led to a perception that enforcement mechanisms are neither transparent nor independent. Environmental regulations can slow projects due to the constitutional requirement of “prior consultation” for any projects that could affect local and indigenous communities. This has affected projects related to the exploitation of natural resources, both renewable and nonrenewable, as well as public works projects. Issuance of environmental licenses has been slow and subject to political influence and corruption. In 2010, the new pension fund was enacted increasing companies’ contributions from 1.71 percent of payroll to 4.71 percent. Bolivia is a full member of the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), which includes Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Bolivia is also in the process of joining the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) as a full (rather than associate) member. The CAN’s norms are considered supranational in character and have automatic application in the regional economic block’s member countries. The government does notify the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade regarding draft technical regulations. Property and contractual rights are enforced in Bolivian courts under a civil law system, but some have complained that the legal process is time consuming and has been subject to political influence and corruption. Although many of its provisions have been modified and supplanted by more specific legislation, Bolivia’s Commercial Code continues to provide general guidance for commercial activities. The constitution has precedence over international law and treaties (Article 410) and stipulates that the state will be directly involved in resolving conflicts between employers and employees (Article 50). Corruption within the judiciary is pervasive. Regulatory and enforcement actions are appealable. No major laws, regulations, or judicial decisions impacting foreign investment came out in the past year. There is no primary, central point-of-contact for investment that provides all the relevant information to investors. Bolivia does not have a competition law, but cases related to unfair competition can be presented to AEMP. Article 314 of the 2009 Constitution prohibits private monopolies. Based on this article, in 2009 the Bolivian government created an office to supervise and control private companies ( http://www.autoridadempresas.gob.bo/ ). Among its most important goals are: regulating, promoting, and protecting free competition. trade relations between traders; implementing control mechanisms, social projects, and voluntary corporate responsibility. corporate restructuring, supervising, verifying, and monitoring companies with economic activities in the country in the field of commercial registration and seeking compliance with legal and financial development of its activities. qualifying institutional management efficiency, timeliness, transparency, and social commitment to contribute to the achievement of corporate goals. The Bolivian Constitution allows the central government or local governments to expropriate property for the public good or when the property does not fulfill a “social purpose” (Article 57). In the case of land, “Economic Social Purpose” (known as FES in Spanish) is understood as “sustainable land use to develop productive activities, according to its best use capacity, for the benefit of society, the collective interest and its owner.” The Bolivian government has no official definition of “collective interest” and makes decisions on a case-by-case basis. Noncompliance with the social function of land, tax evasion, or the holding of large acreage is cause for reversion, at which point the land passes to “the Bolivian people” (Article 401). In cases where the expropriation of land is deemed a necessity of the state or for the public good, just indemnification is required by law. However, in cases where there is non-compliance in fulfilling this “Economic Social Purpose,” the Bolivian government is not required to pay for the land and the land title reverts to the state. The Constitution also gives workers the right to reactivate and reorganize companies that are in the process of bankruptcy, insolvency, or liquidation, or those closed in an unjust manner, into employee-owned cooperatives (Article 54). The mining code of 1997 (last updated in 2007) and hydrocarbons law of 2005 both outline procedures for expropriating land to develop underlying concessions. The Bolivian government between 2006 and 2014, nationalized companies in the hydrocarbons sector, most of the electricity sector, some mining companies (including mines and a tin smelting plant), and a cement plant. To do so, the government forced private entities to sell shares to the government, often at below market prices. Some of the affected companies have cases pending with international arbitration bodies. All outsourcing, private contracts were canceled and assigned to public companies (such as airport administration and water provision). Countries affected included the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Argentina, and Chile. Bolivian governments have previously nationalized private interests to appease social groups protesting. The average time to complete bankruptcy procedures to close a business in Bolivia is 20 months. The Bolivian Commercial Code includes (Article 1654) three different categories of bankruptcy: No Fault Bankruptcy – when the owner of the company is not directly responsible for its inability to pay its obligations. At-Fault Bankruptcy – when the owner is guilty or liable due to the lack of due diligence to avoid harm to the company. Bankruptcy due to Fraud – when the owner intentionally tries to cause harm to the company. In general, the application of laws related to commercial disputes and bankruptcy has been perceived as inconsistent, and corruption charges are common. Foreign creditors often have little redress beyond Bolivian courts, and judgments are generally more favorable to local claimants than international ones. If a company declares bankruptcy, the company must pay employee benefits before other obligations. Workers have broad-ranging rights to recover pay and benefits from foreign firms in bankruptcy, and criminal actions can be taken against individuals the Bolivian government deems responsible for failure to pay in these matters. No credit bureaus or credit monitoring authorities serve the Bolivian market. In 2018, the Bolivian government enacted a new law (No. 1055) called the Creation of Social Enterprises. The law allows for employees of a company to assert ownership rights over companies under financial distress heading into bankruptcy. Passage of the law was controversial, with numerous business chambers asserting that the law could incentivize employees and labor unions to undermine the performance of companies in order to force bankruptcy and gain control of company assets. 6. Financial Sector The government’s general attitude toward foreign portfolio investment is neutral. Established Bolivian firms may issue short or medium-term debt in local capital markets, which act primarily as secondary markets for fixed-return securities. Bolivian capital markets have sought to expand their handling of local corporate bond issues and equity instruments. Over the last few years, several Bolivian companies and some foreign firms have been able to raise funds through local capital markets. However, the stock exchange is small and is highly concentrated in bonds and debt instruments (more than 95 percent of transactions). The number of total transactions in 2021 was around 28 percent of GDP. From 2008-2019, the financial markets experienced high liquidity, which led to historically low interest rates. However, liquidity has been more limited in recent years, and there are some pressures to increase interest rates. The Bolivian financial system is not well integrated with the international system and there is only one foreign bank among the top ten banks of Bolivia. In October 2012, Bolivia returned to global credit markets for the first time in nearly a century. In 2017, Bolivia sold USD 1 billion at 4.5 percent for ten years, with U.S. financial institutions managing the deal. The resources gained from the sales were largely used to finance infrastructure projects. A sovereign bond issuance of up to $2 billion was approved by the National Assembly for 2022 but had not yet occurred as of April 2022. The Bolivian government’s attempt to refinance $2 billion in sovereign debt in February 2022 fell short, with only $850 million sold. The government had also hoped the new issuance would be for a 10-year term but had to settle for eight years (a 2030 maturity) for all the resold bonds. The interest rate for the new bonds is 7.5%, compared to interest rates of approximately 5% for the original bonds. The government and central bank respect their obligations under IMF Article VIII, as the exchange system is free of restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions. Foreign investors legally established in Bolivia can get credits on the local market. However, due to the size of the market, large credits are rare and may require operations involving several banks. Credit access through other financial instruments is limited to bond issuances in the capital market. The 2013 Financial Services Law directs credit towards the productive sectors and caps interest rates. The Bolivian banking system is small, composed of 16 consumer banks, six banks specialized in mortgage lending, three private financial funds, 30 savings and credit cooperatives, and eight institutions specialized in microcredit. Of the total number of personal deposits made in Bolivia through December 2021 (USD 30 billion), the banking sector accounted for 80 percent of the total financial system. Similarly, of the total loans and credits made to private individuals (USD 29 billion) through December 2021, 80 percent were made by the banking sector, while private financial funds and the savings and credit cooperatives accounted for the other 20 percent. Bolivian banks have developed the capacity to adjudicate credit risk and evaluate expected rates of return in line with international norms. The banking sector was stable and healthy with delinquency rates at 1.6 percent in 2021. In 2021, delinquency rates rose after the government permitted clients to defer bank loan payments until June 2021 and to reprogram their debt through 2022 without penalty as a mitigating measure for the COVID-19 pandemic. While delinquency rates remain relatively low, there are concerns this measure could potentially harm the banking sector’s stability. In 2013, a new Financial Services Law entered into force. This new law enacted major changes to the banking sector, including deposit rate floors and lending rate ceilings, mandatory lending allocations to certain sectors of the economy and an upgrade of banks’ solvency requirements in line with the international Basel standards. The law also requires banks to spend more on improving consumer protection, as well as providing increased access to financing in rural parts of the country. Credit is now allocated on government-established rates for productive activities, but foreign investors may find it difficult to qualify for loans from local banks due to the requirement that domestic loans be issued exclusively against domestic collateral. Since commercial credit is generally extended on a short-term basis, most foreign investors prefer to obtain credit abroad. Most Bolivian borrowers are small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In 2007, the government created a Productive Development Bank to boost the production of small, medium-sized, and family-run businesses. The bank was created to provide loans to credit institutions which meet specific development conditions and goals, for example by giving out loans to farmers, small businesses, and other development focused investors. The loans are long term and have lower interest rates than private banks can offer to allow for growth of investments and poverty reduction. In September 2010, the Bolivian government bought the local private bank Banco Union as part of a plan to gain partial control of the financial sector. Banco Union is one of the largest banks, with a share of 10.8 percent of total national credits and 12.7 percent of the total deposits; one of its principal activities is managing public sector accounts. Bolivian government ownership of Banco Union was illegal until December 2012, when the government enacted the State Bank Law, allowing for state participation in the banking sector. There is no strong evidence of “cross-shareholding” and “stable-shareholding” arrangements used by private firms to restrict foreign investment, and the 2009 Constitution forbids monopolies and supports antitrust measures. In addition, there is no evidence of hostile takeovers (other than government nationalizations that took place from 2006-14). The financial sector is regulated by ASFI (Supervising Authority of Financial Institutions), a decentralized institution that is under the Ministry of Economy. The Central Bank of Bolivia (BCB) oversees all financial institutions, provides liquidity when necessary, and acts as lender of last resort. The BCB is the only monetary authority and oversees managing the payment system, international reserves, and the exchange rate. Foreigners can establish bank accounts only with residency status in Bolivia. Blockchain technologies in Bolivia are still in the early stages. Currently, the banking sector is analyzing blockchain technologies and the sector intends to propose a regulatory framework in coordination with ASFI in the future. Three different settlement mechanisms are available in Bolivia: (1) the high-value payment system administered by the Central Bank for inter-bank operations; (2) a system of low value payments utilizing checks and credit and debit cards administered by the local association of private banks (ASOBAN); and (3) the deferred settlement payment system designed for small financial institutions such as credit cooperatives. This mechanism is also administered by the Central Bank. Neither the Bolivian government nor any government-affiliated entity maintains a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Bolivian government has set up companies in sectors it considers strategic to the national interest and social well-being. It has also stated that it plans to do so in every sector it considers strategic or where there is either a monopoly or oligopoly. The Bolivian government owns and operates more than 60 businesses, including energy and mining companies, a telecommunications company, a satellite company, a bank, a sugar factory, an airline, a packaging plant, paper and cardboard factories, and milk and Brazil nut processing factories, among others. In 2005, income from SOEs in Bolivia other than gas exports represented only a fraction of a percent of GDP. As of 2019, public sector contribution to GDP (including SOEs, investments, and consumption of goods and services) has risen to over 40 percent of GDP. The largest SOEs can acquire credit from the Central Bank at very low interest rates and convenient terms. Some private companies complain that it is impossible for them to compete with this financial subsidy. Moreover, SOEs appear to benefit from easier access to licenses, supplies, materials, and land; however, there is no law specifically providing SOEs with preferential treatment in this regard. In many cases, government entities are directed to do business with SOEs, placing other private companies and investors at a competitive disadvantage. The government registered budget surpluses from 2006 until 2013 but began experiencing budget deficits in 2014. The 2009 Constitution requires all SOEs to publish an annual report and makes them subject to financial audits. Additionally, SOEs are required to present an annual testimony in front of civil society and social movements, a practice known as social control. There are currently no privatization programs in Bolivia. 10. Political and Security Environment Bolivia is prone to social unrest, which can include violence. Given the country’s reliance on a few key thoroughfares, conflict often disrupts transportation and distribution networks. Most civil disturbances are related to domestic issues, usually workers pressuring the government for concessions by marching or closing major transportation arteries. Bolivia held peaceful and transparent elections in 2020 that gave a victory to Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) presidential candidate Luis Arce with over 55 percent of the vote. During his administration, political tensions in Bolivia have remained high, but there have been relatively few multi-day protests. While Bolivia has low levels of personal crime, with a homicide rate well below the regional average, there is a growing concern about increased criminality, especially a recent increase in femicides. Production of coca leaf is legal in Bolivia, and the country is a known source and transit country for cocaine and other illicit drugs that are mostly destined for Brazil and Europe but may also find their way to the United States. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $37,898 2020 $36,572 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $432 2020 $432 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 30 2020 30 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 27.6% 2020 27.6% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx * Source for Host Country Data: BEA, UNCTAD, World Bank Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment From/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 10,479 100% Total Outward 789 100% Spain 2,527 24.1% Netherlands 339 43.0% Sweden 1,318 12.6% Peru 77 9.7 Peru 1,247 11.9% Panama 67 8.5% Netherlands 885 8.4% Brazil 40 5.1% France 605 5.8% Canada 37 4.8% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Bosnia and Herzegovina Executive Summary Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is open to foreign investment, but to succeed, investors must overcome endemic corruption, complex legal/regulatory frameworks and government structures, non-transparent business procedures, insufficient protection of property rights, and a weak judicial system under the indue influence of ethno-nationalist parties and their patronage networks. Economic reforms to complete the transition from a socialist past to a market-oriented future have proceeded slowly and the country has a low level of foreign direct investment (FDI). According to the BiH Central Bank preliminary data, in the first nine months of 2021 FDI in BiH was USD 617 million, a 65% increase from the same period in 2020. In the World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business Report, BiH was among the least attractive business environments in Southeast Europe, with a ranking of 90 out of 190 global economies. (Note: Beginning in 2021, the World Bank discontinued the worldwide assessment in the Doing Business Report.) The World Bank 2020 report ranked BiH particularly low for its lengthy and arduous processes to start a new business and obtain construction permits. According to the World Bank estimates, real GDP is expected to grow 4 percent in 2021 after contracting 3.2 percent in 2020. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) expects BiH’s GDP to grow by 4.5% in 2021. EBRD announced that BiH’s economic recovery has been stronger than expected mostly due to the recovery in external markets and strong expansion of domestic private consumption, backed by higher exports of goods and services. BiH is tied closely to global value chains as it primarily exports goods rather than services. U.S. investment in BiH is low due to its small market size, relatively low income levels, distance from the United States, challenging business climate, and the lack of investment opportunities. Most U.S. companies in BiH are represented by small sales offices that are concentrated on selling U.S. goods and services, with minimal longer-term investments. U.S. companies with offices in BiH include major multinational companies and market leaders in their respective sectors, such as Coca-Cola, Microsoft, Cisco, Oracle, Pfizer, McDonalds, Marriott, Caterpillar, Johnson & Johnson, FedEx, UPS, Philip Morris, KPMG, PwC and others. Nonetheless, BiH offers business opportunities to well-prepared and persistent exporters and investors. Companies that overcome the challenges of establishing a presence in BiH often make a return on their investment over time. A major U.S. investment fund was able to enter the market with a regional investment in the telecom/cable sector in 2014 and exit its majority position in 2019 with a good return. There is an active international community, but lack of political will has stalled the many reform efforts that would improve the business climate as BiH pursues eventual European Union membership. The country is open to foreign investment and offers a liberal trade regime and its simplified tax structure is one of the lowest in the region (17 percent VAT and 10 percent flat income tax). The complex institutional and territorial structure of BiH complicates the economic landscape of the country and may lead to further disruptions in Foreign Direct Investment. In July 2021, the Republika Srpska (RS) entity began a blockade of state institutions and in October 2021 began to take unconstitutional steps to return competencies to the entity-level government. This near-virtual decision-making blockade and attempts to withdraw the RS from state institutions and agencies have created questionsfor many investors and businesses. The duplicative nature of the proposed RS-based parallel institutions and agencies will complicate the investment landscape and create regulatory and legal confusion. While no new parallel RS agencies are yet operational, the RS has taken concrete legislative and regulatory steps to lay the groundwork for their full implementation in the near to mid-term. Investors should exercise all due diligence and take into account ongoing and potential Constitutional Court challenges and the fact these RS moves violate the Dayton Peace Agreement when deciding whether to conduct business with these nascent agencies or operate under constitutionally questionable legal frameworks established by the RS. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina entity also has functionality issues, with 2018 election results yet unimplemented, and a legislative body that struggles to pass basic economic reforms. Potential investors are urged to read the legal reviews and statements of the High Representative to BiH. BiH is pursuing World Trade Organization membership and hopes to join in the future. It is also richly endowed with natural resources, providing potential opportunities in energy (hydro, wind, solar, along with traditional thermal), agriculture, timber, and tourism. The best business opportunities for U.S. exporters to BiH include energy generation and transmission equipment, telecommunication and IT equipment and services, transport infrastructure and equipment, engineering and construction services, medical equipment, agricultural products, and raw materials and chemicals for industrial processing. In 2021, U.S. exports to BiH totaled USD 322 million, a 37 percent increase from 2020, and held around 3 percent share of total BiH imports. BiH exports to the United States in 2021 totaled USD 94 million, an increase of 135 percent from 2020. U.S. exports to BiH are primarily in the areas of raw materials for industrial processing, food and agricultural products, machinery and transport equipment, and mineral fuels. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 110 of 180 www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 75 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/home U.S. FDI in partner country 2021 $9 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.cfm World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $6,080 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Bosnia and Herzegovina struggles to attract foreign investment. Complex labor and pension laws, the lack of a single economic space, and inadequate judicial and regulatory protections deter investment. Under the BiH constitution, established through the Dayton Accords that ended the 1990s war, Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth “the state”) is comprised of two “entities,” the Federation of BiH (the Federation) and the Republika Srpska (RS). A third, smaller area, the Brčko District, operates under a special status. The Federation includes ten cantons, each with its own government and responsibilities. There are also 143 municipalities in BiH: 63 in the RS and 80 in the Federation. As a result, BiH has a multi-tiered legal and regulatory framework that can be duplicative and contradictory, and is not conducive to attracting foreign investors. Employers bear a heavy burden toward governments. They must contribute 69 percent on top of wages in the Federation and 52 percent in the RS to the health, unemployment, and pension systems. The labor and pension laws are also deterrents to investment, though both are being reformed to decrease burdens on employers. While corporate income taxes in the two entities and Brčko District are now harmonized at 10 percent, entity business registration requirements are not harmonized. The RS has its own registration requirements, which apply to the entire entity. Each of the Federation’s ten cantons has different business regulations and administrative procedures affecting companies. Simplifying and streamlining this framework is essential to improving the investment climate. EU reforms target changes that should improve the investment climate by clarifying and simplifying regulation and procedures while decreasing fees faced by businesses at the entity, canton, and municipal levels — but lack of political will has stalled even the most basic of reforms. Generally, BiH’s legal framework does not discriminate against foreign investors. However, given the high level of corruption, foreign investors can be at a significant disadvantage in relation to entrenched local companies as well as some foreign investors, such as the People’s Republic of China, especially those with formal or informal backing by BiH’s various levels of government. The Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA) is a state-level organization mandated by the Council of Ministers to facilitate and support FDI ( www.fipa.gov.ba ). FIPA provides data, analysis, and advice on the business and investment climate to foreign investors. All FIPA services are free of charge. BiH does not maintain an ongoing, formal dialogue with foreign investors. Sporadically, high-ranking government officials give media statements inviting foreign investments in the energy, transportation, and agriculture industries; however, the announcements are rarely supported by tangible, commercially-viable investment opportunities. According to the Law on the Policy of FDI, foreign investors are entitled to invest in any sector of the economy in the same form and under the same conditions as those defined for local residents. Exceptions include the defense industry and some areas of publishing and media where foreign ownership is restricted to 49 percent; and electric power transmission, which is closed to foreign investment. In practice, additional sectors are dominated by government monopolies (such as airport operation), or characterized by oligopolistic market structures (such as telecommunications and electricity generation), making it difficult for foreign investors to engage. There have been no significant privatizations of government-owned enterprises in the past few years. In the past three years, the BiH government has not conducted an investment policy review through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the World Trade Organization (WTO); or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Establishing a business in BiH can be an extremely burdensome and time-consuming process for investors. The World Bank estimates there are an average of 13 procedures (actual number depends on the type of business), taking a total of 81 days, to register a new business in the capital city of Sarajevo. Registration in BiH can sometimes be expedited if companies retain a local lawyer to follow up at each step of the process. The RS established a one-stop shop for business registration in the entity. On paper, this dramatically reduced the time required to register a business in the RS, bringing the government-reported time to register a company down to an average of 7 to 14 days. Some businesses, however, report that in practice it can take significantly longer. The entity, cantonal, and municipal levels of government each establish their own laws and regulations on business operations, creating redundant and inconsistent procedures that facilitate corruption. It is often difficult to understand all the laws and rules that might apply to certain business activities, given overlapping jurisdictions and the lack of a central information source. It is therefore critical that foreign investors obtain local assistance and advice. Investors in the Federation may register their business as a branch in the RS and vice versa. The most common U.S. business presence found in BiH are representative offices. A representative office is not considered to be a legal entity and its activities are limited to market research, contract or investment preparations, technical cooperation, and similar business facilitation activities. The BiH Law on Foreign Trade Policy governs the establishment of a representative office. To open a representative office, a company must register with the Registry of Representative Offices, maintained by the BiH Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Affairs (MoFTER), and the appropriate entity’s ministry of trade. Additional English-language information on the business registration process can be found at: BiH Ministry of Foreign Trade & Economic Relations (MoFTER): Ph: +387-33-220-093 www.mvteo.gov.ba BiH Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA): Ph: + 387 33 278 080 www.fipa.gov.ba Republika Srpska Company Registration Website: http://www.investsrpska.net The government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. There are no programs to promote or incentivize outward investment. 3. Legal Regime The government has adequate laws to foster competition; however, due to corruption, laws are often not implemented transparently or efficiently. Additionally, political dysfunction results in lengthy delays in adapting and/or updating regulations necessary to implement legislation. The multitude of state, entity, cantonal (in the Federation only), and municipal administrations – each with the power to establish laws and/or regulations affecting business – creates a heavily bureaucratic, non-transparent system. Ministries and/or regulatory agencies are not typically obligated to publish the text of proposed regulations before they are enacted. Some local and international companies have expressed frustration with generally limited opportunities to provide input and influence/improve draft legislation that impacts the business community. Foreign investors have criticized government and public procurement tenders for a lack of openness and transparency. Dispute resolution is also challenging as the judicial system moves slowly, often does not adhere to existing deadlines, and provides no recourse if the company in question re-registers under a different name. In an effort to promote the growth of business in its entity, the Republika Srpska government created a RS one-stop-shop for business registration in 2013. This institution centralizes the process of registering a business, ostensibly making it easier, faster, and cheaper for new business owners to register their companies in the RS. The Federation’s announced plans to establish a one-stop-shop have long been delayed. Businesses are subject to inspections from a number of entity and cantonal/municipal agencies, including the financial police, labor inspectorate, market inspectorate, sanitary inspectorate, health inspectorate, fire-fighting inspectorate, environmental inspectorate, institution for the protection of cultural monuments, tourism and food inspectorate, construction inspectorate, communal inspectorate, and veterinary inspectorate. Some investors have complained about non-transparent fees levied during inspections, changing rules and regulations, and an ineffective appeals process to protest these fines. BiH is not a part of the EU, the WTO, nor a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). BiH has an overloaded court system and it often takes many years for a case to be brought to trial. Moreover, commercial cases with subject matter that judges do not have experience adjudicating, such as intellectual property rights, are often left unresolved for lengthy periods of time. Most judges have little to no in-depth knowledge of adjudicating international commercial disputes and require training on applicable international treaties and laws. Regulations or enforcement actions can be appealed, and appeals are adjudicated in the national court system. The U.S. government has provided training to judges, trustees, attorneys, and other stakeholders at the state and entity levels to assist in the development of bankruptcy and intellectual property laws. Those laws are now in effect at both the entity and state levels, but have not been fully implemented. The state-level Law on the Policy of Foreign Direct Investment accords foreign investors the same rights as domestic investors and guarantees foreign investors national treatment, protection against nationalization/expropriation, and the right to dispose of profits and transfer funds. In practice, most business sectors in Bosnia and Herzegovina are fully open to foreign equity ownership. Notable exceptions to this general rule are select strategic sectors, such as defense; electric power transmission, which is closed to foreign investment; and some areas of publishing and media, where foreign ownership is restricted to 49 percent (see below). However, the sub-national governments — Federation of BiH, Republika Srpska — may decide to exempt companies from these restrictions. According to legal amendments adopted in March 2015, foreign investors can own more than 49 percent of capital business entities dealing with media activities, such as publishing newspapers, magazines and other journals, publishing of periodical publications, production and distribution of television programs, privately owned broadcasting of radio and TV programs, and other forms of daily or periodic publications. The 2015 law maintains the restriction that foreign investors cannot own more than 49 percent of public television and radio services. It also sets conditions to enhance legal security and clarity for foreign direct investment flows. The Foreign Investment Promotion Agency maintains a list of laws relevant to investors on its website: http://www.fipa.gov.ba/publikacije_materijali/zakoni/default.aspx?id=317&langTag=en-US The complex legal environment in BiH underscores the utility of local legal representation for foreign investors. Attorneys in BiH have limited experience with respect to legal questions and the issues that arise in a market-oriented economy. However, local lawyers are quickly gaining experience in working with international organizations and companies operating in BiH. Companies’ in-house legal counsel should be prepared to oversee their in-country counsel, with explicit explanations and directions regarding objectives. The U.S. Embassy maintains a list of local lawyers willing to represent U.S. citizens and companies in BiH. The list can be accessed at https://ba.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/attorneys/ BiH has a Competition Council, designed to be an independent public institution to enforce anti-trust laws, prevent monopolies, and enhance private sector competition. The Council reviews and approves foreign investments in cases of mergers and acquisitions of local companies by foreign companies. The Competition Council consists of six members appointed for six-year terms of office with the possibility of one reappointment. The BiH Council of Ministers appoints three Competition Council members, the Federation Government appoints two members, and the RS Government appoints one member. From the six-member Competition Council, the BiH Council of Ministers affirms a president of the Council for a one-year term without the possibility of reappointment. BiH investment law forbids expropriation of investments, except in the public interest. According to Article 16, “Foreign investment shall not be subject to any act of nationalization, expropriation, requisition, or measures that have similar effects, except where the public interest may require otherwise.” In such cases of public interest, expropriation of investments would be executed in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, be free from discrimination, and include payment of appropriate compensation. Neither the entity governments nor the state government have expropriated any foreign investments to date. Both the Federation and Republika Srpska entities have Laws on Bankruptcy. However, bankruptcy proceedings are not resolved in a timely manner, and there is insufficient emphasis placed on companies’ rehabilitation and/or reorganization. The entities’ laws define the rights of creditors, equity shareholders, and holders of other financial contracts. Foreign contract holders enjoy the same rights as local contract holders. Bankruptcy is not criminalized. The U.S. government provided recent training to judges on international bankruptcy principles. 6. Financial Sector Capital markets remain underdeveloped in BiH. Both entities have created their own modern stock market infrastructure with separate stock exchanges in Sarajevo (SASE) and Banja Luka (BLSE), both of which started trading in 2002. The small size of the markets, lack of privatization, weak shareholder protection, and public mistrust of previous privatization programs has impeded the development of the capital market. Both the RS and Federation issued government securities for the first time during 2011, as part of their plans to raise capital in support of their budget deficits during this period of economic stress. Both entity governments continue to issue government securities in order to fill budget gaps. These securities are also available for secondary market trading on the stock exchanges. In February 2022, the international rating agency Standard and Poor’s (S&P) affirmed the credit rating of Bosnia and Herzegovina as “B” with a stable outlook. The agency stated that “the stable outlook balances the risks stemming from BiH’s complex and confrontational political dynamics over the next 12 months against some comparatively strong economic fundamentals, such as contained net general government debt, an improving external position, and a resilient banking sector. The outlook is based on the expectation that the ongoing political crisis between RS on one side and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the central government on the other will ultimately deescalate, with RS remaining in BiH on largely the same terms as previously. The ratings on BiH are supported by the modest level and favorable structure of public debt.” The banking and financial system has been stable with the most significant investments coming from Austria. As of March 2022, there are 20 commercial banks operating in BiH: 13 with headquarters in the Federation and 7 in the Republika Srpska. Twenty-one commercial banks are members of a deposit insurance program, which provides for deposit insurance of KM 50,000 (USD 28,000). The banking sector is divided between the two entities, with entity banking agencies responsible for banking supervision. The BiH Central Bank maintains monetary stability through its currency board arrangement and supports and maintains payment and settlement systems. It also coordinates the activities of the entity Banking Agencies, which are in charge of bank licensing and supervision. Reforms of the banking sector, mandated by the IMF and performed in conjunction with the IMF and World Bank, are in progress. BiH passed a state-level framework law in 2010 mandating the use of international accounting standards, and both entities passed legislation that eliminated differences in standards between the entities and Brčko District. All governments have implemented accounting practices that are fully in line with international norms. BiH does not have a government-affiliated Sovereign Wealth Fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises In BiH, subnational governments (the two entities and ten cantons) own the vast majority of government-owned companies. Private enterprises can compete with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, products/services, and incentives. In practice, however, SOEs have the advantage over private enterprises, especially in sectors such as telecommunications and electricity, where government-owned enterprises have traditionally held near-monopolies and are able to influence regulators and courts in their favor. Generally, government-owned companies are controlled by political parties, increasing the possibilities for corruption and inefficient company management. With the exception of SOEs in the telecom, electricity, and defense sectors, many of the remaining public companies are bankrupt or on the verge of insolvency, and represent a growing liability to the government. The country is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the WTO. There have been no significant privatizations in the past few years. Privatization offerings are scarce and often require unfavorable terms. Some formerly successful state-owned enterprises have accrued significant debts from unpaid health and pension contributions, and potential investors are required to assume these debts and maintain the existing workforce. Under the state-level FDI Law, foreign investors may bid on privatization tenders. International financial organizations, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), are seeking to be engaged on privatization and restructuring efforts across the remaining portfolio of state owned enterprises. Historically, the privatization process in BiH has resulted in economic loss due to corruption. Since 1999 more than 1,000 companies have been fully privatized, while around 100 have been partially privatized. Some privatizations led to the loss of value of state property and many of the privatized companies were weakened or ruined in the privatization process. The history of corrupt privatizations has raised concerns that further privatization would only lead to additional unemployment and the enrichment of a few politically-connected individuals. Successful privatizations and restructurings that improve service delivery, business productivity, and employment would be very beneficial for the BiH economy, could help the image of privatization, and would build support for a long overdue shift away from a government-led economy. The Federation government is focused on privatizing or restructuring some SOEs based on the Federation Agency for Privatization’s 2019 privatization plan. The privatization plan includes the fuel retailer Energopetrol dd. Sarajevo, the engineering company Energoinvest, and the insurer Sarajevo-Osiguranje. The remaining companies listed in the privatization plan have posted losses and suffered significant declines in their value, while others have only a small amount of government ownership. The Federation government rejected media speculation that it plans to privatize the two majority entity government-owned telecom companies, BH Telecom (90 percent stake) and HT Mostar (50.1 percent stake). At the same time, it has completed due diligence on the two telecom companies as part of its arrangement with the IMF. The privatization process in the RS is carried out by the RS Investment Development Bank (IRBRS). Many prospective companies have been already privatized, and out of 163 not yet privatized companies, many are being liquidated or undergoing bankruptcy. In 2016, the RS government announced plans to sell its capital in 22 companies but the plan has not been implemented. The plan envisions the privatizations to take place via the sale of government shares on the stock exchange. Although the RS National Assembly passed a decision that the entity has no plans to privatize the energy sector, the RS government maintains the possibility of joint ventures in the energy sector. 10. Political and Security Environment Bosnia and Herzegovina has been at peace since the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Accords in November 1995. There have been no attacks targeting foreign investments. In mid-June 2013 and early 2014, large groups of citizens protested the country’s economic stagnation and the government’s apparent inability to improve the situation. The vast majority of protests were peaceful with relatively small numbers of participants, but some protests in Sarajevo, Mostar, and Tuzla resulted in attacks on government buildings, destruction of government property, and injuries. There were no reports of foreign investors being directly targeted in the protests. However, there are still risks from occasional, localized political and criminal violence. The political environment in BiH has deteriorated since July 2021 when the RS entity began blockading the work of state level institutions and agencies and in October 2021 proceeded with unconstitutional steps to withdraw from state-level institutions and create parallel institutions and agencies. Since this blockade began, little progress has been made by state level institutions to enact necessary reforms strengthening the business environment. RS moves to pull out of state level institutions and form parallel entity level institutions, such as the Medicine and Medical Equipment Agency, threaten to create legal ambiguities that further complicate the business environment, disrupt the economy, and hinder investment. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina entity also has functionality issues, including a government that has not yet implemented 2018 election results. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (USD) 2020 $19.9 billion* 2020 $19.9 billion www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 $250 million (Post estimate) N/A N/A N/A FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Total inbound stock of FDI as % GDP ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A *Source: BiH Statistics Agency Table 3: Sources of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations 1994-2022 (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $8,882 100% Total Outward 524 100% Austria $1,635 18.4% Croatia 130 24.8% Croatia $1,421 15.9% Germany 97 18.5% Serbia $1,288 14.5% Montenegro 87 16.6% Slovenia $692 7.7% Serbia 74 14.1% Germany $501 5.6% Romania 37 7.0% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. According to the BiH Central Bank preliminary data for 2021, FDI inflow in Bosnia and Herzegovina increased significantly by 65% comparing to the same period of 2020 and amounted to USD 617 million. The all-time high for FDI was USD 2.1 billion in 2007. Most investments in 2014-2021 came from Croatia, Austria, Russia, Serbia, Germany, The Netherlands, UAE, and the United Kingdom. Botswana Executive Summary Botswana is a small country with a population of about 2.35 million (World Bank, 2020) and nestled between South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Zambia. Its central location in southern Africa enables it to serve as a gateway to the region. Botswana has historically enjoyed high economic growth rates and its export-driven economy is highly correlated with global economic trends. Development has been driven mainly by revenue from diamond mining, which has enabled Botswana to develop infrastructure and provide social welfare programs for vulnerable members of the population, and these programs will be maintained despite financial challenges in the current financial year, which runs from April 2022 to March 2023. The economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was significant as evidenced by an economic growth of negative 8.5 percent in 2020; economic growth was estimated to reach 9.7 percent in 2021. Unemployment also rose from 22.2 percent in the fourth quarter of 2019 (prior to the pandemic) to 26 percent in the fourth quarter of 2021. The fiscal impact of the pandemic has also been significant, resulting in large budget deficits of $1.4 billion in 2020 and $0.87 billion in 2021 compared to the $0.68 billion surplus that the government had forecasted for 2021 in its National Development Plan (NDP). In the first quarter of 2021, diamond revenues recovered, but international tourism revenues did not. In recent years, inflation has remained at the bottom end of the central bank’s three to six percent acceptable range; however, since the COVID-19 pandemic, inflation rose to a 13-year high of 10.6 percent in January 2022 and stayed at that level in February 2022. The World Bank classifies Botswana as an upper middle-income country based on its per capita income of $6,405 in 2020, although it declined from $7,203 in 2019. Botswana is a stable, democratic country with an independent judiciary system. It maintains a sound macroeconomic environment, fiscal discipline, a well-capitalized banking system, and a crawling peg exchange rate system. In March 2021, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) maintained Botswana’s sovereign credit rating for long and short-term foreign and domestic currency bonds at “BBB+/A-2” with a negative outlook, which reflects the risks COVID-19 will continue to pose on Botswana’s economic and fiscal performance over the next 12 months. In November 2021, Moody’s revised its credit rating for Botswana from A2 to A3 with a stable outlook. These agencies’ ratings are highly influenced by Botswana’s continued dependence on diamonds, which contribute to at least a quarter of Botswana’s GDP and are susceptible to external shocks which places the country at a much higher risk. The diamond industry has however been experiencing a recovery, setting Botswana on a positive trajectory. Botswana has minimal labor strife. The country has been cited in the 2020 Global Competitiveness Report as one of 30 countries out of 141 in which hiring of foreign labor has become significantly harder than it was in 2008. Botswana is a member state to both the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention and the 1958 New York Convention. Corruption in Botswana remains less pervasive than in other parts of Africa; nevertheless, foreign and national companies have noted increasing tender-related corruption. The Government of Botswana (GoB) created the Botswana Investment and Trade Centre (BITC) to assist foreign investors. Botswana offers low tax rates and has no foreign exchange controls. The BITC’s topline economic goals are to promote export-led growth, ensure efficient government spending and financing, build human capital, and to ensure the provision of appropriate infrastructure. GoB entities, including BITC, use these criteria to determine the level of support to give foreign investors. The GoB has committed to streamline business-related procedures, and remove bureaucratic impediments based on World Bank recommendations in a business reform roadmap. Under this framework, the GoB introduced electronic tax and customs processes in 2016 and 2017. The Companies and Intellectual Property Authority (CIPA) built and successfully integrated the Online Business Registration System (OBRS) with Botswana Unified Revenue Services (BURS) and the Immigration Office. OBRS is designed to reduce the business registration process by more than 10 days. On March 2022, Parliament passed the Intellectual Property Policy to leverage Botswana’s IP potential for inclusive and sustainable economic growth and development. The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB) will from April 1, 2022, be transitioned to Public Procurement and Regulatory Authority (PPRA) and no longer adjudicate on government tenders. The GoB also established the Special Economic Zones Authority (SEZA) to streamline sector-targeted investment in Botswana’s different geographic areas. The Ministry of Investment, Trade & Industry (MITI) is developing a Trading Service Strategy to facilitate economic diversification and is also working on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Implementation Strategy. Due to COVID-19-related economic shortfalls, Botswana drew down heavily on its foreign exchange reserves and government savings. Sectors such as mining, tourism, trade, hotels and restaurants, construction, and manufacturing suffered significantly; however, rough diamond sales recovered somewhat in the second half of 2020. In April 2021, the government put in place several interventions to raise revenues including a Value Added Tax (VAT) increase from 12 percent to 14 percent, an increase on Withholding Tax on dividend income from 7.5 percent to 10 percent and increases in several fees and levies charged for government services (source: 2021, Budget Speech). The government moved swiftly to implement relevant statutory instruments to curb the likelihood of companies exploiting COVID-19 to collude to set exorbitant prices. The 2020 statutory instrument 61 regulated the prices of essential supplies and basic food commodities for the duration of the 18-month COVID-19 related state of emergency. Interventions like the Economic Recovery and Transformation Plan (ERTP) and the Reset Agenda augmented the short-term economic relief package that included wage subsidies, tax amnesties, waivers of certain levies due to government, loan guarantee schemes to support firms’ access to bank credit, and provision of food relief. The president’s Reset Agenda seeks to adjust some priorities in light of new and unexpected challenges and to find smarter ways to implement projects in a timely manner and within stipulated budgets. The ERTP aims to reinforce support already given to affected businesses and also to take advantage of opportunities that have emerged because of the pandemic such as digital services and e-commerce. Botswana is committed to reducing greenhouse emissions to 15 percent by 2030 through renewable energy projects already underway and listed in the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP). Botswana also adopted a Climate Change Policy in 2021 which seeks to promote access to carbon markets, climate finance, and clean technologies. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 45 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 57 of 173 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 21.0 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 6,640 USD https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GoB publicly emphasizes the importance of attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and drafted an investment facilitation law recommended by the 2014 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Investment Review. While the draft was completed in 2016 with technical assistance from UNCTAD, it was never enacted. The draft is still under review and will be presented to Parliament for approval. The GoB has launched initiatives to promote economic activity and foreign investment in specific areas, such as establishing a diamond hub which brought more value-added businesses (i.e., cutting and polishing) into the country. Additional investment opportunities in Botswana include large water projects, electricity, transportation, telecommunication infrastructure projects, horticultural production, and agro processing. Economists have also noted Botswana’s considerable potential in the mining, mineral processing, beef, tourism, solar energy, and financial services sectors. BITC assists foreign investors with projects intended to diversify export revenue, create employment, and transfer skills to the citizens of Botswana. The High-Level Consultative Council (HLCC), chaired by the President, and an Exporter Roundtable organized by BITC and Botswana’s Exporters and Manufacturers Association (BEMA), are mechanisms employed by the GoB to focus on a healthy business environment for FDI. Botswana’s 2003 Trade Act reserves licenses for citizens in 19 sectors, including general trading establishments, gas stations, liquor stores, supermarkets (excluding chain stores), bars (other than those associated with hotels), certain types of restaurants, boutiques, auctioneers, car washes, domestic cleaning services, curio shops, fresh produce vendors, funeral homes, hairdressers, various types of rental/hire services, laundromats, specific types of government construction projects under a certain dollar amount, certain activities related to road and railway construction and maintenance, and certain types of manufacturing activities including the production of furniture for schools, welding, and bricklaying. The law allows foreigners to participate in these sectors as minority joint venture partners in medium-sized businesses. Foreigners can hold the majority share if they obtain written approval from the trade minister. Foreign companies have access to about 46 trading licenses in different categories. It takes approximately five working days to obtain a license. The Ministry of Investment, Trade, and Industry (MITI) administers the citizen participation initiative and takes an expansive interpretation of the term chain stores, so that it encompasses any store with more than one outlet. This broad interpretation has resulted in the need to apply exemptions to certain supermarkets, simple specialty operations, and general trading stores. These exceptions were generally granted prior to 2015 and many large general merchandise markets, restaurants, and grocery networks are owned by foreigners as a result. Since 2015, the GoB has denied some exception requests, but reports they have approved some based on localization agreements directly negotiated between the ministry and the applying company. These agreements reportedly include commitments to purchase supplies locally and capacity building for local workers and industry. BITC conducts due diligence on companies that are looking to invest in the country and the Directorate of Intelligence Services (DIS) handles background checks for national security. Botswana has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995. In 2016, the WTO conducted a trade policy review of the Southern African Customs Union to which Botswana belongs ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp322_e.htm ). Botswana underwent an ICT Policy Review and e-Commerce strategy review with UNCTAD and the report was released in October 2021 (https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/dtlstict2021d4_en.pdf). Botswana sees this as a critical move to diversify the economy and position the country to be a bigger player in the global economy. To operate a business in Botswana, one needs to register a company with the GoB’s CIPA through the OBRS at: https://www.cipa.co.bw/types-of-entities CIPA asserts that the company registration process can be completed in a day and is integrated with BURS which allows for a fast-tracked tax registration in 30 days. Additional work is required to open bank accounts and obtain necessary licenses and permits. BITC ( www.bitc.co.bw ), the GoB’s integrated investment and trade promotion authority, was designed to serve as a one-stop shop to assist investors in setting up a business and finding a location for operation. BITC’s ability to streamline procedures varies based on GoB entity and bureaucratic requirements. BITC assesses investment projects on their ability to diversify the economy away from its continued dependence on diamond mining, contribute towards export-led growth, and job creation for and skills transfer to Batswana citizens. BITC also hosts the Botswana Trade Portal ( https://www.botswanatradeportal.org.bw ) that is designed to ease trade across borders. It is a single point of contact for all information relating to import and export to and from Botswana and represents relevant ministries and parastatals. Botswana has several incentives and preferences for both citizen-owned and locally based companies. Foreign-owned companies can benefit from local procurement preferences which are usually required for government tenders. MITI instituted a program in 2015 to give locally based small companies a 15 percent preferential price margin in GoB procurement, with mid-sized companies receiving a 10 percent margin, and large companies a five percent margin. Under this policy, MITI defines small companies as having less than five million pula in annual revenue reflected in their financial statements, medium companies with five to 20 million pula in revenue, and large companies with revenues exceeding 20 million pula. The directive applies to 27 categories of goods and services ranging from textiles, chemicals, and food, as well as a broad range of consultancy services. The government can also offer up to 50 million pula in funding through the Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency (CEDA) to joint ventures between foreign and citizen owned companies. For Companies Act registration purposes, enterprises are classified as: Micro Enterprises – fewer than six employees including the owner and an annual revenue below 60 thousand pula; Small Enterprises – fewer than 25 employees and an annual revenue between 60 thousand and 1.5 million pula; Medium Enterprises – fewer than 100 employees and annual revenue between 1.5 and 5 million pula; Large Enterprises – over 100 employees and an annual revenue of at least 5 million pula. This classification system permits foreigners to participate as minority shareholders in medium-sized enterprises in the 35 business sectors reserved for citizens. The GoB neither promotes nor restricts outward investment. 3. Legal Regime Bureaucratic procedures necessary to start and maintain a business tend to be transparent, though slow, and regulatory procedures can be cumbersome to navigate. In 2018, Botswana launched a Regulatory Impact Assessment Strategy to improve the regulatory environment, ensure legislation is necessary and cost effective, reduce administrative burdens imposed by the regulatory environment to businesses, and to improve transparency, consultation, and government accountability. Most complaints by foreign investors are about the inefficiency and/or unresponsiveness of mid- and low-level government bureaucrats. The GoB has introduced a Performance Management System to improve the service and accountability of its employees. Additionally, President Masisi presented a Reset Agenda in May 2021 and one of its priorities is to align government’s machinery to the presidential agenda. This will ensure transformation and improved service delivery in the public service by bringing significant reforms in all public institutions. Unfair business practices or conduct can be reported to the Competition Authority, which seeks to level the playing field for all business operators and foster a conducive environment for business. The GoB does not require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers to distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. However, Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) are a requirement and taken very seriously when undertaking infrastructural developments projects. Bills in Botswana, including investment laws, go through a public consultation process and are available for public comment. Bills are also debated in Parliament sessions that are open to the public. The Companies Act of 2004 requires all companies registered in Botswana to prepare annual financial statements on the basis of generally accepted accounting principles. It further requires every public company, including non-exempt private companies, to prepare their Financial Statement in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards. The GoB’s procuring entity, Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB) has since April 1, 2022, transitioned to a regulatory authority, Public Procurement and Regulatory Authority (PPRA), under a new procurement act. The new act dictates for all government procurements to be adjudicated and awarded from the relevant procuring ministries/government entities. PPRA will play an oversight role, ensuring that all procurement processes are followed according to the new act. Further, PPRA will provide necessary and relevant training and capacity building to align the local procurement processes with international best practices. Prospective government contractors are still required to register with the PPRA. An independent body from the PPRA known as the Public Procurement Tribunal will be established to adjudicate on any disputes. The PPRA will use a national eProcurement system which will serve as an electronic end-to-end One Stop information and transaction portal for any public procurement. Since 2014, PPADB has partnered with the United States Trade and Development Agency’s (USTDA) Global Procurement Initiative in a shared commitment to utilize best-value determination procurement practices and to professionalize procurement. Through training, USTDA also assisted PPADB’s transition to PPRA. Online services are available at https://ipms.ppadb.co.bw/login The PPRA Act shall from time-to-time call for preferential procurement of citizen-owned contractors for works, service, and supplies. To be eligible for a specific reservation or preference the contractor is required to attach to the bidding package proof of eligibility from the issuing authority. Parliament enacted an Economic Inclusion Act to provide for the establishment of the office of the Coordinator of the Economic Empowerment office that will promote the effective participation of targeted citizens in the growth and development of the economy and facilitate enforcement of the economic empowerment initiatives. Targeted citizen according to this act means a citizen whose access to economic resources has been constrained by various factors as may be prescribed by the minister from time to time. Health and safety laws, embodied in the Factories Act of 1973, provide basic protection for workers from unsafe working conditions. Minimum working conditions required on work premises include cleanliness of the premises, adequate ventilation and sanitation, sufficient lighting, and the provision of safety precautions. Health inspectors and the Botswana Bureau of Standards carry out periodic checks at both new and operating factories. Botswana is a member of SACU and SADC. Neither has authority over member state national regulatory systems. Botswana is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO’s Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary system. Botswana’s legal system is based on Roman-Dutch law as influenced by English common law. This type of system exists with legislation, judicial decisions, and local customary law. The courts enforce commercial contracts, and the judicial system is widely regarded as being fair. Both foreign and domestic investors have equal access to the judicial system. Botswana does not have a dedicated commercial court. The Industrial Court, set up by the Trade Dispute Act of 2004, primarily addresses labor matters. The GoB is planning to create a corps of commercially specialized judges within the civil court system. Under the new system, commercial cases will be overseen by these commercial judges to expedite handling and ensure relevant expertise. Botswana already has a specialized anti-corruption court that handles all corruption cases. Some U.S. litigants have reported that the time to obtain and enforce a judgment in a commercial dispute is unreasonably long. The turnaround time for civil cases is approximately two years. To improve adjudications efficiency, the GoB has established a land tribunal, and industrial, small claims, and corruption courts. In the past several years, some dockets have improved, but progress has been uneven. Local laws are accessible through the Botswana Attorney General’s Office website ( www.elaws.gov.bw ). It can take up to 24 months for a law, once passed, to appear on the website. Under Botswana’s Company Act, foreigners who wish to operate a business are required to register, as well as obtain, the relevant licenses and permits as prescribed by the Trade Act of 2008. Licenses are required for a wide spectrum of businesses, including banking, non-bank financial services, transportation, medical services, mining, energy provision, and alcohol sales. Although amendments to the Trade Act have eliminated the catchall miscellaneous business license category, investors have reported on local authorities insisting a business apply for a license even when it does not fall within the established categories. In addition, some businesses have observed the enforcement of licenses, as well as the time taken for inspections to comply with licensing requirements, varies widely across local government authorities. Botswana has anti-trust legislation and policies to ensure appropriate and fair competition in business. Under the Competition Act, the Competition Authority (CA) monitors mergers and acquisitions. In 2019, the CA expanded its mandate by taking over the operations of the Consumer Protection Act from MITI and rebranded itself as the Competition and Consumer Authority (CCA). The CCA’s mandate is to prevent and rectify anti-competitive practices and protect the interests of consumers through the control of unfair business practices. During the year 2020/2021, the CCA engaged in the Financial Inclusion Program with other stakeholders. While the aim of the program is to reach out to populations that are excluded from financial services, the CCA’s participation ensures that consumers’ interests are taken into consideration, especially the interests of people in remote areas or with limited education. On the competition side, the authority ramped up its public outreach using digital platforms and increased its engagement on public platforms, resulting in an increase in the number of complaints lodged online. The authority handled 41 mergers in 2020/21 financial year, a 26 percent decrease from 56 mergers handled in 2019/20. The decrease could be attributable to the 18-month COVID-19 related State of Emergency that started in March 2020, under which the authority temporarily suspended receipt of new mergers. The CCA investigated a total of 25 competition related cases with 15 of them being carried over from the previous financial year, while 10 were new cases and successfully closed off four cases; the remaining 21 cases are under investigation and have been carried over to the 2021/22 financial year. The CCA is empowered to reject mergers deemed not in the public interest. CCA interprets this power to mean that it can prohibit mergers that concentrate most shares in the hands of foreign investors. For consumer complaints, a total of 1,158 cases were lodged in the year under review with most complaints related to motor vehicles, motor parts and services (mostly involving grey imports) at 23.7 percent, followed by cellphones and accessories at 18.7 percent, electronic category at 16.2 percent, furniture complaints at 11.2 percent, and e-commerce transactions at 0.45 percent. A total of 1,267 of these complaints or 90.3 percent were resolved while 136 of these were still pending at the end of the financial year. During the 2020/21 financial year, the CCA also carried out a research study on cement as a policy advisory instrument to the Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry (MITI) and will use the policy paper to shape the development of a cement sector in Botswana. Section 8 of Botswana’s Constitution prohibits the nationalization of private property. The Constitution is currently under review and a committee has been set up to do consultations and gather public opinion across the country. The GoB has never pursued a forced nationalization policy and is highly unlikely to adopt one. The Acquisition of Property Act provides a process for any expropriation, including parameters to determine market value and receive compensation. The 2007 Amendment to the Electricity Supply Act allows the GoB to revoke an Independent Power Producer’s license and confiscate the operations, with compensation, for public interest purposes. Botswana’s commercial and bankruptcy laws are comprehensive. Secured and unsecured creditors enjoy similar rights under bankruptcy proceedings as those they would enjoy in the United States. 6. Financial Sector The government encourages foreign portfolio investment, although there are limits on foreign ownership in certain sectors. It also embraces the establishment of new and diverse financial institutions to support increased foreign and domestic investment and to fill existing gaps where finance is not commercially available. There are nine commercial banks, one merchant bank, one offshore bank, three statutory deposit-taking institutions, and one credit union operating in Botswana. All have corresponding relationships with U.S. banks. Additional financial institutions include various pension funds, insurance companies, microfinance institutions, stock brokerage companies, asset management companies, statutory finance institutions, collective investment undertakings, and statutory funds. Historically, commercial banks have accounted for 93.7 percent of total deposits and 93.5 percent of total loans in Botswana. Access to banking services measured by the number of depositors on adult population improved from 72 percent in 2019 to 76.6 percent in 2020. Additionally, banks introduced new products and services that included enhancement of transactional accounts, introduction of cross border payment services, collaborative arrangements with money-transfer service providers to widen the financial inclusion efforts for the unbanked population. The central bank, the Bank of Botswana, acts as banker and financial advisor to the GoB and is responsible for the management of the country’s foreign exchange reserves, the administration of monetary and exchange rate policies, and the regulation and supervision of financial institutions in the country. Monetary policy in Botswana is widely regarded as prudent, and the GoB has historically managed to maintain a sensible exchange rate and a stable inflation rate, generally within the target of three to six percent. But the COVID-19 pandemic pushed inflation to new heights, reaching 10.6 percent in January and February 2022, the highest level on record in over a decade. Banks may lend to non-resident-controlled companies without seeking approval from the Bank of Botswana. Foreign investors usually enjoy better access to credit than local firms do. In July 2014, USAID’s Development Credit Authority (now DFC – U.S. International Development Finance Corporation), in collaboration with ABSA (formerly Barclays Bank of Botswana), implemented a seven-year program to allow small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) to access up to US$ 15 million in loans in an effort to diversify the economy. So far, the program that was initially scheduled to come to an end in June 2021 is at 83 percent utilization and has been extended to July 2024. To date ABSA has disbursed US$ 12.5 million and has up to June 2023 to disburse the remaining US$ 2.5 million. At the end of 2020, there were 24 companies on the Domestic Board and eight companies on the Foreign Equities Board of the Botswana Stock Exchange (BSE). In addition, there were 46 listed bonds and three exchange traded funds listed on the Exchange. The Domestic Company Index (DCI) declined by 8.2 percent in 2020, while it declined by 4.6 percent in 2019, reflecting how the pandemic affected the economy. According to the BSE 2020 Annual Report, all sectors in the domestic equity board experienced a decline which contributed a negative 8.4 percent points to the DCI’s depreciation of 8.2 percent except for one sector, Retail & Wholesale. The total market capitalization for listed companies at year-end 2020 was US$ 33.5 billion, with domestic companies’ capitalization standing at US$ 3 billion while foreign companies’ capitalization stood at US$ 30.5 billion. The Mining and Minerals sector continued to dominate the foreign equity board as it contributed 94.7 percent of the foreign companies’ market capitalization in 2020 and contributed 0.97 percentage points to the Foreign Company Index (FCI) depreciation of 1 percent. The BSE is still highly illiquid compared to larger African markets and is dominated by mining companies which adds to index volatility. Laws prohibiting insider trading and securities fraud are clearly stipulated under Section 35 – 37 of the Securities Act, 2014 and charges for contravening these laws are listed under Section 54 of the same Act. The government has legitimized offshore capital investments and allows foreign investors, individuals and corporate bodies, and companies incorporated in Botswana, to open foreign currency accounts in specified currencies. The designated currencies are U.S. Dollar, British Pound sterling, Euro, and the South African Rand. There are no known practices by private firms to restrict foreign investment participation or control in domestic enterprises. Private firms are not permitted to adopt articles of incorporation or association which limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control. In general, Botswana exercises careful control over credit expansion, the pula exchange rate, interest rates, and foreign and domestic borrowing. Banking legislation is largely in line with industry norms for regulation, supervision, and payments. However, Botswana failed to meet the compliance requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), resulting in a grey listing in October 2018. Botswana worked to implement the necessary regulatory legislations to address the identified technical compliance deficiencies and was subsequently removed from the FATF grey list in October 2021, and then in February 2022, removed from the EU blacklist of high risk third countries with regard to AML/CFT. The government continues to work on its regulatory environment to avoid falling back into the grey list. The Non-Bank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority (NBFIRA) was established in 2008 and provides regulatory oversight for the non-banking sector. It extends know-your-customer practices to non-banking financial institutions to help deter money laundering and terrorist financing. NBFIRA is also responsible for regulating the International Financial Services Centre, a hub charged with promoting the financial services industry in Botswana. The Bank of Botswana maintains a long-term sovereign wealth fund, known as the Pula Fund, in addition to a regular foreign reserve account providing basic import cover. The Pula Fund was established under the Bank of Botswana Act and forms part of the country’s foreign exchange reserves, which are primarily funded by diamond revenues. The Pula Fund is wholly invested in foreign currency-denominated assets and is managed by the Bank of Botswana Board with input from recognized international financial management and investment firms. All realized market and currency gains, or losses are reported in the Bank of Botswana’s income statement. The Fund has been affected severely by the COVID-19 pandemic, with the GoB making withdrawals to address significant COVID-19-related revenue shortfalls. As a result, the Pula Fund, which provides long fiscal cushion against economic shocks, is significantly depleted from 20 percent of GDP in 2011 to seven percent of GDP as of mid-2020 – from $1.69 billion to $510 million – a decline of more than 70 percent. Botswana is a founding member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Fund and was one of the architects of the Santiago Principles in 2008. More information is available at: https://www.bankofbotswana.bw/sites/default/files/BOTSWANA-PULA-FUND-SANTIAGO-PRINCIPLES.pdf 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs), known as “parastatals,” are majority or 100 percent owned by the GoB. There is a published list of SOEs at the GoB portal ( www.gov.bw ), with profiles of financial and development SOEs. Some SOEs are state-sanctioned monopolies, including the Botswana Meat Commission, the Water Utilities Corporation, Botswana Railways, and the Botswana Power Corporation. The same business registration and licensing laws govern private and government-owned enterprises. No law or regulation prohibits or restricts private enterprises from competing with SOEs. Botswana law requires SOEs to publish annual reports, and private sector accountants or the Auditor General audits SOEs depending on how they are constituted. GoB ministries together with their respective SOEs are compelled on an annual basis to appear before the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee to provide reports and answer questions regarding their performance. Some SOEs are not performing well and have been embroiled in scandals involving alleged fraud and mismanagement. Botswana is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the WTO. The GOB has committed to privatization on paper. It established a task force in 1997 to privatize all its state-owned companies and formed a Public Enterprises Evaluation and Privatization Agency (PEEPA) to oversee this process. Implementation of its privatization commitments has been limited to the January 2016 sale offer of 49 percent of the stock of the state-owned Botswana Telecommunications Corporation to Botswana citizens only. In February 2017, the GoB issued an Expressions of Interest for the privatization of its national airline, but progress stopped due to the decision to re-fleet the airline before privatization. In 2019, President Masisi announced the Botswana Meat Commission would be placed in the hands of a private management company prior to privatization, but this has yet to occur. Conversely, the GoB has created new SOEs such as the Okavango Diamond Company, the Mineral Development Company, and Botswana Oil Limited in recent years. A Rationalization Strategy covering all parastatals has been developed and its implementation will address issues such as duplication of activities, overlapping mandates and issues of corporate governance. This may finally result in some SOEs being privatized or merged while some may be closed. 10. Political and Security Environment The threat of political violence is low in Botswana. Public demonstrations are rare and seldom turn violent. The last large-scale strikes, which involved public sector employees, occurred April-June 2011 and were not violent. In September 2015, roughly 200 people participated in a peaceful march organized by an opposition political party to protest water shortages in the capital. In August 2016, police forcefully dispersed a small demonstration protesting unemployment outside the National Assembly. In February and March 2017, some student-led protests occurred at tertiary institutions necessitating police deployment but were not overtly political. There were multiple reports of police brutality, including the use of rubber whips and rubber bullets. Another peaceful march against corruption was held in March 2018. This followed allegations of embezzlement of the National Petroleum Fund by a company charged with the management of the funds together with some GoB officials. In late 2019, following general election, the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) held a peaceful march of no more than 200 people protesting the election results. Brazil Executive Summary Brazil is the second largest economy in the Western Hemisphere behind the United States, and the twelfth largest economy in the world (in nominal terms) according to the World Bank. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) named Brazil the seventh largest destination for global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in 2021 with inflows of $58 billion, an increase of 133percent in comparison to 2020 but still below pre-pandemic levels (in 2019, inflows totaled $65.8 billion). In recent years, Brazil has received more than half of South America’s total amount of incoming FDI, and the United States is a major foreign investor in Brazil. According to Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) measurements, U.S. stock was 24 percent ($123.9 billion) of all FDI in Brazil as of the end of 2020, the largest single-country stock by ultimate beneficial owner (UBO), while International Monetary Fund (IMF) measurements assessed the United States had the second largest single-country stock of FDI by UBO, representing 18.7 percent of all FDI in Brazil ($105 billion) and second only to the Netherlands’ 19.9 percent ($112.5 billion). The Government of Brazil (GoB) prioritized attracting private investment in its infrastructure and energy sectors during 2018 and 2019. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 delayed planned privatization efforts and despite government efforts to resume in 2021, economic and political conditions hampered the process. The Brazilian economy resumed growth in 2017, ending the deepest and longest recession in Brazil’s modern history. However, after three years of modest recovery, Brazil entered a recession following the onset of the global coronavirus pandemic in 2020. The country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased 4.6 percent in 2021, in comparison to a 4.1 percent contraction in 2020. As of February 2022, analysts had forecasted 0.3 percent 2022 GDP growth. The unemployment rate was 11.1 percent at the end of 2021, with over one-quarter of the labor force unemployed or underutilized. The nominal budget deficit stood at 4.4 percent of GDP ($72.4 billion) in 2021, and is projected to rise to 6.8 percent by the end of 2022 according to Brazilian government estimates. Brazil’s debt-to-GDP ratio reached 89.4 percent in 2020 and fell to around 82 percent by the end of 2021. The National Treasury projections show the debt-to-GDP ratio rising to 86.7 percent by the end of 2022, while the Independent Financial Institution (IFI) of Brazil’s Senate projects an 84.8 percent debt-to-GDP ratio. The BCB increased its target for the benchmark Selic interest rate from 2 percent at the end of 2020 to 9.25 percent at the end of 2021, and 11.75 percent in March 2022. The BCB’s Monetary Committee (COPOM) anticipates raising the Selic rate to 12.25 percent before the end of 2022. President Bolsonaro took office on January 1, 2019, and in that same year signed a much-needed pension system reform into law and made additional economic reforms a top priority. Bolsonaro and his economic team outlined an agenda of further reforms to simplify Brazil’s complex tax system and complicated code of labor laws in the country, but the legislative agenda in 2020 was largely consumed by the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, the Brazilian government passed a major forex regulatory framework and strengthened the Central Bank’s autonomy in executing its mandate. The government also passed a variety of new regulatory frameworks in transportation and energy sectors, including a major reform of the natural gas market. In addition, the government passed a law seeking to improve the ease of doing business as well as advance the privatization of its major state-owned enterprise Electrobras. Brazil’s official investment promotion strategy prioritizes the automobile manufacturing, renewable energy, life sciences, oil and gas, and infrastructure sectors. Foreign investors in Brazil receive the same legal treatment as local investors in most economic sectors; however, there are foreign investment restrictions in the health, mass media, telecommunications, aerospace, rural property, and maritime sectors. The Brazilian congress is considering legislation to liberalize restrictions on foreign ownership of rural property. Analysts contend that high transportation and labor costs, low domestic productivity, and ongoing political uncertainties hamper investment in Brazil. Foreign investors also cite concerns over poor existing infrastructure, rigid labor laws, and complex tax, local content, and regulatory requirements; all part of the extra costs of doing business in Brazil. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 96 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 57 of 129 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $70,742 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $7,850 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Brazil was the world’s seventh-largest destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2019, with inflows of $58 billion, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The GoB actively encourages FDI – particularly in the automobile, renewable energy, life sciences, oil and gas, mining, and transportation infrastructure sectors – to introduce greater innovation into Brazil’s economy and to generate economic growth. GoB investment incentives include tax exemptions and low-cost financing with no distinction made between domestic and foreign investors in most sectors. Foreign investment is restricted in the health, mass media, telecommunications, aerospace, rural property, maritime, and insurance sectors. The Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX-Brasil) plays a leading role in attracting FDI to Brazil by working to identify business opportunities, promoting strategic events, and lending support to foreign investors willing to allocate resources to Brazil. APEX-Brasil is not a “one-stop shop” for foreign investors, but the agency can assist in all steps of the investor’s decision-making process, to include identifying and contacting potential industry segments, sector and market analyses, and general guidelines on legal and fiscal issues. Their services are free of charge. The website for APEX-Brasil is: http://www.apexbrasil.com.br/en . In 2016, the Ministry of Economy created the Direct Investments Ombudsman (OID) at the Board of Foreign Trade and Investments (CAMEX), to provide assistance to foreign investors through a single body for issues related to FDI in Brazil. This structure aims to help and eventually speed up foreign investments in Brazil, providing foreign and national investors with a simpler process for establishing new businesses and implementing additional investments in their current companies. Since 2019, the OID has acted as a “single window” of the Brazilian government for FDI. It supports and guides investors in their requests, recommending solutions to their complaints (Policy Advocacy) as well as proposing improvements to the legislation or administrative procedures to public agencies whenever necessary. The OID is responsible for receiving requests and inquiries on matters related to foreign investments, to be answered together with government agencies and entities (federal, state and municipal) involved in each case (Focal Points Network). This new structure provides a centralized support system to foreign investors, and must respond in a timely manner to investors’ requests. A 1995 constitutional amendment (EC 6/1995) eliminated distinctions between foreign and local capital, ending favorable treatment (i.e. tax incentives, preference for winning bids) for companies using only local capital. However, constitutional law restricts foreign investment in healthcare (Law 8080/1990, altered by 13097/2015), mass media (Law 10610/2002), telecommunications (Law 12485/2011), aerospace (Law 7565/1986 a, Decree 6834/2009, updated by Law 12970/2014, Law 13133/2015, and Law 13319/2016), rural property (Law 5709/1971), maritime (Law 9432/1997, Decree 2256/1997), and insurance (Law 11371/2006). Brazil does not have a national security-based foreign investment screening process. Foreign investors in Brazil must electronically register their investment with the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) within 30 days of the inflow of resources to Brazil. In cases of investments involving royalties and technology transfer, investors must register with Brazil’s patent office, the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI). Since the approval of the Doing Business Law in 2021, companies are no longer required to have an administrator residing in Brazil, but they must appoint a local proxy attorney to receive legal notifications. Portfolio investors must have a Brazilian financial administrator and register with the Brazilian Securities Exchange Commission (CVM). Brazil does not have an investment screening mechanism based on national security interests. A bill was proposed in the Chamber of Deputies in 2020 (PL 2491) to change the parameters under which to review foreign investments could be reviewed, but the bill has not yet been analyzed by the necessary commissions. To enter Brazil’s insurance and reinsurance market, U.S. companies must establish a subsidiary, enter a joint venture, acquire a local firm, or enter a partnership with a local company. The BCB reviews banking license applications on a case-by-case basis. Foreign interests own or control 20 of the top 50 banks in Brazil, but Santander is the only major wholly foreign-owned retail bank. Since June 2019, foreign investors may own 100 percent of capital in Brazilian airline companies. While 2015 and 2017 legislative and regulatory changes relaxed some restrictions on insurance and reinsurance, rules on preferential offers to local reinsurers remain unchanged. Foreign reinsurance firms must have a representational office in Brazil to qualify as an admitted reinsurer. Insurance and reinsurance companies must maintain an active registration with Brazil’s insurance regulator, the Superintendence of Private Insurance (SUSEP), and maintain a solvency classification issued by a risk classification agency equal to Standard & Poor’s or Fitch ratings of at least BBB-. Foreign ownership of cable TV companies is allowed, and telecom companies may offer television packages with their service. Content quotas require every channel to air at least three and a half hours per week of Brazilian programming during primetime. Additionally, one-third of all channels included in any TV package must be Brazilian. The National Land Reform and Settlement Institute administers the purchase and lease of Brazilian agricultural land by foreigners. Under the applicable rules, the area of agricultural land bought or leased by foreigners cannot account for more than 25 percent of the overall land area in a given municipal district. Additionally, no more than 10 percent of agricultural land in any given municipal district may be owned or leased by foreign nationals from the same country. The law also states that prior consent is needed for purchase of land in areas considered indispensable to national security and for land along the border. The rules also make it necessary to obtain congressional approval before large plots of agricultural land can be purchased by foreign nationals, foreign companies, or Brazilian companies with majority foreign shareholding. In December 2020, the Senate approved a bill (PL 2963/2019; source: https://www25.senado.leg.br/web/atividade/materias/-/materia/136853 ) to ease restrictions on foreign land ownership and the Chamber of Deputies began to deliberate on the bill; however, the bill was shelved with no plans to advance it further after President Bolsonaro expressed concerns regarding the legislation. Brazil is not yet a signatory to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), but submitted its application for accession in May 2020. In February 2021, Brazil formalized its initial offer to start negotiations. The submission establishes a series of thresholds above which foreign sellers will be allowed to bid for procurements. Such thresholds vary for different procuring entities and types of procurements. The proposal also includes procurements by some states and municipalities (with restrictions) as well as state-owned enterprises, but it excludes certain sensitive categories, such as financial services, strategic health products, and specific information technologies. Brazil’s submission is currently under review with GPA members. By statute, a Brazilian state enterprise may subcontract services to a foreign firm only if domestic expertise is unavailable. Additionally, U.S. and other foreign firms may only bid to provide technical services when there are no qualified Brazilian firms. U.S. companies need to enter into partnerships with local firms or have operations in Brazil in order to be eligible for “margins of preference” offered to domestic firms participating in Brazil’s public sector procurement to help these firms win government tenders. Nevertheless, foreign companies are often successful in obtaining subcontracting opportunities with large Brazilian firms that win government contracts, and since October 2020 foreign companies are allowed to participate in bids without the need for an in-country corporate presence (although establishing such a presence is mandatory if the bid is successful). A revised Government Procurement Protocol of the trade bloc Mercosul (Mercosur in Spanish) signed in 2017 would entitle member nations Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay to non-discriminatory treatment of government-procured goods, services, and public works originating from each other’s suppliers and providers. However, none of the bloc’s members have ratified the protocol, so it has not entered into force. Despite the restrictions within Mercosul, in January 2022 Brazil and Chile entered into an agreement which includes government procurement. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) December 2021 Economic Forecast Summary of Brazil summarized that with the COVID-19 vaccination campaign accelerating throughout the year, economic activity underpinned by reduced private consumption and investment restarted as restrictions were lifted, and exports benefited from the global recovery, the robust demand for commodities, and a weak exchange rate. However, supply bottlenecks, lower purchasing power, higher interest rates, and policy uncertainty have slowed the pace of recovery. The labor market is experiencing a lag in recovering from the pandemic, and by the end of 2021 unemployment remained above pre-pandemic levels. The residual effect of the government’s significant fiscal stimulus spending in 2020 to reinvigorate the economy contributed to inflationary pressure, further compounded by constrained global supply chains pushing prices up. In response, the COPOM chose to incrementally increase its benchmark SELIC rate from 2 percent in March 2021 to 11.75 percent in March 2022. The COPOM announced that it would continue tightening its monetary policy in an effort to curb inflation and anchor expectations. Prospects for economic growth are weak for 2022 and 2023. The OECD recommended that Brazil strengthen and adhere to its fiscal rules to increase market confidence in establishing sustainable finances and exercising more efficient public spending to create fiscal space for growth-enhancing policies, along with developing a more inclusive social protection program. The IMF’s 2021 Country Report No. 2021/217 (published in September 2021) for Brazil highlighted that its economic performance for the year had been better than expected, partly due to the government’s fiscal response to the pandemic which propelled the economy back to pre-pandemic levels for most sectors. In addition, the IMF noted a favorable economic momentum supported by booming trade and robust private sector credit growth. The IMF assessed that currency depreciation and a surge in commodity prices had led to headline inflation, and that expectations remained negative. The report noted Brazil’s lagging labor market, especially among youths, women, and Afro-Brazilians. The IMF also expressed concerns that emergency cash transfers (which expired in December 2021) were only a short-term solution, and recommended addressing poverty and inequality by strengthening a more permanent social safety net. The IMF concluded that near-term fiscal risks were low, but the high level of public debt continued to pose a medium-term risk. Restoring high and sustained growth, increasing employment, raising productivity, improving living standards, and reducing vulnerabilities would require longer-term policy efforts to eliminate bottlenecks and foster private sector-led investment. The WTO’s 2017 Trade Policy Review of Brazil noted the country’s open stance towards foreign investment, but also pointed to the many sector-specific limitations (see above). The three reports listed below, with links to the reports, highlight the uncertainty regarding reform plans as the most significant political risk to the economy. OECD Report: IMF Report: WTO Report: A company must register with the National Revenue Service (Receita Federal) to obtain a business license and be placed on the National Registry of Legal Entities (CNPJ). Brazil’s Export Promotion and Investment Agency (APEX) has a mandate to facilitate foreign investment in Brazil. The agency’s services are available to all investors, foreign and domestic. Foreign companies interested in investing in Brazil have access to many benefits and tax incentives granted by the Brazilian government at the municipal, state, and federal levels. Most incentives target specific sectors, amounts invested, and job generation. Brazil’s business registration website can be found at: https://www.gov.br/pt-br/servicos/inscrever-ou-atualizar-cadastro-nacional-de-pessoas-juridicas . Brazil enacted its “Doing Business” law, which entered into force on August 26, 2021. The law simplified the process to open a business, sought to facilitate foreign trade by eliminating redundancy as well as further automating its trade processes, and expand the powers of minority shareholders in private companies. Adopted in September 2019, the Economic Freedom Law 13.874 established the Economic Freedom Declaration of Rights and provides for free market guarantees. The law includes several provisions to simplify regulations and establish norms for the protection of free enterprise and free exercise of economic activity. On August 20, 2021, the Brazilian government included the Foreign Trade Secretariat (SECEX) in the Brazilian Authorized Economic Operator Program (Programa OEA), run by Receita Federal (Internal Federal Revenue service), allowing Government of Brazil-designated OEA certified operators to maintain a low-level risk to achieve benefits in their foreign trade operations related to drawback suspension and exemption regimes. Through the digital transformation initiative in Brazil, foreign companies can open branches via the internet. Since 2019, it has been easier for foreign businesspeople to request authorization from the Brazilian federal government. After filling out the registration, creating an account, and sending the necessary documentation, business entities can make the authorization request on the Brazilian government’s online portal through a legal representative. The electronic documents will then be analyzed by the Brazilian National Department of Business Registration and Integration (DREI) team. DREI will inform the applicant of any missing documentation via the portal and e-mail and give a 60-day period for the applicant to submit any additional information. The legal representative of the foreign company, or another third party who holds a power of attorney, may request registration through this link: https://acesso.gov.br/acesso/#/primeiro-acesso?clientDetails=eyJjbGllbnRVcmkiOiJodHRwczpcL1wvYWNlc3NvLmdvdi5iciIsImNsaWVudE5hbWUiOiJQb3J0YWwgZ292LmJyIiwiY2xpZW50VmVyaWZpZWRVc2VyIjp0cnVlfQ%3D%3D The regulation of foreign companies opening businesses in Brazil is governed by article 1,134 of the Brazilian Civil Code and article 1 of DREI Normative Instruction 77/2020. English-language general guidelines to open a foreign company in Brazil are not yet available, but the Portuguese version is available at the following link: https://www.gov.br/economia/pt-br/assuntos/drei/empresas-estrangeiras . For foreign companies that will be a partner or shareholder of a Brazilian national company, the governing regulation is DREI Normative Instruction 81/2020 (https://www.in.gov.br/en/web/dou/-/instrucao-normativa-n-81-de-10-de-junho-de-2020-261499054 ). The contact information of the DREI is drei@economia.gov.br and +55 (61) 2020-2302. References: provides investment measures, laws and treaties enacted by selected countries. provides links to business registration sites worldwide. Brazil does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. APEX-Brasil supports Brazilian companies’ efforts to invest abroad under its “internationalization program”: http://www.apexbrasil.com.br/como-a-apex-brasil-pode-ajudar-na-internacionalizacao-de-sua-empresa . APEX-Brasil frequently highlights the United States as a worthwhile destination for outbound investment. APEX-Brasil and SelectUSA (U.S. Department of Commerce) signed a memorandum of cooperation in February 2014 to promote bilateral investment. Brazil incentivizes outward investment. APEX-Brasil organizes several initiatives aimed at promoting Brazilian investments abroad. The agency´s efforts include trade missions, business round tables, promoting the participation of Brazilian companies in major international trade fairs, and arranging technical visits for foreign buyers to Brazil as well as facilitating travel for decision-makers seeking to learn about the Brazilian market and performing other commercial activities designed to strengthen the country’s branding abroad. The main sectors of Brazilian investments abroad are financial services and assets (totaling 62.9 percent of total investments abroad); oil and gas extraction (12 percent); and mineral metal extraction (6.5 percent). Including all sectors, Brazilian investments abroad totaled $448 billion in 2020. The regions that received the largest share of Brazilian outward investments are the Caribbean (43.3 percent), concentrated in the Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands and Bahamas, and Europe (37.9 percent), primarily the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Regulations on investments abroad are outlined in BCB Ordinance 3,689/2013 (foreign capital in Brazil and Brazilian capital abroad): https://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/busca/downloadNormativo.asp?arquivo=/Lists/Normativos/Attachments/48812/Circ_3689_v1_O.pdf Sales of cross-border mutual funds are only allowed to certain categories of investors, not to the general public. In 2020, international financial services companies active in Brazil submitted a proposal to Brazilian regulators to allow opening these mutual funds to the general public, and the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission is expected to approve their recommendation by June 2022. Discussions with regulators about increasing the share percentages that pension funds and insurers can invest abroad (currently 10 percent for pension funds, 20 percent for insurers, and 40 percent for qualified investors) are ongoing, along with discussions about tax deferral mechanisms to incentivize Brazilian investment abroad. 3. Legal Regime According to the World Bank, it takes approximately 17 days to start a business in Brazil. Brazil is seeking to streamline the process and decrease the amount of time it takes to open a small- or medium-sized enterprise (SME) to only five days through its RedeSimples Program. Similarly, the government has reduced regulatory compliance burdens for SMEs through the continued use of the SIMPLES program, which simplifies the collection of up to eight federal, state, and municipal-level taxes into one single payment. The Doing Business law (14.195/2021) included provisions to streamline the process, such as unifying federal, state and municipal registrations and eliminating requirements such as address analysis and pre-checking business names. In 2020, the World Bank noted that Brazil’s lowest-ranked component in its Ease of Doing Business score was the annual administrative burden for a medium-sized business to comply with Brazilian tax codes with an average of 1,501 hours per year, a significant improvement from 2019’s 1,958 hour average but still much higher than the 160.7 hour average of OECD high-income countries. The total tax rate for a medium-sized business in Brazil is 65.1 percent of profits, compared to the average of 40.1 percent in OECD high-income countries. Business managers often complain of not being able to understand complex and sometimes contradictory tax regulations, despite having large local tax and accounting departments in their companies. Tax regulations, while burdensome and numerous, do not generally differentiate between foreign and domestic firms. However, some investors complain that in certain instances the processing of rebates for exported goods of the value-added tax collected by individual states (ICMS) favors local companies. Exporters in many states report difficulty receiving their ICMS rebates when their goods are exported. Taxes on commercial and financial transactions are particularly burdensome, and businesses complain that these taxes hinder the international competitiveness of Brazilian-made products. Of Brazil’s ten federal regulatory agencies, the most prominent include: ANVISA, the Brazilian counterpart to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, which has regulatory authority over the production and marketing of food, drugs, and medical devices ANATEL, the country’s telecommunications regulatory agency, which handles telecommunications as well as the licensing and assigning of radio spectrum bandwidth (the Brazilian FCC counterpart) ANP, the National Petroleum Agency, which regulates oil and gas contracts and oversees auctions for oil and natural gas exploration and production ANAC, Brazil’s civil aviation agency IBAMA, Brazil’s environmental licensing and enforcement agency ANEEL, Brazil’s electricity regulator that regulates Brazil’s power sector and oversees auctions for electricity transmission, generation, and distribution contracts In addition to these federal regulatory agencies, Brazil has dozens of state- and municipal-level regulatory agencies. The United States and Brazil conduct regular discussions on customs and trade facilitation, good regulatory practices, standards and conformity assessment, digital issues, and intellectual property protection. Discussions in all these areas occurred during the 19th plenary of the Commercial Dialogue which took place virtually in October 2021, and continue through ongoing regular exchanges at the working level between the U.S. Department of Commerce, Brazil’s Ministry of Economy, and other agencies and regulators throughout the year. Regulatory agencies complete Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) on a voluntary basis. The Brazilian congress passed Law 13.848 in June 2019 on Governance and Accountability (PLS 52/2013 in the Senate, and PL 6621/2016 in the Chamber). Among other provisions, the law makes RIAs mandatory for regulations that affect “the general interest.” The Chamber of Deputies, the Federal Senate, and the Office of the Presidency maintain websites providing public access to both approved and proposed federal legislation. Brazil is seeking to improve its public comment and stakeholder input process. In 2004, the GoB opened an online “Transparency Portal” with data on funds transferred to and from federal, state, and city governments, as well as to and from foreign countries. It also includes information on civil servant salaries. In December 2021, Brazil’s Securities and Exchange Commision (CMV) issued Resolution 59/2021, establishing the first transparency mechanism for environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) practices in the country. The goal of the change was to provide more comprehensive information to potential investors, therefore allowing the market environment to drive changes in business behavior. According to the resolution, starting in January 2023, listed companies will be required to inform the CVM whether they disclose information on ESG indicators and provide details on their reports, such as existence of independent audits, which indicators were used, and if UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have been considered. The new requirement will also include questions regarding the companies’ consideration of the Task Force on Climate Change-Related Financial Disclosures or other recognized entities’ recommendations, the existence of a gas emission inventory, and the role of management bodies in assessing climate-related risks. Regarding diversity issues, companies will be required to disclose information showing the diversity of the body of administrators and employees as well as salary disparities between executives and staff. In 2022, the Department of State concluded in its annual 2021 Fiscal Transparency Report that Brazil had met minimum fiscal transparency requirements. The International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index ranked Brazil slightly ahead of the United States in terms of budget transparency in its most recent (2019) index. The Brazilian government demonstrates adequate fiscal transparency in managing its federal accounts, although there is room for improvement in terms of completeness of federal budget documentation. Brazil’s budget documents are publicly available, widely accessible, and sufficiently detailed. They provide a relatively full picture of the GoB’s planned expenditures and revenue streams. The information in publicly available budget documents is considered credible and reasonably accurate. Brazil is a member of Mercosul – a South American trade bloc whose full members include Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Brazil routinely implements Mercosul common regulations. Brazil is a member of the WTO and the government regularly notifies draft technical regulations, such as potential agricultural trade barriers, to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Brazil has a civil legal system with state and federal courts. Investors can seek to enforce contracts through the court system or via mediation, although both processes can be lengthy. The Brazilian Superior Court of Justice (STJ) must accept foreign contract enforcement rulings for the rulings to be considered valid in Brazil. Among other considerations, the foreign judgment must not contradict any prior decisions by a Brazilian court in the same dispute. The Brazilian Civil Code regulates commercial disputes, although commercial cases involving maritime law follow an older Commercial Code which has been otherwise largely superseded. Federal judges hear most disputes in which one of the parties is the Brazilian State, and also, rule on lawsuits between a foreign state or international organization and a municipality or a person residing in Brazil. The judicial system is generally independent. The Supreme Federal Court (STF), charged with constitutional cases, frequently rules on politically sensitive issues. State court judges and federal level judges below the STF are career officials selected through a meritocratic examination process. The judicial system is backlogged, and disputes or trials frequently take several years to arrive at a final resolution, including all available appeals. Regulations and enforcement actions can be litigated in the court system, which contains mechanisms for appeal depending upon the level at which the case is filed. The STF is the ultimate court of appeal on constitutional grounds; the STJ is the ultimate court of appeal for cases not involving constitutional issues. In 2019, Brazil established a “one-stop shop” for international investors. The one-stop shop, the Direct Investments Ombudsman (DIO), is a ‘single window’ for investors provided by the Executive Secretariat of CAMEX. It is responsible for receiving requests and inquiries about investments, to be answered jointly with the public agency responsible for the matter (at the federal, state and municipal levels) involved in each case (the Network of Focal Points). This new structure allows for supporting the investor via a single governmental body in charge of responding to investor requests within a short time. Private investors have noted the single window is better than the previous system, but does not yet provide all the services of a true “one-stop shop” to facilitate international investment. The DIO’s website in English is: http://oid.economia.gov.br/en/menus/8 The Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), which falls under the purview of the Ministry of Justice, is responsible for enforcing competition laws, consumer protection, and carrying out regulatory reviews of proposed mergers and acquisitions. CADE was reorganized in 2011 through Law 12529, combining the antitrust functions of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance. The law brought Brazil in line with U.S. and European merger review practices and allows CADE to perform pre-merger reviews, in contrast to the prior legal framework that directed the government to review mergers after they had already been completed. In October 2012, CADE performed Brazil’s first pre-merger review. In 2021, CADE conducted 611 total formal investigations. It approved 165 merger and/or acquisition requests and did not reject any requests. Article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution assures property rights of both Brazilians and foreigners that own property in Brazil. The Constitution does not address nationalization or expropriation. Decree-Law 3365 allows the government to exercise eminent domain under certain criteria that include, but are not limited to, national security, public transportation, safety, health, and urbanization projects. In cases of eminent domain, the government compensates owners at fair market value. There are no signs that the current federal government is contemplating expropriation actions in Brazil against foreign interests. Brazilian courts have previously ruled in U.S. citizens’ favor for some claims regarding state-level land expropriations. However, as states have filed appeals of these decisions, the compensation process for foreign entities can be lengthy and have uncertain final outcomes. ICSID Convention and New York Convention In 2002, Brazil ratified the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards. Brazil is not a member of the World Bank’s International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Brazil joined the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 2010, and its membership will expire in 2022. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Article 34 of the 1996 Brazilian Arbitration Act (Law 9307) defines a foreign arbitration judgment as any judgment rendered outside of the national territory. The law established that the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) must ratify foreign arbitration awards. Law 9307, updated by Law 13129/2015, also stipulates that a foreign arbitration award will be recognized or executed in Brazil in conformity with the international agreements ratified by the country and, in their absence, with domestic law. A 2001 Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (STF) ruling established that the 1996 Brazilian Arbitration Act, permitting international arbitration subject to STJ ratification of arbitration decisions, does not violate the federal constitution’s provision that “the law shall not exclude any injury or threat to a right from the consideration of the Judicial Power.” Contract disputes in Brazil can be lengthy and complex. Brazil has both a federal and a state court system, and jurisprudence is based on civil code and contract law. Federal judges hear most disputes in which one of the parties is the State and rule on lawsuits between a foreign State or international organization and a municipality or a person residing in Brazil. Five regional federal courts hear appeals of federal judges’ decisions. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Brazil ratified the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama Convention) and the 1979 Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitration Awards (Montevideo Convention). Law 9307/1996 amplifies Brazilian law on arbitration and provides guidance on governing principles and rights of participating parties. Brazil developed a new Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement (CFIA) model in 2015 (https://concordia.itamaraty.gov.br/ ), but it does not include ISDS mechanisms. (See sections on bilateral investment agreements and responsible business conduct.) Brazil’s commercial code governs most aspects of commercial association, while the civil code governs professional services corporations. In December 2020, Brazil approved a new bankruptcy law (Law 14.112) which largely models the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and addresses criticisms that its previous bankruptcy legislation favored holders of equity over holders of debt. The new law facilitates the judicial and extrajudicial resolution process between debtors and creditors and accelerates reorganization and liquidation processes. Both debtors and creditors are allowed to provide reorganization plans that would eliminate non-performing activities and sell-off assets, thus avoiding bankruptcy. The new law also establishes a framework for cross-border insolvencies that recognizes legal proceedings outside of Brazil. 6. Financial Sector The Brazil Central Bank (BCB) in October 2016 implemented a sustained monetary easing cycle, lowering the Special Settlement and Custody System (Selic) baseline reference rate from a high of 14 percent in October 2016 to a record-low 2 percent by the end of 2020. The downward trend was reversed by an increase to 2.75 percent in March 2021 and reached 10.75 percent in February 2022. Brazil’s banking sector projects that the Selic will reach 12.25 percent by the end of 2022. Inflation for 2021 ended at an annualized 10.06 percent, above the target of 4 percent plus/minus 1.5 percent. The BCB’s Monetary Policy Committee (COPOM) set the BCB’s inflation target at 3.5 percent for 2022 and .25 percent in 2023 (plus/minus 1.5 percent), but as of February 2022 the BCB estimates that inflation will reach 5.4 percent in 2022, above the target again. As of mid-March 2022, Brazil’s annual inflation rate is at 10.75 percent. Brazil’s muddled fiscal policy and heavy public debt burden factor into most analysts’ forecasts that the “neutral” policy rate will remain higher than target rates among Brazil’s emerging-market peers (around five percent) over the reporting period. According to the BCB, in 2021 the ratio of public debt to GDP reached 81.1 percent, compared to a record 89.4 percent in 2020. Analysts project that the debt/GDP ratio may rise to around 85 percent by the end of 2023. The role of the state in credit markets grew steadily beginning in 2008, but showed a reduction in 2020 due to the pandemic. As of January 2022, public banks accounted for about 50 percent of total loans to the private sector (compared to 48.9 percent in 2018). Directed lending (that is, to meet mandated sectoral targets) also rose, and accounts for almost half of total lending. Brazil is paring back public bank lending and trying to expand a market for long-term private capital. While local private sector banks are beginning to offer longer credit terms, state-owned development bank BNDES is a traditional source of long-term credit in Brazil. BNDES also offers export financing. Approvals of new financing by BNDES decreased 4 percent in 2021 from 2020, with the infrastructure sector receiving the majority of new capital. The sole stock market in Brazil is B3 (Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão), created through the 2008 merger of the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) with the Brazilian Mercantile & Futures Exchange (BM&F), forming the fourth-largest exchange in the Western hemisphere, after the NYSE, NASDAQ, and Canadian TSX Group exchanges. In 2020, there were 463 companies traded on the B3 exchange. The B3’s broadest index, the Ibovespa, decreased 11.93 percent in valuation during 2021, due to economic uncertainties related to rising and persistent inflation, particularly in the second half of the year. Foreign investors, both institutional and individuals, can directly invest in equities, securities, and derivatives; however, they are limited to trading those investments only on established markets. Wholly-owned subsidiaries of multinational accounting firms, including the major U.S. firms, are present in Brazil. Auditors are personally liable for the accuracy of accounting statements prepared for banks. The Brazilian financial sector is large and sophisticated. Banks lend at market rates that remain relatively high compared to other emerging economies. Reasons cited by industry observers include high taxation, repayment risk, concern over inconsistent judicial enforcement of contracts, high mandatory reserve requirements, and administrative overhead, as well as persistently high real (net of inflation) interest rates. According to BCB data collected for 2020, the average rate offered by Brazilian banks to non-financial corporations was 11.7 percent. The banking sector in Brazil is highly concentrated, with BCB data indicating that the five largest commercial banks (excluding brokerages) account for approximately 82 percent of the commercial banking credit market totaling $800 billion by the end of 2020. Three of the five largest banks by assets in the country, Banco do Brasil, Caixa Econômica Federal, and BNDES, are partially or completely federally-owned. Large private banking institutions focus their lending on Brazil’s largest firms, while small- and medium-sized banks primarily serve small- and medium-sized companies. Citibank sold its consumer business to Itaú Bank in 2016, but maintains its commercial banking interests in Brazil. It is currently the only U.S. bank operating in the country. Increasing competitiveness in the financial sector, including in the emerging fintech space, is a vital part of the Brazilian government’s strategy to improve access to and the affordability of financial services in Brazil. On November 16, 2020, the BCB launched its instant payment system called “PIX”. PIX is a 24/7 system that offers transfers of any value for people-people (P2P), people-business (P2B), business-people (B2P), business-business (B2B), and government-government (G2G). Brazilian customers in 2021 overwhelmingly embraced PIX, particularly for P2P transfers (which are free), replacing both cash payments and legacy bank electronic transfers which charged relatively high fees and could only take place during business hours. In February 2021, the BCB implemented the first two of four phases of its Open Banking Initiative in an effort to open Brazil’s insulated banking system dominated by relatively few players. The first phase required Brazilian financial institutions to facilitate digitized access to their customer service channels, products, and services related to demand deposit or savings accounts, payment accounts, and credit operations. The second phase of the initiative expanded sharing customer data across a widening scope of bank products including loans. The other two phases, which are scheduled to go into effect in 2022, seek to include sharing customer data on foreign exchange, investments, and pension funds. The BCB expects that increased access to customer information will allow other financial institutions, including competitor banks and fintechs, to offer better and cheaper banking services to incumbent banks’ clients, thereby breaking up the dominance of the six large, incumbent banking institutions. In recent years, the BCB has strengthened bank audits, implemented more stringent internal control requirements, and tightened capital adequacy rules to reflect risk more accurately. It also established loan classification and provisioning requirements. These measures apply to private and publicly owned banks alike. In December 2020, Moody’s upgraded a collection of 28 Brazilian banks and their affiliates to stable from negative after the agency had lowered the outlook on the Brazilian system in April 2020 due to economic difficulties. As of March 2021, the rating remained as stable. The Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM) independently regulates the stock exchanges, brokers, distributors, pension funds, mutual funds, and leasing companies, assessing penalties in instances of insider trading. To open an account with a Brazilian bank, foreign account holders must present a permanent or temporary resident visa, a national tax identification number (CPF) issued by the Brazilian government, either a valid passport or identity card for foreigners (CIE), proof of domicile, and proof of income. On average, this process from application to account opening can take more than three months. Foreign Exchange Brazil’s foreign exchange market remains small. The latest Triennial Survey by the Bank for International Settlements conducted in December 2019 showed that the net daily turnover on Brazil’s market for OTC foreign exchange transactions (spot transactions, outright forwards, foreign-exchange swaps, currency swaps, and currency options) was $18.8 billion, down from $19.7 billion in 2016. This was equivalent to around 0.22 percent of the global market in 2019, down from 0.3 percent in 2016. On December 29, 2021, Brazil approved a new Foreign Exchange Regulatory framework, to go into effect in December 2022, which replaces more than 40 separate regulations with a single law and eases foreign investments in the Brazilian market incentivizing increased foreign investment and assisting Brazilian businesses in integrating into global value chains. The new law aims to streamline currency exchange operations and authorizes more enterprises, including fintechs and small businesses, to conduct operations in foreign currencies bypassing retail banks and increasing their competitiveness. In addition, the law expands the list of qualifying activities transacted in foreign-currency denominated accounts (previously restricted only to import/export firms and for loans in which the debtor or creditor was based outside Brazil). Brazil’s banking system has adequate capitalization and has traditionally been highly profitable, reflecting high interest rate spreads and fees. According to an October 2021 Central Bank Financial Stability Report, the banking system remains solid, with growing capitalization indices, and continues to rebuild its capital base. All institutions are able to meet the minimum prudential requirements, and solvency does not pose a risk to financial stability. Stress testing demonstrated that the banking system has adequate loss-absorption capacity in all simulated scenarios. There are few restrictions on converting or transferring funds associated with a foreign investment in Brazil. Foreign investors may freely convert Brazilian currency in the unified foreign exchange market, where buy-sell rates are determined by market forces. All foreign exchange transactions, including identifying data, must be reported to the BCB. Foreign exchange transactions on the current account are fully liberalized. The BCB must approve all incoming foreign loans. In most cases, loans are automatically approved unless loan costs are determined to be “incompatible with normal market conditions and practices.” In such cases, the BCB may request additional information regarding the transaction. Loans obtained abroad do not require advance approval by the BCB, provided the Brazilian recipient is not a government entity. Loans to government entities require prior approval from the Brazilian senate as well as from the Economic Ministry’s Treasury Secretariat, and must be registered with the BCB. Interest and amortization payments specified in a loan contract can be made without additional approval from the BCB. Early payments can also be made without additional approvals if the contract includes a provision for them. Otherwise, early payment requires notification to the BCB to ensure accurate records of Brazil’s stock of debt. Remittance Policies Brazilian Federal Revenue Service regulates withholding taxes (IRRF) applicable to earnings and capital gains realized by individuals and legal entities residing or domiciled outside Brazil. Upon registering investments with the BCB, foreign investors are able to remit dividends, capital (including capital gains), and, if applicable, royalties. Investors must register remittances with the BCB. Dividends cannot exceed corporate profits. Investors may carry out remittance transactions at any bank by documenting the source of the transaction (evidence of profit or sale of assets) and showing payment of applicable taxes. Under Law 13.259/2016 passed in March 2016, capital gain remittances are subject to a 15 to 22.5 percent income withholding tax, with the exception of capital gains and interest payments on tax-exempt domestically issued Brazilian bonds. The capital gains marginal tax rates are 15 percent for up to $1,000,000 in gains; 17.5 percent for $1,000,000 to $10,000,000 in gains; 20 percent for $10,000,000 to $60,000,000 in gains; and 22.5 percent for more than $60,000,000 in gains. Repatriation of a foreign investor’s initial investment is also exempt from income tax under Law 4131/1962. Lease payments are assessed a 15 percent withholding tax. Remittances related to technology transfers are not subject to the tax on credit, foreign exchange, and insurance, although they are subject to a 15 percent withholding tax and an extra 10 percent Contribution for Intervening in Economic Domain (CIDE) tax. Brazil had a sovereign fund from 2008 – 2018, when it was abolished, and the money was used to repay foreign debt. 10. Political and Security Environment Strikes and demonstrations occasionally occur in urban areas and may cause temporary disruption to public transportation. Brazil has over 41,000 murders annually, with low rates of murder investigation case completions and convictions. Non-violent pro- and anti-government demonstrations have occurred periodically in recent years. Although U.S. citizens usually are not targeted during such events, U.S. citizens traveling or residing in Brazil are advised to take common-sense precautions and avoid any large gatherings or any other event where crowds have congregated to demonstrate or protest. For the latest U.S. State Department guidance on travel in Brazil, please consult www.travel.state.gov. Brunei Executive Summary Brunei is a small, energy-rich sultanate on the northern coast of Borneo in Southeast Asia. Brunei boasts a well-educated, largely English-speaking population, excellent infrastructure, and a government intent on attracting foreign investment and projects. In parallel with Brunei’s efforts to attract foreign investment and create an open and transparent investment regime, the country has taken steps to streamline the process for entrepreneurs and investors to establish businesses and has improved its protections for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Despite ambitions to diversify, Brunei’s economy remains dependent on the income derived from sales of oil and gas, contributing about 50 percent to the country’s GDP. Substantial revenue from overseas investment supplements income from domestic hydrocarbon production. These two revenue streams provide a comfortable quality of life for Bruneians by regional standards. Citizens are not required to pay taxes and have access to free education through the university level, free medical care, and subsidized housing and car fuel. Brunei has a stable political climate and is generally sheltered from natural disasters. Its central location in Southeast Asia, with good telecommunications and airline connections, business tax credits in specified sectors, and no income, sales, or export taxes, offers a welcoming climate for potential investors. Sectors offering U.S. business opportunities in Brunei include aerospace and defense, agribusiness, construction, petrochemicals, energy and mining, environmental technologies, food processing and packaging, franchising, health technologies, information and communication, digital finance, and services. Brunei has ambitious climate change goals, aspiring to lower greenhouse gas emissions by more than 50 percent and increase its share of renewable energy to 30 percent of total capacity by 2035. Brunei continues to take a cautious approach against the COVID-19 pandemic despite having fully immunized 95 percent of the population. As of March 2022, although the country is not under lockdown, Brunei has not fully opened its borders to non-essential travel. Travelers entering the country are required to obtain permission from the Prime Minister’s Office. In 2014, Brunei began implementing sections of its Sharia Penal Code (SPC) that expanded preexisting restrictions on activities such as alcohol consumption, eating in public during the fasting hours in the month of Ramadan, and indecent behavior, with possible punishments including fines and imprisonment. The SPC functions in parallel with Brunei’s common law-based civil penal code. The government commenced full implementation of the SPC in 2019, introducing the possibility of corporal and capital punishments including, under certain evidentiary circumstances, amputation for theft and death by stoning for offenses including sodomy, adultery, and blasphemy. Government officials emphasize that sentencing to the most severe punishments is highly improbable due to the very high standard of proof required for conviction under the SPC. While the SPC does not specifically address business-related matters, potential investors should be aware that the SPC generated global controversy when it was implemented due to its draconian punishments and inherent discrimination toward LGBT communities. The sultan declared a moratorium on the death penalty for sharia crimes in response to the outcry and there have been no recorded incidents of U.S. citizens or U.S. investments directly affected by sharia law. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 35 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 82 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD $11.0 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD $31,510 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Brunei has an open economy favorable to foreign trade and FDI as the government continues its economic diversification efforts to limit its long reliance on oil and gas exports. FDI is important to Brunei as it plays a key role in the country’s economic and technological development. Brunei encourages FDI in the domestic economy through various investment incentives offered by the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Improving Brunei’s Ease of Doing Business status by upgrading the domestic business regulatory environment through a whole-of-nation approach has been a priority for the government. The World Bank Ease of Doing Business report indicated that Brunei ranked 66th overall out of 190 world economies in 2019. Brunei ranked first in the report’s “Getting Credit” category, tied with New Zealand, indicative of Brunei’s strong credit reporting mechanisms. Brunei amended its laws to make it easier and quicker for entrepreneurs and investors to establish businesses. The Business License Act (Amendment) of 2016 exempts several business activities (eateries, boarding and lodging houses or other places of public resort; street vendors and stalls; motor vehicle dealers; petrol stations, including places for storing petrol and inflammable material; timber store and furniture factories; and retail shops and workshops) from needing to obtain a business license. The Miscellaneous License Act (Amendment) of 2015 reduced the wait times for new business registrants to start operations, with low-risk businesses like eateries and shops able to start operations immediately. There is no restriction on foreign ownership of companies incorporated in Brunei. The Companies Act requires locally incorporated companies to have at least one of the two directors—or if more than two directors, at least two of them—to be residents of Brunei, but companies may request exceptions. The corporate income tax rate is the same whether the company is locally or foreign owned and managed. All businesses in Brunei must be registered with the Registry of Companies and Business Names at the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Foreign investors can fully own incorporated companies, foreign company branches, or representative offices, but not sole proprietorships or partnerships. Brunei does maintain its right to screen investment to ensure that foreign investments do not contradict and cause negative impact to the overall National Development Plan and to the national interest. More information on incorporation of companies can be found on the Ministry of Finance and Economy website . The World Trade Organization (WTO) Secretariat prepared a Trade Policy Review of Brunei in December 2014 and a revision in February 2015. As part of Brunei’s effort to attract foreign investment, the government established the Brunei Economic Development Board (BEDB) and Darussalam Enterprise (DARe) as facilitating agents under the Ministry of Finance and Economy. These organizations work together to smooth the process of obtaining permits, approvals, and licenses. Facilitating services are now consolidated into one government website . BEDB is the government’s frontline agency that promotes and facilitates foreign investment into Brunei. BEDB is responsible for evaluating investment proposals, liaising with government agencies, and obtaining project approval from the government’s Foreign Direct Investment and Downstream Industry Committee. Outward Investment A major share of outward investment is made by the government through its sovereign wealth funds, which are managed by the Brunei Investment Agency (BIA) under the Ministry of Finance and Economy. No data is available on the total investment amount due to a strict policy of secrecy. It is believed that the majority of sovereign wealth funds are invested in foreign portfolio investments and real estate. Despite the limited availability of public information regarding the amount, the funds are generally viewed positively and managed well by BIA. 3. Legal Regime Brunei’s regulatory system has limited transparency, particularly in lawmaking processesand impact assessments. Each ministry is responsible for coordinating with the Attorney General’s Chambers to draft proposed legislation. Legislation does not receive broad review and little input is provided from outside of the originating ministry. The sultan has final authority to approve proposed legislation. Laws and regulations are readily accessible on the Attorney General’s Chambers website . Brunei encourages environment, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure but does not mandate it. Brunei is an active member of ASEAN, through which it has concluded FTAs with Australia & New Zealand, China, India, Japan and South Korea. Brunei became a WTO member in 1995 and a signatory to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1993. Brunei’s constitution does not specifically provide for judicial independence, but in practice the court system operates without government interference. Brunei’s legal system includes two parallel systems: one based on common law and the other based on Islamic law. The common law judicial system is presided over by the Supreme Court, which comprises the Court of Appeal and the High Court. Recognizing the importance of protecting investors’ rights and contract enforcement, Brunei established a Commercial Court in 2016. In 2014, Brunei implemented the first phase of its Sharia Penal Code (SPC), which expanded existing restrictions on minor offenses—such as eating during Ramadan—that are punishable by fines or imprisonment. On April 3, 2019 Brunei commenced full implementation of the SPC, introducing the possibility of harsher punishments such as stoning to death for rape, adultery, or sodomy, and execution for apostasy, contempt of the Prophet Muhammad, or insult of the Quran. However, these forms of punishment require higher standards of proof than the common-law-based penal code (for example, four pious men must personally witness an act of fornication to support a sharia-based harsh sentence), placing them under a de facto moratorium. The sultan confirmed the moratorium in a 2019 public statement. The basic legislation on investment includes the Investment Incentive Order 2001 and the Income Tax (As Amended) Order 2001. Investment Order 2001 supports economic development in strategically important industrial and economic enterprises and, through the Ministry of Finance and Economy, offers investment incentives through a favorable tax regime. Although Brunei does not have a stock exchange, the government is reportedly planning to establish a securities market. Foreign ownership of companies is not restricted, although under the Companies Act, at least one of two directors of a locally incorporated company must be a resident of Brunei, unless granted an exemption from the appropriate authorities. Brunei’s Competition Order, published in 2015 to promote and maintain fair and healthy competition to enhance market efficiency and consumer welfare, entered into force on January 1, 2020. The sultan also announced the establishment of the Competition Commission in 2017 to oversee and act on competition issues that include adjudicating anti-competitive cases and imposing penalties on companies that violate the Competition Order. Brunei is a signatory to the 1987 ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments. There is no history of expropriation of foreign owned property in Brunei, but there have been cases of domestically owned private property being expropriated for infrastructure development. The government provided compensation in such cases and claimants were afforded due process. In 2012, amendments to Brunei’s Bankruptcy Act increased the minimum threshold for a creditor to present a bankruptcy petition against a debtor from BND 500 to BND 10,000 (USD350 to USD7,060) and enabled an appointed bankruptcy trustee to direct the Controller of Immigration to impound and retain the debtor’s passport, certificate of identity, or travel document to prevent the debtor from leaving the country. The amendment also requires the debtor to deliver all property under the debtor’s possession to the trustee. Information about Brunei’s bankruptcy laws is available on the judiciary’s website . 6. Financial Sector In March 2021, the Minister of Finance and Economy II renewed its annual budget of USD292 million to fund infrastructure, technology, and socio-economic studies related to the implementation of Brunei’s own stock exchange, which is expected to launch in the next few years. In 2013, Brunei signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Securities Commission Malaysia (SCM) designed to strengthen collaboration in the development of fair and efficient capital markets in the two countries. It also provided a framework to facilitate greater cross-border capital market activities and cooperation in the areas of regulation as well as capacity building and human capital development, particularly in Islamic capital markets. The capital market industry in Brunei is primarily governed by the Securities Markets Order, 2013 and the Securities Markets Regulations, 2015 which are both administered by Brunei Darussalam Central Bank. In addition, securities with any Shariah or Islamic component would be additionally governed by the Syariah Financial Supervisory Board Order, 2006. Brunei has accepted the obligations under IMF Article VIII, Sections 2(a), 3 and 4, and maintains an exchange system that is free of restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions and multiple currency practices. Brunei has a small banking sector which includes both conventional and Islamic banking. The Brunei Darussalam Central Bank (BDCB) is the sole central authority for the banking sector, in addition to its role as the country’s central bank. Banks have high levels of liquidity, good capital adequacy ratios, and well-managed levels of non-performing loans. Several foreign banks such as Standard Chartered Bank and Bank of China (Hong Kong) have established operations in Brunei. In March 2018, HSBC officially ended its operations in Brunei after announcing its planned departure from Brunei in late 2016. All banks fall under the supervision of BDCB, which has also established a credit bureau that centralizes information on applicants’ credit worthiness. The Brunei dollar (BND) is pegged to the Singapore dollar, and each currency is accepted in both countries. The Brunei Investment Agency (BIA) manages Brunei’s General Reserve Fund and their external assets. Established in 1983, BIA’s assets are estimated to be USD60-75 billion. BIA’s activities are not publicly disclosed and are ranked the lowest in transparency ratings by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Brunei’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs), managed by Darussalam Assets under the Ministry of Finance and Economy, lead key sectors of the economy including oil and gas, telecommunications, transport, and energy generation and distribution. These enterprises also receive preferential treatment when responding to government tenders. Some of the largest SOEs include the following: The telecommunications industry is dominated by government-linked companies. The service providers are Datastream Digital, Imagine, and Progresif. In 2019, the government consolidated the infrastructure of all three companies under a state-owned wholesale network operator called Unified National Networks (UNN). Royal Brunei Technical Services (RBTS), established in 1988 as a government owned corporation, is responsible for managing the acquisition of a wide range of systems and equipment. Brunei Energy Services and Trading (BEST) is the national oil company owned by the Brunei government. The company was granted all mineral rights in eight prime onshore and offshore petroleum blocks totaling 20,552 sq. km. PB manages contracts with Shell and Petronas, which are exploring Brunei’s onshore and deep-water offshore blocks. The government continues to modify BEST’s role in the oil and gas industry. In 2019, the government established Petroleum Authority as the oil and gas sector’s regulatory body, a function which had been filled by BEST. Royal Brunei Airlines started operations in 1974 and is the country’s national carrier. The airline flies a combination of Boeing and Airbus aircraft. Brunei’s Ministry of Transportation and Info-Communication has made corporatization and privatization part of its strategic plan, which calls for the Ministry to shift its role from a service provider to a regulatory body with policy-setting responsibilities. The Ministry is studying initiatives to privatize a few state-owned agencies, including the Postal Services Department and public transportation services. These services are not yet completely privatized and there is no timeline for privatization. Guidelines regarding the role of foreign investors and the bidding process are not yet available. 10. Political and Security Environment Brunei is an absolute monarchy and has no recent history of political violence. Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah is an experienced and popular monarch who rules the country as Prime Minister while also retaining the titles of Minister of Finance and Economy, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The country experienced an uprising in 1962 when it was a British protectorate, which ended through the intervention of British troops. The country has been ruled peacefully under emergency law ever since. Brunei has managed to avoid demands for political reform by making use of its hydrocarbon revenues to provide its citizens with generous welfare benefits and subsidies. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $12.211 billion 2020 $12.006 billion www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $2.6 million 2020 $11.0 million BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A No data available Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 $7.45 billion 2020 63.2% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Department of Economic Planning and Statistics, Ministry of Finance and Economy Brunei Darussalam Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment (Not Available) Total Inward 7,589 100% Total Outward Amount 100% China 2,646 35% Country #1 Amount X% United Kingdom 2,608 34% Country #2 Amount X% The Netherlands 855 11% Country #3 Amount X% Singapore 387 5% Country #4 Amount X% Japan 259 3% Country #5 Amount X% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Source: IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (2020) Bulgaria Executive Summary Bulgaria is seen by many investors as an attractive low-cost investment destination, with government incentives for new investment. The country offers some of the least expensive labor in the European Union (EU) and low and flat corporate and income taxes. However, Bulgaria has the lowest labor productivity rate in the EU, and a rapidly shrinking population could exacerbate the trend. In 2021 Bulgaria continued to suffer from the COVID-19 pandemic and related shutdowns, although the impact on the economy was less severe than in many other European countries. In 2021 the government updated the budget to include more public funding of COVID-related measures, such as increased pensions. Tourism, logistics, the service industries, and the automotive sector were particularly hard hit by the pandemic. The Bulgarian economy declined 4.4 percent in 2020, rebounded to 4.2 percent growth in 2021, and is projected to grow by 4.8 percent in 2022. This recovery is being driven by higher consumption and public investment funds. The war in Ukraine and rising energy and food prices, however, threaten these growth expectations. Bulgaria is expected to receive EUR 6.2 billion over a six-year period (2021-2026) from the EU’s post-COVID recovery grant funds to improve its economy in areas such as green energy, digitalization, and private sector development. The government expects to adopt the Euro in early 2024, after having joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) in July 2020 and the EU’s Banking Union in October 2020. The adoption of the euro will eliminate currency risk and help reduce transaction costs with some of the country’s key European trading partners. There are no legal limits on foreign ownership or control of firms. With some exceptions, foreign entities are given the same treatment as national firms and their investments are not screened or otherwise restricted. There is strong growth in software development, technical support, and business process outsourcing. The Information Technology (IT) and back-office outsourcing sectors have attracted a number of U.S. and European companies to Bulgaria, and many have established global and regional service centers in the country. The automotive sector has also attracted U.S. and foreign investors in recent years. Foreign investors remain concerned about rule of law in Bulgaria. Along with endemic corruption, investors cite other problems impeding investment including difficulty obtaining needed permits, unpredictability due to frequent regulatory and legislative changes, sporadic attempts to negate long-term government contracts, and an inefficient judicial system. The new government coalition which came to power in December 2021 cited rule of law reform as its highest priority. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 78 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 35 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 USD 608 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 9,630 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment There are no legal limits on foreign ownership or control of firms. With some exceptions, foreign entities are given the same treatment as national firms and their investments are not screened or otherwise restricted. The Invest Bulgaria Agency (IBA), the government’s investment attraction body, provides information, administrative services, and incentive assessments to prospective foreign investors. Its website (www.investbg.government.bg/en) contains general information for foreign investors. IBA serves as a one-stop shop for foreign investors and certifies proposed investments for eligibility for administrative services. There are no limits to foreign and domestic private entities establishing and owning businesses in Bulgaria. The Offshore Company Act lists 28 activities (including government procurement, natural resource exploitation, national park management, banking, insurance) in which companies registered in offshore jurisdictions with more than 10 percent foreign participation are banned from participating. The law, however, allows those companies to do business if the physical owners of the parent company are Bulgarian citizens and known to the public, if the parent company’s stock is publicly traded, or if the parent company is registered in a jurisdiction with which Bulgaria enjoys a bilateral tax treaty for the avoidance of double taxation (including the United States). Bulgaria has no specific law or coordinated mechanism in place for screening individual foreign investments. A potential foreign investment can be scrutinized on the grounds of its potential national security risk or through the Law on the Measures against Money Laundering. As each ministry is responsible for screening investments within its purview, interagency coordination is lacking, and there are no common standards. As of April 2022, Bulgaria has not publicly reported any initiative on the introduction of a national investment screening mechanism. There have been no recent Investment Policy Reviews of Bulgaria by multilateral economic organizations. An Investment Policy Review by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is planned for 2022. In January 2022 the OECD decided to open accession discussions with Bulgaria. A key milestone toward Bulgaria’s overarching OECD Action Plan was its having joined the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) in January 2021. In 2019, the OECD published reviews of Bulgaria’s healthcare sector and state-owned enterprises, and in January 2021 the OECD published an Economic Assessment in which it acknowledged the successful integration of Bulgarian manufacturing firms into global production chains and sound macroeconomic policies prior to the pandemic. At the same time the report highlighted as key policy challenges Bulgaria’s high income inequality, relative poverty, and an ageing and rapidly shrinking population. In February 2021 the OECD published a study of Bulgarian municipalities that acknowledged solid progress in local governance standards but also noted insufficient progress in bridging regional disparities. Bulgaria typically supports small- and medium-sized business creation and development in conjunction with EU-funded innovation and competitiveness programs and with a special emphasis on export capacity. The state-owned Bulgarian Development Bank has committed to supporting small- and medium-sized businesses in Bulgaria, including through the post-COVID-19 recovery period. Typically, a new business is expected to register an account with the state social security agency and, in some cases, with the local municipality as well. Electronic company registration is available at: https:// portal.registryagency.bg/commercial-register . Women receive equitable treatment to men, and the Bulgarian law does not discriminate against minorities doing business. There is no government agency for outward investment promotion, and no restrictions exist for local businesses to invest abroad. 3. Legal Regime In general, the regulatory environment in Bulgaria is characterized by complexity, lack of transparency, and arbitrary or weak enforcement. These factors create incentives for public corruption. Public procurement rules are at times tailored to match certain local business interests. Bulgarian law lists 38 operations subject to licensing. The law requires all regulations to be justified by defined need (in terms of national security, environmental protection, or personal and material rights of citizens), and prohibits restrictions merely incidental to the stated purposes of the regulation. The law also requires the regulating authority, or the member of Parliament sponsoring the draft law containing the regulation, to perform a cost-benefit analysis of any proposed regulation. This requirement, however, is often ignored when Parliament reviews draft bills. With few exceptions, all draft bills are made available for public comment, both on the central government website and the respective agency’s website, and interested parties are given 30 days to submit their opinions. The government maintains a web platform, www.strategy.bg , on which it posts draft legislation. Тhe government posts all its decisions on: pris.government.bg . In addition, the law eliminates bureaucratic discretion in granting requests for routine economic activities and provides for silent consent (default judgement in favor of the requestor) when the government does not respond to a request in the allotted time. Local companies in which foreign partners have controlling interests may be requested to provide additional information or to meet additional mandatory requirements in order to engage in certain licensed activities, including production and export of arms and ammunition, banking and insurance, and the exploration, development, and exploitation of natural resources. The Bulgarian government licenses the export of dual-use goods and bans the export of all goods under international trade sanctions lists. The Bulgarian government’s budget is assessed as transparent and in accordance with international standards and principles. Central government debt and debt guarantees are published monthly, and debt obligations by individual state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are published every three months on the website of the Agency for Public Enterprises and Control. The first and only Bulgarian think tank for sustainable finance and energy, the Green Finance & Energy Centre , was launched in March 2021 by the Bulgarian Stock Exchange (BSE) and the Independent Bulgarian Energy Exchange (IBEX), in partnership with the Ministries of Finance and Energy, the Financial Supervision Commission, and the Fund of Funds. The mission of the Green Centre includes raising business awareness and upgrading corporate governance codes with environmental and social responsibility provisions. Major banks and investors increasingly recognize the importance of sustainable finance and investment in supporting economic growth while reducing environmental degradation. Bulgaria became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 1996. Under the provisions of Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty), common EU trade policies are exclusively the responsibility of the EU and the European Commission (EC), which coordinates them with the 27 member states. The EC negotiates in the WTO on behalf of the Member States and coordinates issues with them within the Trade Policy Committee of the Council of the EU. The United States supports EU measures to increase digital market competition through the EU’s future Digital Market Act. Following systemic government-controlled prosecutions during Bulgaria’s communist era, the 1991 Constitution created an independent judicial branch comprised of judges, prosecutors, and magistrate-investigators. The system is governed by a 25-member Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), which is responsible for the selection and disciplining of magistrates; however, according to local and international observers its decisions have been opaque and politically influenced. Eleven of the SJC members are appointed by a supermajority in Parliament, a process often leading to behind-the-scenes distribution of seats to politically convenient candidates. All 1,500 prosecutors are administratively subordinate through their chiefs to the Prosecutor General, who is also a voting member of the SJC and as such has significant decision-making power over judicial selections. Numerous well documented media and civil society investigations in recent years have alleged nepotism, corruption, and undue political and business influence over prosecutions, including with the purpose to take over lucrative businesses. Prosecutors’ decisions to dismiss cases are not subject to review by a judge, and trials, especially in criminal cases, often take years to complete because of the inefficient procedures laid out in the criminal procedure code. Polls show a consistent lack of public confidence in the Prosecutor General and the courts. There are three levels of courts. Bulgaria’s 113 regional courts exercise jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases. Above them, 28 district courts, including the Sofia City Court, serve as courts of appellate review for regional court decisions and have trial-level (first-instance) jurisdiction in serious criminal cases and in civil cases where claims exceed BGN 25,000 (USD 14,320), excluding alimony, labor disputes, and financial audit discrepancies, or in property cases where the property’s value exceeds BGN 50,000 (USD 28,640). Five appellate courts review the first-instance decisions of the district courts. The Supreme Court of Cassation is the court of last resort for criminal and civil appeals. There is a separate system of 28 specialized administrative courts which rule on the legality of local and national government decisions, with the Supreme Administrative Court serving as the court of final instance. The Constitutional Court, which is separate from the rest of the judiciary, issues final rulings on the compliance of laws with the Constitution. Bulgaria’s legislation has been largely aligned with EU directives to provide adequate means of enforcing property and contractual rights. In practice, however, investors regularly complain about regulatory impediments, prosecutorial intervention in administrative cases, and inconsistent jurisprudence. Overall, the government’s handling of investment disputes has been slow, interagency coordination is poor, and intervention at the highest political level is often required. The 2004 Investment Promotion Act stipulates equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors. The law encourages investment in manufacturing and high technology, knowledge intensive services, education, and human resource development. It creates investment incentives by helping investors purchase land, providing state financing for basic infrastructure, training new staff, and facilitating tax incentives and opportunities for public-private partnerships (PPPs) with the central and local governments. The most common form of PPPs are concessions, which include the lease of government property for private use for up to 35 years for a construction and service concession. The term of the concession may be extended by a maximum of one-third of the original term. In 2021, defense and security were excluded from concession-eligible sectors. Foreign investors must comply with the 1991 Commercial Law, which regulates commercial and company enterprise law, and the 1951 Law on Obligations and Contracts, which regulates civil transactions. The Invest Bulgaria Agency (IBA) is the government’s investment attraction body and serves as a one-stop-shop for foreign investors. It provides information, administrative services, and incentive assessments to prospective foreign investors. The Commission for Protection of Competition (the “Commission”) oversees market competition and enforces the Law on the Protection of Competition (the “Competition Law”). The Competition Law, enacted in 2008, is intended to implement EU rules that promote competition. The law forbids monopolies, restrictive trade practices, abuse of market power, and certain forms of unfair competition. Monopolies can only be legally established in enumerated categories of strategic industries. In practice, the Competition Law has been applied inconsistently, and some of the Commission’s decisions are questionable and appear subject to political influence. Private real property rights are legally protected by the Bulgarian Constitution. Only in the case where a public need cannot be met by other means may the Council of Ministers or a regional governor expropriate land, in which case the owner is compensated at fair market value. Expropriation actions by the Council of Ministers, by regional authorities, or by municipal mayor can be appealed at a local administrative court. In its Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States, Bulgaria committed to international arbitration to judge expropriation claims and other investment disputes. The 1994 Commercial Law Chapter on Bankruptcy provides for reorganization or rehabilitation of a legal entity, maximizes asset recovery, and provides for fair and equal distribution among all creditors. The law applies to all commercial entities, except public monopolies or state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The 2015 Insurance Code regulates insurance company failures, while bank failures are regulated under the 2002 Bank Insolvency Act and the 2006 Credit Institutions Act. The 2014 bankruptcy of the country’s fourth-largest bank, Corporate Commercial Bank, was a test case that showed serious deficiencies in the process of recovery and preservation of bank assets during bankruptcy proceedings. Non-performance of a financial obligation must be adjudicated before the bankruptcy court can determine whether the debtor is insolvent. There is a presumption of insolvency when the debtor is unable to perform an executable obligation under a commercial transaction or public debt or related commercial activities, has suspended all payments, or is able to pay only the claims of certain creditors. The debtor is deemed over-indebted if its assets are insufficient to cover its short-term monetary obligations. Bankruptcy proceedings may be initiated on two grounds: the debtor’s insolvency, or the debtor’s excessive indebtedness. Under Part IV of the Commercial Law, debtors or creditors, including state authorities such as the National Revenue Agency, can initiate bankruptcy proceedings. The debtor must declare bankruptcy within 30 days of becoming insolvent or over-indebted. Bankruptcy proceedings supersede other court proceedings initiated against the debtor except for labor cases, enforcement proceedings, and cases related to receivables securitized by third parties’ property. Such cases may be initiated even after bankruptcy proceedings begin. Creditors must declare to the trustee all debts owed to them within one month of the start of bankruptcy proceedings. The trustee then has seven days to compile a list of debts. A rehabilitation plan must be proposed within one month after publication of the list of debts in the Commercial Register. After creditors’ approval, the court endorses the rehabilitation plan, terminates the bankruptcy proceeding, and appoints a supervisory body for overseeing the implementation of the rehabilitation plan. The court must endorse the plan within seven days and put it forward to the creditors for approval. The creditors must convene to discuss the plan within a period of 45 days. The court may renew the bankruptcy proceedings if the debtor does not fulfill its obligations under the rehabilitation plan. The Bulgarian National Bank may revoke the operating license of an insolvent bank when the bank’s own capital is negative, and the bank has not been restructured according to the procedure defined in Article 51 in the Law on the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms. The license of a bank may be withdrawn under the conditions set out in Article 36 of the Law on Credit Institutions. 6. Financial Sector The Bulgarian Stock Exchange (BSE), the only securities-trading venue in Bulgaria, operates under license from the Financial Supervision Commission and is majority owned by the Ministry of Finance. The 1999 Law on Public Offering of Securities regulates the issuance of securities, securities transactions, stock exchanges, and investment intermediaries. The law is aimed at providing investor protection and at developing a transparent local capital market. In 2004 BSE performed its first IPO transaction. In 2018 BSE acquired 100 percent of the Independent Bulgarian Energy Exchange (IBEX), Bulgaria’s first independent electricity platform trader. Since its 2007 entry into the EU, Bulgaria has aligned its regulation of securities markets with EU standards under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). The BSE is a full member of the Federation of European Stock Exchanges (FESE) and operates under the Deutsche Boerse’s trading platform Xetra. The BSE’s total market capitalization comprised 23 percent of Bulgaria’s GDP in 2021, down slightly from 2020. Bulgarian companies strongly prefer to obtain financing from local banks instead of drawing from the local financial markets. At the end of 2018, the Financial Supervision Commission approved the ‘SME beam market,’ a special market that provides small and medium-sized businesses the opportunity to raise new capital more easily. Bulgaria’s first “unicorn” company Payhawk, a technological start-up, raised USD 1 billion of capital in 2022. Foreign investors can access credit on the local market. The Bulgarian bank system is well capitalized and liquid. As of the end of September 2021, the total capital adequacy ratio was 22.4 percent, above the EU average and adequately shielding domestic banks against potential macroeconomic risks. In 2020 the Bulgarian National Bank imposed a temporary payment deferral of existing loans as an anti-COVID-19 measure. As of September 2021, there were 25 banks (including 7 branches), with total assets of BGN 132.7 billion (USD 76 billion), equivalent to 100 percent of GDP. The market share of the five significant banks (directly supervised by the ECB) was 66.1 percent, the share of less significant banks was 30.6 percent, and the share of foreign bank branches was 3.3 percent. Non-performing loans were equal to 5.01 percent of the total loan portfolio of the banking system. The Bulgarian government has raised funds by issuing both Euro-denominated and Leva- denominated bonds. Commercial banks and private pension funds and insurance companies are the primary purchasers of these instruments. EU-based banks are eligible to be primary dealers of Bulgarian government bonds. Bulgaria does not have a sovereign wealth fund. The government maintains a multiannual fiscal savings reserve, a farmer subsidy fund, and an electricity price premium fund. Their annual budgeting is compliant with the government’s budget plans. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Upon EU accession, Bulgaria was recognized as a market economy, in which the majority of the companies are private. Significant state-owned enterprises (SOEs) remain, however, such as railways and the postal service. SOEs also predominate in the healthcare, infrastructure, and energy sectors; many of these are collectively managed by holding companies, which are also SOEs. Some of the SOEs receive annual government subsidies for current and capital expenditures, regardless of their actual performance. SOEs’ budgets and audit reports are posted on the website of the Agency for Public Enterprises and Control. The list of all SOEs can be found here: reports.appk.government.bg/public/pubic/organizations . According to the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute (NSI), there is a sizeable state-owned sector consisting of approximately 350 SOEs held by the central government and 580 by subnational governments. In 2020, SOEs accounted for 10.6 percent of the overall economy. Cross-subsidization is common within some government holding companies. In the energy sector, for example, the debts of some energy producers are covered by more lucrative entities within the holding structure. In 2019 Parliament approved the State Enterprise Act, introducing updated corporate standards and management practices. The law lists timeline and criteria for SOE senior management approval. SOEs are typically run by government elected boards. Public and private sector companies are in theory equally treated vis-à-vis bidding on concessions, taxation, or other government-controlled processes. Bulgaria became party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) upon its entry into the EU in 2007. No major privatizations are currently planned in Bulgaria. Parliament must approve government proposals to privatize any company with over 50 percent government ownership. All majority or minority state-owned properties are eligible for privatization, with the exception of those included in a specific list, including water management companies, state hospitals, and state sports facilities. The sale of specific parts of such companies follows a Council of Ministers decision or a decision of the Agency for Public Enterprises and Control, after a proposal made by the government-owned majority holder of the company. State-owned military manufacturers can be privatized with Parliamentary approval. Municipally owned property can be privatized upon decision by a municipal council or authorized body, and upon publication of the municipal privatization list in the national gazette. The 2010 Privatization and Post-Privatization Act created a single Privatization and Post-Privatization Agency responsible for privatization oversight. The new State Enterprise Act in 2019 reshuffled and renamed the agency into the Agency for Public Enterprises and Control ( www.appk.government.bg/bg/17 ). Foreign investors can participate in privatization programs. 10. Political and Security Environment Daily anti-government protests that took place throughout the summer of 2020 in Sofia generated sporadic reports of excessive force by protestors and police, but otherwise there has been no significant political violence in recent years. Burkina Faso Executive Summary On January 24, 2022, the Burkinabé military officers deposed the democratically-elected government of former President Roch Marc Christian Kabore, dissolved the government and national assembly, and suspended the constitution. The coup leader Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba assumed the role of president of Burkina Faso’s Transition Government. In February 2022, a transitional charter was signed by Transition President LTC Damiba laying out a three-year transition period before democratic elections could be held. Since then, a Transitional government and a Transition Legislative Assembly have been installed. Burkina Faso is a landlocked country and the world’s seventh poorest country according to the 2020 UN Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Index, ranked at 182 out of 189 countries. Burkina Faso has an estimated population of 22 million inhabitants (as of June 2022) according to the United Nations, and the IMF estimates its growth domestic product (GDP) at US$ 19.62 billion. Burkina Faso’s economy rebounded in 2021 and grew at an estimated 8.5 percent, attributable to increases in gold exports and the services sector, according to the World Bank. The economy is forecasted to grow at 5.6 percent in 2022. The fiscal deficit stood at 5.5 percent of GDP in 2022, but could reach 6.6 percent of GDP in 2022 as a result of the multitude of challenges Burkina Faso faces, including security, humanitarian, food, and social, etc. Over 40 percent of the Burkinabe population live below the poverty line, and the country ranks 144th out of 157 countries in the World Bank’s Human Capital Index. Some 80 percent of the country’s population is engaged in agriculture—mostly subsistence—with only a small fraction directly involved in agribusiness. In 2020, as a response to the COVID-19 crisis, the Burkinabe government announced a series of socio-economic measures ranging from tax breaks to subsidies and food support to low-income families. The overall cost of the measures was estimated at US$656 million. Overall, Burkina Faso welcomes foreign investment and actively seeks to attract foreign partners to aid in its development. It has partially put in place the legal and regulatory framework necessary to ensure that foreign investors are treated fairly, including setting up a venue for commercial disputes and streamlining the issuance of permits and company registration requirements. More progress is needed to diminish the dominance of state-owned firms in certain sectors and to enforce intellectual property protections. Burkina Faso ranks 100th of 177 countries in the Heritage Foundation’s economic freedom report 2022 Economic Freedom Index. Among the 51 African countries in the report, Burkina Faso ranked 14th, improving its 21st position in the 2021 economic freedom report. Burkina Faso’s corruption perception score improved slightly from 40 in 2020 to 42 in 2021 and improved the country’s ranking from 86th to 78th of 180 countries. The gold mining industry has boomed in the last decade, and the bulk of foreign investment is in the mining sector, mostly from Canadian firms. Moroccan, French and UAE companies control local subsidiaries in the telecommunications industry, while foreign investors are also active in sectors such as agriculture, transport and logistics, energy, and financial technology. There is a growing foreign investment interest in the security sector. In June 2015, a new mining code was approved to standardize contract terms and better regulate the sector. In 2018, the parliament adopted a new investment code that offers many advantages to foreign investors. This code offers a range of tax breaks and incentives to lure foreign investors, including exemptions from value-added tax (VAT) on certain equipment. Effective tax rates as a result are lower than the regional average, though the tax system is complex, and compliance can be burdensome. Opportunities for U.S. firms exist in many sectors, but including in agriculture and manufacturing Burkina Faso remains committed to a market-based economy without barriers to trade. Over the last 15 years, the national power utility’s Société Nationale de l’Eléctricité du Burkina (SONABEL) customer base and energy demand ballooned. Between 2015 and 2021, SONABEL customer base grew by 64%. However, supply can only meet the demand in non-peak periods. Burkina Faso imports nearly 70 percent of its electricity from neighboring Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire and faces electricity reliability and affordability challenges. It also imports other energy products such as gasoline and gas through a network of foreign companies to meet local demand. the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) suspended the US$ 500 million compact with the Government of Burkina Faso. The Compact aimed to unlock economic growth by strengthening electricity sector effectiveness, energy reliability cost-effectiveness, and grid development and access, creating a more favorable investment environment for firms in the energy sector and the wider economy and spurring further foreign direct investment in Burkina Faso. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 78 of 180 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index – Explore the… – Transparency.org Global Innovation Index 2020 115 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 NA https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $770 GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) | Data (worldbank.org) 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Following the 2020 reelection of former President Kabore for his second term, a new national socioeconomic development plan (PNDES-II, 2021-2025) was adopted to replace a previous plan (2016-2020). The plan covered four strategic goals: (1) the consolidation of resilience, security, social cohesion, and peace, (2) the deepening of institutional reforms and modernization of public administration, (3) improving sustainable human development, and (4) promoting high impact sectors of the economy and jobs. However, it remains unclear how PNDES II will be impacted by the January 24 coup d’état. After overthrowing the government on January 24, 2022, LTC Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba met with the private sector on February 1 to allay the concerns of the business community and other investors. A Transitional legislative assembly, a transitional government and a transitional charter and agenda were adopted on March 1, 2022, for a 36-month transition that would lead to presidential and legislative elections. However, in an April 1 address to the nation, interim president LTC Damiba indicated that the 36-month transition timeline to democracy could be revised, should the security situation improve. In a speech to the Transitional Legislative Assembly on April 04, 2022, Prime Minister (PM) Albert Ouedraogo laid out four major pillars or priorities for his government: (1) fighting terrorism and restoring territorial integrity, (2) Responding to the humanitarian crisis, (3) refoundation (or restoration) of the state and improving governance, (4) working towards national reconciliation and social cohesion. PM Ouedraogo indicated plans for a new development plan for the transition period that would incorporate major strategic projects from the PNDES II. Article 8 of the investment code stipulates that there is to be no discrimination against foreign investors. For any foreign investor to benefit from the exemptions provided for by the investment code, it is required to submit a request to the General Directorate for the Promotion of the Private Sector. Burkina Faso hosts a certain number of trade fairs and exhibitions to attract foreign investments. These initiatives encompass several sectors, including the bi-annual International Cotton and Textile Fair (SICOT), the annual West Africa Mining Activities Week (SAMAO), the bi-annual Ouagadougou International Arts and Crafts Fair (SIAO) and the bi-annual Panafrican Film and Television Festival of Ouagadougou (FESPACO). SICOT—which was supposed to place on January 27-29 but was postponed due to the coup d’état—convenes cotton sector actors to advance the cotton value chain in Burkina Faso, Africa and globally. SICOT aspires to be the international forum for promoting African cotton by marketing the sector to the world, promoting industrial processing, attracting investment, and boosting industrial cotton production. Burkina Faso is the third largest producer of cotton in Africa, producing 518,545 tons in the 2021-2022 harvest. Burkina Faso also organizes the Burkina Economic days (JEB) to engage potential investors and foster mutually beneficial partnership opportunities. Previous JEB events have been held in Ouagadougou and across the world, including Canada, Paris, Vienna, and Seoul, among others. Burkina Faso is a member of the Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa (OHCLA). All the Uniform Acts enacted by this organization are applicable in the country. Regarding business structures, OHCLA allows most forms of companies admissible under French business law, namely public corporations, limited liability companies, limited share partnerships, sole proprietorships, subsidiaries, and affiliates of foreign enterprises. Each kind of company has a corresponding set of related preferences, duty exceptions, corporate tax exemptions, and operation-related taxes. From 1995 to 2018, Law 062-95, which was amended several times, governed investments in Burkina Faso. However, to adapt this code to the new exigencies of the world economy and to respond to the fierce competition between states to attract foreign investment, the National Assembly adopted a new Investment Code (Law 038) on October 30, 2018. It replaces Law 062-95 of December 14, 1995, which had several shortcomings, including the non-coverage of investments in renewable energies and other energy sources. According to Article 5 of the Investment Code, certain sectors of activity may be subject to restrictions on foreign direct investment. Foreign companies wishing to invest in these sectors must follow a specific procedure specified by decree. However, Burkina Faso has not yet established a procedure to scrutinize foreign direct investment. Under the investment code, all personal and legal entities lawfully established in Burkina Faso, both local and foreign, are entitled to the following rights: fixed property; forest and industrial rights; concessions; administrative authorizations; access to permits; and participation in government procurement process. The Investment Code establishes a special tax and customs regime for investment agreements signed by the state with large investors—from approximately US$ 162,000 (100,000,000 FCFA) to $1.62 million (1,000,000,000 FCFA). This scheme provides significant tax benefits. U.S. investors are not specifically targeted regarding ownership or control mechanisms. In March 2013, the GoBF created the Burkina Faso Investment Promotion Agency (API-BF). The establishment of the Presidential Council fulfilled recommendations of a 2009 UNCTAD Investment Policy Review. The website is www.investburkina.com . To simplify the registration process for companies wishing to establish a presence in Burkina Faso, the government created eight enterprise registration centers called Centres de Formalités des Entreprises (CEFOREs). The CEFOREs are one-stop shops for company registration. On average, a company can register its business in nine days according to the 2019 Doing Business report. The CEFOREs are in Ouagadougou, Bobo-Dioulasso, Ouahigouya, Tenkodogo, Koudougou, Fada N’Gourma, Kaya, Dedougou and Gaoua. In 2018, Burkina Faso strengthened protections for minority investors by enhancing access to shareholder actions and by increasing disclosure requirements on related-party transactions. The 2020 Doing Business report ranked Burkina Faso 151 of 190 in minority investor protection. Other sites of interest: Chamber of Commerce business registration: http://cci.bf/?q=fr Burkina Chamber of Mines: http://chambredesmines.bf/ Investment Promotion Agency of Burkina Faso or l’Agence de Promotion des Investissements du Burkina Faso (API-BF): http://www.investburkina.com Tax and administrative procedures: https://burkinafaso.eregulations.org/ Among the 21 countries covered by the World Bank’s Investing across Sectors indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa, Burkina Faso is one of the more open economies to foreign equity ownership. Most of its sectors are fully open to foreign capital participation, although the law requires companies providing mobile or wireless communication services to have at least one domestic shareholder. Furthermore, the state automatically owns 10 percent of the shares of all companies active in the mining sector. The government is entitled to nominate one member of the board of directors for such companies. Select additional strategic sectors the oil and gas sector, and the electricity transmission and distribution sectors, are characterized by monopolistic market structures. The Burkinabe Government tries to promote inward investment via the Investment Promotion Agency of Burkina Faso or l’Agence de Promotion des Investissements du Burkina Faso (API-BF), which sits under the Presidential Council for Investment (Conseil Presidentiel pour l’Investissement). The API-BF’s mission is to promote the economic potential of Burkina Faso to attract investment and spur economic development. Burkina Faso currently imposes no restrictions for investors interested in investing abroad, within the framework of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) regional markets. 3. Legal Regime The government of Burkina Faso aims for transparency in law and policy to foster competition. By law, prices of goods and services must be established according to fair and sound competition. The Burkinabe government does not promote or require environmental, social, and governance disclosure to help investors and consumers distinguish between high and low quality investments. However, the government believes that cartels, the abuse of dominant position, restrictive practices, refusal to sell to consumers, discriminatory practices, unauthorized sales, and selling at a loss are practices that distort free competition. At the same time, the price of some staple goods and services are still regulated by the government, including fuel, essential generic drugs, tobacco, cotton, school supplies, water, electricity, and telecommunications, and bread (e.g. baguettes). There are regulatory authorities for government procurement, for electronic communication and posts, for electricity, and for quality standards. Provinces and municipalities have the power to regulate in their jurisdiction, but that regulation has a minimal effect on business entities. There are several regulatory bodies at the national level, and they usually internalize regulations enacted by international organizations. Regulations exist at the supra-national level mostly through WAEMU and ECOWAS. Burkina Faso’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. Since January 2018, Burkina Faso, as a member state of the Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa (OHCLA), adopted the revised version of the OHCLA accounting system. It is composed of the Uniform Act on Accounting and Financial Law (AUDCIF); the OHADA General Accounting Plan (PCGO); the OHADA Accounting System (SYSCOHADA) application guide, and the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) application guide. The OHCLA accounting system complies with the IFRS norms. There is no online Regulatory Disclosure. However, the regulations of the National Assembly allow the various commissions to hear civil society organizations wishing to share information to inform parliamentarians when they are examining bills. Burkina Faso is a member of the West African Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). There is a supranational relationship between these organizations and their state members. Burkina Faso is also a member of the Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa (OHCLA). As such, Uniform Laws adopted by the OHCLA are automatically part of the national legal system. The Government of Burkina Faso regularly notifies all the draft technical barriers to the relevant WTO Committee. In the October 2017 Trade Policy Review, the WTO congratulated WAEMU countries for their continued efforts to improve their international trading environment, especially through the implementation of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). Burkina Faso has begun the ratification process of the TFA, but it has not yet completed it. However, WAEMU and ECOWAS members already implement many of the TFA provisions. The legal system of Burkina Faso is the civil law. Contracts must always be performed in good faith. Burkina Faso has commercial courts and commercial law is constituted by the uniform acts of the OHADA. The Commercial Code governs all matters that are not covered by the OHADA law. The Burkinabe judiciary is independent although there are press reports of cases of corruption of judges. The Disciplinary Commission of the Judiciary has sanctioned corrupt judges. There are three degrees of jurisdiction in Burkina Faso allowing the loser to appeal a decision rendered in first instance. In the event of a dispute over the execution of a contract, the plaintiff must first obtain a judgment from a court and if the loser does not execute, the winner can retain a bailiff. The investment code adopted by law 038-2018 demonstrates the government’s interest in attracting FDI to create industries that produce export goods and provide training and jobs for its domestic workforce. The code provides standardized guarantees to all legally established firms operating in Burkina Faso, whether foreign or domestic. It contains four investment and operations preference schemes, which are equally applicable to all investments, mergers, and acquisitions. Burkina Faso’s regulations governing the establishment of businesses include most forms of companies admissible under French business law, including public corporations, limited liability companies, limited share partnerships, sole proprietorships, subsidiaries, and affiliates of foreign enterprises. With each scheme, there is a corresponding set of related preferences, duty exceptions, corporate tax exemptions, and operation-related taxes. Under the investment code, all personal and legal entities lawfully established in Burkina Faso, both local and foreign, are entitled to the following rights: fixed property, forest and industrial rights, concessions, administrative authorizations, access to permits, and participation in state contracts. The National Commission for Competition and Consumption (Commission Nationale pour la Concurrence et la Consommation) reviews competition matters. Some competition matters are under the aegis of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Law No. 016-2017/AN of 27 April 2017 on organizing competition in Burkina Faso governs market competitiveness. This law is intended to create a free and transparent market, a guarantee of the development of a market economy driven by competitive and wealth-creating businesses. The Burkinabe constitution guarantees basic property rights. These rights cannot be infringed upon except in the case of public necessity, as defined by the government. This has rarely occurred. Until 2007, all land belonged to the government but could be leased to interested parties. The government reserves the right to expropriate land at any time for public use. In instances where property is expropriated, the government must compensate the property holder in advance, except in the event of an emergency. In 2007, Burkina Faso drafted a national land reform policy that recognizes and protects the rights of all rural and urban stakeholders to land and natural resources. It also clarifies the institutional framework for conflict resolution at a local level, establishes a viable institutional framework for land management, and strengthens the general capacities of the government, local communities, and civil society on land issues. A 2009 rural land management law provides for equitable access to rural lands to promote agricultural productivity, manage natural resources, encourage investment, and reduce poverty. It enables legal recognition of rights legitimated by traditional rules and practices. In rural areas, traditional land tenure rules have long governed land transactions and allocations. The 2009 law reinforces the decentralization and devolution of authority over land matters and provides for formalization of individual and collective use rights and the possibility of transforming these rights into private titles. In 2012, the government revised the 2009 law, marking the end of exclusive authority of the state over all land. The new law includes provisions to recognize local land use practices. The new law provides conciliation committees to resolve conflicts between parties prior to any legal action. There are several property rights recognition and protection acts, such as land charters, individual or collective land ownership certificates, and loan agreements that govern the nature, duration, and counterparties for transfer rights between a landowner and a third party. The first Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact (2010-2014) supported the establishment of local authorities and the issuance of titles as part of the land tenure reform process. Since Burkina Faso is a member of the OHADA, the Uniform Act on Bankruptcy is applicable. There are no bankruptcy courts in Burkina Faso. The World Bank’s 2019 “Doing Business” report ranked Burkina Faso 107 out of 190 countries for Resolving Insolvency. 6. Financial Sector The government of Burkina Faso is more focused on attracting FDI and concessionary lending for development than it is on developing its capital markets. Net portfolio inflows were estimated at US$ 148.6 million ( 0.83 percent of GDP) in 2020, per the World Bank. While the government does issue some sovereign bonds to raise capital in the WAEMU regional bond market, in general the availability of different kinds of investment instruments is extremely limited. As part of its mechanism to fund its fiscal budget, the Burkina Faso government regularly issues 182-day maturity treasury bills (BAT) on the regional financial market of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU, or UEMOA in French). The banking system is sound, relatively profitable, and well capitalized, but credit is highly concentrated to a small number of clients and a few sectors of the economy, according to the IMF. Only an estimated 15 percent of the population are believed to have checking accounts. Like all member states of WAEMU, Burkina Faso is a member of the Central Bank of West African States. Many foreign banks have branches in the country. The traditional banking sector is composed of twelve commercial banks and five specialized credit institutions called “établissements financiers.” In Burkina, the national strategy for inclusive finance was adopted on April 23, 2019. The use of mobile money is becoming more prevalent. In addition to two of the three main mobile carriers offering mobile money services, in 2021 other companies, both foreign and local have launched mobile money service operations and are conquering an important client base. This trend has forced traditional banks to install own mobile transfer planforms. Burkina Faso does not have a sovereign wealth fund. However, in 2017, the government created the Deposit and Consignment Fund (CDC-BF), an autonomous legal and financial entity whose mandate is to receive and manage assets of various funds and entities, in particular funds from dormant accounts transferred to the Public Treasury (National Social Security Fund, Autonomous Retirement Fund for Civil Servants, National Post Office). Its mandate is to invest the funds locally. The CDC-BF is not yet fully rolled out. 7. State-Owned Enterprises GoBF announcements for privatization bids are widely distributed, targeting both local and foreign investors. Bids are published in local papers, international magazines, mailed to different diplomatic missions, e-mailed to interested foreign investors, and published on the Internet on sites such as http://www.dgmarket.com . 10. Political and Security Environment Rampant insecurity and the government’s inability to stem violent extremism contributed to the military overthrow of the democratically elected government of President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré on January 24, 2022. In 2021, Burkina Faso recorded the highest number of attacks during its five-plus year battle with violent extremism. The result has led to a crisis resulting in the closure of schools and the massive displacement of people from their homes and communities. President Roch Marc Christian Kabore had been reelected to a second and final term in November 2020. This was the first time a democratic handover of power occurred in Burkina Faso’s history since it gained independence in 1960. During the same period legislative elections were organized and results were accepted by all political parties. However, Violent extremists remain very active in Burkina Faso. Both the Islamic State for the Greater Sahara and the Jama’ at Nasr Al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) coalition have expanded their operation footprints in recent years. Security incidents include violence using tactics such as, improvised explosive devices, kidnapping, attacks, and targeted killings in an expanding part of the country in the north, east, and south. Targets appeared to shift from military and gendarmerie units to civilians and volunteer defense groups. In May 2022, VEOs carried out 61 attacks against civilians and security forces, killing a total of 173 people and injuring 40 others, The number of terrorist incidents in Burkina Faso’s southwestern Boucle du Mouhoun region rose significantly in May compared to the numbers reported for the three previous months. Since October 2021, over 799 people died in terrorist incidents, and an additional 600 individuals sustained injuries during the same period. On June 4, 2021, VEOs killed 160 civilians in Solhan in the Sahel region near the border with Niger. This was the second deadliest terrorist attack globally in 2021, according to the 2022 Global Terrorism Index. The report also indicates that 732 people died from terrorist incidents in Burkina Faso in 2021. The African Center for Strategic Studies noted in its July 2021 report that most violent attacks in the Sahel in 2020 were carried out in Burkina Faso (516 versus 361 in Mali and 118 in Niger). In April 2022, a U.S. citizen was reportedly abducted in Burkina’s Centre-Nord,. In 2018, an American citizen was abducted but was later discovered by French operatives during an unrelated mission to recover French nationals abducted by extremists. Three Europeans – two Spanish and one Irish – were killed in an attack on an anti-poaching patrol in eastern Burkina Faso on April 27, 2021. In 2021, attacks spiked in the southern part of Burkina Faso, contiguous to the north of Cote d’Ivoire. The Cascades region border area, which has suffered several attacks in the past, is seen by experts as a hide-out for armed terrorist groups and a threat for coastal countries. As of April 2022, terrorist attacks have generated around 1.9 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) mostly in Burkina Faso’s Sahel, Centre-Nord, Nord, and Est regions. Since 2018, the Government of Burkina Faso has maintained a state of emergency due to insecurity in many parts of the country As of May 2022, the U.S. State Department’s travel advisory to Burkina Faso is at Level 4: Do Not Travel due to terrorism, crime, and kidnapping. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) N/A N/A 2021 $19.2 Billion https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/BFA#countrydata Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2021 0.03% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Burma Executive Summary On February 1, 2021, the Burmese military seized power in a coup d’état that reversed much of the economic progress of recent years. The military’s brutal crackdown on peaceful protests destabilized the country, prompted widespread opposition, and created a sharp deterioration in the investment climate. Burma’s economy shrank by 18 percent in 2021, with a forecast for one percent growth in 2022, according to the World Bank. The regime’s ongoing violence, repression, and economic mismanagement have significantly reduced Burma’s commercial activity, compounded by the pro-democracy Civil Disobedience Movement that emerged in response to the coup. Many routine business services like customs, ports, and banks are not fully operational as of April 2022. Immediately after the coup, the military detained the civilian leadership of economic and other ministries as well as the Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM) and replaced them with appointees who are beholden to the regime. The CBM has imposed severe foreign exchange restrictions that limit commercial activity, and the regime severely limits access to U.S. dollars. Frequent power outages and reliance on generators have dramatically raised costs for business. The regime’s suspensions of internet and other telecommunications have restricted access to information and seriously hindered business operations. Due to COVID-19 concerns, commercial international flights resumed only on April 17, 2022. Many foreign companies have suspended operations, invoked force majeure to exit investments, and evacuated foreign national staff. The rule of law is absent, regime security forces engage in random violence, there are attacks in response by pro-democracy People’s Defense Forces, and arbitrary detentions of perceived regime opponents including labor organizers and journalists. Companies invested in the market face a heightened reputational risk. There is also the potential for the regime to expropriate property or nationalize private companies. In response to the coup, the U.S. government has imposed targeted sanctions, including on members of the regime’s so-called State Administration Council (SAC), ministers, and other authorities. The U.S. has also suspended our Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and instituted more stringent export controls. In the 2022 Business Advisory for Burma, the United States reaffirmed that it does not seek to curtail legitimate business and responsible investment in Burma. Nevertheless, investors should exercise extreme caution, avoid joint ventures with regime-affiliated businesses, and conduct heightened due diligence when considering new investments in this market. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 140 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/mmr Global Innovation Index 2021 127 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 -6.0 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,350 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Although the military regime has told investors and foreign chambers of commerce it welcomes foreign investment, its actions have undercut pre-coup efforts to improve the enabling environment for investment. A number of foreign investors have withdrawn from the market, evacuated foreign national employees, or suspended their operations in Burma. The 2016 Myanmar Investment Law (MIL) and the 2018 Companies Law continue to govern treatment of foreign investment. The MIL includes a “negative list” of prohibited and restricted sectors for foreign investment. The Companies Law implemented August 1, 2018, permits foreign investment of up to 35 percent in domestic companies— which also opened the stock exchange to limited foreign participation. The Directorate for Investment and Company Administration (DICA), which is part of the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations (MIFER), serves as Burma’s investment promotion agency. However, following the coup, the regime named former military major Aung Naing Oo to lead the Ministry and he terminated staff he deemed unsupportive of the regime. DICA as a consequence has limited operations because of staff boycotts and firings. Previously, DICA encouraged and facilitated foreign investment by providing information, fostering networks between investors, and providing market advice to potential investors. The regime maintains a private sector advisory forum with the Union of Myanmar Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which principally includes domestic businesses. However, military authorities have summoned business leaders for command appearances rather than to conduct voluntary consultations. The U.S. Trade Representative suspended the U.S.-Myanmar Trade and Investment Framework in March 2021. Foreign Chambers of Commerce have limited interactions with the military regime following the coup, mainly by issuing letters of protest to regime economic policies that undermine the private sector. Regime-controlled media regularly praises PRC and Russian business cooperation. Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment Generally, foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in remunerative activity with some sectoral exceptions. Under Article 42 of the Myanmar Investment Law, the Burmese government restricts investment in certain sectors. Some sectors are only open to government or domestic investors. Other sectors require foreign investors to set up a joint-venture with a citizen of Burma or citizen-owned entity or obtain a recommendation from the relevant ministries. The State-Owned Economic Enterprises Law, enacted in March 1989, stipulates that SOEs have the sole right to carry out a range of economic activities in certain sectors, including teak extraction, oil and gas, banking and insurance, and electricity generation. However, in practice many of these areas have been opened to private sector investment. For instance, the 2016 Rail Transportation Enterprise Law allows foreign and local businesses to make certain investments in railways, including in the form of public-private partnerships. The Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC), “in the interest of the State,” can also make exceptions to the State-Owned Enterprises Law. The MIC has routinely granted exceptions, including through joint ventures or special licenses in the areas of insurance, mining, petroleum and natural gas extraction, telecommunications, radio and television broadcasting, and air transport services, although whether such exceptions will continue to be granted after the coup is unclear. As one of their key functions, DICA and the MIC are responsible for screening and approving inbound foreign investment to ensure it does not pose a risk to national security, as well as to determine if the investment furthers Burma’s growth and development. However, since the coup, the military regime has independently approved many foreign investments, including electricity generation projects, for example, that were not submitted to the DICA or MIC. The regime frequently favors regime-owned or affiliated businesses as well as those run by cronies. In 2020, the OECD conducted an investment review for Myanmar, which can be found at http://www.oecd.org/investment/countryreviews.htm In February 2021, the World Trade Organization produced a trade policy review for Myanmar based on pre-coup information, which can be found at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tpr_e.htm Following the coup, the military regime’s approach to governance has caused a sharp reduction in commercial activities including in Yangon and Mandalay. Many routine services that businesses require like customs, ports, and banks were not fully operational as of April 2022. Many companies report difficulty accessing bank funds to pay employees and suppliers, and there is limited foreign and local currency available. The security situation is volatile and unpredictable, and some companies’ local staff have been killed by security forces and foreign-owned factories have been burned. The civilian government previously provided limited business facilitation services through DICA, but services are restricted at present. The previous civilian government instituted online company registration through “MyCo” ( https://www.myco.dica.gov.mm ). Investors were able to submit forms, pay registration fees, and check availability of a company name through a searchable company registry on the “MyCo” website. However, military regime officials have publicly threatened to take down the company registration website so it may not continue to operate, and military-imposed restrictions on internet and mobile access limit businesses’ ability to access this website. The MIC is responsible for verification and approval of investment proposals above USD5 million. Companies can use the DICA website to retrieve information on requirements for MIC permit applications and submit a proposal to the MIC. If the proposal meets the criteria, it is supposed to be accepted within 15 days. If accepted, the MIC will review the proposal and is supposed to reach a decision within 90 days. In 2016, state and regional investment committees were granted the right to approve any investment of less than USD5 million. The World Bank assessed pre-coup that it takes on average seven days to start a business in Burma involving six procedures. Following the coup, it is likely to take substantially longer to register a business because of the suspension of many government services, bank closures, and internet access restrictions and suspensions. Post-coup, the MIC has approved several pending investment applications. According to DICA data, the number of new companies registered has declined 87 percent in the last 12 months compared to the year earlier. 3. Legal Regime The military regime has not demonstrated an interest in providing, or an ability to provide, clear rules. Regulatory and legal transparency are significant challenges for foreign investors in Burma. The military established the SAC, which is vested with authority to make and issue laws, regulations, and notifications with no oversight or transparency. Previously, government ministries drafted most laws and regulations relevant to foreign investors, which were reviewed by the Attorney General and then voted on and discussed by Parliament. The current law-making process is opaque and amendments to laws have been made without public consultation. Burma is not legally obligated to share regulatory development plans with the public or conduct public consultations. There is not a centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published similar to the Federal Register in the United States. The Burmese government previously published new regulations and laws in government-run newspapers and “The State Gazette,” and also sometimes posted new regulations on government ministries’ official Facebook pages. Presently, the military regime announces some regulatory changes via state media or in the Commander-in-Chief’s public addresses, but copies of the changes are not easily accessibly or routinely posted anywhere. There are no oversight or enforcement mechanisms to ensure the government follows administrative processes. Foreign investors previously could appeal adverse regulatory decisions. For instance, under the Myanmar Investment Law, the MIC serves as the regulatory body and has the authority to impose penalties on any investor who violates or fails to comply with the law. Investors have the right to appeal any decision made by the MIC to the government within 60 days from the date of decision. Under the military regime, there is no demonstrated action or espoused commitment to transparent public finance and debt obligations. There are allegations that the military is incurring off-budget debt and using government funds beyond which was allocated in the government budget. Prior to the coup, public finance, and debt obligations, exclusive of contingent liabilities, were public and transparent. Budget reports were published on the Ministry of Planning, and Finance website ( https://myanmar.gov.mm/ministry-of-planning-finance ). Prior to 2021, the budget was published on the Ministry of Planning, Finance, and Industry website (https://www.mopfi.gov.mm/en/content/budget-news). Burma has issued the annual Citizen Budget in the Burmese language since FY 2015-16. The Ministry of Planning, Finance, and Industry has published quarterly budget execution reports, six-month-overview-of-budget-execution reports, and annual budget execution reports on its website since FY 2015-16. However, details regarding the budget allocations for defense expenditures were not transparent, a problem that has been exacerbated since the military coup. The Burmese government also previously published its debt obligation report on the Treasury Department’s Facebook page. (See: https://www.facebook.com/pages/biz/Treasury-Department-of-Myanmar-777018172438019/ ). The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) program reviewed Burma’s public finance system in 2020 ( https://www.pefa.org/about ). The government does not promote or require environmental, social, and governance disclosure to help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. Businesses seeking to legally extract mineral resources, however, are required to prepare an environmental management plan to receive a license to mine from the regime. Burma has been a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since July 1997. However, there is not a consistent relationship between ASEAN and Burma regulatory standards. As an ASEAN member state, Burma’s regulatory systems are expected to conform to harmonization principles established in the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) to support regional economic integration. Burma’s regulatory system does not consistently use international norms or standards. It contains a mix of unique Burma-developed standards and some British-colonial era standards. Prior to the coup, the government had been making progress on legal reforms to ensure the country’s regulations and standards reflected international norms or standards, including ASEAN-developed standards. In an example of ASEAN regulatory harmonization, Burma officially joined the ASEAN Single Window in March 2020 with the launch of the National Single Window Routing Platform, which streamlined the import process by adopting the ASEAN Certificate of Origin Form D. Burma is a WTO member, but it does not regularly notify draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Burma’s legal system is a unique combination of customary law, English common law, statutes introduced through the pre-independence India Code, and post-independence Burmese legislation. Where there is no statute regulating a particular matter, courts are to apply Burma’s general law, which is based on English common law as adopted and modified by Burmese case law. Each state and region has a High Court, with lower courts in each district and township. High Court judges are appointed by the President while district and township judges are appointed by the Chief Justice through the Office of the Supreme Court of the Union. The Union Attorney General’s Office law officers (prosecutors) operate sub-national offices in each state, region, district, and township. Immediately following the 2021 coup, the military regime replaced several members of the Supreme Court with judges seen as more reliable to its interests. After several weeks of largely peaceful protest and increasingly violent responses by security forces including arbitrary detentions, the military regimes placed several Yangon townships under martial law, where court proceedings are conducted by military judges who have meted out harsh punishments with limited to no due process rights for those accused. The Ministry of Home Affairs, led by an active-duty military minister appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, controls the Myanmar Police Force, which files cases directly with the courts. The Attorney General prosecutes criminal cases in civilian court and reviews pending legislation. The current Attorney General, Dr Thida Oo, was appointed the day after the coup by Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing . The Attorney General’s Office was reorganized as a ministry on August 30, 2021. On January 31, 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury added Attorney General, Dr Thida Oo to its Specially Designated Nationals list. While foreign companies have the right to bring cases to and defend themselves in local courts, there are deep concerns about the impartiality and lack of independence of the courts. Burma does not have specialized civil or commercial courts. To address long-standing concerns of foreign investors regarding dispute settlement, the government acceded in 2013 to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”). In 2016, Burma’s parliament enacted the Arbitration Law, putting the New York Convention into effect and replacing arbitration legislation that was more than 70 years old. Since April 2016, foreign companies can pursue arbitration in a third country. However, the Arbitration Law does not eliminate all risks. There is a limited track record of enforcing foreign awards in Burma and inherent jurisdictional risks remain in any recourse to the local legal system. Certain regulatory actions are appealable and are adjudicated with the respective ministry. For instance, according to the Myanmar Investment Law, investment disputes that cannot be settled amicably are “settled in the competent court or the arbitral tribunal in accord with the applicable laws.” An investor dissatisfied with any enforcement action made by the regulatory body has the right to appeal to the government within 60 days from the date of administrative decision. The government may amend, revoke, or approve any decision made by the regulatory body. This decision is considered final and conclusive. The Myanmar Investment Law outlines the procedures the MIC must take when considering foreign investments. The MIC evaluates foreign investment proposals and stipulates the terms and conditions of investment permits. The MIC does not record foreign investments that do not require MIC approval. Many smaller investments may go unrecorded. Foreign companies may register locally without an MIC license, in which case they are not entitled to receive the benefits and incentives provided for in the Myanmar Investment Law. There is no “one-stop-shop” for investors except in Special Economic Zones. Burma has three Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Thilawa, Dawei, and Kyauk Phyu with preferential policies for businesses that locate there, including “one-stop-shop” service. Of the three SEZs, Thilawa is the only SEZ currently in operation. A Competition Law went into effect in 2017. The objective of the law is to protect public interest from monopolistic acts, limit unfair competition, and prevent abuse of dominant market position and economic concentration that weakens competition. The Myanmar Competition Commission serves as the regulatory body to enforce the Competition Law and its rules. The Commission is chaired by the Minister of Commerce, with the Director General of the Department of Trade serving as Secretary. Members also include a mixture of representatives from relevant line ministries and professional bodies, such as lawyers and economists. The 2016 Myanmar Investment Law prohibits nationalization and states that foreign investments approved by the MIC will not be nationalized during the term of their investment. In addition, the law stipulates that the Burmese government will not terminate an enterprise without reasonable cause, and upon expiration of the contract, the Burmese government guarantees an investor the withdrawal of foreign capital in the foreign currency in which the investment was made. Finally, the law states that “the Union government guarantees that it shall not terminate an investment enterprise operating under a Permit of the Commission before the expiry of the permitted term without any sufficient reason.” However, under previous military regimes, private companies have been nationalized. The current military regime has threatened private banks with nationalization if they fail to reopen, including threatening to transfer certain deposits in private banks to state-owned or military-affiliated banks. In addition, security forces have physical cut private company’s fiber wires and the military regimes onerous restrictions and suspension of mobile internet service have deprived private telecommunication operators and internet service providers of their property without any compensation offered. The military regime has also banned a number of private media print outlets from publication and restricted citizen’s access to other private company’s internet platforms. There is a significant risk of nationalization and expropriation by the military regime, particularly in the financial and telecommunications sectors. There is no expectation of due process should the military regime pursue nationalization of private companies despite the provisions in the Myanmar Investment Law prohibiting nationalization and expropriation. In February 2020, the government of Burma passed the new Insolvency Law. The law adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on cross-border insolvency, providing greater legal certainty on transnational insolvency issues. The legislation established an insolvency regime that addresses both corporate and personal insolvency, with a focus on protecting micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. With regards to personal insolvency, the new law encourages debtors to enter into a voluntary legally binding arrangement with their creditors. This agreement allows part or all of the debt to be written off over a fixed period of time. The law also provides equitable treatment for creditors by enabling an efficient liquidation process to ensure creditors receive maximum financial recovery from the property value of a non-viable business. The law also established the Myanmar Insolvency Practitioners’ Regulatory Council to act as an independent regulatory body and assigned DICA the role of Registrar with the authority to fine individuals contravening the law. In addition, the court with legal jurisdiction can order an individual to make good on the default within a specified time. 6. Financial Sector The military regime’s attitude towards foreign portfolio investment is unknown. Previously, the Burmese government had gradually opened to foreign portfolio investment, but both the stock and bond markets are small and lack sufficient liquidity to enter and exit sizeable positions. Burma has a small stock market with infrequent trading. In July 2019, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced that foreign individuals and entities are permitted to hold up to 35 percent of the equity in Burmese companies listed on the Yangon Stock Exchange. Burma also has a very small publicly traded debt market. Banks have been the primary buyers of government bonds issued by the CBM, which has established a nascent bond market auction system. The Central Bank issues government treasury bonds with maturities of two, three, and five years. The CBM sets commercial loan interest rates and saving deposit rates that banks can offer, so banks cannot conduct risk-based pricing for credit. Consequently, credit is not strictly allocated on market terms. Foreign investors generally seek financing outside of Burma because of the lack of sophisticated credit instruments offered by Burmese financial institutions and lack of risk-based pricing. There is limited penetration of banking services in the country, but the usage of mobile payments had grown rapidly prior to the coup. A government 2020 census found 14 percent of the population has access to a savings account through a traditional bank. The banking system is fragile with a high volume of non-performing loans (NPLs). Financial analysts estimate that NPLs at some local banks account for 40 to 50 percent of outstanding credit but accurate calculations are hard because of accounting inconsistencies about what constitutes a non-performing loan. According to Central Bank of Myanmar’s report for FY 2020-2021, total assets in Burma’s banking system were 75 trillion kyat (USD 40.5 billion). The CBM is responsible for the country’s monetary and exchange rate policies as well as regulating and supervising the banking sector. Prior to the coup, the government had gradually opened the banking sector to foreign investors. The government began awarding limited banking licenses to foreign banks in October 2014. In November 2018, the CBM published guidelines that permit foreign banks with local licenses to offer “any financing services and other banking services” to local corporations. Previously, foreign banks were only allowed to offer export financing and related banking services to foreign corporations. No U.S. banks have a correspondent relationship with Burmese banks. Following the military coup and the imposition of U.S. sanctions on Burma, including on two large military holding companies, some non-U.S. international banks are considering whether to terminate their correspondent banking relationship with Burmese banks. Foreigners are allowed to open a bank account in Burma in either U.S. dollars or Burmese kyat. In April 2022, the CBM issued rules requiring most accounts with foreign currency holdings to be converted into Myanmar kyat at a fixed rate within one business day excluding foreign investment businesses, diplomatic missions, UN missions and international development partners. To open a bank account, foreigners must provide proof of a valid visa along with proof of income or a letter from their employer. The Germany development agency GIZ published the fifth edition the GIZ Banking Report in January 2021. According to Chapter 15 of the Myanmar Investment Law, foreign investors can convert, transfer, and repatriate profits, dividends, royalties, patent fees, license fees, technical assistance and management fees, shares and other current income resulting from any investment made under this law. Nevertheless, in practice, the transfer of money in or out of Burma has been difficult, as many international banks have internal prohibitions on conducting business in Burma given the long history of sanctions and significant money-laundering risks. The intermittent closure of banks following the coup, shortage of U.S. dollars, and low cash withdrawal limits, and CBM restrictions on holding foreign currency have further limited investors’ ability to conduct foreign exchange transactions and other necessary business operations. Under the Foreign Exchange Management Law, transfer of funds can be made only through licensed foreign exchange dealers, using freely usable currencies. The CBM grants final approval on any new loans or loan transfers by foreign investors. According to a new regulation in the Foreign Exchange Management Law, foreign investors applying for an offshore loan must get approval from the CBM. Applications are submitted through the MIC by providing a company profile, audited financial statements, draft loan agreement, and a recent bank credit statement. In April 2022, the Central Bank fixed the exchange rate at 1850 kyat/1 USD. In April 2022, the black-market exchange rate was roughly 2010 kyat/1 USD. According to the Myanmar Investment Law, foreign investors can remit foreign currency through authorized banks. Nevertheless, in practice, the transfer of money in or out of Burma has been difficult, as many international banks have internal prohibitions on conducting business in Burma given the long history of sanctions and significant money-laundering risks. The military coup and the regime’s economic policies, including restrictions placed on holding and transferring foreign currencies, has further exacerbated these investment remittance challenges. The challenge of repatriating remittances through the formal banking system are also reflected in the continued use of informal remittance services (such as the “hundi system”) by both the public and businesses. On November 15, 2019, the CBM adopted the Remittance Business Regulation in order to bring these informal networks into the official financial system. The regulations require remittance business licenses to conduct inward and outward remittance businesses from the Central Bank. It is unclear how the military regime will proceed with this regulation and the training of businesses to grant them a license to conduct remittances. Burma does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Burma are active in various sectors, including natural resource extraction, print news, energy production and distribution, banking, mobile telecommunications, and transportation. SOEs employ approximately 145,000 people, according to a 2018 report by the Natural Resource Governance Institute. The 1989 State-Owned Economic Enterprises Law does not establish a system of monitoring enterprise operations, hence detailed information on Burmese SOEs is difficult to obtain. However, according to commercial statements, the total net income of all SOEs during fiscal year 2020`21 was approximately USD 828 million. The top profit-making SOEs are found in the natural resource sector, namely the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, Myanma Gems Enterprise, and Myanma Timber Enterprise. Within Burma, there are 32 SOEs managed directly by six ministries without independent boards. SOEs enjoy several advantages including serving in some cases as the market regulator, preferential land access, and access to low-interest credit. According to the State-Owned Economic Enterprises Law, SOEs wield regulatory powers that provide SOEs a significant market advantage, including through an ability to recommend specific tax exemptions to the MIC on behalf of private sector joint-venture partners and to monitor private sector companies’ compliance with contracts. In addition, the law stipulates that SOE managers have sole discretion in awarding contracts and licenses to private sector partners with limited oversight. SOEs can secure loans at low interest rates from state-owned banks, with approval from the cabinet. Private enterprises, unlike SOEs, are forced to provide land or other real estate as collateral in order to be considered for a loan. SOEs have historically had an advantage over private entities in land access because under the Constitution the State owns all the land. In April 2021, the U.S. Department of Treasury sanctioned three Burmese SOEs for their roles in financing the military regime: the Myanma Gems Enterprise, the Myanma Timber Enterprise; and the Myanmar Pearl Enterprise. In March 2021, the U.S. Department of Treasury also sanctioned two Myanmar military holding companies: Myanmar Economic Corporation and Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited, and those sanctions also apply to entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked entities or persons. Investors should conduct careful due diligence, including by consulting the Special Designated National list, to identify which entities are subject to U.S. sanctions given the broad scope of these firms and their privileged position in the economy. The military regime has not publicly announced any plans or timeline for privatization and in the past has preferred nationalization and supporting state-owned enterprises. Prior to the coup, the civilian government had been implementing a privatization plan, which permitted foreign investment. 10. Political and Security Environment Burma has a long history of civil wars and military coups marked by violence. In the aftermath of the February coup, Burmese security forces launched a brutal crackdown against the people of Burma, who peacefully protested the coup and the military’s upending of their democratic transition. In the face of brutal force by the regime, the people of Burma have disrupted the military’s ability to govern by launching a nationwide Civil Disobedience Movement, including general strikes and protests. Burma is also home to multiple long-running insurgencies in border regions, where the military competes for control with various ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). Shortly after the February 2021 coup, the military launched brutal and unprovoked attacks against EAOs, perceived opponents, and peaceful demonstrators across the country seeking to terrorize the public into submission. On September 7, 2021, the National United Government (NUG) announced a “People’s Defensive War against the military regime.” Violence is widespread and could continue to escalate. There have been several reported fires and explosion targeting foreign businesses since the coup, including at Chinese-owned factories, an agricultural storage facility, and military related companies. Attacks resulting in destruction of property and injuries have also been reported at banks and ATMs as well. Foreign businesses are concerned about the potential for violence and destruction of property to escalate, although principally the targets have been companies or infrastructure associated with the military or companies that are perceived to be supportive of the military. The Chinese government has reportedly sought increased regime protection for an oil and gas pipeline that runs through Burma to China because of the deteriorating security situation. The military regime has also declared martial law in several industrial townships in Yangon, suspending even the veneer of civil liberties and allowing security forces to be more aggressive in response to protests. Protestors and military opponents have organized boycotts of businesses that have ties to the military regime with great success. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $76.19 billion 2021 N/A www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2021 N/A BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 -$1 million 2020 N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 44.3% 2021 N/A UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Burundi Executive Summary Located in Central Africa, Burundi is one of the seven member states of the East African Community (EAC). Burundi is one of the world’s most impoverished countries, with 87 percent of the population living below the World Bank’s poverty measure of $1.90 per day, 80-90 percent of the population reliant on agriculture (mostly subsistence farming) and a youth unemployment rate of about 65 percent. Economic growth is insufficient to create employment for Burundi’s rapidly growing population and President Ndayishimiye, in power since June 2020, has actively promoted good political and economic governance to improve the business environment by fighting corruption and promoting fiscal transparency. His administration is actively seeking to increase existing value chains to find new sources of employment and revenue and to find new revenue streams. The Government of Burundi (GoB) is also seeking to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI). Since taking office President Ndayishimiye has made or hosted multiple state visits with potential trade and development partners. Given the importance of agriculture, the GoB is promoting initiatives to modernize and diversify agricultural production, seeking to increase production of crops beyond coffee and tea. To attract FDI, the GoB must address an array of longstanding challenges, including: poor governance and weak institutional capacity; pervasive corruption; an exchange rate gap between the official and parallel market rates that fluctuates between 50-70 percent; financial restrictions and capital controls that limit access to and expatriation of foreign exchange; a low-skilled workforce; only 12 percent electrification nationwide; poor internet connectivity; and limited availability of reliable economic statistics. The GoB is working to develop infrastructure, including photovoltaic and hydroelectric power plants, roads construction, rehabilitation of Bujumbura Port and the construction of a railway joining Burundi, DRC and Tanzania to improve access to the country, reduce transportation costs and boost regional trade. The demand for electricity and water significantly exceeds capacity, and the transmission system is old and poorly maintained, leading to rolling blackouts and outages. In the mining sector, the GoB is introducing a new mining code and industry-wide regulations it says will promote greater transparency. As of March 2022, all foreign mining companies’ operations remain pending revision and renegotiation of new contracts/agreements based on a “win-win” principle and implementation of the new mining code. The COVID-19 pandemic and associated border closures resulted in a sharp economic slowdown in 2020, and the IMF estimates GDP shrank by around 1 percent, before rebounding by 3.6 percent in 2021. Testing capacity is low and vaccination rates remain among the lowest in the world. Burundian authorities have prepared a COVID-19 response plan to limit the disease spread and cushion its macroeconomic and social impacts; however, its implementation has been constrained by limited financing and domestic resistance, including from some at high levels of government. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 169 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 230 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Burundi (GoB) is generally supportive of FDI and seeks investments to promote economic growth. During the reporting period, the GoB implemented new laws and regulations, including a revised June 2021 investment code (last updated in 2008), and the first national industrialization policy and its accompanying implementation strategy. These regulations offer the same advantages to both Burundian and foreign investors. The regulations also raised the minimum investment amounts to be eligible for certain benefits in the investment code from $50,000 to $500,000 for all investors, with the stated purpose of attracting only quality investments that will create decent jobs. Industry experts believe the new investment regulations will boost development of the industrial sector, which so far contributes only about 17 percent of GDP. An overview of the legal framework for foreign investment can be found at: https://www.investburundi.bi/index.php/espace-medias1/publications/depliants-et-brochures Along with the new investment code, the Burundi Development Agency (ADB) officially replaced the Investment Promotion Agency (API). The ADB has taken over all the missions of the API and is currently the only entry portal and interlocutor for all investors looking for business opportunities in Burundi. The ADB is the government authority responsible for promoting investment, improving the business climate, and facilitating market entry for investors in Burundi. ADB offers a range of services to potential investors, including assistance in acquiring the licenses, certificates, approvals, authorizations, and permits required by law to set up and operate a business enterprise in Burundi. ADB has set up a “one-stop shop” to facilitate and simplify business registration in Burundi, although investors must be physically present in country to register with ADB. ADB is also tasked with providing investors with information on investment and export promotion, assisting them with legal formalities, including obtaining the required documents, and intervening when laws and regulations are not properly applied. While ADB is the initial and primary point of entry for investors, relevant government ministries also regularly meet with private investors to discuss regulatory and legal issues. Foreign and domestic companies have the same rights to establish and own businesses in the country and engage in all forms of activities. However, there are restrictions on foreign investments in weaponry, ammunition, and any sort of military or para-military enterprises. There are no other restrictions nor are there any other sectors in which foreign investors are denied the same treatment as domestic firms. There are no general limits on foreign ownership or control. Article 63 of the 2013 mining code stipulates that the GoB must own at least 10 percent of shares in any foreign company with an industrial mining license and state participation cannot be diluted in the event of an increase in the share capital. Burundi does not maintain an investment screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment. No investment policy review from a multilateral organization has taken place in the last three years. The most recent review was performed in 2010 by UNCTAD. In addition to fiscal advantages provided in the new investment code, Burundi has approved reforms designed to improve ease of doing business, including reinforcing the capabilities of the one-stop shop at ADB, simplifying tax procedures for small and medium enterprises, reducing the time and cost of registering a business (about four hours at the cost of approximately $21), launching an electronic single window for business transactions, and harmonizing commercial laws within the East African Community. For more details and information on registration procedures, deadlines and costs, investors can visit the ADB at https://www.investburundi.bi/. The ADB is also responsible for assisting investors in obtaining entry visas, work permits and operating licenses, connections to water and electricity, amicable resolution of disputes between investors and state-owned entities, as well as any other related appropriate assistance. During the reporting period, the ADB indicates it assisted registering more than 4,000 Burundian companies, certified eight foreign investors with a capital of more than $25 million and granted 21 certificates of eligibility for the advantages provided in the 2021 investment code to investors with a combined capital of more than $170 million. ADB reports the companies created and during the rating period have already invested more than $85 million in Burundi and have created more than 2,327 jobs. There is no specific mechanism for ensuring equitable treatment of women and underrepresented minorities. The host government does not have mechanisms for promoting or incentivizing outward investment. The host government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Although parts of the government are working to create more transparent policies for fostering competition, Burundi lacks much of the necessary regulatory framework. Many policies for foreign investment are not transparent, and laws or regulations on the books are often ineffective or unenforced. Burundi’s regulatory and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms on paper, but a lack of capacity or training for staff and political constraints sometimes limit the regularity and transparency of their implementation. Rule-making and regulatory authority is exercised exclusively at the national level. Relevant ministries and the Council of Ministers exercise regulatory and rule-making authority, based on laws passed by the Senate and National Assembly. In practice, government officials sometimes exercise influence over the application and interpretation of rules and regulations outside of formal structures. The government sometimes discusses proposed legislation and rule-making with private sector interlocutors and civil society but does not have a formal public comment process. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or private sector associations. Draft bills or regulations are not subject to a public consultation process. There are no conferences that involve citizens in a consultative process to give them an opportunity to make comments or contributions, especially at the time of project development, and, even if this were the case, the public does not have access to the detailed information needed to participate in this process. Burundi does not have a centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published; however, regulatory actions are sometimes posted on the websites of GoB institutions (typically that of the Office of the President or respective ministries). Burundi has sectoral regulatory agencies covering taxes and revenues, mining and energy, water, and agriculture. Regulatory actions are reviewable by courts. There have been no recent reforms to the regulatory enforcement system. The government generally issues terms of reference and recruits private consultants who prepare a study on the draft legislation for review and comment by the private sector. The government analyzes these comments and takes them into consideration when drafting new regulations. New regulations can be issued by a presidential decree or Parliament can make them into a law. This mechanism applies to laws and regulations on investment. Information on public finances and debt obligations (including explicit and contingent liabilities) is published in the Burundi Central Bank’s Reports and on its website: https://www.brb.bi/ . However, some publications on the website are not up to date. Burundi is a member of the East African Community (EAC), a regional economic bloc composed of seven member states, the republics of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and the recently admitted Democratic Republic of the Congo. The EAC integration process is anchored on four pillars: a customs union, a common market, a monetary union, and political federation. Each member state must harmonize its national regulatory system with that of the EAC. Burundian law and regulations reference several standards, including the East African Standards, Codex Alimentarius Standards, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and Burundi’s own standards. ISO remains the main standard of reference. The country joined the WTO on July 23, 1995. According to the Ministry of Trade, Transport, Industry and Tourism, Burundi has not notified the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade of all its draft technical regulations. The country’s legal system is civil (Roman), based on German and French civil codes. For local civil matters, customary law also applies. Burundi’s legal system contains standard provisions guaranteeing the right to private property and the enforcement of contracts. The country has a written commercial law and a commercial court. The investment code offers plaintiffs recourse in the national court system and to international arbitration. The judicial system is not effectively independent of the executive branch. A lack of capacity hinders judicial effectiveness, and judicial procedures are not rigorously observed. In June 2021, the GoB adopted a revised investment code and the first national industrialization policy and its accompanying implementation strategy. Along with the new investment code, the Burundi Development Agency (ADB) officially replaced the Investment Promotion Agency (API) (See Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment above). There is no agency in charge of reviewing transactions for competition-related concerns. Burundian law allows the GoB to expropriate property for exceptional and state-approved reasons, but the GoB is then committed to provide compensation based on the fair market value prior to expropriation. There are no recent cases involving expropriation of foreign investments nor do any foreign firms have active pending complaints regarding compensation in Burundian courts. Burundi has two laws governing or pertaining to bankruptcy: Law N°1/07 of March 15, 2006, on bankruptcy and Law N°1/08 of March 15, 2006, on legal settlement of insolvent companies. Under Burundian law, creditors have the right to file for liquidation and the right to request personal or financial information about the debtors from the legal bankruptcy agent. The bankruptcy framework does not require that creditors approve the selection of the bankruptcy agent and does not provide creditors the right to object to decisions accepting or rejecting creditors’ claims. 6. Financial Sector Although there are no regulatory restrictions on foreign portfolio investment, Burundi does not have capital markets that would enable it. Capital allocation within Burundi is entirely dependent on commercial banks. The country does not have its own stock market. There is no regulatory system to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. Existing policies do not actively facilitate nor impede the free flow of financial resources into product and factor markets. There is no regulation restricting international transactions. In practice, however, the government restricts payments and transfers for international transactions due to a shortage of foreign currency, which impedes doing business in a number of ways. In theory, foreign investors have access to all existing credit instruments and on market terms. In practice, available credit is extremely limited. The financial sector includes 15 credit institutions, 40 microfinance institutions, 16 insurance companies, three social security institutions and three payment institutions. All these institutions aim at reducing unemployment by creating job opportunities, particularly small and medium-scale entrepreneurship. The banking market is dominated by the three largest and systemically important banks: Credit Bank of Bujumbura (BCB), Burundi Commercial Bank (BANCOBU), and Interbank Burundi (IBB). Burundi’s population has very limited access to banking services, according to the most recent national survey on financial inclusion conducted by the central bank. In this 2016 survey, the Bank of the Republic of Burundi (BRB) found a penetration level of approximately 22 percent, although the government opened two banks, one for youth entrepreneurs and one for women, over the last 1.5 years in an effort to address this challenge. The government is a minority shareholder in six banks, including the country’s three largest banks and is the main shareholders in the two new banks BIJE (Banque d’Investissement des Jeunes/Youth Investment Bank) and BIDF (Banque d’Investissement et de Développement pour les Femmes/Investment and Development Bank for Women). Several local commercial banks have branches in urban centers and micro-finance institutions mostly serve rural areas. Foreign banks can establish operations in the country. Foreign banks operating in the country include ECOBANK (Pan African Bank-West Africa), CRDB (Tanzanian Bank), DTB and KCB (both Kenyan Banks). The central bank directs banking regulatory policy, including prudential measures for the banking system. Foreigners and locals are subject to the same conditions when opening a bank account; the only requirement is the presentation of identification. Burundi does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are five SOEs in Burundi with 100 percent government ownership: REGIDESO (public utility company), ONATEL (telecom), SOSUMO (sugar), OTB (tea), COGERCO (cotton) and ODECA (Coffee). No statistics on assets are available for these companies as their reports are not available to the public. Board members for SOEs are appointed by the GoB and report to its ministries. The GoB also has a minority (40 percent) share in Brarudi brewing company, a branch of the Heineken Group, the country’s largest taxpayer. There is no published list of SOEs. SOEs have no market-based advantages and compete with other investors under the same terms and conditions; however, Burundi does not adhere to the OECD guidelines on corporate governance for SOEs. In 2002, Burundi entered an active phase of political stabilization, national reconciliation, and economic reform. In 2004, it received an emergency post-conflict program from the IMF and the World Bank, paving the way for the development of the Strategic Framework for Growth and Poverty Alleviation (PRSP). After the 2005 elections, the GoB made the decision to open several state-owned enterprises in different sectors of the economy to private investment, including foreign investment. The Burundian government, considering coffee a strategic sector of its economy, decided to opt for the privatization of the coffee sector first in an effort to modernize it. However, following the crisis of 2015, the GoB decided to suspend the privatization program. At that time, it had not yet privatized other sectors such as tea or sugar. In late 2019, the GoB regained control of the coffee sector, citing as its rationale perceived mismanagement on the part of the privatized companies during 2015-2019. It is unclear if or when the privatization program will continue. 10. Political and Security Environment Burundi has experienced cycles of ethnic and political violence since its independence in 1962. Periods before and after national elections have often been marked by political violence and civil disturbance. The May 2020 elections were largely peaceful, and the GoB has since consolidated power and security gains. Political tensions between the ruling party and opposition remain. The new administration has made efforts to reduce tensions with neighboring countries, including Rwanda, and to increase participation in regional security cooperation. Cabo Verde Executive Summary The Government of Cabo Verde welcomes international investment, provides prospective investors “one-stop shop” assistance through its investment promotion agency Cabo Verde TradeInvest, and offers incentives and tax breaks for investments in multiple sectors, most notably tourism and information and communication technology. Growth is projected to slowly accelerate in 2022 as tourism inflows from Europe increase and the COVID-19 pandemic recedes, helped by an efficient vaccination rollout throughout the country. However, increases in food and energy costs stemming from the Ukraine crisis could hinder economic recovery. Cabo Verde’s political stability, democratic institutions, and economic freedom lend predictability to its business environment. Free and fair elections, good governance, prudent macroeconomic management, openness to trade, increasing integration into the global economy, and the adoption of effective social development policies all contribute to a favorable climate for investment. Cabo Verde receives high marks on international indicators for transparency and lack of corruption. There are few regulatory barriers to foreign investment in Cabo Verde, and foreign investors receive the same treatment as Cabo Verdean nationals regarding taxes, licenses and registration, and access to foreign exchange. The country’s strategic location and growing connectivity with other West African nations make it a potential gateway for investors interested in a foothold from which to expand to the continent. As Cabo Verde’s low proportion of arable land, scant rainfall, lack of natural resources, territorial discontinuity, and small population make it a high-cost economy with few economies of scale, the country relies on foreign investment, imports, development aid, and remittances. Despite the challenges, in 2007 the country became one of the first to graduate from least developed country status, and it met most of its Millennium Development Goals by 2015. As the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated, the economy’s dependence on tourism, which accounted directly for 25 percent of GDP and more than 40 percent indirectly pre-pandemic, makes it vulnerable to external shocks. In addition, the pandemic caused the government to put plans to privatize state-owned enterprises on hold, though privatization of ports and airports management and water and electricity could move forward later. While the business and investment climates continue to improve, there remain bureaucratic, linguistic (relatively few English or French speakers), and cultural challenges to overcome. The government’s new Cabo Verde Ambition 2030 plan builds on its Strategic Plan for Sustainable Development and promises to open opportunities in sustainable tourism, renewable energy, blue and digital economies, and the transformation of Cabo Verde into a transportation and logistics platform. Cabo Verde aims to generate 50 percent of its electricity from renewable sources by 2030 and 100 percent by 2040. Diversification of the economy remains a priority, but high public debt levels, which reached a record estimated 158.4 percent of GDP in 2021, limit government funding capacity. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 39 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 89 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $3,060 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Cabo Verde seeks both domestic and foreign investment to drive economic recovery, diversification, and growth following the COVID-19 crisis. The government’s Ambition 2030 strategy emphasizes development of sustainable tourism, transformation of the country into a transportation and logistics platform, renewable energy, blue and digital economy, and export-oriented industries. The government promotes a market-oriented economic model under which all investors, regardless of nationality, have the same rights and are subject to the same duties and obligations under the law. Improving the business climate to attract investment remains an economic priority, as does reducing the state’s role in the economy, though the COVID-19 pandemic has pushed back plans to privatize state-owned enterprises. In 2021, approved investment projects reached an all-time high of USD 1.9 billion, confirming continued investor confidence in Cabo Verde despite pandemic uncertainties. Foreign investment continues to be concentrated in tourism and light manufacturing. In 2021, over 98 percent of the approved investment projects were in the tourism sector. Cabo Verdean law offers tax benefits and grants permanent residence to foreign citizens with an investment exceeding 180 million escudos (USD 2 million). In December 2021, the government approved creation of a permanent residence permit for foreigners who own second homes in Cabo Verde. The new law also allows for exemption from excise duties on assets. The legal framework establishes conditions for investment in the country by Cabo Verdean emigrants, including fiscal incentives. Investment promotion agency Cabo Verde TradeInvest (CVTI) is a one-stop shop for all investors. Through CVTI, the government maintains dialogue with investors using personalized and virtual meetings, round tables, conferences, and workshops. CVTI offers investors a “One-Stop Shop for Investments” electronic platform and help in formalizing expressions of interest and monitoring the investment process. It also provides investors and exporters information about trade agreements and benefits (including those related to the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Cabo Verde’s membership in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)), market information, details on trade fairs and events, and contacts with other state institutions and potential partners. In addition, CVTI can assist with securing authorizations and licensing, tax and customs incentives, work permits for foreign workers, visas for company workers, social security registration for workers, and introductions to service providers, such as banks, lawyers, accountants, and real estate agents. For investments of less than USD 500,000, government entities Pro-Empresa and the Casa do Cidadao (Commercial Registry Department) provide similar services. The International Business Center (Centro Internacional de Negocios – CIN) provides tax and customs benefits for companies that do international business, with the aim of promoting, supporting, and strengthening the emergence of new industrial, commercial, and service provision activities in Cabo Verde. The Investment Law applies to both foreign and domestic investors, and it enshrines the principle of freedom of investment regardless of nationality. However, sector-specific legislation requires that foreign operators have at least 51 percent participation from Cabo Verdean partners in the fisheries sector and at least 25 percent in interisland maritime transport. The Investment Law further protects against direct and indirect expropriation. Private property is protected from unilateral requisition and nationalization, except for public interest reasons, in accordance with the law and the principle of non-discrimination, subject to prompt, full, and fair compensation. An approval process serves as a screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment. The process begins with submission of a formal expression of interest to investment promotion agency Cabo Verde TradeInvest in accordance with the Investment Law. Relevant government entities (depending on the sector and of the nature of the investment) then conduct an integrated review of the investment project and provide an opinion. If the opinion is favorable, Cabo Verde TradeInvest, in coordination with relevant agencies, approves the project and issues an investor certificate no later than 45 days from the submission of interest. Tourism-related projects can obtain tourism utility status in addition to the certificate, and for investments considered of special national interest based on the volume of investment and number of jobs created, the government may offer exceptional fiscal and other incentives. During 2018, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) conducted an Investment Policy Review (IPR) at the request of the Government of Cabo Verde. The report contains strategic analysis on how Cabo Verde can utilize foreign direct investment (FDI) in the tourism sector to advance sustainable development objectives. https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2248 In the last five years, civil society organizations have not conducted reviews of investment policy concerns. Cabo Verde offers benefits to attract private-sector investment. Although equality of treatment and non-discrimination are granted to all investors, certain investment projects, given their nature or size, may receive special treatment and support from the government. In an effort to reduce approval time for investment projects, the government has established a maximum period of 15 days for analysis and 30 days for approval of investment and export projects. In addition, Cabo Verde has adopted measures to facilitate and stimulate business activity, including lowering the maximum personal income tax (IRPS) one percentage point to 24 percent, eliminating double taxation, and waiving tax installment payments for taxpayers who had negative results or began their business activity in the previous year. Investments of at least 500 million escudos (USD 4.8 million) qualify for contractual benefits such as reduction of or exemption from customs and stamp duties, property taxes, and some other fiscal duties. Those investments that create a minimum number of jobs or expand into new strategic sectors qualify for a 50 percent investment credit, which can be deducted over 15 years. The law commits the government to paying its bills within 45 days and interest on late payments to ensure predictability in the payment of the state’s obligations to companies. The 2021 budget prioritizes expenditures on assistance for families and support for companies and jobs in the context of the pandemic. It also includes benefits to attract private sector investments and improve the business environment. Registering a company is straightforward. The Commercial Registry Department (Casa do Cidadao) is a one-stop shop where a company can be created and registered in less than a day. Information on business registration procedures is available at https://portondinosilhas.gov.cv/ and http://caboverde.eregulations.org/show-list.asp?l=pt&mid=1 . Step-by-step information on procedures, time, and cost involved in starting a company can be found at http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/cabo-verde/starting-a-business/ . The CVTI website also offers information on investing in Cabo Verde, including Cabo Verde’s Investment Law, the Code of Fiscal Benefits, and the Contractual Tax Benefits-Incentives: https://cvtradeinvest.com/ . The government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. There is no data available on outward investments. 3. Legal Regime Cabo Verde is a regional model of transparency and good governance. The government is committed to improving conditions for foreign investment and encouraging a more transparent and competitive economic environment. Laws to promote exports and free-zone enterprises stress the government’s commitment to encouraging investment in export-oriented industries. The tax regime encourages entrepreneurial activity, and government policies support free trade and open markets. Environmental issues are a priority in Cabo Verde’s sustainable development strategic planning. Legislation requires promotion of an ecologically balanced environment by private companies. Local companies and foreign investment projects must complete environmental-impact studies for assessment of potential impacts by relevant government authorities. The government promotes the disclosure from companies on the social and corporate governance aspects of their businesses. Many companies, including those operating in sectors such as telecommunications, banking, pharmaceuticals, and laboratories, disclose the information in reports, normally available online. There is free online access to all laws through the government’s official register website, https://kiosk.incv.cv/ . Regulations on economic activity can also be viewed on the Cabo Verde TradeInvest website, http://cvtradeinvest.com/ . Cabo Verde’s regulatory agencies do not solicit comments on proposed regulations from the general public, according to the World Bank . Public finance and debt obligations are in line with international norms and standards on budget credibility, thoroughness, and fiscal transparency. Cabo Verde continues to improve its processes for the planning, execution, and control of its budgets. The Ministry of Finance uses a digital platform to publish public accounts. With this web portal, any institution or citizen can observe the execution of the budget in real time. A Public Finance Council independently assesses the sustainability of the budget and policies. Cabo Verde has an independent Supreme Audit Institution (SAI), which operates in accordance with International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions and the Mexico Declaration and is responsible for verifying and publishing the government’s annual financial statements. In February 2022, Cabo Verde submitted the instrument of ratification of the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Regionally, Cabo Verde is committed to integration into ECOWAS but has announced postponement of implementation of the ECOWAS Common External Tariffs to later in 2022 and does not foresee adoption of an ECOWAS single currency. Cabo Verde formally acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2008. Cabo Verde has not notified the WTO of any measures that are inconsistent with its Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIM)s obligations. Cabo Verde’s legal system is based on the civil law system of Portugal. The 1992 constitution provides for a judiciary independent from the executive branch. The judicial system is composed of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and regional courts. Judges cannot be affiliated with political parties. The Ministry of Justice appoints local judges. The judiciary generally provides due process rights; however, an overburdened and understaffed judicial system constrains the right to an expeditious trial. Cabo Verde has modern commercial and contractual laws. The judicial system in Cabo Verde is transparent and independent. There is no government interference in the court system, but judicial decisions are often delayed, sometimes for years. The right to private ownership is guaranteed under the constitution. Property rights are also recognized and guaranteed by several laws. There is a legal entity that records secured interests in property, both chattel and real estate. The legal system also protects and facilitates acquisition and disposition of all property rights. Cabo Verdean laws concerning FDI include the Investment Law of 2012, which applies to both foreign and domestic investors and preserves the principle of freedom of investment. The Industrial Development Statute regulates incentives and the investment approval process. Law 41/2016 defines the mandate of Cabo Verde TradeInvest ( https://cvtradeinvest.com/ ) as a one-stop shop for external investors. Cabo Verde does not have an agency charged with regulating competition, though the government has explored the creation of one. The law protects competition in all economic activities. The Investment Law protects against direct and indirect expropriation. Private property is protected against requisition and nationalization, except for public interest reasons (Investment Law, article 6.1). Under the law, in the event of expropriation, the government is to compensate the owner on the basis of prevailing market prices or the actual market value of the property. To date there have been no cases of unlawful expropriation or claims of discriminatory behavior by the government against foreigners. In case of noncompliance of investment projects, the law states that land can be recovered by the state and made available to new investment projects. ICSID Convention and New York Convention In 2011, Cabo Verde became a contracting state to the ICSID convention. In 2018 Cabo Verde became a state party to the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention). Investor-State Dispute Settlement Disputes between the government and investors concerning the interpretation and application of the law that cannot be resolved amicably or via negotiation are submitted for resolution by judicial authorities in accordance with Cabo Verdean law. Disputes between the government and foreign investors on investments authorized and made in the country are settled by arbitration if no other process has been agreed upon. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts The law favors arbitration as a mechanism for settling investment disputes between the Government of Cabo Verde and foreign investors, under national and international dispute resolution rules. Courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards. Generally, arbitration is conducted in Cabo Verde and in Portuguese unless the parties agree on another location and language. The decision of the single referee or the arbitration committee is final and not subject to appeal. In 2018, the Tax Arbitration Center was created to resolve disputes regarding tax matters. Cabo Verdean law provides for a reorganization procedure and a framework that allows creditors involvement in insolvency proceedings. 6. Financial Sector Limited capital market and portfolio investment opportunities exist in Cabo Verde. The Cabo Verdean stock market, Bolsa de Valores de Cabo Verde (BVC), is fully operational. It has been most active in the issuance of bonds. Foreign investors must open an account with a bank in Cabo Verde before buying stocks or bonds from BVC. Foreign interests may access credit under the same market conditions as Cabo Verdeans. The IMF’s April 2021 country report on Cabo Verde noted that “the government did not impose or intensify restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions nor introduce multiple currency practices. Similarly, it did not conclude bilateral payment agreements inconsistent with Article VIII nor impose or intensify import restrictions for balance of payments purposes.” Cabo Verde has a small financial sector supervised and regulated by the Central Bank of Cabo Verde (BCV). According to 2020 data from BCV, 82.8 percent of Cabo Verde’s adult population has a bank account. Internet-based tools and services in the banking sector continue to grow in Cabo Verde, particularly since the COVID-19 pandemic, changing the model of the client-bank relationship. New information and communications technology products allow customers online alternatives to in-person support. Banking represents more than 80 percent of the assets of the entire Cabo Verdean financial system. Two banks – Banco Comercial do Atlantico (BCA) and Caixa Economica de Cabo Verde (CECV) – together held 57.7 percent of market share in 2020, according to BCV data. Legislation approved in January 2020 terminated the issuance of restricted licenses for offshore banking operations, calling for generic licenses and operations with resident clients. BCV subsequently announced that banks with a restricted license (offshore) serving non-residents would have to adjust to the new requirements or face revocation of their license and enforced administrative liquidation. Offshore banks operating in Cabo Verde had until December 2021 to complete the transition. One did, two opted for liquidation, and BCV revoked the license of a fourth. Currently there are no offshore banks operating in Cabo Verde. To establish a bank account, clients must provide proper identification and obtain a taxpayer number from the Commercial Registry Department (Casa do Cidadao), a process that takes approximately 10 minutes. Bank credit is available to foreign investors under the same conditions as for domestic investors. The private sector has access to credit instruments such as loans, letters of credit, and lines of credit. 10. Political and Security Environment Cabo Verde is a model of political stability with a tradition of peaceful transitions of power. There have been no political, social, or religious conflicts resulting in violence in recent years. Civil liberties are generally protected, but access to justice is impaired by an overburdened court system, and crime remains a concern. Cambodia Executive Summary The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant adverse impact on Cambodia’s economy. Despite a surge of cases in 2021, Cambodia’s economy demonstrated resilience in some sectors (agriculture, manufacturing) and showed signs of gradual recovery from the previous year’s economic disruptions, achieving 2.2 percent gross domestic product (GDP) growth. This follows a 3.1 percent contraction of its GDP in 2020. Having adopted a “living with COVID” stance to reopen its economy and attract international tourists, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) in March 2022 dropped all quarantine and testing requirements for fully vaccinated travelers. The World Bank predicts Cambodia’s GDP growth to rebound to 4.5 percent in 2022. The RGC has made attracting investment from abroad a top priority, and in October 2021 passed a new Law on Investment. Foreign direct investment (FDI) incentives available to investors include 100 percent foreign ownership of companies, corporate tax holidays, reduced corporate tax rates, duty-free import of capital goods, and no restrictions on capital repatriation. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government enacted economic recovery measures to boost competitiveness and support the economy, including a long-awaited Competition Law, a Public-Private Partnership Law, and provided tax breaks to the hardest hit businesses, such as those in the tourism and restaurant sectors. The government also delayed the implementation of a capital gains tax to 2024 and established an SME Bank of Cambodia to support small- and medium-sized enterprises. Despite these incentives, Cambodia has not attracted significant U.S. investment. Apart from the country’s relatively small market size, other factors dissuading U.S. investors include: systemic corruption, a limited supply of skilled labor, inadequate infrastructure (including high energy costs), a lack of transparency in some government approval processes, and preferential treatment given to local or other foreign companies that engage in acts of corruption or tax evasion or take advantage of Cambodia’s weak regulatory environment. Foreign and local investors alike lament the government’s failure to adequately consult the business community on new economic policies and regulations. In light of these concerns, on November 10, 2021, the U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce issued a business advisory to caution U.S. businesses currently operating in, or considering operating, in Cambodia to be mindful of interactions with entities involved in corrupt business practices, criminal activities, and human rights abuses. Notwithstanding these challenges, several large American companies maintain investments in the country, for example, Coca-Cola’s $100 million bottling plant and a $21 million Ford vehicle assembly plant slated to open in 2022. In recent years, Chinese FDI — largely from state-run or associated firms — has surged and has become a significant driver of growth in Cambodia. Chinese businesses, many of which are state-owned enterprises, may not assess the challenges in Cambodia’s business environment in the same manner as U.S. businesses. In 2021, Cambodia recorded FDI inflows of $655 million, with approximately 52 percent reportedly coming from the PRC. Physical infrastructure projects, including commercial and residential real estate developments, continue to attract the bulk of FDI. However, there has been some increased investments in manufacturing, including garment and travel goods factories, as well as agro-processing. In 2022, both the Cambodia-China Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement entered into force. Climate change remains a critical issue in Cambodia due to its vulnerability to extreme weather occurrences, high rates of deforestation, and low environmental accountability. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 157 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 109 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 1994-2021 $1.58 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ http://www.cambodiainvestment.gov.kh World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,500 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Cambodia has a liberal foreign investment regime and actively courts FDI. In 2021, the RGC enacted a new Law on Investment to attract more FDI in emerging sectors including agro-processing, electronics/machinery, health, industrial parts, infrastructure, and green energy. The government permits 100 percent foreign ownership of companies in most sectors. In a handful of sectors, such as cigarette manufacturing, movie production, rice milling, and gemstone mining and processing, foreign investment is subject to local equity participation or prior authorization from authorities. While there is little or no official legal discrimination against foreign investors, some foreign businesses report disadvantages vis-a-vis Cambodian or other foreign rivals that engage in acts of corruption or tax evasion or take advantage of Cambodia’s weak regulatory environment. The Council for the Development of Cambodia ( CDC ) is the principal government agency responsible for providing incentives to stimulate investment. Investors are required to submit an investment proposal to either the CDC or the Provincial-Municipal Investment Sub-committee to obtain a Qualified Investment Project (QIP) status depending on capital level and location of the investment in question. QIPs are then eligible for specific investment incentives. The CDC also serves as the secretariat to Cambodia’s Government-Private Sector Forum (G-PSF), a public-private consultation mechanism that facilitates dialogue within and among 10 government/private sector working groups. Cambodia has created special economic zones (SEZs) to further facilitate foreign investment. As of 2021, there are 25 SEZs in Cambodia. These zones provide companies with access to land, infrastructure, and services to facilitate the set-up and operation of businesses. Services provided include utilities, tax services, customs clearance, and other administrative services designed to support import-export processes. Cambodia offers incentives to projects within the SEZs such as tax holidays, zero rate VAT, and import duty exemptions for raw materials, machinery, and equipment. The primary authority responsible for Cambodia’s SEZs is the Cambodia Special Economic Zone Board (CSEZB). The largest of its SEZs is in Sihanoukville and hosts primarily Chinese companies. There are few limitations on foreign control and ownership of business enterprises in Cambodia. Foreign investors may own 100 percent of investment projects except in the sectors mentioned above. According to Cambodia’s new Law on Investment and related sub-decrees, there are no limitations based on shareholder nationality nor discrimination against foreign investors except for land ownership as stipulated in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia. For property, land title must be held by one or more Cambodian citizens. For state-owned enterprises, the Law on Public Enterprise provides that the Cambodian government must directly or indirectly hold more than 51 percent of the capital or veto rights in state-owned enterprises. For agriculture investments, foreign investors may request economic land concessions, if they meet certain criteria including provisions on land use, productivities, job creation, and environmental protection and natural resource management. There are some limitations on the employment of foreigners in Cambodia. A QIP allows employers to obtain visas and work permits for foreign citizens as skilled workers, but the employer may be required to prove to the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training that the skillset is not available among Cambodia workers. The Cambodian Bar has periodically taken actions to restrict or impede the work of foreign lawyers or foreign law firms in the country. The OECD Investment Policy Review of Cambodia in 2018 is available at the following link . The World Trade Organization (WTO) last reviewed Cambodia’s trade policies in 2017, which can be found at this link . All businesses are required to register with the Ministry of Commerce (MOC), the General Department of Taxation (GDT), and the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training (MOLVT). Registration with MOC is possible through an online business registration portal at this link , while the GDT’s online portal is also available here . To further facilitate the process, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) in 2020 launched the “ Single Portal ” – found at here , where businesses can register at the three ministries through a single online platform. In addition, new businesses may also be required to register with other relevant ministries governing their sector and business activities. For example, travel agencies must also register with the Ministry of Tourism, and private universities must also register with the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport. There are no restrictions on Cambodian citizens investing abroad. Some Cambodian companies have invested in neighboring countries – notably, Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar. Cambodia’s foreign direct investment abroad reached approximately $127 million in 2020. 3. Legal Regime Cambodia’s regulatory system, while improving, still lacks transparency. This is the result of a lack of legislation and the limited capacity of key institutions, which is further exacerbated by a weak court system. Investors often complain that the decisions of Cambodian regulatory agencies are inconsistent, arbitrary, and influenced by corruption. For example, in May 2016, in what was perceived as a populist move, the government set caps on retail fuel prices, with little consultation with petroleum companies. In April 2017, the National Bank of Cambodia introduced an interest rate cap on loans provided by the microfinance industry with no consultation with relevant stakeholders. More recently, investors have regularly expressed concern overdraft legislation that has not been subject to stakeholder consultations. Cambodian ministries and regulatory agencies are not legally obligated to publish the text of proposed regulations before their enactment. Draft regulations are only selectively and inconsistently available for public consultation with relevant non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private sector, or other parties before their enactment. Approved or passed laws are available on websites of some ministries but are not always up to date. The Council of Jurists, the government body that reviews laws and regulations, publishes a list of updated laws and regulations on its website. Businesses are not required to have audited financial statements or publish their financial reports unless they are financial institutions (banks/microfinance institutions) or publicly listed companies. The RGC does not mandate companies to make environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures with respect to investments. As a member of ASEAN since 1999, Cambodia is required to comply with certain rules and regulations regarding free trade agreements with the 10 ASEAN member states. These include tariff-free importation of information and communication technology (ICT) equipment, harmonizing custom coding, harmonizing the medical device market, as well as compliance with tax regulations on multi-activity businesses, among others. As a member of the WTO since 2004, Cambodia has both drafted and modified laws and regulations to comply with WTO rules. Relevant laws and regulations are notified to the WTO legal committee only after their adoption. A list of Cambodian legal updates in compliance with the WTO is described in the above section regarding Other Investment Policy Reviews. The Cambodian legal system is primarily based on French civil law. Under the 1993 Constitution, the King is the head of state and the elected Prime Minister is the head of government. Legislative power is vested in a bicameral parliament, while the judiciary makes up the third branch of government. Contractual enforcement is governed by Decree Number 38 D Referring to Contract and Other Liabilities. More information on this decree can be found at this link . Although the Cambodian Constitution calls for an independent judiciary, both local and foreign businesses report problems with inconsistent judicial rulings, corruption, and difficulty enforcing judgments. For these reasons, many commercial disputes are resolved through negotiations facilitated by the Ministry of Commerce, the Council for the Development of Cambodia, the Cambodian Chamber of Commerce, and other institutions. Foreign investors often build into their contracts clauses that dictate that investment disputes must be resolved in a third country, such as Singapore. Cambodia’s new Law on Investment, passed in October 2021, regulates the approval process for FDI and provides incentives to potential investors, both domestic and foreign. Sub-decree No. 111 (2005) lays out detailed procedures for registering a QIP with the CDC and provincial/municipal investment subcommittees. The new Law on Investment introduces an online registration process for QIP applications and shortens the timeline for the CDC’s issuance of a Registration Certificate to 20 working days. The portal for QIP registration with CDC can be found at this link . Information about investment procedures and incentives in Cambodia may be found on the CDC’s website . Cambodia’s Competition Law was signed in October 2021, following the enactment of a Law on Consumer Protection in 2019. Cambodia’s Consumer Protection Competition and Fraud Repression Directorate-General ( CCF ), is mandated to enforce these laws and investigate complaints. When disputes arise, individuals or businesses can file complaints with the CCF, with courts acting as the final arbitrator. Land rights are a contentious issue in Cambodia, complicated by the fact that most property holders do not have legal documentation of their ownership because of the policies and social upheaval during Khmer Rouge era in the 1970s. Numerous cases have been reported of influential individuals or groups acquiring land titles or concessions through political and/or financial connections and then using force to displace communities to make way for commercial enterprises. In late 2009, the National Assembly approved the Law on Expropriation, which sets broad guidelines on land-taking procedures for public interest purposes. It defines public interest activities to include construction, rehabilitation, preservation, or expansion of infrastructure projects, and development of buildings for national defense and civil security. These provisions include construction of border crossing posts, facilities for research and exploitation of natural resources, and oil pipeline and gas networks. Property can also be expropriated for natural disasters and emergencies, as determined by the government. Legal procedures regarding compensation and appeals are expected to be established in a forthcoming sub-decree, which is under internal discussion at the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The government has shown willingness to use tax issues for political purposes. For instance, in 2017, a U.S.-owned independent newspaper had its bank account frozen purportedly for failure to pay taxes. It is believed that, while the company may have had some tax liability, the General Department of Taxation inflated the assessment to pressure the newspaper to halt operations. The action took place in the context of a widespread government crackdown on independent media in the country. Cambodia’s 2007 Law on Insolvency is intended to provide collective, orderly, and fair satisfaction of creditor claims from debtor properties and, where appropriate, the rehabilitation of the debtor’s business. The law applies to the assets of all businesspeople and legal entities in Cambodia. In 2012, Credit Bureau Cambodia (CBC) was established to create a more transparent credit market in the country. CBC’s main role is to provide credit scores to banks and financial institutions and to improve access to credit information. 6. Financial Sector To address the need for capital markets in Cambodia, the Cambodia Securities Exchange (CSX) was founded in 2011 and started trading in 2012. Though the CSX is one of the world’s smallest securities markets, with nine listed companies, it has taken steps to increase the number of listed companies, including attracting SMEs. In 2021, market capitalization stood at $2.4 billion, and the daily trading value averaged $246,000. In September 2017, the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) adopted a regulation on the Conditions for Banking and Financial Institutions to be listed on CSX. The regulation sets additional requirements for banks and financial institutions that intend to issue securities to the public. This includes prior approval from the NBC and minimum equity of KHR 60 billion (approximately $15 million). Cambodia’s bond market is at the beginning stages of development. The regulatory framework for corporate bonds was bolstered in 2017 through the publication of several regulations covering public offering of debt securities, the accreditation of bondholders’ representatives, and the accreditation of credit rating agencies. The country’s first corporate bond was issued in 2018, and there are currently eight corporate bonds listed on the CSX. There is currently no sovereign bond market, but the government has stated its intention of making government securities available to investors in 2022. The NBC regulates the operations of Cambodia’s banks. Foreign banks and branches are freely allowed to register and operate in the country. There are 54 commercial banks, 10 specialized banks (set up to finance specific turn-key projects such as real estate development), 79 licensed microfinance institutions (MFIs), and five licensed microfinance deposit taking institutions in Cambodia. The NBC has also granted licenses to 17 financial leasing companies and one credit bureau company to improve transparency and credit risk management and encourage lending to small- and medium-sized enterprise customers. The banking sector’s assets, including those of MFIs, rose 16 percent year-over-year in 2020 to KHR 241 trillion ($59.4 billion) and customer loans increased 15 percent to KHR 151 trillion ($37.3 billion). In 2020, the number of deposit accounts reached 8.9 million (out of a population of roughly 17 million), while credit accounts reached 3.2 million. The government does not use the regulation of capital markets to restrict foreign investment. Banks have been free to set their own interest rates since 1995, and increased competition between local institutions has led to a gradual lowering of interest rates from year to year. However, in April 2017, at the direction of Prime Minister Hun Sen, the NBC capped interest rates on loans offered by MFIs at 18 percent per annum. The move was designed to protect borrowers, many of whom are poor and uneducated, from excessive interest rates. In March 2016, the NBC doubled the minimum capital reserve requirement for banks to $75 million for commercial banks and $15 million for specialized banks. Based on the new regulations, deposit-taking microfinance institutions now have a $30 million reserve requirement, while traditional microfinance institutions have a $1.5 million reserve requirement. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the NBC adopted measures to maintain financial stability and ensure liquidity in the banking system. These measures included allowing banks to maintain their capital conservation buffer at 50 percent, reducing the reserve requirement rate, and allowing banks to restructure loans for clients impacted by COVID. Financial technology (Fintech) in Cambodia is developing rapidly. Available technologies include mobile payments, QR codes, and e-wallet accounts for domestic and cross-border payments and transfers. In 2012, the NBC launched retail payments for checks and credit remittances. A “Fast and Secure Transfer” (FAST) payment system was introduced in 2016 to facilitate instant fund transfers. The Cambodian Shared Switch (CSS) system was launched in October 2017 to facilitate the access to network automated teller machines (ATMs) and point of sale (POS) machines. In February 2019, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) cited Cambodia for being “deficient” with regard to its anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) controls and policies and included Cambodia on its “grey list.” The RGC committed to working with FATF to address these deficiencies through a joint action plan, although Cambodia remains on the grey list as of 2022. Should Cambodia not take appropriate action, FATF could move it to the “black list,” which could negatively impact the cost of capital as well as the banking sector’s ability to access international capital markets. In addition to Cambodia’s weak AML/CFT regime, vulnerabilities include a largely cash-based, dollarized economy and porous borders. Both legal and illicit transactions, regardless of size, are frequently conducted outside of regulated financial institutions. Cash proceeds from crime are readily channeled into land, housing, luxury goods and vehicles, and other forms of property, without passing through the banking sector. Moreover, a lack of judicial independence and transparency constrains effective enforcement of laws against financial crimes. The judicial branch lacks efficiency and cannot assure impartiality, and judicial officials, up to and including the chief of the Supreme Court, have simultaneously held positions in the political ruling party. Refer to Section II: “Illicit Finance and Corrupt Activities in Cambodia” of the U.S. government’s Cambodia Business Advisory on High-Risk Investments and Interactions released on November 10, 2021, for more information. Cambodia does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 10. Political and Security Environment Incidents of violence directed at businesses are rare. The Embassy is unaware of any incidents of political violence directed at U.S. or other non-regional interests. In the past, authorities have used force to disperse protestors. Nevertheless, political tensions remain. After relatively competitive communal elections in June 2017, where Cambodia’s opposition party won 43 percent of available seats, the government banned the opposition party and imprisoned its leader on charges of treason. With no meaningful opposition, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) swept the 2018 national elections, winning all 125 parliamentary seats. The government has also taken steps to limit free speech and stifle independent media, including forcing independent news outlets and radio stations to cease operations. While there are few overt signs the country is growing less secure today, the possibility for insecurity exists going forward, particularly if COVID-driven economic problems persist and if a large percentage of the population remains disenfranchised. Cameroon Executive Summary Cameroon, the largest economy in the Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC), continues to face the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic; however, growth has started to recover from a 2020 recession. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects Cameroon’s gross domestic product (GDP) to increase by 4.6 percent in 2022. Cameroon’s current account balance also improved in 2021 and early 2022. The government continues to implement its 2020-2030 National Development Strategy and development projects, especially in road infrastructure, transport, energy, and health, albeit with delays. Cameroon utilized its hosting of the Africa Cup of Nations soccer tournament in early 2022 to hasten the completion of some long-awaited projects and promote Cameroon to investors. Cameroon maintains strong competitive advantages because of a bilingual population, a relatively diversified economy, and its location as a gateway to the Central African region. It offers immense investment potential in infrastructure, extractive industries, consumer markets, and modern communication technology (for example, internet broadband, fiber optic cable, and data centers). However, Cameroon’s telecommunication infrastructure is overutilized and in need of upgrades, which often results in network outages. Agricultural processing and transport infrastructure, such as seaports, airports, and rail, need investments, especially for modernization and maintenance. More investment opportunities exist in the financial sector as only 15 percent of Cameroonians have access to formal banking services. Corruption and weak governance structures continue to hamper Cameroon’s business climate. The IMF approved a three-year, $689.5 million hybrid Extended Credit Facility-Extended Fund Facility arrangement in July 2021 to advance structural fiscal reforms, improve governance, and continue mitigating the health, economic, and social consequences of the pandemic while ensuring domestic and external sustainability. Cameroon’s 2022 budget aligns with its National Development Strategy and IMF program and sets a target to reduce the budget deficit from -3.2 percent in 2021 to -2 percent in 2022. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 144 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 123 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $-19 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,520 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Creating a conducive business environment to attract foreign direct investments is a corner stone of Cameroon’s development strategy. Governance and strategic management of the state constitutes one of the four pillars of the 2020-2030 National Development Strategy 2030, which was launched November 2020. The Government of Cameroon acknowledges that the challenging nature of the domestic business climate remains a concern. To fight corruption, rebuild a weak legal system, and modernize an inefficient public service, the National Development Strategy has adopted a holistic approach to governance, which includes political and institutional governance, administrative governance, economic and financial governance, regional governance, and social and cultural governance. Cameroon has put in place an arsenal of institutions and laws to improve governance. The government created the Special Crime Tribunal on corruption and economic crimes in 2012 to prosecute crimes related to the misappropriation of public funds of $100,000 or more. The Court specifically targets custodians of public funds as well as officials who have the authority to collect or spend money on behalf of the state. The Court reported it had tried 225 cases and recovered $323 million as of July 2020. Another institution, the Audit Bench of the Supreme Court, reports directly to the President and is charged with conducting audits and investigations of public funds. The National Anti-Corruption Commission also reports to the President and investigates corruption allegations. However, corruption and administrative mismanagement continue to hamper the business climate in Cameroon. Cameroon consistently ranks in the bottom half of the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (144 of 180 in 2021). In 2020, Cameroon ranked 167 of 190 on the Ease of Doing Business index. Despite the active presence of state-owned companies in important sectors of the economy, private entities – both domestic and foreign – can create and own businesses that engage in all forms of legal remunerative activities. They can also enter joint ventures and public-private partnerships with the government. The Cameroon Investment Promotion Agency (CIPA) was created in 2010 and is a state-owned entity with a mission of attracting investment to Cameroon in collaboration with other state institutions. The agency seeks also to foster an enabling environment for investments in Cameroon. As of 2021, CIPA had signed 172 investment agreements and generated the creation of over 60,000 jobs. CIPA offers investment incentives covering existing and emerging economic sectors. The agency also serves as a one-stop-shop facilitator through the assistance it provides to foreign and domestic investors. It processes application files for approval in compliance with its investment charter and assists in the alignment of projects with the general tax code. It can support potential foreign investors for visa applications. The agency also follows up to monitor the implementation of commitments made by approved companies. CIPA’s sector coverage Sources: National Institute of Statistics, IMF, estimates 2019-2020 The government maintains dialogue with business associations such as the Groupement Inter-Patronal du Cameroun (GICAM) and Enterprise Cameroon through the Cameroon Business Forum, which is sponsored by the World Bank. Over the past two years, GICAM has been critical of the government’s handling of the negative impacts of COVID-19 and global inflationary pressures on business. There are no general economy-wide (statutory, de facto, or otherwise) limits on foreign ownership or control. Apart from the national defense and security areas, there are no sector-specific restrictions, limitations, or requirements applied to foreign ownership and control. Despite an active government presence in most sectors of the economy, private entities – both domestic and foreign – can create and own businesses that engage in all forms of legal remunerative activities. They can also enter joint ventures and public-private partnerships with the government. Cameroon has no laws or regulations that expressly prohibit investment, equity caps, mandatory domestic joint venture partners, licensing restrictions, or mandatory intellectual property/technology transfer requirements. Cameroon has a screening process, which is applicable to all domestic and foreign investments. This screening process ensures that investors meet the criteria, such as employment and export quantities, to qualify for private investment incentives. The IMF approved a three-year, $689.5 million hybrid Extended Credit Facility-Extended Fund Facility arrangement in July 2021. The arrangements are built around five pillars: (i) mitigating the health, economic, and social consequences of the pandemic while ensuring domestic and external sustainability; (ii) reinforcing good governance and strengthening transparency and the anti-corruption framework; (iii) accelerating structural fiscal reforms to modernize tax and customs administrations, mobilize revenue, improve public financial management, increase public investment efficiency, and reduce fiscal risks from state-owned enterprises; (iv) strengthening debt management and reduce debt vulnerabilities; and (v) implementing structural reforms to accelerate economic diversification, boost financial sector resilience and inclusion, and promote gender equality and a greener economy. The IMF completed a First Review of the program on February 23, 2022 and found Cameroon’s overall program performance to be mixed. While macroeconomic performance is broadly satisfactory, and efforts to promote good governance and transparency are gaining momentum, progress on structural reforms is slow. Copies of the review can be found on the IMF website . Civil society organizations and business associations have provided investment related policy recommendations. Following the introduction of an electronic payment tax, which includes mobile money, in the 2022 finance law, Cameroon’s largest business association GICAM noted “mobile money taxes can have a negative impact on excise tax receipts as consumers are pushed into non-traceable cash transactions, and on the size of remittances from abroad.” GICAM recommended the government enhance consumer purchasing power by reducing some taxes, reviewing remuneration policy, and amending its price regulation policies. Following reform proposals from the road transport syndicate on freight conditions on the Douala-Bangui Corridor, the government approved the construction of rest areas along the corridor as well as the reduction of police checkpoints in 2021. Entrepreneurs obtain a unique tax identifying number when they open a company in Cameroon. Within 15 days after the registration for a new business, the Directorate General of Taxation issues a permanent taxpayer identification number, known as the Unique Identification Number (UIN). According to the World Bank, it takes 14 procedures and 82 days to establish a foreign-owned limited liability company in Douala, Cameroon’s largest city and economic capital. This process is longer and more complex than regional and global averages. For foreign investors, a declaration of foreign investment to the Ministry of Finance is mandatory 30 days prior to the beginning of operations. In addition, if the company wants to engage in international trade, registration in the importers’ file is required to obtain an automated customs systems number (Système Douanier Automatisé, or “sydonia”). This number facilitates the entry and exit of goods produced by the company. The authentication of the parent company’s documentation abroad is required only to establish a subsidiary. Foreign-owned resident companies that wish to maintain foreign currency bank accounts must obtain prior approval. The Minister of Finance issues such authorization, which is subject to approval from the Bank of Central African States (BEAC) as per Section 24 of the exchange control regulations. This approval takes on average 38 days to obtain. There is a minimum paid-in capital requirement of CFA 1,000,000 (~$1,800) for establishing LLCs. In Cameroon, business registration is most often manual, although the Ministry of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises launched an electronic registration portal designed to automate the process at https://cameroun.eregistrations.org/ . Due to internet access challenges, the website is not always operational. To manually register, entrepreneurs must go to a Ministry of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises regional center for the creation of enterprises, which can complete the registration procedure within one week. The Cameroonian government does not promote or incentivize outward investment, nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Cameroon’s laws are consistent with international business and legal norms. Cameroon’s legal architecture is made up of national, regional CEMAC, and supra-national regulations, most of which are applicable to domestic and foreign businesses. Weak implementation and investigative capacity, a lack of understanding of international business practices, and corruption in the judiciary limit the effectiveness of the rule of law. In many circumstances, judicial loopholes persist, leading to arbitrary interpretations of the texts. Some government ministries, though not all, consult with public and private sector organizations through targeted outreach with stakeholders, such as business associations or other groups. There is no formal process for such consultations. Ministries do not report the results of consultations, but there is no evidence that such processes disadvantage U.S. or other foreign investors. Cameroon’s National Assembly and Senate pass laws. The Executive proposes bills and then executes laws. Though there is technically a separation of powers, the Presidency is the supreme rule-making and regulatory authority. Decentralized institutions in the regions and municipalities have little additional regulatory authority. Draft bills and regulations are not made available for public comment. The website for the Office of the Prime Minister (www.spm.gov.cm) contains PDF versions of most new regulatory actions published in the Cameroon Tribune, the country’s newspaper of record. Ministries and regulatory agencies do not have a list of anticipated regulatory changes or proposals intended to be adopted/implemented within a specified period. Ministries do not have a legal obligation to publish the text of proposed regulations before their enactment. There is no period set by law for the text of the proposed regulations to be publicly available. There is no specialized government body tasked with reviewing and monitoring regulatory impact assessments conducted by other individual agencies or government bodies. Cameroon has administrative courts that specialize in the application and enforcement of public laws. From a strictly legal perspective, the Supreme Court has oversight on enforcement mechanisms, but a lack of separation of powers prevents the judiciary from carrying out its responsibilities. There have been no new regulatory or enforcement reforms announced since the 2021 Investment Climate Statement. Cameroon does not meet the minimum standards of fiscal transparency. This is partly because many of the state-owned enterprises do not have public accounts. Companies that are listed or aspire to be listed on the Central African Stock Exchange (CASE) have more stringent transparency requirements. There are only four publicly listed companies on the CASE. All four use the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) accounting system, which does not align completely with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Cameroon is a member of CEMAC and is thus subject to its regulations, though implementation remains weak. CEMAC’s central bank, the Bank of Central African States (BEAC), controls monetary policy and is the de facto finance sector regulator, in coordination with the Ministry of Finance. The National Institute of Statistics (INS) conducts surveys and produces statistics, which are meant to inform policy decisions. Some of these statistics are cited in government documents when ministries are drafting legislative proposals or during parliamentary debates. Quantitative analysis conducted by the INS has often been used by multilateral lenders such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank. However, empirical evaluation and data-driven assessments of the impact of new and existing regulations are limited. Similarly, public comments are not the main drivers of regulations. However, some consultations take place for the national budget, which is produced each year, but there is little oversight to ensure adherence to the document. The government does not require companies to have environmental, social, or governance disclosures. Cameroon is a CEMAC member state. CEMAC regulations supersede those of individual members, though areas such as the free movement of people, goods, and services are not respected by some states. Recent reforms by CEMAC’s central bank, BEAC, have met stiff resistance and delays in their application by individual member states, including Cameroon. The government requires use of OHADA accounting standards, which are used by 14 African nations. No other norms or standards are referenced in the country’s regulatory system. Cameroon joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 13, 1995 and was previously a member of the General Agreement on Taxes and Tariffs. Cameroon did not notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) in 2020 and submitted eight notifications between 1995 and 2020. The Cameroonian legal system is a legacy of French (Civil Law), German (Codified Laws), English (Common Law), and domestic national customs, which vary for each ethnic group. The government wants to harmonize these different legal traditions to equip Cameroon with laws that are applicable across the country and to reduce the need to navigate different legal opinions. This project, however, is being met with stiff resistance from English-speaking lawyers, who believe that the initiative will undermine the English system to which they are accustomed. In terms of standards, Cameroon’s commercial legal system follows the OHADA rules, which are supposed to be aligned with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Enforcement is weak, partly because of lack of capacity. There are not enough specialized judges in the commercial and economic fields. Consequently, poor enforcement of laws and accounting standards tend to create confusion for foreign investors. Despite efforts to align OHADA standards to international norms, government accounting regulations remain obsolete in the context of rapid developments in international finance and capital markets. To circumvent the problem, U.S. enterprises and investors often maintain two sets of accounting records, one in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or suitable international standards, and another set to address the OHADA standards and government reporting requirements. Arbitration is becoming the solution of choice to solve business disputes in Cameroon. Arbitration is in the OHADA corporate law and business associations can choose to use OHADA law to run arbitration councils. Since OHADA is a supra-national law, Cameroon is bound by its decisions. In OHADA, regulations and enforcement actions are appealable, and they can also be adjudicated in the national court system. In Cameroon, businesses mostly use the GICAM and Abidjan Arbitration Councils. Foreign direct investments are governed by Law No. 2013/004 of April 18, 2013, which defines incentives for private investment in Cameroon, while proposing generic and special incentives and affirming the government’s responsibilities towards private investors. The law applies to both domestic and foreign investors. Additional laws and regulations that refer to specific economic sectors are available on the website of the Ministry of Finance ( http://www.minfi.gov.cm/index.php/en/documents ). The 2022 finance law is the newest legal instrument to have been published in the past year. The 2021 finance law created new taxes, while maintaining some existing exonerations, notably on value-added taxes and life insurance savings. The 2022 law created new taxes as well, including a tax on electronic payments. CIPA maintains a list of relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors ( https://www.investincameroon.net/language/en/ ). The National Competition Commission handles anti-competition and anti-trust disputes. In some cases, the regulator of a specific economic sector can play the anti-trust role. State-owned enterprises tend to have quasi-monopoly or monopsony status in their markets. Decree No.85-9 of July 4, 1985 and the subsequent implementation of Decree N°.87-1872 of December 16, 1987, outline the procedures governing expropriation for public purposes and conditions for compensation. Some of the provisions of these legal texts were repealed by Instruction No. 005/I/Y.25/MINDAF/D220 of December 29, 2005. Essentially, for the public interest, the state may expropriate privately-owned land. The laws also explain the formalities to be observed within the context of the procedure, both at the central and local levels. In recent years, the government of Cameroon has expropriated large infrastructure road and hydroelectric dam projects. The government has a compensation process in place to meet the losses of those affected by such decisions. Despite weakness in the actual implementation and execution of laws on the ground, compensation after expropriation generally follows a due process. There are no cases of indirect expropriation, confiscatory tax regimes, or regulatory actions that deprive investors of substantial economic benefits from their investments. However, serious allegations of corruption have plagued compensation procedures over the last decade. These incidents, often carried out by civil servants, have undermined trust in the process. 6. Financial Sector The Cameroonian government is open to portfolio investment. With the encouragement of the IMF and BEAC, Cameroon and other members of the CEMAC region have designed policies that facilitate the free flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets. The Financial Markets Commission of Cameroon merged operations with the Libreville-based Central African Financial Market Supervisory Board in February 2019. The merger has led to the establishment of a unique regional stock exchange called the Central African Stock Exchange (CASE). Cameroon’s financial sector is underdeveloped, and government policies have limited bearing on the free flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets. Foreign investors can get credit on the local market and the private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. In 2016, Cameroon sought to encourage the development of capital markets through Law No 2016/010 of July 12, 2016, governing undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities in Cameroon. Cameroon is connected to the international banking payment system. The country is a CEMAC member, which maintains a central bank, BEAC. CEMAC’s central bank works with the IMF on monetary policies and public finance reform. BEAC respects IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Despite generally respecting Article VIII, BEAC has instituted several restrictions on payments to boost foreign exchange reserves. Financial institutions and importers complain of a backlog of requests for foreign exchange. BEAC is currently negotiating with several international oil companies on repatriation of revenues before external payments. Investors should be aware that timely repatriation of profits may be a stumbling block. In 2020, with the support of the IMF, BEAC took steps to address the economic impact of COVID-19 in the region. The central bank eased monetary policy and introduced accommodative measures to ensure adequate liquidity in the banking system to supporting internal and external stability. Concomitantly, the regional banking sector controller (Commission Bancaire de l’Afrique Centrale or COBAC) eased prudential regulations to help banks delay pandemic-related losses. Less than 20 percent of Cameroonians have access to formal banking services. The Cameroonian government has often spoken of increasing access, but no coherent policy or action has been taken to alleviate the problem. Mobile money, introduced by local and international telecom providers, is the closest tool to banking services that most Cameroonians can access. In its 2022 finance law, the government introduced a tax on electronic payment transfers, including the ubiquitously used “Mobile Money.” The banking sector is generally healthy. Large, international commercial banks do most of the lending. One local bank, Afriland, operates in Cameroon and multiple other countries. Most smaller banks deal in small loans of short duration. Retail banking is not common. According to the World Bank, non-performing loans were 10.31 percent of total bank loans in 2016. The Cameroonian government does not keep statistics on non-performing assets. According to Cameroon’s National Credit Council, Afriland First Bank, Societe General Cameroun (SGC), Banque Internationale du Cameroun pour l’Epargne et le Credit (BICEC), and Societe Commerciale de Banque Cameroun (SCB) are the most important banks in the national banking system, accounting for 52 percent of the banking system’s total consolidated balance sheet, 54 percent of total loans, and 54 percent of customer deposits in 2020. Foreign banks can establish operations in Cameroon. Most notably, Citibank and Standard Chartered Bank have operated in Cameroon for more than 20 years. They are subject to the same regulations as local banks. U.S. Embassy Yaoundé officials are unaware of any lost correspondent banking relationships within the past three years. There are no restrictions on foreigners establishing bank accounts, credit instruments, business financing, or other such transactions. The country has 412 registered microfinance institutions, 19 insurance companies, four electronic money institutions, and one Post Office bank. Two major money transfer operators are also present, essentially offering over-the-counter services. The Cameroon market is at the startup stage for its digital financial system. This emerging market segment is currently provided by banks in partnership with telecom operators. According to a 2021 BEAC report on the state of electronic payments in the CEMAC zone, electronic money payments in the CEMAC region increased 21.8 percent from 2019 to 2020, totaling approximately $51 million in 2020 compared to $42 million in 2019. Cameroon represented the largest amount of electronic payment transfers, accounting for 73 percent of all CEMAC transactions and totaling over $20 million in 2020. Financial inclusion is low despite some progress brought about by mobile telephony. The World Bank estimates there were 25 million mobile cellular subscriptions in Cameroon in 2020. Putting aside the multi-SIM effect, the penetration rate in terms of unique subscribers was about 50 percent at the end of 2019, which puts Cameroon in the lower end in the Central African region. Cameroon does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 10. Political and Security Environment Cameroon faces several security challenges. Violence by non-state armed groups against security forces and the local population is in its sixth year in the primarily English-speaking Southwest and Northwest Regions. Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa continue to attack civilians and security forces in the Far North Region. In the Adamoua and East Regions, a wave of kidnappings and the presence of refugees from the Central African Republic has led to increased military presence. Terrorists and separatists alike have targeted economic assets and public infrastructure to effect political change. In the Northwest and Southwest regions, leaders of non-state armed groups have claimed responsibility on social media for the killing of government officials, arsons that destroyed hospitals, schools, bridges, roads, and the seizure of state-run utilities. Non-state armed groups have also posted videos on social media of executions and beheadings of security officers while also claiming responsibility for multiple kidnappings for ransom of persons perceived to be against their cause. Human rights organizations and local citizens have accused soldiers and separatists of grave human rights abuses. In the Far North of Cameroon, Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa fighters have looted villages and cattle, kidnapped, and abused women. Consequently, several infrastructures projects have ground to a halt. Canada Executive Summary Canada and the United States have one of the largest and most comprehensive investment relationships in the world. U.S. investors are attracted to Canada’s strong economic fundamentals, proximity to the U.S. market, highly skilled work force, and abundant resources. Canada encourages foreign direct investment (FDI) by promoting stability, global market access, and infrastructure. The United States is Canada’s largest investor, accounting for 44 percent of total FDI. As of 2020, the amount of U.S. FDI totaled USD 422 billion, a 5 percent increase from the previous year. Canada’s FDI stock in the United States totaled USD 570 billion, a 15 percent increase from the previous year. Canada attracted USD 61 billion inward FDI flows in 2021 (the highest since 2007), a rebound from COVID-19-related decreases in 2020 according to Canada’s national statistical office. The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) came into force on July 1, 2020, replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The USMCA supports a strong investment framework beneficial to U.S. investors. Foreign investment in Canada is regulated by the Investment Canada Act (ICA). The purpose of the ICA is to review significant foreign investments to ensure they provide an economic net benefit and do not harm national security. In March 2021, the Canadian government announced revised ICA foreign investment screening guidelines that include additional national security considerations such as sensitive technology areas, critical minerals, and sensitive personal data. The guidelines followed an April 2020 ICA update, which provides for greater scrutiny of foreign investments by state-owned investors, as well as investments involving the supply of critical goods and services. Despite a generally welcoming foreign investment environment, Canada maintains investment stifling prohibitions in the telecommunication, airline, banking, and cultural sectors. The 2022 budget proposal included language that could limit foreign ownership of real estate for a two-year period (to cool an overheated market and lack of housing for Canadians). Ownership and corporate board restrictions prevent significant foreign telecommunication and aviation investment, and there are deposit acceptance limitations for foreign banks. Investments in cultural industries such as book publishing are required to be compatible with national cultural policies and be of net benefit to Canada. In addition, non-tariff barriers to trade across provinces and territories contribute to structural issues that have held back the productivity and competitiveness of Canada’s business sector. Canada has taken steps to address the climate crisis by establishing the Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act that enshrines in law the Government of Canada’s commitment to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and issuing the 2030 Emissions Reduction Plan that describes the measures Canada is undertaking to reduce emissions to 40 to 45 percent below 2005 levels by 2030 and achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 13 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 16 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 USD 402,255 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 43,580 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Canada actively encourages FDI and maintains a sound enabling environment. Investors are attracted to Canada’s proximity to the United States, highly skilled workforce, strong legal protections, and abundant natural resources. Once established, foreign-owned investments are treated equally to domestic investments. As of 2020, the United States had a stock of USD 422 billion of foreign direct investment in Canada. U.S. FDI stock in Canada represents 44 percent of Canada’s total investment. Canada’s FDI stock in the United States totaled USD 570 billion. The USMCA modernizes the previous NAFTA investment protection rules and investor-state dispute settlement provisions. Parties to the USMCA agree to treat investors and investments of the other Parties in accordance with the highest international standards, and consistent with U.S. law and practice, while safeguarding each Party’s sovereignty and promoting domestic investment. Invest in Canada is Canada’s investment attraction and promotion agency. It provides information and advice on doing business in Canada, strategic market intelligence on specific industries, site visits, and introductions to provincial, territorial, and municipal investment promotion agencies. Still, non-tariff barriers to trade across provinces and territories contribute to structural issues that have held back the productivity and competitiveness of Canada’s business sector. Foreign investment in Canada is regulated under the provisions of the Investment Canada Act (ICA). U.S. FDI in Canada is also subject to the provisions of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the USMCA, and the NAFTA. The ICA mandates the review of significant foreign investments to ensure they provide an economic net benefit and do not harm national security. Canada is not a party to the USMCA’s chapter on investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). Ongoing NAFTA arbitrations are not affected by the USMCA, and investors can file new NAFTA claims by July 1, 2023, provided the investment(s) were “established or acquired” when NAFTA was still in force and remained “in existence” on the date the USMCA entered into force. An ISDS mechanism between the United States and Canada will cease following a three-year window for NAFTA-protected legacy investments. The Canadian government announced revised ICA foreign investment screening guidelines on March 24, 2021. The revised guidelines include additional national security considerations such as sensitive technology areas, critical minerals, and sensitive personal data. The new guidelines are aligned with Innovation, Science, and Economic Development Canada’s April 2020 update on greater scrutiny for foreign investments by state-owned investors, as well as investments involving the supply of critical goods and services. The 2020-21 Investment Canada Act Annual Report (released February 2, 2022) indicated a record high 24 investments were subject either to formal national security review or heightened screening despite historically fewer total foreign investments in Canada due to COVID-19-related factors. In contrast, a total of 21 investments were subject to similar screening in the four years from 2016 to 2020. Still, some Canadian elected officials and national security experts assess national security standards should be heightened. The government is exploring proposed amendments to the National Security Review of Investments Regulations which would introduce a voluntary filing mechanism for investments by non-Canadians that do not require an application or a notification. Foreign ownership limits apply to Canadian telecommunication, airline, banking, and cultural sectors. Telecommunication carriers, including internet service providers, that own and operate transmission facilities are subject to foreign investment restrictions if they hold a 10 percent or greater share of total Canadian communication annual market revenues as mandated by The Telecommunications Act. These investments require Canadian ownership of 80 percent of voting shares, Canadians holding 80 percent of director positions, and no indirect control by non-Canadians. If the company is a subsidiary, the parent corporation must be incorporated in Canada and Canadians must hold a minimum of 66.6 percent of the parent’s voting shares. Foreign ownership of Canadian airlines is limited to 49 percent with no individual non-Canadian able to control more than 25 percent by mandate of the 2018 Transportation Modernization Act. Canadian airlines cannot be directly or indirectly controlled by non-Canadians to meet Canadian Transportation Agency “control in fact” licensure requirements. Foreign banks can establish operations in Canada but are generally prohibited from accepting deposits of less than USD 112,000. Foreign banks must receive Department of Finance and the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) approval to enter the Canadian market. Investment in cultural industries also carries restrictions, including a provision under the ICA that foreign investment in book publishing and distribution must be compatible with Canada’s national cultural policies and be of net benefit to Canada. The World Trade Organization conducted a trade policy review of Canada in 2019. The report is available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp489_e.htm . The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development completed an Economic Forecast Summary and released the results in December 2021. The report is available at: http://www.oecd.org/economy/canada-economic-snapshot/ . Individuals from Canadian civil society organizations, industry, and academic institutions regularly comment on and assess investment policy-related concerns. In January and February 2022, for example, subject matter experts gave evidence to Canada’s House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry and Technology regarding an investment policy decision concerning a high-profile critical mineral sector investment. The Canadian government provides information necessary for starting a business at: https://www.canada.ca/en/services/business/start.html . Business registration requires federal or provincial government-based incorporation, the application of a federal business number and corporation income tax account from the Canada Revenue Agency, the registration as an extra-provincial or extra-territorial corporation in all other Canadian jurisdictions of business operations, and the application of relevant permits and licenses. In some cases, registration for these accounts is streamlined (a business can receive its business number, tax accounts, and provincial registrations as part of the incorporation process); however, this is not true for all provinces and territories. Canada prioritizes export promotion and outward investment as a means to enhance future Canadian competitiveness and productivity. Canada’s Trade Commissioner Service offers a number of funding opportunities and support programs for Canadian businesses to break into and expand in international markets: https://www.tradecommissioner.gc.ca/funding_support_programs-programmes_de_financement_de_soutien.aspx?lang=eng&wbdisable=true . Canada does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad except when recipient countries or businesses are designated under the government’s sanctions regime. 3. Legal Regime Canada’s regulatory transparency is similar to the United States. Regulatory and accounting systems, including those related to debt obligations, are transparent and consistent with international norms. Proposed legislation is subject to parliamentary debate and public hearings, and regulations are issued in draft form for public comment prior to implementation in the Canada Gazette, the government’s official journal of record. While federal and/or provincial licenses or permits may be needed to engage in economic activities, regulation of these activities is generally for statistical or tax compliance reasons. Under the USMCA, parties agreed to make publicly available any written comments they receive, except to the extent necessary to protect confidential information or withhold personal identifying information or inappropriate content. Canada published regulatory roadmaps for clean technology, digitalization and technology neutrality, and international standards in June 2021. These roadmaps, part of the federal government’s multi-year Targeted Regulatory Review program, lay out plans to advance regulatory modernization to support economic growth and innovation. Canadian securities legislation does not currently mandate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure for public or private companies. The Canadian Securities Administrators, an umbrella organization of all provincial and territorial securities regulators, released two proposed ESG disclosure policies for public comment between October 2021 and February 2022. The policies would require climate-related governance disclosures and climate-related strategy, risk management and metrics and targets disclosures if adopted. Canada publishes an annual budget and debt management report. According to the Ministry of Finance, the design and implementation of the domestic debt program are guided by the key principles of transparency, regularity, prudence, and liquidity. Canada addresses international regulatory norms through its FTAs and actively engages in bilateral and multilateral regulatory discussions. U.S.-Canada regulatory cooperation is guided by Chapter 28 of the USMCA “Good Regulatory Practices” and the bilateral Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC). The USMCA aims to promote regulatory quality through greater transparency, objective analysis, accountability, and predictability. The RCC is a bilateral forum focused on harmonizing health, safety, and environmental regulatory differences. Canada-EU regulatory cooperation is guided by Chapter 21 “Regulatory Cooperation” of the CETA and the Regulatory Cooperation Forum (RCF). CETA encourages regulators to exchange experiences and information and identify areas of mutual cooperation. The RCF seeks to reconstitute regulatory cooperation under the previous Canada-EU Framework on Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency. The RCF is mandated to seek regulatory convergence where feasible to facilitate trade. CPTPP Chapter 25 “Regulatory Coherence” seeks to encourage the use of good regulatory practices to promote international trade and investment, economic growth, and employment. The CPTPP also established a Committee on Regulatory Coherence charged with considering developments to regulatory best practices in order to make recommendations to the CPTPP Commission for improving the chapter provisions and enhancing benefits to the trade agreement. Canada is a member of the WTO and notifies draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Canada is a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement, which it ratified in December 2016. Canada’s legal system is based on English common law, except for Quebec, which follows civil law. Law-making responsibility is split between the Parliament of Canada (federal law) and provincial/territorial legislatures (provincial/territorial law). Canada has both written commercial law and contractual law, and specialized commercial and civil courts. Canada’s Commercial Law Directorate provides advisory and litigation services to federal departments and agencies whose mandate includes a commercial component and has legal counsel in Montréal and Ottawa. The judicial branch of government is independent of the executive branch and the current judicial process is considered procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. The provinces administer justice in their jurisdictions, including management of civil and criminal provincial courts. Foreign investment in Canada is regulated under the provisions of the ICA. U.S. FDI in Canada is also subject to the provisions of the WTO, the USMCA, and the NAFTA. The purpose of the ICA is to review significant foreign investments to ensure they provide an economic net benefit and do not harm national security. Canada relies on its Invest In Canada promotion agency to provide relevant information to foreign investors: https://www.investcanada.ca/ Competition Bureau Canada is an independent law enforcement agency charged with ensuring Canadian businesses and consumers prosper in a competitive and innovative marketplace as stipulated under the Competition Act, the Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act, the Textile Labelling Act, and the Precious Metals Marking Act. The Bureau is housed under the Department of Innovation, Science, and Economic Development (ISED) and is headed by a Commissioner of Competition. Competition cases, excluding criminal cases, are brought before the Competition Tribunal, an adjudicative body independent from the government. The Competition Bureau and Tribunal adhere to transparent norms and procedures. Appeals to Tribunal decisions may be filed with the Federal Court of Appeal as per section 13 of the Competition Tribunal Act. Criminal violations of competition law are investigated by the Competition Bureau and are referred to Canada’s Public Prosecution Service for prosecution in federal court. The federal government announced in February 2022 an intention to review competition law and policy including specific evaluation of loopholes that allow for harmful conduct, drip pricing, wage fixing agreements, access to justice for those injured by harmful conduct, adaptions to the digital economy, and penalty regime modernization. The announcement cited competition as a key tool to strengthen Canadian post-pandemic economic recovery. In September 2020, the Bureau signed the Multilateral Mutual Assistance and Cooperation Framework for Competition Authorities (MMAC) with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the New Zealand Commerce Commission, the United Kingdom Competition & Markets Authority, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the U. S. Federal Trade Commission. The MMAC aims to improve international cooperation through information sharing and inter-organizational training. Canadian federal and provincial laws recognize both the right of the government to expropriate private property for a public purpose and the obligation to pay compensation. The federal government has not nationalized a foreign firm since the nationalization of Axis property during World War II. Both the federal and provincial governments have assumed control of private firms, usually financially distressed companies, after reaching agreement with the former owners. The USMCA, like the NAFTA, requires expropriation only be used for a public purpose and done in a nondiscriminatory manner, with prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, and in accordance with due process of law. Bankruptcy in Canada is governed at the federal level in accordance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act. Each province also has specific laws for dealing with bankruptcy. Canada’s bankruptcy laws stipulate that unsecured creditors may apply for court-imposed bankruptcy orders. Debtors and unsecured creditors normally work through appointed trustees to resolve claims. Trustees will generally make payments to creditors after selling the debtors assets. Equity claimants are subordinate to all other creditor claims and are paid only after other creditors have been paid in full per Canada’s insolvency ladder. In all claims, provisions are made for cross-border insolvencies and the recognition of foreign proceedings. Secured creditors generally have the right to take independent actions and fall outside the scope of the BIA. 6. Financial Sector Canada’s capital markets are open, accessible, and regulated. Credit is allocated on market terms, the private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments, and foreign investors can get credit on the local market. Canada has several securities markets, the largest of which is the Toronto Stock Exchange, and there is sufficient liquidity in the markets to enter and exit sizeable positions. The Canadian government and Bank of Canada do not place restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. The Canadian banking system is composed of 35 domestic banks and 16 foreign bank subsidiaries. Six major domestic banks are dominant players in the market and manage close to USD 5.4 trillion in assets. Many large international banks have a presence in Canada through a subsidiary, representative office, or branch. Ninety-nine percent of Canadians have an account with a financial institution. The Canadian banking system is viewed as very stable due to high capitalization rates that are well above the norms set by the Bank for International Settlements. The OSFI, Canada’s primary banking regulator, announced in January 2022 revised capital, leverage, liquidity, and disclosure rules that incorporate the final Basel III banking reforms with additional adjustments to make them suitable for federally regulated deposit-taking institutions. Most of the revised rules will take effect in the second fiscal quarter of 2023, with those related to market risk and credit valuation adjustment risk taking effect in early 2024. Foreign financial firms interested in investing submit their applications to the OSFI for approval by the Minister of Finance. U.S. and other foreign banks can establish banking subsidiaries in Canada. Several U.S. financial institutions maintain commercially focused operations, principally in the areas of lending, investment banking, and credit card issuance. Foreigners can open bank accounts in Canada with proper identification and residency information. The Bank of Canada is the nation’s central bank. Its principal role is “to promote the economic and financial welfare of Canada,” as defined in the Bank of Canada Act. The Bank’s four main areas of responsibility are: monetary policy; promoting a safe, sound, and efficient financial system; issuing and distributing currency; and being the fiscal agent for Canada. Canada does not have a federal sovereign wealth fund. The province of Alberta maintains the Heritage Savings Trust Fund to manage the province’s share of non-renewable resource revenue. The fund’s net financial assets were valued at USD 14 billion as of December 31, 2021. The Fund invests in a globally diversified portfolio of public and private equity, fixed income, and real assets. The Fund follows the voluntary code of good practices known as the “Santiago Principles” and participates in the IMF-hosted International Working Group of SWFs. The Heritage Fund holds approximately 50 percent of its value in equity investments, seventeen percent of which are domestic. 10. Political and Security Environment Canada is politically stable with rare instances of civil disturbance. In January and February 2022, however, various groups of protestors occupied large parts of the downtown core of Ottawa and blocked commercial trade at several U.S.-Canada ports of entry. The initial protest movement of several hundred individuals claimed to be focused on the reversal of cross-border vaccine mandates. The movement attracted thousands of additional followers with a spectrum of political philosophies and grievances including far right extremist and anti-government groups. The protestors hindered hundreds of millions of dollars in daily two-way trade causing production slowdowns at several factories on both sides of the border. Many Ottawa residents complained of acts of harassment, desecration, and destruction by the protestors including deafening horn honking. The federal government invoked the never-before-used Emergencies Act to provide additional police powers to end the protests. Some commentators characterized the protests as a demonstration of growing politization within Canada. Chad Executive Summary Chad is Africa’s fifth largest country by surface area, encompassing three bioclimatic zones. Chad is landlocked, bordering Libya to the north, Sudan to the east, Central African Republic (CAR) to the south, and Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger to the west (with which it shares Lake Chad). The nearest port — Douala, Cameroon — is 1,700 km from the capital, N’Djamena. Chad is one of six countries that constitute the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), a common market. Chad’s human development is one of the lowest in the world according to the UN Human Development Index (HDI). Poverty afflicts a large proportion of the population. The Government of Chad (GOC) actively solicits foreign investment, especially from North America. Opportunities for foreign investment exist in Agribusiness; Agricultural, Construction, Building & Heavy Equipment; Automotive & Ground Transportation; Education; Energy & Mining; Environmental Technologies; Food Processing & Packaging; Health Technologies; Information Technology; Industrial Equipment & Supplies; Information & Communication; and Services. Since oil production began in 2003, the petroleum sector has dominated economic activity and been the largest target of foreign investment, including from U.S. companies. Agriculture and livestock breeding are also important economic activities, employing most of the population. In recent years, the GOC has prioritized agriculture, solar energy production, gold mining, livestock breeding and processing, and information technology to diversify the economy and lessen fiscal dependence on volatile global energy markets. Chad’s investment climate is challenging. Private sector development suffers from a lack of transport infrastructure, GDP growth, skilled labor, reliable electricity, adequate contract enforcement, good governance, and attractive tax rates. Frequent border closures with neighboring countries complicate trade. The COVID-19 pandemic, and associated restrictions, halted Chad’s modest 2019 economic recovery following several years of recession caused by low global oil prices and disruptive debt payments to Glencore. Overall vaccination rates remain low. Existing IMF and World Bank programs aim to improve governance, increase transparency, and reduce internal arrears. Private sector financing is limited, and low GDP growth constrains government investment. Corruption and historically frequent replacement of senior level government figures present further roadblocks, as does cumbersome French-based labor law. The GOC’s interest in maintaining a stake in investment projects, while facilitating access to key decision makers, also introduces financial and operational risks. Despite these challenges, the success of several foreign investments into Chad illustrates opportunities for experienced, dedicated, and patient investors. Successful investors typically operate with trusted local partners. The oil sector will mark 20 years of operations in 2023. Singapore-based Olam International entered Chad’s cotton market in 2018. Mindful of the imperative to enact reforms, the GOC operationalized a Presidential Council to Improve the Business Climate in January 2021. With rich natural resources, minimally developed agriculture and meat processing sectors, ample sunshine, increasing telecommunications coverage, and a rapidly growing population, Chad presents an opportunity for targeted investment in key sectors. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2022 164 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $630 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GOC’s policies towards foreign direct investment (FDI) are generally positive. Chad’s laws and regulations encourage FDI, and there are few formal restrictions on foreign trade and investment. Under Chadian law, foreign and domestic entities may establish and own business enterprises. The National Investment Charter of 2008 permits full foreign ownership of companies in Chad. The only limit on foreign control is on ownership of companies deemed related to national security. The National Investment Charter guarantees both foreign companies and individuals equal standing with Chadian companies and individuals in the privatization process. In principle, tenders for foreign investment in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and for government contracts are conducted through open international bid procedures. The National Investment Charter also offers incentives to certain foreign companies establishing significant operations in Chad, including up to five years of tax-exempt status. Chad’s National Agency for Investment and Exports (ANIE, Agence Nationale des Investissements et des Exports), an agency of the Ministry of Industrial and Commercial Development & Private Sector Promotion, facilitates foreign investment. ANIE’s mandate is to contribute to the creation of a business environment that meets international standing, promote investment and exports, support the development of SMEs, and inform GOC decision makers about economic policy. ANIE acts as a one-stop shop for new investors. Chad has demonstrated few signs of prioritizing investment retention or maintaining an ongoing dialogue with investors, such as through a formal business roundtable or Ombudsman. The Presidential Council for Improving the Investment Climate has met only twice since its 2021 establishment and is still working to clarify its work plan. There are no limits on foreign ownership or control. There are no sector-specific restrictions that discriminate against market access for U.S. or other foreign investors, and no de facto anti-foreign discriminatory practices. In terms of investment screening mechanisms, the government reviews potential investment projects in a holistic and project-by-project way but has not made public any fixed criteria or standardized methodology. UNCTAD published a French-language Investment Policy Review (IPR) on Chad in July 2019 ( https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/publications/1212/investment-policy-review-of-chad ). The World Trade Organization (WTO) published a joint trade policy review for Chad, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Gabon, and Central African Republic in 2013 ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp385_e.htm ), and a standalone trade policy review for Chad in 2007 ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp275_e.htm ). The OECD has not published any investment policy reviews of Chad. Civil society groups have not shared useful reviews of investment policy-related concerns, though many Chadians at large have voiced concern about the negative effects of Chad’s onerous and lethargic tourist visa process as dissuading potential foreign investment, compared to other countries which boast inexpensive, hassle-free visas on arrival. To date, the government has shown little interest in addressing this common complaint. A Chamber of Commerce does exist, though has published little information regarding policy-related investment concerns. Foreign businesses interested in investing in or establishing an office in Chad should contact ANIE, which offers a one-stop shop for filing the legal forms needed to start a business. The process officially takes 72 hours and is the most important legal requirement for investment. ANIE’s website ( www.anie-tchad.com ) provides additional information. An easy step to facilitate business (that the government has not taken) would be completing online business registration via the Global Enterprise Registration web site ( www.GER.co ) and the Business Facilitation Program ( www.businessfacilitation.org ). The World Bank estimated in 2019 that it took, on average, 58 days to start a business in Chad. Contracts are tailored to each investment and often include additional incentives and concessions, such as permissions to import labor or agreements to work with specific local suppliers. Some contracts are confidential. Occasionally, government ministries attempt to change the terms of contracts or apply new laws broadly, even to companies that have pre-existing agreements that exempt them. Chad’s judicial system is weak, and rulings, including those relating to contract disputes, are susceptible to government interference. There is limited capacity within the judiciary to address commercial issues, including contract disputes. Frivolous lawsuits are expensive and difficult to resolve. Parties usually settle disputes directly or through arbitration provided by the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Agriculture, Mining, and Crafts (CCIAMA) or through an outside entity, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris. The GOC does not offer any programs or incentives encouraging outward investment. The GOC does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Chad implements laws to foster competition and establish clear rules based on Uniform Acts produced by the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA, Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires, www.ohada.com ). However, certain Chadian and foreign companies may encounter difficulties from well-established companies with a corner on the market, discouraging competition. Regulations and financial policies generally do not impede competition in the financial sector. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems pertaining to banking are transparent and consistent with international norms. Chad began using OHADA’s accounting system in 2002, bringing its national standards into harmony with accounting systems throughout the region. Several international accounting firms have offices in Chad. However, while accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are consistent with international norms, some local firms do not use generally accepted standards and procedures in their business practices. Chad develops forward regulatory plans to encourage foreign investment and budget support. Government ministries draft regulations, subject to approval by the Secretary General of the Government, Council of Ministers, National Assembly, and President. National regulations are most relevant to foreign investors. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. The GOC occasionally provides opportunities for local associations, such as the National Council of Employers (CNPT, Conseil National du Patronat Tchadien) or the CCIAMA to comment on proposed laws and regulations pertaining to investment. All contracts and practices are subject to legal review, which can be weak. The government publishes all budget information, including on the Ministry of Finance and Budget website. Other proposed laws and regulations are not published in draft form for public comment. The Observatory on Public Finance is an online framework for the dissemination of public finance data and the operationalization of the Code of Transparency and Good Governance. This code is an implementation of one of the six CEMAC directives on the December 2011 harmonized framework for public financial management that set 2020 as its goal for complete implementation. The Presidential Council to Improve the Business Climate was announced in 2018, met once in late 2019, and formally launched in January 2021 due to the negative impact of COVID-19 in 2020. This effort to reform Chad’s investment climate and improve Chad’s performance in World Bank assessments is still in its embryonic stage. The government has not registered Chad on UNCTAD’s website for helping governments simplify, digitize, and automate administrative procedures, www.businessfacilitation.org , despite the website’s ability to be customized for any procedure or level of government without changing any of its laws. To date, the government has not promoted or required companies environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers distinguish between the quality of potential investments. While the government publishes both its general budget and a simplified “citizen” budget to the website of the Ministry of Finance and Budget and to the Observatory on Public Finance website, it does not allow transparency into its debt obligations, including explicit and contingent liabilities. Chad has been a member of the WTO since October 19, 1996, and a member of GATT since July 12, 1963. Chad is a member of OHADA and the CEMAC ( www.cemac.int ). Since 2017, Chad is gradually implementing business and economic laws and regulations based on CEMAC standards and OHADA Uniform Acts. Chad’s banking sector is regulated by COBAC (Commission Bancaire de l’Afrique Centrale), a regional agency. Chad’s legal system and commercial law are based on the French Civil Code which gives rise to the proliferation of frivolous lawsuits and judicial abuse by corrupt authorities. The constitution recognizes customary and traditional law if it does not interfere with public order or constitutional rights. Chad’s judicial system, which often lacks access to printed versions of Chad’s own laws, rules on commercial disputes in a limited technical capacity. Courts normally award monetary judgments in local currency, although it may designate awards in foreign currencies based on the circumstances of the disputed transaction. Historically, the Chadian President appointed judges without National Assembly confirmation, and thus the judiciary may have been subject to executive influence. Following the April 2021 establishment of the Transitional Military Council, its members appointed 93 members to an interim legislative body known as the Transitional National Council (CNT). Many Chadian civil society groups criticized the CNT’s appointment, rather than popular election, as well as its makeup as disproportionately reflecting individuals aligned with former President Deby, and for resulting perceptions of a lack of neutrality. Chad’s commercial laws are based on standards promulgated by CEMAC, OHADA, and the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC, Communaute Economique des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale, http://www.ceeac-eccas.org ). The government is in the process of adopting legislation to comply fully with all these provisions. Specialized commercial tribunal courts were authorized in 1998 and operationalized in 2004. These tribunals exist in five major cities but lack adequate technical capacity to perform their duties. Firms not satisfied with judgments in these tribunals may appeal to OHADA’s regional court in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, that ensures uniformity and consistent legal interpretations across its member countries. Several Chadian companies have done so. OHADA also allows foreign companies to utilize tribunals outside of Chad, generally in Paris, France, to adjudicate business disputes. Finally, CEMAC established a regional court in N’Djamena in 2001 to hear business disputes, but this body is not widely used. Contracts and investment agreements can stipulate arbitration procedures and jurisdictions for settlement of disputes. If both parties agree, and settlements do not violate Chadian law, Chadian courts uphold the decision of the court in the nation where an agreement was signed, such as the United States. This principle also applies to disputes between foreign companies and the Chadian Government. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) can arbitrate such disputes and foreign companies frequently choose to include clauses in their contract to mandate ICC arbitration. Bilateral judicial cooperation is in effect between Chad and certain nations. Chad signed the Antananarivo Convention in 1970, covering the discharge of judicial decisions and serving of legal documents, with eleven other former French colonies (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Cote d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal). Chad has similar arrangements in place with France, Nigeria, and Sudan. The National Investment Charter encourages foreign direct investment. Chad is a member of CEMAC and OHADA. Since 2017, Chad has gradually implemented business and economic laws and regulations based on CEMAC standards and OHADA Uniform Acts. Foreign investors using the court system are not generally subject to executive interference. In addition, the OHADA Treaty allows foreign companies to utilize tribunals outside of Chad, e.g., the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris, France, to adjudicate any disputes. Companies may also access the OHADA’s court located in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. Foreign businesses interested in investing in or establishing an office in Chad should contact ANIE, which offers a one-stop shop for filing the legal forms needed to start a business. The process officially takes 72 hours and is the most important legal requirement for investment. ANIE’s website ( www.anie-tchad.com ) provides additional information. Regulation of competition is covered by the OHADA Uniform Acts that form the basis for Chadian business and economic laws and regulations. The Office of Competition in Chad’s Ministry of Industrial and Commercial Development & Private Sector Promotion reviews transactions for competition-related concerns. Chadian law protects businesses from nationalization and expropriation, except in cases where expropriation is in the public interest. There were no direct government expropriations of foreign-owned property in 2021, though the government maintains indirect expropriation measures, such as a confiscatory tax regime that boasts the third-highest corporate tax rate in the world. There are no indications that the GOC intends to directly expropriate foreign property in the near term, though foreign businesses have reported difficulty repatriating profits from Chadian bank accounts and the open-source reporting indicates that the Chadian government has demanded an extralegal multi-million dollar exit payment from a large multinational. Historically, a 1967 Land Law has prohibited since its passage the deprivation of ownership without due process, stipulating that the state may not take possession of expropriated properties until 15 days after the payment of compensation. While the government continues to work on reform of the 1967 Land Law, the May 2018 constitution (amended in December 2020), prohibited in its Article 45 the seizure of private property, except in cases of urgent public need — of which there are no known cases. The transitional government’s constitutional charter, which came into place in April 2021 upon the dissolution of Chad’s constitution by the Transitional Military Council, likewise prohibits expropriation outside the framework of the law in its Article 26, though without inclusion of “public utility” or “fair and prior compensation” that were present in the 2018 document. Chad’s bankruptcy laws are based on OHADA Uniform Acts. According to Section 3, Articles 234 – 239 of OHADA’s Uniform Insolvency Act, creditors and equity shareholders may designate trustees to lodge complaints or claims to the commercial court collectively or individually. The OHADA provisions grant Chad the discretion to apply its own sentences. 6. Financial Sector Chad’s financial system is underdeveloped. There are no capital markets or money markets in Chad. A limited number of financial instruments are available to the private sector, including letters of credit, short- and medium-term loans, foreign exchange services, and long-term savings instruments. Chad maintains an exchange system that is free from restrictions and multiple currency practices on payments and transfers for current international transactions. This includes due to any actions delegated to BEAC. Commercial banks offer credit on market terms, often at rates of 12 to 25 percent for short-term loans. Access to credit is available but is prohibitively expensive for most Chadians in the private sector. Medium-term loans are difficult to obtain, as lending criteria are rigid. Most large businesses maintain accounts with foreign banks and borrow money outside of Chad. There are ATMs in some major hotels, most neighborhoods of N’Djamena, the N’Djamena airport, and in major cities. Chad does not have a stock market and has no effective regulatory system to encourage or facilitate portfolio investments. A small regional stock exchange, known as the Central African Stock Exchange, in Libreville, Gabon, was established by CEMAC countries in 2006. Cameroon, a CEMAC member, launched its own market in 2005. Both exchanges are poorly capitalized. Chad’s banking sector is small and continues to streamline lending practices and reduce the volume of bad debt accumulated before and during the 2016-2017 economic crisis. While Chad’s banking rate remains low due to low aggregate savings and limited trust in and exposure to banks, according to the World Bank it increased from nine to 22 percent between 2009 and 2017. Chad’s four largest banks have been privatized. The former Banque Internationale pour l’Afrique au Tchad (BIAT) became a part of Togo-based Ecobank; the former Banque Tchadienne de Credit et de Depôt was re-organized as the Societe Generale Tchad; the former Financial Bank became part of Togo-based Orabank; and the former Banque de Developpement du Tchad (BDT) was reorganized as Commercial Bank Tchad (CBT), in partnership with Cameroon-based Commercial Bank of Cameroon. There are two Libyan banks in Chad, BCC (formerly Banque Libyenne) and BSCIC (Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour l’Investissement et le Commerce), along with one Nigerian bank — United Bank for Africa (UBA). In 2018, the GOC funded a new bank Banque de l’Habitat du Tchad (BHT) with the GOC as majority shareholder with 50 percent of the shares and two public companies, the National Social Insurance Fund (Caisse Nationale de Prevoyance Sociale, CNPS) and the Chadian Petroleum Company (Societe des Hydrocarbures du Tchad, SHT), each holding 25 percent. Chad, as a CEMAC member, shares a central bank with Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon — the Central African Economic Bank (BEAC, Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale), headquartered in Yaounde, Cameroon. Foreigners must establish legal residency in order to establish a bank account. The GOC does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises All Chadian SOEs operate under the umbrella of government ministries. SOE senior management reports to the minister responsible for the relevant sector, as well as a board of directors and an executive board. Historically, the president appointed members of SOE boards of directors, executive boards, and CEOs though no new appointments have happened since the April 2021 establishment of the Transitional Military Council. The boards of directors give general directives over the year, while the executive boards manage general guidelines set by the boards of directors. Some executive directors consult with their respective ministries before making business decisions. The GOC operates SOEs in several sectors, including Energy and Environmental Industries; Agribusiness; Construction, Building and Heavy Equipment; and Information and Communication. The percentage of their annual budget that SOEs allocate to research and development (R&D) is unpublished. There were no reports of discriminatory action taken by SOEs against the interests of foreign investors in 2021. Some foreign companies operated in direct competition with SOEs. Chad’s Public Tender Code (PTC) provides preferential treatment for domestic competitors, including SOEs. SOEs are not subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors and are often afforded material advantages such as preferential access to land and raw materials. SOEs receive government subsidies under the national budget, which the government does not publish. SOEs often comingle government and SOE funds, which complicates their financial picture. Chad is not a party to the Agreement on Government Procurement within the framework of the WTO. Chadian practices are not consistent with the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. (Please use DOC key words for industries in this section; list available at https://www.export.gov/industries ). Foreign investors are permitted and encouraged to participate in the privatization process. There is a public, non-discriminatory bidding process. Having a local contact in Chad to assist with the bidding process is important. To combat corruption, the GOC has recently hired private international companies to oversee the bidding process for government tenders. The Chamber of Commerce submitted a ‘white paper’ (livre blanc) in 2018 with recommendations for the GOC to facilitate and simplify private sector operations, including establishing a Business Observatory and a Presidential Council, which would implement over 70 recommendations to improve the investment climate in Chad. The Presidential Council became operational in January 2021. The GOC has expressed general willingness to privatize its generally unprofitable SOEs, including to foreign investors. As an example, in 2018, it sold a majority stake in cotton export company CotonTchad Société Nouvelle (CotonTchad SN) to the Singaporean Olam International. Qatari investors recently purchased a slaughterhouse in Moundou as well. Investors from the UAE are under talks to purchase a slaughterhouse in Farcha, though their progress has stalled. Chad is considering privatization in the following industries: Information & Communication (SOTEL Tchad) Food Processing & Packaging (the Société Tchadienne de Jus de Fruit (STJF), which produces fruit juice in Doba Agricultural Products (Société Moderne de Abbatoires (SMA), a slaughterhouse and meat packaging company in Farcha) In addition, a 2019 law opened the market for power generation to private companies, though involvement in transmission remains under the control of the state-owned Societe Nationale d’Electricite du Tchad (SNE), which is reportedly unprofitable. 10. Political and Security Environment Chad enjoyed relative political stability from 2010 to April 2021, when armed groups entered from Libya and engaged in armed hostilities with Chadian government forces following the government’s announcement of former President Idriss Déby having won a sixth term. During this incursion, Deby, who had ruled the country since 1990, was killed. A group of 15 generals called the Transitional Military Council, with former President Deby’s son Mahamat Deby at the head, dissolved Chad’s constitution and legislative National Assembly in favor of a constitutional charter and interim legislature (Transitional National Council, CNT) based on an 18-month mandate. During these 18 months, set to end in October 2022, the government plans to hold a National Dialogue in May on a range of social, economic, political, and security issues pertinent to the country to inform the drafting of a new constitution to be adopted by referendum a possible pre-election census, and parliamentary and presidential elections to return to civilian-led government. Following the creation of the transitional government, Chad has entered a period of tenuous peace as the government engages in negotiations with armed political groups over their possible terms for participation in the May National Dialogue as well as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) into Chadian society. Cross-border intercommunal violence near neighboring Darfur threatens to hamstring the prospect of a lasting peace, as do widespread frustrations over poor socio-economic conditions and impunity for excessive use of force by government security forces. Prior to July 2021, the government typically denied permits for demonstrations or suppressed them using tear gas while arresting participants and organizers. Since then, the transitional government has allowed limited protests in N’Djamena while insisting on rigid adherence to pre-approved routes with occasional use of tear gas to disperse protestors. On the other hand, state security forces outside N’Djamena repressed public demonstrations, including live ammunition that resulted in fatalities, to quell political dissent. In December 2021, in northern Chad’s city of Faya, government forces used live ammunition to disperse protestors frustrated with changes in customs procedures, reportedly resulting in one fatality. In January, in the eastern city of Abeche, government security forces violently confronted protestors frustrated with appointment of traditional official, leaving a reported 14 dead and 64 wounded. There were no reports of politically motivated damage to investment projects and/or installations in recent years, including during incursions by armed groups into Chad in 2008 and 2021. While Chad, which depends on oil for nearly 80 percent of its export revenues, has faced the stresses of an extended period of reduced oil revenues, recent increases in oil prices have begun to alleviate this issue. The COVID-19 pandemic, despite a low estimated incidence rate in Chad, strains Chad’s limited medical infrastructure, disrupts trade routes with neighboring countries, and complicates international air travel. Regional violent extremist organizations threaten regional stability and foreign investments along the Lake Chad Basin and. Armed non-governmental groups operate along the Libyan border in northern Chad. Violent attacks by Boko Haram have choked off vital trade routes with Nigeria and the road between N’Djamena and Douala, Cameroon, the principal port serving Chad. This has increased costs for imports and decreased exports. U.S. businesses and organizations in Chad are welcome to inquire at the Embassy about joining the Overseas Security Advisory Committee (OSAC). For up-to-date information on political and security conditions in Chad, please refer to the Consular Affairs Bureau’s Travel Warning and Country Specific Information at http://www.travel.state.gov. The Embassy encourages all U.S. Citizens in Chad to enroll online with the Smart Traveler Enrollment (STEP) program or with the Embassy upon arrival to receive the latest safety and security updates via email. Chile Executive Summary With the second highest GDP per capita in Latin America (behind Uruguay), Chile has historically enjoyed among the highest levels of stability and prosperity in the region. However, widespread civil unrest broke out throughout the country in 2019 in protest of the government’s handling of the economy and perceived systemic inequality. Pursuant to a political accord, Chile held a plebiscite in October 2020 in which citizens chose to redraft the constitution. Uncertainty about the outcome of the redrafting process may impact investment. Due to Chile’s solid macroeconomic policy framework, the country boasts one of the strongest sovereign bond ratings in Latin America, which has provided fiscal space for the Chilean government to respond to the economic contraction resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic through stimulus packages and other measures. As a result, Chile’s economic growth in 2021 was, according to the Central Bank’s latest estimation, between 11.5 percent and 12 percent. The same institution forecasts Chile’s economic growth in 2022 will be in the range of 1 to 2 percent due largely to the gradual elimination of COVID-19 economic stimulus programs. Chile has successfully attracted large amounts of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) despite its relatively small domestic market. The country’s market-oriented policies have created significant opportunities for foreign investors to participate in the country’s economic growth. Chile has a sound legal framework and there is general respect for private property rights. Sectors that attract significant FDI include mining, finance/insurance, energy, telecommunications, chemical manufacturing, and wholesale trade. Mineral, hydrocarbon, and fossil fuel deposits within Chilean territory are restricted from foreign ownership, but companies may enter into contracts with the government to extract these resources. Corruption exists in Chile but on a much smaller scale than in most Latin American countries, ranking 27 – along with the United States – out of 180 countries worldwide and second in Latin America in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. Although Chile is an attractive destination for foreign investment, challenges remain. Legislative and constitutional reforms proposed in response to the social unrest and the pandemic have generated concerns about the future government policies on property rights, rule of law, tax structure, the role of government in the economy, and many other issues. Importantly, the legislation enabling the constitutional reform process requires that the new constitution must respect Chile’s character as a democratic republic, its judicial sentences, and its international treaties (including the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement). Despite a general respect for intellectual property (IP) rights, Chile has not fully complied with its IP obligations set forth in the U.S.-Chile FTA and remains on the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report for not adequately enforcing IP rights. Environmental permitting processes, indigenous consultation requirements, and cumbersome court proceedings have made large project approvals increasingly time consuming and unpredictable, especially in cases with political sensitivities. The current administration has stated its willingness to continue attracting foreign investment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 27 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 53 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country (US$ billion, historical stock positions) 2020 23.0 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita (US$) 2020 13,470 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Historically and for more than four decades, promoting FDI has been an essential part of the Chilean government’s national development strategy. The country’s market-oriented economic policy creates significant opportunities for foreign investors to participate. Laws and practices are not discriminatory against foreign investors, who receive treatment similar to Chilean nationals. Chile’s business climate is generally straightforward and transparent, and its policy framework has remained consistent despite developments such as civil unrest in 2019 and the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the permitting process for infrastructure, mining, and energy projects is contentious, especially regarding politically sensitive environmental impact assessments, water rights issues, and indigenous consultations. In July 2021, Chile began a constitutional reform process that is expected to produce a new constitution by July that Chileans will vote on whether to enact in September. Key issues under discussion through the Constitutional Assembly process include the political structure of the country, water rights, mining rights, environmental regulation, and the status of indigenous communities. InvestChile is the government agency in charge of facilitating the entry and retention of FDI into Chile. It provides services related to investment attraction (information about investment opportunities); pre-investment (sector-specific advisory services, including legal); landing (access to certificates, funds and networks); and after-care (including assistance for exporting and re-investment). Regarding government-investor dialogue, in May 2018, the Ministry of Economy created the Sustainable Projects Management Office (GPS). This agency provides support to investment projects, both domestic and foreign, serving as a first point of contact with the government and coordinating with different agencies in charge of evaluating investment projects, which aims to help resolve issues that emerge during the permitting process. Foreign investors have access to all productive activities, except for the domestic maritime freight sector, in which foreign ownership of companies is capped at 49 percent. Maritime transportation between Chilean ports is open since 2019 to foreign cruise vessels with more than 400 passengers. Some international reciprocity restrictions exist for fishing. Most enterprises in Chile may be 100 percent owned by foreigners. Chile only restricts the right to private ownership or establishment in what it defines as certain “strategic” sectors, such as nuclear energy and mining. The current Constitution establishes the “absolute, exclusive, inalienable and permanent domain” of the Chilean state over all mineral, hydrocarbon, and fossil fuel deposits within Chilean territory. However, Chilean law allows the government to grant concession rights and lease agreements to individuals and companies for exploration and exploitation activities, and to assign contracts to private investors, without discrimination against foreign investors. The Constitutional Assembly is reviewing proposals that if enacted could affect mining operations of foreign investors. Chile has not implemented an investment screening mechanism to protect key national security priorities. FDI is subject to pro forma screening by InvestChile. Businesses in general do not consider these screening mechanisms as barriers to investment because approval procedures are expeditious, and investments are usually approved. Some transactions require an anti-trust review by the office of the national economic prosecutor (Fiscalía Nacional Económica) and possibly by sector-specific regulators. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has not conducted a Trade Policy Review for Chile since June 2015 (available here: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp415_e.htm ). The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has not conducted an Investment Policy Review for Chile since 1997 (available here: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/34384328.pdf ), and the country is not part of the countries covered to date by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) Investment Policy Reviews. The Chilean government took significant steps towards business facilitation during the past decade. Starting in 2018, the government introduced updated electronic and online systems for providing some tax information, complaints related to contract enforcement, and online registration of closed corporations (non-public corporations). In June 2019, the Ministry of Economy launched the Unified System for Permits (SUPER), a new online single-window platform that brings together 182 license and permit procedures, simplifying the process of obtaining permits for investment projects. According to the World Bank, Chile has one of the shortest and smoothest processes among Latin American and Caribbean countries – 11 procedures and 29 days – to establish a foreign-owned limited liability company (LLC). Drafting statutes of a company and obtaining an authorization number can be done online at the platform HYPERLINK hError! Hyperlink reference not valid.. Electronic signature and invoicing allow foreign investors to register a company, obtain a tax payer ID number and get legal receipts, invoices, credit and debit notes, and accountant registries. A company typically needs to register with Chile’s Internal Revenue Service, obtain a business license from a municipality, and register either with the Institute of Occupational Safety (public) or with one of three private nonprofit entities that provide work-related accident insurance, which is mandatory for employers. In addition to the steps required of a domestic company, a foreign company establishing a subsidiary in Chile must authenticate the parent company’s documents abroad and register the incoming capital with the Central Bank. This procedure, established under Chapter XIV of the Foreign Exchange Regulations, requires a notice of conversion of foreign currency into Chilean pesos when the investment exceeds $10,000. The registration process at the Registry of Commerce of Santiago is available online. The Government of Chile does not have an active policy of promotion or incentives for outward investment, nor does it impose restrictions on it. 3. Legal Regime Chile’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and provide clear rules for competition and a level playing field for foreigners. They are consistent with international norms; however, environmental regulations – which include mandatory indigenous consultation required by the International Labor Organization’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (ILO 169) – and other permitting processes have become lengthy and unpredictable, especially in politically sensitive cases. Chile does not have a regulatory oversight body. Four institutions play key roles in the rule-making process: The General-Secretariat of the Presidency (SEGPRES), the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy, and the General Comptroller of the Republic. Most regulations come from the national government; however, some, in particular those related to land use, are decided at the local level. Both national and local governments are involved in the issuance of environmental permits. Regulatory processes are managed by governmental entities. NGOs and private sector associations may participate in public hearings or comment periods. In Chile, non-listed companies follow norms issued by the Accountants Professional Association, while publicly listed companies use the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Since January 2018, IFRS 9 entered into force for companies in all sectors except for banking, in which IFRS 15 will be applied. IFRS 16 entered into force in January 2019. On January 1, 2022, Chile’s Financial Market Commission (CMF) began implementation of the IFRS 17 accounting standards in the Chilean insurance market. The legislation process in Chile allows for public hearings during discussion of draft bills in both chambers of Congress. Draft bills submitted by the Executive Branch to the Congress are readily available for public comment. Ministries and regulatory agencies are required by law to give notice of proposed regulations, but there is no formal requirement in Chile for consultation with the general public, conducting regulatory impact assessments of proposed regulations, requesting comments, or reporting results of consultations. For lower-level regulations or norms that do not need congressional approval, there are no formal provisions for public hearing or comment. As a result, Chilean regulators and rulemaking bodies normally consult with stakeholders, but in a less formal manner. All decrees and laws are published in the Diario Oficial (roughly similar to the Federal Register in the United States), but other types of regulations will not necessarily be found there. There are no other centralized online locations where regulations in Chile are published. According to the OECD, compliance rates in Chile are generally high. The approach to enforcement remains punitive rather than preventive, and regulators still prefer to inspect rather than collaborate with regulated entities on fostering compliance. Each institution with regulation enforcement responsibilities has its own sanction procedures. Law 19.880 from 2003 establishes the principles for reversal and hierarchical recourse against decisions by the administration. An administrative act can be challenged by lodging an action in the ordinary courts of justice, or by administrative means with a petition to the Comptroller General of the Republic. Affected parties may also make a formal appeal to the Constitutional Court against a specific regulation. Chile still lacks a comprehensive, “whole of government” regulatory reform program. The OECD’s April 2016 “Regulatory Policy in Chile” report asserts that Chile took steps to improve its rule-making process, but still lags behind the OECD average in assessing the impact of regulations, consulting with outside parties on their design and evaluating them over time. The World Bank´s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance project finds that Chile is not part of the countries that have improved their regulatory governance framework since 2017. Chile’s level of fiscal transparency is excellent. Information on the budget and debt obligations, including explicit and contingent liabilities, is easily accessible online. Chile does not share regulatory sovereignty with any regional economic bloc. However, several international norms or standards from multilateral organizations (UN, WIPO, ILO, among others) are referenced or incorporated into the country’s regulatory system. As a member of the WTO, the Chile notifies draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Chile’s legal system is based on civil law. Chile’s legal and regulatory framework provides for effective means for enforcing property and contractual rights. Laws governing issues of interest to foreign investors are found in several statutes, including the Commercial Code of 1868, the Civil Code, the Labor Code and the General Banking Act. Chile has specialized courts for dealing with tax and labor issues. The judicial system in Chile is generally transparent and independent. The likelihood of government intervention in court cases is low. If a state-owned firm is involved in the dispute, the Government of Chile may become directly involved through the State Defense Council, which represents the government interests in litigation cases related to expropriations. Regulations can be challenged before the court system, the National Comptroller, or the Constitutional Court, depending on the nature of the claim. Law 20,848 of 2015, established a new framework for foreign investment in Chile and created the Agency for the Promotion of Foreign Investment (APIE), successor to the former Foreign Investment Committee and which also acts under the name of “InvestChile.” The InvestChile website provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. For more on FDI regulations and services for foreign investors, see the section on Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment. Chile’s anti-trust law prohibits mergers or acquisitions that would prevent free competition in the industry at issue. An investor may voluntarily seek a ruling by an Anti-trust Court that a planned investment would not have competition implications. The national economic prosecutor (FNE) is an active institution in conducting investigations for competition-related cases and filing complaints before the Free Competition Tribunal (TDLC), which rules on those cases. In January and March 2021, the TDLC approved two extra-judicial settlements between the FNE and Nestle, after the company faced two cases of anti-competitive clauses in the contracts with fresh milk producers. The settlement included a US$ 1.8 million payment from Nestle. On the other hand, in April 2021, the FNE cleared Nestle´s acquisition of Chilean premium chocolate maker La Fete, after finding that the two companies serve different market segments. In March 2021, the FNE cleared Chinese state-owned enterprise State Grid International Development Limited’s (SGIDL) acquisition of Chilean energy company Compañia General de Electricidad (CGE). In September 2020, the FNE imposed fines amounting to US$ 4.1 million on the Walt Disney Company and its subsidiary TWDC Enterprises 18 Corp. for failing to provide accurate information to adopt adequate mitigation measures during the approval process for its acquisition of Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. In June 2021, the TDLC approved the payment of a US$ 220,000 fine for the second charge, while the investigation for the main charge remains ongoing. In October 2021, the TDLC approved remedies agreed upon by Delta and LATAM airlines with the FNE to mitigate the risks to competition arising from Delta’s acquisition of a 20% minority stake in LATAM’s share capital, along with a joint venture and code share agreements for direct routes between the United States and Canada and between certain South American countries with the United States. In October 2021, the FNE presented a collusion case against the three main securities transport companies that operate in Chile -Brink’s Chile S.A., Prosegur and Loomis-, for having entered into an agreement to fix the prices of its services between 2017 and 2018. The FNE asked the TDLC to apply fines amounting to US$ 63.4 million against the firms (US$30.5 million for Brink’s Chile S.A., US$25.8 million for Prosegur and US$6.4 million for Loomis), as well as fines between US$ 88,000 and US$ 135,000 against the general managers and the regional heads who were in charge of the Chile offices. Chilean law grants the government authority to expropriate property, including property of foreign investors, only on public interest or national interest grounds, on a non-discriminatory basis and in accordance with due process. The government has not nationalized a private firm since 1973. Expropriations of private land take place in a transparent manner, and typically only when the purpose is to build roads or other types of infrastructure. The law requires the payment of immediate compensation at fair market value, in addition to any applicable interest. Chile’s Insolvency Law from 1982 was updated in October 2014. The current law aims to clarify and simplify liquidation and reorganization procedures for businesses to prevent criminalizing bankruptcy. It also established the new Superintendence of Insolvency and created specialized insolvency courts. The new insolvency law requires creditors’ approval to select the insolvency representative and to sell debtors’ substantial assets. The creditor also has the right to object to decisions accepting or rejecting creditors’ claims. However, the creditor cannot request information from the insolvency representative. The creditor may file for insolvency of the debtor, but for liquidation purposes only. The creditors are divided into classes for the purposes of voting on the reorganization plan; each class votes separately, and creditors in the same class are treated equally. 6. Financial Sector Chile’s authorities are committed to developing capital markets and keeping them open to foreign portfolio investors. Foreign firms offer services in Chile in areas such as financial information, data processing, financial advisory services, portfolio management, voluntary saving plans and pension funds. Under the U.S.-Chile FTA, Chile opened up significantly its insurance sector, with very limited exceptions. The Santiago Stock Exchange is Chile’s dominant stock exchange, and the third largest in Latin America. However, when compared to other OECD countries, it has lower market liquidity. Existing policies facilitate the free flow of financial resources into Chile’s product and factor markets and adjustment to external shocks in a commodity export-dependent economy. Chile accepted the obligations of Article VIII (sections 2, 3 and 4) and maintains a free-floating exchange rate system, free of restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms and its various instruments are available to foreigners. The Central Bank reserves the right to restrict foreign investors’ access to internal credit if a credit shortage exists. To date, this authority has not been exercised. Nearly one fourth of Chileans have a credit card from a bank and nearly one third have a non-bank credit card, but less than 20 percent have a checking account. However, financial inclusion is higher than banking penetration: a large number of lower-income Chilean residents have a CuentaRut, which is a commission-free card with an electronic account available for all, launched by the state-owned Banco Estado, also the largest provider of microcredit in Chile. The Chilean banking system is healthy and competitive, and many Chilean banks already meet Basel III standards. The new General Banking Act (LGB), published in January 2019, defined general guidelines for establishing a capital adequacy system in line with Basel standards, and gave the CMF the authority to establish the capital framework. All Basel III regulations were published in December 2020, and the CMF started the implementation process of Basel III requirements to last to December 1, 2025. The system’s liquidity position (Liquidity Coverage Ratio) remains above regulatory limits (70%). Capital adequacy ratio of the system equaled 14.9 percent as of December 2021 and remains robust even when including discounts due to market and/or operational risks. Non-performing loans decreased after August 2020 due to government relief measures for households, including legislation authorizing two rounds of withdrawals from pension accounts. As of January 2022, non-performing loans equaled 1.26 percent compared to 1.54 percent as of January 2021) when measured by the standard 90 days past due criterion. As of November 2021, the total assets of the Chilean banking system amounted to US$ 428.6 billion, according to the Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions. The largest six banks (Banco de Crédito e Inversiones, Banco Santander-Chile, Banco Estado, Banco de Chile, Scotiabank Chile and Itaú-Corpbanca) accounted for 88 percent of the system’s assets. Chile’s Central Bank conducts the country’s monetary policy, is constitutionally autonomous from the government, and is not subject to regulation by the Superintendence of Banks. Foreign banks have an important presence in Chile, comprising three out of the six largest banks of the system. Out of 17 banks currently in Chile, five are foreign-owned but legally established banks in Chile and four are branches of foreign banks. Both categories are subject to the requirements set out under the Chilean banking law. There are also 21 representative offices of foreign banks in Chile. There are no reports of correspondent banking relationships withdrawal in Chile. In order to open a bank account in Chile, a foreigner must present his/her Chilean ID Card or passport, Chilean tax ID number, proof of address, proof of income/solvency, photo, and fingerprints. The Government of Chile maintains two sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) built with savings from years with fiscal surpluses. The Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (FEES) was established in 2007 and was valued at US$ 6.4 billion as of January 2022. The purpose of the FEES is to fund public debt payments and temporary deficit spending, in order to keep a countercyclical fiscal policy. The Pensions Reserve Fund (FRP) was built up in 2006 and amounted to US$ 7.2 billion as of January 2022. The purpose of the FRP is to anticipate future needs of payments to those eligible to receive pensions, but whose contributions to the private pension system fall below a minimum threshold. Chile is a member of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) and adheres to the Santiago Principles. Chile’s government policy is to invest SWFs entirely abroad into instruments denominated in foreign currencies, including sovereign bonds and related instruments, corporate and high-yield bonds, mortgage-backed securities from U.S. agencies, and stocks. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Chile had 28 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in operation as of 2020. Twenty-seven SOEs are commercial companies and the newest one (FOINSA) is an infrastructure fund that was created to facilitate public-private partnership projects. 25 SOEs are not listed and are fully owned by the government, while the remaining three are majority government owned. Ten Chilean SOEs operate in the port management sector, six in the services sector, three in the defense sector, three in the mining sector (including CODELCO, the world’s largest copper producer, and ENAP, an oil and gas company), two in transportation, one in the water sector, one is a TV station, and one is a state-owned bank (Banco Estado). The state holds a minority stake in four water companies as a result of a privatization process. In 2020, total assets of Chilean SOEs amounted to US$ 89.3 billion, while their total net income was US$ 833.7 million. SOEs employed 47,225 people in 2020. Twenty SOEs in Chile fall under the supervision of the Public Enterprises System (SEP), a state holding in charge of overseeing SOE governance. The rest – including the largest SOEs such as CODELCO, ENAP and Banco Estado – have their own governance and report to government ministries. Allocation of seats on the boards of Chilean SOEs is determined by the SEP, as described above, or outlined by the laws that regulate them. In CODELCO’s corporate governance, there is a mix between seats appointed by recommendation from an independent high-level civil service committee, and seats allocated by political authorities in the government. A list of SOEs made by the Budget Directorate, including their financial management information, is available in the following link: http://www.dipres.gob.cl/599/w3-propertyvalue-20890.html. In general, Chilean SOEs work under hard budget constraints and compete under the same regulatory and tax frameworks as private firms. The exception is ENAP, which is the only company allowed to refine oil in Chile. As an OECD member, Chile adheres to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. Chile does not have a privatization program. 10. Political and Security Environment Pursuant to a political accord in response to the 2019 civil unrest, Chile held a plebiscite in October 2020 in which citizens voted to draft a new constitution. The process to create and ratify the new constitution launched on July 4, 2021 and will continue to mid-2022. Uncertainty over what changes could be made to Chile’s political and regulatory environment could negatively impact investor confidence. Importantly, the legislation enabling the constitutional reform process requires that the new constitution must respect Chile’s character as a democratic republic, its judicial sentences, and its international treaties (including the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement). Prior to 2019, there were generally few incidents of politically motivated attacks on investment projects or installations with the exception of the southern Araucania region and its neighboring Arauco province in the southwest of Bio-Bio region. This area, home to nearly half a million indigenous inhabitants, has seen an ongoing trend of politically motivated violence and organized criminal activity. Land claims and conflicts with forestry companies are the main grievances underneath the radicalization of a relatively small number of indigenous Mapuche communities, which has led to the rise of organized groups that pursue their demands by violent means. Incidents include arson attacks on churches, farms, forestry plantations, forestry contractors’ machinery and vehicles, and private vehicles, as well as occupation of private lands, resulting in over a half-dozen deaths (including some by police forces), injuries, and damage to property. The indigenous issue has been further politicized due to anger among landowners, forestry transport contractors, and farmers affected by violence, as well as the illegal killing of a young Mapuche activist by special police forces in 2018 and the controversy over accusations of fraud by the police during the investigation of indigenous organized groups. In March 2020, a truck driver died in an arson attack on his vehicle. Since 2007, Chile has experienced a number of small-scale attacks with explosive and incendiary devices, targeting mostly banks, police stations, and public spaces throughout Santiago, including metro stations, universities, and churches. ATMs have been blown up in the late evenings or early mornings. Anarchist groups often claim responsibility for these acts, as well as violent incidents during student and labor protests. In January 2017, an eco-terrorist group claimed responsibility for a parcel bomb that detonated at the home of the chairman of the board of Chilean state-owned mining giant CODELCO. The same group detonated a bomb of similar characteristics in 2019 at a bus stop in downtown Santiago, causing five injuries, and sent a letter bomb to the office of the president of the Metro system, which was defused by police. One suspect was arrested in 2019 and the investigation of the crimes is ongoing. Another group sent package bombs to a police station in the Santiago metro area, wounding 8 police officers, and to a former Interior Minister, which was defused by police. Two suspects were arrested in 2020, and the investigation remains ongoing at the time of this report. Then-President Piñera announced a 15-day State of Emergency in October 2021 in four southern provinces in the Araucania and Biobio regions. Piñera emphasized the State of Emergency was intended to combat drug trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime. The enactment of the State of Emergency placed the respective zones under a military authority designated by the president and empowered the armed forces to support law enforcement functions, prohibit public gatherings, and control the entry and exit of people in the four provinces, which have large populations of indigenous Mapuche among its 1.6 million residents. Congress authorized multiple extensions to the State of Emergency until March 26. On March 15, the Minister of Interior traveled to the Araucania region to initiate dialogue on the conflict between indigenous Mapuche communities and the Chilean government, however, armed gunmen prevented the minister from entering the community of Temucuicui. The State of Emergency lapsed on March 26 after the Boric government decided not to seek an extension from Congress. While the security environment is generally safe, street crime, carjackings, telephone scams, and residential break-ins are common, especially in larger cities. Vehicle thefts are a serious problem in Valparaiso and northern Chile (from Iquique to Arica). On occasion, illegal activity by striking workers resulted in damage to corporate property or a disruption of operations. Some firms have publicly expressed concern that during a contentious strike, law enforcement has appeared to be reluctant to protect private property. After a truck driver died in Antofagasta February 10 following an altercation with irregular immigrants from Venezuela, federations of northern truck drivers created road blockages and supply-chain disruptions to demand the Piñera administration implement increased safety measures. On February 14, the government initiated a State of Emergency in provinces along Chile’s northern border with Bolivia and Peru, sending soldiers to support law enforcement efforts. The State of Emergency is set to expire on April 15. Chilean civil society is active and demonstrations occur frequently. Although the vast majority of demonstrations are peaceful, criminal elements have taken advantage of civil society protests to loot stores along the protest route and clash with the police. Annual demonstrations to mark March 29, the Day of the Young Combatant; September 11, the anniversary of the 1973 coup against the government of President Salvador Allende; and October 18, the anniversary of the outbreak of the 2019 civil unrest, have resulted in damage to property, looting, and scuffles between police and protesters. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M US$) 2020 $252.9 2020 $252.940 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country (US$ billion, stock positions) 2020 $31.84 2020 23.01 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States (US$ billion, stock positions) 2020 $12.9 2019 3.0 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 109.9% 2020 41.4% OECD data available at https://data.oecd.org/ * Source for Host Country Data: Central Bank of Chile. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 188,885 100% Total Outward 71,705 100% Canada 30,592 13.6% Brazil 13,102 16.5% United States 28,994 13.5% United States 10,095 9.9% Spain 21,451 13.5% Peru 10,043 9.2% The Netherlands 19,526 8.1% Colombia 6,734 7.1% United Kingdom 15,740 7.4% Argentina 5,291 7.0% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- US$ 500,000. According to the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS), total stock of FDI in Chile in 2020 amounted to US$ 188.9 billion, compared to US$ 254.3 billion in 2019. Canada, the United States and Spain are the main sources of FDI to Chile with US$ 30.6 billion, US$ 29.0 billion and US$ 21.5 billion, respectively, concentrating 42.9 percent of the total. Chile’s outward direct investment stock in 2020 amounted to US$ 188.9 billion, compared to US$ 71.7 billion in 2020, a significant decrease compared to US$ 130.2 billion in 2019. It remains concentrated in South America, where Brazil, Peru, Colombia and Argentina together represented 49 percent of total Chilean outward FDI. The United States accounted for 14.1 percent of the total, an increase compared to 2019 when it represented 9.2 percent of the total. The data below is consistent with host country statistics. Although not included in the table below, tax havens are relevant destinations of outward FDI to Chile, with the British Virgin Islands, Panama, Luxembourg, and Cayman Islands ranking sixth, seventh, ninth and tenth in inbound sources of FDI, respectively, according to the Central Bank of Chile. The Cayman Islands and Bermuda rank sixth and seventh and tenth, respectively, among Chile´s main inward FDI source. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment According to the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), total stock of portfolio investment in Chile as of June 2021 amounted to US$ 200.4 billion, of which US$ 164.6 billion were equity and investment funds shares, and the rest were debt securities. The United States and Luxembourg (a tax haven) were the main sources of portfolio investment to Chile with US $71.3 billion and $54.9 billion, representing 35.6 percent and 27.4 percent of the total, respectively. Both countries also represent 65 percent of the total of equity investment. Ireland, the United Kingdom and Germany are the following top sources of equity portfolio investment to Chile, while the United States, Mexico and Japan are the top sources of debt securities investment. China Executive Summary In 2021, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was the number two global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) destination, behind the United States. As the world’s second-largest economy, with a large consumer base and integrated supply chains, China’s economic recovery following COVID-19 reassured investors and contributed to high FDI and portfolio investments. The PRC implemented major legislation in 2021, including the Data Security Law in September and the Personal Information Protection Law in November. China remains a relatively restrictive investment environment for foreign investors due to restrictions in key sectors and regulatory uncertainties. Obstacles include ownership caps and requirements to form joint venture (JV) partnerships with local firms, industrial policies to develop indigenous capacity or technological self-sufficiency, and pressures to transfer technology as a prerequisite to gaining market access. New data and financial rules announced in 2021 also created significant uncertainty surrounding the financial regulatory environment. The PRC’s pandemic-related visa and travel restrictions significantly affected foreign businesses operations, increasing labor and input costs. An assertive Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and emphasis on national companies and self-reliance has heightened foreign investors’ concerns about the pace of economic reforms. Key developments in 2021 included: The Rules for Security Reviews on Foreign Investments came into effect January 18, expanding PRC vetting of foreign investment that may affect national security. The National People’s Congress (NPC) adopted the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law on June 10. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) issued draft revisions to its Cybersecurity Review Measures to broaden PRC approval authority over PRC companies’ overseas listings on July 10. China formally applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) on September 16. On November 1, the Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) went into effect and China formally applied to join the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA). On December 23, President Biden signed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. The law prohibits importing goods into the United States that are mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part with forced labor in the PRC, especially from Xinjiang. On December 27, the National Reform and Development Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) updated its foreign FDI investment “negative lists.” While PRC pronouncements of greater market access and fair treatment of foreign investment are welcome, details and effective implementation are needed to ensure equitable treatment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 66 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 12 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 123.8 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 10,550 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment FDI has played an essential role in China’s economic development. Though the PRC remains a relatively restrictive environment for foreign investors, PRC government officials tout openness to FDI, promising market access expansion and non-discriminatory, “national treatment” for foreign enterprises through improvements to the business environment. They also have made efforts to strengthen China’s regulatory framework to enhance market-based competition. MOFCOM reported FDI flows grew by about 15 percent year-on-year, reaching USD 173 billion, however, foreign businesses continue to express concerns over China’s pandemic restrictions. In 2021, U.S. businesses’ concerns with China’s COVID-19 restrictive travel restrictions were at the top of the agenda, along with concerns over PRC’s excessive cyber security and data-related requirements, preferential treatment for domestic companies – including state-owned enterprises – under various industrial policies, preference for domestic technologies and products in the procurement process, an opaque regulatory system, and inconsistent application of laws protecting intellectual property rights (IPR). U.S.-China geopolitical tensions were also cited as a significant concern. See the following: American Chamber of Commerce China 2021 American Business in China White Paper American Chamber of Commerce China 2021 Business Climate Survey U.S.-China Business Council’s 2021 China Business Environment Member Survey China’s International Investment Promotion Agency (CIPA), under MOFCOM, oversees attracting foreign investment and promoting China’s overseas investment. Duties include implementing overseas investment policy; guiding domestic sub-national and international investment promotion agencies; promoting investment in industrial parks at the national, subnational, and cross-border level; organizing trainings in China and abroad for overseas investment projects; and, engaging international and multilateral economic organizations, foreign investment promotion agencies, chambers of commerce, and business associations. The agency has offices worldwide, including CIPA Europe in Hungary, CIPA Germany, and a representative office in the Hague to promote investment in the Benelux area. CIPA maintains an “Invest in China” website which lists laws, regulations, and rules relevant to foreign investors. The China Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investments (CAEFI) is a non-profit organization overseen by MOFCOM. The association and corresponding provincial institutions have hotlines to receive foreign investor complaints. Entry into China’s market is regulated by the country’s “negative lists,” which identify the sectors in which foreign investment is restricted or prohibited, and a catalogue for encouraged foreign investment, which identifies the sectors and locations (often less developed regions) in which the government encourages investment. The Special Administrative Measures for Foreign Investment Access to Pilot Free Trade Zones (the “FTZ Negative List”) applies to China’s 20 FTZs and one free trade port. The Special Administrative Measures for Foreign Investment Access (̈the “Nationwide Negative List”) came into effect on January 1, 2022. The Industry Catalogue for Encouraged Foreign Investment (released December 27, 2020) encourages FDI inflows to key sectors, in particular semiconductors and other high-tech industries. The Industrial Catalogue for Encouraged Foreign Investment in Western Region. The “encouraged list” is subdivided into a cross-sector nationwide catalogue and a separate catalogue for western and central regions, China’s least developed regions. In restricted industries, foreign investors face equity caps or JV requirements to ensure control by a PRC national and enterprise. Due to these requirements, foreign investors that wish to participate in China’s market must enter partnerships, which sometimes require transfer of technology. However, even in “open” sectors, a variety of factors, including ability to access local government officials and preferences, enhanced ability to impact local rules and standards, perceptions of better understanding of the PRC market, and access to procurement opportunities, led many foreign companies to rely on the JV structure to operate in the PRC market. Below are a few examples of industries where investment restrictions apply: Preschool to higher education institutes require a PRC partner with a dominant role. Establishment of clinical trials for new drugs require a PRC partner who holds the IPR tied to data drawn from the clinical research. Examples of foreign investment sectors requiring PRC majority stake include: Radio/television market survey. Basic telecommunication services outside free trade zones. The 2021 negative lists made minor modifications to some industries, reducing the number of restrictions and prohibitions from 33 to 31 in the nationwide negative list, and from 30 to 27 in China’s pilot FTZs. Notable changes included openings in the automotive and satellite television broadcasting manufacturing sectors. Sectors that remain closed to foreign investment include rare earths, film production and distribution, and tobacco products. However, the government continues to constrain foreign investors in a myriad of ways beyond caps on ownerships. For instance, in the pharmaceutical sector, while JV requirements were eliminated in the 1990s, foreign companies must partner with local PRC institutions for clinical trials. Other requirements that place undue burden on foreign investors include but are not limited to: applying higher standards for quality-related testing, prohibitions on foreign parties in JVs conducting certain business activities, challenges in obtaining licenses and permits, mandatory intellectual property sharing related to certain biological material, and other implicit and explicit downstream regulatory approval barriers. The negative list regulating pilot FTZ zones will lift all barriers to foreign investment in all manufacturing sectors, widen foreign investor access to some service sectors, and allow foreign investment into the radio and TV-based market research sector. For the market research sector, caveats include a 33 percent foreign investor ownership cap and PRC citizenship requirements for legal representatives. While U.S. businesses welcomed market openings, foreign investors remained underwhelmed by the PRC’s lack of ambition and refusal to provide more significant liberalization. Foreign investors noted the automotive sector openings were inconsequential since the more lucrative electric vehicle (EV) sector was opened to foreign investors in 2018, whereas the conventional auto sector is saturated. Foreign investors cited this was in line with the government announcing liberalization mainly in industries that domestic PRC companies already dominate. In addition to the PRC’s system for managing foreign investments, MOFCOM and NDRC also maintain a system for managing which segments of the economy are open to non-state-owned investors. The most recent Market Access Negative List was issued on December 10, 2020. The Measures for Security Reviews on Foreign Investments came into effect January 18, 2021, revising the PRC’s framework for vetting foreign investments that could affect national security. The NDRC and the Ministry of Commerce will administer the new measures which establish a mechanism for reviewing investment activities across a range of sectors perceived to implicate PRC national security, including agriculture, energy and resources, cultural products, and more. China is not a member of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), but the OECD Council established a country program of dialogue and co-operation with China in October 1995. The OECD completed its most recent investment policy review for China in 2022. OECD 2022 Report China’s 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) boosted its economic growth and advanced its legal and governmental reforms. The WTO completed its most recent trade policy review for China in 2021, highlighting FDI grew at a slower pace than in previous periods but remains a major driver of global growth and a key market for multinational companies. WTO Trade Policy Review for China USTR 2021 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance International Monetary Fund (IMF) information on China Created in 2018, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) is responsible for business registration processes. Under SAMR’s registration system, parties are required to report when they (1) establish a Foreign Invested Enterprise (FIE); (2) establish a representative office in China; (3) acquire stocks, shares, assets or other similar equity of a domestic China-based company; (4) re-invest and establish subsidiaries in China; and (5) invest in new projects. Foreign companies still report challenges setting up a business relative to their PRC competitors. Many companies offer consulting, legal, and accounting services for establishing operations in China. Investors should review their options carefully with an experienced advisor before investing. Invest in China The State Council Information on Doing Business in China Filing a Complaint as a Foreign Company Nationwide Government Service Platform Since 2001, China has pursued a “going-out” investment policy. At first, the PRC encouraged SOEs to invest overseas, but in recent years, China’s overseas investments have diversified with both state and private enterprises investing in nearly all industries and economic sectors. China remains a major global investor and in 2021, total outbound direct investment (ODI) increased for the first time in four years to reach $153.7 billion, a 12 percent increase year-on-year, according to the 2020 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment . China’s government created “encouraged,” “restricted,” and “prohibited” outbound investment categories to suppress significant capital outflow pressure in 2016 and to guide PRC investors to more “strategic sectors.” The Sensitive Industrial-Specified Catalogue of 2018 further restricted outbound investment in sectors like property, cinemas, sports teams, and non-entity investment platforms and encouraged outbound investment in sectors that supported PRC national objectives by acquiring advanced manufacturing and high-tech assets. PRC firms involved in sectors cited as priorities in the Strategic Emerging Industries, New Infrastructure Initiative, and MIC 2025 often receive preferential government financing and subsidies for outbound investment. In 2006, the PRC established the Qualified (QDII) program to channel domestic funds into offshore assets through financial institutions. While the quota tied to this program has fluctuated over the years based on capital flight concerns, in 2021 the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) approved new quotas for 17 institutions under the program to allow a potential $147.3 billion in outbound investment. In 2013, the PRC government established a pilot program allowing global asset management companies more opportunities to raise RMB-denominated funds from high net-worth PRC-based individuals and institutional investors to invest overseas. These programs include the Qualified Domestic Limited Partnership (QDLP) pilot program and the Shenzhen-specific Qualified Domestic Investment Entity (QDIE) program. In 2021, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and SAFE expanded the pilot areas to at least seven jurisdictions and quotas for the QDLP to $10 billion, respectively. In April, the Shenzhen Financial Regulatory Bureau amended the Administrative Measures of Shenzhen for Implementation of the Pilot Program for Overseas Investment by Qualified Domestic Investors (“Shenzhen QDIE Measures”) to include investments in the securities market that aligns it with the QLDP program. 3. Legal Regime One of China’s WTO accession commitments was to establish an official journal dedicated to the publication of laws, regulations, and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, trade related aspects of IPR (TRIPS), and the control of foreign exchange. Despite mandatory 30-day public comment periods, PRC ministries continue to post only some draft administrative regulations and departmental rules online, often with a public comment period of less than 30 days. As part of the Phase One Agreement, China committed to providing at least 45 days for public comment on all proposed laws, regulations, and other measures implementing the Phase One Agreement. While China has made some progress, U.S. businesses operating in China consistently cite arbitrary legal enforcement and the lack of regulatory transparency among the top challenges of doing business in China. In China’s state-dominated economic system, the relationships between the CCP, the PRC government, PRC business (state- and private-owned), and other PRC stakeholders are blurred. Foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) perceive that China prioritizes political goals, industrial policies, and a desire to protect social stability at the expense of foreign investors, fairness, and the rule of law. The World Bank Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance gave China a composite score of 1.75 out 5 points, attributing China’s relatively low score to stakeholders not having easily accessible and updated laws and regulations; the lack of impact assessments conducted prior to issuing new laws; and other concerns about transparency. For accounting standards, PRC companies use the Chinese Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBE) for all financial reporting within mainland China. Companies listed overseas or in Hong Kong may choose to use ASBE, the International Financial Reporting Standards, or Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards. While the government of China made many policy announcements in 2021 that will provide impetus to ESG reporting, stock exchanges on mainland China (not including Hong Kong) have not made ESG reporting mandatory. For instance, currently eighteen PRC companies are signatories to the UN Principles for Responsible Investment. While the PRC government did announce its green finance taxonomy known as China’s “Catalogue of Green Bond Supported Projects”, experts cited the taxonomy lacks mandatory reporting and verification. On November 4, the People’s Bank of China and the European Commission also jointly launched a sustainable finance taxonomy to create comparable standards on green finance products. Mainland ESG efforts were also primarily focused on environmental and social impact-related, and less so on governance-related reporting. China’s goal to peak carbon emissions before 2030 and reach carbon neutrality by 2060 will drive reporting on decarbonization plans and targets and could increase alignment with international standards such as those outlined in the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) recommendations. The PRC government also incorporated non-mandatory ESG-like principles into overseas development initiatives such as its signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) via its Guiding Opinions on Promoting Green Belt and Road Construction. For instance, the PRC adopted the Green Investment Principles (GIP) for greening investment for BRI projects; under this initiative members – including major PRC policy banks funding BRI projects – are expected to provide their first TCFD disclosure by 2023. Obstacles contacts cited include a shortage of quality data and ESG professionals, such as third-party auditors which are required to support evidence based ESG reporting. In December, MEE issued new disclosure rules requiring five types of domestic entities to disclose environmental information on an annual basis, effective February 8, 2022. The rules will apply only to listed companies and bond issuers that were subject to environmental penalties the previous year and other MEE-identified entities, including those that discharged high levels of pollutants. Entities must disclose information on environmental management, pollution generation, carbon emissions, and contingency planning for environmental emergencies. These same companies and bond issuers must also disclose climate change and environmental protection information related to investment and financing transactions. On June 28, the CSRC issued final amendments requiring listed companies disclose environmental penalties and encouraging carbon emissions disclosures. It also issued guidelines on the format and content of annual reports and half-year reports of listed companies, requiring them to set up a separate “Section 5 Environmental and Social Responsibility” to encourage carbon emission reduction related disclosure. In May, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) issued a plan for strengthening environmental disclosure requirements by 2025. Most contacts assessed investors are the key drivers of increased ESG disclosures. As part of its WTO accession agreement, China agreed to notify the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of all draft technical regulations. However, China continues to issue draft technical regulations without proper notification to the TBT Committee. The PRC is also a member of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which entered into force on January 1, 2022. Although RCEP has some elements of a regional economic bloc, many of its regulatory provisions (for example on data flow) are weakened by national security exemptions. On September 16, China submitted a written application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to New Zealand (the depositary of the agreement). The PRC would face challenges in addressing obligations related to SOEs, labor rights, digital trade, and increased transparency. China’s legal system borrows heavily from continental European legal systems, but with “Chinese characteristics.” The rules governing commercial activities are found in various laws, regulations, departmental rules, and Supreme People’s Court (SPC) judicial interpretations, among other sources. While China does not have specialized commercial courts, it has created specialized courts and tribunals for the hearing of intellectual property disputes (IP), including in Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Hainan. The PRC’s constitution and laws are clear that PRC courts cannot exercise power independent of the Party. Further, in practice, influential businesses, local governments, and regulators routinely influence courts. Outside of the IP space, U.S. companies often hesitate in challenging administrative decisions or bringing commercial disputes before local courts due to perceptions of futility or fear of government retaliation. The PRC’s new foreign investment law, the FIL, came into force on January 1, 2020, replacing the previous foreign investment framework. The FIL provides a five-year transition period for foreign enterprises established under previous foreign investment laws, after which all foreign enterprises will be subject to the same domestic laws as PRC companies, such as the Company Law. The FIL standardized the regulatory regimes for foreign investment by including the negative list management system, a foreign investment information reporting system, and a foreign investment security review system all under one document. The FIL also seeks to address foreign investors complaints by explicitly banning forced technology transfers, promising better IPR, and the establishment of a complaint mechanism for investors to report administrative abuses. However, foreign investors remain concerned that the FIL and its implementing regulations provide PRC ministries and local officials significant regulatory discretion, including the ability to retaliate against foreign companies. The December 2020 revised investment screening mechanism under the Measures on Security Reviews on Foreign Investments (briefly discussed above) came into effect January 18 without any period for public comment or prior consultation with the business community. Foreign investors complained China’s new rules on investment screening were expansive in scope, lacked an investment threshold to trigger a review, and included green field investments – unlike most other countries. Moreover, new guidance on Neutralizing Extra-Territorial Application of Unjustified Foreign Legislation Measures, a measure often compared to “blocking statutes” from other markets, added to foreign investors’ concerns over the legal challenges they would face in trying to abide by both their host-country’s regulations and China’s. Foreign investors complained that market access in China was increasingly undermined by national security-related legislation. While not comprehensive, a list of official PRC laws and regulations is here . On June 10, the Standing Committee of the NPC adopted the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Countering Foreign Sanctions (“Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law” or AFSL). The AFSL gives the government explicit authority to impose countermeasures related to visas, deportation, and asset freezing against individuals or organizations that broadly endanger China’s “sovereignty, security, or development interests.” The law also calls for Chinese citizens and organizations harmed by foreign “sanctions” to pursue damages via PRC civil courts. On October 13, MOF issued a circular prohibiting discrimination against foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) in government procurement for products “produced in China.” The circular required that suppliers not be restricted based on ownership, organization, equity structure, investor country, or product brand, to ensure fair competition between domestic and foreign companies. The circular also required the abolition of regulations and practices violating the circular by the end of November, including the establishment of alternative databases and qualification databases. This circular may have been intended to address the issuance of Document No. 551 in May by MOF and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) (without publishing on official websites), titled “Auditing guidelines for government procurement of imported products,” outlining local content requirements for hundreds of items, many of which are medical devices, including X-ray machines and magnetic resonance imaging equipment. It is unclear whether Document 551 will be rescinded or revised based on this circular. Additionally, the circular applies only to FIEs and does not provide fair treatment for imported products from companies overseas. While the circular does state FIEs should be afforded equal treatment, the circular does not address concerns about localization pressures created by Document 551. Further, the circular provides no guidance on what constitutes a “domestic product” and does not address treatment of products manufactured in China that incorporate content from other jurisdictions, key concerns for a wide range of U.S. firms. In November 2021, the PRC government announced transformation of the Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the SAMR, renaming it the National Anti-Monopoly Bureau, adding three new departments, and doubled staffing. The National Anti-Monopoly Bureau enforces China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) and oversees competition issues at the central and provincial levels. The bureau reviews mergers and acquisitions, and investigates cartel and other anticompetitive agreements, abuse of a dominant market positions, including those related to IP, and abuse of administrative powers by government agencies. The bureau also oversees the Fair Competition Review System (FCRS), which requires government agencies to conduct a review prior to issuing new and revising administrative regulations, rules, and guidelines to ensure such measures do not inhibit competition. SAMR issues implementation guidelines to fill in gaps in the AML, address new trends in China’s market, and help foster transparency in enforcement. Generally, SAMR has sought public comment on proposed measures, although comment periods are sometimes less than 30 days. In October 2021, SAMR issued draft amendments to the AML for public comment. Revisions to the AML are expected to be finalized in 2022 and likely will include changes such as stepped-up fines for AML violations and specification of the factors to consider in determining whether an undertaking in the internet sector has abused a dominant market position. In February 2021, SAMR published (after public comment) the “Antitrust Guidelines for the Platform Economy.” The Guidelines address monopolistic behaviors of online platforms operating in China. Foreign companies have long expressed concern that the government uses AML enforcement in support of China’s industrial policies, such as promoting national champions, particularly for companies operating in strategic sectors. The AML explicitly protects the lawful operations of government authorized monopolies in industries that affect the national economy or national security. U.S. companies expressed concerns that in SAMR’s consultations with other PRC agencies when reviewing M&A transactions, those agencies raise concerns not related to competition concerns to block, delay, or force transacting parties to comply with preconditions – including technology transfer – to receive approval. China’s law prohibits nationalization of FIEs, except under vaguely specified “special circumstances” where there is a national security or public interest need. PRC law requires fair compensation for an expropriated foreign investment but does not detail the method used to assess the value of the investment. The Department of State is not aware of any cases since 1979 in which China has expropriated a U.S. investment, although the Department has notified Congress through the annual 527 Investment Dispute Report of several cases of concern. The PRC introduced bankruptcy laws in 2007, under the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (EBL), which applies to all companies incorporated under PRC laws and subject to PRC regulations. In May 2020, the PRC released the Civil Code, contract and property rights rules. Despite the NPC listing amendments to the EBL as a top work priority for 2021, the NPC has not released the amendments to the public. Court-appointed administrators – law firms and accounting firms that help verify claims, organize creditors’ meetings, list, and sell assets online – look to handle more cases and process them faster. As of 2021 official statements cited 5,060 institutional administrators and 703 individual administrators. On August 18, the Law Enforcement Inspection Team of the Standing Committee of the NPC was submitted its report on the enforcement of enterprise bankruptcy to the 30th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Thirteenth NPC for deliberation. While the report is unavailable publicly, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) website issued a press release noting the report found that from 2007 to 2020, courts at all levels nationwide accepted 59,604 bankruptcy cases, and concluded 48,045 bankruptcy cases (in 2020 there were 24,438 liquidation and bankruptcy cases). Of the total liquidation and bankruptcy cases recorded in that same period, 90 percent involved private enterprises. The announcement also cited the allocation of additional resources, including future establishment of at least 14 bankruptcy tribunals and 100 Liquidation & Bankruptcy Divisions and specialized collegial panels to handle bankruptcy cases. As of August 2021, bankruptcy cases are handled by 417 bankruptcy judges, 28 high people’s courts, and 284 intermediate people’s courts. In 2021 the government added a new court in Haikou. National data is unavailable for 2021, but local courts have released some information that suggest a nearly 10 percent increase in liquidation and bankruptcy cases in Jiangxi province and about a 66 percent increase in Guangzhou, the capital city of Guangdong province. While PRC authorities are taking steps to address corporate debt and are gradually allowing some companies to fail, companies generally avoid pursing bankruptcy because of the potential for local government interference and fear of losing control over the outcome. According to the SPC, 2.899 million enterprises closed business in 2020, of which only 0.1 percent or 3,908 closed because of bankruptcy. In August 2020, Shenzhen released the Personal Bankruptcy Regulations of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, to take effect on March 1, 2021. This is the PRC’s first regulation on personal bankruptcy. On July 19, the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court of Guangdong Province, China served a ruling on Liang Wenjin approving his personal bankruptcy reorganization plan. This was the first personal bankruptcy case closed by Shenzhen Court since the implementation of the Personal Bankruptcy Regulations of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and is the first personal bankruptcy reorganization case in China. The Personal Bankruptcy Regulations is China’s first set of rules on personal bankruptcy, which formally establishes the personal bankruptcy system in China for the first time. At present, the Personal Bankruptcy Regulations is only applicable in Shenzhen. Numerous other localities have also begun experimenting with legal remedies for personal insolvency, in part to deter debtors from taking extreme measures to address debt. 6. Financial Sector China’s leadership has stated that it seeks to build a modern, highly developed, and multi-tiered capital market. Since their founding over three decades ago, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges, combined, are ranked the third largest stock market in the world with over USD 12.2 trillion in assets. China’s bond market has similarly expanded significantly to become the second largest worldwide, totaling approximately USD 18.6 trillion. In 2021, China took steps to open certain financial sectors such as mutual funds, securities, and asset management, but multinational companies still report barriers to entering the PRC insurance markets. As an example, in September, Black Rock was the first firm given approval to sell mutual funds to PRC nationals as the first wholly foreign owned mutual fund. Direct investment by private equity and venture capital firms increased but also faced setbacks due to China’s capital controls, which obfuscate the repatriation of returns. Though the PRC is taking steps to liberalize its capital markets, PRC companies that seek overseas investment have historically tended to list in the United States or Hong Kong; PRC and U.S. regulations on exchanges and geopolitics may begin to impact this trend. As of 2021, 24 sovereign entities and private sector firms, including the Asian Development Bank, Hungary, and BMW, have since issued RMB 106.5 billion yuan, roughly USD 16.7 billion, in 72 “Panda Bonds,” Chinese renminbi (RMB)-denominated debt issued by foreign entities in China. China’s private sector can also access credit via bank loans, bond issuance, trust products, and wealth management products. However, most bank credit flows to state-owned firms, largely due to distortions in China’s banking sector that have incentivized lending to state-affiliated entities over their private sector counterparts. China has been an IMF Article VIII member since 1996 and generally refrains from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. However, the government has used administrative and preferential policies to encourage credit allocation towards national priorities, such as infrastructure investments and industrial policy. The PRC’s monetary policy is run by the PBOC, the PRC’s central bank. The PBOC has traditionally deployed various policy tools, such as open market operations, reserve requirement ratios, benchmark rates and medium-term lending facilities, to control credit growth. The PBOC had previously also set quotas on how much banks could lend but ended the practice in 1998. As part of its efforts to shift towards a more market-based system, the PBOC announced in 2019 that it will reform its one-year loan prime rate (LPR), which would serve as an anchor reference for other loans. The one-year LPR is based on the interest rate that 18 banks offer to their best customers and serves as the benchmark for rates provided for other loans. In 2020, the PBOC requested financial institutions to shift towards use of the one-year LPR for their outstanding floating-rate loan contracts from March to August. Despite these measures to move towards more market-based lending, the PRC’s financial regulators still influence the volume and destination of PRC bank loans through “window guidance” – unofficial directives delivered verbally – as well as through mandated lending targets for key economic groups, such as small and medium sized enterprises. In 2020, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) also began issuing laws to regulate online lending by banks including internet companies such as Ant Financial and Tencent, which had previously not been subject to banking regulations. In 2021, PBOC and CBIRC issued circulars emphasizing the need to emphasize and encourage financial stability among real estate developers. The CBIRC oversees the PRC’s 4,607 lending institutions, about USD 54 trillion in total assets. China’s “Big Five” – Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, Bank of Communications, China Construction Bank, and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China – dominate the sector and are largely stable, but has experienced regional banking stress, especially among smaller lenders. Reflecting the level of weakness among these banks, in September 2021, the PBOC announced in “China Financial Stability Report 2020” that 422 or 9.6 percent of the 4,400 banking financial institutions received a “fail” rating (high risk) following an industry-wide review in in the second quarter of 2021. The assessment deemed 393 firms, all small and medium sized rural financial institutions, “extremely risky.” The official rate of non-performing loans among China’s banks is relatively low: 1.7 percent as of the end of 2021. However, analysts believed the actual figure may be significantly higher. Bank loans continue to provide most credit options (reportedly around 63.6 percent in 2021) for Chinese companies, although other sources of capital, such as corporate bonds, equity financing, and private equity are quickly expanding in scope, reach, and sophistication in China. As part of a broad campaign to reduce debt and financial risk, Chinese regulators have implemented measures to rein in the rapid growth of China’s “shadow banking” sector, which includes wealth management and trust products. These measures have achieved positive results. In December 2020, CBIRC published the first “Shadow Banking Report,” and claimed that the size of China’s shadow banking had shrunk sharply since 2017 when China started tightening the sector. By the end of 2019, the size of China’s shadow banking by broad measurement dropped to 84.8 trillion yuan from the peak of 100.4 trillion yuan in early 2017. PBOC estimated in January 2021 that the outstanding balance of China’s shadow banking was around RMB 32 trillion yuan at the end of 2020. Alternatively, Moody’s estimated that China’s shadow banking by broad measurement dropped to RMB 57.8 trillion yuan in the first half of 2021 and shadow banking to GDP ratio dropped to 52.9 percent from 58.3 percent at the end of 2020. Foreign owned banks can now establish wholly owned banks and branches in China, however, onerous licensing requirements and an industry dominated by local players, have limited foreign banks market penetration. Foreigners are eligible to open a bank account in China but are required to present a passport and/or Chinese government issued identification. China officially has only one sovereign wealth fund (SWF), the China Investment Corporation (CIC), which was launched in 2007 to help diversify China’s foreign exchange reserves. Overall, information and updates on CIC and other funds that function like SWFs was difficult to procure. CIC is ranked the second largest SWF by total assets by Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (SWFI). With USD 200 billion in initial registered capital, CIC manages over USD 1.2 trillion in assets as of 2021 and invests on a 10-year time horizon. In 2021, CIC reported that during the 2020 period it increased its information technology-related holdings while cutting holdings of overseas equities and bonds. CIC has two overseas branches, CIC International (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd. and CIC Representative Office in New York. CIC has since evolved into three subsidiaries: CIC International was established in September 2011 with a mandate to invest in and manage overseas assets. It conducts public market equity and bond investments, hedge fund, real estate, private equity, and minority investments as a financial investor. CIC Capital was incorporated in January 2015 with a mandate to specialize in making direct investments to enhance CIC’s investments in long-term assets. Central Huijin makes equity investments in China’s state-owned financial institutions. China also operates other funds that function in part like sovereign wealth funds, including: China’s National Social Security Fund, with an estimated USD 450 billion in assets in 2021; the China-Africa Development Fund (solely funded by the China Development Bank), with an estimated USD 10 billion in assets (2020); the SAFE Investment Company, with an estimated USD 417.8 billion in assets; and China’s state-owned Silk Road Fund, established in December 2014 with USD 40 billion in assets to foster investment in BRI countries. China’s state-run funds do not report the percentage of assets invested domestically. However, China’s state-run funds follow the voluntary code of good practices known as the Santiago Principles and participate in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on SWFs. While CIC affirms they do not have formal government guidance to invest funds consistent with industrial policies or designated projects, CIC is expected to pursue government objectives. 7. State-Owned Enterprises China has approximately 150,000 wholly-owned SOEs, of which 50,000 are owned by the central government, and the remainder by local or provincial governments. SOEs account for 30 to 40 percent of total gross domestic product (GDP) and about 20 percent of China’s total employment. Non-financial SOE assets totaled roughly USD 30 trillion. SOEs can be found in all sectors of the economy, from tourism to heavy industries. State funds are spread throughout the economy and the state may also be the majority or controlling shareholder in an ostensibly private enterprise. China’s leading SOEs benefit from preferential government policies aimed at developing bigger and stronger “national champions.” SOEs enjoy preferential access to essential economic inputs (land, hydrocarbons, finance, telecoms, and electricity) and exercise considerable power in markets like steel and minerals. SOEs also have long enjoyed preferential access to credit and the ability to issue publicly traded equity and debt. A comprehensive, published list of all PRC SOEs does not exist. PRC officials have indicated China intends to utilize OECD guidelines to improve the SOEs independence and professionalism, including relying on Boards of Directors that are free from political influence. However, analysts believe minor reforms will be ineffective if SOE administration and government policy remain intertwined, and PRC officials make minimal progress in primarily changing the regulation and business conduct of SOEs. SOEs continue to hold dominant shares in their respective industries, regardless of whether they are strategic, which may further restrain private investment in the economy. Among central SOEs managed by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), senior management positions are mainly filled by senior party members who report directly to the CCP, and double as the company’s party secretary. SOE executives often outrank regulators in the CCP rank structure, which minimizes the effectiveness of regulators in implementing reforms. While SOEs typically pursue commercial objectives, the lack of management independence and the controlling ownership interest of the state make SOEs de facto arms of the government, subject to government direction and interference. SOEs are rarely the defendant in legal disputes, and when they are, they almost always prevail. U.S. companies often complain about the lack of transparency and objectivity in commercial disputes with SOEs. Since 2013, the PRC government has periodically announced reforms to SOEs that included selling SOE shares to outside investors or a mixed ownership model, in which private companies invest in SOEs and outside managers are hired. The government has tried these approaches to improve SOE management structures, emphasize the use of financial benchmarks, and gradually infuse private capital into some sectors traditionally monopolized by SOEs like energy, finance, and telecommunications. For instance, during an August 25 press conference, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) officials announced that in the second half of the year central SOE reform would focus on the advanced manufacturing and technology innovation sectors. As part of these efforts, they claimed SASAC would ensure mergers and acquisitions removed redundancies, stabilize industrial supply chains, withdraw from non-competitive businesses, and streamline management structures. In practice, however, reforms have been gradual, as the PRC government has struggled to implement its SOE reform vision and often preferred to utilize a SOE consolidation approach. Recently, Xi and other senior leaders have increasingly focused reform efforts on strengthening the role of the state as an investor or owner of capital, instead of the old SOE model in which the state was more directly involved in managing operations. SASAC issued a circular on November 20, 2020, directing tighter control over central SOEs overseas properties held by individuals on behalf of SOEs. The circular aims to prevent leakage of SOE assets held by individuals and SOE overseas variable interest entities (VIEs). According to the circular, properties held by individuals should be approved by central SOEs and filed with SASAC. In Northeast China, privatization efforts at provincial and municipal SEOs remains low, as private capital makes cautious decisions in making investment to local debt-ridden and inefficient SOEs. On the other hand, local SOEs prefer to pursue mergers and acquisitions with central SOEs to avoid being accused of losing state assets. There is no available information on whether foreign investors could participate in privatization programs. 10. Political and Security Environment Foreign companies operating in China face a growing risk of political violence, most recently due to U.S.-China political tensions. PRC authorities have broad authority to prohibit travelers from leaving China and have imposed “exit bans” to compel U.S. citizens to resolve business disputes, force settlement of court orders, or facilitate PRC investigations. U.S. citizens, including children, not directly involved in legal proceedings or wrongdoing have also been subject to lengthy exit bans to compel family members or colleagues to cooperate with Chinese courts or investigations. Exit bans are often issued without notification to the foreign citizen or without clear legal recourse to appeal the exit ban decision. A 2020 independent report presented evidence that since 2018, more than 570,000 Uyghurs were implicated in forced labor picking cotton. There was also reporting that Xinjiang’s polysilicon and solar panel industries are connected to forced labor. In 2021, PRC citizens, with the encouragement of the PRC government, boycotted companies that put out statements on social media affirming they do not use Xinjiang cotton in their supply chain. Some landlords forced companies to close retail outlets during this boycott due to fears of being associated with boycotted companies. The ongoing PRC crackdown on virtually all opposition voices in Hong Kong and continued attempts by PRC organs to intimidate Hong Kong’s judges threatens the judicial independence of Hong Kong’s courts – a fundamental pillar for Hong Kong’s status as an international hub for investment into and out of China. Apart from Hong Kong, the PRC government has also previously encouraged protests or boycotts of products from countries like the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, Norway, Canada, and the Philippines, in retaliation for unrelated policy decisions such as the boycott campaigns against Korean retailer Lotte in 2016 and 2017 in response to the ROK government’s decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); and the PRC’s retaliation against Canadian companies and citizens for Canada’s arrest of Huawei’s Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $14,724,435 2021 $14,343,000 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $90,190 2020 $123,875 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/factsheet.html#650 Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $80,048 2020 $37,995 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment -and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/factsheet.html#650 Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 $16.6% 2020 13% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/statistics * Source for Host Country Data: National Bureau of Statistics Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $3,214,115 100% Total Outward $2,580,658 100% China, P.R., Hong Kong $1,726,212 53.7% China, P.C., Hong Kong $1,438,531 55.7% British Virgin Islands $403,903 12.5% Cayman Islands $457,027 17.7% Japan $193,338 6.0% British Virgin Islands $155,645 6% Singapore $148,721 4.6% United States $80,048 3.1% United States $86,907 2.7% Singapore $59,858 2.3% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. Colombia Executive Summary With improving security conditions in metropolitan areas, a market of 50 million people, an abundance of natural resources, and an educated and growing middle-class, Colombia continues to be an attractive destination for foreign investment in Latin America. Colombia ranked 67 out of 190 countries in the “Ease of Doing Business” index of the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report (most recent report). The Colombian economy grew by 10.6 percent in 2021, the largest increase in gross domestic product (GDP) since the statistical authority started keeping records in 1975. This followed a 6.8 percent collapse in 2020 due to the negative effects of the pandemic and lower oil prices, the first economic contraction in more than two decades. In July 2021, rating agencies Fitch and Standard & Poor’s (S&P) downgraded Colombia below investment grade status, citing the increasing fiscal deficit (7.1 percent of GDP for 2021) as the main reason for the downgrade. The Colombian Government passed a tax reform that entered into effect in January 2022, the Social Investment Law, that seeks to reactivate the economy, generate employment, and contribute to the fiscal stability of the country. Colombia’s legal and regulatory systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The country has a comprehensive legal framework for business and foreign direct investment (FDI). The 2012 U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA) has strengthened bilateral trade and investment. Colombia’s dispute settlement mechanisms have improved through the CTPA and several international conventions and treaties. Weaknesses include protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), as Colombia has yet to implement certain IPR-related provisions of the CTPA. Colombia became the 37th member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2020, bringing the obligation to adhere to OECD norms and standards in economic operations. The Colombian government has made a concerted effort to develop efficient capital markets, attract investment, and create jobs. Restrictions on foreign ownership in specific sectors still exist. FDI inflows increased 4.8 percent from 2020 to 2021, with 67 percent of the 2021 inflow dedicated to the extractives sector. Roughly half of the Colombian workforce in metropolitan areas is employed in the informal economy, a share that increases to four-fifths in rural areas. In 2021, the unemployment rate was 13.7 percent with 3.4 million people unemployed. The employed population reached 21.6 million, an increase of 0.9 percent compared to 2020. Since the 2016 peace agreement between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia has experienced a significant decrease in terrorist activity. Several powerful narco-criminal operations still pose threats to commercial activity and investment, especially in rural zones outside of government control. Corruption remains a significant challenge. The Colombian government continues to work on improving its business climate, but U.S. and other foreign investors continue to voice complaints about non-tariff, regulatory, and bureaucratic barriers to trade, investment, and market access at the national, regional, and municipal levels. Stakeholders express concern that some regulatory rulings in Colombia target specific companies, resulting in an uneven playing field. Investors generally have access at all levels of the Colombian government, but cite a lack of effective and timely consultation with regulatory agencies in decisions that affect them. Investors also note concern regarding the national competition and regulatory authority’s (Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio, SIC) differing rulings for different companies on similar issues, and slow processing at some regulatory agencies, such as at food and drug regulator INVIMA. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 87 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 67 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $7,767 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $5,790 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Colombian government actively encourages foreign direct investment (FDI). The economic liberalization reforms of the early 1990s provided for national treatment of foreign investors, lifted controls on remittance of profits and capital, and allowed foreign investment in most sectors. Colombia imposes the same investment restrictions on foreign investors that it does on national investors. Generally, foreign investors may participate in the privatization of state-owned enterprises without restrictions. All FDI involving the establishment of a commercial presence in Colombia requires registration with the Superintendence of Corporations and the local chamber of commerce. All conditions being equal during tender processes, national offers are preferred over foreign offers. Assuming equal conditions among foreign bidders, those with major Colombian national workforce resources, significant national capital, and/or better conditions to facilitate technology transfers are preferred. ProColombia is the Colombian government entity that promotes international tourism, foreign investment, and non-traditional exports. ProColombia assists foreign companies that wish to enter the Colombian market by addressing specific needs, such as identifying contacts in the public and private sectors, organizing visit agendas, and accompanying companies during visits to Colombia. All services are free of charge and confidential. Priority sectors include business process outsourcing, software and IT services, cosmetics, health services, automotive manufacturing, textiles, graphic communications, agribusiness, and electric energy. ProColombia’s “Invest in Colombia” web portal offers detailed information about opportunities in agribusiness, manufacturing, and services in Colombia ( www.investincolombia.com.co/sectors ). The Duque administration – including senior leaders at the Presidency, ProColombia, and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Trade – continue to stress Colombia’s openness to foreign investors and aggressively market Colombia as an investment destination. The government of Colombia does not have a national security-based investment screening mechanism in place. Foreign investment in the financial, hydrocarbon, and mining sectors is subject to special regimes, such as investment registration and concession agreements with the Colombian government, but is not restricted in the amount of foreign capital. The following sectors require that foreign investors have a legal local representative and/or commercial presence in Colombia: travel and tourism agency services; money order operators; customs brokerage; postal and courier services; merchandise warehousing; merchandise transportation under customs control; international cargo agents; public service companies, including sewage and water works, waste disposal, electricity, gas and fuel distribution, and public telephone services; insurance firms; legal services; and special air services, including aerial fire-fighting, sightseeing, and surveying. According to the Colombian constitution and foreign investment regulations, foreign investment in Colombia receives the same treatment as an investment made by Colombian nationals. Foreign investment is permitted in all sectors, except in activities related to defense, national security, and toxic waste handling and disposal. There are no performance requirements explicitly applicable to the entry and establishment of foreign investment in Colombia. Foreign investors face specific exceptions and restrictions in the following sectors: Media: Only Colombian nationals or legally constituted entities may provide radio or subscription-based television services. For National Open Television and Nationwide Private Television Operators, only Colombian nationals or legal entities may be granted concessions to provide television services. Foreign investment in national television is limited to a maximum of 40 percent ownership of an operator. Accounting, Auditing, and Data Processing: To practice in Colombia, providers of accounting services must register with the Central Accountants Board and have uninterrupted domicile in Colombia for at least three years prior to registry. A legal commercial presence is required to provide data processing and information services in Colombia. Banking: Foreign investors may own 100 percent of financial institutions in Colombia, but are required to obtain approval from the Financial Superintendent before making a direct investment of ten percent or more in any one entity. Foreign banks must establish a local commercial presence and comply with the same capital and other requirements as local financial institutions. Every investment of foreign capital in portfolios must be through a Colombian administrator company, including brokerage firms, trust companies, and investment management companies. Fishing: A foreign vessel may engage in fishing activities in Colombian territorial waters only through association with a Colombian company holding a valid fishing permit. If a ship’s flag corresponds to a country with which Colombia has a complementary bilateral agreement, this agreement shall determine whether the association requirement applies for the process required to obtain a fishing license. The costs of fishing permits are greater for foreign flag vessels. Private Security and Surveillance Companies: Companies constituted with foreign capital prior to February 11, 1994 cannot increase the share of foreign capital. Those constituted after that date can only have Colombian nationals as shareholders. Transportation: Foreign companies can only provide multimodal freight services within or from Colombian territory if they have a domiciled agent or representative legally responsible for its activities in Colombia. International cabotage companies can provide cabotage services (i.e. between two points within Colombia) “only when there is no national capacity to provide the service.” Colombia prohibits foreign ownership of commercial ships licensed in Colombia. The owners of a concession providing port services must be legally constituted in Colombia, and only Colombian ships may provide port services within Colombian maritime jurisdiction, unless there are no capable Colombian-flag vessels. The WTO most recently reviewed Colombia’s trade policy in June 2018. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp472_e.htm New businesses must register with the chamber of commerce of the city in which the company will reside. Applicants also register using the Colombian tax authority’s portal at: www.dian.gov.co to obtain a taxpayer ID (RUT). Business founders must visit DIAN ( Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales) offices to obtain an electronic signature for company legal representatives, and obtain – in-person or online – an authorization for company invoices from DIAN. In 2019, Colombia made starting a business a step easier by lifting a requirement of opening a local bank account to obtain invoice authorization. Companies must submit a unified electronic form to self-assess and pay social security and payroll contributions to the Governmental Learning Service (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje, or SENA), the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar, or ICBF), and the Family Compensation Fund (Caja de Compensación Familiar). After that, companies must register employees for public health coverage, affiliate the company to a public or private pension fund, affiliate the company and employees to an administrator of professional risks, and affiliate employees with a severance fund. According to the World Bank’s “Doing Business 2020” report, recent reforms simplified starting a business, trading across borders, and resolving insolvency. According to the report, starting a company in Colombia requires seven procedures and takes an average of 10 days. Information on starting a company can be found at http://www.ccb.org.co/en/Creating-a-company/Company-start-up/Step-by-step-company-creation ; https://investincolombia.com.co/how-to-invest.html ; and http://www.dian.gov.co . Colombia does not incentivize outward investment nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The Colombian legal, accounting, and regulatory systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The written commercial code and other laws cover broad areas, including banking and credit, bankruptcy/reorganization, business establishment/conduct, commercial contracts, credit, corporate organization, fiduciary obligations, insurance, industrial property, and real property law. The civil code contains provisions relating to contracts, mortgages, liens, notary functions, and registries. There are no identified private-sector associations or non-governmental organizations leading informal regulatory processes. The ministries generally consult with relevant actors, both foreign and national, when drafting regulations. Proposed laws are typically published as drafts for public comment, although sometimes with limited notice. Information on Colombia’s public finances and debt obligations is readily available and is published in a timely manner. Enforcement mechanisms exist, but historically the judicial system has not taken an active role in adjudicating commercial cases. The Constitution establishes the principle of free competition as a national right for all citizens and provides the judiciary with administrative and financial independence from the executive branch. Colombia has transitioned to an oral accusatory system to make criminal investigations and trials more efficient. The new system separates the investigative functions assigned to the Office of the Attorney General from trial functions. Lack of coordination among government entities, clear lines of responsibility, as well as insufficient resources complicate timely resolution of cases. Colombia is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures (see http://www.businessfacilitation.org and Colombia’s websites http://colombia.eregulations.org and https://www.colombiacompra.gov.co ). Foreign and national investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures for investment and income generating operations, including the number of steps, name, and contact details of the entities and people in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal bases justifying the procedures. In general, Colombia does not promote or require environmental, social, and governance disclosure to help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. Colombia became the 37th member of the OECD in April 2020. Colombia is part of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The government generally notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. In August 2020, Colombia fully joined the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). Regionally, Colombia is a member of organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Pacific Alliance, and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN). Colombia has a comprehensive, civil law-based legal system. Colombia’s judicial system defines the legal rights of commercial entities, reviews regulatory enforcement procedures, and adjudicates contract disputes in the business community. The judicial framework includes the Council of State, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Justice, and various departmental and district courts, which collectively are overseen administratively by the Superior Judicial Council. The 1991 Constitution provided the judiciary with greater administrative and financial independence from the executive branch. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable through the different stages of legal court processes in Colombia. The judicial system in general remains hampered by time-consuming bureaucratic requirements. Colombia has a comprehensive legal framework for business and FDI that incorporates binding norms resulting from its membership in the Andean Community of Nations and the WTO, as well as other free trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties. Colombia’s official investment portal explains procedures and relevant laws for those wishing to invest (see https://investincolombia.com.co/en/how-to-invest ). The Superintendence of Industry and Commerce (SIC), Colombia’s independent national competition authority, monitors and protects free economic competition, consumer rights, compliance with legal requirements and regulations, and protection of personal data. It also manages the national chambers of commerce. The SIC has been strengthened in recent years with the addition of personnel, including economists and lawyers. The SIC has recently investigated companies, including U.S.-based technology firms and Colombian banks, for failing to protect customer data. Other investigations include those related to pharmaceutical pricing, “business cartelization” among companies supplying public entities, and misleading advertising by a major brewing company. One U.S. gig-economy platform was temporarily barred from operating in Colombia in early 2020, although other similarly-situated companies remained; a court overturned the prohibition on appeal. U.S. companies have expressed concern about limited ability to appeal SIC orders and the SIC’s increasing reliance on orders to remedy perceived problems. Other U.S. companies have noted that SIC investigations can be drawn-out and opaque, similar to the judicial system. In general Stakeholders continue to express concern that some regulatory rulings in Colombia target specific companies, resulting in an uneven playing field and regulatory inconsistency. Investors also note concern that the SIC has ruled differently on similar issues for different companies, leading to different results. Article 58 of the Constitution governs indemnifications and expropriations and guarantees owners’ rights for legally-acquired property. For assets taken by eminent domain, Colombian law provides a right of appeal both on the basis of the decision itself and on the level of compensation. The Constitution does not specify how to proceed in compensation cases, which remains a concern for foreign investors. The Colombian government has sought to resolve such concerns through the negotiation of bilateral investment treaties and strong investment chapters in free trade agreements, such as the CTPA. Colombia’s 1991 Constitution grants the government the authority to intervene directly in financial or economic affairs, and this authority provides solutions similar to U.S. Chapter 11 filings for companies facing liquidation or bankruptcy. Colombia’s bankruptcy regulations have two major objectives: to regulate proceedings to ensure creditors’ protection, and to monitor the efficient recovery and preservation of still-viable companies. This was revised in 2006 to allow creditors to request judicial liquidation, which replaces the previous forced auctioning option. Now, inventories are valued, creditors’ rights are considered, and either a direct sale takes place within two months or all assets are assigned to creditors based on their share of the company’s liabilities. The insolvency regime for companies was further revised in 2010 to make proceedings more flexible and allow debtors to enter into a long-term payment agreement with creditors, giving the company a chance to recover and continue operating. Bankruptcy is not criminalized in Colombia. In 2013, a bankruptcy law for individuals whose debts surpass 50 percent of their assets value entered into force. Restructuring proceedings aim to protect the debtors from bankruptcy. Once reorganization has begun, creditors cannot use collection proceedings to collect on debts owed prior to the beginning of the reorganization proceedings. All existing creditors at the moment of the reorganization are recognized during the proceedings if they present their credit. Foreign creditors, equity shareholders (including foreign equity shareholders), and holders of other financial contracts (including foreign contract holders) are recognized during the proceeding. Established creditors are guaranteed a vote in the final decision. According to the Doing Business 2020 report Colombia ranked 32nd for resolving insolvency and it takes an average of 1.7 years – the same as OECD high-income countries – to resolve insolvency; the average time in Latin America is 2.9 years. 6. Financial Sector The Colombian Securities Exchange (BVC after its acronym in Spanish) is the main forum for trading and securities transactions in Colombia. The BVC is a private company listed on the stock market. The BVC, as a multi-product and multi-market exchange, offers trading platforms for the stock market, along with fixed income and standard derivatives. The BVC also provides listing services for issuers. Foreign investors can participate in capital markets by negotiating and acquiring shares, bonds, and other securities listed by the Foreign Investment Statute. These activities must be conducted by a local administrator, such as trust companies or Financial Superintendence-authorized stock brokerage firms. Direct and portfolio foreign investments must be registered with the Central Bank. Foreigners can establish a bank account in Colombia as long as they have a valid visa and Colombian government identification. The market has sufficient liquidity for investors to enter and exit sizeable positions. The central bank respects IMF Article VIII and does not restrict payments and transfers for current international transactions. The financial sector in Colombia offers credit to nationals and foreigners that comply with the requisite legal requirements. In 2005, Colombia consolidated supervision of all aspects of the banking, financial, securities, and insurance sectors under the Financial Superintendence. Colombia has an effective regulatory system that encourages portfolio investment, and the country’s financial system is strong by regional standards. Commercial banks are the principal source of long-term corporate and project finance in Colombia. Loans rarely have a maturity in excess of five years. Unofficial private lenders play a major role in meeting the working capital needs of small and medium-sized companies. Only the largest of Colombia’s companies participate in the local stock or bond markets, with the majority meeting their financing needs either through the banking system, by reinvesting their profits, or through credit from suppliers. Colombia’s central bank is charged with managing inflation and unemployment through monetary policy. Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in the country and must set up a Colombian subsidiary in order to do so. The Colombian central bank has a variety of correspondent banks abroad. In 2012, Colombia began operating a sovereign wealth fund called the Savings and Stabilization Fund (FAE), which is administered by the central bank with the objective of promoting savings and economic stability in the country. Colombia is not a member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. The fund can administer up to 30 percent of annual royalties from the extractives industry. Its primary investments are in fixed securities, sovereign and quasi-sovereign debt (both domestic and international), and corporate securities, with just eight percent invested in stocks. The government transfers royalties not dedicated to the fund to other internal funds to boost national economic productivity through strategic projects, technological investments, and innovation. In 2020, the government authorized up to 80 percent of the FAE’s USD 3.9 billion in assets to be lent to the Fund for the Mitigation of Emergencies (FOME) created in response to the pandemic. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Since 2015, the Government of Colombia has concentrated its industrial and commercial enterprises under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. According to Ministry’s 2019 annual report, there are 105 state-owned companies, with a combined value of USD 20 billion. The government is the majority shareholder of 39 companies and a minority shareholder in the remaining 66. Among the most notable companies with a government stake are Ecopetrol (Colombia’s majority state-owned and privately-run oil company), ISA (electricity distribution), Banco Agrario de Colombia, Bancoldex, and Satena (regional airline). SOEs competing in the Colombian market do not receive non-market-based advantages from the government. The Ministry of Finance normally updates their annual report on SOEs every June. Decree 2111 of 2019, formalized the creation of financial holding company Grupo Bicenterario. The holding company seeks to optimize the administration of Colombia’s state-owned enterprises, centralize property rights, and incorporate recommendations from the OECD regarding the composition of their boards of directors. Colombia has privatized state-owned enterprises under article 60 of the Constitution and Law Number 226 of 1995. This law stipulates that the sale of government holdings in an enterprise should be offered to two groups: first to cooperatives and workers’ associations of the enterprise, then to the general public. During the first phase, special terms and credits must be granted, and in the second phase, foreign investors may participate along with the general public. A series of privatizations planned for 2020 were postponed to 2021 due to the pandemic. The government views stimulating private-sector investment in roads, ports, electricity, and gas infrastructure as a high priority. The government is increasingly turning to concessions and using public-private partnerships (PPPs) to secure and incentivize infrastructure development. In order to attract investment and promote PPPs, Colombian modified infrastructure regulations to clarify provisions for frequently-cited obstacles to participation, including environmental licensing, land acquisition, and the displacement of public utilities. The law puts in place a civil procedure that facilitates land expropriation during court cases, allows for expedited environmental licensing, and clarifies that the cost to move or replace public utilities affected by infrastructure projects falls on private companies. However, infrastructure development companies considering bidding on tenders have raised concerns about unacceptable levels of risk that result from a law (Ley 80) establishing the framework for public works projects. They interpret Ley 80 as not establishing liability caps on potential judgments, and that it views company officials equivalent to those with fiscal oversight authority when it comes to criminal liability for misfeasance. Municipal enterprises operate many public utilities and infrastructure services. These municipal enterprises have engaged private sector investment through concessions. There are several successful concessions involving roads. These partnerships have helped promote reforms and create a more attractive environment for private, national, and foreign investment. 10. Political and Security Environment Security in Colombia has improved significantly over recent years, most notably in large urban centers. Terrorist attacks and powerful narco-criminal group operations pose a threat to commercial activity and investment in some rural zones where government control is weak. In 2016, Colombia signed a peace agreement with the FARC to end half a century of confrontation. Congressional approval of that peace accord put in motion a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process, which granted the FARC status as a legal political organization and took over 13,000 combatants off the battlefield. Currently the peace negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN), which began in 2017, are suspended. This terrorist group continues a low-cost, high-impact asymmetric insurgency, including an attack on the Colombian police academy in 2019 that killed 22 cadets. The ELN often focuses attacks on oil pipelines, mines, roads, and electricity towers to disrupt economic activity and pressure the government. The ELN also extorts businesses in their areas of operation, kidnaps personnel, and destroys property of entities that refuse to pay for protection. Costa Rica Executive Summary Costa Rica is the oldest continuous democracy in Latin America and the newest member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), with an established government institutional framework, stable society, and a diversified upper-middle-income economy. The country’s well-educated labor force, relatively low levels of corruption, geographic location, living conditions, dynamic investment promotion board, and attractive free trade zone incentives all appeal to investors. Foreign direct investment inflow in 2020 was USD 1.76 billion, or 2.8 percent of GDP, with the United States accounting for USD 1.2 billion. Costa Rica recorded 7.6 percent GDP growth in 2021 (the highest level since 2008) as it recovered from a 4.5 percent contraction in 2020 largely due to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. Costa Rica has had remarkable success in the last two decades in establishing and promoting an ecosystem of export-oriented technology companies, suppliers of input goods and services, associated public institutions and universities, and a trained and experienced workforce. A similar transformation took place in the tourism sector, with a plethora of smaller enterprises handling a steadily increasing flow of tourists eager to visit despite Costa Rica’s relatively high prices. Costa Rica is doubly fortunate in that these two sectors positively reinforce each other as they both require and encourage English language fluency, openness to the global community, and Costa Rican government efficiency and effectiveness. A 2019 study of the free trade zone (FTZ) economy commissioned by the Costa Rican Investment and Development Board (CINDE) shows an annual 9 percent growth from 2014 to 2018, with the net benefit of that sector reaching 7.9 percent of GDP in 2018. This sector continued to expand during the pandemic. The value of exports increased by 24 percent in 2021, representing the highest growth in 15 years. The Costa Rican investment climate is threatened by a high and persistent government fiscal deficit, underperformance in some key areas of government service provision, including health care and education, high energy costs, and deterioration of basic infrastructure. The Covid-19 world recession damaged the Costa Rican tourism industry, although it is recovering. Furthermore, the government has very little budget flexibility to address the economic fallout and is struggling to find ways to achieve debt relief, unemployment response, and the longer-term policy solutions necessary to continue compliance under the current stabilizing agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). On the plus side, the Costa Rican government has competently managed the crisis despite its tight budget and Costa Rican exports are proving resilient; the portion of the export sector that manufactures medical devices, for example, is facing relatively good economic prospects and companies providing services exports are specialized in virtual support for their clients in a world that is forced to move in that direction. Moreover, Costa Rica’s accession in 2021 to the Organization for Co-operation and Development (OECD) has exerted a positive influence by pushing the country to address its economic weaknesses through executive decrees and legislative reforms in a process that began in 2015. Also in the plus column, the export and investment promotion agencies CINDE and the Costa Rican Foreign Trade Promoter (PROCOMER) have done an excellent job of protecting the Free Trade Zones (FTZs) from new taxes by highlighting the benefits of the regime, promoting local supply chains, and using the FTZs as examples for other sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, Costa Rica’s political and economic leadership faces a difficult balancing act over the coming years as the country must simultaneously exercise budget discipline and respond to demands for improved government-provided infrastructure and services. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 39 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/ index/cri Global Innovation Index 2021 56 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis- indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 2.0bill https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 11,530 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP. PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Costa Rica actively courts FDI, placing a high priority on attracting and retaining high-quality foreign investment. PROCOMER and CINDE lead Costa Rica’s investment promotion efforts. CINDE has had great success over the last several decades in attracting and retaining investment in specific areas, currently services, advanced manufacturing, life sciences, light manufacturing, and the food industry. In addition, the Tourism Institute (ICT) attends to potential investors in the tourism sector. CINDE, PROCOMER, and ICT are strong and effective guides and advocates for their client companies, prioritizing investment retention and maintaining an ongoing dialogue with investors. Costa Rica recognizes and encourages the right of foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in most forms of remunerative activity. The exceptions are in sectors that are reserved for the state (legal monopolies – see #7 below “State Owned Enterprises, first paragraph) or that require participation of at least a certain percentage of Costa Rican citizens or residents (electrical power generation, transport services, professional services, and aspects of broadcasting). Properties in the Maritime Zone (from 50 to 200 meters above the mean high-tide mark) may only be leased from the state and with residency requirements. In the areas of medical services, telecommunications, finance and insurance, state-owned entities dominate, but that does not preclude private sector competition. Costa Rica does not have an investment screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment, beyond those applied under anti-money laundering procedures. U.S. investors are not disadvantaged or singled out by any control mechanism or sector restrictions; to the contrary, U.S. investors figure prominently among the various major categories of FDI. On May 25, 2021, Costa Rica officially became the 38th OECD member. A comprehensive review of the Costa Rican economy was published by the OECD at the conclusion of the accession process, which offered valuable insights into challenges faced by the economy, “OECD Economic Surveys Costa Rica 2020: https://www.oecd.org/countries/costarica/oecd-economic-surveys-costa-rica-2020-2e0fea6c-en.htm . In the same context, the OECD offered a March 2020 review of international investment in Costa Rica: https://www.oecd.org/investment/OECD-Review-of-international-investment-in-Costa-Rica.pdf . For the index of OECD reports on Costa Rica, go to https://www.oecd.org/costarica/ The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted its 2019 “Trade Policy Review” of Costa Rica in September of that year. Trade Policy Reviews are an exercise, mandated in the WTO agreements, in which member countries’ trade and related policies are examined and evaluated at regular intervals: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp492_e.htm . The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) produced in 2019 the report Overview of Economic and Trade Aspects of Fisheries and Seafood Sectors in Costa Rica: https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2583 . The Environmental Justice Atlas – https://ejatlas.org/country/costa-rica – highlights a number of environmental disputes involving foreign investors, some moribund and some ongoing. A new company in Costa Rica must typically register with the National Registry (company and capital registry), Internal Revenue Directorate of the Finance Ministry (taxpayer registration), National Insurance Institute (INS) (basic workers’ comp), Ministry of Health (sanitary permit), Social Security Administration (CCSS) (registry as employer), and the local Municipality (business permit). Legal fees are the biggest single business start-up cost, as all firms registered to individuals must hire a lawyer for a portion of the necessary paperwork. Costa Rica’s business registration website Crearempresa functions but in 2021 is rated last of 76 national business registration sites evaluated by “Global Enterprise Registration” ( www.GER.co ). Traditionally, the Costa Rican government’s small business promotion efforts have tended to focus on participation by women and underserved communities. The National Institute for Women (INAMU), National Training Institute (INA), the Ministry of Economy (MEIC), and PROCOMER through its supply chain initiative have all collaborated extensively to promote small and medium enterprise with an emphasis on women’s entrepreneurship. In 2020, INA launched a network of centers to support small and medium-sized enterprises based upon the U.S. Small Business Development Center (SBDC) model. The Costa Rican government does not promote or incentivize outward investment. Neither does the government discourage or restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Costa Rican laws, regulations, and practices are generally transparent and meant to foster competition in a manner consistent with international norms, except in the sectors controlled by a state monopoly, where competition is explicitly excluded. Rule-making and regulatory authority is housed in any number of agencies specialized by function (telecom, financial, personal data, health, environmental) or location (municipalities, port authorities). Tax, labor, health, and safety laws, though highly bureaucratic, are not seen as unfairly interfering with foreign investment. It is common to have Professional Associations that play a role in policing or guiding their members. Costa Rica is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures ( http://www.businessfacilitation.org ). Within that context, the Ministry of Economy compiled the various procedures needed to do business in Costa Rica: https://tramitescr.meic.go.cr/ . Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms. The stock and bond market regulator SUGEVAL requires International Accounting Standards Board for public companies, while the Costa Rican College of Public Accountants (Colegio de Contadores Publicos de Costa Rica -CCPA) has adopted full International Financial Reporting Standards for non-regulated companies in Costa Rica; for more, see the international federation of accountants IFAC: https://www.ifac.org/about-ifac/membership/country/costa-rica . While the government does not require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure, to facilitate transparency and better inform investors, government entities do regularly encourage commitments to environmental and social standards (e.g., within the coffee and tourism industries) beyond or complementary to purely legal requirements. Certifications with Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) components used by the Costa Rican private sector include an array of agricultural certifications, the B Corporation Certificate, the Environmental Design Certification from the Green Building Council, and the ISO 26000 Social Responsibility standard. In the banking sector, entities under the supervision of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras (Financial Regulator) must comply with corporate governance regulations such as transparency and accountability to shareholders. Regulations must go through a public hearing process when being drafted. Draft bills and regulations are made available for public comment through public consultation processes that will vary in their details according to the public entity and procedure in question, generally giving interested parties sufficient time to respond. The standard period for public comment on technical regulations is 10 days. As appropriate, this process is underpinned by scientific or data-driven assessments. A similarly transparent process applies to proposed laws. The Legislative Assembly generally provides sufficient opportunity for supporters and opponents of a law to understand and comment on proposals. To become law, a proposal must be approved by the Assembly by two plenary votes. The signature of 10 legislators (out of 57) is sufficient after the first vote to send the bill to the Supreme Court for constitutional review within one month, although the court may take longer. Regulations and laws, both proposed and final, for all branches of government are published digitally in the government registry “La Gaceta”: https://www.imprentanacional.go.cr/gaceta/ . The Costa Rican American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham – http://amcham.co.cr ) and other business chambers closely monitor these processes and often coordinate responses as needed. The government has mechanisms to ensure laws and regulations are followed. The Comptroller General’s Office conducts operational as well as financial audits and as such provides the primary oversight and enforcement mechanism within the Costa Rican government to ensure that government bodies follow administrative processes. Each government body’s internal audit office and, in many cases, the customer-service comptroller (Contraloria de Servicios) provide additional support. There are several independent avenues for appealing regulatory decisions, and these are frequently pursued by persons or organizations opposed to a public sector contract or regulatory decision. The avenues include the Comptroller General (Contraloria General de la Republica), the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes), the public services regulatory agency (ARESEP), and the constitutional review chamber of the Supreme Court. The State Litigator’s office (Procuraduria General) is frequently a participant in its role as the government’s attorney. Costa Rica is transparent in reporting its public finances and debt obligations, including explicit and contingent liabilities. Debt obligations are transparent; the Ministry of Finance provides updates on public debt through the year, with the debt categorized as Central Government, Central Government and Non-Financial Sector, and Central Bank of Costa Rica. https://www.hacienda.go.cr/contenido/12519-informacion-de-la-deuda-publica . The following chart covers contingent debt as of January 31, 2022: https://www.hacienda.go.cr/docs/6213fa8ea594c_01-2022%20DEUDA%20CONTINGENTE%20PUBLICAR.pdf The review and enforcement mechanisms described above have kept Costa Rica’s regulatory system relatively transparent and free of abuse, but have also rendered the system for public sector contract approval exceptionally slow and litigious. There have been several cases in which these review bodies have overturned already-executed contracts, thereby interjecting uncertainty into the process. Bureaucratic procedures are frequently long, involved and can be discouraging to new investors. Furthermore, Costa Rica’s product market regulations are more stringent than in any other OECD country, according to the OECD’s 2020 Product Market Regulations Indicator, leading to market inefficiencies. Find this explanation as well as a detailed review of the regulatory challenges Costa Rica faces in the September 2020 OECD report on regulatory reform: https://www.oecd.org/countries/costarica/enhancing-business-dynamism-and-consumer-welfare-in-costa-rica-with-regulatory-reform-53250d35-en.htm While Costa Rica does consult with its neighbors on some regulations through participation in the Central American Integration System (SICA) ( http://www.sica.int/sica/sica_breve.aspx ), Costa Rica’s lawmakers and regulatory bodies habitually refer to sample regulations or legislation from OECD members and others. Costa Rica’s commitment to OECD standards as an OECD member has accentuated this traditional use of best-practices and model legislation. Costa Rica regularly notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers in Trade (TBT). Costa Rica uses the civil law system. The fundamental law is the country’s political constitution of 1949, which grants the unicameral legislature a particularly strong role. Jurisprudence or case law does not constitute legal precedent but can be persuasive if used in legal proceedings. For example, the Chambers of the Supreme Court regularly cite their own precedents. The civil and commercial codes govern commercial transactions. The courts are independent, and their authority is respected. The roles of public prosecutor and government attorney are distinct: the Chief Prosecuting Attorney or Attorney General (Fiscal General) operates a semi-autonomous department within the judicial branch while the government attorney or State Litigator (Procuraduria General) works within the Ministry of Justice and Peace in the Executive branch. The primary criminal investigative body “Organismo de Investigacion Judicial” OIJ, is a semi-autonomous department within the Judicial Branch. Judgments and awards of foreign courts and arbitration panels may be accepted and enforced in Costa Rica through the exequatur process. The Constitution specifically prohibits discriminatory treatment of foreign nationals. The Costa Rican Judicial System addresses the full range of civil, administrative, and criminal cases with a number of specialized courts. The judicial system generally upholds contracts, but caution should be exercised when making investments in sectors reserved or protected by the Constitution or by laws for public operation. Regulations and enforcement actions may be, and often are, appealed to the courts. Costa Rica’s commercial code details all business requirements necessary to operate in Costa Rica. The laws of public administration and public finance contain most requirements for contracting with the state. The legal process to resolve cases involving squatting on land can be especially cumbersome. Land registries are at times incomplete or even contradictory. Buyers should retain experienced legal counsel to help them determine the necessary due diligence regarding the purchase of property. Costa Rican websites are useful to help navigate laws, rules and procedures including that of the investment promotion agency CINDE, http://www.cinde.org/en , the export promotion authority PROCOMER, http://www.procomer.com/ (“inversionista”), and the Health Ministry, https://www.ministeriodesalud.go.cr/ (product registration and import/export). In addition, the State Litigator’s office ( www.pgr.go.cr, the “SCIJ” tab) compiles relevant laws. Two public institutions are responsible for consumer protection as it relates to monopolistic and anti-competitive practices. The “Commission for the Promotion of Competition” (COPROCOM), an autonomous agency housed in the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce, is charged with investigating and correcting anti-competitive behavior across the economy. The Telecommunications Superintendence (SUTEL) shares that responsibility with COPROCOM in the Telecommunications sector. Both agencies are charged with defense of competition, deregulation of economic activity, and consumer protection. Their decisions may be appealed judicially. For the OECD assessment of competition law and policy in Costa Rica, see this July 2020 report: https://www.oecd.org/countries/costarica/costarica-competition.htm. The three principal expropriating government agencies in recent years have been the Ministry of Public Works – MOPT (highway rights-of-way), the state-owned Costa Rican Electrical Institute – ICE (energy infrastructure), and the Ministry of Environment and Energy – MINAE (National Parks and protected areas). Expropriations generally conform to Costa Rica’s laws and treaty obligations. Article 45 of Costa Rica’s Constitution stipulates that private property can be expropriated without proof that it is done for public interest. The 1995 Law 7495 on expropriations further stipulates that expropriations require full and prior payment, and upon full deposit of the calculated amount the government may take possession of land despite the former owner’s dispute of the price. The law makes no distinction between foreigners and nationals. The expropriations law was amended in 1998, 2006, and 2015 to clarify and expedite some procedures, including those necessary to expropriate land for the construction of new roads. (For full detail go to https://PGRweb.go.cr/SCIJ . When reviewing the articles of the law go to the most recent version of each article.) There is no discernible bias against U.S. investments, companies, or representatives during the expropriations process. Costa Rican public institutions follow the law as outlined above and generally act in a way acceptable to the affected landowners. However, when landowners and government differ significantly in their appraisal of the expropriated lands’ value, the resultant judicial processes generally take years to resolve. In addition, landowners have, on occasion, been prevented from developing land which has not yet been formally expropriated for parks or protected areas; the courts will eventually order the government to proceed with the expropriations but the process can be long. The Costa Rican bankruptcy law, addressed in both the commercial code and the civil procedures code, has long been similar to corresponding U.S. law. In February 2021, Costa Rica’s National Assembly approved a comprehensive bankruptcy law #9957 “Ley Concursal”, in effect since December 1, 2021. The new law eases bankruptcy processes and help companies in financial distress to move through the “administrative intervention” intended to save the companies. The previous law too often ended with otherwise viable companies ceasing operations, rather than allowing them to recover, due to a bias towards dissolution of companies in distress. As in the United States, penal law will also apply to criminal malfeasance in some bankruptcy cases. 6. Financial Sector The Costa Rican government’s general attitude towards foreign portfolio investment is prudently welcoming, seeking to facilitate the free flow of financial resources into the economy while minimizing the instability that might be caused by the sudden entry or exit of funds. The securities exchange (Bolsa Nacional de Valores) is small and is dominated by trading in bonds. Stock trading is of limited significance and involves less than 10 of the country’s larger companies, resulting in an illiquid secondary market. There is a small secondary market in commercial paper and repurchase agreements. The Costa Rican government has in recent years explicitly welcomed foreign institutional investors purchasing significant volumes of Costa Rican dollar-denominated government debt in the local market. The securities exchange regulator (SUGEVAL) is generally perceived to be effective. Costa Rica accepted the obligations of IMF Article VIII, agreeing not to impose restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions or engage in discriminatory currency arrangements, except with IMF approval. There are no controls on capital flows in or out of Costa Rica or on portfolio investment in publicly traded companies. Some capital flows are subject to a withholding tax (see section on Foreign Exchange and Remittances). Within Costa Rica, credit is largely allocated on market terms, although long-term capital is scarce. Favorable lending terms for USD-denominated loans compared to colon-denominated loans have made USD-denominated mortgage financing popular and common. Foreign investors are able to borrow in the local market; they are also free to borrow from abroad, although a 15% withholding tax on interest paid will apply when the creditor is a non-tax resident in the country, under the reasoning that the interest payment constitutes income from a Costa Rican source. Potential overseas borrowers must also consider Costa Rica’s limitation on the deductibility of financial expenses by the debtor when the creditor is not an entity regulated in its country of origin by a body like the Costa Rican financial supervisory authority (SUGEF). In such cases, deductible interest for the current fiscal year is around 30% of EBITDA -Earnings Before Interest Taxes Depreciation and Amortization. Costa Rica’s financial system boasts a relatively high financial inclusion rate, estimated by the Central Bank through August 2020 at 81.5 percent (the percentage of adults over the age of 15 holding a bank account). Non-resident foreigners may open what are termed “simplified accounts” in Costa Rican financial institutions, while resident foreigners have full access to all banking services. The banking sector is healthy and well-regulated, although the 2020 non-performing loan ratio of 2.4 percent of active loans as of December 2021 (2.8 percent in state-owned banks) would be significantly higher if not for Covid-19 temporary regulatory measures allowing banks to readjust loans. The country hosts a large number of smaller private banks, credit unions, and factoring houses, although the four state-owned banks (two commercial, one mortgage and one workers’) are still dominant, accounting for 46 percent of the country’s financial system assets. Consolidated total assets of those state-owned banks were USD 29.6 billion, while combined assets of the regulated financial sector (public banks, private banks, savings-and-loans and others) were almost USD 64 billion as of December 2021. Costa Rica’s Central Bank performs the functions of a central bank while also providing support to the four autonomous financial superintendencies (Banking, Securities, Pensions and Insurance) under the supervision of the national council for the supervision of the financial system (CONASSIF). The Central Bank developed and operates the financial system’s transaction settlement and direct transfer mechanism “SINPE” through which clients transfer money to and from accounts with any other account in the financial system. The Central Bank’s governance structure is strong, with a significant degree of autonomy from the Executive Branch. Foreign banks may establish both full operations and branch operations in the country under the supervision of the banking regulator SUGEF. The Central Bank has a good reputation and has had no problem maintaining sufficient correspondent relationships. Costa Rica is steadily improving its ability to ensure the efficacy of anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism finance. The Costa Rican financial sector in broad terms appears to be satisfied to date with the available correspondent banking services. The OECD 2020 report “review of the financial system” for Costa Rica is an excellent resource for those seeking more detail on the current state of Costa Rica’s financial system: https://www.oecd.org/countries/costarica/Costa-Rica-Review-of-Financial-System-2020.pdf . Costa Rica does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Costa Rica’s total of 28 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are commonly known by their abbreviated names. They include monopolies in petroleum-derived fuels (RECOPE), lottery (JPS), railroads (INCOFER), local production of ethanol (CNP/FANAL), water distribution (AyA), and electrical distribution (ICE, CNFL, JASEC, ESPH). SOEs have market dominance in insurance (INS), telecommunications (ICE, RACSA, JASEC, ESPH) and finance (BNCR, BCR, Banco Popular, BANHVI, INVU, INFOCOOP). They have significant market participation in parcel and mail delivery (Correos) and ports operation (INCOP and JAPDEVA). Six of those SOEs hold significant economic power with revenues exceeding 1 percent of GDP: ICE, RECOPE, INS, BNCR, BCR and Banco Popular. The 2020 OECD report “Corporate Governance in Costa Rica” reports that Costa Rican SOE employment is 1.9% of total employment, somewhat below the OECD average of 2.5%. Audited returns for each SOE may be found on each company’s website, while basic revenue and costs for each SOE are available on the General Controller’s Office (CGR) “Sistema de Planes y Presupuestos” https://www.cgr.go.cr/02-consultas/consulta-pp.html . The Costa Rican government does not currently hold minority stakes in commercial enterprises. Costa Rican state-owned enterprises have not in recent decades required continuous and substantial state subsidy to survive. Several (notably ICE, AyA and RECOPE) registered major losses in pandemic year 2020, while others (INS, BCR, BNCR) registered substantial profits, which are allocated as dictated by law and boards of directors. Financial allocations to and earnings from SOEs may be found in the CGR “Sistema de Informacion de Planes y Presupuestos (SIPP)”. U.S. investors and their advocates cite some of the following ways in which Costa Rican SOEs competing in the domestic market receive non-market-based advantages because of their status as state-owned entities. According to Law 7200, electricity generated privately must be purchased by public entities and the installed capacity of the private sector is limited to 30 percent of total electrical installed capacity in the country: 15 percent to small privately-owned renewable energy plants and 15 percent to larger “buildoperatetransfer” (BOT) operations. Telecoms and technology sector companies have called attention to the fact that government agencies often choose SOEs as their telecom services providers despite a full assortment of private-sector telecom companies. The Information and Telecommunications Business Chamber (CAMTIC) has long protested against what its members feel to be unfair use by government entities of a provision (Article 2) in the public contracting law that allows noncompetitive award of contracts to public entities (also termed “direct purchase”) when functionaries of the awarding entity certify the award to be an efficient use of public funds. CAMTIC has compiled detailed statistics showing that while the yearly total dollar value of Costa Rican government direct purchases in the IT sector under Article 2 has dropped considerably from USD 226 million in 2017, to USD 72.5 million in 2018, USD 27.5 million in 2019, USD 54 million in 2020, and USD 5 million in 2021, the number of purchases has actually increased from 56 purchases in both 2017 and 2018 to 86 in 2019, 104 in 2020, and 115 in 2021. The state-owned insurance provider National Insurance Institute (INS) has been adjusting to private sector competition since 2009 but in 2021 still registered 66 percent of total insurance premiums paid; 13 insurers are now registered with insurance regulator SUGESE: ( https://www.sugese.fi.cr/SitePages/index.aspx ). Competitors point to unfair advantages enjoyed by the stateowned insurer INS, including a strong tendency among SOE’s to contract their insurance with INS. Costa Rica is not a party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) although it is registered as an observer. Costa Rica is working to adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs ( www.oecd.org/daf/ca/oecdguidelinesoncorporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises.htm ). For more information on Costa Rica’s SOE’s, see the OECD Accession report “Corporate Governance in Costa Rica”, dated October 2020: https://www.oecd.org/countries/costarica/corporate-governance-in-costa-rica-b313ec37-en.htm . Costa Rica does not have a privatization program and the markets that have been opened to competition in recent decades – banking, telecommunications, insurance and Atlantic Coast container port operations – were opened without privatizing the corresponding state-owned enterprises (SOs). Two relatively minor SOEs, the state liquor company (Fanal) and the International Bank of Costa Rica (Bicsa), are the most likely targets for privatization if such political sentiment grows. 10. Political and Security Environment Since 1948, Costa Rica has not experienced significant domestic political violence. There are no indigenous or external movements likely to produce political or social instability. However, Costa Ricans occasionally follow a long tradition of blocking public roads for a few hours as a way of pressuring the government to address grievances; the traditional government response has been to react slowly, thus giving the grievances time to air. This practice on the part of peaceful protesters can cause logistical problems. Crime increased in Costa Rica in recent decades and U.S. citizen visitors and residents are frequent victims. While petty theft is the main problem, criminals show an increased tendency to use violence. Some crime in Costa Rica is associated with the illegal drug trade. Please see the State Department’s Travel Advisory page for Costa Rica for the latest information- https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/costa-rica-travel-advisory.html 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $62,158 2020 $61,847 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $26,306 2020 $2,000 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $124 2020 $-86 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 1.2% 2020 2.9% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Costa Rican Central Bank. The “FDI Stock” positions detailed here are an accounting expression of the accumulation of FDI through 2020, while the “FDI inflow” statistic given in the first paragraph of the executive summary is the sum of foreign direct investment made in Costa Rica during calendar year 2020, as reported by the Costa Rican Central Bank. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 46,115 100% Total Outward 3,578 100 United States 26,306 57% Nicaragua 1,065 30% Spain 2,810 6% Guatemala 1,023 29% Mexico 2,173 5% Panama 867 24% The Netherlands 1,777 4% United States 124 4% Colombia 1,681 4% Luxembourg 90 3% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Côte d’Ivoire Executive Summary Côte d’Ivoire (CDI) offers a welcoming environment for U.S. investment. The Ivoirian government wants to deepen commercial cooperation with the U.S. The Ivoirian and foreign business community in CDI considers the 2018 investment code generous with welcome incentives and few restrictions on foreign investors. Côte d’Ivoire’s resiliency to the COVID-19 crisis led to quick economic recovery. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth stayed positive at two percent in 2020 and rebounded to 6.5 percent in 2021, with government of CDI projecting average growth at 7.65 percent during the period 2021-2025. International credit rating agency Fitch upgraded the country’s political risk rating in July 2021 from B+ to BB-, while the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) assessment confirms CDI’s economic resilience, despite the Omicron variant of COVID. However, possible repetition of 2021 energy shortages, poor transparency, and delays in reforms could dampen confidence. U.S. businesses operate successfully in several Ivoirian sectors including oil and gas exploration and production; agriculture and value-added agribusiness processing; power generation and renewable energy; IT services; the digital economy; banking; insurance; and infrastructure. The competitiveness of U.S. companies in IT services is exemplified by one company that altered the local payment system by introducing a digital payment system that rapidly increased its market share, forcing competitors to lower prices. Côte d’Ivoire is well poised to attract increased Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) based on the government’s strong response to the pandemic, the buoyancy of the economy, high-level support for private sector investment, and clear priorities set forth in the new 2021-2025 National Development Plan (PND – Plan National de Développement). An important factor is Côte d’Ivoire’s resurgence as a regional economic and transportation hub. Government authorities are continuing to implement structural reforms to improve the business environment, modernize public administration, increase human capital, and boost productivity and private sector development. However, this will not come without challenges and uncertainties in the medium term, particularly regarding the evolution of the pandemic and global recovery as well as regulatory and transparency concerns. Government authorities underscore their commitment to strengthening peace and security systems in the northern zone of the country, while striving for inclusive growth in the context of post-pandemic recovery. Finally, recent political instability in northern and western neighboring countries Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea, could impede investor confidence in the region, especially when it comes to security. Doing business with the Ivoirian government remains a significant challenge in some areas such as procurement, taxation, and regulatory processes. Some new public procurement procedures adopted in 2019 were only implemented in 2021, including implementation of an e-procurement module, and improved evaluation, prioritization, selection, and monitoring procedures. This is a work in process, and concerns remain that these procedures are not consistently and transparently applied. Similar concerns circulate about tax procedures, especially retroactive assessments based on changes in tax formulas. An overly complicated tax system and slow, opaque government decision-making processes hinder investment. Government has identified VAT (Value Added Tax), mining, digitalization, and property taxes as key areas for broadening the tax base and improving state revenues. Other challenges include low levels of literacy and income, weak access to credit for small businesses, corruption, and the need to broaden the tax base to relieve some of the tax-paying burden on businesses. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 105 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2020 110 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings Global Innovation Index 2021 114 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 -$495 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $2,280 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The government actively encourages FDI and is committed to increasing it. The preparation of the 2021-2025 PND was informed by a comprehensive review of the previous 2016-2020 PND to identify the main achievements, remaining challenges and additional strategic priorities. The 2021-2025 PND process was collaborative, including consultations with civil society, private sector, local government, and development finance institutions (DFIs). The government recognizes it cannot achieve its ambitious PND investment goals without increasing foreign investment and private investment to a target of 72 percent of total investment. Prime Minister Achi’s March 2022 visit to the U.S. profiled CDI as an attractive trade and investment partner that offers a conducive environment to accommodate foreign companies. Achi broadcast the government’s objective to use the private sector as a principal element of development, urging U.S. companies to invest in Côte d’Ivoire. He highlighted CDI’s success in delivering peace and stability through its commitment to political dialogue. Part of CDI’s vision by 2030 is to process domestically at least 50 percent of its raw export commodities. Foreign companies are free to invest and list on the Regional Stock Exchange (BVRM – Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières), which is based in Abidjan and covers the eight countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). WAEMU members are part of the Regional Council for Savings and Investment (CREPMF – Conseil Régional de l’Épargne Publique et des Marchés Financiers), a West African securities regulatory body. BRVM has only 46 companies, 34 of which are Ivorian. Looking ahead, the market is slowly going digital, with online trading platforms. Licensed stock broking companies already execute most investors’ trades through an automated trading system. Nevertheless, investor and corporate sentiment remain low. Companies are reluctant to list, and investors do not yet see the market as an alternative way to make profit. There is a need to expand and deepen markets to support international trade, including forward and futures markets. In most sectors, there are no laws that limit foreign investment. There are restrictions, however, on foreign investment in the health sector, law and accounting firms, and travel agencies (see the section below). The Ivoirian government’s investment promotion agency, the Center for the Promotion of Investment in Côte d’Ivoire (CEPICI), promotes and attracts national and foreign investment. Its services are available to all investors and are provided through a one-stop shop intended to facilitate business creation, operation, and expansion. CEPICI ensures that investors receive incentives outlined in the investment code and facilitates access to industrial land. More information is available at http://www.cepici.gouv.ci/. In 2019, the government added a Ministry of Investment Promotion and Private Sector Development, charged with investment promotion activities and development of industrial zones, including economic and free zones. The Ministry oversees the CEPICI and the Ivoirian Enterprise Institute (INIE – Institut Ivoirien de l’Entreprise), charged with programs targeting Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) development. This overlaps with the mandate of the Ministry of SMEs (Ministère de la Promotion des PME, de l’artisanat et de la Transformation du Secteur informel). Côte d’Ivoire maintains an ongoing dialogue with investors through various business networks and platforms, such as the CEPICI, the Ivoirian Chamber of Commerce (CCI-CI), the association of large enterprises (CGECI), and the bankers’ association. CGECI regularly proposes reforms to be adopted by the government regarding private sector financing and investment. CGECI workshops and conferences are venues to discuss issues ranging from tax to access to debt issues. Foreign investors generally have access to all forms of remunerative activity on terms equal to those enjoyed by Ivoirians. The government encourages foreign investment, including investor participation in state-owned firms that the government is privatizing, although in most cases of privatization the state reserves an equity stake in the new company. There are no general, economy-wide limits on foreign ownership or control, and few sector-specific restrictions. There are no laws specifically directing private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association that limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control in those firms, and no such practices have been reported. Non-citizens and foreign entities can buy stocks listed on the regional stock exchange located in Abidjan. Banks and insurance companies are subject to licensing requirements, but there are no restrictions designed to limit foreign ownership or to limit establishment of subsidiaries of foreign companies in this sector. Investments in health, law and accounting, and travel agencies are subject to prior approval and require appropriate licenses and association with an Ivoirian partner. The Ivoirian government has, on a case-by-case basis, mandated using local providers, hiring local employees, or arranging for eventual transfer to local control. The government has implemented local content requirement for companies in the oil and gas sectors. Local content includes an obligation to employ local employees and to work with local SMEs. The government does not have an official policy to screen investments; its overall economic and industrial strategy does not discriminate against foreign-owned firms. There are indications in some instances of preferential treatment for firms from countries with longstanding commercial ties to CDI. In some sectors, such as cocoa and cashew processing, the government gives preferential treatment to Ivoirian companies. For instance, 20 percent of the national cocoa production is exclusively granted to local cocoa exporting companies. Côte d’Ivoire has not conducted an investment policy review (IPR) through the OECD. The WTO last conducted a Trade Policy Review in October 2017, which can be found at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp462_e.htm. UNCTAD published an Investment Policy Review for Côte d’Ivoire in February 2020, which can be found at https://unctad.org/webflyer/investment-policy-review-cote-divoire. The Government of CDI provides information about sector policies and business opportunities in publicly available reports. More information can be found at: https://www.cepici.gouv.ci/. The National Development Plan 2021-2025 outlines the key sectors and priorities of the government regarding investment. The CEPICI manages CDI’s online information portal containing all documents dedicated to business creation and registration (https://cotedivoire.eregulations.org/). All the necessary documentation for registration is available online, however actual registration must be done in person. Further information on business registration is also available on CEPICI’s website (http://www.cepici.gouv.ci/). Businesses can register at the CEPICI’s One-Stop Shop (Guichet Unique) in Abidjan. The One-Stop Shop allows businesses to register with the commercial registrar (Registre du Commerce et du Crédit Immobilier), the tax authority (Direction Générale d’Impôts) and the social security institute (Caisse Nationale de Prévoyance Sociale). The One-Stop Shop also publishes the legal notice of incorporation on CEPICI’s website. All necessary documents for registration are also available on the website. Registration takes between one and three days, while preparation of necessary documents can take more time. The business licensing process, controlled by sector-specific governing bodies, is separate from the registration process. Women have equal access to the registration process. There have not been any reports of discrimination in that regard. International financial institutions are recommending that government authorities better and more transparently address concerns from the private sector in the following general areas: 1) enhancing the regulatory framework, reducing bureaucratic red tape, and improving the provision of public sector services, for example by simplifying and harmonizing the process for issuing business licenses and approvals; 2) promoting digitalization, both in the provision of public services and in public finance management; 3) reducing labor market rigidities by broadening professional training programs; 4) safeguarding property rights, particularly with respect to ownership and transfer of land; 5) deepening financial inclusion and facilitating access to financial markets, also via mobile systems and digital platforms; and 6) reducing uncertainty in the timing of government payments. Government authorities are stepping up efforts to strengthen macroeconomic statistics. The National Strategy for the development of statistics aims to broaden the competencies of the National Institute of Statistics, reinforce its independence, and create a national fund for the development of statistics. Côte d’Ivoire does not promote or incentivize outward investment. However, the government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The government aims for transparency in law and policy to foster competition and provide clear rules of the game and a level playing field for domestic and foreign investors. However, at the operational level, lack of regulatory transparency is a concern. Publication of draft legislation and regulations is not required. Foreign and Ivoirian companies complain that new regulations are issued with little warning and without a period for public comment. For instance, new duties and taxes on products are generally reported in the fiscal annexes towards the end of the year and take immediate effect at the beginning of the next year. The Ministry of Commerce supports introducing a period for public comment on new regulations and changes in regulation before they are implemented, and government often holds ad hoc public seminars and workshops to discuss proposed plans with trade and industry associations. Further work in this area would boost investor confidence. Regulatory actions, once adopted, are published on the government website at enforcement stage. They are also published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (Journal Officiel de la République de Côte d’Ivoire) , which is available for purchase at newsstands and by subscription on the Journal’s website http://www.sgg.gouv.ci/jo.php and at https://abidjan.net/. The National Regulatory Authority for Public Procurement (ANRMP – Autorité Nationale de Régulation des Marchés Publics) polices transparency in public procurement and private sector compliance with public procurement rules. Consumers, trade associations, private companies, and individuals have the right to file complaints with ANRMP to hold the government to its own administrative processes. Since 2019, public tenders’ audits have not been published on the ANRMP official website. Regulatory bodies regularly publish and promote access to their data for the business community and development partners, allowing for scientific and data-driven reviews and assessments. Quantitative analysis and public comments are made available. Regulatory authority and decision-making exist only at the national level. Sub-national jurisdictions do not regulate business. For most industries or sectors, regulations are developed through the ministry responsible for that sector. In the telecommunications, electricity, cocoa, coffee, cotton, and cashew sectors, the government has established control boards or independent agencies to regulate the sector and pricing. Companies have complained that rules for buying prices determined by the agriculture commodity regulatory agencies tend to be opaque and local prices are set arbitrarily without reference to world prices. Côte d’Ivoire’s agency regulating cocoa and coffee (CCC – Conseil Café et Cacao) has identified the need for a single mechanism to control traceability to prevent child labor and deforestation. The private sector and non-governmental stakeholders agree on the need for increased accountability and traceability, but generally prefer a multi-prong approach which incorporates the work already being done in this area outside of government. Growing international awareness of child labor and environmental challenges in CDI, and the possibility that this could impact exports, are catalysts for action. The government publishes tender notices in the local press and sometimes in international magazines and newspapers. On occasion, there is a charge for the bidding documents. Côte d’Ivoire has a generally decentralized government procurement system, with most ministries undertaking their own procurements. The National Bureau of Technical and Development Studies, the government’s technical and investment planning agency and think tank, occasionally serves as an executing agency in major projects to be financed by international institutions. The Public Procurement Department is a centralized office of public tenders in the Ministry of Finance tasked with ensuring compliance with international bidding practices. Côte d’Ivoire’s update to its public procurement code in 2019 introduced electronic procurement bidding, provisions for sustainable public procurement, and promotion of socially responsible vendors as a bidding qualification. While the public procurement process is open by law, in practice it is often opaque and government contracts are occasionally awarded outside of public tenders. During negotiations on a tender, the Ivorian Government at times imposes local content requirements on foreign companies. There are specific regulations governing the government’s use of sole source procurements and the government has awarded sole source bids without tenders, citing the high technical capacity of a firm or a declared emergency. Many firms continue to cite corruption as an obstacle to a transparent understanding of procurement decisions. The National Authority for Regulation of Public Procurement (ANRMP) regulates public procurement with a view to improving governance and transparency. It has the authority to audit and sanction private-sector entities that do not comply with public-procurement regulations, and to provide recommendations to ministries to address irregularities. Côte d’Ivoire’s accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are consistent with international norms, though both foreign and Ivoirian businesses often complain about the government’s poor communication. Côte d’Ivoire is a member of the Organization for the Harmonization of African Business Law (OHADA), which is common to 16 countries and adheres to the WAEMU accounting system. In accounting, companies use the WAEMU system, which complies with international norms and is a source of economic and financial data. Banking regulation follows the Central Bank (BCEAO) monetary policy covering the eight countries of WAEMU. Ivoirian authorities have limited power to conduct monetary policy. The Central Bank regulates interest rates to control the money supply. IMF assessments confirm CDI’s creditworthiness, with strong financial oversight. The Ivoirian government promotes transparency of public finances and debt obligations (including explicit and contingent liabilities) with the publication of this information through the following websites: http://budget.gouv.ci https://www.tresor.gouv.ci/tres/fr_FR/rapport-de-la-dette-publique/ The Ivoirian government incorporates WAEMU directives into its public procurement bidding policy, processes, and auditing. This includes separating auditing and regulatory functions and increasing advance payment for the initial procurement of goods and services from 25 to 30 percent. Côte d’Ivoire is part of the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), whose mandate is to protect economies, reinforce cooperation among member states, harmonize measures, and evaluate current strategies against money laundering and terrorism financing. The government hopes to adopt the draft national strategy to combat money laundering and terrorism financing in 2022. Once adopted, this strategy will put in place regulations and institutions that protect the Ivoirian financial system against money laundering and the financing of terrorism . CDI’s National Financial Information Processing Unit (CENTIF – Cellule nationale de Traitement des Informations financières) analyzes, processes, exploits, and circulates information from atypical financial transactions transmitted by professions subject to the law, in the form of “suspicious transaction reports.” Ivoirian laws, codes, professional-association standards, and regional-body membership obligations are incorporated in the country’s regulatory system. The private sector often follows European norms to take advantage of the Ivoirian trade agreement with the EU – CDI’slargest market. Côte d’Ivoire has been a WTO member since 1995 but has not notified all the draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Côte d’Ivoire signed the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in December 2013 and ratified it in December 2015. The National TFA Committee (NTFC) coordinates TFA implementation. Consistent with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Côte d’Ivoire applies a Common External Tariff (CET) on goods importations. The Ivoirian legal system is based on the French civil-law model. The law guarantees to all the right to own and transfer private property. Rural land, however, is governed by a separate set of laws, which makes ownership and transfer very difficult. The court system enforces contracts. The Commercial Court of Abidjan adjudicates corporate law cases and contract disputes. Mediation is also available through the Ivoirian legal framework in addition to the Commercial Court and the Arbitration Tribunal. The Commercial Court of Abidjan retains jurisdiction for the entire country. The Ivoirian judicial system is ostensibly independent, but magistrates are sometimes subject to political or financial influence. Judges sometimes fail to prove that their decisions are based on the legal or contractual merits of a case and often rule against foreign investors in favor of entrenched interests. A frequent complaint from investors is the slow dispute-resolution process. Cases are often postponed or appealed without a reasonable explanation, moving from court to court for years or even decades. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable and adjudicated through the national court system. The 2018 Investment Code is the primary governing authority for investment conduct. The Code does not restrict foreign investment or the repatriation of funds. The Code offers a mixture of fiscal incentives, combining tax exoneration, patents and licenses contribution and tax credits to encourage investment. The government also offers incentives to promote small businesses and entrepreneurs, low-cost housing construction, factories, and infrastructure development, which the government considers key to the country’s economic development. Concessionary agreements that exempt investors from tax payments require the additional approval of the Ministry of Finance and Economy and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The clearance procedure for planned investments, if the investor seeks tax breaks, is time consuming and confusing. Even when companies have complied fully with the requirements, the Tax Office sometimes denies tax exemptions with little explanation, giving rise to accusations of favoritism. Some sectors have additional laws that govern investment activity in those sectors. In mining, for example, the Mining Code allows for a ten-year holding period for permits with an option to extend for an two additional years on a limited permit area of 400 square kilometers. The government drafted not yet passed in the National Assembly that would impose local-content requirements in the oil and gas sector such as the requirement that companies hire locals, finance personnel training, and support local SMEs. The government is actively seeking to increase the share of local processing of raw agricultural commodities for export from 10 percent to 50 percent by 2025 and is looking for private investments to help reach this goal. Côte d’Ivoire was once a net energy exporter and it is making investments to retake that position as the sub-region’s energy hub. According to 2020 data, the country produces 38,000 barrels-per-day (bpd) of oil from four blocks and 213 million cubic-feet-per-day of gas. The country has divided its offshore Exclusive Economic Zone into 51 hydrocarbons blocks, of which 18 blocks remain available for bid. Currently, the production of gas is entirely used for electricity production. The government seeks to attract more foreign companies to invest in the oil and gas sector. In 2021, the large Italian oil company ENI discovered oil and gas at an offshore well site called “Baleine.” The CEPICI provides a one-stop shop website to assist investors. More information on Côte d’Ivoire’s laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements can be found at: www.apex-ci.org/ www.cepici.gouv.ci/ The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Small Business Promotion, through the Commission on Anti-Competition Practices, is responsible for reviewing competition–related concerns under the 1991 competition law, which was updated in 2013. ANRMP is responsible for reviewing the awarding of contracts. No significant competition cases were reported over the past year. The Ivoirian constitution guarantees the right to own property and freedom from expropriation without compensation. The government may expropriate property with due compensation (fair market value) at the time of expropriation in the case of “public interest.” Perceived corruption and weak judicial and security capacity, however, have resulted in poor enforcement of private property rights, particularly when the entity in question is foreign and the plaintiff is Ivoirian or a long-established foreign resident. Côte d’Ivoire is ranked 85 out of 190 countries for ease of resolving insolvency, according to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report. As a member of OHADA, CDI has both commercial and bankruptcy laws that address the liquidation of business liabilities. OHADA is a regional system of uniform laws on bankruptcy, debt collection, and rules governing business transactions. OHADA permits three different types of bankruptcy liquidation: an ordered suspension of payment to permit a negotiated settlement; an ordered suspension of payment to permit restructuring of the company, like Chapter 11; and the complete liquidation of assets, similar to Chapter 7. Creditors’ rights, irrespective of nationality, are protected equally by the Act. Bankruptcy is not criminalized. Court-ordered monetary settlements resulting from declarations of bankruptcy are usually paid out in local currency. The joint venture Credit Info – Volo West Africa manages regional credit bureaus in WAEMU. 6. Financial Sector Government policies generally encourage foreign portfolio investment. The Regional Stock Exchange (BRVM) is in Abidjan and the BRVM lists companies from the eight countries of the WAEMU. The existing regulatory system effectively facilitates portfolio investment through the West African Central Bank (BCEAO). The Regional Council for Savings Investments (CREPMF) sets the rules and regulations regarding the market participants and market structure. There is sufficient liquidity in the markets to enter and exit sizeable positions. However, the market follows a limit-order mechanism. Besides traditional foreign trade risk management tools offered by commercial banks (i.e., export credits, trade bills), the stock exchange does not provide markets for forwards, futures, or options derivative instruments. Market volatility is low. The market benchmark BRVM Composite rose to 6.63 percent in 2021. Government policies allow the free flow of financial resources into investing in financial assets. The BCEAO respects IMF Article VIII on payment and transfers for current international transactions. Credit allocation is based on market terms and has increased to support the private sector and economic growth, specifically for large businesses. The Central Bank monitors inflation, money supply, and business cycles to ensure efficient monetary policy. The average interbank interest rate was 2.61 percent compared to 3.01 percent in 2021, demonstrating the will of WAEMU nations to boost commercial banks’ liquidity and support private sector investment. Foreign investors can acquire credit on the local market. This year the government facilitated access to capital, lowering borrowing interest rates for real estate companies. As of December 2021, there were 29 commercial banks and two credit institutions in Côte d’Ivoire. Banks are expanding their national networks, especially in the secondary cities outside Abidjan, as domestic investment has increased up-country. The total number of bank branches has more than doubled from 324 in 2010 to 725 branches in 2019 (latest data available). According to the World Bank, in 2017 (latest data available) 41 percent of the population over the age of 15 have a bank account. Alternative financial services available include mobile money and microfinance for bill payments and transfers. Many Ivoirians prefer mobile money over banking, but mobile money does not yet offer the same breadth of financial services as banks. Most Ivoirian banks are compliant with the BCEAO’s minimum capital requirements. The government facilitated mortgages for foreign investors in housing in Côte d’Ivoire. Foreign banks are allowed to operate in Côte d’Ivoire; at least one has been in Côte d’Ivoire for decades. They are subject to the WAEMU Banking Commission’s prudential measures and regulations. There have been no reports of Côte d’Ivoire losing any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years. No correspondent banking relationships are known to be in jeopardy. Côte d’Ivoire does not have a sovereign wealth fund. Rothschild Bank was reported in the press to have been awarded the contract to create one. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Companies owned or controlled by the state are subject to national laws and the tax code. The Ivoirian government still holds substantial interests in many firms, including the refinery SIR (49 percent), the public transport firm (60 percent), the national television station RTI (98 percent), the national lottery (80 percent), the national airline Air Côte d’Ivoire (58 percent), and the land management agency Agence de Gestion Foncière AGEF (35 percent). Total assets of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were $796 million and total net income of SOEs was $116 million in 2018 (latest figures). Of the 82 SOEs, 28 are wholly government-owned and 12 are majority government-owned, the government owns a blocking minority in seven and holds minority shares in 35. Each SOE has an independent board. The government has begun the process of divestiture for some SOEs (see next section). There are active SOEs in the banking, agri-business, mining, and telecom industries. The published list of SOEs is available at https://dgpe.gouv.ci/ind ex.php?p=portefeuille_etat SOEs competing in the domestic market do not receive non-market-based advantages from the government. They are subject to the same tax burdens and policies as private companies. Côte d’Ivoire does not adhere to OECD guidelines for SOE corporate governance (it is not a member of OECD). In 2021, audits of several SOEs highlighted serious irregularities (alleged embezzlement estimated at several tens or even hundreds of billions of FCFA, i.e. up to hundreds of millions of dollars. The SOEs include FER, FDFP, ARTCI, and ANSUT, whose leaders have been removed and replaced. The government has been pursuing SOE privatization for decades the most recent of which was in 2018. That year, the government sold 51 percent of the Housing Bank of Côte d’Ivoire (BHCI – Banque d’Habitat de Côte d’Ivoire). See previous Investment Climate Statements for past privatization efforts. Contracts for participation in SOE privatization are competed through a French-language public tendering process, for which foreign investors are encouraged to submit bids. The Privatization Committee, which reports to the Prime Minister, maintains a website. The 2019 (latest) report is available at: http://privatisation.gouv.ci. 10. Political and Security Environment Following peaceful and inclusive legislative elections in March 2021, CDI entered a period of stability. Major opposition parties participated and won a meaningful number of seats in elections internationally deemed credible. The political leadership clearly recognizes that internal and regional security are prerequisites for sustained economic growth and longer-term stability. All political parties participated in a structured Political Dialogue aimed at fostering reconciliation and strengthening democratic institutions, including dispute resolution mechanisms. The fifth round of the Political Dialogue concluded in March 2022 and produced a consensus list of tangible recommendations to the President of the Republic. The next presidential election is not due until 2025, so there is now a window of opportunity for the country’s political leaders to focus on difficult reforms. The Ivoirian government has demonstrated a strong commitment to addressing insecurity in the region by strengthening its capacity to counter terrorism, strengthen social resilience, professionalize law enforcement, strengthen its justice system, and improve border security. In June 2021, CDI and France inaugurated the International Academy for the Fight Against Terrorism (AILCT) near Jacqueville, west of Abidjan. The aim of this academy is to train relevant cadres (e.g., prosecutors, forensic investigators) and security forces from the African continent to strengthen capacity to prevail against self-styled jihadists within respect for law and human rights, thereby reinforcing ties between the population and the state. This comes at a time of increased security challenges emanating from the Sahel and spilling over into CDI’s northern region. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) N/A N/A 2020 $61,349 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 -$1 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 2.1% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/EconomicTrends/ Fdi.html Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $11,997 Total Outward $2,520 France $2,532 21.1% Burkina Faso $426 16.9% Canada $1,217 10.1% Mali $246 9.8% United Kingdom $986 8.2% Liberia $227 9% Morocco $801 6.7% Ghana $180 7.1% Mauritius $664 5.5% Benin $177 7% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Croatia Executive Summary Croatia’s EU membership has enhanced its economic stability and provided new opportunities for trade and investment. Characteristics that make Croatia an attractive destination for foreign investment include a geostrategic location with diverse topography and temperate climate, well-developed infrastructure, and a well-educated multilingual workforce. The Croatian government settled a longstanding investment dispute with a U.S. investor in December 2021. Historically, the most promising sectors for investment in Croatia have been tourism, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and healthcare, and banking. Investment opportunities are growing in Croatia’s robust IT sector, and the coming years will offer new opportunities related to the energy transition. Croatia also offers visas for so-called “digital nomads” to work in Croatia for up to one year without having to pay local taxes. Despite the ongoing effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the economy experienced a robust rebound of 10.4 percent growth in 2021. Tourism in 2021 exceeded all expectations, and the sector, which accounts for as much as 20 percent of GDP, achieved 88 percent of record-breaking 2019 revenues. Throughout the pandemic, the government distributed more than $1.5 billion in job-retention and economic stabilization measures that significantly helped maintain employment. Unemployment in January 2022 was at 7.8 percent. In early 2022, the government announced nearly $800 million worth of measures to help citizens and businesses cope with rising energy costs. The European Commission estimates the Croatian economy will grow 4.8 percent in 2022 and 3.0 percent in 2023. Croatia will receive more than $30 billion in EU funding through 2030, including approximately $7 billion through the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), which has the potential to provide a significant boost to the economy if the government directs the funds to productive activities that stimulate job creation and economic growth. The government intends to spend approximately 40 percent of RRF funds in support of climate-related and clean energy objectives, including initiatives to improve energy efficiency in public and private buildings, accelerate development of renewable sources of energy, modernize the electricity distribution and transmission grid to facilitate the integration of renewable energy sources, and promote greater investments in geothermal energy. Croatia joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) in July 2020, and the government expects to enter the eurozone on January 1, 2023. Croatia also received an invitation from the OECD in early 2022 to begin the accession process. The Croatian government has taken some positive steps to improve the business climate, but it has been slow to reform the judiciary, which is most often mentioned as one of the greatest barriers to investment. In addition, the economy is burdened by a large government bureaucracy, underperforming state-owned enterprises, and low regulatory transparency. The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated digitalization efforts, which has helped decrease excessive bureaucratic procedures for both citizens and companies. Government reforms also seek to liberalize the services market, diversify capital markets and improve access to alternative financing, and reform tax incentives for research and development. Croatia’s labor laws provide strong protections to workers and there are no risks to doing business responsibly in terms of labor laws and human rights. The government is willing to meet at senior levels with interested investors and to assist in resolving problems. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 63 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/hrv Global Innovation Index 2021 48 of 128 https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2021.pdf U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 $295 million https://www.hnb.hr/en/statistics/statistical-data/rest-of-the-world/foreign-direct-investments World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $27,185 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.KD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Croatia is generally open to foreign investment and the Croatian government continues to make efforts, through financial incentives, to attract foreign investors. All investors, both foreign and domestic, are guaranteed equal treatment by law, with a handful of exceptions described below. However, bureaucratic and political barriers remain. Investors highlight that an unpredictable regulatory framework, lack of transparency, judicial inefficiencies, lengthy administrative procedures, lack of structural reforms, and unresolved property ownership issues all weigh heavily upon the investment climate. Croatia is partnered with the World Bank through European Commission Directorate-General for Structural Reform Support on the “Croatia Business Environment Reform” project which intends to help Croatia implement various business reforms. The Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development Directorate for Internationalization assists investors, including by offering services such as providing information on investment opportunities, offering support through all phases of business development, organizing tours of investment locations and arranging meetings, and promoting Croatia as an investment destination. For more information, see: http://investcroatia.gov.hr/ . The Strategic Investment Act fast-tracks and streamlines bureaucratic processes for large projects valued at $10.7 million or more on the investor’s behalf. Various business groups, including the American Chamber of Commerce, Foreign Investors’ Council, and the Croatian Employers’ Association, are in dialogue with the government about ways to make doing business easier and to keep investment retention as a priority. Croatian law allows for all entities, both foreign and domestic, to establish and own businesses and to engage in all forms of remunerative activities. Article 49 of the Constitution states all entrepreneurs have equal legal status. However, the Croatian government restricts foreign ownership or control of services for a handful of strategic sectors: inland waterways transport, maritime transport, rail transport, air to ground handling, freight-forwarding, publishing, ski instruction, and primary mandated healthcare. Apart from these, the only regulatory requirements to market access involve occupational licensing requirements (architect, auditor, engineer, lawyer, and veterinarian, etc.), about which detailed information can be found at http://psc.hr/en/sectoral-requirements/ . Business services such as consulting, marketing, creative industries, accounting (bookkeeping), and IT are not licensed. Relevant international comparison of the level of regulatory restrictiveness (including for Croatia and the U.S. which is represented by NY and TX) is available at https://www.oecd.org/economy/reform/indicators-of-product-market-regulation/ . Over 90 percent of the banking sector is foreign owned. Croatia does not have a foreign investment screening mechanism, but the government designated the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development Internationalization Directorate as the “National Contact Point” for reviewing direct investments and responding to requests for information from EU Member States or the European Commission, per European Union Directive 2019/452. The latest International Monetary Fund Article IV Staff Report from September 2021 includes a broad overview of economic and financial developments and is available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/09/10/Republic-of-Croatia-2021-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-465424 The American Chamber of Commerce in Croatia publishes position papers on various topics related to the economy and investment climate, which can be found at: https://www.amcham.hr/en/position-papers-d207 . The European Commission’s Country Report Croatia 2020 assesses the country’s economic situation and outlook: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1584545612721&uri=CELEX%3A52020SC0510 . B. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, there were no civil society organizations that provided useful reviews of investment policy related concerns. In March 2020, the Voice of Entrepreneurs business association was formed to advocate for economic measures and reforms to stimulate private sector growth. The association has not yet published its policy recommendations. The Croatian government offers two e-government options for on-line business registration, www.hitro.hr and start.gov.hr , both of which provide 24-hour access. Start.gov.hr provides complete business registration for a limited liability company (d.o.o.), simple limited company (j.d.o.o.), or general business, without any need to physically enter a public administration office. The procedure guarantees a short turnaround on requests and provides deadlines by which the company can expect to be registered. The Start.gov.hr procedure eliminates fees for public notaries, proxies, seals and stamps, and reduces court registration fees by 50 percent. Hitro.hr also provides on-line services but maintains offices in 60 Croatian cities and towns for those who want to register their business in person. In 2021, the Global Enterprise Registration website ( www.GER.co ) rated Croatia’s business registration process 7 out of 10, up from 4 out of 10 in 2020. The government pledged to improve conditions for business registration and continues to identify areas for removing burdensome regulations and processes. Croatia’s business facilitation mechanism provides for equitable treatment to all interested in registering a business, regardless of gender or ethnicity. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) provides an outline of investment facilitation proposals at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/country-navigator/53/croatia . Croatian foreign direct investment totals approximately $85.84 million in the United States, according to Croatian National Bank figures. The government does not promote or incentivize outward investment. Croatia has no restrictions on domestic investors who wish to invest abroad. 3. Legal Regime Croatian legislation, which is harmonized with European Union legislation (acquis communautaire), affords transparent policies and fosters a climate in which all investors are treated equally. Nevertheless, bureaucracy and regulations can be complex and time-consuming, although the government is working to remove unnecessary regulations. There are no informal regulatory processes, and investors should rely solely on government-issued legislation to conduct business. The Croatian Parliament promulgates national legislation, which is implemented at every level of government, although local regulations vary from county to county. Members of Government and Members of Parliament, through working groups or caucuses, are responsible for presenting legislation. Responsible ministries draft and present new legislation to the government for approval. When the Government approves a draft text, it is sent to Parliament for approval. The approved act becomes official on the date defined by Parliament and when it is published in the National Gazette. Citizens maintain the right to initiate a law through their district Member of Parliament. New legislation and changes to existing legislation which have a significant impact on citizens are made available for public commentary at https://esavjetovanja.gov.hr/ECon/Dashboard . The Law on the Review of the Impact of Regulations defines the procedure for impact assessment, planning of legislative activities, and communication with the public, as well as the entities responsible for implementing the impact assessment procedure. The complete text of all legislation is published both online and in the National Gazette, available at: www.nn.hr . Croatia adheres to international accounting standards and abides by international practices through the Accounting Act, which is applied to all accounting businesses. Publicly listed companies must adhere to these accounting standards by law. The Croatian government does not promote or require companies to disclose ESG standards, but the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency (HANFA) oversees implementation of the EU directive on sustainability-related disclosures in the financial sector. HANFA also publishes information regarding sustainable financing, and in March 2021 published guidelines to encourage companies listed on the Zagreb Stock Exchange to start regularly publishing their best practices for sustainability, in order to attract investors interested in sustainable investments. Croatian courts are responsible for ensuring that laws are enforced correctly. If an investor believes that the law or an administrative procedure is not implemented correctly, the investor may initiate a case against the government at the appropriate court. However, judicial remedies are frequently ineffective due to delays or political influence. The Enforcement Act defines the procedure for enforcing claims and seizures carried out by the Financial Agency (FINA), the state-owned company responsible for offering various financial services to include securing payment to claimants following a court enforced order. FINA also has the authority to seize assets or directly settle the claim from the bank account of the person or legal entity that owes the claim. Enforcement proceedings are regulated by the Enforcement Act, last amended in 2017, and by laws regulating its execution, such as the Act on Implementation of the Enforcement over Monetary Assets, amended in 2020. The legislation incorporates European Parliament and European Commission provisions for easily enforcing cross-border financial claims in both business and private instances. Enforcement proceedings are conducted on the basis of enforcement title documents which specify the creditor and debtor, the subject, type, scope, and payment deadline. More information can be found at www.fina.hr . Public finances and debt obligations are transparent and available on the Ministry of Finance website, in Croatian only, at https://mfin.gov.hr/ . Croatia, as an EU member, transposes all EU directives. Domestic legislation is applied nationally and – while local regulations vary from county to county — there is no locally-based legislation that overrides national legislation. Local governments determine zoning for construction and therefore have considerable power in commercial or residential building projects. International accounting, arbitration, financial, and labor norms are incorporated into Croatia’s regulatory system. Croatia has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2000. Croatia submits all draft technical regulations to the WTO, in coordination with the European Commission. The legal system in Croatia is civil and provides for ownership of property and enforcement of legal contracts. The Commercial Company Act defines the forms of legal organization for domestic and foreign investors. It covers general commercial partnerships, limited partnerships, joint stock companies, limited liability companies and economic interest groupings. The Obligatory Relations Act serves to enforce commercial contracts and includes the provision of goods and services in commercial agency contracts. The Croatian constitution provides for an independent judiciary. The judicial system consists of courts of general and specialized jurisdictions. Core structures are the Supreme Court, County Courts, Municipal Courts, and Magistrate/Petty Crimes Courts. Specialized courts include the Administrative Court and High and Lower Commercial Courts. The Constitutional Court determines the constitutionality of laws and government actions and protects and enforces constitutional rights. Municipal courts are courts of first instance for civil and juvenile/criminal cases. The High Commercial Court is located in Zagreb and has appellate review of lower commercial court decisions. The Administrative Court has jurisdiction over the decisions of administrative bodies of all levels of government. The Supreme Court is the highest court in the country and, as such, enjoys jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases. It hears appeals from the County Courts, High Commercial Court, and Administrative Court. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable and adjudicated in the national court system. On January 1, 2021 the government established a High Criminal Court, headquartered in Zagreb, with responsibility for adjudication of second instance appeals against decisions made by County Courts in cases that involve criminal acts. The Ministry of Justice and Public Administration continues to pursue a court reorganization plan intended to increase efficiency and reduce the backlog of judicial cases. The World Bank approved a $110 million loan to Croatia for the Justice for Business Project in March 2020, to support ICT infrastructure upgrades, court process improvements, and other reforms to judicial services to improve the business climate. This initiative will last until 2024. The government is undertaking additional reforms, but significant challenges remain in relation to land registration, training court officers, providing adequate resources to meet the court case load, and reducing the length of bankruptcy procedures. Investors often face problems with unusually protracted court procedures, lack of clarity in legal proceedings, contract enforcement, and judicial efficiency. Croatian courts have decreased the number of civil, criminal, and commercial cases and decreased the disposition time for resolution of those cases, however there is still a significant case backlog. The last available European Commission Country Report for Croatia from 2020 assessed that the length of court proceedings continues to be a burden for business. There are no specific laws aimed at foreign investment; both foreign and domestic market participants in Croatia are protected under the same legislation. The Company Act defines the forms of legal organization for domestic and foreign investors. The following entity types are permitted for foreigners: general partnerships; limited partnerships; branch offices; limited liability companies; and joint stock companies. The Obligatory Relations Act regulates commercial contracts. The Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development Internationalization Directorate (https://investcroatia.gov.hr/en/ ) facilitates both foreign and domestic investment. The directorate’s website offers relevant information on business and investment legislation and includes an investment guide. According to Croatian commercial law, significant or “strategic” business decisions must be approved by 75 percent of the company’s shareholders. Minority investors with at least 25 percent ownership plus one share have what is colloquially called a “golden share,” meaning they can block or veto “strategic” decisions requiring a 75 percent vote. The law calls for minimum 75 percent shareholder approval to remove a supervisory board member, authorize a supervisory board member to make a business decision, revoke preferential shares, change company agreements, authorize mergers or liquidations, and to purchase or invest in something on behalf of the company that is worth more than 20 percent of the company’s initial capita (Note: This list is not exhaustive). The Competition Act defines the rules and methods for promoting and protecting competition. In theory, competitive equality is the standard applied with respect to market access, credit and other business operations, such as licenses and supplies. In practice, however, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and government-designated “strategic” firms may still receive preferential treatment. The Croatian Competition Agency is the country’s competition watchdog, determining whether anti-competitive practices exist and punishing infringements. The Agency adheres to international norms and standards. It has determined in the past that some subsidies to SOEs constituted unlawful state aid, however state aid issues are now handled by the Ministry of Finance. Information on authorities of the Agency and past rulings can be found at www.aztn.hr . The website includes a “call to the public” inviting citizens to provide information on competition-related concerns. Croatia’s Law on Expropriation and Compensation gives the government broad authority to expropriate real property in economic and security-related circumstances, including eminent domain. The Law on Strategic Investments also provides for expropriation for projects that meet the criteria for “strategic” projects. However, it includes provisions that guarantee adequate compensation, in either the form of monetary compensation or real estate of equal value to the expropriated property, in the same town or city. The law includes an appeals mechanism to challenge expropriation decisions by means of a complaint to the Ministry of Justice and Public Administration within 15 days of the expropriation order. The law does not describe the Ministry’s adjudication process. Parties not pleased with the outcome of a Ministry decision can pursue administrative action against the decision, but no appeal to the decision is allowed. There is not a history of alleged expropriations since Croatia declared independence in 1991. The government has not taken measures alleged to be indirect expropriation. Article III of the U.S.-Croatia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) covers both direct and indirect expropriations. The BIT bars all expropriations or nationalizations except those that are for a public purpose, carried out in a non-discriminatory manner, in accordance with due process of law, and subject to prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. ICSID Convention and New York Convention In 1998 Croatia ratified the Washington Convention that established the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Croatia is a signatory to the 1958 New York Convention on the Acceptance and Execution of Foreign Arbitration Decisions. Investor-State Dispute Settlement The Croatian Law on Arbitration addresses both national and international proceedings in Croatia. Parties to arbitration cases are free to appoint arbitrators of any nationality or professional qualifications and Article 12 of the Law on Arbitration requires impartiality and independence of arbitrators. Croatia recognizes binding international arbitration, which may be defined in investment agreements as a means of dispute resolution. Croatia is a signatory to the following international conventions regulating the mutual acceptance and enforcement of foreign arbitration: the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, the 1927 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitration Decisions, and the 1961 European Convention on International Business Arbitration. The Arbitration Act covers domestic arbitration, recognition and enforcement of arbitration rulings, and jurisdictional matters. Once an arbitration decision has been reached, the judgment is executed by court order. If no payment is made by the established deadline, the party benefiting from the decision notifies the Commercial Court, which becomes responsible for enforcing compliance. Arbitration rulings have the force of a final judgment, but can be appealed within three months. In regard to implementation of foreign arbitral awards, Article 19 of the Act on Enforcement states that judgments of foreign courts may be executed only if they “fulfill the conditions for recognition and execution as prescribed by an international agreement or the law.” More detailed requirements for executing foreign arbitral awards are set out in Article 40 of the Arbitration Act. The two main requirements that must be met are: 1) Croatian law must allow for the subject matter to be resolved by arbitration, and 2) recognizing and enforcing the foreign decision would not be contrary to Croatian public order. Moreover, an arbitral award will be recognized in Croatia only if it was not contested by one of the parties on any of the legally prescribed grounds and subsequently annulled by a court. If the arbitral award has not yet become binding for the parties, or if it has been annulled by a court of the country in which it was rendered or if its legal effects were delayed, then the Croatian courts will not recognise such an arbitral award. The Act on Enforcement provides for the collection of financial claims and seizures by the Financial Agency (FINA), which is authorised to implement court decisions ordering enforcement. FINA has the authority to instruct a bank to seize assets or directly settle the claim from the bank account of the debtor. FINA also has the authority to seize assets or directly settle the claim from the bank account of the person or legal entity that owes the claim. More information can be found at www.fina.hr. Article Ten of the U.S.-Croatia BIT sets forth mechanisms for the resolution of investment disputes, defined as any dispute arising out of or relating to an investment authorization, an investment agreement, or an alleged breach of rights conferred, created, or recognized by the BIT with respect to a covered investment. Croatia has no history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors. There is currently one known case filed by a U.S. investor in Croatian courts in 2016, following an investment dispute with a municipality that began in the early 2000s. The investor has announced plans to file a claim at international arbitration courts, citing the U.S.-Croatia BIT as the basis for the action, if an agreement with the government cannot be reached. The Croatian government settled a second longstanding investment dispute with a U.S. investor in December 2021. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts To reduce the backlog of court cases in the Croatian judiciary, non-disputed cases are passed to public notaries, but before those decisions are final and enforceable, they can be contested, in which case procedures will be continued before the competent court. Both mediation and arbitration services are available through the Croatian Chamber of Economy. The Chamber’s permanent arbitration court has been in operation since 1965. Arbitration is voluntary and conforms to UNCITRAL procedures. The Chamber of Economy’s Mediation Center has been operating since 2002 – see https://www.hok-cba.hr/centar-za-mirenje/. There are no major investment disputes currently underway involving state-owned enterprises, other than a dispute between the Croatian government and a Hungarian energy company over implementation of a purchase agreement with a Croatian oil and gas company. There is no evidence that domestic courts rule in favor of state-owned enterprises. Croatia’s Bankruptcy Act corresponds to the EU regulation on insolvency proceedings and United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. All stakeholders in the bankruptcy proceeding, foreign and domestic, are treated equally in terms of the Bankruptcy Act. Bankruptcy is not considered a criminal act. The Financial Operations and Pre-Bankruptcy Settlement Act helps expedite proceedings and establish timeframes for the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings. One of the most important provisions of pre-bankruptcy is that it allows a firm that has been unable to pay all its bills to remain open during the proceedings, thereby allowing it to continue operations and generate cash under financial supervision in hopes that it can recover financial health and avoid closure. The Commercial Court of the county in which a bankrupt company is headquartered has exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters. A bankruptcy tribunal decides on initiating formal bankruptcy proceedings, appoints a trustee, reviews creditor complaints, approves the settlement for creditors, and decides on the closing of proceedings. A bankruptcy judge supervises the trustee (who represents the debtor) and the operations of the creditors’ committee, which is convened to protect the interests of all creditors, oversee the trustee’s work and report back to creditors. The Act establishes the priority of creditor claims, assigning higher priority to those related to taxes and revenues of state, local and administration budgets. It also allows for a debtor or the trustee to petition to reorganize the firm, an alternative aimed at maximizing asset recovery and providing fair and equitable distribution among all creditors. 6. Financial Sector Croatia’s securities and financial markets are open equally to domestic and foreign investment. Foreign residents may open non-resident accounts and may do business both domestically and abroad. Specifically, Article 24 of the Foreign Currency Act states that non-residents may subscribe, pay in, purchase, or sell securities in Croatia in accordance with regulations governing securities transactions. Non-residents and residents are afforded the same treatment in spending and borrowing. These and other non-resident financial activities regarding securities are covered by the Foreign Currency Act, available on the central bank website (www.hnb.hr). Securities are traded on the Zagreb Stock Exchange (ZSE). Regulations that govern activity and participation in the ZSE can be found (in English) at: https://zse.hr/en/legal-regulations/234 . There are three tiers of securities traded on the ZSE. The Capital Markets Act regulates all aspects of securities and investment services and defines the responsibilities of the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency (HANFA). More information can be found (in English) at: http://www.hanfa.hr/regulations/capital-market/ . There is sufficient liquidity in the markets to enter and exit sizeable positions. There are no policies that hinder the free flow of financial resources. There are no restrictions on international payments or transfers, in accordance with IMF Article VIII. The private sector, both domestic and foreign-owned, enjoys open access to credit and a variety of credit instruments on the local market, available on market terms. The banking sector is mostly privatized and is highly developed, competitive, resilient, and increasingly offering a diversity of products to businesses (foreign and domestic) and consumers. According to conclusions from an IMF Virtual Visit with Croatia in November 2020, the banking sector is one of the strongest sectors of the Croatian economy. French, German, Italian, and Austrian companies own over 90 percent of Croatia’s banks. As of December 31, 2021, there were 20 commercial banks and three savings banks, with assets totaling $78.75 billion. The largest bank in Croatia is Italian-owned Zagrebacka Banka, with assets of $20.82 billion and a market share of 26.5 percent. The second largest bank is Italian-owned Privredna Banka Zagreb, with assets totaling $16.46 billion and 20.9 percent market share. The third largest is Austrian Erste Bank, with assets totaling $13.01 billion and a 16.52 percent market share. According to Croatian National Bank statistics, the non-performing loans (NPL) rate for Croatia was 4.3 in 2021, down from 5.4 percent in 2020. The country has a central bank system and all information regarding the Croatian National Bank can be found at https://www.hnb.hr/en/ . In an extraordinary move facilitated by the Croatian National Bank, state-owned Croatian Postal Bank (HPB) bought Sberbank Croatia, a subsidiary of Sberbank Europe, on March 1, reportedly paying $11 million for Sberbank’s assets. The sale saved Sberbank Croatia from bankruptcy following the collapse of Sberbank Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Prior to the sale, Sberbank Croatia had roughly 60,000 clients and represented 2.21 percent of total bank assets in Croatia. Non-residents are able to open bank accounts without restrictions or delays. The Croatian government has not introduced or announced any intention to introduce block chain technologies in banking transactions. The Croatian Constitution guarantees the free transfer, conversion, and repatriation of profits and invested capital for foreign investments. Article VI of the U.S.-Croatia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) establishes protection for American investors from government exchange controls. The BIT obliges both countries to permit all transfers relating to a covered investment to be made freely and without delay into and out of each other’s territory. Transfers of currency are additionally protected by Article VII of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement (http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/AA/index.htm#art7 ). The Croatian Foreign Exchange Act permits foreigners to maintain foreign currency accounts and to make external payments. The Foreign Exchange Act also defines foreign direct investment (FDI) in a manner that includes use of retained earnings for new investments/acquisitions, but excludes financial investments made by institutional investors such as insurance, pension, and investment funds. The law also allows Croatian entities and individuals to invest abroad. Funds associated with any form of investment can be freely converted into any world currency. On July 10, 2020 the European Central Bank and European Commission announced that Croatia had fulfilled its commitments and the Croatian kuna (HRK) was admitted into the Banking Union and European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II), with the exchange rate between the kuna and the euro (EUR) pegged at EUR 1 to 7.5345 HRK. Any risk of currency devaluation or significant depreciation is generally low. The Croatian government intends to adopt the euro on January 1, 2023. Remittance Policies No limitations exist, either temporal or by volume, on remittances. The U.S. Embassy in Zagreb has not received any complaints from American companies regarding transfers and remittances. Croatia does not own any sovereign wealth funds. 10. Political and Security Environment The risk of political violence in Croatia is low. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars in the region, Croatia has emerged as a stable, democratic country and is a member of NATO and the EU. Relations with neighboring countries are generally fair and improving, although some disagreements regarding border demarcation and residual war-related issues persist. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $65,675 2020 $56.8 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 $295 million N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 $85.84 million N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2021 57.7% N/A N/A UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx * GDP for 2021 estimate and FDI for Q1-Q3 2021 at www.hnb.hr Note: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis do not have GDP or FDI data available for 2020 at time of publishing. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (through 2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $37,922 100% Total Outward $5,983 100% The Netherlands $6,615 17.4% Slovenia $1,646 27.5% Austria $5,096 13.4% Bosnia Herzegovina $1,405 23.4% Luxembourg $4,308 11.4% Serbia $1,045 17.5% Germany $3,923 10.3% Switzerland $296 4.9% Italy $3,659 9.6% Montenegro $290 4.8% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. *FDI at www.hnb.hr for Q1-Q3 2020 Cyprus Executive Summary Cyprus is the eastern-most member of the European Union (EU), situated at the crossroads of three continents – Europe, Africa, and Asia – and thus occupies a strategic place in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The Republic of Cyprus (ROC) eagerly welcomes foreign direct investment (FDI). The ROC is a member of the eurozone. English is widely spoken. The legal system is based on UK common law. Legal and accounting services for foreign investors are highly developed. Invest Cyprus, an independent, government-funded entity, aggressively promotes investment in the traditional sectors of shipping, tourism, banking, and financial and professional services. Newer sectors for FDI include energy, film production, investment funds, education, research & development, information technology, and regional headquartering. The discovery of significant hydrocarbon deposits in Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic Zone (and in the surrounding Eastern Mediterranean region) has driven major new FDI by multinational companies in recent years. The ROC has generally handled the pandemic effectively, mitigating its impact on investment to the greatest extent possible. As of March 2022, around 85 percent of the adult population was double-vaccinated, with many people having received a third dose. COVID case loads generally follow trends in continental Europe. COVID cases are again rising, consistent with what we are seeing elsewhere in Europe, the government has a highly effective testing regime in place and has demonstrated competence in managing the local epidemic. The ROC has also demonstrated commitment to promoting green investments, with significant funding allocated to securing a green transition (see Section 8). Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 52 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 28 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 4,900 https://apps.bea.gov/ international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 26,440 https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD The Government of the Republic of Cyprus is the only internationally recognized government on the island, but since 1974 the northern third of Cyprus has been administered by Turkish Cypriots. This area proclaimed itself the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) in 1983. The United States does not recognize the “TRNC” as a government, nor does any country other than Turkey. A substantial number of Turkish troops remain in the northern part of the island. A buffer zone, or “green line,” patrolled by the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), separates the two parts. The Republic of Cyprus and the area administered by Turkish Cypriots are addressed separately below. U.S. citizens can travel to the north / Turkish Cypriot area, however, additional COVID-19 measures may apply when crossing. U.S. companies can invest in the north but should be aware of legal complications and risks due to the lack of international recognition, tensions between the two communities, and isolation of the north from the eurozone. Turkish Cypriot businesses are interested in working with American companies in the fields of agriculture, hospitality, renewable energy, and retail franchising. Significant Turkish aid and investment flows to the “TRNC.” A political settlement between the communities would be a powerful catalyst for island-wide Cypriot economic growth and prosperity. 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The ROC has a favorable attitude towards FDI and welcomes U.S. investors. There is no discrimination against U.S. investment; however, there are some ownership limitations and licensing restrictions set by law on non-EU investment in certain sectors, such as private land ownership, media, and construction (see Limits on Foreign Control, below). The ROC promotes FDI through a dedicated agency, Invest Cyprus, which is tasked with attracting FDI in the key economic sectors of shipping, education, real estate, tourism and hospitality, energy, investment funds, filming, and innovation and startups. Invest Cyprus is the first point of contact for investors, and provides detailed information on the legal, tax, and business regulatory framework. The ROC and Invest Cyprus also promote an ongoing dialogue with investors through a series of promotion seminars each year. The Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCCI) is a robust organization with country-specific bilateral chambers, including the American Chamber (AmCham Cyprus), that is dedicated to promoting FDI and serving the business interests of foreign companies and trade partners operating in Cyprus. For more information: Invest Cyprus 9 Makariou III Avenue Severis Building, 4th Floor 1965 Nicosia, Cyprus Tel: +357 22 441133 Fax: +357 22 441134 Email: info@investcyprus.org.cy Website: https://www.investcyprus.org.cy Cyprus Embassy Trade Center – New York 13 East 40th Street New York, NY 10016 Phone: (212) 213-9100Fax: (212) 213-9100 Website: https://www.cyprustradeny.org/ AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS Turkish Cypriots welcome FDI and are eager to attract investments, particularly those that will lead to the transfer of advanced technology and technical skills. Priority is also given to investments in export-oriented industries. There are no laws or practices that discriminate against FDI. The “Turkish Cypriot Investment Development Agency (YAGA)” provides investment consultancy services, guidance on the legal framework, sector specific advice, and information about investor incentives. “Turkish Cypriot Investment Development Agency” (“YAGA”) Tel: +90 392 – 22 82317 Website: https://investnorthcyprus.gov.ct.tr/ REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The ROC does not currently have a mandatory foreign investment screening mechanism that grants approval to FDI other than sector-specific licenses granted by relevant ministries. Invest Cyprus does grant approvals for investment under the film production incentive scheme. Invest Cyprus often refers projects for review to other agencies. The following restrictions apply to investing in the ROC: Non-EU entities (persons and companies) may purchase only two real estate properties for private use (two holiday homes or a holiday home and a shop or office). This restriction does not apply if the investment property is purchased through a domestic Cypriot company or a corporation elsewhere in the EU. U.S. investment in such companies is welcome. Non-EU entities cannot invest in the production, transfer, and provision of electrical energy. The Council of Ministers may refuse granting a license for investment in hydrocarbons prospecting, exploration, and exploitation to a third-country national or company if that third country does not allow similar investment by Cyprus or other EU member states. ROC hydrocarbon exploration is currently led by two U.S. companies. Individual non-EU investors may not own more than five percent of a local television or radio station, and total non-EU ownership of any single local TV or radio station is restricted to a maximum of 25 percent. The right to register as a building contractor in Cyprus is reserved for citizens of EU member states. Non-EU entities are not allowed to own a majority stake in a local construction company. Non-EU physical persons or legal entities may bid on specific construction projects but only after obtaining a special license from the Council of Ministers. Non-EU entities cannot invest directly in private tertiary education institutions but may do so through ownership of Cypriot or EU companies. The provision of healthcare services on the island is subject to certain restrictions, applying equally to all non-residents. The Central Bank of Cyprus’s prior approval is necessary before any individual person or entity, whether Cypriot or foreign, can acquire more than 9.99 percent of a bank incorporated in Cyprus. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS According to the “Registrar of Companies Office,” all non-Turkish Cypriot ownership of construction companies is capped at 49 percent. Currently, the travel agency sector is closed to foreign investment. Registered foreign investors may buy property for investment purposes but are limited to one parcel or property. Foreign natural persons also have the option of forming private liability companies, and foreign investors can form mutual partnerships with one or more foreign or domestic investors. Nothing to report. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry (MECI) provides a “One Stop Shop” business facilitation service; contact details below. The One-Stop-Shop offers assistance with the logistics of registering a business in Cyprus to all investors, regardless of origin and size. Additionally, since September 2020, MECI offers a Fast Track Business Activation mechanism to provide efficient business registration services to eligible foreign investors who want to establish a physical presence on the island. This program has already generated interest from abroad, attracting several firms in the technology, IT, and communications sectors. One-Stop-Shop & Point of Single Contact Ministry of Energy, Commerce, and Industry (MECI) 13-15 Andreas Araouzos 1421 Nicosia, Cyprus Tel. +357 22 409318 or 321 Fax: +357 22 409432 Email 1: onestopshop@meci.gov.cy Email 2: psccyprus@meci.gov.cy Website: www.businessincyprus.gov.cy MECI’s Department of the Registrar of Companies and Official Receiver (DRCOR) provides the following services: Registration of domestic and overseas companies, partnerships, and business names; bankruptcies and liquidations; and trademarks, patents, and intellectual property matters. Domestic and foreign investors may establish any of the following legal entities or businesses in the ROC: Companies (private or public); General or limited partnerships; Business/trade name; European Company (SE); and Branches of overseas companies. The registration process takes approximately two working days and involves completing an application for approval/change of name, followed by the steps outlined in the following link: http://www.businessincyprus.gov.cy/mcit/psc/psc.nsf/All/A2E29870C32D7F17C2257857002E18C9?OpenDocument. At the end of 2021, there were a total of 203,545 companies registered in the ROC, 12,604 of which had been registered in 2021 (for more statistics on company registrations, please see: https://www.companies.gov.cy/en/ ). In addition to registering a business, foreign investors, like domestic business owners, are required to obtain all permits that may be necessary under Cypriot law. At a minimum, they must obtain residence and employment permits, register for social insurance, and register with the tax authorities for both income tax and Valued Added Tax (VAT). In order to use any building or premises for business, including commerce, industry, or any other income-earning activity, one also needs to obtain a municipal license. Additionally, town planning or building permits are required for building new offices or converting existing buildings. There are many sector-specific procedures. Information on all the above procedures is available online at the link above. The World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report ( http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings) ranked Cyprus 54th out of 190 countries for ease of doing business. Among the ten sub-categories that make up this index, Cyprus performed best in the areas of protecting minority investors (21/190) and paying taxes (29/190), and worst in the areas of enforcing contracts (142/190) and dealing with construction permits (125/190). Cyprus has recorded small gains in almost all subcategories since the 2019 report, with a substantial improvement in the area of paying taxes, achieving a small overall climb in its ranking since last year. Using another metric, in the Global Competitiveness Index, issued by the World Economic Forum, Cyprus maintained its ranking of 44th out of 141 countries in the 2019 edition. The two areas where Cyprus performed the worst in this report were its small market size and relatively low innovation capability. Since 2020, the World Bank Group has discontinued the Doing Business project and is now formulating a new approach to assessing the business and investment climate in economies worldwide. The ROC follows the EU definition of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), and foreign-owned MSMEs are free to take advantage of programs in Cyprus designed to help such companies. https://www.fundingprogrammesportal.gov.cy/en/call/enabling-discovery-and-interoperability-of-federated-research-objects-across-scientific-communities/ Foreign investors can take advantage of the services and expertise of Invest Cyprus, an agency registered under the companies’ law and funded mainly by the state, dedicated to attracting investment. Invest Cyprus 9A Makarios III Ave Severis Bldg., 4th Flr. 1065 Nicosia Tel. +357 22 441133 Fax: +357 22 441134 Email: info@investcyprus.org.cy Website: http://www.investcyprus.org.cy/ Additionally, the Association of Large Investment Projects, under the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry, can provide useful information on large ongoing investment projects: Association of Large Investment Projects 38 Grivas Dhigenis Ave. & 3 Deligiorgis Str., P.O.Box 21455 1509 Nicosia Tel: +357 22 889890 Fax: +357 22 667593 Email: bigprojects@ccci.org.cy Lastly, the Cyprus Country Profiler website offers some useful background on the ROC: https://www.cyprusprofile.com/ AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS Information available on the “Registrar of Companies’” website is available only in Turkish: http://www.rkmmd.gov.ct.tr/. An online registration process for domestic or foreign companies does not exist and registration needs to be completed in person. The “YAGA” website ( https://investnorthcyprus.gov.ct.tr /) provides explanations and guides in English on how to register a company in the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots. As of March 2021, the “Registrar of Companies Office” statistics indicated there were 23,133 registered companies, 429 foreign companies; and 516 offshore companies. The area administered by Turkish Cypriots defines MSMEs as entities having fewer than 250 employees. There are several grant programs financed through Turkish aid and EU aid targeting MSMEs. The Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (KTTO) publishes an annual Competitiveness Report on the Turkish Cypriot economy, based on the World Economic Forum’s methodology. KTTO’s 2019-2020 report ranked Northern Cyprus 107 among 141 economies, dropping eighteen places from its ranking in 2019. KTTO has not published reports since 2020. For more information and requirements on establishing a company, obtaining licenses, and doing business visit: “Turkish Cypriot Investment Development Agency” (“YAGA”) Tel: +90 392 – 22 82317 Website: https://investnorthcyprus.gov.ct.tr/ Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (KTTO) https://www.ktto.net/en/ Tel: +90 392 – 228 37 60 / 228 36 45 Fax: +90 392 – 227 07 82 REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The ROC does not restrict outward investment, other than in compliance with international obligations such as specific UN Security Council Resolutions. In terms of programs to encourage investment, businesses in Cyprus have access to several EU programs promoting entrepreneurship, such as the European Commission’s Next Generation EU economic recovery package, or the Erasmus program for Young Entrepreneurs, in addition to the European Investment Bank’s guarantee facilities for SMEs for projects under USD 4.8 million (EUR 4 million). AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS Turkish Cypriot “officials” do not incentivize or promote outward investment. The Turkish Cypriot authorities do not restrict domestic investors. 3. Legal Regime REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The ROC achieved a score of 4 out of 6 in the World Bank’s composite Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance score (based on data collected December 2015 to April 2016) designed to explore good regulatory practices in three core areas: publication of proposed regulations, consultation around their content, and the use of regulatory impact assessments. For more information, please see: http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/cyprus . U.S. companies competing for ROC government tenders have noted concerns about opaque rules and possible bias by technical committees responsible for preparing specifications and reviewing tender submissions. Overall, however, procedures and regulations are transparent and applied in practice by the government without bias towards foreign investors. The ROC actively promotes good governance and transparency as part of its administrative reform action plan. In line with the above plan and EU requirements, the ROC launched the National Open Data Portal ( https://www.data.gov.cy/ ) in 2016 to increase transparency in government services. Government agencies are now required to post publicly available information, data, and records, on the entire spectrum of their activities. The number of data sets available through this portal has been growing rapidly, although much of it is in Greek only. Several agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) share competency on fostering competition and transparency, including the ROC Commission for the Protection of Competition ( http://www.competition.gov.cy/competition/competition.nsf/index_en/index_en?OpenDocument ), the Competition and Consumer Protection Service, under MECI ( https://meci.gov.cy/en/departments-services/consumer-protection-service ), the Cyprus Consumers Association ( https://www.katanalotis.org.cy/ ), and the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission ( https://www.cysec.gov.cy/en-GB/home/ ). Government and independent oversight agencies such as the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission actively promote companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate transparency. In 2017, the European Commission published guidelines to help companies disclose environmental and social information, which it supplemented in 2019 with guidelines on reporting climate-related information. These guidelines are not mandatory, but many progressive local companies are adopting them to secure their sustainability and long-term gains. Most laws and regulations are published only in Greek and obtaining official English translations can be difficult, but expert analysis in English is generally available from local law and accounting firms when the regulation affects international investment or business activity. When passing new legislation or regulations, Cypriot authorities follow the EU acquis communautaire – the body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all EU members. A formal procedure of public notice and comment is not required in Cyprus, except for specific types of laws. In general, the ROC will seek stakeholder feedback directly. Draft legislation must be published in the Official Gazette before it is debated in the House to allow stakeholders an opportunity to submit comments. The ROC House of Representatives typically invites specific stakeholders to offer their feedback when debating bills. Draft regulations, on the other hand, need not be published in the Official Gazette prior to being approved. In an effort to contribute to global tax transparency, the ROC has adopted the Standard of Automatic Exchange of Information developed by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) known as Common Reporting Standard (CRS). Since 2016, the ROC Tax Department requires all financial institutions to confirm their clients’ jurisdiction(s) of Tax Residence and Respective Tax Identification Number, if applicable. Additionally, the ROC has signed the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), allowing Cypriot tax authorities to share information with U.S. counterparts. Public finances and debt obligations are published as part of the annual budget process. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS The level of transparency for “lawmaking” and adoption of “regulations” in the “TRNC” lags behind U.S. and EU standards. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. Draft legislation or regulations are made available for public comment for 21 days after the legislation is sent to “parliament.” Almost all legislation and regulations are published only in Turkish. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS As an EU member state since May 1, 2004, the Republic of Cyprus must ensure compliance with the acquis communautaire. The acquis is constantly evolving and comprises of Treaties, international agreements, legislation, declarations, resolutions, and other legal instruments. EU legislation, for its part, is subdivided into: Regulations, which are directly applicable to member states and require no further action to have legal effect; Directives, which are addressed to and are binding on member states, but the member state may choose the method by which to implement the directive. Generally, a member state must enact national legislation to comply with a directive; Decisions, which are binding on those parties to whom they are addressed; and Recommendations and opinions, which have no binding force. When there is conflict between European law and the law of any member state, European law prevails; the norms of national law have to be set aside, under the principle of EU law primacy or supremacy. The ROC is often slow to transpose EU directives into local law, but transposition is generally consistent with EU intent when it happens. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS The entire island of Cyprus is considered EU territory, but the acquis communautaire is suspended in the areas administered by Turkish Cypriots and the north is not considered to be within the EU customs area. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS Cyprus is a common law jurisdiction and its legal system is based on English Common Law for both substantive and procedural matters. Cyprus inherited many elements of its legal system from the United Kingdom, including the presumption of innocence, the right to due process, the right to appeal, and the right to a fair public trial. Courts in Cyprus possess the necessary powers to enforce compliance by parties who fail to obey judgments and orders made against them. Public confidence in the integrity of the Cypriot legal system remains strong, although long delays in courts, and the perceived failure of the system collectively to punish those responsible for the island’s financial troubles in 2013 have tended to undermine this trust in recent years. International disputes are resolved through litigation in Cypriot courts or by alternative dispute resolution methods such as mediation or arbitration. Businesses often complain of court gridlock and judgments on cases generally taking years to be issued, particularly for claims involving property foreclosure. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS Investors should note the EU’s acquis communautaire is suspended in the area administered by the Turkish Cypriots. The “TRNC” is a common law jurisdiction. Judicial power other than the “Supreme Court” is exercised by the “Heavy Penalty Courts,” “District Courts,” and “Family Courts.” Turkish Cypriots inherited many elements of their legal system from British colonial rule before 1960, including the right to appeal and the right to a fair public trial. There is a high level of public confidence in the judicial system in the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots. The judicial process is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. Foreign investors can make use of all the rights guaranteed to Turkish Cypriots. Commercial courts and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are not available in the “TRNC.” The resolution of commercial or investment disputes through the “judicial system” can take several years. The Turkish Cypriot administration has trade and industry “law” and contractual “law.” The Turkish Cypriot administration has several trade and economic cooperation agreements with Turkey. For more information about “legislation,” visit https://investnorthcyprus.gov.ct.tr/ . Because the “TRNC” is not recognized internationally, “TRNC court” decisions and orders may be difficult to enforce outside of the area administered by Turkish Cypriots or Turkey. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS For more information on laws affecting incoming foreign investment see https://www.investcyprus.org.cy/ AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS Visit the “YAGA” website, for more information about laws and regulations on FDI: https://investnorthcyprus.gov.ct.tr/ REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The oversight agency for competition is the Commission for the Protection of Competition: http://www.competition.gov.cy/competition/competition.nsf/index_en/index_en?OpenDocument AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS The oversight “agency” for competition is the “Competition Board:” http://www.rekabet.gov.ct.tr/ REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS Private property may, in exceptional instances, be expropriated for public purposes, in a non-discriminatory manner, and in accordance with established principles of international law and consistent with EU law, rights, and directives. The expropriation process entitles investors to proper compensation, whether through mutual agreement, arbitration, or the local courts. Foreign investors may claim damages resulting from an act of illegal expropriation by means other than litigation. Investors and lenders to expropriated entities receive compensation in the currency in which the investment was made. In the event of any delay in the payment of compensation, the Government is also liable for the payment of interest based on the prevailing six-month interest rate for the relevant currency. Like most other jurisdictions, banks in Cyprus are expected to complete the switch from the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) to the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) by June 2023. Following a financial crisis in 2013, the ROC took extraordinary steps as part of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Republic of Cyprus and international lenders (European Commission, European Central Bank, and the IMF – the “troika”). Depositors in two of the largest Cypriot banks were forced to take a cut on almost half of their deposits exceeding insured limits. This action sparked 3,000 lawsuits against the ROC and the banks, but the European Court of Justice ruled that the MOU with the troika was not an unlawful act and dismissed actions for compensation. The ROC has not taken any similar extraordinary actions since. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS Private property may be expropriated for public purposes. The expropriation process entitles investors to proper compensation. Foreign investors may claim damages resulting from an act of illegal expropriation by means other than litigation. In expropriation cases involving private owners, they are first notified, the property is then inspected, and, if an agreement is reached regarding the amount, then the owner is compensated. In cases where the owner declines the compensation package, the case relegated to local “courts” for a final decision. Because the “TRNC” is not recognized internationally, “TRNC court” decisions and orders may be difficult to enforce outside of the area administered by Turkish Cypriots or Turkey. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS New insolvency legislation introduced in 2015 helped overhaul bankruptcy procedures, with a view to resolving the island’s high levels of non-performing loans (NPLs). Bankruptcy procedures can be initiated by a creditor through compulsory liquidation or by the debtor through voluntary liquidation. The court can impose debt rescheduling, in cases where aggregate liabilities do not exceed USD 409,500 (EUR 350,000) and individuals with minimal assets and income may apply to the court via the Insolvency Service for a debt relief order of up to USD 29,250 (EUR 25,000). Discharge from bankruptcy is automatic after three years, provided all debtor assets are sold and the proceeds distributed to creditors. Fraudulent alienation of assets prior to bankruptcy and non-disclosure of assets draws criminal sanctions under the new legislation. Cypriot authorities are closely monitoring implementation of the new insolvency framework. Despite concerted efforts by Cypriot authorities and the banks NPLs remained stubbornly high at 28.5 percent of total loans at the end of 2019, compared to 30.3 percent a year earlier, although two major banks are in the process of selling significant NPL portfolios to investors. The World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report ranked Cyprus 31st from the top among 190 countries in terms of the ease with which it resolves insolvency. For additional information, please see: https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/cyprus#DB_ri . AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS In 2013, the “TRNC” passed a debt restructuring “law” aimed at providing incentives to restructure debts and NPLs separately. Turkish Cypriots also have a bankruptcy “law” that defines “collecting power;” conditions under which a creditor can file a bankruptcy application; and the debtor’s bankruptcy application, and agreement plans. As of the end of the third quarter of 2021, NPLs were 1.5 billion Turkish Lira (USD 10 million). 6. Financial Sector REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The Cyprus Stock Exchange (CSE), launched in 1996, is one of the EU’s smallest stock exchanges, with a capitalization of USD 3.7 billion (EUR 3.4 billion) as of March 2022. The CSE and the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) have operated from a joint trading platform since 2006, allowing capital to move more freely from one exchange to the other, even though both exchanges retain their autonomy and independence. The joint platform has increased capital available to Cypriot firms and improved the CSE’s liquidity, although its small size remains a constraint. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments, which has been enhanced through the operation of private venture capital firms. Credit is allocated on market terms to foreign and local investors alike. Foreign investors may acquire up to 100 percent of the share capital of Cypriot companies listed on the CSE with the notable exception of companies in the banking sector. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS There is no stock exchange in the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots and no foreign portfolio investment. Foreign investors are able to get credit from the local market, provided they have established domestic legal presence, majority-owned (at least 51 percent) by domestic companies or persons. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS At the end of November 2021, the value of total deposits in ROC banks was USD 56.3 billion (EUR 51.2 billion), and the value of total loans was USD 32.6 billion (EUR 29.6 billion). Currently, there are seven local banks in Cyprus offering a full range of retail and corporate banking services – the largest two of which are the Bank of Cyprus and Hellenic Bank – plus another two dozen or so subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks offering more specialized services. The full list of authorized credit institutions in Cyprus is available on the Central bank of Cyprus website: https://www.centralbank.cy/en/licensing-supervision/banks/register-of-credit-institutions-operating-in-cyprus . The banking sector has made significant progress since the 2013 financial crisis resulted in a “haircut” of uninsured deposits, followed by numerous bankruptcies and consolidation. The island’s two largest banks – Bank of Cyprus and Hellenic – are now adequately capitalized and have returned to profitability. However, the profitability of the banking sector as a whole is challenged by low interest margins, a high level of liquidity, and a still-elevated volume of NPLs. NPLs in Cyprus are the second-highest in the EU at 15.1 percent of total loans at the end of November 2021, compared to 19.1 percent a year earlier, albeit considerably lower than in 2014, when they reached 47.8 percent. Banks continue striving to reduce NPLs further, either by selling off portfolios of NPLs or using recently amended insolvency and foreclosure frameworks. The economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and political pressure to protect citizens under the current extraordinary circumstances makes reducing NPLs difficult. Aggregate banking sector data is available here: https://www.centralbank.cy/en/licensing-supervision/banks/aggregate-cyprus-banking-sector-data . Cyprus has a central bank – the Central Bank of Cyprus – which forms part of the European Central Bank. Foreign banks or branches are allowed to establish operations in Cyprus. They are subject to Central Bank of Cyprus supervision, just like domestic banks. JPMorgan, Citibank, Bank of New York Mellon, and HSBC currently provide U.S. dollar correspondent banking services to ROC banks. Opening a personal or corporate bank account in Cyprus is straightforward, requiring routine documents. But because of a history of money-laundering concerns, banks now carefully scrutinize these documents and can conduct extensive due diligence checks on sources of wealth and income. A local bank account is not necessary for personal household expenses. Opening a corporate bank account is mandatory when registering a company in Cyprus. Since 2018, Cyprus has taken steps to address recognized regulatory shortcomings in combatting illicit finance in its international banking and financial services sector, tightening controls over non-resident shell companies and bank accounts. Cyprus’ first National Risk Assessment (NRA) of money laundering and terrorist financing, released in November 2018, is available at: http://mof.gov.cy/en/press-office/announcements/national-risk-assessment-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-cyprus . Cyprus is a member of the Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), a FATF-style regional body. Its most recent mutual evaluation report of the Cypriot banking sector, released December 2021, can be found at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/moneyval/jurisdictions/cyprus . AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS The “Central Bank” oversees and regulates local, foreign, and private banks. In addition to the “Central Bank” and the “Development Bank”, there are 21 banks in the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots, of which 16 are Turkish Cypriot-owned banks, and five are branch banks from Turkey. Banks are required to follow “know-your-customer” (KYC) and AML “laws,” which are regulated by the “Ministry of Economy and Energy,” and supervised by the “Central Bank,” but AML practices do not meet international standards. Due to non-recognition issues, Turkish Cypriot banks do not qualify for a SWIFT number to facilitate international transactions. All international transfers depend on routing through Turkish banks. In the third quarter of 2021, total deposits, which have the largest share in the sector’s total liabilities, reached 48,8 billion TL (USD 3.3 billion). As of the end of the third quarter of 2021 , NPLs reached 1.5 Billion Turkish Lira (USD 10 million). REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The Parliament passed legislation in March 2019 providing for the establishment of a National Investment Fund (NIF) to manage future offshore hydrocarbons and other natural resources revenue. Section 29 of the NIF Law specifies that the Corporation to be set up shall invest the Fund in a diversified manner with a view to maximizing risk-adjusted financial returns and in a manner consistent with the portfolio management by a prudent institutional investor. The Fund is precluded from investing in securities issued by a Cypriot issuer (including the state) or in real estate located in Cyprus. This provision safeguards against the possibility of speculative development catering to the Fund and political interference favoring domestic investments for purposes other than the best interests of the Fund and the Cypriot people as a whole. Additionally, Section 30 of the law provides that the fund cannot invest, directly or indirectly, to acquire more than five percent of any one company or legal entity. The fund is not yet operational. Regulations for the NIF are being drafted and will require legislative approval, and it will be several years before there are any revenues generated from the ROC’s hydrocarbon assets. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS There is no established sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The ROC maintains exclusive or majority-owned stakes in more than 40 SOEs and is making slow progress towards privatizing some of them (see sections on Privatization and OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs). There is no comprehensive list of all SOEs available but the most significant are the following: Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC); Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CyTA); Cyprus Sports Organization; Cyprus Ports Authority; Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CyBC); Cyprus Theatrical Organization; and Cyprus Agricultural Payments Organization. These SOEs operate in a competitive environment (domestically and internationally) and are increasingly responsive to market conditions. The state-owned EAC monopoly on electricity generation and distribution ended in 2014, although competition remains difficult given the small market size and delays in implementing new market rules. As an EU Member State, Cyprus is a party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance are not mandatory for ROC SOEs, although some of the larger SOEs have started adopting elements of corporate governance best practices in their operating procedures. Each of the SOEs is subject to dedicated legislation. Most are governed by a board of directors, typically appointed by the government at the start of its term, and for the duration of its term in office. SOE board chairs are typically technocrats, affiliated with the ruling party. Representatives of labor unions and minority shareholders contribute to decision making. Although they enjoy a fair amount of independence, they report to the relevant minister. SOEs are required by law to publish annual reports and submit their books to the Auditor General. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS In the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots, there are several “state-owned enterprises” and “semi-state-owned enterprises,” usually common utilities and essential services. In the Turkish Cypriot administered area, the below-listed institutions are known as “public economic enterprises” (POEs), “semi-public enterprises” and “public institutions,” which aim to provide common utilities and essential services. Some of these organizations include: Turkish Cypriot Electricity Board (KIBTEK); BRTK – State Television and Radio Broadcasting Corporation; Cyprus Turkish News Agency; Turkish Cypriot Milk Industry; Cypruvex Ltd. – Citrus Facility; EMU – Eastern Mediterranean Foundation Board; Agricultural Products Corporation; Turkish Cypriot Tobacco Products Corporation; Turkish Cypriot Alcoholic Products LTD; Coastal Safety and Salvage Services LTD; and Turkish Cypriot Development Bank. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The ROC has made limited progress towards privatizations, despite earlier commitments to international creditors in 2013 to raise USD 1.6 billion (EUR 1.4 billion) from privatizations by 2018. In 2017, opposition parties passed legislation abolishing the Privatizations Unit, an independent body established March 2014. A bill providing the transfer of Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CyTA) commercial activities to a private legal entity, with the government retaining majority ownership, has been pending since March 2018. In December 2015, under the threat of strikes, the government reversed earlier plans to privatize the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC). However, in recent years, the EAC has been forced to unbundle its operations in line with Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority (CERA) recommendations and EU regulations. The EAC has created independent units for its core regulated activities, namely Transmission, Distribution, Generation, and Supply. Private firms have been offering renewable energy generation since 2003 and electricity supply since January 1, 2021. Despite slow progress in electricity and telecommunications, the current administration continues pursuing privatizations in other areas. In August 2020, the government assigned the Larnaca marina and port privatization project to a Cyprus-Israeli consortium, based on a 40-year lease agreement. The project, starting in April 2022, will be completed in four phases by 2037. It provides for port infrastructure, a marina, land redevelopment, a road network, green areas, parks and pedestrian areas as well as residential units and catering and recreation establishments. At a cost of about EUR1.2 billion, this project will be the biggest investment in Cyprus so far. The government also continues efforts to sell the state lottery, find long-term investors to lease state-owned properties in the Troodos area, and forge a strategic plan on how to handle the Cyprus Stock Exchange. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS The airport at Ercan and K-Pet Petroleum Corporation have been converted into public-private partnerships. The concept of privatization continues to be controversial in the Turkish Cypriot community. In March 2015, Turkish Cypriot authorities signed a public-private partnership agreement with Turkey regarding the management and operation of the water obtained from an underwater pipeline funded by Turkey. Within the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots, there has also been discussion about privatizing the electricity authority “KIBTEK”, Turkish Cypriot telecommunications operations, and the seaports. 10. Political and Security Environment REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS There have been no incidents of politically-motivated damage to foreign projects and or installations since 1974. U.S. companies have not been the target of violence. There were numerous relatively peaceful protests against the ROC government following the financial crisis of March 2013 and in response to the forced conversion of deposits into equity. Since then, protests against additional austerity measures have been fairly calm. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS There have been no incidents of politically-motivated damage to foreign projects and or installations since 1974. U.S. companies have not been the target of violence. Protests and demonstrations, usually targeting the “government,” are commonplace. They are generally peaceful and well-regulated; however, some demonstrations result in scuffles with police or minor damage to buildings. Czechia Executive Summary The Czech Republic is a medium-sized, open economy with 71 percent of its GDP based on exports, mostly from the automotive and engineering industries. According to the Czech Statistical Office, most of the country’s exports go to the European Union (EU), with 32.4 percent going to Germany alone. The United States is the Czech Republic’s second largest non-EU export destination, following the United Kingdom. While the Czech GDP dropped by 5.6 percent due to the economic impact of COVID-19 in 2020, it rebounded in 2021 to 3.3 percent according to the Czech Statistical Office. The Ministry of Finance forecasts 3.1 percent growth for 2022. The “Bill on Screening of Foreign Investments” entered into force May 1, 2021. The law gives the government the ability to screen greenfield investments and acquisitions by non-EU investors. The Czech Republic has taken strides to diversify its traditional investments in engineering into new fields of research and development (R&D) and innovative technologies. EU structural funding has enabled the country to open a number of world-class scientific and high-tech centers. EU member states are the largest investors in the Czech Republic. The United States announced on February 15, 2020 plans to provide up to USD 1 billion in financing through the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund, the dedicated investment vehicle for the Three Seas Initiative and its participating Central and Eastern European countries. The Three Seas Initiative seeks to reinforce security and economic growth in the region through the development of energy, transportation, and digital infrastructure. In December 2020 the DFC approved the first tranche of U.S. financial support for the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund amounting to USD 300 million. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) agreed March 24, 2021, to a request from the Czech cabinet to return as an investor to the Czech Republic after a 13-year pause to help mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy. The EBRD’s investments in the Czech Republic primarily focus on private sector assistance and should reach EUR 100 – 200 million annually (USD109-218 million). The EBRD plans to be involved in investment projects in the Czech Republic temporarily (maximum five years). The continued economic fallout from COVID-19 resulted in the Czech Republic’s highest historic state budget deficit of 419.7 billion crowns (USD 18.2 billion) in 2021. In 2021, the Czech Republic appropriated approximately USD17 billion for the COVID-19 response, including USD7.7 billion in direct support, USD 6.7 billion in healthcare and social services expenses, and USD2.3 billion in loan guarantees. The Czech Republic has adopted environmental strategies and policies to address the climate crisis. Public procurement policies include environmental considerations, and the government provides subsidies to companies for using modern low-carbon technologies, renewables, and resource-effective processes. There are no significant risks to doing business responsibly in areas such as labor and human rights in the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic fully complies with EU and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) standards for labor laws and equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors. Wages continue to trail those in neighboring Western European countries (Czech wages are roughly one-third of comparable German wages). While wage growth slowed in 2020 following the coronavirus pandemic, resulting in a 3.1 percent year-on-year increase, wages rose by 6.1 percent in 2021, according to the Czech Statistical Office. As of the fourth quarter of 2021, wages grew primarily in the real estate, accommodation, and hospitality sectors. As of January 2022, the unemployment rate remained the lowest in the EU, at only 2.3 percent. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 49 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 24 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 5,629 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 22,070 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Czech government actively seeks to attract foreign investment via policies that make the country a competitive destination for companies to locate, operate, and expand. The Czech investment incentives legislation (amended Act No. 72/2000 Coll., effective as of September 6, 2019) creates incentive payments for high value-added investments that focus on R&D and create jobs for university graduates. The law eliminates incentives for investments targeting low-skilled labor and establishes more favorable rules for technological investments in sectors such as aerospace, information and communication technology, life sciences, nanotechnology, and advanced segments of the automotive industry. In addition, due to COVID-19, the government approved November 30, 2020, an amendment to this statute, which enables producers of personal protective equipment, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals to more easily obtain investment incentives. CzechInvest, the government investment promotion agency that operates under the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT), negotiates on behalf of the Czech government with foreign investors. In addition, CzechInvest provides assistance during implementation of investment projects, consulting services for foreign investors entering the Czech market, support for suppliers, and assistance for the development of innovative start-up firms. There are no laws or practices that discriminate against foreign investors. The Czech Republic is a recipient of substantial FDI. Total foreign investment in the Czech Republic (equity capital + reinvested earnings + other capital) equaled USD 192.5 billion at the end of 2020, compared to USD 171.3 billion in 2019. As a medium-sized, open, export-driven economy, the Czech market is strongly dependent on foreign demand, especially from EU partners. In 2021, 84 percent of Czech exports went to fellow EU member states, with 32.4 percent to the Czech Republic’s largest trading partner, Germany, according to the Czech Statistical Office. Since emerging from recession in 2013, the economy had enjoyed some of the highest GDP growth rates of the European Union until the COVID-19 outbreak. While GDP declined by 5.6 percent in 2020, it rebounded in 2021 and grew by 3.3 percent. The Ministry of Finance is forecasting 3.1 percent growth for 2022. The Czech Republic has no plans to adopt the euro as it believes having its own currency and independent monetary policy is helpful for managing economic crises such as the one caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The slow pace of legislative and judicial reforms has posed obstacles to investment, competitiveness, and company restructuring. The Czech government has harmonized its laws with EU legislation and the acquis communautaire. This effort involved positive reforms of the judicial system, civil administration, financial markets regulation, protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, and in many other areas important to investors. While there have been many success stories involving American and other foreign investors, a handful have experienced problems, for example in the media industry. Both foreign and domestic businesses voice concerns about corruption. Long-term economic challenges include dealing with an aging population and diversifying the economy away from manufacturing toward a more high-tech, services-based, knowledge economy. Foreign individuals or entities can operate a business under the same conditions as Czechs. Foreign entities need to register their permanent branches with the Czech Commercial Register. Some professionals, such as architects, physicians, lawyers, auditors, and tax advisors, must register for membership in the appropriate professional chamber. In general, licensing and membership requirements apply equally to foreign and domestic professionals. In response to the European Commission’s September 2017 investment screening directive, the Czech government adopted foreign investment screening legislation. The law came into effect on May 1, 2021, and gives the government the ability to review greenfield investments and acquisitions by non-EU foreign investors. The law allows the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) to screen FDI in virtually any sector of the Czech economy but specifies four high-risk sectors for which investment screening is mandatory: critical infrastructure, ICT systems used for critical infrastructure, military equipment, and sensitive dual use items. Outside these critical sectors, non-EU investors are under no obligation to report acquisitions or greenfield investments, but MOIT can retroactively review investments at any point within five years if security concerns arise. Screening of acquisitions is triggered when a non-EU buyer attempts to make a purchase that would give it at least 10 percent of the voting rights of a Czech company. However, screening is possible at an even lower threshold in cases where the foreign investor has additional means of exerting potentially malign control over a Czech company, such as through appointment of staff to key positions. Furthermore, the law gives regulators considerable leeway to designate an investor as “non-EU” if the investor is “indirectly controlled” by non-EU business or individuals. As of early 2012, U.S. and other non-EU nationals could purchase real estate, including agricultural land, in the Czech Republic without restrictions. However, following the implementation of the investment screening law as of May 1, 2021, land purchases by non-EU investors may be screened if located near critical infrastructure, such as military installations. Enterprises are permitted to engage in any legal activity with the previously noted limitations in sensitive sectors. The right of foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises is guaranteed by law. Laws on auditing, accounting, and bankruptcy are in force, including the use of international accounting standards (IAS). The OECD last conducted an economic survey of the government in 2020. Individuals must complete a number of bureaucratic requirements to set up a business or operate as a freelancer or contractor. MOIT provides an electronic guide for obtaining a business license. The guide offers step-by-step assistance, including links to related legislation and statistical data, and specifying authorities with whom to work (such as business registration, tax administration, social security, and municipal authorities). The guide is available at: https://www.mpo.cz/en/business/licensed-trades/guide-to-licensed-trades/. MOIT also has established regional information points to provide consulting services related to doing business in the Czech Republic and EU. A list of contact points is available at: https://www.businessinfo.cz/en/starting-a-business/starting-up-points-of-single-contact-psc/addresses-points-of-single-contact-psc/. The average time required to start a business is 25 days according to the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ Index. The Czech Republic’s Business Register is publicly accessible and provides details on business entities including legal addresses and major executives. An application for an entry into the Business Register can be submitted in a hard copy, via a direct entry by a public notary, or electronically, subject to meeting online registration criteria requirements. The Business Register is publicly available at: https://or.justice.cz/ias/ui/rejstrik. The Czech Republic’s Trade Register is an online information system that collects and provides information on entities facilitating small trade and craft-oriented business activities, as specifically determined by related legislation. It is available online at: http://www.rzp.cz/eng/index.html. The Czech government does not incentivize outward investment. The volume of outward investment is lower than incoming FDI. According to the latest data from the Czech National Bank, Czech outward investments amounted to USD51.3 billion in 2020, compared to inward investments of USD 195.2 billion. However, according to the Export Guarantee and Insurance Corporation (EGAP), Czech companies increasingly invest abroad to get closer to their customers, save on transport costs, and shorten delivery times. As part of EU sanctions, there is a total ban on EU investment in North Korea as of 2017. 3. Legal Regime Tax, labor, environment, health and safety, and other laws generally do not distort or impede investment. Policy frameworks are consistent with a market economy. Fair market competition is overseen by the Office for the Protection of Competition (UOHS) (http://www.uohs.cz/en/homepage.html). UOHS is a central administrative body entirely independent in its decision-making practice. The office is mandated to create conditions for support and protection of competition and to supervise public procurement and state aid. The government requires companies with over 500 employees to undertake environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures to facilitate transparency. All laws and regulations in the Czech Republic are published before they enter into force. Opportunities for prior consultation on pending regulations exist, and all interested parties, including foreign entities, can participate. A biannual governmental plan of legislative and non-legislative work is available online, along with information on draft laws and regulations (often only in the Czech language). Business associations, consumer groups, and other non-governmental organizations, including the American Chamber of Commerce, can submit comments on laws and regulations. Laws on auditing, accounting, and bankruptcy are in force. These laws include the use of international accounting standards (IAS) for consolidated corporate groups. Public finances are transparent. The government’s budget and information on debt obligations are publicly available and published online. Membership in the EU requires the Czech Republic to adopt EU laws and regulations, including rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Czechoslovakia was a founding member of the GATT in 1947 and a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Since the Czech Republic’s entry into the EU in 2004, the European Commission – an independent body representing all EU members – oversees Czech equities in the WTO and in trade negotiations. The Czech Commercial Code and Civil Code are largely based on the German legal approach, which follows a continental legal system where the principal areas of law and procedures are codified. The commercial code details rules pertaining to legal entities and is analogous to corporate law in the United States. The civil code deals primarily with contractual relationships among parties. The Czech Civil Code, Act. No. 89/2012 Coll. and the Act on Business Corporations, Act No. 90/2012 Coll. (Corporations Act) govern business and investment activities. The Act on Business Corporations introduced substantial changes to Czech corporate law such as supervision over the performance of a company’s management team, decision-making process, and remuneration and damage liability. Detailed provisions for mergers and time limits on decisions by the authorities on registration of companies are covered, as well as protection of creditors and minority shareholders. The judiciary is independent of the executive branch. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable, and the judicial process is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. The Foreign Direct Investment agenda is governed by the Civil Code and by the Act on Business Corporations. In addition, the newly adopted investment screening law, which came into effect on May 1, 2020, gives the government the ability to screen greenfield investments and acquisitions by non-EU investors for national security considerations. The Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade maintains a “one-stop-shop” website available in Czech only at https://www.businessinfo.cz/, which aids foreign companies in establishing and managing a foreign-owned business in the Czech Republic, including navigating the legal requirements, licensing, and operating in the EU market. The Office for the Protection of Competition (UOHS) is the central authority responsible for creating conditions that favor and protect competition. UOHS also supervises public procurement and monitors state aid (subsidy) programs. UOHS is led by a chairperson who is appointed by the president of the Czech Republic for a six-year term. Government acquisition of property is done only for public purposes in a non-discriminatory manner and in full compliance with international law. The process of tracing the history of property and land acquisition can be complex and time-consuming, but it is necessary to ensure clear title. Investors participating in privatization of state-owned companies are protected from restitution claims through a binding contract with the government. The government amended the bankruptcy law on June 1, 2019, expanding the categories of debtors qualified for debt discharge. The basic debt relief period for individuals is currently five years. However, if the debtor is a pensioner, disabled, his or her debt was created prior 18 years of age, or manages to repay at least 60 percent of debt, then the debt relief period shortened to three years. 6. Financial Sector The Czech Republic is open to portfolio investment. There are 54 companies listed on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE). The overall trade volume of stocks increased from CZK108.78 billion (USD4.7 billion) in 2019 to CZK125.31 (USD5.4 billion) in 2020, with an average daily trading volume of CZK501.23 million (USD21.7 million). In March 2007, the PSE created the Prague Energy Exchange (PXE), which was later re-named to Power Exchange Central Europe, to trade electricity in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and, later, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. PXE’s goal is to increase liquidity in the electricity market and create a standardized platform for trading energy. In 2016, the German power exchange EEX acquired two thirds of PXE shares. Following the acquisition, the PXE benefited from both an increased number of traders and increased trade volume. The Czech National Bank, as the financial market supervisory authority, sets rules to safeguard the stability of the banking sector, capital markets, and insurance and pension scheme industries, and systematically regulates, supervises and, where appropriate, issues penalties for non-compliance with these rules. The Central Credit Register (CCR) is an information system that pools information on the credit commitments of individual entrepreneurs and legal entities, facilitating the efficient exchange of information between CCR participants. CCR participants consist of all banks and branches of foreign banks operating in the Czech Republic, as well as other individuals included in a special law. As an EU member country, the local market provides credits and credit instruments on market terms that are available to foreign investors. The Czech Republic respects IMF Article VIII. Large domestic banks belong to European banking groups. Most operate conservatively and concentrate almost exclusively on the domestic Czech market. Despite the COVID-19 crisis, Czech banks remain healthy. Results of regular banking sector stress tests, as conducted by the Czech National Bank, repeatedly confirm the strong state of the Czech banking sector which is deemed resistant to potential shocks. Results of the most recent stress test conducted by the Czech National Bank are available at: https://www.cnb.cz/en/financial-stability/stress-testing/banking-sector/. As of January 31, 2022, the total assets of commercial banks stood at CZK9,405 billion (approximately USD409 billion). Foreign investors have access to bank credit on the local market, and credit is generally allocated on market terms. The Czech National Bank has 10 correspondent banking relationships, including JP Morgan Chase Bank in New York and the Royal Bank of Canada in Toronto. The Czech Republic has not lost any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years, and there are no relationships in jeopardy. The Czech Republic does not currently regulate cryptocurrencies. The Czech government does not operate a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Ministry of Finance administers state ownership policies. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are structured as joint-stock companies, state enterprises, national enterprises, limited liability companies, and limited partnerships. SOEs are owned by the individual ministries but are managed according to their business organizational structure as defined by law and are required to publish an annual report, disclose their accounting books, and submit to an independent audit. Potential conflicts of interest are covered by existing Act No. 159/2006 on Conflicts of Interest, and Act No. 14/2017 on Amendments to the Act on Conflict of Interest. Legislation on the civil service, which took effect January 1, 2015, established measures to prevent political influence over public administration, including operation of SOEs. Private enterprises are generally allowed to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, government contracts and other business operations. SOEs purchase or supply goods and services from private sector and foreign firms. SOEs are subject to the same domestic accounting standards, rules, and taxation policies as their private competitors, and are not given any material advantages compared to private entities. State-owned or majority state-owned companies are present in several (strategic) sectors, including the energy, postal service, information and communication, and transport sectors. The Czech Republic has 52 wholly owned SOEs and three majority owned SOEs (excluding those in liquidation). Wholly owned SOEs employ roughly 78,000 people and own more than CZK487 billion (approximately USD21.1 billion) in assets. A list of all companies with a percentage of state ownership is available in Czech at: https://www.komora.cz/legislation/167-19-strategie-vlastnicke-politiky-statu-t-20-12-2019/. As an OECD member, the Czech Republic promotes the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the affiliated Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. SOEs are subject to the same legislation as private enterprises regarding their commercial activities. As a result of several waves of privatization, the vast majority of the Czech economy is now in private hands. Privatizations have generally been open to foreign investors. In fact, most major SOEs were privatized with foreign participation. The government evaluates all investment offers for SOEs. Many competitors have alleged non-transparent or unfair practices in connection with past privatizations. Democratic Republic of the Congo Executive Summary The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the largest country in Sub-Saharan Africa and one of the richest in the world in terms of natural resources. With 80 million hectares (197 million acres) of arable land and 1,100 minerals and precious metals, the DRC has the resources to achieve prosperity for its people. Despite its potential, the DRC often cannot provide adequate food, security, infrastructure, and health care to its estimated 100 million inhabitants, of which 75 percent live on less than two dollars a day. The ascension of Felix Tshisekedi to the presidency in 2019 and his government’s commitment to attracting international, and particularly U.S. investment, have raised the hopes of the business community for greater openness and transparency. In January 2021, the DRC government (GDRC) became eligible for preferential trade preferences under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), reflecting progress made on human rights, anti-corruption, and labor. Tshisekedi created a presidential unit to address business climate issues. In late 2020 Tshisekedi ejected former President Joseph Kabila’s party from the ruling coalition and in April 2021 he appointed a new cabinet. Overall investment is on the rise, fueled by multilateral donor financing and private domestic and international finance. The natural resource sector has historically attracted the most foreign investment and continues to attract investors’ attention as global demand for the DRC’s minerals grows. The primary minerals sector is the country’s main source of revenue, as exports of copper, cobalt, gold, coltan, diamond, tin, and tungsten provide over 95 percent of the DRC’s export revenue. The highly competitive telecommunications industry has also experienced significant investment, as has the energy sector through green sources such as hydroelectric and solar power generation. Several breweries and bottlers, some large construction firms, and limited textiles production are active. Given the vast needs, there are commercial opportunities in aviation, road, rail, border security, water transport, and the ports. The agricultural and forestry sectors present opportunities for sustainable economic diversification in the DRC, and companies are expressing interest in developing carbon credit markets to fund investment. Overall, businesses in the DRC face numerous challenges, including poor infrastructure, a predatory taxation system, and corruption. The COVID-19 pandemic slowed economic growth and worsened the country’s food security, and the Russia’s attacks on Ukraine have raised global prices on imported foods and gasoline. Armed groups remain active in the eastern part of the country, making for a fragile security situation that negatively affects the business environment. Reform of a non-transparent and often corrupt legal system is underway. While laws protecting investors are in effect, the court system is often very slow to make decisions or follow the law, allowing numerous investment disputes to last for years Concerns over the use of child labor in the artisanal mining of copper and cobalt have served to discourage potential purchasers. USG assistance programs to build capacity for labor inspections and enforcement are helping to address these concerns. The government’s announced priorities include greater efforts to address corruption, election reform, a review of mining contracts signed under the Kabila regime, and improvements to mining sector revenue collection. The economy experienced increased growth in 2021 based on renewed demand for its minerals. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 169 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 $25 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita (USD) 2020 $550 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The ascension of Felix Tshisekedi to the Presidency in January 2019 and his welcoming attitude toward foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly from the United States, have raised hopes that the GDRC can impose and monitor investor-friendly policies. FDI-friendly laws exist, but the judicial system is slow to protect investors’ rights and is susceptible to political pressure and corruption. Investors hope that Tshisekedi can create a more favorable environment by improving the rule of law and tackling corruption. The DRC’s rich endowment of natural resources, large population, and generally open trading system offer significant potential opportunities for U.S. investors. For more than a decade, the DRC has undertaken reforms related to investment in order to make its business environment competitive and attractive including reforms to the investment code, the mining code, the insurance code, the agricultural Act, the Act on the liberalization of electricity, and the telecommunications code. The GDRC has also promoted improvements in the tax, customs, parafiscal, non-tax and foreign exchange regimes, which are applicable to collaboration agreements and cooperation projects, as well as the decree on the strategic partnership on value chains, the Industrial Property Act, the Public-Private Partnership Act, the Competition Act, and the Special Economic Zones Act. The main regulations governing FDI are found in the Investment Code Act (No. 004/2002 of February 21, 2002). Current regulations reserve the practice of small-scale commerce and retail commerce in DRC to nationals and prohibit majority ownership by foreigners of agricultural enterprises. The ordinance of “August 8, 1990” clearly states that “small business may only be carried out by Congolese”. Foreign investors must limit themselves to import trade and wholesale and semi-wholesale trade. Investors fear that the ban on foreign agricultural ownership will stifle any attempt to revive the agrarian sector. The National Investment Promotion Agency (ANAPI) is the official investment agency, providing investment facilitation services for initial investments above $200,000. It is mandated to promote the positive image of the DRC and specific investment opportunities; advocate for the improvement of the business climate in the country; and provide administrative support to new foreign investors who decide to establish or expand their economic activities on the national territory. More information is available at https://www.investindrc.cd/ . The GDRC maintains an ongoing dialogue with investors to hear their concerns. There are several public and private sector forums that address the government on the investment climate in specific sectors. In 2019, the GDRC created the Business Climate Unit (CCA) to monitor and improve the business enabling environment in the DRC, and to interface with the business community. In June 2020, the CCA presented a roadmap for reforms. In December 2021, the CCA developed a digital tool for monitoring and evaluating reforms and missions within the public administration, to allow the highest authorities, including the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, to follow in real time the progress of the implementation of reforms by the various ministers. The Public-Private mining group Financial and Technical Partners (PTF) represents countries with significant mining investments in the DRC. On March 1, 2022, the GDRC created, by decree, the Agency for the Steering, Coordination and Monitoring of Cooperation Agreements between the DRC and its Private Partners (APCSC). This agency will oversee the implementation of cooperation agreements that the DRC has concluded with private companies, particularly in the areas of basic infrastructure and natural resources. The APCSC serves as an interface between the various parties and entities interested in projects resulting from collaboration or cooperation agreements in basic infrastructure and natural resources, including the GDRC, private companies and/or groups of companies, as well as any joint venture or monitoring structure created for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, or marketing natural resources and/or carrying out infrastructure work. The Federation of Congolese Enterprises (FEC), a private sector organization that partners with the government and workers’ unions, maintains a dialogue on business interests with the government. The GDRC provides the right for foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. Foreign ownership or control is possible except in certain excepted sectors. The DRC law reserves small-scale commerce and retail trade to Congolese nationals and there is a foreign ownership limit of 49 percent for agricultural concerns, which limits agricultural investment. Many investors note that in practice the GDRC requires foreign investors to hire local agents and participate in joint ventures with the government or local partners. The new telecommunications law enacted in 2022 includes a 25 percent ownership requirement. Some foreign investors in the mining sector note that the 2018 mining code raised royalty rates from two to ten percent, raising tax rates on “strategic” metals, and imposing a surcharge on the “super profits” of mining companies. The code also removed a stability clause that protected investors from any new taxes or duties for ten years. The Tshisekedi government has indicated that it is prepared to reopen discussions on the mining code. The GDRC does not maintain an organization to screen inbound investment. The Presidency and the ministries serve this purpose de facto. In May 2021 President Tshisekedi announced his intention to review the content of and compliance with mining contracts signed under former President Kabila, a process that is still ongoing. In the past five years, has the GDRC not been subject to a third-party investment policy review (IPR) through a multilateral organization such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), World Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) or the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights. Cities with high custom clearance traffic use Sydonia https://asycuda.org/wp-content/uploads/Etude-de-Cas-SYDONIA-Contr%C3%B4le-de-la-Valeur-RDC.pdf , which is an advanced software system for custom administrations in compliance with ASYCUDA WORLD. (ASYCUDA is a large technical assistance software program recommended by UNCTAD for custom clearance management.) The international NGO The Sentry published a report in November 2021 on a multi-million-dollar embezzlement and bribery operation using money intended to support infrastructure development. The NGO Global Witness reported in 2019 that a DRC-based bank was involved in laundering money for Congolese officials. The GDRC operates a “one-stop-shop” for Business Creation (GUCE) that brings together all the government entities involved in the registration of a company in the DRC with an electronic tracking system of the business creation file online. The goal is to permit the quick and simple registration of companies through one office in one location. In October 2020, President Tshisekedi instructed the government to restructure GUCE in order to ease its work with the various state organizations involved in its operation. More information is available at https://guichetunique.cd/ . In December 2021, the GDRC attempted to make the GUCE more efficient for companies by implementing a system that allows for online business registration. Using the GUCE’s online portal, companies fill out a “single form,” which integrates all of the services involved in the process of creating a company including the Notary’s Office, the Registry of the Commerce and Personal Property Credit Register, the Administration of Tax Authority (DGI), a Center for Ordination of the General Directorate of Administrative, State, Judicial and Participation Revenues (DGRAD), the Administration of the National Economy, the National Fund of Social Security (CNSS), the Administration of the Environment, the National Office of Employment (ONEM), the National Institute of Professional Preparation (INPP), the General Inspection of Work; and a representation of Municipal Entities. Businesses may also need to obtain an operating permit as required by some city councils. The registration process should now take three days, but in practice it can take much longer. Some businesses have reported that the GUCE has significantly shortened and simplified the overall business registration process. The GDRC does not promote or incentivize outward investment. There are currently no government restrictions preventing domestic investors from investing abroad, and there is currently no blacklist of countries with which domestic investors are prevented from doing business. 3. Legal Regime The 2018 Law on Pricing, Freedom, and Competition (the “Competition Act”) created a Competition Commission. DRC law mandates review if a company’s turnover is equal to or exceeds the amount determined by Decree of the Prime Minister upon proposal of the Minister of the Economy; if the party in question also holds a combined market share of 25% or more; or if the contemplated transaction creates / reinforces an already dominant position. DRC law requires notification prior to a corporate merger. The DRC is a member of the regional competition bodies, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),and the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (“OHADA”), which covers francophone African countries . OHADA does not have an operational merger control regime in place, while COMESA does have merger control. Merger activities in the DRC should should comply with COMESA standards. There are no informal regulations run by private or nongovernmental organizations that discriminate against foreign investors. However, some U.S. investors perceive the regulations in the mining and agricultural sectors mandating a percentage of local ownership as discriminatory against foreign investment. Proposed laws and regulations are rarely published in draft format for public discussion and comment; discussion is typically limited to the governmental entity that proposes the draft law and Parliament prior to enactment. Sometimes the government will hold a public hearing after public appeals. The Official Gazette of the DRC is a specialized service of the Presidency of the Republic, which publishes and disseminates legislative and regulatory texts, judicial decisions, acts of companies, associations and political parties, designs, industrial models, trademarks as well as any other act referred to in the law. More information is available at http://www.leganet.cd/ . There are no formal or informal GDRC provisions that systematically impede foreign investment. Companies often complain of facing administrative hurdles as laws and regulations are often poorly or unevenly applied. DRC is member of Francophone Africa’s OHADA – the Organization for Business and Customs Harmonization, or Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires – a system of accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures which covers the legal framework in the areas of contract, company, and bankruptcy law and sets up an accounting system better aligned to international standards. A Coordination Committee in the DRC monitors OHADA implementation. The GDRC does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. However, some companies believe that compliance with international ESG standards can attract new financing and are taking steps to ensure that their companies are ESG compliant. These companies believe that compliance allows them to have a positive impact on the communities in which they operate and protect the environment. Draft bills or regulations are rarely made available for public comment, or through a public comment process. Discussion is usually limited to the government entity proposing the bill and to Parliament before the bill’s enactment. Sometimes the government will hold a public hearing after public appeals. The Official Gazette of the DRC is a specialized service of the Presidency of the Republic, which publishes and disseminates legislative and regulatory texts, judicial decisions, acts of companies, associations and political parties, designs, industrial models, trademarks as well as any other act referred to in the law. More information is available at http://www.leganet.cd/ . Oversight mechanisms are weak, and often the law does not require audits to ensure that internal controls are in place or that administrative procedures are followed. Companies often complain that they face administrative barriers, with the government often poorly or unevenly enforcing laws and regulations. However, there are regulatory authorities in different sectors that ensure compliance with laws, regulations, conventions, etc., in order to guarantee effective and fair competition for the benefit of consumers and to provide legal and regulatory certainty for private investors. Some of them can issue, suspend, or withdraw authorizations and establish corresponding specifications. In August 2021, the GDRC established the National Agency for Export Promotion (ANAPEX), with the aim of identifying and attracting foreign investments to sectors with export potential. Following the decree signed in March 2022 by the Prime Minister, a new public establishment called the Agency for the Steering, Coordination and Monitoring of Collaboration Agreements Between the DRC and Private Partners (APCSC) was created. It replaces the Office for Coordination and Monitoring of the Sino-Congolese Program (BCPSC) established by former President Kabila and limited to agreements with Chinese investors. The APCSC will focus particularly on the areas of basic infrastructure and natural resources. Through the National Agency for the Promotion of Exports (ANAPEX), the DRC can take advantage of its commitments at the regional level and can also target the Asian, European, and American markets to increase exports and further diversify its international markets. APCSC will interface between the various parties and entities interested in collaborating on projects in basic infrastructure and natural resources. The enforcement process is legally reviewable, sometimes digitalized, and otherwise made accountable to the public. Public and private institutions responsible for monitoring and regulating various sectors make regulatory enforcement mechanisms publicly available. Regulatory agencies regularly publish their data and make it available to the business community and development partners, allowing for scientific and data-driven reviews and assessments. In 2021, the DRC made significant progress by producing and publicly issuing a revised budget when budget execution deviated significantly from budget projections. Information on debt obligations was publicly available, except for major State-Owned Enterprise debt information. However, the GDRC strives to promote transparency in public finances and debt obligations (including explicit and contingent liabilities) by publishing information on https://budget.gouv.cd/ . The DRC is a member of several regional economic blocs, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (“OHADA”), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC). In April 2022, the DRC joined the East African Community. The Congolese Parliament must still ratify the EAC’s laws and regulations before the agreement take effect. The GDRC has made efforts to harmonize its system with these regional bodies. According to the Congolese National Standardization Committee, the DRC has adopted 470 harmonized COMESA standards, which are based on the European system. The DRC is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and seeks to comply with Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIM) requirements, including notifying regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The DRC is a civil code country, and the main provisions of its private law date back to the Napoleonic Civil Code. The general characteristics of the Congolese legal system are similar to those of the Belgian system. Various local laws govern both personal status laws and property rights, including inheritance and land ownership systems in traditional communities throughout the country. The Congolese legal system consists of three branches: public law, private law, and economic law. Public law governs legal relationships involving the state or state authority; private law governs relationships between private persons; and economic law governs interactions in areas such as labor, trade, mining, and investment. The DRC has written commercial and contractual laws. The DRC has thirteen commercial courts located in its main business cities, including Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Matadi, Boma, Kisangani, and Mbuji-Mayi. These courts are designed to be led by professional judges specializing in commercial matters and exist in parallel to the judicial system. However, a lack of qualified personnel and reluctance by some DRC jurisdictions to fully recognize OHADA law and institutions have hindered the development of commercial courts. Legal documents in the DRC can be found at: http://www.leganet.cd/ . The current executive branch has generally not interfered with judicial proceedings. The current judicial process is not procedurally reliable, and its rulings are not always respected. The national court system provides an appeals mechanism under the OHADA framework. The 2002 Investment Code governs most foreign direct investment (FDI) and provides for investment protection. Law n°004/2002 on the Investment Code, through the provisions of articles 23-30, which provide the mechanisms of security and guarantees for investments as well as customs, tax, and parafiscal exemptions. The country’s constitution and laws state that the property (private and collective) of all persons in the DRC is sacred. The GDRC guarantees the right to individual or collective property acquired in accordance with the law or custom. It encourages and ensures the security of private, national, and foreign investments. No one may be deprived of his or her property except for reasons of public utility and in return for fair and prior compensation granted under the conditions established by law; the State guarantees the right to private initiative to both nationals and foreigners. The Public Private Partnership (PPP) Act provides for the guarantee of execution of the partnership contract regardless of a change of government (art. 15). Taxation in this law a common application of the law, except for the reduction of the tax on profits and earnings, which is set at 15%. There are other laws that grant customs exemptions, such as the Agricultural Act, the Partnership Act in the Value Chain, etc. The law favors amicable settlement or arbitration in case of investment disputes. Specific sectoral laws govern agriculture, industry (protection of industrial property), infrastructure and civil engineering, transportation (operating license in air transport), mining research and exploitation, hydrocarbons, various electricity sub-sectors, information and communication technologies (ICT) (license to operate telecommunications services), insurance and reinsurance, healthcare, and arms production and related military activities. Notwithstanding the specific provisions governing each of these sectors, all investors are required to submit a copy of their investment file to the DRC investment agency ANAPI ( www.investindrc.cd ). The Telecommunications Law went into effect in 2021, bringing the first revision of the law since 2002. The government’s decisions in 2021 to establish an agency to monitor foreign investment in infrastructure and natural resources and to create a presidential body to review all mining contracts have affected some of the largest investments in the DRC. The GUCE provides a One-Stop Shop designed to simplify business creation. The GUCE has reduced the processing time from five months to three days and for corporations, the fee was lowered from $120 to $80. For sole proprietorships, the fee has been reduced from $40 to $30. There is also an Integral One-Stop Shop for foreign trade (GUICE), which is a neutral, transparent, and secure electronic platform, accessible 24 hours a day to the entire foreign trade community. It centralizes all regulatory, customs and logistical components related to the import, export, and transit of goods ( https://segucerdc.com ). GUICE is operated by SEGUCE RDC SA, a private operator under the framework of a public-private partnership. Competition Commission – COMCO is the regulatory and supervisory body for competition in DRC under the Organic Law no. 18/020 on Pricing Freedom and Competition and the COMESA Competition Regulation. It ensures that the rules of free competition are respected by economic operators. This commission works to allow all economic operators, according to their capacities, to exercise a fair competition, based on the quality of goods, products, and services, respecting the official price structure. Its priorities are acquisitions and mergers (investigating, evaluating, and monitoring acquisitions and mergers), business practices and exemptions (investigating anti-competitive practices), consumer welfare (acting against violators), and good practice awareness (good practices and anti-competitive consequences). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ordered the GDRC to pay a liability judgment of $619 million to the South African company Dig Oil due to breach of contract. The GDRC is considering settling the 2020 judgment but has yet to do so. In August 2021, the Minister of Justice informed the GDRC of six emblematic cases of international litigation. The main causes of the DRC’s multiple liabilities in these cases are the poor management of the disputes by the sectoral authorities, the late transmission of files to the Ministry of Justice, and the failure to respect the findings of arbitration procedures. President Tshisekedi has called for better monitoring of cases involving the DRC before the courts in order to reduce the risk of the state being found liable for hundreds of millions of dollars. As a member of COMESA, the DRC follows the COMESA Competition Regulations and rules, and the COMESA competition body regulates competition. Agency decisions may be appealed to the courts/judicial system. The GDRC may proceed with an expropriation when it benefits the public interest, and the person or entity subject to an expropriation should receive fair compensation. There have been no expropriations of property in the past three years. Some claims have been taken to arbitration, though many arbitral judgments against the GDRC have are not resulted in a payment. Businesses report that the GDRC levies heavy fines, which is a form of financial expropriation. A government agency imposes fines because a company has not paid a tax, although often the tax system is unclear, and several government agencies impose different taxes. Companies that appeal these fines in court often face a long wait. 6. Financial Sector The government welcomes investment including by foreign portfolio investors. A small number of private equity firms are actively investing in the mining industry. The institutional investor base is not well developed, with only an insurance company and a state pension fund as participants. There is no market for derivatives in the country. Cross-shareholding and stable shareholding arrangements are also not common. Credit is allocated on market terms, but there are occasional complaints about unfair privileges extended to certain investors in profitable sectors such as mining and telecommunications. There is no domestic stock market. Although reforms have been initiated, the Congolese financial system remains small, heavily dollarized, characterized by fragile balance sheets, and difficult to use. Further reforms are needed to strengthen the financial system, sustain its expansion, and stimulate economic growth. Inadequate risk-based controls, weak regulatory enforcement, low profitability, and over-reliance on demand deposits undermine the resilience of the financial system. The DRC’s capital market remains underdeveloped and consists primarily of the issuance of Treasury bonds. The Central Bank refrains from making restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. It is possible for foreign companies to borrow from local banks, but their options are limited. Loan terms are generally limited to 3-6 months, and interest rates are typically 16-21 percent. The inconsistent legal system, the often-burdensome business climate, and the difficulty of obtaining interbank financing discourage banks from making long-term loans. Opportunities for financing large projects in the national currency, the Congolese franc (CDF), are limited. The Congolese financial system is comprised of 15 licensed banks, a national insurance company (SONAS), the National Social Security Institute (INSS), one development bank, SOFIDE (Société Financière de Development), a savings fund (CADECO), roughly 21 microfinance institutions and 72 cooperatives, 81 money transfer institutions which are concentrated in Kinshasa, Kongo Central, former Bandundu, North and South Kivu and the former Katanga provinces, 4 electronic money institutions, and 48 foreign exchange offices. While the financial system is improving, it is fragmented and dominated by so-called “local” banks. With very different profiles (international, local, pan-African, networked, corporate, etc.) and approaches that diverge fundamentally in terms of management, governance, and terms of management and risk appetite, the so-called “local” commercial banks continue to dominate the banking sector. Pan-African banks are increasing their share, especially with the recent acquisition of the Banque Commerciale du Congo by the Kenyan Equity Group. The Central Bank controls monetary policy and regulates the banking system. Banks are mainly concentrated in the provinces of Kinshasa, Kongo Central, North and South Kivu, and Haut Katanga. The banking penetration rate is about 7.6 percent, or about 5.3 million accounts, which places the country among the least banked nations in the world. Mobile banking has the potential to significantly increase the banking customer base, as an estimated 35 million Congolese use cell phones. In the last five years, there has been an evolution and consolidation of prudential ratios or risk indicators of the banking sector and the introduction of alternative channels for financial service delivery and inclusion, such as Agency Banking and Mobile Banking. Mobile money continues to play an increasingly important role in financial inclusion in the DRC, as mobile money is a lever for economic and social inclusion. Over the past ten years, mobile money subscriptions in the DRC have increased by 20 percent per year. There is no debt market. The financial health of DRC banks is fragile, reflecting high operating costs and exchange rates. In 2021 asset quality measures taken by the Central Bank allowed banks to absorb the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Fees charged by banks are a major source of revenue. Statistics on non-performing loans are not available because many banks only record the balance due and not the total amount of their non-performing loans. The financial system is primarily based on the banking sector, with total assets estimated at US$ 5.2 billion. Of the five largest banks, four are local and one is controlled by foreign holding companies. The five largest banks hold nearly 65 percent of bank deposits and more than 60 percent of total bank assets, or about $ 3.1 billion. The country has an operating central banking system with Citigroup as the only correspondent bank. All foreign banks or branches need to be accredited by the Central Bank, are considered Congolese banks with foreign capital, and fall under the provisions and regulations covering the credit institutions’ activities in the DRC. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account in the DRC. The DRC has no declared Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF), although the 2018 Mining Code refers to creating a future fund “FOMIN” that will be capitalized by a percentage of mining revenues. In October 2021, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Technical Secretariat organized a workshop to develop the FOMIN decree as well as tools for managing the shares of mining royalties accruing to the provinces and local entities. 10. Political and Security Environment The DRC has a history of armed group activity, sometimes of a politicized nature and particularly in the east of the country, and of elections-related violence and civil unrest. The 2018 election, which took place after years of delay marked by protests that were in some instances violently repressed, was marred by irregularities, but most citizens accepted the announced result, and the election aftermath was calm. In January 2019, Felix Tshisekedi became President in the DRC’s first peaceful transition of power. Following President Felix Tshisekedi’s establishment of a new political alliance known as the “Sacred Union,” Tshisekedi appointed Jean-Michel Sama Lukonde as Prime Minister in April 2021. The security situation continues to be a concern and the U.S. Embassy, through its travel advisories ( https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/DemocraticRepublicoftheCongoDRC.html), keeps a list of areas where it does not recommend travel by U.S. citizens. The security situation in eastern DRC remains unstable. Some 15-20 significant armed groups are present and inter-communal violence can affect the political, security, and humanitarian situation. Several towns in eastern DRC continue to be reported to be under attack by armed groups or temporarily under their control. The foreign terrorist organization-designated ISIS-DRC (aka the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebel group) in eastern DRC is one of the country’s most notorious and intractable armed groups and its members have shown no interest in demobilizing. In May 2021, Tshisekedi declared a “state of siege” – effectively martial law – in North Kivu and Ituri provinces, installing military governors and ramping up Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) operations against ISIS-DRC/ADF and other armed groups. The state of siege has been accompanied by problematic human rights practices; the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has documented violations including extrajudicial killings by FARDC and police, while military governments have restricted civil society and political activists and prosecuted some for criticizing the state of siege. US citizens and interests are not being specifically targeted by armed groups, but anyone can easily fall victim to violence or kidnapping by being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset tracks political violence in developing countries, including the DRC, https://acleddata.com/ . Kivu Security Tracker ( https://kivusecurity.org/ ) is another database for information on attacks in eastern DRC. The Department of State continues to advise U.S. citizen travelers to review the Embassy’s Travel Advisory and country information page ( https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/DemocraticRepublicoftheCongoDRC.html) for the latest security information. Denmark Executive Summary Denmark is regarded by many independent observers as one of the world’s most attractive business environments and ranks highly in indices measuring political, economic, and regulatory stability. It is a member of the European Union (EU), and Danish legislation and regulations conform to EU standards on virtually all issues. It maintains a fixed exchange rate policy, with the Danish Krone linked closely to the Euro. Denmark is a social welfare state with a thoroughly modern market economy heavily driven by trade in goods and services. Given that exports account for about 60 percent of GDP, the economic conditions of its major trading partners – the United States, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom – have a substantial impact on Danish national accounts. Denmark is a world leader in “green technology” industries, such as offshore wind and energy efficiency, and in sectors such as shipping and life sciences. Denmark is a net exporter of food. Its manufacturing sector depends on raw material imports. Within the EU, Denmark is among the strongest supporters of liberal trade policy. Transparency International regularly ranks Denmark as being perceived as the least corrupt nation in the world. Denmark is strategically situated to link continental Europe with the Nordic and Baltic countries. Transport and communications infrastructures are efficient. The Danish economy experienced a contraction of 2.1 percent of GDP in 2020 due to COVID-19 followed by a 4.7 percent rebound in 2021, thereby weathering the pandemic with among the lowest declines in GDP in the EU. Denmark’s economic activity and employment have surpassed their pre-pandemic levels and trends, but companies across sectors cite labor shortages as a key challenge. In May 2022, the Ministry of Finance revised its GDP growth projections, forecasting 3.5 percent GDP growth in 2022, decelerating to 2 percent annual GDP growth in 2023. The Ministry projects the Danish economy will weather headwinds from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and surging energy prices, as well as elevated levels of inflation, due to its robust foundation, although economic activity will be at a slightly lower level. The Ministry anticipates the impact will mainly be through increased inflation and disruption of trade. Denmark’s underlying macroeconomic conditions, however, are healthy, and the investment climate is sound. The entrepreneurial climate, including female-led entrepreneurship, is robust. New legislation establishing a foreign investment screening mechanism to prevent threats to national security and public order came into effect on July 1, 2021. The mechanism requires mandatory notification for investments in the following five sectors: defense, IT security and processing of classified information, companies producing dual-use items, critical technology, and critical infrastructure. It allows for voluntary notification for all sectors. The legislation does not apply to Greenland or to the Faroe Islands, though both are looking into potential legislation. In 2020, the Danish parliament passed the Danish Climate Act, which established a statutory target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 70 percent from 1990 levels in 2030 and achieving net zero by 2050. In April 2022, the government presented a reform proposal on Danish energy policy to move towards the above goals and simultaneously achieve independence from Russian natural gas. The proposal includes plans for increased domestic production of biogas as well as natural gas from the North Sea, a quadrupling of combined onshore wind and solar power production capacity by 2030, and an expansion of district heating. The government also proposed green taxation to finance the transition with a differentiated carbon emission tax in addition to the EU carbon trading system. Note: Additional information on the investment climates in the constituent parts of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland, can be found at the end of this report. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 1 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 9 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 9.9 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 63,010 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment As a small country with an open economy, Denmark is highly dependent on foreign trade and investment. Exports comprise the most significant component (60 percent) of GDP. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) ranks Denmark as the world’s sixth-most attractive business environment and the leading nation in the Nordic region. The EIU characterizes Denmark’s business environment as reflecting excellent infrastructure, a friendly policy towards private enterprise and competition, low bureaucracy, and a well-developed digital sector. Principal concerns include low productivity growth, a high personal tax burden, and potential capacity constraints on the labor market. Overall, however, operating conditions for companies are broadly favorable. Denmark ranks highly in multiple categories, including its political and institutional environment, macroeconomic stability, foreign investment policy, private enterprise policy, financing, and infrastructure. As of February 2022, the EIU rated Denmark an “AA” country on its Country Risk Service, noting the country is on the “cusp of an upgrade.” Denmark ranked tenth out of 140 on the World Economic Forum’s 2019 Global Competitiveness Report and sixth on the EIU 2021 Democracy Index. Denmark has an AAA rating from Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch Group. “Invest in Denmark,” an agency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and part of the Danish Trade Council, provides detailed information to potential investors. Invest in Denmark has prioritized six sectors in its strategy to attract foreign investment: tech, cleantech, life sciences, food, maritime, and design and innovation. The website for the agency is https://investindk.com . As an EU member state, Denmark is bound by EU rules on the free movement of goods, capital, persons, and certain services. Denmark welcomes foreign investment and does not discriminate between EU and other investors. Denmark’s central and regional governments actively encourage foreign investment on a national-treatment basis, with relatively few foreign control limits, nor any reported bias against foreign companies from municipal or national authorities when compared to domestic investors. A foreign investment screening mechanism came into force July 1, 2021, to prevent threats to national security and public order from foreign direct investment, but there are otherwise no additional permits required by foreign investors. The mechanism requires mandatory notification for five sectors and allows for voluntary notification for all sectors. The sectors requiring mandatory notification are defense, IT security and processing of classified information, companies producing dual-use items, critical technology, and critical infrastructure. Mandatory notification applies for investments reaching 10 percent ownership or control, and voluntary notification can be made for investments where the company reaches 25 percent ownership or control. A pre-screening process exists to determine if the investment is in the critical technology or critical infrastructure sector. Notification and guidance all take place online, handled by the Danish Business Authority: https://businessindenmark.virk.dk/topics/Economy/Investments/ A foreign or domestic private entity may freely establish, own, and dispose of a business enterprise in Denmark. The capital requirement for establishing a corporation (Aktieselskab A/S) or Limited Partnership (Partnerselskab P/S) is $63,000 (DKK 400,000) and for establishing a private limited liability company (Anpartsselskab ApS) $6.300 (DKK 40,000). In 2019, the government lowered the capital requirements to set up a private limited liability company, which brought Denmark more in line with other Scandinavian countries. No restrictions apply regarding the residency of directors and managers. Since October 2004, any private entity may establish a European public limited company (SE company) in Denmark. The legal framework of an SE company is subject to Danish corporate law, but it is possible to change the nationality of the company without liquidation and re-founding. An SE company must be registered at the Danish Business Authority if its official address is in Denmark. The minimum capital requirement is $137,000 (EUR 120,000). Danish professional certification and/or local Danish experience are required to provide professional services in Denmark. In some instances, Denmark may accept equivalent professional certification from other EU or Nordic countries on a reciprocal basis. EU-wide residency requirements apply to the provision of legal and accountancy services. In addition to investment screening cases, ownership restrictions apply to the following sectors: Oil and Gas: Requires 20 percent Danish government participation on a “non-carried interest” basis. Defense: The Minister of Justice must approve foreign investment in defense companies doing business in Denmark if such investment exceeds 40 percent of the equity or more than 20 percent of the voting rights, or if the investment gives the foreign interest a controlling share. This approval is generally granted unless there are security or other foreign policy considerations weighing against approval. Maritime Services: There are foreign (non-EU resident) ownership requirements on Danish-flagged vessels other than those owned by an enterprise incorporated in Denmark. Ships owned by Danish citizens, Danish partnerships, or Danish limited liability companies are eligible for registration in the Danish International Ships Register (DIS). Vessels owned by EU or European Economic Area (EEA) entities with a genuine, demonstrable link to Denmark are also eligible for registration. Foreign companies with a significant Danish interest can register a ship in the DIS. Civil Aviation: For an airline to be established in Denmark, it must have majority ownership and be effectively controlled by an EU state or a national of an EU state, unless otherwise provided for through an international agreement to which the EU is a signatory. Financial Services: Non-resident financial institutions may engage in securities trading on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange only through subsidiaries incorporated in Denmark. Real Estate: Ownership of holiday homes, also known as summer houses, is restricted to Danish citizens. Such homes are generally located along the Danish coastline and may not be used as full-year residences. On a case-by-case basis, the Ministry of Justice may waive the citizenship requirement for those with close familial, linguistic, cultural, or other close connections to Denmark or the specific property. In general, EU and EEA citizens may purchase full-year residential property or real estate that supports self-employment without obtaining prior authorization from the Ministry of Justice. Companies domiciled in an EU or an EEA Member State that have set up or will set up subsidiaries or agencies or will provide services in Denmark may, in general, also purchase real property in Denmark without prior authorization. Non-EU/EEA citizens must obtain authorization from the Ministry of Justice to purchase real estate in Denmark, which is generally granted to those with permanent residence in Denmark or who have lived in Denmark for a consecutive period of five years. The most recent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) review of Denmark occurred in March 2013 and is available here: unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2013d2_en.pdf . There is no specific mention of Denmark in the latest WTO Trade Policy Review of the European Union, revised in December 2019. The EU Commission’s European Semester documents for Denmark are available here: ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-semester/european-semester-your-country/denmark_en A 2017 Foreign Investment Regulation review by DLA Piper can be found here: www.dlapiper.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2017/11/denmark.pdf Denmark ranked first out of 180 in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. In the IMD 2021 World Competitiveness Ranking, Denmark ranked third out of 64 countries. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) ranked Denmark ninth out of 132 in its 2021 Global Innovation Index. The Danish Business Authority (DBA) is responsible for business registrations in Denmark. As a part of the DBA, “Business in Denmark” provides information on relevant Danish rules and online registrations to foreign companies in English. The Danish business registration website, www.virk.dk , is the principal digital tool for licensing and registering companies in Denmark and offers a business registration process that is clear and complete. Registration of sole proprietorships and partnerships is free of charge. For other types of businesses, online registration costs $106 (DKK 670). Registration by email or mail costs $341 (DKK 2,150). The process for establishing a new business is distinct from that of registration. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ “Invest in Denmark” program provides a step-by-step guide to establishing a business at https://investindk.com/publications/step-by-step-guide-to-do-business-in-denmark , along with other relevant resources at https://investindk.com/our-services/how-to-set-up-a-business-in-denmark . The services are free of charge and available to all investors, regardless of country of origin. The processing time for establishing a new business varies depending on the chosen business entity. Establishing a Danish private limited liability company (ApS), for example, generally takes four to six weeks for a standard application. Establishing a sole proprietorship (Enkeltmandsvirksomhed) is more straightforward, with processing generally taking about one week. Those providing temporary services in Denmark must provide their company details to the Registry of Foreign Service Providers (RUT). The website ( www.virk.dk ) provides English guidance on registering a service with RUT. A public digital signature, referred to as a NemID or its replacement MitID, is required for those wishing to register a foreign company in Denmark. A CPR number (a 10-digit personal identification number) and valid identification are needed to obtain a NemID/MitID. Danish citizenship is not a requirement. Denmark defines small enterprises as those with fewer than 50 employees. Annual revenue or the yearly balance sheet total must be lower than $14.1 million (DKK 89 million) or $7.0 million (DKK 44 million), respectively. Medium-sized enterprises cannot have more than 250 employees. Limits on annual revenue or the yearly balance sheet total are $49.7 million (DKK 313 million) or $24.8 million (DKK 156 million). Danish companies are not restricted from investing abroad, and Danish outward investment has exceeded inward investments for more than a decade. 3. Legal Regime Denmark’s judicial system is highly regarded and considered fair. Its legal system is independent of the government’s legislative branch and includes written and consistently applied commercial and bankruptcy laws. Secured interests in property are recognized and enforced. The World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 2019 Global Competitiveness Report ranked Denmark as the world’s tenth most competitive economy and fourth among EU member states, characterizing it as having among the best functioning and most transparent institutions in the world. Denmark ranks high on specific WEF indices related to macroeconomic stability (first), labor market (third), business dynamism (third), institutions (seventh), ICT adoption (ninth), and skills (third). To facilitate business administration, Denmark maintains only two “legislative days” per year—January 1 and July 1—as the only days when new laws and regulations affecting the business sector can come into effect. Danish laws and policies granting national treatment to foreign investments are designed to increase FDI in Denmark. Denmark consistently applies high standards to health, environment, safety, and labor laws. Danish corporate law is generally in conformity with current EU legislation. The legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are relatively transparent and follow international standards. Bureaucratic procedures are streamlined and transparent; proposed laws and regulations are published in draft form for public comment. Public finances and debt obligations are transparent. The government uses transparent policies and effective laws to foster competition and establish “clear rules of the game,” consistent with international norms and applicable equally to Danish and foreign entities. The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (CCA) works to make markets well-functioning so that businesses compete efficiently on all parameters. The CCA is a government agency under the Danish Ministry of Industry, Business, and Financial Affairs. It enforces the Danish Competition Act. This Act, along with Danish consumer legislation, aims to promote efficient resource allocation in society, promote efficient competition, create a level playing field for enterprises, and protect consumers. Corporate tax records of all companies, associations, and foundations that pay taxes in Denmark are published by the tax authorities according to public law since December 2012 and are updated annually. The corporate tax rate is 22 percent. Greenland and the Faroe Islands retain autonomy for their respective tax policies. Publicly listed companies in Denmark must adhere to the Danish Financial Statements Act when preparing their annual reports. The accounting principles are International Accounting Standards (IAS), International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and Danish Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Financial statements must be prepared annually. The Danish Financial Statements Act covers all businesses. Private limited companies, public limited companies, and corporate funds are obliged to prepare financial statements under accounting classes determined by company size. There are four different accounting classes: A, B, C and D. Accounting class B is further divided into micro B and B, and C is divided into medium-sized C and large C. The smallest companies belong to accounting class A, while the largest belong to accounting class D. The classification is based on the assessed size of the company based on two out of three parameters: net revenue, balance sheet, and number of employees. Personal companies as well as companies with limited liability (Class A): Less than an annual average of 10 full-time employees and total assets not exceeding $1.1 million (DKK 7 million) or net revenue not exceeding $2.2 million (DKK 14 million) during the fiscal year. According to the Danish Financial Statements Act, personally-owned businesses, personally-owned general partnerships (multiple owners), and general funds are characterized as Class A; there is no requirement to prepare financial statements unless the owner voluntarily chooses to do so. Class B. Private limited liability companies, commercial funds, and companies with limited liability. Micro businesses (Class micro B): Less than an annual average of 10 full-time employees and total assets not exceeding $429,000 (DKK 2.7 million) or net revenue not exceeding $858,000 (DKK 5.4 million) during the fiscal year. Small businesses (Class B): Less than an annual average of 50 full-time employees and total assets not exceeding $7.0 million (DKK 44 million) or net revenue not exceeding $14.1 million (DKK 89 million) during the fiscal year. Medium-sized enterprises (Class C medium): Less than an annual average of 250 full-time employees and total assets not exceeding $24.8 million (DKK 156 million) or net revenue not exceeding $49.7 million (DKK 313 million) during the fiscal year. Large companies (Class C large): Companies that are neither small nor medium companies, and have an annual average of at least 250 full-time employees, total assets in excess of $24.8 million (DKK 156 million), or net revenue in excess of $49.7 million (DKK 313 million) during the fiscal year, but are not a class D company. Accounting class D: Publicly-traded companies and state-owned stock-based enterprises. Large companies (Class C and D) are required to report annually on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) efforts. This includes reporting on environmental; social; labor and human rights; and anti-corruption and bribery efforts. The reporting requirement covers four components: the company’s business model, material risks associated with each of the four issue areas, non-financial key performance indicators, and integrative referral to the financial amounts provided elsewhere in the annual report. There is no requirement for companies to have policies on the four issues, though they are required to follow a do-or-explain principle that requires companies to explain their policies in substance or explain why they have decided not to have a policy on the issue. For implemented policies, companies are required to disclose the substance of the policy and how they translate policies into action. The rules on reporting generally follow EU Directive 2014/95/EU on disclosure of non-financial information though certain issues, including reporting on the company’s impact on climate change, are stricter in Denmark than the directive. The rules on reporting on these issues allow for an exception if the companies report on similar issues using international standards such as UN Global Compact’s Communication on Progress. All government draft proposed regulations are published at “Høringsportalen” ( www.hoeringsportalen.dk ) and are available for comment from interested parties. Following the comment period, the government may revise draft regulations before publication on the Danish Parliament’s website ( www.ft.dk ). Final regulations are published at www.lovtidende.dk and www.ft.dk . All ministries and agencies are required to publish proposed regulations. Denmark has a World Bank composite score of 4.75 for the Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance, on a zero to five scale. Concerning governance, the World Bank suggests the following areas for improvement: Affected parties cannot request reconsideration or appeal adopted regulations to the relevant administrative agency. There is no existing requirement that regulations be periodically reviewed to see whether they should be revised or eliminated. Denmark is a member of the European Union and is an active supporter of the internal market. As a result, many aspects of business regulation are dictated by the EU and hence aligned with other EU Member States. Denmark adheres to the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs); no inconsistencies have been reported. Denmark’s decision-making power is divided into the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The principles of separation of power and an independent judiciary help ensure democracy and Danish citizens’ legal rights. The district courts, the high courts, and the Supreme Court represent the Danish legal system’s three basic levels. The legal system also comprises other institutions with special functions, e.g., the Maritime and Commercial Court. For further information, please see: domstol.dk/om-os/english/the-danish-judicial-system/ As an EU member state, Denmark is bound by EU rules on the free movement of goods, capital, persons, and certain services. The government agency “Invest in Denmark” is part of the Danish Trade Council and is situated within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The agency provides detailed information to potential investors. The website for the agency is investindk.com . The Faroese government promotes Faroese trade and investment through its website faroeislands.fo/economy-business . For further information concerning Greenland’s investment potential, please see Greenland Venture at www.venture.gl or the Greenland Tourism & Business Council at visitgreenland.com . The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (CCA) reviews transactions for competition-related concerns. A merger or takeover is subject to approval by the CCA. Large-scale mergers also require approval from EU competition authorities. According to the Danish Competition Act, the CCA requires notification of mergers and takeovers if the aggregate annual revenue in Denmark of all undertakings involved is more than $134 million (DKK 900 million) and the aggregate yearly revenue in Denmark of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than $15.9 million (DKK 100 million), or if the aggregate annual revenue in Denmark of at least one of the undertakings involved is more than $604 million (DKK 3.8 billion) and the aggregate yearly worldwide revenue of at least one of the other undertakings concerned is more than $604 million (DKK 3.8 billion). When a merger results from the acquisition of parts of one or more undertakings, the calculation of the revenue referred to shall only comprise the share of the revenue of the seller or sellers that relates to the assets acquired. Merger control provisions are contained in Part Four of the Danish Competition Act and in the Executive Order on the Notification of Mergers . Revenue is calculated under the Executive Order on the Calculation of Turnover in the Competition Act . A full notification of a merger must include the information and documents specified in the full notification form, Annex 1 – Information for Full Notification of Mergers . A simplified notification of a merger must include the information and documents specified in the simplified notification form, Annex 2 – Information for Simplified Notification of Mergers . From August 1, 2013, merger fees are payable for merger notifications submitted to the CCA. The fee for a simplified notification amounts to $7,950 (DKK 50,000). The fee for a full notification amounts to 0.015 percent of the aggregate annual turnover in Denmark of the undertakings involved; this fee is capped at $238,400 (DKK 1,500,000). Additional information concerning notification of mergers is available in the Guidelines to the Executive Order on Notification of Mergers and on Merger Fees . More general information on Danish merger control can be found in the Merger Guidelines . By law, private property can only be expropriated for public purposes, in a non-discriminatory manner, with reasonable compensation, and under established principles of international law. There have been no recent expropriations of significance in Denmark. Monetary judgments under the bankruptcy law are made in freely convertible Danish Kroner. The bankruptcy law addresses creditors’ claims in the following order: (1) costs and debt accrued during the treatment of the bankruptcy; (2) costs, including the court tax, relating to attempts to find a solution other than bankruptcy; (3) wage claims and holiday pay; (4) excise taxes owed to the government; and (5) all other claims. 6. Financial Sector Denmark has fully liberalized foreign exchange flows, including those for direct and portfolio investment purposes. Credit is allocated on market terms and is freely available. Denmark adheres to its IMF Article VIII obligations. The Danish banking system is under the regulatory oversight of the Financial Supervisory Authority. Differentiated voting rights – A and B stocks – are used to some extent, and several Danish companies are controlled by foundations, which can restrict potential hostile takeovers, including foreign takeovers. The Danish stock market functions efficiently. In 2005, the Copenhagen Stock Exchange became part of the integrated Nordic and Baltic marketplace, OMX Exchanges, which is headquartered in Stockholm. Besides Stockholm and Copenhagen, OMX also includes the stock exchanges in Helsinki, Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. To increase the access to capital for primarily small companies, the OMX in December 2005 opened a Nordic alternative marketplace – “First North” – in Denmark. In February 2008, the NASDAQ-OMX Group acquired the exchanges. In the World Economic Forum 2019 report, Denmark ranked 11th out of 141 on the metric “Financial System.” The Danish stock market is divided into four different branches/indexes. The C25 index contains the 25 most valuable companies in Denmark. Other large companies with a market value exceeding $1.05 billion (EUR 1 billion) are in the group of “Large Cap,” companies with a market value between $158 million (EU 150 million) and $1.05 billion (EUR 1 billion) belong to the “Mid Cap” segment, while companies with a market value smaller than $158 million (EU 150 million) belong to the “Small Cap” group. The major Danish banks are rated by international agencies, and their creditworthiness is rated as high by international standards. The European Central Bank and the Danish National Bank reported that Denmark’s major banks have passed stress tests by considerable margins. Denmark’s banking sector is relatively large; based on the ratio of consolidated banking assets to GDP, the sector is three times bigger than the national economy. By January 2022, the total of Danish shares valued $673.4 billion (DKK 4.24 trillion) and were owned 55.1 percent by foreign owners and 44.9 percent by Danish owners, including 13.5 percent held by households and 3.9 percent by the government. The three largest Danish banks – Danske Bank, Nordea Bank Danmark, and Jyske Bank – hold approximately 75 percent of the total assets in the Danish banking sector. The primary goal of the Central Bank (Nationalbanken) is to maintain the peg of the Danish currency to the Euro – with allowed fluctuations of 2.25 percent. It also functions as the general lender to Danish commercial banks and controls the money supply in the economy. As occurred in many countries, Danish banks experienced significant turbulence in 2008 – 2009. The Danish parliament subsequently passed a series of measures to establish a “safety net” program, provide government lending to financial institutions in need of capital to uphold their solvency requirements, and ensure the orderly winding down of failed banks. The parliament passed an additional measure, named Bank Package 4, in August 2011, which sought to identify systemically important financial institutions, ensure the liquidity of banks that assume control of a troubled bank, support banks acquiring troubled banks by allowing them to write off obligations of the troubled bank to the government, and change the funding mechanism for the sector-funded guarantee fund to a premiums-based, pay-as-you-go system. According to the Danish government, Bank Package 4 provides mechanisms for a sector solution to troubled banks without senior debt holder losses but does not supersede earlier legislation. As such, senior debt holder losses are still a possibility in the event of a bank failure. On October 10, 2013, the Danish Minister for Business and Growth concluded a political agreement with broad political support which, based on the most recent financial statements, identified specific financial institutions as “systemically important” (SIFI). The SIFIs in Denmark as of June 2021, the most recent designation, are Danske Bank A/S, Nykredit Realkredit A/S, Nordea Kredit Realkreditaktieselskab, Jyske Bank A/S, Sydbank A/S, DLR Kredit A/S, Spar Nord Bank A/S and A/S Arbejdernes Landsbank. The government identified these institutions based on three quantitative measures: 1) a balance sheet to GDP ratio above 6.5 percent; 2) market share of lending in Denmark above 5 percent; or 3) market share of deposits in Denmark above 3 percent. If an institution is above the requirement of any one of the three measures, it will be considered systemically important and must adhere to the stricter requirements on capitalization, liquidity, and resolution. The Faroese SIFIs are P/F BankNordik, and Betri Banki P/F, while Grønlandsbanken is the only SIFI in Greenland. The Danish government projected in May 2022 that Denmark’s debt to GDP ratio will decrease from approximately 42 percent at the end of 2020 to 33 percent by the end of 2023. The Ministry of Finance announced in May 2022 that Denmark ran a 2.3 percent budget surplus in 2021, and projects budget surpluses of 0.6 percent and 0.2 percent in 2022 and 2023, respectively. Denmark maintains no sovereign wealth funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Denmark is party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the WTO. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) hold dominant positions in rail, energy, utilities, and broadcast media in Denmark. Large-scale public procurement must go through public tender in accordance with EU legislation. Competition from SOEs is not considered a barrier to foreign investment in Denmark. As an OECD member, Denmark promotes and upholds the OECD Corporate Governance Principles and subsidiary SOE Guidelines. Denmark has no current plans to privatize its SOEs. 10. Political and Security Environment Denmark is a politically stable country. Incidents involving politically motivated damage to projects or installations are very rare. The EIU rates Denmark “AAA” for political risk. Djibouti Executive Summary Djibouti, a country with few resources, recognizes the crucial need for foreign direct investment (FDI) to stimulate economic development. The country’s assets include a strategic geographic location, free zones, an open trade regime, and a stable currency. Djibouti has identified a number of priority sectors for investment, including transport and logistics, real estate, energy, agriculture, and tourism. Djibouti’s investment climate has improved in recent years, which has led to interest by U.S. and other foreign firms. There are, however, a number of reforms still needed to promote investment. In 2020, according to the UN Conference of Trade and Development, FDI stock represented 58.53% of GDP, up from 52.5% in 2018. Real GDP growth has remained between 5% and a little over 8% per year for the last five years. Inflation decreased to 0.1 % in 2018 then peaked at an estimated 3.3% in 2019 and decreased to 2.9% in 2020. In recent years, Djibouti undertook a surge of foreign-backed infrastructure loans to posture themselves as the “Singapore of Africa.” Major projects have included a new gas terminal and pipeline to Ethiopia, a new port, free zones, improved road systems, a railroad connecting Djibouti and Addis Ababa, and a water pipeline from Ethiopia. Djibouti launched the first phase of an ambitious port and free zone project, Djibouti Damerjog Industrial Development (DDID) free-trade zone, scheduled to be built in three phases of five years each. The project includes a multipurpose port, a liquefied natural gas terminal, a livestock terminal, dry docks and a ship repair area, a power plant and a factory that will produce construction materials. DDID, which is expected to attract foreign investors, will offer all the preferential policies guaranteed by the free zone authority, such as tax exemption, minimized restrictions on foreign labor and competitive water and electricity rates. In April 2018, the Government of Djibouti enacted tax, labor, and financial reforms to improve its investment climate. Various business climate reforms were introduced in 2020 with the objectives of improving competitiveness both regionally and internationally. These reforms included starting online registration for companies and the creation of the Djibouti Port Community System platform which is a portal that provides a comprehensive set of online services to the business community. Economic development and foreign investment are hindered by high electricity costs, high unemployment, an unskilled workforce, a large informal sector, regional instability, opaque business practices, compliance risks, corruption, and a weak financial sector. The World Bank estimated the government’s public debt-to-GDP ratio was 66.7% in 2019 with a projection of 69.9% in 2020 which will gradually decrease over the years. The majority of the debt is owed to Chinese entities. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 128 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021 Global Innovation N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $3,310 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Djibouti’s laws encourage FDI, with the government as a driving force behind Djibouti’s economic growth. Faced with an unemployment rate of over 47%, FDI is expected to generate jobs. There are no laws, practices, or mechanisms that discriminate against foreign investors. Navigating the bureaucracy, however, can be complicated. FDI is encouraged by policy and foreign companies are often able to negotiate favorable tax terms on a case-by-case basis. The government is gradually opening public sector entities, including state owned utilities, to private investment. In 2021 the government invited proposals for a strategic investor in the state-owned telecommunications monopoly. The energy sector remains open to competition through power purchase agreements; however, the state-owned electric utility retains all rights to the transmission and distribution of electricity. This liberalization of production has resulted in the private development of wind, solar, and waste to energy resources. Djibouti’s National Investment Promotion Agency (NIPA), created in 2001, promotes private-sector investment, facilitates investment operations, and works to modernize the country’s regulatory framework. NIPA assists foreign and domestic investors by disseminating information and streamlining administrative procedures. Since 2017, NIPA’s one-stop-shop, which houses several agencies under one roof, has simplified business registration. NIPA has identified several priority sectors for investment, including infrastructure and renewable energy. The Secretariat of State in charge of Investment and Private Sector Development, established in May 2021, is in charge of implementing the business climate policy, investment promotion and private sector development. This agency works in coordination with the Ministry of Economy and Finance. It ensures that the business environment is internationally competitive and conducive to private initiatives. It identifies administrative reforms that remove obstacles to the proper functioning of the private sector. Foreign and domestic private entities have equal rights in establishing and owning business enterprises and engaging in all forms of remunerative activity. Furthermore, foreign investors are not required by law to have a local partner except in the insurance industry, and then, only if the company is registered as a local company and not as a branch of an existing foreign company. Nevertheless, some foreign companies choose to have a local partner to help them better navigate the local bureaucracy and cultural sensitivities. There is no established screening process for FDI. The OECD, WTO, and the UNCTAD have not conducted an investment policy review (IPR) for Djibouti in the last five years. The Business and Human Rights Resource Center conducted a review in 2022 of Djibouti’s Doraleh Multipurpose Port (DMP) which focused on the DMP’s financing by China Eximbank. The government of Djibouti has facilitated the registration of business by reducing the capital needed for investment, simplifying the formalities needed to register and simplifying certain tax procedures. The most important facilitation effort is the one-stop-shop, or Guichet Unique, managed by NIPA. The Guichet Unique (http://www.guichet-unique.dj ) brings together all the agencies with which a company must register. Typically, a company registers with the following Djiboutian offices: Office of Intellectual Property, Tax office, and the Social Security office. Online registration is not possible; the normal registration process takes 14 days, according to the World Bank. In Djibouti, new businesses must have every document notarized to begin operations. The government neither promotes nor restricts outward investment. 3. Legal Regime Government policies are sometimes not transparent, and do not foster competition on a non-discriminatory basis. Likewise, the legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are not always transparent nor are they consistent with international norms. Rule-making and regulatory authority exists at the state level. The Djiboutian accounting system is loosely based on the French accounting system as it existed at independence (1977) with subsequent updates. The regulatory regime is written in a way that promotes open competition, but application of the rules is not always consistent. Draft bills are initiated by the relevant ministry in consultation with stakeholders from relevant ministries or public institutions. Laws are then proposed by the relevant ministry, and then debated and passed by the parliament. The promulgation by the president is the last stage. Regulatory actions including laws and decrees are available online: https://www.presidence.dj/jord . Ministries and regulatory agencies do not develop forward regulatory plans – that is, a public list of anticipated regulatory changes or proposals intended to be adopted/implemented within a specified time frame The government has no environmental, social, and governance disclosure requirement. The State Inspector General (SGI) is tasked with ensuring human and material resources in the public sector are properly utilized. It also acts as an enforcement mechanism to ensure administrative processes are followed. Public finances and the terms of debt obligations are opaque. Djibouti is a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The regulatory systems in these countries are not yet harmonized. European norms and standards, especially French, are referenced in Djibouti. Djibouti is a member of the WTO. Djibouti’s legal system is based on Civil law, inherited from the French Napoleonic Code. It consists of three courts: a Court of First Instance presided over by a single judge; a Court of Appeals, with three judges; and the Supreme Court. In addition, Islamic law (shariah) and traditional law is practiced. Djibouti has a written commercial code and specialized courts, including commercial, criminal, administrative, and civilian courts. The court system is de jure independent from executive power, but may be susceptible to political pressure. Most investors request the right to counsel, including agreements for arbitration, in a recognized international court. International lawyers practicing in Djibouti have reported effective application of maritime and other commercial laws, but in the past, foreign companies operating in Djibouti have reported that court deliberations were biased or delayed. The country’s legal system has no discriminatory policy against foreign investment, and frequently negotiates extended tax breaks and other incentives to attract larger investments. In conjunction with UNCTAD, NIPA developed an investment guide that provides useful information: https://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/djibouti. The Djibouti Office of Industrial and Commercial Protection (ODPIC) is the agency in charge of registering businesses. Its website contains information about the registration process: https://odpic.net/ . In 2008, Djibouti adopted a law on competition and consumer protection, which does not cover state-owned enterprises, such as electricity and telecommunications. Under this law, the Government of Djibouti regulates prices in areas where competition remains limited. For example, the government regulates postal services, telecommunications, utilities, and urban transport services. Djibouti does not have an agency that specifically promotes competition and does not have a comprehensive strategy to restrict market monopolies. Foreign companies enjoy the same benefits as domestic companies under Djibouti’s Investment Code. The Investment Code stipulates that “no partial or total, temporary or permanent expropriation will take place without equitable compensation for the damages suffered.” There are no known recent cases of U.S. companies in Djibouti being subject to expropriation. There have been cases of foreign companies facing de facto expropriation via fines, while other companies have had their concession to run a public service unilaterally revoked (see discussion below about DP World). The government may expropriate land when it is needed for public utility. In that case, the government will compensate the landowner by providing land at a different location or by cash settlement. ICSID Convention and New York Convention On April 12, 2019, Djibouti signed the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention, also known as the Washington Convention). Djibouti made its deposit of ratification on June 9, 2020 for an entry into force on July 9, 2020. Djibouti is a contracting member of the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Djibouti’s government has had only a few investment disputes in the past several years, none with U.S. businesses. In some cases, the disputes have been settled in international arbitration courts and the government has abided by those decisions. In other cases, there has been de facto expropriation through large fines. As in any country, a strong, enforceable contract is important. The government passed a law in November 2017 permitting the government to unilaterally alter or terminate contracts. Using this law, in February 2018, Djibouti’s president issued a decree abrogating the government’s contract with the Emirati company, DP World, concerning the Doraleh Container Terminal, later nationalizing the equipment, physical assets, and land. DP World continued to hold 33.33% of shares until July 2018, when the government terminated the shareholders’ agreement with DP World and later nationalized all shares. Throughout, DP World has continued to claim that the 30-year 2006 Doraleh Container Terminal concession agreement remains in force. In July 2021, the London Court of International Arbitration decided, in a seventh ruling, that Djibouti should restore DP World’s rights to operate Doraleh Container Terminal in line with the original deal and receive compensation. Djibouti has not yet officially replied, but responded to a similar London Court of International Arbitration ruling in January 2020 with an official communiqué rejecting the court ruling, stating “As the Republic of Djibouti has consistently indicated since the termination of the concession, the only possible outcome is allocation of fair compensation in accordance with international law.” International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts There is no domestic arbitration body within the country. In February 2014, the IGAD countries agreed to set up an international Business Arbitration Center in Djibouti. This institution provides a mechanism for resolving business disputes and helps create a more transparent business environment in the region by reinforcing the principles of contract law and increasing the number of lawyers practicing commercial and contract law in Djibouti. Investment dispute cases are not made public. Djibouti has bankruptcy laws, and bankruptcy is not criminalized. 6. Financial Sector Djibouti is open to and receptive of foreign investors. Djibouti does not have its own stock market, but some multinational companies with investments in Djibouti are publicly traded. Portfolio investment in Djibouti is primarily done through private equity investments in a given sector, rather than through purchase of securities. Investments in Djibouti are inherently illiquid for that reason, and the purchase or sale of any sizeable investment in Djibouti affects the market accordingly. Existing policies respect IMF Article VIII and allow the free flow of funds for international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign companies do not face discrimination in obtaining it. Generally, however, only well-established businesses obtain bank credit, as the cost of credit is high. Credit is available to the private sector, whether foreign or domestic. Where credit is not available, it is primarily due to the associated risk and not structural factors. Three large banks, Bank of Africa, Bank for Commerce and Industry – Mer Rouge, and CAC bank dominate Djibouti’s banking sector. While these three banks account for the majority share of deposits in-country, there are 13 total banks, all established in the last 14 years. The 2011 banking law fixed the minimum capital requirement for financial institutions at DJF 1 billion (USD 5,651,250) and also covers financial auxiliaries, such as money transfer agencies and Islamic financial institutions. In addition to the three names banks above, foreign banks include Silkroad Bank, Bank of China, and the Burkina Faso-based International Business Bank. The banking sector suffers from a lack of consistent supervision, but it has been improving. Non-performing loans decreased from 16.26% in 2019 to 13.31% in 2020 and to 9.8% in 2021. The total assets of all the banks were estimated to be USD 3.1 billion in 2020, of which 80% were held by the four largest banks. The country has a Central Bank, which is in charge of delivering licenses to banks and supervising them. Foreign banks or branches are allowed to establish operations in the country. They are subject to the same regulations as local banks. Djibouti has not announced that it intends to implement or allow the implementation of blockchain technologies in its banking transactions. Some banks have begun to provide mobile and e-banking services. In June 2020, Djibouti Telecom launched D-Money, a Digital Mobile Money service which allows users to make digital money transfers and payments directly from mobile phones. Foreign Exchange Djibouti has no foreign exchange restrictions. Businesses are free to repatriate profits. There are no limitations on converting or transferring funds, or on the inflow and outflow of cash. The Djiboutian franc, which has been pegged to the U.S. dollar since 1949, is stable. The fixed exchange rate is 177.71 Djiboutian francs to the U.S. dollar. Funds can be transferred by using banks or international money transfer companies such as Western Union, all monitored by the Central Bank. Remittance Policies There are no recent changes or plans to change investment remittance policies. There are no time limitations on remittances. The government does not issue bonds on the open market, and cash-like instruments are not in common use in Djibouti, so direct currency transfers are the only practical method of remitting profits. In mid-2020 the Djiboutian government announced the creation of a Sovereign Wealth Fund. According to a government statement, the state-owned fund targets investments locally and in neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa. It focuses on industries including telecommunications, technology, energy, and logistics. The fund acts as a long-term investor and is required to reinvest the entire net profits of its activity. The government aims to fund it to $1.5 billion within ten years. Article 12 of Law N° 75/AN/20/8th L, creating the Sovereign Fund of Djibouti, states the fund will adopt and implement best practice in terms of transparency and performance reporting in accordance with the Santiago Principles. As of late 2021, the fund was ramping up operations. Law No. 75/AN/20/8th L establishing the Sovereign Fund of Djibouti – https://www.presidence.dj/texte/75-an-20-8eme-l-10332 Decree No. 2020-127/PRE approving the statutes and determining certain initial resources of the Sovereign Fund of Djibouti – https://www.presidence.dj/texte/2020-127-pre-10361 Decree No. 2020-111/PRE appointing the members of the Board of Directors and the Director General of the Sovereign Fund of Djibouti – https://www.presidence.dj/texte/2020-111-pre-10360 10. Political and Security Environment Djibouti has seen only very limited episodes of political violence over the last two decades. In the last ten years, there have been no known incidents of political violence leading to damage to foreign investments. Both the ruling coalition party and the recognized opposition parties favor foreign direct investment into Djibouti and local attitudes towards foreigners are positive. Djibouti held presidential elections April 9, 2021, with President Ismael Omar Guelleh winning a fifth consecutive term with 98% of the vote. His 22-year reign has contributed to stability and economic growth, but questions of succession and subsequent instability remain. Djibouti was recently awarded the International Peace Award by the journal Jeune Afrique for its secure environment, despite being surrounded by countries facing instability. According to data acquired by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, Djibouti’s instances of violence and disorder have significantly declined in the past three years. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2019 $3,346 2020 $3,380 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 58.3% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report * Ministry of Finance and Economy Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Dominica Executive Summary The Commonwealth of Dominica (Dominica) is a member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). The Government of Dominica strongly encourages foreign direct investment, particularly in industries that create jobs, earn foreign currency, and have a positive impact on its citizens. Dominica remains vulnerable to external shocks such as climate change impacts, natural hazards, and global economic downturns. According to Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) figures, the economy of Dominica had an estimated GDP of $409.9 million USD (1,107.78 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) in 2021, which signified a slight recovery from a 15.4 percent contraction in 2020 due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting stagnation of the tourism sector. The IMF forecasts real GDP growth of 7.9 percent in 2022 and expects GDP to reach pre-pandemic levels by 2023. The economy also continues to recover from the devastation caused by Hurricane Maria in 2017. Losses from Hurricane Maria were estimated at $1.37 billion or 226 percent of GDP. Prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government was primarily focused on reconstruction efforts, with support from the international community. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government of Dominica has received financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to provide fiscal assistance and macro-economic stability and support in health-related expenditures, loss of household income, food security, and the agricultural sector. Through its economic policies, the government is seeking to stimulate sustainable and climate-resilient economic growth by implementing a revised macroeconomic framework that includes strengthening the nation’s fiscal framework. The government states it is committed to creating a vibrant business climate to attract more foreign investment. Dominica remains a small emerging market in the Eastern Caribbean, with investment opportunities mainly in the service sector, particularly in eco-tourism, information and communication technologies, and education. Other opportunities exist in alternative energy, including geothermal energy, and capital works due to reconstruction and new tourism projects. The government provides some investment incentives for businesses that are considering establishing operations in Dominica, encouraging both domestic and foreign private investment. Foreign investors can repatriate all profits and dividends and can import capital. Dominica’s legal system is based on British common law. It does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States, though it does have bilateral investment treaties with the UK and Germany. In 2018, the Government of Dominica signed an Intergovernmental Agreement to implement the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), making it mandatory for banks in Dominica to report the banking information of U.S. citizens. Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 45 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 7,270 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Dominica strongly encourages foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly in industries that create jobs, earn foreign currency, and have a positive impact on local citizens. Through the Invest Dominica Authority (IDA), the government instituted several investment incentives for businesses considering locating in Dominica. Government policies provide liberal tax holidays, duty-free import of equipment and materials, exemption from value added tax on some capital investments, and withholding tax exemptions on dividends, interest payments, and some external payments and income. The IDA additionally provides support to approved citizenship by investment projects. The IDA launched a new Investment Promotion Strategy in 2021. The new strategy is focused on four sectors: agriculture and agri-business, renewable energy, tourism, and knowledge services such as business processing operations. Other sectors include film, music, and video production, manufacturing, bulk water export and bottled water operations, medical and nursing schools, and English language training services. The government continuously reviews these sectors. While these sectors are priorities, the government broadly welcomes FDI. Local laws do not place limits on foreign control in Dominica. Foreign investment in Dominica is not subject to restrictions, and foreign investors are entitled to receive the same treatment as nationals of Dominica. Foreign investors are entitled to hold up to 100 percent of their investment. However, there is a requirement for foreign investors seeking to purchase property for residential or commercial purposes to obtain an Alien Landholders License. Local enterprises generally welcome joint ventures with foreign investors in order to access technology, expertise, markets, and capital. The OECS, of which Dominica is a member, has not conducted a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review since 2014. There have also not been any investment policy reviews by civil society organizations in the past five years. The IDA is Dominica’s main business facilitation unit. It facilitates foreign direct investment into priority sectors and advises the government on the formation and implementation of policies and programs to attract investment in Dominica. The IDA provides business support services and market intelligence to all investors. It offers an online tool useful for navigating laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors. Its website is http://investdominica.com . All potential investors applying for government incentives must submit their proposals for review by the IDA to ensure the project is consistent with the national interest and provides economic benefits to the country. The Companies and Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) maintains an e-filing portal for most of its services, including company registration on its website. However, this only allows for the preliminary processing of applications prior to the investor physically making a payment at the Supreme Court office. Investors are advised to seek the advice of a local attorney prior to starting the process. Further information is available at http://www.cipo.gov.dm . Businesses must register with CIPO, the Tax Authority, and the Social Services Institute. The general practice for registration is to retain an attorney who prepares all the relevant incorporation documents. Local laws do not place any restrictions on domestic investors seeking to do business abroad. Local companies in Dominica are actively encouraged to take advantage of export opportunities specifically related to the country’s membership in the OECS Economic Union and the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy (CSME), which enhance the competitiveness of the local and regional private sectors across traditional and emerging high-potential markets. 3. Legal Regime The Government of Dominica provides a legal framework to foster competition and establish clear rules for foreign and domestic investors in the areas of tax, labor, environment, health, and safety. The Ministry of Finance and the IDA provide oversight of the transparency of the system as it relates to investment. Rule-making and regulatory authority lies within the unicameral parliament. The parliament has 21 members elected for a five-year term in single-seat constituencies, nine appointed members, one speaker, and one clerk. Relevant ministries develop laws which are drafted by the Ministry of National Security and Home Affairs. FDI is governed principally through the laws that oversee the IDA and the Citizenship by Investment program. Laws are available online at http://www.dominica.gov.dm/laws-of-dominica . Although some draft bills are not subject to public consultation, the government generally solicits input from various stakeholder groups in the formulation of laws. In some instances, the government convenes a special committee to make recommendations on provisions outlined in the law. The government uses public awareness campaigns to sensitize the general population on legislative reforms. Copies of proposed regulations are published in the official gazette shortly before the bills are taken to parliament. Although Dominica does not have legislation guaranteeing access to information or freedom of expression, access to information is generally available in practice. The government maintains a website and an information service on which it posts information such as directories of officials and a summary of laws and press releases. The International Financial Accounting Standards, which stem from the General Accepted Accounting Principles, govern the accounting profession in Dominica. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner or Ombudsman guards against excesses by government officers in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman is responsible for investigating complaints related to any decision or act of any government officer or body in any case in which a member of the public claims to be aggrieved or appears to the Ombudsman to be the victim of injustice as a result of the exercise of the administrative function of that officer or body. The government does not promote nor require companies’ environmental, social, and governance disclosures. Dominica’s membership in regional organizations, particularly the OECS and its Economic Union, commits it to implement all appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of its various treaty obligations. For example, the Banking Act, which establishes a single banking space and the harmonization of banking regulations in the Economic Union, is uniformly in force in the eight member territories of the ECCU, although there are some minor differences in implementation from country to country. The enforcement mechanisms of these regulations include penalties or legal sanctions. The IDA can revoke an issued investment certificate if the holder fails to comply with certain stipulations detailed in the IDA Act and its regulations. The regulatory enforcement process is not digitized. As a member of the OECS and the ECCU, Dominica subscribes to a set of principles and policies outlined in the Revised Treaty of Basseterre. The relationship between national and regional systems is such that each participating member state is expected to coordinate and adopt, where possible, common national policies aimed at the progressive harmonization of relevant policies and systems across the region. Thus, Dominica is obligated to implement regionally developed regulations such as legislation passed under OECS authority, unless specific concessions are sought. The Dominica Bureau of Standards develops, maintains, and promotes standards for improving industrial development, industrial efficiency, promoting the health and safety of consumers, protecting the environment, and facilitating trade. It also conducts national training and consultations in international standards practices. As a signatory to the WTO Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade, Dominica, through the Dominica Bureau of Standards, is obligated to harmonize all national standards to international norms to avoid creating technical barriers to trade. Dominica ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2016. Ratification of the Agreement is an important signal to investors of the country’s commitment to improving its business environment for trade. The TFA aims to improve the speed and efficiency of border procedures, facilitate trade costs reduction, and enhance participation in the global value chain. Dominica has already implemented a number of TFA requirements. A full list is available at https://tfadatabase.org/members/dominica/measure-breakdown . As a member of CARICOM, Dominica utilizes the Advanced Cargo Information System, a computer-based system developed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to harmonize and standardize electronic cargo information in order to improve the capability to track cargo efficiently and to support regional and international trade. The Advance Cargo Information System forms a critical part of the World Customs Organization SAFE Framework of Standards. Dominica has also fully implemented the Automated System for Customs Data. Dominica bases its legal system on British common law. The Attorney General, the Chief Justice of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, junior judges, and magistrates administer justice in the country. The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Act establishes the Supreme Court of Judicature, which consists of the High Court and the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal. The High Court hears criminal and civil matters and makes determinations on the interpretation of the constitution. Parties may appeal to the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, an itinerant court that hears appeals from all OECS members. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is the regional judicial tribunal. The CCJ has original jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. In 2015, Dominica acceded to the CCJ, making the CCJ its final court of appeal. The United States and Dominica are both parties to the WTO. The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body resolve disputes over WTO agreements, while courts of appropriate jurisdiction in both countries resolve private disputes. The main laws concerning investment in Dominica are the Invest Dominica Authority Act (2007), the Tourism Act (2005), and the Fiscal Incentives Act. Regulatory amendments have been made to the Income Tax Act, the Value Added Tax Act, the Title by Registration Act, the Alien Landholding Regulation Act, and the Residential Levy Act. The IDA provides a full list of the relevant legislation on their website. The IDA reviews all proposals for investment concessions and incentives to ensure the project is consistent with the national interest and provides economic benefits to the country. The Cabinet makes the final decision on investment proposals. Under Dominica’s citizenship by investment program, qualified foreign investors may obtain citizenship without voting rights. Applicants can contribute a minimum of $100,000 to the Economic Diversification Fund for a single person or invest in designated real estate with a value of at least $200,000. Applicants must also provide a full medical certificate, undergo a background check, and provide evidence of the source of funds before proceeding to the final stage of an interview. The government introduced a citizen by investment certificate in order to minimize the risk of unlawful duplication. Further information is available at http://cbiu.gov.dm . Chapter 8 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas outlines the competition policy applicable to CARICOM States. Member states are required to establish and maintain a national competition authority for implementing the rules of competition. CARICOM established a Caribbean Competition Commission to apply rules of competition regarding anti-competitive cross-border business conduct. CARICOM competition policy addresses anti-competitive business conduct such as agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises, and concerted practices by enterprises that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within CARICOM, and actions by which an enterprise abuses its dominant position within CARICOM. Dominica does not have domestic legislation to regulate competition. There are no known pending expropriation cases involving American citizens. In such an event, Dominica would employ a system of eminent domain to pay compensation when property must be acquired in the public interest. There were no reported tendencies of the government to discriminate against U.S. investments, companies, or landholdings. There are no laws mandating local ownership in specified sectors. Under the Bankruptcy Act (1990), Dominica has a bankruptcy framework that grants certain rights to debtor and creditor. A full copy of the act is available for download from the government’s website . 6. Financial Sector Dominica is a member of the ECCU. As such, it is a member of the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange (ECSE) and the Regional Government Securities Market. The ECSE is a regional securities market established by the ECCB and licensed under the Securities Act of 2001, a uniform regional body of legislation governing the buying and selling of financial products for the eight member territories. In 2021, the ECSE listed 164 securities, comprising 140 sovereign debt instruments, 13 equities, and 11 corporate debt securities. Market capitalization stood at $1.9 billion. Dominica is open to portfolio investment. Dominica has accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF Agreement, Sections 2, 3, and 4 and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on making payments and transfers for current international transactions. Dominica does not normally grant foreign tax credits except in the case of taxes paid in a British Commonwealth country that grants similar relief for Dominica taxes or where an applicable tax treaty provides a credit. The private sector has access to credit on the local market through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, trade credits, and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. The eight participating governments of the ECCU have passed the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement Act. The act provides for the establishment of the ECCB, its management and administration, its currency, relations with financial institutions, relations with the participating governments, foreign exchange operations, external reserves, and other related matters. Dominica is a signatory to this agreement and the ECCB controls Dominica’s currency and regulates its domestic banks. The Banking Act is a harmonized piece of legislation across the ECCU. The Minister of Finance usually acts in consultation with, and on the recommendation of, the ECCB with respect to those areas of responsibility within the Minister of Finance’s portfolio. Domestic and foreign banks can establish operations in Dominica. The Banking Act requires all commercial banks and other institutions to be licensed in order to conduct any banking business. The ECCB regulates financial institutions. As part of ongoing supervision, licensed financial institutions are required to submit monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports to the ECCB. In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector in Dominica as stable. Assets of commercial banks totaled $781.8 million (2.1 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) at the end of 2019. Dominica is well served by bank and non-financial institutions. There are minimal alternative financial services. The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S. and European banks. CARICOM remains committed to engaging with key stakeholders on the issue and appointed a Committee of Ministers of Finance on Correspondent Banking to monitor the issue. In 2019, the ECCB launched an 18-month financial technology pilot to launch a Digital Eastern Caribbean dollar (DXCD) with its partner, Barbados-based Bitt Inc. An accompanying mobile application, DCash was officially launched in March 2021 in four pilot countries, adding Dominica to the pilot in December 2021. In January 2022, the platform experienced a system interruption, and its operation was suspended. The platform regained full functionality at the end of March 2022 following system upgrades. The digital Eastern Caribbean currency operates alongside physical Eastern Caribbean currency. Dominica does not have any specific legislation to regulate cryptocurrencies. Neither the Government of Dominica, nor the ECCB, of which Dominica is a member, maintains a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Dominica work in partnership with ministries, or under their remit to carry out certain specific ministerial responsibilities. The U.S. Embassy in Bridgetown is aware of 20 SOEs currently operating in areas such as tourism, investment services, broadcasting and media, solid waste management, and agriculture. There is no published list of these SOEs. They are all wholly owned government entities. Each is headed by a board of directors to which senior management reports. The SOE sector is affected by financial sustainability challenges, with resources insufficient to cover capital replacement. Dominica does not currently have a targeted privatization program. 10. Political and Security Environment Dominica held parliamentary elections in December 2019. Voting was held under heightened security following weeks of protests and legal challenges seeking electoral reform. The protests were led by the United Workers’ Party, which lost the election in a landslide to the ruling Dominica Labour Party. Dominica’s economy was severely affected by the COVID-19 crisis. The IMF has projected that Dominica’s GDP will grow 7.9 percent in 2022. In May 2020, the government unveiled a disaster resilience strategy that was based on three key pillars: structural resilience, financial resilience, and post-disaster resilience. Both the IMF and the World Bank provided support to address the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $503.7 2020 $504.2 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $0 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 66.8% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Eastern Caribbean Central Bank https://www.eccb-centralbank.org/statistics/dashboard-datas/ . Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDIData not available. Dominica Executive Summary The Commonwealth of Dominica (Dominica) is a member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). The Government of Dominica strongly encourages foreign direct investment, particularly in industries that create jobs, earn foreign currency, and have a positive impact on its citizens. Dominica remains vulnerable to external shocks such as climate change impacts, natural hazards, and global economic downturns. According to Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) figures, the economy of Dominica had an estimated GDP of $409.9 million USD (1,107.78 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) in 2021, which signified a slight recovery from a 15.4 percent contraction in 2020 due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting stagnation of the tourism sector. The IMF forecasts real GDP growth of 7.9 percent in 2022 and expects GDP to reach pre-pandemic levels by 2023. The economy also continues to recover from the devastation caused by Hurricane Maria in 2017. Losses from Hurricane Maria were estimated at $1.37 billion or 226 percent of GDP. Prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government was primarily focused on reconstruction efforts, with support from the international community. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government of Dominica has received financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to provide fiscal assistance and macro-economic stability and support in health-related expenditures, loss of household income, food security, and the agricultural sector. Through its economic policies, the government is seeking to stimulate sustainable and climate-resilient economic growth by implementing a revised macroeconomic framework that includes strengthening the nation’s fiscal framework. The government states it is committed to creating a vibrant business climate to attract more foreign investment. Dominica remains a small emerging market in the Eastern Caribbean, with investment opportunities mainly in the service sector, particularly in eco-tourism, information and communication technologies, and education. Other opportunities exist in alternative energy, including geothermal energy, and capital works due to reconstruction and new tourism projects. The government provides some investment incentives for businesses that are considering establishing operations in Dominica, encouraging both domestic and foreign private investment. Foreign investors can repatriate all profits and dividends and can import capital. Dominica’s legal system is based on British common law. It does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States, though it does have bilateral investment treaties with the UK and Germany. In 2018, the Government of Dominica signed an Intergovernmental Agreement to implement the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), making it mandatory for banks in Dominica to report the banking information of U.S. citizens. Table 1 Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 45 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 7,270 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Dominica strongly encourages foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly in industries that create jobs, earn foreign currency, and have a positive impact on local citizens. Through the Invest Dominica Authority (IDA), the government instituted several investment incentives for businesses considering locating in Dominica. Government policies provide liberal tax holidays, duty-free import of equipment and materials, exemption from value added tax on some capital investments, and withholding tax exemptions on dividends, interest payments, and some external payments and income. The IDA additionally provides support to approved citizenship by investment projects. The IDA launched a new Investment Promotion Strategy in 2021. The new strategy is focused on four sectors: agriculture and agri-business, renewable energy, tourism, and knowledge services such as business processing operations. Other sectors include film, music, and video production, manufacturing, bulk water export and bottled water operations, medical and nursing schools, and English language training services. The government continuously reviews these sectors. While these sectors are priorities, the government broadly welcomes FDI. Local laws do not place limits on foreign control in Dominica. Foreign investment in Dominica is not subject to restrictions, and foreign investors are entitled to receive the same treatment as nationals of Dominica. Foreign investors are entitled to hold up to 100 percent of their investment. However, there is a requirement for foreign investors seeking to purchase property for residential or commercial purposes to obtain an Alien Landholders License. Local enterprises generally welcome joint ventures with foreign investors in order to access technology, expertise, markets, and capital. The OECS, of which Dominica is a member, has not conducted a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review since 2014. There have also not been any investment policy reviews by civil society organizations in the past five years. The IDA is Dominica’s main business facilitation unit. It facilitates foreign direct investment into priority sectors and advises the government on the formation and implementation of policies and programs to attract investment in Dominica. The IDA provides business support services and market intelligence to all investors. It offers an online tool useful for navigating laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors. Its website is http://investdominica.com . All potential investors applying for government incentives must submit their proposals for review by the IDA to ensure the project is consistent with the national interest and provides economic benefits to the country. The Companies and Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) maintains an e-filing portal for most of its services, including company registration on its website. However, this only allows for the preliminary processing of applications prior to the investor physically making a payment at the Supreme Court office. Investors are advised to seek the advice of a local attorney prior to starting the process. Further information is available at http://www.cipo.gov.dm . Businesses must register with CIPO, the Tax Authority, and the Social Services Institute. The general practice for registration is to retain an attorney who prepares all the relevant incorporation documents. Local laws do not place any restrictions on domestic investors seeking to do business abroad. Local companies in Dominica are actively encouraged to take advantage of export opportunities specifically related to the country’s membership in the OECS Economic Union and the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy (CSME), which enhance the competitiveness of the local and regional private sectors across traditional and emerging high-potential markets. 3. Legal Regime The Government of Dominica provides a legal framework to foster competition and establish clear rules for foreign and domestic investors in the areas of tax, labor, environment, health, and safety. The Ministry of Finance and the IDA provide oversight of the transparency of the system as it relates to investment. Rule-making and regulatory authority lies within the unicameral parliament. The parliament has 21 members elected for a five-year term in single-seat constituencies, nine appointed members, one speaker, and one clerk. Relevant ministries develop laws which are drafted by the Ministry of National Security and Home Affairs. FDI is governed principally through the laws that oversee the IDA and the Citizenship by Investment program. Laws are available online at http://www.dominica.gov.dm/laws-of-dominica . Although some draft bills are not subject to public consultation, the government generally solicits input from various stakeholder groups in the formulation of laws. In some instances, the government convenes a special committee to make recommendations on provisions outlined in the law. The government uses public awareness campaigns to sensitize the general population on legislative reforms. Copies of proposed regulations are published in the official gazette shortly before the bills are taken to parliament. Although Dominica does not have legislation guaranteeing access to information or freedom of expression, access to information is generally available in practice. The government maintains a website and an information service on which it posts information such as directories of officials and a summary of laws and press releases. The International Financial Accounting Standards, which stem from the General Accepted Accounting Principles, govern the accounting profession in Dominica. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner or Ombudsman guards against excesses by government officers in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman is responsible for investigating complaints related to any decision or act of any government officer or body in any case in which a member of the public claims to be aggrieved or appears to the Ombudsman to be the victim of injustice as a result of the exercise of the administrative function of that officer or body. The government does not promote nor require companies’ environmental, social, and governance disclosures. Dominica’s membership in regional organizations, particularly the OECS and its Economic Union, commits it to implement all appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of its various treaty obligations. For example, the Banking Act, which establishes a single banking space and the harmonization of banking regulations in the Economic Union, is uniformly in force in the eight member territories of the ECCU, although there are some minor differences in implementation from country to country. The enforcement mechanisms of these regulations include penalties or legal sanctions. The IDA can revoke an issued investment certificate if the holder fails to comply with certain stipulations detailed in the IDA Act and its regulations. The regulatory enforcement process is not digitized. As a member of the OECS and the ECCU, Dominica subscribes to a set of principles and policies outlined in the Revised Treaty of Basseterre. The relationship between national and regional systems is such that each participating member state is expected to coordinate and adopt, where possible, common national policies aimed at the progressive harmonization of relevant policies and systems across the region. Thus, Dominica is obligated to implement regionally developed regulations such as legislation passed under OECS authority, unless specific concessions are sought. The Dominica Bureau of Standards develops, maintains, and promotes standards for improving industrial development, industrial efficiency, promoting the health and safety of consumers, protecting the environment, and facilitating trade. It also conducts national training and consultations in international standards practices. As a signatory to the WTO Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade, Dominica, through the Dominica Bureau of Standards, is obligated to harmonize all national standards to international norms to avoid creating technical barriers to trade. Dominica ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2016. Ratification of the Agreement is an important signal to investors of the country’s commitment to improving its business environment for trade. The TFA aims to improve the speed and efficiency of border procedures, facilitate trade costs reduction, and enhance participation in the global value chain. Dominica has already implemented a number of TFA requirements. A full list is available at https://tfadatabase.org/members/dominica/measure-breakdown . As a member of CARICOM, Dominica utilizes the Advanced Cargo Information System, a computer-based system developed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to harmonize and standardize electronic cargo information in order to improve the capability to track cargo efficiently and to support regional and international trade. The Advance Cargo Information System forms a critical part of the World Customs Organization SAFE Framework of Standards. Dominica has also fully implemented the Automated System for Customs Data. Dominica bases its legal system on British common law. The Attorney General, the Chief Justice of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, junior judges, and magistrates administer justice in the country. The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Act establishes the Supreme Court of Judicature, which consists of the High Court and the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal. The High Court hears criminal and civil matters and makes determinations on the interpretation of the constitution. Parties may appeal to the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, an itinerant court that hears appeals from all OECS members. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is the regional judicial tribunal. The CCJ has original jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. In 2015, Dominica acceded to the CCJ, making the CCJ its final court of appeal. The United States and Dominica are both parties to the WTO. The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body resolve disputes over WTO agreements, while courts of appropriate jurisdiction in both countries resolve private disputes. The main laws concerning investment in Dominica are the Invest Dominica Authority Act (2007), the Tourism Act (2005), and the Fiscal Incentives Act. Regulatory amendments have been made to the Income Tax Act, the Value Added Tax Act, the Title by Registration Act, the Alien Landholding Regulation Act, and the Residential Levy Act. The IDA provides a full list of the relevant legislation on their website. The IDA reviews all proposals for investment concessions and incentives to ensure the project is consistent with the national interest and provides economic benefits to the country. The Cabinet makes the final decision on investment proposals. Under Dominica’s citizenship by investment program, qualified foreign investors may obtain citizenship without voting rights. Applicants can contribute a minimum of $100,000 to the Economic Diversification Fund for a single person or invest in designated real estate with a value of at least $200,000. Applicants must also provide a full medical certificate, undergo a background check, and provide evidence of the source of funds before proceeding to the final stage of an interview. The government introduced a citizen by investment certificate in order to minimize the risk of unlawful duplication. Further information is available at http://cbiu.gov.dm . Chapter 8 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas outlines the competition policy applicable to CARICOM States. Member states are required to establish and maintain a national competition authority for implementing the rules of competition. CARICOM established a Caribbean Competition Commission to apply rules of competition regarding anti-competitive cross-border business conduct. CARICOM competition policy addresses anti-competitive business conduct such as agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises, and concerted practices by enterprises that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within CARICOM, and actions by which an enterprise abuses its dominant position within CARICOM. Dominica does not have domestic legislation to regulate competition. There are no known pending expropriation cases involving American citizens. In such an event, Dominica would employ a system of eminent domain to pay compensation when property must be acquired in the public interest. There were no reported tendencies of the government to discriminate against U.S. investments, companies, or landholdings. There are no laws mandating local ownership in specified sectors. Under the Bankruptcy Act (1990), Dominica has a bankruptcy framework that grants certain rights to debtor and creditor. A full copy of the act is available for download from the government’s website . 6. Financial Sector Dominica is a member of the ECCU. As such, it is a member of the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange (ECSE) and the Regional Government Securities Market. The ECSE is a regional securities market established by the ECCB and licensed under the Securities Act of 2001, a uniform regional body of legislation governing the buying and selling of financial products for the eight member territories. In 2021, the ECSE listed 164 securities, comprising 140 sovereign debt instruments, 13 equities, and 11 corporate debt securities. Market capitalization stood at $1.9 billion. Dominica is open to portfolio investment. Dominica has accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF Agreement, Sections 2, 3, and 4 and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on making payments and transfers for current international transactions. Dominica does not normally grant foreign tax credits except in the case of taxes paid in a British Commonwealth country that grants similar relief for Dominica taxes or where an applicable tax treaty provides a credit. The private sector has access to credit on the local market through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, trade credits, and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. The eight participating governments of the ECCU have passed the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement Act. The act provides for the establishment of the ECCB, its management and administration, its currency, relations with financial institutions, relations with the participating governments, foreign exchange operations, external reserves, and other related matters. Dominica is a signatory to this agreement and the ECCB controls Dominica’s currency and regulates its domestic banks. The Banking Act is a harmonized piece of legislation across the ECCU. The Minister of Finance usually acts in consultation with, and on the recommendation of, the ECCB with respect to those areas of responsibility within the Minister of Finance’s portfolio. Domestic and foreign banks can establish operations in Dominica. The Banking Act requires all commercial banks and other institutions to be licensed in order to conduct any banking business. The ECCB regulates financial institutions. As part of ongoing supervision, licensed financial institutions are required to submit monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports to the ECCB. In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector in Dominica as stable. Assets of commercial banks totaled $781.8 million (2.1 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) at the end of 2019. Dominica is well served by bank and non-financial institutions. There are minimal alternative financial services. The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S. and European banks. CARICOM remains committed to engaging with key stakeholders on the issue and appointed a Committee of Ministers of Finance on Correspondent Banking to monitor the issue. In 2019, the ECCB launched an 18-month financial technology pilot to launch a Digital Eastern Caribbean dollar (DXCD) with its partner, Barbados-based Bitt Inc. An accompanying mobile application, DCash was officially launched in March 2021 in four pilot countries, adding Dominica to the pilot in December 2021. In January 2022, the platform experienced a system interruption, and its operation was suspended. The platform regained full functionality at the end of March 2022 following system upgrades. The digital Eastern Caribbean currency operates alongside physical Eastern Caribbean currency. Dominica does not have any specific legislation to regulate cryptocurrencies. Neither the Government of Dominica, nor the ECCB, of which Dominica is a member, maintains a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Dominica work in partnership with ministries, or under their remit to carry out certain specific ministerial responsibilities. The U.S. Embassy in Bridgetown is aware of 20 SOEs currently operating in areas such as tourism, investment services, broadcasting and media, solid waste management, and agriculture. There is no published list of these SOEs. They are all wholly owned government entities. Each is headed by a board of directors to which senior management reports. The SOE sector is affected by financial sustainability challenges, with resources insufficient to cover capital replacement. Dominica does not currently have a targeted privatization program. 10. Political and Security Environment Dominica held parliamentary elections in December 2019. Voting was held under heightened security following weeks of protests and legal challenges seeking electoral reform. The protests were led by the United Workers’ Party, which lost the election in a landslide to the ruling Dominica Labour Party. Dominica’s economy was severely affected by the COVID-19 crisis. The IMF has projected that Dominica’s GDP will grow 7.9 percent in 2022. In May 2020, the government unveiled a disaster resilience strategy that was based on three key pillars: structural resilience, financial resilience, and post-disaster resilience. Both the IMF and the World Bank provided support to address the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2 Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $503.7 2020 $504.2 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $0 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 66.8% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Eastern Caribbean Central Bank https://www.eccb-centralbank.org/statistics/dashboard-datas/ . Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. Dominican Republic Executive Summary Foreign direct investment (FDI) plays an important role for the Dominican economy, and the Dominican Republic is one of the main recipients of FDI in the Caribbean and Central America. The government actively courts FDI with generous tax exemptions and other incentives to attract businesses to the country. Historically, the tourism, real estate, telecommunications, free trade zones, mining, and financing sectors are the largest FDI recipients. Besides financial incentives, the country’s membership in the Central America Free Trade Agreement-Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR) is one of the greatest advantages for foreign investors. Observers credit the agreement with increasing competition, strengthening rule of law, and expanding access to quality products in the Dominican Republic. The United States remains the single largest investor in the Dominican Republic. CAFTA-DR includes protections for member state foreign investors, including mechanisms for dispute resolution. Foreign investors report numerous systemic problems in the Dominican Republic and cite a lack of clear, standardized rules by which to compete and a lack of enforcement of existing rules. Complaints include perceptions of widespread corruption at both national and local levels of government; delays in government payments; weak intellectual property rights enforcement; bureaucratic hurdles; slow and sometimes locally biased judicial and administrative processes, and non-standard procedures in customs valuation and classification of imports. Weak land tenure laws and interference with private property rights continue to be a problem. The public perceives administrative and judicial decision-making to be inconsistent, opaque, and overly time-consuming. A lack of transparency and poor implementation of existing laws are widely discussed as key investor grievances. U.S. businesses operating in the Dominican Republic often need to take extensive measures to ensure compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Many U.S. firms and investors have expressed concerns that corruption in the government, including in the judiciary, continues to constrain successful investment in the Dominican Republic. The current government, led by President Luis Abinader, made a concerted effort in its first full year of government to address issues of corruption and transparency that are a core issue for social, economic, and political prosperity, including prosecutorial independence, long-awaited electricity sector reform, and the empowerment of the supreme audit institution, the Chamber of Accounts. More work has repeatedly been promised, but passage remains uncertain as each measure is still subject to administrative or legislative processes, including approval of new public procurement legislation, passage of draft civil asset forfeiture legislation, the law for reform of the management of government assets, and a modern foreign investment law. The Dominican Republic, an upper middle-income country, has been the fastest growing economy in Latin America over the past 50 years, according to World Bank data. It grew by 12.3 percent in 2021, 4.7 percent when compared with 2019 (pre-pandemic). Tax revenues were 12.7 percent higher than what was stipulated in the Initial Budget for 2021; coupled with budgetary discipline, the government closed its deficit to 2.7 percent of GDP. However, inflation at the end of 2021 was 8.50 percent, double the target of 4.0 percent ±1.0. Despite the government efforts to reduce public spending and increase revenues, absent meaningful fiscal reform, public debt continued to grow in 2021, reaching $47.7 billion at the end of November 2021 (if debt to the Central Bank is added, the public debt reached $62.04 billion), and a total service of debt of $5.9 billion – resulting in decrease in the debt to GDP ratio, but an increase in the total value of government debt. The government continues to apply large subsidies to different sectors of the economy such as the electricity sector and hydrocarbons. In 2021, the government allocated $1.03 billion to the subsidy for Electricity Distribution Companies (EDE’s) and $266.9 million directly to fuel. According to the 2022 Climate Change Performance Index, the Dominican Republic is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to the effects of climate change, though it represents only 0.06% of global greenhouse gas emissions. As a small island developing state, the Dominican Republic is particularly vulnerable to the effects of extreme climate events, such as storms, floods, droughts, and rising sea levels. Combined with rapid economic growth (over 5 percent until 2020) and urbanization (more than 50 percent of population in cities, 30 percent in Santo Domingo), climate change could strain key socio-economic sectors such as water, agriculture and food security, human health, biodiversity, forests, marine coastal resources, infrastructure, and energy. The National Constitution calls for the efficient and sustainable use of the nation’s natural resources in accordance with the need to adapt to climate change. The government is acting, both domestically and in coordination with the international community, to mitigate the effects of climate change. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 128 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 93 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $2,806 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $7,260 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Dominican Republic presents both opportunities and challenges for foreign investment. The government strongly promotes inward FDI and has prioritized creating a sound enabling environment for foreign investors. While the government has established formal programs to attract FDI, a lack of clear rules and uneven enforcement of existing rules can lead to difficulties. The approval in 2021 of a National Competitiveness Strategy, including the formation of a National Competitiveness Council, seeks to respond to the indicators of the Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum, and should help address some of these concerns. The Dominican Republic provides tax incentives for investment in tourism, renewable energy, film production, Haiti-Dominican Republic border development, and the industrial sector. The country is also a signatory of CAFTA-DR, which mandates non-discriminatory treatment, free transferability of funds, protection against expropriation, and procedures for the resolution of investment disputes. However, some foreign investors indicate that the uneven enforcement of regulations and laws, or political interference in legal processes, creates difficulties for investment. There are two main government agencies responsible for attracting foreign investment, the Export and Investment Center of the Dominican Republic (CEI-RD) and the National Council of Free Trade Zones for Export (CNZFE). CEI-RD promotes foreign investment and aids prospective foreign investors with business registration, matching services, and identification of investment opportunities. It publishes an annual “Investment Guide of the Dominican Republic,” highlighting many of the tools, incentives, and opportunities available for prospective investors. The CEI-RD also oversees “ProDominicana,” a branding and marketing program for the country launched in 2017 that promotes the DR as an investment destination and exporter. CNZFE aids foreign companies looking to establish operations in the country’s 79 free trade zones for export outside Dominican territory. There are a variety of business associations that promote dialogue between the government and private sector, including the Association of Foreign Investor Businesses (ASIEX). Foreign Investment Law No. 16-95 states that unlimited foreign investment is permitted in all sectors, with a few exceptions for hazardous materials or materials linked to national security. Private entities, both foreign and domestic, have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all legal remunerative activity. Foreign companies are not restricted in their access to foreign exchange, there are no requirements that foreign equity be reduced over time or that technology be transferred according to defined terms, and the government imposes no conditions on foreign investors concerning location, local ownership, local content, or export requirements. See Section 3 Legal Regime for more information. The Dominican Republic does not maintain a formalized investment screening and approval mechanism for inbound foreign investment. Details on the established mechanisms for registering a business or investment are elaborated in the Business Facilitations section below. The Dominican Republic has not been reviewed recently by multilateral organizations regarding investment policy. The most recent reviews occurred in 2015. This included a trade policy review by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a follow-up review by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) regarding its 2009 investment policy recommendations. 2009 UNCTAD – https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=6343 2015 WTO – https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s319_e.pdf 2015 UNCTAD – https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2016d2_en.pdf Foreign investment does not require any prior approval in the Dominican Republic, but once made it must be registered with the CEI-RD. Investments in free zones must be registered with the CNZFE, which will notify the CEI-RD. Foreign investment registration is compulsory, but failure to do so is not subject to any sanction. Law No. 16-95 Foreign Investment, Law No. 98-03 on the Creation of the CEI-RD, and Regulation 214-04 govern foreign investment in the Dominican Republic and require an interested foreign investor to file an application form at the offices of CEI-RD within 180 calendar days from the date on which the foreign investment took place. The required documents include the application for registration, containing information on the invested capital and the area of the investment; proof of entry into the country of the foreign capital or physical or tangible goods; and documents of commercial incorporation or the authorization of operation of a branch office through the setting up of legal domicile in the country. The reinvestment of profits (in the same or a different firm) must be registered within 90 days. Once the documents have been approved, the CEI-RD issues a certificate of registration within 15 business days subject to the payment of a fee which varies depending on the amount of the investment. Lack of registration does not affect the validity of the foreign investment; but the fact that it is needed to fulfill various types of procedures, makes registration necessary in practice. For example, the registration certificate has to be presented to repatriate profits or investment in the event of sale or liquidation and to purchase foreign exchange from the authorized agencies for transfers abroad, as well as to process the residency of the investor. In April 2021, CEI-RD launched an online Registry of Foreign Direct Investment, which aims to streamline and make the registration processes more transparent to investors. For more information on becoming an investor or exporter, visit the CEI-RD ProDominicana website at https://prodominicana.gob.do . The Dominican Republic has a single-window registration website for registering a limited liability company (SRL by its Spanish acronym) that offers a one-stop shop for registration needs ( https://www.formalizate.gob.do/ ). Foreign companies may use the registration website. However, this electronic method of registration is not widely used in practice and consultation with a local lawyer is recommended for company registrations. According to the “Doing Business” report, starting a SRL in the Dominican Republic is a seven-step process that requires 16.5 days. However, some businesses advise the full incorporation process can take two to three times longer than the advertised process. In order to set up a business in a free trade zone, a formal request must be made to the CNZFE, the entity responsible for issuing the operating licenses needed to be a free zone company or operator. CNZFE assesses the application and determines its feasibility. For more information on the procedure to apply for an operating license, visit the website of the CNZFE at http://www.cnzfe.gov.do. There are no legal or government restrictions on Dominican investment abroad, although the government does little to promote it. Outbound foreign investment is significantly lower than inbound investment. The largest recipient of Dominican outward investment is the United States. 3. Legal Regime The national government manages all regulatory processes. Information about regulations is often scattered among various ministry and agency websites and is sometimes only available through direct communication with officials. It is advisable for U.S. investors to consult with local attorneys or advisors to assist with locating comprehensive regulatory information. On the 2021 Global Innovations Index, the Dominican Republic’s overall rank was 93 out of 131 nations analyzed, which is a setback from its rank in 2020 by three positions. In sub-sections of the report, the Dominican Republic ranks 101 out of 131 for regulatory environment and 74 out of 131 for regulatory quality. The World Bank Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance report states that Dominican ministries and regulatory agencies do not publish lists of anticipated regulatory changes or proposals intended for adoption within a specific timeframe. Law No. 107-13 requires regulatory agencies to give notice of proposed regulations in public consultations and mandates publication of the full text of draft regulations on the relevant agency’s website. Additionally, Law No. 200-04 allows citizens in general to request information to the government on a unified website: https://saip.gob.do/ . Foreign investors, however, note that these requirements are not always met in practice since not all relevant Dominican agencies provide content, and those that do often do not keep the content up to date, and many businesses point out that the scope of SAIP’s website content is not always adequate for investors or interested parties. U.S. businesses also reported years’ long delays in the enactment of regulations supporting new legislation, even when the common legal waiting period is normally six months. The process of public consultation is not uniform across the government. Some ministries and regulatory agencies solicit comments on proposed legislation from the public; however, public outreach is generally limited and depends on the responsible ministry or agency. For example, businesses report that some ministries upload proposed regulations to their websites or post them in national newspapers, while others may form working groups with key public and private sector stakeholders participating in the drafting of proposed regulations. Often the criteria used by the government to select participants in these informal exchanges are unclear, which at a minimum creates the appearance of favoritism and that undue influence is being offered to a handpicked (and often politically connected) group of firms and investors. Public comments received by the government are generally not publicly accessible. Some ministries and agencies prepare consolidated reports on the results of a consultation for direct distribution to interested stakeholders. Ministries and agencies do not conduct impact assessments of regulations or ex post reviews. Affected parties cannot request reconsideration or appeal of adopted regulations, although they could challenge any of its content if deemed unconstitutional at the Constitutional Court and contest its application before the Superior Administrative Tribunal. In February 2022, the Dominican Republic’s General Directorate of Internal Taxes (DGII) proposed to extend the existing 18% value added tax known as the ITBIS to digital services and published the draft regulation on its website (https://dgii.gov.do/Paginas/default.aspx) for public comment. The Dominican Institute of Certified Public Accountants (ICPARD) is the country’s legally recognized professional accounting organization and has authority to establish accounting standards in accordance with Law No. 479-08, which also declares that (as amended by Law No. 311-14) financial statements should be prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting standards nationally and internationally. The ICPARD and the country’s Securities Superintendency require the use of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and IFRS for small and medium-sized entities (SMEs). By law, the Office of Public Credit publishes on its website a quarterly report on the status of the non-financial public sector debt, which includes a wide array of information and statistics on public borrowing ( www.creditopublico.gov.do/publicaciones/informes_trimestrales.htm ). In addition to the public debt addressed by the Office of Public Credit, the Central Bank maintains on its balance sheet nearly $10 billion in “quasi-fiscal” debt. When consolidated with central government debt, the debt-to-GDP ratio is over 60 percent, and the debt service ratio is over 30 percent. As of the end of 2020, the Dominican Republic was involved in 18 dispute settlement cases with the WTO: one as complainant, eight as respondent, and nine as a third party. In recent years, the Dominican Republic has frequently changed technical requirements (e.g., for steel rebar imports and sanitary registrations, among others) and has failed to provide proper notification under the WTO TBT agreement and CAFTA-DR. The judicial branch is an independent branch of the Dominican government. According to Article 69 of the Constitution, all persons, including foreigners, have the right to appear in court. The basic concepts of the Dominican legal system and the forms of legal reasoning derive from French law—civil law system in general. The five basic French Codes (Civil, Civil Procedure, Commerce, Penal, and Criminal Procedure) were translated into Spanish and passed as legislation in 1884. Some of these codes have since been amended and parts have been replaced, including the total derogation of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 2002, resulting in a hybrid legal framework. There is a Commercial Code and a wide variety of laws governing business formation and activity. The main laws governing commercial disputes are the Commercial Code; Law No. 479-08, the Commercial Societies Law; Law No. 3-02, concerning Business Registration; Commercial Arbitration Law No. 489-08; Law No. 141-15 concerning Restructuring and Liquidation of Business Entities; and Law No. 126-02, concerning e-Commerce and Digital Documents and Signatures. Some investors complain of significant delays in obtaining a decision by the Judiciary. While Dominican law mandates overall time standards for the completion of key events in a civil case, these standards frequently are not met. The Judiciary has requested additional funds to hire more judges, clerks, and judicial personnel to address these concerns. In 2020 the World Bank noted that resolving complaints raised during the award and execution of a contract can take more than four years in the Dominican Republic, although some take longer. Dominican nationals and foreigners alike have the constitutional right to submit their cases to an appeal court or to request the Supreme Court review (recurso de casación in Spanish) the ruling of a lower court. If a violation of fundamental rights is alleged, the Constitutional Court might also review the case with the authority to nullify the lower court judgment. Notwithstanding, foreign investors have complained that the local court system is unreliable, is biased against them, and that special interests and powerful individuals are able to use the legal system in their favor. Others who have successfully won in courts, have struggled to get their ruling enforced. While the law provides for an independent judiciary, businesses and other external groups have noted that traditionally the government did not respect judicial independence or impartiality, and improper influence on judicial decisions was widespread. The Abinader administration has made a concerted effort to respect the autonomy of the Public Ministry and the Office of the Attorney General, and investors have noted improvements. The administration has proposed a constitutional amendment to strengthen the independence of the Office of the Attorney General, but it faces uncertain prospects in the Dominican Congress. Several large U.S. firms cite the improper and disruptive use of lower court injunctions as a way for local distributors to obtain more beneficial settlements at the end of contract periods. To engage effectively in the Dominican market, many U.S. companies seek local partners that are well-connected and understand the local business environment, but even this is a not a guarantee. The legal framework supports foreign investment. Article 221 of the Constitution declares that foreign investment shall receive the same treatment as domestic investment. Foreign Investment Law No. 16-95 states that unlimited foreign investment is permitted in all sectors, with a few exceptions. According to the law, foreign investment is not allowed in the following categories: a) disposal and remains of toxic, dangerous, or radioactive garbage not produced in the country; b) activities affecting the public health and the environmental equilibrium of the country, pursuant to the norms that apply in this regard; and c) production of materials and equipment directly linked to national defense and security, except for an express authorization from the Executive. The Export and Investment Center of the Dominican Republic (ProDominicana, formally known as CEI-RD) aims to be the one-stop shop for investment information, registration, and investor after-care services. ProDominicana maintains a user-friendly website for guidance on the government’s priority sectors for inward investment and on the range of investment incentives ( https://prodominicana.gob.do ). In February 2020, the Dominican government enacted the Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) Law No. 47-20 to establish a regulatory framework for the initiation, selection, award, contracting, execution, monitoring and termination of PPPs in line with the 2030 National Development Strategy of the Dominican Republic. The law also created the General Directorate of Public-Private Partnerships (DGAPP) as the agency responsible for the promotion and regulation of public-private alliances and the National Council of Public-Private Partnerships as the highest body responsible for evaluating and determining the relevance of the PPPs. The PPP law recognizes public-private and public-private non-profit partnerships from public or private initiatives and provides for forty-year concession contracts, five-year exemptions of the tax on the transfer of goods and services (ITBIS), and accelerated depreciation and amortization regimes. The DGAPP website has the most up to date information on PPPs ( https://dgapp.gob.do/en/home/ ). The National Commission for the Defense of Competition (ProCompetencia) has the power to review transactions for competition-related concerns. Private sector contacts note, however, that strong public pressure is required for ProCompetencia to act. Its decisions can be challenged before the Superior Administrative Tribunal (TSA). The TSA’s ruling can be revised in its legality through a recurso de casación by the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ), and if there was a constitutional violation, the case could be heard by the Constitutional Court. On June 14, 2021, ProCompetencia approved sanctions against four pharmaceuticals firms found guilty of price fixing (Profarma Internacional, S.R.L, Sued & Fargesa, S.R.L., Mercantil Farmacéutica, S.A. y J. Gassó Gassó, S.A.S) for certain drugs such as analgesics and anti-flu medicines. Total fines reached $250,000 ($14 million pesos). The Dominican constitution permits the government’s exercise of eminent domain after the President has declared a plot of land for public use by official decree; however, it also mandates fair market compensation in advance of the use of seized land. Nevertheless, there are many outstanding disputes between U.S. investors and the Dominican government concerning unpaid government contracts or expropriated property and businesses, as well indirect expropriation. Property claims make up the majority of cases. Most, but not all, expropriations have been used for infrastructure or commercial development and many claims remain unresolved for years. The Abinader administration has committed to resolve disputes over land title before government use, but in some cases the matters are protracted and there are multiple claims to the same piece of land. Traditionally, investors and lenders have reported that they typically do not receive prompt payment of fair market value for their losses. They have complained of difficulties in the subsequent enforcement even in cases in which the Dominican courts, including the Supreme Court, have ordered compensation or when the government has recognized a claim. In other cases, some indicate that lengthy delays in compensation payments are blamed on errors committed by government-contracted property assessors, slow processes to correct land title errors, a lack of budgeted funds, and other technical problems. There are also cases of regulatory action that investors say could be viewed as indirect expropriation. For example, they note that government decrees mandating atypical setbacks from roads, or establishing new protected areas can deprive investors of their ability to use purchased land in the manner initially planned, substantially affecting the economic benefit sought from the investment. Many companies report that the procedures to resolve expropriations lack transparency. Government officials are rarely, if ever, held accountable for failing to pay a recognized claim or failing to pay in a timely manner. Law 141-15 provides the legal framework for bankruptcy. It allows a debtor company to continue to operate for up to five years during reorganization proceedings by halting further legal proceedings. It also authorizes specialized bankruptcy courts; contemplates the appointment of conciliators, verifiers, experts, and employee representatives; allows the debtor to contract for new debt which will have priority status in relation to other secured and unsecured claims; stipulates civil and criminal sanctions for non-compliance; and permits the possibility of coordinating cross-border proceedings based on recommendations of the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1997. In March 2019, a specialized bankruptcy court was established in Santo Domingo. The Dominican Republic scores lower than the regional average and comparator economies on resolving insolvency on most international indices. 6. Financial Sector The Dominican Stock Market (BVRD by its Spanish acronym) is the only stock exchange in the Dominican Republic. It began operations in 1991 and is viewed as a cornerstone of the country’s integration into the global economy and domestic development. It is regulated by the Securities Market Law No. 249-17 and supervised by the Superintendency of Securities, which approves all public securities offerings. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. Foreign investors are able to obtain credit on the local market but tend to prefer less expensive offshore sources. The Central Bank regularly issues certificates of deposit using an auction process to determine interest rates and maturities. In recent years, the local stock market has continued to expand, in terms of the securities traded on the BVRD. There are very few publicly traded companies on the exchange, as credit from financial institutions is widely available and many of the large Dominican companies are family-owned enterprises. Most of the securities traded in the BVRD are fixed-income securities issued by the Dominican State. On August 6, 2021, the Law 163-21 for the Promotion of the Placement and Marketing of Publicly Offered Securities in the Stock Market of the Dominican Republic was enacted as a complement to Law 249-17, to promote the issuance of shares by private and public companies. This law declares of national interest the promotion and development of the public offering of securities as a financing mechanism for the revitalization of the national economy, with special emphasis on the issuance of shares of private and public companies in the stock market of the Dominican Republic. Among the incentives proposed by Law 163-21, is the exemption of listed companies from the 1% tax for capital increase when they issue new shares during their first three years of validity. Likewise, during that same 3-year period, the Law reduces to 15% the rate of Income Tax applicable to Capital gains generated by the seller of a share listed on the stock exchange. Dominican Republic’s financial sector is relatively stable, and the IMF declared the financial system satisfactory during 2021 Article IV consultations, however, directors agreed that while financial system remains resilient and well monitored, it would benefit from moving closer to international standards for supervision and regulation and enhancing the macroprudential and crisis management toolkit. According to the first National Financial Inclusion Survey from the Central Bank, published on March 22, 2020, only 46.3 percent of Dominicans have a bank account. Financial depth is relatively constrained. Private lending to GDP (around 30.5 percent, according to the IMF) is low by international and regional standards, representing around half the average for Latin America. Real interest rates, driven in part by large interest rate spreads, are also relatively high. The country’s relatively shallow financial markets can be attributed to a number of factors, including high fiscal deficits crowding out private investment; complicated and lengthy regulatory procedures for issuing securities in primary markets; and high levels of consolidation in the banking sector. Dominican banking consists of 112 entities, as follows: 47 financial intermediation entities (including large commercial banks, savings and loans associations, financial intermediation public entities, credit corporations), 41 foreign exchange and remittance agents (specifically, 35 exchange brokers and 6 remittances and foreign exchange agents), and 24 trustees. According to the latest available information (January 2022), total bank assets were $47.7 billion. The three largest banks hold 69.7 percent of the total assets – Banreservas 32.6 percent, Banco Popular 21.9 percent, and BHD Leon 16.4 percent. While full-service bank branches tend to be in urban areas, several banks employ sub-agents to extend services in more rural areas. Technology has also helped extend banking services throughout the country. The Monetary and Banking system is regulated by the Monetary and Financial Law No. 183-02, and is overseen by the Monetary Board, the Central Bank, and the Superintendency of Banks. The mission of the Central Bank is to maintain the stability of prices, promote the strength and stability of the financial system, and ensure the proper functioning of payment systems. The Superintendency of Banks carries out the supervision of financial intermediation entities, in order to verify compliance by said entities with the provisions of the law. Foreign banks may establish operations in the Dominican Republic, although it may require a special decree for the foreign financial institution to establish domicile in the country. Foreign banks not domiciled in the Dominican Republic may establish representative offices in accordance with current regulations. To operate, both local and foreign banks must obtain the prior authorization of the Monetary Board and the Superintendency of Banks. Major U.S. banks have a commercial presence in the country, but most focus on corporate banking services as opposed to retail banking. Some other foreign banks offer retail banking. There are no restrictions on foreigners opening bank accounts, although identification requirements do apply. The Dominican government does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The legacy of autocratic rule in the mid-twentieth century and the practice of distributing social services as political patronage have resulted in a relatively larger role for state-actors in the Dominican economy when compared with the United States. Since 1997, by means of the approval of the General Law of Reform of Public Companies No. 141-97, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have been on the decline and do not have as significant a presence in the economy as they once did, with most functions now performed by privately held firms. Notable exceptions are in the electricity, banking, mining, and refining sectors. The Dominican Corporation of State Enterprises (CORDE) was established by Law No. 289 of June 30, 1966, with the purpose of managing, directing, and developing all the productive and commercial companies, goods, and rights ceded by the Dominican State as a result of the death of the dictator Rafael Leónidas Trujillo. Among the state-owned companies that came to be managed by CORDE are the salt, gypsum, marble, and pozzolana mines. In 2017, the dissolution of CORDE was entrusted to a Commission chaired by the Legal Consultancy of the Executive Power, which assumed the operational, administrative, and financial management of this entity until the dissolution process was definitively completed. Within the framework of the dissolution process of CORDE, the ownership of the mining concessions of the Dominican State was transferred to the Patrimonial Fund of Reformed Companies (FONPER) through the Mining Concessions Transfer Agreement between CORDE and FONPER dated July 2, 2020. Shortly after being sworn into office, in August 2020, President Abinader issued Decree 422-20 forming the Commission for the Liquidation of State Organs (CLOE) under the charge of the Ministry of the Presidency. Since then, the CLOE has been in the process of dissolution and liquidation of CORDE, and on December 8, 2020, CLOE requested the FONPER Board of Directors revoke the Concessions Transfer Agreement. FONPER’s Board of Directors approved the revocation through Minutes No. 02-2021 of March 11, 2021, authorizing the president of FONPER to sign an agreement with CLOE that revokes and nullifies the Transfer Agreement. It is not clear whether this revocation has been completed. In 2021, the Office of the President proposed a bill to regulate government business assets, government participation in public trusts, and to create the National Center for Companies and Public Trusts (CENEFIP). The bill’s intent is to reform the management of state assets and replace the disgraced Patrimonial Fund of Reformed State Enterprises (FONPER), which is being investigated for alleged irregularities that may have personally benefited politically affiliated persons. The CENEFIP bill is under review in the legislature. Also in 2021, the executive branch transferred the functions and properties of the State Sugar Council [Consejo Estatal del Azúcar] to the Directorate General of National Assests [Dirección General de Bienes Nacionales]. The State Sugar Council maintains one remaining sugar mill, Porvenir. In the partially privatized electricity sector, private companies mainly provide electricity generation, while the government handles the transmission and distribution phases via the Dominican Electric Transmission Company (ETED) and the Dominican Corporation of State Electrical Companies (CDEEE). This sector is undergoing additional reforms, including the dissolution of the CDEEE and privatization of the management and operation of the distribution companies. The CDEEE and the distribution companies have traditionally been the largest SOEs in terms of government expenditures. The government also participates in the generation phase, too (most notably in hydroelectric power), and one of the distribution companies is partially privatized. The Dominican financial sector consists of 112 entities, as follows: 47 financial intermediation entities (including large commercial banks, savings and loans associations, financial intermediation public entities, credit corporations), 41 foreign exchange and remittance agents (specifically, 35 exchange brokers and 6 remittances and foreign exchange agents), and 24 trustees. According to the latest available information (January 2022), total bank assets were $47.7 billion. The three largest banks hold 69.7 percent of the total assets – Banreservas 32.6 percent, Banco Popular 21.9 percent, and BHD Leon 16.4 percent. The state-owned, but autonomously operated BanReservas is the largest bank in the country and is a market leader in lending and deposits. Part of this success is due to a requirement for government employees to open accounts with BanReservas in order to receive salary payments. BanReservas was also utilized to distribute government social support payments during the pandemic. Roughly a third of the bank’s lending portfolio is to government institutions. In the refining sector, the government is now the exclusive shareholder of the country’s only oil refinery; Refinery Dominicana (Refidomsa), after having extricated Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) in August 2021. Refidomsa operates and manages the refinery, is the only importer of crude oil in the country, and is also the largest importer of refined fuels, with a 60 percent market share. The price for fuel products is set by the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and SMEs. Fuel prices are heavily subsidized. Law No. 10-04 requires the Chamber of Accounts to audit SOEs. Audits should be published at https://www.camaradecuentas.gob.do/index.php/auditorias-publicadas . While audits have not always been publicly available, the new President of the Chamber is making a concerted effort to conduct and publish all audits required by law. Partial privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the late 1990s and early 2000s resulted in foreign investors obtaining management control of former SOEs engaged in activities such as electricity generation, airport management, and sugarcane processing. In the electricity sector, these reforms were reversed between 2003 and 2009, but have largely remained in place for other sectors. Major reforms for the electricity sector, as outlined in the National Pact for Energy Reform signed February 2021, are ongoing. Plans for dissolving the CDEEE are in process, with the organization functional in name only, and the Ministry of Energy and Mines having assumed many of the authorities conferred to the CDEEE upon its founding in 2001 and across its 20-year life span. Complete dissolution and final distribution of authorities remains a legal question, which is currently being reviewed by the President’s legal advisor and the Ministry of Energy and Mines. The DGAPP has taken the first step to improve the governance and performance of electricity distribution companies through the introduction of private sector participation. On November 29, 2021, the DGAPP publicly accepted for detailed evaluation an application submitted by the Board of the Electricity Distribution Companies (Consejo Unificado de las Empresas Distribuidoras de Electricidad) for a Public Private Partnership (PPP) covering the three state-owned distribution companies. The DGAPP Resolution No. 89/2021 follows the process in the PPP Law (Law No. 47-20), whereby any public or private entity wishing to propose a PPP must submit a formal proposal and justification to the DGAPP. Government officials expect the process to privatize the management and operation of the electricity distribution companies to begin in earnest in the summer of 2022 with the release of tender documents. All indications are that foreign firms will be invited to participate in these tenders. Questions should be directed toward the Ministry of Energy and Mines ( https://mem.gob.do/ ) or DGAPP ( https://dgapp.gob.do/en/home/ ). 10. Political and Security Environment Despite political stability and strong pre-pandemic economic growth, citizen and public security concerns in the Dominican Republic impose significant costs on businesses and limit foreign and domestic investment. There are no known national security threats affecting foreign investment within the Dominican Republic. The U.S. Department of State has assessed Santo Domingo as a critical-threat location for crime. According to the Latin American Public Opinion Project, there is a steady increase in crime-related victimization and a growing perception of insecurity in the Dominican Republic since 2010. In 2021, Fund for Peace ranked the Dominican Republic 107 out of 179 countries in its Fragile States index. Other than domestic violence, criminal activity is mostly associated with street-level incidents consisting of robberies and petty larcenies. Of these, street robbery is particularly concerning as criminals often use weapons to coerce compliance from victims. In addition, the Dominican Republic faces challenges with organized crime. Transnational criminal organizations in the Dominican Republic use land, airspace, and territorial waters for the transshipment of drugs from South America destined for the United States and Europe, transshipment of ecstasy from the Netherlands and Belgium destined for United States and Canada, substantial money laundering activity particularly by Colombian narcotics traffickers, and significant amphetamine consumption. The U.S. Department of State has assessed the Dominican Republic as being a low-threat location for terrorism and a medium-threat location for political violence. There are no known organized domestic terrorist groups in the Dominican Republic. Nonetheless, the Dominican Republic is a likely transit point for extremists from within the Caribbean, Africa, and Europe. A porous border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic remains an ongoing concern as the security situation in Haiti has worsened after the assassination of the Haitian President Moise in August 2021 and the growing gang problem in Haiti. Dominican officials have expressed concerns about widespread civil unrest or instability in Haiti contributing to illegal flows of people and illicit goods across the border. In 2021, few protests took place. COVID-19 protocols might have had a dampening effect on the size and scale of protests. The Dominican Republic armed forces view irregular migration along the border, citizen security, illicit trafficking of arms, weapons, and drugs, as well as natural disasters as threats to their national security. As a result, they have postured their forces to support land, air, and maritime whole of government efforts to protect their sovereign territory. Ecuador Executive Summary The government of Ecuador under President Guillermo Lasso has adopted an ambitious economic reform agenda to drive investment. Private sector leaders in Ecuador emphasize the “Lasso Effect” in investment given the surge of optimism following the April 2021 election of the region’s most pro-business president in decades. “More Ecuador in the world and more of the world in Ecuador” – President Lasso’s key message for his presidency – includes the administration’s drive to attract $30 billion in investment over his four-year administration. Indeed, investment is growing – with both international and domestic companies searching for opportunities in this traditionally protectionist market that once garnered little attention compared to neighbors Colombia and Peru. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are the cornerstone of the administration’s investment drive, including the establishment of a PPP Secretariat and the consolidation of PPP-related tax rules and regulations. The Ecuadorian government is taking positive steps to improving fiscal stability. In September 2020, the International Monetary Fund approved a $6.5 billion, 27-month Extended Fund Facility for Ecuador and has already disbursed $4.8 billion to aid in economic stabilization and reform. The IMF program is in line with the government’s efforts to correct fiscal imbalances and to improve transparency and efficiency in public finance. The Ecuadorian Central Bank reported solid GDP growth of 4.2 percent in 2021 and projects 2.8 percent GDP growth in 2022. The Ecuadorian government remains committed to the sustainability of public finances and to continue a fiscal consolidation path. The fiscal deficit narrowed to 3.5 percent of GDP in 2021 (from over 7 percent of GDP in 2020) and is expected to narrow further to a little over 2 percent of GDP in 2022 due to improved tax collection, prudent public spending, and high oil prices. Still, the Lasso administration faces major challenges to its investment agenda given the country’s long-term reputation as a high-risk country for investment. A challenging relationship with the National Assembly complicates the passage of needed economic reform legislation. While the administration’s November 2021 tax reform passed into law, the National Assembly soundly defeated President Lasso’s proposed investment promotion bill March 24. Serious budget deficits and the COVID-induced economic recession force the government to employ cost cutting measures and limit public investment. Ecuador has traditionally struggled to structure tenders and PPPs that are bankable, transparent, and competitive. This has discouraged private investment and attracted companies that lack a commitment to quality construction, accountability and transparency, environmental sustainability, and social inclusion. Corruption remains widespread, and Ecuador is ranked in the bottom half of countries surveyed for Transparency International’s Perceptions of Corruption Index. In addition, economic, commercial, and investment policies are subject to frequent changes and can increase the risks and costs of doing business in Ecuador. Ecuador is a dollarized economy that has few limits on foreign investment or repatriation of profits, with the exception of a currency exit tax. It has a population that generally views the United States positively, and the Lasso Administration has expanded bilateral ties and significantly increased cooperation with the United States on a broad range of economic, security, political, and cultural issues. Sectors of Interest to Foreign Investors Petroleum and Gas: Per the 2008 Constitution, all subsurface resources belong to the state, and the petroleum sector is dominated by one state-owned enterprise (SOE) that cannot be privatized. Presidential Decree 95 published July 2021 opened private sector participation in oil exploration and production, with a goal to double oil production to 1 million barrels per day by 2028. The government can offer concessions of its refineries, sell off SOE gasoline stations, issue production-sharing contracts for oil exploration and exploitation, and prepare the SOE to be listed publicly on the stock market. The government maintained its consumer fuel subsidies since May 2020. The Ecuadorian government plans three oil field tenders in 2022 including concessions for Intracampos II and III and Block 60–Sacha. Given its declining and underdeveloped gas fields, the government plans to launch a tender for its Amistad offshore gas field. Additionally, the government announced potential tenders for a South-East concession, a private operator for the Esmeraldas refinery, and another to build and operate a new Euro 5 quality refinery. Mining: The Ecuadorian government plans to accelerate mining development to increase revenues and diversify its economy. Presidential Decree 151, published August 2021, seeks to promote private sector participation in mining exploration and production. The decree allows for private sector investment, joint ventures with the state-owned mining enterprise (SOE); seeks to combat illegal mining; and establishes an Advisory Board to guide the government on best practices for responsible mining. The government announced plans to relaunch its mining cadastre in 2022, which was closed in 2018 due to irregularities in granting concessions. Ecuador has two operating mines — a gold mine operated by a Canadian company and a copper mine operated by a PRC-affiliated company. In 2021 the government issued two new mining concessions and announced plans to issue concessions for 12 additional strategic mining projects. Electricity: Hydroelectric electricity accounts for 80 percent of Ecuador’s electricity generation. The PRC-built 1500 MW Coca Codo Sinclair (CCS) hydro power plant designed to provide 30 percent of Ecuador’s electricity has never generated its total installed power capacity and has been undergoing repairs since it began operating in 2016. CCS is also at risk from regressive erosion from the adjacent Coca River. The government contracted U.S. Army Corp of Engineers engineering services December 2021 to develop a solution to mitigate the river erosion. The government plans to develop wind, solar, hydro, biomass, biogas, geothermal, biofuel, combined cycle, and gas-fired electrical generation plants to diversify the energy matrix. It awarded a 200 MW solar tender and a 110 MW wind tender to private operators in 2020. It launched tenders for a 500 MW renewable energy block, a 400 MW combined cycle power plant, and a Northeast Interconnection transmission line in December 2021. The government imported its first LNG cargo December 2021 followed by a second shipment in February 2022. Telecommunications: The Lasso administration is prioritizing rural connectivity as its major telecommunications policy. In mid-2021, the Ministry of Telecommunications (MINTEL) received from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) the valuation report for the 2.5 GHz (gigahertz) and 700 MHz (megahertz) bands. The cost set is reserved. Likewise, MINTEL asked the ITU for the valuation of the 3.5 GHz, 850, 900 AWS and 1900 bands, which in turn will allow new players in the market and the future deployment of the fifth generation of technologies (5G). Three 5G technology connectivity tests have taken place in Ecuador, though there is no target date for the beginning of 5G commercial operations. Ecuador is due to renegotiate the concession contracts with the mobile network operators, which expire in 2023. New terms and conditions of the concession rights and use of frequencies are currently in the works including technical, legal, and regulatory requirements. The current negotiations do not include the frequency bands for the 5G network and are instead focused on the frequencies currently assigned to operators. E–Commerce: In 2020, E-Commerce sales reached $2.3 billion record sales, an overnight digital transformation due to the pandemic. In 2021, according to Ecuador´s Electronic Commerce Chamber, E-Commerce sales grew 20 to 40 percent ($460 to $920 million, approximately). While many Ecuadorians are interested in purchasing online, they are limited in their ability to receive international shipments due to logistics and customs problems upon arrival in Ecuador. The Ministry of Production launched the National E-Commerce Strategy in 2021, establishing a framework for facilitating the digital transformation in the country. The strategy focuses on strengthening the current legal framework, capacity building for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and improving logistics and payment gateway capabilities. Since the issuance of the National E-Commerce Strategy, no new regulations have entered into force to facilitate its application and the objectives set forth therein. The government is also promoting the development of the Andean Digital Agenda together with the other Andean Community countries, whose update will be promulgated in the first half of this year. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 105 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 91 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $29 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.cfm World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $5,530 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Ecuador is open to FDI in most sectors. The 2008 Constitution established that the state reserves the right to manage strategic sectors through state-owned or -controlled companies. The sectors identified are energy, telecommunications, non-renewable natural resources, transportation, hydrocarbon refining, water, biodiversity, and genetic patrimony (flora, fauna, and ancestral knowledge). Although in recent years Ecuador took steps to attract FDI, its overall investment climate remains challenging as economic, commercial, and investment policies are subject to frequent change. From January to September 2021 (latest information available), FDI flows to Ecuador were USD 493 million, a 50 percent decrease compared to 2020 levels (USD 986 million) and 23 percent lower than 2019 levels (USD 642 million). FDI continues to be very low compared to other countries in the region. There are no laws or practices that discriminate against foreign investors, but the legal complexity resulting from the inconsistent application and interpretation of existing laws and regulations increases the risks and costs of doing business in Ecuador. Under the prior Correa administration, disputes involving U.S. companies were politicized, especially in sensitive areas such as the energy sector. This resulted in several high-profile international investment dispute cases, with companies awarded damages in international arbitral rulings against Ecuador in the last few years. One case is still pending final arbitral ruling. [Please use U.S. Department of Commerce key words for industries in this section, list available at https://www.trade.gov/industries-0 ] Foreign and domestic private entities are allowed to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity, with limitations in strategic sectors as enumerated in the Constitution. Ecuador does not have a single national-level interagency investment screening system for FDI. Each ministry analyzes investments and assesses FDI risks. One hundred precent foreign equity ownership is allowed. For license and franchise transactions, no limits exist on royalties that may be remitted, although financial outflows are subject to a 4.5 percent capital exit tax. The Lasso administration committed to the gradual phaseout of Ecuador’s capital exit tax (ISD) over the next four years starting in 2022 with a quarterly reduction of 0.25 percent. President Lasso signed September 2 executive decree 182 removing the ISD on the international aviation and maritime cargo sectors. All license and franchise agreements must be registered with the National Service for Intellectual Property Rights (SENADI). In addition to registering with the Superintendence of Companies, Securities, and Insurance, foreign investors must register investments with Ecuador’s Central Bank for statistical purposes. Ecuador conducted a trade policy review with the World Trade Organization in March 2019; information can be found at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp483_e.htm In 2020, Ecuador conducted an investment policy review with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), published in 2021. Information can be found at: https://unctad.org/node/34311 . In the past three years, Ecuador has not conducted an investment policy review with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). ProEcuador ( https://www.proecuador.gob.ec/ ) is the government entity responsible for promoting economic development through exports, imports, and investment in Ecuador. The institution forms a Vice Ministry within the Ministry of Production, Foreign Trade, Investments and Fisheries (MPCEIP) and has 27 offices in 23 countries, including three in the United States. A newly created company will at a minimum be required to register with the Superintendence of Companies, Securities, and Insurance ( http://www.supercias.gob.ec/ ), the municipal government, the Internal Revenue Service (SRI), and the Social Security Institute (IESS). The registry with the Superintendence of Companies is a completely online process as of April 2019. The incorporation of companies in Ecuador grew 44 percent in 2021 (15,714 new companies), propelled by the introduction of the simplified joint-stock company (SAS). The SAS came into effect in May 2020 following the enactment of the Organic Law on Entrepreneurship and Innovation. Ecuador does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. ProEcuador is responsible for promoting outward investment from Ecuador. Foreign investments are subject to a 4.5 percent ISD. The 2021 Tax Reform Law enumerates several ISD payment exemptions to productive investment, under certain conditions. In July 2021, the Lasso administration announced a gradual ISD dismantling by sector, quickly followed up with an Executive Decree immediately eliminating ISD on the international aviation and maritime cargo sectors. In February 2017, voters passed a government-backed referendum prohibiting elected officials and public servants from having financial dealings in tax havens and other suspect jurisdictions. The list includes several U.S. states and territories that do not have state income taxes. The prohibition entered into force in September 2017. The United States and Ecuador signed the Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency in December 2020 under the Ecuador-U.S. Trade and Investment Council Agreement (TIC). The Protocol entered into force in August 2021 following National Assembly ratification. The agreement updates the TIC with new annexes in four areas: Trade Facilitation and Customs Administration, Good Regulatory Practices, Anti-Corruption, and SMEs. 3. Legal Regime The Lasso administration, in office since May 2021, has stressed its desire to build the capacity of Ecuador’s weak institutions and promote democracy, transparency, and governability. Combatting corruption is a top priority of the Lasso administration including developing state institutions to be more transparent and responsive to the Ecuadorian people and enhancing civil society’s role in promoting transparency and accountability. President Lasso has reaffirmed Ecuador’s commitment to pursue a trade policy that holistically supports workers, protects the environment, and fosters equitable and inclusive growth. However, economic, commercial, and investment policies are subject to frequent changes and can increase the risks and costs of doing business in Ecuador. National and municipal level regulations can conflict with each other. Regulatory agencies are not required to publish proposed regulations before enactment, and rulemaking bodies are not required to solicit public comments on proposed regulations, although there has been some movement toward public consultative processes. Government ministries generally consult with relevant national actors when drafting regulations, but not always and not broadly. The government does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. The Government of Ecuador publishes regulatory actions in the Official Registry and posts them online at https://www.registroficial.gob.ec/ . Publicly listed companies generally adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). While there are some transparency enforcement mechanisms within the government, they tend to be weak and rarely enforced. There are no identified informal regulatory processes led by private sector associations or nongovernmental organizations. Ecuador is a member of the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) along with Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Ecuador is an associate member of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR). Ecuador is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and notifies draft regulations to the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee. Ecuador ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement on October 16, 2018. Ecuador has a civil codified legal system. Systemic weakness in the judicial system and its susceptibility to external pressures constitute challenges faced by U.S. companies investing in Ecuador. While Ecuador updated its Commercial Code in May 2019, enforcement of contract rights, equal treatment under the law, intellectual property protections, and unstable regulatory regimes continue to be concerns for foreign investors. Ecuador does not have laws specifically on FDI, but several have effects on overall investment. The Organic Law for Production Incentives and Tax Fraud Prevention, passed in December 2014, includes provisions to improve tax stability and lower the income tax rate in the mining sector. The Organic Law of Incentives for Public-Private Associations and Foreign Investment from 2015 includes provisions to improve legal stability, reduce red tape, and exempt public private partnerships from paying income and capital exit taxes under certain conditions. The 2021 Tax Reform Law repealed the zero-tariff income tax incentives included in previous legislation and replaced them with income tax reductions. These range from three to five percentage points of the current corporate income tax rate (25 percent), provided the compliance with certain conditions. Investments done under the prior legal framework will continue to enjoy the benefits offered from that legislation. ProEcuador’s website https://www.proecuador.gob.ec/ provides a guide for investors in English and Spanish and highlights the procedures to register a company, types of incentives for investors, and relevant taxes related to investing in Ecuador. The Superintendence of Control of Market Power reviews transactions for competition-related concerns. Ecuador’s 2011 Organic Law for Regulation and Control of Market Power includes mechanisms to control and sanction market power abuses, restrictive market practices, market concentration, and unfair competition. The Superintendence of Control of Market Power can fine up to 12 percent of gross revenue of companies found to be in violation of the law. The Constitution establishes that the state is responsible for managing the use and access to land, while recognizing and guaranteeing the right to private property. It also provides for the redistribution of land if it has not been in active use for more than two years. The Article 101 of the 2015 Telecommunications Law grants permission for the occupation or expropriation of private property for telecommunication network installation provided there are no other economically viable alternatives. Service providers must assume costs associated with the property’s expropriation or occupation. With the goal of protecting consumers and preventing a real estate bubble, the National Assembly approved in June 2012 a law that allows homeowners to default on their first home and car loan without penalty if they forfeit the asset. The provisions do not apply to homes with a market value of more than 500 times the basic 2022 monthly salary (currently USD 212,500) or vehicles worth more than 100 times the basic monthly salary (currently USD 42,500). In cases of foreclosure, the average time for banks to collect on debts is 5.3 years, usually taking 4.5 years for courts to approve the initiation of foreclosures. After the appointment and acceptance of an auctioneer, it takes about six months for the auction to take place. 6. Financial Sector The 2014 Law to Strengthen and Optimize Business Partnerships and Stock Markets created the Securities Market Regulation Board to oversee the stock markets. Investment options on the Quito and Guayaquil stock exchanges are very limited. Sufficient liquidity to enter and exit sizeable positions does not exist in the local markets. The five percent capital exit tax also inhibits free flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets. Ecuador is a small market that has relied almost exclusively on the financial sector to undertake medium and short-term financing operations. Foreigners can access credit on the local market. In 2021, the Central Bank of Ecuador (BCE) designed a new methodology to set interest rates aimed at increasing financial inclusion and including technical factors for better determination. Despite these changes, the Government continues setting interest rate ceilings and controls. Ecuador is a dollarized economy, and its banking sector is healthy. According to the Ecuadorian Central Bank’s Access to the Financial System Report, as of September 2020, 75 percent of the adult (over 15 years old) population (8.5 million people) has access to financial products and services. As of December 2021, Ecuador’s banks hold in total USD 51.9 billion in assets, with the largest banks being Banco Pichincha with USD 13.3 billion in assets, Banco del Pacifico with USD 6.9 billion, Banco de Guayaquil with USD 6.3 billion, and Produbanco with USD 6.1 billion. The Banking Association (ASOBANCA) estimates 2.3 percent of loans are non-performing. Foreigners require residency to open checking accounts in Ecuador. Ecuador’s Superintendence of Banks regulates the financial sector. Between 2012 and 2013, the financial sector was the target of numerous new restrictions. By 2012, most banks had sold off their brokerage firms, mutual funds, and insurance companies to comply with Constitutional changes following a May 2010 referendum. The amendment to Article 312 of the Constitution required banks and their senior managers and shareholders with more than six percent equity in financial entities to divest entirely from any interest in all non-financial companies by July 2012. These provisions were incorporated into the Anti-Monopoly Law passed in September 2011. The 2021 Law for the Defense of Dollarization established that the Monetary and Financial Policy and Regulation Board be divided into a Monetary Policy and Regulation Board and a Financial Policy and Regulation Board. The latter should oversee the interest rate system jointly with the BCE as the technical entity. The law gives the Financial Policy and Regulation Board the ability to prioritize certain sectors for lending from private banks. There are 24 private banks in Ecuador as of December 2021. A 2018 BCE resolution that ordered electronic money accounts closure effectively eliminated electronic currency. However, banks handle transactions by electronic or digital means for transferences and/or payments to transfer resources and/or payments according to the authorization of the Superintendence of Banks. BCE resolutions were integrated into the Codification of Monetary, Financial, Insurance, and Securities Resolutions. This regulatory body requires all financial transfers (inflows and outflows) to be channeled through the BCE’s accounts. In principle, the regulation increases monetary authorities’ oversight and prevents banks from netting their inflows and outflows to avoid paying the five percent currency exit tax. The Government of Ecuador does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). Approved in July 2020, Ecuador’s Public Finance Law (COPLAFIP) established a Fiscal Stabilization Fund to invest excess revenues from extractive industries and hedge against oil and metal price fluctuations. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Ecuador has a total of 17 SOEs. The major SOEs include those for petroleum (Petroecuador), electricity (Electricity Corporation of Ecuador – CELEC – and the National Corporation for Electricity – CNEL), and telecommunications (National Corporation of Telecommunications – CNT). The 17 SOEs combined have approximately 30,000 employees. As part of the government’s austerity measures to deal with the COVID-19-related economic crisis, the Lasso administration continued with the SOE liquidation processes started in May 2020. As of September 2021, there were three liquidated SOEs (Manufacture Ecuador, Pharmaceutical Public Company, Public Cement Company) and eight in the process of liquidation, including the state-owned airline (TAME), railroad company (Ecuadorian Railways Company), a social development firm using profits from natural resource revenues (Strategic Ecuador), training centers for athletes (High Performance Training Centers), an agricultural storage company (National Storage Units), the public media company, and a science and technology research firm (Siembra EP, formerly Yachay City of Knowledge). In February 2021, the government announced that Ecuador Post Office will be replaced by Ecuador Postal Services (SPE). Ecuador’s Coordinator of Public Companies maintains a list of SOEs at: https://www.emco.gob.ec/Emco2/empresas-publicas-2/ . The 2009 Organic Law of Public Enterprises regulates SOEs. SOEs are most active in areas designated by the 2008 Constitution as strategic sectors. SOEs follow a special procurement regime with greater flexibility and limited oversight. The Law of Public Enterprises requires SOEs to follow generally accepted accounting principles. Still, SOEs are not required to follow the same accounting practices as the central government, nor do they have to participate in the electronic financial management system used in most of the public sector for budget and accounting management. SOEs are eligible for government guarantees and face lower tax burdens than private companies. SOEs generally do not have professionally audited financial statements. The Ministry of Economy and Finance approves SOEs’ annual budgets and often slows distribution of funds to SOEs to compensate for other government expenditures. Ecuador is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization. The Ecuadorian Constitution prohibits privatization of state-owned enterprises. Still, the Ecuadorian government is seeking to offer long-term concessions and joint-venture agreements with its SOEs to operate some of its assets in strategic sectors including oil and gas exploration and production, electricity generation, and mining. In addition, MPCEIP is considering projects to be developed as potential PPPs. 10. Political and Security Environment Widespread public protests in 1997, 2000, and 2005 contributed to the removal of three elected presidents before the end of their terms. Large-scale but peaceful demonstrations against the Correa government occurred in June 2015. Some indigenous communities opposed to natural resource development have blocked access by petroleum and mining companies. Opposition to the government’s decision to remove fuel subsidies led to nationwide violent protests in October 2019. The protests paralyzed the country for 11 days, causing significant property damage, including to petroleum and telecommunications infrastructure. A dialogue between the government and indigenous protest leaders, mediated by the United Nations and the Catholic Church, led to the government’s decision to restore the fuel subsidies. Security along the northern border with Colombia deteriorated significantly in late 2017 and early 2018, when dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia groups attacked police and military units and kidnapped civilians, resulting in several deaths. Military and police increased their presence in the zone, and violence in the northern border area calmed in 2019, although illicit activities continue. Violence related to drug-trafficking organizations increased in 2020, 2021, and continue into 2022, particularly in Ecuador’s port cities. In 2021, the Lasso administration declared an emergency in the prison system after a series of riots in various prisons that left more than 300 prisoners dead. The Executive has submitted to the National Assembly updated regulations aimed at ensuring public safety and control of prison systems. The National Assembly continues to debate and analyze security sector reforms. Ecuador’s Constitutional Court affirmed communities have the right to vote on whether to allow large-scale mining projects near their water sources, in a September 21 ruling on a plebiscite proposed by the municipality of Cuenca 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($B USD) 2020 $98.80. 2019 $108.1 https://data.worldbank.org/ Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $29 2019 $681 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $36 2019 $38 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 21.4% 2019 18.2% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/ World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx * Source for Host Country Data: Central Bank of Ecuador. The Central Bank publishes FDI calculated as net flows only. Outward Direct Investment statistics are not published by the Central Bank. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $493.0 100% Total Outward Amount 100% Costa Rica $83.1 17% N/A N/A Switzerland $73.4 15% N/A N/A China $55.9 11% N/A N/A UK $37.4 8% N/A N/A Chile $36.1 7% N/A N/A “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Source: Central Bank of Ecuador – September 2021 data. The Central Bank publishes FDI calculated as net flows only. The Central Bank does not publish Outward Direct Investment statistics, nor is there information available on the IMF’s CDIS website. Egypt Executive Summary The Egyptian government continues to make progress on economic reforms, and while many challenges remain, Egypt’s investment climate is improving. Thanks in part to the macroeconomic reforms it completed as part of a three-year, $12-billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) program from 2016 to 2019, Egypt was one of the fastest-growing emerging markets prior to the COVID-19 outbreak. Egypt was also the only economy in the Middle East and North Africa to record positive economic growth in 2020, despite the COVID-19 pandemic and thanks in part to IMF assistance totaling $8 billion. Increased investor confidence and high real interest rates have attracted foreign portfolio investment and increased foreign reserves. In 2021, the Government of Egypt (GoE) announced plans to launch a second round of economic reforms aimed at increasing the role of the private sector in the economy, addressing long-standing customs and trade policy challenges, modernizing its industrial base, and increasing exports. The GoE increasingly understands that attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is key to addressing many of its economic challenges and has stated its intention to create a more conducive environment for FDI. FDI inflows grew 11 percent between 2018 and 2019, from $8.1 to $9 billion, before falling 39 percent to $5.5 billion in 2020 amid sharp global declines in FDI due to the pandemic, according to data from the Central Bank of Egypt and the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). UNCTAD ranked Egypt as the top FDI destination in Africa between 2016 and 2020. Egypt has passed several regulatory reform laws, including a new investment law in 2017; a “new company” law and a bankruptcy law in 2018; and a new customs law in 2020. These laws aim to improve Egypt’s investment and business climate and help the economy realize its full potential. The 2017 Investment Law is designed to attract new investment and provides a framework for the government to offer investors more incentives, consolidate investment-related rules, and streamline procedures. The 2020 Customs Law is likewise meant to streamline aspects of import and export procedures, including through a single-window system, electronic payments, and expedited clearances for authorized companies. Egypt will host the United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP 27, in November 2022. Recognizing the immense challenges the country faces from the impacts of climate change, government officials announced that the Cabinet will appropriate 30 percent of government investments in the 2022/2023 budget to green investments, up from 15 percent in the current fiscal year 2021/2022, and that by 2030 all new public sector investment spending would be green. The GoE accelerated plans to generate 42 percent of its electricity from renewable sources by five years, from 2035 to 2030, and is prioritizing investments in solar and wind power, green hydrogen, water desalination, sustainable transportation, electric vehicles, smart cities and grids, and sustainable construction materials. The government continues to seek investment in several mega projects, including the construction of smart cities, and to promote mineral extraction opportunities. Egypt intends to capitalize on its location bridging the Middle East, Africa, and Europe to become a regional trade and investment gateway and energy hub and hopes to attract information and communications technology (ICT) sector investments for its digital transformation program. Egypt is a party to more than 100 bilateral investment treaties, including with the United States. It is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), and the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA). In many sectors, there is no legal difference between foreign and domestic investors. Special requirements exist for foreign investment in certain sectors, such as upstream oil and gas as well as real estate, where joint ventures are required. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 117 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 94 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, on a historical-cost basis 2020 USD 11,206 http://www.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 3,000 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Egypt’s completion of the three-year, $12-billion IMF Extended Fund Facility between 2016 and 2019, and its associated reform package, helped stabilize Egypt’s macroeconomy, introduced important subsidy and social spending reforms, and helped restore investor confidence in the Egyptian economy. The flotation of the Egyptian Pound (EGP) in November 2016 and the restart of Egypt’s interbank foreign exchange (FX) market as part of this program was the first major step in restoring investor confidence that immediately led to increased portfolio investment and should lead to increased FDI over the long term. Other important reforms have included a new investment law and an industrial licensing law in 2017, a new bankruptcy law in 2018, a new customs law in 2020, and other reforms aimed at reducing regulatory overhang and improving the ease of doing business. In 2021, Egypt’s government announced plans to launch a second round of economic reforms aimed at increasing the role of the private sector in the economy, addressing long-standing customs and trade policy challenges, and modernizing its industrial base and increasing exports. As a result of the government’s increased focus on infrastructure development, Egypt’s $259 billion project finance pipeline is the third-largest in the Middle East and the largest in Africa as of March 2022, according to ratings agency Fitch. Recognizing the immense challenges the country faces from the impacts of climate change, government officials announced in 2021 that by 2030 all new public sector investment spending would be green, and accelerated plans to generate 42 percent of its electricity from renewable sources by 2035. Egypt will host the United Nations Conference on Climate Change, COP 27, in November 2022, and the government is developing a package of investment incentives aimed at attracting foreign investment and project finance in areas such as solar and wind power, green hydrogen, water desalination, sustainable transportation, electric vehicles, smart cities and grids, and sustainable construction materials. With few exceptions, Egypt does not legally discriminate between Egyptian nationals and foreigners in the formation and operation of private companies. The 1997 Investment Incentives Law was designed to encourage domestic and foreign investment in targeted economic sectors and to promote decentralization of industry away from the Nile Valley. The law allows 100 percent foreign ownership of investment projects and guarantees the right to remit income earned in Egypt and to repatriate capital. The Tenders Law (Law 89 of 1998) requires the government to consider both price and best value in awarding contracts and to issue an explanation for refusal of a bid. However, the law contains preferences for Egyptian domestic contractors, who are accorded priority if their bids do not exceed the lowest foreign bid by more than 15 percent. The Capital Markets Law (Law 95 of 1992) and its amendments, including the most recent in February 2018, and relevant regulations govern Egypt’s capital markets. Foreign investors are able to buy shares on the Egyptian Stock Exchange on the same basis as local investors. The General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI, http://gafi.gov.eg) is the principal government body that regulates and facilitates foreign investment in Egypt and reports directly to the Prime Minister. The Investor Service Center (ISC) is an administrative unit within GAFI that provides “one-stop-shop” services, easing the way for global investors looking for opportunities presented by Egypt’s domestic economy and the nation’s competitive advantages as an export hub for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. This is in addition to promoting Egypt’s investment opportunities in various sectors. The ISC provides a start-to-end service to the investor, including assistance related to company incorporation, establishment of company branches, approval of minutes of Board of Directors and General Assemblies, increases of capital, changes of activity, liquidation procedures, and other corporate-related matters. The Center also aims to issue licenses, approvals, and permits required for investment activities within 60 days from the date of request. Other services GAFI provides include: Advice and support to help in the evaluation of Egypt as a potential investment location; Identification of suitable locations and site selection options within Egypt; Assistance in identifying suitable Egyptian partners; and Dispute settlement services. The ISC plans to establish branches in each of Egypt’s Governorates by the end of 2021. Egypt maintains ongoing communication with investors through formal business roundtables, investment promotion events (conferences and seminars), and one-on-one investment meetings. The Egyptian Companies Law does not set any limitation on the number of foreigners, neither as shareholders nor as managers/board members, except for Limited Liability Companies where the only restriction is that one of the managers must be an Egyptian national. In addition, companies are required to obtain a commercial and tax license, and pass a security clearance process. Companies are able to operate while undergoing the often lengthy security screening process. However, if the firm is rejected, it must cease operations and may undergo a lengthy appeals process. Businesses have cited instances where Egyptian clients were hesitant to conclude long-term business contracts with foreign businesses that have yet to receive a security clearance. They have also expressed concern about seemingly arbitrary refusals, a lack of explanation when a security clearance is not issued, and the lengthy appeals process. Although the Government of Egypt has made progress streamlining the business registration process at GAFI, inconsistent treatment by banks and other government officials has in some cases led to registration delays. Sector-specific limitations to investment include restrictions on foreign shareholding of companies owning lands in the Sinai Peninsula. Likewise, the Import-Export Law requires companies wishing to register in the Import Registry to be 51 percent owned and managed by Egyptians. Nevertheless, the new Investment Law does allow wholly foreign companies investing in Egypt to import goods and materials. In January 2021 the Egyptian government removed the 20-percent foreign ownership cap for international and private schools in Egypt. The ownership of land by foreigners is complicated, in that it is governed by three laws: Law 15 of 1963, Law 143 of 1981, and Law 230 of 1996. Land/Real Estate Law 15 of 1963 explicitly prohibits foreign individual or corporation ownership of agricultural land (defined as traditional agricultural land in the Nile Valley, Delta and Oases). Law 15/1963 stipulates that no foreigners, whether natural or juristic persons, may acquire agricultural land. Law 143/1981 governs the acquisition and ownership of desert land. Certain limits are placed on the number of feddans (one feddan is approximately equal to one acre) that may be owned by individuals, families, cooperatives, partnerships, and corporations regardless of nationality. Partnerships are permitted to own 10,000 feddans. Joint stock companies are permitted to own 50,000 feddans. Under Law 230/1986, non-Egyptians are allowed to own real estate (vacant or built) only under the following conditions: Ownership is limited to two real estate properties in Egypt that serve as accommodation for the owner and his family (spouses and minors) in addition to the right to own real estate needed for activities licensed by the Egyptian Government; The area of each real estate property does not exceed 4,000 m²; and The real estate is not considered a historical site. Exemption from the first and second conditions is subject to the approval of the Prime Minister. Ownership in tourist areas and new communities is subject to conditions established by the Cabinet of Ministers. Non-Egyptians owning vacant real estate in Egypt must build within a period of five years from the date their ownership is registered by a notary public. Non-Egyptians cannot sell their real estate for five years after registration of ownership, unless the Prime Minister consents to an exemption. In December 2020, the World Bank published a Country Private Sector Diagnostic report for Egypt which analyzed key structural economic reforms that the Egyptian government should adopt in order to encourage private-sector-led economic growth. The report also included recommendations for the agribusiness, manufacturing, information technology, education, and healthcare sectors. https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/publications_ext_content/ifc_external_publication_site/publications_listing_page/cpsd-egypt On July 8, 2020, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released an Investment Policy Review for Egypt that highlighted the government’s progress implementing a proactive reform agenda to improve the business climate, attract more foreign and domestic investment, and reap the benefits of openness to FDI and participation in global value chains. https://www.oecd.org/countries/egypt/egypt-continues-to-strengthen-its-institutional-and-legal-framework-for-investment.htm In January 2018 the World Trade Organization (WTO) published a comprehensive review of the Egyptian Government’s trade policies, including details of the Investment Law’s (Law 72 of 2017) main provisions. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s367_e.pdf The United Nations Conference on Trade Development (UNCTAD) published an Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Policy Review for Egypt in 2017, in which it highlighted the potential for investments in the ICT sector to help drive economic growth and recommended specific reforms aimed at strengthening Egypt’s performance in key ICT policy areas. https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtlstict2017d3_en.pdf GAFI’s ISC ( https://gafi.gov.eg/English/Howcanwehelp/OneStopShop/Pages/default.aspx ) was launched in February 2018 and provides start-to-end service to the investor, as described above. The Investment Law (Law 72 of 2017) also introduces “Ratification Offices” to facilitate obtaining necessary approvals, permits, and licenses within 10 days of issuing a Ratification Certificate. Investors may fulfill the technical requirements of obtaining the required licenses through these Ratification Offices, directly through the concerned authority, or through its representatives at the Investment Window at GAFI. The Investor Service Center is required to issue licenses within 60 days from submission. Companies can also register online. GAFI has also launched e-establishment, e-signature, and e-payment services to facilitate establishing companies. Egypt promotes and incentivizes outward investment. According to the Egyptian government’s FDI Markets database for the period from January 2003 to January 2021, outward investment featured the following: Egyptian companies implemented 278 Egyptian FDI projects. The estimated total value of the projects, which employed about 49,000 workers, was $24.26 billion; The following countries respectively received the largest amount of Egyptian outward investment in terms of total project value: The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Kenya, Jordan, Ethiopia, Germany, Libya, Morocco, and Nigeria; The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria accounted for about 28 percent of the total amount; Elsewedy Electric was the largest Egyptian company investing abroad, implementing 21 projects with a total investment estimated to be $2.1 billion. Egypt does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The Egyptian government has made efforts to improve the transparency of government policy and to support a fair, competitive marketplace. Nevertheless, improving government transparency and consistency has proven difficult, and reformers have faced strong resistance from entrenched bureaucratic and private interests. Significant obstacles continue to hinder private investment, including the reportedly arbitrary imposition of bureaucratic impediments and the length of time needed to resolve them. Nevertheless, the impetus for positive change driven by the government reform agenda augurs well for improvement in policy implementation and transparency. Enactment of laws is the purview of the Parliament, while executive regulations are the domain of line ministries. Under the Constitution, the president, the cabinet, and any member of parliament can present draft legislation. After submission, parliamentary committees review and approve legislation, including any amendments. Upon parliamentary approval, a judicial body reviews the constitutionality of any legislation before referring it to the president for his approval. Although notice and full drafts of legislation are typically printed in the Official Gazette (similar to the Federal Register in the United States), there is no centralized online location where the government publishes comprehensive details about regulatory decisions or their summaries, and in practice consultation with the public is limited. In recent years, the Ministry of Trade and other government bodies have circulated draft legislation among concerned parties, including business associations and labor unions. This has been a welcome change from previous practice, but is not yet institutionalized across the government. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms. The Financial Regulatory Authority (FRA) supervises and regulates all non-banking financial markets and instruments, including capital markets, futures exchanges, insurance activities, mortgage finance, financial leasing, factoring, securitization, and microfinance. It issues rules that facilitate market efficiency and transparency. FRA has issued legislation and regulatory decisions on non-banking financial laws, which govern FRA’s work and the entities under its supervision. ( http://www.fra.gov.eg/jtags/efsa_en/index_en.jsp ) The criteria for awarding government contracts and licenses are made available when bid rounds are announced. The process actually used to award contracts is broadly consistent with the procedural requirements set forth by law. Further, set-aside requirements for small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) participation in GoE procurement are increasingly highlighted. The FRA publishes key laws and regulations to the following website: http://www.fra.gov.eg/content/efsa_en/efsa_pages_en/laws_efsa_en.htm The Parliament and the independent “Administrative Control Authority” both ensure the government’s commitment to follow administrative processes at all levels of government. The cabinet develops and submits proposed regulations to the president following discussion and consultation with the relevant ministry and informal consultation with other interest groups. Based on the recommendations provided in the proposal, including recommendations by the presidential advisors, the president issues “Presidential Decrees” that function as implementing regulations. Presidential decrees are published in the Official Gazette for enforcement. The degree to which ministries and government agencies responsible for drafting, implementing, or enforcing a given regulation coordinate with other stakeholders varies widely. Although some government entities may attempt to analyze and debate proposed legislation or rules, there are no laws requiring scientific studies or quantitative regulatory impact analyses prior to finalizing or implementing new laws or regulations. Not all issued regulations are announced online, and not all public comments received by regulators are made public. The government made its budget documents widely and easily accessible to the general public, including online. Budget documents did not include allocations to military state-owned enterprises, nor allocations to and earnings from state-owned enterprises. Information on government debt obligations was publicly available online, but up-to-date and clear information on state-owned enterprise debt guaranteed by the government was not available. According to information the Central Bank has provided to the World Bank, the lack of information available about publicly guaranteed private-sector debt meant that this debt was generally recorded as private-sector non-guaranteed debt, thus potentially obscuring some contingent debt liabilities. In general, international standards are the main reference for Egyptian standards. According to the Egyptian Organization for Standardization and Quality Control, approximately 7,000 national standards are aligned with international standards in various sectors. In the absence of international standards, Egypt uses other references referred to in Ministerial Decrees No. 180/1996 and No. 291/2003, which stipulate that in the absence of Egyptian standards, the producers and importers may use European standards (EN), U.S. standards (ANSI), or Japanese standards (JIS). Egypt is a member of the WTO, participates actively in various committees, and notifies technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Egypt ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in June 2017 (Presidential decree No. 149/2017) and deposited its formal notification to the WTO on June 24, 2019. Egypt notified indicative and definitive dates for implementing Category B and C commitments on June 20, 2019, but to date has not notified dates for implementing Category A commitments. In August 2020, the Egyptian Parliament passed a new Customs Law, Law 207 of 2020, that includes provisions for key TFA reforms, including advance rulings, separation of release, a single-window system, expedited customs procedures for authorized economic operators, post-clearance audits, and e-payments. Egypt’s legal system is a civil codified law system based on the French model. If contractual disputes arise, claimants can sue for remedies through the court system or seek resolution through arbitration. Egypt has written commercial and contractual laws. The country has a system of economic courts, specializing in private-sector disputes, which have jurisdiction over cases related to economic and commercial matters, including intellectual property disputes. The judiciary is set up as an independent branch of the government. Regulations and enforcement actions can be appealed through Egypt’s courts, though appellants often complain about the lengthy judicial process, which can often take years. To enforce judgments of foreign courts in Egypt, the party seeking to enforce the judgment must obtain an exequatur (a legal document issued by governments allowing judgements to be enforced). To apply for an exequatur, the normal procedures for initiating a lawsuit in Egypt must be satisfied. Moreover, several other conditions must be satisfied, including ensuring reciprocity between the Egyptian and foreign country’s courts, and verifying the competence of the court rendering the judgment. Judges in Egypt enjoy a high degree of public trust, according to Egyptian lawyers and opinion polls, and are the designated monitors for general elections. The Judiciary is proud of its independence and can point to a number of cases where a judge has made surprising decisions that run counter to the desires of the regime. The judge’s ability to interpret the law can sometimes lead to an uneven application of justice. No specialized court exists for foreign investments. The 2017 Investment Law (Law 72 of 2017) as well as other FDI-related laws and regulations, are published on GAFI’s website, https://gafi.gov.eg/English/StartaBusiness/Laws-and-Regulations/Pages/default.aspx . In 2017, the Parliament also passed the Industrial Permits Act, which reduced the time it takes to license a new factory by mandating that the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) respond to a request for a license within 30 days of the request being filed. As of February 2020, new regulations allow IDA regional branch directors or their designees to grant conditional licenses to industrial investors until other registration requirements are complete. In 2016, the Import-Export Law was revised to allow companies wishing to register in the Import Registry to be 51 percent owned and managed by Egyptians; formerly the law required 100 percent Egyptian ownership and management. Later in 2016, the inter-ministerial Supreme Investment Council also announced seventeen presidential decrees designed to spur investment or resolve longstanding issues. These include: Forming a “National Payments Council” that will work to restrict the handling of FX outside the banking sector; Producers of agricultural crops that Egypt imports or exports will get tax exemptions; Five-year tax exemptions for manufacturers of “strategic” goods that Egypt imports or exports; Five-year tax exemptions for agriculture and industrial investments in Upper Egypt; and Begin tendering land with utilities for industry in Upper Egypt for free as outlined by the Industrial Development Authority. The Egyptian Competition Law (ECL), Law 3 of 2005, provides the framework for the government’s competition rules and anti-trust policies. The ECL prohibits the abuse of dominant market positions, which it defines as a situation in which a company’s market share exceeds 25 percent and in which the company is able to influence market prices or volumes regardless of competitors’ actions. The ECL prohibits vertical agreements or contracts between purchasers and suppliers that are intended to restrict competition, and also forbids agreements among competitors such as price collusion, production-restriction agreements, market sharing, and anti-competitive arrangements in the tendering process. The ECL applies to all types of persons or enterprises carrying out economic activities, but includes exemptions for some government-controlled public utilities. In early 2019, the Egyptian Parliament endorsed a number of amendments to the ECL, including controls on price hikes and prices of essential products and higher penalties for violations. In addition to the ECL, other laws cover various aspects of competition policy. The Companies Law (Law 159/1981) contains provisions on mergers and acquisitions; the Law of Supplies and Commerce (Law 17 of 1999) forbids competition-reducing activities such as collusion and hoarding; and the Telecommunications Law (Law 10 of 2003), the Intellectual Property Law (Law 82 of 2002), and the Insurance Supervision and Control Law (Law 10 of 1981) also include provisions on competition. The Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) is responsible for protecting competition and prohibiting the monopolistic practices defined within the ECL. The ECA has the authority to receive and investigate complaints, initiate its own investigations, and take decisions and necessary steps to stop anti-competitive practices. The ECA’s enforcement powers include conducting raids; using search warrants; requesting data and documentation; and imposing “cease and desist orders” on violators of the ECL. The ECA’s enforcement activities against government entities are limited to requesting data and documentation, as well as advocacy. Egypt’s Investment Incentives Law provides guarantees against nationalization or confiscation of investment projects under the law’s domain. The law also provides guarantees against seizure, requisition, blocking, and placing of assets under custody or sequestration. It offers guarantees against full or partial expropriation of real estate and investment project property. The U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty also provides protection against expropriation. Private firms are able to take cases of alleged expropriation to court, but the judicial system can take several years to resolve a case. Egypt passed a Bankruptcy Law (Law 11 of 2018) in January 2018, which was designed to speed up the restructuring of troubled companies and settlement of their accounts. It also replaced the threat of imprisonment with fines in cases of bankruptcy. As of July 2020, the Egyptian government was considering but had not yet implemented amendments to the 2018 law that would allow debtors to file for bankruptcy protection, and would give creditors the ability to determine whether debtors could continue operating, be placed under administrative control, or be forced to liquidate their assets. In practice, the paperwork involved in liquidating a business remains convoluted and protracted; starting a business is much easier than shutting one down. Bankruptcy is frowned upon in Egyptian culture, and many businesspeople still believe they may be found criminally liable if they declare bankruptcy. 6. Financial Sector To date, high returns on Egyptian government debt have crowded out Egyptian investment in productive capacity. As of February 2022, loans to the government and government-related entities accounted for 67 percent of banks’ assets, and Egypt’s debt-to-GDP ratio was 91.4 percent at the end of 2021. Meanwhile, consistently positive and relatively high real interest rates have attracted large foreign capital inflows since 2017, most of which has been volatile portfolio capital. Foreign investors sold $1.19 billion of Egyptian treasury bonds following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX) is Egypt’s registered securities exchange. Some 246 companies were listed on the EGX, including Nilex, as of February 2022. There were more than 3.3 million investors registered to trade on the exchange in July 2021. Stock ownership is open to foreign and domestic individuals and entities. The Government of Egypt issues dollar-denominated and Egyptian Pound-denominated debt instruments, for which ownership is open to foreign and domestic individuals and entities. Foreign investors conducted 18.3 percent of sales on the EGX in 2021. In September 2020, the GoE issued the region’s first sovereign green bonds with a value of $750 million. The GoE issued Eurobonds worth $11.75 billion in 2020 and 2021, and issued its first $500 million Japanese Yen-dominated bond in March 2022. The government has announced its intention to issue its first sovereign sukuk bonds and additional green bonds during the remainder of 2022. The Capital Market Law 95 of 1992, along with Banking Law 94 that President Sisi ratified in September 2020, constitute the primary regulatory frameworks for the financial sector. The law grants foreigners full access to capital markets, and authorizes establishment of Egyptian and foreign companies to provide underwriting of subscriptions, brokerage services, securities and mutual funds management, clearance and settlement of security transactions, and venture capital activities. The law specifies mechanisms for arbitration and legal dispute resolution and prohibits unfair market practices. Law 10 of 2009 created the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) and brought the regulation of all non-banking financial services under its authority. In 2017, EFSA became the Financial Regulatory Authority (FRA). Settlement of transactions takes one day for treasury bonds and two days for stocks. Although Egyptian law and regulations allow companies to adopt bylaws limiting or prohibiting foreign ownership of shares, virtually no listed stocks have such restrictions. A significant number of the companies listed on the exchange are family-owned or -dominated conglomerates, and free trading of shares in many of these ventures, while increasing, remains limited. Companies are de-listed from the exchange if not traded for six months. Prior to November 2020, foreign companies listing on the EGX had to possess minimum capital of $100 million. With the FRA’s passage of new rules, foreign companies joining the EGX must now meet lesser requirements matching those for Egyptian companies: $6.4 million (100 million EGP) for large companies and between $63,000 and $6.4 million (1-100 million EGP) for smaller companies, depending on their size. Foreign businesses are only eligible for these lower minimum capital requirements if the EGX is their first exchange and if they attribute more than 50 percent of their shareholders’ equites, revenues, and assets to Egyptian subsidiary companies. A capital gains tax of 10 percent on Egyptian tax residents came into force in January 2022 after more than 6 years of suspension, then it was decreased in March to 5 percent for two years. The rate will rise to 7.5 percent once this period ends. Capital increases and share-swaps between listed and unlisted companies will not be taxed. Non-tax residents and foreigners are permanently tax-exempt. The government also set the stamp tax on stock market transactions by non-tax residents at 0.125 percent and at 0.05 percent for tax residents on unlisted securities. Tax residents are exempted from stamp tax on listed securities. Foreign investors can access Egypt’s banking system by opening accounts with local banks and buying and selling all marketable securities with brokerages. The government has repeatedly emphasized its commitment to maintaining the profit repatriation system to encourage foreign investment in Egypt, especially since the pound flotation and implementation of the IMF loan program in November 2016. The current system for profit repatriation by foreign firms requires sub-custodian banks to open foreign and local currency accounts for foreign investors (global custodians), which are exclusively maintained for stock exchange transactions. The two accounts serve as a channel through which foreign investors process their sales, purchases, dividend collections, and profit repatriation transactions using the bank’s posted daily exchange rates. The system is designed to allow for settlement of transactions in fewer than two days, though in practice some firms have reported significant delays in repatriating profits due to problems with availability. Foreign firms and individuals continue to report delays in repatriating funds and problems accessing hard currency for the purpose of repatriating profits. The Egyptian credit market, open to foreigners, is vibrant and active. Repatriation of investment profits has become much easier, as there is enough available hard currency to execute foreign exchange (FX) trades. Since the flotation of the Egyptian Pound in November 2016, FX trading is considered straightforward, given the re-establishment of the interbank foreign currency trading system. There have been no reports of difficulties executing FX transactions following the CBE’s interest rate hike and currency devaluation in March, 2022. Thirty-eight banks operate in Egypt, including several foreign banks. The CBE has not issued a new commercial banking license since 1979. The only way for a new commercial bank, whether foreign or domestic, to enter the market (except as a representative office) is to purchase shares in an existing bank. According to the CBE, banks operating in Egypt held nearly $448 billion (8.6 trillion EGP) in total assets as of December 2021, generating a total profit of $6.8 billion with the five largest banks generating 74 percent, or $5 billion (79 billion EGP). Egypt’s banking sector is generally regarded as well-capitalized, due in part to its deposit-based funding structure and ample liquidity, especially since the flotation and restoration of the interbank market. The CBE declared that 3.5 percent of the banking sector’s loans were non-performing by December 2021. However, since 2011, a high level of exposure to government debt, accounting for two-thirds of banks’ assets as of February 2022, has reduced the diversity of bank balance sheets and crowded out domestic investment. Moody’s and S&P consider Egypt’s banking system to be stable, although S&P classifies it as facing high levels of economic and financial system risk due to its high exposure to sovereign debt and the government’s external funding vulnerabilities. In February 2022, S&P affirmed Egypt’s government issuer rating of B stable due to the government’s relatively low issuance of foreign currency loans and relatively low external government debt. Benefitting from the nation’s increasing economic stability, Egypt’s banks have enjoyed both ratings upgrades and continued profitability. Banking competition is serving a largely untapped retail segment and the nation’s challenging, but potentially rewarding, small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) segment. The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) requires that banks direct 25 percent of their lending to SMEs. Over the past two years, the Central Bank has launched a subsidized loan program worth $16 billion (253 billion EGP) to spur domestic manufacturing, agriculture, and real state development. Also, with only one-third of Egypt’s adult population owning or sharing an account at a formal financial institution (according press and comments from contacts), the banking sector has potential for growth and higher inclusion, which the government and banks discuss frequently. A low median income plays a part in modest banking penetration. The CBE has taken steps to work with banks and technology companies to expand financial inclusion. The employees of the government, one of the largest employers, must now have bank accounts because salary payment is through direct deposit. The CBE approved new procedures in October 2020 to allow deposits and the opening of new bank accounts with only a government-issued ID, rather than additional documents. The maximum limits for withdrawals and account balances also increased. In July 2020, President Sisi ratified a new Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) Development Law (Law 152 of 2020) that will provide incentives, tax breaks, and discounts for small, informal businesses willing to register their businesses and begin paying taxes. As an attempt to keep pace with best practices and international norms, President Sisi ratified a new Banking Law, Law 94 of 2020, in September 2020. The law establishes a National Payment Council headed by the President to move Egypt away from cash and toward electronic payments; establishes a committee headed by the Prime Minister to resolve disputes between the CBE and the Ministry of Finance; establishes a CBE unit to handle complaints of monopolistic behaviors; requires banks to increase their cash holdings to $320 million (5 billion EGP), up from the prior minimum of $32 million (500 million EGP); and requires banks to report deficiencies in their own audits to the CBE. The chairman of the EGX stated that Egypt is exploring the use of blockchain technologies across the banking community. The FRA will regulate how the banking system adopts the fast-developing blockchain systems into banks’ back-end and customer-facing processing and transactions. The Central Bank developed a national fintech and innovation strategy in March 2019, and the government has issued regulations to incentivize mobile and electronic payments. The Central Bank launched in March 2022 a new mobile application, InstaPay, which allows Egyptian banking customers to perform instant bank and payments transactions. At the end of 2021 Egypt was among the top four African countries for fintech investment, with investments in fintech startups quadrupling between 2020 and 2021, reaching $159 million. According to research firm Magnitt, Egyptian startups received $509 million in venture capital investments in 2021, with a 100 percent year-on-year compound annual growth rate between 2017 and 2021. Since 2020, the Central Bank has prohibited all dealings with cryptocurrencies: the issuance of them, trading in them, promoting them, and establishing or operating platforms for their trading. Alternative financial services in Egypt are extensive, given the large informal economy, estimated to account for between 30 and 50 percent of GDP. Informal lending is prevalent, but the total capitalization, number of loans, and types of terms in private finance is less well known. The 1992 U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty provides for free transfer of dividends, royalties, compensation for expropriation, payments arising out of an investment dispute, contract payments, and proceeds from sales. Prior to reform implementation throughout 2016 and 2017, large corporations had been unable to repatriate local earnings for months at a time, but repatriation of funds is no longer restricted. The Investment Incentives Law (Law 72 of 2017) stipulates that non-Egyptian employees hired by projects established under the law are entitled to transfer their earnings abroad. Conversion and transfer of royalty payments are permitted when a patent, trademark, or other licensing agreement has been approved under the Investment Law. Banking Law 94 of 2020 regulates the repatriation of profits and capital. The current system for profit repatriation by foreign firms requires sub-custodian banks to open foreign and local currency accounts for foreign investors (global custodians), which are exclusively maintained for stock-exchange transactions. The two accounts serve as a channel through which foreign investors process their sales, purchases, dividend collections, and profit-repatriation transactions using the bank’s posted daily exchange rates. The system is designed to allow for settlement of transactions in less than two days, though in practice some firms have reported short delays in repatriating profits due to the steps involved in processing. Egypt’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF), approved by the Cabinet and launched in late 2018, holds 200 billion EGP ($12.5 billion) in authorized capital as of July 2021. The SWF aims to invest state funds locally and abroad across asset classes and manage underutilized government assets. The sovereign wealth fund focuses on sectors considered vital to the Egyptian economy, particularly industry, energy, and tourism, and has established four new sub-funds covering healthcare, financial services, real estate, and infrastructure while plans to establish another two sub-funds for education and technology. The SWF participates in the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State and military-owned companies compete directly with private companies in many sectors of the Egyptian economy. Although Public Sector Law 203 of 1991 states that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) should not receive preferential treatment from the government or be accorded exemptions from legal requirements applicable to private companies, in practice SOEs and military-owned companies enjoy significant advantages, including relief from regulatory requirements. IMF reports show that Egyptian SOEs have an average return on assets of just two percent and are only one-fourth as productive as private companies. Some 40 percent of SOEs are loss-making, despite access to subsidized capital and owning assets worth more than 50 percent of GDP. Profitable SOEs, meanwhile, tend to exploit a natural monopoly or hold exclusive rights to public assets. Few of Egypt’s 300 state-owned companies, 645 joint ventures, and 53 economic authorities release regular financial statements. SOEs in Egypt are structured as individual companies controlled by boards of directors and grouped under government holding companies that are arranged by industry, including Petroleum Products & Gas, Spinning & Weaving; Metallurgical Industries; Chemical Industries; Pharmaceuticals; Food Industries; Building & Construction; Tourism, Hotels, & Cinema; Maritime & Inland Transport; Aviation; and Insurance. The holding companies are headed by boards of directors appointed by the Prime Minister with input from the relevant Minister. The Egyptian government has announced plans to privatize shares of SOEs several times since 2018, but has only carried out a small number of sales. It sold a minority stake in the Eastern Tobacco Company in March 2018, a 26 percent share of state-owned e-payment firm E-Finance in October 2021, and a 10 percent share of Abu Qir Fertilizers in December 2021. In December 2020 the government announced plans to sell stakes in two military-owned companies and in February 2022 added a handful of other SOEs to the list, but scaled back those plans following Russia’s war against Ukraine. The government has indefinitely delayed plans for privatizing stakes in 20 other SOEs, including up to 30 percent of the shares of Banque du Caire, due to adverse market conditions and increased global volatility. Egypt’s privatization program is based on Public Enterprise Law 203/1991, which permits the sale of SOEs to foreign entities. Law 32 of 2014 limits the ability of third parties to challenge privatization contracts between the Egyptian government and investors. The law was intended to reassure investors concerned by legal challenges brought against privatization deals and land sales dating back to the pre-2008 period. Court cases at the time Parliament passed the law had put many of these now-private firms, many of which are foreign-owned, in legal limbo over concerns that they may be returned to state ownership. 10. Political and Security Environment Stability and economic development remain Egypt’s priorities. The Egyptian government has taken measures to eliminate politically motivated violence while also limiting peaceful protests and political expression. Egypt’s presidential elections in March 2018 and senatorial elections in August 2020 proceeded without incident. In 2020 and 2021, all terrorist attacks took place in the Sinai Peninsula. Nevertheless, terrorist plans to target civilians, tourists, and security personnel in mainland Egypt and the greater Cairo region remained a concern. The government has been conducting a comprehensive counterterrorism offensive in the Sinai since early 2018 in response to terrorist attacks against military installations and personnel by ISIS-affiliated militant groups. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $319,056 2020 $365,253 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 11 2020 $11,206 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $1 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 41% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/ World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx * Sources for Host Country Data: Central Bank of Egypt; CAPMAS; GAFI Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Elizabeth Stratton, Economic Officer, U.S. Embassy Cairo 02-2797-2735 StrattonEC@state.gov El Salvador Executive Summary El Salvador’s location and natural attributes make it an attractive investment destination. The macroeconomic context and declining rule of law present some challenges. El Salvador’s economy has registered the lowest levels of growth in the region for many years, with average annual GDP growth of 2.5 percent from 2016 to 2019. After a deep pandemic-related contraction (7.9 percent) in 2020, the Central Bank estimates GDP rebounded to 10.3 percent growth in 2021. The IMF expects the economy to grow 3.2 percent in 2022, with growth rates declining to 2 percent in the medium-term. Economic underperformance is mainly driven by fiscal constraints. Persistent budget deficits and increased government spending – exacerbated by the pandemic – have contributed to a heavy debt burden. With public debt at an estimated 88.5 percent of GDP in 2021, the Government of El Salvador (GOES) has limited capacity for public investment and job creation initiatives. Large financing needs are projected for 2022. The Bukele administration continues to make efforts to attract foreign investment and has taken measures to reduce cumbersome bureaucracy and improve security conditions. However, the implementation of the reforms has been slow, and laws and regulations are occasionally passed and implemented quickly without consulting with the private sector or assessing the impact on the business climate. After being announced in June 2021, Bitcoin became a legal tender in El Salvador on September 7, 2021, alongside the U.S. dollar. The Bitcoin Law mandates that all businesses must accept Bitcoin, with limited exceptions for those who do not have the technology to carry out transactions. Prices do not need to be expressed in Bitcoin and the U.S. dollar is the reference currency for accounting purposes. The GOES created a $150 million trust fund managed by El Salvador’s Development Bank to guarantee automatic convertibility and subsidize exchange fees. The rapid implementation caused uncertainty in the investment climate and added costs to businesses. Government of El Salvador actions have eroded separation of powers and independence of the judiciary over the past year. In May 2021, the Legislative Assembly dismissed the Attorney General and all five justices of the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber and immediately replaced them with officials loyal to President Bukele. Furthermore, in August 2021, the legislature amended the Judicial Career Organic Law to force into retirement judges ages 60 or above and those with at least 30 years of service. The move was justified by the ruling party as an effort to root out corruption in the judiciary from past administrations. A September 2021 ruling from the newly appointed Constitutional Chamber allows for immediate presidential re-election, despite the Constitution prohibiting presidential incumbents from re-election to a consecutive term. Legal analysts believe these measures were unconstitutional and have enabled the Legislative Assembly and the Bukele administration to exert control over the judiciary. The Legislative Assembly is not required to publish draft legislation and opportunities for public engagement are limited. With the Nuevas Ideas ruling party holding a supermajority, legislation is often passed quickly with minimal analysis and debate in parliamentary committees and plenary sessions, contributing to an overall climate of regulatory uncertainty. Commonly cited challenges to doing business in El Salvador include the discretionary application of laws and regulations, lengthy and unpredictable permitting procedures, as well as customs delays. El Salvador has lagged its regional peers in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). The sectors with the largest investment have historically been textiles and retail establishments, though investment in energy has increased in recent years. The Bukele administration has proposed several large infrastructure projects which could provide opportunities for U.S. investment. Project proposals include enhancing road connectivity and logistics, expanding airport capacity and improving access to water and energy, as well as sanitation. Given limited fiscal capacity for public investment, the Bukele administration has begun pursuing Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to execute infrastructure projects. In August 2021, El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly approved the contract award of the first PPP project to expand the cargo terminal at the international airport. As a small energy-dependent country with no Atlantic coast, El Salvador heavily relies on trade. It is a member of the Central American Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR); the United States is El Salvador’s top trading partner. Proximity to the U.S. market is a competitive advantage for El Salvador. As most Salvadoran exports travel by land to Guatemalan and Honduran ports, regional integration is crucial for competitiveness. Although El Salvador officially joined the Customs Union established by Guatemala and Honduras in 2018, implementation stalled following the Bukele administration’s decision to prioritize bilateral trade facilitation with Guatemala. In October 2021, however, the GOES announced it would proceed with Customs Union implementation. El Salvador rejoined technical level working group discussions and resumed testing of system interconnectivity. The Bukele administration has taken initial steps to facilitate trade. In 2019, the government of El Salvador (GOES) relaunched the National Trade Facilitation Committee (NTFC), which produced the first jointly developed private-public action plan to reduce trade barriers. The plan contained 60 strategic measures focused on simplifying procedures, reducing trade costs, and improving connectivity and border infrastructure. Measures were not fully implemented in 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic. In 2021, the NTFC revised the action plan to adjust measures under implementation and finalized drafting the national trade facilitation strategy, which will be launched in March 2022. In January 2022, the NFTC met to evaluate progress on the action plan. The NFTC released the action plan for 2022 on February 17th. The 2022 action plan has 29 measures to facilitate cross-border trade and improve road and border infrastructure. Table 1 Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 115 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 96 of 132 http://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 3,4133 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.html#209 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 3,630 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GOES recognizes the benefits of attracting FDI. El Salvador does not have laws or practices that discriminate against foreign investors, nor does the GOES screen or prohibit FDI. However, FDI levels are among the lowest in Central America. The Central Bank reported net annual FDI inflows of $408.5 million, or approximately 1.5 percent of GDP, at the end of September 2021. The Exports and Investment Promotion Agency of El Salvador (PROESA) supports investment in seven main sectors: textiles and apparel; business services; tourism; aeronautics; agro-industry; light manufacturing; and energy. PROESA provides information for potential investors about applicable laws, regulations, procedures, and available incentives for doing business in El Salvador. Websites: https://investelsalvador.com/ and https://proesa.gob.sv/servicios/servicios-al-inversionista/ . The National Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP), El Salvador’s umbrella business chamber, serves as the primary private sector representative in dialogues with GOES ministries. http://www.anep.org.sv/ . In 2019, the Bukele administration created the Secretariat of Commerce and Investment, a position within the President’s Office responsible for the formulation of trade and investment policies, as well as overall coordination of the Economic Cabinet. In addition, the Bukele administration created the Presidential Commission for Strategic Projects to lead the GOES’ major infrastructure projects. Foreign citizens and private companies can freely establish businesses in El Salvador. No single natural or legal person – whether national or foreign – can own more than 245 hectares (605 acres) of land. The Salvadoran Constitution stipulates there is no restriction on foreign ownership of rural land in El Salvador except in cases where Salvadoran nationals face ownership restrictions in the corresponding country. Rural land to be used for industrial purposes is not subject to this reciprocity requirement. The Investments Law grants equal treatment to foreign and domestic investors. Apart from limitations imposed on micro businesses, which are defined as having 10 or fewer employees and yearly sales of $175,930 or less, foreign investors may freely establish any type of domestic business. Investors who begin operations with 10 or fewer employees must present plans to increase employment to the Ministry of Economy’s National Investment Office. The Investment Law provides that extractive resources are the exclusive property of the state. The GOES may grant private concessions for resource extraction, though concessions are infrequently granted. El Salvador has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995. The latest trade policy review performed by the WTO was published in 2016 (document: WT/TPR/S/344/Rev.1). https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symbol=%20wt/tpr/s/*)%20and%20((%20@Title=%20el%20salvador%20)%20or%20(@CountryConcerned=%20el%20salvador))&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true# The latest investment policy review performed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was in 2010. http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaepcb200920_en.pdf In 2018, the Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development (FUSADES) published a position paper on investment policies, expanding on a 2015 study of the role of policies in productive development and investment. The report, written in Spanish, contains an analysis of policies, competitive advantages, constraints to investment attraction, and private sector views of the business climate. The report recommends that the government formulate a long-term development strategy, strengthen the cohesion between investment, trade facilitation and competitiveness policies, and develop an infrastructure policy that includes investment and PPP portfolios, among others. In addition, a September 2021 report on foreign direct investment in El Salvador, also by FUSADES, points out that investment attraction continues to be constrained by the lack of a comprehensive development and competitiveness strategy, poor coordination among government agencies on investment issues, including promotion and aftercare, and institutional capacity limitations. The analysis also notes that stabilizing public finances would contribute to supporting capital flows to El Salvador. http://fusades.org/publicaciones/Como_reactivar_inversiones_ES.pdf . http://fusades.org/publicaciones/la-inversion-extranjera-sigue-baja-falta-un-plan-estrategico-publico-y-privado-para-revertirla El Salvador has various laws that promote and protect investments, as well as providing benefits to local and foreign investors. These include: the Investments Law, the International Services Law; the Free Trade Zones Law; the Tourism Law, the Renewable Energy Incentives Law; the Law on Public Private Partnerships; the Special Law for Streamlining Procedures for the Promotion of Construction Projects; and the Legal Stability Law for Investments. While the government encourages Salvadoran investors to invest in El Salvador, it neither promotes nor restricts investment abroad. 3. Legal Regime The laws and regulations of El Salvador are relatively transparent and generally foster competition, but government accountability has weakened in recent years. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. However, the discretionary application of rules can complicate routine transactions, such as customs clearances and permitting applications. Regulatory agencies are often understaffed and inexperienced in dealing with complex issues. New foreign investors should review the regulatory environment carefully. In addition to applicable national laws and regulations, localities may impose permitting requirements on investors. Environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosures are not mandatory in El Salvador. However, the financial services industry is introducing ESG factors into investment portfolios and strategies. In 2019, 12 private banks signed the “Sustainable Finance Protocol” to develop green finance strategies, design specialized products and services for sustainable development, and implement result-based frameworks for achieving environmental and social sustainability. In June 2021, the Stock Exchange issued guidelines for the issuance of sustainability-linked bonds and announced dedicated listing segments for thematic bonds (green, social and sustainable bonds). Companies note the GOES has enacted laws and regulations without adhering to established notice and comment procedures. The Regulatory Improvement Law, which entered into force in 2019, requires GOES agencies to publish online the list of laws and regulations they plan to approve, reform, or repeal each year. Institutions cannot adopt or modify regulations and laws not included in that list. The implementation of the law is gradual; the regulatory agenda is required for the executive branch since 2020, for the legislative and judicial branches, and autonomous entities in 2022, and municipalities in 2023. Prior to adopting or amending laws or regulations, the Simplified Administrative Procedures Law requires the GOES to perform a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) based on a standardized methodology. Proposed legislation and regulations, as well as RIAs, must be made available for public comment. In practice, however, the Legislative Assembly does not publish draft legislation on its website and does not solicit comments on pending legislation. The GOES does not yet require the use of a centralized online portal to publish regulatory actions. The reforms have not been fully implemented. In 2021, 13 ministries (out of 16) drafted and published their regulatory agendas. Only five ministries revised their regulatory agendas to publish modifications. GOES agencies performed only five RIAs prior to approving new legislation. Although the implications of the reforms are still not apparent, private sector stakeholders have expressed support for the measures. El Salvador continues to develop the National Procedures Registry, an online platform listing all investment and trade-related procedures and requirements. The registry aims at increasing transparency and legal certainty, as only registered procedures and requirements will be enforceable. Procedures and requirements of central government agencies will be registered in 2022, autonomous institutions and state-owned companies in 2023, and municipalities in 2024. In 2021, ten ministries registered their procedures and requirements. El Salvador began implementing the Simplified Administrative Procedures Law in February 2019. This law seeks to streamline and consolidate administrative processes among GOES entities to facilitate investment. In 2016, El Salvador adopted the Electronic Signature Law to facilitate e-commerce and trade. Policies, procedures and needed infrastructure (data centers and specialized hardware and software) are in place for implementation. The first digital certification providers were licensed in 2021. Six GOES agencies plan to implement electronic signature in 2022, including the Ministry of Economy, the National Directorate of Medicines, the National Registry Center, and the Planning Office of the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador. El Salvador also enacted the Electronic Commerce Law, which entered into force in February 2021. The law establishes the framework for commercial and financial activities, contractual or not, carried out by electronic and digital means, introduces fair and equitable standards to protect consumers and providers, and sets processes to minimize risks arising from the use of new technologies. The law aims to support rapidly growing online businesses and financial technology (FinTech). In 2018, El Salvador enacted the Law on the Elimination of Bureaucratic Barriers, which created a specialized tribunal to verify that regulations and procedures are implemented in compliance with the law and to sanction public officials who impose administrative requirements not contemplated in the law. However, the law is pending implementation until the GOES appoints members of the tribunal. The GOES controls the price of some goods and services, including electricity, liquid propane gas, gasoline, public transport fares, and medicines. The government also directly subsidizes water services and residential electricity rates. Electricity price is set by supply and demand and traded on a spot market. The market also operates with Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and long-term contracts. The GOES took over some private buses and routes in March 2022 in an effort to confront rising inflation, which critics said violated the Constitution. The Superintendent of Electricity and Telecommunications (SIGET) oversees electricity rates, telecommunications, and distribution of electromagnetic frequencies. The Salvadoran government subsidizes residential consumers for electricity use of up to 105 kWh monthly. The electricity subsidy costs the government between $50 million to $64 million annually. El Salvador’s public finances are relatively transparent, but do not fully meet international standards. Budget documents, including the executive budget proposal, enacted budget, and end-of-year reports, as well as information on debt obligations are accessible to the public at: http://www.transparenciafiscal.gob.sv/ptf/es/PTF2-Index.html An independent institution, the Court of Accounts, audits the financial statements, economic performance, cash flow statements, and budget execution of all GOES ministries and agencies. The results of these audits are publicly available online. The GOES has not disclosed information on the use of public funds devoted for Bitcoin implementation, including information about bitcoin holdings and operations. In addition, the GOES continues to shield the accounts of the Intelligence Agency from Court of Accounts and has limited the Court’s capacity to audit state-owned enterprise subsidiaries. El Salvador belongs to the Central American Common Market and the Central American Integration System (SICA), organizations which are working on regional integration, (e.g., harmonization of tariffs and customs procedures). El Salvador commonly incorporates international standards, such as the Pan-American Standards Commission (Spanish acronym COPANT), into its regulatory system. El Salvador is a member of the WTO, adheres to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), and has adopted the Code of Good Practice annexed to the TBT Agreement. El Salvador is also a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and has notified its Categories A, B, and C commitments. In 2017, El Salvador established a National Trade Facilitation Committee (NTFC) as required by the TFA, which was reactivated in July 2019. El Salvador is a member of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development’s international network of transparent investment procedures: https://elsalvador.eregulations.org/ Investors can find information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income-generating operations including the name and contact details for those in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal bases for the procedures. El Salvador’s legal system is codified law. Commercial law is based on the Commercial Code and the corresponding Commercial and Civil Code of Procedures. There are specialized commercial courts that resolve disputes. Although foreign investors may seek redress for commercial disputes through Salvadoran courts, many investors report the legal system to be slow, costly, and unproductive. Local investment and commercial dispute resolution proceedings routinely last many years. Final judgments are at times difficult to enforce. The Embassy recommends that potential investors carry out proper due diligence by hiring competent local legal counsel. According to the Constitution, the judicial system is independent of the executive branch. Recent actions by the Legislative Assembly have eroded separation of powers and independence of the judiciary. In May 2021, the Legislative Assembly dismissed the Attorney General and all five justices of the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber and immediately replaced them with officials loyal to President Bukele. Furthermore, in August 2021, the legislature amended the Judicial Career Organic Law to force into retirement judges ages 60 or above and those with at least 30 years of service. The move was justified by the ruling party as an effort to root out corruption in the judiciary from past administrations. Legal analysts believe these measures were unconstitutional and enabled the Legislative Assembly and the Bukele administration to exert control over the judiciary. Miempresa is the Ministry of Economy’s website for new businesses in El Salvador. At Miempresa, investors can register new companies with the Ministry of Labor (MOL), Social Security Institute, pension fund administrators, and certain municipalities; request a tax identification number/card; and perform certain administrative functions. https://www.miempresa.gob.sv/ The country’s e-Regulations site provides information on procedures, costs, entities, and regulations involved in setting up a new business in El Salvador. https://elsalvador.eregulations.org/ The Exports and Investment Promoting Agency of El Salvador (PROESA) is responsible for attracting domestic and foreign private investment, promoting exports of goods and services, evaluating and monitoring the business climate, and driving investment and export policies. PROESA provides technical assistance to investors interested in starting operations in El Salvador, regardless of the size of the investment or number of employees. http://www.proesa.gob.sv/ The Office of the Superintendent of Competition reviews transactions for competition concerns. The OECD and the Inter-American Development Bank note the Superintendent employs enforcement standards that are consistent with global best practices and has appropriate authority to enforce the Competition Law effectively. Superintendent decisions may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court, the country´s highest court. https://www.sc.gob.sv/ The Constitution allows the government to expropriate private property for reasons of public utility or social interest. Indemnification can take place either before or after the fact. In November 2021, the Legislative Assembly passed the Eminent Domain Law for Municipal Works to enable the National Directorate of Municipal Works (DOM) to expropriate land necessary for the development of infrastructure projects in the 262 municipalities of the country. The law allows the DOM to begin works before condemnation proceedings are finalized and without depositing the estimated value of the property. Landowners can appeal the court’s determination of the compensation but cannot challenge the grounds for the seizure. Legal experts have noted that the law’s broad expropriation parameters and insufficient guarantees for landowners could lead to arbitrary land seizures. There are no recent cases of expropriation. In 1980, a rural/agricultural land reform established that no single natural or legal person could own more than 245 hectares (605 acres) of land, leading to the government expropriating the land of some large landholders. In 1980, private banks were nationalized but were subsequently returned to private ownership in 1989-90. A 2003 amendment to the Electricity Law requires energy-generating companies to obtain government approval before removing fixed capital from the country. The Commercial Code, the Commercial Code of Procedures, and the Banking Law contain sections that deal with the process for declaring bankruptcy. There is no separate bankruptcy law or court. Bankruptcy proceedings are cumbersome, lengthy, and costly. In practice, bankruptcy proceedings are uncommon. In El Salvador, real estate mortgages and pledges grant the creditor privileged rights to obtain payment from assets given in guarantee. Thus, in case of insolvency, creditors with preferred guarantees file individual lawsuits. In addition, any creditor can request the judge the appointment of a receiver, procedure much simpler than bankruptcy. Companies in financial distress can request a payment deferral from the judge to prevent bankruptcy. If approved by the judge and the creditors, the company may be able to negotiate a rescue plan with creditors. Bankruptcy is not criminalized, but it can become a crime if the judge determines there was intent to defraud. 6. Financial Sector The Superintendent of the Financial System ( https://www.ssf.gob.sv/ ) supervises individual and consolidated activities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries, financial conglomerates, stock market participants, insurance companies, and pension fund administrators. Foreign investors may obtain credit in the local financial market under the same conditions as local investors. Interest rates are determined by market forces, with the interest rate for credit cards and loans capped at 1.6 times the weighted average effective rate established by the Central Bank. The maximum interest rate varies according to the loan amount and type of loan (consumption, credit cards, mortgages, home repair/remodeling, business, and microcredits). In January 2019, El Salvador eliminated a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT), which was enacted in 2014 and greatly opposed by banks. The Securities Market Law establishes the framework for the Salvadoran securities exchange. Stocks, government and private bonds, and other financial instruments are traded on the exchange, which is regulated by the Superintendent of the Financial System. Foreigners may buy stocks, bonds, and other instruments sold on the exchange and may have their own securities listed, once approved by the Superintendent. Companies interested in listing must first register with the National Registry Center’s Registry of Commerce. In 2021, the exchange traded $3.7 billion, with average daily volumes between $12 million and $30 million. Government-regulated private pension funds, Salvadoran insurance companies, and local banks are the largest buyers on the Salvadoran securities exchange. For more information, visit: https://www.bolsadevalores.com.sv/ All but two of the major banks operating in El Salvador are regional banks owned by foreign financial institutions. Given the high level of informality, measuring the penetration of financial services is difficult; however, it remains relatively low, between 30 percent – according to the Salvadoran Banking Association (ABANSA) – and 37 percent – reported by the Superintendence of the Financial System (SSF). The banking system is sound and generally well-managed and supervised. El Salvador’s Central Bank is responsible for regulating the banking system, monitoring compliance of liquidity reserve requirements, and managing the payment systems. No bank has lost its correspondent banking relationship in recent years. There are no correspondent banking relationships known to be in jeopardy. The banking system’s total assets as of December 2021 were $21.1 billion. Under Salvadoran banking law, there is no difference in regulations between foreign and domestic banks and foreign banks can offer all the same services as domestic banks. The Cooperative Banks and Savings and Credit Associations Law regulates the organization, operation, and activities of financial institutions such as cooperative banks, credit unions, savings and credit associations, and other microfinance institutions. The Money Laundering Law requires financial institutions to report suspicious transactions to the Attorney General. Despite having regulatory scheme in place to supervise the filing of reports by cooperative banks and savings and credit associations, these entities rarely file suspicious activity reports. The Insurance Companies Law regulates the operation of both local and foreign insurance firms. Foreign firms, including U.S., Colombian, Dominican, Honduran, Panamanian, Mexican, and Spanish companies, have invested in Salvadoran insurers. El Salvador does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises El Salvador has successfully liberalized many sectors, though it maintains state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in energy generation and transmission, water supply and sanitation, ports and airports, and the national lottery (see chart below). SOE 2022 Budgeted Revenue Number of Employees National Lottery $51,553,600 148 State-run Electricity Company (CEL) $403,309,045 795 Water Authority (ANDA) $255,939,465 4,281 Port Authority (CEPA) $186,895,990 2,551 Although the GOES privatized energy distribution in 1999, it maintains significant energy production facilities through state-owned Rio Lempa Executive Hydroelectric Commission (CEL), a significant producer of hydroelectric and geothermal energy. In October 2021, El Salvador’s legislature enacted the Creation Law of the Power, Hydrocarbons, and Mines General Directorate. The new General Directorate will be responsible for dictating the national energy policy and proposing amendments to energy legislation and by-laws, as well as implementing the energy policy. The law allows the President of the state-owned power company (CEL) to serve as the Director General of the new entity. The law will enter into force in November 2022. Industry stakeholders are concerned about the potential conflict of interest that would result from CEL making energy policy and participating in the sector as SOE. The primary water service provider is the National Water and Sewer Administration (ANDA), which provides services to 96.6 percent of urban areas and 77 percent of rural areas in El Salvador. The Autonomous Executive Port Commission (CEPA) operates both the seaports and the airports. CEL, ANDA, and CEPA Board Chairs hold Minister-level rank and report directly to the President. The Law on Public Administration Procurement and Contracting (LACAP) covers all procurement of goods and services by all Salvadoran public institutions, including the municipalities. Exceptions to LACAP include: procurement and contracting financed with funds coming from other countries (bilateral agreements) or international bodies; agreements between state institutions; and the contracting of personal services by public institutions under the provisions of the Law on Salaries, Contracts and Day Work. Additionally, LACAP allows government agencies to use the auction system of the Salvadoran Goods and Services Market (BOLPROS) for procurement. Although BOLPROS is intended for use in purchasing standardized goods (e.g., office supplies, cleaning products, and basic grains), the GOES uses BOLPROS to procure a variety of goods and services, including high-value technology equipment and sensitive security equipment. As of October 2021, public procurement using BOLPROS totaled $157.1 million. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) also support government agencies in the procurement of a wide range of infrastructure projects. Procurement for municipal infrastructure works is governed by the Simplified Procurement Law for Municipal Works in force since November 2021 and centralized in the National Directorate of Municipal works created by the Bukele administration to oversee investment in infrastructure and social projects in municipalities. The GOES has created a dedicated procurement website to publish tenders by government institutions. https://www.comprasal.gob.sv/comprasal_web/ ). In August 2020, President Bukele signed an executive order allowing the submission of bids for contractual services via email and eliminating bidders’ obligation to register online with the public procurement system (Comprasal), as well as lifting the responsibility of procurement officers to keep a record of companies and individuals who receive tender documents. Transparency advocates and legal experts have noted that the order would decrease potential bidders’ ability to access and compete fairly for government tenders. The order is pending review in the Supreme Court of Justice, but without injunctive effect. Alba Petroleos is a joint venture between a consortium of mayors from the FMLN party and a subsidiary of Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA. As majority PDVSA owned, Alba Petroleos has been subject to Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions since January 2019. Alba Petroleos operates a reduced number of gasoline service stations and businesses in other industries, including energy production, food production, convenience stores, and bus transportation. Alba Petroleos has been surrounded by allegations of mismanagement, corruption, and money laundering. Critics charged that the conglomerate received preferential treatment during FMLN governments and that its commercial practices, including financial reporting, are non-transparent. In May 2019, the Attorney General’s Office initiated an investigation against Alba Petroleos and its affiliates for money laundering. Alba Petroleos’ assets are frozen by court order and some of its gasoline service stations are being managed by the National Council for Asset Administration (CONAB). El Salvador is not engaged in a privatization program and has not announced plans to privatize. 10. Political and Security Environment El Salvador’s 12-year civil war ended in 1992. Since then, there has been no political violence aimed at foreign investors. The crime threat level in El Salvador is critical, with high rates of crime and violence. Most serious crimes in El Salvador are never solved. El Salvador lacks sufficient resources to properly investigate and prosecute cases and to deter crime. For more information, visit: https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/ElSalvador.html El Salvador has thousands of known gang members from several gangs including Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 18th Street (M18). Gang members engage in violence or use deadly force if resisted. These “maras” concentrate on extortion, violent street crime, carjacking, narcotics and arms trafficking, and murder for hire. Extortion is a common crime in El Salvador. U.S. citizens who visit El Salvador for extended periods are at higher risk for extortion demands. Bus companies and distributors often must pay extortion fees to operate within gang territories, and these costs are passed on to customers. The World Economic Forum’s 2019 Global Competitiveness Index reported that costs due to organized crime for businesses in El Salvador are the highest among 141 countries. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2019 $27,022.64 2019 $27,023 https://data.worldank.org/country/el-salvador Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $2,104.22 2019 $3,413 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/factsheet.cfm?Area=209 Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 N.A. 2019 N.A. BEA data available at http://bea.gov/international/direct_ investment_multinational_companies_ comprehensive_data.htm Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 40.9% 2020 N.A, * Central Bank, El Salvador. In 2018, the Central Bank released GDP estimates using the new national accounts system from 2008 and using 2005 as the base year. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (2020)* From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 10,075 100% Total Outward 3.1 100% Panama 3,656 36.3% Guatemala 1.6 49.5% United States 2,104 20.9% Honduras 0.8 24.3% Spain 1,339 13.3% Costa Rica 0.5 17.3% Colombia 833 8.3% Nicaragua 0.3 8.9% Mexico 670 6.7% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. *Coordinated Direct Investment Survey, International Monetary Fund Equatorial Guinea Executive Summary Equatorial Guinea’s rise to become a country with one of the highest GDPs per capita in sub-Saharan Africa has been driven almost entirely by U.S. companies’ foreign direct investment (FDI) in the oil and gas sector. In the mid-2010s, the decline in both oil prices and the country’s hydrocarbon reserves caused an economic recession that has continued for six years and has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. While it still ranks among the top five richest sub-Saharan countries, the country’s gross national income (GNI) per capita plummeted from $14,030 in 2013 to $5,810 in 2021. Despite its economy’s dependence on FDI, the country presents a complex, challenging environment for foreign investors. Equatorial Guinea ranks near the bottom of the list for various global indices, including those for corruption, transparency, and ease of doing business, and the government suffers from a lack of technical expertise and capacity to implement many of the reforms it proposes. Freedom of the press is limited, and public information on laws and regulations is not readily accessible, creating an opaque operating environment that many outside investors have difficulty navigating. Furthermore, both senior leaders of the ruling Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) and members of the president’s extended family own a significant number of businesses in diverse industries, dominating the private sector and creating major conflicts of interest in a country known for pervasive corruption. On January 1, 2022, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), of which Equatorial Guinea is a member, began enforcing new foreign currency regulations on companies operating in extractive industries. While there continue to be negotiations on the final implementation of these regulations, they are likely to impact foreign firms’ willingness to invest in the hydrocarbon sector in Equatorial Guinea and other CEMAC countries. Finally, as a small country with an estimated population of 1.2 million residents and an underdeveloped education system, Equatorial Guinea suffers from a shortage of both skilled and unskilled labor, which affects many businesses’ abilities to operate competitively. In the face of the country’s growing economic and fiscal challenges, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a $282.8 million, three-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement in December 2019, which required the government to implement reforms to improve transparency, good governance, and the business environment. Between 2019 and 2021, the government passed laws, issued decrees, and established institutions to comply with these requirements. It implemented a new anti-corruption law, created an Investment Promotion Center (IPC), passed an updated labor law, announced the privatization of its main state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and launched its Single Business Window to simplify the process of registering a business. Some of these initiatives have had modest success, while most exist on paper only. On the surface, Equatorial Guinea appears to provide opportunities for foreign investment. In addition to its hydrocarbon reserves, the country has rich soils, abundant fishing waters, vast forests, eye-catching landscapes, relatively developed road infrastructure, and a strategic location for maritime trade. Before investing in Equatorial Guinea, however, potential investors should conduct extensive research and carefully consider both the potential benefits and pitfalls of establishing operations in the country’s opaque and challenging environment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 172 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $690 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $5,810 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The government recognizes the critical role foreign direct investment (FDI) in its hydrocarbon sector plays in Equatorial Guinea’s development. However, chronic corruption, patronage, highly centralized decision-making, and a lack of local regulatory capacity create a challenging environment for foreign investors. Article 27 of the country’s fundamental law states “the State protects, guarantees, and controls the investment of foreign capital that contributes to the development of the country.” In Article 12 of Law No. 7/1992 on the Investment Regime, the government again commits to fair and equitable treatment for all investors. Law No. 7/1992 also creates an Investment Promotion Center (IPC) to advise the government on investment policies, promote investments, and support both domestic and international investors with information and in the resolution of conflicts. These laws also create a National Investment Commission (NIC). Neither the IPC nor the NIC are operational. In 2015, the government directed the Ministry of Commerce and Business Promotion to create an agency to promote, integrate, and coordinate a national strategy to attract FDI. The ministry has yet to establish this agency. Historically, the president has had de facto final approval on large contracts with foreign investors; however, since 2020, the vice president has largely taken over this role. Foreign-owned companies pay higher registration fees than local companies and are often subject to taxes that more informal local businesses avoid. Equatorial Guinea’s six-year recession has motivated the government to focus on improving economic diversification and attracting new FDI. Led by the Ministry of Finance, Economy, and Planning, the government is promoting its National Economic Diversification Strategy, developed in 2019 to comply with IMF-required reforms to receive a three-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement. One of the primary goals of the strategy is to reduce the country’s economic and fiscal dependence on the hydrocarbon sector. The government collaborates with the World Bank, IMF, UN Development Program (UNDP), and private consultants on its economic diversification strategy, including in attracting FDI, but implementation of recommendations remains mixed. In general, the government focuses its efforts on recruiting investments in large capital projects over small ventures, as large-scale projects are more likely to create new employment opportunities for Equatorial Guinea’s largely unskilled workforce and provide greater fiscal benefits for the government under its underdeveloped and poorly implemented taxation system. The government is increasingly seeking South-South FDI from new partners in countries like Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Turkey, and Venezuela. The government sometimes focuses on recruiting new partners in lieu of maintaining existing partnerships, neglecting improvements to its operating environment, and damaging its prospects for longer term returns from investments. Foreign investors are allowed to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity in Equatorial Guinea. As part of its economic diversification strategy, in 2018 the government eliminated the requirement to have a domestic joint venture partner for investments in the non-oil sector. Under Equatorial Guinea’s Hydrocarbons Law No. 8/2006, however, the state-owned oil company (GE Petrol) or gas company (Sonagas) must hold a stake of at least 35 percent in foreign-owned hydrocarbon companies and must account for one third of the representatives on their Boards of Directors. Under Law 4/2009 on the Land Ownership Regime, foreigners cannot own land but can lease property from the government for up to 99 years. To secure a lease, under Decree 140/2013, a foreign national must request approval through the Office of Property Registry, who then requests authorization from the president in the form of a presidential decree. The government does, however, recognize land owned by foreign nationals before the decree entered into force in 2013, if the land was properly registered. Prior to approving an EFF in 2019, the IMF conducted several rounds of staff-monitored assessments of the governments’ structural, fiscal, and monetary reforms. The results of these assessments, which include investment policy recommendations, can be found on the IMF’s website: https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/GNQ . Beyond these IMF reviews, in the past five years, Equatorial Guinea has not undergone a third-party investment policy review (IPR) through a multilateral organization such as the OECD, WTO, UNCTAD, or UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights. Civil society organizations in Equatorial Guinea remain weak, hampered by difficulties in registering for legalization through the Ministry of Interior and Local Corporations, and thus are unable to provide oversight of investment policy-related concerns. In January 2019, the Ministry of Commerce launched its Single Business Window (abbreviated VUE for its Spanish name Ventanilla Unica Empresarial) at its headquarters in Malabo. The VUE reduced the time required to register a business from an average of 33 days to five. In July 2021, the ministry opened a second VUE office in the mainland city of Bata. Registration still must take place in person, however, as there is no online registration page nor a working VUE website. Individuals choosing to register their businesses without utilizing the VUE must complete the following steps through a variety of government agencies: Process Agency Time Required Undergo criminal background check Ministry of Justice 1 day Legalize business’s articles of incorporation Ministry of Justice, Office of the Notary Public 3-14 days Add name to business registry Ministry of Justice 2-3 days Open bank account and obtain bank solvency certificate Commercial Bank 1 day Obtain tax clearance certificate (certificate of good standing) Ministry of Finances 2 days Add name to business registry Ministry of Commerce 15 days Complete small and medium enterprise (SME) registration, if applicable Ministry of Commerce 15 days Register for the Employee Guarantee Fund Ministry of Labor Obtain tax ID number Ministry of Finances 3 days Register for social security National Institute of Social Security 1 day Although Equatoguinean citizens may legally invest outside the country, the government does not actively promote foreign investment. There are no known restrictions on foreign investment, but some individuals and companies have faced delays when transferring money overseas or converting local currency into foreign exchange, which has been exacerbated by new CEMAC rules on foreign currency reserves enacted in 2019. The National Bank of Equatorial Guinea (BANGE) – majority-owned by the government – launched two subsidiary offices in neighboring Cameroon. 3. Legal Regime Regulations governing the investment environment in Equatorial Guinea are implemented at the national level and can be introduced and enacted in one of three ways: As a law, which begins as a draft bill presented by the relevant government ministry to the Council of Ministries before being submitted to Parliament for review and a vote. Through a decree (at times referred to as a “decree-law”) issued directly by the president. Through a ministerial order issued by the relevant ministry, in this case often the Ministry of Commerce and Business Promotion; the Ministry of Labor, Employment Promotion, and Social Security; or the Ministry of Finance, Economy, and Planning. The government does not make draft versions of bills and regulations available for public comment at any stage of the approval process. Civil society groups complain that they are not consulted in the drafting of relevant laws and regulations. The regulatory regime suffers from both a lack of public information and shortcomings in implementation and enforcement. Online versions of laws and regulations are difficult to find and sometimes completely unavailable. To comply with the IMF’s 2019 required reforms, the Ministry of Finance created both a website ( https://minhacienda-gob.com/biblioteca-juridica/ ) and physical office to facilitate public access to commercial regulations, but in practice limited documentation is available through either resource. In 2020, the government launched the official webpage of the state bulletin ( https://boe.gob.gq/# ) to improve public access to laws and regulations. The page has not been updated since January 2021, purportedly because of delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite these efforts at digitalization, most of the information on regulations is still only accessible in hard copies for a fee through the Office of the National State Bulletin. As a member country of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), Equatorial Guinea’s accounting standards are governed by the organization’s uniform act on accounting law and financial information (AUDCIF). However, due to a lack of local expertise on OHADA’s accounting standards, the government uses the Spanish model for its general accounting system. In 2020, a World Bank-sponsored program to strengthen the investment climate in the OHADA region established an office in Equatorial Guinea to train local accountants on OHADA accounting law. Of the 10 accountants registered through the office, currently only two are Equatoguineans. Officially only these accredited accountants can audit and certify companies’ financial statements. While the government has made improvements in its overall fiscal transparency since 2019, it does not meet the minimum requirements of fiscal transparency as established by the U.S. Department of State. While the government’s published budget provides a substantially complete picture of its planned expenditures and revenue streams, including natural resource revenues, in 2021 it failed to disclose its total debt obligations, produce audited financial statements for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), or establish a supreme audited institution, which was mandated by law in 2012. Additional information is included in the Department of State’s annual Fiscal Transparency Report: https://www.state.gov/fiscal-transparency-report/. As a CEMAC member, Equatorial Guinea’s investment-related regulations are based on CEMAC policies. Implementation of some policies at the national level remains pending, such as the commitment to free movement of people and goods between member countries. Equatorial Guinea is not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) but has been an observer since 2002. In 2007, the government applied for full WTO membership, and its application remains in process. The Ministry of Commerce is implementing a strategic action plan for the country’s accession, including hiring an international consultant to prepare a required Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime (MFTR). The legislature has yet to approve the memorandum. Equatorial Guinea’s national judicial system is not independent of the executive branch, as the president serves as the chief magistrate and has the power to appoint or remove judges at will. In 2018, the IMF highlighted numerous factors that result in a weak judiciary, including a lack of publicly accessible information on judicial decisions and limited capacity and understaffing that cause delays in rendering court decisions. Additionally, in many cases, judges are awarded percentages of the penalties they levy against defendants, which can be particularly concerning for larger U.S. companies operating in the country. While the government has committed to addressing these issues, domestic and foreign investors continue to generally distrust the judicial system. Equatorial Guinea’s legal system is a mix of civil and customary law. The country does not have an established commercial law, and so it instead refers to the uniform acts of the OHADA for arbitrating commercial cases. OHADA legislation creates a civil legal system that aims to provide a common business and legal framework across all 17 member states, while enhancing the legal certainty and predictability of international transactions in the region. In 2010, OHADA passed its Uniform Act Organizing Securities, which created a modern security law for OHADA nations and reinforced lenders’ rights by enabling them to use new, efficient security enforcement mechanisms, such as out-of-court appropriation. Other new and revised laws for the OHADA region include: Uniform Act related to general commercial law act, revised in 2010 Uniform Act related to commercial companies and economic interest groups, revised in January 2014 and effective May 2014 Uniform Act organizing collective proceedings for clearing debts, revised in September 2015 and effective December 2015 Uniform Act on the harmonization of accounting, adopted in January 2017 and effective January 2018. Each member country has the responsibility to apply these acts locally through laws and regulations, and the government in Equatorial Guinea has to date failed to implement most of them. The primary legal instrument governing foreign investment in Equatorial Guinea is Law No. 7/1992 on the Investment Regime in Equatorial Guinea, which was last updated by in 1994 by No. 2/1994. Due to the difficulty in passing new laws, subsequent changes have mostly been implemented through more than two dozen presidential decrees, which are summarized in a document published on the Ministry of Finance’s website: https://minhacienda-gob.com/materia-de-inversion-3/ . The government published Decree 45/2020 in April 2020 reducing the minimum amount of capital needed to register a limited-liability company from one million XAF (approximately $1,650) to 100,000 XAF (approximately USD 165). Specific regulations governing investments in the hydrocarbon and mining sectors are summarized on the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbon’s website at https://mmie.gob.gq/ , although the English version of the page has not been updated since 2017. The government has yet to create a one-stop-shop for foreign investors seeking information on relevant, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements. There is no specific agency that enforces competition laws. Due to Equatorial Guinea’s membership in OHADA, OHADA competition laws should be applied to such cases. Information on all OHADA uniform acts and case law can be found at https://www.ohada.org/en/ . Law No. 7/1992 states that the government will not expropriate foreign investments except when acting in the public interest with fair, just, and proper compensation. The government does not generally nationalize or expropriate foreign investments, although there are alleged cases of local private companies cooperating with the government to expropriate property from foreign investors after falsely accusing them of breach of contract. This practice has become less common since 2018, when the government eliminated the requirement for foreign investors to identify a local business partner. The government has an extensive record, however, of expropriating locally owned property, frequently offering little or no compensation. OHADA uniform code and case law on bankruptcy apply in Equatorial Guinea. However, despite being an OHADA member country and therefore having recourse to insolvency and debt recovery proceedings, the country has no legal practice or expertise in judicial reorganization, judicial liquidation, or debt enforcement. Creditors are therefore likely to face difficulty in recovering their money through a formal legal process in insolvency cases. 6. Financial Sector Equatorial Guinea does not have its own stock market, but CEMAC operates a common stock market for all member states known as the Central Africa Stock Exchange (BVMAC). In August 2021, the Financial Market Supervisory Commission of Central Africa provided authorization for the National Bank of Equatorial Guinea’s (BANGE) new brokerage division, the BANGE Securities Company, to operate in the BVMAC and individual stock markets accredited within the CEMAC subregion. The BANGE Securities Company offers financial advising, portfolio management, brokerage services, and bond issuance. The government owns a 51 percent stake in BANGE, and bank shares were made available to domestic institutional investors through an initial public offering in November 2020, followed by secondary offering valued at $75 million in April 2021, which was opened to individual and foreign investors. In March 2022, BANGE advised the government to issue treasury bonds on the subregional market as one means of financing the country’s rising debt. CEMAC’s Bank of Central African States (BEAC) regulates interest rates in member countries by setting the discount rate. However, due to the high prevalence of default on loan repayment in Equatorial Guinea, local commercial banks set high interest rates for private borrowers, ranging from 12 to 18 percent for mortgages and approximately 15 percent for personal loans. Business loans generally require significant collateral, limiting opportunities for entrepreneurs, and may have rates of 20 percent or greater. There is no evidence of foreign investors obtaining credit on the local market. Equatorial Guinea’s banking system remains relatively underdeveloped, and little public information is available about the assets and health of the financial sector. The government’s National Economic and Financial Committee creates a semi-annual report on the country’s banking sector, but the report is not always made public. While banks have branches throughout the country, they are concentrated in urban centers. BANGE has the most branches (31), while CCEI/CCIW Bank de Guinea Ecuatorial, which has been wholly owned by the government since 2021, is the largest bank in the country in terms of total assets under management. BGFI Bank Guinée Equatoriale operates as a subsidiary of BGFI Holding Corporation (Gabon). Pan-African EcoBank (Togo) and Societe Générale (France) also operate in Equatorial Guinea. The construction of new bank branches is typically a result of government efforts to project an image of Equatorial Guinea as a financial center, rather than a reflection of the actual demand in the country. A small number of ATMs are located in urban centers. Banks are increasingly offering online banking services, though such services remain limited. BANGE estimates that 60 percent of the population has accessed formal financial services. CEMAC members do not have their own central banks, but instead host national BEAC branches. Three BEAC branches are located in Equatorial Guinea in Ebibeyin, Bata, and Malabo. BEAC’s Central Africa Banking Commission (COBAC) regulates the region’s banking systems and provides authorization for commercial banks to operate in each member country. The Ministry of Finance provides information on establishing a financial institution within the CEMAC region on its website at https://minhacienda-gob.com/condiciones-para-la-solicitud-de-una-acreditacion-de-actividades-financieras-en-la-cemac/ . Equatorial Guinea’s banking sector has been weighed down by a high prevalence of nonperforming loans (NPLs), as well as undercapitalization and low liquidity. At end of 2020, NPLs accounted for approximately 53 percent of all loans, driven mainly by government nonpayment of arrears on construction projects. A significant portion of the NPLs is concentrated in BANGE. Due to the continued economic recession and widespread property damage caused by explosions at a military barracks in the mainland city of Bata in March 2021, NPL rates are expected to increase in 2022. To address the NPL crisis, the government established a Partial Guarantee Fund over a decade ago to insure non-performing loans through the National Institute for Businesses Promotion, but the fund only covers small loans and so has had a limited effect on the larger problem. While the country’s economy is almost entirely cash-based, customers have reported that cash is not always available for withdrawal, a liquidity problem exacerbated by lengthy bureaucratic procedures and minimal digital record keeping. Foreigners must provide proof of residency to establish a bank account. The government established the Fund for Future Generations as its sovereign wealth fund in 2002. The fund receives 0.5% of all oil revenues and is governed and managed by BEAC. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute estimates that the fund has approximately $165.5 million USD under management, although there is no publicly available information on its allocations or the regulations directing its maintenance and management. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The government controls at least eight state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the energy, housing, fishing, aerospace and defense, and information and communication sectors. These include Sonagas (natural gas), GEPetrol (oil), SEGESA (electricity), GECOMSA and GETESA (telecommunications), SONAPESCA (fishing), ENPIGE (low-income housing), and Ceiba Intercontinental (national airline). The government’s annual budget includes allocations to and earnings from SOEs, but other details – such as total assets and number of employees – are not made available. SOEs also lack publicly available audited financial statements. In 2017, the government contracted Deloitte and Ernst & Young to conduct a detailed report on its SOEs, which provided a comprehensive list of these entities. The report and other information regarding SOEs can be found on the Ministry of Finance’s website at https://minhacienda-gob.com/empresas-publicas-y-entidades-autonomas/ . Following the recommendations of the IMF’s 2018 staff-monitored program, the government began efforts to improve governance of its SOEs. It established a committee for the restructuring of public entities and appointed new governing boards for each one. The IMF also required the government to contract an internationally reputable firm to audit the accounts of the state-owned oil (GEPetrol) and gas (Sonagas) companies, which the government hired at the start of 2019. As of April 2022, however, the audits had not been completed. To comply with the IMF’s recommendations, the government also committed to the privatization several of its SOEs. In April 2022, it announced that it would be privatizing GETESA, SEGESA, GITGE, and Ceiba Intercontinental, as well as its mail delivery service (GECOTEL) and vehicle inspection service (ITV). The government also stated that it will undertake privatization of undefined assets in the hospitality, health, and education sectors, as well as at the airports and ports. The government did not provide any details on the timeline or process for the privatization process, but it instructed the Ministry of Finance to establish the relevant procedures, including a transparent public bidding process that is open to international investors. 10. Political and Security Environment Politically motivated arbitrary detentions do occur. Equatorial Guinea does not have a recent history of political violence or civil disturbance, due in part to significant government controls on political opposition and civil society. Over 50 percent of the population has official membership in the ruling Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE), which has maintained control of the legislative, executive, and, by extension, judicial branches since its founding in 1987. The Convergence for Social Democracy is the only legal, non-aligned opposition party, while 16 minor parties make up the “aligned opposition” and are closely affiliated with the PDGE. Legislative elections are expected to take place in 2022, with presidential elections anticipated in 2023. During its November 2021 national convention, the PDGE surprised many observers by not announcing whether President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who has led the country since taking power in 1979, would run for his final constitutionally authorized term. If a new PDGE candidate is named for the 2023 presidential elections or following President Obiang’s final term, some observers predict in-fighting within the party and/or the ruling family that could lead to temporary political instability. In almost all official meetings and speeches, Equatorial Guinea’s top leaders warn of the many internal and external threats faced by the country. Some of these warnings results from thwarted coup attempts in 2004, 2009, and 2017, as well as increasing instability in West and Central Africa, but they may also be designed to solidify popular support for the PDGE and the Obiang family. Maritime piracy remains a critical threat in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). While reported attacks dropped from 81 in 2020 to 34 in 2021, all 57 of the global piracy-related kidnappings in 2021 occurred in the GoG. The year-to-year decrease in incidents was in part the result of several foreign governments sending vessels to patrol the waters of the GoG, including the Russian, Brazilian, and Danish navies. Following the 2019 hijacking of a supply vessel in transit to Exxon-Mobil’s offshore facility and the October 2020 on-land attack on an oil compound, the government required all ships operating in Equatorial Guinea’s water to have an armed security officer, provided by Equatorial Guinea’s military, on board. Some international oil companies are instead attempting to procure their own armed security vessels, although the government has yet to provide final approval. Despite these efforts, five high-profile attacks in and around Equatorial Guinea’s waters occurred in November and December 2021. Eritrea Executive Summary Except for the mining sector, Eritrea’s investment climate is not conducive to U.S. investment. Wide-ranging U.S. economic sanctions, the lack of a commercial code, disconnection from international financial systems for all but government-to-government transactions, and strict government control of all imports and exports severely limit foreign investment. Most private businesses are small, family-owned storefronts. With rare exception, businesses of size or scale are state controlled or run by the sole political party, the Peoples Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). The Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE) is the largest employer in the country, and most citizens are employed by country’s national service program, which often results in indefinite terms of forced labor at very low wages in a wide range of public sector positions. The national currency, the Eritrean Nakfa, is not convertible and there are restrictions on the repatriation of profits out of the country. The national budget is not public. The judiciary is not independent or transparent. There is limited freedom of the press, international journalists are often barred from entry, and the government maintains control of the media. Most profitable investments in Eritrea come about through direct negotiation with the PFDJ rather than market-based private investment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 161 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 $-2 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2011 $600 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Eritrean government professes a desire for more and more diversified FDI. However, strict governmental control of the economy, circulation of currency, access to foreign currency, and the means of production, and the lack of robust business and investment legal code makes private investment difficult, time-consuming, and financially risky. The official 1994 Investment Proclamation No. 59/1994 states that all sectors (excluding domestic retail, domestic wholesale, import, and commission agency companies without a bilateral agreement of reciprocity) are open to any investors. In practice, this law has been suspended and the ruling PFDJ determines those sectors in which – and defines the terms under which – private investment is accepted. The Investment Center, established in 1998, operates directly under the Office of the President; it does not publish any information related to its activities. In the past, the Center conducted public outreach to encourage members of the Eritrean diaspora to invest in Eritrea. The Center has not conducted a large public event since 2012; senior Center officials have stated that the time for investments is not appropriate because investment developments must follow political developments. There is no business ombudsman in Eritrea or other mechanisms to prioritize retention or maintain dialogue with existing investors. In practice, there is no fundamental “right” for either foreign or domestic private entities to establish or run business enterprises free from government interference. All sectors of the economy are tightly controlled by the GSE, most large enterprises are either entirely or partially owned by the government or the PFDJ, and the government can order a business to close without explanation or legal recourse. There are both statutory and de facto limits on foreign ownership and control of enterprises. All foreign-owned mines must give a 10% stake to the Eritrean National Mining Corporation (ENAMCO), and ENAMCO has the option to buy another 30% equity in a project. Regulations in other fields are not well established. With some exceptions, such as mining, investment is de facto prohibited in most sectors of the economy. The government has encouraged investment in the mining sector, and mining-specific regulations were adopted in 2011. There are few other large foreign investments in the country. The few foreign enterprises operating in Eritrea do so under non-public agreements negotiated directly between the companies or countries and a small group of officials from the GSE and the PFDJ. There is no transparent GSE screening mechanism for approving inbound foreign investment. The GSE has undergone no recent third-party investment policy review. No civil society organizations have provided useful reviews of investment policy-related concerns. The government has made no known efforts to facilitate business in Eritrea although this may change for Chinese businesses following the November 2021 signing of a Memorandum of Understanding for China’s Belt Road Initiative. The government does not have a business registration website. Businesses are required to register with six government offices (the Business License Office, the Ministry of Information, the Inland Revenue Department, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, and the local municipality), and the registration process usually takes 84 days, according to the World Bank’s Doing Business report. According to local experts, if an agreement is reached with the government and the PFDJ, this process can be expedited significantly for foreign businesses. Given the low level of capital accumulation in the economy, Eritrea is not a likely provider of foreign capital. As part of its efforts to direct capital towards development, the GSE’s laws strictly control capital flows (including payment for the importation of goods), currency exchange, and restricts domestic investors from making large investments abroad. For example, per person monthly bank withdrawals are limited to 5,000 Nakfa ($333), and Eritreans are generally unable to withdraw dollars. 3. Legal Regime The GSE is not transparent. Legal and regulatory systems are not transparent. Ministries are empowered to (and do) issue new regulations, subject to PFDJ approval, with no public debate. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernment organizations or private sector associations. New regulations come out with no public announcement; people only learn of them through word-of-mouth. There is no publicly accessible location (online or otherwise) to find key proclamations, laws, or regulatory actions. One can sometimes find the regulations for sale at bookshops. There is no public oversight of government actions nor legal recourse against government actions taken. The government does not promote any form of transparency, including promoting or requiring companies’ environmental, social, and governance disclosures. The seeming arbitrariness of government regulation and action is a drag on the economy. Officials occasionally shutter businesses without explanation, leaving other businesses to wonder (and often spread rumors) as to what happened. Public finances and debt obligations are not made public. Eritrea is a founding member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). It also belongs to the Community of Sahel-Saharan States and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (though it has not participated in the latter for several years.) COMESA decisions are binding on all member states, but as they are made by consensus this does not cause conflict. Eritrea is one of only 10 UN member states that has no affiliation with the WTO. The Eritrean legal system is based on the Ethiopian system that was in place at the time of independence in 1993. It is primarily a civil law system, though these laws are deeply influenced by traditional law. Eritrea has a written commercial code, derived from the Ethiopian commercial code in effect at the time of independence along with several proclamations to update the code. A full rewrite was done as part of a 2015 overhaul of the major legal codes, but these were never implemented. Any international company doing business in Eritrea will need the assistance of a local attorney versed in the complexities of the Eritrean legal system. The judicial system is not fully independent of the executive. Judges are National Service employees, and thus work for the executive branch. Many enforcement decisions, and especially those that relate to the commercial or labor codes, are adjudicated solely through the national court system and are appealable. Eritrea’s legal system plays only a minor role in foreign direct investment. All large-scale foreign direct investment is part of an opaque political process and is managed by non-public agreements negotiated directly with a small group of officials in the government and the ruling party. Eritrea does not have a website for foreign investors to learn about relevant laws, rules, procedures and reporting requirements. There have been no new major laws, regulations, or judicial decisions announced in the past year. There are no indications that the GSE makes any effort to promote market competition. All large-scale economic activity is either fully controlled by the PFDJ or jointly controlled by it in partnership with international companies operating under agreements negotiated directly with the GSE/PFDJ. There is no transparent process that would allow an individual or company to appeal any GSE expropriation of property. The most recent public case of expropriation was in 2019, when the government expropriated 22 health clinics from the Catholic Church, citing a law prohibiting religious organizations from providing social services. The Catholic Church said there was no due process or ability to appeal the decision. Bankruptcy is addressed in the Eritrean Civil Law and the proclamations amending it; however due to lack of transparency in the court system, it is impossible to determine what rights, if any, creditors, shareholders and holders of other financial contracts have in practice. No information is available on how bankruptcy is handled in practice. 6. Financial Sector There is no functioning public market for capital in Eritrea, nor is there an established stock market. The GSE fully controls the banking and financial sectors; there are no transparent mechanisms to facilitate the free flow of financial resources into portfolio investments. There is no transparency in decisions regarding credit allocation. Transfers of foreign currency are heavily restricted due, in part, to government concerns about foreign terrorist financing and maintaining adequate foreign currency reserves. The GSE does not respect the International Monetary Fund’s (IMP) Article VIII, regarding restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions. Due to restrictions on the use and hoarding of cash, most Eritreans now have bank accounts and use banking services. However, there are excessive regulation on banking accounts (including low monthly limits on withdrawals and restrictions on sending foreign currency abroad) and obsolete technology at the banks, which are frequently subjected to extended power cuts, forcing them to cease or limit services. There are no automated teller machines in Eritrea and there is no infrastructure to allow the use of credit or debit cards. It is unclear what the estimated total assets of the country’s largest banks are. The Bank of Eritrea is the country’s central bank. Foreign banks are not allowed to open branches or establish operations in Eritrea. Foreigners are able to establish bank accounts but are subject to the same monthly Nakfa withdrawal limits as Eritreans. Eritrea does not currently have any correspondent banking relationships. Per a 1994 regulation, locally based entities are forbidden from maintaining foreign bank accounts. Eritrea has no sovereign wealth fund. 10. Political and Security Environment There is no history of politically motivated violence or civil disturbance. In 2015, there were public reports that a Canadian-operated mine in Eritrea was damaged by explosions caused by either bombs or mortars. The mine continued to operate and there were conflicting accounts of who was responsible for the explosion(s). This one incident does not seem to have had a continuing impact on the investment environment. Due to Eritrea’s single-party political system, it is difficult to know how politicized or secure the country is, as information on public opinion and security matters does not flow freely. However, the level of politicization and security does not seem to have changed in recent years. Estonia Executive Summary Estonia is a safe and dynamic country for investment, with a business climate very similar to the United States. As a member of the EU, the Government of Estonia (GOE) maintains liberal policies in order to attract investments and export-oriented companies. Creating favorable conditions for foreign direct investment (FDI) and openness to foreign trade has been the foundation of Estonia’s economic strategy. The overall freedom to conduct business in Estonia is well protected under a transparent regulatory environment. Estonia is among the leading countries in Eastern and Central Europe regarding FDI per capita. By 2021, Estonia had attracted in total USD 38 billion (stock) of investment, of which 27 percent was made into the financial sector, 17 percent into real estate, 15 percent into retail and wholesale sector, and 13 percent into science and technology. United States FDI stock in Estonia is USD 451 million, and Estonian FDI stock in United States totals USD 349 million. The Estonian economy has recovered strongly from the pandemic crisis. The country’s GDP grew 8.3 percent in 2021, one of the fastest recoveries in Europe. Although Estonia is tightly connected to international value chains, it has experienced relatively few impacts from global supply chain issues so far, but the war in Ukraine is likely to have a more significant impact on supply chains in the region than the COVID crisis. In the area of climate and environmental policies, Estonia is working toward decarbonizing its economy including reducing its dependency on oil shale in electricity generation, increasing the energy efficiency of buildings, and introducing carbon free transport. The green transition in the business sector will require support from the government to help ensure Estonia adheres to the principles of circular economy. Estonia’s government has not yet set limitations on foreign ownership, and foreign investors are treated on an equal footing with local investors. However, the government is currently developing a framework to screen incoming FDI for national security concerns, which could have some impact on foreign investments. There are no investment incentives available to foreign investors. Foreign investors have not faced significant challenges with corruption, though Estonia has had some cases in local municipalities. The Estonian income tax system, with its flat rate of 20 percent, is considered one of the simplest tax regimes in the world. Deferral of corporate taxation payment shifts the time of taxation from the moment of earning the profits to that of their distribution. Undistributed profits are not subject to income taxation, regardless of whether these are reinvested or merely retained. This may change for companies with an annual turnover of more than 750 million euros depending on the EU’s implementation of the OECD’s global minimum tax agreement. Estonia offers opportunities for businesses in a number of economic sectors including information and communication technology (ICT), green energy, wood processing, and biotechnology. Estonia has strong trade ties with Finland, Sweden, and Germany. Estonia suffers a shortage of labor, both skilled and unskilled. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 13 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 21 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in Partner Country ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 $451 https://statistika.eestipank.ee/#/en/p/146/r/2293/2122 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $23,170 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Estonia is open to FDI and foreign investors are treated on an equal footing with local investors, though the government is developing a screening mechanism to adhere to the EU Foreign Investment Screening Regulation entered into force on April 10, 2019. This new regulation was launched in October 2020, creating an information-sharing mechanism between Member States and allows Member States and the European Commission to comment on foreign investments foreseen in other Member States. The Estonian Investment Agency (EIA), a part of Enterprise Estonia, is a government agency promoting foreign investments in Estonia and assisting international companies in finding business opportunities in Estonia. EIA offers comprehensive, one-stop investment consultancy services, free of charge. The agency’s goal is to increase awareness of business opportunities in Estonia and promote the image of Estonia as an attractive country for investments. More info: http://www.investinestonia.com/en/estonian-investment-agency/about-the-agency Estonia’s government has not set limitations on foreign ownership. Licenses are required for foreign investors to enter the following sectors: mining, energy, gas and water supply, railroad and transport, waterways, ports, dams and other water-related structures, and telecommunications and communication networks. The Estonian Financial Supervision Authority issues licenses for foreign interests seeking to invest in or establish a bank. Additionally, the Estonian Competition Authority reviews transactions for anti-competition concerns. Government review and licensing have proven to be routine and non-discriminatory. As a member of the EU, the Government of Estonia (GOE) maintains liberal policies in order to attract investment and export-oriented companies. Creating favorable conditions for FDI and openness to foreign trade has been the foundation of Estonia’s economic strategy. Existing requirements are not intended to restrict foreign ownership but rather to regulate it and establish clear ownership responsibilities. Since becoming a member of the EU, Estonia is included in World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Policy Reviews (TPRs) of the EU/EC. The fourteenth review of the trade policies and practices of the European Union took place in February 2020. Full report available here: WTO | Trade policy review -European Union (formerly EC) 2020 . The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report ranks Estonia in 18th place out of 190 countries on the ease of Starting a Business. Economic freedom, ease of doing business, per capita investments, low national debt, euro zone membership, and low corruption scores – all these factors play a role in fostering a good climate for business facilitation. In Estonia there are two ways to register your business: Electronic registration via the e-Commercial Register’s (takes between 5 minutes and 1 business day). Through a notary (takes 2-3 business days) More info on registering the business entity and link to the Register: https://www.eesti.ee/en/doing-business/establishing-a-company/comparison-of-each-form-of-business/ On July 1, 2014, an amended Taxation Act establishing the employment register entered into force, requiring all natural and legal employers to register the persons employed by them with the Estonian Tax and Customs Board. The company must register itself as a value-added tax payer if the taxable turnover of the company, excluding imports of goods, exceeds EUR 40,000 as calculated from the beginning of the calendar year. There are certain areas of activity (like construction, electrical works, fire safety, financial services, security services, etc.) in which business operation requires an additional registration in the Register of Economic Activities (MTR), but this can be done after registration of the company in the Commercial Register: https://mtr.mkm.ee/ Estonia does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad nor does it promote outward investment. Estonia companies have invested abroad about USD 12.5 billion, mostly into EU countries. The main sectors for outward investments are services, manufacturing, real estate and financial. 3. Legal Regime The Government of Estonia has set transparent policies and effective laws to foster competition and establish “clear rules of the game.” Despite these measures, due to the small size of Estonia’s commercial community, instances of favoritism are not uncommon. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms. Financial statements should be prepared in accordance with either: accounting principles generally accepted in Estonia; or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as adopted by the EU. Listed companies and financial institutions are required to prepare financial statements in accordance with IFRS as adopted by the EU. The Estonian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are written by the Estonian Accounting Standards Board (EASB). Estonian GAAP, effective since 2013, is based on IFRS for Small and Medium-sized Entities (IFRS for SMEs) with limited differences from IFRS for SMEs with regard to accounting policies as well as disclosure requirements. More info: https://investinestonia.com/business-in-estonia/establishing-company/accounting-requirements/ The Minister of Justice has responsibility for promoting regulatory reform. The Legislative Quality Division of the Ministry of Justice provides an oversight and coordination function for Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) and evaluations with regards to primary legislation. For government strategies, EU negotiations and subordinate regulations, oversight responsibilities lie within the Government Office. The Government of Estonia has placed a strong focus on accessibility and transparency of regulatory policy by making use of online tools. There is an up-to-date database of all primary and subordinate regulations ( https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/ ) in an easily searchable format. An online information system tracks all legislative developments and makes available RIAs and documents of legislative intent ( http://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main ). Estonia also established the website www.osale.ee , an interactive website of all ongoing consultations where every member of the public can submit comments and review comments made by others. Regulations are reviewed on the basis of scientific and data-driven assessments. Estonia, an OECD member country, has committed at the highest political level to an explicit whole-of-government policy for regulatory quality and has established sufficient regulatory oversight. Estonia scores the same as the United States on the World Bank`s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance on whether governments publish or consult with public about proposed regulations: http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/estonia . Estonia’s widely praised “e-governance” solutions and other bureaucratic procedures are generally far more streamlined and transparent than those of other countries in the region and are among the easiest to use globally. In addition, Estonia’s budget and debt obligations are widely and easily accessible to the general public on the Ministry of Finance website. Estonia is a member of the EU. An EU regulation is a legal act of the European Union that becomes immediately enforceable as law in all member states simultaneously. Regulations can be distinguished from directives which, at least in principle, need to be transposed into national law. Regulations can be adopted by means of a variety of legislative procedures depending on their subject matter. European Standards are under the responsibility of the European Standardization Organizations (CEN, CENELEC, ETSI) and can be used to support EU legislation and policies. Estonia has been a member of WTO since November 13, 1999. Estonia is a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) since 2015. Estonia’s judiciary is independent and insulated from government influence. The legal system in Estonia is based on the Continental European civil law model and has been influenced by the German legal system. In contrast to common law countries, Estonia has detailed codifications. Estonian law is divided into private and public law. Generally, private law consists of civil law and commercial law. Public law consists of international law, constitutional law, administrative law, criminal law, financial law and procedural law. Estonian arbitral tribunals can decide in cases of civil matters that have not previously been settled in court. More on Estonian court system: https://www.riigikohus.ee/en . Arbitration is usually employed because it is less time consuming and cheaper than court settlements. The following disputes can be settled in arbitral tribunals: Labor disputes; Lease disputes; Consumer complaints arguments; Insurance conflicts; Public procurement disputes; Commercial and industrial disputes. Recognition of court rulings of EU Member States is regulated by EU legislation. More: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/509988/IPOL_STU(2015)509988_EN.pdf Estonia is part of the Continental European legal system (civil law system). The most important sources of law are legal instruments such as the Constitution, European Union law, international agreements and Acts and Regulations. Major laws affecting incoming foreign investment include the Commercial Code, Taxation Act, Income Tax Act, Value Added Tax Act, Social Tax Act, and Unemployment Insurance Payment Act. More information is available at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/ . An overview of the investment-related regulations can be found here: http://www.investinestonia.com/en/investment-guide/legal-framework The Estonian Competition Authority reviews transactions for anti-competition concerns. Government review and licensing have proven to be routine and non-discriminatory. More info on specific competition cases: https://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/en Private property rights are observed in Estonia. The government has the right to expropriate for public interest related to policing the borders, public ports and airports, public streets and roads, supply to public water catchments, etc. Compensation is offered based on market value. Cases of expropriation are extremely rare in Estonia, and the Embassy is not aware of any expropriation cases involving discrimination against foreign owners. Bankruptcy is not criminalized in Estonia. Bankruptcy procedures in Estonia fall under the regulations of Bankruptcy Act that came into force in February 1997. The Estonian Bankruptcy Act focuses on the protection of the debtors and creditors’ rights. According to the Act, bankruptcy proceedings in Estonia can be compulsory, in which case a court will decide to commence the procedures for debt collection, or voluntarily by company reorganization. Detailed information about creditor’s rights: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/Riigikogu/act/504072016002/consolide More info from World Bank’s Doing Business Report on Estonian ranking for ease of “resolving insolvency: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.DFRN.XQ?locations=EE 6. Financial Sector Estonia is a member of the Euro zone. Estonia’s financial sector is modern and efficient. Credit is allocated on market terms and foreign investors are able to obtain credit on the local market. The private sector has access to an expanding range of credit instruments similar in variety to those offered by banks in Estonia’s Nordic neighbors, Finland and Sweden. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. The Security Market Law complies with EU requirements and enables EU securities brokerage firms to deal in the market without establishing a local subsidiary. The NASDAQ OMX stock exchanges in Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius form the Baltic Market, which facilitates cross-border trading and attracting more investments to the region. This includes sharing the same trading system and harmonizing rules and market practices, all with the aim of reducing the costs of cross-border trading in the Baltic region. Certain investment services and products may be limited to U.S. persons in Estonia due to financial institutions’ response to the U.S. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). Estonian financial services market overview: https://www.fi.ee/en?id=12737 IMF report on Estonia: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/07/20/Republic-of-Estonia-2021-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-462375 Estonia’s banking system has consolidated rapidly. The banking sector is dominated by two major commercial banks, Swedbank and SEB, both owned by Swedish banking groups. These two banks control approximately 62 percent of the financial services market. The third largest bank is a local LHV bank with 14 percent of market share. There are no state-owned commercial banks or other credit institutions. More information on banks’ assets is available at: http://statistika.eestipank.ee/#/en/p/FINANTSSEKTOR/147/645 The Scandinavian-dominated Estonian banking system is modern and efficient. Local and international banks in Estonia provide both domestic and international services (including internet and mobile banking) at competitive rates, as well as a full range of financial, insurance, accounting, and legal services. Estonia has a highly-advanced internet banking system: currently 98 percent of banking transactions are conducted via the internet. The Bank of Estonia (Eesti Pank) is Estonia’s independent central bank. As Estonia is part of the Euro zone, the core tasks of the Bank are to help to define the monetary policy of the European Community and to implement the monetary policy of the European Central Bank, including the circulation of cash in Estonia. Eesti Pank is also responsible for holding and managing Estonian official foreign exchange reserves as well as supervising overall financial stability and maintaining reliable and well-functioning payment systems. Neither the Central Bank nor the government hold shares in the banking sector. EU legislation requires Estonia to make its AML regime compliant with EU directives. Estonia has passed legislation that makes its AML regime compliant with EU legislation. After large-scale money laundering cases through Estonian branches of Nordic banks came to light in Estonia, regulatory and government officials are taking steps to improve the AML oversight regime. The recent changes included transformation of supervisory structures and roles as well as amendment of laws governing them. Due to strict anti-money laundering (AML) regulations and bank compliance practices, it can be difficult for non-residents to open a bank account. More information on opening a bank account for non-resident investors: https://www.lhv.ee/en/non-residents https://wise.com/gb/blog/opening-a-bank-account-in-estonia There are no sovereign wealth funds or state-owned investment funds in Estonia. 10. Political and Security Environment Civil unrest generally is not a problem in Estonia, and there have been no incidents of terrorism. Public gatherings and demonstrations may occur on occasion in response to political issues, but these have proceeded, with very few exceptions, without incidence of violence in the past. Eswatini Executive Summary Since the 2018 election that saw a number of ministers with private sector experience join the cabinet, foreign investments have increased. The Eswatini Investment Promotion Authority (EIPA) advocates for foreign investors and facilitates regulatory approval. Recent positive developments include the country’s commercial operation of a 10 MW solar powered plant as well as the opening of a Kelloggs – Tolaram factory that produces noodles for export as well as the first 24-hour border operation between Eswatini and South Africa. After Eswatini regained AGOA eligibility, the country has worked to redefine itself through the economic recovery strategy as an export-oriented, private sector led economy. The government built or is in the process building a number of factory shells that benefit manufacturing firms. In addition to manufacturing, the Swati government is prioritizing the energy sector, particularly renewable energy, and developed a Grid Code and Renewable Energy and Independent Power Producer (RE&IPP) Policy to create a transparent regulatory regime and attract investment. Eswatini generally imports 80 percent of its power from South Africa and Mozambique. With both South Africa and Mozambique experiencing electricity shortages, Eswatini is working to increase its own energy generation using renewable sources, including hydro and solar projects. With the emergence of Covid 19, the need for ICT business and infrastructure opportunities found their way to the top of the priority list as ICT became the core of the new normal. Eswatini is supporting ICT initiatives such as e-governance and further development of the Royal Science and Technology Park. The digital migration program of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) also presents ICT opportunities in the country. Incentives to invest in Eswatini include repatriation of profits, fully serviced industrial sites, purpose-built factory shells at competitive rates, and duty exemptions on raw materials for manufacture of goods to be exported outside the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Financial incentives for all investors include tax allowances and deductions for new enterprises, including a 10-year exemption from withholding tax on dividends and a low corporate tax rate of 10 percent for approved investment projects. New investors also enjoy duty-free import of machinery and equipment. Special Economic Zone (SEZ) investors may benefit from a 20-year exemption from all corporate taxation (followed by taxation at 5 percent); full refunds of customs duties, value-added tax, and other taxes payable on goods purchased for use as raw material, equipment, machinery, and manufacturing; unrestricted repatriation of profits; and full exemption from foreign exchange controls for all operations conducted within the SEZ. In the year 2021, six mining licenses were granted by the king for prospecting in gold, diamonds, and coal. Eswatini’s land tenure system, where the majority of rural land is “held in trust for the Swati nation,” continues to discourage long-term investment in commercial real estate and agriculture. Eswatini has historically been a services economy with South African retail service providers being among the major employers. However, due to developments in the Africa continental free trade area, it is likely that strategic manufacturing for export will again take the lead in the near future as there is new enthusiasm towards foreign market opportunities. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 120 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $3,723.3 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of the Kingdom of Eswatini (GKoE) regards foreign direct investment (FDI) as one of the five pillars of its Sustainable Development and Inclusive Growth (SDIG) Program, and a means to drive the country’s economic growth, obtain access to foreign markets for its exports, and improve international competitiveness. While the government has strongly encouraged foreign investment over the past 15 years, it only recently adopted a formal strategy for achieving measurable progress. Eswatini does not have a unified policy on investment. Instead, individual ministries have their own investment facilitation policies, which include policies on Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), agriculture, energy, transportation, mining, education, and telecommunications. Calls for more concerted action on these policies have intensified in the last few years as Eswatini has suffered from drought, fiscal challenges, and general economic recession. The Swati constitution states, generally, that non-citizens and/or companies with a majority of non-citizen shareholders may not own land unless they were vested in their ownership rights before the constitution entered into force in 2006. On the other hand, the constitution’s general prohibition “may not be used to undermine or frustrate an existing or new legitimate business undertaking of which land is a significant factor or base.” Furthermore, non-citizens and non-citizen majority-owned companies may hold long-term (up to 99 years) leases on Title and Swati Nation Land. Besides land ownership laws, there are no laws that discriminate against foreign investors. In 2019, the government listed some of its title deed land to make it available for long-term leasing for commercial purposes. In practice, most successful foreign investors associate local partners to navigate Eswatini’s complex bureaucracy. Most of the country’s land is Swati Nation Land held by the king “in trust for the Swati Nation” and cannot be purchased by foreign investors. Foreign investors that require significant land for their enterprise must engage the Land Management Board to negotiate long-term leases. The Eswatini Investment Promotion Authority (EIPA) is the state-owned enterprise (SOE) charged with designing and implementing strategies for attracting desired foreign investors. Eswatini’s Investment Policy and policies that support the business environment are online at https://investeswatini.org.sz/legal-and-regulatory-framework/ (EIPA is currently functional and helpful, but it is not yet a one-stop-shop for foreign investors). EIPA services include: Attract and promote local and foreign direct investments Identify and disseminate trade and investment opportunities Provide investor facilitation and aftercare services Promote internal and external trade Undertake research and policy analysis Facilitate company registration and business licenses/permits Facilitate work permits and visas for investors Provide a one stop shop information and support facility for businesses Export product development Facilitation of participation in external trade fairs BuyerSeller Missions The GKoE continues its attempts to improve the ease of doing business in the country through the Investor Roadmap Unit (IRU). The IRU engages with businesses and government to review and report on the progress and implementation of the investor roadmap reforms. EIPA has an aftercare division for purposes of investment retention that serves as a direct avenue for investors to communicate concerns they may have. Most investors who stay beyond the initial period during which the GKoE offers investment incentives have opted to remain long-term. Both foreign and domestic private entities have a right to establish businesses and acquire and dispose of interest in business enterprises. Foreign investors own several of Eswatini’s largest private businesses, either fully or with minority participation by Swati institutions. There are no general limits on foreign ownership and control of companies, which can be 100 percent foreign owned and controlled. The only exceptions on foreign ownership and control are in the mining sector and in relation to land ownership. The Mines and Minerals Act of 2011 requires that the King (in trust for the Swati Nation) be granted a 25-percent equity stake in all mining ventures, with another 25 percent equity stake granted to the GKoE. There are also sector-specific trade exclusions that prohibit foreign control, which include business dealings in firearms, radioactive material, explosives, hazardous waste, and security printing. Foreign investments are screened only through standard background and credit checks. Under the Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (Prevention) Act of 2011, investors must submit certain documents including proof of residence and source of income for deposits. EIPA also conducts general screening of FDI monies through credit bureau checks and Interpol. This screening is not a barrier to investing in Eswatini. There are no discriminatory mechanisms applied against US foreign direct investors. There have been no investment policy reviews for Eswatini in the last 3 years. Through its membership in the Southern African Customs Union, its ratification of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement and its participation in the work of the WTO, Eswatini continues to pursue the importance of trade in development. In 2015, the WTO performed a Trade Policy Review of the Southern African Customs Union that included Namibia, Botswana, Eswatini, South Africa, and Lesotho. In 2016, the Trade Facilitation agreement was ratified, and Eswatini’s portion of that review is available online: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/archive_e/country_arc_e.htm?country1=SWZ Eswatini does not have a single overarching business facilitation policy. Policies that address business facilitation are spread across the spectrum of relevant ministries. The Investors Road Map Unit (IRMU) is the public entity responsible for the review and monitoring of business environment reforms. EIPA facilitates foreign and domestic investment opportunities and has a fairly modern, up-to-date website: https://investeswatini.org.sz / , and certain GKoE application forms are available online at the EIPA website. Recent developments in the business facilitation space include the online registration of companies via the link www.online.gov.sz . As of 2020 the final steps (payment of statutory fees and registration fee) are now available offline. According to the Doing Business Report, the process of registering a company in Eswatini takes approximately 10 days. In practice, the process can take much longer for foreign investors. The main organization representing the private sector is Business Eswatini ( www.business-eswatini.co.sz ), which represents more than 80 percent of large businesses in Eswatini, works on a wide range of issues of interest to the private sector and seeks to build partnerships with the government to promote commercial development. Through Business Eswatini, the private sector is represented in a number of national working committees, including the National Trade Negotiations Team (NTNT). 3. Legal Regime In general, the laws of the country are transparent, including laws to foster competition. The Swaziland Competition Act came into force in 2007, and the Competition Commission Regulations came into effect in 2011. The Swaziland Competition Commission (SCC) is a statutory body charged with the administration and enforcement of the Competition Act of 2007. The legal and regulatory environment is underdeveloped, but currently growing as the GKoE has recently established additional regulatory bodies in the financial, energy, communications, and construction procurement sectors. These bodies generally attempt to emulate the regulatory practices of South Africa or Britain. Eswatini’s rule-making and regulatory authority lies with the central government and may be delegated by the relevant line ministry to a department, parastatal, or board. The primary custodian of policy and regulation is the minister responsible for the relevant law. All laws, regulations, and policies are applied at a national level. There are no regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. Regulatory enforcement actions can be reviewed through the court system, and court rulings are publicly available. Adherence to the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) is required for listed companies, financial institutions, and government-owned companies. It remains optional for small and medium enterprises. Proposed laws and regulations are published in the government Gazette and have a public comment period of thirty days prior to a bill’s presentation to parliament. Ministries sometimes consult with selected members of the public and private sectors through stakeholder meetings. Most draft regulations are not available online but can be acquired in hard copy through the government printing office for a fee. Regulations are generally developed and reviewed through various stakeholder consultations. The use of science and data to inform regulatory reform is not widespread. Foreign investors coming into the country can join Business Eswatini on equal footing with Eswatini nationals. Business Eswatini often serves as the link between the private sector and the government. There are no informal regulatory processes that apply to foreign investors. Eswatini public finance and debt obligations are published online through the budget estimates book as well as the Central Bank of Eswatini’s annual report. Eswatini is part of four distinct economic blocks: the Common Monetary Area (CMA), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The standards of membership in these blocks are primarily based on British law and have been domesticated accordingly into each context. Eswatini is a member of the WTO and notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Eswatini signed and ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2016 and has begun implementing its requisites. The TFA entered into force in February 2017 and requires prompt and transparent publication of trade-related information. Eswatini developed a trade portal in partnership with the World Bank to make reliable trade-related information accessible to the private sector. The GKoE approved the portal and is now at the data collection stage. Eswatini has a dual legal system consisting of a set of courts that follow Roman-Dutch law and a set of national courts that follow Swati law and custom. The former consists of a Court of Appeals (Supreme Court) and a High Court, in addition to magistrate’s courts in each of the four districts. The traditional courts deal with minor offenses and violations of traditional Swati law and custom. Sentences in traditional courts are subject to appeal and review at the Court of Appeals and High Court. The western-style court system enforces contracts and property rights. The country has various written commercial and contractual laws. Commercial and contractual disputes are handled in the magistrate court or High Court depending on the amount in dispute. There are currently no specialized commercial courts; however, the government is in the process of establishing a Small Claims Bench. Specialized Industrial Courts hear labor relations matters. The constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary, and the courts are generally independent of executive control or influence in nonpolitical criminal and civil cases not involving the royal family or government officials. The current judicial process is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable, although the capacity of the judiciary to handle cases in a timely manner is extremely limited, creating significant case backlogs. Enforcement of laws and regulations is appealable up to the Supreme Court. The Swaziland Investment Promotion Act of 1998 established EIPA and provides for the freedom of investment, protection of investment, and non-discrimination on the part of the government with respect to investors. The Competition Act of 2007 proscribes anti-competitive trade practices and specifies requirements for mergers and acquisitions, and protection of consumer welfare. The new economic recovery strategy (Revised National Development Strategy) has emphasized the need to promote further reforms in order to facilitate investment. In February 2018, the GKoE enacted the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act in an effort to attract foreign direct investment. The benefits for an SEZ investor include: a 20-year exemption from all corporate taxation, followed by taxation at the rate of 5 percent; full refunds of customs duties, value-added tax, and all other taxes payable in respect of goods purchased for use as raw material, equipment, machinery, and manufacturing; unrestricted repatriation of profits; and full exemption from foreign exchange controls for all operations conducted within the SEZ. The Swaziland Competition Commission (SCC) was established in 2007 to encourage competition in Eswatini’s economy by controlling anti-competitive trade practices, mergers, and acquisitions; protecting consumer welfare; and providing an institutional mechanism for implementing these objectives. The Swaziland Competition Act ( http://www.compco.co.sz/documents/Competition%20Act%202007%20scanned18%20Februry%202010.pdf ) and Competition Commission Regulations ( http://www.compco.co.sz/documents/Competition%20Commission%20Regulations%20Notice%202010.pdf ) are available online. All entities must submit their merger and acquisition plans to the SCC for prior approval. The SCC has the power to not only investigate and regulate, but also to issue administrative decisions relating to mergers, competition, and anti-trust. There have been no rulings against foreign investors since the establishment of the Swaziland Competition Commission. The law prohibits expropriation and nationalization. The Swati constitution narrowly limits the GKoE’s powers to deprive a landowner of “property or any interest in or right over property,” except where “necessary,” conducted pursuant to a court order, and compensated by the “prompt payment of fair and adequate compensation.” Anyone whose property interests are threatened by expropriation is also expressly granted due process rights under the constitution. There have been no recent cases of foreign-owned businesses being expropriated, and when disputes have arisen in the past, there has been due process through Swati institutions and/or international tribunals. The Insolvency Act of 1955 is the law that governs bankruptcy in Eswatini. The insolvent debtor or his agent petitions the court for the acceptance of the surrender of the debtor’s estate for the benefit of his creditors. Creditors need to petition with the court and provide documents supporting their claim. Bankruptcy is only criminalized if the debtor, trustee, or sole owner does not comply with the requirements of the creditor. For example, if he/she fails to submit documents or declare assets, or if he/she obstructs or hinders a liquidator appointed under the Act in the performance of his functions, then he/she could be found guilty of an offense. The most widely used credit bureau in Eswatini is Transunion. In the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, Eswatini ranks 121 out of 190 economies for ease of resolving insolvency. SEZ investors have access to numerous investment incentives more fully described above in “Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment” and below in “Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation.” For non-SEZ investors, the Minister of Finance has the discretion to apply a reduced tax rate of 10 percent for the first ten-year period of operation, which is available for businesses that qualify under the Development Approval Order. Capital goods imported into the country for productive investments are exempt from import duties. Raw materials imported into the country to manufacture products to be exported outside the SACU area are also exempt from import duties. The law allows for repatriation of profits and dividends including salaries for expatriate staff and capital repayments. The Central Bank of Eswatini guarantees loans raised by investors for export markets. There is also provision of loss cover that a company can carry over in case it incurs a loss in the year of assessment. Eswatini has a human resources training rebate that offers a tax credit for 150 percent of the cost of training. The GKoE issues guarantees for key sectors like transportation and energy. There have been no reports of government jointly financing FDI projects. In February 2018, the GKoE enacted the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act in an effort to attract foreign direct investment. The Act establishes two designated SEZs: the Royal Science and Technology Park and King Mswati III International Airport. According to the Act, investors may establish additional SEZs outside of these designated areas by satisfying the minimum requirements and submitting an application to the Minister of Commerce. Under the Act, foreign-owned firms have the same investment opportunities as Swati entities. To operate within an SEZ, a beneficiary company must meet the following minimum requirements (among others): at least 90 percent of its employees must be paid at or above the threshold for income taxation (approximately USD 330/month); at least two thirds of its employees must be Swati citizens; and the minimum capital investment must be E30 million (USD 2.1 million) for sole companies and E70 million (USD 5 million) for joint ventures. The benefits for an SEZ investor include: a 20-year exemption from all corporate taxation, followed by taxation at the rate of 5 percent; full refunds of customs duties, value-added tax, and all other taxes payable in respect of goods purchased for use as raw material, equipment, machinery, and manufacturing; unrestricted repatriation of profits; and full exemption from foreign exchange controls for all operations conducted within the SEZ. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security’s Training and Localization Unit requires the hiring of qualified Swati workers where possible, even at executive positions. The mandate of the Unit is to ensure the maximum utilization of local manpower resources and to formulate training plans in conjunction with industries so as to maximize employment. It also facilitates and provides information on the process of obtaining work permits. Foreign investors are required to apply for residence and work permits. Although they are generally awarded, businesspeople complain that the process is cumbersome. There are no government-imposed conditions on permission to invest. The government does not follow a “forced localization” policy. However, in the manufacturing sector, if a company plans to label a product for export as “Made in Eswatini,” the government requires that the local content of such export be at least 25 percent. There are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to encryption. The technology industry in Eswatini is still in its infancy. The intellectual property rights index (2020) ranks Eswatini 7th in Africa and 79th globally in protection of intellectual property. https://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/country/swaziland There are two major categories of land tenure: Swati Nation Land (SNL) and Title Deed Land (TDL), each subject to different rules and procedures. More than 60 percent of Eswatini’s territory is SNL, governed by the country’s traditional structures. SNL is “held in trust for the Swati people” by the King, who appoints chiefs to oversee its use. The chiefs keep records of who “owns” or resides on land in their chiefdoms. For TDL, the Eswatini government recognizes and enforces secured interest in property and there is a reliable system of recording security interests. The Constitution protects the right to own property, but most rural land is SNL and is not covered by this constitutional protection. Most urban property, on the other hand, is TDL. The law allows for eminent domain in limited circumstances but requires prompt payment of adequate compensation. In the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, Eswatini ranks 104 out of 190 economies for ease of registering property. This ranking refers to property in peri-urban areas, where TDL is widely available. SNL is not titled, and lending institutions are reluctant to use it as collateral. Though foreign or non-resident individuals generally may not own land (with some exceptions), foreign-owned businesses are able to own or lease land. Legally purchased property cannot revert to other owners (must be “willing buyer, willing seller”). Protection for patents, trademarks, and copyrights is currently inadequate under Swati law. Patents are currently protected under a 1936 act that automatically extends patent protection, upon proper application, to products that have been patented in either South Africa or Great Britain. Trademark protection is addressed in the Trademarks Act of 1981. Copyright protections are addressed under four statutes, dated 1912, 1918, 1933, and 1936. Laws enacted in 2018 have updated Eswatini’s intellectual property legal framework. The Copyright and Neighboring Rights Act of 2014 (replacing the Copyright Act of 1912) protects literary, musical, artistic, audio-visual, sound recordings, broadcasts, and published editions. It also criminalizes illicit recording and false representation of someone else’s work. The Act also gives the duration of copyright among other things. The Swaziland Intellectual Property Tribunal Act of 2015 established an Intellectual Property Tribunal that is responsible for hearing all matters and disputes involving intellectual property in Eswatini. The Trademarks (amendment) Act of 2015 brings the (1981) Trademarks Act into compliance with provisions of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the Madrid Agreement concerning International Registration of Marks, and the Banjul Protocol on Trademarks. Eswatini does not track and report on seizures of counterfeit goods. Eswatini is not listed on the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . Eswatini’s capital markets are closely tied to those of South Africa and operate under conditions generally similar to the conditions in that market. In 2010, the GKoE passed the Securities Act to strengthen the regulation of portfolio investments. The Act was primarily intended to facilitate and develop an orderly, fair, and efficient capital market in the country. Eswatini has a small stock exchange with only a handful of companies currently trading. In 2010, the Financial Services Regulatory Authority (FSRA) was established. This institution governs non-bank financial institutions including capital markets, insurance firms, retirement funds, building societies, micro-finance institutions, and savings and credit cooperatives. The royal wealth fund and national pension fund invest in the private equity market, but otherwise there are few professional investors. Existing policies neither inhibit nor facilitate the free flow of financial resources; the demand is simply not present. The Central Bank respects International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII, and credit is allocated on market terms. Foreign investors are able to get credit and equity from the local market. A variety of credit instruments are available to the private sector including Central Bank of Eswatini loan guarantees for the export markets and for small businesses. 54 percent of the Swati adult population is banked. According to the Central Bank of Eswatini’s Financial Stability Report, the Swati banking sector is stable and financially sound. The asset quality (the ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to gross loans) stood at 9.3 per cent marginally rising from 9.2 percent. Aggregate bank liquidity to deposits stood at 38.3 per cent, increasing from 32.8 per cent the previous year. The average return on assets (ROA) and return on total equity (ROE) decreased from 2.6 percent and 16.6 percent to 1.5 percent and 10.3 percent, respectively, during the same period (June 2019 to June 2020). The estimated total assets for the country’s banks are estimated at E19.4 billion (USD 1.4 billion) as of June 2018, up from E17.9 billion (USD 1.3 billion) in March 2017. Eswatini has a central bank system. Eswatini’s banks are primarily subsidiaries of South African banks. Standard Bank is the largest bank by capital assets and employs about 400 workers. In 2018, the Central Bank of Eswatini under the Financial Institutions Act of 2005 awarded a new commercial banking license to Farmer’s Bank. Eswatini’s financial sector is liberalized and allows foreign banks or branches to operate under the supervision of the Central Bank’s laws and regulations (http://www.centralbank.org.sz). Foreigners may establish a bank account in Eswatini if they have residency in one of the CMA countries (Eswatini, South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia). There have been no bank closures or banks in jeopardy in the last three years. Hostile takeovers are uncommon. In 1968, the late King Sobhuza II created a Royal Charter that governs the Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) in Eswatini, Tibiyo TakaNgwane. This fund is not subject to government or parliamentary oversight and does not provide information on assets or financial performance to the public. Tibiyo TakaNgwane publishes an annual report with financials, but it is not required by law to do so as it is not registered under the Companies Act of 1912. The annual reports are not made public or submitted to any other state organ for debate or review. The SWF obtains independent audits at the discretion of its Board of Directors. Tibiyo TakaNgwane states in its objectives that it supports the government in fostering economic independence and self-sufficiency. It widely invests in the economy and holds shares in most major industries, e.g., sugar, real estate, beverages, dairy, hotels, and transportation. For its social responsibility practices, it provides some scholarships to students. The SWF and the government co-invest to exercise majority control in many instances. Tibiyo TakaNgwane invests entirely in the local economy and local subsidiaries of foreign companies. It has shares in a number of private companies. Sometimes foreign companies can form partnerships with Tibiyo, especially if the foreign company wants to raise capital and can manage the project on its own. Eswatini has 49 SOEs, which are active in agribusiness, information and communication, energy, automotive and ground transportation, health, housing, travel and tourism, building education, business development, finance, environment, and publishing, media, and entertainment . The Swati government defines SOEs as private enterprises, separated into two categories. Category A represents SOEs that are wholly owned by government. Category B represents SOEs in which government has a minority interest, or which monitor other financial institutions or a local government authority. These categories are further broken down into profit-making SOEs with a social responsibility focus, those that are profit-making and developmental, those that are regulatory, and those that are regulatory but developmental. SOEs purchase and supply goods and services to and from the private sector including foreign firms. Those in which government is a minority shareholder are subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as the private sector. The Public Enterprise Act governs SOEs. The Boards of the respective SOEs review their budgets before tabling them to the relevant line ministry, which in turn, tables them to Parliament for scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committee. The Ministry of Finance’s Public Enterprise Unit (PEU) maintains a published list of SOEs, available on request from the PEU. SOEs do not receive non-market-based advantages from government. Eswatini SOEs generally conform to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. Senior managers of SOEs report to the board and, in turn, the board reports to a line minister. The minister then works with the Standing Committee on Public Enterprise (SCOPE), which is composed of cabinet ministers. SOEs are governed by the Public Enterprises Act, which requires audits of the SOEs and public annual reports. Government is not involved in the day-to-day management of SOEs. Boards of SOEs exercise their independence and responsibility. The Public Enterprise Unit provides regular monitoring of SOEs. The line minister of the SOE appoints the board and, in some cases, the appointments are politically motivated. In some cases, the king appoints his own representative as well. Generally, court processes are nondiscriminatory in relation to SOEs. A published list of SOEs can be found on: http://www.gov.sz/index.php/component/content/article/141-test/1995-swaziland-enterprise-parastatals?Itemid=799 Eswatini SOEs operate primarily in the domestic market. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has long advised the Eswatini government to privatize SOEs, particularly in the telecommunications sector and the electricity sector. In response, the government has passed several laws, and privatization efforts have begun to advance. Since Eswatini Mobile (formerly Swazi Mobile) launched in 2016, as well as other private telecommunications companies during the intervening years, prices for cellular services have come down and mobile and data offerings have improved in the country. Sectors and timelines have not been prioritized for future privatization, although it is likely that some SOEs will be privatized following the public launch of the Revised National Development Strategy. The government is working to reduce the country’s dependence on foreign electricity by promoting renewable energy production. Eswatini imports the bulk of its electricity from South Africa and Mozambique, reaching 100 percent importation during a recent drought, since domestic production comes predominantly from hydropower. With assistance from USAID’s Southern Africa Energy Program (SAEP), the government has developed a National Grid Code and a Renewable Energy and Independent Power Producer (RE&IPP) Policy to provide a framework for the sector and incentivize investors. The Swati government encourages foreign and local enterprises to follow generally accepted responsible business conduct (RBC) principles. Multinational enterprises in the country have robust standards for RBC, and consumers often recognize their efforts; however, smaller domestic companies are less likely to have RBC programs. The Development Approval Order, which is part of the income tax law, allows a company to receive a tax rate discounted by up to 10 percent if it makes significant RBC investments. Government enforcement is sporadic, but generally does not vary based on whether a company is domestic or foreign, and requirements are not waived to attract foreign investment. The government does not have corporate governance, accounting, and executive compensation standards to protect shareholders. There are no independent NGOs monitoring RBC. The local courts are responsible for ensuring human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protections, and other laws/regulations intended to protect individuals from adverse business impacts. The courts have not demonstrated a bias against foreign-owned corporations. The mining sector of Eswatini does not have enough economic significance to warrant special consideration by the government. It is treated consistent with other sectors of similar size. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World and; Comply Chain The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government does not implement the law effectively. Officials sometimes engage in corrupt practices with impunity. Corruption continues to be a problem, most often involving personal relationships and bribes being used to secure government contracts on large capital projects. The Prevention of Corruption Act and the Swaziland Public Procurement Act are the two laws that combat corruption by all persons, including public officials. The Public Procurement Act prohibits public sector workers and politicians from supplying the government with goods or services; however, this prohibition does not extend to family members of officials. The Eswatini Public Procurement Agency (ESPPRA) conducted capacity building exercises nationwide with both public and private companies to increase knowledge and encourage adoption of universally practiced purchasing systems. According to Section 27 of the Public Procurement Regulations, suppliers are prohibited from offering gifts or hospitality, directly or indirectly, to staff of a procuring entity, members of the tender board, and members of the ESPPRA. While avoiding conflict of interest and establishing codes of conduct are policies that are encouraged, they are not effectively enforced. Some companies use internal controls and audit compliance programs to try to track and prevent bribery. Eswatini is a signatory to the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and Related Offenses and the SADC Protocol against Corruption. Eswatini has signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention, but it is not party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is legally allowed to investigate corruption and does so. The ACC does not provide protection to NGOs involved in investigating corruption. Given the Commission’s current capacity, “government procurement” is the most likely area to find corruption in Eswatini. The global competitiveness report ranks Swaziland 79 of 140 countries on incidence of corruption. Transparency International reports Eswatini as the 14th least corrupt country in Africa Though no US firms have cited corruption, the 2015 Africa Competitiveness report found that 12.8% of business owners saw corruption as a hurdle to doing business in Eswatini, impacting profits, contracts, and investment decisions for their companies. There is a public perception of corruption in the executive and legislative branches of government and a consensus that the government does little to combat it. There have been credible reports that a person’s relationship with government officials influenced the awarding of government contracts; the appointment, employment, and promotion of officials; recruitment into the security services; and school admissions. Authorities rarely took action on reported incidents of nepotism. Contact at government agency responsible for combating corruption: Dan Dlamini Commissioner Eswatini Anti-Corruption Commission 3rd Floor, Mbandzeni House, Mbabane +268-2404-3179/0761 anticorruption@realnet.co.sz In July 2021, following COVID lockdowns and the banning of petition deliveries by citizenry protesting the death of a student, the country erupted in violence with business projects and installations being damaged or destroyed as a result. The resulting violence lasted for two days, culminating in the police and army restoring order. The king and government agreed to hold a dialogue on how the country should be governed. Although Eswatini has a long record of political stability with sporadic nonviolent protest, poor living and working conditions, widespread poverty, income inequality, and a large and growing youth population, however, continues to yield a political environment conducive to further unrest. The structure of the labor market and economic fundamentals in Eswatini are better developed than in many other Sub-Saharan African countries. For example, GDP per capita is higher, the informal sector is smaller, exports are more diversified, the overall education level is higher, and the labor pool is predominantly domestic. Nevertheless, although Eswatini is considered a middle-income country, it has many characteristics of a low-income country. The minimum wage is low, inequality is high (0.51 Gini coefficient), poverty is widespread, the middle class is small, overall unemployment (especially youth unemployment) is high, and female representation is low. Eswatini has a shortage of technically skilled labor. The government has identified several sectors as priorities in terms of building skilled labor capacity: agricultural engineering, ICT, medicine, medical imaging, and occupational health. Other priority fields that the government may sponsor include physiotherapy, paramedic studies, forestry, special education, clinical and dental science, and pharmacy. The law requires that employers give first preference to Swati nationals unless they cannot find candidates with the necessary qualifications. The Employment Act states that if an employer contemplates adjusting employment to respond to fluctuating market conditions, the employer must give no less than one month’s notice to the Labor Commissioner and the trade union. The employer must provide the number of employees to be affected, their occupations and remuneration, the reasons for the adjustment, the effective date, financial statements and audited accounts of the company, and options that have been considered to avert the situation. Section 34 of the Employment Act says if the services of an employee are terminated other than being fired, a severance allowance amounting to ten working days’ wages for each completed year in excess of one year continuously employed by that employer is due. Layoffs are defined as temporary absences from work that are necessitated by the employer facing certain difficulties that are temporary in nature, while firing refers to the sacking of an employee. There are no social safety net programs for workers who are laid off. Labor laws are not waived in order to attract or retain investment. In 2018, Eswatini enacted the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act in an effort to attract foreign direct investment. In order to operate within an SEZ, a beneficiary company must meet the following minimum requirements (among others): at least 90 percent of its employees must be paid at or above the threshold for income taxation (approximately USD 330/month); at least two thirds of its employees must be Swati citizens; and the minimum capital investment must be E30 million (USD 2.1 million) for sole companies and E70 million (USD 5.0 million) for joint ventures. The law provides that workers, except for those in essential services, have the right to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively. Labor unions practice collective bargaining, but there are few industry associations and bargaining is conducted largely with individual employers in the private sector. Collective bargaining is common in the financial and textile sectors. The Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration Commission (CMAC) serves as Eswatini’s labor dispute resolution mechanism. Labor disputes generally start at CMAC with mediation and arbitration. Either party can refuse arbitration and bring the case to the Industrial Court; however, due to severe backlogs at the court, the matter may not be heard for several years. According to the Industrial Relations Act, workers can engage in a strike action if there is an unresolved dispute. Although the law permits strikes, the right to strike is strictly regulated, and the administrative requirements to register a legal strike made striking difficult. Strikes and lockouts are prohibited in essential services, and the minister’s power to modify the list of these essential services provides for broad prohibition of strikes in nonessential sectors, including postal services, telephone, telegraph, radio, and teaching. The procedure for announcing a strike action requires advance notice of at least seven days. The law details the steps to be followed when disputes arise and provides penalties for employers who conduct unauthorized lockouts. When disputes arise with civil servant unions, the government often intervenes to reduce the chances of a strike action, which may not be called legally until all avenues of negotiation are exhausted and a secret ballot of union members is conducted. Eswatini has ratified the eight core ILO conventions; however, compliance gaps with international labor standards continue to remain in both law and practice. The law provides that workers, except for those in essential services, have the right to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively. The law provides for the registration of unions and federations but grants far-reaching powers to the labor commissioner with respect to determining eligibility for registration. Unions must represent at least 50 percent of employees in a workplace and submit their constitutions to be automatically recognized. The law also gives employers discretion to recognize a union as a collective employee representative if it has less than 50 percent membership, and furthermore, allows employers to set conditions for such recognition. The Department of Labor has inspectors who verify whether companies adhere to labor regulations, health and safety standards, and wage laws. The Minister of Labor sets minimum wages through the Wages Councils. In 2018, Eswatini enacted a new Public Order Act that substantially loosened restrictions on public gatherings, including eliminating the requirement for prior consent for gatherings of fewer than 50 persons and completely removing restrictions on private gatherings. A gathering no longer requires permission, but instead only requires notice that provides basic information as to time, place, date, and logistics. Demonstrators no longer have to provide information as to the content of their planned speech. There is strong potential for a DFC program in Eswatini, particularly in the renewable energy industry; however, there has been not yet been a DFC (or OPIC) project in Eswatini. The GKoE has demonstrated a commitment towards encouraging private sector investment. Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020$3.97 Billion 2020 $3.97 billion www.worldbank.org/en/country *Host Country Statistical Source: Central Bank of Eswatini Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. No detailed information is available on the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) website and no information is available on outward direct investment from Eswatini. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. Political/Economic Officer U.S. Embassy Eswatini +268-2417-9663 Mbabane-Pol-Econ@state.gov Ethiopia Executive Summary Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa after Nigeria, with a growing population of over 110 million, approximately two-thirds of whom are under age 30. A reform-minded government, low-cost labor, a national airline with over 100 passenger connections, and growing consumer markets are key elements attracting foreign investment. Ethiopia faced several economic challenges in 2021 related to the COVID-19 pandemic, a drought in the southern and eastern lowlands, political tension and unrest in parts of the country, and an ongoing conflict in the north. Ethiopia’s macroeconomic position was characterized by over 30 percent inflation, meager foreign exchange reserves, a large budget deficit, and plummeting credit ratings. The IMF estimated GDP growth at 2.0 percent in 2021, a significant drop from 6.0 percent in 2020 and double-digit growth for much of the past decade. During 2021, the Government of Ethiopia (GOE) made the first revisions in over 60 years to the commercial code, awarded a spectrum license to a private telecom operator, and took initial steps toward privatization of other state-owned sectors, including the telecom and sugar industries. Ethiopia is a signatory of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and it has a climate resilience green economy strategy (CRGES) to build a green and resilient economy. Ethiopia has also formulated climate-resilient sectoral policies and strategies to provide specific strategic interventions in areas such as agriculture, forestry, transport, health, urban development, and housing. In 2020-21, the GOE provided liquidity to private banks to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on businesses, to facilitate debt restructuring and to prevent bankruptcies and it also injected liquidity into the hotel and tourism sector through commercial banks. The GOE planned to allocate roughly $1 billion U.S. dollars during the same period for medical equipment purchases, healthcare worker salaries, quarantine and isolation facilities, and the procurement of disinfectants and personal protective equipment. The challenges of doing business in Ethiopia remain daunting. Companies often face long lead-times importing goods and dispatching exports due to logistical bottlenecks, corruption, high land-transportation costs, and bureaucratic delays. An acute foreign exchange shortage (the Ethiopian birr is not a freely convertible currency) impedes companies’ ability to repatriate profits and obtain investment inputs. The lack of a capital market hinders private sector growth. Export performance remains weak, as the country struggles to develop exports beyond primary commodities (coffee, gold, and oil seeds) and the Ethiopian birr remains overvalued. Ethiopia is not a signatory of major intellectual property rights treaties such as the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks. Insecurity and political instability associated with various ethnic conflicts – particularly the conflict in northern Ethiopia – have negatively impacted the investment climate and dissuaded foreign direct investment (FDI). Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 87 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/ethiopia Global Innovation Index 2020 126 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/gii-2018-report# U.S. FDI in partner country (M USD, stock positions) 2021 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.html#411 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $890 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Ethiopia needs significant inflows of FDI to meet its ambitious growth goals. Over the past year, to attract more foreign investment, the government passed a new investment law, acceded to the New York Convention on Arbitration, amended its 60-year-old commercial code, and digitized the commercial registration and business licensing processes. The government has also begun implementing the Public Private Partnership (PPP) Proclamation to allow for private investment in the power generation and road construction sectors. The Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC) has the mandate to promote and facilitate foreign investments in Ethiopia. To accomplish this task, the EIC is charged with 1) promoting the country’s investment opportunities to attract and retain investment; 2) issuing investment permits, business licenses, work permits, and construction permits; 3) issuing commercial registration certificates and renewals; 4) negotiating and signing bilateral investment agreements; and 5) registering technology transfer agreements. In addition, the EIC has the mandate to advise the government on policies to improve the investment climate and to hold regular and structured public-private dialogues with investors and their associations. At the local level, regional investment agencies facilitate regional investment. The American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) advances U.S. business interests in Ethiopia. AmCham provides a mechanism for coordination among American companies and facilitates regular meetings with government officials to discuss issues that hinder operations in Ethiopia. The Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce organizes a monthly business forum that enables the business community to discuss issues related to the investment climate with government officials. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish, acquire, own, and dispose of most forms of business enterprises. The Investment Proclamation and associated regulations outline the areas of investment reserved for government and local investors. There is no private ownership of land in Ethiopia. All land is technically owned by the state but can be leased for up to 99 years. Small-scale rural landholders have indefinite use rights, but cannot lease out holdings for extended periods, except in the Amhara Region. The 2011 Urban Land Lease Proclamation allows the government to determine the value of land in transfers of leasehold rights to curb speculation by investors. A foreign investor intending to buy an existing private enterprise or shares in an existing enterprise needs to obtain prior approval from the EIC. While foreign investors have complained about inconsistent interpretation of the regulations governing investment registration (particularly relating to accounting for in-kind investments), they generally do not face undue screening of FDI, unfavorable tax treatment, denial of licenses, discriminatory import or export policies, or inequitable tariff and non-tariff barriers. Over the past three years, the government has not undertaken any third-party investment policy review by a multilateral or non-governmental organization. The government has worked closely with some international stakeholders, such as the International Finance Corporation, in its attempt to modernize and streamline its investment regulations. The EIC has attempted to establish itself as a “one-stop shop” for foreign investors by acting as a centralized location where investors can obtain the visas, permits, and paperwork they need, thereby reducing the time and cost of investing and acquiring business licenses. The EIC has worked with international consultants to modernize its operations and has adopted a customer management system to build lasting relationships and provide post-investment assistance to investors. Despite progress, the EIC admits that many bureaucratic barriers to investment remain. U.S. investors report that the EIC, as a federal organization, has little influence at regional and local levels. Currently, more than 95 percent of Ethiopia’s trade passes through the Port of Djibouti, with residual trade passing through the Somaliland Port of Berbera or Port Sudan. Ethiopia concluded an agreement in March of 2018 with the Somaliland Ports Authority and DP World to acquire a 19 percent stake in the joint venture developing the Port of Berbera. The agreement will help Ethiopia secure an additional logistical gateway for its increasing import and export trade. The GOE is working to improve business facilitation services by making the licensing and registration of businesses easier and faster. In February 2021, the Ministry of Trade and Regional Integration (MOTRI) launched an eTrade platform ( etrade.gov.et ) for business registration licensing to enable individuals to register their companies and acquire business licenses online. The amended commercial registration and licensing law eliminates the requirement to publicize business registrations in local newspapers, allows business registration without a physical address, and reduces some other paperwork burdens associated with business registration. U.S. companies can obtain detailed information for the registration of their business in Ethiopia from an online investment guide to Ethiopia: ( https://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/ethiopia ) and the EIC’s website: ( http://www.investethiopia.gov.et/index.php/investment-process/starting-a-business.html ). MOTRI has target timeframes for the registration of new businesses, but it often fails to meet its deadlines. There is no officially recorded outward investment by domestic investors from Ethiopia as citizens/local investors are not allowed to hold foreign accounts. 3. Legal Regime Ethiopia’s regulatory system is generally considered fair, though there are instances in which burdensome regulatory or licensing requirements have prevented the local sale of U.S. exports, particularly health-related products. Investment decisions can involve multiple government ministries, lengthening the registration and investment process. The Constitution is the highest law of the country. The parliament enacts proclamations, which are followed by regulations that are passed by the Council of Ministers and implementing directives that are passed by ministries or agencies. The government engages the public for feedback before passage of draft legislation through public meetings, and regulatory agencies request comments on proposed regulations from stakeholders. Ministries or regulatory agencies do neither impact assessments for proposed regulations nor ex-post reviews. Parties that are affected by an adopted regulation can request reconsideration or appeal to the relevant administrative agency or court. There is no requirement to periodically review regulations to determine whether they are still relevant or should be revised. All proclamations and regulations in Ethiopia are published in official gazettes and most of them are available online: http://www.hopr.gov.et/web/guest/122 and https://chilot.me/federal-laws/2/ Legal matters related to the federal government are entertained by Federal Courts, while state matters go to state courts. To ensure consistency of legal interpretation and to promote predictability of the courts, the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division is empowered to give binding legal interpretation on all federal and state matters. Though there are no publicly listed companies in Ethiopia, all banks and insurance companies are obliged to adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Regulations related to human health and environmental pollution are often enforced. In January 2019, the Oromia Region’s Environment, Forest, and Climate Change Commission shut down three tanneries in the Oromia Region for what was said to be repeated environmental pollution offenses. The federal government also suspended the business license of MIDROC Gold Mining in May 2018 following weeks of protests by local communities who accused the company of causing health and environmental hazards in the Oromia Region. In February 2019, the Ethiopian Parliament passed a bill entitled ‘Food and Medicine Administration Proclamation number 1112/2019’, which bans smoking in all indoor workplaces, public spaces, and means of public transport and prohibits alcohol promotion on broadcasting media. In April 2020, Ethiopia published the Administrative Procedure Proclamation number 1183/2020 (APP). The APP’s aim is to allow ordinary citizens who seek administrative redress to file suits in federal courts against government institutions. Potential redress includes financial restitution. The APP’s passage will require government institutions to set up offices that will handle such complaints. Complainants are required to follow an administrative appeal process, and only after exhausting administrative remedies will a person be allowed to file a suit in federal court. Four government institutions are exempt from the APP: the Ministry of Justice (MOJ); the Ethiopian Federal Police; the Ethiopian National Defense Force, and the intelligence agencies. To foster transparency, the APP obligates all government agencies’ regulations to be registered with MOJ (https://www.eag.gov.et/en-us/Home) and be widely accessible to the public. The enactment of the APP is widely viewed as a positive step in increasing confidence in the public sector and addressing the need for governmental institutions to adhere to the rule of law. Ethiopia is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures . Foreign and national investors can find detailed information from the investment commission’s website ( https://www.invest-ethiopia.com/ ) on administrative procedures applicable to investing in Ethiopia. The GOE provides accurate, comprehensive, and detailed information on the enacted budget and overall government debt. However, fiscal transparency in Ethiopia continues to have several deficiencies, including the unavailability of executive budget proposals, a lack of publicly available information on state-owned enterprise (SOE) debt, poor legislative oversight of budget preparation and execution, and limited budget execution reports. In April 2020 Ethiopia became a member of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The AfCFTA aims to create a single continental market for goods and services, with free movement of businesspersons and investments. Ethiopia is also a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), a regional economic block, which has 21 member countries and has introduced a 10 percent tariff reduction on goods imported from member states. Ethiopia has not yet joined the COMESA free trade area, however. Ethiopia resumed its WTO accession process in 2018, which it originally began in 2003, but which later stagnated. Ethiopian standards have a national scope and applicability and some of them, particularly those related to human health and environmental protection, are mandatory. The Ethiopian Standards Agency is the national standards body of Ethiopia. Ethiopia has codified criminal and civil laws, including commercial and contractual law. According to the contractual law, a contract agreement is binding between contracting parties. Disputes between the parties can be taken to court. There are, however, no specialized courts for commercial law cases, though there are specialized benches at both the federal and state courts. While there have been allegations of executive branch interference in judiciary cases with political implications, there is no evidence of widespread interference in purely commercial disputes. The country has a procedural code for both civil and criminal court. Enforcement actions are appealable and there are at least three appeal processes from the lower courts to the Supreme Court. The Criminal Procedure Code follows the inquisitorial system of adjudication. Companies that operate businesses in Ethiopia assert that courts lack adequate experience and staffing, particularly with respect to commercial disputes. While property and contractual rights are recognized, judges often lack understanding of commercial matters, including bankruptcy and contractual disputes. In addition, companies complain that these cases often face extended scheduling delays, and that contract enforcement remains weak. To address these issues, the federal Supreme Court issued a new court-led mediation directive, number 12/2021, which is expected to resolve disputes including commercial ones within a shortened period while reducing litigation costs for involved parties. In March 2021, the parliament revised the Commercial Code for the first time in 60 years. The revised code modernizes and simplifies business regulations, develops regulations for new technologies not covered in the prior version, and seeks to implement greater transparency and accountability in commercial activities. Investment Proclamation number 1180/2020 and its implementing regulation number 474/2020 are Ethiopia’s main legal regime related to FDI. These laws instituted the opening of new economic sectors to foreign investment, enumerated the requirements for FDI registration, and outlined the incentives that are available to investors. The investment law allows foreign investors to invest in any investment area except those that are clearly reserved for domestic investors. A few specified investment areas are possible for foreign investors only as part of a joint venture with domestic investors or the government. The Investment Proclamation has introduced an Investment Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, to accelerate implementation of the new law and to address coordination challenges investors face at the federal and regional levels. Further, the new law expanded the mandate of the EIC by allowing it to provide approvals to foreign investors proposing to buy existing enterprises. The EIC now also delivers “one stop shop” services by consolidating investor services provided by other ministries and agencies. Still, the EIC delegates licensing of investments in some areas: air transport services (the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority), energy generation and transmission (the Ethiopian Energy Authority), and telecommunication services (the Ethiopian Communications Authority). The EIC’s website ( https://www.invest-ethiopia.com/ ) provides information on the government’s policy and priorities, registration processes, and regulatory details. In addition, the Business Negarit website ( http://businessnegarit.com/a/resources1/ ) provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. The MOJ Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Adjudicative Bench is responsible for reviewing merger and acquisition transactions and monopolistic business practices. The bench’s decisions can be appealed to the federal Supreme Court. Post is not aware any significant competition cases during the reporting period. The 2020 Investment Proclamation stipulates that no investment by a domestic or foreign investor or enterprise can be expropriated or nationalized, wholly or partially, except when required by public interest in compliance with the law and provided adequate compensatory payment. The former Derg military regime nationalized many properties in the 1970s. The current government’s position is that property seized lawfully by the Derg (by court order or government proclamation published in the official gazette) remains the property of the state. In most cases, property seized by oral order or other informal means is gradually being returned to the rightful owners or their heirs through a lengthy bureaucratic process. Claimants are required to pay for improvements made by the government during the time it controlled the property. The Public Enterprises Holding and Administration Agency stopped accepting requests from owners for return of expropriated properties in July of 2008. The Commercial Code (Book III) outlines bankruptcy provisions and proceedings and establishes a court system that has jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings. The primary purpose of the law is to protect creditors, equity shareholders, and other contractors. Bankruptcy is not criminalized. However, there is limited application of bankruptcy procedures in Ethiopia as the process can take years to settle. 6. Financial Sector Ethiopia has a limited and undeveloped financial sector, and investment is largely closed off to foreign firms. Liquidity at many banks is limited, and commercial banks often require 100 percent collateral, making access to credit one of the greatest hindrances to growth in the country. Ethiopia is the largest economy in Africa without a securities market, and sales/purchases of debt are heavily regulated. Ethiopia’s concessional IMF Extended Credit Facility (ECF) program expired in September 2021. The program aimed to reduce public sector borrowing, rein in inflation, reform the exchange rate regime, and ensure external debt sustainability. The GOE has not yet launched formal talks with the IMF on a new program. The GOE has announced, as part of its overall economic reform effort, its intention to liberalize the financial sector. The government has already made good progress by allowing non-financial Ethiopian firms to participate in mobile money activities, introducing Treasury-bill auctions with market pricing, and reducing forced lending to the government on the part of the commercial banks. The parliament approved the establishment of a capital market in June 2021, and activities are underway to set up a capital market regulatory body and the stock market. The National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE, the central bank) began offering a limited number of 28-day and 91-day Treasury bills at market-determined interest rates in December 2019. Since then, more bond offerings of longer tenures have been included in the auctions. The move was part of an effort to expand the NBE’s monetary policy tools and finance the government in a more sustainable way. Previously, the NBE had only sold Treasury bills at below-market interest rates, and the only buyers were public sector enterprises, primarily the Public Social Security Agency and the Development Bank of Ethiopia. Ethiopia issued its first 10-year Eurobond in December of 2014, raising 1 billion U.S. dollars at a rate of 6.625 percent. According to the Ministry of Finance, the bond proceeds are being used to finance industrial parks, the sugar industry, and power transmission infrastructure. Due to its increasing external debt load, the Ethiopian government has committed to refrain from non-concessional financing for new projects and to shift ongoing projects to concessional financing when possible. As Ethiopia’s ability to service its external debts declined in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Ethiopia participated in the World Bank Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), which suspended external debt payments from May 2020 through June of 2021. Ethiopia is seeking further debt treatment under the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments Beyond the DSSI. Ethiopia has 23 commercial banks, two of which are state-owned. The Development Bank of Ethiopia, a state-owned bank, provides loans to investors in priority sectors, notably agriculture and manufacturing. By regional standards, the 21 private commercial banks are not large (either by total assets or total lending), and their service offerings are not sophisticated. Mobile money and digital finance, for instance, remain limited in Ethiopia. Foreign banks are not permitted to provide financial services in Ethiopia; however, since April 2007, Ethiopia has allowed some foreign banks to open liaison offices in Addis Ababa to facilitate credit to companies from their countries of origins. Chinese, German, Kenyan, Turkish, and South African banks have opened liaison offices in Ethiopia, but the market remains completely closed to foreign retail banks. Foreigners of Ethiopian origin are now allowed to both establish their own banks and hold shares in financial institutions. The state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia accounts for more than 50 percent of total bank deposits, bank loans, and foreign exchange in Ethiopia. The NBE controls banks’ minimum deposit rate, which now stands at 7 percent, while loan interest rates are allowed to float. Real deposit interest rates have been negative in recent years, mainly due to double digit annual inflation. Non-performing loans account for less than 3 percent of all loans. Ethiopia’s Council of Ministers approved in December 2021 the creation of Ethiopian Investment Holdings (EIH) – Ethiopia’s Sovereign Wealth Fund. EIH is currently under formation and expects to manage assets worth about $2 billion across several sectors, including telecoms, mining, banking, aviation, and logistics. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Ethiopia’s roughly 40 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate major sectors of the economy. There is a state monopoly or state dominance in telecommunications, power, banking, insurance, air transport, shipping, railway, industrial parks, and petroleum importing. SOEs have considerable advantages over private firms, including priority access to credit, foreign exchange, land, and quick customs clearances. While there are no conclusive reports of credit preference for these entities, there are indications that they receive incentives, such as priority foreign exchange allocation, preferences in government tenders, and marketing assistance. Ethiopia does not publish financial data for most state-owned enterprises, but Ethiopian Airlines and the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia have transparent accounts Ethiopia is not a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and does not adhere to the guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs. Corporate governance of SOEs is structured and monitored by a board of directors composed of senior government officials and politically affiliated individuals, but there is a lack of transparency in the structure of SOEs. In July 2018, the GOE announced plans to fully or partially privatize several state-owned enterprises and sectors. In 2020, Ethiopia enacted Public Enterprises Privatization Proclamation number 1206/2020 regulate and encourage transparency and private sector participation in privatization processes. The GOE will implement privatizations through public tenders open to local and foreign investors. In September 2021, the GOE tendered a 40 percent stake of state-owned Ethio telecom but later postponed the process indefinitely due in part to muted investor interest. The government has sold more than 370 public enterprises since 1995, mainly small companies in the trade and service sectors, most of which were nationalized by the Derg military regime in the 1970s. 10. Political and Security Environment Ethnic conflict – often sparked by historical grievances or resource competition, including land disputes – has resulted in varying levels of violence across Ethiopia. According to the 2022 Global Humanitarian Overview, there were an estimated 4.2 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Ethiopia at the end of 2021, with high levels of need also identified among non-displaced people living in conflict-affected areas. The primary cause of displacements was conflict and insecurity, followed by drought and seasonal floods and flash flooding. Most significantly, in early November 2020, a conflict broke out between a regional political party in the Tigray Region and the federal government. The conflict quickly enlarged, with Eritrean troops present in parts of Tigray Region, and Amhara Region forces controlling much of Western Tigray. The conflict in northern Ethiopia has led to many deaths, widespread displacements, extensive destruction of infrastructure, widespread gross human rights violations, gender-based violence, a vast reduction in public services, and widespread hunger. Insecurity, often driven by ethnic tensions, persists in many other areas, notably in the southern and western Oromia Region; eastern Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region; and in the Hararges on the border of the Somali Region. In western Oromia, the Oromo Liberation Army-Shane and other unidentified armed groups have intensified attacks against public and local government officials; this violence has spilled over into other parts of Oromia. In far western Ethiopia, ethnic violence and clashes in Benishangul-Gumuz Region have continued throughout 2021 and into early 2022, leaving hundreds dead and hundreds of thousands displaced. Amhara has experienced altercations in 2022 between regional security forces and youth militias. When Prime Minister Abiy came to power in 2018, political space opened significantly, although it has since regressed especially after the government declared a State of Emergency in November 2021. While the State of Emergency was lifted in February 2022, during its implementation thousands of people, mostly of Tigrayan ethnicity, were arbitrarily detained and freedom of the press was significantly curtailed. Constitutional rights, including freedoms of assembly and expression, are generally supported at the level of the federal government, though the protection of these rights remains uneven, especially at regional and local levels. While opposition parties mostly operate freely, authorities, especially at the sub-national level, have employed politically motivated procedural roadblocks to hinder opposition parties’ efforts to hold meetings or other party activities; this was especially true in the run-up to the June 2021 general election. The space for media and civil society groups has generally become freer following reforms instituted by Prime Minister Abiy. Still, journalism in the country remains undeveloped, social media is often rife with unfounded rumors, and government officials occasionally react with heavy-handedness, especially to news they feel might spur social unrest, resulting in self-censorship. Civil society reforms have spurred an expansion of the sector, though many civil society groups continue to struggle with capacity and resource issues. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (M USD) 2020/21** $111.3 2020 $107.6 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country (M USD, stock positions) 2021 $741 N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States (M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A N/A N/A http://bea.gov/international/direct_ investment_multinational_companies_ comprehensive_data.htm Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020-21** 10% 2020 2.22% www.worldbank.org/en/country *National Bank of Ethiopia and Ethiopian Investment Commission **Ethiopian Fiscal Year 2020-21, which begins on July 8, 2020. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data regarding inward direct investment are not available for Ethiopia via the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) site ( http://data.imf.org/CDIS ). Fiji Executive Summary Since April 2021, Fiji experienced a second wave of the COVID-19 outbreak, and at one point during the crisis, suffered among the highest infection rates in the world. The COVID-19 pandemic and a series of natural disasters had a devastating impact on the tourism-dependent economy. The government also lost over $1.51 billion in tax revenues. The gradual easing of COVID-19 restrictions, increased remittances from overseas workers, and the distribution of government-funded unemployment benefits have slightly boosted some consumption and investment activity, with GDP growth estimated at -4.1 percent in 2021, compared to -15.2 percent in 2020. The reopening of borders for tourism in December 2021 resulted in a 12-fold increase in visitor arrivals in the 12 months to February 2022, compared to the same period ending February 2021. The resumption of tourism and improved performance in the primary and industrial sectors, major exports, and the service-related sectors is expected to drive growth by 11.3 percent in 2022 and 8.5 percent in 2023. Fiji has traditionally been the economic, transportation, and academic hub of the South Pacific islands. The government welcomes foreign investment and parliament passed the Investment Act 2021 to improve the ease of doing business in Fiji. The government’s investment and trade promotion agency, Investment Fiji, registered 12 investment projects valued at $7.64 million (FJD $16.2 million) from American investors in 2021. Exports to Fiji totaled over $180 million in 2021. The United States is Fiji’s top export market. In 2021, U.S. consumers bought over $230 million in Fijian goods and services last year. Fiji has trade and investment potential, and offers incentives to encourage investments in agriculture, residential housing development, energy, audio & visual, retirement village/aged care facilities, health sector, tourism, manufacturing, and the information communication technology (ICT)/business process outsourcing (BPO) sector. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 45/180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 USD $109.39M https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD $4,890.00 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Demonstrating its commitment to improving the business environment in Fiji, the Fiji Parliament passed the Investment Act 2021 which will eventually replace the Foreign Investment Act 1999. The new law aims to improve ease of doing business in Fiji by streamlining the business registration process; attracting foreign and domestic investment; and providing equity for investors with transparent, reliable, efficient, and fair rules and procedures. Previously, all foreign investors were required to register for a Foreign Investment Registration Certificate (FIRC). The new law not only removes the requirement for a FIRC but also strengthens the rights and obligations of the investors. Fiji’s Ministry of Commerce, Trade, Tourism, and Transport (MCTTT) is currently working with the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to draft the regulations of the Act. The new law will come into effect once a notice in the Gazette is issued. Under the new law, both domestic and foreign investors will undergo the business registration process with the Registrar of Companies and annually report to Investment Fiji. One of the investors’ rights under the law is in reference to national treatment and the most-favored-nation principle whereby foreign investors must be treated no less favorably in like circumstances than domestic investors with respect to the acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, sale, or other disposition of investments in Fiji. Fiji’s Department of Immigration is responsible for managing investor permits for non-citizen investors. Investment Fiji is responsible for the promotion of foreign investment in the interest of national development. The three main services provided by Investment Fiji include investment promotion, investment facilitation (project management), and trade promotion. In addition to registering and assisting with the implementation of foreign investment projects, Investment Fiji hosts information seminars for visiting foreign business delegations and participates at investment missions overseas. The process of foreign investor registration by Investment Fiji will be phased out when the new law takes effect. Investment Fiji has recently placed more focus on providing facilitation support for both new and existing foreign and domestic investors. The Fijian government supports and encourages existing businesses to re-invest. Several industry associations have been established which provide a forum for companies to share concerns and ideas in the industry. Examples of these industry associations include the Textile, Clothing, and Footwear (TCF) Council of Fiji, Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) Council of Fiji, and the Fiji Manufacturers Association. Investors are free to invest in all sectors and regions in Fiji provided it does not contravene the Investment Act 2021 and other laws in place. Investment in the fisheries sector requires a 30 percent local equity in the project. Some investment activities are reserved for Fiji nationals or are subject to restrictions. For all other business activities, there is no minimum investment requirement. There are currently 17 reserved activities exclusively for Fiji citizens, mainly in the services sector, and eight restricted activities that fall under the Foreign Investment Act 1999 and Foreign Investment Regulations 2009. These will soon be phased out and will be replaced with a new list of reserved and restricted activities currently being drafted for the Investment Act 2021. The current list of reserved and restricted areas can be found at https://global-uploads.webflow.com/5fc6b3ad7010ef7a53f68376/60d8f22321e2187f849ac435_Checklist%202020.pdf Investment Fiji helps vet foreign investment proposals to ensure that the projects are in the interest of national development and to support implementation of projects. The Investment Act 2021 has provisions to restrict investment for the protection of national security interests. Investments in a sector that may have potential effects on critical infrastructure such as energy, transport, communications, data storage, or financial infrastructure; critical technologies; the security of supply of critical inputs; or access to sensitive information or the ability to control sensitive information must have their proposals submitted for Ministerial approval. The Fiji government’s MCTTT revised the recently passed Investment Act 2021. The International Finance Corporation, a member of the World Bank Group, in collaboration with foreign development partners, provided technical expertise in the review. The Fiji Civil Society Organization released a 2016-2019 report on Sustainable Development Goals. The report details ways in which civil society and community groups contribute to the achievement of the 17 SDGs in Fiji. This includes Goals 7, 8, 9 & 10 on “affordable and clean energy; and decent work and economic growth” and “industry, innovation, and infrastructure; and reduced inequality.” Australia is the largest donor for civil society in Fiji and currently supports CSOs through bilateral, regional, and global initiatives. The Fiji government’s bizFiji website ( www.business-fiji.com ) is an information portal for new and existing businesses, as well as foreign investors. The portal provides information on the business registration process, how to obtain construction permits, and included application forms and links to all the required agencies, including the Registrar of Companies, Fiji Revenue and Customs Services (FRCS), Fiji National Provident Fund, National Occupational Health and Safety Services, and Fiji National University. The government’s reforms to improve the ease and reduce the cost of doing business include the removal of the business license requirement for low-risk businesses, reducing the processing times from five days to 48 hours to issue business licenses, and the removal of several requirements for existing businesses. Since the launch of bizFiji in 2019, the government has worked to develop a single online clearance system to improve registration processes, but inefficiencies remain. For foreign investors, the bizFiji website is also linked to the Investment Fiji website. The registration form and procedures, and regulations for foreign investment is available at the Investment Fiji issue of the Foreign Investment Registration Certificate (FIRC). Applications for a FIRC and payment of the requisite application fee of $1,336 (FJD$2,725) must be submitted to Investment Fiji. Investors need to meet the requirements listed under the Foreign Investment Act (FIA) and the 2009 Foreign Investment Regulation as well as ensure that the investment activity does not fall under the reserved and restricted activities lists. The registration process for investment applications takes at least five working days and sometimes longer if the paperwork is incomplete. Once the Investment Act 2021 comes into effect, the requirement to register with Investment Fiji will be removed. Investors are also required to obtain the necessary permits and licenses from other relevant authorities and should be prepared for delays. There are no special services or preferences to facilitate investment and business operations by micro, small, and medium sized enterprises, or by women. Contact: Ministry of Commerce, Trade, Tourism and Transport, Level 2 and 3, Civic Tower, Victoria Parade, Suva; Telephone: (679) 330 5411; Website: www.mcttt.gov.fj The Reserve Bank of Fiji (RBF) tightened exchange controls for any outward investment by individuals, companies, and non-bank financial institutions, including the Fiji National Provident Fund, which require clearance from the RBF. 3. Legal Regime Laws passed in parliament are available to the public on the parliament website and published in an official gazette. The lack of consultation with the private sector and other stakeholders on proposed laws and regulations remains an area of concern. The business community has complained that the government enacts new regulations with little prior notice or publicity. There is a perception among foreign investors that there is a lack of transparency in government procurement and approval processes. Some foreign investors considering investment in Fiji have encountered lengthy and costly bureaucratic delays, shuffling of permits among government ministries, inconsistent and changing procedures, lack of technical capacity, costly penalties due to the interpretation of tax regulations by the Fiji Revenue and Customs Service (FRCS), and slow decision-making. The Biosecurity Authority of Fiji (BAF) regulates all food and animal products entering Fiji and has stringent and costly point-of-origin inspection and quarantine requirements for foreign goods. The government does not require companies to file an environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure. Fiji’s constitution provides for public access to government information and for the correction or deletion of false or misleading information. Although the constitution requires that a freedom of information law be enacted, there is no such law yet. Proposed bills or regulations, including investment regulations, are made available and usually posted on the relevant ministry or regulatory authority’s website. The parliamentary website ( http://www.parliament.gov.fj/ ) is a centralized online location that publishes laws and regulations passed in parliament. The government’s public finances and debt obligations are also made available annually in the budget documents. Fiji is a member of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) that allows for the duty-free trade of goods between Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Solomon Islands. Fiji has been a member of the WTO since January 1996. According to Fiji’s trade profile on the WTO website, there are no records of disputes. Fiji ratified the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement in 2017. The legal system in Fiji developed from British law. Fiji maintains a judiciary consisting of a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeal, a High Court, and magistrate courts. The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal. Both companies and individuals have recourse to legal treatment through the system of local and superior courts. A foreign investor theoretically has the right of recourse to the courts and tribunals of Fiji with respect to the settlement of disputes, but government laws have been used to block foreign investors from legal recourse in investment takeovers, tax increases, or write-offs of interest to the government. The Foreign Investment Act (FIA) and the 2009 Foreign Investment Regulation regulate foreign investment in Fiji. However, these laws will be replaced when the Investment Act 2021, passed in parliament in 2021, is implemented. At time of writing, all businesses with a foreign-investment component in their ownership are required to register and obtain a Foreign Investment Registration Certificate (FIRC). Information on the registration procedures, regulations, and registration requirements for foreign investment is available at the Investment Fiji website: http://www.investmentfiji.org.fj . Amendments to the FIA also require that foreign investors seek approval prior to any changes in the ownership structure of the business, with penalties incurred for non-compliance. The Fiji government’s bizFiji website (www.business-fiji.com), an information portal for businesses and foreign investors, includes links to the Investment Fiji website. Since the launch of bizFiji in 2019, the government has worked to develop a single online clearance system to improve registration processes, but inefficiencies remain. The Fiji Competition and Commerce Commission (FCCC) regulates monopolies, promotes competition, and controls prices of selected hardware, basic food items, and utilities, to ensure a fair, competitive, and equitable market. Expropriation has not historically been a common phenomenon in Fiji. A foreign investor theoretically has the same right of recourse as a Fijian enterprise to the courts and other tribunals of Fiji to settle disputes. In practice, the government has acted to assert its interests with laws affecting foreign investors. In 2013, the government amended the Foreign Investment Decree with provisions to permit the forfeiture of foreign investments as well as significant fines for breaches of compliance with foreign investment registration conditions. Fiji’s Companies Act 2015 has provisions relating to solvency and negative solvency. According to the 2020 World Bank Doing Business survey, prior to COVID-19, in terms of resolving insolvency, it took an estimated 1.8 years at a cost of ten percent of the estate to complete the process, with an estimated recovery rate of 46.5 percent of value. 6. Financial Sector The capital market is regulated and supervised by the Reserve Bank of Fiji (RBF). Twenty companies were listed on the Suva-based South Pacific Stock Exchange (SPSE). At the end of September 2021, market capitalization was $1.52 billion (FJD$3.212 billion), an annual decline of 5.9 percent compared to September 2020. To promote greater activity in the capital market, the government lowered corporate tax rates for listed companies to ten percent and exempted income earned from the trading of shares in the SPSE from income tax and capital gains tax. The RBF issued the Companies (Wholesale Corporate Bonds) Regulations 2021 to develop the domestic corporate bond market by providing a simplified process for the issuance of corporate bonds to eligible wholesale investors only. Foreign investors are allowed to get credit from authorized banks and other lending institutions without the approval of the RBF for loans up to $4.7 million (FJD$10 million), provided the debt-to-equity ratio of 3:1 is satisfied. Fiji has a well-developed banking system supervised by the Reserve Bank of Fiji. The RBF regulates the Fiji monetary and banking systems, manages the issuance of currency notes, administers exchange controls, and provides banking and other services to the government. In addition, it provides lender-of-last-resort facilities and regulates trading bank liquidity. There are six commercial banks with established operations in Fiji: ANZ Bank, Bank of Baroda, Bank of South Pacific, Bred Bank, Home Finance Corporation (HFC), and Westpac Banking Corporation, with the HFC the only locally owned bank. Non-banking financial institutions also provide financial assistance and borrowing facilities to the commercial community and to consumers. These institutions include the Fiji Development Bank, Credit Corporation, Kontiki Finance, Merchant Finance, and insurance companies. As of December 2021, total assets of commercial banks amounted to $5.77 billion (FJD$12.223 billion). The RBF reported that liquidity reached $0.94 billion (FJD$1.99 billion) in December 2021 and were sufficient and did not pose a risk to bank solvency. However, the RBF also noted that existing levels of non-performing loans could rise, with the ending of moratoriums offered by financial institutions to COVID-19 affected customers. To open a bank account, foreign investors need to provide a copy of the Foreign Investment Registration Certificate (FIRC) issued by Investment Fiji. The Fiji government does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund or asset management bureau in Fiji. The country’s pension fund scheme, the Fiji National Provident Fund, which manages and invests members’ retirement savings, accounts for a third of Fiji’s financial sector assets. The fund invests in equities, bonds, commercial paper, mortgages, real estate, and various offshore investments. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Fiji are concentrated in utilities and key services and industries including aerospace (Fiji Airways, Airports Fiji Limited); agribusiness (Fiji Pine Ltd); energy (Energy Fiji Limited); food processing (Fiji Sugar Corporation, Pacific Fishing Company); information and communication (Amalgamated Telecom Holdings); and media (Fiji Broadcasting Corporation Ltd). There are 25 SOEs with combined assets valued at $3.87 billion (FJD $8.2 billion) in 2019. The SOEs include 10 Government Commercial Companies which operate commercially and are fully owned by the government, five Commercial Statutory Authorities (CSA) which have regulatory functions and charge nominal fees for their services, seven Majority Owned Companies, and two Minority Owned Companies with some government equity. The SOEs that provide essential utilities, such as energy and water, also have social responsibility and non-commercial obligations. A list of SOEs is published in government’s annual budget documentation. Aside from the CSAs, SOEs do not exercise delegated governmental powers. SOEs benefit from economies of scale and may be favored in certain sectors. The Fiji Broadcasting Company Ltd (FBCL) is exempt from the Media Decree, which governs private media organizations and exposes private media to criminal libel lawsuits. The government has pursued a policy of opening or deregulating various sectors of the economy. The government is pursuing public private partnership (PPP) models in energy, aviation infrastructure, and public housing, often seeking technical assistance from development partners including the International Finance Corporation to implement these arrangements and to encourage more private sector participation. In 2021, a Japanese consortium acquired 44 percent shareholding in state utility company Energy Fiji Limited. Foreign investors are already partnering in public-private partnership arrangements in the health and maritime port sectors. In 2018, the government signed the first public private partnership agreement in the medical sector with Fiji’s pension fund and an Australian company to develop, upgrade, and operate the Ba and Lautoka hospitals, the country’s two major hospitals in the western region. The PPP arrangements were finalized and in April 2022, and the new Ba hospital opened. The Ministry of Economy publishes these opportunities as Tenders or Expressions of Interest ( http://www.economy.gov.fj/ ). 10. Political and Security Environment The country held general elections in November 2018 and international observers deemed elections credible. Although civil unrest is uncommon, the Public Order Act restricts freedoms of speech, assembly, and movement to preserve public order. The Online Safety law may also restrict free speech in the digital space. In 2021, there were reports that authorities used the POA’s wide provisions to restrict freedom of expression and of association, and arrest citizens critical of the government on social media. The next elections are expected in 2022. Finland Executive Summary Finland is a Nordic country situated north of the Baltic States bordering Russia, Sweden, and Norway, possessing a stable and modern economy, including a world-class investment climate. It is a member of the European Union and part of the euro area. The country has a highly skilled, educated, and multilingual labor force, with strong expertise in Information Communications Technology (ICT), emerging technologies, shipbuilding, forestry, and renewable energy. Finland offers stability, functionality, high standard of living, and a well-developed digital infrastructure. Key challenges for foreign investors include high tax rates, a rigid labor market, cumbersome bureaucracy, and lengthy and unwieldly process in opening bank accounts. An aging population and the shrinking work force are the most pressing demographic concerns for economic growth. Finland is top-ranked in COVID Recovery Index Table (CERI), reflecting its good governance and resilient health care sector. Finland’s vulnerabilities are its dependence on exports and an aging population. Finland is committed to the EU’s greenhouse emissions reduction target under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement and is aiming to become the world’s first carbon-neutral society by 2035. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Finland by country is as follows: Sweden, 27 percent; the Netherlands 17 percent; Luxembourg 15 percent; Norway 7 percent; and China 5 percent. Despite its openness to trade and investment, Finland lags behind the other Nordic and Baltic countries as a destination for foreign investment. In 2019, FDI accounted for 31 percent of Finland’s GDP – less than in 2010 and well below the 49 percent regional average. To attract investment, the Government of Finland (GOF) cut the corporate tax rate in 2014 from 24.5 percent to 20 percent (the lowest rate in the Nordics), simplified its residency permit procedures, and established Business Finland as a one-stop-shop for foreign investors. The Foreign Commercial Service and Political/Economic Section at U.S. Embassy in Finland are a valuable resource for American businesses wishing to engage the Finnish market. Finland has vibrant telecommunication, energy, emerging markets, and biotech sectors, as well as Arctic expertise. With excellent transportation links to the Nordic-Baltic region, Finland is emerging as a regional transportation hub. On January 1, 2018, Finpro, the Finnish trade promotion organization, and Tekes, the Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation, merged to become Business Finland, which facilitates foreign direct investment in Finland and trade promotion. Business Finland employs 600 experts in 40 offices abroad and 16 offices in Finland. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 1 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 7 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $5,269 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $ 49,780 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 3. Legal Regime The Securities Market Act (SMA) contains regulations on corporate disclosure procedures and requirements, responsibility for flagging share ownership, insider regulations and offenses, the issuing and marketing of securities, and trading. The clearing of securities trades is subject to licensing and is supervised by the Financial Supervision Authority. The SMA is at https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2012/en20120746_20130258.pdf . See the Financial Supervisory Authority’s overview of regulations for listed companies here: https://www.finanssivalvonta.fi/en/capital-markets/issuers-and-investors/regulation-of-listed-companies/ . Finland is currently not a member of the UNCTAD Business Facilitation Program https://unctad.org/topic/enterprise-development/business-facilitation The Act on the Openness of Public Documents establishes the openness of all records in the possession of officials of the state, municipalities, registered religious communities, and corporations that perform legally mandated public duties, such as pension funds and public utilities. Exceptions can only be made by law or by an executive order for reasons such as national security. For more information, see the Ministry of Justice’s page on Openness: https://oikeusministerio.fi/en/act-on-the-openness-of-government-activities . The Act on the Openness of Government Activities can be found here: https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990621 . In September 2021, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment released a Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Finance Roadmap – Finnish Roadmap for Financing a Decade of SDG Action 2021- report, where environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) is promoted, as records show increasingly a positive relation between good ESG practices and investment returns and volatility. More information here: https://tem.fi/en/developing-finlands-sustainable-finance-ecosystems . Finland ranks third on the World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index (2021) regarding constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice and criminal justice. For more, see: https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2021 Finland ranks fourth on World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance: http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/finland . Availability of official information in Finland is the best in the EU, according to a report by the Center for Data Information (2017). The newly established Digital and Population Data Services Agency (2020) is responsible for developing and maintaining the national open data portal https://www.avoindata.fi/en In 2019, Finland passed the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) directive, which in parts rules conditions for the secondary use of private-sector health and social data. A single data permit authority (Findata) was established to oversee the entire data-sharing process: https://findata.fi/en/ Finland joined the Open Government Partnership Initiative (OGP) in April 2013. The global OGP-initiative aims at promoting more transparent, effective, and accountable public administration. The goal is to develop dialogue between citizens and administration and to enhance citizen engagement. The OGP aims at concrete commitments from participating countries to promote transparency, to fight corruption, to citizen participation and to the use of new technologies. Finland’s 4th national Open Government Action Plan for 2019–2023 was published in September 2019. The current Government Program (issued in December 2019) sets openness of public information, including open data, application programming interface APIs and open source software, as key goals of the administration. The status of Finland’s public finances is available at Statistics Finland, Finland’s official statistics agency: https://www.stat.fi/til/jul_en.html The status of Finland’s national debt is available at the State Treasury: https://www.treasuryfinland.fi/statistics/statistics-on-central-government-debt/ Finland respects EU common rules and expects other Member States to do the same. The Government seeks to constructively combine national and joint European interests in Finland’s EU policy and seeks better and lighter regulation that incorporates flexibility for SMEs. The Government will not increase burdens detrimental to competitiveness during its national implementation of EU acts. Finland, as a member of the WTO, is required under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) to report to the WTO all proposed technical regulations that could affect trade with other Member countries. In 2021, Finland submitted two notifications of technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures to the WTO and has submitted 105 notifications since 1995. Finland is a signatory to the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which entered into force on February 22, 2017. Finland follows European Union (EU) internal market practices, which define Finland’s trade relations both inside the EU and with non-EU countries. Restrictions apply to certain items such as products containing alcohol, pharmaceuticals, narcotics and dangerous drugs, explosives, etc. The import of beef cattle bred on hormones is forbidden. Other restrictions apply to farm products under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In March 1997 EU commitments required the establishment of a tax border between the autonomously governed, but territorially Finnish, Aland Islands and the rest of Finland. As a result, the trade of goods and services between the Aland Islands and the rest of Finland is treated as if it were trade with a non-EU area. The Aland Islands belong to the customs territory of the EU but not to the EU fiscal territory. The tax border separates the Aland Islands from the VAT and excise territory of the EU. VAT and excise are levied on goods imported across the tax border, but no customs duty is levied. In tax border trade, goods can be sold with a tax free invoice in accordance with the detailed taxation instructions of the Finnish Tax Administration. Finland has a civil law system. European Community (EC) law is directly applicable in Finland and takes precedence over national legislation. The Market Court is a special court for rulings in commercial law, competition, and public procurement cases, and may issue injunctions and penalties against the illegal restriction of competition. It also governs mergers and acquisitions and may overturn public procurement decisions and require compensatory payments. The Court has jurisdiction over disputes regarding whether goods or services have been marketed unfairly. The Court also hears industrial and civil IPR cases. Amendments to the Finnish Competition Act (948/2011) entered into force on June 17, 2019, and on January 1, 2020. The amendments include, most notably, changes to the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority FCCA’s dawn raid practices, information exchange practices between national authorities and the calculation of merger control deadlines, which are now calculated in working days, rather than calendar days. On June 24, 2021, the Finnish Competition Act was amended to implement the EU ECN+ Directive, helping competition authorities to be more effective enforcers and to ensure proper functioning of the internal market. More information here: https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/-/1410877/competition-act-amendments-aimed-at-improving-enforcement-enter-into-force-on-24-june Finland is a party of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards since 1962. The provisions of the Convention have been included in the Arbitration Act (957/1992). The Oikeus.fi website (https://oikeus.fi/en/index.html) contains information about the Finnish judicial system and links to the websites of the independent courts, the public legal aid and guardianship districts, the National Prosecution Authority, the National Enforcement Authority Finland, and the Criminal Sanctions Agency. There is no primary or “one-stop-shop” website that provides all relevant laws, rules, procedures and reporting requirements for investors. A non-European Economic Area (EEA) resident (persons or companies) operating in Finland must obtain a license or a notification when starting a business in a regulated industry. A comprehensive list of regulated industries can be found at: https://www.suomi.fi/company/responsibilities-and-obligations/permits-and-obligations . See also the Ministry of Employment and the Economy’s Regulated Trade guidelines: https://tem.fi/en/regulation-of-business-operations . The autonomously governed Aland Islands, however are an exception. Right of domicile is acquired at birth if it is possessed by either parent. Property ownership and the right to conduct business are limited to those with the right of domicile in the Aland Islands. The Aland Government can occasionally grant exemptions from the requirement of right of domicile for those wishing to acquire real property or conduct a business in Aland. This does not prevent people from settling in, or trading with, the Aland Islands. Provided they are Finnish citizens, immigrants who have lived in Aland for five years and have adequate Swedish may apply for domicile and the Aland Government can grant exemptions. The Competition Act allows the government to block mergers where the result would harm market competition. A December 2021 study on the need to expand the merger filing obligation by the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (FCCA) shows that the current national turnover thresholds allow harmful merges to escape the scrutiny of the authority. FCCA proposes that the current turnover thresholds in merger control should be lowered and, in addition, the FCCA be granted the right to require a notification when the thresholds are not met: https://www.kkv.fi/en/current/press-releases/fcca-study-expanding-the-obligation-to-notify-mergers-would-create-significant-consumer-benefit/#main-content FCCA issued merger control guidelines in 2011: https://arkisto.kkv.fi/globalassets/kkv-suomi/julkaisut/suuntaviivat/en/guidelines-1-2011-mergers.pdf EnterpriseFinland/Suomi.fi ( https://www.suomi.fi/company/ ) is a free online service offering information and services for starting, growing and developing a company. Users may also ask for advice through the My Enterprise Finland website: https://oma.yrityssuomi.fi/en#. Finnish legislation is available in the free online databank Finlex in Finnish, where some English translations can also be found: https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/ . The Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority FCCA protects competition by intervening in cases regarding restrictive practices, such as cartels and abuse of dominant position, and violations of the Competition Act and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Investigations occur on the FCCA’s initiative and on the basis of complaints. Where necessary, the FCCA makes proposals to the Market Court regarding penalties. In international competition matters, the FCCA’s key stakeholders are the European Commission (DG Competition), the OECD Competition Committee, the Nordic competition authorities and the International Competition Network (ICN). FCCA rulings and decisions can be found in the archive in Finnish. More information at: https://www.kkv.fi/en/facts-and-advice/competition-affairs/ . In September 2020, the Nordic Competition Authorities released a joint memorandum on digital platforms, setting out the Nordic perspective on issues of competition in digital markets in Europe. For more see: https://www.kkv.fi/globalassets/kkv-suomi/julkaisut/pm-yhteisraportit/nordic-report-2020-digital-platforms-and-the-potential-changes-to-competition-law-at-the-european-level.pdf Finnish law protects private property rights. Citizen property is protected by the Constitution which includes basic provisions in the event of expropriation. Private property is only expropriated for public purposes (eminent domain), in a non-discriminatory manner, with reasonable compensation, and in accordance with established international law. Expropriation is usually based on a permit given by the government or on a confirmed plan and is performed by the District Survey Office. An expropriation permit granted by the Government may be appealed against to the Supreme Administrative Court. Compensation is awarded at full market price, but may exclude the rise in value due only to planning decisions. Besides normal expropriation according to the Expropriation Act, a municipality or the State has the right to expropriate land for planning purposes. Expropriation is mainly for acquiring land for common needs, such as street areas, parks and civic buildings. The method is rarely used: less than one percent of land acquired by the municipalities is expropriated. Credendo Group ranks Finland’s expropriation risk as low (1), on a scale from 1 to 7: https://credendo.com/en/country-risk/finland . ICSID Convention and New York Convention In 1969, Finland became a member state to the World Bank-based International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID; Washington Convention). Finland is a signatory to the Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention). Investor-State Dispute Settlement The Finnish Arbitration Act (967/1992) is applied without distinction to both domestic and international arbitration. Sections 1 to 50 apply to arbitration in Finland and Sections 51 to 55 to arbitration agreements providing for arbitration abroad and the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Finland. Of 229 parties in 2021, the majority (208) were from Finland. There have been no reported investment disputes in Finland in recent years. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Finland has a long tradition of institutional arbitration and its legal framework dates back to 1928. Today, arbitration procedures are governed by the 1992 Arbitration Act (as amended), which largely mirrors the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985 (with amendments, as adopted in 2006). The UNCITRAL Model law has not yet, however, been incorporated into Finnish Law. Finland’s Act on Mediation in Civil Disputes and Certification of Settlements by Courts (394/2011) aims to facilitate alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and promote amicable settlements by encouraging mediation, and applies to settlements concluded in other EU member states: https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2011/en20110394.pdf . In June 2016, the Finland Arbitration Institute of the Chamber of Commerce (FAI) launched its Mediation Rules under which FAI will administer mediations: https://arbitration.fi/mediation/mediation_rules/ .Any dispute in a civil or commercial matter, international or domestic, which can be settled by agreement may be referred to arbitration. Arbitration is frequently used to settle commercial disputes and is usually faster than court proceedings. An arbitration award is final and binding. FAI promotes the settlement of disputes through arbitration, commonly using the “FAI Arbitration/Expedited Arbitration Rules”, which were updated in 2020: https://arbitration.fi/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2020/01/arbitration-rules-of-the-finland-chamber-of-commerce-2020.pdf The Finland Arbitration Institute (FAI) appoints arbitrators both to domestic and international arbitration proceedings, and administers domestic and international arbitrations governed by its rules. It also appoints arbitrators in ad hoc cases when the arbitration agreement so provides, and acts as appointing authority under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The Finnish Arbitration Act (967/1992) states that foreign nationals can act as arbitrators. For more information see: https://arbitration.fi/arbitration/ Finland signed the UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (“Mauritius Convention”) in March 2015. Under these rules, all documents and hearings are open to the public, interested parties may submit statements, and protection for confidential information has been strengthened. The Finnish Bankruptcy Act was amended and the amendments took effect on July 1, 2019. The main objectives of these amendments were to simplify, digitize and speed-up bankruptcy proceedings. The amended Bankruptcy Act allows administrators to send notices and invitations to creditor addresses registered in the Trade Register. This will improve accessibility for foreign companies that have established a branch in Finland. Administrators of bankruptcy and restructuring proceedings must upload data and documentation to the bankruptcy and restructuring proceedings case management system (KOSTI). KOSTI is available only in Finnish for creditors located in Finland due to the strong ID requirements. The Reorganization of Enterprises Act (1993/47), https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1993/en19930047, establishes a legal framework for reorganization with the aim to provide an alternative to bankruptcy proceedings. The Act excludes credit and insurance institutions and certain other financial institutions. Recognition of restructuring or insolvency processes initiated outside of the EU requires an exequatur from a Finnish court. The bankruptcy ombudsman, https://www.konkurssiasiamies.fi/en/index.html , supervises the administration of bankruptcy estates in Finland. The Act on the Supervision of the Administration of Bankruptcy Estates dictates related Finnish law: https://www.konkurssiasiamies.fi/material/attachments/konkurssiasiamies/konkurssiasiamiehentoimistonliitteet/6JZrLGPN1/Act_on_the_Supervision_of_the_Administration_of_Bankruptcy_Estates.pdf . Finland can be considered creditor-friendly; enforcement of liabilities through bankruptcy proceedings as well as execution outside bankruptcy proceedings are both effective. Bankruptcy proceedings are creditor-driven, with no formal powers granted to the debtor and its shareholders. The rights of a secured creditor are also quite extensive. According to data collected by the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, resolving insolvency takes 11 months on average and costs 3.5 percent of the debtor’s estate. The average recovery rate is 88 cents on the dollar. Globally, Finland ranked first of 190 countries on the ease of resolving insolvency in the Doing Business 2020 report : https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/f/finland/FIN.pdf 6. Financial Sector Finland is open to foreign portfolio investment and has an effective regulatory system. According to the Bank of Finland, in end December 2021 Finland had USD 17.5 billion worth of official reserve assets, mainly in foreign currency reserves and securities. Credit is allocated on market terms and is made available to foreign investors in a non-discriminatory manner, and private sector companies have access to a variety of credit instruments. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. The Helsinki Stock Exchange is part of OMX, referred to as NASDAQ OMX Helsinki (OMXH). NASDAQ OMX Helsinki is part of the NASDAQ OMX Nordic division, together with the Stockholm, Copenhagen, Iceland, and Baltic (Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius) stock exchanges. Finland accepts the obligations under IMF Article VIII, Sections 2(a), 3, and 4 of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement. It maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions, except for those measures imposed for security reasons in accordance with Regulations of the Council of the European Union. Banking is open to foreign competition. Due to in-group mergers, the number of credit institutions operating in Finland dropped by 18 to 228 in 2020. Total assets of the domestic banking groups and branches of foreign banks operating in Finland amounted to USD 951 billion in Q3 2021 . For more information see: https://www.finanssiala.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/FA-Julkaisu-Finnish_Banking_2020.pdf In October 2021, Handelsbanken, Finland’s fifth biggest banking group with a 5 percent market share, announced decision to divest its businesses in Finland. Foreign nationals can in principle open bank accounts in the same manner as Finns. However, banks must identify customers and this may prove more difficult for foreign nationals. In addition to personal and address data, the bank often needs to know the person’s identifier code (i.e. social security number), and a number of banks require a work permit, a certificate of studies, or a letter of recommendation from a trustworthy bank, and details regarding the nature of transactions to be made with the account. All authorized deposit-taking banks are members of the Deposit Guarantee Fund, which guarantees customers’ deposits to a maximum of EUR 100,000 per depositor. In 2020 the capital adequacy ratio of the Finnish banking sector was 21.2 percent, above the EU average. Measured in Core Tier 1 Capital, the ratio was 18.1 percent. The capital adequacy of the Finnish banking sector remains well above the EU average. The Finnish banking sector’s return on equity (ROE) was 6.4 percent, well above the average ROE for all EU banking sectors (2.3 percent). Standard & Poor’s in March 2022 reaffirmed Finland’s AA+ long term credit rating and stable outlook while Fitch kept Finland’s credit rating at AA+ in November 2021. The Finnish banking sector is dominated by four major banks (OP Financial Group, Nordea, Municipality Finance and Danske Bank), which together hold 80 percent of the market. Nordea, which relocated its headquarters from Sweden to Finland in 2018, has the leading market position among household and corporate customers in Finland. The relocation increased the Finnish banking sector to over three times the size of Finland’s GDP. Nordea’s balance sheet is approximately twice the size of the GDP of any of the Nordic economies. Consequently, Finland’s banking sector is one of Europe’s largest relative to the size of the national economy. Nordea became a member of the “we.trade” consortium in November 2017, a blockchain based trade platform for customers of the European wide consortium of banks signed up for the platform. “we.trade” makes domestic and cross-border commerce easier for European companies by harnessing the power of distributed ledger and block chain technology. Commercially launched in January 2019, the we.trade’s technology is currently licensed by 17 banks across 15 countries. The Act on Virtual Currency providers (572/2019) entered into force in May, 2019. The Financial Supervisory Authority (FIN-FSA) acts as the registration authority for virtual currency providers. The primary objective of the Act is to introduce virtual currency providers into the scope of anti-money laundering regulation. Only virtual currency providers meeting statutory requirements are able to carry on their activities in Finland, and only a FIN-FSA registered virtual currency provider may market its currency and services in Finland The Finnish Tax Administration released guidelines on the taxation of cryptocurrency in May 2018, updates were made in October 2019, and new guidelines were released in January 2020 : https://www.vero.fi/en/detailed-guidance/guidance/48411/taxation-of-virtual-currencies3/ Foreign Exchange Finland adopted the Euro as its official currency in January 1999. Finland maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for international transactions, except for those measures imposed for security reasons. Remittance Policies There are no legal obstacles to direct foreign investment in Finnish securities or exchange controls regarding payments into and out of Finland. Banks must identify their customers and report suspected cases of money laundering or the financing of terrorism. Banks and credit institutions must also report single payments or transfers of EUR 15,000 or more. If the origin of funds is suspect, banks must immediately inform the National Bureau of Investigation. There are no restrictions on current transfers or repatriation of profits. Residents and non-residents may hold foreign exchange accounts. There is no limit on dividend distributions as long as they correspond to a company’s official earnings records. Travelers carrying more than EUR 10,000 must make a declaration upon entering or leaving the EU. As a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) member, Finland observes most of FATF’s 40 recommendations. In its Mutual Evaluation Report of Finland, released October 5, 2021, FATF concluded that Finland’s measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing are delivering good results, but that deficiencies on the lack of specific requirements for risk-based supervision and monitoring of non-profit organizations (NPOs) at risk of terrorist financing (TF) abuse and sharing information promptly with competent authorities remain unaddressed. Finland passed new legislation (the Act on Money Collection 2020), completed its National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (NRA 2021) in March 2021 and developed an Action Plan for National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 2021– 2023. Finland’s AML/CFT legislation was amended in 2019 to introduce the Finnish Trade Register of beneficial owners of legal entities and foreign trusts. The National AML/CFT Coordination Group has also developed a public AML/CFT website to improve the understanding of ML/TF risks and provide guidance on reporting suspicious transactions for obliged entities. FATF’s Mutual Evaluation Report of Finland, October 2021: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/fur-finland-2021.html In Finland, the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive was implemented, among other things, by means of the Act on the Bank and Payment Accounts Control System, which entered into force on May 1, 2019. In accordance with the Act, Customs has established a bank and payment accounts register and issue a regulation on a data retrieval system, which entered into force on September 1, 2020. Finland is in the process of amending the Act on the Bank and Payment Accounts Control System and the Act on the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) to implement the EU Directive on access to financial information. Solidium is a holding company that is fully owned by the State of Finland. Although it is not explicitly a sovereign wealth fund, Solidium’s mission is to manage and increase the long-term value of the listed shareholdings of the Finnish State. Solidium is a minority owner in 12 listed companies; the market value of Solidium’s equity holdings is approximately USD 9.2 billion (March 2022), https://www.solidium.fi/en/holdings/holdings/ 10. Political and Security Environment While instances of political violence in Finland are rare, extremism exists, and anti-immigration and anti-Semitic incidents do occur. Stickers and posters with anti-Semitic images and messages were on the synagogue of Helsinki’s Jewish congregation in neighborhoods with significant Jewish populations and on public property throughout 2021. The vandalism ranged from targeted to apparently random, and similar incidents had occurred numerous times over the previous three years. Some of the anti-Semitic graffiti and stickers claimed to be from the banned neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM). Stickers specifically targeted Jewish community members at lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) pride events. In 2019, 15 anti-Semitic acts of vandalism against the Israeli Embassy over an 18-month period prompted an official demarche. The NRM is banned in Finland, as is its Facebook page. However, in January 2021 the daily newspaper Helsingin Sanomat reported that the NRM continued to operate out of public sight and without a clear name. In June 2021 prosecutors charged nine members of the NRM with engaging in illegal association for continuing NRM activities under the organization of the group Toward Freedom! (Kohti Vapautta! in Finnish) and leading a demonstration at Tampere Central Market in October 2020. There were a few anti-Semitic incidents on International Holocaust Remembrance Day at the beginning of 2020, but the banning of NRM and COVID-19 have led to a marked decline in anti-Semitic incidents over the past two years. It is illegal in Finland to share violent content such as footage of Christchurch massacre, but it is still being disseminated and no one has been prosecuted. In August 2017, a stabbing attack took place in central Turku, in southwest Finland in which two pedestrians were killed and eight injured. Finnish authorities considered the attack a terrorist act and its perpetrator was convicted on terrorism charges, making it the first incident of its kind in Finland since the end of World War II. In December 2021, the Finnish Intelligence Service (SUPO) announced that the first terrorism investigation on the extreme right in Finland has started. Although the investigation is exceptional, it does not affect SUPO’s terrorist threat assessment, according to which the most significant threat is posed by lone operators or small groups inspired by far-right or radical Islamist ideology. According to SUPO’s most recent 2020 yearbook, released in March 2021, the danger of extreme right-wing terrorism has grown in Finland, and SUPO has identified far-right operators with the capacity and motivation to mount a terrorist attack. Some indications of concrete preparation have also emerged. The threat of radical Islamist terrorism has remained at the previous level. The Fund for Peace (FFP) ranked Finland as the most stable country in the world again in 2021 in the Fragile States Index based on political, social, and economic indicators including public services, income distribution, human rights, and the rule of law. Marsh’s Political Risk Map 2021, based on Marsh Specialty’s World Risk Review platform, provides risk ratings for 197 countries on a 0.1 to 10 scale, with 10 representing the highest risk and 0.1 the lowest. Finland was rated low risk, with ratings ranging from 1.2 to 3.9. France and Monaco Executive Summary France welcomes foreign investment and has a stable business climate that attracts investors from around the world. The French government devotes significant resources to attracting foreign investment through policy incentives, marketing, overseas trade promotion offices, and investor support mechanisms. France has an educated population, first-rate universities, and a talented workforce. It has a modern business culture, sophisticated financial markets, a strong intellectual property rights regime, and innovative business leaders. The country is known for its world-class infrastructure, including high-speed passenger rail, maritime ports, extensive roadway networks, a dense network of public transportation, and efficient intermodal connections. High-speed (3G/4G) telephony is nearly ubiquitous, and France has begun its 5G roll-out in key metropolitan cities. In 2021, the United States was the leading foreign investor in France in terms of new jobs created (10,118) and second in terms of new projects invested (247). The total stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in France reached $91 billion. More than 4,500 U.S. firms operate in France, supporting over 500,000 jobs, making the United States the top foreign investor overall in terms of job creation. Following the election of French President Emmanuel Macron in May 2017, the French government implemented significant labor market and tax reforms. By relaxing the rules on companies to hire and fire employees, the government cut production taxes by 15 percent in 2021, and corporate tax will fall to 25 percent in 2022. Surveys of U.S. investors in 2021 showed the greatest optimism about the business operating environment in France since 2008. Macron’s reform agenda for pensions was derailed in 2018, however, when France’s Yellow Vest protests—a populist, grassroots movement for economic justice—rekindled class warfare and highlighted wealth and, to a lesser extent, income inequality. The onset of the pandemic in 2020 shifted Macron’s focus to mitigating France’s most severe economic crisis in the post-war era. The economy shrank 8.3 percent in 2020 compared to the year prior, but with the help of unprecedented government support for businesses and households, economic growth reached seven percent in 2021. The government’s centerpiece fiscal package was the €100 billion ($110 billion) France Relance plan, of which over half was dedicated to supporting businesses. Most of the support was accessible to U.S. firms operating in France as well. The government launched a follow-on investment package in late 2021 called “France 2030” to bolster competitiveness, increase productivity, and accelerate the ecological transition. Also in 2020, France increased its protection against foreign direct investment that poses a threat to national security. In the wake of the health crisis, France’s investment screening body expanded the scope of sensitive sectors to include biotechnology companies and lowered the threshold to review an acquisition from a 25 percent ownership stake by the acquiring firm to 10 percent, a temporary provision set to expire at the end of 2022. In 2020, the government blocked at least one transaction, which included the attempted acquisition of a French firm by a U.S. company in the defense sector. In early 2021, the French government threated to block the acquisition of French supermarket chain Carrefour by Canada’s Alimentation Couche-Tard, which eventually scuttled the deal. Key issues to watch in 2022 are: 1) the impact of the war in Ukraine and measures by the EU and French government to mitigate the fallout; 2) the degree to which COVID-19 and resulting supply chain disruptions continue to agitate the macroeconomic environment in France and across Europe, and the extent of the government’s continued support for the economic recovery; and 3) the creation of winners and losers resulting from the green transition, the degree to which will be largely determined by firms’ operating models and exposure to fossil fuels. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 22 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 11 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 91.153 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 39.480 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment France welcomes foreign investment. In the current economic climate, the French government sees foreign investment as a means to create additional jobs and stimulate growth. Investment regulations are simple, and a range of financial incentives are available to foreign investors. Surveys of U.S. investors in 2021 showed the greatest optimism about the business operating environment in France since 2008. U.S. companies find France’s good infrastructure, advanced technology, and central location in Europe attractive. France’s membership in the European Union (EU) and the Eurozone facilitates the efficient movement of people, services, capital, and goods. However, notwithstanding recent French efforts at structural reform, including a reduction in corporate and production tax, and advocacy for a global minimum tax within the European Union, perceived disincentives to investing in France include the persistently high tax environment, ongoing labor law rigidity, and a shortage of skilled labor. France is among the least restrictive countries for foreign investment. With a few exceptions in certain specified sectors, there are no statutory limits on foreign ownership of companies. Foreign entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. France maintains a national security review mechanism to screen high-risk investments. French law stipulates that control by acquisition of a domiciled company or subsidiary operating in certain sectors deemed crucial to France’s national interests relating to public order, public security and national defense are subject to prior notification, review, and approval by the Economy and Finance Minister. Other sectors requiring approval include energy infrastructure; transportation networks; public water supplies; electronic communication networks; public health protection; and installations vital to national security. In 2018, four additional categories – semiconductors, data storage, artificial intelligence and robotics – were added to the list requiring a national security review. For all listed sectors, France can block foreign takeovers of French companies according to the provisions of the 2014 Montebourg Decree. On December 31, 2019 the government issued a decree to lower the threshold for vetting of foreign investment from outside Europe from 33 to 25 percent and then lowered it again to 10 percent on July 22, 2020, a temporary provision to prevent predatory investment during the COVID-19 crisis. This lower threshold is set to expire at the end of 2022. The decree also enhanced government-imposed conditions and penalties in cases of non-compliance and introduced a mechanism to coordinate the national security review of foreign direct investments with the European Union (EU Regulation 2019/452). The new European rules entered into force on October 11, 2020. The list of strategic sectors was also expanded to include the following activities listed in the EU Regulation 2019/452: agricultural products, when such products contribute to national food supply security; the editing, printing, or distribution of press publications related to politics or general matters; and R&D activities relating to quantum technologies and energy storage technologies. Separately, France expanded the scope of sensitive sectors on April 30, 2020, to include biotechnology companies. Procedurally, the Minister of Economy, Finance, and Recovery has 30 business days following the receipt of a request for authorization to either: 1) declare that the investor is not required to obtain such authorization; 2) grant its authorization without conditions; or 3) declare that an additional review is required to determine whether a conditional authorization is sufficient to protect national interests. If an additional review is required, the Minister has an additional 45 business days to either clear the transaction (possibly subject to conditions) or prohibit it. The Minister is further allowed to deny clearance based on the investor’s ties with a foreign government or public authority. The absence of a decision within the applicable timeframe is a de facto rejection of the authorization. The government also expanded the breadth of information required in the approval request. For example, a foreign investor must now disclose any financial relationship with or significant financial support from a State or public entity; a list of French and foreign competitors of the investor and of the target; or a signed statement that the investor has not, over the past five years, been subject to any sanctions for non-compliance with French FDI regulations. In 2020, the government blocked at least one transaction—the attempted acquisition of a French firm by a U.S. company in the defense sector. In early 2021, the French government blocked the acquisition of French supermarket chain Carrefour by Canada’s Alimentation Couche-Tard on the basis that it was a threat to France’s food security and national sovereignty. France has not recently been the subject of international organizations’ investment policy reviews. The OECD Economic Survey for France (November 2021) can be found here: https://www.oecd.org/economy/france-economic-snapshot/ . Business France is a government agency established with the purpose of promoting new foreign investment, expansion, technology partnerships, and financial investment. Business France provides services to help investors understand regulatory, tax, and employment policies as well as state and local investment incentives and government support programs. Business France also helps companies find project financing and equity capital. The agency unveiled a website in English to help prospective businesses that are considering investments in the French market ( https://www.businessfrance.fr/en/invest-in-France ). The U.S. Embassy in Paris also collaborated with Business France to create a map of U.S. investment in each region of France ( https://investinfrance.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Entreprises-americaines.pdf ). In addition, France’s public investment bank, Bpifrance, assists foreign businesses to find local investors when setting up a subsidiary in France. It also supports foreign startups in France through the government’s French Tech Ticket program, which provides them with funding, a resident’s permit, and incubation facilities. Both business facilitation mechanisms provide for equitable treatment of women and minorities. President Macron prioritized innovation early in his five-year mandate. In 2017, he launched a €10 billion ($11 billion) fund to back disruptive innovation in energy, the digital sector, and the climate transition by privatizing state-owned enterprises and introduced a four-year tech visa for entrepreneurs to come to France. He also introduced tax reforms that would tax capital gains, interest and dividends at a flat 30 percent, instead of the existing top rate of 45 percent. In June 2020, the French government introduced a new €1.2 billion ($1.3 billion) plan to support French startups, concentrating on the health, quantum, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity sectors. The plan included the creation of a €500 million ($550 million) investment fund to help startups overcome the COVID-19 crisis and continue to innovate. It also comprised a “French Tech Sovereignty Fund” launched in December 2020 by France’s public investment bank Bpifrance, with an initial commitment of €150 million ($165 million). In October 2021, President Macron unveiled a €34 billion ($37.4billion) innovation investment strategy between 2022 and 2027, which mirrors the priorities of the European Commission’s investments in digital innovation and decarbonisation. France will invest by 2030 in breakthrough innovation in a wide variety of areas, including small nuclear fission reactors, green hydrogen production facilities, the production of two million electric and hybrid vehicles every year, research on developing France’s first low-carbon airplane, healthy and sustainable foods, and 20 drugs for cancer and chronic diseases as well as the development of new medical devices. Major industrial groups are encouraged to work with startups, which will also benefit from funding under this new plan. This plan comes on top of the €20 billion ($22 billion) from the 2021 Fourth Future Investment Program. A new Secretary General for Investment was appointed in January 2022 to ensure the coordination of these two innovation programs. France’s sectors that traditionally attracted the most investment include aeronautics, agro-foods, digital, nuclear, rail, auto, chemicals and materials, forestry, eco-industries, shipbuilding, health, luxury, and extractive industries. However, Business France and Bpifrance are particularly interested in attracting foreign investment in the tech sector. The French government has developed the “French Tech” initiative to promote France as a location for start-ups and high-growth digital companies. French Tech offices have been established in 17 French cities and over 100 cities globally, including New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Moscow, and Berlin. French Tech has special programs to provide support to startups at various stages of their development. The latest effort has been the creation of the French Tech 120 Program, which provides financial and administrative support to some 123 most promising tech companies. In 2019, €5 billion ($5.9 billion) in venture funding was raised by French startups, an increase of nearly threefold since 2015. Venture capital investment in French startups has doubled from €5.1 billion ($5.6 billion) in 2020 to over €10 billion ($11 billion) in 2021. In March 2021, France launched, with the support of the European Commission and other member states, the Scale-Up Europe initiative bringing together over 300 start-up and scale-up founders, investors, researchers, and corporations, with the goal of creating 10 tech giants each valued at more than €100 billion ($110 billion) by 2030. French authorities supported the Scale-up Europe initiative designed to promote businesses across Europe to expand beyond their local and European markets. As part of that initiative, on February 8, 2022, France inaugurated a new European Investment Fund designed to increase European venture capital funds’ capacity to provide late-stage funding to EU-based start-ups and scale-ups. France and Germany have each committed €1 billion ($1.1 billion), along with €500 million ($565 million) from the European Investment Bank. The website Guichet Enterprises ( https://www.guichet-entreprises.fr/fr/ ) is designed to be a one-stop website for registering a business. The site, managed by the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI), is available in both French and English although some fact sheets on regulated industries are only available in French on the website. French firms invest more in the United States than in any other country and support approximately 765,100 American jobs. Total French investment in the United States reached $314.9 billion in 2020. France was still our tenth largest trading partner with approximately $115.7 billion in bilateral trade in 2021. The business promotion agency Business France also assists French firms with outward investment, which it does not restrict. 3. Legal Regime The French government has made considerable progress in the last decade on the transparency and accessibility of its regulatory system. The government generally engages in industry and public consultation before drafting legislation or rulemaking through a regular but variable process directed by the relevant ministry. However, the text of draft legislation is not always publicly available before parliamentary approval. U.S. firms may also find it useful to become members of industry associations, which can play an influential role in developing government policies. Even “observer” status can offer insight into new investment opportunities and greater access to government-sponsored projects. To increase transparency in the legislative process, all ministries are required to attach an impact assessment to their draft bills. The Prime Minister’s Secretariat General (SGG for Secretariat General du Gouvernement) is responsible for ensuring that impact studies are undertaken in the early stages of the drafting process. The State Council (Conseil d’Etat), which must be consulted on all draft laws and regulations, may reject a draft bill if the impact assessment is inadequate. After experimenting with new online consultations, the Macron Administration is regularly using this means to achieve consensus on its major reform bills. These consultations are often open to professionals as well as citizens at large. Another innovation is to impose regular impact assessments after a bill has been implemented to ensure its maximum efficiency, revising, as necessary, provisions that do not work in favor of those that do. Over past decades, major reforms have extended the investigative and decision-making powers of France’s Competition Authority. On April 11, 2019, France implemented the European Competition Network (ECN) Directive, which widens the powers of all European national competition authorities to impose larger fines and temporary measures. The Authority publishes its methodology for calculating fines imposed on companies charged with abuse of a dominant position. It issues specific guidance on competition law compliance, and government ministers, companies, consumer organizations, and trade associations now have the right to petition the authority to investigate anti-competitive practices. While the Authority alone examines the impact of mergers on competition, the Minister of the Economy retains the power to request a new investigation or reverse a merger transaction decision for reasons of industrial development, competitiveness, or saving jobs. The Competition Authority continues to simplify takeover and merger notifications with online procedures via a dedicated platform in 2020 and updated guidelines in English released on January 11, 2021. Since January 2021, the Competition Authority has a new President, Benoît Cœuré, who intends to focus on the impact of the Cloud on all sectors of the French economy. France’s budget documents are comprehensive and cover all expenditures of the central government. An annex to the budget also provides estimates of cost sharing contributions, though these are not included in the budget estimates. Last September, the French government published its first “Green Budget,” as an annex to the 2021 Finance Bill. This event attests to France’s strong commitment, notably under the OECD-led “Paris Collaborative on Green Budgeting” (which France joined in December 2017), to integrate “green” tools into the budget process. In its spring report each year, the National Economic Commission outlines the deficits for the two previous years, the current year, and the year ahead, including consolidated figures on taxes, debt, and expenditures. Since 1999, the budget accounts have also included contingent liabilities from government guarantees and pension liabilities. The government publishes its debt data promptly on the French Treasury’s website and in other documents. Data on nonnegotiable debt is available 15 days after the end of the month, and data on negotiable debt is available 35 days after the end of the month. Annual data on debt guaranteed by the state is published in summary in the CGAF Report and in detail in the Compte de la dette publique. More information can be found at: https://www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/fra/fiscal.htm France was the first country to include extra-financial reporting in its 2001 New Economic Regulations Law. To encourage companies to develop a social responsibility strategy and limit the negative externalities of globalized trade, the law requires French companies with more than 500 employees and annual revenues above €100 million ($106 million) to report on the social and environmental consequences of their activities and include them in their annual management report. A 2012 decree on corporate social and environmental transparency obligations requires portfolio management companies to incorporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria in their investment process. France’s 2015 Law on Energy Transition for Green Growth strengthened mandatory carbon disclosure requirements for listed companies and introduced carbon reporting for institutional investors. It requires investors (defined as asset owners and investment managers) to disclose in their annual investor’s report and on their website how they factor ESG criteria and carbon-related considerations into their investment policies. The regulation concerns all asset classes: listed assets, venture capital, bonds, physical assets, etc. France is a founding member of the European Union, created in 1957. As such, France incorporates EU laws and regulatory norms into its domestic law. France has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995 and a member of GATT since 1948. While developing new draft regulations, the French government submits a copy to the WTO for review to ensure the prospective legislation is consistent with its WTO obligations. France ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement in October 2015 and has implemented all of its TFA commitments. French law is codified into what is sometimes referred to as the Napoleonic Code, but is officially the Code Civil des Français, or French Civil Code. Private law governs interactions between individuals (e.g., civil, commercial, and employment law) and public law governs the relationship between the government and the people (e.g., criminal, administrative, and constitutional law). France has an administrative court system to challenge a decision by local governments and the national government; the State Council (Conseil d’Etat) is the appellate court. France enforces foreign legal decisions such as judgments, rulings, and arbitral awards through the procedure of exequatur introduced before the Tribunal de Grande Instance (TGI), which is the court of original jurisdiction in the French legal system. France’s Commercial Tribunal (Tribunal de Commerce or TDC) specializes in commercial litigation. Magistrates of the commercial tribunals are lay judges, who are well known in the business community and have experience in the sectors they represent. Decisions by the commercial courts can be appealed before the Court of Appeals. France’s judicial system is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable and is independent of the government. The judiciary – although its members are state employees – is independent of the executive branch. The judicial process in France is known to be competent, fair, thorough, and time-consuming. There is a right of appeal. The Appellate Court (cour d’appel) re-examines judgments rendered in civil, commercial, employment or criminal law cases. It re-examines the legal basis of judgments, checking for errors in due process and reexamines case facts. It may either confirm or set aside the judgment of the lower court, in whole or in part. Decisions of the Appellate Court may be appealed to the Highest Court in France (cour de cassation). The French Financial Prosecution Office (Parquet National Financier, or PNF), specialized in serious economic and financial crimes, was set up by a December 6, 2013 law and began its activities on February 1, 2014. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all sorts of remunerative activities. U.S. investment in France is subject to the provisions of the Convention of Establishment between the United States of America and France, which was signed in 1959 and remains in force. The rights it provides U.S. nationals and companies include: rights equivalent to those of French nationals in all commercial activities (excluding communications, air transportation, water transportation, banking, the exploitation of natural resources, the production of electricity, and professions of a scientific, literary, artistic, and educational nature, as well as certain regulated professions like doctors and lawyers). Treatment equivalent to that of French or third-country nationals is provided with respect to transfer of funds between France and the United States. Property is protected from expropriation except for public purposes; in that case it is accompanied by payment that is just, realizable and prompt. Potential investors can find relevant investment information and links to laws and investment regulations at http://www.businessfrance.fr/ . Major reforms have extended the investigative and decision-making powers of France’s Competition Authority. France implemented the European Competition Network, or ECN Directive, on April 11, 2019, allowing the French Competition Authority to impose heftier fines (above €3 million / $3.3 million) and temporary measures to prevent an infringement that may cause harm. The Authority issues decisions and opinions mostly on antitrust issues, but its influence on competition issues is growing. For example, following a complaint in November 2019 by several French, European, and international associations of press publishers against Google over the use of their content online without compensation, the Authority ordered the U.S. company to start negotiating in good faith with news publishers over the use of their content online. On December 20, 2019, Google was fined €150 million ($177 million) for abuse of dominant position. Following an in-depth review of the online ad sector, the Competition Authority found Google Ads to be “opaque and difficult to understand” and applied in “an unfair and random manner.” On November 17, 2021, the Competition Authority brokered a “pioneering” five-year deal between the CEOs of Google and French news agency Agence France-Presse for the search giant to pay for the French news agency’s content. The deal covers the entirety of the EU and follows 18 months of negotiations. It is the first such deal by a news agency under Article 15 of the 2019 European directive creating a neighboring right for the benefit of press agencies and press publishers when online services reproduce press publications in search engine results. France was the first EU member state to implement Article 15 through its July 24, 2019 law, which came into force on October 24, 2019. Additional U.S. firms also continue to fall under review of the Competition Authority. For example, it fined Apple $1.3 billion on March 16, 2020, for antitrust infringements involving the restriction of intra-brand competition and the rarely used French law concept of “abuse of economic dependency.” The Competition Authority launches regular in-depth investigations into various sectors of the economy, which may lead to formal investigations and fines. The Authority publishes its methodology for calculating fines imposed on companies charged with abuse of a dominant position. It issues specific guidance on competition law compliance. Government ministers, companies, consumer organizations and trade associations have the right to petition the authority to investigate anti-competitive practices. While the Authority alone examines the impact of mergers on competition, the Minister of the Economy retains the power to request a new investigation or reverse a merger transaction decision for reasons of industrial development, competitiveness, or saving jobs. A new law on Economic Growth, Activity and Equal Opportunities (known as the “Macron Law”), adopted in August 2016, vested the Competition Authority with the power to review mergers and alliances between retailers ex-ante (beforehand). The law provides that all contracts binding a retail business to a distribution network shall expire at the same time. This enables the retailer to switch to another distribution network more easily. Furthermore, distributors are prohibited from restricting a retailer’s commercial activity via post-contract terms. The civil fine incurred for restrictive practices can now amount to up to five percent of the business’s revenue earned in France. In accordance with international law, the national or local governments cannot legally expropriate property to build public infrastructure without fair market compensation. There have been no expropriations of note during the reporting period. France has extensive and detailed bankruptcy laws and regulations. Any creditor, regardless of the amount owed, may file suit in bankruptcy court against a debtor. Foreign creditors, equity shareholders and foreign contract holders have the same rights as their French counterparts. Monetary judgments by French courts on firms established in France are generally made in euros. Not bankruptcy itself, but bankruptcy fraud – the misstatement by a debtor of his financial position in the context of a bankruptcy – is criminalized. Under France’s bankruptcy code managers and other entities responsible for the bankruptcy of a French company are prevented from escaping liability by shielding their assets (Law 2012-346). France has adopted a law that enables debtors to implement a restructuring plan with financial creditors only, without affecting trade creditors. France’s Commercial Code incorporates European Directive 2014/59/EU establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of claims on insolvent credit institutions and investment firms. In the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Index, France ranked 32nd of 190 countries on ease of resolving insolvency. The Bank of France, the country’s only credit monitor, maintains files on persons having written unfunded checks, having declared bankruptcy, or having participated in fraudulent activities. Commercial credit reporting agencies do not exist in France. 6. Financial Sector There are no administrative restrictions on portfolio investment in France, and there is an effective regulatory system in place to facilitate portfolio investment. France’s open financial market allows foreign firms easy access to a variety of financial products, both in France and internationally. France continues to modernize its marketplace; as markets expand, foreign and domestic portfolio investment has become increasingly important. As in most EU countries, France’s listed companies are required to meet international accounting standards. Some aspects of French legal, regulatory, and accounting regimes are less transparent than U.S. systems, but they are consistent with international norms. Foreign banks are allowed to establish branches and operations in France and are subject to international prudential measures. Under IMF Article VIII, France may not impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions without the (prior) approval of the Fund. Foreign investors have access to all classic financing instruments, including short-, medium-, and long-term loans, short- and medium-term credit facilities, and secured and non-secured overdrafts offered by commercial banks. These assist in public offerings of shares and corporate debt, as well as mergers, acquisitions and takeovers, and offer hedging services against interest rate and currency fluctuations. Foreign companies have access to all banking services. Most loans are provided at market rates, although subsidies are available for home mortgages and small business financing. Euronext Paris (also known as Paris Bourse) is part of a regulated cross-border stock exchange located in six European countries. Euronext Growth is an alternative exchange for medium-sized companies to list on a less regulated market (based on the legal definition of the European investment services directive), with more consumer protection than the Marché Libre still used by a couple hundred small businesses for their first stock listing. A company seeking a listing on Euronext Growth must have a sponsor with status granted by Euronext and prepare a French language prospectus for a permit from the Financial Markets Authority (Autorité des Marchés Financiers or AMF), the French equivalent of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) may also list on Enternext, a subsidiary of the Euronext Group created in 2013. The bourse in Paris also offers Euronext Access, an unregulated exchange for start-ups. France’s banking system recovered gradually from the 2008-2009 global financial crises and passed the 2018 stress tests conducted by the European Banking Authority. In the context of the COVID-19 outbreak, the European Banking Authority (EBA) launched an EU-wide stress test exercise in January 2021 and published its results in July 2021. The results of the stress tests confirmed the resilience of the French banking system over the entire time horizon of the exercise (2021-2023), despite using a particularly severe macroeconomic and financial scenario, which envisages a prolongation of the crisis between 2021 and 2023. A new EBA EU-wide stress test will be carried out in 2023. Four French banks were ranked among the world’s 20 largest as of the end of 2020 (BNP Paribas SA; Crédit Agricole Group, Société Générale SA, Groupe BPCE). The assets of France’s top five banks totaled $7.7 trillion in 2020. Acting on a proposal from France’s central bank, Banque de France, in March 2020, the High Council for Financial Stability (HCSF) instructed the country’s largest banks to decrease the “countercyclical capital buffer” from 0.25 percent to zero percent of their bank’s risk-weighted assets, thereby increasing liquidity to help mitigate the impact of the pandemic-induced recession. As of January 2022, HCSF maintained the zero percent countercyclical capital buffer but with the intention of normalizing it to its pre-crisis level at its next meeting. Banque de France is a member of the Eurosystem, which groups together the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks of all countries that have adopted the euro. Banque de France is a public entity governed by the French Monetary and Financial Code. The conditions whereby it conducts its missions on national territory are set out in its Public Service Contract. The three main missions are monetary strategy; financial stability, together with the High Council of Financial Stability (HCSF) which implements macroprudential policy; and the provision of economic services to the community. In addition, it participates in the preparation and implementation of decisions taken centrally by the ECB Governing Council. Foreign banks can operate in France either as subsidiaries or branches but need to obtain a license. Credit institutions’ licenses are generally issued by France’s Prudential Authority (Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution or ACPR) which reviews whether certain conditions are met (e.g. minimum capital requirement, sound and prudent management of the bank, compliance with balance sheet requirements, etc.). Both EU law and French legislation apply to foreign banks. Foreign banks or branches are additionally subject to prudential measures and must provide periodic reports to the ACPR regarding operations in France, including detailed reports on their financial situation. At the EU level, the ‘passporting right’ allows a foreign bank settled in any EU country to provide their services across the EU, including France. There are about 944 credit institutions authorized to carry on banking activities in France; the list of foreign banks is available on this website: https://www.regafi.fr/spip.php?page=results&type=advanced&id_secteur=3&lang=en&denomination=&siren=&cib=&bic=&nom=&siren_agent=&num=&cat=01-TBR07&retrait=0 France has no sovereign wealth fund per se (none that use that nomenclature) but does operate funds with similar intents. The Public Investment Bank (Bpifrance) supports small and medium enterprises (SMEs), larger enterprises (Entreprises de Taille Intermedaire), and innovating businesses with over €36 billion ($39.6 billion) assets under management. The government strategy is defined at the national level and aims to fit with local strategies. Bpifrance may hold direct stakes in companies, hold indirect stakes via generalist or sectorial funds, venture capital, development or transfer capital. In November 2020, Bpifrance became a member of the One Planet Sovereign Wealth Funds (OPSWF) international initiative, which federates international sovereign wealth funds mobilized to contribute to the transition towards a more sustainable economy. Bpifrance stepped up its support for the ecological and energy transition, aiming to reach nearly €6 billion ($6.6 billion) per year by 2023. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The 11 listed entities in which the French State maintains stakes at the federal level are Aeroports de Paris (50.63 percent); Airbus Group (10.92 percent); Air France-KLM (28.6 percent); EDF (83.88 percent), ENGIE (23.64 percent), Eramet (27.13 percent), La Française des Jeux (FDJ) (20.46 percent), Orange (a direct 13.39 percent stake and a 9.60 percent stake through Bpifrance), Renault (15.01 percent), Safran (11.23 percent), and Thales (25.67 percent). Unlisted companies owned by the State include SNCF (rail), RATP (public transport), CDC (Caisse des depots et consignations) and La Banque Postale (bank). In all, the government maintains majority and minority stakes in 88 firms in a variety of sectors. Private enterprises have the same access to financing as SOEs, including from state-owned banks or other state-owned investment vehicles. SOEs are subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors. SOEs may get subsidies and other financial resources from the government. France, as a member of the European Union, is party to the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization. Companies owned or controlled by the state behave largely like other companies in France and are subject to the same laws and tax code. The Boards of SOEs operate according to accepted French corporate governance principles as set out in the (private sector) AFEP-MEDEF Code of Corporate Governance. SOEs are required by law to publish an annual report, and the French Court of Audit conducts financial audits on all entities in which the state holds a majority interest. The French government appoints representatives to the Boards of Directors of all companies in which it holds significant numbers of shares, and manages its portfolio through a special unit attached to the Ministry for the Economy and Finance Ministry, the shareholding agency APE (Agence de Participations de l’Etat). The State as a shareholder must set an example in terms of respect for the environment, gender equality and social responsibility. The report also highlighted that the State must protect its strategic assets and remain a shareholder in areas where the general interest is at stake. In 2021, the French Government increased to 29.9 percent its existing 14.3 percent stake in the Air France-KLM group in a deal that injected €4 billion ($4.5 billion) into Air France and its Holding Company under the European State aid Temporary Framework. This recapitalization, through a mix of new shares and hybrid debt, constrains the group from taking more than a 10 percent stake in any competitor until three-quarters of that aid is repaid. It follows a €7 billion ($7.7 billion) bailout the government provided earlier in 2020. The French Government has pledged to reduce its stake to the pre-crisis level of 14.3 percent by the end of 2026. The government was due to privatize many large companies in 2019, including ADP and ENGIE in order to create a €10 billion ($11 billion) fund for innovation and research. However, the program was delayed because of political opposition to the privatization of airport manager ADP, regarded as a strategic asset to be protected from foreign shareholders. The government succeeded in selling in November 2019 a 52 percent stake in gambling firm FDJ. The government continues to maintain a strong presence in some sectors, particularly power, public transport, and defense industries. 10. Political and Security Environment France is a politically stable country. Large demonstrations and protests occur regularly (sometimes organized to occur simultaneously in multiple French cities); these can result in violence. When faced with imminent business closures, on rare occasions French trade unions have resorted to confrontational techniques such as setting plants on fire, planting bombs, or kidnapping executives or managers. From mid-November 2018 through 2019, Paris and other cities in France faced regular protests and disruptions, including “Gilets Jaunes” (Yellow Vest) demonstrations that turned violent, initiated by discontent over high cost of living, gas, taxes, and social exclusion. In the second half of 2019, most demonstrations were in response to President Macron’s proposed unemployment and pension reform. Authorities permitted peaceful protests. During some demonstrations, damage to property, including looting and arson, in popular tourist areas occurred with reckless disregard for public safety. Police response included water cannons, rubber bullets and tear gas. Between 2012 and 2021, 271 people have been killed in terrorist attacks in France, including the January 2015 assault on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, the November 2015 coordinated attacks at the Bataclan concert hall, national stadium, and streets of Paris, and the 2016 Bastille Day truck attack in Nice. While the terrorist threat remains high, the threat is lower than its peak in 2015. Terrorist attacks have since been smaller in scale. Security services remained concerned with lone-wolf attacks, carried out by individuals already in France, inspired by or affiliated with ISIS. French security agencies continue to disrupt plots and cells effectively. Despite the spate of recent small-scale attacks, France remains a strong, stable, democratic country with a vibrant economy and culture. Americans and investors from all over the world continue to invest heavily in France. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy French Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount France’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $2,542,370 2020 $ 2,630,317 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment French Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in France ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $67,195 2020 $91,153 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ France’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $213,390 2020 $314,979 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 34.1% 2019 37.2% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ EconomicTrends/Fdi.html * French Source : INSEE database for GDP figures and French Central Bank (Banque de France) for FDI figures. Accessed on March 21, 2022. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in France Economy Data 2020 From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (U/S. Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 897,115 100% Total Outward 1,440,715 100% Luxembourg 164,501 18% The Netherlands 221,098 15% Switzerland 119,020 13% United States 213,390 15% United Kingdom 115,093 12% Belgium 166,713 11% The Netherlands 107,709 12% United Kingdom 137,138 9% Germany 98,303 10% Italy 76,091 5% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Source: Bank of France. Note: These figures represent the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI), not the annual flow of FDI. The United States was the second top investor by number of projects recorded in 2021 but remained in first place for jobs generated (10,118). Gabon Executive Summary Gabon is a historically stable country in a volatile region and has significant economic advantages: a small population (roughly 2 million), an abundance of natural resources, and a strategic location in the Gulf of Guinea. After taking office in 2009, President Ali Bongo Ondimba introduced reforms to diversify Gabon’s economy away from oil and traditional investment partners, and to position Gabon as an emerging economy. Gabon promotes foreign investment across a range of sectors, particularly in oil and gas, infrastructure, timber, ecotourism, and mining. Gabon’s government depends on revenues from hydrocarbons. The Gabonese investment climate is marked by impediments related to establishing a new business, connecting to utilities, such as electricity and water, and transferring company ownership. Many companies also report difficulties in obtaining loans. Banks and other financiers struggle to release funds, especially to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), due to a lack of guarantees and missing documentation. However, several business incubators active in the country are attempting to facilitate business activities. Gabon ranks 38th in Africa for the protection of minority investors and 43rd for the payment of taxes. Gabon adopted a new hydrocarbon code and a new mining code in July 2019, to provide a modernized basis for the legal, institutional, technical, economic, customs, and tax regimes governing these sectors and to spur investment through a more stable business climate. Economic conditions in Gabon continued to weaken throughout 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic caused two shocks to the Gabonese economy, prompting it to enter into a recession. First, the decline in global demand and the corresponding collapse in oil prices hit government revenues and the economy hard. Second, domestic demand plummeted as a result of the government’s actions taken to halt the pandemic, such as through border closures and a national curfew. A renewed wave of illnesses that began in January 2021 compounded this situation. Gabon officially launched its national vaccination campaign against COVID-19 in March 2022; a total of 499,247 doses of COVID vaccines have been administered. Assuming every person requires two doses, the number of doses is seen as enough to have vaccinated about 11.5% of the country’s population (World-coronavirus-tracker) On July 2021, the IMF Executive Board approved a USD $553.2 million, 36-month arrangement under an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for Gabon. The Board’s approval allowed for an immediate disbursement of US$115.25 million for budget support. The program aims to support the short-term response to the COVID-19 crisis and lay the foundations for green and inclusive private sector-led growth and a strong and sustainable recovery to benefit all Gabonese. A combined first and second review of the EFF was undertaken in May 2022. Historically, the mining, oil and petroleum, and wood sectors have attracted the most investment in Gabon. To attract more investors in those key sectors Gabon created a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) at Nkok near Libreville in 2010. This 1,350-hectare project targets local and foreign investors, provides priority access to electricity and water and on-site legal and financial services, and is near the deep-sea port of Owendo. Originally set up through a partnership between Olam International Ltd, the Gabonese government, and the Africa Finance Corporation, it operates with a mandate to develop infrastructure, enhance industrial competitiveness, and build a business-friendly ecosystem. However, corruption, bureaucratic red tape, and the lack of transparency, including through the inconsistent application of customs regulations, remain impediments to investment. Many international companies, including U.S. firms, continued to report difficulties in receiving timely payments from the government, and some oil companies have closed down operations altogether. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 124 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 -172.0 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 7,030 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Gabon’s 1998 investment code conforms to the Central African Economic and Monetary Community’s (CEMAC) investment regulations and provides the same rights to foreign companies operating in Gabon as to domestic firms. Gabon’s domestic and foreign investors are protected from expropriation or nationalization without appropriate compensation, as determined by an independent third party. Certain sectors, such as mining, forestry, petroleum, agriculture, and tourism, have specific investment codes, which encourage investment through customs and tax incentives. Gabon established the Investment Promotion Agency (ANPI-Gabon) with the assistance of the World Bank in 2014. Its mission is to promote investment and exports, support SMEs, manage public-private partnerships (PPPs), and help companies establish themselves. It is designed to act as the gateway for investment into the country and to reduce administrative procedures, costs, and waiting periods. Gabonese authorities have made efforts to prioritize investment. In 2017, the High Council for Investment was established to promote investment and boost the economy. This body provides a platform for dialogue between the public and private sectors, and its main objectives are to improve the economy and create jobs. Foreign investors are largely treated in the same manner as their Gabonese counterparts regarding the purchase of real estate, negotiation of licenses, and entering into commercial agreements. There is no general requirement for local participation in investments (see local labor requirements below). Many businesses find it useful to have a local partner who can help navigate the subjective aspects of the business environment. There are no limits on foreign ownership or control. However, the Government of Gabon automatically owns a 20 percent stake in all petroleum development in the nation, with Gabon Oil able to purchase up to an additional 15 percent. The standard practice is for the Gabonese President to review foreign investment contracts following the completion of ministerial-level negotiations. The President has taken an active interest in meeting with investors. The lack of a standardized procedure for new entrants to negotiate deals with the government can lead to confusion and time-consuming negotiations. Moreover, the centralization of decision-making by a few senior officials who are exceedingly busy can delay the process. As a result, new entrants often find the process of finalizing deals time-consuming and difficult to navigate. Gabon has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995. In June 2013, Gabon conducted an investment policy review with the WTO. The government has not conducted any investment policy reviews through the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) since 2017. The government encourages investments in those economic sectors that contribute the greatest share to Gross National Product (GNP), including oil and gas, mining, and wood harvesting and transformation through customs and tax incentives. For example, oil and mining companies are exempt from customs duties on imported machinery and equipment specific to their industries. The Tourism Investment Code, enacted in 2000, provides tax incentives to foreign tourism investors during the first eight years of operation. The SEZ at Nkok offers tax incentives to industrial investors; the government has mused on the possibility of increasing the number of SEZs in a move to attract further investment. ANPI-Gabon covers more than 20 public and private agencies, including the Chamber of Commerce, National Social Security Fund (CNSS), and National Health Insurance and Social Security (CNAMGS). It aims to attract domestic and international investors through improved methods of approving and licensing new companies and to support public-private dialogue. It has a single window registration process that allows domestic and foreign investors to register their businesses in 48 hours. There are, however, no special mechanisms for equitable treatment of women and underrepresented minorities in Gabon. ANPI-Gabon’s website address is: https://www.investingabon.ga/ One of ANPI-Gabon’s primary goals is to promote outward investments and exports. The Gabonese government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Government policies and laws often do not establish clear rules of the game, and foreign firms can have difficulty navigating the bureaucracy. Despite reform efforts, hurdles and red tape remain, especially at the lower and mid-levels of the ministries. Lack of transparency in administrative processes and lengthy bureaucratic delays occasionally raise questions for companies about fair treatment and the sanctity of contracts. Rule-making and regulatory authority rests at the ministerial level. There are no nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations that manage informal regulatory processes. The government of Gabon has not exhibited any recent tendency to discriminate against U.S. investments, companies, or representatives. The government does not publish proposed laws and regulations in draft form for public comment. There are no centralized online locations where key regulatory actions or their summaries are published. Key regulatory actions are published in the government’s printed Official Journal. It is not uncommon for legislative proposals to be provided “off the record” to the press. Gabon is affiliated with the Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa (Organisation pour l’harmonisation en Afrique du droit des affaires, OHADA, http://www.ohada.com/ ). The Transformation Acceleration Plan (PAT) is a new structure of enforcement of mechanisms to ensure governments follow administrative processes and was launched in January 2021 in response to a request by the IMF for a transparency enforcement mechanism. The PAT will monitor the implementation of administrative processes, and regularly transmit the monitoring information necessary for decision-making to the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. No new regulatory systems have been announced in the last year, and no new reforms have been implemented in the last year. Gabon lacks transparency on public finances and debt obligations, with limited availability of public documents. Gabon is a member of CEMAC, along with Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad. Gabon is also a member of the larger Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which is headquartered in Gabon and has 11 members: Gabon, Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Both CEMAC and ECCAS work to promote economic cooperation among members. Gabon is a member of OHADA, which includes nine validated Uniform Acts: General Commercial Law, Commercial Companies and Economic Interest Groups, Secured Transactions Law, Debt Resolution Law, Insolvency Law, Arbitration Law, Harmonization of Corporate Accounting, Contracts for the Carriage of Goods, and Cooperatives Companies Law. Gabon has been a member of the WTO since January 1, 1995. It fulfills its duties on notification of all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Gabon’s legal system is based on French Civil Law. Regular courts handle commercial disputes in compliance with OHADA’s standards. Courts do not apply the law consistently, however, and delays are frequent in the judicial system. A lack of transparency in administrative processes and lengthy bureaucratic delays call into question the country’s commitment to fair treatment and the sanctity of contracts. Judicial capacity is weak, and many government contacts underscore the need for specialized training in technical issues, such as money laundering and environmental crimes. Foreign court and international arbitration decisions are accepted, but enforcement may be difficult. Gabon has a written code of commercial law. Gabon’s judicial system is not independent from its executive branch, making it subject to political influence, which creates uncertainty around the fair treatment and the sanctity of contracts. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable and are adjudicated in the national court system. Gabon’s 1998 investment code, which gives foreign companies operating in Gabon the same rights as domestic firms, allows foreign investors to choose freely from a wide selection of legal business structures, such as a private limited liability company or a public limited liability company. The distinctions arise primarily from the minimum capital requirements and the conditions under which shares may be re-sold. Foreign investment in Gabon is subject to local law that is in many instances unsettled or unclear, and in certain cases, Gabonese law may require local majority ownership of businesses. The state reserves the right to invest in the equity capital of ventures established in certain sectors (e.g., petroleum and mining). There are no known systemic practices by private firms to restrict foreign investment, participation, or control. No major related laws have been passed this past year. ANPI-Gabon’s website contains most investment-related information in Gabon: https://www.investingabon.ga/ . There are no specific ministries in charge of reviewing transactions and conduct for competition-related concerns. That responsibility lies with the ministry that is party to a contract. The Gabonese Law No. 14/1998 of July 23, 1998, on the Establishment of the Competition Regime of Gabon on Competition covers all aspects of competition and anti-trust measures. Foreign firms established in Gabon operate on an equal legal basis with national companies. Businesses are protected from expropriation or nationalization without appropriate compensation, as determined by an independent third party. The Gabonese government has not exhibited a tendency to expropriate, nor have there been any indications or reports of incidences of indirect expropriation. Gabon has a bankruptcy law, but it is not well developed. In the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Report 2020 (http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/134861574860295761/pdf/Doing-Business-2020-Comparing-Business-Regulation-in-190-Economies-Economy-Profile-of-Gabon.pdf ), Gabon ranked 130 out of 190 economies on the ease of resolving insolvency. Gabon’s bankruptcy law is based on OHADA regulations. According to Section 3: Art 234-239 of OHADA’s Uniform Insolvency Act, creditors and equity shareholders, collectively or individually, may designate trustees to lodge complaints or claims to the commercial court. These laws criminalize bankruptcy, and the OHADA regulations grant Gabon the discretion to apply its own remedies. 6. Financial Sector There is no law prohibiting or limiting foreign investment in Gabon. Aside from the preference in employment given to Gabonese workers, from a general corporate law perspective, there are no specific legislative requirements. Regardless of the type of company, there must be one resident representative on the management board of all Gabonese companies. However, this resident representative can be a non-Gabonese citizen. The Government of Gabon automatically owns a 20 percent stake in all petroleum development in the nation, with Gabon Oil able to purchase up to an additional 15 percent. The standard practice is for the Gabonese President to review foreign investment contracts following the completion of ministerial-level negotiations. The contracting company can assign its rights and obligations under any hydrocarbon’s contracts to a third party, subject to the prior approval of the Ministry of Oil and Hydrocarbons and the Ministry of Economy. The state is entitled to the right of first refusal on application to assign these rights to a third party, excluding assignments between the contracting company and its affiliates. The Gabonese government encourages and supports foreign portfolio investment, but Gabon’s capital markets are poorly developed. Gabon is the home to the Central Africa Regional Stock Exchange, which began operation in August 2008. Additionally, the Bank of Central African States is in the process of consolidating the Libreville Stock Exchange into a single CEMAC zone stock exchange to be based in Douala, Cameroon; this process began in July 2019. On June 25, 1996, Gabon formally notified the IMF that they accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the IMF Articles of Agreement. These sections provide that members shall not impose or engage in certain measures, namely restrictions on making payments and transfers for current international transactions, discriminatory currency arrangements, or multiple currency practices, without the approval of the IMF. Foreign investors are authorized to obtain credit on the local market and have access to a variety of credit instruments offered by local banks without restriction. The banking sector is composed of seven commercial banks and is open to foreign institutions. The industry is highly concentrated, with three of the largest banks accounting for 77 percent of all loans and deposits. The lack of diversification in the economy has constrained bank growth in the country, given that the financing of the oil sector is largely undertaken by foreign international banks. Access to banking services outside major cities is limited. According to data from the Gabonese General Directorate for the Economy and Fiscal Policy, the term resources of the banking sector fell by 8% in the first half of 2020, due in particular to the negative impact of COVID-19 on economic activity. These resources stood at 552.1 billion FCFA at the end of June 2020, compared to 600 billion a year earlier. The Gabonese banking sector remains weak due to its difficulty in financing the private sector as a result of unreliable and often incomplete documentation presented by new companies. In addition, interest rates offered by banks are very high – around 15 percent – discouraging individuals and businesses. BGFI Bank Gabon is the largest Gabonese bank in both deposits and loans with approximatively 45 percent of the market share and a balance sheet total of over 3,000 billion FCFA, according to the Professional Association of Gabon Credit Institutions (APEC). The Bloomfield Investment Corporation financial rating agency gave the BGFI Bank a mark of A+ in recognition for its financial strength and management system. Gabon shares a common Central Bank (Bank of Central African States) and a common currency, the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) Franc, with the other countries of CEMAC. The CFA is pegged to the euro. Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in the country. There is one U.S. bank (Citigroup) present in Gabon. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account in the local economy. Gabon’s financial system is shallow and financial intermediation levels remain low. Basic documents are required for applying for a residency permit in Gabon. Gabon created a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) in 2008. Initially called the Fund for Future Generations (Fonds des Génerations Futures) and later changed to the Sovereign Funds of the Gabonese Republic (Fonds Souverains de la République Gabonaise), the current iteration of Gabon’s SWF is referred to as Gabon’s Strategic Investment Funds (Fonds Gabonaises d’Investissements Stratégiques, or FGIS). As of September 2013, the most recent FGIS report, the FGIS had USD 2.4 billion in assets and was actively making investments. Further details are not available. Gabon’s SWF accepted the Santiago principles and joined the IMF-hosted International Working Group on SWFs on January 2022. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Government-appointed civil servants manage Gabonese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), which operate primarily in energy, extractive industries, and public utilities. SOEs generally follow OECD guidelines on corporate governance, which usually consists of a board of directors under the authority of the related ministry. That ministry determines the board members, who may be government officials or members of the general public. The SOEs often consult with their ministry before undertaking any important business decisions. The corresponding ministry in each sector prepares and submits the budget of each SOE each year. Independent auditors examine the SOEs’ activities each year, conducting audits according to international standards. Auditors do not publish their reports, but rather submit them to the relevant ministry. There is no published list of SOEs. There are no specific laws or rules that offer preferential treatment to SOEs. Although private enterprises may compete with public enterprises under open market access conditions, SOEs often have a competitive advantage in the industries in which they operate. Gabon does not have an active privatization program. However, when there is a privatization program foreign investors are usually invited to participate. The bidding process for these programs is easy to understand, non-discriminatory, and transparent. 10. Political and Security Environment Violence related to politics is relatively rare in Gabon. Elections, however, can lead to heightened tensions or violence. While the 2018 legislative and local elections took place without major incident, violence did break out on August 31, 2016, after the National Electoral Commission announced that the incumbent ABO defeated his opponent Jean Ping in the presidential election by a margin of less than 2%. Protestors took to the streets, attempting to burn the National Assembly building. Non-governmental organizations stated the government’s use of excessive force to disperse demonstrators resulted in approximately 20 deaths and over 1000 arrests; the opposition claimed at least 50 people were killed. The COVID-19 pandemic has had a major impact on Gabon’s economy since March 2020. Measures to contain cases included closing several economic sectors, which increased the unemployment rate, with around 12,500 Gabonese losing their jobs (Minister of Labor announcement, January 2021). The social tension was high in February 2021 when further restrictions were announced, including a 6PM to 5AM curfew; this led to peaceful protests, occasionally marked by riots, during which two people were killed in Libreville and Port-Gentil. Georgia Executive Summary Georgia, located at the crossroads of Western Asia and Eastern Europe, is a small but open market that derives benefits from international trade, tourism, and transportation. While it is susceptible to global and regional shocks, the country has made sweeping economic reforms since 1991 that have produced a relatively well-functioning and stable market economy. Average growth rate was over five percent from 2005 through 2019, and its rankings improved impressively in global business, governance, corruption, and other indexes. Georgia ranked twenty sixth in the Heritage Foundations’ 2022 Economic Freedom Index, and 45th in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. Fiscal and monetary policy are focused on low deficits, low inflation, and a floating real exchange rate, although the latter was affected by regional developments, including sanctions on Russia and other external factors, such as a stronger U.S. Dollar. The COVID-19 pandemic reversed some of the past gains and placed significant pressure on the domestic currency and local economy. Georgia’s economy contracted six percent in 2020 with particularly steep losses in the tourism sector. Although Georgia successfully managed the first wave of COVID-19 pandemic, the infection rate surged in the second part of 2021, compelling the government to adopt a series of restrictions and shut-downs that negatively impacted economic activity. Despite this, Georgia’ economy picked up in 2021, demonstrating strong growth, 10.4 percent higher than 2020. While government and international financial partners forecasted an optimistic outlook for 2022, the economic impacts of the Russia-Ukraine war and sanctions on Russia have damaged growth prospects and led to lower growth expectations. Overall, business and investment conditions are sound, and Georgia favorably compares to the regional peers. However, there is an increasing lack of confidence in the judicial sector’s ability to adjudicate commercial cases independently or in a timely, competent manner, with some business dispute cases languishing in the court system for years. Other companies complain of inefficient decision-making processes at the municipal level, shortcomings in the enforcement of intellectual property rights, lack of effective anti-trust policies, accusations of political meddling, selective enforcement of laws and regulations, including commercial laws, and difficulties resolving disputes over property rights. The Georgian government continues to work to address these issues, and despite these remaining challenges, Georgia ranks high in the region as a good place to do business. The United States and Georgia work to increase bilateral trade and investment through a High-Level Dialogue on Trade and Investment and through the U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission’s Economic, Energy, and Trade Working Group. Both countries signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty in 1994, and Georgia is eligible to export many products duty-free to the United States under the Generalized System of Preferences program. Georgia suffered considerable instability in the immediate post-Soviet period. After regaining independence in 1991, civil war and separatist conflicts flared up along the Russian border in the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In August 2008, tensions in the region of South Ossetia culminated in a brief war between Russia and Georgia. Russia invaded and occupied the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia continues to occupy these Georgian regions, and the central government in Tbilisi does not have effective control over these areas. The United States supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders and does not recognize the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia as independent. Tensions still exist both inside the occupied territories and near the administrative boundary lines, but other parts of Georgia, including Tbilisi, are not directly affected. Transit and logistics are priority sectors as Georgia seeks to benefit from increased East/West trade through the country. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad has boosted Georgia’s transit prospects and the government has looked for ways to enhance trade. In 2016, the government awarded the contract to build a new port in Anaklia to a group of international investors, including a U.S. company. However, in 2020 the government terminated its contract with the group, resulting in a legal dispute with the investor. While the government has stated its commitment to the construction of the Anaklia Deep Sea Port Project, a tender has not yet been announced. Separately, logistics and port management companies in Poti and Batumi have started to develop and expand the Batumi and Poti Ports. In 2020, the owner of Georgia’s largest port, Poti Port on the Black Sea, announced its plans to create a deep-water port. In 2021, logistics companies completed two new terminal projects in Batumi and Poti ports. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 45 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 63 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $4,270 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Georgia is open to foreign investment. Legislation establishes favorable conditions for foreign investment, but not preferential treatment for foreign investors. The Law on Promotion and Guarantee of Investment Activity protects foreign investors from subsequent legislation that alters the condition of their investments for a period of ten years. Investment promotion authority is vested in the Investment Division of Enterprise Georgia, a legal entity of public law under the Ministry of Economic and Sustainable Development. The Investment Division’s primary role is to attract, promote, and develop foreign direct investment in Georgia. For this purpose, it acts as the moderator between foreign investors and the Georgian government, ensures access to updated information, provides a means of communication with government bodies, and serves as a “one-stop-shop” to support investors throughout the investment process. ( http://www.enterprisegeorgia.gov.ge/en/about ). Enterprise Georgia also operated the website for foreign investors: www.investingeorgia.org . Georgia’s Investors Council, an advisory body operating since 2015, aims to promote dialogue among the private business community, international organizations, donors, and the Georgian government for the development of a favorable, non-discriminatory, transparent, and fair business and investment climate in Georgia ( http://ics.ge ). The Business Ombudsman, who is a member of the Investors Council, is another tool for protecting investors’ rights in Georgia ( http://businessombudsman.ge ). Georgia does not have comprehensive mechanisms in place for screening foreign investment and Georgia does not have FDI thresholds. Governmental reviews of investment projects in Georgia are ad hoc. The Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development’s Investment Policy and Support Department is responsible for analyzing proposed foreign investment projects at the request of state agencies. Georgia’s State Security Service, National Security Council (NSC), Revenue Service, Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure, National Bank, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Ministry of Defense all have potential equities and could play a role in reviewing a foreign transaction or investment proposal for national security concerns in certain circumstances. Georgia’s NSC is currently drafting critical infrastructure protection legislation that is linked to NSC’s investment screening efforts. Foreign investors have participated in most major privatizations of state-owned property. Transparency of privatization has been an issue at times. No law or regulation authorizes private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association that limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control. Cross-shareholder or stable-shareholder arrangements are not used by private firms in Georgia. Georgian legislation does not protect private firms from takeovers. There are no regulations authorizing private firms to restrict foreign partners’ investment activity or limit foreign partners’ ability to gain control over domestic enterprises. There are no specific licensing requirements for foreign investment other than those that apply to all companies. The government requires licenses for activities that affect public health, national security, and the financial sector: weapons and explosives production, narcotics, poisonous and pharmaceutical substances, exploration and exploitation of renewable or non-renewable substances, exploitation of natural resource deposits, establishment of casinos and gambling houses and the organization of games and lotteries, banking, insurance, securities trading, wireless communication services, and the establishment of radio and television channels. The law requires the state to retain a controlling interest in air traffic control, shipping traffic control, railroad control systems, defense and weapons industries, and nuclear energy. For investment projects requiring licenses or permits, the relevant government ministries and agencies have the right to review the project for national security concerns. By law, the government has 30 days to make a decision on licenses, and if the licensing authority does not state a reasonable ground for rejection within that period, the government must approve the license or permit for issuance. In the real estate sector, only Georgian nationals or companies, with some exceptions, may own agricultural land. Per Georgian law, it is illegal to undertake any type of economic activity in Abkhazia or South Ossetia if such activities require permits, licenses, or registration in accordance with Georgian legislation. Laws also ban mineral exploration, money transfers, and international transit via Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Only the state may issue currency, banknotes, and certificates for goods made from precious metals, import narcotics for medical purposes, and produce control systems for the energy sector. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published an Investment Policy Review in December 2020 ( http://www.oecd.org/investment/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-georgia-0d33d7b7-en.htm ). The most recent WTO Investment Policy Review on Georgia was done in 2016 ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp428_e.htm ), and by UNCTAD in 2014. Registering a business in Georgia is relatively quick and streamlined. Registration takes one day to complete through Georgia’s single window registration process. The National Agency of Public Registry (NAPR) ( www.napr.gov.ge – webpage is in Georgian only), located in Public Service Halls (PSH) under the Ministry of Justice of Georgia, carries out company registration. The PSH website (https://www.psh.gov.ge/https://www.psh.gov.ge/main/page/2/85) outlines procedures and requirements for business registration in English. For registration purposes, the law does not require a verification of the amount or existence of charter capital. A company is not required to complete a separate tax registration; the initial registration includes both the revenue service and national business registration. The following information is required to register a business in Georgia: bio data for the founder and principal officers, articles of incorporation, and the company’s area of business activity. Other required documents depend on the type of entity to be established. To register a business, the potential owner must first pay the registration fee, register the company with the Entrepreneurial Register, and obtain an identification number and certificate of state and tax registration. Registration fees are GEL100 (around $30) for a regular registration and GEL200 (around $60) for an expedited registration, plus a GEL1 bank processing fee. The owner must also open a bank account (free). Georgia’s business facilitation mechanism provides equitable treatment of women and men. There are a variety of state-run and donor-supported projects that aim to promote women entrepreneurs through specific training or other programs, including access to financing and business training. The Georgian government does not have any specific policy on promoting or restricting domestic investors from investing abroad and Georgia’s outward investment is insignificant. According to Georgia’s central bank, the net international investment position of Georgia, which measures the difference between external financial assets and liabilities of a country, totaled negative $26.3 billion as of December 31, 2021. 3. Legal Regime Georgia’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms, and the Georgian government has committed to achieving even greater transparency and simplicity of regulations for these systems. In Georgia, the lawmaking process involves Parliament (drafting and consideration) and the President (signing). Under Georgia’s constitution, the following subjects have the right to initiate legislation: the President, the government, members of Parliament, a committee, faction, the representative bodies of the Autonomous Republics of Abkhazia and Adjara, and groups of at least 30,000 voters. A subject who does not have the right to launch a legislative initiative does, however, has the right to submit a “legislative proposal,” which should be a well-reasoned address to Parliament advocating for the adoption of a new law or of changes/amendments to existing legislation. According to Article 150 of the Law on Parliament, the following can submit a legislative proposal: citizens of Georgia, state bodies (except the establishments of the executive branch of government), the representative and executive bodies of local self-government, political and public unions registered in Georgia according to the established rule, and other legal entities. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations, except their entitlement for participating in the law-making process prescribed by the above law. Publicly listed companies are required to prepare financial statements in accordance with IFRS – International Financial Reporting Standards. Draft bills or regulations are available for public comment. NGOs, professional associations, and business chambers actively participate in public hearings on legislation. The government publishes laws and regulations in Georgian in the official online legislative herald gazette, the Legislative Messenger, ‘Matsne’ ( www.matsne.gov.ge ). Another online tool to research Georgian legislation is www.codex.ge or the webpage of the Parliament of Georgia, www.parliament.ge . General oversight of the executive branch is vested in the parliament. The new Constitution, which entered into force in December 2018, and subsequently adopted new Parliamentary Rules and Procedures, aims to strengthen Parliament’s oversight role. Under their strengthened roles, public officials are obliged to respond to Parliament’s questions. Government institutions also submit annual reports. However, local watchdog organizations continue to raise concerns that one party controls all branches of government, undermining checks and balances. Independent agencies, such as the State Audit Office the Ombudsman’s office (including the Business Ombudsman), and business associations also provide an oversight function. Georgia maintains an active civil society that frequently reports on government activities. Georgia has six types of taxes: corporate profit tax (0% or 15%; no corporate income tax on retained and reinvested profit; profit tax applies only to distributed earnings), value added tax (VAT; 18%), property tax (up to 1%), personal income tax (20%), excise (on few selected goods), and import tax (0%, 5% or 12%). Dividend income tax is five percent. There are no dividend or capital gains taxes for publicly traded equities (a free float in excess of 25 percent). Georgia imposes excise taxes on cigarettes, alcohol, fuel, and mobile telecommunication. Most goods, except for some agricultural products, have no import tariffs. For goods with tariffs, the rates are five or 12 percent, unless excluded by an FTA. Detailed information on the types and rates of taxes applicable to businesses and individuals, as well as a payment calendar, is available on the Georgia Revenue Service website: http://www.rs.ge/ . In 2019, the Georgian government introduced new regulations to simplify the tax regime and streamline processes for small businesses. The new legislation decreased turnover tax from five percent to one percent for small businesses and defined small business as those with less than GEL 500,000 ($160,000) annual turnover, a fivefold increase from the previous GEL 100,000 ($30,000) threshold. In addition, the new regulations allow small businesses to pay taxes by the end of month, instead of requiring advance payments. For medium and large businesses, the reform introduced an automatic system of VAT returns and activated a special system whereby entrepreneurs can pay VAT returns in five to seven business days by filling out an electronic application. Enterprise Georgia operates the Business Service Center in Tbilisi, which provides domestic and foreign businesses with information on doing business in Georgia. The Business Service Center facilitates an online chat tool for interested individuals ( http://www.enterprisegeorgia.gov.ge/en/SERVICE-CENTER ). Additionally, the Investor’s Council provides an opportunity for the private sector to discuss legislative reforms, economic development plans, and actions to spur economic growth with the government. Different commercial chambers, such as the American Chamber of Commerce ( www.amcham.ge ), International Chamber of Commerce ( www.icc.ge ), Business Association of Georgia ( www.bag.ge ), Georgian Chamber of Commerce and Industry ( www.gcci.ge ), and EU-Georgia Business Council ( http://eugbc.net ) remain important tools for facilitating ongoing dialogue between domestic and foreign business communities and the government. International accounting standards are binding for joint stock companies, banks, insurance companies, companies operating in the insurance field, limited liability companies, limited partnerships, joint liability companies, and cooperatives. Private companies are required to perform accounting and financial reporting in accordance with international accounting standards. Sole entrepreneurs, small businesses, and non-commercial legal entities perform accounting and financial reporting according to simplified interim standards approved by the Parliamentary Accounting Commission. Shortcomings in the use of international accounting standards persist, and qualified accounting personnel are in short supply. The Law of Georgia on Free Trade and Competition provides for the establishment of an independent structure, the Competition Agency, to exercise effective state supervision over a free, fair, and competitive market environment. Nonetheless, certain companies have dominant positions in pharmaceutical, petroleum, and other sectors. Public finances and debt obligations are transparent, and Georgia’s budget and information on debt obligations were widely and easily accessible to the public through government websites including the Ministry of Finance’s site ( www.mof.gov.ge ). Georgia’s State Audit Office ( www.sao.ge ) reviews the government’s accounts and makes its reports publicly available. Georgia’s Association Agreement of 2014 with the European Union introduced a preferential trade regime, the DCFTA, which increased market access between the EU and Georgia based on better-aligned regulations. The agreement is designed to introduce European standards gradually in all spheres of Georgia’s economy and sectoral policy: infrastructure, energy, the environment, agriculture, tourism, technological development, employment and social policy, health protection, education, culture, civil society, and regional development. It also provides for the approximation of Georgian laws with nearly 300 separate European legislative acts. The DCFTA should promote a gradual approximation with European standards for food safety, establish a transparent and stable business environment in Georgia, increase Georgia’s potential to attract investment, introduce innovative approaches and new technologies, stimulate economic growth, and support the country’s economic development. The latest progress report, adopted by the European Parliament on September 17, 2020, confirmed Georgia’s continued progress on the implementation of the agreement. Georgia has been a WTO member since 2000 and consistently meets requirements and obligations included in the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures. Since WTO accession, Georgia has not introduced any Technical Barriers to Trade. In January 2016, Georgia ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. Georgia’s legal system is based on civil law and the country has a three-tiered court system. The first tier consists of 25 trial courts throughout the country that hear criminal, civil, and administrative cases. Two appellate courts, Tbilisi Appeal Court (East Georgia) and Kutaisi Appeal Court (West Georgia), represent the second tier. The Supreme Court of Georgia occupies the third, or the highest, instance and acts as the highest appellate court. In addition, there is a separate Constitutional Court for arbitrating constitutional disputes between branches of government and ruling on individual claims concerning human rights violations stemming from the Constitution. Georgia does not have an integrated commercial code. There are several different laws and codes (Tax Code, Law on Entrepreneurs, and Law on Insolvency) that regulate commercial activity in Georgia. There are no specialized courts, such as a commercial court, to handle commercial disputes; however, in Tbilisi there are specialized court panels that handle high value disputes, including some commercial disputes. The Ministry of Justice’s Public Service Halls provide property registration. The lack of independence of Georgia’s judiciary and political inference in the judicial system, especially in high-profile cases, is troubling. Concerns regarding the integrity of the judicial appointment process and the capacity of the courts to deliver quality outcomes continue to affect investor confidence in the court system. The Government’s hesitance to conduct a full assessment of the judicial system to ensure full compliance with Venice Commission recommendations further undermines faith in the independence of the judiciary. OECD’s 2020 IPR notes the Georgian government’s efforts to strengthen the judiciary to improve the country’s business and investment environment under its Georgia 2020 strategy. However, the report highlights that “the existing framework for adjudication of civil disputes in Georgian courts nonetheless continues to suffer from several significant problems despite the reforms. Foremost of these are persisting concerns with the independence, accountability, and capacity of the High Council of Justice and the judiciary. Many investors perceive Georgia’s court processes as slow, inefficient, lacking in transparency, and hampered by a lack of technical expertise. All these issues affect public trust in the judicial system. They are among the most pressing concerns for investors in their assessments of the investment climate in Georgia.” The full OECD report is available at https://www.oecd.org/countries/georgia/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-georgia-0d33d7b7-en.htm. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable and are adjudicated in the national court system. The U.S.-Georgia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) guarantees U.S. investors national treatment and most favored nation treatment. Exceptions to national treatment have been carved out for Georgia in certain sectors, such as maritime fisheries, air, and maritime transport and related activities, ownership of broadcast, common carrier, or aeronautical radio stations, communications satellites, government-supported loans, guarantees, and insurance, and landing of submarine cables. Georgia’s legal system is based on civil law. Legislation governing foreign investment includes the Constitution, the Civil Code, the Tax Code, and the Customs Code. Other relevant legislation includes the Law on Entrepreneurs, the Law on Promotion and Guarantee of Investment Activity, the Bankruptcy Law, the Law on Courts and General Jurisdiction, the Law on Limitation of Monopolistic Activity, the Accounting Law, and the Securities Market Law. Ownership and privatization of property is governed by the following acts: the Civil Code, the Law on Ownership of Agricultural Land, the Law on Private Ownership of Non-Agricultural Land, the Law on Management of State-Owned Non-Agricultural Land, and the Law on Privatization of State Property. Property rights in extractive industries are governed by the Law on Concessions, the Law on Deposits, and the Law on Oil and Gas. Intellectual property rights are protected under the Civil Code and the Law on Patents and Trademarks. Financial sector legislation includes the Law on Commercial Banks, the Law on National Banks, and the Law on Insurance Activities. Information about the procedures and requirements during the investment process is available in English Language at the Invest in Georgia (by Enterprise Georgia) website: https://investingeorgia.org/en/downloads/useful-guides The Georgian Law “On Free Trade and Competition” of 2005 that governs competition is in line with the Georgian Constitution and international agreements. The agency in charge of reviewing transactions for competition-related concerns is the Competition Agency, an independent legal entity of public law, subordinated to the Prime Minister of Georgia. The agency aims to promote market liberalization, free trade, and competition ( www.competition.ge ). Competition Agency decisions can be appealed at court. Georgia has also signed several international agreements containing competition provisions, including the EU-Georgia Association Agreement (AA). The DCFTA within the AA goes further than most FTAs, with regulatory alignment, the elimination of non-tariff barriers, and binding rules on investments and services. In July 2020, Georgia adopted the Law of Georgia on the Introduction of Anti-dumping Measures in Trade that became effective January 1, 2021. The aim of the law is to protect local industry from price dumping on imports. The Law establishes the basic conditions and rules for the introduction of anti-dumping measures to be implemented when importing goods via the customs territory of Georgia. In 2022, the Georgian Parliament adopted a bill on Consumer Protection, which is an essential component among the obligations under the EU-Georgia Association Agreement; it establishes rules for consumer protection and prohibits “unfair commercial practices” that violate the values of “trust and good faith.” The National Competition Agency is responsible for executing the Consumer Protection law. The Georgian Constitution protects property ownership rights, including ownership, acquisition, disposal, and inheritance of property. Foreign citizens living in Georgia possess rights and obligations equal to those of the citizens of Georgia, except for certain property rights (see Section 5). The Constitution allows restriction or revocation of property rights only in cases of extreme public necessity, and then only as allowed by law. The Law on Procedures for Forfeiture of Property for Public Needs establishes the rules for expropriation in Georgia. The law allows expropriation for certain enumerated public needs, establishes a mechanism for valuation and payment of compensation, and provides for court review of the valuation at the option of any party. The Georgian Law on Investment allows expropriation of foreign investments only with appropriate compensation. Amendments to the Law on Procedures for Forfeiture of Property for Public Needs allow payment of compensation with property of equal value as well as money. Compensation includes all expenses associated with the valuation and delivery of expropriated property. Compensation must be paid without delay and must include both the value of the expropriated property as well as the loss suffered by the foreign investor because of expropriation. The foreign investor has a right to review an expropriation in a Georgian court. In 2007, Parliament passed a law generally prohibiting the government from contesting the privatization of real estate sold by the government before August 2007. The law is not applicable, however, to certain enumerated properties. The U.S.-Georgia BIT permits expropriation of covered investments only for a public purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, and in accordance with due process of law and general principles of fair treatment. Expropriation disputes are not common in Georgia, although under the previous government there were cases of property transfers that lacked transparency and allegedly were implemented under coercion. On 1 April 2021, a new insolvency law, “On Rehabilitation and Collective Satisfaction of Creditors,” entered into force in Georgia. The main aim of the law is to protect the interests of the creditors, promote mechanisms for rehabilitation, strengthen the role of the courts during the insolvency proceedings, and separate and clarify the rights and responsibilities of individuals involved in the process and the creation of fair regulations. This law has eased the process for struggling businesses to return to growth. The law defines two types of creditors: secured and non-secured. Creditors can file a court claim for opening an insolvency proceeding, given certain conditions are satisfied (conditions vary, depending on the outstanding debt amount and the delayed days of repayment). Creditor meetings are held in court and chaired by a judge. The creditor meeting can decide several issues, including the appointment of a supervisor of the bankruptcy or rehabilitation proceedings, and the appointment of a member of the facilitation council. Secured creditors: Secured creditors must make unanimous decisions on approving a debtor’s new debts, the encumbrance of the debtor’s property, and suretyship. If there are no secured creditors, the creditor’s meeting is authorized to make the same decisions. The secured creditors, in a creditor’s meeting, may suspend enforcement of the material conditions of the agreement with the bankruptcy or rehabilitation supervisor or on the definition of the terms of the rehabilitation. After the debtor’s property is sold on auction, secured creditors have priority for being repaid. All secured creditors must approve the rehabilitation plan and plan amendments. New equity investment in the debtor’s company is only possible if there are prior consents from all secured creditors and the rehabilitation supervisor. Non-secured creditors: Non-secured creditors are satisfied only after all secured creditors are satisfied (unless otherwise agreed by all creditors unanimously). Non-secured creditors do not have voting rights for the rehabilitation plan approval. The priority system shall not apply to creditors whose claim is secured by financial collateral. Foreign creditors: The law provides additional time for foreign creditors to file claims. Creditors may file claims to the court and request to declare the agreements made by the insolvent debtor voidable and/or request reimbursement of damages, if such agreements inflicted damages to the creditor. The Debt Registry of the National Agency of the Public Register is Georgia’s credit monitoring authority. 6. Financial Sector The National Bank of Georgia regulates the securities market. All market participants submit their reports in line with international standards. All listed companies must make public filings, which are then uploaded to the National Bank’s website, allowing investors to evaluate a company’s financial standing. The Georgian securities market includes the following licensed participants: two Stock Exchanges, a Central Securities Depository, eight brokerage companies, and three independent securities registrars. ( https://www.nbg.gov.ge/index.php?m=487&lng=eng ) The Georgian Stock Exchange (GSE, https://gse.ge/en/ ) is the only organized securities market in Georgia. Designed and established with the help of USAID and operating under a legal framework drafted with the assistance of U.S. experts, the GSE complies with global best practices in securities trading and offers an efficient investment facility to both local and foreign investors. The GSE’s automated trading system can accommodate thousands of securities that can be traded by brokers from workstations on the GSE floor or remotely from their offices. No law or regulation authorizes private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association that limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control. Cross-shareholder or stable-shareholder arrangements are not used by private firms in Georgia. Georgian legislation does not protect private firms from takeovers. There are no regulations authorizing private firms to restrict the investment activity of foreign partners or to limit the ability of foreign partners to gain control over domestic enterprises. The government and Central Bank (National Bank of Georgia) follow IMF Article VIII and do not impose any restrictions on payments and transfers in current international transactions. Credit from commercial banks is available to foreign investors as well as domestic clients, although interest rates are high. Banks offer business, consumer, and mortgage loans. The government adopted a new law in 2018 that introduced an accumulative pension scheme, which became effective on January 1, 2019. The pension scheme is mandatory for legally employed people under 40. For the self-employed and those above the age of 40, enrolment in the program is voluntary. The pension savings system applies to Georgian citizens, foreign citizens living in Georgia with permanent residency in the country, and stateless persons who are employed or self-employed and receive an income. Banking is one of the fastest growing sectors in the Georgian economy. As of March 1, 2022, Georgia’s banking sector consists of 14 commercial banks, including 13 foreign-controlled banks, with 154 commercial bank branches and 756 service centers throughout the country. In March 2022, Georgian commercial banks held GEL 61.7 billion (around $19.6 billion) in total assets. The private sector Credit-to-GDP ratio reached 78%, one of the highest among regional peers. As of early 2022, there were 18 insurance companies and 38 microfinance (MFI) organizations operating in Georgia. MFIs held GEL 1.6 billion ($528 million) in total assets as of January 1, 2022. The two largest Georgian banks are listed on the London Stock Exchange: TBC Bank (listed in 2014) and the Bank of Georgia (2006). The banking system is stable, well capitalized, liquid, and profitable. The financial sector maintains solid capital and liquidity buffers against potential threats. The share of non-performing loans (5.2% as of January 1, 2022) is declining. As outlined by the 2021 IMF Financial System Stability Assessment (https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/09/17/Georgia-Financial-System-Stability-Assessment-465911), Georgia’s banking supervision practices and regulations have significantly progressed and are in line with Basel/EU directives. Despite substantial progress, dollarization remains the main challenge for the system, given that around half of the credit portfolio is disbursed in foreign currency, largely to unhedged borrowers. The National Bank of Georgia (NBG, www.nbg.gov.ge ) is Georgia’s central bank, as defined by the Constitution. The rights and obligations of the NBG as the central bank, the principles of its activity, and the guarantee of its independence are defined in the Organic Law of Georgia on the National Bank of Georgia. The National Bank supervises the financial sector to facilitate the financial stability and transparency of the financial system, as well as to protect the rights of the sector’s consumers and investors. Through the Financial Monitoring Service of Georgia, a separate legal entity, the NBG undertakes measures against illicit income legalization and terrorism financing. In addition, the NBG is the government’s banker and fiscal agent. The IMF, credit rating agencies, and other international organizations positively assess the NBG’s macroeconomic framework and inflation targeting regime. In June 2021, the NBG was awarded the Transparency Award by the international publisher Central Banking. The award highlighted the improved communications on monetary policy, financial stability, consumer protection and financial education. The NBG also was nominated for the Risk Manager Award of 2021 by the same group. In 2021, Global Finance named Koba Gvenetadze, Governor of the NBG, among the Best Central Bankers for the fourth time. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the Asian Development Bank (ABD), and other international development agencies have a variety of lending programs making credit available to large and small businesses in Georgia. Georgia’s two largest banks – TBC and Bank of Georgia – have correspondent banking relationships with the United States through Citibank, and some other banks have a relationship with JP Morgan. However, correspondent banking remains a major challenge for small and medium size banks. Georgia does not restrict foreigners from establishing a bank account in Georgia. Several local banks are subsidiaries of international banking groups and subject to the same regulations. The NBG and Georgian financial institutions act fully in accordance with the financial sanctions imposed by the United States and others on the Russian Federation. Compliance with international financial sanctions is systematically checked during the onsite inspections of financial institutions. In 2020, the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MoneyVal) approved the Fifth Round Evaluation Report of Georgia. The report assessed the NBG’s supervisory process and practices as having effective outcomes. The report also notes that financial institutions generally have a good understanding of risks and are part of large banking or other financial groups that have put in place sophisticated internal systems and controls which effectively mitigate money laundering and terrorism financing risks. Georgia does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Georgian government privatized most state-owned enterprises (SOEs). At the end of 2013, Georgian Railways (GRW), Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC), Georgian State Electrosystem (GSE), Electricity System Commercial Operator (ESCO), and Enguri Hydropower plant were the major remaining SOEs. The energy-related companies largely implement the government’s energy policies and help manage the electricity market. There are also a number of Legal Entities of Public Law (LEPLs), independent bodies that carry out government functions, such as the Public Service Halls. During 2012, Georgian Railways, GOGC, GSE, and ESCO’s assets were placed under the Partnership Fund ( fund.ge ), a state-run fund to facilitate foreign investment into new projects. The fund also controlled 25 percent of shares in the TELASI Electricity Distribution Company, which it sold to private investors in 2020. Despite state ownership, SOEs act under the general terms of the Entrepreneurial Law. Georgian Railways and GOGC have supervisory boards, while GSE and ESCO do not. The SOEs’ individual charters describe their procedures and policies. Georgia encourages its SOEs to adhere to the OECD’s Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. The senior management of SOEs report to Supervisory Boards, where they exist (e.g., GRW, GOGC); in other cases, they report to line ministries. Governmental officials can be on the supervisory board of the SOEs, and the Partnership Fund has five key governmental officials on its board. SOEs explicitly are not obligated to consult with government officials before making business decisions, but informal consultations take place depending on the scale and importance of the issue. To ensure the transparency and accountability of state business decisions and operations, SOEs have regular outside audits and publish annual reports. SOEs with more than 50 percent state ownership are obliged to follow the State Procurement Law and make procurements via public tender. The Partnership Fund, GRW, and GOGC are subject to valuation by international rating agencies. There is no legal requirement for SOEs to publish annual report or to submit their books for independent audit, but this is done in practice. In addition, GRW and GOGC are Eurobond issuer companies and therefore are required to publish reports. SOEs are subject to the same domestic accounting standards and rules. These standards are comparable to international financial reporting standards. No SOEs exercise delegated governmental powers. In early 2021, the government announced it would start reforming state-owned enterprises and create a new council to develop a strategy to be implemented in 2021-2024. The goal of the reform is to bring the management of SOEs closer to higher standards of corporate governance. The first state-owned enterprise to undergo reforms will be the Georgian State Electrosystem (GSE), an electricity transmission system operator. According to a December 20, 2021 IMF report on Georgia ( https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2021/English/1GEOEA2021009.ashx ), auditing, reporting, and disclosure practice in Georgia is largely consistent with international good practice. The IMF report contains concrete recommendations for further improving the financial accountability system of SOEs. Georgia’s government has privatized most large SOEs. Successful privatization projects include major assets in energy generation and distribution, telecommunications, water utilities, port facilities, and real estate sectors. A list of entities available to be privatized can be found at eauction.ge . Foreign investors are welcome to participate in privatization programs. Additional information is also available the American Chamber of Commerce in Georgia website: www.amcham.ge . In 2019, the government offered mining deposits for privatization in addition to other state-owned assets through the 100 Investment Offers for Business initiative. Within the initiative, the government selected mineral resource deposits from various regions to sell at e-auctions . The mineral deposits include gold and copper-polymetallic, ore, bentonite clay, volcanic slag, peat, diatomite, tuff breccia, zeolite-containing tuff, basalt, marble, limestone, underground fresh water, and carbonated mineral water. Mining license prices vary and depend on the type of mineral resource and its price. National Agency of State Property, a Legal Entity of Public Law under the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development, manages the privatization of state property, the transfer of the right of use, and the management of SOEs. The agency’s website ( http://nasp.gov.ge/ ) contains links to electronic auctions, proposals for investments, and other relevant information. 10. Political and Security Environment The United States established diplomatic relations with Georgia in 1992, following Georgia’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Since independence, Georgia has made impressive progress fighting corruption, developing modern state institutions, and enhancing global security. The United States is committed to helping Georgia deepen Euro-Atlantic ties and strengthen its democratic institutions. In August 2008, tensions in the Georgian region of South Ossetia culminated in a brief war between Russia and Georgia. Russia invaded and occupied the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia continues to occupy these regions – nearly 20 percent of Georgia’s territory – and the central government in Tbilisi does not have effective control over these areas. The United States supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders and does not recognize the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia as independent. Only Russia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Syria, and Venezuela recognize them as independent states. Tensions still exist both inside the occupied territories and near the administrative boundary lines (ABLs). A Russian military build-up along the South Ossetia ABL dramatically escalated tensions in August 2019. In addition, Russian “border” guards regularly patrol the ABLs and have increasingly detained people trying to cross the ABLs. Several attacks, criminal incidents, and kidnappings have occurred near the ABLs as well. While none of the activity has been anti-American in nature, there is a high risk of travelers finding themselves in a wrong place, at the wrong time, situation. In addition, unexploded ordnance from previous conflicts poses a danger near the South Ossetia ABL. However, other parts of Georgia, including Tbilisi, are not directly affected. Per Georgian law, it is illegal to undertake any type of economic activity in Abkhazia or South Ossetia if such activities require permits, licenses, or registration in accordance with Georgian legislation. Laws also ban mineral exploration, money transfers, and international transit via Abkhazia or South Ossetia. While violent street protests are generally uncommon, there have been some recent episodes of politically motivated violence and civil disturbance. In July 2021 far-right groups violently rioted throughout Tbilisi against a planned Tbilisi Pride parade, destroying the offices of two NGOs and attacking over 50 journalists and individuals thought to be members of the LGBTQI+ community. In June 2019, when protesters attempted to enter Parliament during an anti-Russian and anti-government protest, some people were injured with some suffering severe eye injuries due to police use of rubber bullets. Generally, police have fulfilled their duty to maintain order even in cases of unannounced protests. However, in some instances the police have allowed a permissive environment for far-right violence. In 2021, Turkish company ENKA cancelled its $800 million Namakhvani hydropower plant (HPP), citing violation of the terms of the contract by the Georgian government and force majeure. The decision was preceded by months-long protests – including blocking access to the construction area – by local activists claiming the project was launched without sufficient research and thorough consideration of the risks. Following a series of protests, Georgian authorities started renegotiating with ENKA to improve the terms of the contract and involved protestors in these conversations. However, the protesting groups withdrew from the process, finally leading to the Namakhvani HPP cancelation. Germany Executive Summary As Europe’s largest economy, Germany is a major destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) and has accumulated a vast stock of FDI over time. Germany is consistently ranked as one of the most attractive investment destinations based on its stable legal environment, reliable infrastructure, highly skilled workforce, and world-class research and development. An EU member state with a well-developed financial sector, Germany welcomes foreign portfolio investment and has an effective regulatory system. Capital markets and portfolio investments operate freely with no discrimination between German and foreign firms. Germany has a very open economy, routinely ranking among the top countries in the world for exports and inward and outward foreign direct investment. Foreign investment in Germany mainly originates from other European countries, the United States, and Japan, although FDI from emerging economies (and China) has grown in recent years. The United States is the leading source of non-European FDI in Germany. In 2020, total U.S. FDI in Germany was $162 billion. The key U.S. FDI sectors include chemicals ($8.7 billion), machinery ($6.5 billion), finance ($13.2 billion), and professional, scientific, and technical services ($10.1 billion). From 2019 to 2020, the industry sector “chemicals” grew significantly from $4.8 billion to $8.7 billion. Historically, machinery, information technology, finance, holding companies (nonbank), and professional, scientific, and technical services have dominated U.S. FDI in Germany. German legal, regulatory, and accounting systems can be complex but are generally transparent and consistent with developed-market norms. Businesses operate within a well-regulated, albeit relatively high-cost, environment. Foreign and domestic investors are treated equally when it comes to investment incentives or the establishment and protection of real and intellectual property. Germany’s well-established enforcement laws and official enforcement services ensure investors can assert their rights. German courts are fully available to foreign investors in an investment dispute. New investors should ensure they have the necessary legal expertise, either in-house or outside counsel, to meet all national and EU regulations. The German government continues to strengthen provisions for national security screening of inward investment in reaction to an increasing number of high-risk acquisitions of German companies by foreign investors, particularly from China, in recent years. German authorities screen acquisitions by foreign entities acquiring more than 10 percent of voting rights of German companies in critical sectors, including health care, artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, specialized robots, semiconductors, additive manufacturing, and quantum technology, among others. Foreign investors who seek to acquire at least 10 percent of voting rights of a German company in one of those fields are required to notify the government and potentially become subject to an investment review. Furthermore, acquisitions by foreign government-owned or -funded entities will now trigger a review. German authorities are committed to fighting money laundering and corruption. The government promotes responsible business conduct and German SMEs are aware of the need for due diligence. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 9 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 9 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 162,387 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 47,470 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The German government and industry actively encourage foreign investment. U.S. investment continues to account for the largest share of Germany’s FDI. The 1956 U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation affords U.S. investors national treatment and provides for the free movement of capital between the United States and Germany. As an OECD member, Germany adheres to the OECD National Treatment Instrument and the OECD Codes of Liberalization of Capital Movements and of Invisible Operations. The Foreign Trade and Payments Act and the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance provide the legal basis for the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (MEC) to review acquisitions of domestic companies by foreign buyers and to assess whether these transactions pose a risk to the public order or national security (for example, when the investment pertains to critical infrastructure). For many decades Germany has experienced significant inbound investment, which is widely recognized as a considerable contributor to Germany’s growth and prosperity. The investment-related challenges facing foreign companies are broadly the same as those that face domestic firms, e.g., relatively high tax rates and energy costs, stringent environmental regulations, and labor laws that complicate hiring and dismissals. Germany Trade and Invest (GTAI), the country’s economic development agency, provides extensive information for investors: https://www.gtai.de/gtai-en/invest Under German law, a foreign-owned company registered in the Federal Republic of Germany as a GmbH (limited liability company) or an AG (joint stock company) is treated the same as a German-owned company. There are no special nationality requirements for directors or shareholders. Companies seeking to open a branch office in Germany without establishing a new legal entity, (e.g., for the provision of employee placement services, such as providing temporary office support, domestic help, or executive search services), must register and have at least one representative located in Germany. While there are no economy-wide limits on foreign ownership or control, Germany maintains an elaborate mechanism to screen foreign investments based on national security grounds. The legislative basis for the mechanism (the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance) has been amended several times in recent years to tighten parameters of the screening as technological threats evolve, particularly to address growing interest by foreign investors in both Mittelstand (mid-sized) and blue-chip German companies. Germany amended its investment screening mechanism May 1, 2021 and has now fully implemented the EU Screening Directive. With the amendment, firms must notify MEC of foreign investments and MEC can then screen investments in sensitive sectors and technologies if the buyer plans to acquire 10 percent or more of the company’s voting rights and may be required, regardless, for a non-EU company acquiring more than 25 percent of voting rights ( https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Artikel/Foreign-Trade/investment-screening.html ). In the screening process, MEC considers “stockpile acquisitions” by the same investor in a German company or “atypical control investments” where an investor secures additional influence in company operations via side contractual agreements. MEC can also factor in combined acquisitions by multiple investors if all are controlled by one foreign government. The total time for the screening process, depending on the sensitivities of the investment, may take up 10 to 12 months. BMWK – Investment screening (bmwi.de) The World Bank Group’s “Doing Business 2020” Index provides additional information on Germany’s investment climate. [Note: this report is no longer updated]. The American Chamber of Commerce in Germany publishes results of an annual survey of U.S. investors in Germany (“AmCham Germany Transatlantic Business Barometer.” https://www.amcham.de/publications ). Before engaging in commercial activities, companies and business operators must register in public directories, the two most significant of which are the commercial register (Handelsregister) and the trade office register (Gewerberegister). Applications for registration at the commercial register ( www.handelsregister.de ) are electronically filed in publicly certified form through a notary. The commercial register provides information about all relevant relationships between merchants and commercial companies, including names of partners and managing directors, capital stock, liability limitations, and insolvency proceedings. Registration costs vary depending on the size of the company. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2020, the median duration to register a business in Germany is eight days, though some firms have experienced longer processing times. Germany Trade and Invest (GTAI), the country’s economic development agency, can assist in the registration processes ( https://www.gtai.de/gtai-en/invest/investment-guide/establishing-a-company/business-registration-65532 ) and advises investors, including micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), on how to obtain incentives. In the EU, MSMEs are defined as follows: Micro-enterprises: fewer than 10 employees and less than €2 million annual turnover or less than €2 million in balance sheet total. Small enterprises: fewer than 50 employees and less than €10 million annual turnover or less than €10 million in balance sheet total. Medium-sized enterprises: fewer than 250 employees and less than €50 million annual turnover or less than €43 million in balance sheet total. U.S.-based exporters seeking to sell in Germany (e.g., via commercial platforms) are required to register with one specific tax authority in Bonn, which can lead to significant delays due to capacity issues. Germany’s federal government provides guarantees for investments by Germany-based companies in developing and emerging economies and countries in transition in order to insure them against political risks. In order to receive guarantees, the investment must have adequate legal protection in the host country. The Federal Government does not insure against commercial risks. In 2020, the government issued investment guarantees amounting to €900 million for investment projects in 13 countries, with the majority of those in China and India. 3. Legal Regime Germany has transparent and effective laws and policies to promote competition, including antitrust laws. The legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are complex but transparent and consistent with international norms. Public consultation by federal authorities is regulated by the Joint Rules of Procedure, which specify that ministries must consult early and extensively with a range of stakeholders on all new legislative proposals. In practice, laws and regulations in Germany are routinely published in draft form for public comment. According to the Joint Rules of Procedure, ministries should consult the concerned industries’ associations, consumer organizations, environmental, and other NGOs. The consultation period generally takes two to eight weeks. The German Institute for Standardization (DIN), Germany’s independent and sole national standards body representing Germany in non-governmental international standards organizations, is open to German subsidiaries of foreign companies. As a member of the European Union, Germany must observe and implement directives and regulations adopted by the EU. EU regulations are binding and enter into force as immediately applicable law. Directives, on the other hand, constitute a type of framework law that Member States transpose via their respective legislative processes. Germany regularly adheres to this process. EU Member States must transpose directives within a specified time period. Should a deadline not be met, the Member State may suffer the initiation of an “infringement procedure,” which could result in steep fines. Germany has a set of rules that prescribe how to break down any payment of fines devolving to the Federal Government and the federal states (Länder). Both bear part of the costs. Payment requirements by the individual states depend on the size of their population and the respective part they played in non-compliance. In 2020, the Commission opened 28 new infringement cases against Germany; at year-end, 79 total infringement cases remained open against Germany. In accordance with WTO membership requirements, the Federal Government notifies draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) through the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy. German law is stable and predictable. Companies can effectively enforce property and contractual rights. Germany’s well-established enforcement laws and official enforcement services ensure investors can assert their rights. German courts are fully available to foreign investors in an investment dispute. The judicial system is independent, and the government does not interfere in the court system. The legislature sets the systemic and structural parameters, while lawyers and civil law notaries use the law to shape and organize specific situations. Judges are highly competent and impartial. International studies and empirical data have attested that Germany offers an effective court system committed to due process and the rule of law. In Germany, most important legal issues and matters are governed by comprehensive legislation in the form of statutes, codes, and regulations. Primary legislation in the area of business law includes: the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, abbreviated as BGB), which contains general rules on the formation, performance, and enforcement of contracts and on the basic types of contractual agreements for legal transactions between private entities; the Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch, abbreviated as HGB), which contains special rules concerning transactions among businesses and commercial partnerships; the Private Limited Companies Act (GmbH-Gesetz) and the Public Limited Companies Act (Aktiengesetz), covering the two most common corporate structures in Germany – the ‘GmbH’ and the ‘Aktiengesellschaft’; and the Act on Unfair Competition (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, abbreviated as UWG), which prohibits misleading advertising and unfair business practices. Apart from the regular courts, which hear civil and criminal cases, Germany has specialized courts for administrative law, labor law, social law, and finance and tax law. Many civil regional courts have specialized chambers for commercial matters. In 2018, the first German regional courts for civil matters (in Frankfurt and Hamburg) established Chambers for International Commercial Disputes, introducing the possibility to hear international trade disputes in English. Other federal states are currently discussing plans to introduce these specialized chambers as well. In November 2020, Baden-Wuerttemberg opened the first commercial court in Germany with locations in Stuttgart and Mannheim, with the option to choose English– language proceedings. The Federal Patent Court hears cases on patents, trademarks, and utility rights related to decisions by the German Patent and Trademarks Office. Both the German Patent Office (Deutsches Patentamt) and the European Patent Office are headquartered in Munich. In the case of acquisitions of critical infrastructure and companies in sensitive sectors, the threshold for triggering an investment review by the government is 10 percent. The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action may review acquisitions of domestic companies by foreign buyers, regardless of national security concerns, where investors seek to acquire at least 25 percent of the voting rights to assess whether these transactions pose a risk to the public order or national security of the Federal Republic of Germany. In 2021, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action screened 306 foreign acquisitions and prohibited none. MEC officials told Post the mere prospect of rejection has caused foreign investors to pull out of prospective deals in sensitive sectors in the past. All national security decisions by the Ministry can be appealed in administrative courts. There is no general requirement for investors to obtain approval for any acquisition unless the target company poses a potential national security risk, such as operating or providing services relating to critical infrastructure, is a media company, or operates in the health sector. The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action may launch a review within three months after obtaining knowledge of the acquisition; the review must be concluded within four months after receipt of the full set of relevant documents. An investor may also request a binding certificate of non-objection from the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action in advance of the planned acquisition to obtain legal certainty at an early stage. If the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action does not open an in-depth review within two months from the receipt of the request the certificate is deemed as granted. During the review, MEC may ask to submit further documents. The acquisition may be restricted or prohibited within three months after the full set of documents has been submitted. The German government has continuously amended domestic investment screening provisions in recent years to transpose the relevant EU framework and address evolving security risks. An amendment in June 2017 clarified the scope for review and gave the government more time to conduct reviews, in reaction to an increasing number of acquisitions of German companies by foreign investors with apparent ties to national governments. The amended provisions provide a clearer definition of sectors in which foreign investment can pose a threat to public order and security, including operators of critical infrastructure, developers of software to run critical infrastructure, telecommunications operators or companies involved in telecom surveillance, cloud computing network operators and service providers, and telematics companies, and which are subject to notification requirements. The new rules also extended the time to assess a cross-sector foreign investment from two to four months, and for investments in sensitive sectors, from one to three months, and introduced the possibility of retroactively initiating assessments for a period of five years after the conclusion of an acquisition. Indirect acquisitions such as those through a Germany- or EU-based affiliate company are now also explicitly subject to the new rules. With further amendments in 2020, Germany implemented the 2019 EU Screening Regulation. The amendments a) introduced a more pro-active screening based on “prospective impairment” of public order or security by an acquisition, rather than a de facto threat, b) consider the impact on other EU member states, and c) formally suspend transactions during the screening process. Furthermore, acquisitions by foreign government-owned or -funded entities now trigger a review, and the healthcare industry is now considered a sensitive sector to which the stricter 10% threshold applies. In May 2021, a further amendment entered into force, which introduced a list of sensitive sectors and technologies (like the current list of critical infrastructures), including artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, specialized robots, semiconductors, additive manufacturing, and quantum technology. Foreign investors who seek to acquire at least 10% of ownership rights of a German company in one those fields must notify the government and potentially become subject to an investment review. The screening can now also consider “stockpiling acquisitions” by the same investor, “atypical control investments” where an investor seeks additional influence in company operations via side contractual agreements, or combined acquisitions by multiple investors, if all are controlled by one foreign government. The Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action provides comprehensive information on Germany’s investment screening regime on its website in English: https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Artikel/Foreign-Trade/investment-screening.html The German Economic Development Agency (GTAI) provides extensive information for investors, including about the legal framework, labor-related issues and incentive programs, on their website: http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/EN/Invest/investment-guide.html . The German government ensures competition on a level playing field based on two main legal codes: The Law against Limiting Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – GWB) is the legal basis for limiting cartels, merger control, and monitoring abuse. State and Federal cartel authorities are in charge of enforcing anti-trust law. In exceptional cases, the Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Action can provide a permit under specific conditions. A June 2017 amendment to the GWB expanded the reach of the Federal Cartel Office (FCO) to include internet and data-based business models; the FCO has shown an interest in investigating large internet firms. A February 2019 FCO investigation found that Facebook had abused its dominant position in social media to harvest user data. Facebook challenged the FCO’s decision in court, but in June 2020, Germany’s highest court upheld the FCO’s action. In March 2021, the Higher Regional Court in Düsseldorf referred the case to the European Court of Justice for guidance. The FCO has continued to challenge the conduct of large tech platforms, particularly with regard to the use of user data. Another FCO case against Facebook, initiated in December 2020, regards the integration of the company’s Oculus virtual reality platform into its broader platform, creating mandatory registration of Facebook accounts for all Oculus users. In 2021, a further amendment to the GWB, known as the Digitalization Act, entered into force codifying tools that allow greater scrutiny of digital platforms by the FCO, in order to “better counteract abusive behavior by companies with paramount cross-market significance for competition.” The law aims to prohibit large platforms from taking certain actions that put competitors at a disadvantage, including in markets for related services or up and down the supply chain – even before the large platform becomes dominant in those secondary markets. To achieve this goal, the amendments expand the powers of the FCO to act earlier and more broadly. Due to the relatively modest number of German platforms, the amendments will primarily affect U.S. companies. The Cartel Office commenced investigations against four U.S. platforms – Alphabet/Google, Amazon, Meta/Facebook and Apple – in 2021 to assess whether they fall under the scope of the new legislation. In January 2022, the competition authority determined Alphabet/Google will be subject to abuse control measures under the scope of the new law but has not yet announced remedies. The three other investigations are still ongoing. While the focus of the GWB is to preserve market access, the Law against Unfair Competition seeks to protect competitors, consumers, and other market participants against unfair competitive behavior by companies. This law is primarily invoked in regional courts by private claimants rather than by the FCO. German law provides that private property can be expropriated for public purposes only in a non-discriminatory manner and in accordance with established principles of constitutional and international law. There is due process and transparency of purpose, and investors in and lenders to expropriated entities are entitled to receive prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. The Berlin state government is currently reviewing a petition for a referendum submitted by a citizens’ initiative calling for the expropriation of residential apartments owned by large corporations. At least one party in the governing coalition officially supports the proposal. Certain long-running expropriation cases date back to the Nazi and communist regimes. German insolvency law, as enshrined in the Insolvency Code, supports and promotes restructuring. If a business or the owner of a business becomes insolvent, or a business is over-indebted, insolvency proceedings can be initiated by filing for insolvency; legal persons are obliged to do so. Insolvency itself is not a crime, but deliberately filing late for insolvency is. Under a regular insolvency procedure, the insolvent business is generally broken up in order to recover assets through the sale of individual items or rights or parts of the company. Proceeds can then be paid out to creditors in the insolvency proceedings. The distribution of monies to creditors follows detailed instructions in the Insolvency Code. Equal treatment of creditors is enshrined in the Insolvency Code. Some creditors have the right to claim property back. Post-adjudication preferred creditors are served out of insolvency assets during the insolvency procedure. Ordinary creditors are served on the basis of quotas from the remaining insolvency assets. Secondary creditors, including shareholder loans, are only served if insolvency assets remain after all others have been served. Germany ranks fourth in the global ranking of “Resolving Insolvency” in the World Bank’s Doing Business Index, with a recovery rate of 79.8 cents on the dollar. In December 2020, the Bundestag passed legislation implementing the EU Restructuring Directive to modernize and make German restructuring and insolvency law more effective. The Bundestag also passed legislation granting temporary relief to companies facing insolvency due to the COVID-19 pandemic, including temporary suspensions from the obligation to file for insolvency under strict requirements. This suspension expired in May 2021. 6. Financial Sector As an EU member state with a well-developed financial sector, Germany welcomes foreign portfolio investment and has an effective regulatory system. Capital markets and portfolio investments operate freely with no discrimination between German and foreign firms. Germany has a very open economy, routinely ranking among the top countries in the world for exports and inward and outward foreign direct investment. As a member of the Eurozone, Germany does not have sole national authority over international payments, which are a shared task of the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the 19 member states, including the German Central Bank (Bundesbank). A European framework for national security screening of foreign investments, which entered into force in April 2019, provides a basis under European law to restrict capital movements into Germany because of threats to national security. Global investors see Germany as a safe place to invest. German sovereign bonds continue to retain their “safe haven” status. Listed companies and market participants in Germany must comply with the Securities Trading Act, which bans insider trading and market manipulation. Compliance is monitored by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) while oversight of stock exchanges is the responsibility of the state governments in Germany (with BaFin taking on any international responsibility). Investment fund management in Germany is regulated by the Capital Investment Code (KAGB), which entered into force on July 22, 2013. The KAGB represents the implementation of additional financial market regulatory reforms, committed to in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The law went beyond the minimum requirements of the relevant EU directives and represents a comprehensive overhaul of all existing investment-related regulations in Germany with the aim of creating a system of rules to protect investors while also maintaining systemic financial stability. Although corporate financing via capital markets is on the rise, Germany’s financial system remains mostly bank-based. Bank loans are still the predominant form of funding for firms, particularly the small- and medium-sized enterprises that comprise Germany’s “Mittelstand,” or mid-sized industrial market leaders. Credit is available at market-determined rates to both domestic and foreign investors, and a variety of credit instruments are available. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international banking norms. Germany has a universal banking system regulated by federal authorities; there have been no reports of a shortage of credit in the German economy. After 2010, Germany banned some forms of speculative trading, most importantly “naked short selling.” In 2013, Germany passed a law requiring banks to separate riskier activities such as proprietary trading into a legally separate, fully- capitalized unit that has no guarantee or access to financing from the deposit-taking part of the bank. Since the creation of the European single supervisory mechanism (SSM) in November 2014, the European Central Bank directly supervises 21 banks located in Germany (as of January 2022), among them four subsidiaries of foreign banks. Germany has a modern and open banking sector characterized by a highly diversified and decentralized, small-scale structure. As a result, it is extremely competitive, profit margins notably in the retail sector are low, and the banking sector is considered “over-banked” and in need of consolidation. The country’s “three-pillar” banking system consists of private commercial banks, cooperative banks, and public banks (savings banks/Sparkassen and the regional state-owned banks/Landesbanken). This structure has remained unchanged despite marked consolidation within each “pillar” since the financial crisis in 2009. By the end of 2020 the number of state banks (Landesbanken) had dropped from 12 to 6, savings banks from 446 in 2007 to 377, and cooperative banks from 1,234 to 818. Two of the five large private-sector banks have exited the market (Dresdner, Postbank). The balance sheet total of German banks dropped from 304 percent of GDP in 2007 to 192 percent of year-end 2020 GDP with banking sector assets worth €9.1 trillion. Market shares in corporate finance of the banking groups remained largely unchanged (all figures for end of 2021): commercial banks 25.5 percent (domestic 16.2 percent, foreign banks 9.3 percent), savings banks 31.2 percent, credit cooperative banks 22 percent, regional Landesbanken 9.3 percent, and development banks/building and loan associations/mortgage banks 12 percent. Germany’s retail banking sector is healthy and well capitalized in line with ECB rules on bank capitalizations. The sector is dominated by globally active banks, Deutsche Bank (Germany’s largest bank by balance sheet total) and Commerzbank (fourth largest bank), with balance sheets of €1.32 trillion and €507 billion respectively (2020 figures). Commerzbank received €18 billion in financial assistance from the federal government in 2009, for which the government took a 25 percent stake in the bank (now reduced to 15.6 percent). Merger talks between Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank failed in 2019. The second largest of the top ten German banks with €595 billion of assets per year-end 2020 is DZ Bank, the central institution of the Cooperative Finance Group (after its merger with WGZ Bank in July 2016), followed by German branches of large international banks (UniCredit Bank, ING-Diba), development banks (KfW Group, NRW Bank), and state banks (LBBW, Bayern LB, Helaba, NordLB). Bank EUR bn (December 31, 2020) Deutsche Bank AG 1,325.259 DZ Bank AG 594.573 KfW Group 546.384 Commerzbank AG 506.916 Unicredit Bank AG 338.124 Landesbank Baden-Württemberg 276.449 Bayerische Landesbank 256,271 J.P. Morgan AG 244.618 Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen 219,324 ING Holding Deutschland GmbH 190.070 NRW.Bank 155.787 Norddeutsche Landesbank 126.491 DKB Deutsche Kreditbank AG 109.840 German credit institutions’ operating business proved robust in 2020 despite the prolonged low interest rate environment and the coronavirus pandemic. Operating income rose by €1.8 billion (+1.5 percent) on the year to €120.5 billion. In 2020 German credit institutions reported however a pre-tax profit of only €14.3 billion, coming in below the long-term average of €17.6 billion and significantly lower than the average of the post-financial crisis years (2010 to 2018) of €25.4 billion. Their 2020 net interest income of €81.1 billion remained below the long-term average of €87.2 billion. Credit risk provisioning rose significantly due to the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on economic activity, reaching €5.3 billion or 0.8 percent of big banks’ annual average lending portfolio. The banking sector’s average return on equity before tax in 2020 slipped to 2.71 percent (after tax: 1.12 percent) (with savings banks and credit cooperatives generating a higher return, and big banks a negative return). The German government does not currently have a sovereign wealth fund or an asset management bureau. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The formal term for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Germany translates as “public funds, institutions, or companies,” and refers to entities whose budget and administration are separate from those of the government, but in which the government has more than 50 percent of the capital shares or voting rights. Appropriations for SOEs are included in public budgets, and SOEs can take two forms, either public or private law entities. Public law entities are recognized as legal personalities whose goal, tasks, and organization are established and defined via specific acts of legislation, with the best-known example being the publicly-owned promotional bank KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau). KfW’s mandate is to promote global development. The government can also resort to ownership or participation in an entity governed by private law if the following conditions are met: doing so fulfills an important state interest, there is no better or more economical alternative, the financial responsibility of the federal government is limited, the government has appropriate supervisory influence, and yearly reports are published. Government oversight of SOEs is decentralized and handled by the ministry with the appropriate technical area of expertise. The primary goal of such involvement is promoting public interests rather than generating profits. The government is required to close its ownership stake in a private entity if tasks change or technological progress provides more effective alternatives, though certain areas, particularly science and culture, remain permanent core government obligations. German SOEs are subject to the same taxes and the same value added tax rebate policies as their private- sector competitors. There are no laws or rules that seek to ensure a primary or leading role for SOEs in certain sectors or industries. Private enterprises have the same access to financing as SOEs, including access to state-owned banks such as KfW. The Federal Statistics Office maintains a database of SOEs from all three levels of government (federal, state, and municipal) listing a total of 19,009 entities for 2019, or 0.58 percent of the total 3.35 million companies in Germany. SOEs in 2019 had €646 billion in revenue and €632 billion in expenditures. Forty-one percent of SOEs’ revenue was generated by water and energy suppliers, 12 percent by health and social services, and 11 percent by transportation-related entities. Measured by number of companies rather than size, 88 percent of SOEs are owned by municipalities, 10 percent are owned by Germany’s 16 states, and two percent are owned by the federal government. The Federal Ministry of Finance is required to publish a detailed annual report on public funds, institutions, and companies in which the federal government has direct participation (including a minority share) or an indirect participation greater than 25 percent and with a nominal capital share worth more than €50,000. The federal government held a direct participation in 106 companies and an indirect participation in 401 companies at the end of 2019 (per the Ministry’s April 2021 publication of full-year 2019 figures), most prominently Deutsche Bahn (100 percent share), Deutsche Telekom (32 percent share), and Deutsche Post (21 percent share). Federal government ownership is concentrated in the areas of infrastructure, economic development, science, administration/increasing efficiency, defense, development policy, and culture. As the result of federal financial assistance packages from the federally-controlled Financial Market Stability Fund during the global financial crisis of 2008/9, the federal government still has a partial stake in several commercial banks, including a 15.6 percent share in Commerzbank, Germany’s second largest commercial bank. In 2020, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the German government acquired shares of several large German companies, including CureVac, TUI, and Lufthansa in an attempt to prevent companies from filing for insolvency or, in the case of CureVac, to support vaccine research in Germany. The 2021 annual report (with 2019 data) can be found here: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/publikationen/beteiligungsbericht-des-bundes-2021-2016812 Publicly-owned banks constitute one of the three pillars of Germany’s banking system (cooperative and commercial banks are the other two). Germany’s savings banks are mainly owned by the municipalities, while the so-called Landesbanken are typically owned by regional savings bank associations and the state governments. Given their joint market share, about 40 percent of the German banking sector is thus publicly owned. There are also many state-owned promotional/development banks which have taken on larger governmental roles in financing infrastructure. This increased role removes expenditures from public budgets, particularly helpful considering Germany’s balanced budget rules, which took effect for the states in 2020. Germany does not have any privatization programs currently. German authorities treat foreigners equally in privatizations of state-owned enterprises. 10. Political and Security Environment Overall, political acts of violence against either foreign or domestic business enterprises are extremely rare. Most protests and demonstrations, whether political acts of violence against either foreign or domestic business enterprises or any other cause or focus, remain peaceful. However, minor attacks by left-wing extremists on commercial enterprises occur. These extremists justify their attacks as a means to combat the “capitalist system” as the “source of all evil.” In the foreground, however, concrete connections such as “anti-militarism” (in the case of armament companies), “anti-repression” (in the case of companies for prison logistics or surveillance technology), or the supposed commitment to climate protection (companies from the raw materials and energy sector) are usually cited. In several key instances in larger cities with a strained housing market (low availability of affordable housing options), left-wing extremists target real estate companies in connection with the defense of autonomous “free spaces” and the fight against “anti-social urban structures.” Isolated cases of violence directed at certain minorities and asylum seekers have not targeted U.S. investments or investors. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 €3.332,230 2020 $3.846,414 Federal Statistical Office, www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 €88,748 2020 $162,387 Bundesbank, BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 €324,992 2020 $564,294 Bundesbank, BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 29.7% 2020 27.9% Federal Statistical Office, Bundesbank, UNCTAD data available at https://hbs.unctad.org/foreign-direct-investment/ * Source for Host Country Data: Federal Statistical Office, www.destatis.de ; Bundesbank, www.bundesbank.de Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $1,129,900 100% Total Outward $1,955,383 100% Luxembourg $220,284 19% United States $336,475 17% The Netherlands $206,592 18% Luxembourg $291,412 15% United States $115,320 10% The Netherlands $228,609 12% Switzerland $91,434 8% United Kingdom $132,019 7% United Kingdom $748,964 7% France $99,582 5% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Ghana Executive Summary Ghana’s economy had expanded at an average of seven percent per year since 2017 until the coronavirus pandemic reduced growth to 0.4 percent in 2020, according to the Ministry of Finance. Between 2017 and 2019, the fiscal deficit narrowed, inflation decreased, and GDP growth rebounded, driven primarily by increases in oil production. Ghana saw a 9 percent growth rate in the first quarter of 2019 and closed that year with a 6.5 percent GDP growth rate. Indicating a recovery from the pandemic, the Ghana Statistical Service reported a 6.6 percent growth rate in the third quarter of 2021, marking the fastest growth in GDP since the pandemic began. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expected growth to rebound to 4.7 percent in 2021 from the shock of COVID-19 and by 6.2 percent in 2022. The economy remains highly dependent on the export of primary commodities such as gold, cocoa, and oil, and consequently is vulnerable to slowdowns in the global economy and commodity price shocks. In November 2020, Ghana launched the 100 billion cedi (about $13 billion) Ghana COVID-19 Alleviation and Revitalization of Enterprises Support (Ghana CARES) Program to address the effects of the virus on the economy. In 2020, the government also launched Ghana’s National Adaptation Plan Process by which it expects to develop strategies to build resilience against the impacts of both climate change and crises such as COVID-19. In general, Ghana’s investment prospects remain favorable, as the Government of Ghana seeks to diversify and industrialize through agro-processing, mining, and manufacturing. It has made attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) a priority to support its industrialization plans and to overcome an annual infrastructure funding gap. Challenges to Ghana’s economy include high government debt, particularly energy sector debt, low internally generated revenue, and inefficient state-owned enterprises. Ghana has a population of 31 million, with over 14 million potential taxpayers, but only six million of whom filed their annual tax returns. As Ghana seeks to move beyond dependence on foreign aid, it must develop a solid domestic revenue base. On the energy front, Ghana has enough installed power capacity to meet current demand, but it needs to reduce the cost of electricity by improving the management of its state-owned power distribution system. Among the challenges hindering foreign direct investment are: costly and difficult financial services, lack of government transparency, corruption, under-developed infrastructure, a complex property market, costly and intermittent power and water supply, the high costs of cross-border trade, a burdensome bureaucracy, and an unskilled labor force. Enforcement of laws and policies is weak, even where good laws exist on the books. Public procurements are sometimes opaque, and there are often issues with delayed payments. In addition, there have been troubling trends in investment policy over the last six years, with the passage of local content regulations in the petroleum, power, and mining sectors that may discourage needed future investments. Despite these challenges, Ghana’s abundant raw materials (gold, cocoa, and oil/gas), relative security, and political stability, as well as its hosting of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat make it stand out as one of the better locations for investment in sub-Saharan Africa. There is no discrimination against foreign-owned businesses. Investment laws protect investors against expropriation and nationalization and guarantee that investors can transfer profits out of the country, although international companies have reported high levels of corruption in dealing with Ghanaian government institutions. Among the most promising sectors are agribusiness and food processing; textiles and apparel; downstream oil, gas, and minerals processing; construction; and mining-related services subsectors. The government has acknowledged the need to strengthen its enabling environment to attract FDI, and is taking steps to overhaul the regulatory system, improve the ease of doing business, and restore fiscal discipline. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 73 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 112 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in Ghana ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 429 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 2,340 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Ghana has made increasing FDI a priority and acknowledges the importance of having an enabling environment for the private sector to thrive. Officials are implementing regulatory and other reforms such as automation and digitalization of government processes and enhancing GIPC’s own support services, to improve the ease of doing business and make investing in Ghana more attractive. The 2013 Ghana Investment Promotion Center (GIPC) Act requires the GIPC to register, monitor, and keep records of all business enterprises in Ghana. Sector-specific laws further regulate investments in minerals and mining, oil and gas, industries within Free Zones, banking, non-bank financial institutions, insurance, fishing, securities, telecommunications, energy, and real estate. Some sector-specific laws, such as in the oil and gas sector and the power sector, include local content requirements that could discourage international investment. Foreign investors are required to satisfy the provisions of the GIPC Act as well as the provisions of sector-specific laws. GIPC leadership has pledged to collaborate more closely with the private sector to address investor concerns, but there have been no significant changes to the laws. More information on investing in Ghana can be obtained from GIPC’s website, www.gipc.gov.gh. Most of Ghana’s major sectors are fully open to foreign capital participation. U.S. investors in Ghana are treated the same as other foreign investors. All foreign investment projects must register with the GIPC. Foreign investments are subject to the following minimum capital requirements: USD 200,000 for joint ventures with a Ghanaian partner, who should have at least 10 percent of the equity; USD 500,000 for enterprises wholly owned by a non-Ghanaian; and USD 1 million for trading companies (firms that buy or sell imported goods or services) wholly owned by non-Ghanaian entities. The minimum capital requirement may be met in cash or capital goods relevant to the investment. Trading companies are also required to employ at least 20 skilled Ghanaian nationals. Ghana’s investment code excludes foreign investors from participating in eight economic sectors: petty trading; the operation of taxi and car rental services with fleets of fewer than 25 vehicles; lotteries (excluding soccer pools); the operation of beauty salons and barber shops; printing of recharge scratch cards for subscribers to telecommunications services; production of exercise books and stationery; retail of finished pharmaceutical products; and the production, supply, and retail of drinking water in sealed pouches. Sectors where foreign investors are allowed limited market access include: telecommunications, banking, fishing, mining, petroleum, and real estate. Ghana has not conducted an investment policy review (IPR) through the OECD recently. UNCTAD last conducted an IPR in 2003. The WTO last conducted a Trade Policy Review (TPR) in May 2014. The next review is scheduled for May 4-6, 2022. The 2014 TPR concluded that the 2013 amendment to the investment law raised the minimum capital that foreigners must invest to levels above those specified in Ghana’s 1994 GATS horizontal commitments and excluded new activities from foreign competition. However, it was determined that overall, this would have minimal impact on dissuading future foreign investment due to the size of the companies traditionally seeking to do business within the country. An executive summary of the findings can be found at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp398_e.htm . Although registering a business is a relatively easy procedure and can be done online through the Registrar General’s Department (RGD) at https://rgd.gov.gh/index.html , businesses have noted that the process involved in establishing a business is lengthy and complex, and requires compliance with regulations and procedures of at least four other government agencies, including GIPC, Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA), Ghana Immigration Service, and the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT). In 2019, Ghana passed a new Companies Act, 2019 (Act 992), which among other things, created a new independent office called the Office of the Registrar of Companies, responsible for the registration and regulation of all businesses. A new office is expected to be in place which would separate the registration process for companies from the Registrar General’s Department; the latter would continue to serve as the government’s registrar for non-business transactions such as marriages. The new law also simplifies some registration processes by scrapping the issuance of a certificate to commence business and the requirement for a company to state business objectives, which limited the activities in which a company could engage. The law also expands the role of the company secretary, which now requires educational qualifications with some background in company law practice and administration or having been trained under a company secretary for at least three years. Foreign investors must obtain a certificate of capital importation, which can take 14 days. The local authorized bank must confirm the import of capital with the Bank of Ghana, which confirms the transaction to GIPC for investment registration purposes. Per the GIPC Act, all foreign companies are required to register with GIPC after incorporation with the RGD. Registration can be completed online at www.gipc.gov.gh. While the registration process is designed to be completed within five business days, but there are often bureaucratic delays. The Ghanaian business environment is unique, and guidance can be extremely helpful. In some cases, a foreign investment may enjoy certain tax benefits under the law or additional incentives if the project is deemed critical to the country’s development. Most companies or individuals considering investing in Ghana or trading with Ghanaian counterparts find it useful to consult with a local attorney or business facilitation company. The United States Embassy in Accra maintains a list of local attorneys, which is available through the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service ( https://www.trade.gov/ghana-contact-us ) or U.S. Citizen Services ( https://gh.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/attorneys/). Specific information about setting up a business is available at the GIPC website: https://gipc.gov.gh/4232-2/. Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Post: P. O. Box M193, Accra-Ghana Note: Omit the (0) after the country code when dialing from abroad. Telephone: +233 (0) 302 665 125, +233 (0) 302 665 126, +233 (0) 302 665 127, +233 (0) 302 665 128, +233 (0) 302 665 129, +233 (0) 244 318 254/ +233 (0) 244 318 252 Email: info@gipc.gov.gh Note that mining or oil/gas sector companies are required to obtain licensing/approval from the following relevant bodies: Petroleum Commission Head Office Plot No. 4A, George Bush Highway, Accra, Ghana P.O. Box CT 228 Cantonments, Accra, Ghana Telephone: +233 (0) 302 953 392 | +233 (0) 302 953 393 Website: http://www.petrocom.gov.gh/ Minerals Commission Minerals House, No. 12 Switchback Road, Cantonments, Accra P. O. Box M 248 Telephone: +233 (0) 302 772 783 /+233 (0) 302 772 786 /+233 (0) 302 773 053 Website: http://www.mincom.gov.gh/ Ghana has no specific outward investment policy. It has entered into bilateral treaties, however, with a number of countries to promote and protect foreign investment on a reciprocal basis. Some Ghanaian companies have established operations in other West African countries and there are a number of active Ghanaian investments in the United States in the food processing and personal care sectors. 3. Legal Regime The Government of Ghana’s policies on trade liberalization and investment promotion are guiding its efforts to create a clear and transparent regulatory system. Ghana does not have a standardized consultation process, but ministries and Parliament generally share the text or summary of proposed regulations and solicit comments directly from stakeholders or via public meetings and hearings. All laws that are currently in effect are printed by the Ghana Publishing Company, while the notice of publication of the law, bills, or regulations are made in the Ghana Gazette (equivalent of the U.S. Federal Register). The non-profit Ghana Legal Information Institute ( Home | GhaLII ) re-publishes hard copies of the Ghana Gazette. The Government of Ghana does not publish draft regulations online, and the Parliament publishes only some draft bills ( https://www.parliament.gh/docs?type=Bills&OT ), which inhibits transparency in the approval of laws and regulations. The Government of Ghana has established regulatory bodies such as the National Communications Authority, the National Petroleum Authority, the Petroleum Commission, the Energy Commission, and the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission to oversee activities in the telecommunications, downstream and upstream petroleum, electricity and natural gas, and water sectors. The creation of these bodies was a positive step, but the lack of resources and the bodies’ susceptibility to political influence undermine their ability to deliver the intended level of oversight. The government launched a Business Regulatory Reform program in 2017, but implementation has been slow. The program aims to improve the ease of doing business, review all rules and regulations to identify and reduce unnecessary costs and requirements, establish an e-registry of all laws, establish a centralized public consultation web portal, provide regulatory relief for entrepreneurs, and eventually implement a regulatory impact analysis system. The government continues to work towards achieving these goals and in 2020 established the centralized public consultation web portal ( www.bcp.gov.gh ), the Ghana Business Regulatory Reforms platform. It is an interactive platform to allow policymakers to consult businesses and individuals in a transparent, inclusive, and timely manner on policy issues. Ghana adopted International Financial Reporting Standards in 2007 for all listed companies, government business enterprises, banks, insurance companies, security brokers, pension funds, and public utilities. Projects likely to have significant impacts on the environment are required to obtain environmental permits from the Ghanaian Environmental Protection Agency before commencement of construction and operations. The government, however, does not have a policy that requires or promotes companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. Ghana has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since January 1995 and a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade since 1957. Ghana issues its own standards for many products under the auspices of the Ghana Standards Authority (GSA). The GSA has promulgated more than 500 Ghanaian standards and adopted more than 2,000 international standards including European Union and U.S. standards for certification purposes. The Ghanaian Food and Drugs Authority is responsible for enforcing standards for food, drugs, cosmetics, and health items. Ghana has a WTO obligation to notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Ghana’s legal system is based on British common law and local customary law. Investors should note that the acquisition of real property is governed by both statutory and customary law. The judiciary comprises both lower courts and superior courts. The superior courts are the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, and the High Court and Regional Tribunals. Lawsuits are permitted and usually begin in the High Court. The High Court has jurisdiction in all matters, civil and criminal, other than those involving treason and some cases that involve the highest levels of the government – which go to the Supreme Court. There is a history of government intervention in the court system, although somewhat less so in commercial matters. The courts have entered judgments against the government. However, the courts have been slow in disposing of cases and at times face challenges in having their decisions enforced, largely due to resource constraints and institutional inefficiencies. The GIPC Act codified the government’s desire to present foreign investors with a transparent foreign investment regulatory regime. GIPC regulates foreign investment in acquisitions, mergers, takeovers and new investments, as well as portfolio investment in stocks, bonds, and other securities traded on the Ghana Stock Exchange. The GIPC Act also specifies areas of investment reserved for Ghanaian citizens, and further delineates incentives and guarantees that relate to taxation, transfer of capital, profits and dividends, and guarantees against expropriation. GIPC helps to facilitate the business registration process and provides economic, commercial, and investment information for companies and businesspeople interested in starting a business or investing in Ghana. GIPC provides assistance to enable investors to take advantage of relevant incentives. Registration can be completed online at www.gipc.gov.gh. As detailed in the previous section on “Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment,” sector-specific laws regulate foreign participation/investment in telecommunications, banking, fishing, mining, petroleum, and real estate. Ghana regulates the transfer of technologies not freely available in Ghana. According to the 1992 Technology Transfer Regulations, total management and technical fee levels higher than eight percent of net sales must be approved by GIPC. The regulations do not allow agreements that impose obligations to procure personnel, inputs, and equipment from the transferor or specific source. The duration of related contracts cannot exceed ten years and cannot be renewed for more than five years. Any provisions in the agreement inconsistent with Ghanaian regulations are unenforceable in Ghana. Ghana is reportedly working on a new competition law to replace the existing legislation, the Protection Against Unfair Competition Act, 2000 (Act 589); however, the new bill is still under review. The Constitution sets out some exceptions and a clear procedure for the payment of compensation in allowable cases of expropriation or nationalization. Additionally, Ghana’s investment laws generally protect investors against expropriation and nationalization. The Government of Ghana may, however, expropriate property if it is required to protect national defense, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and county planning, or to ensure the development or utilization of property in a manner to promote public benefit. In such cases, the GOG must provide prompt payment of fair and adequate compensation to the property owner, but the process for determining adequate compensation and making payments can be complicated and lengthy in practice. The Government of Ghana guarantees due process by allowing access to the High Court by any person who has an interest or right over the property. Ghana does not have a bankruptcy statute. A new insolvency law, the Corporate Restructuring and Insolvency Act, 2020 (Act 1015), was passed to replace the Bodies Corporate (Official Liquidations) Act, 1963 (Act 180). The new law, unlike the previous one, provides for reorganization of a company before liquidation when it is unable to pay its debts, as well as cross-border insolvency rules. The new law does not have a U.S. Chapter 11-style bankruptcy provision but allows for a process that puts the company under administration for restructuring. The new law complements the law for private liquidations under the Companies Act, 2019 (Act 992), but does not apply to businesses that are under specialized regulations such as banks and insurance companies. 6. Financial Sector Private sector growth in Ghana is constrained by financing challenges. Businesses continue to face difficulty raising capital on the local market. While credit to the private sector has increased in nominal terms, levels as percentage of GDP have remained stagnant over the last decade, and high government borrowing has brought interest rates above 20 percent and crowded out private investment. Capital markets and portfolio investment are gradually evolving. The longest-term domestic bonds are 20 years, with Eurobonds ranging up to 41-year maturities. Foreign investors are permitted to participate in auctions of bonds only with maturities of two years or longer. In January 2022, foreign investors held about 16.6 percent (valued at USD 5 billion) of the total outstanding domestic securities. In 2015, the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) added the Ghana Fixed-Income Market (GFIM) – https://gfim.com.gh/, a specialized platform for secondary trading in debt instruments to improve liquidity. The rapid accumulation of debt over the last decade, and particularly the past three years, has raised debt sustainability concerns. Ghana received debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative in 2004, and began issuing Eurobonds in 2007. In February 2020, Ghana sold sub-Saharan Africa’s longest-ever Eurobond as part of a $3 billion deal with a tenor of 41 years. At the end of December 2021, total public debt, roughly evenly split between external and domestic, stood at 80 percent of GDP, according to the Bank of Ghana, partly as a result of the economic shock of COVID-19 as revenue declined and expenditures spiked. The Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) has 36 listed companies. Both foreign and local companies are allowed to list on the GSE. The Securities and Exchange Commission regulates activities on the Exchange. There is an eight percent tax on dividend income. Foreigners are permitted to trade stocks listed on the GSE without restriction. There are no capital controls on the flow of retained earnings, capital gains, dividends, or interest payments. The GSE composite index (GGSECI) has exhibited mixed performance. Banks in Ghana are relatively small, with the largest in the country in terms of operating assets, Ecobank Ghana Ltd., holding assets of about USD 2.3 billion in 2020. The Central Bank’s minimum capital requirement for commercial banks is 400 million (USD 57 million), effective December 2018. As a result of the reforms and subsequent closures and mergers of some banks from 2017 to 2019, the number of commercial banks dropped from 36 to 23. Eight are domestically controlled, and the remaining 15 are foreign controlled. In total, there are over 1,500 branches distributed across the sixteen regions of the country. Overall, the banking industry in Ghana is well capitalized with a capital adequacy ratio of 19.6 percent as of December 2021, above the 11.5 percent prudential and statutory requirement. The non-performing loans ratio increased from 14.8 percent in December 2020 to 15.2 percent as of December 2021. Lending in foreign currencies to unhedged borrowers poses a risk, and widely varying standards in loan classification and provisioning may be masking weaknesses in bank balance sheets. The BoG has almost completed actions to address weaknesses in the non-bank deposit-taking institutions sector (e.g., microfinance, savings and loan, and rural banks) and has also issued new guidelines to strengthen corporate governance regulations in the banks. Recent developments in the non-banking financial sector indicate increased diversification, including new rules and regulations governing the trading of Exchange Traded Funds. Non-banking financial institutions such as leasing companies, building societies, and village savings and loan associations have increased access to finance for underserved populations, as have rural and mobile banking. Currently, Ghana has no “cross-shareholding” or “stable shareholder” arrangements used by private firms to restrict foreign investment through mergers and acquisitions, although, as noted above, the Payments Systems and Services Act, 2019 (Act 987), does require a 30 percent Ghanaian company or Ghanaian holding by any electronic payments service provider, including banks or special deposit-taking institutions. Ghana’s main sovereign wealth fund is the Ghana Petroleum Fund (GPF), which is funded by oil profits and flows to the Ghana Heritage Fund and Ghana Stabilization Fund. The Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA), 2011 (Act 815), spells out how revenues from oil and gas should be spent and includes transparency provisions for reporting by government agencies, as well as an independent oversight group, the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC). Section 48 of the PRMA requires the Fund to publish an audited annual report by the Ghana Audit Service. The Fund’s management meets the legal obligations. Management of the Ghana Petroleum Fund is a joint responsibility between the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Ghana. The minister develops the investment policy for the GPF, and is responsible for the overall management of GPF funds, consults regularly with the Investment Advisory Committee and Bank of Ghana Governor before making any decisions related to investment strategy or management of GPF funds. The minister is also in charge of establishing a management agreement with the Bank of Ghana for the oversight of the funds. The Bank of Ghana is responsible for the day-to-day operational management of the Petroleum Reserve Accounts (PRAs) under the terms of Operation Management Agreement. For additional information regarding Ghana Petroleum Fund, please visit the 2020 Petroleum Annual Report at: https://mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/reports/petroleum/2020-Annual-Petroleum-Report.pdf . 7. State-Owned Enterprises Ghana has 94 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 51 of which are wholly owned, while 43 are partially owned. While the president appoints the CEO and full boards of most of the wholly owned SOEs, they are under the supervision of line ministries. Most of the partially owned investments are in the financial, mining, and oil and gas sectors. To improve the efficiency of SOEs and reduce fiscal risks they pose to the budget, in 2019 the government embarked on an exercise to tackle weak corporate governance in the SOEs as well as created the State Interests and Governance Authority (SIGA), a single institution, to monitor all SOEs, replacing both the State Enterprises Commission and the Divestiture Implementation Committee. As of December 2021, only a handful of large SOEs remain, mainly in the transportation, water, banking, power, and extractive sectors. The largest SOEs are Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), Volta River Authority (VRA), Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL), Ghana Ports and Harbor Authority (GPHA), Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), Ghana National Gas Company Limited (GNGC), Ghana Airport Company Limited (GACL), Consolidated Bank Ghana Limited (CBG), Bui Power Authority (BPA), and Ghana Grid Company Limited (GRIDCo). Many of these receive subsidies and assistance from the government. The list of SOEs can be found at: https://siga.gov.gh/state-interest/ . While the Government of Ghana does not actively promote adherence to the OECD Guidelines, SIGA oversees corporate governance of SOEs and encourages them to be managed like Limited Liability Companies to be profit making. In addition, beginning in 2014, most SOEs were required to contract and service direct and government-guaranteed loans on their own balance sheet. The government’s goal is to stop adding these loans to “pure public” debt, paid by taxpayers directly through the budget. Ghana has no formal privatization program. The government has announced its intention, however, to prioritize the creation of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to restructure and privatize non-performing SOEs, although progress to implement this goal has been slow. Procuring PPPs is allowed under the National Policy on Public Private Partnerships in Ghana, which was adopted in June 2011. The Public Private Partnership Act, 2020 (Act 1039) was passed in December 2020. Greece Executive Summary The Greek economy has proven resilient in recent years as it continues to rebound from the 2007 economic crisis – including the rigid fiscal constraints demanded by creditors — and the global COVID-19 pandemic. In early 2020, COVID-19 held the potential to permanently scar an economy that still suffered from legacy issues, including high debt and non-performing loans, limited credit growth, near zero capacity for fiscal expansion, and a hollowed-out healthcare system. While continuing its aggressive reform agenda, the Mitsotakis government rose to meet the pandemic challenge, as European institutions effectively welcomed Greek debt back into the eurosystem, the IMF and EU evaluated the country’s public debt as sustainable, Moody’s upgraded Greek sovereign debt, the country began borrowing at historically low cost, and strategic investors returned, favorably considering Greece’s current and long-term value proposition. Meanwhile, over the past several years, our bilateral relationship has deepened significantly via our defense and strategic partnerships, and Greece ambitiously seeks now to bring our economic ties to similar, historic heights. Far from being the problem child of Europe or the international financial system, Greece is increasingly a source of solutions – not just in the fields of energy diplomacy and defense, but in high-tech innovation, healthcare, and green energy, improving prospects for solid economic growth and stability here and in the wider region. The Mitsotakis government was elected in July 2019 on an aggressive investment and economic reform agenda which has plowed forward despite the pandemic. During its first nine months in power, Mitostakis’s team pushed market-friendly reforms and Parliament voted through dozens of economic-related bills, including a key investment law in October 2019, designed to cut red tape, help achieve full employment, and adopt best international practices – including by digitizing government services. GDP growth reached 8.3 percent in 2021, a major leap forward following the detrimental effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Greece maintains a liquidity buffer, estimated at €30 billion, but is intent on boosting its coffers as the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic is larger than expected. So far untouched, the buffer should be sufficient to cover the country’s financing needs until at least the end of 2022, and the country’s leadership maintains its intention to reserve the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) tranche solely for sovereign debt interest payments. While capital controls were completely lifted in September 2019, Greece remains subject to enhanced supervision by Eurozone creditors. However, the European Commission’s (EC) latest positive assessment on the Greek economy, will – most likely – pave the way for the end of the country’s enhanced surveillance status in Q3 2022. Greece’s banking system, despite three recapitalizations as part of the August 2015 European Stability Mechanism (ESM) agreement, remains saddled with the largest ratio of non-performing loans in the EU, which constrains the domestic financial sector’s ability to finance the national economy. As a result, businesses, particularly small and medium enterprises, still struggle to obtain domestic financing to support operations due to inflated risk premiums in the sector. To tackle the issue, and as a requirement of the agreement with the ESM, Greece has established a secondary market for its non-performing loans (NPLs). According to the Bank of Greece, non-performing loans (NPLs) came, on a solo basis, to €58.7 billion at end-September 2020, down by €9.8 billion from December 2019 and by €48.5 billion from their March 2016 peak. The NPL-to-total loan ratio remained high in September 2020 at 35.8 percent. The high percentage of performing loans benefited from moratoria until December 31, 2020, and contained the inflow of new NPLs. Non-performing private debt remains high, irrespective of the reduction in NPLs on bank balance sheets via transfer to non-bank entities. 2020 saw substantial reforms aimed at resolving the issue of NPLs. These involved the securitization of NPLs through the activation of the “Hercules” scheme and the enactment of Law No. 4738/2020 which improves several aspects of insolvency law. Nevertheless, NPLs will remain high, and considering that there will be a new inflow of NPLs due to the pandemic, other solutions complementary to the “Hercules” scheme should be implemented. In addition to sales of securitized loan packages, banks have exploited other ways to manage bad loans. For example, nearly all of Greece’s systemic banks employ loan servicing firms to manage non-performing exposure. Greece’s secondary market for NPL servicers now includes 24 companies including: Sepal (an Alpha Bank-Aktua joint venture), FPS (a Eurobank subsidiary), Pillarstone, Independent Portfolio Management, B2Kapital, UCI Hellas, Resolute Asset Management, Thea Artemis, PQH, Qquant Master Servicer, and DV01 Asset Management. Greece’s return to economic growth has generated new investor interest in the country. Pfizer, Cisco, Deloitte, and Microsoft, to name a few, have all announced major investments in the past few years, due in part to improved protection of intellectual property rights and Greece’s delisting from the U.S. Trade Representatives Special 301 Watch List in 2020. In March 2021, Greece successfully raised €2.5 billion from its first 30-year bond sale in more than a decade, with the issue more than 10 times oversubscribed. The bond, which has so far received investor demand of more than €26.1 billion, will price at 150 basis points over the mid-swap level, resulting in a yield of 1.93 percent. In January 2022, Fitch Ratings Agency maintained Greece’s credit rating at BB and noted the country’s outlook as ‘stable’ due to the financial impact of COVID-19. On April 1, 2021, Moody’s improved its outlook of the Greek banking system from “stable” to “positive.”Standard & Poor’s affirmed its credit rating for Greece at BB-in October 2020 and also kept its outlook to “stable.” The European Central Bank (ECB) included Greek government bonds in its quantitative easing program, with €12 billion worth of Greek government debt earmarked for purchase under the ECB’s €750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program in 2020. In February 2022, Greece has received the Eurogroup’s approval to repay the final tranches of bailout loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) early, along with a small part of bilateral loans from its eurozone partners. Greece plans to repay loans worth €1.9 billion to the IMF by March, two years ahead of schedule. The Greek government was given strong marks for its initial response in limiting the spread of the pandemic and has implemented several innovative digital reforms to its economy during COVID-19. The Greek economy contracted by 10 percent in 2020 with a gross domestic product (GDP) of €189 billion but its GDP rose to €211 billion in 2021. This was largely attributed to the successful 2021tourism season, which brought in €10 billion to the Greek economy. The unemployment rate was 15.8 percent in 2021, a slight increase from 15.5 percent in 2020. In response to the pandemic, Greece’s recovery and resilience plan was among the first plans that were formally approved by the European Council, in July 2021. Greece received €4 billion of the disbursement in August. The plan will disburse €17.8 billion in grants and €12.7 billion in loans over the course of five years. Greece has earmarked funding for many climate-relevant investments and digitalization efforts. Greece was also the first Member State to finalize its Partnership Agreement for the 2021-2027 programming period. The Partnership Agreement outlines the plan for deploying of more than €21 billion worth of investments to support Greece’s economic, social and territorial cohesion. The Greek government also took measures to support businesses throughout the pandemic in 2021. In February 2021, the government approved a €500 million scheme to support small and medium-sized businesses affected by the pandemic. The state aid Temporary Framework was open to small and medium-sized enterprises active in all sectors except financial, primary agriculture, tobacco, and fisheries sectors. This public support, in the form of direct grants, sought to provide sufficient working capital for businesses affected by the pandemic. In May 2021, the European Commission approved a €793 million support measure for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises affected by the coronavirus outbreak in the form of direct grants, which is open to companies active in all sectors except the financial one. The aid aims to provide liquidity support to qualifying beneficiaries, to safeguard businesses against the risk of default, allowing them to preserve their economic activity and helping them recover after the pandemic. Rounding out 2021, the Greek government enacted a €665 million scheme in November 2021 to support households affected by the pandemic. The scheme was adopted to assist households at risk of losing their primary residence by defaulting on their mortgage loans. On 3 November 2021, the European Commission approved modifications to ensure the extension of the loan period and a reduction of the maximum aid amount per beneficiary. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 58 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/country/GRC Global Innovation Index 2021 47 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $74 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.cfm?Area=310 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $17,930 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Greek government continues to take steps to increase foreign investment, implementing economic reforms and taking steps to mitigate the impact of the pandemic. Greece completed its EU bailout program in 2018, allowing it to borrow once again at market rates, reflected in a rising economic sentiment since 2017. Heavy bureaucracy and a slow judicial system continue to create challenges for both foreign and domestic investors. There are no laws or practices known to Post that discriminate against foreign investors. The country has investment promotion agencies to facilitate foreign investments, with “Enterprise Greece” as the official agency of the Greek state. Under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Enterprise Greece is responsible for promoting investment in Greece and exports from Greece, and with making Greece more attractive as an international business partner. Enterprise Greece provides the full spectrum of services related to international business relationships and domestic business development for the international market, including an Investor Ombudsman program for investment projects exceeding €2 million. The Ombudsman is available to assist with specific bureaucratic obstacles, delays, disputes, or other difficulties that impede an investment project. However, Enterprise Greece, even with its ombudsman service, is not very effective at moving investment projects forward. The General Secretariat for Strategic and Private Investments streamlines the licensing procedure for strategic investments, aiming to make the process easier and more attractive to investors. Greece has adopted the following EU definitions regarding micro, small, and medium size enterprises: Micro Enterprises: Fewer than 10 employees and an annual turnover or balance sheet below €2 million. Small Enterprises: Fewer than 50 employees and an annual turnover or balance sheet below €10 million. Medium-Sized Enterprises: Fewer than 250 employees and annual turnover below €50 million or balance sheet below €43 million. Numerous structural reforms, undertaken as part of the country’s 2015-2018 international bailout program as well as a part of the current New Democracy administration’s efforts to lower taxes and reduce bureaucracy, aim to welcome and facilitate foreign investment, and the government has publicly messaged its dedication to attracting foreign investment.The 2019 investment law simplified licensing procedures in order to facilitate investment. In December 2020, parliament passed a new law allowing non-residents who relocate their jobs to Greece to benefit from half their salary being free of income tax for up to seven years. The scheme is open to any type of job, any income level and complements other tax incentive schemes put in place, including a non-dom program for wealthy investors and a low flat tax rate for pensioners. The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) is another example of the government’s commitment in this area. In November 2015, the Greek government and TAP investors agreed on measures and began construction on the largest investment project since the start of the financial crisis. The pipeline began operations in December 2020 and in March 2021, TAP announced that a total of 1 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas from Azerbaijan entered Europe via the Greek interconnection point of Kipoi. Law 4710/2020 gave a strong push for electro-mobility, with several incentives and subsidies to those interested in acquiring an electric vehicle. The law has paved the way for greater U.S. investment. For example, Tesla has installed the first pop-up stand along with three electric vehicle (EV) charges at a major Greek shopping mall, while Blink expanded its EV network in Greece. Additionally, there are directives that have eased the bureaucracy surrounding renewable energy source (RES) projects, including establishing a deadline for the issuance of Environmental Terms Approvals (ETAs) of 120 days and limiting the environmental licensing stages to three stages instead of the previous six or seven stages required for companies to abide by. In the past decade, the country underwent one of the most significant fiscal consolidations in modern history, with broad and deep cuts to public expenditures and significant increases in labor and social security tax rates, which have offset improved labor market competitiveness achieved through significant wage devaluation. While there has been notable progress, corruption and burdensome bureaucracy continue to create barriers to market entry for new firms, permitting incumbents to maintain oligopolies in different sectors, and creating scope for arbitrary decisions and rent seeking by public servants. As a member of the EU and the European Monetary Union (the “Eurozone”), Greece is required to meet EU and eurozone investment regulations. Foreign and domestic private entities have the legal right to establish and own businesses in Greece; however, the country places restrictions on foreign equity ownership higher than those imposed on average in the other 17 high-income OECD economies, such as equity restrictions on airport operations and limits on foreign ownership in electricity and media. The government has undertaken EU-mandated reforms in its energy sector, opening much of it to foreign equity ownership. Restrictions exist on land purchases in border regions and on certain islands because of national security considerations. Foreign investors can buy or sell shares on the Athens Stock Exchange on the same basis as local investors. Greece does not maintain an investment screening mechanism. However, the Greek Government is currently working on the legislation for the development of an FDI screening mechanism. The plan is to finalize the text in mid-2022 and then present it to the European Commission. The government has not undergone an investment policy review by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), or United Nations Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) or worked with any other international institution to produce a public report on the general investment climate in the past three years. However, in July 2020, the OECD published a periodic economic survey describing the state of the economy and addressing foreign direct investment concerns, especially regarding needed reforms in the public sector and judicial system.In particular, the OECD report lauds the Ministry of Digital Governance’s progress in instituting digital and public administration reforms and recommends continued effort in this area. To date, the OECD has not published an economic survey for 2021, however, the economic forecast summary for Greece was published in December 2021. Although Greece has many civil society organizations (CSOs), no CSO has raised concerns related to investment policies introduced by the government of Greece. In 2020, Greece eased processes for starting a business by reducing the time to register a company and removing the requirement to obtain a tax clearance. Accessing industrial land in Greece is relatively quick, with only three weeks required to lease land from the government. Private land can be leased within 15 days. Arbitrating commercial disputes, however, can take almost a year. Establishing a limited liability company takes approximately four days with three procedures involved, including registering the business, making a company seal, and registering with the Unified Social Security Institution. Greece’s Ease of Doing Business score in 2020 is 96, for a rank of 11 for starting a business and rank of 79 overall. Greece is now one of the 37 countries listed on www.businessfacilitation.org. Greece’s business registration entity GEMI (General Commercial Register) has the basic responsibility for digitizing and automating the registration and monitoring procedures of commercial enterprises. The online business registration process is relatively clear, and although foreign companies can use it, the registration steps are currently available only in Greek. In general, a company must register with the business chamber, tax registry, social security, and local municipality. Business creation without a notary can be done for specific cases (small/personal businesses, etc.). For the establishment of larger companies, a notary is mandatory. The Greek government does not have any known outward investment incentive programs. Capital controls were eliminated in September 2019. Enterprise Greece supports the international expansion of Greek companies. While no incentives are offered, Enterprise Greece has been supportive of Greek companies attending the U.S. Government’s Annual SelectUSA Investment Summit, which promotes inbound investment to the United States, and similar industry trade events internationally. 3. Legal Regime As an EU member, Greece is required to have transparent policies and laws for fostering competition. Foreign companies consider the complexity of government regulations and procedures and their inconsistent implementation to be a significant impediment to investing and operating in Greece. Occasionally, foreign companies report cases where there are multiple laws governing the same issue, resulting in confusion over which law is applicable. Under its bailout programs, the Greek government committed to widespread reforms to simplify the legal framework for investment, including eliminating bureaucratic obstacles, redundancies, and undue regulations. The fast-track law, passed in December 2010, aimed to simplify the licensing and approval process for “strategic” investments, i.e. large-scale investments that will have a significant impact on the national economy. In 2013, Greece’s parliament passed Investment Law 4146/2013 to simplify the regulatory system and stimulate investment. This law provides additional incentives, beyond those in the fast-track law, available to domestic and foreign investors, dependent on the sector and the location of the investment. In February 2021, the EU introduced new trade enforcement regulations which apply to all member-states, including new policy countermeasures to services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (IPR). Former trade enforcement regulations only permitted countermeasures in goods. The following enforcement mechanisms have been enacted at the EU-level: the appointment of a Chief Trade Enforcement Officer; the creation of a new Directorate in DG Trade for enforcement, market access and SMEs; and the establishment under Access2Markets of a single-entry point for complaints from EU stakeholders and businesses on trade barriers on foreign markets and violations of sustainable trade commitments in EU trade agreements. Additionally, the European Commission has also committed to developing the EU’s anti-coercion mechanism, with the goal to deter countries from restricting or threatening to restrict trade or investment. Greece’s tax regime lacked stability during the economic crisis, presenting additional obstacles to investment, both foreign and domestic. Foreign firms are not subject to discrimination in taxation. Numerous changes to tax laws and regulations since the beginning of the economic crisis injected uncertainty into Greece’s tax regime. As part of Greece’s August 2015 bailout agreement, the government converted the Ministry of Finance’s Directorate-General for Public Revenue into a fully independent tax agency effective January 2017, with a broad mandate to increase collection and develop further reforms to the tax code aimed at reducing evasion and increasing the coverage of the Greek tax regime. The government makes continued efforts to combat tax evasion by increasing inspections and crosschecks among various authorities and by using more sophisticated methods to find undeclared income. Authorities held monthly lotteries offering taxpayers rewards of €1,000 ($1,200) for using credit or debit cards, which are considered more financially transparent, in their daily transactions. Foreign investment is not legally prohibited or otherwise restricted. Proposed laws and regulations are published in draft form for public comment before Parliament takes up consideration of the legislation. The laws in force are accessible on a unified website managed by the government and printed in an official gazette. Greece introduced International Financial Reporting Standards for listed companies in 2005 in accordance with EU directives. These rules improved the transparency and accountability of publicly traded companies. Citizens of other EU member state countries may work freely in Greece. Citizens of non-EU countries may work in Greece after receiving residence and work permits. There are no discriminatory or preferential export/import policies affecting foreign investors, as EU regulations govern import and export policy, and increasingly, many other aspects of investment policy in Greece. Greece has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since January 1, 1995, and a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since March 1, 1950. Greece complies with WTO Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) requirements. There are no performance requirements for establishing, maintaining, or expanding an investment. Performance requirements may come into play, however, when an investor wants to take advantage of certain investment incentives offered by the government. Greece has not enacted measures that are inconsistent with TRIMs requirements, and the Embassy is not aware of any measures alleged to violate Greece’s WTO TRIMs obligations. Trade policy falls within the competence and jurisdiction of the European Commission Directorate General for Trade and is generally not subject to regulation by member state national authorities. Although Greece has an independent judiciary, the court system is an extremely time-consuming and unwieldy means for enforcing property and contractual rights. According to the “Enforcing Contracts Indicator” of the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business 2020” survey, Greece ranks 146 among 190 countries in terms of the speed of delivery of justice, requiring 1,711 days (more than four years) on average to resolve a dispute, compared to the OECD high-income countries’ average of 589.6 days. The government committed, as part of its three bailout packages, to reforms intended to expedite the processing of commercial cases through the court system. In July 2015, the government adopted significant reforms to the Code of Civil Procedure (Law 4335/2015). These reforms aimed to accelerate judicial proceedings in support of contract enforcement and investment climate stability and entered into force in January 2016. Foreign companies report, however, that Greek courts do not consistently provide fast and effective recourse. Problems with judicial corruption reportedly still exist. Commercial and contractual laws accord with international norms, and the judicial system remains independent of the executive branch. In 2019 and 2020, Parliament passed several investment-related laws. In December 2020, Parliament passed Law 4758/2020, which introduced amendments in the current tax legislation regarding special taxation of employment services and business activity income arising in Greece, earned by individuals who transfer their tax residence in Greece. In October 2019, Parliament passed an economic development bill, Law 4635/2019, aimed at boosting economic recovery in the post-bailout era which entered into force in January 2020. The bill, called “Invest in Greece and other provisions,” simplifies processes for investors regarding environmental and urban planning regulations, speeding up bureaucratic processes. The bill also introduces changes to labor union alterations to encourage job creation and reforms the functioning of the General Commercial Registry. Law 4605/2019 expands the types of investments that qualify an individual for a residence permit, allowing investments in intangible assets. In particular, capital contribution of at least €400,000 in a real estate investment company, in a company registered in Greece, in a purchase of state bonds, corporate bonds, or shares, in a venture capital investment company, or in mutual funds, allows the investor and his or her family members a five-year residency permit in Greece. Law 4608/2019 for strategic investments was approved in April 2019, creating a favorable investment climate by providing various privileges to investors such as tax exemptions and fast track licensing. Investments in Greece operate under two main laws: the new Investment Law (4399/2016) that addresses small-scale investments and Law 4146/2013 that addresses strategic investments. In particular: Law 4399/2016, entitled “Statutory framework to the establishment of Private Investments Aid Schemes for the regional and economic development of the country” was passed in June 2016. Its key objectives include the creation of new jobs, the increase of extroversion, the reindustrialization of the country, and the attraction of FDI. The law provides aids (as incentives) for companies that invest from €50,000 (Social Cooperative Companies) up to €500,000 (large sized companies) as well as tax breaks. The Greek government provides funds to cover part of the eligible expenses of the investment plan; the amount of the subsidy is determined based on the region and the business size. Qualified companies are exempt from paying income tax on their pre-tax profits for all their activities. There is a fixed corporate income tax rate and fast licensing procedures. Eligible economic activities are manufacturing, shipbuilding, transportation/infrastructure, tourism, and energy. More about this law can be found here: https://www.enterprisegreece.gov.gr/files/pdf/madrid2019/2-Investment-Incentives-Law.pdf. – Law 4146/2013, entitled the “Creation of a Business-Friendly Environment for Strategic and Private Investments” is the other primary investment incentive law currently in force. The law aims to modernize and improve the institutional framework for private investments, raise liquidity, accelerate investment procedures, and increase transparency. It seeks to provide an efficient institutional framework for all investors and speed the approval processes for pending and approved investment projects. The law created a general directorate for private investments within the Ministry of Development and Investment and reduced the value of investments needed to be considered strategic. The law also provides tax exemptions and incentives to investors and allows foreign nationals from non-EU countries who buy property in Greece worth over €250,000 ($285,000) to obtain five-year renewable residence permits for themselves and their families. In March 2019, the Greek government brought a bill to parliament to expand eligibility criteria of the existing program. Other investment laws include: – Law 3908/2011, which provides incentives in the form of tax relief, grants, and allowances on investments, is gradually being phased out by Law 4146 (above). – Law 3919/2011 aims to liberalize more than 150 currently regulated or closed-shop professions. – Law 3982/2011 reduced the complexity of the licensing system for manufacturing activities and technical professions and modernized certain qualification and certification requirements to lower barriers to entry. – Law 4014/2011 simplified the environmental licensing process. – Law 3894/2010 (also known as fast track) allows Enterprise Greece to expedite licensing procedures for qualifying investments in the following sectors: industry, energy, tourism, transportation, telecommunications, health services, waste management, or high-end technology/innovation. To qualify, investments must meet one of the following conditions: exceed €100 million; exceed €15 million in the industrial sector, operating in industrial zones; exceed €40 million and concurrently create at least 120 new jobs; or create 150 new jobs, regardless of the monetary value of the investment. More about fast-track licensing of strategic investments can be found online at https://www.enterprisegreece.gov.gr/en/invest-in-greece/strategic-investments – Law 3389/2005 introduced the use of public-private partnerships (PPP). This law aimed to facilitate PPPs in the service and construction sectors by creating a market-friendly regulatory environment. – Law 3426/2005 completed Greece’s harmonization with EU Directive 2003/54/EC and provided for the gradual deregulation of the electricity market. Law 3175/2003 harmonized Greek legislation with the requirements of EU Directive 2003/54/EC on common rules for the internal electricity market. Law 2773/99 initially opened 34 percent of the Greek energy market, in compliance with EU Directive 96/92 concerning regulation of the internal electricity market. – Law 3427/2005, which amended Law 89/67, provides special tax treatment for offshore operations of foreign companies established in Greece. Special tax treatment is offered only to operations in countries that comply with OECD tax standards. – Law 2364/95 and supporting amendments govern investment in the natural gas market in Greece. – Law 2289/95, which amended Law 468/76, allows private (both foreign and domestic) participation in oil exploration and development. – Law 2246/94 and supporting amendments opened Greece’s telecommunications market to foreign investment. – Legislative Decree 2687 of 1953, in conjunction with Article 112 of the Constitution, gives approved foreign “productive investments” (primarily manufacturing and tourism enterprises) property rights, preferential tax treatment, and work permits for foreign managerial and technical staff. The Decree also provides a constitutional guarantee against unilateral changes in the terms of a foreign investor’s agreement with the government, but the guarantee does not cover changes in the tax regime. Under Articles 101-109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, the European Commission (EC), together with member state national competition authorities, directly enforces EU competition rules. The EC Directorate-General for Competition carries out this mandate in member states, including Greece. Greece’s competition policy authority rests with the Hellenic Competition Commission, in consultation with the Ministry of Economy. The Hellenic Competition Commission protects the proper functioning of the market and ensures the enforcement of the rules on competition. It acts as an independent authority and has administrative and financial autonomy. Private property may be expropriated for public purposes, but the law requires this be done in a nondiscriminatory manner and with prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. Due process and transparency are mandatory, and investors and lenders receive compensation in accordance with international norms. There have been no expropriation actions involving the real property of foreign investors in recent history, although legal proceedings over expropriation claims initiated, in one instance, over a decade ago, continue to work through the judicial system. Bankruptcy laws in Greece meet international norms. Under Greek bankruptcy law 3588/2007, private creditors receive compensation after claims from the government and insurance funds have been satisfied. Monetary judgments are usually made in euros unless explicitly stipulated otherwise. Greece has a reliable system of recording security interests in property. According to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report, resolving insolvency in Greece takes 3.5 years on average and costs nine percent of the debtor’s estate, with the most likely outcome that the company will be sold piecemeal. Recovery rate is 32 cents on the dollar. Greece ranks 72 of 190 economies surveyed for ease of resolving insolvency in the Doing Business report (from 62 in 2019). 6. Financial Sector Following EU regulations, Greece is open to foreign portfolio investment. Law 3371/2005 sets an effective legal framework to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. Law 3283/2004 incorporates the European Council’s Directive 2001/107, setting the legal framework for the operation of mutual funds. The Bank of Greece complies with its IMF Article VIII obligations and does not generally impose restrictions on payments. Transfers for current international transactions are allowed but are subject to specific conditions for approval. The lack of liquidity in the Athens Stock Exchange along with the challenging economic environment have hindered the allocation of credit but is accessible to foreign investors on the local market, who also have access to a variety of credit instruments. Greece’s banking system is recovering from a decade-long economic crisis that created a large stock of nonperforming loans (NPLs). In previous years, Greek banks cleared their balance sheets though the sale of their NPLs to several international funds. The strong economic recovery in Greece in 2021, coupled with accommodative monetary and fiscal policies to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, contributed to improved liquidity conditions. Banks successfully continued their efforts to clean up their loan portfolios. This laid the groundwork for banks to resume their financial intermediation role and thus contribute to sustainable economic growth. However, banks continue to face challenges including the legacy stock of non-performing loans still on bank balance sheets; the low quality of Greek banks’ prudential own funds, given the large share of deferred tax assets; and low operating profitability. Currently, banks enjoy adequate liquidity and capital buffers that allow them to provide lending to the economy. In November 2015, following an Asset Quality Review and Stress Test conducted by the ECB as a requirement of the 2015 ESM agreement, a third recapitalization of Greece’s four systemic banks (National Bank of Greece, Piraeus Bank, Alpha Bank, and Eurobank) took place. The recapitalization concluded with the banks remaining in private hands, after raising €6.5 billion from foreign investors, mostly hedge funds. In September 2020, the ratio of NPLs decreased to 35.8 percent, down from 40.6 percent in December 2019. Banks estimate that about 20 percent of non-performing exposures (NPEs) are owned by so-called “strategic defaulters” – borrowers who refrain from paying their debts to lenders to take advantage of the laws enacted during the financial crisis to protect borrowers from foreclosure or creditors’ collection even though they are able to pay their obligations. Developing an effective NPL reduction strategy has been among the most difficult challenges for the Greek economy. According to the Bank of Greece, Greek banks’ NPL ratio, at 15 percent in June 2021, remains the highest in the eurozone, well over the European average of around three percent. Under the terms of the ESM agreement, Greece remains obliged to create an NPL market through which the loans could, over time, be sold or transferred for servicing purposes to foreign investors. The Bank of Greece has licensed more than ten servicers, and the sale and securitization environment for non-performing loans continues to mature, with all of Greece’s systemic banks having conducted portfolio sales of secured and unsecured loan tranches since mid-2017. The potential sale and/or transfer of Greek NPLs continues to receive interest by many Greek and foreign companies and funds, signaling a viable market. The Greek state operates an auction platform for collateral and foreclosed assets, although the bulk of auctions still conclude with the selling bank as the purchaser of the assets. The government introduced its “Hercules” asset protection scheme in late 2019, providing guarantees to banks as an incentive to securitize €30 billion more in NPLs. The plan offloads bad debt by wrapping it into asset backed securities via special purpose vehicles that will purchase the NPLs. The sales are financed by notes issued by the special purpose vehicles with a government guarantee for senior tranches, thereby limiting the risk to the Greek state. Since all four systemic banks have availed themselves of the plan, the Greek government submitted an official request for an extension of the Hercules scheme on March 16, 2021, that will permit banks to further reduce non-performing loans (NPLs) in 2021 and 2022. Poor asset quality inhibits banks’ ability to provide systemic financing, although the situation is slowly improving. The annual growth rate of total deposits increased to 8.5 percent in 2020.Deposits increased by roughly €9 billion over 2019, up from around €200 billion in early 2019, a significant improvement from the crisis years, when deposits shrunk from their highest level of €237 billion in September 2009 to around €123 billion in September 2017. Greece’s systemic banks held the following assets at the end of 2020: Piraeus Bank, €71.6 billion; National Bank of Greece, €64.3 billion; Alpha Bank, €70 billion; and Eurobank, €67.7 billion. Few U.S. financial institutions have a retail presence in Greece. In September 2014, Alpha Bank acquired the retail operations of Citibank, including Diners Club. Bank of America serves only companies and some special classes of pensioners. There are a limited number of cross-shareholding arrangements among Greek businesses. To date, the objective of such arrangements has not been to restrict foreign investment. The same applies to hostile takeovers, a practice which has been recently introduced in the Greek market. The government actively encourages foreign portfolio investment. Greece has a reasonably efficient capital market that offers the private sector a wide variety of credit instruments. Credit is allocated on market terms prevailing in the eurozone and credit is equally accessible by Greek and foreign investors. An independent regulatory body, the Hellenic Capital Market Commission, supervises brokerage firms, investment firms, mutual fund management companies, portfolio investment companies, real estate investment trusts, financial intermediation firms, clearing houses and their administrators (e.g. the Athens Stock Exchange), and investor indemnity and transaction security schemes (e.g. the Common Guarantee Fund and the Supplementary Fund), and also encourages and facilitates portfolio investments. Owner-registered bonds and shares are traded on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). It is mandatory in Greece for the shares of banking, insurance, and public utility companies to be registered. Greek corporations listed on the ASE that are also state contractors are required to have all their shares registered. Greece has not announced that it intends to implement or allow the implementation of blockchain technologies in its banking transactions. There are no sovereign wealth funds in Greece. Public pension funds may invest up to 20 percent of their reserves in state or corporate bonds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Greek state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are active in utilities, transportation, energy, media, health, and the defense industry. There is no official website with a list of SOEs. Bank of Greece: partially owned (Greek state shares cannot exceed 35 percent); over 1,800 employees; governed by a Governor appointed by the government. Public Gas Corporation of Greece (DEPA): majority-owned by Greek state (65 percent); Net income €131 million in 2016; Total assets €3.1 billion in 2016; governed by Ministry of Development; Government is in the process of splitting the company and privatizing its infrastructure and commercial operations. Hellenic Aerospace Industry: wholly owned; Total assets €932.5 million in 2014; Net income €13.7 million in 2014; over 1,300 employees. Hellenic Financial Stability Fund: governed by General Council and Executive Board Hellenic Post: majority-owned (90 percent by Greek state); Net income €15.5 million in 2017. Hellenic Vehicle Organization: majority-owned (51 percent owned by Greek state); around 400 employees; Total assets around €69 million; governed by Board of Directors. Water Supply and Sewerage Company (EYDAP): majority-owned (34 percent by Greek state); governed by Board of Directors. Public Power Corporation: majority-owned (51 percent by Greek state); Total assets €14.1 billion in 2018; over 16,700 employees. Most Greek SOEs are structured under the auspices of the Hellenic Corporation for Assets and Participations (HCAP), an independent holding company for state assets mandated by Greece’s 2015 bailout and formally launched in 2016. HCAP’s supervisory board is independent from the Greek state and is appointed in part by Greece’s creditor institutions. Some SOEs are still supervised by the Finance Ministry’s Special Secretariat for Public Enterprises and Organizations, established by Law 3429/2005. Private companies previously were not allowed to enter the market in sectors where the SOE functioned as a monopoly, such as water, sewage, or urban transportation. However, several of these SOEs are planned for privatization as a requirement of the country’s bailout programs, intended to liberalize markets and raise revenues for the state. Official government statements on privatization since 2015 have sometimes led to confusion among investors. Some senior officials have declared their opposition to previously approved privatization projects, while other officials have maintained the stance that the government remains committed to the sale of SOEs. The current government has expressed its commitment and is moving forward with privatizations, including DEPA and some of the port assets. Under the bailout agreement, Greece has moved forward with the deregulation of the electricity market, adopting the Target Model in November 2020. In sectors opened to private investment, such as the telecommunications market, private enterprises compete with public enterprises under the same nominal terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations, such as licenses and supplies. Some private sector competitors to SOEs report the government has provided preferential treatment to SOEs in obtaining licenses and leases. The government actively seeks to end many of these state monopolies and introduce private competition as part of its overall reform of the Greek economy. Greece – as a member of the EU – participates in the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the WTO. SOEs purchase goods and services from private sector and foreign firms through public tenders. SOEs are subject to budget constraints, with salary cuts imposed in the past few years on public sector jobs. The Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (HRADF, or TAIPED in Greek), an independent non-governmental privatization fund, was established in 2011 under Greece’s bailout program to manage the sale or concession of major government assets, to raise substantial state revenue, and to bring in new technology and expertise for the commercial development of these assets. These include listed and unlisted state-owned companies, infrastructure, and commercially valuable buildings and land. Foreign and domestic investor participation in the privatization program has generally not been subject to restrictions, although the economic environment during the crisis and subsequent pandemic has challenged the domestic private sector’s ability to raise funds to purchase firms slated for privatization. The August 2015 ESM bailout agreement required Greece to consolidate the HRADF, the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF), the Public Properties Company (ETAD), and a new entity that will manage other state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into the Hellenic Corporation of Assets and Participations (or HCAP), formed by Law 4389/2016. In March 2017, HCAP received short- and long-term guidelines from the Minister of Finance, and in September 2017, it received strategic guidelines from the Greek state (HCAP’s sole shareholder). Privatizations are subject to a public bidding process, which is easy to understand, non-discriminatory, and transparent. Notable privatizations recently completed include the transfer of the 66 percent of Greece’s gas transmission system operator DESFA to Senfluga Energy Infrastructure Holdings, the sale of 67 percent of the shares of Thessaloniki Port Authority, the sale of the remaining 5 percent of the largest telecommunications provider shares to Deutsche Telecom and rolling stock maintenance and railroad availability services company Rosco. In February 2019, the government concluded the 20-year extension of the concession agreement of the Athens International Airport, worth €1.4 billion euros, and received nine expressions of interest in January 2020 for a 30 percent stake. The extension allowed for launch of the tender for the sale of the 30 percent stake in the airport. In January 2020, the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (HRADF) shortlisted nine parties (from 10 that have originally expressed interest) that were qualified for the next phase of the tender; the binding offers. However, with the arrival of the pandemic in Greece (February-March 2020), and the dramatic drop in the airport operations/revenues, the HRADF has decided to freeze the whole process indefinitely. In January 2020, the government of Greece launched the legal procedures necessary for privatization of ten regional ports, including Heraklion, Elefsina, and Alexandroupolis, which will be privatized through either partial concession deals or full management schemes. In January 2021, the European Commission gave the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transportation the approval to proceed with the construction of a road network linking the town of Trikala with the main Egnatia Motorway. In July 2020, the HRDF proceeded with two tenders for the privatization of the ports of Alexandroupoli and Kavala, that were deemed as more mature projects. In October of the same year six parties (in total) have expressed interest for both ports. In March 2021, the HRADF announced that four parties have been qualified for the binding offers phase of the tenders including two US companies (Quintana Infrastructure & Development, and Black Summit Financial Group). The project is budgeted at €442 million and is expected to promote the energy, economic and tourism development of Central Greece, Thessaly, and Western Macedonia. In March 2020, the commercial operations of DEPA received nine non-binding bids for its sale of a 65 percent stake. Hellenic Petroleum maintains the other 35 percent. The Public Power Corporation continues to consider the partial privatization of its power distribution operator. 10. Political and Security Environment There have been no major terrorist incidents in Greece in recent years; however, domestic groups conduct intermittent small-scale attacks such as targeted package bombs, improvised explosive devices, and unsophisticated incendiary devices (Molotov cocktails) typically targeting properties of political figures, party offices, privately owned vehicles, ministries, police stations, and businesses. In addition, domestic anarchist groups often carry out small-scale attacks targeting government buildings and foreign missions. Bilateral counterterrorism cooperation with the Greek government remains strong, and support from the Greek security services with respect to the protection of American interests is excellent. Demonstrations and protests are commonplace in large cities in Greece. While most of these demonstrations and strikes are peaceful and small-scale, they often cause temporary disruption to essential services and traffic, and anarchist groups are known in some cases to attach themselves to other demonstrations to create mayhem. The masterminds of Greece’s most notorious terrorist groups are currently behind bars, including leaders of November 17 and Revolutionary Popular Struggle, active between the 1970s and 1990s and responsible for hundreds of attacks and murders. Greek authorities largely eliminated these groups in advance of the 2004 Olympic Games. Following the Olympics, a new wave of organizations emerged, including Revolutionary Struggle, Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei, and Sect of Revolutionaries, though authorities rounded up these groups in a wave of arrests between 2009 and 2011, and again in 2014. Domestic terrorist groups include “OLA,” also known as the Group of Popular Fighters or Popular Fighters Group, which claimed responsibility for the December 2018 bomb outside a private television station and the December 2017 bomb outside an Athens courthouse. OLA also claimed responsibility for the November 2015 bomb attack at the offices of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, which caused extensive damage to the offices and surrounding buildings, the December 2014 attack on the Israeli embassy in Athens, which resulted in no injuries and minor damage to the building, and the attack on the German Ambassador’s residence in Athens in December 2013. OLA also claimed responsibility for an indirect fire attack on a Mercedes-Benz building on January 12, 2014, and an attack in January 2013 against the headquarters of the then-governing New Democracy party in Athens. Grenada Executive Summary Grenada’s legal framework for business is strong. The country is a parliamentary democracy, has a functioning court system, relatively low crime rates, and no political violence. The presence of a comprehensive investment incentive regime, stable economy, existing trade agreements, responsive investment promotion experts, and a robust citizenship by investment program contributes to a healthy and attractive investment climate. However, Grenada’s tourism-driven economy was severely impacted by the global COVID-19 pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic posed unparalleled challenges for Grenada by creating macroeconomic instability that threatened to undermine years of consecutive socio-economic progress since 2013. The government’s main revenue earners – tourism and international education — were severely impacted and continue to struggle amidst efforts to revive the economy. Growth in construction, private sector projects, and the country’s Citizenship by Investment (CBI) program is fueling economic activity and forecasted to drive recovery in 2022. Following a 13.8 percent decline in growth during 2020, Grenada experienced a slower-than-expected real GDP growth of 4.8 percent compared to an initial projection of 6 percent. Grenada’s recovery is driven by growth in several sectors including construction (22.8 percent), agriculture (12.5 percent), wholesale and retail (4.4 percent), and financial intermediation (3.5 percent). Tourism and private tertiary education, which once accounted for more than 60 percent of GDP, continues to lag, but the government hopes for an uptick as students return to classes and tourists resume travel. Government finances remain significantly lower than the 2019 pre-pandemic era, but 2021 saw some positive developments compared to 2020. Revenue collection in 2021 surpassed that of 2020 but remained below 2019 performance. Grenada continues to depend on the country’s citizenship by investment program as a significant source of revenue generation. At the end of October 2020, the program received 437 applications compared to 303 the previous year. By the end of 2021 the CBI program earned more than $55.4 million in revenue – a 40 percent increase compared to the previous year. The debt-to-GDP ratio fell from 108 percent in 2013 to just under 60 percent by the end of 2020. Due to an increase in borrowing and long-term concessionary loans to finance the country’s COVID response, the debt to GDP ratio currently stands at 69 percent. The government of Grenada has a strong interest in climate resilient initiatives, renewable energy, and developing the blue economy (broadly defined as the sustainable, environmentally sensitive use of ocean resources for economic growth and job creation). Other international investments include projects in construction, manufacturing, retail, duty free outlets, and agriculture. Parliament continues to review legislature governing value added tax, property transfer tax, investment, excise tax, customs (service charge), and bankruptcy and insolvency. The government has an innovative investment incentives regime which assists with streamlining bureaucratic and legal processes to increase the attractiveness of FDI and improve the ease of doing business in Grenada. This regime ensures transparency, equitable treatment of investors, and adherence to the rule of law, thus bolstering Grenada’s marketability as an investor-friendly climate. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 52 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $41M – Outward (D) – Inward https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD $9,410 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Grenada employs a liberal approach to foreign direct investment (FDI) and actively promotes foreign investment into the country. The government of Grenada identified five priority sectors for investment: Tourism and hospitality services Education and health services Information and communication technology Agribusiness Energy development The Grenada Investment Development Corporation (GIDC) is the country’s investment promotion agency. It was established in 1985 to stimulate, facilitate, and encourage the creation and development of industry. The GIDC is a “one-stop shop” offering: Investment and trade information Investment incentives Investment facilitation and aftercare Entrepreneurial/business skills training Small business support services Industrial facilities Policy advice To promote FDI, the GIDC adopts a targeted approach to promote investment opportunities, provides investor facilitation and entrepreneurial development services, and advocates for a supportive environment for investors to develop and grow businesses, trade, and industries. Investment retention is a priority in Grenada and is maintained through ongoing dialogue with investors facilitated by the GIDC. There are no economic and industrial strategies that discriminate against foreign investors. Non-Grenadian investors may be required to obtain an Alien Landholding License and pay a property transfer tax, which levies a 10 percent fee on the purchase of shares in a Grenadian registered company or real estate. In addition, the sale of such shares or real estate to non-nationals will attract a property transfer tax of 15 percent payable by the seller if the seller is a non-Grenadian. Foreign investors employed in Grenada are required to obtain a work permit, renewable annually. U.S. investors must pay a fee of USD $1,111 or XCD $3,000 for work permits. The renewal fee varies based on the investor’s country of citizenship. There are no limits on foreign ownership or control, except for enterprises deemed prejudicial to national security, the environment, public health, or national culture, or which contravene the laws of Grenada. Grenada has accepted but not yet implemented regional anti-competition obligations. U.S investors are not disadvantaged or singled out by any of the ownership or control mechanisms, sector restrictions, or investment screening mechanisms in Grenada relative to other foreign investors. Grenada maintains an investment screening and approval mechanism for inbound foreign investment. Inbound investment is screened and approved by the Grenada Investment Development Corporation. GIDC will review the submitted proposal and advise on the requirements and processes for doing business in Grenada. Depending on the type of investment they will work with the respective ministries. Post is unaware of any notable public statements by government officials or private sector representatives about the screening mechanism. Grenada passed its most recent Investment Promotion Act in 2014. The legislation promotes, encourages, and protects investment in Grenada by providing investors with a stable framework of fundamental and enforceable rights. It seeks to guarantee and ensure security and fairness in strict accordance with the rule of law and best international standards and practices. The 2014 Act is also in compliance with WTO regulations, the Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Agreement between the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) and the EU. The incentives regime enacted in 2016 grants incentives to ensure that all new tax exemptions are codified, restricts discretionary exemptions, and requires that the beneficiaries of exemptions file appropriate tax returns and comply with tax requirements. It also sets streamlined, simple, and non-discretionary systems/processes for the granting of incentives. The Customs and Inland Revenue Departments (CIRD) administer exemptions through a clearly defined rule-based system in contrast with past incentive schemes that required each case to be approved at the cabinet level. Under this regime, the CIRD grants incentives to projects within the priority sectors for investment. These priority sectors are tourism, manufacturing, agriculture and agribusiness, information technology services, telecommunication providers and business process outsourcing operations, education and training, health and wellness, creative industries, energy, and research and development. Other sectors include student accommodation, heavy equipment operators, investment projects above particular investment thresholds, and projects within specific geographical locations. The incentive regime seeks to provide investment incentives on a performance basis (i.e., the more one invests, the more incentives one can receive). Therefore, based on the level of investment, CIRD grants different levels of incentives in a transparent, predictable, and non-discriminatory manner. In the past three years, the government was not subject to third-party investment policy reviews through multilateral organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the WTO, and the UN Conference on Trade and Development. In the past five years, Post is unaware of any civil society organization, including those based in Grenada or in third countries, that provided useful reviews of investment policy-related concerns. An investor must register a business name and identify whether it is a partnership or limited liability company. A registered business can be wholly owned or a joint venture. The official website of the GIDC includes an investor’s guide that details the procedures for starting and operating a business in Grenada. The guide has a business procedure flow chart and gives step-by-step instructions for various tasks from registering a business and owning properties to obtaining permits and licenses. Detailed information on business registration and timelines can be found at: http://grenadaidc.com/investor-centre/investors-guide/starting-up-a-business/#.WKxXdfnQe70 The GIDC provides business facilitation mechanisms and ensures the equitable treatment of women and underrepresented minorities in the economy. The government of Grenada does not promote or incentivize outward investment. The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, to which Grenada is a party, includes a chapter on service agreements under the European Partnership Agreement (EPA). Under certain circumstances, provisions in these agreements may offer incentives to the potential investor. Grenada does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Grenada recognizes that investors value transparent rules and regulations dealing with investment. The Investment Act and the investment promotion regime promote transparency by authorizing investment incentives to key sectors through the GIDC. This helps to streamline processes, standardize treatment of investors, and better define investment rights. It also provides procedural guarantees and reduces the possibility for political influence in business negotiation. Grenada also seeks to promote investment by consulting with interested parties, simplifying and codifying legislation, using plain language drafting, developing registers of existing and proposed regulation, expanding electronic dissemination of regulatory material, and publishing and reviewing administrative decisions. Tax, labor, environment, health and safety, and other laws or policies do not distort or impede investment. Bureaucratic procedures, including those for licenses and permits, are sufficiently streamlined and transparent. However, local authorities recognize that the implementation of procedures can sometimes be slow and inefficient. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. Public finances and debt obligations, including explicit and contingent liabilities, are also transparent and in keeping with international requirements. Depending on the type of investment, government will require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. Not only does this facilitate transparency, but also ensures corporate responsibility and protection of the country’s social and environmental resources. Draft bills, particularly those that directly impact the public, often go through a public consultation process to address any concerns and allow for revision before being brought before cabinet and passed into law. No new regulatory systems and enforcement reforms have been announced since the last ICS report. Grenada has been a member of the WTO since 1996 and is a party to agreements established under the organization. In pursuit of WTO compliance, Grenada is in the process of negotiating trade and investment agreements that contain provisions better aligned with the provisions of the WTO. Grenada is a member of CARICOM and the CARICOM Single Market Economy, which adheres to the international norms and regulatory standards outlined by the WTO. Also, in keeping with WTO regulations the government notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. The Prime Minister and the cabinet have the executive authority to negotiate and sign international agreements and conventions with other states and international organizations. Grenada’s judicial system is based on English common law. The judiciary has four levels: the Magistrates Court, the High Court, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, and the UK-based Privy Council. The Magistrates Court primarily handles minor civil and criminal cases, while the High Court adjudicates cases under the purview of the Acts of Parliament. Appeals from the Magistrates Court are heard by the High Court, while appeals from the High Court are heard by the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court. The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court is comprised of the Chief Justice, who serves as the Head of the Judiciary; four Justices of Appeal; nineteen High Court Judges; and three Masters, who are primarily responsible for procedural and interlocutory matters. The Court of Appeal judges are based at the Court’s headquarters in Saint Lucia. The Privy Council serves as Grenada’s final Court of Appeal. However, the Caribbean Court of Justice has compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction under Section 211 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, to which Grenada is a party. The Treaty delineates rights and responsibilities within CARICOM to hear and decide disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty. The judicial system remains independent of the executive branch, and judicial processes are generally competent, fair, and reliable, however the process can be slow. Provisions are also made for appeals with the relevant court. Grenadian law also provides for the use of arbitration and mediation to resolve investment disputes. The economy is supported by a strong legislative and regulatory framework that encourages FDI and promotes investment initiatives. Grenada augmented the investment climate with a revitalization of its Citizenship by Investment (CBI) program. In 2016 parliament passed its most recent suite of legislative changes to enhance the investment climate in Grenada. Changes were made to the following Acts: Value Added Tax Amendment Act – Provides for VAT exemptions for qualifying investments in priority sectors. Excise Tax Amendment Act – Provides for tax incentives for investors engaged in manufacturing and investors entitled to conditional duties exemptions for motor vehicles. Property Transfer Tax Amendment Act – Establishes more favorable rates of property transfer tax for investors. Customs Service Charge Amendment Act – Removes the discretionary power of cabinet to prescribe varying rates of customs service charge (CSC) and to prescribe a new rate of CSC applicable to investors engaged in manufacturing. Investment Amendment Act– Provides for specified circumstances under which the Minister of Finance may make regulations under the Principal Act. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Amendment Act – Modernizes the law relating to bankruptcy and insolvency of individuals and companies. The act is based on the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, which has been used as a model in several Caribbean countries. Income Tax Amendment Act – Provides for a waiver on withholding tax applicable on specified types of repatriated funds relating to investors engaged in tourism accommodation or health and wellness. The GIDC and the Inland Revenue and Customs Department of Grenada work to ensure adherence to the rule of law and to facilitate the procedures outlined in the revised investment regime. The legal and regulatory framework governing foreign direct investment in Grenada is described here: http://grenadaidc.com/ There are no competition laws in Grenada. A number of CARICOM and Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) proposals on competition are under consideration to strengthen market regimes under the CARICOM Single Market and Economy. CARICOM established a Competition Commission and plans are underway to establish a sub-regional Eastern Caribbean Competition Commission. According to the constitution, Grenada shall not compulsorily acquire or take possession of any investment or any asset of an investor except for a purpose which is legal and non-discriminatory. If the government expropriates property for a legal purpose, it must promptly pay adequate and effective compensation. Owners of expropriated assets have the right to file claims in the High Court regarding the amount of compensation or ownership of the expropriated asset. In 2016, parliament repealed the 1994 Electricity Supply Act and opened the market to potential investors who will commit to transition to alternative sources of power generation, decreasing costs, reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels, and improving energy efficiency. This repealed the exclusive license that was granted to the country’s sole electricity provider Grenada Electricity Services (GRENLEC) and its majority shareholder, U.S.-owned WRB Enterprises. This regulatory change triggered a clause in the Share Purchase Agreement requiring Grenada to repurchase the GRENLEC shares from WRB. WRB filed a request for arbitration with ICSID, and the Grenada government was ordered to pay $74 million to the U.S. investors following a March 2020 ruling. A negotiated sum of $63 million was paid to WRB Enterprises in December 2020. In the past, Grenadian citizens had their lands expropriated to permit foreign investments but were compensated for such actions, typically at the market value. There are no sectors at greater risk of expropriation, and there are no laws requiring local ownership. All expropriations have been subject to due process. The Bankruptcy Act makes provisions for all aspects of bankruptcy and sets out procedures for creditors to apply to the High Court for a bankruptcy order against a debtor and the appointment of a trustee in bankruptcy. There are provisions for the court to appoint an interim receiver pending the outcome of the application for a bankruptcy order. It also includes provisions for a process whereby an insolvent person, with leave of the court, may make an assignment of the insolvent person’s property for the general benefit of creditors of the insolvent person. The High Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction in matters related to bankruptcy. 6. Financial Sector Grenada possesses a robust legislative and policy framework that facilitates the free flow of financial resources. Its currency, the Eastern Caribbean dollar, has a fixed exchange rate established by the regional Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB). Foreign employees of investment enterprises and their families may repatriate their earnings after paying personal income tax and all other taxes due. The government of Grenada encourages foreign investors to seek investment capital from financial institutions chartered outside Grenada due to the short domestic supply of capital. Foreign investors are more likely to tap local financial markets for working capital. The government, local banks, and the ECCB respect IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. The private sector has access to the limited number of credit instruments. Grenadian stocks are traded on the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange, whose limited liquidity may pose difficulties in conducting transactions. The financial industry in Grenada is regulated by two entities: The ECCB and the Grenada Authority for Regulation of the Financial Industry (GARFIN). The ECCB regulates the banking system. GARFIN oversees non-banking financial institutions through a regulatory system that encourages and facilitates portfolio investment. The estimated total assets of the largest banks are USD $1.03 billion. Information on the percentage of non-performing assets is not available. Grenada has not experienced cross-shareholding or hostile takeovers. As of November 30, 2020, commercial banks in Grenada deferred debt service on 4,069 commercial bank loans due to job losses and a reduction in salaries caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. This was the second highest number of deferrals in the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). Foreign banks or branches can establish operations in Grenada subject to prudential measures and regulations governed by the ECCB. For the requirements and procedures, foreign banks can refer to the following website: https://www.eccb-centralbank.org/p/grenada-1 There is correspondent banking available with all licensed commercial banks. No correspondent banking relationships have been lost in the past three years. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account. In addition to the banking sector, there are alternative financial services provided through credit unions. GARFIN regulates credit unions. Grenada does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Grenadian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are legislatively established by acts of Parliament. These enterprises all have boards of directors appointed by the government and answerable to the relevant ministries. Twenty-five of the 28 authorized SOEs are operational. They secure credit on commercial terms from commercial banks. SOEs submit annual reports to the Government Audit Department and are subject to audits shared with their parent ministries. SOEs manage transportation infrastructure (ports and airports), housing, education, hospitals, cement production, investment promotion, and small business development, among other functions. Generally, where they compete with the private sector, they do so on an equal basis. Grenada, like its neighbors, acknowledges the OECD guidelines. Corporate governance of SOEs is established and regulated by founding statutes. Local courts show no favoritism toward SOEs in the adjudication of investment disputes. For additional information on SOEs in Grenada see:http://www.oecd.org/countries/grenada/ Grenada does not have a privatization program. 10. Political and Security Environment Grenada has a stable parliamentary representative democracy free from political violence. There have been no examples over the past ten years of damage to projects and/or installations. Guatemala Executive Summary Guatemala has the largest economy in Central America, with a $ 85.9 billion gross domestic product (GDP) in 2021. The economy grew by an estimated 7.5 percent in 2021 following a 1.5 percent retraction in 2020. Remittances, mostly from the United States, increased by 34.9 percent in 2021 and were equivalent to 17.8 percent of GDP. The United States is Guatemala’s most important economic partner. The Guatemalan government continues to make efforts to enhance competitiveness, promote investment opportunities, and work on legislative reforms aimed at supporting economic growth. More than 200 U.S. and other foreign firms have active investments in Guatemala, benefitting from the U.S. Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). Foreign direct investment (FDI) stock was $21.4 billion in 2021, a 21.9 percent increase over 2020. FDI flows increased by 272.6 percent in 2021 mostly due to the purchase of outstanding shares of a local company by a foreign telecommunications company. Some of the activities that attracted most of the FDI flows in the last three years were information and communications, financial and insurance activities, manufacturing, commerce and vehicle repair, water, electricity, and sanitation services. Despite steps to improve Guatemala’s investment climate, international companies choosing to invest in Guatemala face significant challenges. Complex laws and regulations, inconsistent judicial decisions, bureaucratic impediments, and corruption continue to impede investment. Citing Guatemala’s CAFTA-DR obligations, the United States has raised concerns with the Guatemalan government regarding its enforcement of both its labor and environmental laws. Guatemala’s Climate Change Framework Law established the groundwork for Guatemala’s Low Emission Development Strategy (LEDS) and is designed to align Guatemala’s emissions and development targets with national planning documents in six sectors: energy, transportation, industry, land use, agriculture, and waste management. In November 2020, the Guatemala government endorsed the LEDS as the country’s official strategy for climate change mitigation. As part of the government’s efforts to promote economic recovery during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry of Economy (MINECO) began implementing an economic recovery plan in September 2020, which focuses on recovering lost jobs and generating new jobs, attracting new strategic investment, and promoting consumption of Guatemalan goods and services locally and globally. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 150 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 101 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 789 https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,490 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Guatemalan government continues to promote investment opportunities and work on reforms to enhance competitiveness and the business environment. As part of the government’s efforts to promote economic recovery during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry of Economy (MINECO) began implementing an economic recovery plan in September 2020, which focuses on recovering lost jobs and generating new jobs, attracting new strategic investment, and promoting consumption of Guatemalan goods and services locally and globally. Private consultants contributed to the government’s September 2020 economic recovery plan, which focuses on increasing exports and attracting foreign direct investment. During 2021 and first months of 2022 the Guatemalan congress approved some key economic legislation included in the economic recovery plan to improve the investment climate and foster economic growth, such as a leasing law, amendments to the free trade zone law, a law to simplify administrative procedures and requirements, and an insolvency law. Guatemala’s investment promotion office operates within MINECO’s National Competitiveness Program (PRONACOM). PRONACOM supports potential foreign investors by offering information, assessment, coordination of country visits, contact referrals, and support with procedures and permits necessary to operate in the country. Services are offered to all investors without discrimination. The World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report ranked Guatemala 96 out of 190 countries, one position lower than its rank in 2019. (Word Bank discontinued its Doing Business report in September 2021.) The two areas where the country had the highest rankings that year were electricity and access to credit. The areas of the lowest ranking were protecting minority investors, enforcing contracts, and resolving insolvency. International investors tend to engage with the Guatemalan government via chambers of commerce and industry associations, and/or directly with specific government ministries. PRONACOM began to prioritize investment retention in 2020 and continued this policy throughout 2021. The Guatemalan Constitution recognizes the right to hold private property and to engage in business activity. Foreign private entities can establish, acquire, and dispose freely of virtually any type of business interest, with the exception of some professional services as noted below. The Foreign Investment Law specifically notes that foreign investors enjoy the same rights of use, benefits, and ownership of property as Guatemalan citizens. Guatemalan law prohibits foreigners, however, from owning land immediately adjacent to rivers, oceans, and international borders. Guatemalan law does not prohibit the formation of joint ventures or the purchase of local companies by foreign investors. The absence of a developed, liquid, and efficient capital market, in which shares of publicly owned firms are traded, makes equity acquisitions in the open market difficult. Most foreign firms operate through locally incorporated subsidiaries. The law does not restrict foreign investment in the telecommunications, electrical power generation, airline, or ground-transportation sectors. The Foreign Investment Law removed limitations to foreign ownership in domestic airlines and ground-transport companies in January 2004. The Guatemalan government does not have a screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment. Some professional services may only be supplied by professionals with locally-recognized academic credentials. Public notaries must be Guatemalan nationals. Foreign enterprises may provide licensed, professional services in Guatemala through a contract or other relationship with a Guatemalan company. As of 2010, Guatemalan law allows foreign insurance companies to open branches in Guatemala, a requirement under CAFTA-DR. This law requires foreign insurance companies to fully capitalize in Guatemala. Guatemala has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995. The Guatemalan government had its last WTO trade policy review (TPR) in November 2016. In 2011, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) conducted an investment policy review (IPR) on Guatemala. The WTO TPR highlighted Guatemala’s efforts to increase trade liberalization and economic reform efforts by eliminating export subsidies for free trade zones, export-focused manufacturing, and assembly operations (maquilas) regimes, as well as amendments to the government procurement law to improve transparency and efficiency. The WTO TPR noted that Guatemala continues to lack a general competition law and a corresponding competition authority. The UNCTAD IPR-recommended strengthening the public sector’s institutional capacity and highlighted that adopting a competition law and policy should be a priority in Guatemala’s development agenda. The government agreed to approve a competition law by November 2016 as part of its commitments under the Association Agreement with the European Union, but the draft law had not been approved as of March 2022. Other important recommendations from the UNCTAD IPR were to further explore alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and the establishment of courts for commercial and land disputes, though the government had not made substantive progress on these recommendations as of March 2022. The Guatemalan government has a business registration website (https://minegocio.gt/), which facilitates on-line registration procedures for new businesses. Foreign companies that are incorporated locally are able to use the online business registration window, but the system is not yet available to other foreign companies. The commercial code amendments that entered into force in January 2018 reduced the time and costs to register a new business online. As of March 2022, the estimated time to register a new mercantile company online was from four to 36 hours and the estimated time to register a limited liability company was between 11 and 15 days.. The estimated costs to register a new mercantile company and a new limited liability company were $19 and $77, respectively, as of March 2022. The procedures allow mercantile companies to receive their business registration certificates online. Every company must register with the business registry, the tax administration authority, the social security institute, and the labor ministry. Licenses, if required from the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food, and/or Ministry of Health and Social Assistance, add considerable additional time. Guatemala does not incentivize nor restrict outward investment. 3. Legal Regime Tax, labor, environment, health, and safety laws do not directly impede investment in Guatemala. Bureaucratic hurdles are common for both domestic and foreign companies, including lengthy processes to obtain permits and licenses as well as to clear shipments through Customs. The legal and regulatory systems can be confusing and administrative decisions are often not transparent. Laws and regulations often contain few explicit criteria for government administrators, resulting in ambiguous requirements that are applied inconsistently by different government agencies and the courts. Public participation in the formulation of laws or regulations is rare. In some cases, private sector groups, and to a lesser extent civil society groups are able to submit comments to the issuing government office or to the congressional committee reviewing the bill, but with limited effect. There is no legislative oversight of administrative rule making. The Guatemalan congress publishes all draft bills on its official website, but it does not make them available for public comment. The congress often does not disclose last-minute amendments before congressional decisions. Final versions of laws, once signed by the President, must be published in the official gazette before entering into force. Congress publishes scanned versions of all laws that are published in the official gazette. Information on the budget and debt obligations is publicly available at the Ministry of Finance’s primary website, but information on debt obligations does not include state-owned enterprise debt. Guatemala is a member of the Central American Common Market and has adopted the Central American uniform customs tariff schedule. As a member of the WTO, the Guatemalan government notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of draft technical regulations. The Guatemalan congress approved the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in January 2017, which entered into force for Guatemala March 8, 2017. Guatemala classified 63.9 percent of its commitments under Category A, which includes commitments implemented upon entry into the agreement; 8.8 percent under Category B, which includes commitments to be implemented between February 2019 to July 2020; and 27.3 percent under Category C, which includes commitments to be implemented between February 2020 and July 2024. In February 2022, Guatemala requested an extension of time for a commitment to implement a single window for importation, exportation, and transit of goods, established under Article 10.4.1 and 10.4.2 of the TFA from the initial date of July 2022 to January 2024. In 1996, Guatemala ratified Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization (ILO 169), which entered into force in 1997. Article 6 of the Convention requires the government to consult indigenous groups or communities prior to initiating a project that could affect them directly. Potential investors should determine whether their investment will affect indigenous groups and, if so, request that the Guatemalan government lead a consultation process in compliance with ILO 169. The Guatemalan congress began considering a draft law to create a community consultation mechanism to fulfill its ILO-mandated obligations in March 2018, but the bill was still pending congressional approval as of March 2022. The lack of a clear consultation process significantly impedes investment in large-scale projects. Guatemala has a civil law system. The codified judicial branch law stipulates that jurisprudence or case law is also a source of law. Guatemala has a written and consistently applied commercial code. Contracts in Guatemala are legally enforced when the holder of a property right that has been infringed upon files a lawsuit to enforce recognition of the infringed right or to receive compensation for the damage caused. The civil law system allows for civil cases to be brought before, after, or concurrently with criminal claims. Guatemala does not have specialized commercial courts, but it does have civil courts that hear commercial cases and specialized courts that hear labor, contraband, or tax cases. The judicial system is designed to be independent of the executive branch, and the judicial process for the most part is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. There are frequent and wide-ranging accusations of corruption within the judicial branch. More than 200 U.S. firms as well as hundreds of foreign firms have active investments in Guatemala. CAFTA-DR established a more secure and predictable legal framework for U.S. investors operating in Guatemala. Under CAFTA-DR, all forms of investment are protected, including enterprises, debt, concessions, contracts, and intellectual property. U.S. investors enjoy the right to establish, acquire, and operate investments in Guatemala on an equal footing with local investors in almost all circumstances. The U.S. Embassy in Guatemala places a high priority on improving the investment climate for U.S. investors. Guatemala passed a foreign investment law in 1998 to streamline and facilitate processes in foreign direct investment. In order to ensure compliance with CAFTA-DR, the Guatemalan congress approved in May 2006 a law that strengthened existing legislation on intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, government procurement, trade, insurance, arbitration, and telecommunications, as well as the penal code. Congress approved an e-commerce law in August 2008, which provides legal recognition to electronically executed communications and contracts; permits electronic communications to be accepted as evidence in all administrative, legal, and private actions; and, allows for the use of electronic signatures. Guatemala previously faced two for violating its CAFTA-DR obligations—one under the labor chapter and the other under the environmental chapter. In the 2008 labor case filed by the AFL-CIO and six Guatemalan worker organizations, the arbitration panel found that the Guatemalan government failed to effectively enforce its labor laws, particularly by failing to enforce labor court orders for anti-union dismissals and to take enforcement actions in response to worker complaints. The panel determined that beyond the noted enforcement failures, evidence did not rise to a level sufficient to prove a violation of CAFTA-DR. Regarding the environmental case, the CAFTA-DR Secretariat for Environmental Matters suspended its investigation in 2012 when the Guatemalan government provided evidence that the relevant facts of the case were under consideration by Guatemala’s Constitutional Court. The constitutional court dismissed the case on procedural grounds in 2013. Complex and confusing laws and regulations, inconsistent judicial decisions, bureaucratic impediments and corruption continue to constitute practical barriers to investment. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business Reports for 2015 and 2016, Guatemala made paying taxes easier and less costly by improving the electronic filing and payment system (“Declaraguate”) and by lowering the corporate income tax rate. Despite these measures, World Banks Doing Business Report for 2020 (the last available) ranked Guatemala 104 of 190 countries with respect to paying taxes. The Guatemalan government developed a useful website to help navigate the laws, procedures and registration requirements for investors (http://asisehace.gt/). The website provides detailed information on laws and regulations and administrative procedures applicable to investment, including the number of steps, names, and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time and legal grounds justifying the procedures. Companies that carry out export activities or sell to exempted entities have the right to claim value added tax (VAT) credit refunds for the VAT paid to suppliers and documented with invoices for purchases of the goods and services used for production. Some local and foreign companies continue to experience significant delays in receiving refunds. Guatemala’s Tax and Customs Authority (SAT) began implementing a new plan in 2017 to streamline the process and expedite VAT credit refunds. The Guatemalan congress approved legal provisions in April 2019 that went into effect in November 2019. SAT established in December 2019 an electronic tax credit refund regime that expedites VAT credit refunds to exporters, but exporters claiming refunds outside the electronic tax credit refund regime continued to reportdelays in VAT refunds as of March 2022. As part of its 2012 income tax reform, the Guatemalan government began implementing transfer pricing provisions in 2016. The Guatemalan congress approved a leasing law in February 2021 to regulate real estate and other types of leasing operations, including lease contracts with an option to purchase. A Guatemalan law to simplify, streamline, and digitize requirements and administrative procedures that are carried out with Executive Branch’s offices entered into force in August 2021. Guatemala does not have a law to regulate monopolistic or anti-competitive practices. The Guatemalan government agreed to approve a competition law by November 2016 as part of its commitments under the Association Agreement with the European Union. The Guatemalan government submitted a draft competition law to Congress in May 2016, but it was still pending approval by Congress as of March 2022. Guatemala’s constitution prohibits expropriation, except in cases of eminent domain, national interest, or social benefit. The Foreign Investment Law requires proper compensation in cases of expropriation. Investor rights are protected under CAFTA-DR by an impartial procedure for dispute settlement that is fully transparent and open to the public. Submissions to dispute panels and dispute panel hearings are open to the public, and interested parties have the opportunity to submit their views. The Guatemalan government maintains the right to terminate a contract at any time during the life of the contract, if it determines the contract is contrary to the public welfare. It has rarely exercised this right and can only do so after providing the guarantees of due process. Guatemala does not have an independent bankruptcy law in effect as of March 2022. However, the Guatemalan congress passed an insolvency law that applies to both individuals and businesses and regulates the renegotiation procedure between debtors and creditors in case of insolvency in February 2022. The new law will enter into force in August 2022 and requires the judicial branch to create specialized bankruptcy/insolvency courts within five years of the law’s enactment. Meanwhile, individuals and businesses that are facing insolvency can continue to use the Code on Civil and Mercantile Legal Proceedings, which contains a specific chapter on bankruptcy proceedings. Under the code, creditors can request to be included in the list of creditors; request an insolvency proceeding when a debtor has suspended payments of liabilities to creditors; and constitute a general board of creditors to be informed of the proceedings against the debtor. Bankruptcy is not criminalized, but it can become a crime if a court determines there was intent to defraud. According to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, Guatemala ranked 157 out of 190 countries in resolving insolvency. 6. Financial Sector Guatemala’s capital markets lack a securities regulator. The local stock exchange (Bolsa Nacional de Valores) deals almost exclusively in commercial paper, repurchase agreements (repos), and government bonds. The Guatemalan Central Bank (Banguat),the Superintendency of Banks (SIB), and the Ministry of Economy were drafting an updated capital markets bill that included a chapter on securitization companies and the securitization process as of March 2022. Notwithstanding the lack of a modern capital markets law, the government debt market continues to develop. Domestic treasury bonds represented 58.1 percent of total public debt as of December 2021. Guatemala lacks a market for publicly traded equities, which raises the cost of capital and complicates mergers and acquisitions. As of December 2021, borrowers faced a weighted average annual interest rate of 15.4 percent in local currency and 6.1 percent in foreign currency, with some banks charging over 40 percent on consumer or micro-credit loans. Commercial loans to large businesses offered the lowest rates and were on average 5.5 percent in local currency as of December 2021. Dollar-denominated loans typically are some percentage points lower than those issued in local currency. Foreigners rarely rely on the local credit market to finance investments. Overall, the banking system remains stable. The Monetary Board, Banguat, and SIB approved various temporary measures during 2020 to increase liquidity of the banking system during the first months of the pandemic and to allow banks to approve restructuring of loans or deferral of loans to businesses and individuals affected by the pandemic. About 5.8 percent of the total number of loans remained subject to the temporary measures approved in 2020 as of December 2021. Non-performing loans represented 1.8 percent of total loans as of January 2022. According to information from the SIB, Guatemala’s 17 commercial banks had an estimated $56 billion in assets in December 2021. The six largest banks control 88 percent of total assets. In addition, Guatemala has 11 non-bank financial institutions, which perform primarily investment banking and medium- and long-term lending, and three exchange houses. Access to financial services is very high in Guatemala City, as well as in major regional cities. Guatemala had 23.7 access points per 10,000 adults at the national level and 29.1 access points per 10,000 adults in the capital area as of December 2021. There were 12,446 banking accounts per 10,000 adults at the national level and 24,915 banking accounts per 10,000 adults in the capital area as of December 2021. Most banks offer a variety of online banking services. Foreigners are normally able to open a bank account by presenting their passport and a utility bill or some other proof of residence. However, requirements vary by bank. In April 2002, the Guatemalan congress passed a package of financial sector regulatory reforms that increased the regulatory and supervisory authority of the SIB, which is responsible for regulating the financial services industry. The reforms brought local practices more in line with international standards and spurred a round of bank consolidations and restructurings. The 2002 reforms required that non-performing assets held offshore be included in loan-loss-provision and capital-adequacy ratios. As a result, a number of smaller banks sought new capital, buyers, or mergers with stronger banks, reducing the number of banks from 27 in 2005 to 17 in 2021. Guatemalan banking and supervisory authorities and the Guatemalan congress actively work on new laws in the business and financial sectors. In August 2012, the Guatemalan congress approved reforms to the Banking and Financial Groups Law and to the Central Bank Organic Law that strengthened supervision and prudential regulation of the financial sector and resolution mechanisms for failed or failing banks. The Guatemalan government submitted to congress proposed amendments to the Banking and Financial Groups Law in November 2016 and an anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing draft law in August 2020. Both proposed laws were pending congressional approval as of March 2022. Foreign banks may open branches or subsidiaries in Guatemala subject to Guatemalan financial controls and regulations. These include a rule requiring local subsidiaries of foreign banks and financial institutions operating in Guatemala to meet Guatemalan capital and lending requirements as if they were stand-alone operations. Groups of affiliated credit card, insurance, financial, commercial banking, leasing, and related companies must issue consolidated financial statements prepared in accordance with uniform, generally accepted accounting practices. The groups are audited and supervised on a consolidated basis. The total number of correspondent banking relationships with Guatemala’s financial sector showed a slight decline in 2016, but the changes in the relationships were similar to those seen throughout the region and reflected a trend of de-risking. The situation stabilized in 2017. The number of correspondent banking relationships remained stable in 2021. Alternative financial services in Guatemala include credit and savings unions and microfinance institutions. Guatemala does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Guatemala has three main state-owned enterprises: The National Electricity Institute (INDE) and two state-owned ports, Santo Tomas on the Caribbean coast, and Port Quetzal on the Pacific coast. INDE is a state-owned electricity company responsible for expanding the provision of electricity to rural communities. INDE owns approximately 14 percent of the country’s installed effective generation capacity, and it participates in the wholesale market under the same rules as its competitors. It also provides a subsidy to consumers of up to 88 kilowatt-hours (kWh) per month. Its board of directors comprises representatives from the government, municipalities, business associations, and labor unions. The board of directors appoints the general manager. The Guatemalan President appoints Santo Tomas Ports’ board of directors, and the board of directors appoints the general manager. The Guatemalan President also appoints the president of Port Quetzal’s board, and the president of the board appoints the general manager. The Guatemalan government also appoints the manager of state-owned telephone company GUATEL, which split off from the fixed-line telephone company during the 1998 privatization program. GUATEL’s operations are small, and it continuously fails to generate sufficient revenue to cover expenses. The GUATEL director reports to the Guatemalan President and to the board of directors. The Guatemalan government currently owns 16 percent of the shares of the Rural Development Bank (Banrural), the second largest bank in Guatemala, and holds 3 out of 10 seats on its board of directors. Banrural is a mixed capital company and operates under the same laws and regulations as other commercial banks. The Guatemalan government privatized a number of state-owned assets in industries and utilities in the late 1990s including power distribution, telephone services, and grain storage. Guatemala does not currently have a privatization program. 10. Political and Security Environment According to the National Civil Police (PNC), the murder rate in 2020 dropped 28 percent – from 20.8 per 100,000 to 15 per 100,000, compared to 2019, continuing a downward trend in recent years. The Guatemalan government attributed the general decline in violence to the economic downturn during the first months of the coronavirus pandemic, including interdepartmental travel restrictions and the prohibition of most alcohol sales. The murder rate increased to 16.6 per 100,000 in 2021, a 9 percent increase compared to 2020. Rule of law is a challenge and the judicial system is faces significant delays in case processing and inefficiency. Local police may lack the resources to respond effectively to serious criminal incidents. Major criminal groups operating in Guatemala are involved in a number of illicit activities, including violent street crime, drug trafficking, kidnaping, extortion, arms trafficking, illegal adoption rings, and environmental crimes. Although security remains a concern, foreigners are not usually singled out as targets of crime. The political climate in Guatemala, marked by its 36 years of armed conflict, is characterized by periodic civil disturbances. For example, in October 2021, President Alejandro Giammattei declared a State of Siege in El Estor as dozens of protestors, including environmental defenders, indigenous activists, and outside agitators blocked coal trucks from accessing a nickel mine and allegedly clashed with National Police (PNC) forces who attempted to clear the road for mining traffic. Protests and highway roadblocks organized by transportation workers and military veterans have caused disruption and heightened security, impacting general mobility and traffic condition, on a recurring basis in recent years. In November 2020 civil unrest sparked by congressional approval of the 2021 budget proposal, which added to long-standing grievances. Largely peaceful protests were marred by isolated acts of vandalism and violence, including fire damage to the national congress building, as well as acts of violence by both security forces against some protestors and by some protestors against security forces. The main source of tension among indigenous communities, Guatemalan authorities, and private companies is the lack of prior consultation and alleged environmental damage. Damage to projects or installations is rare. However, there were instances in October 2018 and January 2019 in which unidentified arsonists burned machinery and other equipment at the site of a hydroelectric construction project near the northern border with Mexico. Additionally, activist groups at times have engaged in blockades to prevent personnel, materials, and equipment from entering or leaving disputed installations. Guinea Executive Summary On September 5, 2021 Colonel Mamadi Doumbouya and Guinean military special forces seized power and detained former President Alpha Conde through a coup d’état. COL Doumbouya declared himself Guinea’s head of state, dissolved the government and National Assembly and suspended the constitution. Guinea is currently governed by the National Committee for Reunification and Development (CNRD), which is led by COL Doumbouya and comprised primarily of military officials. On September 27, 2021 COL Doumbouya released the Transitional Charter which supersedes the constitution until a new Constitution is promulgated; Guinea’s penal and civil codes remains in force. On October 1, 2021 the Supreme Court Justice installed COL Doumbouya as Head of State, Transition President, CNRD President, and Commander-in-Chief of Security Forces. On January 22, 2022 the National Transition Council, the transition government’s legislative body, was installed but no timeline for future elections or return to civilian rule was provided as of April 2022. Guinea enjoys sizeable endowments of natural resources, energy opportunities, and arable land. These seeming advantages have not yet resulted in economic development, and may in fact hinder it, in an example of the famous “resource curse.” Guinea’s economy has been based on extraction of primary resources, from at least the French colonial era and the slave trade before it. This extractive paradigm and legacy of underdevelopment, combined with low levels of education, and longstanding patterns of nondemocratic governance dating back to the colonial era, limit the potential for broad-based economic growth based on value addition, innovation, and productive as opposed to extractive or rent-seeking investment. At the same time, a sense of national identity and unity, and both formal and informal practices of solidarity that tend towards wealth redistribution may prove to be assets for the country’s development, if the government and the private sector can harness them productively. The 2021 coup d’etat, persistent corruption, and fiscal mismanagement make the near-term economic prognosis for Guinea mixed. In this context, Guinea has looked to foreign investment to bolster tax and export revenues and to support infrastructure projects and overall economic growth. China, Guinea’s largest trading partner, dramatically increased its role in years leading up to the coup with a variety of infrastructure investments. Investors should proceed with caution, understanding that the potential for profits comes with significant political risk. Weak institutions mean that investors may secure lucrative concessions from the government in the short term, but these could be open to renegotiation or rescission in the long term. Prior to the coup, former President Conde’s government implemented reforms to improve various aspects of the investment climate. For example, the former government reduced property transfers fees from 2 to 1.2 percent of property value. The time required to obtain a construction permit was reduced and import procedures were improved. Since 2019, Guinea has implemented a permanent taxpayer identification number system that requires all payments to be made by “Real Time Gross System” (RTGS) immediate transfers. Since the coup d’etat, the transition government has spoken extensively about fighting corruption and increasing transparency. Transition President COL Doumbouya created the Court to Repress Economic and Financial Crimes (CRIEF) to handle cases involving embezzlement, corruption, and misuse of public funds over one billion GNF (approximately $110,000) in December 2021. As of April 2022, the court has focused on collecting evidence for corruption cases against businesses tied to and officials that served in former President Conde’s government. Endowed with abundant mineral resources, Guinea has the raw materials to be an economic leader in the extractives industry. Guinea is home to a third of the world’s reserves of bauxite (aluminum ore), and bauxite accounts for over half of Guinea’s present exports. Historically, most of the country’s bauxite was exported by Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee (CBG) (Bauxite Company of Guinea) [a joint venture between the Government of Guinea, U.S.-based Alcoa, the Anglo-Australian firm Rio Tinto, and Dadco Investments of the Channel Islands], via a designated port in Kamsar. While CBG still retains the largest reserves, the Societe Miniere de Boke (SMB) (Mineral Company of Boke), a Sino-Singaporean conglomerate, recently surpassed CBG as the largest single producer of bauxite. New investment by SMB and CBG, in addition to new market entrants, are expected to significantly increase Guinea’s bauxite output over the next five to ten years. Guinea also possesses over four billion tons of untapped high-grade iron ore, significant gold and diamond reserves, undetermined amounts of uranium, as well as prospective offshore oil reserves. Artisanal and medium-sized industrial gold mining in the Siguiri region is a significant contributor to the Guinean economy, but some suspect much of the gold leaves the country clandestinely, without generating any government revenue. In the long term, both former President Conde’s government and the transition government project that Guinea’s greatest potential economic driver will be the Simandou iron ore project, which is slated to be the largest greenfield project ever developed in Africa. The transition government reached an ambitious agreement with Rio Tinto and the SMB-Winning Consortium (WCS) in March 2022 to develop the rail and port infrastructure to bring ore from Simandou to market by early 2025. In 2017, the governments of Guinea and China signed a USD 20 billion framework agreement giving Guinea potentially USD 1 billion per year in infrastructure projects in exchange for increased access to mineral wealth. In 2018, the Chinese Group TBEA invested USD 2.89 billion in the bauxite and alumina sector. The project includes development of a bauxite mine, the construction of a port, railroad, and power plant to facilitate the supply chain. The project is estimated to generate USD 406 million in annual revenue for Guinea. The amended 2013 Mining Code stipulates that raw ore producers in Guinea begin processing raw ore into refined or processed products within a few years of development, depending on the terms of the individual investment and the mandate with the Ministry of Mines and Geology. In April 2022, the transition government called upon bauxite concessionaires to solidify refining plans by May 2022. U.S.-based companies are in varying stages of proposing LNG projects to furnish this upcoming tremendous energy need. China is reportedly offering coal-based solutions to meet the potential demand. Guinea’s abundant rainfall and natural geography bode well for hydroelectric and renewable energy production. The largest energy sector investment in Guinea is the 450MW Souapiti dam project (valued at USD 2.1 billion), begun in late 2015 with Chinese investment, which likewise completed the 240MW Kaleta Dam (valued at USD 526 million) in May 2015. Kaleta more than doubled Guinea’s electricity supply, and for the first-time furnished Conakry with more reliable, albeit seasonal, electricity (May-November). Souapiti began producing electricity in 2021. A third hydroelectric dam on the same river, dubbed Amaria, began construction in January 2019 and is expected to be operational in 2024. The Chinese mining firm TBEA is providing financing for the Amaria power plant (300 MW, USD 1.2 billion investment). If corresponding distribution infrastructure is built, and pricing enables it, these projects could make Guinea an energy exporter in West Africa. In addition, U.S.-based Endeavor began operating Project Te in November 2020, a 50MW thermal plant on the outskirts of the capital. Former President Conde’s government also signed an emergency agreement in December 2019 to buy power from the 105 MW Turkish Karpowership barge anchored off Conakry’s coast. Former President Conde’s government emphasized investment in solar and other energy sources to compensate for hydroelectric deficits during Guinea’s dry season. Toward that end, former President Conde’s government entered into several Memoranda of Understanding with the private sector to develop solar projects. Agriculture and fisheries hold other areas of opportunity and growth in Guinea. Already an exporter of fruits, vegetables, and palm oil to its immediate neighbors, Guinea is climatically well suited for large-scale agricultural production and export. However, the sector has suffered from decades of neglect and mismanagement, lack of transportation infrastructure, and lack of electricity and a reliable cold chain. Guinea is an importer of rice, its primary staple crop. Guinea’s macroeconomic and financial situation is weak. The aftermath of the 2014-2016 Ebola crisis left former President Conde’s government with few financial resources to invest in social services and infrastructure. Lower natural resource revenues stemming from a drop in world commodities prices and ill-advised government loans strained an already tight budget. In 2018 the government borrowed excessively from the Central Bank (BCRG), which threatened the first review of Guinea’s current International Monetary Fund (IMF) program. Lower than forecast natural resource revenues in 2019 due to heavy rains and political violence threatened the fourth review, which Guinea passed in April 2020. In December 2020, the Executive Board of the IMF completed its fifth and sixth reviews of Guinea’s economic performance. The completion of these reviews enabled the immediate disbursement of USD 49.47 million – bringing total disbursements under Guinea’s third extended credit facility to USD 66.60 million before the program’s end. A shortage of credit persists, particularly for small- and medium-sized enterprises, and the government is increasingly looking to international investment to increase growth, provide jobs, and kick-start the economy. On March 13, 2020, Guinea confirmed its first Covid-19 case. The pandemic negatively impacted the well-being of households, particularly those working in the informal sector, who have limited access to savings and financial services. Guinea experienced an Ebola epidemic from February to June 2021. Despite its able handling of the epidemic, which kept deaths to a minimum, cross-border trade with Liberia, Ivory Coast, and Sierra Leone was reduced temporarily during the outbreak. Violence surrounding the March 2020 legislative election and constitutional referendum, as well as the October 2020 presidential election, all negatively impacted Guinea’s growth prospects. The transition government has worked to maintain economic stability since the 2021 coup d’etat, though without a timeline for elections, the uncertain political situation further limits potential growth. Prior to the coup, Guinea passed and implemented an anti-corruption law, updated its Investment Code, and renewed efforts to attract international investors, including a new investment promotion website put in place in 2016 by Guinea’s investment promotion agency to increase transparency and streamline processes for new investors. However, Guinea’s capacity to enforce its more investor-friendly laws is compromised by a weak and unreliable legal system. Then President Conde inaugurated the first Trade Court of Guinea on March 20, 2018. Transition President COL Doumbouya created the Court to Repress Economic and Financial Crimes (CRIEF) to handle cases involving embezzlement, corruption, and misuse of public funds over one billion GNF (approximately $110,000) in December 2021. As of April 2022, the court has focused on collecting evidence for corruption cases against businesses tied to and officials that served in former President Conde’s government. To attract foreign investment, the Private Investment Promotion Agency (APIP) and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Small and Medium Enterprises hosted the second annual Guinea Investment Forum (GUIF) in Dubai in February 2022, following the inaugural event in Guinea in February 2021. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 150 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 130 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $278 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,020 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Former President Conde’s government had adopted a strong, positive attitude toward foreign direct investment (FDI), an approach that has been echoed by the transition government. In the face of budget shortfalls and low commodity prices, both former President Conde’s government and the transition government have expressed hope FDI will help diversify the economy, spur GDP growth, and provide reliable employment. To that end, former President Conde’s government reduced land transfer fees, and improved procedures for import and construction permits. Guinea does not discriminate against foreign investors, with the exception of a prohibition on foreign media ownership. One area of concern, mining companies have negotiated different taxation rates despite mining code requirements. In some instances, short-term tax breaks end up being costly for the investor as they are then expected to “contribute” resources like electrical energy or roadbuilding as an informal quid pro quo for the lighter tax burden. According to the 2021World Investment Report, FDI in Guinea increased from USD 44 million in 2019 to 325 million in 2020. In late 2015, the U.S. Embassy facilitated the establishment of an informal international investors group to liaise with the government, although the group has not been very active since. There is the Chambre des Mines (Chamber of Mines), a government-sanctioned advisory organization that includes Guinea’s major mining firms. Guinea’s Agency for the Promotion of Private Investment (APIP) provides support in the following areas: Create and register businesses Facilitate access to incentives offered under the investment code Provide information and resources to potential investors Publish targeted sector studies and statistics Provide training and technical assistance Facilitate solutions for investors in Guinea’s interior On March 13, 2021, a presidential decree changed the structure of APIP into a public agency under the technical supervision of the Ministry of Investments and Public Private Partnerships, and under the financial supervision of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Since the September 2021 coup d’etat, APIP falls under the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Small and Medium Enterprises. More information about APIP can be found at: http://apip.gov.gn/ Investors can register under one of four categories of business in Guinea. More information on the four types of business registration is available at http://invest.gov.gn/page/create-your-company. There are no general limits on foreign ownership or control, and 100 percent ownership by foreign firms is legal in most sectors. Foreign ownership of print media, radio, and television stations is not permitted. The 2013 Mining Code gives the government the right to a 15 percent interest in any major mining operation in Guinea (the government decides when an operation has become large enough to qualify). Mining and media notwithstanding, there are no sector-specific restrictions that discriminate against market access for foreign investment. Despite this lack of official discrimination, many enterprises have discovered the licensing process to be laden with bureaucratic delays that are usually dealt with by paying consultant fees to help expedite matters. The U.S. Embassy may be able to advocate on behalf of American companies when it is aware of excessive delays. According to the Investment Code, the National Investment Commission has a role in reviewing requests for approval of foreign investment and for monitoring companies’ efforts to comply with investment obligations. The Ministry of Planning and Economic Development hosts the secretariat for this commission, which grants investment approvals. The government gives approved companies, especially industrial firms, the use of the land necessary for their plant, with the duration and conditions of use set out in the terms of the approval. The land and associated buildings belong to the State but can also be rented by or transferred to another firm with government approval. There has been no investment policy review conducted by the UN Conference on Trade and Development or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development within the past several years. The World Trade Organization (WTO) last conducted a review of Guinea in 2018. The 2018 report can be viewed here: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp470_e.htm. APIP promotes investment, helps register businesses, assists with the expansion of local companies, and works to improve the local business climate. APIP maintains an online guide for potential investors in Guinea (http://invest.gov.gn). Business registration can be completed in person at APIP’s office in Conakry or through their online platform: https://synergui.apipguinee.com/fr/utilisateurs/register/. The only internationally accredited business facilitation organization that assesses Guinea is the Global Enterprise Registration (GER.co), which gives Guinea’s business creation/investment website a 6/10 rating for 2021. It takes roughly seventy-two hours to register a business. APIP’s services are available to both Guinean and foreign investors. The “One Stop Shop” at APIP’s Conakry office can provide small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) with requisite registration numbers, including tax administration numbers and social security numbers. Notaries are required for the creation of any other type of enterprise. An SME in Guinea is defined as a business with less than 50 employees and revenue less than 500 million Guinean francs (GNF) (around USD 50,000). SMEs are taxed at a yearly fixed rate of GNF 15 million (USD 1,500). Administrative modalities are simplified and funneled through the “One Stop Shop”. In December 2019, the Prime Minister inaugurated the “Maison des PME,” (“The SME House”) a public-private partnership between the Societe Generale bank and APIP to help local SMEs expand and develop. Guinea does not formally promote outward investment, though the government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Under former President Alpha Conde, Guinea made its laws and regulations more transparent, though draft bills were not always made available for public comment. Ministries did not develop forward-looking regulatory plans and publish neither summaries nor proposed legislation. Once ratified, laws were not enforceable until published in the government’s official gazette. Since January 2022, the National Transition Council (CNT) has served as Guinea’s legislative body, tasked by the CNRD to draft a new constitution and recommend an electoral timeline to return to democratic and civilian rule. All laws relevant to international investors are posted (in French) on invest.gov.gn. When investing, it is important to engage with all levels of government to ensure each authority is aware of expectations and responsibilities on both sides. Guinea has had an independent Supreme Audit Institution since 2016. The institution is charged with making available information on public finances. The institution presented its first 2016 activities report in January 2018. The institution presented the 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020 activities report to the President of CNT in February 2022 Guinea’s 2013 amended Mining Code commits the country to increasing transparency in the mining sector. In the code, the government commits to awarding mining contracts by competitive tender and to publish all past, current, and future mining contracts for public scrutiny. Members of mining sector governing bodies and employees of the Ministry of Mines are prohibited from owning shares in mining companies active in Guinea or their subcontractors. Each mining company must sign a code of good conduct and develop and implement a corruption-monitoring plan. There is a public database of mining contracts designed by the Natural Resource Governance Institute (http://www.contratsminiersguinee.org/). The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) ensures greater transparency in the governance of Guinea’s natural resources and full disclosure of government revenues from its extractives sector. The EITI standard aims to provide a global set of conditions that ensures greater transparency of the management of a country’s oil, gas, and mineral resources. EITI reiterates the need to augment support for countries and governments that are making genuine efforts to address corruption but lack the capacity and systems necessary to manage effectively the businesses, revenues, and royalties derived from extractive industries. Guinea requires mining companies to file environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures. Guinea was accepted as EITI compliant for the first time by the international EITI Board at its meeting in Mexico City on July 2, 2014. As an EITI country, Guinea must disclose the government’s revenues from natural resources. Guinea completed its most recent report in December 2020 for the 2018 reporting period. The report is located at: https://www.itie-guinee.org/rapport-itie-guinee-2018/. While Guinea’s laws promote free enterprise and competition, there is often a lack of transparency in the law’s application. Business owners openly assert that application procedures are sufficiently opaque to allow for corruption, and regulatory activity is often instigated due to personal interests. Every year Guinea publishes budget documents and debt obligations. The yearly enacted budgets are published online LOIS DE FINANCES | Ministère du Budget Guinée (mbudget.gov.gn) https://mbudget.gov.gn/. Guinea has historically been a member of ECOWAS, but not a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and as such has its own currency. At the beginning of 2017, Guinea adopted ECOWAS’s Common Exterior Tariff (TEC), which harmonizes Guinea’s import taxes with other West African states and eliminates the need for assessing import duties at Guinea’s land border crossings, though, sometimes it is difficult to get the required certificates to export under these ECOWAS exemptions. Guinea is a member of the WTO and is not party to any trade disputes. Since the September 2021 coup, the African Union and ECOWAS have suspended Guinea’s memberships. Guinea’s legal system is codified and largely based upon French civil law. Under former President Conde, the judicial system was reported to be generally understaffed, corrupt, and opaque. Accounting practices and bookkeeping in Guinean courts are frequently unreliable. U.S. businesspersons should exercise extreme caution when negotiating contract arrangements and do so with proper local legal representation. Although the current transition charter, former constitution, and laws provide for an independent judiciary; in practice the judicial system lacks independence, is underfunded, inefficient, and is portrayed in the press as corrupt. Budget shortfalls, a shortage of qualified lawyers and magistrates, nepotism, and ethnic bias contribute to the judiciary’s challenges. Former President Conde’s administration successfully implemented some judicial reforms and increased the salaries of judges by 400 percent to discourage corruption. After the September 2021 coup, Guinea’s penal and civil code remains in force. The transition government maintained the existing legal structure and stated that “justice will be the compass guiding every Guinean citizen.” Transition President COL Doumbouya created the Court to Repress Economic and Financial Crimes (CRIEF) to handle cases involving embezzlement, corruption, and misuse of public funds over one billion GNF (approximately $110,000) in December 2021. As of April 2022, the court has focused on collecting evidence for corruption cases against businesses tied to and officials that served in former President Conde’s government. There are few international investment lawyers accredited in Guinea and it is a best practice to include international arbitration clauses in all major contracts. U.S. companies have identified the absence of a dependable legal system as a major barrier to investment. Despite dispute settlement procedures set forth in Guinean law, business executives complain of the glacial pace of the adjudication of business disputes. Most legal cases take years and significant legal fees to resolve. In speaking with local business leaders, the general sentiment is that any resolution occurring within three to five years might be considered quick. In many cases, the government does not meet payment obligations to private suppliers of goods and services, either foreign or Guinean, in a timely fashion. Arrears to the private sector are a major issue that is often ignored. There is no independent enforcement mechanism for collecting debts from the government, although some contracts have international arbitration clauses. The government, while bound by law to honor judgments made by the arbitration court, often actively influences the decision itself. Although the situation has improved recently, Guinean and foreign business executives have publicly expressed concern over the rule of law in the country. In 2014, high-ranking members of the military harassed foreign managers of a telecommunications company because they did not renew a contract. American businesses experience long delays in getting required signatures and approvals from government ministries, and in some cases the presidency, under both former President Conde’s government and the transition government. Some businesses have been subject to sporadic harassment from tax authorities and demands for donations from military and police personnel. The National Assembly ratified an Investment Code regulating FDI in May 2015. Developed in cooperation with the Work Bank and IMF, the code harmonizes Guinea’s FDI regulations with other countries in the region and broadens the definition of FDI. The code also allows for direct agreements between investors and the State. Other important legislation related to FDI includes the Procurement Code, the BOT (Build Operate Transfer, now Public Private Partnership or PPP) Law and the Customs Code. An October 2017 Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) law replaced the earlier BOT law, providing a clearer, updated, and more secure legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for PPP projects, including through partnership agreements, BOT schemes, concessions, public leasing, and delegated public service. PPP procurement tender processes also have been clarified and updated. The PPP law seeks to increase infrastructure development in Guinea. Under the new law, Parliament no longer needs to approve Guinean government contracts with private companies, as was required under BOT, apart from mining contracts. Obligations to conduct feasibility studies and to precisely define public needs also have been increased in this new law. Guinea’s investment promotion agency has a website (www.invest.gov.gn) to increase transparency and streamline investment procedures. The legal system handles domestic cases involving foreign investors. However, the legal system continues to be weak, is in need of reform, and continues to be subject to interference. Although the transition charter provides for an independent judiciary, in practice the judicial system lacks independence and is underfunded, inefficient, and is perceived by many to be corrupt. APIP launched a website in 2016 that lists information related to laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors, as well as strategy documents for specific sectors http://invest.gov.gn. Further information on APIP’s services is available at https://apip.gov.gn/. APIP has a largely bilingual (English and French) staff and is designed to be a clearinghouse of information for investors. The National Assembly ratified an Investment Code regulating FDI in May 2015. Developed in cooperation with the Work Bank and IMF, the code harmonizes Guinea’s FDI regulations with other countries in the region and broadens the definition of FDI. The code also allows for direct agreements between investors and the State. Other important legislation related to FDI includes the Procurement Code, the BOT (Build Operate Transfer, now Public Private Partnership or PPP) Law and the Customs Code. An October 2017 Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) law replaced the earlier BOT law, providing a clearer, updated, and more secure legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for PPP projects, including through partnership agreements, BOT schemes, concessions, public leasing, and delegated public service. PPP procurement tender processes also have been clarified and updated. The PPP law seeks to increase infrastructure development in Guinea. Under the new law, Parliament no longer needs to approve Guinean government contracts with private companies, as was required under BOT, apart from mining contracts. Obligations to conduct feasibility studies and to precisely define public needs also have been increased in this new law. Guinea’s investment promotion agency has a website (www.invest.gov.gn) to increase transparency and streamline investment procedures. The legal system handles domestic cases involving foreign investors. However, the legal system continues to be weak, is in need of reform, and continues to be subject to interference. Although the transition charter provides for an independent judiciary, in practice the judicial system lacks independence and is underfunded, inefficient, and is perceived by many to be corrupt. APIP launched a website in 2016 that lists information related to laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors, as well as strategy documents for specific sectors http://invest.gov.gn. Further information on APIP’s services is available at https://apip.gov.gn/. APIP has a largely bilingual (English and French) staff and is designed to be a clearinghouse of information for investors. There are no agencies that review transactions for competition-related concerns. Guinea’s Investment Code states that the government will not take any steps to expropriate or nationalize investments made by individuals and companies, except for reasons of public interest. It also promises fair compensation for expropriated property. In 2011, the former President Conde’s government claimed full ownership of several languishing industrial facilities in which it had previously held partial shares as part of several joint ventures—including a canned food factory and processing plants for peanuts, tea, mangoes, and tobacco—with no compensation to the private sector partner. Each of these facilities was privatized under opaque circumstances in the late 1980s and early 1990s. By expropriating these businesses, which the Conde government deemed to be corrupt and/or ineffective, and putting them to public auction, Guinea hoped to correct past mistakes and put the assets in more productive hands. During the 1990s, a U.S. investor acquired a 67 percent stake in an explosives and munitions factory from a Canadian entity. The Guinean government owned the remaining 33 percent. From 2000 to 2008, the government halted manufacturing at the factory, nationalizing the factory in 2010. While there had not been recent large-scale expropriation cases by the end of former President Conde’s administration, some mining concession contracts have had their initial award revoked and were sold to another bidder. In 2008, the previous regime of Lansana Conde stripped Rio Tinto of 50 percent of its concession of the Simandou iron ore mine and sold it to another company. In March 2022, the transition government began seizing property they believed belonged to the state and was inappropriately sold under former President Conde’s government, in some cases demolishing houses and buildings on the disputed land before legal challenges were exhausted. Guinea, as a member of OHADA, has the same bankruptcy laws as most West African francophone countries. OHADA’s Uniform Act on the Organization of Securities enforces collective proceedings for writing off debts and defines bankruptcy in articles 227 to 233. The Uniform Act also distinguishes fraudulent from non-fraudulent bankruptcies. There is no distinction between foreign and domestic investors. The only distinction made is a privilege ranking that defines which claims must be paid first from the bankrupt company’s assets. Articles 180 to 190 of OHADA’s Uniform Act define which creditors are entitled to priority compensation. Bankruptcy is only criminalized when it occurs due to fraudulent actions and leaves criminal penalties to national authorities. Non-fraudulent bankruptcy is adjudicated though the Uniform Act. 6. Financial Sector Commercial credit for private enterprises is difficult and expensive to obtain in Guinea. The FY 2022 Millennium Challenge Corporation score for Access to Credit in Guinea reached 30 percent, increasing from 21 percent in FY 2021. Guinea adopted a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) law in 1998, but the law was never fully implemented as the government failed to adopt the decree necessary for its implementation. An October 2017 Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) law replaced the earlier BOT law, providing a clearer, updated, and more secure legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for PPP projects, including through partnership agreements, BOT schemes, concessions, public leasing, and delegated public service. PPP procurement tender processes also have been clarified and updated. The PPP law seeks to increase infrastructure development in Guinea. Under the new law, Parliament no longer needs to approve Guinean government contracts with private companies, as was required under BOT, apart from mining contracts. Obligations to conduct feasibility studies and to precisely define public needs also have been increased in this new law. Guinea’s investment promotion agency has a website (www.invest.gov.gn) to increase transparency and streamline investment procedures. However, in practice businesses often wait months or years to receive final approvals from one ministry or another or the President, depending on the sector. Guinea’s capacity to enforce its more investor-friendly laws is compromised by a weak and unreliable legal system. Some especially large-scale enterprises or extractives industry firms must wait for final permission from the President himself to begin operations. These facts make personal relationships with high-ranking officials desirable and indeed generally essential, though as mentioned above, this brings the risk of a project’s becoming associated with specific individuals or administrations, and thus subject to subsequent rescission. Guinea updated its Investment Code in 2015 and renewed efforts to attract international investors. The Investment Code allows income derived from investment in Guinea, the proceeds of liquidating that investment, and the compensation paid in the event of nationalization, to be transferred to any country in convertible currency. The legal and regulatory procedures, based on French civil law, are not always applied uniformly or transparently. Individuals or legal entities making foreign investments in Guinea are guaranteed the freedom to transfer the original foreign capital, profits resulting from investment, capital gains on disposal of investment, and fair compensation paid in the case of nationalization or expropriation of the investment to any country of their choice. The Guinean franc is subject to a managed floating exchange rate. The few commercial banks in Guinea are dependent on the Central Bank (BCRG) for foreign exchange liquidity, making large transfers of foreign currency difficult. Laws governing takeovers, mergers, acquisitions, and cross-shareholding are limited to rules for documenting financial transactions and filing any change of status documents with the economic register. There are no laws or regulations that specifically authorize private firms to adopt articles of incorporation that limit or prohibit investment. Guinea’s financial system is small and dominated by the banking sector. It comprises 19 active banks, 19 insurance companies and 19 microfinance institutions. Guinea’s banking sector is overseen by the Central Bank (BCRG), which also serves as the agent of the government treasury for overseeing banking and credit operations in Guinea and abroad. The BCRG manages foreign exchange reserves on behalf of the State. The Office of Technical Assistance of the Department of the Treasury assesses that Guinea does not properly manage debt and that its treasury is too involved in the process, although improvements made in 2017-2018 point to a better future. Further information on the BCRG can be found in French at http://www.bcrg-guinee.org. Due to the difficulty of accessing funding from commercial banks, small commercial and agricultural enterprises have increasingly turned to microfinance, which has been growing rapidly with a net increase in deposits and loans. The quality of products in the microfinance sector remains mediocre, with bad debt accounting for five percent of loans with approximately 17 percent of gross loans outstanding. Guinea plans to broaden the country’s SME base through investment climate reform, improved access to finance, and the establishment of SME growth corridors. Severely limited access to finance (especially for SMEs), inadequate infrastructure, deficiencies in logistics and trade facilitation, corruption and the diminished capacity of the government, inflation, and poor education of the workforce has seriously undermined investor confidence in Guinean institutions. Guinea’s weak enabling environment for business, its history of poor governance, erratic policy, and inconsistent regulatory enforcement exacerbate the country’s poor reputation as an investment destination. As a result, private participation in the economy remains low and firms’ productivity measured by value added is one of the lowest in Africa. Firms’ links with the financial sector are weak: only 3.9 percent of firms surveyed in the 2016 World Bank Enterprise survey had a bank loan. Credit to the private sector is low, at around 8.6 percent of GDP in 2021. Commercial banks are reluctant to extend loans due to the lack of credit history reporting for potential borrowers. Through the Central Bank, Guinea is in the process of establishing a credit information bureau to overcome this asymmetry of credit information. Despite the pandemic and September 2021 coup, the banking sector remains liquid and solvent with limited credit available to the private sector. Heavy government borrowing drained the excess liquidity and crowded out private sector credit in 2021. Despite the COVID-19 slowdown and political instability, private sector credit grew by 7.36 percent from January 2021 to January 2022. Guinea is a cash-based society driven by trade, agriculture, and the informal sector, which all function outside the banking sector. The banking sector is highly concentrated in Conakry and is technologically behind. Banks in Guinea tend to favor short-term lending at high interest rates. In collaboration with the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance, the Central Bank began planning to implement a bank deposit insurance scheme. The deposit coverage limit has not been set yet, but the Central Bank began to collect premiums from commercial banks in 2019. While the microfinance sector grew strongly from a small base, it was hit hard during the 2014-2016 Ebola crisis. Currently it is not generally profitable and needs capacity and technology upgrades. Furthermore, many microfinance institutions struggle to meet higher minimum capital requirements imposed by the Central Bank since 2019. This heightened financial hurdle will likely lead to a consolidation of the microfinance sector. The efficiency and use of payment services by all potential users needs to be improved, with an emphasis on greater financial inclusion. The penetration of digital cellphone fund transfers is increasing. Four foreign e-money (or mobile banking) institutions lead the effort to digitize payments and improve access to financial services in underserved and rural segments of the population. However, the vast majority of operations processed by these e-money institutions remain cash-in cash-out transactions within a single network. In an effort to modernize payment methods, the transition government is continuing an initiative of former President Conde’s administration to implement a national switch — a nationwide platform that will interface all electronic payment systems and facilitate payment processing between service providers. This service was still under development in 2022, and the Central Bank is in the process of selecting a service provider. Generally, there are no restrictions on foreigners’ ability to establish bank accounts in Guinea. EcoBank is the preferred bank for most U.S. dealings with Foreign Account Tax Compliant Act (FACTA) reporting requirements. With the acquisition of a majority stake in BICIGUI (Banque Internationale pour le Commerce et l’Industrie de la Guinee) in July 2021, Vista Bank became the largest bank in Guinea, a first on the African continent for a U.S.-owned financial institution. Guinea does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises While all Guinea’s public utilities (water and electricity) are state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the former Conde administration proposed permitting private enterprises to operate in this sphere. In 2015, the French firm Veolia was contracted to manage the state-owned electric utility Electricité de Guinée (EDG) – a contract which ended in October 2019. Several private projects aimed at harnessing Guinea’s solar energy potential and gas-powered thermal plants are being implemented with the goal of producing and selling energy throughout Guinea and possibly to neighboring countries. Other SOEs are found in the telecommunications, road construction, lottery, and transportation sectors. There are several other mixed companies where the state owns a significant or majority share, that are typically related to the extractives industry. The hydroelectricity sector could support Guinea’s modernization, and possibly even supply regional markets. Guinea’s hydropower potential is estimated at over 6,000MW, making it a potential exporter of power to neighboring countries. The largest energy sector investment in Guinea is the 450MW Souapiti dam project (valued at USD 2.1 billion), begun in late 2015 with Chinese investment. A Chinese firm likewise completed the 240MW Kaleta Dam (valued at USD 526 million) in May 2015. Kaleta more than doubled Guinea’s electricity supply, and for the first-time furnished Conakry with more reliable, albeit seasonal, electricity (May-November). Souapiti began producing electricity in 2021. A third hydroelectric dam on the same river, dubbed Amaria, began construction in January 2019 and is expected to be operational in 2024. The Chinese mining firm TBEA is providing financing for the Amaria power plant (300 MW, USD 1.2 billion investment). If corresponding distribution infrastructure is built, and pricing enables it, these projects could make Guinea an energy exporter in West Africa. Plans for improving the distribution network to enable electricity export are in process with the development of the Gambia River Basin Development (OMVG) (Organization pour la Mise en Oeuvre de Fleuve Gambie, in French) transmission project connecting Guinea, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, and The Gambia. The OMVG project involves the construction of 1,677 kilometers of 225-volt transmission network capable of handling 800MW to provide electricity for over two million people. At the same time, Guinea is moving forward with the Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, (CLSG) transmission interconnector project, which will integrate Guinea into the West African Power Pool (WAPP) and allow for energy import-export across the region. While neither former President Conde’s administration nor the transition government have published significant information concerning the financial stability of SOEs, EDG’s balance sheet is understood to be in the red. The IMF reported that as recently as 2017, up to 28 percent of Guinea’s budget went towards subsidizing electricity, and the IMF urged that EDG improve tariff collection since large numbers of its users do not pay. Former Prime Minister Ibrahima Kassory Fofana announced in March 2021 that EDG subsidies cost Guinea’s government USD 350 million annually. The amount of research and development (R&D) expenditures is not known, but it would be highly unlikely that any of Guinea’s SOEs would devote significant funding to R&D. Guinean SOEs are entitled to subsidized fuel, which EDG uses to run thermal generator stations in Conakry. Guinea is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement. Corporate governance of SOEs is determined by the government. Guinean SOEs do not adhere to the OECD guidelines. SOEs are supposed to report to the Office of the President, however, typically they report to a ministry. Seats on the board of governance for SOEs are usually allocated by presidential decree. The transition government is continuing the former Conde administration’s initiative to privatize the energy sector. In April 2015, the government tendered a management contract to run the state-owned electrical utility EDG. French company Veolia won the tender and attempted to manage and rehabilitate the insolvent utility until the end of 2019. In February 2020, EDG became a public limited company with its own board of directors. The new directors were appointed by former President Conde through decree, replaced with a new Board of Directors with a decree from Transition President COL Doumbouya in February 2022. Bidding processes are clearly spelled out for potential bidders; however, Guinea gives weight to competence in the French language and experience working on similar projects in West Africa. In spring 2015, a U.S. company lost a fiber optics tender largely due to its lack of native French speakers on the project and lack of regional experience. 10. Political and Security Environment Guinea has had a long history of political repression, with more recent episodes of politically-motivated violence around elections. The country suffered under authoritarian rule from independence in 1958 until its first democratic presidential election in 2010. It has seen continued political violence associated with national and local elections since 2010, culminating in the most recent September 2021 coup d’etat. On September 5, 2021 Colonel Mamadi Doumbouya and Guinean military special forces seized power and detained former President Alpha Conde through a coup d’état. COL Doumbouya declared himself Guinea’s head of state, dissolved the government and National Assembly and suspended the constitution. Guinea is currently governed by the National Committee for Reunification and Development (CNRD), which is led by COL Doumbouya and comprised primarily of military officials. On September 27, 2021 COL Doumbouya released the Transitional Charter which supersedes the constitution until a new Constitution is promulgated; Guinea’s penal and civil codes remains in force. On October 1, 2021 the Supreme Court Justice installed COL Doumbouya as Head of State, Transition President, CNRD President, and Commander-in-Chief of Security Forces. On January 22, 2022 the National Transition Council, the transition government’s legislative body, was installed but no timeline for future elections or return to civilian rule was provided as of April 2022. In March 2020, the former Conde administration amended the constitution through a referendum that allowed former President Conde to seek a third term in office. Observers noted the process was not transparent, inclusive, or consultative. Major opposition parties boycotted the referendum and accompanying legislative elections. This resulted in resetting presidential term limits and the ruling party, the Rally for the Guinean People, gaining a super majority in the National Assembly. Domestic and international observers raised concerns regarding widespread violence and voting irregularities in the legislative elections, including closed and ransacked polling stations. In October 2020 President Alpha Conde ran for reelection for a third term under the new constitution. International and domestic observers raised concerns about widespread electoral violence, restrictions on freedom of assembly, the lack of transparency in vote tabulation, and inconsistencies between the announced results and tally sheet results from polling stations. Violent protests during both elections closed businesses in major population centers, resulted in about 150 deaths, and the arbitrary detention of hundreds of people including several prominent opposition figures. Political intimidation and arbitrary detention of opposition members continued for several months after the election. The local populace in Boke, Bel-Air, and Sangaredi disrupted road and/or railroad traffic on at least three occasions in 2017 and at least twice in 2018, in response to grievances over employment, lack of services, and other issues. Although none of these events targeted American or foreign investors, they were disruptive to business in general and eroded confidence in the security situation under which investors must operate in Guinea. Street violence is difficult to predict or avoid, but generally does not target westerners. Presidential elections in 2015 sparked violent protests in Conakry, but clashes between police and demonstrators were largely contained. In addition to political violence, sporadic and generally peaceful protests over fuel prices, lack of electricity, labor disputes, and other issues have occurred in the capital and sometimes beyond since 2013. In February 2017, seven civilians died in confrontations with security services during large protests against education reforms. After two days of violent protests in March 2018, teachers’ unions and the government agreed to a raise of 40 percent. These protests over teacher union pay became intermingled with political protests over voting irregularities in the February 4 local elections. The political opposition claims the government is responsible for the deaths of over 90 people during political protests over the past eight years. Other instances of violence occurred in 2014 and 2015 during the Ebola epidemic when local citizens attacked the vehicles and facilities of aid workers. The Red Cross, MSF (Doctors Without Borders) and the World Health Organization (WHO) also reported cases of property damage (destroyed vehicles, ransacked warehouses, etc.). On September 16, 2014, in the Forest Region village of Womei, eight people were killed by a mob when they visited the village as part of an Ebola education campaign. The casualties included radio journalists, local officials, and Guinean health care workers. The small mining town of Zogota, located in Guinea’s Forest Region, saw the deaths of five villagers, including the village chief, during August 2012 clashes with security forces over claims that the Brazilian iron-mining company Vale was not hiring enough local employees and was instead bringing workers from other regions of Guinea. The ensuing instability led to Vale evacuating all expatriate personnel from the town. Following the death of President Lansana Conte on December 22, 2008, a military junta calling themselves the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD) took power in a bloodless coup. Immediately following the coup, the U.S. government suspended all but humanitarian and election assistance to Guinea. The African Union (AU) and ECOWAS suspended Guinea’s membership pending democratic elections and a relinquishment of power by the military junta. In September 2009, junta security forces attacked a political rally in a stadium in Conakry, killing 150 people, and raping over a hundred women. The state had persecuted political dissidents and opposition parties for decades. The Sekou Toure regime (1958-1984) and the Lansana Conte regime (1984-2008) were marked by political violence and human rights abuses. Guyana Executive Summary Guyana is located on South America’s North Atlantic coast, bordering Venezuela, Suriname, and Brazil, and is the only English-speaking country on the continent. Guyana became an oil producing nation in 2019 and, with a population of 782,766, is poised to dramatically increase its per capita wealth. While it is currently the third poorest country in the western hemisphere, Guyana’s economy grew by 19.9 percent in 2021. Guyana’s economy is projected to grow by 47.9 percent in 2022 according to the Ministry of Finance, making it one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Guyana’s is poised for strong economic growth over the next decade as its offshore oil and gas production quickly ramps up to over 1 million barrels per day (bpd), an unprecedented development pace for a country that just discovered commercially viable hydrocarbon resources in 2015. ExxonMobil, the majority shareholder in the consortium (which also includes Hess and the China National Offshore Oil Company) developing Guyana’s offshore oil and gas deposits, increased its estimate for commercially viable oil deposits in Guyana to over 10 billion barrels in October 2021. Industry experts expect Guyana’s total recoverable oil deposits to increase as exploration activities expand to other offshore blocks, which remain unexplored. To manage the windfall from oil and gas production, the Government of Guyana (GoG) amended its sovereign wealth fund legislation in December 2021, thereby opening its coffers for the government to spend most of the fund’s initial balance on needed infrastructure and energy developments and invest in the country’s healthcare and education systems. Guyana is quickly transforming into a regional destination for international investment. Foreign direct investment (FDI) into Guyana increased from $1.8 billion in 2020 to $4.3 billion in 2021, mainly due to investments in its oil and gas sector. In an effort to diversify the economy away from oil and gas, the GoG is offering incentives for investment in the agriculture, business support services, health, information technology manufacturing and energy sectors, especially in outlying regions, through the Guyana Office for Investment (GOINVEST). At the same time, processes including the government tender process are slow and often opaque, with some tenders expiring and being re-issued after a year passes without decision and no pro-active communication to U.S. bidders. The GoG lifted most of its COVID-19 domestic restrictions on February 14, 2022, thanks to a significant drop in COVID cases. Proof of vaccination and a negative COVID-19 PCR, or approved antigen, test taken with 72 of travel are still required to enter Guyana. The Ministry of Health (MoH) reports that more than 60 percent of Guyana’s adult population is fully vaccinated, as are 44 percent of children ages 12 – 17. While the GoG remains wary of future variants, the government has indicated a strong resistance to resuming containment and mitigation efforts like mask mandates, nationwide curfews, and strict quarantine requirements. Climate change presents a clear and present danger to Guyana, especially in its low-lying coastal regions where 90 percent of the population lives. According to the United Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2021 report, Guyana’s capital, Georgetown, is forecasted to be under water by 2030 due to rising sea levels. To assist the country’s transition to a more climate resilient economy, the GoG is revising its Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS), which seeks to create financial incentives for maintaining the country’s intact forests covering 87 percent of the landmass, watersheds, and unique biodiversity. The strategy is expected to be tabled in parliament in mid-2022 for approval and adoption. The GoG’s 2022 priorities include significant infrastructure investments, energy developments, improving healthcare services, diversifying and expanding agriculture sector, boosting sea and flood defenses, supporting emerging and value-added industries, and improving the business climate. Key challenges to Guyana’s development include high crime rates, some of the highest cost of electricity in the region, lengthy delays for permits, and access to land. Despite commitments from the GoG to ease regulatory hurdles and improve the business climate, Guyana’s Ease of Doing Business ranking continues to hover at 134 out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s 2020 report. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 87 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2015 178 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 7,130 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GoG recognizes foreign direct investment (FDI) as critical for growing and diversifying the Guyanese economy. Guyanese law does not discriminate against foreign investors. The GoG has prioritized investments in the following sectors: agriculture, agro-processing, light manufacturing, renewable energy, tourism and information and communications technology (ICT). The Guyana Office for Investment (GO-INVEST) is the GoG’s primary vehicle for promoting FDI opportunities and assisting foreign corporations with their business registrations and applying for tax concessions. Companies and investors are encouraged to do their due diligence and have robust business plans completed before approaching GOINVEST. The GoG passed the Local Content Act (LCA) on December 31, 2021, which establishes baseline requirements for foreign and local firms operating in the country’s oil and gas sector to hire Guyanese and source local materials. The legislation lists local quotas for 40 business services and material inputs, which must come from Guyanese businesses. The targets range from near total local sourcing (90 to 100 percent) for services like ground transportation of personnel, local accounting and legal services, and pest control services to lower levels (between 5 to 25 percent) for more technical items like dredging services, engineering and machining, borehole testing, environmental services and studies, and aviation support services. The GoG plans to expand this initial list of services and materials as local capacity increases, in which case foreign firms may have to enter into partnerships with local firms to comply with the LCA. Some local firms involved in joint ventures or subcontract relationships with foreign companies have expressed concerns about unclear requirements or the suggestion of new or revised tenders by the Local Content Secretariat, which could delay their operations and create conditions for undue influence and rent seeking behavior. Guyana’s constitution protects the rights of foreigners to own property in Guyana. Foreign and domestic firms possess the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of commerce, except for some oil and gas services which are now legally protected under the LCA. Private entities are governed by the 1991 Companies Act (amended in 1995) under which they have the right to establish business enterprises and are free to acquire or dispose of interest in accordance with the law. Some key sectors like oil and gas, aviation, forestry, banking, mining, and tourism are heavily regulated and require special licensing and may have limits on foreign ownership. The process to obtain licenses can be time consuming and may in some instances require ministerial approval. The LCA significantly increased the ownership criteria for a company operating in, or servicing the oil sector, to be considered Guyanese as: Guyanese nationals having at least 51 percent voting rights, holding at least 75 percent of executive and senior management positions within the company, and at least 90 percent non-managerial staff positions. As of April 2022, these limits on foreign control and ownership only apply to the initial schedule of local companies outlined in the 2021 LCA. The GoG also prohibits foreign ownership of small-and-medium-scale mining (ASM) concessions. Foreign investors interested in participating in the industry at those levels may establish joint ventures with Guyanese nationals, under which the two parties agree to jointly develop a mining property. However, this type of relationship can carry a high level of risk because arrangements are governed only by private contracts and the sector’s regulatory agency, the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission (GGMC), offers little recourse for ASM disputes. The U.S. Embassy strongly encourages investors to thoroughly conduct their due diligence when exploring business opportunities. The GoG maintains an investment screening mechanism through GOINVEST. Under this mechanism, investment agreements are prepared by GOINVEST, followed by a review by the Guyana Revenue Authority (GRA), and approval by the Minister of Finance ultimately approves the investment agreement, pending approval by the GRA. Industry specific investments can be subject to approval by the relevant ministries, like the recently established Local Content Secretariat within the Ministry of Natural Resources, which now approves all oil and gas related business operations. Government policy focuses on attracting inward FDI. The GoG applies national treatment to all economic activities, except for certain oil and gas and mining operations. The World Trade Organization (WTO) published its most recent trade policy review of Guyana on March 2, 2022, in which it encouraged the GoG to invest in infrastructure and human capital development and reduce its dependence on fossil fuels. The most recent report reiterated prior recommendations for the GoG to increase transparency in government procurement and modernize of the government’s treatment of intellectual property rights. World Trade Organization is available at the following link: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp522_crc_e.htm President Irfaan Ali’s administration has emphasized its desire to diversify Guyana’s economy and expand business ties with the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and others. The GoG created a Diaspora Affairs Unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation to encourage business ties with the Guyanese diaspora, especially the U.S. based diaspora. All companies operating in Guyana must physically register with the Registrar of Companies, there is no online platform. Registration fees are lower for companies incorporated in Guyana than those incorporated abroad. Locally incorporated companies are subjected to a flat fee of approximately $300 and a company incorporated abroad is subject to a fee of approximately $400. Depending on the type of business, registration may take three weeks or more. Newly registered businesses are encouraged to immediately apply for a tax identification number (TIN) from the GRA. If a company employs Guyanese workers, the company must demonstrate compliance with the National Insurance Scheme (social security). Businesses in the sectors requiring specific licenses, such as oil and gas, mining, telecommunications, forestry, and banking must obtain operation licenses from the relevant authorities before commencing operations. Guyana has six municipal authorities which also assess municipal taxes: Anna Regina, Corriverton, Georgetown, Linden, New Amsterdam, and Rosehall. GOINVEST advises the GoG on the formulation and implementation of national investment policies and provides facilitation services to foreign investors, particularly in completing administrative formalities, such as commercial registration and applications for land purchases or leases. Under the Status of Aliens Act, foreign and domestic investors have the same rights to purchase and lease land. However, the process to access licensing can be complex and many foreign companies have opted to partner with local companies which may assist with acquiring a license. The Investment Act specifies that there should be no discrimination between foreign and domestic private investors, or among foreign investors from different countries. The authorities maintain that foreign investors have equal access to opportunities arising from privatization of state-owned companies. Resources Guyana Deeds and Commercial Registry: https://dcra.gov.gy/ GO-INVEST: https://goinvest.gov.gy/ Guyana Revenue Authority: https://www.gra.gov.gy/ While the GoG is focused on attracting inward investment into Guyana, there are no restrictions for domestic investors to invest abroad. GOINVEST supports Guyanese investors and exporters looking to operate overseas. In 2021, Guyana repealed and replaced its existing sovereign wealth fund legislation, the Natural Resource Fund Act. The passage of the revised NRF, along with the appointment of a board of directors, paves the way for the GoG to invest a portion of its oil revenues and royalties in global markets. 3. Legal Regime Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are consistent with international norms. Guyana is a commonwealth nation and embraces the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS), under which all publicly traded companies are legally required to publish their annual reports. Guyana is a democratic country, whose constitution mandates the separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. In practice, however, many GoG processes are opaque and consistently cause confusion for investors and exporters. Regulations are developed through stakeholder consultations followed by parliamentary debate and eventual passage in Guyana’s National Assembly (parliament). While the GoG does not require companies to disclose environmental, social and governance (ESG) standards, it actively encourages ESG through investment policies and the LCDS. Guyana’s laws are publicly available on the Ministry of Legal Affairs website. Publicly listed companies’ finances and debt obligations are relatively transparent, but Guyana’s accounting and auditing firms are severely limited in their capacity to conduct thorough audits that comply with international best practices. Oversight mechanisms for public finances include the national assembly and the Auditor General Office. As captured in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report, the GoG’s bureaucratic procedures are cumbersome, often involve multiple ministries that often have overlapping regulatory responsibilities. Investors report having received conflicting messages from various officials, and difficulty determining where the authority for decision-making lies. In the absence of adequate legislation, most decision-making remains centralized. An extraordinary number of issues continue to be resolved in the presidential cabinet, a process that is perceived by many – especially new investors or bidders – as opaque and slow. Resources Ministry of Legal Affairs: https://mola.gov.gy/laws-of-guyana Guyana has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995 and adheres to Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) guidelines. Guyana is also a member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and is working to harmonize its regulatory systems with the rest of the CARICOM member states. Guyana is a member of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) initiative. Guyana has laws on intellectual property rights and patents. However, a lack of enforcement offers few protections in practice and allows for the relatively uninhibited distribution and sale of illegally obtained content. Guyana’s legal system combines civil and common laws. Guyana’s judicial system operates independently from the executive branch. The Caribbean Court of Justice, located in Trinidad and Tobago, is Guyana’s highest court. Registered companies are governed by the Companies Act and contracts are enforced by Guyanese courts or through a mediator. Guyana has a commercial court in its High Court, which has both original and appellate jurisdiction. Legislation exists in Guyana to support foreign direct investment, but the enforcement of these regulations continues to be inadequate. The objective of the Investment Act of 2004 and Industries and Aid and Encouragement Act of 1951 is to stimulate socio-economic development by attracting and facilitating foreign investment. Other relevant laws include: the Income Tax Act, the Customs Act, the Procurement Act of 2003, the Companies Act of 1991, the Securities Act of 1998, and the Small Business Act. Regulatory actions are still required for much of this legislation to be effectively implemented. The Companies Act provides special provisions for companies incorporated outside of Guyana called “external companies.” Most recently the 2021 Local Content Act mandates certain levels of Guyanese participation (in the form of workforce, company ownership, and sourcing of materials) in the oil and gas sector. Companies should direct their inquiries about regulations on FDI to GOINVEST. Guyana has no known examples of executive interference in the court system that have adversely affected foreign investors. The judicial system is generally perceived to be slow and ineffective in enforcing legal contracts. The 2020 World Bank’s Doing Business Report states that it takes 581 days to enforce a contract in Guyana. Guyana’s local content legislation was passed on December 30, 2022. The legislation ringfences 40 business lines for Guyanese businesses within the oil and gas industry. The Competition Commission of Guyana was established under the 2006 Competition and Fair-Trading Act. The Competition and Fair-Trading act seek to promote, maintain, and encourage competition; to prohibit the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition, the abuse of dominant trade positions; and to promote the welfare and interests of consumers. The Competition Commission and Consumer Affairs Commission (CCAC) is responsible for investigating complaints by agencies and consumers, eliminating anti-competitive agreements, and may institute or participate in proceedings before a Court of Law. For mergers and acquisitions within of the banking sector, the Bank of Guyana has ultimate oversight and approval. The government can expropriate property in the public interest under the 2001 Acquisition of Land for Public Purposes Act, although there are no recent cases of expropriation. Adequate legislation exists to promote and protect foreign investment. However, enforcement is often ineffective. Many reports view Guyana’s judicial system as being slow and ineffective in enforcing legal contracts. All companies are encouraged to conduct due diligence and seek appropriate legal counsel for any potential questions prior to doing business in Guyana. Guyana is a party to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention). Additionally, Guyana has ratified the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention), which entered into force in December 2014. Guyana does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States. Negotiations began in 1993 but broke down in 1995. Since then, the two countries have not conducted subsequent negotiations. Double taxation treaties are in force with Canada (1987), the United Kingdom (1992), and CARICOM (1995). Other double taxation agreements remain under negotiation with India, Kuwait, and the Seychelles. The CARICOM-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement provides for the negotiation of a double taxation agreement, but no significant developments have occurred since March 2009. There is one ongoing investment dispute involving a U.S. telecommunications company, which previously held a legal monopoly in Guyana. International arbitration decisions are enforceable under the 1931 Arbitration Act of British Guiana, as amended in 1998. The Act is based on the Geneva Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927. The GoG enforces foreign awards by way of judicial decisions or action, and such awards must be in line with the policies and laws of Guyana. According to the 2020 World Bank’s Doing Business Report, resolving disputes in Guyana takes 581 days, and on average costs 27 percent of the value of the claim. According to many businesses, suspected corrupt practices and long delays make the courts an unattractive option for settling investment or contractual disputes, particularly for foreign investors unfamiliar with Guyana. The GoG has set up a Commercial Court to expedite commercial disputes, but this court only has one judge presiding, and companies have reported that it is overwhelmed by a backlog of cases. The Caribbean Court of Justice, based in Trinidad and Tobago, is Guyana’s court of final instance. In practice, most business disputes are settled by mediation which avoids a lengthy court battle and keeps costs low to both parties. Guyanese state-owned enterprises are not widely involved in investor disputes. To date, there are no complaints on the court process relating to judgments involving state owned enterprises. The 1998 Guyana Insolvency Act provides for the facilitation of insolvency proceedings. The 2004 Financial Institutions Act gives the Central Bank power to take temporary control of financial institutions in trouble. This Act provides legal authority for the Central Bank to take a more proactive role in helping insolvent local banks. According to data collected by the World Bank Doing Business Report, resolving insolvency in Guyana takes three years on average and costs 28.5% of the debtor’s estate, with the most likely outcome being that the company will be sold piecemeal. The average recovery rate is 18 cents on the dollar. 6. Financial Sector The GoG is indifferent to foreign portfolio investment. Guyana has its own stock market, which is supervised by the Guyana Association of Securities Companies and Intermediaries (GASCI). GASCI is a self- regulated organization. Dividends earned from the local stock exchange are tax free. Guyana’s stock market outpaced GDP growth in 2021 with a 46.1 percent increase in its market capitalization. Despite growing interest in the local stock market, however, Guyana has not seen a new company listed for over a decade. Foreign investors can access credit on the local market if they satisfy local banking requirements. Credit is allocated based on risk profile and creditworthiness. Credit is available on market terms. The private sector has access to credit instruments though limited on the local market. The Central Bank respects IMF Article VIII with regard to payments and transfers for international transactions. Guyana relies heavily on cash payments for most financial transactions, but credit cards and mobile payment options are increasingly common. The GoG’s monetary policy remains accommodative, aimed at achieving price stability and controlling liquidity within the economy. The financial sector is regulated by the Bank of Guyana (BoG), the country’s central bank. The financial sector is regulated by the Bank of Guyana (BOG), the country’s central bank. The BOG is empowered under the 1995 Financial Institutions Act and the Bank of Guyana Act to regulate the financial sector. Under these regulations a bank operating in Guyana must maintain high levels of liquidity and a strong deposit and asset base. Approval from the BOG is required before operating in Guyana. The BoG regularly performs stress tests to determine the vulnerability of licensed depository financial institutions (LDFIs). Guyanese LDFI’s ratio of reserves against non-performing loans increased by 1.9 percentage points to 37.2 percent as of mid-year 2021. Guyana’s banking system remains adequate with capital adequacy ratios (CAR) well above the prudential benchmark of 8 percent. Guyana’s banking stability index improved from 0.15 to 0.38 at the end of June 2021, reflecting improved performances in asset quality, profitability, and liquidity indicators. Non–bank financial institutions’ total assets, which includes depository and non-depository licenses and unlicensed financial institutions, grew by 8 percent. Guyana has six commercial banks. Foreign banks can provide domestic services or enter the market with a license from the BoG. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account. The GoG recognizes a need to improve access to finance for both the private sector and private citizens, with the current financial institutions seen as slow, overly cautious, and full of bureaucratic red tape. Guyana established a sovereign wealth fund, the Natural Resource Fund (NRF), in 2019, with the passage of the 2019 Natural Resources Act. While the NRF broadly conformed to the Santiago principles, President Irfaan Ali’s administration vowed to repeal and replace the 2019 NRF with a version that decentralized control over the fund and established a simpler withdrawal schedule. In December 2021, the Ali administration used its veto proof majority in parliament to unilaterally repeal and replace the existing law with the NRF 2021. While the revised law includes some improvements, like the creation of a board of directors and more intuitive withdraw schedule, it still affords the President broad reaching powers to appoint all the NRF’s key leadership positions, provides few limits on the investment or usage of the fund, and while a former member of the opposition was proposed for the board, the current opposition’s nominees were not accepted by the government. This prompted more concerns about transparent management of the fund moving forward. As of January 2022, the NRF holds $607.5 million, which under the revised law the GoG will be able to withdraw in its entirety in the coming year to meet 2022 budget allocations. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Guyana has ten state-owned enterprises (SOEs) including: National Industrial and Commercial Investments Ltd. (NICIL), Guyana Sugar Corporation (GUYSUCO), MARDS Rice Complex Ltd., National Insurance Scheme (NIS), Guyana Power and Light (GPL), Guyana Rice Development Board (GRDB), Guyana National Newspapers Ltd. (GNNL), Guyana National Shipping Corporation (GNSC) and Guyana National Printers Ltd. (GNPL). The private sector competes with SOEs for market share, credit, and business opportunities. It is common for SOEs in Guyana to experience political interventions, driven by boards of directors filled with political appointees. Procurement on behalf of SOEs may be passed through the National Procurement and Tender Administration or handled directly by the SOE. The Public Corporation Act requires public corporations to publish an annual report no later than six months after the end of the calendar year. These reports must be audited by an independent auditor. In the 1990s, Guyana underwent significant privatization with the divestment of many sectors. In 1993, the Privatization Policy Framework Paper known as the “Privatisation White Paper” was tabled in Parliament and led to the creation of the Privatization Unit (PU). Its function was to co-ordinate the implementation of the GoG’s privatization program and was tasked with: Combining the functions of the Public Corporations Secretariat (PCS) and the National Industrial & Commercial Investments Limited (NICIL); Preparing for the program strategy and annual program targets for privatization or liquidation Cabinet’s approval; Implementing the privatization of SOEs and assets selected for inclusion in the program; Participating in negotiations for the privatization of SOEs; Reviewing offers and making recommendations to Cabinet on the terms and conditions for the sale of SOEs; Preparing financial and administrative audits of SOEs not selected for privatization; Developing a strategy to build public understanding and support for privatization; Ensuring that transparency of the privatization program is strictly respected and followed; Monitoring operations of privatized entities in accordance with the terms and conditions of each respective contract; Preparing for Cabinet, broad guidelines on operating policies for privatization, develop action plans for implementation, conduct a public relations campaign and help to build national consensus in support of government’s program. Foreign investors have equal access to privatization opportunities. However, there are many reports that the process is opaque and favors politically connected local businesses. Currently, the GoG is interested in privatizing at least a portion of GUYSUCO. U.S. firms are generally given equal access to these projects through a public bidding process. However, many bidders continue to complain about the criteria and question their unsuccessful attempt at securing a contract. In cases where international financial institution (IFI) funding has been involved in the project, such allegations have been credibly addressed. In cases where the project relied solely on GoG funds, redress has been more problematic to achieve. 10. Political and Security Environment Guyana has a high crime rate, and violence associated with drug and gold smuggling is on the rise. The country peacefully transitioned to a new government on August 2, 2020, after a 20 month-long extra-constitutional and electoral crisis, which saw few instances of politically incited violence. The GoG has committed to electoral reform in the wake of the 2020 electoral crisis to avoid future electoral impasses. The security environment in the country continues to be a concern for many businesses. Businesses considering investing in Guyana are strongly encouraged to develop adequate security systems. Haiti Executive Summary Haiti, one of the most urbanized nations in Latin America and the Caribbean region, occupies the western third of the island of Hispaniola. Haiti’s investment climate continues to present both important opportunities and major challenges for U.S. investors. With a market economy, ample arable land, and a young population, Haiti offers numerous opportunities for investors. Despite efforts by the Haitian government to achieve macroeconomic stability and sustainable private sector-led and market-based economic growth, Haiti’s investment climate is characterized by an unstable national currency (Haitian gourde, or HTG), persistent inflation, high unemployment, political uncertainty, and insecurity. The global outbreak of the coronavirus and resulting slowdown of economic activity, the August 2021 earthquake in the south of Haiti, the assassination of the Haitian president, and increasingly emboldened criminal actors further complicated the Haitian government’s capacity to achieve macroeconomic stability, create jobs, and encourage economic development through foreign trade and investment. In the absence of a functioning parliament and prior to President Moise’s assassination in July 2021, the Haitian government had taken additional steps to regulate commercial activity by presidential decree, with sudden regulatory changes the business community viewed as detrimental to a functioning market. As a free market system, the Haitian economy traditionally relies on its agricultural, construction, and commerce sectors, as well as the export-oriented apparel assembly industry. Although the business climate is challenging, Haiti’s legislation encourages foreign direct investment. The government has prioritized building and improving infrastructure, including boosting energy production, and has additionally designated agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism as key investment sectors. The Haitian investment code provides the same rights, privileges, and equal protection to local and foreign companies. Under Haitian law, Haiti’s business climate affords equal treatment to all investors, including women, minorities, and foreign nationals. Haiti continues to face significant challenges and civil unrest. With no dates yet announced for national elections, it is anticipated that political uncertainty and a short-term economic policy focus will complicate the workings of an already opaque bureaucracy. Prime Minister Ariel Henry has publicly announced the imminent formation of a new Provisional Electoral Council to organize elections and a National Constituent Assembly to reform the constitution. While the country maintains a liberal trade and foreign exchange regime, and largely adheres to World Bank programs to fight poverty, continuing reports of corruption and financial mismanagement have raised challenges for investment. The Government of Haiti (GoH) Post-COVID Economic Recovery Plan (PREPOC 2020-2023) includes the textile sector as one of the most important means for achieving economic transformation and diversification over the next three years. Since its launch in January 2021, the Investment Opportunity Generation Project has tried to support the industry through targeted business information as well as transactional support to increase business opportunities for investors and manufacturers. Despite the negative impact of the pandemic, most companies in the sector currently operates near full capacity. According to the World Investment Report 2021 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows to Haiti fell to $30 million in 2020 from $75 million the year prior – a 60 percent decrease and the lowest level since United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) began recording FDI inflows using a consistent methodology in 2010. Inflation remains above target because of weak domestic production, a deepening government budget deficit mostly financed by monetization from the Central Bank, food price pressures, and the depreciation of the Haitian gourde against the U.S. dollar. The Haitian Central Bank (BRH) assesses that inflation is also caused by deteriorating security conditions, with armed gangs blocking key transport thoroughfares and cutting off Haiti’s southern departments from markets in Port-au-Prince and the North. The rise in commodity prices on the international market also increases the country’s import bill and amplifies inflationary pressures. Haiti’s net international reserves were $520 million at the end of March 2022. Improving the investment outlook for Haiti requires political and economic stability underscored by the enactment of institutional and structural reforms that can improve Haiti’s business and political environment. The International Monetary Fund projects a 0.3 percent growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2022. Monthly inflation was recorded at 0.6 percent and 2.1 percent, respectively in January and February 2022. Year-on-year, the inflation rate reached 25.2 percent in February 2022. The Central Bank assesses the implementation of a realistic budget and better coordination between fiscal and monetary policies through adherence to an economic and financial governance pact could limit the monetary effect in the fueling of inflationary pressures. Haiti is ranked 170 out of 189 countries on the United Nations Development Program’s 2020 Human Development Index. The World Bank’s latest household survey in 2012 reported that over 6 million Haitians live on less than $2.41 per day, and more than 2.5 million fall below $1.12 per day. The reports of damage from the 2021 earthquake indicate that nearly 54,000 houses were destroyed and 83,770 other buildings, including schools, health facilities, and public buildings, were damaged. The Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) report, made available on December 12, 2021, estimated the total recovery needs from the earthquake to be $1.98 billion, which is equivalent to 13.5 percent of Haiti’s 2020 GDP. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 164 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/hti World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2020 179 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings In September 2021, World Bank Group management decided to discontinue the Doing Business report Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $29.0M https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,320 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Haiti’s legislation encourages foreign direct investment. Import and export policies are non-discriminatory and are not based on nationality. Haitian and foreign investors have the same rights, privileges, and protections under the 1987 investment code. The Haitian government has made some progress in recent years to improve the legal framework, create and strengthen core public institutions, and enhance economic governance. The Haitian Central Bank continues to work with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to implement measures aimed at creating a stable macroeconomic environment. The IMF concluded its most recent Article IV consultation (2019) with Haiti in January 2020. In April 2020, the IMF loaned Haiti $112 million through its rapid credit facility mechanism to provide liquidity to Haiti for expenditures to address COVID-19. Most recently, in August 2021, Haiti received an allocation of IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) equivalent to $224 million. While the IMF recommended using these funds to support COVID-19 measures and earthquake relief efforts, the IMF did not stipulate how these fuds were to be used. While not discriminatory towards international investment specifically, the Haitian government’s economic policies fall short of providing a sound enabling environment for foreign direct investment. Despite the Haitian Central Bank’s periodic interventions in the foreign exchange market, the Haitian gourde continued to depreciate against the U.S. dollar. As of March 2022, the BRH benchmark rate has reached HTG/USD 104.7, having increased by 23.3 percent over the prior 12 months and the U.S. dollar banknotes remain scarce for businesses and regular citizens. Despite passing anti-money laundering and anti-corruption laws to ensure that Haiti’s legislation corresponds with international standards, the government has not strictly followed the legal framework of these laws and has also failed to incentivize investment in Haiti. In early 2017, the Parliament enacted legislation making electronic signatures and electronic transactions legally binding. Other pieces of legislation that may improve Haiti’s investment climate remain pending, including incorporation procedures, a new mining code, and an insurance code. The Finance Ministry is implementing measures to improve revenue collection and control spending. The Ministry signed an agreement with Haiti’s Central Bank in November 2020 to strengthen fiscal discipline and limit government monetary financing. Despite these measures, monetary financing of the budget deficit over Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 has grown by 15 percent from FY2020 and stood at 15.8 billion gourdes (approximately $145 million) as of March 2022, six months into the fiscal year. The Center for the Facilitation of Investments (CFI), which operates under Haitian Ministry of Commerce oversight, was established to promote domestic and international investment opportunities in Haiti. In concept, the CFI could streamline the investment process by working with other government agencies to simplify procedures related to trade and investment; providing updated economic and commercial information to local and foreign investors; making proposals on investor incentives; and promoting investment in priority sectors. The CFI aims to offer tailored services to large international investors. In practice, the CFI has made limited progress to incentivize job creation and boost national production in agriculture, apparel assembly, and tourism. As examples, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Haiti’s Tourism Association reported a 60 percent loss of jobs in the sector in 2019. The apparel sector, the largest provider of jobs in the formal private sector, has reported great difficulties operating due to insecurity and recurring fuel shortages with adverse effect on contracts and employment. The Haitian government does not impose discriminatory requirements on foreign investors. Haitian laws related to residency status and employment are reciprocal. Foreigners who are legal residents in Haiti and wish to engage in trade have, within the framework of laws and regulations, the same rights granted to Haitian citizens. However, Article 5 of the Decree on the Profession of Merchants reserves the function of manufacturer’s agent for Haitian nationals. Foreign firms are also encouraged to participate in government-financed development projects. Performance requirements are not imposed on foreign firms as a condition for establishing or expanding an investment, unless indicated in a signed contract. Foreign investors are permitted to own 100 percent of a company or subsidiary. As a Haitian entity, such companies enjoy all rights and privileges provided under the law. Additionally, foreign investors are permitted to operate businesses without equity-to-debt ratio requirements. Accounting law allows foreigners to capitalize using tangible and intangible assets in lieu of cash investments. Both Haitian and foreign investors enjoy the same rights and privileges. However, foreign investors residing in Haiti must obtain a residence permit and are expected to pay duties and taxes, in accordance with the scales and regulations applicable. Foreign investors are free to own real estate for the needs of their businesses and enjoy the same rights and prerogatives as Haitian investors. The reimbursement of debts contracted abroad for investments made in Haiti are not subject to any constraint or taxation. Foreign investors are free to enter into joint ventures with Haitian citizens. The distribution of shares is a private matter between the two parties. However, the government regulates the sale and purchase of company shares. Investment in certain sectors, such as health and agriculture, requires special Haitian government authorization. Investment in “sensitive” sectors such as electricity, water, telecommunications, and mining require a Haitian government concession as well as authorization from the appropriate governmental agency. In general, natural resources are the property of the state, and the exploitation of mineral and energy resources requires concessions and permits from the Ministry of Public Works’ Bureau of Mining and Energy. Mining, prospecting, and operating permits may only be granted to companies established and resident in Haiti, and the establishment of new industrial mines cannot take place until an elected parliament passes an updated mining law, along the lines of a draft law initially presented in 2017. Entrepreneurs are free to dispose of their properties and assets and to organize production and marketing activities in accordance with local laws. Investors in Haiti can create the following types of businesses: sole proprietorship, limited or general partnership, joint-stock company, public company (corporation), subsidiary of a foreign company, and co-operative society. The most common business structures in Haiti are corporations. A draft law (Société de Droits law), which would facilitate the creation of other types of businesses in Haiti, such as LLCs, remains pending parliamentary approval when parliament is restored. Haiti’s last investment policy review from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development occurred in 2012. In general, Haiti’s political instability, weak institutions, and inconsistent economic policies impede the country’s ability to attract and direct foreign direct investment. The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 2015 Trade Policy Review stated that Haiti’s Investment Code and Law on Free Trade Zones is fully compliant with the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures. The full report can be viewed at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp427_e.htm . While the Haitian government has made efforts to facilitate the launching and operating of businesses, the average time to start a business in Haiti is 189 days, according to the World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business Report. At present, it takes between 90 and 120 days to complete registration with the Commercial Registry at the Ministry of Commerce and obtain the authorization of operations (Droit de fonctionnement). The CFI also offers a service providing pre-registered and fully authorized companies in manufacturing, agribusiness, and real estate the opportunity to reduce their registration time. Once the Inter-Ministerial Investment Commission validates these established companies, the shares are transferred to the new owners. Both foreign and domestic businesses can register at Haiti’s CFI: http://cfihaiti.com . All businesses must register with the Ministry of Commerce, the Haitian tax office, the state-owned Banque Nationale de Crédit, the social security office, and the retirement insurance office. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry’s internet registry allows investors to search for and verify the existence of a business in Haiti. The registry will eventually provide online registration of companies through an electronic one-stop shop. In October 2020, CFI launched Spotlight, an initiative with the aim of promoting visibility of companies already established in Haiti and registered in the CFI database. Neither the law nor the Haitian government restricts domestic investors from investing abroad. Still, Haiti’s outward investment is limited to a few enterprises with small investments. These investors are generally businesspersons with dual citizenship and others of Haitian origin who presently reside in the country in which their firms operate. The majority of these firms are service providers and not investment firms. There is no current program or incentive in place to encourage Haitian entrepreneurs to invest abroad. 3. Legal Regime Haitian laws are written to allow for transparency and to be applied universally. However, Haitian officials do not uniformly enforce these laws and the bureaucratic “red tape” in the Haitian legal system is often excessive. Tax, labor, health, and safety laws and policies are also loosely enforced. The private sector often provides services, such as healthcare, to employees that are not entitled to coverage under Haitian government agencies or institutions. All regulatory processes are managed exclusively by the government and do not involve the private sector and non-governmental organizations. Draft bills or regulations are available to the public through “Le Moniteur,” the official journal of the Haitian government, and information is sometimes made available online. Le Moniteur contains public agency rules, decrees, and public notices that Les Presses Nationales d’Haiti publishes. According to the World Bank, Haitian ministries and regulatory agencies do not develop forward regulatory plans, nor do they publish proposed regulations prior to their adoption. Haitian law does not require a timeframe for public comment or review of proposed regulations. Haiti is a member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), an organization of 15 states and dependencies established to promote regional economic integration. The CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), created in 1989, aims to advance the region’s integration into the global economy by facilitating free trade in goods and services, and the free movement of labor and capital. CSME became operational in January 2006 in 12 of the 15 member states. Haiti, as a member of CARICOM, has expressed an interest in participating fully in CSME. However, to become eligible, Haiti must amend its customs code to align with CARICOM and WTO standards. Haiti also adheres to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice on issues of international law, and of the Caribbean Court of Justice for the settlement of trade disputes within CARICOM. Haiti is an original member of the WTO. As such, it has made several commitments to the WTO with regard to the financial services sector. These commitments include allowing foreign investment in financial services, such as retail, commercial, investment banking, and consulting. One foreign bank, Citibank, operates in Haiti. Haiti has committed to notifying the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade of all draft technical regulations. However, Haiti is not party to the Trade Facilitation Agreement. As a former French colony, Haiti adopted the French civil law system. Judicial power is exercised by the Superior Magistrate Council, the courts of appeal, the courts of first instance, the courts of justice of the peace, and the courts of exception. Their operations, organization and competence are set by law. The Supreme Court, also known as the Superior Magistrate Council, is the highest court of the nation, followed in descending order by the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance. Haiti’s commercial code dates back to 1826 and underwent significant revisions in 1944. There are few commercial laws in place and there are no commercial courts. Injunctive relief is based upon penal sanctions rather than securing desirable civil action. Similarly, contracts to comply with certain obligations, such as commodities futures contracts, are not enforced. Haitian judges do not have specializations, and their knowledge of commercial law is limited. Utilizing Haitian courts to settle disputes is a lengthy process and cases can remain unresolved for years. Bonds to release assets frozen through litigation are unavailable. Business litigants often pursue out-of-court settlements. Haiti’s legal system often presents challenges for U.S. citizens seeking to resolve legal disputes. In Haiti, judges are appointed for a set number of years. Public prosecutors are direct employees of the Ministry of Justice and can be transferred or suspended by the executive branch at any time. There are numerous allegations of undue political interference. Additionally, there are persistent claims that some Haitian officials use their public office to influence commercial dispute outcomes for personal gain. The Haitian government receives international assistance to increase the capacity of its oversight institutions and the capacity of the national police. The Investment Code prohibits fiscal and legal discrimination against foreign investors. The code explicitly recognizes the crucial role of foreign direct investment in promoting economic growth. It also aims to facilitate, liberalize, and stimulate private investment, and contains exemptions to promote investments that enhance competitiveness in sectors deemed priorities, especially export-oriented sectors. Tax incentives, such as reductions on taxable income and tax exemptions, are designed to promote private investment. Additionally, the code grants Haitian and foreign investors the same rights, privileges, and equal protection. Foreign investors must be legally registered and pay appropriate local taxes and fees. The code also established an Inter-Ministerial Investment Commission (CII) to examine investor eligibility for license exemptions as well as customs and tariff advantages. The Center for Facilitation of Investments (CFI) is the Technical Secretariat of the CII. The Prime Minister, or his delegate, chairs the CII, which is composed of representatives of the Ministries of Economy and Finance, Commerce, and Tourism, as well as those ministries that oversee specific areas of investment. The CII must authorize all business sales, transfers, mergers, partnerships, and fiscal exemptions within the scope of the code. The CII also manages the process of fining and sanctioning enterprises that disregard the code. The following areas are often noted by businesses as challenging aspects of Haitian law: operation of the judicial system; publication of laws, regulations, and official notices; establishment of companies; land tenure and real property law and procedures; bank and credit operations; insurance and pension regulation; accounting standards; civil status documentation; customs law and administration; international trade and investment promotion; foreign investment regulations; and regulation of market concentration and competition. Although these deficiencies hinder business activities, they are not specifically aimed at foreign firms; rather, they appear to affect both foreign and local companies. There is currently no law to regulate competition. Haiti is one of the most open economies in the region. The investment code provides the same rights, privileges, and equal protection to local and foreign investors. Anti-corruption legislation also criminalizes nepotism and the dissemination of inside information on public procurement processes. Haiti does not, however, have anti-trust legislation. The 1987 Constitution allows expropriation or dispossession only for reasons of public interest or land reform and is subject to prior payment of fair compensation as determined by an expert. If the initial project for which the expropriation occurred is abandoned, the Constitution stipulates that the expropriation will be annulled, and the property returned to the original owner. The Constitution prohibits nationalization and confiscation of real and personal property for political purposes or reasons. Title deeds are vague and often insecure. The Haitian government established the National Institute of Agrarian Reform to implement expropriations of private agricultural properties with appropriate compensation. The agrarian reform project, initiated under the Preval administration (1996-2001), was controversial among both Haitian and U.S. property owners. There have been complaints of non-compensation for the expropriation of property. Moreover, a revision of the land tenure code, intended to address issues related to the lack of access to land records, surveys, and property titles in Haiti, has been pending in parliament since 2014. A partnership between the private sector, Haitian government, and international organizations resulted in a guide on security land rights in Haiti, which was translated in 2016 and can be found here: https://www.land-links.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Haiti-Land-Manual-2.pdf . Haiti’s bankruptcy law was enacted in 1826 and modified in 1944. There are three phases of bankruptcy under Haitian law. In the first stage, payments cease to be made and bankruptcy is declared. In the second stage, a judgment of bankruptcy is rendered, which transfers the rights to administer assets from the debtor to the Director of the Haitian Tax Authority (Direction Generale des Impots). In this phase, assets are sealed, and the debtor is confined to debtor’s prison. In the last stage, the debtor’s assets are liquidated, and the debtor’s verified debts are paid prorated according to their right. The debtor is released from prison once the debtor’s verified debts are paid. In practice, the above measures are seldom applied. Since 1955, most bankruptcy cases have been settled between the parties. The practice of mob looting remains a means for some to express their frustration with the country’s social inequities. Many companies went bankrupt after being attacked by violent protesters. Lack of insurance coverage and the complexity of compensation proceedings make it difficult for many to restart their businesses. The state does not have a court assessing the losses of businesses for state financial compensation for bodily or patrimonial damages. While the provisions of Article 356 of the Haitian Penal Code states perpetrators should be punished in hard labor in perpetuity, many of these crimes remained unsolved. Although the concepts of real property mortgages and chattel mortgages – based on collateral of movable property, such as machinery, furniture, automobiles, or livestock to secure a mortgage – exist, real estate mortgages involve antiquated procedures and may fail to be recorded against the debtor or other creditors. Property is seldom purchased through a mortgage and secured debt is difficult to arrange or collect. Liens are virtually impossible to impose and using the judicial process for foreclosure is time consuming and often futile. Banks frequently require that loans be secured in U.S. dollars. 6. Financial Sector The scale of financial services remains modest in Haiti. The banking sector is well capitalized and profitable. In principle, there are no limitations to foreigners’ access to the Haitian credit market, but limited credit is available through commercial banks. The free and efficient flow of capital, however, is hindered by Haitian accounting practices, which are below international standards. While there are no restrictions on foreign investment through mergers or acquisitions, there is no Haitian stock market, so there is no way for investors to purchase shares in a company outside of direct transactions. As summarized in the most recent (2020) IMF Article IV consultation for Haiti, however, the country has accepted the obligations of Article VIII and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions. The standards that govern the Haitian legal, regulatory, and accounting systems do not comply with international norms. Haitian laws do not require external audits of domestic companies. Local firms calculate taxes, obtain credit or insurance, prepare for regulatory review, and assess real profit and loss. Accountants use basic accounting standards set by the Organization of Certified Professional Accountants in Haiti. Administrative oversight in the banking sector is superior to oversight in other sectors. Under Haitian law, however, banks are not required to comply with internationally recognized accounting standards, and they are often not audited by internationally recognized accounting firms. Nevertheless, Haiti’s Central Bank requires that banks apply internal audit procedures. As part of their corporate governance all private banks also have in-house audit functions. Most private banks follow international accounting norms and use consolidated reporting principles. The Central Bank is generally viewed as one of the best-functioning Haitian government institutions. While there are companies that issue shares and corporate bonds through financial intermediaries, these activities are often done in informal settings and through small groups in the primary market. The Central Bank is looking to expand the financial market in Haiti by creating two sub-committees for the development of financial markets and for the implementation of financial market infrastructure. Such platforms are expected to promote the mobilization and allocation of capital, long-term growth, and a solid legal, regulatory and institutional framework. The banking sector has concentrated on credit for trade financing and in the expansion of bank branches to capture deposits and remittances. Telebanking has expanded access to banking services for Haitians. Foreign banks are free to establish operations in Haiti. Three major banking institutions (Unibank, Sogebank and Banque Nationale de Credit) hold roughly 81 percent, or 421.72 billion gourdes (approximately $3.9 billion), of total banking sector assets. With its acquisition of the Haitian operations of Scotiabank in 2017, Unibank became Haiti’s largest banking company, with a market share of 35 percent of deposits. As part of this deal, Scotiabank remains one of Unibank’s international correspondent banks. U.S.-based Citibank also has a correspondent banking relationship with Unibank. The bank also manages one of the only two privatization operations in Haiti, that of the flour mill “Les Moulins d’Haiti SEM” in which it is a partner of two U.S. companies: Continental Grain/Contigroup (New York) and Seaboard Corporation (Kansas City). The three major commercial banks also hold 76 percent of the country’s total loan portfolio, while 70 percent of total loans are monopolized by 10 percent of borrowers. The concentration of holdings and limited number of borrowers increases the Haitian banking system’s vulnerability to systemic credit risk and restricts the availability of capital. The quality of loan portfolios in the banking system has slightly improved. Per the Haitian Central Bank, the ratio of nonperforming loans over total loans was 6.34 percent in December 2021, compared to 5.37 percent in December 2020. The Central Bank conducts regular inspections to ensure that financial institutions are in compliance with minimum capital requirements, asset quality, currency, and credit risk management. The Central Bank’s main challenge is maintaining sound monetary policy in the context of a larger-than-expected government deficit and a depreciating local currency. The exchange rate suffers from continued pressure on the foreign exchange market. The Central Bank has made a series of interventions with the objective of supporting the value of the gourde by increasing the dollar supply in the foreign exchange market. Selling U.S. dollars in the foreign exchange market has also allowed the Central Bank to dry up the excess liquidity of the gourde in the market with the potential effect of tempering the inflation rate. Annual inflation accelerated to 25.2 percent as of February 2022, remaining on an upward trend since August 2021. As of the end of March 2022, Haiti’s stock of net international reserves was approximately $520 million. There are no legal limitations on foreigners’ access to the domestic credit market. However, banks demand collateral of real property to grant loans. Given the lack of effective cadastral and civil registries, loan applicants face numerous challenges in obtaining credit. The banking sector is extremely conservative in its lending practices. Banks typically lend exclusively to their most trusted and credit-worthy clients. Based on a 2018 study by FinScope Haiti, only one percent of the adult population has access to a bank loan. The high concentration of assets does not allow for product innovation at major banks. To provide greater access to financial services for individuals and prospective investors, the Haitian government’s banking laws recognize tangible movable property (such as portable machinery, furniture, and tangible personal property) as collateral for loans. These laws allow individuals to buy condominiums, and banks to accept personal property, such as cars, bank accounts, etc., as collateral for loans. USAID has a loan portfolio guarantee program with a diversified group of financial institutions to encourage them to expand credit to productive small and medium enterprises, and rural micro-enterprises. Haiti has a credit rating registry in effect for users of the banking sector but does not have the relevant legislation in place to establish a credit rating bureau. Haiti’s Central Bank issued a series of monetary policy measures to alleviate the potential impact of COVID-19 on the financial system and the economy in March 2020. These measures included a reduction in the Central Bank’s policy rate to help lower interest rates on loans; the decrease of reserve requirement ratios to reduce the cost for banks to capture resources and grant loans; a reduction in the Central Bank’s refinancing rate to lower the cost of access to liquidity; the alleviation of loan repayment conditions for customers over a three-month period; the waiver of the Central Bank’s fees on interbank transfers to reduce transaction costs for customers; and the increase of limits on transactions through mobile payment services. On July 2020, a decree was issued reorganizing the National Bank for Agricultural Development (BNDA). The bank is tasked with developing the agricultural sector through the financing of the entire value chain (production, breeding, processing, marketing, and equipment) through access to basic financial services for the greatest number of people, targeting those living in semi-urban and rural areas. The bank is installed in municipal agricultural offices, attached to the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR). The bank is in partnership with the National Bank of Credit (BNC) with 63.8 million gourdes (approximately $584,623) in its portfolio and 700 million gourdes (approximately $6.4 million) out of a capital of 1 billion (approximately $9 million) planned for its launch. It uses its network for cash operations, such as disbursement and reimbursement. The Haitian government published a decree dated August 2020 regulating micro-finance, with institutions granting small loans to entrepreneurs or retailers who operate according to the regulations of the Central Bank of Haiti. This decision is part of the framework of financial inclusion. Micro-finance institutions have access to the Central Bank programs and microcredits are more accessible to entrepreneurs and small traders than large financial corporations. To date Haiti does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund. Per information released by the Central Bank in September 2018, since 2011 Haiti has levied a tax of $1.50 on all transfers into and out of the country, with the proceeds designated for the National Fund for Education. According to a Central Bank report in September 2019, more than $150 million has been collected since July 2011 on taxes from remittances from the diaspora. Many Haitians mistrust the government because of high levels of corruption and criticize the government’s slow and ineffective response to natural disasters and social crises. Donors and critics have called for guarantees of oversight and accountability in the rebuilding process following the 2021 earthquake in the south. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Haitian government owns and operates, either wholly or in part, several State-Owned Enterprises (SOE). The Haitian commercial code governs the operations of these SOEs. The sectors include food processing and packaging (a flourmill), construction and heavy equipment (a cement factory); information and communications (a telecommunications company); energy (the state electricity company, EDH); finance (two commercial banks, the Banque Nationale de Crédit and the Banque Populaire Haïtienne); and the national port authority and the airport authority. The law defines SOEs as autonomous enterprises that are legally authorized to be involved in commercial, financial, and industrial activities. All SOEs operate under the supervision of their respective sectorial ministry and are expected to create economic and social return. Today, some SOEs are fully owned by the state, while others are jointly owned commercial enterprises. The Haitian parliament, when it is functioning, has full authority to liquidate state enterprises that are underperforming. The majority of SOEs are financially sound. However, EDH receives substantial annual subsidies from the government to stay in business. In response to the economic difficulties of the late 1990s and mismanagement of the SOEs, the government liberalized the market and allows foreign firms to invest in the management and/or ownership of some Haitian state-owned enterprises. To accompany the initiative, the government established the Commission for the Modernization of Public Enterprises in 1996 to facilitate the privatization process. In 1998, two U.S. companies, Seaboard and Continental Grain, purchased shares of the state-owned flourmill. Each partner currently owns a third of the company, known today as Les Moulins d’Haiti. In 1999, a consortium of Colombian, Swiss, and Haitian investors purchased a majority stake in the national cement factory. In 2010, a state-owned Vietnamese corporation, Viettel, officially acquired 60 percent of the state telecommunications company Teleco (now operating as Natcom), with the Haitian government retaining 40 percent ownership. The government has allowed limited private sector investment in selected seaports. Competition is generally not distorted in favor of state-owned enterprises to the detriment of private companies. The Haitian government has allowed private sector investment in electricity generation to compensate for EDH’s inability to generate sufficient power, though it has had contractual disputes with multiple independent power producers. Only one independent power producer, partially U.S.-owned E-Power, currently generates electricity for EDH in Port au Prince as of 2021. In 2019, the Haitian energy sector regulatory authority, ANARSE, issued a series of prequalification rounds for concessionaires to take over and expand electricity production, transmission, and distribution for several of the country’s regional grids, including the grid serving the Caracol Industrial Park. ANARSE launched a call for proposals for its “Improvement of Access to Electricity in Haiti” program. It aims to strengthen the regulatory and planning capacities of the electricity sector. ANARSE plans to establish a shortlist of firms or groups of firms for the development of a national plan for the development of the electricity sector. The plan will: Consult all stakeholders working in the energy sector to collect data; Collect and process the data collected and share the most relevant information with ANARSE and the Energy Cell of the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications (MTPTC) in electronic format; Develop the national plan for the development of the electricity sector in Haiti over a period of 10 years; Organize public consultations; and Revise the development plan to take into account the comments made during the public consultations carried out to produce a complete and final version. The Government of Haiti created the National Commission for Public Procurement (CNMP) to ensure that government contracts are awarded through competitive bidding and to establish effective procurement controls in public administration. The CNMP publishes lists of awarded government of Haiti contracts. The procurement law of 2009 requires contracts to be routed through CNMP. In 2012, however, a presidential decree substantially raised the threshold at which public procurements must be managed by the CNMP, resulting in what companies have identified as a decrease in transparency for many smaller government contracts. Moreover, the government frequently enters into no-bid contracts, sometimes issued using “emergency” authority derived from natural disasters, even when there is no apparent connection between the alleged emergency and the government contract, according to foreign investors. 10. Political and Security Environment The U.S. government partners with Haiti in its efforts to strengthen the rule of law and enhance public security; pursue economic growth through increased domestic resource mobilization and support for private investment; and strengthen good governance and anti-corruption efforts. President Jovenel Moise was assassinated on July 7, 2022, seven months before the end his five-year term. His administration has faced repeated challenges due to frequently changing executive branch leadership, an ineffective parliament followed by a parliamentary lapse beginning in January 2020, legislative elections not being held as scheduled in October 2019, allegations of widespread corruption, weak rule of law, and a deteriorating economy. These factors have hindered both reconstruction efforts and the passage of important legislation. Sporadic protests since mid-2018 have stemmed from a number of factors, including a lack of progress in the fight against corruption and a lack of viable economic options. Haiti’s political situation remains fragile. Political and civil disorder, such as periodic demonstrations triggered by fuel shortage, increases in fuel prices and worsening insecurity often interrupt normal business operations. Gang violence continues to plague urban centers. Kidnapping, murders, and sexual and gender-based violence by gangs in their struggle to expand their territorial control have a detrimental impact on the population. The Haitian National Police is seeking to improve the effectiveness of its anti-gang operations, take a more balanced approach between prevention and repression, and increase its presence in sensitive areas. The judiciary suffers from serious structural weaknesses, as evidenced by a lack of judges at every level, high absenteeism, executive influence, and increasing numbers of prolonged pretrial detainees. In recent months, Prime Minister Ariel Henry has continued to engage in dialogue with actors from all political backgrounds in an attempt to broaden the consensus around a single, unified vision that would lead to the restoration of fully functional and democratically elected institutions. Although the government has not yet published a revised electoral calendar, momentum seems to be building around an effort to form an inclusive, credible, and effective interim electoral council that would inspire confidence among a critical mass of national stakeholders. Damage to businesses and other installations frequently occurs as a result of political and civil disorder. Over the past 10 years, multiple incidents of property damage to offices, stores, hotels, hospitals, fuel stations, and car rental companies and dealerships have been reported in the media and to the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince. Property destruction and vandalism ranges from broken windows to arson and looting. Employees and tourists have also been victims of violence. Kidnapping for ransom is a frequent occurrence in Port-au-Prince. While improvements in the Haitian National Police’s technical and operational capabilities have maintained some semblance of order, violent crime, including looting of businesses, remains a serious problem, along with criminal gang control of a number of Port-au-Prince’s marginalized areas. More information is available at: https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/Haiti.html https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-haiti/ 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Central Bank of Haiti USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Haiti Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $6,255 2021 $5,741 https://mef.gouv.ht/ Foreign Direct Investment Central Bank of Haiti USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Total FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) FY2020 $75 2020 $30 https://unctad.org/fr/news/2020-voit-linvestissement-direct-etranger-chuter-de-45-en-amerique-latineen.pdf Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 0.3% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ EconomicTrends/Fdi.html Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Honduras Executive Summary Honduras contains all the ingredients for a thriving, prosperous economy: strategic location next to U.S. markets with a deep-water port, a rich endowment of natural resources, breathtaking tourist destinations, and hard-working people, including a significant cadre of skilled labor. Despite these advantages, per capita income in Honduras is the third lowest in all Latin America. Investors cite corruption, crime, and poor infrastructure and weak or nonexistent rule of law as the primary reasons that Honduras does not attract more of the private investment it needs to stimulate inclusive economic growth. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), real Honduran GDP grew by 12.5 percent in 2021, a rebound from the devastating effects in 2020 of the COVID-19 pandemic and twin hurricanes Eta and Iota. The IMF predicts the economy will grow by 3.8 percent in 2022. The 2022 inauguration of Honduras first woman president, Xiomara Castro, marked the beginning of a new era in the country’s political economy. The participation of U.S. Vice President Harris at President Castro’s inauguration exemplified the strong U.S. commitment to Honduras. The two countries have committed to work jointly to address the root causes of migration, including by combating corruption and expanding economic opportunity. Since taking office, the Castro administration has launched initiatives to reduce corruption, improve education and public health, and create jobs. These laudable efforts have been frustrated by fiscal challenges, including budget planning and debt management. Although the United States and international organizations including the IMF assess Honduras as low risk for debt distress, public messaging from the administration announcing a fiscal crisis roiled international bond markets, driving up the risk premium on Honduran debt. To address these budget shortfalls, the government announced it will utilize its foreign reserves to finance operations, which could put additional inflationary pressure on the economy. To help Honduras implement its social agenda without increasing its debt burden, the United States has begun a debt management technical assistance program with the Ministry of Finance. In both public and private, the Castro administration emphasizes the need for job creation and private investment in Honduras. The government approved a new law in 2022 to facilitate the development and formalization of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). The government’s Results-Based Governance system and other anti-corruption efforts are excellent examples of efforts to improve the investment climate. From the perspective of the private sector, however, these efforts have been overshadowed by policy decisions that have dramatically increased the uncertainty of investment returns. Chief among these was the May 2022 approval of a new energy law that threatens power generators with forced sale at a “just price” if they do not reduce their tariffs to the government’s satisfaction. The law provides no guarantee of future payment, stipulates that new energy investment must be majority state-owned, and all but eliminates private trade in energy. As a result of the new law, several private energy companies have discontinued planned projects in Honduras and are exploring investment opportunities in other countries in the region. The Castro administration also eliminated the special economic zones known as “ZEDEs” by their initials in Spanish. The ZEDEs were broadly unpopular, and viewed by some as a vector for corruption, but their elimination raised concerns in the business community about the government’s commitment to commercial stability and the rule of law. Another government policy contributing to uncertainty in the investment climate has been the elimination of the legal framework used by most businesses to employ per-hour workers. The law’s repeal fulfilled a Castro campaign promise, responding to criticism by labor unions that temporary work allowed companies to evade their social security obligations and exploit workers. Business representatives note, however, that many industries, including retail, tourism, and food service rely heavily on hourly labor and will be constrained by the new framework. Civil society representatives also point out that the change adversely affects women and students, who relied on hourly work to manage households and school schedules, although union leaders counter that the previous framework allowed employers to target women and young people for economic exploitation, given that their personal circumstances often do not allow them to take on full-time employment. Many foreign investors in Honduras operate thriving enterprises. At the same time, all investors face challenges including unreliable and expensive electricity, corruption, unpredictable tax application and enforcement, high crime, low education levels, and poor infrastructure. Squatting on private land is an increasingly severe problem in Honduras and anti-squatting laws are poorly enforced. Continued low-level protests and strikes are additional concerns for private investors. Despite these setbacks, over 200 American companies operate businesses in Honduras. Honduras enjoys preferential market access to the United States under CAFTA-DR, which has allowed for the development of intra-industry trade in textiles and electrical machinery, among other sectors. The proximity to the United States and established supply chain linkages means that opportunities exist to increase nearshoring sourcing to meet U.S. demand for a variety of goods. The White House “Call to Action to Deepen Investment in the Northern Triangle” is designed to coordinate increased U.S. investment in the region, including Honduras. This program, along with others, aims to support sustained and inclusive economic development in Honduras and surrounding countries. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 157 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 108 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 1,111 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 2180 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Honduras is generally open to foreign investment and government leaders consistently assert their desire to attract investment. At the same time, recent government actions have increased uncertainty in the investment climate. The legal framework for investment includes the Honduran constitution, the investment chapter of CAFTA-DR (which takes precedence over most domestic law), and the 2011 Law for the Promotion and Protection of Investments. The Honduran constitution requires all foreign investment to complement, but not substitute for, national investment. Honduras’ legal obligations guarantee national treatment and most favored nation treatment for U.S. investments in most sectors of the Honduran economy and include enhanced benefits in the areas of insurance and arbitration for domestic and foreign investors. CAFTA-DR has equal status with the constitution in most sectors of the Honduran economy. In addition to liberalizing trade in goods and services, CAFTA-DR includes important requirements relating to investment, customs administration and trade facilitation, technical barriers to trade, government procurement, telecommunications, electronic commerce, intellectual property rights, transparency, and labor and environmental protection. Representatives from the international investment community have voiced concerns that several Castro administration policies have made the investment climate in Honduras less attractive. For example, after the hourly employment law was repealed in April 2022, all Honduran employees must now be salaried, eliminating flexible hiring practices vital for seasonal work. In addition, the threat of expropriation in a May 2022 energy law damaged perceptions of commercial rule of law in Honduras, increasing state control of the sector and leaving many investors wondering which other sectors will be subjected to government coercion and threats. The repeal of the framework establishing the special economic “ZEDE” zones further contributed to uncertainty over the government’s commitment to investment protections required by international treaties. And the Castro administration’s tendency to pass important laws very quickly, with little consultation or consideration of secondary and tertiary effects has created concerns about the stability and predictability of the investment environment. The National Investment Council, the Ministry of Investment Promotion, and the Ministry of Economic Development all have equities in attracting foreign investment and an ambitious job creation mandate. Critics complain that lack of clarity and overlapping responsibilities among these entities undermine the government’s ability to effectively promote Honduras as a profitable destination for foreign capital. Honduras’ Investment Law does not limit foreign ownership of businesses, except for those specifically reserved for Honduran investors, including small firms with capital less than $6,300 and the domestic air transportation industry. For all investments, at least 90 percent of companies’ labor forces must be Honduran, and companies must pay at least 85 percent of their payrolls to Hondurans. Majority ownership by Honduran citizens is required for companies in the commercial fishing sector, forestry, local transportation, radio, television, or benefiting from the Agrarian Reform Law. There is no screening or approval process specific to foreign direct investments in Honduras. Foreign investors are subject to the same requirements for environmental and other regulatory approvals as domestic investors. According to the law, investors can establish, acquire, and dispose of enterprises at market prices under freely negotiated conditions without government intervention, but some foreign business operators report difficulty closing businesses. Private enterprises fairly compete with public enterprises on market access, credit, and other business operations. Foreign investors have the right to own property, subject to certain restrictions established by the Honduran constitution and several laws relating to property rights. Investors may acquire, profit, use, and dispose of property ownership with the exception of land within 40 kilometers of international borders and shorelines. Honduran law does permit, however, foreign individuals to purchase properties close to shorelines in designated “tourism zones.” In 2020, the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights conducted a review of Honduras: A/HRC/44/43/Add.2 (un.org) The Environmental Justice Atlas details 23 cases of environmental conflicts in Honduras: https://ejatlas.org/country/honduras The Business and Human Rights Centre aggregates news articles about responsible business conduct in Honduras: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/?&language=en&countries=HN Global Witness details concerns about environmental and human rights practices in Honduras: https://www.globalwitness.org/tagged/honduras/ The Honduran government has worked to simplify administrative procedures for establishing a company in recent years, including by offering many processes online. Government of Honduras (GOH) officials are pressing for, and have made good progress in, the digitalization of business, import, permitting and licensing, and taxation processes to increase efficiency and transparency, but procedural red tape to obtain government approval for investment activities remains common, especially at the local level. Honduras’ business registration information portal ( https://honduras.eregulations.org/ ) provides clear step-by-step information on registering a business, including fees, agencies, and required documents. Honduras does not promote or incentivize outward investment. 3. Legal Regime The GOH publishes approved regulations in the official government Gazette. Honduras lacks an indexed legal code so lawyers and judges must maintain their own libraries of law publications. The government does not have a process to solicit comments on proposed regulations from the general public. CAFTA-DR requires host governments publish proposed regulations that could affect businesses or investments. Honduras made significant progress in 2019 and 2020 in relation to the publication and availability of information under CAFTA-DR. Honduras notified Article 1 technical provisions, per CAFTA-DR requirements, and the Customs Administration (ADUANAS) and Sanitary Regulatory Agency (ARSA) have improved publication of regulations through their official online portals. Some U.S. investors experience long waiting periods for environmental permits and other regulatory and legislative approvals. Sectors in which U.S. companies frequently encounter problems include infrastructure, telecoms, mining, and energy. Generally, regulatory requirements are complex and lengthy and vulnerable to rent-seeking and corruption. Regulatory approvals require congressional intervention if the time exceeds a presidential term of four years. Current regulations are available at the Honduran government’s eRegulations website ( http://honduras.eregulations.org/ ). While the majority of regulations are at the national level, municipal level regulations also exist and can be very discouraging to investment. No significant regulatory changes of relevance to foreign investors were announced since the last report. Public comments received by regulators are not published. The government does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. As a member of the WTO, Honduras notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Honduras has a civil law system. The Honduran Commercial Code, enacted in 1950, regulates business operations and falls under the jurisdiction of the Honduran civil court system. The Civil Procedures Code, which entered into force in 2010, introduced the use of open, oral arguments for adversarial procedures. The Civil Procedures Code provides for protection of commercial transactions, property rights, and land tenure. It also established a process for the enforcement of rulings issued by foreign courts. Despite these codes, U.S. claimants have noted the lack of transparency and the slow administration of justice in the courts. U.S. firms report favoritism, external pressure, and bribes within the judicial system. They also mention the poor quality of legal representation from Honduran attorneys. Resolving an investment or commercial dispute in the local Honduran courts is often a lengthy process. Foreign investors report dispute resolution typically involves multiple appeals and decisions at different levels of the Honduran judicial system. Each decision can take months or years, and it is usually not possible for the parties to predict the time required to obtain a decision. An electronic case management system has recently been introduced with US Government support to increase transparency and reduce corruption. This system is gradually being rolled out to the different courts. Final decisions from Honduran courts or from arbitration panels often require subsequent enforcement from lower courts to take effect, requiring additional time. Foreign investors sometimes prefer to resolve disputes with suppliers, customers, or partners out of court when possible. Honduras has a very high-quality mechanism for alternate dispute resolution. Honduras’ Investment Law requires all local and foreign direct investment be registered with the Investment Office in the Ministry of Economic Development. Upon registration, the Investment Office issues certificates to guarantee international arbitration rights under CAFTA-DR. An investor who believes the government has not honored a substantive obligation under CAFTA-DR may pursue CAFTA-DR’s dispute settlement mechanism, as detailed in the Investment Chapter. The claim’s proceedings and documents are generally open to the public. The Government of Honduras requires authorization for both foreign and domestic investments in the following areas: Basic health services Telecommunications Generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity Air transport Fishing, hunting, and aquaculture Exploitation of forestry resources Agricultural and agro-industrial activities exceeding land tenancy limits established by the Agricultural Modernization Law of 1992 and the Land Reform Law of 1974 Insurance and financial services Investigation, exploration, and exploitation of mines, quarries, petroleum, and related substances. The Government of Honduras offers one-stop business set-up at its My Business Online website, which helps domestic and international investors submit initial business registry information and provides step-by-step instructions. ( https://www.miempresaenlinea.org/ ) However, formalizing a business still requires visiting a municipal chamber of commerce window for registration and permits, a process vulnerable to rent-seeking and corruption. The Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Competition (CDPC) is the Honduran government agency that reviews proposed transactions for competition-related concerns. Honduras’ Competition Law established the CDPC in 2005 as part of the effort to implement CAFTA-DR. The Honduran Congress appoints the members of the CDPC, which functions as an independent regulatory commission. Laws that grant sole companies exclusive distribution rights for imported goods have created artificial monopolies in Honduras, hindering the availability and raising the price of imported goods in the Honduran market. The Honduran government has the authority to expropriate property for purposes of land reform or public use. The National Agrarian Reform Law provides that idle land fit for farming can be expropriated and awarded to indigent and landless persons via the Honduran National Agrarian Institute. In 2013, the Honduran government passed legislation regarding recovery and reassignment of concessions on underutilized assets. Both local and foreign firms have expressed concerns that the law does not specify what the government considers “underutilized.” The government has not published implementing regulations for the law nor indicated plans to use the law against any private sector firm. The May 2022 energy law threatens energy producers with expropriation if they do not renegotiate their power-purchasing agreements to the government’s satisfaction. Government expropriation of land owned by U.S. companies is rare. CAFTA-DR’s Investment Chapter Section 10.7 states no party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly, with limited public purpose exceptions that require prompt and adequate compensation. Under the Agrarian Reform Law, the Honduran government must compensate expropriated land partly in cash and partly in 15-, 20-, or 25-year government bonds. The portion to be paid in cash cannot exceed $1,000 if the expropriated land has at least one building and it cannot exceed $500 if the land is in use but has no buildings. If the land is not in use, the government will compensate entirely in 25-year government bonds. Land invasions by squatters on both Honduran and foreign-owned land are increasingly common, especially in agricultural areas. These invasions have grown more frequent in 2022, sometimes leading to violent confrontations. Owners of disputed land have found pursuing legal avenues costly, time consuming, and ineffective at enforcing property rights. Companies that default in payment of their obligations in Honduras can declare bankruptcy. A Honduran court must ratify a bankruptcy for it to take effect. These cases are regulated by the country’s Commercial Code. The judicial ruling that declares the bankruptcy of the company establishes the value of the assets, the recognition and classification of the credits, the procedure for the sale of assets and the schedule for the payment of the obligations, in the case that it is not possible for the company to continue its operations. The ruling must be published in the Gazette. The liquidation of companies is always a judicial matter, except in the case of banking institutions which are liquidated by the National Banking and Insurance Commission. Any creditor or a company itself may initiate the liquidation procedure, which is generally a civil matter. The judge appoints a liquidator to execute the procedure. A mechanism that a company may exercise to prevent bankruptcy is to request a suspension of payments from the judge. If approved by the judge and the creditors, the company may be able to reach an agreement with its creditors that allows the same administrative board to maintain control of the company. A company may be prosecuted for fraudulently declaring bankruptcy in the case that the administrative board or shareholders withdraw their assets before the declaration, alter accounting books making it impossible to determine the real situation of the company, or favor certain creditors granting them benefits that they would not be entitled to otherwise. 6. Financial Sector There are no government restrictions on foreign investors’ access to local credit markets, though the local banking system generally extends only limited amounts of credit. Investors should not consider local banks a significant capital resource for new foreign ventures unless they use specific business development credit lines made available by bilateral or multilateral financial institutions such as the Central American Bank for Economic Integration. A limited number of credit instruments are available in the local market. The only security exchange operating in the country is the Central American Securities Exchange (BCV) in Tegucigalpa, but investors should exercise caution before buying securities listed on it. Supervised by the National Banking and Insurance Commission (CNBS), the BCV theoretically offers instruments to trade bankers’ acceptances, repurchase agreements, short-term promissory notes, Honduran government private debt conversion bonds, and land reform repayment bonds. In practice, however, the BCV is almost entirely composed of short- and medium-term government securities and no formal secondary market for these bonds exists. A few banks have offered fixed rate and floating rate notes with maturities of up to three years, but outside of the banks’ issuances, the private sector does not sell debt or corporate stock on the exchange. Any private business is eligible to trade its financial instruments on the BCV, and firms that participate are subject to a rigorous screening process, including public disclosure and ratings by a recognized rating agency. Historically, most traded firms have had economic ties to the other business and financial groups represented as shareholders of the exchange. As a result, risk management practices are lax and public confidence in the institution is limited. The Honduran financial system is comprised of commercial banks, state-owned banks, savings and loans institutions, and financial companies. There are currently 15 commercial banks, and 10 financial groups operating in Honduras. There is no offshore banking or homegrown blockchain technology in Honduras. Honduras has a highly professional, independent Central Bank and an effective banking regulator, the Comisión Nacional de Bancos y Seguros. While access to credit remains limited in Honduras, especially for historically underserved populations, the financial sector is a source of economic stability in the country. Honduras does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Most state-owned enterprises are in telecommunications, electricity, water utilities, banking, and commercial ports. The main state-owned Honduran telephone company, Hondutel, has private contracts with eight foreign and domestic carriers. The GOH has yet to establish a legal framework for foreign companies to obtain licenses and concessions to provide long distance and international calling. As a result, investors remain unsure if they can become fully independent telecommunication service providers. The state-owned National Electric Energy Company (ENEE) is the single largest contributor to the country’s fiscal deficit. Due to years of mismanagement and corruption, ENEE loses over $30 million every month and its debt amounts to more than 10 percent of Honduran GDP. With the May 2022 energy law, the government has reversed energy reform legislation that called for the separation of ENEE into three independent units for distribution, transmission, and generation. The law also weakened the electricity regulator and eliminated the independent systems operator. Electricity subsector experts say that dispatch decisions have become much less transparent since the elimination of the systems operator, a disincentive for new investment. The electrical subsector faces serious structural problems, including high electricity system losses, a transmission system in need of upgrades, vulnerability of generation costs to volatile international oil prices, an electricity tariff that does not reflect actual costs, and the high costs of long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs), which have often been awarded directly to companies with political connections instead of via a fair and transparent tendering and procurement process. Many businesses have installed on-site power generation systems to supplement or substitute for power from ENEE due to frequent blackouts and high tariffs. Honduran law grants municipalities the right to manage water distribution and to grant concessions to private enterprises. Major cities with public-private concessions include San Pedro Sula, Puerto Cortes, and Choloma. The state water authority National Autonomous Aqueduct and Sewer Service (SANAA) manages Tegucigalpa’s water distribution. Persistent water shortages are another constraint on private enterprise in Honduras, especially during the spring dry season. The Honduran National Port Company (ENP) is the state-owned organization that oversees management of the country’s government-operated maritime ports, including Puerto Cortes, La Ceiba, Puerto Castilla, and San Lorenzo. Private companies Central American Port Operators and Maritime Ports of Honduras have 30-year concessions to operate container and bulk shipping facilities at Honduras’ principal port Puerto Cortes. The Honduran government is not seeking to privatize state-owned enterprises. The May 2022 energy law aims to increase government control over the electricity sector. 10. Political and Security Environment Crime and violence rates remain high and add cost and constraint to investments. Demonstrations occur regularly in Honduras and political uncertainty poses a challenge to ongoing stability. U.S. citizens should be aware that large public gatherings might become unruly or violent quickly. For more information, consult the Department of State’s latest travel warning: https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/Honduras.html. Although violent crime remains a persistent problem, Honduras has successfully reduced homicides to less than 40 per 100,000 inhabitants. Cases of violence, extortion, and kidnapping are still relatively common, particularly in urban areas where gang presence is more pervasive. Drug traffickers continue to use Honduras as a transit point for cocaine and other narcotics en route to the United States and Europe, which fuels local turf battles in some areas and injects illicit funds into judicial proceedings and local governance structures to distort justice. The business community historically had been a target for ransom kidnappings, but the number of such kidnappings dropped from 92 in 2013 to 15 in 2021, primarily through the work of the USG-supported Honduran National Police National Anti-Kidnapping Unit. Although violent crime rates are trending downward, corruption and white-collar crime, including money laundering, negatively affect economic prosperity and stability for the business community. Hong Kong Executive Summary Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on July 1, 1997, with its status defined in the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. Under the concept of “one country, two systems,” the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government promised that Hong Kong would be vested with executive, legislative, and independent judicial power, and that its social and economic systems would remain unchanged for 50 years after reversion. The PRC’s imposition of the National Security Law (NSL) on June 30, 2020 undermined Hong Kong’s autonomy and introduced heightened uncertainty for foreign and local firms operating in Hong Kong. As a result, the U.S. Government has taken measures under Executive Order 13936 on Hong Kong Normalization to eliminate or suspend aspects of Hong Kong’s differential treatment, including issuing a suspension of licenses under the Arms Export Control Act, giving notice of termination of an agreement that provided for reciprocal tax exemption on income from the international operation of ships, establishing new marking rules requiring goods made in Hong Kong to be labeled “Made in China,” and imposing sanctions against several former and current Hong Kong and PRC government officials. On March 31, 2022, the Secretary of State again certified Hong Kong does not warrant treatment under U.S. law in the same manner as U.S. laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 1997. Since the imposition of the NSL in Hong Kong by Beijing, U.S. citizens traveling or residing in Hong Kong may be subject to increased levels of surveillance, as well as arbitrary enforcement of laws and detention for purposes other than maintaining law and order. The PRC’s 14th Five-Year Plan through 2025, which includes long-range objectives for 2035, lays out a plan for Hong Kong to become more closely integrated into the overall development of the Mainland and encourages deeper co-operation between the Mainland and Hong Kong. On March 5, 2022, PRC Premier Li Keqiang asserted that Beijing intends to exercise “overall jurisdiction over the two SARs,” referring to Hong Kong and Macau. On July 16, 2021, the Department of State, along with the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Homeland Security, issued an advisory to U.S. businesses regarding potential risks to their operations and activities in Hong Kong. These include risks for businesses following the imposition of the NSL; data privacy risks; risks regarding transparency and access to critical business information; and risks for businesses with exposure to sanctioned Hong Kong or PRC entities or individuals. The imposition of the NSL by Beijing, significant curtailments in protected freedoms, and the reduction of the high degree of autonomy Hong Kong enjoyed in the past has raised concerns among a number of international firms operating in Hong Kong. Hong Kong is the United States’ twelfth-largest export market, thirteenth largest for total agricultural products, and sixth largest for high-value consumer food and beverage products. Hong Kong’s economy, with advanced institutions and regulatory systems, is bolstered by competitive sectors including financial and professional, trading, logistics, and tourism, although tourism has suffered devastating drops since 2020 due to COVID-19. The Hong Kong Government’s (HKG) adherence to a “Zero COVID” policy for most of the past two years has also imposed high economic costs on residents and businesses, and drastically reduced the number of visitors to the territory. Since Beijing’s 2020 imposition of the NSL on Hong Kong and the city’s implementation of COVID-19 travel restrictions, some international firms in Hong Kong have relocated entirely, while others have shifted key staff or operations elsewhere. Hong Kong provides for no distinction in law or practice between investments by foreign-controlled companies and those controlled by local interests. Foreign firms and individuals can incorporate their operations in Hong Kong, register branches of foreign operations, and set up representative offices without encountering discrimination or undue regulation. There are no restrictions on the ownership of such operations. Company directors are not required to be residents of or in Hong Kong. Reporting requirements are straightforward and are not onerous. On economic issues, Hong Kong generally pursues a free market philosophy with minimal government intervention. The HKG generally welcomes foreign investment, neither offering special incentives nor imposing disincentives for foreign investors. While Hong Kong’s legal system had been traditionally viewed as a bastion of judicial independence, authorities have placed considerable pressure on the judiciary over the previous year. Rule of law risks that were formerly limited to mainland China are now increasingly a concern in Hong Kong. In March 2020, two sitting UK judges resigned from the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, with the UK government citing a systematic erosion of liberty and democracy that made it untenable for those judges to sit on Hong Kong’s highest court. The service sector accounted for more than 90 percent of Hong Kong’s nearly USD 367 billion gross domestic product (GDP) in 2021. Hong Kong hosts a large number of regional headquarters and regional offices, though Hong Kong’s deteriorating political environment and COVID-related travel restrictions have led some firms to depart. The number of U.S. firms with regional bases in Hong Kong fell over the previous decade. Approximately 1,260 U.S. companies are based in Hong Kong, according to Hong Kong’s 2021 census data, with more than half regional in scope. Finance and related services companies, such as banks, law firms, and accountancies, dominate the pack. Seventy of the world’s 100 largest banks have operations in Hong Kong. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 12 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 14 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 92,487 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 48,630 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Hong Kong is the world’s third-largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI), according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2021, with a significant amount bound for mainland China. The HKG’s InvestHK department encourages inward investment, offering free advice and services to support companies from the planning stage through to the launch and expansion of their business. U.S. and other foreign firms can participate in government financed and subsidized research and development programs on a national treatment basis. Hong Kong does not discriminate against foreign investors by prohibiting, limiting, or conditioning foreign investment in a sector of the economy. Capital gains are not taxed, nor are there withholding taxes on dividends and royalties. Profits can be freely converted and remitted. Foreign-owned and Hong Kong-owned company profits are taxed at the same rate – 16.5 percent. The tax rate on the first USD 255,000 profit for all companies is currently 8.25 percent. No preferential or discriminatory export and import policies affect foreign investors. Domestic industries receive no direct subsidies. Foreign investments face no disincentives, such as quotas, bonds, deposits, or other similar regulations. According to HKG statistics, 3,940 overseas companies had regional operations registered in Hong Kong as of June 1, 2021. The United States has the largest number with 664. Hong Kong is working to attract more start-ups as it develops its technology sector, and about 28 percent of start-ups in Hong Kong come from overseas. Hong Kong’s Business Facilitation Advisory Committee is a platform for the HKG to consult the private sector on regulatory proposals and implementation of new or proposed regulations. Foreign investors can invest in any business and own up to 100 percent of equity. Like domestic private entities, foreign investors have the right to engage in all forms of remunerative activity. The HKG owns virtually all land in Hong Kong, which the HKG administers by granting long-term leases without transferring title. Foreign residents claim that a fifteen percent Buyer’s Stamp Duty on all non-permanent-resident and corporate buyers discriminates against them. The main exceptions to the HKG’s open foreign investment policy are: Broadcasting – Voting control of free-to-air television stations by non-residents is limited to 49 percent. There are also residency requirements for the directors of broadcasting companies. Legal Services – Foreign-qualified lawyers may only practice the law of their home jurisdiction, provided the firm they are working for is licensed in Hong Kong to work in those jurisdictions. Foreign law firms may become “local” firms after satisfying certain residency and other requirements. Localized firms may thereafter hire local attorneys and must maintain at least a 1:1 ratio of local attorneys to registered-foreign lawyers, without exception. Foreign law firms can also form associations with local law firms. Hong Kong last conducted the Trade Policy Review in 2018 through the World Trade Organization (WTO). https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/g380_e.pdf The Efficiency Office under the Innovation and Technology Bureau is responsible for business facilitation initiatives aimed at improving the business regulatory environment of Hong Kong. The e-Registry (https://www.eregistry.gov.hk/icris-ext/apps/por01a/index) is a convenient and integrated online platform provided by the Companies Registry and the Inland Revenue Department for applying for company incorporation and business registration. Applicants, for incorporation of local companies or for registration of non-Hong Kong companies, must first register for a free user account, presenting an original identification document or a certified true copy of the identification document. The Companies Registry normally issues the Business Registration Certificate and the Certificate of Incorporation on the same day for applications for company incorporation. For applications for registration of a non-Hong Kong company, it issues the Business Registration Certificate and the Certificate of Registration two weeks after submission. Hong Kong’s Companies Registry permits public inspection of company information such as the full identification number of company directors and secretaries and their residential addresses. This information is currently available on a paid basis. Starting October 24, 2022, the HKG will restrict public access to this information, citing a need to balance privacy protections and transparency. Those approved by the HKG as “specified persons” will continue to have unrestricted access to the Companies Registries. The ability to apply for status as a “specified person” is largely limited to those working in finance, law, and compliance. Government transparency advocates assert the changes will limit the free flow of information and facilitate fraud, corruption, and other business malfeasance. As a free market economy, Hong Kong does not promote or incentivize outward investment, nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. Mainland China and the British Virgin Islands were the top two destinations for Hong Kong’s outward investments in 2020 (based on most recent data available). 3. Legal Regime Hong Kong’s regulations and policies typically strive to avoid distortions or impediments to the efficient mobilization and allocation of capital and to encourage competition. Bureaucratic procedures and “red tape” are usually transparent and held to a minimum. To make or amend any legislation, including investment laws, the HKG conducts a three-month public consultation on the issue concerned, which then informs the drafting of the bill. Lawmakers then discuss draft bills and vote. Hong Kong’s regulatory and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. Rule of law risks that were formerly limited to mainland China are now increasingly a concern in Hong Kong. Gazette is the official publication of the HKG. This website https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/english/whatsnew/whatsnew.html is the centralized online location where laws, regulations, draft bills, notices, and tenders are published. All public comments received by the HKG are published at the websites of relevant policy bureaus. The Office of the Ombudsman, established in 1989 by the Ombudsman Ordinance, is Hong Kong’s independent watchdog of public governance. Public finances are regulated by clear laws and regulations. The Basic Law prescribes that authorities strive to achieve a fiscal balance and avoid deficits. There is a clear commitment by the HKG to publish fiscal information under the Audit Ordinance and the Public Finance Ordinance, which prescribe deadlines for the publication of annual accounts and require the submission of annual spending estimates to the Legislative Council (LegCo), Hong Kong’s legislature. There are few contingent liabilities of the HKG, with details of these items published about seven months after the release of the fiscal budget. In addition, LegCo members have a responsibility to enhance budgetary transparency by urging government officials to explain the government’s rationale for the allocation of resources. All LegCo meetings are open to the public, so the government’s responses are available to the general public. However, the HKG maintains a special fund for “national security expenditures” that is not subject to public scrutiny. In February 2021, the HKG’s annual budget allocated HKD 8 billion (approximately USD 1 billion) to this fund, and the HKG refused to provide information on how this money would be spent. On June 18, 2021, a subsidiary legislation was gazetted to implement the changes authorized under the Companies Ordinance. The new changes will gradually restrict the public from accessing certain information about executives in the Company Registry (CR) over three phases. Phase one starts on August 23, 2021 and allows new companies to have the option to withhold the usual residential addresses (URA) of directors and the full identification numbers (IDN) of directors and company secretaries from public inspection in hardcopy. Phase two starts on October 24, 2022 and will automatically swap out the URA and IDN of directors and company secretaries in the online CR with correspondence addresses and partial IDNs for public inspection. Phase three starts December 27, 2023 and allows all registered companies to retroactively apply to the CR to replace the URA and IDN of directors and company secretaries with their correspondence addresses and partial IDNs in hardcopy. “Specified persons” could apply to the CR for access to the protected information of directors and other persons. Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Commission issued a revised guideline in June 2021 requiring asset managers to disclose more information regarding their methodology for environment, sustainability, governance (ESG) funds, including the ESG focus, ESG investment strategy, expected proportion of ESG investment, any reference benchmark, and related risks. It also requires an ESG fund to conduct periodic assessment, at least annually, to assess how the fund has attained its ESG focus. To enhance transparency of ESG funds in Hong Kong, a central database of all SFC-authorized ESG funds is accessible through the SFC’s website. Hong Kong is an independent member of the WTO and Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). It notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade and was the first WTO member to ratify the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). Hong Kong has achieved a 100 percent rate of implementation commitments. While Hong Kong is not a member of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), it is a participant of the OECD’s Trade Committee and the Committee on Financial Markets. The HKG is in the process of implementing the OECD’s new minimum global corporate tax initiative, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS 2.0). Hong Kong’s common law system is based on the United Kingdom’s, and judges are appointed by the Chief Executive on the recommendation of the Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable, and they are adjudicated in the court system. In March 2020 two sitting UK judges resigned from the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, with the UK government citing a systematic erosion of liberty and democracy that made it untenable for those judges to sit on Hong Kong’s leading court. Hong Kong’s commercial law covers a wide range of issues related to doing business. Most of Hong Kong’s contract law is found in the reported decisions of the courts in Hong Kong and other common law jurisdictions. The imposition of the NSL and pressure from mainland China authorities raised serious concerns about the state of Hong Kong’s judicial independence. The NSL authorizes the mainland China judicial system, which lacks judicial independence and has a 99 percent conviction rate, to take over any national security-related case at the request of the HKG or the Office of Safeguarding National Security. Under the NSL, the Chief Executive is required to establish a list of judges to handle all cases concerning national security-related offenses. Legal scholars argued that this unprecedented involvement of the Chief Executive weakens Hong Kong’s judicial independence. Media outlets controlled by the PRC central government in both Hong Kong and mainland China repeatedly accused Hong Kong judges of bias following the acquittals of protesters accused of rioting and other crimes. Some Hong Kong and PRC central government officials questioned the existence of the “separation of powers” in Hong Kong, including some statements that judicial independence is not enshrined in Hong Kong law and that judges should follow “guidance” from the government. Hong Kong’s extensive body of commercial and company law generally follows that of the United Kingdom, including the common law and rules of equity. Most statutory law is made locally. The local court system provides for effective enforcement of contracts, dispute settlement, and protection of rights. Foreign and domestic companies register under the same rules and are subject to the same set of business regulations. The Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers (1981) sets out general principles for acceptable standards of commercial behavior. The Companies Ordinance (Chapter 622) applies to Hong Kong-incorporated companies and contains the statutory provisions governing compulsory acquisitions. For companies incorporated in jurisdictions other than Hong Kong, relevant local company laws apply. The Companies Ordinance requires companies to retain accurate and up to date information about significant controllers. The Securities and Futures Ordinance (Chapter 571) contains provisions requiring shareholders to disclose interests in securities in listed companies and provides listed companies with the power to investigate ownership of interests in its shares. It regulates the disclosure of inside information by listed companies and restricts insider dealing and other market misconduct. The independent Competition Commission (CC) investigates anti-competitive conduct that prevents, restricts, or distorts competition in Hong Kong. In November 2021, the CC filed a case in the Competition Tribunal against three undertakings for participating in cartel conduct regarding the sale of inserters in Hong Kong. The U.S. Consulate General is not aware of any expropriations in the recent past. Expropriation of private property in Hong Kong may occur if it is clearly in the public interest and only for well-defined purposes such as implementation of public works projects. Expropriations are to be conducted through negotiations, and in a non-discriminatory manner in accordance with established principles of international law. Investors in and lenders to expropriated entities are to receive prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. If agreement cannot be reached on the amount payable, either party can refer the claim to the Land Tribunal. Hong Kong’s Bankruptcy Ordinance provides the legal framework to enable: i) a creditor to file a bankruptcy petition with the court against an individual, firm, or partner of a firm who owes him/her money; and ii) a debtor who is unable to repay his/her debts to file a bankruptcy petition against himself/herself with the court. Bankruptcy offenses are subject to criminal liability. The Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance aims to improve and modernize the corporate winding-up regime by increasing creditor protection and further enhancing the integrity of the winding-up process. The Commercial Credit Reference Agency collates information about the indebtedness and credit history of SMEs and makes such information available to members of the Hong Kong Association of Banks and the Hong Kong Association of Deposit Taking Companies. Hong Kong’s average duration of bankruptcy proceedings is just under ten months. 6. Financial Sector There are no impediments to the free flow of financial resources. Non-interventionist economic policies, complete freedom of capital movement, and a well-understood regulatory and legal environment make Hong Kong a regional and international financial center. It has one of the most active foreign exchange markets in Asia. Assets and wealth managed in Hong Kong amounted to USD 4.5 trillion in 2020 (the latest figure available), with almost two-thirds of that coming from overseas investors. To enhance the competitiveness of Hong Kong’s fund industry, OFCs as well as onshore and offshore funds are offered a profits tax exemption. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s (HKMA) Infrastructure Financing Facilitation Office (IFFO) provides a platform for pooling the efforts of investors, banks, and the financial sector to offer comprehensive financial services for infrastructure projects in emerging markets. IFFO is an advisory partner of the World Bank Group’s Global Infrastructure Facility. Under the Insurance Companies Ordinance, insurance companies are authorized by the Insurance Authority to transact business in Hong Kong. As of January 2022, there were 163 authorized insurance companies in Hong Kong; 67 of them were foreign or mainland Chinese companies. The Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s total market capitalization dropped by eleven percent to USD 5.4 trillion in 2021, with 2,572 listed firms at year-end. Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited, a listed company, operates the stock and futures exchanges. The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), an independent statutory body outside the civil service, has licensing and supervisory powers to ensure the integrity of markets and protection of investors. No discriminatory legal constraints exist for foreign securities firms establishing operations in Hong Kong via branching, acquisition, or subsidiaries. Rules governing operations are the same for all firms. No laws or regulations specifically authorize private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association that limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control. In 2021, 1,368 mainland companies were listed in Hong Kong, including a total of 296 “H” share listings on the stock exchange, with total market capitalization of around USD 4.3 trillion, or 79 percent of the market total. The Shanghai-Hong Kong and Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connects allow individual investors to cross trade Hong Kong and mainland stocks. Cross-boundary Wealth Management Connect launched in September 2021 in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA), which aims to integrate Hong Kong, Macau, and nine cities in the Mainland’s Guangdong Province together. The GBA, which still lacks major details, faces many challenges that are likely to stall its success, including coordinating three disparate legal systems, three different currencies, and removing barriers to the movement of capital and people. The Wealth Connect scheme will enable residents in GBA to carry out cross-boundary investment in wealth management products distributed by banks in the area. Under the Mainland-Hong Kong Mutual Recognition of Funds scheme, eligible mainland and Hong Kong mutual funds were allowed to be distributed in each other’s market. Hong Kong also has mutual recognition of funds programs with Switzerland, Thailand, Ireland, France, the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg. Hong Kong has developed its debt market with the Exchange Fund bills and notes program. Outstanding Hong Kong Dollar debt stood at USD 155 billion by the end of 2021. The Bond Connect, a mutual market access scheme, allows investors from mainland China and overseas to trade in each other’s respective bond markets through a financial infrastructure linkage in Hong Kong. As of December 2021, northbound trading under Bond Connect has attracted 78 out of the top 100 global asset management companies, and 3,233 international investors from 35 jurisdictions. Southbound trading under Bond Connect was launched in September 2021 to enable mainland institutional investors to invest in offshore bonds through the Hong Kong bond market. In September 2021, the SFC revised its anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-financing of terrorism guidelines. The updated guidelines require financial institutions to apply additional due diligence and risk mitigation measures for cross-border correspondent relationships in the securities sector, such as determining through publicly available information whether the respondent institution has been subject to targeted financial sanctions or regulatory actions and obtaining senior management’s approval before establishing cross-border correspondent relationships. The guidelines also prohibit financial institutions from establishing or continuing a cross-border correspondent relationship with a shell financial institution. In February 2021, the HKG announced it would issue green bonds regularly and expand the scale of the Government Green Bond Program to USD 22.5 billion within the next five years. In November 2021, the HKG issued USD 3 billion worth of U.S.- and euro- denominated green bonds and its inaugural offering of renminbi-denominated bonds. In February 2022, the HKG also announced that it would issue about USD 800 million worth of retail green bonds for the first time, with proceeds from the sale used for sustainable projects in the city. The HKG requires workers and employers to contribute to retirement funds under the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) scheme. Contributions are expected to channel roughly USD five billion annually into various investment vehicles. By December of 2021, the net asset values of MPF funds amounted to USD 152 billion. A new listing regime for special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) took effect on January 1, 2022 to provide an alternative to the traditional initial public offering (IPO) route. Under the city’s listing regime, a SPAC is required to raise IPO funds of a minimum of USD 130 million, and the trading of SPAC securities is restricted to professional and institutional investors only. Aquila Acquisition Corp, a SPAC backed by the asset management arm of mainland Chinese brokerage CMB International, made its trading debut on March 18, 2022. As of March 2022, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange has accepted a total of eleven SPAC applications. Hong Kong has a three-tier system of deposit-taking institutions: licensed banks (159), restricted license banks (15), and deposit-taking companies (12). HSBC is Hong Kong’s largest banking group. With its majority-owned subsidiary Hang Seng Bank, HSBC controls more than 52.9 percent of total assets of banks in Hong Kong, followed by the Bank of China (Hong Kong), with 14.9 percent of total assets throughout 190 branches. In total, the five largest banks in Hong Kong had more than USD 2 trillion in total assets at the end of 2020. Full implementation of the Basel III capital, liquidity, and disclosure requirements was completed in 2019. Hong Kong is a burgeoning cryptocurrency and digital asset hub in Asia. Cryptocurrency exchanges remain minimally regulated, despite a largescale crackdown in the Mainland. HKMA has announced plans to increase oversight of the market in an effort to combat scams and reduce volatility. In January 2022, HKMA announced plans for new crypto regulations, including guidelines for payment with stablecoins, investor protection policies, and digital asset authorities for licensed financial institutions. Credit in Hong Kong is allocated on market terms and is available to foreign investors on a non-discriminatory basis. The private sector has access to the full spectrum of credit instruments as provided by Hong Kong’s banking and financial system. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. The HKMA, the de facto central bank, is responsible for maintaining the stability of the banking system and managing the Exchange Fund that backs Hong Kong’s currency. Real Time Gross Settlement helps minimize risks in the payment system and brings Hong Kong in line with international standards. Banks in Hong Kong have in recent years strengthened anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing controls, including the adoption of more stringent customer due diligence (CDD) process for existing and new customers. The HKMA stressed that “CDD measures adopted by banks must be proportionate to the risk level and banks are not required to implement overly stringent CDD processes.” In May 2021, the HKG concluded a three-month consultation on legislative proposals to enhance Hong Kong’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regime through the introduction of a licensing requirement for virtual asset services providers and a registration system for dealers in precious metals and stones. The government has yet to introduce a bill into the Legislative Council, as of end February 2022. The NSL granted police the authority to freeze assets related to national security-related crimes. In June 2021 Hong Kong authorities froze the assets of flagship pro-democracy newspaper Apple Daily, which was subsequently forced to close. The HKMA advised banks in Hong Kong to report any transactions suspected of violating the NSL, following the same procedures as for money laundering. Hong Kong authorities reportedly asked financial institutions to freeze the bank accounts of media companies, former lawmakers, civil society groups, and other political targets who appear to be under investigation for their pro-democracy activities. Banks are also advised to disclose related property of clients who are found in breach of the NSL, according to the October 2021 guideline developed by the Hong Kong Association of Banks. The HKMA welcomes the establishment of virtual banks, which are subject to the same set of supervisory principles and requirements applicable to conventional banks. The HKMA granted eight virtual banking licenses by the end of February 2022. The HKMA’s Fintech Facilitation Office (FFO) aims to promote Hong Kong as a fintech hub in Asia. FFO has launched the faster payment system to enable bank customers to make cross-bank/e-wallet payments easily and created a blockchain-based trade finance platform to reduce errors and risks of fraud. The HKMA has signed nine fintech co-operation agreements with the regulatory authorities of Brazil, France, Poland, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. The Future Fund, Hong Kong’s wealth fund, was established in 2016 with an endowment of USD 28.2 billion. The fund seeks higher returns through long-term investments and adopts a “passive” role as a portfolio investor. About half of the Future Fund has been deployed in alternative assets, mainly global private equity and overseas real estate, over a three-year period. The rest is placed with the Exchange Fund’s Investment Portfolio, which follows the Santiago Principles, for an initial ten-year period. In February 2020, the HKG announced that it will deploy 10 percent of the Future Fund to establish a new portfolio, which is called the Hong Kong Growth Portfolio (HKGP), focusing on domestic investments to lift the city’s competitiveness in financial services, commerce, aviation, logistics and innovation. Announced in February 2022, the HKG will inject HK$10 billion (USD 1.3 billion) to the HKGP, of which half will be used to set up the Strategic Tech Fund, and the other half will be used to set up a GBA Investment Fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Hong Kong has several major HKG-owned enterprises classified as “statutory bodies.” Hong Kong is party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the WTO framework. Annex 3 of the GPA lists as statutory bodies the Housing Authority, the Hospital Authority, the Airport Authority, the Mass Transit Railway Corporation Limited, and the Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation, which procure in accordance with the agreement. The HKG provides more than half the population with subsidized housing, along with most hospital and education services from childhood through the university level. The government also owns major business enterprises, including the stock exchange, railway, and airport. Conflicts occasionally arise between the government’s roles as owner and policymaker. Industry observers have recommended that the government establish a separate entity to coordinate its ownership of government-held enterprises and initiate a transparent process of nomination to the boards of government-affiliated entities. Other recommendations from the private sector include establishing a clear separation between industrial policy and the government’s ownership function and minimizing exemptions of government-affiliated enterprises from general laws. The Competition Law exempts all but six of the statutory bodies from the law’s purview. While the government’s private sector ownership interests do not materially impede competition in Hong Kong’s most important economic sectors, industry representatives have encouraged the government to adhere more closely to the Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). All major utilities in Hong Kong, except water, are owned and operated by private enterprises, usually under an agreement framework by which the HKG regulates each utility’s management. 10. Political and Security Environment Beijing’s imposition of the National Security Law (NSL) on June 30, 2020 has introduced heightened uncertainties for companies operating in Hong Kong. As a result, U.S. citizens traveling through or residing in Hong Kong may be subject to increased levels of surveillance, as well as arbitrary enforcement of laws and detention for purposes other than maintaining law and order. As of March 2022, police have carried out at least 160 arrests of opposition politicians and activists for alleged “national security” offenses, including one U.S. citizen, in an effort to suppress pro-democracy views and political activity in the city. Police have also reportedly issued arrest warrants under the NSL for at least thirty individuals residing abroad, including U.S. citizens. Since June 2019, police have arrested over 10,000 people on various charges in connection with largely peaceful protests against government policies. Please see the July 16, 2021 business advisory issued by the Department of State, along with the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Homeland Security, for a facts-based analysis of the risks for companies operating in Hong Kong. As a result of Hong Kong’s decreased autonomy from China, the Department of Commerce removed many of the Department of Commerce’s License Exceptions. U.S. Customs and Borders Protection (CBP) requires goods produced in Hong Kong to be marked to show China, rather than Hong Kong, as their country of origin. This requirement took effect November 9, 2020. It does not affect country of origin determinations for purposes of assessing ordinary duties or temporary or additional duties. Hong Kong has requested World Trade Organization dispute consultations to examine the issue. As of March 2022, the Department of Treasury has sanctioned 42 Hong Kong and PRC officials for their role in undermining Hong Kong’s high-degree of autonomy as guaranteed by the Sino-British Joint Declaration. The PRC government does not recognize dual nationality. In January 2021, the HKG moved to enforce existing provisions of the Nationality Law of the People’s Republic of China in place since 1997, effectively ending its longstanding recognition of dual citizenship in Hong Kong. The action ended consular access to two detained U.S. citizens as of March 2021 and potentially removed our ability to provide fulsome consular assistance to about half of the estimated 85,000 U.S. citizens then residing in Hong Kong. U.S.-PRC, U.S.-Hong Kong and U.S. citizens of Chinese heritage may be subject to additional scrutiny and harassment, and the mainland government may prevent the U.S. Embassy or U.S. consulate from providing consular services. Hong Kong financial regulators have conducted outreach to stress the importance of robust anti-money laundering (AML) controls and highlight potential criminal sanctions implications for failure to fulfill legal obligations under local AML laws. However, Hong Kong has a low number of prosecutions and convictions compared to the number of cases investigated. Under the President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization, the United States notified the Hong Kong authorities in August 2020 of its suspension of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Hong Kong for the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders and termination of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Hong Kong for the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. The United States also gave notice of its termination of the Agreement Concerning Tax Exemptions from the Income Derived from the International Operation of Ships. In response, the HKG notified the United States of its purported suspension of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Hong Kong on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $366,874 2020 $346,586 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $46,103 2020 $92,487 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $19,705 2020 $16,547 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct- investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 536.6% 2020 539.1% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ EconomicTrends/Fdi.html * Source for Host Country Data: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (2020, latest available data) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 1,840,307 100% Total Outward 1,909,128 100% British Virgin Islands 582,103 32% China, P.R.: Mainland 903,641 47% China, P.R.: Mainland 499,154 27% British Virgin Islands 603,218 32% Cayman Islands 184,410 10% Cayman Islands 73,346 4% United Kingdom 175,256 10% Bermuda 67,705 4% Bermuda 104,295 6% Singapore 39,974 2% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Hungary Executive Summary Hungary continues to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and now faces rising inflation and economic uncertainty due to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Despite a growing deficit and energy prices, as well as a continued skilled labor shortage and corruption concerns, ratings agencies in 2021 maintained Hungary’s sovereign debt at BBB, two notches above investment grade, with a stable outlook. In December 2021, the Finance Ministry forecasted 5.9 percent economic growth and a 4.9 percent budget deficit for 2022. Analysts since then have revised their forecasts and project 2 percentage points lower economic growth for this year. Hungary, an EU member since 2004, currently has a population of 9.7 million and a GDP of $155 billion. Fellow EU member states and the United States are Hungary’s most important trade and investment partners, although Asian influence is growing; foreign direct investment (FDI) from Asian sources was five percent of total FDI in 2019 and now accounts for over 30 percent of new foreign direct investment in 2020. Macroeconomic indicators were generally strong before the COVID-19 pandemic, with GDP growing by 4.9 percent in 2019. Following a 5.1 percent pandemic-induced contraction in 2020, Hungary’s GDP increased by 6.4 percent in 2021. As the Government of Hungary (GOH) increased spending to support the economy and other priorities, the 2021 budget deficit reached approximately 7.5 percent of GDP, which pushed up public debt close to 80 percent of GDP. Hungary’s central location in Europe and high-quality infrastructure have traditionally made it an attractive destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Between 1989 and 2019, Hungary received approximately $97.8 billion in FDI, mainly in the banking, automotive, software development, and life sciences sectors. The EU accounts for 89 percent of all in-bound FDI. The United States is the largest non-EU investor, whereas in terms of annual investment, South Korea was the largest investor overall in 2021. The GOH actively encourages investments in manufacturing and other sectors promising high added value and/or employment, such as research and development, defense, and service centers. Despite these advantages, Hungary’s regional economic competitiveness has declined in recent years. Since early 2016, multinationals have identified shortages of qualified labor, specifically technicians and engineers, as the largest obstacle to investment in Hungary. In certain industries, such as finance, energy, telecommunication, pharmaceuticals, and retail, unpredictable sector-specific tax and regulatory policies have favored national and government-linked companies. Additionally, persistent corruption and cronyism continue to plague the public procurement sector. According to Transparency International’s (TI) 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index, Hungary placed 73rd worldwide and ranked 26th out of the 27 EU member states, outperforming only Bulgaria. Analysts remain concerned that the GOH may intervene in certain priority sectors to unfairly promote domestic ownership at the expense of foreign investors. In September 2016, Prime Minister (PM) Viktor Orban announced that at least half of the banking, media, energy, and retail sectors should be in Hungarian hands. Since then, observers note that through various tax changes the GOH has pushed several foreign-owned banks out of Hungary. GOH efforts have helped increase Hungarian ownership in the banking sector to close to 60 percent, up from 40 percent in 2010. In the energy sector, foreign-owned companies’ share of total revenue fell from 70 percent in 2010 to below 50 percent by 2022. Foreign media ownership has decreased drastically as GOH-aligned businesses have consolidated control of Hungary’s media landscape: the number of media outlets owned by GOH allies increased from around 30 in 2015 to nearly 500 in 2018. In November 2018, the owners of 476 pro-GOH media outlets, constituting between 80 and 90 percent of all media, donated those outlets to the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA) run by individuals with ties to the ruling Fidesz party. Ostensibly in response to the COVID crisis, the Hungarian government has had uninterrupted state-of-emergency (SOE) powers since November 2020 with authority to bypass Parliament and govern by decree. Parliament passed the first SOE legislation in March 2020 as part of its COVID-19 pandemic response; this legislation did not have a sunset clause, and the government repealed it in June 2020. The GOH passed a second SOE law in November 2020, this time for a 90-day period. Following the expiration of the first 90-day term, the Parliament extended the SOE in February, May, September and most recently in December 2021 – until June 2022 – without any support from opposition parties. As part of the emergency measures, the GOH extended measures for national security screening of foreign investments from December 31, 2020, until December 31, 2022, and may extend this deadline further. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 73 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 34 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $13,295 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $15,890 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Hungary’s government actively courts FDI; net annual FDI in 2020 amounted to $3.2 billion, and gross FDI totaled $98.1 billion. EU countries account for approximately 89 percent of all FDI in Hungary in terms of direct investors and 62 percent in terms of ultimate controlling parent investor. In terms of ultimate investor – i.e., country of origin – the United States was the second largest investor after Germany in 2019. In terms of direct investor location, Germany was the largest investor, followed by the Netherlands, Austria, Luxembourg, and then the United States; approximately 450 U.S. companies maintain a presence in Hungary. Most U.S. investment falls within the automotive, software development, and life sciences sectors. According to Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency (HIPA) data, U.S. foreign direct investment produced more jobs in Hungary in 2020 than investment from any other country. Total cumulative FDI from Asian sources has doubled since 2010, accounting for over five percent of total FDI stock in 2019. According to HIPA, South Korea, Japan, China, India, and other Asian countries accounted for about 40 percent of the value of new foreign investment projects in Hungary in 2020 and in 2021, with $3.1 billion in investments creating 3,500 jobs. The GOH has implemented tax changes to increase Hungary’s regional competitiveness and attract investment; the government reduced the personal income tax rate to 15 percent in 2016, the corporate income tax rate to 9 percent in 2017, the employer-paid welfare contribution to 13 percent in 2021, and employers’ payroll tax to 13 percent. Hungary’s Value-Added Tax (VAT), however, is the highest in Europe at 27 percent. As of 2016, the GOH streamlined the National Tax and Customs authority (NAV) procedure to offer fast-track VAT refunds to customers categorized as “low-risk.” In 2020 Hungary committed to join the OECD Global Minimum Tax Agreement with a 10-year transitionary period. Government policies have resulted in some foreign investors selling their stakes to the government or state-owned enterprises in other sectors, including banking and energy. Many foreign companies have expressed displeasure with the unpredictability of Hungary’s tax regime, its retroactive nature, slow response times, and the volume of legal and tax changes. According to the European Commission (EC), a series of progressively tiered taxes implemented in 2014 disproportionately penalized foreign businesses in the telecommunications, tobacco, retail, media, and advertisement industries, while simultaneously favoring Hungarian companies. Following EC infringement procedures, the GOH phased out most discriminatory tax rates by 2015 and replaced them with flat taxes. Another 2014 law required retail companies with over $53 million in annual sales to close if they report two consecutive years of losses. Retail businesses claimed the GOH specifically set the threshold to target large foreign retail chains. The EC likewise determined that the law was discriminatory and launched an infringement procedure in 2016, leading the GOH to repeal the law in November 2018. In 2017, the GOH passed a regulation that gives the government preemptive rights to purchase real estate in World Heritage areas. The rule has been used to block the purchase of real estate by foreign investors in the most desirable areas of Budapest. In April 2020 the GOH issued a decree that levied sector-specific taxes on the banking and retail sectors to fund COVID-19 pandemic economic support. This progressive tax on retail grocery outlets is structured such that it applies mainly to large foreign retail firms. In December 2021, the Parliament fast-tracked a legislation to increase the retail tax and compelled retail chains with an annual revenue over $310 million to offer their food items nearing expiry date to a state-owned nonprofit company, introducing another measure which hits only foreign-owned retailers. The GOH publicly declared its intention to reduce foreign ownership in the banking sector in 2012. Accordingly, various GOH initiatives have reduced foreign ownership from about 70 percent in 2008 to 40.5 percent by the end of 2020. These initiatives included a 2010 bank tax; a 2012 financial transaction tax levied on all cash withdrawals; and regulations enacted between 2012-2015 that obligated banks to retroactively compensate borrowers for interest rate increases on foreign currency-denominated mortgage loans, even though these increases were spelled out in the original contracts with customers and had been permitted by Hungarian law. While the pharmaceutical industry is competitive and profitable in Hungary, multinational enterprises complain of numerous financial and procedural obstacles, including high taxes on pharmaceutical products and operations, prescription directives that limit a doctor’s choice of drugs, and obscure tender procedures that negatively affect the competitiveness of certain drugs. Pharmaceutical companies also complain about the lengthy procedure to accept innovative medications in the national reimbursement system, making business planning challenging for them. The Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency (HIPA), under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, encourages and supports inbound FDI. HIPA offers company and sector-specific consultancy, recommends locations for investment, acts as a mediator between large international companies and Hungarian firms to facilitate supplier relationships, organizes supplier training, and maintains active contact with trade associations. Its services are available to all investors. For more information, see: https://hipa.hu/main. Foreign investors generally report a productive dialogue with the government, both individually and through business organizations. The American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) enjoys an ongoing high-level dialogue with the GOH and the government has adopted many AmCham policy recommendations in recent years. In 2017, the government established a Competitiveness Council, now chaired by the Minister of Finance, which includes representatives from multinationals, chambers of commerce, and other stakeholders, to increase Hungary’s competitiveness. Many U.S. and foreign investors have signed MOUs with the GOH to facilitate one-on-one discussions and resolutions to any pending issues. The GOH has regularly consulted foreign businesses and business associations as it has developed economic support measures during the pandemic. For more information, see: HYPERLINK “https://kormany.hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/strategiai-partnersegi-megallapodasok” HYPERLINK “https://kormany.hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/strategiai-partnersegi-megallapodasok” https://kormany.hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/strategiai-partnersegi-megallapodasok and https://www.amcham.hu/. The U.S.-Hungary Business Council (USHBC) – a private, non-profit organization established in 2016 – aims to facilitate and maintain dialogue between American corporate executives and top government leaders on the U.S.-Hungary commercial relationship. Most significant U.S. investors in Hungary have joined USHBC, which hosts roundtables, policy conferences, briefings, and other major events featuring senior U.S. and Hungarian officials, academics, and business leaders. For more information, see: https://www.us-hungarybusinesscouncil.com/ . Foreign ownership is permitted except for certain “strategic” sectors including farmland and defense-related industries which require special government permits. As part of its economic measures during the COVID-19 pandemic, the GOH passed a decree which requires foreign investors to seek approval for foreign investments in Hungary. Foreign law firms and auditing companies must sign a cooperation agreement with a Hungarian company to provide services on Hungarian legal or auditing issues. According to the Land Law, only private Hungarian citizens or EU citizens resident in Hungary with a minimum of three years of experience working in agriculture or holding a degree in an agricultural discipline can purchase farmland. Eligible individuals are limited to purchasing 300 hectares (741 acres). All others may only lease farmland. Non-EU citizens and legal entities are not allowed to purchase agricultural land. All farmland purchases must be approved by a local land committee and Hungarian authorities, and local farmers and young farmers must be offered a right of first refusal before a new non-local farmer is allowed to purchase the land. For legal entities and those who do not fulfill these requirements, the law allows the lease of farmland up to 1200 hectares for a maximum of 20 years. The GOH has invalidated any pre-existing leasing contract provisions that guaranteed the lessee the first option to purchase, provoking criticism from Austrian farmers. Austria has reported the change to the European Commission, which initiated an infringement procedure against Hungary in 2014. In March 2018, the European Court of Justice ruled that the termination of land use contracts violated EU rules, opening the way for EU citizens who lost their land use rights to sue the GOH for damages. The GOH passed a national security law on investment screening in 2018 that requires foreign investors seeking to acquire more than a 25-percent stake in a Hungarian company in certain sensitive sectors (defense, intelligence services, certain financial services, electric energy, gas, water utility, and electronic information systems for governments) to seek approval from the Interior Ministry. The Ministry has up to 60 days to issue an opinion and can only deny the investment if it determines that the investment is designed to conceal an activity other than normal economic activity. In 2020, as part of the measures to mitigate the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the GOH passed an additional regulation requiring foreign investors to seek approval from the Ministry of Innovation and Technology (MIT) for greenfield or expansion of existing investments. Some observers have suggested this law could be used to disadvantage foreign firms or deny them access to the Hungarian market. Hungary has not had any third-party or independent civil organization investment policy reviews in the last five years. In 2006, Hungary joined the EU initiative to create a European network of “point of single contact” through which existing businesses and potential investors can access all information on the business and legal environment, as well as connect to Hungary’s investment promotion agency. In recent years, the government has strengthened investor relations, signed strategic agreements with key investors, and established a National Competitiveness Council to formulate measures to increase Hungary’s economic competitiveness. The registration of business enterprises is compulsory in Hungary. Firms must contract an attorney and register online with the county-level courts of justice operating as courts of registration. Registry courts must process applications to register limited liability and joint-enterprise companies within 15 workdays, but the process is usually complete within three workdays. If the Court fails to act within the given timeframe, the new company is automatically registered. If the company chooses to use a template corporate charter, registration can be completed in a one-day fast track procedure. Registry courts provide company information to the Tax Authority (NAV), eliminating the need for separate registration. The Court maintains a computerized registry and electronic filing system and provides public access to company information. The minimum capital requirement for a limited-liability company is HUF 3,000,000 ($8,500); for private limited companies HUF 5,000,000 ($14,300), and for public limited companies HUF 20,000,000 ($57,100). Foreign individuals or companies can establish businesses in Hungary without restrictions. Further information on business registration and the business registry can be obtained at the GOH’s information website for businesses: http://eugo.gov.hu/starting-business-hungary or at the Ministry of Justice’s Company Information Service https://ceginformaciosszolgalat.kormany.hu/elektronikus-cegeljaras , and the Tax Authority https://en.nav.gov.hu/taxation/registration/specific_rules.html. Hungarian business facilitation mechanisms offer no special preference or assistance for them in establishing a company. Outward investment is mainly in manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, services, finance and insurance, and science and technology. The stock of total Hungarian investment abroad amounted to $36.8 billion in 2019. There is no restriction in place for domestic investors to invest abroad. The GOH announced in early 2019 that it would like to increase Hungarian investment abroad and it is considering incentives to promote such investment. 3. Legal Regime Generally, legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are consistent with international and EU standards. However, some executives in Hungarian subsidiaries of U.S. companies express concerns about a lack of transparency in the GOH’s policy-making process and an uneven playing field in public tendering. In recent years, there has been an uptick in the number of companies, including major U.S. multinational franchises and foreign owners of major infrastructure, reporting pressure to sell their businesses to government-affiliated investors. Those that refuse to sell report an increase in tax audits, fines, and spurious regulatory challenges and court cases. SMEs increasingly report a desire to either remain small (and therefore “under the radar” of these government-affiliated investors) or relocate their businesses outside of Hungary. For foreign investors, the most relevant regulations stem from EU directives and the laws passed by Parliament to implement them. Laws in Parliament can be found on Parliament’s website (https://www.parlament.hu/en/web/house-of-the-national-assembly). Legislation, once passed, is published in a legal gazette and available online at www.magyarkozlony.hu . The GOH can issue decrees, which also have national scope, but they cannot be contrary to laws enacted by Parliament. Local municipalities can create local decrees, limited to the local jurisdiction. As a result of the COVID-19 crisis, in March 2020, the Parliament passed a bill that established a state of emergency (SOE) in Hungary, allowing the GOH to govern by decree without parliamentary approval. The GOH used this decree to levy new sector-specific taxes, to take control of a Hungarian company that had been in an ownership dispute with the GOH, and to reallocate competencies and tax collection duties from an opposition-led municipality to a county-level body led by the ruling Fidesz party. Hungarian financial reporting standards are in line with the International Accounting Standards and the EU Fourth and Seventh Directives. The accounting law requires all businesses to prepare consolidated financial statements on an annual basis in accordance with international financial standards. The government does not promote or require environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure for companies operating in Hungary. The GOH rarely invites interested parties to comment on draft legislation. Civil society organizations have complained about a loophole in the current law that allows individual Members of Parliament to submit legislation and amendments without public consultation. The average deadline for submitting public comment is often very short, usually less than one week. The Act on Legislation and the Law Soliciting Public Opinion, both passed by Parliament in 2010, govern the public consultation process. The laws require the GOH to publish draft laws on its webpage and to give adequate time for all interested parties to give an opinion on the draft. However, implementation is not uniform, and the GOH often fails to solicit public comments on proposed legislation. The legislation process – including key regulatory actions related to laws – are published on the Parliament’s webpage. Explanations attached to draft bills include a short summary on the aim of the legislation, but regulators only occasionally release public comments. Regulatory enforcement mechanisms include the county and district level government offices, whose decisions can be challenged at county-level courts. The court system generally provides efficient oversight of the GOH’s administrative processes. Hungary’s budget was widely accessible to the general public, including online through the Parliament and Finance Ministry websites and the Legal Gazette. The government made budget documents, including the executive budget proposal, the enacted budget, and the end-of-year report publicly available within a reasonable period of time. Modifications to a current budget, which in 2021 were quite substantial because of the pandemic, are not consolidated with the initial budget law and do not include economic analysis of the effects of those modifications. Information on debt obligations was publicly available, including online through the Hungarian Central Bank ( https://www.mnb.hu/en ) and Hungarian State Debt Manager’s ( https://akk.hu/ ) websites. All EU regulations are directly applicable in Hungary, even without further domestic measures. If a Hungarian law is contrary to EU legislation, the EU rule takes precedence. As a whole, labor, environment, health, and safety laws are consistent with EU regulations. Hungary follows EU foreign trade and investment policy, and all trade regulations follow EU legislation. Hungary participates in the WTO as an EU Member State. The Hungarian legal system is based on continental European (German-French and Roman law) traditions. Contracts are enforced by ordinary courts or – if stipulated by contract – arbitration centers. Investors in Hungary can agree with their partners to turn to Hungarian or foreign arbitration courts. Apart from these arbitration centers, there are no specialized courts for commercial cases; ordinary courts are entitled to judge any kind of civil case. The Civil Code of 2013 applies to civil contracts. The Hungarian judicial system includes four tiers: district courts (formerly referred to as local courts); courts of justice (formerly referred to as county courts); courts of appeal; and the Curia (the Hungarian Supreme Court). Hungary also has a Constitutional Court that reviews cases involving the constitutionality of laws and court rulings. There are no special commercial courts, but first level public administration and labor cases are judged only by the county level courts of justices. Although the GOH has criticized court decisions on several occasions, ordinary courts are considered to generally operate independently under largely fair and reliable judicial procedures. Recently, an increasing number of current and former judges have raised concerns about growing GOH influence over the court system and intimidation of judges by court administration. The European Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report, issued in July 2021, cited judicial independence in Hungary as a source of concern. Most business complaints about the court system pertain to the lengthy proceedings rather than the fairness of the verdicts. The GOH has said it hopes to improve the speed and efficiency of court proceedings with an updated Civil Procedure Code that entered into force in January 2018. Regulations and law enforcement actions pertaining to investors may be appealed at ordinary courts or at the Constitutional Court. Hungarian law protects property and investment. The Hungarian state may expropriate property only in exceptional cases where there is a public interest; any such expropriations must be carried out in a lawful way, and the GOH is obliged to make immediate and full restitution for any expropriated property, without additional stipulations or conditions. The GOH passed a national security law on investment screening in 2018 that requires foreign investors seeking to acquire more than a 25 percent stake in a Hungarian company in certain “sensitive sectors” (defense, intelligence services, certain financial services, electric energy, gas, water utility, and electronic information systems for governments) to seek approval from the Interior Ministry. (Please see above section on limits on foreign control for more details). Based on this law, in April 2021 the Interior Ministry blocked Austria’s Vienna Insurance Group from buying Dutch insurer Aegon’s Hungarian subsidiary. In February 2022 the European Commission decided the blocked sale violated EU rules, but by that time the GOH and VIG agreed that the state would acquire a 45 percent stake in Aegon. Additionally, in 2020, as part of the measures to mitigate the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the GOH passed another regulation requiring foreign investors to seek approval from the Ministry of Innovation and Technology (MIT) for greenfield or expansion of existing investments. There is no primary website or “one-stop shop” which compiles all relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. The Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency (HIPA), however, facilitates establishment of businesses and provides guidance on relevant legislation. The Hungarian Competition Authority, tasked with safeguarding the public interest, enforces the provisions of the Hungarian Competition Act, and EU competition law also binds Hungary. The Competition Authority is empowered to investigate suspected violations of competition law, order changes to practices, and levy fines and penalties. According to the Authority, since 2010 the number of competition cases has decreased, but they have become more complex. Out of more than 60 cases in 2021, only a few minor cases pertained to U.S.-owned companies. Hungarian law does not consider conflict of interest to be a criminal offense. Citing evidence of conflict of interest and irregularities, in December 2017 the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) recommended opening a criminal investigation into a high-profile $50 million EU-funded public procurement project, but Hungarian authorities declined to prosecute the case. Hungary’s Constitution provides protection against uncompensated expropriation, nationalization, and any other arbitrary action by the GOH except in cases of threat to national security. In such cases, immediate and full compensation is to be provided to the owner. There are no known expropriation cases where the GOH has discriminated against U.S. investments, companies, or representatives. There have been some complaints from other foreign investors within the past several years that expropriations have been improperly executed and without proper remuneration. Parties involved in these cases turned to the domestic legal system for dispute settlement. There is no recent history of official GOH expropriations. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Hungary is a signatory to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention), proclaimed in Hungary by Law 27 of 1978. Hungary also is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention), proclaimed in Hungary by Law 25 of 1962. There is not specific legislation providing for enforcement other than the two domestic laws proclaiming the New York and ICSID Conventions. According to Law 71 of 1994, an arbitration court decision is equally binding to that of a court ruling. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and to UN’s 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Under the New York Convention, Hungary recognizes and enforces rulings of the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration. Hungary shares no Bilateral Investment Treaty or Free Trade Agreement with the United States. Since 2000 Hungary has been the respondent in 16 known investor-State arbitration claims, although none of these involve U.S. investors. Local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards against the GOH. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts In the last few years, parties have increasingly turned to mediation to settle disputes without engaging in lengthy court procedures. Law 60 of 2017 on domestic arbitration procedures is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. Investment dispute settlement clauses are frequently included in investment contract between the foreign enterprise and GOH. Hungarian law allows the parties to set the jurisdiction of any courts or arbitration centers. The parties can also agree to set up an ad hoc arbitration court. The law also allows investors to agree on settling investment disputes by turning to foreign arbitration centers, such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), UNCITRAL’s Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), or the Vienna International Arbitral Centre. In Hungary, foreign parties can turn to the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry arbitration court, which has its own rules of proceedings (HYPERLINK “https://mkik.hu/en/court-of-arbitration” HYPERLINK “https://mkik.hu/en/court-of-arbitration” https://mkik.hu/en/court-of-arbitration ) and in financial issues to the Financial and Capital Market’s arbitration court. Local courts recognize and enforce foreign or domestic arbitral awards. An arbitral ruling may only be annulled in limited cases, and under special conditions. Domestic courts do not favor State-owned enterprises (SOEs) disproportionately. Investors can expect a fair trial even if SOEs are involved and in case of an unfavorable ruling, may elevate the case to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Investors do not generally complain about non-transparent or discriminatory court procedures. The Act on Bankruptcy Procedures, Liquidation Procedures, and Final Settlement of 1991, covers all commercial entities except banks (which have their own regulatory statutes), trusts, and State-owned enterprises, and brought Hungarian legislation in line with EU regulations. Debtors can initiate bankruptcy proceedings only if they have not sought bankruptcy protection within the previous three years. Within 90 days of seeking bankruptcy protection, the debtor must call a settlement conference to which all creditors are invited. Majority consent of the creditors present is required for all settlements. If agreement is not reached, the court can order liquidation. The Bankruptcy Act establishes the following priorities of claims to be paid: 1) liquidation costs; 2) secured debts; 3) claims of the individuals; 4) social security and tax obligations; 5) all other debts. Creditors may request the court to appoint a trustee to perform an independent financial examination. The trustee has the right to challenge, based on conflict of interest, any contract concluded within 12 months preceding the bankruptcy. The debtor, the creditors, the administrator, or the Criminal Court may file liquidation procedures with the court. Once a petition is filed, regardless of who filed it, the Court notifies the debtor by sending a copy of the petition. The debtor has eight days to acknowledge insolvency. If the insolvency is acknowledged, the company declares if any respite for the settlement of debts is requested. Failure to respond results in the presumption of insolvency. The Court may allow up to of 30 days for the debtor to settle the debt upon request. If the Court finds the debtor insolvent, it appoints a liquidator. Bankruptcy itself is not criminalized unless it is made in a fraudulent way, deliberately, and in bad faith to prevent the payment of debts. Law 122 of 2011 obliges banks and credit institutions to establish and maintain the Central Credit Information System to assess creditworthiness of businesses and individuals to facilitate prudent lending (HYPERLINK “http://www.bisz.hu ” HYPERLINK “http://www.bisz.hu” http://www.bisz.hu ). 6. Financial Sector The Hungarian financial system offers a full range of financial services with an advanced information technology infrastructure. The Hungarian Forint (HUF) has been fully convertible since 2001, and both Hungarian financial market and capital market transactions are fully liberalized. The Capital Markets Act of 2001 sets out rules on securities issues, including the conversion and marketing of securities. As of 2007, separate regulations were passed on the activities of investment service providers and commodities brokers (2007), on Investment Fund Managing Companies (2011), as well as on Collective Investments (2014), providing more sophisticated legislation than those in the Capital Markets Act. These changes aimed to create a regulatory environment where free and available equity easily matches with the best investment opportunities. The 2016 modification of the Civil Code removed remaining obstacles to promote collection of public investments in the course of establishing a public limited company. The Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE) re-opened in 1990 as the first post-communist stock exchange in the Central and Eastern European region. Since 2010, the BSE has been a member of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) Stock Exchange Group. In 2013, the internationally recognized trading platform Xetra replaced the previous trading system. In 2021, the BSE has 23 members and 139 issuers. The issued securities are typically shares, investment notes, certificates, corporate bonds, mortgage bonds, government bonds, treasury bills, and derivatives. In December 2021, the BSE had a market capitalization of $30.2 billion, and the average monthly equity turnover volume amounted to $2.1 billion. The most traded shares are OTP Bank, pharmaceutical company Richter, MOL, Magyar Telekom, and 4iG. Financial resources flow freely into the product and factor markets. In line with IMF rules, international currency transactions are not limited and are accessible both in domestic and foreign currencies. Individuals can hold bank accounts in either domestic or foreign currencies and conduct transactions in foreign currency. Since March 2020, commercial banks introduced real time bank transfers for domestic currency transactions. Commercial banks provide credit to both Hungarian and foreign investors at market terms. Credit instruments include long-term and short-term liquidity loans. All banks publish total credit costs, which includes interest rates as well as other costs or fees. There are no rules preventing a foreigner or foreign firm from opening a bank account in Hungary. Valid personal documents (i.e., a passport) are needed and as of 2015, when the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) came into force, also a declaration of whether the individual is a U.S. citizen. Banks have not discriminated against U.S. citizens in opening bank accounts based on FATCA. The Hungarian banking system has strengthened over the past few years, and the capital position of banks is generally adequate even in the challenging economic environment created by COVID-19. Following several years of deleveraging after the 2008 crisis, the banking system is mainly deposit funded. The penetration of the banking system decreased slightly in 2019 due to a relatively high GDP growth rate. The sector’s total assets amounted to 92.6 percent of GDP. The Hungarian banking system is healthy, and banks have a stable capital position. The loan-to-deposit ratio has been gradually decreasing from its 160 percent peak in 2009 after the financial crisis to 85 percent in 2015 and has been fluctuating between this value and a 92.4 percent peak in 2019. In spring 2020, during the first wave of the COVID-19 in Hungary, it reached 91.6 percent but decreased to 81.7 percent by the end of the year. The liquidity cover ratio was 160 percent in the first wave of COVID-19, then climbed to 220.8 percent by the end of the year. In response to the COVID-19 crisis, the Central Bank restructured and expanded its monetary policy tools to provide liquidity to the financial sector through currency swaps, fixed-rate loans, and exemptions from minimum reserve requirements. The Central Bank also introduced instruments to influence short- and long-term term yields. It offered low-interest loans through commercial banks to the SME sector and launched a government securities purchase program on the secondary market. The ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) decreased from a high of 18 percent in 2013 to 3.3 percent in 2021 as a result of portfolio cleaning, the improving economic environment, and increased lending. The banking sector became profitable after several years of losses between 2010 and 2015, reaching a return on equity (ROE) record high of 16.8 percent in 2017. Since then, ROE has decreased close to zero in 2020 as a result of the pandemic but recovered to 11.6 percent by the end of 2021. The banking sector’s total assets exceeded 112 percent of GDP in 2021, of which 73 percent were held by five banks. The largest bank in Hungary is OTP Bank, which is mostly Hungarian-owned and controls about 25 percent of the market. Hungary has a modern two-tier financial system and a developed financial sector. Between 2000 and 2013, the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (PSZAF) served as a consolidated financial supervisor, regulating all financial and securities markets. PSZAF, in conjunction with the MNB, managed a strong two-pillar system of control over the financial sector, producing stability in the market, effective regulation, and a system of checks and balances. In 2013, the MNB absorbed the PSZAF and over the past few years has efficiently strengthened its supervisory role over the financial sector and established a customer protection system. In accordance with the GOH’s stated goal of reducing foreign ownership in the financial sector, the proportion of foreign banks’ total assets in the financial sector decreased to about 40 percent in 2019, down from a peak of 70 percent before the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Following the sale of Budapest Bank and merge with the other Hungarian-owned banks and the Hungarian Savings’ Bank network, it has fallen to about 40 percent by 2021. Foreign banks are subject to central bank uniform regulations and prudential measures, which are applied to Hungary’s entire financial market without discrimination. On March 2, 2020, MNB launched an immediate e-transfer system up to a maximum of HUF 10 million (about $32,000) for domestic transactions in HUF. Commercial banks have extensive direct correspondent banking relationships and are capable of transferring domestic or foreign currencies to most banks outside of Hungary. Since 2018, however, the cashing of U.S. checks is no longer possible. No loss or jeopardy of correspondent banking relations has been reported. Recent regulations restrict foreign currency loans to only those that earn income in foreign currency, an effort to eliminate the risk of exchange rate fluctuations. Foreign investors continue to have equal – if not better – access to credit on the global market, apart from special GOH credit concessions such as small business loans. Foreign Exchange The Hungarian forint (HUF) has been convertible for essentially all business transactions since January 1, 1996, and foreign currencies are freely available in all banks and exchange booths. Act 93 of 2001 on Foreign Exchange Liberalization lifted all remaining foreign exchange restrictions and allowed free movement of capital in line with EU regulations. Hungary complies with all OECD convertibility requirements and IMF Article VIII. Hungary’s EU accession agreement dictates that Hungary must adopt the Euro once it meets the relevant criteria. The GOH has not set a specific target date even though Hungary meets most of the necessary fiscal and financial criteria. According to the Ministry of Finance, Hungary’s economic performance should mirror the Eurozone average more closely before adapting the Euro. Short-term portfolio transactions, hedging, short, and long-term credit transactions, financial securities, assignments and acknowledgment of debt may be carried out without any limitation or declaration. While the Forint remains the legal tender in Hungary, parties may settle financial obligations in a foreign currency. Many Hungarians took out mortgages denominated in foreign currency prior to the global financial crisis and suffered when the Forint depreciated against the Swiss Franc and the Euro. Despite strong pressure, the Hungarian Supreme Court ruled that there is nothing inherently illegal or unconstitutional in loan agreements that are foreign currency denominated, upholding existing contract law. New consumer loans, however, are denominated in Forints only, unless the debtor receives regular income in a foreign currency. Market forces determine the value of the Hungarian Forint. Analysts note that the MNB’s consistently low interest rates have contributed to a nearly 30 percent decline in the value of the of the Forint against the Euro since 2010. Remittance Policies Sovereign Wealth Funds Hungary does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund. 10. Political and Security Environment The security environment is relatively stable. Politically motivated violence or civil disturbance is rare. Violent crime is low, with street crimes the most frequently reported crimes in the country. Political violence is not common in Hungary. The transition from communist authoritarianism to capitalist democracy was negotiated and peaceful, and free elections have been held consistently since 1990. Iceland Executive Summary Iceland is an island country located between North America and Europe in the Atlantic Ocean, near the Arctic Circle with an advanced economy that centers around three primary sectors: fisheries, tourism, and aluminum production. Until recently, U.S. investment in Iceland has mostly been concentrated in the aluminum sector, with Alcoa and Century Aluminum operating plants in Iceland. However, U.S. portfolio investments in Iceland have been steadily increasing in recent years. Iceland’s convenient location between the United States and Europe, its high levels of education, connectivity, and English proficiency, and a general appreciation for U.S. products make Iceland a promising market for U.S. companies. Furthermore, Americans made up a third of the tourist population that visited Iceland in 2021. There is broad recognition within the Icelandic government that foreign direct investment (FDI) is a key contributor to the country’s economic revival after the 2008 financial collapse. As part of its investment promotion strategy, the Icelandic government operates a public-private agency called “Invest in Iceland” that facilitates foreign investment by providing information to potential investors and promoting investment incentives. Iceland has identified the following “key sectors” in Iceland; tourism; algae culture; data centers; and life sciences. Iceland offers incentives to foreign investors in certain industries. Tourism has been a growing force behind Iceland’s economy in the past decade, with opportunities for investors in high-end tourism, including luxury resorts and hotels. The number of tourists in Iceland grew by more than 400 percent between 2010 and 2018, reaching more than 2.3 million in 2018. However, tourism in Iceland contracted in 2019, and the COVID-19 pandemic has had drastic effects on tourism, and the overall economy. The government implemented measures to bolster the tourism economy, thus avoiding mass bankruptcies in the sector, and has committed to building out tourism-related infrastructure. The startup and innovation communities in Iceland are flourishing, with the IT and biotech sectors growing fast, particularly pharmaceuticals and wellness, gaming, and aquaculture. Iceland’s IT sector spans all areas of the digital economy. The Icelandic energy grid derives 99 percent of its power from renewable resources, making it uniquely attractive for energy-dependent industries. For instance, the data center industry in Iceland is expanding. Iceland is working by the 2018 Climate Acton Plan, which was updated in 2020, and is designed to achieve Iceland’s national climate goals of making the country carbon neutral by 2040 and to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent by 2030 under the Paris Agreement. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 13 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 17 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $796 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $62,420 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The government of Iceland maintains an open investment climate. The Act on Incentives for Initial Investments, which came into force in 2015, is intended to “promote initial investment in commercial operations, the competitiveness of Iceland and regional development by specifying what incentives are permitted in respect of initial investments in Iceland, and how they should be used.” The Act does not apply to investments in airports, energy production, financial institutions, insurance operations, or securities. For more information, see the English translation of the act: ( https://www.stjornarradid.is/leit/$LisasticSearch/Search/?SearchQuery=Act+on+incentives+for+initial+investments+in+Iceland ). As part of its investment promotion strategy, the Icelandic government operates a public-private agency called “Invest in Iceland” that facilitates foreign investment by providing information to potential investors and promotes investment incentives. There is a debate, however, within Iceland over balancing energy intensive FDI with the environmental impact associated with certain projects. That said, energy-intensive industries long dominated by aluminum smelting, have expanded to include silicon production plants and data centers. For further resources see: ( http://www.invest.is/doing-business/incentives-and-support ). Tourism has been a growing force behind Iceland’s economy in the past decade, with opportunities for investors in high-end tourism, including luxury resorts and hotels. The number of tourists in Iceland grew by more than 400 percent between 2010 and 2018, reaching more than 2.3 million in 2018. However, tourism in Iceland contracted in 2019 with visitors falling just below 2 million, which can be largely attributed to the fall of Icelandic budget airline WOW Air. The COVID-19 pandemic has had drastic effects on tourism, as well as on Iceland’s overall economy, which contracted by 7.1 percent in 2020, according to Statistics Iceland. Less than half a million tourists visited Iceland in 2020, with the number of tourists reaching 700,000 in 2021. Stakeholders in the industry have been generally optimistic for 2022, with hotels reporting good booking positions for the spring and summer seasons. Isavia, a public company that handles the operation and development of Keflavik International Airport has embarked on $1-2 billion capital works project to expand the airport. Projects include extension of buildings, baggage screening and baggage handling systems, self-check in stations, waiting areas and retail/dining areas, check-in areas, bag-drop off areas, security areas, airbridges/gates for remote stands, re-modelling of existing terminal, de-icing platforms, new runway, new taxiway, and a new ATC tower. The startup and innovation communities in Iceland are flourishing, with IT and biotech startups seeking investors. Foreign investment in the fisheries sector is restricted, as well as in the energy sector (hydropower and geothermal exploitation rights other than for personal use and energy processing and transportation are limited to Icelandic citizens and legal persons, and individuals and legal persons who reside in the European Economic Area). The wind energy sector is growing in Iceland, and the legal framework is still being developed for that sector. The 1991 Act on “foreign investments for commercial purposes” limits foreign ownership of fishing rights and fish processing companies (only Icelandic citizens or companies that are controlled by Icelandic citizens and have less than 25 percent foreign shareholders can own or control fishing companies); of hydropower and geothermal exploitation rights other than for personal use and energy processing and transportation (only Icelandic citizens and legal persons, and individuals and legal persons who reside in the European Economic Area (EEA) can hold those rights); and of aviation operators (Icelandic ownership of aviation companies needs to be at least 51 percent, and this does not apply to individuals and legal persons that have EEA citizenship). The law further stipulates that foreign states, sub-national governments, or other foreign authorities are prohibited from investing in Iceland for commercial purposes, although the Minister of Culture and Business Affairs may grant exemptions. The responsibility to inform the relevant ministry of both new investments and investments in companies that the party in question has already invested in lies with the investor, or with the Icelandic company that the foreign individual or entity invested in (this does not apply to EEA citizens or residents). However, the 1991 Act does not stipulate how foreign investment is screened or monitored by relevant authorities, only that the Minister of Culture and Business Affairs handles permits and monitors the execution of this legislation. The Minister can block foreign investments if s/he considers it a “threat to national security or goes against public policy, public safety or public health or if there are serious economic, societal or environmental complications in specific industries or in specific areas, that is likely to persist…” The law further states that the “Minister has the authority to stop foreign investment in systematically important companies if such investment entails systematic risk.” If an investment has already taken place, the Minister of Tourism, Industries, and Innovation has the authority to compel the foreign person or entity in question to sell. Iceland has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995 and a member of GATT since 1968. The WTO conducted its fifth Trade Policy Review of Iceland in 2017 ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp461_e.htm ). The review notes that “with a small population and limited natural resources, apart from energy and fish, trade remains important, but the range of exports is limited to tourism, fish and fish products, and aluminum and products thereof. Therefore, the country remains vulnerable to shocks, including the appreciation of the ISK, overheating of the economy, and Brexit. Furthermore, despite uncertainties relating to Brexit, as growth picks up in the EU, Iceland’s main trading partner, opportunities for trade in goods and services should continue to improve.” The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and UN Cooperation for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have not conducted Investment Policy Reviews for Iceland. Businesses are registered with Iceland Revenue and Customs (Skatturinn) ( http://www.rsk.is/english/ ). Applications for the registration of businesses can be filled in online, however some forms are in Icelandic only and it is therefore necessary for foreign businesses to contract a local representative to complete the paperwork. The website of the Business Registry in Iceland is ( http://www.rsk.is/fyrirtaekjaskra ) (Icelandic only). More information on establishing a business in Iceland can be found here ( https://www.government.is/topics/business-and-industry/establishing-a-business-in-iceland/ ). Services offered by Invest in Iceland, a public-private agency that promotes and facilitates foreign investment in Iceland, are free of charge to all potential foreign investors ( http://www.invest.is ). Invest in Iceland can provide information on investment opportunities in Iceland; collect data on the business environment, arrange site visits and plan contacts with local authorities; arrange meetings with local business partner and professional consultants; influence legislation and lobby on behalf of foreign investors ( https://www.invest.is/at-your-service/what-we-do ). Invest in Iceland offers detailed information on how to establish a company on its website ( http://www.invest.is/doing-business/establishing-a-company ). Its sister agencies, Business Iceland (formerly Promote Iceland) ( https://www.businessiceland.is/ ) and Film in Iceland ( http://www.filminiceland.com ), aim to enhance Iceland’s reputation as a tourist destination and as a destination for filming movies and television productions. The Icelandic Government along with other stakeholders promote exports of Icelandic goods and services through the public-private agency Islandsstofa, also known as Business Iceland ( https://www.businessiceland.is/ ). Business Iceland assists Icelandic businesses in the main industry sectors to export products and services, including fisheries (seafood and technology), agricultural produce (including organic lamb meat), high-tech products and solutions (software, prosthetics, etc.), and services (tourism). Business Iceland has been very active in the United States and Canada in recent years. A trade commissioner represents the Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs in New York, facilitating exports to the United States and promoting business relations between the two countries. Business Iceland also promotes exports to the U.K., Northern and Southern Europe, and more recently to Asia (China and Japan). Iceland imposed capital controls following the economic collapse in late 2008, which largely prevented Icelandic investors and pensions funds from investing outside of Iceland. The government lifted capital controls on March 14, 2017. 3. Legal Regime The regulatory system is transparent, although bureaucratic delays can occur. All proposed laws and regulations are published in draft form for the public record and are open for comment. Icelandic laws regulating business practices are consistent with those of most OECD member states. Iceland’s laws are generally based on European Union directives as a result of Iceland’s membership in the European Economic Area (EEA), which legally obligates it to adopt EU directives and law concerning the four freedoms of the EU: free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital. The Competition Authority is responsible for enforcing anti-monopoly regulations and promoting effective competition in business activities. This includes eliminating unreasonable barriers and restrictions on freedom in business operations, preventing monopolies and limitations on competition, and facilitating new competitors’ access to the market. The Consumer Agency holds primary responsibility for market surveillance of business operators, transparency of the markets with respect to safety and consumers’ legal rights, and enforcement of legislation concerning protection of consumers’ health, legal, and economic rights. For more information see the Competition Authority’s website ( https://en.samkeppni.is/ ) and the Consumer Agency website ( https://www.neytendastofa.is/English ). The Icelandic Parliament (Althingi) consists of a single chamber of 63 members; a simple majority is required for ordinary bills to become law. All bills are introduced in the parliament in draft form. Draft laws and regulations are open to public comment and are published in full on the parliament’s web page ( http://www.stjornartidindi.is ) and on the websites of the relevant ministries (often in English). Invest in Iceland also maintains an information portal website that includes information on industry sectors, the business climate, and incentives that foreign investors may find useful ( http://www.invest.is ). Ministries or regulatory agencies develop bills, which are available to the general public. Ministries or regulatory agencies publish the text of the proposed regulations before their enactment on a unified website ( https://www.stjornartidindi.is/ ). Ministries or regulatory agencies solicit comments on proposed regulation form the general public. Laws and regulations are published on both the parliament’s website ( https://www.althingi.is/ ) and separate website managed by the Ministry of Justice ( https://www.stjornartidindi.is/ ). The OECD published a report on Iceland in September 2019. One of the findings of the report was that regulatory barriers were high in Iceland. “Regulation should be more commensurate with the needs of a small open economy. Product market regulation is stringent and the administrative burden for start-ups is high, holding back investment and innovation. Restrictions to foreign direct investment are among the highest of the OECD, dampening employment and productivity gains through international knowledge transfer. The government should set up a comprehensive action plan for regulatory reform, prioritizing reforms that foster competition, level the playing field between domestic and foreign firms and attract international investment” ( http://www.oecd.org/economy/iceland-economic-snapshot/ ). The Government of Iceland has worked to reduce the regulatory burden since the report was published. OECD conducted an economic survey of Iceland in 2021. The key findings are as follows: “the pandemic-related collapse of foreign tourism and international travel, which account for almost a fifth of GDP, highlighted the need to diversify the economy. Iceland needs to improve resilience and find new drivers of productivity and employment growth, in particular given the objective of emission reductions. Boosting skills across the population is hence the top priority, along with reforms to strengthen competitive forces.” The Iceland Chamber of Commerce operates an independent arbitration institute, the Nordic Arbitration Centre (NAC). The NAC provides for a dispute resolution mechanism, allowing parties to solve their dispute efficiently and safely. Both the arbitration process and the Arbitral Tribunals final awards are strictly confidential. There have been no known cases of discrimination against U.S. investors. For more information visit the Iceland Chamber of Commerce’s website ( https://www.chamber.is/arbitration ). Iceland scores 4.75 out of 5 (best possible) on The World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance index ( https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/iceland# ). Icelandic laws regulating business practices are generally consistent with other OECD members. Iceland’s laws are generally based on EU directives as a result of Iceland’s membership in the EEA, which legally obligates it to adopt EU directives and law concerning four freedoms of the EU: free movement, goods, services, persons, and capital. Iceland has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since January 1, 1995. Iceland and the United States signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in January 2009. The Icelandic civil law system enforces property rights, contractual rights, and the means to protect these rights. The Icelandic court system is independent from the parliament and government. Foreign parties must abide by the same rules as Icelandic parties, and they enjoy the same privileges in court; there is no discrimination against foreign parties in the Icelandic court system. When trade or investment disputes are settled, the settlement is usually remitted in the local currency. Iceland has a three-tier judicial system; eight District Courts (Héraðsdómstólar), the Court of Appeal (Landsréttur), and the Supreme Court (Hæstiréttur Íslands). All court actions commence at the District Courts, and conclusions can then be appealed to the Court of Appeal. In special cases the conclusions of the Court of Appeal can be referred to the Supreme Court. A new public agency, the Judicial Administration (Dómstólasýsla), along with the Court of Appeal (Landsréttur) began operating on January 1, 2018. The Landsdómur is a special high court or impeachment court to handle cases where members of the Cabinet of Iceland are suspected of criminal behavior. The Landsdómur has 15 members — five supreme court justices, a district court president, a constitutional law professor, and eight people chosen by parliament every six years. The court assembled for the first time in 2011 to prosecute a former Prime Minister for alleged gross misconduct in the events leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. He was found guilty of failing to hold regular cabinet meetings during the crisis but was not convicted of gross misconduct. Icelandic laws regulating and protecting foreign investments are consistent with OECD and EU standards. As Iceland is a member of the EEA, most EU commercial legislation and directives are in effect in Iceland. The major law governing foreign investment is the 1996 Act on Investment by Non-residents in Business Enterprises, which grants national treatment to non-residents of the EEA. The law dictates that foreign ownership of businesses is generally unrestricted, except for limits in the fishing, energy, and aviation sectors. Icelandic law also restricts the ability of non-EEA citizens to own land, but the Minister of Culture and Business Affairs may waive this. The managers and the majority of the board of directors in an Icelandic enterprise must be domiciled in Iceland or another EEA member state, although exemptions from this provision can be granted by the Minister of Culture and Business Affairs. Iceland has no automatic screening process for investments that trigger national security concerns (similar to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States), although bidders in privatization sales may have to go through a pre-qualification process to verify that the bidder has the financial strength to participate. Investors that intend to hold more than 10 percent of shares (“active” shareholders) in financial institutions are subject to approval from the Central Bank of Iceland ( http://en.fme.is/ ). For information on incentives and doing business in Iceland see Invest in Iceland’s website: ( https://www.invest.is/doing-business/incentives-and-support ). Competition Law no. 44/2005 is currently in place to promote competition and to prevent unreasonable barriers on economic operations. Depending on the turnover of the companies in question, the Icelandic Competition Authority is notified of mergers and acquisitions. The Authority may annul mergers or set conditions to prevent monopolies and limitations on competition. For more information see the Competition Authority’s website: ( https://en.samkeppni.is/ ). The Constitution of Iceland stipulates that no one may be obliged to surrender their property unless required by the government to serve a public interest, and that such a measure shall be provided for by law and full compensation be paid. A special committee is appointed every five years to review and proclaim the legality of expropriation cases. If the committee proclaims a case to be legal, it will negotiate an amount of compensation with the appropriate parties. If an amount cannot be agreed upon, the committee determines a fair value after hearing the case of all parties. The Icelandic government has never expropriated a foreign investment. However, some private investors described actions by the Icelandic government before and during the October 2008 financial crisis (related to the takeover of three major banks and offshore krona assets) as a type of indirect expropriation ( www.cb.is ). The 1991 Act on Bankruptcy states that “the provisions of this Act on the right to obtain a license of financial reorganization or for composition with creditors, and on bankruptcy, shall only apply to a debtor who is a natural person if the debtor’s legal domicile is in Iceland and the debtor is not exempted from the jurisdiction of the courts of Iceland. The provisions of this Act shall however be applied to Icelandic nationals not having their legal domicile in Iceland if they are exempted from the jurisdiction of the courts of other states. Where the debtor is a company or an institution the provisions of this Act on his right to obtain a license of financial reorganization or for composition with creditors, or on bankruptcy, shall only apply if the following conditions are fulfilled: in the case of a registered company, if its registered venue is in Iceland, and in the case of an unregistered company, if its venue is on Iceland according to its articles or as provided for by law, or in the nature of the matter. The same shall apply, as applicable, to institutions.” For more information, refer to the Act on Bankruptcy ( https://www.government.is/publications/legislation/lex/2018/01/15/Act-on-Bankruptcy-etc.-No.-21-1991/ ). 6. Financial Sector Capital controls were lifted in March 2017 after more than eight years of restricting the free movement of capital. New foreign currency inflows fall under the Rules on Special Reserve Requirements for new Currency Inflows, no. 223/2019 which took effect on March 6, 2019, and replaced the older Rules no. 490/2016 on the same subject. The rules contain provisions on the implementation of special reserve requirements for new foreign currency inflows, including the special reserve base, holding period, special reserve ratio, settlement currency, and interest rates on deposit institutions’ capital flow accounts with the Central Bank of Iceland and Central Bank certificates of deposit. For more information see the Central Bank of Iceland’s website ( https://www.cb.is ). Foreign portfolio investment has increased significantly over the past few years in Iceland after being dormant in the years following the economic crash. U.S. investment funds have been particularly active on the Icelandic stock exchange. The Icelandic stock exchange operates under the name Nasdaq Iceland. Companies listed on Nasdaq Iceland are reported on its website ( http://www.nasdaqomxnordic.com/hlutabref/Skrad-fyrirtaeki/iceland ). The private sector has access to financing through the commercial banks and pensions funds. The IMF 2019 Article IV Consultation report states that “the de jure exchange rate arrangement is free floating, and the de facto exchange rate arrangement under the IMF classification system is floating. In the period from November 2018 to October 31, 2019, the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) intervened in the foreign exchange market on 14 of the 248 working days. The CBI publishes daily data on its foreign exchange intervention with a lag. Iceland has accepted the obligations under Article VIII, Sections 2(a), 3, and 4 and maintains no exchange restrictions subject to Fund jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 2(a). Iceland continues to maintain certain measures that constitute exchange restrictions imposed for security reasons based on UN Security Council Resolutions.” ( https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/12/19/Iceland-2019-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-48891 ). The Central Bank of Iceland is an independent institution owned by the State and operates under the auspices of the Prime Minister. Its objective is to promote price stability, financial stability, and sound and secure financial activities. The bank also maintains international reserves and promotes a safe, effective financial system, including domestic and cross-border payment intermediation. The Icelandic banking sector is generally healthy. The Central Bank of Iceland has since the financial collapse of 2008 introduced stringent measures to ensure that the financial system remains “safe, stable, and effective.” For more information see the Central Bank webpage ( https://www.cb.is/financial-stability/ ). There are three commercial banks in Iceland, Landsbankinn, Islandsbanki, and Arion Bank. The Government of Iceland took over operations of the banks during the financial collapse in September and October 2008. Landsbankinn (formerly known as Landsbanki Islands) is still government-owned, while the Government of Iceland is in the process of privatizing Islandsbanki (formerly known as Glitnir). Arion Bank (formerly known as Kaupthing Bank) has been privatized and is listed on the Icelandic stock exchange Nasdaq Iceland. There is one investment bank in Iceland, Kvika, which is listed on Nasdaq Iceland. Icelandic pension funds offer loans and mortgages and are active investors in Icelandic companies. There are no foreign banks operating in Iceland. All companies have access to regular commercial banking services in Iceland. Establishing a bank account in Iceland requires a local personal identification number known as a “kennitala.” Foreign nationals should contact Registers Iceland for more information on how to register in Iceland ( https://www.skra.is/english/ ). The Government of Iceland has proposed establishing a sovereign wealth fund, called the National Fund of Iceland. The bill to establish the fund has not passed through Parliament. The stated purpose of the fund is “to serve as a sort of disaster relief reserve for the nation, when the Treasury suffers a financial blow in connection with severe, unforeseen shocks to the national economy, either due to a plunge in revenues or the cost of relief measures that the government has considered unavoidable to undertake.” 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Icelandic Government owns wholly or majority shares in 40 companies, including systematically important companies such as energy companies, the Icelandic National Broadcasting Service (RUV) and Iceland Post. Other notable SOEs are Landsbankinn (one of three commercial banks in Iceland), Isavia (public company that operates Keflavik International Airport), and ATVR (the only company allowed to sell alcohol to the general public). Here you can find a list of SOEs ( https://www.stjornarradid.is/verkefni/rekstur-og-eignir-rikisins/felog-i-eigu-rikisins/ ). Total assets of SOEs in 2020 amounted to 5,735 billion ISK (approx. $44.3 billion) and SOEs employed around 5,100 people that same year. In terms of assets and equity, Landsbankinn (one of three commercial banks in Iceland) is the largest SOE in Iceland, and Isavia employs the most people. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) generally compete under the same terms and conditions as private enterprises, except in the energy production and distribution sector. Private enterprises have similar access to financing as SOEs through the banking system. As an OECD member, Iceland adheres to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance. The Iceland Chamber of Commerce in Iceland, NASDAQ OMX Iceland and the Confederation of Icelandic Employers have issued guidelines that mirror the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance. Iceland is party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). For SOEs operating within the private sector in a competitive environment, the general guideline from the Icelandic government is that all decisions of the board of the SOE should ensure a level playing field and spur competition in the market. In the midst of the banking crisis, the state, through the Financial Supervisory Authority (FME), took over Iceland’s three largest commercial banks, which collapsed in October 2008, and subsequently took over several savings banks to allow for uninterrupted banking services in the country. The government has started the privatization process of Islandsbanki, and currently owns 42.5 percent shares in the bank. The Bank Shares Management Company, established by the state in 2009, manages state-owned shares in financial companies. The government of Iceland has acquired stakes in many companies through its ownership of shares in the banks; however, it is the policy of the government not to interfere with internal or day-to-day management decisions of these companies. Instead, in 2009, the state established the Bank Shares Management Company to manage the state-owned shares in financial companies. The board of this entity, consisting of individuals appointed by the Minister of Finance, appoints a selection committee, which in turn chooses the State representative to sit on the boards of the various companies. While most energy producers are either owned by the state or municipalities, there is free competition in the energy market. That said, potential foreign investment in critical sectors like energy is likely to be met by demands for Icelandic ownership, either formally or from the public. For example, a Canadian company, Magma Energy, acquired a 95 percent stake in the energy production company HS Orka in 2010, but later sold a 33.4 percent stake to the Icelandic pension funds in the face of intense public pressure. Iceland’s universal healthcare system is mainly state-operated. However, few legal restrictions to private medical practice exist; private clinics are required to maintain an agreement regarding payment for services with the Icelandic state, a foreign state, or an insurance company. Icelandic authorities are currently in the process of privatizing Islandsbanki, one of Iceland’s three commercial banks. Authorities sold 35 percent shares in Islandsbanki in 2021, and 22.5 percent earlier this year. The government currently owns 42.5 percent in the bank. The government of Iceland currently owns 99.8 percent in Landsbankinn and has no immediate plans to privatize it. The government took ownership of the banks when the Icelandic banking system collapsed in 2008. Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, Bjarni Benediktsson, has publicly declared his intentions to sell all government of Iceland shares in Islandsbanki, but wants the government to remain a large shareholder in Landsbankinn, with around 40 percent of shares. 10. Political and Security Environment Politically motivated violence in Iceland is rare, and Iceland consistently ranks among the world’s safest countries. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator on Political Stability and Absence of Violence placed Iceland in the top 97th percentile rank of all countries worldwide in 2020 ( http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports ). In early 2014, frustration among voters regarding the then-governing Progressive Party-Independence Party coalition government’s withdrawal of Iceland’s accession bid to the European Union led to the largest protests since the financial collapse; these protests did not include violence. Non-violent protests led to a governmental reorganization and early elections following the 2016 “Panama Papers” scandal. A subsequent government, composed of the Independence Party, Bright Future, and the Reform Party, took office in early 2017 and collapsed within a year. The current coalition government, composed of the Independence Party, Progressive Party, and the Left-Green Movement, assumed power in November 2017 and began its second term November 28, 2021. There have been individual cases of politically motivated vandalism of foreign holdings in recent years, directed primarily at the aluminum industry. India Executive Summary The Government of India continued to actively court foreign investment. In the wake of COVID-19, India enacted ambitious structural economic reforms that should help attract private and foreign direct investment (FDI). In February 2021, the Finance Minister announced plans to raise $2.4 billion though an ambitious privatization program that would dramatically reduce the government’s role in the economy. In March 2021, parliament further liberalized India’s insurance sector, increasing FDI limits to 74 percent from 49 percent, though still requiring a majority of the Board of Directors and management personnel to be Indian nationals. Parliament passed the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill on August 6, 2021, repealing a law adopted by the Congress-led government of Manmohan Singh in 2012 that taxed companies retroactively. The Finance Minister also said the Indian government will refund disputed amounts from outstanding cases under the old law. While Prime Minister Modi’s government had pledged never to impose retroactive taxes, prior outstanding claims and litigation led to huge penalties for Cairn Energy and telecom operator Vodafone. Both Indian and U.S. business have long advocated for the formal repeal of the 2012 legislation to improve certainty over taxation policy and liabilities. India continued to increase and enhance implementation of the roughly $2 trillion in proposed infrastructure projects catalogued, for the first time, in the 2019-2024 National Infrastructure Pipeline. The government’s FY 2021-22 budget included a 35 percent increase in spending on infrastructure projects. In November 2021, Prime Minister Modi launched the “Gati Shakti” (“Speed Power”) initiative to overcome India’s siloed approach to infrastructure planning, which Indian officials argue has historically resulted in inefficacies, wasteful expenditures, and stalled projects. India’s infrastructure gaps are blamed for higher operational costs, especially for manufacturing, that hinder investment. Despite this progress, India remains a challenging place to do business. New protectionist measures, including strict enforcement and potential expansion of data localization measures, increased tariffs, sanitary and phytosanitary measures not based on science, and Indian-specific standards not aligned with international standards effectively closed off producers from global supply chains and restricted the expansion in bilateral trade and investment. The U.S. government continued to urge the Government of India to foster an attractive and reliable investment climate by reducing barriers to investment and minimizing bureaucratic hurdles for businesses. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank/ Amount Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 85 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/india Innovation Index 2021 46 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country (Million. USD stock positions) 2020 $41,904 usdia-position-2020.xlsx (live.com) World Bank GNI per capita (USD) 2020 $1,920 https://databank.worldbank.org/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&dd=y&inf= n&zm=n&country=IND 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Changes in India’s foreign investment rules are notified in two different ways: (1) Press Notes issued by the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) for most sectors, and (2) legislative action for insurance, pension funds, and state-owned enterprises in the coal sector. FDI proposals in sensitive sectors will, however, require the additional approval of the Home Ministry. The DPIIT, under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, is the lead investment agency, responsible for the formulation of FDI policy and the facilitation of FDI inflows. It compiles all policies related to India’s FDI regime into a single document that is updated every year. This updated policy compilation can be accessed at: http://dipp.nic.in/foreign-direct–investment/foreign–direct–investment-policy. The DPIIT disseminates information about India’s investment climate and, through the Foreign Investment Implementation Authority (FIIA), plays an active role in resolving foreign investors’ project implementation problems. The DPIIT oftentimes consults with lead ministries and stakeholders. However, there have been specific incidences where some relevant stakeholders reported being left out of consultations. In most sectors, foreign and domestic private entities can establish and own businesses and engage in remunerative activities. However, there are sectors of the economy where the government continues to retain equity limits for foreign capital as well as management and control restrictions. For example, India caps FDI in the Insurance Sector at 74 percent and mandates that insurance companies retain “Indian management and control.” Similarly, India allows up to 100 percent FDI in domestic airlines but has yet to clarify governing substantial ownership and effective control (SOEC) rules. A list of investment caps is accessible in the DPIIT’s consolidated FDI circular at: https://dpiit.gov.in/foreign-direct-investment/foreign-direct-investment-policy . The Indian Government has continued to liberalize FDI policies across sectors. Notable changes during 2021 included: Increasing the FDI cap for the insurance sector to 74 percent from 49 percent, albeit while retaining an “Indian management and control” requirement. Increased the FDI cap for the pensions sector to 74 percent from 49 percent. The rider of “Indian management and control” is applicable in the pension sector. Eliminated the FDI cap in the telecom sector. 100 percent FDI allowed for insurance intermediaries. Eliminated the FDI cap for insurance intermediaries and state-run oil companies. Increased the FDI cap for defense manufacturing units to 74 percent from 49 percent and up to 100 percent if the investment is approved under the Government Route review process. Since the abolition of the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) in 2017, FDI screening has been progressively liberalized and decentralized. All FDI into India must complete either an “Automatic Route” or “Government Route” review process. FDI in most sectors fall under the Automatic Route, which simply requires a foreign investor to notify India’s central bank, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), and comply with relevant domestic laws and regulations for that sector. In contrast, investments in specified sensitive sectors – such as defense – require review under the Government Route to obtain the prior approval of the ministry with jurisdiction over the relevant sector along with the concurrence of the DPIIT. In 2020, India issued Press Note 3 requiring all proposed FDI by nonresident entities located in (or having “beneficial owners” in) countries that share a land border with India to obtain prior approval via the Government Route. This screening requirement applies regardless of the size of the proposed investment or relevant sector. The rule primarily impacted the People’s Republic of China, whose companies had more FDI in India, but other neighboring countries affected include Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, and Bhutan. A. Third-party investment policy reviews https://www.oecd.org/economy/india-economic-snapshot/ https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/india/overview https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp503_e.htm B. Civil society organization reviews of investment policy-related concerns https://www.ncaer.org/publication_details.php?pID=370 https://www.orfonline.org/research/jailed-for-doing-business/ The DPIIT is responsible for formulation and implementation of promotional and developmental measures for growth of the industrial sector. The DPIIT also is responsible for the overall industrial policy and facilitating and increasing FDI flows to the country. However, Invest India is the government’s lead investment promotion and facilitation agency and is managed in partnership with the DPIIT, state governments, and business chambers. Invest India works with investors through their investment lifecycle to provide support with market entry strategies, deep dive industry analysis, partner search, and policy advocacy as required. Businesses can register online through the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) website: http://www.mca.gov.in/ . To fast-track the regulatory approval process, particularly for major projects, the government created the digital multi-modal Pro-Active Governance and Timely Implementation (PRAGATI) initiative in 2015. The Prime Minister personally monitors the PRAGATI process, to ensure government entities meet project deadlines. As of September 2021, the Prime Minister had chaired 38 PRAGATI meetings with 297 projects, worth around $200 billion, approved and cleared. In 2014, the government also formed an inter-ministerial committee, led by the DPIIT, to track investment proposals requiring inter-ministerial approvals. Business and government sources report this committee meets informally on an ad hoc basis as they receive reports from companies and business chambers seeking assistance with stalled projects. According to data from the Ministry of Commerce’s India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF), outbound investment from India has both increased and changed which countries and sectors it targets. During the last ten years, Overseas Investment Destination (OID) shifted away from resource-rich countries, such as Australia, UAE, and Sudan, toward countries providing higher tax benefits, such as Mauritius, Singapore, the British Virgin Islands, and the Netherlands. Indian firms invest overseas primarily through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) to get direct access to newer and more extensive markets and better technologies and increasingly achieve a global reach. According to RBI data, outward investment from India in 2021 totaled around $29 billion compared with around $30 billion the previous year. The RBI’s recorded total of outward investment includes equity capital, loans, and issuance of guarantees. 3. Legal Regime Policies pertaining to foreign investments are framed by the DPIIT, and implementation is undertaken by lead federal ministries and sub-national counterparts. Some government policies are written in a way that can be discriminatory to foreign investors or favor domestic industry. For example, India bars foreign investors from engaging in multi-brand retail, which also limits foreign e-Commerce investors to a “market-place model.” On most occasions major rules are framed after thorough discussions by government authorities and require the approval of the cabinet and, in some cases, the Parliament as well. However, in some instances the rules have been enacted without any consultative process. The Indian Accounting Standards were issued under the supervision and control of the Accounting Standards Board, a committee under the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), and has government, academic, and professional representatives. The Indian Accounting Standards are named and numbered in the same way as the corresponding International Financial Reporting Standards. The National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards recommends these standards to the MCA, which all listed companies must then adopt. These can be accessed at: https://www.mca.gov.in/content/mca/global/en/acts-rules/ebooks/accounting-standards.html India is a member of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), an eight- member regional block in South Asia. India’s regulatory systems are aligned with SAARC’s economic agreements, visa regimes, and investment rules. Dispute resolution in India has been through tribunals, which are quasi-judicial bodies. India has been a member of the WTO since 1995, and generally notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade; however, at times there are delays in publishing the notifications. The Governments of India and the United States cooperate in areas such as standards, trade facilitation, competition, and antidumping practices. India adopted its legal system from English law and the basic principles of the Common Law as applied in the UK are largely prevalent in India. However, foreign companies need to adjust for Indian law when negotiating and drafting contracts in India to ensure adequate protection in case of breach of contract. The Indian judiciary provides for an integrated system of courts to administer both central and state laws. The judicial system includes the Supreme Court as the highest national court, as well as a High Court in each state or a group of states which covers a hierarchy of subordinate courts. Article 141 of the Constitution of India provides that a decision declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. Apart from courts, tribunals are also vested with judicial or quasi-judicial powers by special statutes to decide controversies or disputes relating to specified areas. Courts have maintained that the independence of the judiciary is a basic feature of the Constitution, which provides the judiciary institutional independence from the executive and legislative branches. The government has a policy framework on FDI, which is updated every year and formally notified as the Consolidated FDI Policy ( https://dpiit.gov.in/foreign-direct-investment/foreign-direct-investment-policy ). The DPIIT issues policy pronouncements on FDI through the Consolidated FDI Policy Circular, Press Notes, and press releases that are also notified by the Ministry of Finance as amendments to the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 under the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), 1999. These notifications take effect from the date of issuance of the Press Notes/Press Releases, unless specified otherwise therein. In case of any conflict, the relevant Notification under the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 will prevail. The payment of inward remittance and reporting requirements are stipulated under the Foreign Exchange Management (Mode of Payment and Reporting of Non-Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2019 issued by the RBI. The government has introduced “Make in India” and “Self-Reliant India” programs that include investment policies designed to promote domestic manufacturing and attract foreign investment. The “Digital India” program aims to open new avenues for the growth of the information technology sector. The “Start-up India” program creates incentives to enable start-ups to become commercially viable and grow. The “Smart Cities” program creates new avenues for industrial technological investment opportunities in select urban areas. The central government has successfully established independent and effective regulators in telecommunications, banking, securities, insurance, and pensions. India’s antitrust body, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) reviews cases against cartelization and abuse of dominance and is a well-regarded regulator. The CCI’s investigations wing is required to seek the approval of the local chief metropolitan magistrate for any search and seizure operations. The CCI conducts capacity-building programs for government officials and businesses. Tax experts confirm that India does not have domestic expropriation laws in place. The Indian Parliament on August 6, 2021, repealed a 2012 law that authorized retroactive taxation. In first proposing the repeal on August 5, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman committed the government to refund the disputed amounts from outstanding cases under the old law. The Indian government has been divesting from state owned enterprises (SOEs) since 1991. In February 2021, the Finance Minister detailed an ambitious program to privatize roughly $24 billion in state owned enterprises as part of the FY 2021-22 (March 31-April 1) budget. India made resolving contract disputes and insolvency easier with the enactment of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) in 2016. The World Bank noted that the IBC introduced the option of insolvency resolution for commercial entities as an alternative to liquidation or other mechanisms of debt enforcement, reshaping the way insolvent companies can restore their financial well-being or are liquidated. The IBC created effective tools for creditors to successfully negotiate and receive payments. As a result, the overall recovery rate for creditors jumped from 26.5 to 71.6 cents on the dollar, and the time required for resolving insolvency also was reduced from 4.3 years to 1.6 years. India is now, by far, one of the best performers in South Asia in resolving insolvency and does better than the average for OECD high-income economies in terms of the recovery rate, time taken, and cost of proceedings. India enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation Act in 1996, based on the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model to align its adjudication of commercial contract dispute resolution mechanisms with global standards. The government established the International Center for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ICADR) as an autonomous organization under the Ministry of Law and Justice to promote the settlement of domestic and international disputes through alternate dispute resolution. The World Bank has also funded ICADR to conduct training for mediators in commercial dispute settlement. Judgments of foreign courts have been enforced under multilateral conventions, including the Geneva Convention. India is a signatory to the convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention). However, Indian firms are known to file lawsuits in domestic courts to delay paying an arbitral award. Several cases are currently pending, the oldest of which dates to 1983. In 2021, Amazon received an interim award against Future Retail from the Singapore International Arbitration Centre. However, Future Retail has refused to accept the findings and initiated litigation in Indian courts. India is not a member state to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague and the Indian Law Ministry agreed in 2007 to establish a regional PCA office in New Delhi, although this remains pending. The office would provide an arbitration forum to match the facilities offered at The Hague but at a lower cost. In November 2009, the Department of Revenue’s Central Board of Direct Taxes established eight dispute resolution panels across the country to settle the transfer-pricing tax disputes of domestic and foreign companies. In 2016 the government approved amendments that would allow Commercial Courts, Commercial Divisions, and Commercial Appellate Divisions of the High Courts Act to establish specialized commercial divisions within domestic courts to settle long-pending commercial disputes. Since formal dispute resolution is expensive and time consuming, many businesses choose methods, including ADR, for resolving disputes. The most used ADRs are arbitration and mediation. India has enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation Act based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. In cases that involve constitutional or criminal law, traditional litigation remains necessary. The introduction and implementation of the IBC in 2016 overhauled of the previous framework for insolvency with much-needed reforms. The IBC created a uniform and comprehensive creditor-driven insolvency resolution process that encompasses all companies, partnerships, and individuals (other than financial firms). According to the World Bank, the time required for resolving insolvency was reduced significantly from 4.3 years to 1.6 years after implementation of the IBC. The law, however, does not provide for U.S. style Chapter 11 bankruptcy provisions. In August 2016, the Indian Parliament passed amendments to the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, and the Debt Recovery Tribunals Act. These amendments targeted helping banks and financial institutions recover loans more effectively, encouraging the establishment of more asset reconstruction companies (ARCs), and revamping debt recovery tribunals. The Finance Minister announced in her February 2021 budget speech to Parliament plans to establish the National Asset Reconstruction Company Limited (NARCL), or “bad bank” to resolve large cases of corporate stress. In October 2021, the RBI approved the license to set up the NARCL. On May 10, 2021, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) issued a circular to introduce new environment, social, and governance (ESG) reporting requirements for the top 1,000 listed companies by market capitalization. According to this circular, new disclosure will be made in the format of the Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report (BRSR), which is a notable departure from SEBI’s existing Business Responsibility Report and a significant step toward bringing sustainability reporting up to existing financial reporting standards. BRSR reporting will be voluntary for FY 2021-22 and mandatory from FY 2022-23 for the top 1,000 listed companies by market capitalization. This is to provide companies subject to these requirements with sufficient time to adapt to the new requirements. 6. Financial Sector Indian stocks experienced significant losses at the start of 2021, stemming from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy. By midyear, markets began to recover, with India’s stock benchmarks reaching record highs and becoming among the top performers globally. Indian companies raised a combined $15.57 billion through 121 IPOs in 2021, the highest amount ever raised in a single calendar year compared with the previous high of $8.4 billion in 2017. Foreign investment inflows drove markets higher through February 2021. However, these investments began exiting the market when faced with the potential for faster-than-expected withdrawal of monetary stimulus and the Delta variant of COVID-19. Domestic institutional investors compensated outflows of foreign investment through significant investment in Indian stocks. Foreign investors’ net investment in 2021 was about $7 billion, significantly lower than the $14.5 billion in 2020 and $19 billion in 2019. Domestic investors put about $12.5 billion in 2021 into Indian domestic equity markets. Indian investors opened 27.4 million new stock trading accounts in 2021, up from 10.5 million accounts opened in 2020. The SEBI is considered one of the most progressive and well-run of India’s regulatory bodies. The SEBI regulates India’s securities markets, including enforcement activities and is India’s direct counterpart to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Board oversees seven exchanges: BSE Ltd. (formerly the Bombay Stock Exchange), the National Stock Exchange (NSE), the Metropolitan Stock Exchange, the Calcutta Stock Exchange, the Multi Commodity Exchange (MCX), the National Commodity & Derivatives Exchange Limited, and the Indian Commodity Exchange. Foreign venture capital investors (FVCIs) must register with the SEBI to invest in Indian firms. They can also set up domestic asset management companies to manage funds. All such investments are allowed under the automatic route, subject to SEBI and RBI regulations, as well as FDI policy. FVCIs can invest in many sectors, including software, information technology, pharmaceuticals and drugs, biotechnology, nanotechnology, biofuels, agriculture, and infrastructure. Companies incorporated outside India can raise capital in India’s capital markets through the issuance of Indian Depository Receipts (IDRs) based on SEBI guidelines. Standard Chartered Bank, a British bank was the only foreign entity to list in India but delisted in June 2020. Experts attribute the lack of interest in IDRs to initial entry barriers, lack of clarity on conversion of the IDRs holdings into overseas shares, lack of tax clarity, and the regulator’s failure to popularize the product. External commercial borrowing (ECB), or direct lending to Indian entities by foreign institutions, is allowed if it conforms to parameters such as minimum maturity; permitted and non-permitted end-uses; maximum all-in-cost ceiling as prescribed by the RBI; funds are used for outward FDI or for domestic investment in industry, infrastructure, hotels, hospitals, software, self-help groups or microfinance activities, or to buy shares in the disinvestment of public sector entities. The rules are published by the RBI: https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_ViewMasDirections.aspx?id=11510 According to RBI data, ECB by corporations and non-banking financial companies reached $38.8 billion in 2021. Companies have been increasingly tapping overseas markets for funds to take advantage of low interest rates in global markets. On December 8, 2021, the RBI announced a switch in calculation of interest rates for ECB and trade credits from the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) to alternative reference rates (ARRs). The RBI has taken several steps in the past few years to bring the activities of the offshore Indian rupee (INR) market in Non-Deliverable Forwards (NDF) onshore, with the goal of deepening domestic markets, enhancing downstream benefits, and obviating the need for an NDF market. FPIs with access to currency futures or the exchange-traded currency options market can hedge onshore currency risks in India and may directly trade in corporate bonds. The RBI allowed banks to freely offer foreign exchange quotes to non-resident Indians. The RBI has stated that trading on INR derivatives would be allowed and settled in foreign currencies in International Financial Services Centers (IFSCs). In June 2020, the RBI allowed foreign branches of Indian banks and branches located in IFSCs to participate in the NDF. With the INR trading volume in the offshore market higher than the onshore market, the RBI felt the need to limit the impact of the NDF market and curb volatility in the movement of the INR. In August 2021, the RBI released a working paper discussing the influence of offshore markets on onshore markets. The International Financial Services Centre at Gujarat International Financial Tech-City (GIFT City) is being developed to compete with global financial hubs. In January 2016, BSE Ltd. was the first exchange to start operations there. The NSE, domestic banks, and foreign banks have also started IFSC banking units in GIFT city. As part of its FY 2021-22 budget proposal, the government recommended establishing an international arbitration center in GIFT City to help facilitate faster resolution of commercial disputes, akin to the operation of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) or London Commercial Arbitration Centre (LCAC). The public sector remains predominant in the banking sector, with public sector banks (PSBs) accounting for about 66 percent of total banking sector assets. However, the share of public banks in total loans and advances has fallen sharply in the last five years (from 70.84 percent in FY 2015-16 to 58.68 percent in FY 2021-22), primarily driven by stressed balance sheets and non-performing loans. In recent years, several new licenses were granted to private financial entities, including two new universal bank licenses and 10 small finance bank licenses. The government announced plans in 2021 to privatize two PSBs. This followed Indian authorities consolidating 10 public sector banks into four in 2019, which reduced the total number of PSBs from 18 to 12. However, the government has yet to introduce the necessary legislation needed to privatize PSBs. Although most large PSBs are listed on exchanges, the government’s stakes in these banks often exceeds the 51 percent legal minimum. Aside from the large number of state-owned banks, directed lending and mandatory holdings of government paper are key facets of the banking sector. The RBI requires commercial banks and foreign banks with more than 20 branches to allocate 40 percent of their loans to priority sectors which include agriculture, small and medium enterprises, export-oriented companies, and social infrastructure. Additionally, all banks are required to invest 18 percent of their net demand and time liabilities in government securities. PSBs continue to face two significant hurdles: capital constraints and poor asset quality. As of September 2021, gross non-performing loans represented 6.9 percent of total loans in the banking system, with the PSBs having a larger share of 8.8 percent of their loan portfolio. The government announced its intention to set up the NARCL and India Debt Resolution Company Limited (IDRCL) to take over legacy stressed assets from bank balance sheets. With the IBC in place, banks are making progress in non-performing asset recognition and resolution. To address asset quality challenges faced by public sector banks, the government has injected $32 billion into public sector banks in recent years. The capitalization largely aimed to address the capital inadequacy of public sector banks and marginally provide for growth capital. Bank mergers and capital raising from the market, improved public sector banks’ total capital adequacy ratio (CAR) from 13.5 percent in September 2020 to 16.6 percent in September 2021. Women’s lack of sufficient access to finance remained a major impediment to women’s entrepreneurship and participation in the workforce. According to experts, women are more likely than men to lack financial awareness, confidence to approach a financial institution, or possess adequate collateral, often leaving them vulnerable to poor terms of finance. Despite legal protections against discrimination, some banks reportedly remained unwelcoming toward women as customers. International Finance Corporation (IFC) analysts have described Indian women-led Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSME) as a large but untapped market that has a total finance requirement of $29 billion (72 percent for working capital). However, 70 percent of this demand remained unmet, creating a shortfall of $20 billion. The government-affiliated think tank NITI-Aayog provides information on networking, mentorship, and financing to more than 25,000 members via its Women Entrepreneurship Platform (WEP), launched in March 2018. The government’s financial inclusion scheme Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) provides universal access to banking facilities with at least one basic banking account for every adult, financial literacy, access to credit, insurance, and pension. As of March 2, 2022, 249 million women comprised 55 percent of the program’s 448 million beneficiaries. In 2015, the government started the Micro Units Development and Refinance Agency Ltd. (MUDRA), which supports the development of micro-enterprises. The initiative encourages women’s participation and offers collateral-free loans of around $15,000 to non-corporate, non-farm small and micro enterprises. As of October 29, 2021, 215 million loans have been extended to women borrowers. In FY 2016, the Indian government established the National Infrastructure Investment Fund (NIIF), India’s first sovereign wealth fund, to promote investments in the infrastructure sector. The government agreed to contribute $3 billion to the fund, with an additional $3 billion raised from the private sector primarily from foreign sovereign wealth funds, multilateral agencies, endowment funds, pension funds, insurers, and foreign central banks. Currently, the NIIF manages over $4.3 billion in assets through its funds: Master Fund, Fund of Funds, and Strategic Opportunities Fund. The NIIF Master Fund is focused on investing in core infrastructure sectors including transportation, energy, and urban infrastructure. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The government owns or controls interests in key sectors with significant economic impact, including infrastructure, oil, gas, mining, and manufacturing. The Department of Public Enterprises ( http://dpe.gov.in ) controls and formulates all the policies pertaining to SOEs, and is headed by a minister to whom the senior management reports. The Comptroller and Auditor General audits the SOEs. The government has taken several steps to improve the performance of SOEs, also called Central Public Sector Enterprises (CPSEs), including improvements to corporate governance. This was necessary as the government planned to disinvest its stake from these entities. According to the Public Enterprise Survey 2019-20, as of March 2020 there were 366 CPSEs, of which 256 are operational with a total turnover of $328 billion. The report revealed that 96 CPSEs were incurring losses and 14 units are under liquidation. Foreign investment is allowed in CPSEs in all sectors. The Master List of CPSEs can be accessed at http://www.bsepsu.com/list-cpse.asp . While the CPSEs face the same tax burden as the private sector, they receive streamlined licensing that private sector enterprises do not on issues such as procurement of land. The government has not generally privatized its assets but instead adopted a gradual disinvestment policy that dilutes government stakes in SOEs without sacrificing control. However as announced in the FY 2021-22 budget, the government has recommitted to the process of privatization of loss-making SOEs with an ambitious disinvestment target of $24 billion. In addition to completing the privatization of national carrier Air India in early 2022, the government has prioritized privatizing the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited and reducing its shares in the state-owned Life Insurance Corporation (LIC). Details about the privatization program can be accessed at the Ministry of Finance site for Disinvestment ( https://dipam.gov.in/ ). FIIs can participate in these disinvestment programs. Earlier limits for foreign investors were 24 percent of the paid-up capital of the Indian company and 10 percent for non-resident Indians and persons of Indian origin. The limit is 20 percent of the paid-up capital in the case of public sector banks. There is no bidding process. The shares of the SOEs being disinvested are sold in the open market. 10. Political and Security Environment India is a multiparty, federal, parliamentary democracy with a bicameral legislature. The president, elected by an electoral college composed of the state assemblies and parliament, is the head of state, and the prime minister is the head of government. National parliamentary elections are held every five years. Under the constitution, the country’s 28 states and eight union territories have a high degree of autonomy and have primary responsibility for law and order. Electors chose President Ram Nath Kovind in 2017 to serve a five-year term. Following the May 2019 national elections, Prime Minister Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) received a larger majority in the lower house of Parliament, or Lok Sabha, than it had won in the 2014 elections and returned Modi for a second term as prime minister. Observers considered the parliamentary elections, which included more than 600 million voters, to be free and fair, although there were reports of isolated instances of violence. Indonesia Executive Summary Indonesia’s 274 million population, USD 1 trillion economy, growing middle class, abundant natural resources, and stable economy are attractive features to U.S. investors; however, investing in Indonesia remains challenging. President Joko (“Jokowi”) Widodo, now in his second five-year term, has prioritized pandemic recovery, infrastructure investment, and human capital development. The government’s marquee reform effort — the 2020 Omnibus Law on Job Creation (Omnibus Law) — was temporarily suspended by a constitutional court ruling, but if fully implemented, is touted by business to improve competitiveness by lowering corporate taxes, reforming labor laws, and reducing bureaucratic and regulatory barriers. The United States does not have a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with Indonesia. In February 2021, Indonesia replaced its 2016 Negative Investment List, liberalizing nearly all sectors to foreign investment, except for seven “strategic” sectors reserved for central government oversight. In 2021, the government established the Risk-Based Online Single Submission System (OSS), to streamline the business license and import permit process. Indonesia established a sovereign wealth fund (Indonesian Investment Authority, i.e., INA) in 2021 that has a goal to attract foreign investment for government infrastructure projects in sectors such as transportation, oil and gas, health, tourism, and digital technologies. Yet, restrictive regulations, legal and regulatory uncertainty, economic nationalism, trade protectionism, and vested interests complicate the investment climate. Foreign investors may be expected to partner with Indonesian companies and to manufacture or purchase goods and services locally. Labor unions have protested new labor policies under the Omnibus Law that they note have weakened labor rights. Restrictions imposed on the authority of the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) led to a significant decline in investigations and prosecutions. Investors cite corruption as an obstacle to pursuing opportunities in Indonesia. Other barriers include bureaucratic inefficiency, delays in land acquisition for infrastructure projects, weak enforcement of contracts, and delays in receiving refunds for advance corporate tax overpayments. Investors worry that new regulations are sometimes imprecise and lack stakeholder consultation. Companies report that the energy and mining sectors still face significant foreign investment barriers, and all sectors have a lack of adequate and effective IP protection and enforcement, and restrictions on cross border data flows. Nonetheless, Indonesia continues to attract significant foreign investment. According to the 2020 IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey, Singapore, the United States, the Netherlands, Japan, and China were among the top foreign investment sources (latest available full-year data). Private consumption drives the Indonesian economy that is the largest in ASEAN, making it a promising destination for a wide range of companies, ranging from consumer products and financial services to digital start-ups and e-commerce. Indonesia has ambitious plans to expand access to renewable energy, build mining and mineral downstream industries, improve agriculture production, and enhance infrastructure, including building roads, ports, railways, and airports, as well as telecommunications and broadband networks. Indonesia continues to attract American digital technology companies, financial technology start-ups, franchises, health services producers and consumer product manufacturers. Indonesia launched the National Women’s Financial Inclusion Strategy in 2020, which aims to empower women through greater access to financial resources and digital skills and to increase financial and investor support for women-owned businesses. Table 1 Measure Year Index or Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions index 2021 96 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/idn Global Innovation Index 2021 87 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $18,715 M https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=2&step=1 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $3,870 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=ID 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Indonesia is an attractive destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) due to its relatively young demographics, strong domestic demand, stable political situation, abundant natural resources, and well-regarded macroeconomic policy. Indonesian government officials often state that they welcome increased FDI, aiming to create jobs, spur economic growth, and court foreign investors, notably focusing on infrastructure development, export-oriented manufacturing, mining refinery industries, and green investment. To further improve the investment climate, the government issued the Omnibus Law on Job Creation (Law No. 1/2020) in October 2020 to amend dozens of prevailing laws deemed to hamper investment. It introduced a risk-based approach for business licensing, simplified environmental requirements and building certificates, tax reforms to ease doing business, more flexible labor regulations, and the establishment of the priority investment list. It also streamlined the business licensing process at the regional level. At the same time, investors cite concerns over restrictive technical regulations, policy inconsistency, bureaucratic inefficiency, lack of infrastructure, sanctity of contract issues, and corruption. The Ministry of Investment / Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) serves as an investment promotion agency, a regulatory body, and the agency in charge of approving planned investments in Indonesia. As such, it is the first point of contact for foreign investors, particularly in manufacturing, industrial, and non-financial services sectors. In August 2021, BKPM launched the Risk-Based Online Single Submission (OSS), an integrated online system that streamlines almost all business licensing and permitting processes (except in the oil and gas, and financial sectors). Under the OSS, businesses deemed lower risk will face fewer administrative requirements to obtain permits and licenses. The GOI abolished building permit requirements and relaxed environmental licenses, which the government deemed were major sources of corruption in the business licensing process. The OSS system intends to streamline permit issuance, but integrating overlapping authorities across ministries into one system, both at the national and subnational level, remains challenging. The Omnibus Law on Job Creation requires local governments to integrate their license systems into the OSS. The law allows the central government to take over local governments’ authority if local governments are not performing. The government has provided investment incentives particularly for “priority” sectors (please see the section on Industrial Policies). As part of the implementation of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation, the Indonesian government enacted Presidential Regulation No. 10/2021 to introduce a significant liberalization of foreign investment in Indonesia, repealing the 2016 Negative List of Investment (DNI). In contrast to the previous regulation, the new investment list sets a default principle that all business sectors are open for investment unless stipulated otherwise. It details the seven sectors that are closed to investment, explains that public services and defense are reserved for the central government, and outlines four categories of sectors that are open to investment: priority investment sectors that are eligible for incentives; sectors that are reserved for micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) and cooperatives or open to foreign investors who cooperate with them; sectors that are open with certain requirements (i.e., with caps on foreign ownership or special permit requirements); and sectors that are fully open for foreign investment. Although hundreds of sectors that were previously closed or subject to foreign ownership caps are in theory open to 100 percent foreign investment, in practice technical and sectoral regulations may stipulate different or conflicting requirements that still need to be resolved. In total, 245 business fields listed in the new Investment Priorities List, or DPI, are eligible for fiscal and non-fiscal incentives, notably pioneer industries, export-oriented manufacturing, capital intensive industries, national infrastructure projects, digital economy, labor-intensive industries, as well as research and development activities. Restrictions on foreign ownership in telecommunications and information technology (e.g., internet providers, fixed telecommunication providers, mobile network providers), construction services, oil and gas support services, electricity, distribution, plantations, and transportation were removed. Healthcare services including hospitals/clinics, wholesale of pharmaceutical raw materials, and finished drug manufacturing are fully open for foreign investment, which was previously capped in certain percentages. The regulation also reduced the number of business fields that are subject to certain requirements to only 46 sectors. Domestic sea transportation and postal services are allowed up to 49 percent of foreign ownership, while press, including magazines and newspapers, and broadcasting sectors are open up to 49 percent and 20 percent, respectively, but only for business expansion or capital increases. Small plantations, industry related to special cultural heritage, and low technology industries or industries with capital less than IDR10 billion (USD 700,000) are reserved for MSMEs and cooperatives. Foreign investors in partnership with MSMEs and cooperatives can invest in certain designated areas. The new investment list shortened the number of restricted sectors from 20 to 7 categories including cannabis, gambling, fishing of endangered species, coral extraction, alcohol, industries using ozone-depleting materials, and chemical weapons. In addition, while education investment is still subject to the Education Law, Government Regulation No. 40/2021 permits education and health investment as business activities in special economic zones. In 2016, Bank Indonesia (BI) issued Regulation No. 18/2016 on the implementation of payment transaction processing. The regulation governs all companies providing the following services: principal, issuer, acquirer, clearing, final settlement operator, and operator of funds transfer. The BI Regulation capped foreign ownership of payments companies at 20 percent, though it contained a grandfathering provision. BI’s Regulation No. 19/2017 on the National Payment Gateway (NPG) subsequently imposed a 20 percent foreign equity cap on all companies engaging in domestic debit switching transactions. Firms wishing to continue executing domestic debit transactions are obligated to sign partnership agreements with one of Indonesia’s four NPG switching companies. In December 2020, BI issued umbrella Regulation No. 22/23/2020 on the Payment System, which implements BI’s 2025 Payment System Blueprint and introduces a risk-based categorization and licensing system. The regulation entered into force on July 1, 2021. It allows 85 percent foreign ownership of non-bank payment services providers, although at least 51 percent of shares with voting rights must be owned by Indonesians, and foreign investors may only hold 49 percent of voting shares. The 20 percent foreign equity cap remains in place for payment system infrastructure operators who handle clearing and settlement services, and a grandfathering provision remains in effect for existing licensed payment companies. U.S. payment systems companies have stated that the new regulations could further limit access to Indonesia’s financial services market. Prior regulations required authorization, clearing, and settlement to be processed onshore. The new regulations add initiation of a payment as an onshore processing requirement. The regulations do not specify requirements by product. While the regulations provide for offshore processing if certain requirements are met, it is subject to BI approval. OJK Regulation No. 12/POJK.03/2021, issued in August 2021, increased the foreign equity cap for commercial banks to 99 percent subject to OJK evaluation and approval, and foreign entities should meet requirements as follows: be committed to support the development of the Indonesian economy; obtain recommendations from the supervisory authority of the country of origin; and have a rating of at least 1 level above the lowest investment rating for bank financial institutions, 2 levels above the lowest investment rating for nonbank financial institutions, and 3 levels above the lowest investment rating for legal entities that are not financial institutions. This new regulation does not repeal the regulations listed in POJK 56 of 2016 article 2 and article 6 paragraph 1, stating that foreign entities may own shares of a bank representing more than 40 percent of the Bank’s capital subject to the approval of the Financial Services Authority (OJK). Foreigners may purchase equity in state-owned firms through initial public offerings and the secondary market. Capital investments in publicly listed companies through the stock exchange are generally not subject to the limitation of foreign ownership as stipulated in Presidential Regulation No. 10/2021. Government Regulation 14/2018 (Regulation 14) on foreign ownership in insurance companies set the maximum threshold for foreign equity ownership of an Indonesian insurance company to 80 percent but exempted insurance companies with existing foreign ownership levels that exceed 80 percent. Subsequently, the government issued Government Regulation 3/2020 to strengthen the grandfathering provisions of Regulation 14 by allowing foreign investors to inject capital and maintain their existing capital share, repealing the obligation under Regulation 14 for a local shareholder to make a corresponding 20 percent capital injection in the event of a capital increase. In June 2020, OJK issued Regulation 39/2020, which provides for the phased elimination of the domestic cession requirements for purchase of reinsurance from companies domiciled in a country with whom Indonesia has a bilateral agreement. The regulation also phased out the requirement for domestic reinsurance obligations for simple risks by the end of 2020, and for non-simple risks in 2022. Indonesia’s vast natural resources have attracted significant foreign investment and continue to offer significant prospects. However, some companies report that a variety of government regulations have made doing business in the resources sector increasingly difficult, and Indonesia now ranks 69th of 78 jurisdictions in the Fraser Institute’s 2020 Mining Policy Perception Index. In 2012, Indonesia banned the export of raw minerals, dramatically increased the divestment requirements for foreign mining companies, and required major mining companies to renegotiate their contracts of work with the government. The full export ban did not come into effect until January 2017, when the government also issued new regulations allowing exports of copper concentrate and other specified minerals, while imposing onerous requirements. Of note for foreign investors, provisions of the regulations require that to export mineral ores, companies with contracts of work must convert to mining business licenses – and be subject to prevailing regulations – and must commit to build smelters within the next five years. Also, foreign-owned mining companies must gradually divest 51 percent of shares to Indonesian interests over ten years, with the price of divested shares determined based on a “fair market value” determination that does not consider existing reserves. In January 2020, the government banned the export of nickel ore for all mining companies, foreign and domestic, in the hopes of encouraging construction of domestic nickel smelters. In March 2021, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources issued a Ministerial Decision to allow mining business licenses holders who have not reached smelter development targets to continue exporting raw mineral ores under certain conditions. The 2020 Mining Law returned the authority to issue mining licenses to the central government. Local governments only retain authority to issue small scale mining permits. In December 2020, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources issued Ministerial Decision No. 255.K/30/MEM/2020 that mandates coal mining companies fulfill 25 percent of its production for Domestic Market Obligation (DMO) and set the maximum price of coal for domestic power generation at $70/ton. In January 2022, the government of Indonesia banned exports of coal for all mining companies due to low DMO fulfillment, leading to the risk of power blackouts. The government has lifted the coal export ban and imposed stricter control to allow exports only for coal mining companies that have fulfilled DMO requirements. The latest World Trade Organization (WTO) Investment Policy Review of Indonesia was conducted in February 2021 and can be found on the WTO website: directdoc.aspx (wto.org) The last OECD Investment Policy Review of Indonesia, conducted in 2020, can be found on the OECD website: https://www.oecd.org/investment/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-indonesia-2020-b56512da-en.htm The 2021 UNCTAD Report on ASEAN Investment can be found here: http://investasean.asean.org/files/upload/ASEAN%20Investment%20Report%202020-2021.pdf Business and Human Rights Resource Center’s Reports: Report on Human Rights Impact Assessment for Japanese Business Investmnt in Indonesia: Investigation Into Deforestation at An Indonesian Company: Global Witness country-specific reports can be accessed here: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/indonesia-palm-oil-traders-are-failing-land-and-environmental-defenders/ List of conflicts related to environmental and human rights involving companies investing in Indonesia can be seen on Environmental Justice can be accessed here: https: https://ejatlas.org/ In order to conduct business in Indonesia, foreign investors must be incorporated as a foreign-owned limited liability company (PMA) through the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. Once incorporated, a PMA must fulfill business licensing requirements through the OSS system. In February 2021, the Indonesian government issued Government Regulation No. 5/2021, introducing a risk-based approach and streamlined business licensing process for almost all sectors. The regulation classifies business activities into categories of low, medium, and high risk, which will further determine business licensing requirements for each investment. Low-risk business activities only require a business identity number (NIB) to start commercial and production activities. An NIB also serves as the import identification number, customs access identifier, halal guarantee statement (for low risk), and environmental management and monitoring capability statement letter (for low risk). Medium-risk sectors must obtain an NIB and a standard certification. Under the regulation, a standard certificate for medium-low risk is a self-declared statement that certain business standards were fulfilled, while a standard certificate for medium-high risk must be verified by the relevant government agency. High-risk sectors must apply for full business licenses, including an environmental impact assessment (AMDAL). A business license remains valid while the business operates in compliance with Indonesian laws and regulations. A grandfather clause applies to existing businesses that have obtained business licenses. Guidance on the business application process through the Risk-Based OSS can be found at https://oss.go.id/panduan. The OSS system is an online portal which allows foreign investors to apply for and track the status of licenses and other services online. Foreign investors are generally prohibited from investing in MSMEs in Indonesia, although Presidential Regulation No. 10/2021 opened some opportunities for partnerships in farming, two- and three-wheeled vehicles, automotive spare parts, medical devices, ship repair, health laboratories, and jewelry/precious metals. According to Presidential Instruction 7/2019, the Ministry of Investment/BKPM is responsible for issuing “investment licenses” (the term used to encompass both NIB and other business licenses) that have been delegated from all relevant ministries and government institutions to foreign entities through the OSS system. BKPM has also been tasked to review policies deemed unfavorable for investors. While the OSS’s goal is to help streamline investment approvals, investments in the mining, oil and gas, and financial sectors still require licenses from related ministries and authorities. Certain tax and land permits, among others, typically must be obtained from local government authorities. Though Indonesian companies are only required to obtain one approval at the local level, businesses report that foreign companies must often seek additional approvals to establish a business. Government Regulation No. 6/2021 requires local governments to integrate their business licenses system into the Risk-Based OSS system and standardize services through a service-level agreement between the central and local governments. Indonesia’s outward investment is limited, as domestic investors tend to focus on the large domestic market. BKPM is responsible for promoting and facilitating outward investment, to include providing information about investment opportunities in other countries. BKPM also uses its investment and trade promotion centers abroad to match Indonesian companies with potential investment opportunities. The government neither restricts nor provides incentives for outward private sector investment. The Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) encourages Indonesian SOEs through the SOE Go Global Program to increase their investment abroad, aiming to improve Indonesia’s supply chain and establish demand for Indonesian exports in strategic markets. According to the United Nation Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Indonesia recorded USD 4.5 billion outward direct investments in 2020, increasing 33.3 percent. 3. Legal Regime Indonesia continues to bring its legal, regulatory, and accounting systems into compliance with international norms and agreements, but foreign investors have indicated they still encounter challenges in comparison to domestic investors and have criticized the current regulatory system for its failure to establish clear and transparent rules for all actors. Certain laws and policies establish sectors that are either fully off-limits to foreign investors or are subject to substantive conditions. To improve the investment climate and create jobs, Indonesia overhauled more than 70 laws and thousands of regulations through the enactment of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation. In November 2021, Indonesia’s Constitutional Court ruled the Omnibus Law on Job Creation was conditionally unconstitutional due to its non-alignment with the standard formulation of laws and regulations, specifically that the law did not have the appropriate public participation during its formulation and deliberation process. The court ordered government officials to amend the procedural flaws in the law within two years and that no new implementing regulations for the Omnibus Law should be issued, although implementing regulations that had already been issued up to the date of the court ruling remain in force. U.S. businesses cite regulatory uncertainty and a lack of transparency as two significant factors hindering operations. U.S. companies note that regulatory consultation in Indonesia is inconsistent, despite the existence of Law No. 12/2011 on the Development of Laws and Regulations and implementation of Government Regulation No. 87/204, which states that the community is entitled to provide oral or written input into draft laws and regulations. The law also sets out procedures for revoking regulations and introduces requirements for academic studies as a basis for formulating laws and regulations. Nevertheless, the absence of a formal consultation mechanism has been reported to lead to different interpretations among policy makers of what is required. Laws and regulations are often vague and require substantial interpretation by the implementers, leading to business uncertainty and rent-seeking opportunities. Decentralization has introduced another layer of bureaucracy and red tape for firms to navigate. In 2016, the Jokowi administration repealed 3,143 regional bylaws that overlapped with other regulations and impeded the ease of doing business. However, a 2017 Constitutional Court ruling limited the Ministry of Home Affairs’ authority to revoke local regulations and allowed local governments to appeal the central government’s decision. The Ministry continues to play a consultative function in the regulation drafting stage, providing input to standardize regional bylaws with national laws. The Omnibus Law on Job Creation provided a legal framework to streamline regulations. It establishes the norms, standards, procedures, criteria (NSPK) and performance requirements in administering government affairs for both the central and local governments. Law No. 11/2020 aims to harmonize licensing requirements at the central and regional levels. Under that law and its implementing regulations, the central government has the authority to take over regional business licensing if local governments do not meet performance requirements. Local governments must also obtain recommendations from the Ministries of Home Affairs and Finance prior to implementing local tax regulations. In 2017, Presidential Instruction No. 7/2017 was enacted to improve coordination among ministries in the policy-making process. The regulation requires lead ministries to coordinate with their respective coordinating ministry before issuing a regulation. The regulation also requires ministries to conduct a regulatory impact analysis and provide an opportunity for public consultation. The presidential instruction did not address the frequent lack of coordination between the central and local governments. The Omnibus Law on Job Creation enhanced the predictability of trade policy by moving the authority to issue trade regulations from the ministry-level (Ministry of Trade regulation) to the cabinet-level (government regulation). Indonesia ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2014 and the 2015 Paring Agreement in 2019 and issued Presidential Regulation 59/2017 on the implementation of the SDGs to support reforms in tackling issued related environment, social, and governance, and climate changes. The government made reforms to attract green investment, among others, through the issuance of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation. The Indonesian Financial Services Authority (OJK) has been actively promoting sustainable financing by developing a sustainable finance roadmap, establishing a task force for sustainable finance in financial sectors, and developing green bonds regulations. The Minister of Finance issued the first green sukuk (Islamic bonds) in February 2018. As an ASEAN member, Indonesia has successfully implemented regional initiatives, including the real-time movement of electronic import documents through the ASEAN Single Window, which reduces shipping costs, speeds customs clearance, and limits corruption opportunities. Indonesia has also ratified the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), and the ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement and committed to ratify the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Notwithstanding the progress made in certain areas, the often-lengthy process of aligning national legislation has caused delays in implementation. The complexity of interagency coordination and/or a shortage of technical capacity are among the challenges being reported. Indonesia joined the WTO in 1995. Indonesia’s National Standards Body (BSN) is the primary government agency to notify draft regulations to the WTO concerning technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS); however, in practice, notification is inconsistent. In December 2017, Indonesia ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). Indonesia has met 88.7 percent of its commitments to the TFA provisions to date, including publication of information, consultations, advance rulings, detention and test procedures, goods clearance, import/export formalities, and goods transit. Indonesia is a Contracting Party to the Aircraft Protocol to the Convention of International Interests in Mobile Equipment (Cape Town Convention). However, foreign investors bringing aircraft to Indonesia to serve the general aviation sector have faced difficulty utilizing Cape Town Convention provisions to recover aircraft leased to Indonesian companies. Foreign owners of leased aircraft that have become the subject of contractual lease disputes with Indonesian lessees have been unable to recover their aircraft in certain circumstances. Indonesia’s legal system is based on civil law. The court system consists of District Courts (primary courts of original jurisdiction), High Courts (courts of appeal), and the Supreme Court (the court of last resort). Indonesia also has a Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court has the same legal standing as the Supreme Court, and its role is to review the constitutionality of legislation. Both the Supreme and Constitutional Courts have authority to conduct judicial review. Corruption continues to plague Indonesia’s judiciary, with graft investigations involving senior judges and court staff. Many businesses note that the judiciary is susceptible to influence from outside parties. Certain companies have claimed that the court system often does not provide the necessary recourse for resolving property and contractual disputes and that cases that would be adjudicated in civil courts in other jurisdictions sometimes result in criminal charges in Indonesia. Judges are not bound by precedent and many laws are open to various interpretations. A lack of clear land titles has plagued Indonesia for decades, although land acquisition law No. 2/2012 includes legal mechanisms designed to resolve some past land ownership issues. The Omnibus Law on Job Creation also created a land bank to facilitate land acquisition for priority investment projects. In January 2022, President Jokowi established a task force to formulate land use policy and conduct mapping of land use on mining, plantation, and forestry activities, and provide recommendations to the Ministry of Investment on revocation of land permits that are not being utilized. Government Regulation No. 27/2017 provided incentives for upstream energy development and regulates recoverable costs from production sharing contracts. Indonesia has also required mining companies to renegotiate their contracts of work to include higher royalties, more divestment to local partners, more local content, and domestic processing of mineral ore. Indonesia’s commercial code, grounded in colonial Dutch law, has been updated to include provisions on bankruptcy, intellectual property rights, incorporation and dissolution of businesses, banking, and capital markets. Application of the commercial code, including the bankruptcy provisions, remains uneven, in large part due to corruption and training deficits for judges and lawyers. FDI in Indonesia is regulated by Law No. 25/2007 (the Investment Law) which was amended by the Omnibus Law of Job Creation. Under the law, any form of FDI in Indonesia must be in the form of a limited liability company with minimum capital of IDR 10 billion (USD 700,000), excluding land and building and with the foreign investor holding shares in the company. The Omnibus Law on Job Creation allows foreign investors to invest below IDR 10 billion in technology-based startups in special economic zones. The Law also introduces several provisions to simplify business licensing requirements, reforms rigid labor laws, introduces tax reforms to support ease of doing business, and establishes the Indonesian Investment Authority (INA) to facilitate direct investment. In addition, the government repealed the 2016 Negative Investment List through the issuance of Presidential Regulation No. 10/2021, introducing major reforms that removed restrictions on foreign ownership in hundreds of sectors that were previously closed or subject to foreign ownership caps. Several sectors remain closed to investment or are otherwise restricted. Presidential Regulation No. 10/2021 contains a grandfather clause that clarifies that existing investments will not be affected unless treatment under the new regulation is more favorable or the investment has special rights under a bilateral agreement. The Indonesian government also expanded business activities in special economic zones to include education and health. (See section on limits on foreign control regarding the new list of investments.) The website of the Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) provides information on investment requirements and procedures: https://nswi.bkpm.go.id/guide. Indonesia mandates reporting obligations for all foreign investors through the OSS system as stipulated in BKPM Regulation No. 6/2020. (See section two for Indonesia’s procedures for licensing foreign investment.) The Indonesian Competition Authority (KPPU) implements and enforces the 1999 Indonesia Competition Law. The KPPU reviews agreements, business practices and mergers that may be deemed anti-competitive, advises the government on policies that may affect competition, and issues guidelines relating to the Competition Law. Strategic sectors such as food, finance, banking, energy, infrastructure, health, and education are the KPPU’s priorities. The Omnibus Law on Job Creation and its implementing regulation, Government Regulation No. 44/2021, removes criminal sanctions and the cap on administrative fines, which was set at a maximum of IDR 25 billion (USD 1.7 million) under the previous regulation. Appeals of KPPU decisions must be processed through the commercial court. Indonesia’s political leadership has long championed economic nationalism, particularly concerning mineral and oil and gas reserves. According to Law No. 25/2007 (the Investment Law), the Indonesian government is barred from nationalizing or expropriating an investor’s property rights, unless provided by law. If the Indonesian government nationalizes or expropriates an investors’ property rights, it must provide market value compensation. Presidential Regulation No. 77/2020 on Government Use of Patent and the Ministry of Law and Human Rights (MLHR) Regulation No. 30/2019 on Compulsory Licenses (CL) enables patent right expropriation in cases deemed in the interest of national security or due to a national emergency. Presidential Regulation No. 77/2020 allows a GOI agency or Ministry to request expropriation, while MLHR Regulation No. 30/2019 allows an individual or private party to request a CL. GOI issued Presidential decrees number 100 and number 101 in November 2021 announcing government use of the Remdesivir and Favipiravir Patents to secure needed COVID-19 drugs supply. This decree will remain in effect for three years, extendable until the end of the global Covid-19 pandemic and requires the assigned company to compensate Remdesivir and Favirapir patent holders one percent of its net annual sales. 6. Financial Sector The Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) index has 766 listed companies as of December 2021 with a daily trading volume of USD 922.2 million and market capitalization of USD 571 billion (IDR 8,284 trillion). Over the past six years, there has been a 45.9 percent increase in the number listed companies, but the IDX is dominated by its top 50 listed companies, which represent 69.2 percent of the market cap. There were 54 initial public offerings in 2021 – three more than in 2020. During the fourth quarter of 2021, domestic entities conducted 75 percent of total IDX stock trades. Government treasury bonds are the most liquid bonds offered by Indonesia. Corporate bonds are less liquid due to less public knowledge of the product and the shallowness of the market. The government issues sukuk (Islamic treasury notes) as part of its effort to diversify Islamic debt instruments and increase their liquidity and issued the first in Southeast Asia Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) bond to fund projects that benefit communities and the environment. This SDG bond was issued in the global capital market, denominated in Euros, and listed in the Singapore and Frankfurt Stock Exchanges. Indonesia’s sovereign debt as of February 2022 was rated as BBB by Standard and Poor’s, BBB by Fitch Ratings and Baa2 by Moody’s. Foreigners held 19 percent of government bonds in January 2022 OJK began overseeing capital markets and non-banking institutions in 2013, replacing the Capital Market and Financial Institution Supervisory Board. In 2014, OJK also assumed BI’s supervisory role over commercial banks. Foreigners have access to the Indonesian capital markets and are a major source of portfolio investment. Indonesia respects International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Although there is some concern regarding the operations of the many small and medium sized family-owned banks, the banking system is generally considered sound, with banks enjoying some of the widest net interest margins in the region. As of December 2021, commercial banks had IDR 9,913.6 trillion (USD 683 billion) in total assets, with a capital adequacy ratio of 25.67 percent. Outstanding loans grew by 4.4 percent in 2021, a significant improvement from the 2,4 percent contraction in 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Gross non-performing loans (NPL) in December 2021 decreased to 3 percent from 3.06 percent the previous year. NPL rates were partly mitigated through a loan restructuring program implemented by OJK as part of the COVID-19 recovery efforts. The Financial Services Authority (OJK) issued a regulation on credit restructuring in 2020 to support businesses hit by the pandemic and maintain financial stability, which was extended until March 2023 to prepare banks and debtors for a “soft landing” and give banks time to adequately provision for potential loan losses. The amount of credit restructured under this policy declined from IDR 830.5 trillion (USD 57.2 billion) in 2020 to IDR 693.6 trillion (USD 47.8 billion) in 2021. Most of the loans were restructured by extending the maturity, delaying payments, or reducing the interest rate, which provided borrowers with temporary liquidity relief. Loans at risk, a broader measure of potential troubled loans than the NPL ratio, decreased from 23.4 percent at the end of 2020 to 19.5 percent in December 2021. OJK Regulation No. 56/03/2016 limits bank ownership to no more than 40 percent by any single shareholder, applicable to foreign and domestic shareholders. This does not apply to foreign bank branches in Indonesia. Foreign banks may establish branches if the foreign bank is ranked among the top 200 global banks by assets. A special operating license is required from OJK to establish a foreign branch. The OJK granted an exception in 2015 for foreign banks buying two small banks and merging them. To establish a representative office, a foreign bank must be ranked in the top 300 global banks by assets. OJK regulation No. 12/POJK.03/2021, issued in August 2021, increased the foreign equity cap for commercial banks to 99 percent, subject to OJK evaluation and approval. On March 16, 2020, OJK issued Regulation No. 12/POJK.03/2020 on commercial bank consolidation. The regulation aimed to strengthen the structure and competitiveness of the national banking industry by increasing bank capital and encouraging consolidation of banks in Indonesia. This regulation increased minimum core capital requirements for commercial banks and Capital Equivalency Maintained Asset requirements for foreign banks with branch offices by least IDR 3 trillion (USD 209 million), by December 31, 2022. In 2015, OJK eased rules for foreigners to open a bank account in Indonesia. Foreigners can open a bank account with a balance between USD 2,000-50,000 with just their passport. For accounts greater than USD 50,000, foreigners must show a supporting document such as a reference letter from a bank in the foreigner’s country of origin, a local domicile address, a spousal identity document, copies of a contract for a local residence, and/or credit/debit statements. Growing digitalization of banking services, spurred on by innovative payment technologies in the financial technology (fintech) sector, complements the conventional banking sector. Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending companies and e-payment services have grown rapidly over the past decade. Indonesian policymakers are hopeful that these fintech services can reach underserved or unbanked populations and micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). In October 2021, OJK launched a Digital Banking transformation blueprint providing the agency’s policy vision for digital banking that consist of 5 elements: 1) data protection, transfer, and governance, 2) technology governance, architecture, emerging technology, 3) IT risk management, outsourcing, and cybersecurity, 4) platform sharing and cooperation of financial/non-financial institutions, and 5) institutional capacity, culture, leadership, and talent management. OJK Regulation 77/2016 on peer-to-peer (P2P) lending introduces various guidelines, obligations, and restrictions for P2P lending services, and the organization of P2P lending service providers. This regulation caps foreign ownership of P2P services at 85 percent and mandates data localization. Nonbank financial service suppliers may do business in Indonesia as a joint venture or be partially owned by foreign investors but cannot operate in Indonesia as a branch or subsidiary of a foreign entity. Indonesia issued a moratorium on October 2021 for peer-to-peer (P2P) lending licenses to combat illegal platforms. Under OJK Regulation 13/2018, financial technology companies must register with OJK and implement a regulatory sandbox to test new services and business models. As of December 2021, total fintech lending reached USD 20.4 billion in loan disbursements, with USD 2 billion outstanding, while payment transactions using e-money in 2021 grew by 49.06 percent y-o-y to USD 21.06 billion. The value of digital banking transactions increased by 45.6 percent y-o-y to USD 2.7 trillion. According to OJK data, only 39 percent of the population currently use digital banking, therefore significant growth potential remains. The government places no restrictions or time limitations on investment remittances. However, certain reporting requirements exist. Banks should adopt Know Your Customer (KYC) principles to carefully identify customers’ profile to match transactions. Indonesia does not engage in currency manipulation. As of 2015, Indonesia is no longer subject to the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) monitoring process under its on-going global Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing (AML/CTF) compliance process. It continues to work with the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) to further strengthen its AML/CTF regime. In 2018, Indonesia was granted observer status by FATF, a necessary milestone toward becoming a full FATF member. The Indonesian Investment Authority (INA), also known as the sovereign wealth fund, was legally established by the 2020 Omnibus Law on Job Creation. INA’s supervisory board and board of directors were selected through competitive processes and announced in January and February 2021. The government initially capitalized INA with USD 2 billion through injections from the state budget and added another USD 4.04 billion from the state budget in October 2021. INA aims to attract foreign equity and invest that capital in long-term Indonesian assets to improve the value of the assets through enhanced management. According to Indonesian government officials, the fund will consist of a master portfolio with sector-specific sub-funds, such as infrastructure, oil and gas, health, tourism, and digital technologies. INA reportedly inked MoUs with several parties such as with Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec (CDPQ), APG Asset Management (APG), and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) on May 2021, to establish Indonesia’s first infrastructure investment platform; with state-owed energy/oil company Pertamina on May 19, to carry out investment cooperation in the energy sector; and with BP Jamsostek on May 24, to carry out investment activity cooperation. INA partnered with state-owned airport operator Angkasa Pura II to accelerate Jakarta’s Soekarno-Hatta airport expansion on October 28; partnered with Dubai Ports (DP) World on October 29 to invest USD 7.5 billion into Indonesian seaport facilities; and made an agreement with the Abu Dhabi growth fund (ADG) on November 25, to invest up to USD 10 billion in Indonesia. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Indonesia had 114 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 28 subsidiaries divided into 12 sectors, as of December 2019. By February 2022 that number had been reduced to 41 SOEs divided into 12 sectors mainly through consolidation or merger, although a small number of SOEs have also been liquidated due to ineffectiveness. As of December 2021, 28 were listed on the Indonesian stock exchange. Two SOEs plan IPOs in 2022, namely PT Pertamina Geothermal Energy and PT ASDP Indonesia Ferry (Persero). SOEs make up 55 percent of the economy. In 2017, Indonesia announced the creation of a mining holding company, PT Inalum. In 2020, three state owned sharia banks were merged. In January 2022, Minister of SOEs, Erick Thohir, stated that in total, nine SOE holding companies will be formed by 2024, including pharmaceutical, insurance, survey services, food industry, manufacturing industry, defense state-owned holdings, the media industry, port services, and transportation and tourism services holding. Several of this holding companies have already been formed, including pharmaceutical holding (Lead by PT Bio Farma, formed in early 2020), Indonesia battery holding (formed on March 26, 2021), Port Service Holding (a merger of PT Pelindo I to Pelindo IV, formed on October 1, 2021), Indonesia Financial Group (IFG) as an insurance holding formed in October 2020, Holding of SOE hotels (Wika as the lead of the holding, formed in December 2020), Ultra Micro Holding (BRI, Pegadaian and PNM, formed Sept 13, 2021), ID Food or Holding of food SOEs (lead by PT Rajawali Nusantara Indonesia, formed on January 7), Injourney as a tourism holding company (PT Aviasi Pariwisata Indonesia, formed on January 13), and Defend ID as the defense industry holding (with Len Industry as the lead of the holding, formed on March 2). Since his appointment by President Jokowi in November 2019, Minister of SOEs Erick Thohir has underscored the need to reform SOEs in line with President Jokowi’s second-term economic agenda. Thohir has noted the need to liquidate underperforming SOEs, ensure that SOEs improve their efficiency by focusing on core business operations, and introduce better corporate governance principles. Thohir has spoken publicly about his intent to push SOEs to undertake initial public offerings (IPOs) on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. He also encourages SOEs to increase outbound investment to support Indonesia’s supply chain in strategic markets, including through acquisition of cattle farms, phosphate mines, and salt mines. Information regarding SOEs can be found at the SOE Ministry website ( http://www.bumn.go.id/ ) (Indonesian language only). There are also an unknown number of SOEs owned by regional or local governments. SOEs are present in almost all sectors/industries including banking (finance), tourism (travel), agriculture, forestry, mining, construction, fishing, energy, and telecommunications (information and communications). Indonesia is not a party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement. Private enterprises can compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations. However, many sectors report that SOEs receive strong preference for government projects. SOEs purchase some goods and services from the private sector and foreign firms. SOEs publish an annual report and are audited by the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP), and external and internal auditors. While some state-owned enterprises have offered shares on the stock market, Indonesia does not have an active privatization program. The government capitalized Indonesia Investment Authority (INA) with USD 4 billion in state-owned assets to attract equity investments in those assets, which may eventually be sold to investors or listed on the stock market. 10. Political and Security Environment As in other democracies, politically motivated demonstrations occasionally occur throughout Indonesia, but are not a major or ongoing concern for most foreign investors. Since the Bali bombings in 2002 that killed over 200 people, and other follow-on high-profile attacks on western targets Indonesian authorities have aggressively continued to pursue terrorist cells throughout the country, disrupting multiple aspirational plots. Despite these successes, violent extremist networks, terrorist cells, and lone wolf-style ISIS sympathizers have conducted small-scale attacks against law enforcement, government, and non-Muslim places of worship with little or no warning. Foreign investors in Papua face unique challenges. Indonesian security forces occasionally conduct operations against small armed separatist groups, including the Free Papua Movement, a group that is most active in the central highlands region. Low-intensity communal, tribal, and political conflict also exists in Papua and has caused deaths and injuries. Anti-government protests have resulted in deaths and injuries, and violence has been committed against employees and contractors of at least one large corporation there, including the death of a New Zealand citizen in an attack on March 30, 2020, as well as armed groups seizing aircraft and temporarily holding pilots and passenger’s hostage. Additionally, racially-motivated attacks against ethnic Papuans in East Java province led to violence in Papua and West Papua in late 2019, including riots in Wamena, Papua that left dozens dead and thousands more displaced. Continued attacks and counter attacks between security personnel and local armed groups have exacerbated the region’s issues with internally displaced persons. Travelers to Indonesia can visit the U.S. Department of State travel advisory website for the latest information and travel resources: https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/Indonesia.html. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $1,187 2020 $1,058 https://data.worldbank.org/ country/Indonesia Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 $2,537.2 2020 $18,715 https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm? reqid=2&step=1&isuri=1#reqid=2&step=1&isuri=1 Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $461 https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm? reqid=2&step=1&isuri=1#reqid=2&step=1&isuri=1 Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2021 2.6% 2020 22.7% /World Investment Report 2021: Country-Fact-Sheets *Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM), January 2022 There is a discrepancy between U.S. FDI recorded by BKPM and BEA due to differing methodologies. While BEA recorded transactions in balance of payments, BKPM relies on company realization reports. BKPM also excludes investments in oil and gas, non-bank financial institutions, and insurance. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment 2020 Outward Direct Investment 2020 Total Inward 240,507 100% Total Outward 88,847 100% Singapore 57,994 24.1% Singapore 31,240 35.2% United States 31,859 13.2% China (PR Mainland) 24,673 27.8% Netherlands 31,554 13.1% France 19,432 21.9% Japan 25,594 10.6% Cayman Islands 3,445 3.9% China (PR: Hong Kong) 13,577 5.6% British Virgin Islands 2,868 3.2% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Source: IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey, 2020 for inward and outward investment data. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Portfolio Investment Assets 2019 Top Five Partners (Millions, US Dollars) Total Equity Securities Total Debt Securities All Countries 22,957 100% All Countries 8,757 100% All Countries 14,200 100% Singapore 16,604 72.3% Singapore 8,06 92.1% Singapore 8,542 60.1% British Virgin Islands 2,210 9.6% India 450 5.1% British Virgin Islands 2,210 15.6% United States 950 4.1% Guernsey 81 0.9% United States 948 6.7% United Arab Emirates 599 2.6% China (PR Hong Kong) 59 0.6% United Arab Emirates 599 4.2% India 457 2.0% Japan 57 0.6% China (PR Hong Kong) 361 2.5% Source: IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, 2020. Sources of portfolio investment are not tax havens. The Bank of Indonesia published comparable data. Iraq Executive Summary The effects of COVID-19 have begun to recede in Iraq, and vaccination rates are rising daily. The Iraqi economy is recovering and reverting to more normal conditions. However, the 2020 devaluation of the dinar and Russia’s war against Ukraine have exacerbated inflationary pressures, resulting in price increases, particularly on agricultural products. As of April 2022, the new government has not yet been formed and policies of the new government remain uncertain. Widespread protests in October 2019 caused the resignation of then-PM Adil Abdul-Mahdi and his government. After a lengthy period of government formation, the current government of PM Mustafa al-Kadhimi came to power in May 2020. Sporadic, sometimes violent, protests continue, especially in the country’s south. Iraq held national elections in October 2021, with the government formation process expected to continue into 2022. In October 2020, Iraq’s cabinet approved an economic reform agenda known as the “white paper,” which identified numerous reforms, legislative amendments, subsidy cuts, and e-government measures that are broadly in line with previous World Bank and IMF reform recommendations. The white paper acknowledged the scope of Iraq’s structural economic problems and aimed to place the country on a private sector-driven economic growth path. While Finance Minister Ali Allawi asserted that his ministry itself was able to implement 65 percent of the reforms, there was a lack of collaboration and buy-in from other ministries due to entrenched opposition from stakeholders who profit from Government of Iraq (GOI) opacity and inefficiency. Iraq did achieve one key white paper initiative, one-stop company registration, with the launch of its Online Single Window, which used the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) digital solutions platform. The security environment, including the threat of resurgent extremist groups, remains an investment impediment in many parts of the country. Other lingering effects of the fight against ISIS include major disruptions of key domestic and international trade routes and the negative impacts on respective economic infrastructure. Many militia groups that participated in the fight against ISIS remain deployed and are only under nominal government control. Militia groups have been implicated in a range of criminal and illicit activities in commercial sectors, including extortion. However, the security situation varies throughout the country and is generally less problematic in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). Investors in Iraq face challenges resolving issues with legitimate GOI entities, including procurement disputes, receiving timely payments, and winning public tenders. Difficulties with corruption, business registration, customs regulations, irregular and high tax liabilities, unclear visa and residency permit procedures, arbitrary application of regulations, lack of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, electricity shortages, and lack of access to financing remain common complaints for local and foreign companies operating in Iraq. Shifting and unevenly enforced regulations that often change with new government formation create additional burdens for investors. Despite these challenges, the Iraqi market offers potential for U.S. exporters. Iraq regularly imports rice, wheat, and other agricultural commodities, as well as machinery, consumer goods, and defense articles. While non-oil bilateral trade with the United States was $805.8 million in 2021, Iraq’s economy had an estimated GDP of $98 billion. Government contracts and tenders are the source of most commercial opportunities in Iraq in all sectors, including the significant oil and gas contracts, and have been financed almost entirely by oil revenues. Increasingly, the GOI has asked investors and suppliers to provide financing solutions and allow for deferred payments. Investors in the IKR face many of the same challenges as investors elsewhere in Iraq, but the IKR’s security and regulation environments are more stable. However, the region’s economy has struggled to recover from the 2014 ISIS offensive and ongoing disputes with the central government over revenue sharing. The GOI’s Federal Supreme Court (FSC) February 15, 2022 decision declared the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 2007 oil and gas law to be unconstitutional. The oil contracts impacted by this decision are the KRG’s largest revenue source, providing economic stability when oil prices at present are rising. Local businesses welcome an American Chamber of Commerce presence in the IKR, hoping to improve KRG’s business process effectiveness and transparency. Water scarcity is a present danger and the salinization of water and soils, desertification, and the disappearance of arable land are existential environmental concerns connected to poor resource management and climate change. These challenges also represent economic opportunities in Iraq, which needs investments in green and renewable energy, modern irrigation systems, and the infrastructure to capture flared gas. The Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) was approved by the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR) in 2012 and became effective the following year. The U.S. and Iraqi governments subsequently established the Trade and Finance Joint Coordination Committee and held the first TIFA meeting in Washington in March 2014. A second meeting was held in June 2019. Trade data resources in addition to Table 1 Key Business Metrics and Rankings include: https://oec.world/en/profile/country/irq https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/IRQ#:~:text=Iraq%20had%20a%20total%20export,is%20222%2C434%2C137%2C055.84%20in%20current%20US%24. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 157 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2020 172 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita N/A N/A http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GOI has publicly and repeatedly stated its desire to attract foreign investment as part of national plans to strengthen local industries and promote the “Made in Iraq” brand. The GOI has yet to follow through on reform process commitments made at the pre-COVID Kuwait International Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq in February 2018 to reform processes and regulations that hinder investment. Iraq claims that other countries have not followed through on their financial pledges either. Iraq administers foreign direct investments (FDI) under its National Investment Law (Investment Law, 2006), amended in December 2015. The Investment Law outlines improved investment terms for foreign investors, the purchase of land in Iraq for certain projects, and an investment license process. The purchase of land for commercial or residential development remains extremely difficult. Since 2015, Iraq has been a party to the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nations of Other States (ICSID). Foreign investors continue to encounter bureaucratic challenges, corruption, and a weak financial services sector, making it difficult to conclude and implement investment deals. State-owned banks in Iraq serve predominantly to settle financial payments, with the GOI’s vast public sector payroll dominating the small market for depositors. Privately-owned banks, until recently, served almost entirely as currency exchange businesses, except for a handful of mostly regionally owned private commercial banks. Iraq’s more than 60 private commercial banks compete for less than 20 percent of the market; Iraq is a cash-based economy, with many Iraqis distrusting private banks. Some privately owned banks have commercial lending programs, but Iraq’s lack of a credit monitoring system, insufficient legal guarantees for lenders, and limited correspondent connections to international banks hinder commercial lending. The financial sector in the IKR suffers from similar issues. Recently, the GOI has been exploring multi-year financing options to pay for large-scale development projects rather than relying on its previous practice of funding investments entirely from current annual budget outlays. However, even basic private bank-provided project finance models are virtually non-existent. According to Iraqi law, a foreign investor is entitled to make investments in Iraq on terms no less favorable than those applicable to an Iraqi investor, and the amount of foreign participation is not limited. However, Iraq’s Investment Law limits foreign direct and indirect ownership of most natural resources, particularly the extraction and processing of natural resources. It does allow foreign ownership of land to be used for residential projects and co-ownership of land to be used for industrial projects when an Iraqi partner is participating. Despite this legal equity between foreign and domestic investment, the GOI reserves the right to screen FDI. The screening process is vague, although it does not appear to have been used to block foreign investment. Still, bureaucratic barriers to FDI, such as a requirement to place a significant portion of the capital investment in an Iraqi bank prior to receiving a license, remain significant. The GOI established the National Investment Commission (NIC) in 2007, along with its provincial counterparts Provincial Investment Commissions (PICs), as provided under Investment Law 13 (2006). This cabinet-level organization provides policy recommendations to the Prime Minister and support to current and potential investors in Iraq. The NIC’s “One Stop Shop” https://investpromo.gov.iq/one-stop-shop/ is intended to guide investors through the investment process, though investors have reported challenges using NIC services. The IKR operates under a different investment law and its supporting regulations implemented in 2006. Under KRG’s law, foreign investors are entitled to incentives, including full property ownership, capital repatriation, and 10-year tax holidays. The KRG has an Investment Board to assist investors. An updated investment law, first drafted in 2010, has failed to pass the Iraqi Kurdish Parliament after numerous amendments. In 2020, the KRG Ministry of Planning (MOP) published a framework for creating public-private partnerships in the region but has not drafted legislation to codify it. Legislation to amend the investment law to broaden its reach to potential investors remains pending in the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament (IKP). Iraqi law stipulates that 50 percent of a project’s workers must be Iraqi nationals to obtain an investment license (National Investment Regulation No. 2, 2009). Investors must prioritize hiring Iraqi citizens before hiring non-Iraqi workers. The GOI pressures foreign companies to hire local employees and has encouraged foreign companies to partner with local industries and purchase Iraqi-made products. The KRG permits full foreign ownership under its 2006 investment law. The GOI generally favors State Owned Enterprises (SOE) and state-controlled banks in competitions for government tenders and investment. This preference discriminates against both local and foreign investors. In the past three years, the GOI did not conduct any investment policy reviews through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), or the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). However, the GOI uses UNCTAD’s business registration platform for the Online Single Window program, launched in September 2021. The Online Single Window, at https://business.mot.gov.iq/, is an important step toward minimizing delays in business registration and reducing corruption, showing Iraq’s willingness to modify its processes to attract international investors. Foreign investors interested in establishing an office in Iraq or bidding on a public tender are required to register as foreign businesses with the Ministry of Trade’s (MOT) Companies Registration Department. The procedure costs and time to obtain a business license can be found at https://baghdad.eregulations.org/procedure/108?l=en. Many international companies use a local agent to assist in this process due to its complexity. The GOI continues working with UNCTAD to streamline the business registration process and make it available online. Procedures to obtain investment licenses from the NIC can be found at: https://baghdad.eregulations.org/procedure/60?l=en and https://baghdad.eregulations.org/procedure/51/step/230?l=en®=0. The KRG offers business registration for companies seeking business only in the IKR; however, companies seeking business in both the IKR and greater Iraq must follow both GOI and KRG requirements. Business registration remains within the jurisdiction of IKR’s Chambers of Commerce. The KRG recently moved the authorities for brand name registration from the Chambers of Commerce to the Ministry of Trade, but this decision has not yet been implemented. Reforms to reduce bureaucracy and red tape to implement a “single window” for company registration remain unimplemented, though officials have expressed interest in learning from the GOI. Iraqi laws give the NIC and PICs authority to provide information, sign contracts, and facilitate registration for new foreign and domestic investors. The NIC offers investor facilitation services on transactions including work permit applications, visa approval letters, customs procedures, and business registration. Investors can request these services through the NIC website: http://investpromo.gov.iq/. The NIC does not exclude businesses from taking advantage of its services based on the number of employees or the size of the investment project. The NIC can also connect investors with the appropriate provincial investment council. These official investment commissions do struggle to operate amid unclear lines of authority, budget constraints, and the absence of regulations and standard operating procedures. Importantly, the investment commissions lack the authority to resolve investors’ bureaucratic obstacles with other Iraqi ministries. The Kurdistan Board of Investment (KBOI) manages an investment licensing process in the IKR that can take from three to six months and may involve more than one KRG ministry or entity, depending on the sector of investment. Due to oversaturated commercial and residential real estate markets, the KBOI has moved away from approving licenses in these sectors but may still grant them on a case-by-case basis. The KBOI has prioritized industrial tourism such as business conferences, and agricultural projects. Businesses reported some difficulties establishing local connections, obtaining qualified staff, and meeting import regulations. Some businesses reported that the KRG did not provide the promised support infrastructure such as water, electricity, or wastewater services, as required under the investment law framework. Additional information is available at the KBOI’s website: https://gov.krd/boi-en/. Iraq does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Iraq’s overall regulatory environment remains opaque, and the Investment Law does not establish a full legal framework governing investment. Corruption, unclear regulations, and bureaucratic bottlenecks are major challenges for companies that bid on public procurement contracts or seek to invest in major infrastructure projects. The KRG procurement reform measures, beginning in 2016, sought to address these problems, but with little result. Iraq’s commercial and civil laws generally fall short of international norms. The GOI’s rulemaking process, especially regarding commercial activity and investments, can be opaque and lends itself to arbitrary application. To illustrate, while ministries must publish regulations imposing duties on citizens or private businesses in the official government gazette, internal ministerial regulations have no corresponding requirement. This loophole allows officials to create internal requirements or procedures with little or no oversight, which can result in additional burdens for investors and businesses. Furthermore, the lack of regulatory coordination between GOI ministries and national and provincial authorities can result in conflicting regulations, which makes it difficult to accurately interpret the regulatory environment. In addition, accounting and legal procedures are opaque, inconsistent, and generally do not meet international standards. Draft bills, including investment laws, are not available for public comment. The promulgation of new regulations with little advance notice and requirements related to investment guarantees have also slowed projects. The GOI encourages private sector associations, but these associations are generally not influential, given Iraqi SOEs’ dominant role in the Iraqi economy. In the IKR, private sector associations have some influence and many, such as the contractors’ union, are very active in advocacy with the KRG. However, unions (or “syndicates”) often act as barriers to foreign entry into markets. Publicly available budgets do not include expenditures by ministry or revenues by source and type. The budget provided limited details regarding allocations to, and earnings from, SOEs. Financial statements for most SOEs were generally not publicly available. Limited information on debt obligations is available on the Central Bank and MOF websites. Iraq is not a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement and is not a member of the WTO. Iraqi officials have, however, expressed some interest in WTO accession. Iraq has a civil law system, although Iraqi commercial jurisprudence is relatively underdeveloped. Over decades of war and sanctions, Iraqi courts did not keep up with developments in international commercial transactions. Corruption remains a significant problem because illegitimate gains are not consistently or successfully prosecuted. As trade with foreign parties increases, Iraqi courts have had to deal with rising numbers of complex commercial cases. Iraq is a signatory to the League of Arab States Convention on Commercial Arbitration (1987) and the Riyadh Convention on Judicial Cooperation (1983). Iraq formally joined the ICSID Convention on December 17, 2015, and on February 18, 2017, Iraq joined the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) process agreement between investors and states. Additional information can be found in “A Legal Guide to Investment in Iraq:” http://cldp.doc.gov/programs/cldp-in-action/details/1551. The COR passed a Competition Law and a Consumer Protection Law in 2010. However, the Iraqi government has yet to form the Competition and Consumer Protection Commissions authorized by these laws. The COR has also amended Iraqi law several times to promote fair competition and “competitive capacities” in the local market (2010, 2015). The COR has also issued many recommendations regarding the amendments of investment licenses and improvements to the investment and businesses environment in Iraq. Resolution 245 issued in August 2019 announced investment opportunities provided through the NIC. Public and private corruption and the inordinately large role SOEs play in Iraq’s economy undermine the competitive landscape. The Iraqi constitution prohibits expropriation, unless done for the purpose of public benefit and in return for just compensation. The Constitution stipulates that expropriation may be regulated by law, but the COR has not drafted specific legislation regarding expropriation. Article 9 of the Investment Law guarantees non-seizure or nationalization of any investment project that the provisions of this law cover, except in cases with a final judicial judgment. The law prohibits expropriation of an investment project, except in cases of public benefit and with fair compensation. Iraq’s Commercial Court is charged with resolving expropriation cases. In recent years, there have not been any government actions or shifts in government policy that would indicate possible expropriations in the foreseeable future. In the IKR, the KBOI can impose fines and potentially confiscate land if it determines that investors are using land awarded under investment licenses for purposes other than those outlined in the license or if the projected was not started during the specified time limits. The IKR investment law (Article 17) outlines an investor’s arbitration rights, which fall under the civil court system, as the IKR lacks a commercial court system. Arbitration clauses should be written into local contracts in order to facilitate enforcement in the event of a dispute. Under Iraqi law, an Iraqi debtor may file for bankruptcy, and an Iraqi creditor may file for liquidation of the debtor. Bankruptcy is not criminalized. The Iraqi Companies Law regulates the process for the liquidation of legal entities. Nevertheless, the mechanism for resolving insolvency remains opaque. In the IKR, there are no independent laws for resolving companies’ bankruptcies. Courts use the Iraqi commercial law 49 of 1970 (article 715-729) to settle bankruptcy claims, which can be cumbersome and costly. Iraq ranks 168 out of 190 countries in the category of Resolving Insolvency, according to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report. 6. Financial Sector Iraq remains one of the most under-banked countries in the Middle East. The Iraqi banking system includes around 70 private banks and seven state-owned banks. As of early 2022, 20 foreign banks have licensed branches in Iraq and several others have strategic investments in Iraqi banks. The three largest banks in Iraq are Rafidain Bank, Rasheed Bank, and the Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI), which account for roughly 85 percent of Iraq’s banking sector assets. Iraq’s economy remains primarily cash based, with many banks acting as little more than ATMs in a heavily U.S. dollarized economy. Rafidain and Rasheed offer standard banking products but primarily provide pension and government salary payments to individual Iraqis. Credit is difficult to obtain and expensive. Iraq ranked 186 out of 190 in terms of ease of getting credit in the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report. Although the lending volume of by privately-owned banks is growing, most privately-owned banks do more wire transfers and other fee-based exchange services. Businesses are largely self-financed or “between individuals” private transactions. State-owned banks mainly make financial transfers from the government to provincial authorities or individuals, rather than business loans. The CBI introduced a small and medium enterprise lending program in 2015, in which 47 private banks have reportedly participated. In early 2020, the CBI launched a real estate lending initiative and an Islamic finance consolidation program. The initiative received an enthusiastic response from private banks, as it increased their liquidity. The main purpose of the Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI) is to provide financial and related services to facilitate trade, particularly through letters of credit. Although CBI granted private banks permission to issue letters of credit below $50 million, TBI continues to process nearly all government letters of credit. Although banking sector reform was a priority of Iraq’s IMF Stand-By Arrangement, the GOI has had only incremental success reforming its two largest state-owned banks, Rafidain and Rasheed. Private banks are mostly active in currency exchanges and wire transfers. CBI is headquartered in Baghdad, with branches in Basrah and Erbil. CBI’s Erbil branch, and the IKR’s state-owned banking system, are now electronically linked to the CBI system. The CBI now has full supervisory authority over the financial sector in the IKR, including the banks and non-bank financial institutions. The Finance Action Task Force (FATF) recognized Iraqi’s anti-money laundering and counter finance terrorism progress towards best practice standards in June 2018, removing Iraq from FATF’s monitoring process. Iraq does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises SOEs are active across all sectors in Iraq. GOI ministries currently own and operate over 192 SOEs, a legacy of the state planning system. The GOI’s continued support of unprofitable entities places a substantial fiscal burden on Iraq, as many SOEs are unproductive. These firms employ over half a million Iraqis, many of whom are underemployed. The degree to which SOEs compete with private companies varies by sector; SOEs face the most competition in the market for consumer goods. The GOI had expressed a commitment to reforming the SOEs and taking steps toward privatization as part of its previous international financing programs. Iraqi law permits SOEs to partner with foreign companies. When parent ministries wish to initiate a partnership for an SOE under their purview, they generally advertise the tender on their ministry’s website. Partnerships are negotiated on a case-by-case basis and require the respective minister’s approval. Iraq does not have a centralized ownership entity that exercises ownership rights for each of the SOEs. SOEs are required to seek their parent ministry’s approval for certain categories of financial decisions and operation expansions. However, in practice, SOEs defer to the parent ministry for most decisions. SOEs submit financial reports to their parent ministry’s audit departments and the Board of Supreme Audit. These reports are not published and sometimes exclude salary expenses. The Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM), which oversees the largest number of Iraq’s SOEs, established the following requirements for partnerships: minimum duration of three years, the foreign company must register a company office in Iraq, and the foreign company must participate in the production of goods. Foreign companies have faced challenges in partnerships because the GOI has, at times, cut subsidies to SOEs after partnerships were formed and due to conflicts between the parent ministry and the GOI’s official policy. In addition, the MIM has often required that the foreign investor pay all SOE employees’ salaries regardless of whether they are working on the agreed project. GOI entities are required to give preferential treatment to SOEs, under multiple laws. A 2009 COM decision requires all Iraqi government agencies to procure goods from SOEs unless SOEs cannot fulfill the quality and quantity requirements of the tender. A Board of Supreme Audit decision requires government agencies to award SOEs tenders if their bids are no more than 10 percent higher than other bids. Furthermore, some GOI entities, including the MIM, have also issued their own internal regulations requiring tenders to select Iraqi SOEs, unless Iraqi SOEs state that they cannot fulfill the order. Sometimes a foreign firm must form a partnership with an Iraqi firm to fulfill SOE-promulgated tenders. Further, SOEs are exempt from the bid bond and performance bond requirements that private businesses are subject to. Iraq is not a party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the WTO. SOEs do not adhere to OECD guidelines. Iraqi law supports a degree of autonomy in the selection process of an SOE’s board of directors. For example, it requires that a minister’s sole appointment to a board of directors receive the approval of an “opinion board.” Nevertheless, in practice, most board members have close personal and political connections to their parent ministry’s leadership. The GOI has repeatedly announced that it plans to reorganize failing SOEs across multiple sectors. Additionally, the GOI is eager to modernize Iraq’s financial and banking institutions. There are, however, no concrete timelines for these initiatives, and entrenched patronage networks tying SOEs to ministries remain a stumbling block. 10. Political and Security Environment Iraqi security forces continue to carry out counter-terrorism operations against ISIS cells throughout the country. Terrorist attacks within the IKR occur less frequently than in other parts of Iraq, although the KRG, U.S. government facilities, and Western interests remain possible targets. In addition, Iran-aligned militias threaten U.S. citizens and companies throughout Iraq. Travelers should review the embassy’s official COVID-19 page, which is updated weekly, before traveling: https://iq.usembassy.gov/covid-19-information/. State Department guidance to U.S. businesses in Iraq advises the use of protective security details. Detailed security information is available on the U.S. Embassy website: http://iraq.usembassy.gov/. Some U.S. and third country businesspeople travel throughout much of Iraq; however, in general their movement is restricted with security advisors and protective security teams taken on most travels. Embassy Baghdad and Consulate Erbil maintain an active branch of the Overseas Security Advisory Council. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics The GOI collects and publishes limited statistics with which to compare international and U.S. investment data. The NIC and PICs granted 1067 licenses between 2008 and 2015 (latest statistics available) with a total potential value of $53.9 billion. In the IKR, the KBOI granted licenses to 166 projects from the period of January 2019 to March 2021, with a total potential value of $5.11 billion. This represented a capital increase of $1.98 billion (163 percent) compared to 2018. Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $166.757 2020 $234,094 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2016 $5,911 2019 $1,928 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2016 3.5% N/A N/A UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: http://cosit.gov.iq/en/ Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Ireland Executive Summary The COVID-19 crisis had a massive impact on Ireland’s economy and its effects will continue in 2022. The Irish government implemented varying degrees of lockdown measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic from the onset in March 2020, including restrictions to close non-essential businesses and services for extended periods of time. Unemployment (including COVID-19 related temporary unemployment) peaked at 28.1 percent in April 2020. Ireland’s official unemployment rate remained around 5 percent (currently at 5.2 percent as of February 2022) due to the unprecedented pandemic related government assistance programs to businesses and workers furloughed due to COVID-19. Over the past two years, the government sustained a level of unprecedented deficit spending to combat the pandemic. Despite the prolonged difficulties caused by COVID-19, Ireland’s economy performed extremely well with GDP growth of 13.5 percent recorded in 2021 following growth of 5.9 percent in 2020. Most of this growth can be attributed to export focused industries (technology, pharmaceutical, and other large multinational companies headquartered in Ireland) while the domestic economy struggled with temporary business closures due to the restrictions. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exasperated Ireland’s growing inflation concerns with fuel and gas price rises leading to price increases across all sectors, which could dampen consumer spending and confidence and could result in lower-than-expected growth for 2022. The Irish government actively promotes foreign direct investment (FDI) and has had considerable success in attracting investment, particularly from the United States. There are over 950 U.S. subsidiaries in Ireland operating primarily in the following sectors: chemicals, biosciences, pharmaceutical and medical devices; computer hardware and software; internet and digital media; electronics, and financial services. One of Ireland’s many attractive features as an FDI destination is its favorable 12.5 percent corporate tax (in place since 2003), the second lowest in the European Union (EU). Ireland signed the OECD Inclusive Framework Agreement, which institutes minimum corporate tax rate of 15 percent when implemented. Firms routinely note that they come to Ireland primarily for the high quality and flexibility of the English-speaking workforce; the availability of a multilingual labor force; cooperative labor relations; political stability; and pro-business government policies and regulators. Additional positive features include a transparent judicial system; transportation links; proximity to the United States and Europe; and Ireland’s geographic location making it well placed in time zones to support investment in Asia and the Americas. Ireland benefits from its membership of the EU and a barrier-free access to a market of almost 500 million consumers. In addition, the clustering of existing successful industries has created an ecosystem attractive to new firms. The United Kingdom’s (UK) departure from the EU, or Brexit, on January 1, 2021, leaves Ireland as the only remaining English-speaking country in the EU and may make Ireland even more attractive as a destination for FDI. The Irish government treats all firms incorporated in Ireland on an equal basis. Ireland’s judicial system is transparent and upholds the sanctity of contracts, as well as laws affecting foreign investment. Conversely, Ireland’s ability to attract investment are often marred by relatively high labor and operating costs (such as for energy); skilled-labor shortages; licensing and permitting challenges (e.g., for zoning, rezoning, project permissions, etc.) Eurozone-risk; infrastructure in need of investment (such as in transportation, affordable housing, energy and broadband internet); high income tax rates; uncertainty in EU policies on some regulatory matters; and absolute price levels among the highest in Europe. New data centers must meet new requirements regarding location, energy consumption and energy storage as Ireland’s electricity system struggles to meet demand for energy. A formal national security screening process for foreign investment in line with the EU framework is expected to be in place by late 2022, though the original date was 2020 but delayed due to the pandemic. At present, investors looking to receive government grants or assistance through one of the four state agencies responsible for promoting foreign investment in Ireland are often required to meet certain employment and investment criteria. Ireland uses the euro as its national currency and enjoys full current and capital account liberalization. The government recognizes and enforces secured interests in property, both chattel and real estate. Ireland is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and a party to the International Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property. Several state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operate in Ireland in the energy, broadcasting, and transportation sectors. All of Ireland’s SOEs are open to competition for market share. While Ireland has no bilateral investment treaties, the United States and Ireland have shared a Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty since 1950 that provides for national treatment of U.S. investors. The two countries have also shared a Tax Treaty since 1998, supplemented in December 2012 with an agreement to improve international tax compliance and to implement the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 13 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 19 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $390,274 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $65,620 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Irish government actively promotes FDI, a strategy that has fueled economic growth since the mid-1990s. The principal goal of Ireland’s investment promotion has been employment creation, especially in technology-intensive and high-skill industries. More recently, the government has focused on Ireland’s international competitiveness by encouraging foreign-owned companies to enhance research and development (R&D) activities and to deliver higher-value goods and services. U.S. companies are attracted to Ireland as an exporting sales and support platform to the EU market of almost 500 million consumers and other global markets. Ireland is a successful FDI destination for many reasons, including a currently low corporate tax rate of 12.5 percent for all domestic and foreign firms (Ireland is party to the October 2021 OECD deal on a global minimum corporate tax that will set the tax rate to 15 percent); a well-educated, English-speaking workforce; the availability of a multilingual labor force; cooperative labor relations; political stability; and pro-business government policies and regulators. Ireland also benefits from a transparent judicial system; good transportation links; proximity to the United States and Europe, and the drawing power of existing companies operating successfully in Ireland (a so-called “clustering” effect). The stock of American FDI in Ireland stood at USD 390 billion in 2020, more than the U.S. total for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the so-called BRICS countries) combined. There are approximately 900 U.S. subsidiaries currently in Ireland employing roughly 190,000 people and supporting work for another 152,000. This figure represents a significant proportion of the 2.51 million people employed in Ireland. U.S. firms operate primarily in the following sectors: chemicals, biosciences, pharmaceuticals and medical devices, computer hardware and software, web and digital media; electronics, and financial services. U.S. investment has been particularly important to the growth and modernization of Irish industry over the past thirty years, providing new technology, export capabilities, management and manufacturing best practices, and employment opportunities. Ireland has more recently become an important R&D center for U.S. firms in Europe, and a magnet for U.S. internet and digital media investment. Industry leaders like Google, Amazon, eBay, PayPal, Meta (Facebook), Twitter, LinkedIn, Electronic Arts and cybersecurity firms like Tenable, Forcepoint, AT&T Cybersecurity, McAfee use Ireland as the hub or important part of their respective European, and sometimes Middle Eastern, African, and/or Indian operations. Factors that challenge Ireland’s ability to attract investment include relatively high labor and operating costs (such as for energy); sporadic skilled-labor shortages; the fall-out from the COVID-19 pandemic; and sometimes-deficient infrastructure (such as in transportation, energy and broadband quality). Ireland also suffers from housing and high-quality office space shortages; and absolute price levels that are among the highest in Europe. The American Chamber of Commerce in Ireland has called for greater attention to a “skills gap” in the supply of Irish graduates to the high technology sector. It also has asserted that relatively high personal income tax rates can make attracting talent from abroad difficult. In 2013, Ireland became the first country in the Euro zone to exit a financial bailout program from the EU, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund (EU/ECB/IMF, or so-called Troika). Compliance with the terms of the Troika program came at a substantial economic cost with gross domestic product (GDP) stagnation and austerity measures, while dealing with high unemployment (which hit 15 percent). Strong economic progress followed through government-backed initiatives to attract investment and stimulate job creation and employment. Despite the prolonged difficulties caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Ireland’s economic performance continued to be the best in the Euro zone in 2021 with an estimated 13.5 percent growth, achieved on the back of strong exports from the food, pharmaceutical and med-tech sectors and other large multinational companies headquartered in Ireland. The domestic economy struggled with temporary business closures due to the restrictions. With Ireland’s official unemployment rate at 5.2 percent in February 2022, employers are expecting a tight labor market over the next year. Ireland’s sovereign debt remains attractive to investors exemplifying international confidence in Ireland’s economic progress. The UK’s exit from the EU (Brexit) in 2021, leaves Ireland as the only remaining English-speaking country in the bloc. The UK is now a non-EU member which shares a land border with Ireland. The December 2020 Brexit agreement dictates the future trading relationship between the UK and the EU and will likely affect Ireland’s future economic performance. The agreement allows for tariff-free Ireland to Great Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales) trade but comes with increased customs procedures. Existing Ireland – Northern Ireland trade continues unimpeded (aka, the Northern Ireland Protocol). While some disruption has been noticed in the supply chain of retail and agricultural sectors (due to their traditional use of the UK “land-bridge” to move products to and from the EU), Irish companies have generally been able to find alternate routes (i.e., using ferries from Ireland directly to continental Europe), though this has raised costs in some sectors. The EU and UK are in ongoing discussions to ensure the Northern Ireland Protocol remains. With Brexit, Ireland has lost a close EU ally on policy matters, particularly free trade and business friendly open markets. Ireland continues to be heavily dependent on the UK as an export market and source especially for food products, and the full effect of Brexit may yet hit sectors such as food and agri-business with disruptions to supply chains and increased red-tape. Irish trade with its EU colleagues has already seen a dramatic switch to direct shipping rather than using Great Britain as a land-bridge for trucking products. Some UK-based firms (including U.S. firms) have moved headquarters or opened subsidiary offices in Ireland to facilitate ease of business with other EU countries. The Irish Department of Finance and the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) estimate Brexit will cut Ireland’s economic growth modestly in the near term, but such models are complicated with the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Six government departments and organizations have responsibility to promote investment into Ireland by foreign companies: The Industrial Development Authority of Ireland (IDA Ireland) has overall responsibility for promoting and facilitating FDI in Ireland. IDA Ireland is also responsible for attracting foreign financial and insurance firms to Dublin’s International Financial Services Center (IFSC). IDA Ireland maintains seven U.S. offices (in New York, NY; Boston, MA; Chicago, IL; Mountain View, CA; Irvine, CA; Atlanta, GA; and Austin, TX), as well as offices throughout Europe and Asia. Enterprise Ireland (EI) promotes joint ventures and strategic alliances between indigenous and foreign companies. The agency assists entrepreneurs establish in Ireland and assists foreign firms that wish to establish food and drink manufacturing operations in Ireland. EI has six existing offices in the United States (Austin, TX; Boston, MA; Chicago, IL; New York, NY; San Francisco, CA; and Seattle, WA and has offices in Europe, South America, the Middle East, and Asia. Shannon Group (formerly the Shannon Free Airport Development Company) promotes FDI in the Shannon Free Zone (SFZ) and owns properties in the Shannon region as potential green-field investment sites. Since 2006, the responsibility for investment by Irish firms in the Shannon region has passed to Enterprise Ireland while IDA Ireland remains responsible for FDI in the region. Udaras na Gaeltachta (Udaras) has responsibility for economic development in those areas of Ireland where the predominant language is Irish. Udaras works with IDA Ireland to promote overseas investment in these regions. Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has responsibility for economic messaging and supporting the country’s trade promotion agenda as well as diaspora engagement to attract investment. Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE) supports the creation of jobs by promoting the development of a competitive business environment where enterprises can operate with high standards and grow in sustainable markets. Irish law allows foreign corporations (registered under the Companies Act 2014 or previous legislation and known locally as a public limited company (plc)) to conduct business in Ireland. Any company incorporated abroad that establishes a branch in Ireland must file certain papers with the Companies Registration Office (CRO). A foreign corporation with a branch in Ireland has the same standing in Irish law for purposes of contracts, etc., as a domestic company incorporated in Ireland. Private businesses are not competitively disadvantaged to public enterprises with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations. No barriers exist to participation by foreign entities in the purchase of state-owned Irish companies. Residents of Ireland may, however, be given priority in share allocations over all other investors. There are no recent examples of this, but Irish residents did receive priority in share allocations in the 1998-sale of the state-owned telecommunications company Eircom. The government privatized the national airline Aer Lingus through a stock market flotation in 2005 but chose to retain about a one-quarter stake. At that time, U.S. investors purchased shares in the sale. The International Airlines Group (IAG) purchased the government’s remaining stake in the airline in 2015, and subsequently took an overall controlling interest which it continues to hold. Citizens of countries other than Ireland and EU member states can acquire land for private residential or industrial purposes. In the past, all non-EU nationals needed written consent from the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine before acquiring an interest in land zoned for agricultural use but these limitations no longer exist. There are many equine stud farms and racing facilities owned by foreign nationals. No restrictions exist on the acquisition of urban land. Ireland does not yet have formal investment screening legislation in place. Draft legislation has been submitted to the Dail (Irish parliament) which is expected to be enacted during 2022. (The bill was partially delayed due to the government’s efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.) As a member of the EU, Ireland is required to implement any common EU investment screening regulations or directives such as the EU Framework. There were no third-party investment policy reviews in the past five years. All firms must register with the Companies Registration Office (CRO) online at www.cro.ie . The CRO, as well as registering companies, can also register a business/trading name, a non-Ireland based foreign company (external company), or a limited partnership. Any firm or company registered under the Companies Act 2014 becomes a body corporate as and from the date mentioned in its certificate of incorporation. The CRO website permits online data submission. Firms must submit a signed paper copy of this online application to the CRO, unless the applicant company has already registered with www.revenue.ie (the website of Ireland’s tax collecting authority, the Office of the Revenue Commissioners). The Ireland pages in the following link gives the most up-to-date information: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/country-navigator/102/ireland Enterprise Ireland assists Irish firms in developing partnerships with foreign firms mainly to develop and grow indigenous firms. 3. Legal Regime Ireland’s judicial system is transparent and upholds the sanctity of contracts, as well as laws affecting foreign investment. These laws include: The Companies Act 2014 which contains the basic requirements for incorporation in Ireland; The 2004 Finance Act which introduced tax incentives to encourage firms to set up headquarters in Ireland and to conduct R&D; The Mergers, Takeovers and Monopolies Control Act of 1978 which sets out rules governing mergers and takeovers by foreign, and domestic firms; The Competition (Amendment) Act of 1996 which amends and extends the Competition Act of 1991 and the Mergers and Takeovers (Control) Acts of 1978 and 1987, and sets out the rules governing competitive behavior; and, The Industrial Development Act (1993) which outlines the functions of IDA Ireland. The Companies Act (2014), with more than 1,400 sections and 17 Schedules, is the largest-ever Irish statute. The Act consolidated and reformed all Irish company law for the first time in over 50 years. In addition, numerous laws and regulations pertain to employment, social security, environment protection and taxation, with many of these keyed to EU regulations and directives. Ireland has been a member of the EU since 1973. As a member, it incorporates all EU legislation into national legislation and applies all EU regulatory standards and rules. Ireland is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and follows all WTO procedures Ireland’s legal system is common law. Courts are presided over by judges appointed by the President of Ireland (on the advice of the government). The Commercial Court is a designated court of the High Court which deals with commercial disagreements between businesses where the value of the claim is at least €1 ($1.2) million. The Commercial Court also oversees cases on intellectual property rights, including trademarks and trade secrets. Ireland treats all firms incorporated in Ireland on an equal basis. With only a few exceptions, no constraints prevent foreign individuals or entities from ownership or participation in private firms/corporations. The most significant of these exceptions is that, in common with other EU countries, Irish airlines must be at least 50 percent owned by EU residents to have full access to the single European aviation market. Citizens of countries other than Ireland and EU member states can acquire land for private residential or industrial purposes. In the past, one of Ireland’s many attractive features as an FDI destination was its low corporate tax rate. Since 2003, the headline corporate tax rate was 12.5 percent, one of the lowest in the EU. In 2014, the government announced firms would no longer be able to incorporate in Ireland without also being tax resident. Prior to this, firms could incorporate in Ireland and be tax resident elsewhere, making use of a tax avoidance arrangement colloquially known as the “Double Irish” to reduce tax liabilities. The Irish government is party to the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Sharing (BEPS) negotiations and ratified the BEPS Multilateral Instrument in January 2019. The government implemented a Knowledge Development Box (KDB), effective 2016, which is consistent with OECD guidelines. The KDB allows for the application of a tax rate of 6.25 percent on profits arising to certain intellectual property assets that are the result of qualifying research and development activities carried out in Ireland. In October 2021, Ireland signed up to the OECD Inclusive Framework Agreement and will raise its corporate tax rate to 15 percent when implemented. The Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) is an independent statutory body with a dual mandate to enforce competition and consumer protection law in Ireland. The CPCC was established in 2014, following the amalgamation of the National Consumer Agency and the Competition Authority. The CPCC enforces Irish and EU competition law in Ireland. It has the power to conduct investigations and can take civil or criminal enforcement action if it finds evidence of breaches of competition law. The CPCC is given enforcement powers by the Competition Act of 2002, subsequently amended and extended by the Competition Act 2006. The Act introduced criminal liability for anti-competitive practices, increased corporate liability for violations, and outlined available defenses. Most tax, labor, environment, health and safety, and other laws are compatible with EU regulations, and they do not adversely affect investment. The government publishes proposed drafts of laws and regulations to solicit public comment, including those by foreign firms and their representative trade associations. Bureaucratic procedures are transparent and reasonably efficient, in line with the general pro-business approach of the government. The Irish Takeover Panel Act of 1997 gives the ‘Irish Takeover Panel’ responsibility for monitoring and supervising takeovers and other relevant corporate transactions. The minority squeeze-out provisions in the legislation, allows a bidder who holds 80 percent of the shares of the target firm (or 90 percent for firms with securities on a regulated market) to compel the remaining minority shareholders to sell their shares. There are no reports that the Irish Takeover Panel Act has prevented foreign takeovers, and, in fact, there have been several high-profile foreign takeovers of Irish companies in the banking and telecommunications sectors in the past. Although not recent, Babcock & Brown (an Australian investment firm) acquired the former national telephone company, Eircom in 2006 which it subsequently sold to Singapore Technologies Telemedia in 2009. The EU Directive on Takeovers provides a framework of common principles for cross-border takeover bids, creates a level playing field for shareholders, and establishes disclosure obligations throughout the EU. Irish legislation fully implemented the directive in 2006, though the Irish Takeover Panel Act 1997 had already incorporated many of its principles. Companies must notify the CCPC of mergers over a certain financial threshold for review as required by the Competition Act 2002, as amended (Competition Act). The government normally expropriates private property only for public purposes in a non-discriminatory manner and in accordance with established principles of international law. The government condemns private property in accordance with recognized principles of due process. The Irish courts provide a system of judicial review and appeal where there are disputes brought by owners of private property subject to a government action. There is no specific domestic body for handling investment disputes apart from the judicial system. The Irish Constitution, legislation, and common law form the basis for the Irish legal system. DETE has primary responsibility for drafting and enforcing company law. The judiciary is independent, and litigants are entitled to trial by jury in commercial disputes. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Ireland is a member of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and a party to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, meaning local courts must enforce international arbitration awards under appropriate circumstances. Some U.S. business representatives have occasionally called into question the transparency of Irish government tenders. According to some U.S. firms, lengthy procedural decisions often delay the procurement tender process. Unsuccessful bidders have expressed concerns over difficulties receiving information on the rationale behind the tender outcome. In addition, some successful bidders have experienced delays in finalizing contracts, commencing work on major projects, obtaining accurate project data, and receiving compensation for work completed, including through conciliation and arbitration processes. Some successful bidders have also subsequently found that the original tenders may not have accurately described conditions on the ground. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Ireland treats all firms incorporated in Ireland on an equal basis. Ireland’s legal system is common law and Ireland’s courts apply Irish and EU legislation. All disputes are dealt with judicially. In the past ten years, we are not aware of any investment disputes involving U.S. investors nor of any extrajudicial action against foreign investors. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Ireland’s judicial court system is used to settle all investor disputes. Investment disputes involving U.S. or other foreign investors in Ireland are extremely rare. There were no known instances of SOE investment disputes in the past five years. The Companies Act 2014 is the most important body of law dealing with commercial and bankruptcy law, which Irish courts consistently apply. Irish company bankruptcy legislation gives creditors a strong degree of protection. 6. Financial Sector Capital markets and portfolio investments operate freely with no discrimination between Irish and foreign firms. In some instances, development authorities and commercial banks facilitate loan packages to foreign firms with favorable credit terms. All loans are offered on market terms. There was limited credit available, especially to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), after the financial crisis of 2008. Bank balance sheets have since improved with lending levels increasing as the health of the economy improved. The government established the Strategic Banking Corporation of Ireland (SBCI) to ensure SMEs had access to credit available at market terms. Irish legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms and provide a secure environment for portfolio investment. The current capital gains tax rate is 33 percent (since December 2012). Euronext, an EU-based grouping of stock exchange operators in 2018 acquired and operates the Irish Stock Exchange (ISE), now known as Euronext Dublin. The Irish banking sector, like many worldwide, came under intense pressure in 2007 and 2008 following the collapse of Ireland’s construction industry and the end of Ireland’s property boom. A number of Ireland’s financial lenders were severely under-capitalized and required government bailouts to survive. The government, fearing a flight of private investments, introduced temporary guarantees (still in operation) to personal depositors in 2008 to ensure that deposits remained in Ireland. Anglo Irish Bank (Anglo), a bank heavily involved in construction and property lending, failed and was resolved by the government. The government subsequently took majority stakes in several other lenders, effectively nationalized two banks and acquired a significant proportion of a third. The National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), established in 2009, acquired most of the property-related loan books of the Irish banks (including Anglo) at a fraction of their book value. The government, with its increased exposure to bank debts and a rising budget deficit, had difficulty in placing sovereign debt on international bond markets following the economic crash of 2008. Ireland sought and got assistance from the Troika (International Monetary Fund (IMF), EU and European Central Bank (ECB)) in November 2010. A rescue package of $110 (€85) billion, with $88 (€67.5) billion of this provided by the Troika, was agreed to cover government deficits and costs related to the bank recapitalizations. The government then took effective control of Allied Irish Bank (AIB), following a further recapitalization by the end of 2010. The government took into state control, and then resolved, two building societies, Irish Nationwide Building Society and Educational Building Society. The government helped re-capitalize Irish Life and Permanent (the banking portion of which was spun off and now operates under the name Permanent TSB) and the Bank of Ireland (BOI). Irish banks were forced to deleverage their non-core assets in line with Troika bailout program recommendations and were effectively limited to service domestic banking demand. BOI succeeded in remaining non-nationalized by realizing capital from the sale of non-essential portfolios and by imposing some targeted burden sharing with some of its bondholders. The government has been actively selling down its stake in BOI since 2021 and its holding has declined to below 6 percent. The government also signaled its to fully sell off its AIB shareholding by mid-2022. Soon after it exited the Troika program in 2013, Ireland re-entered sovereign debt markets. International financing rates continued to fall to record lows for Irish debt, and Ireland was able to fully repay all of its IMF loans by securing bond sales at less expensive rates. Ireland also paid off some bilateral loans extended to it by Denmark and Sweden ahead of schedule in 2017. Currently, Ireland is placing its sovereign debt at very low interest rates in line with other nations. Ireland’s retail banking sector rebounded from the crisis and is now healthy and well capitalized in line with ECB rules on bank capitalizations. The stock of non-performing loans on bank balance sheets remains high; and banks continue to divest themselves of these loans through bundle sales to investors. Ulster Bank, part of the UK-based NatWest Banking group and Ireland’s third largest retail bank, announced its withdrawal from retail banking in Ireland. KBC Bank also announced its withdrawal of services in Ireland in late 2022/early 2023. The move by the two banks is expected to create an unprecedented demand for new accounts with the remaining banks. The two banks are actively selling off portfolios of loan books and mortgages, but up to a million customers will need to find an alternative bank for daily business and credit card facilities. The Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) is responsible for both central banking and financial regulation. The CBI is a member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), whose primary objective is to maintain price stability in the euro area. There are a large number of U.S. banks with operations in Ireland, many of whom are located in Dublin’s International Financial Services Center (IFSC) Dublin. The IFSC originally functioned somewhat like a business park for financial services firms. U.S. banks located in Ireland provide a range of financial services to clients in Europe and worldwide. These firms include State Street, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan, and Northern Trust. The regulation of the international banks operating throughout Ireland falls under the jurisdiction of the CBI. Ireland is part of the Eurozone, and therefore does not have an independent monetary policy. The ECB formulates and implements monetary policy for the Eurozone and the CBI implements that policy at the national level. The Governor of the CBI is a member of the ECB’s Governing Council and has an equal say as other ECB governors in the formulation of Eurozone monetary and interest rate policy. The CBI also issues euro currency in Ireland, acts as manager of the official external reserves of gold and foreign currency, conducts research and analysis on economic and financial matters, oversees the domestic payment and settlement systems, and manages investment assets on behalf of the State. Foreign Exchange Ireland uses the euro as its national currency and enjoys full current and capital account liberalization. Foreign exchange is easily available at market rates. Ireland is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Remittance Policies There are no restrictions or significant reported delays in the conversion or repatriation of investment capital, earnings, interest, or royalties, nor are there any announced plans to change remittance policies. Likewise, there are no limitations on the import of capital into Ireland. The National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) is the asset management bureau of the government. NTMA is responsible for day-to-day funding for government operations normally through the sale of sovereign debt worldwide. NTMA is also responsible for investing Irish government funds, such as the national pension funds, in financial instruments worldwide. Ireland suspended issuing sovereign debt upon entering the Troika bailout program in 2010 but has been successfully placing Irish debt since Ireland’s 2013 exit from the Troika program, The NTMA also has oversight of the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), the agency established to take on, and dispose of, the property-related loan books of Ireland’s bailed-out banks. The Ireland Strategic Investment Fund (ISIF) established in 2014 has the statutory mandate to invest on a commercial basis to support economic activity and employment in Ireland. The dual objective mandate of the ISIF – investment return and economic impact – requires all its investments to generate returns as well as having a positive (i.e., job-creating) economic impact in Ireland. The ISIF has assisted some small and medium sized enterprises during Ireland’s economic revival. 10. Political and Security Environment There has been no significant spillover of violence from Northern Ireland since the ceasefires of 1994 and the signing and implementation of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in 1998. The cessation of violence in Northern Ireland led to increased business investment and confidence in Northern Ireland which also benefited Ireland. The GFA designated funding to develop cross-border cooperation on R&D collaboration, create energy and transportation infrastructure linkages, and for participation in joint trade missions. No violence related to the situation in Northern Ireland has been specifically directed at U.S. citizens or firms located in Ireland. There have been some incidents of criminal terrorism and gangland violence attributed to cross-border groups believed to be involved in the black market. There is considerable Garda and Police Service Northern Ireland (PSNI) cooperation to stem any illegal activity. There have been no recent incidents involving politically motivated damage to foreign investment projects and/or installations in Ireland. There were some instances of damage to U.S. military assets transiting Shannon Airport in 2003 and later in 2011 by a small number of Irish citizens opposed to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2017, two anti-war activists defaced a U.S. aircraft with graffiti. The Garda arrested two peace protesters as they attempted to gain illegal access to Shannon airport runways in 2019. Other than these incidences of anti-military acts, there have been no acts against U.S. firms or private interests in Ireland. Israel Executive Summary Israel has an entrepreneurial spirit and a creative, highly educated, skilled, and diverse workforce. It is a leader in innovation in a variety of sectors, and many Israeli start-ups find good partners in U.S. companies. Popularly known as “Start-Up Nation,” Israel invests heavily in education and scientific research. U.S. firms account for nearly two-thirds of the more than 300 research and development (R&D) centers established by multinational companies in Israel. Israel has 117 companies listed on the NASDAQ, the fourth most companies after the United States, Canada, and China. Israeli government agencies, led by the Israel Innovation Authority, fund incubators for early-stage technology start-ups, and Israel provides extensive support for new ideas and technologies while also seeking to develop traditional industries. Private venture capital funds have flourished in Israel in recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic shook Israel’s economy, but successful pre-pandemic economic policy buffers – strong growth, low debt, a resilient tech sector among them – mean Israel entered the COVID-19 crisis with relatively low vulnerabilities, according to the International Monetary Fund’s Staff Report for the 2020 Article IV Consultation. The fundamentals of the Israeli economy remain strong, and Israel’s economy rebounded strongly post-pandemic with 8.1 percent GDP growth in 2021. With low inflation and fiscal deficits that have usually met targets pre-pandemic, most analysts consider Israeli government economic policies as generally sound and supportive of growth. Israel seeks to provide supportive conditions for companies looking to invest in Israel through laws that encourage capital and industrial R&D investment. Incentives and benefits include grants, reduced tax rates, tax exemptions, and other tax-related benefits. The U.S.-Israeli bilateral economic and commercial relationship is strong, anchored by two-way trade in goods and services that reached USD 45.1 billion in 2021, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, and extensive commercial ties, particularly in high-tech and R&D. The total stock of Israeli foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States was USD 40.4 billion in 2020. Since the signing of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement in 1985, the Israeli economy has undergone a dramatic transformation, moving from a protected, low-end manufacturing and agriculture-led economy to one that is diverse, mostly open, and led by a cutting-edge high-tech sector. The Israeli government generally continues to take slow, deliberate actions to remove trade barriers and encourage capital investment, including foreign investment. The continued existence of trade barriers and monopolies, however, have contributed significantly to the high cost of living and the lack of competition in key sectors. The Israeli government maintains some protective trade policies. Israel has taken steps to meet its pledges to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with planned investments in technologies and projects to slow the pace of climate change. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 36 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 15 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $40.4 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $42,600 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Israel is open to foreign investment and the government actively encourages and supports the inflow of foreign capital. The Israeli Ministry of Economy and Industry’s ‘Invest in Israel’ office serves as the government’s investment promotion agency facilitating foreign investment. ‘Invest in Israel’ offers a wide range of services including guidance on Israeli laws, regulations, taxes, incentives, and costs, and facilitation of business connections with peer companies and industry leaders for new investors. ‘Invest in Israel’ also organizes familiarization tours for potential investors and employs a team of advisors for each region of the world. The Israeli legal system protects the rights of both foreign and domestic entities to establish and own business enterprises, as well as the right to engage in remunerative activity. Private enterprises are free to establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises. As part of ongoing privatization efforts, the Israeli government encourages foreign investment in privatizing government-owned entities. Israel’s policies aim to equalize competition between private and public enterprises, although the existence of monopolies and oligopolies in several sectors, including communications infrastructure, food manufacturing and marketing, and some manufacturing segments, stifles competition. In the case of designated monopolies, defined as entities that supply more than 50 percent of the market, the government controls prices. Israel established a centralized investment screening (approval) mechanism for certain inbound foreign investments in October 2019. Investments in regulated industries (e.g., banking and insurance) require approval by the relevant regulator. Investments in certain sectors may require a government license. Other regulations may apply, usually on a national treatment basis. The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted its fifth and latest trade policy review of Israel in July 2018. In the past three years, the Israeli government has not conducted any investment policy reviews through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The OECD concluded an Economic Survey of Israel in 2020, which can be found here: https://www.oecd.org/economy/israel-economic-snapshot/ The Israeli government is fairly open and receptive to companies wishing to register businesses in Israel. The business registration process in Israel is relatively clear and straightforward. Four procedures are required to register a standard private limited company and take 12 days to complete, on average, according to the Israeli Ministry of Finance. The foreign investor must obtain company registration documents through a recognized attorney with the Israeli Ministry of Justice and obtain a tax identification number for company taxation and for value added taxes from the Israeli Ministry of Finance. The cost to register a company averages around USD 1,000 depending on attorney and legal fees. The Israeli Ministry of Economy and Industry’s “Invest in Israel” website provides useful information for companies interested in starting a business or investing in Israel. The website is http://www.investinisrael.gov.il/Pages/default.aspx . The Israel Export and International Cooperation Institute is an Israeli government agency operating independently, under the Ministry of Economy, that helps facilitate trade and business opportunities between Israeli and foreign companies. More information on their activities is available at https://www.export.gov.il/en . In general, there are no restrictions on Israeli investors seeking to invest abroad. However, investing abroad may be restricted on national security grounds or in certain countries or sectors where the Israeli government deems such investment is not in the national interest. 3. Legal Regime Israel promotes open governance and has joined the International Open Government Partnership. The government’s policy is to pursue the goals of transparency and active reporting to the public, public participation, and accountability. Israel’s regulatory system is transparent. Ministries and regulatory agencies give notice of proposed regulations to the public on a government web site: http://www.knesset.gov.il . The texts of proposed regulations are also published (in Hebrew) on this web site. The government requests comments from the public about proposed regulations. However, the government occasionally issues new or revised regulations without prior comment periods. Israel is a signatory to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), which covers most Israeli government entities and government-owned corporations. Most of the country’s open international public tenders are published in the local press. U.S. companies have won government tenders, notably in the energy and communications sectors. However, government-owned corporations make extensive use of selective tendering procedures. In addition, the lack of transparency in the public procurement process discourages U.S. companies from participating in major projects and disadvantages those that choose to compete. Enforcement of the public procurement laws and regulations is not consistent. Israel is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. ( http://unctad.org/en/pages/home.aspx ). Foreign and national investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations including the number of steps, name and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal basis justifying the procedures. The Israeli Securities Authority released a recommendation in April 2021 calling for all public companies to publish annual environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reports based on international standards. In May 2021, the Bank of Israel required banks to note in the annual reports the material environmental, social and governance aspects integrated into their targets, and to note concisely the main principles established by the banking corporation for promoting these issues. The Israeli Capital, Insurance, and Savings Authority, which regulates financial services in the insurance and pension funds industries, also required institutional investors to publish ESG reports. Israel is not a member of any major economic bloc but maintains strong economic relations with several such blocs. Israeli regulatory bodies in the Ministry of Economy (Standards Institute of Israel), Ministry of Health (Food Control Services), and the Ministry of Agriculture (Veterinary Services and the Plant Protection Service) often adopt standards developed by European standards organizations. Israel’s adoption of European standards rather than international may add costs for some U.S. exports to Israel. Israel became a member of the WTO in 1995. The Ministry of Economy and Industry’s Standardization Administration is responsible for notifying the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, and regularly does so. Israel has a written and consistently applied commercial law based on the British Companies Act of 1948, as amended. The judiciary is independent, but businesses complain about the length of time required to obtain judgments. The Supreme Court is an appellate court that also functions as the High Court of Justice. Israel does not employ a jury system. There are few restrictions on foreign investors, except in defense and other national security industries. Foreign investors are welcome to participate in Israel’s privatization program. Israeli courts exercise authority in cases within the jurisdiction of Israel. However, if an agreement between involved parties contains an exclusively foreign jurisdiction, the Israeli courts will generally decline to exercise their authority. Israel’s Ministry of Economy sponsors the web site “Invest in Israel” at www.investinisrael.gov.il The Investment Promotion Center of the Ministry of Economy seeks to encourage investment in Israel. The center stresses Israel’s high marks in innovation, entrepreneurship, and Israel’s creative, skilled, and ambitious workforce. The center also promotes Israel’s strong ties to the United States and Europe. Israel adopted its comprehensive competition law in 1988. Israel created the Israel Competition Authority (originally called the Israel Antitrust Authority) in 1994 to enforce the competition law. There have been no known expropriations of U.S.-owned businesses in Israel. Israeli law requires adequate payment, with interest from the day of expropriation until final payment, in cases of expropriation. Israel has established and well-regarded bankruptcy measures in place. Israeli Bankruptcy Law has several layers, some rooted in Common Law, when Palestine was under the British mandate in 1917-1948. Bankruptcy Law in Israel is based on the 1980 Bankruptcy Ordinance, the 1985 Bankruptcy Regulations, and the 2018 Law for Insolvency and Economic Recovery. 6. Financial Sector The Israeli government is supportive of foreign portfolio investment. The Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) is Israel’s only public stock exchange. Financial institutions in Israel allocate credit on market terms. Various credit instruments are available to the private sector and foreign investors can receive credit on the local market. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and conform to international norms, although the prevalence of inflation-adjusted accounting means there are differences from U.S. accounting principles. In the case of publicly traded firms where ownership is widely dispersed, the practice of “cross-shareholding” and “stable shareholder” arrangements to prevent mergers and acquisitions is common, but not directed at preventing foreign investment. Israeli law prevents foreign investment by individuals or businesses from “enemy states,” currently limited to Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. The Bank of Israel (BOI) is Israel’s central bank and regulates all banking activity and monetary policy. In general, Israel has a healthy banking system that offers most of the same services as the U.S. banking system. Fees for normal banking transactions are significantly higher in Israel than in the United States and some services do not meet U.S. standards. There are 12 commercial banks and four foreign banks operating in Israel, according to the BOI. Bank Leumi and Bank Hapoalim, the two largest banks, dominate Israel’s banking sector, collectively controlling nearly 60 percent of Israel’s credit market. The State of Israel holds 6 percent of Bank Leumi’s shares; all of Israel’s other banks are fully private. Israel passed legislation to establish the Israel Citizens’ Fund, a sovereign wealth fund managed by the BOI, in 2014. The law establishing the fund states that it will begin operating a month after the state’s tax revenues from natural gas exceed USD 307 million (1 billion NIS), which the Ministry of Finance expects will occur in late 2022. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Israel established the Government Companies Authority (GCA) as an auxiliary unit of the Ministry of Finance following the passage of the 1975 Government Companies Law. It is the administrative agency for state-owned companies in charge of supervision, privatization, and implementation of structural changes. The Israeli state only provides support for commercial SOEs in exceptional cases. The GCA leads the recruitment process for SOE board members. Board appointments are subject to the approval of a committee, which confirms whether candidates meet the minimum board member criteria set forth by law. The GCA oversees some 100 commercial and noncommercial companies, government subsidiaries, and companies under mixed government-private ownership. Among these companies are some of the biggest and most complex in the Israeli economy, such as the Israel Electric Corporation, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, Israel Postal Company, Mekorot Israel National Water Company, Israel Natural Gas Lines, the Ashdod, Haifa, and Eilat Port Companies, Israel Railways, Petroleum and Energy Infrastructures and the Israel National Roads Company. The GCA does not publish a publicly available list of SOEs. Israel is party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the World Trade Organization. Israel’s inter-ministerial privatization committee approved plans in January 2020 to sell off the Port of Haifa, Israel’s largest shipping hub. The privatization process is underway now. The incoming owner will be required to invest approximately USD 280 million (1 billion NIS) in the port, including the cost of upgrading infrastructure and financing the layoff of an estimated 200 workers. The government of Israel has ongoing plans to fully privatize Israel Post, which currently has 20 percent of its shares publicly listed. 10. Political and Security Environment For the latest safety and security information regarding Israel and the current travel advisory level, see the Travel Advisory for Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. ( https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/israel-west-bank-and-gaza-travel-advisory.html). The security situation remains complex in Israel and the West Bank, and can change quickly depending on the political environment, recent events, and geographic location. Terrorist groups and lone-wolf terrorists continue plotting possible attacks in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Terrorists may attack with little or no warning, targeting tourist locations, transportation hubs, markets, shopping malls, and government facilities. Hamas, a U.S. government-designated foreign terrorist organization, controls security in Gaza, making it particularly dangerous and volatile. Italy Executive Summary Italy’s successful vaccination campaign, an ambitious reform and investment plan funded and approved by the European Union, and Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s leadership which has boosted Italy’s role on the international stage, helped the Italian economy to grow a healthy 6.6 percent in 2021 – one of the fastest rates in Europe. Growth was underpinned by a robust 17 percent increase in investment. However, energy price spikes, supply chain disruptions, and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine create uncertainty affecting consumer and business confidence. Italy now forecasts its economy, the euro area’s third largest, will grow by 3.1 percent (down from a 4.7 percent projected in September 2021). For 2023, the government projects GDP will grow 2.4 percent (down from the previous target of 2.8 percent). The public debt, proportionally the highest in the eurozone after Greece’s, is targeted at 147 percent of GDP in 2022, down from 2020’s 156 percent, and projected to decline to 145 percent in 2023. Italy’s National Resilience and Recovery Plan (NRRP) combines over €200 billion in investment to accelerate the digital and green transition coupled with wide-ranging reforms addressing the Italian economy’s longstanding drags on growth — namely its slow legal system, tax administration and bloated bureaucracy — while rebalancing policies to address gender, youth, and regional disparities. This combination of investment and reform, with some easing of fiscal constraints from Brussels, may reposition Italy, the eurozone’s second largest industrial base, as an engine for growth. In April 2022, the European Commission disbursed €21 billion in the first tranche of Next Generation EU funds pandemic aid to Italy after determining the Italian government successfully met the 51 objectives of its NRRP set out for 2021. Italy will have to achieve a further 45 milestones and targets by June 30, 2022, to receive the second tranche of funds worth €24.1 billion. Crucial for improving Italy’s investment climate and spurring growth is reform of Italy’s justice system, one of the slowest in Europe. According to the European Commission, the average Italian civil law case takes more than 500 days to resolve, versus an average of about 200 days in Germany, 300 in Spain and 450 in Greece. For U.S. investors, judicial reform and bureaucratic streamlining would minimize uncertainty and create a more favorable investment climate. Italy is and will remain an attractive destination for foreign investment, with one of the largest markets in the EU, a diversified economy, and a skilled workforce. Italy’s economy, the eighth largest in the world, is dominated by small and medium-sized firms (SMEs), which comprise 99.9 percent of Italian businesses. Italy’s relatively affluent domestic market, access to the European Common Market, proximity to emerging economies in North Africa and the Middle East, and assorted centers of excellence in scientific and information technology research, remain attractive to many investors. Italy is the eighth largest consumer market in the world, the seventh largest manufacturing producer, and boasts a diversified economy and skilled workforce. The clustering of industry, the infrastructure, and the quality of life are also among the top reasons international investors decide to start or expand a business in Italy. According to Italy’s Institute of Statistics, over 15,000 foreign multinationals employ one out of seven Italian residents. Foreign companies account for 18 percent of Italian GDP and 14 percent of investments. Exports of pharmaceutical products, furniture, industrial machinery and machine tools, electrical appliances, automobiles and auto parts, food and wine, as well as textiles/fashion are an important source of external revenue. The sectors that have attracted significant foreign investment include telecommunications, transportation, energy, and pharmaceuticals. The government remains open to foreign investment in shares of Italian companies and continues to make information available online to prospective investors. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 42 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/ cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 29 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 $31,093 https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $32,290 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Italy is an open economy and welcomes foreign direct investment (FDI). As an EU member state, Italy is bound by the EU’s treaties and laws. Under EU treaties with the United States, as well as OECD commitments, Italy is generally obliged to provide national treatment to U.S. investors established in Italy or in another EU member state. EU and Italian antitrust laws provide Italian authorities with the right to review mergers and acquisitions for market dominance. In addition, the Italian government may block mergers and acquisitions involving foreign firms under its investment screening authority (known as “Golden Power”) if the proposed transactions raise national security concerns. Enacted in 2012 and further implemented through decrees or follow-on legislation in 2015, 2017, 2019, 2020, and 2022, the Golden Power law allows the Government of Italy (GOI) to block foreign acquisition of companies operating in strategic sectors: defense/national security, energy, transportation, telecommunications including 5G and cloud computing, critical infrastructure, sensitive technology, and nuclear and space technology. Under the April 6, 2020, Liquidity Decree the Prime Minister’s Office issued, the government strengthened Italy’s investment screening authority to cover all sectors outlined in the EU’s March 2019 foreign direct investment screening directive. The decree also extends (and has been renewed until December 31, 2022) Golden Power review to certain transactions by EU-based investors and gives the government new authorities to investigate non-notified transactions. Embedded in a broader government decree issued on March 18, 2022, the latest revision of the Golden Power investment screening authority reflects the government’s effort to adapt to both rapid developments in technology and recent shifts in the geopolitical landscape. The proposed restructuring of the Golden Power mechanism revolves around three poles: the first enlarges Golden Power’s scope to capture emerging and critical technology, including cloud-based activities of strategic importance to the national defense and security system; the second proposes a requirement that companies submit to the Golden Power committee for approval annual procurement plans; and the third empowers a ten-expert committee to carry out investigations to monitor compliance, and also establishes strict penalties and enforcement mechanisms for non-compliance. The decree is in force for 60 days by which time it will need to be passed by the Italian parliament. The Italian Trade Agency (ITA) is responsible for foreign investment attraction as well as promoting foreign trade and Italian exports. ITA operates under the coordination of the Italian Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As of April 2022, ITA operates through a network of 79 offices in 65 countries. ITA promotes foreign investment in Italy through Invest in Italy program: http://www.investinitaly.com/en/ . The Foreign Direct Investment Unit is the dedicated unit of ITA for facilitating the establishment and development of foreign companies in Italy. ITA supports foreign investors from location scouting to bureaucratic consulting to aftercare following the establishment of their business (e.g., visas, expansion projects, etc.). While not directly responsible for investment attraction, SACE, Italy’s export credit agency, has additional responsibility for guaranteeing certain domestic investments. Foreign investors – particularly in energy and infrastructure projects – may see SACE’s project guarantees and insurance as further incentive to invest in Italy. Additionally, Invitalia is the national agency for inward investment and economic development operating under the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance. The agency focuses on strategic sectors for development and employment. Invitalia finances projects both large and small, targeting entrepreneurs with concrete development plans, especially in innovative and high-value-added sectors. For more information, see https://www.invitalia.it/eng . The Ministry of Economic Development ( https://www.mise.gov.it/index.php/en/ ) within its Directorate for Incentives to Businesses also has an office with some responsibilities relating to attraction of foreign investment. Italy’s main business association (Confindustria) also helps companies in Italy: https://www.confindustria.it/en . Under EU treaties and OECD obligations, Italy is generally obliged to provide national treatment to U.S. investors established in Italy or in another EU member state. EU and Italian antitrust laws provide national authorities with the right to review mergers and acquisitions over a certain financial threshold. The Italian government may block mergers and acquisitions involving foreign firms to protect the national strategic interest or in retaliation if the government of the country where the foreign firm is from applies discriminatory measures against Italian firms. Foreign investors in the defense and aircraft manufacturing sectors are more likely to encounter resistance from the many ministries involved in reviewing foreign acquisitions than are foreign investors in other sectors. Italy maintains a formal national security screening process for inbound foreign investment in the sectors of defense/national security, transportation, energy, telecommunications, critical infrastructure, sensitive technology, and nuclear and space technology through its “Golden Power” legislation. Italy expanded its Golden Power authority in March 2019 to include the purchase of goods and services related to the planning, realization, maintenance, and management of broadband communications networks using 5G technology. Under the April 6, 2020, Liquidity Decree the Prime Minister’s Office issued, the government strengthened Italy’s investment screening authority to cover all sectors outlined in the EU’s March 2019 foreign direct investment screening directive. The EU regulations cover: (1) critical infrastructure, physical or virtual, including energy, transport, water, health, communications, media, data processing or storage, aerospace, defense, electoral or financial infrastructure, and sensitive facilities, as well as land and real estate; (2) critical technologies and dual use items, including artificial intelligence, robotics, semiconductors, cybersecurity, aerospace, defense, energy storage, quantum and nuclear technologies, and nanotechnologies and biotechnologies; (3) supply of critical inputs, including food security, energy, and raw materials; (4) access to sensitive information; and (5) freedom of the media. The 2020 decree also extended (and has been renewed until December 31, 2022) Golden Power review to certain transactions by EU-based investors and gives the government new authorities to investigate non-notified transactions. Embedded in a broader government decree issued on March 18, 2022, the latest revision of the Golden Power investment screening authority reflects the government’s effort to adapt to both rapid developments in technology and recent shifts in the geopolitical landscape. The proposed restructuring of the Golden Power mechanism revolves around three poles: the first enlarges Golden Power’s scope to capture emerging and critical technology, including cloud-based activities of strategic importance to the national defense and security system; the second proposes a requirement that companies submit to the Golden Power committee for approval annual procurement plans; and the third empowers a ten-expert committee to carry out investigations to monitor compliance, and also establishes strict penalties and enforcement mechanisms for non-compliance. The decree is in force for 60 days by which time it will need to be passed by the Italian parliament. Italy has a business registration website, available in Italian and English, administered through the Union of Italian Chambers of Commerce: http://www.registroimprese.it. The online business registration process is clear and complete, and available to foreign companies. Before registering a company online, applicants must obtain a certified e-mail address and digital signature, a process that may take up to five days. A notary is required to certify the documentation. The precise steps required for the registration process depend on the type of business being registered. The minimum capital requirement also varies by type of business. Generally, companies must obtain a value-added tax account number (partita IVA) from the Italian Revenue Agency; register with the social security agency (Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale– INPS); verify adequate capital and insurance coverage with the Italian workers’ compensation agency (Istituto Nazionale per L’Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro – INAIL); and notify the regional office of the Ministry of Labor. According to the World Bank Doing Business Index 2020, Italy’s ranking decreased from 67 to 98 out of 190 countries in terms of the ease of starting a business; it takes seven procedures and 11 days to start a business in Italy. Additional licenses may be required, depending on the type of business to be conducted. Invitalia and the Italian Trade Agency’s Foreign Direct Investment Unit assist those wanting to set up a new business in Italy. Many Italian localities also have one-stop shops to serve as a single point of contact for, and provide advice to, potential investors on applying for necessary licenses and authorizations at both the local and national level. These services are available to all investors. Italy neither promotes, restricts, nor incentivizes outward investment, nor restricts domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Regulatory authority exists at the national, regional, and municipal level. All applicable regulations could be relevant for foreign investors. The GOI and individual ministries, as well as independent regulatory authorities, develop regulations at the national level. Regional and municipal authorities issue regulations at the sub-national level. Draft regulations may be posted for public comment, but there is generally no requirement to do so. Final national-level regulations generally are published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale (and only become effective upon publication). Regulatory agencies may publish summaries of received comments. In Italy private companies are not required to obtain an Environmental Product Declaration (EPD) – an internationally-recognized certificate on the environmental impact of their products or services – but an increasing number of companies apply and disclose it voluntarily. Eco-label licenses were first introduced to Italy in 1998. Since their inception, there has been a positive growth trend in both the number of labeled products and services and EU Eco-label licenses. According to a report issued by the European Commission, Italy ranked second in Europe for number of Eco-labeling licenses. Currently in Italy there are 351 EU Eco-label licenses involving 8,552 products. The product group with the largest number of licenses is “Tourist services” with 199 licenses followed by “Paper Fabric” with 36 licenses. No major regulatory reform affecting foreign investors was undertaken in 2021. Aggrieved parties may challenge regulations in court. Public finances and debt obligations are transparent and are publicly available through banking channels such as the Bank of Italy (BOI). Italy is a member of the EU. EU directives are brought into force in Italy through implementing national legislation. In some areas, EU procedures require Member States to notify the European Commission (EC) before implementing national-level regulations. Italy on occasion has failed to notify the EC and/or the World Trade Organization (WTO) of draft regulations in a timely way. For example, in 2017 Italy adopted Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) measures for milk and milk products, rice, durum wheat, and tomato-based products. Italy’s Ministers of Agriculture and Economic Development publicly stated these measures would support the “Made in Italy” brand and make Italian products more competitive. Though the requirements were widely regarded as a Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT), Italy failed to notify the WTO in advance of implementing these regulations. Moreover, in March 2020, the Italian Ministers of Agriculture and Economic Development extended the validity of such COOL measures until December 31, 2021. Italy is a signatory to the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and has implemented all developed-country obligations. Italian law is based on Roman law and on the French Napoleonic Code law. The Italian judicial system consists of a series of courts and a body of judges employed as civil servants. The system is unified; every court is part of the national network. Though notoriously slow, the Italian civil legal system meets the generally recognized principles of international law, with provisions for enforcing property and contractual rights. Italy has a written and consistently applied commercial and bankruptcy law. Foreign investors in Italy can choose among different means of alternate dispute resolution (ADR), including legally binding arbitration, though use of ADR remains rare. The GOI in recent years has introduced justice reforms to reduce the backlog of civil cases and speed new cases to conclusion. These reforms also included a digitization of procedures, and a new emphasis on ADR. Judicial sector reform is a significant pillar of Italy’s National Recovery and Resilience Program. Regulations can be appealed in the court system. Italy is bound by EU laws on FDI. In 2020, Italy began implementing a digital services tax (DST), applicable to companies that meet the following two conditions: 1. €750 million in annual global revenues from any source, not just digital services; and, 2. €5.5 million in annual revenues from digital services delivered in Italy. Some U.S. technology companies fall under Italy’s DST, as do some Italian media firms. Taxes incurred for the calendar year are due in May of the following year. The government collected €233 million in digital services taxes incurred in 2020, well below the €702 billion estimate. The DST will expire with the full implementation of Pillar 1 of the corporate tax deal reached as part of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework. In October 2021, the United States and Italy (along with France, Spain, Austria, and the UK) agreed that DST liabilities accrued by U.S. companies prior to implementation of the global tax deal will be creditable against future Pillar 1 taxes. The Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) is responsible for reviewing transactions for competition-related concerns. AGCM may examine transactions that restrict competition in Italy as well as in the broader EU market. As a member of the EU, Italy is also subject to interventions by the European Commission Competition Directorate (DG COMP). Companies can challenge AGCM decisions before the Lazio Regional Administrative Court. Regional Administrative Court decisions can be appealed to the Council of State. In August 2021, Italy’s antitrust authority opened an investigation into McDonald’s franchise agreements which require franchisees purchase supplies at fixed prices from the corporation. While the pending probe could result in considerable fines, it has not hampered the company’s planned expansion; at the end of 2021, McDonald’s announced its intent to open 200 new outlets in Italy over the next five years, a move that would create another 12,000 In November 2021, AGCM fined Amazon and Apple $225 million for alleged anti-competitive cooperation in the resale of Apple and Beats products. In December 2021 AGCM fined Amazon $1.3 billion for abuse of market dominance, in one of the biggest penalties imposed on a U.S. technology company in Europe. AGCM alleges Amazon grants benefits and higher site visibility to users (sellers) of Amazon’s warehouse and delivery service, thereby harming competitor delivery services. In addition to the fine, AGCM ordered Amazon “to grant sales benefits and visibility on Amazon.it to all third-party sellers which are able to comply with fair and non-discriminatory standards for the fulfillment of their orders.” AGCM alleges Amazon unfairly imposes stringent performance metrics on sellers not using Amazon delivery services, which can lead to account suspension. An Amazon spokesperson said, “The proposed fine and remedies are unjustified and disproportionate,” and added, “More than half of all annual sales on Amazon in Italy come from [small and medium businesses], and their success is at the heart of our business model.” The Italian Constitution permits expropriation of private property for “public purposes,” defined as essential services (including during national health emergencies) or measures indispensable for the national economy, with fair and timely compensation. Expropriations have been minimal in 2020. Italy’s bankruptcy regulations are somewhat analogous to U.S. Chapter 11 restructuring and allow firms and their creditors to reach a solution without declaring bankruptcy. In recent years, the judiciary’s role in bankruptcy proceedings has been reduced to simplify and expedite proceedings. In 2015, the Italian parliament passed a package of changes to the bankruptcy law, including measures to ease access to interim credit for bankrupt companies and to restructure debts. Additional changes were approved in 2017 (juridical liquidation, early warning, simplified process, arrangement with creditors, insolvency of affiliated companies as a group, and reorganization of indebtedness rules). The measures aim to reduce the number of bankruptcies, limit the impact on the local economy, and facilitate the settlement of corporate disputes outside of the court system. The reform follows on the 2015 reform of insolvency procedures. Finally, the conversion law of the NRRP includes elements aimed at resolving potential bankruptcies through preliminary agreements among creditors facilitated by exchanges of information and data with the use of telematic tools. In the World Bank’s Doing Business Index 2020, Italy ranks 21 out of 190 economies in the category of “Ease of Resolving Insolvency.” 6. Financial Sector The GOI welcomes foreign portfolio investments, which are generally subject to the same reporting and disclosure requirements as domestic transactions. Financial resources flow relatively freely in Italian financial markets and capital is allocated mostly on market terms. Foreign participation in Italian capital markets is not restricted. In practice, many of Italy’s largest publicly traded companies have foreign owners among their primary shareholders. While foreign investors may obtain capital in local markets and have access to a variety of credit instruments, gaining access to equity capital is difficult. Italy has a relatively underdeveloped capital market and businesses have a long-standing preference for credit financing. The limited venture capital available is usually provided by established commercial banks and a handful of venture capital funds. In 2021 the Netherlands-based Euronext acquired Italy’s stock exchange, the Milan Stock Exchange (Borsa Italiana), from the London Stock Exchange. Euronext’s primary data center is being transferred from London to Bergamo in northern Italy. Borsa Italiana is relatively small, with 407 listed companies and a market capitalization of 43 percent of GDP at the end of 2021, up from 37 percent at the end of 2020. Although the exchange remains primarily a source of capital for larger Italian firms, Borsa Italiana created “AIM Italia” in 2012 as an alternative exchange with streamlined filing and reporting requirements to encourage SMEs to seek equity financing. The GOI recognizes that Italian firms remain overly reliant on bank financing and has initiated some programs to encourage alternative forms of financing, including venture capital and corporate bonds. Financial experts have held that slow CONSOB (the Italian Companies and Stock Exchange Commission) processes and cultural biases against private equity have limited equity financing in Italy. The Italian Association of Private Equity, Venture Capital, and Private Debt (AIFI) estimates investment by venture capital and private equity funds in Italy increased by 142% in the first half of 2021 compared to the first half of 2020 (and by 81.5% over the first half of 2019) and totals around €4.5 billion – a low figure given the size of Italy’s economy. Italy’s financial markets are regulated by the Italian securities regulator CONSOB, Italy’s central bank (the Bank of Italy), and the Institute for the Supervision of Insurance (IVASS). CONSOB supervises and regulates Italy’s securities markets (e.g., the Milan Stock Exchange). As of January 2022, the European Central Bank directly supervised 13 of Italy’s largest banks and indirectly supervised less significant Italian banks through the Bank of Italy. IVASS supervises and regulates insurance companies. Liquidity in the primary markets is sufficient to enter and exit sizeable positions, though Italian capital markets are small by international standards. Liquidity may be limited for certain less-frequently traded investments (e.g., bonds traded on the secondary and OTC markets). Italian policies generally facilitate the flow of financial resources to markets. Dividends and royalties paid to non-Italians may be subject to a withholding tax, unless covered by a tax treaty. Dividends paid to permanent establishments of non-resident corporations in Italy are not subject to the withholding tax. Italy imposed a financial transactions tax (FTT, or Tobin Tax) beginning in 2013. Financial trading is taxed at 0.1 percent in regulated markets and 0.2 percent in unregulated markets. The FTT applies to daily balances rather than to each transaction. The FTT applies to trade in derivatives as well, with fees ranging from €0.025 to €200. High-frequency trading is also subject to a 0.02 percent tax on trades occurring every 0.5 seconds or faster (e.g., automated trading). The FTT does not apply to “market makers,” pension and small-cap funds, transactions involving donations or inheritances, purchases of derivatives to cover exchange/interest-rate/raw-materials (commodity market) risks, government and other bonds, or financial instruments for companies with a capitalization of less than €500 million. The FTT has been criticized for discouraging small savers from investing in publicly traded companies on the Milan stock market. There are no restrictions on foreigners engaging in portfolio investment in Italy. Financial services companies incorporated in another EU member state may offer investment services and products in Italy without establishing a local presence. Since April 2020, investors, Italian or foreign, acquiring a stake of more than one percent of a publicly traded Italian firm must inform CONSOB but do not need its approval. Earlier the limit was three percent for non-SMEs and five percent for SMEs. Any Italian or foreign investor seeking to acquire or increase its stake in an Italian bank equal to or greater than ten percent must receive prior authorization from the BOI. Acquisitions of holdings that would change the controlling interest of a banking group must be communicated to the BOI at least 30 days in advance of the closing of the transactions. Approval and advance authorization by the Italian Insurance Supervisory Authority are required for any significant acquisition in ownership, portfolio transfer, or merger of insurers or reinsurers. Regulators retain the discretion to reject proposed acquisitions on prudential grounds (e.g., insufficient capital in the merged entity). Italy has sought to curb widespread tax evasion by improving enforcement and changing attitudes. GOI actions include a public communications effort to reduce tolerance of tax evasion; increased and visible financial police controls on businesses (e.g., raids on businesses in vacation spots at peak holiday periods); and audits requiring individuals to document their income. Tax reforms implemented in 2015 institutionalized some OECD best practices to encourage taxpayer compliance, including by reducing the administrative burden for taxpayers through the increased use of technology such as e-filing, pre-completed tax returns, and automated screenings of tax returns for errors and omissions prior to a formal audit. The reforms also offer additional certainty for taxpayers through programs such as cooperative compliance and advance tax rulings (i.e., binding opinions on tax treatment of transactions in advance) for prospective investors. In July 2021, the Draghi-led government approved overarching guidelines of a general tax reform to simplify Italy’s tax system, which remains complex and has relatively high tax rates on labor income. The tax reform, however, which is part of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) must still be finalized and then implemented through a series of decrees. The GOI and the BOI have accepted and respect IMF obligations, including Article VIII. Despite isolated problems at individual Italian banks, the banking system remains sound and capital ratios exceed regulatory thresholds. However, Italian banks’ profit margins have suffered since 2011. The BOI said the profitability of Italian banks in 2020 declined significantly during the pandemic, with the annualized rate of return on equity (ROE) falling from 5.0 percent to 1.9 percent (net of extraordinary components). Government support measures for households and firms and the economy’s recovery in 2021 contributed to mitigating the effects of the pandemic on the quality banks’ assets. The capitalization of large banks (the ratio between common tier 1 equity and risk weighted assets) stood at 15.5 percent at the end of 2020, an increase of 150 basis points compared to the end of 2019. While the BOI has not yet released ROE data for 2021, major Italian banks reported significant improvements in their profitability compared to 2020. For example, even troubled Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) recorded a €310 million profit, its best result since 2015. While the financial crisis brought a pronounced worsening of the quality of banks’ assets, the ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to total outstanding loans has decreased significantly since its height in November 2015, as banks continue to offload NPLs and unlikely-to-pay loans. As of December 2021, net NPLs decreased to €15.1 billion, the lowest since March 2009 and down from €20.9 billion in December 2020. ABI, the Italian banking association, reported the NPL ratio was 0.86% (net of provisions) in December 2021, compared to 1.21% in December 2020 and 4.89% in November 2015 when NPLs reached record level of €88.8 billion. The GOI has also taken steps to facilitate acquisitions of NPLs by outside investors. In 2016, the GOI created a €20 billion bank rescue fund to assist struggling Italian banks in need of liquidity or capital support. Italy’s fourth-largest bank, MPS, became the first bank to avail itself of this fund in January 2019. The government currently owns 64 percent of MPS but failed to exit the bank by the beginning of 2022, as agreed with EU authorities. The GOI also facilitated the sale of two struggling “Veneto banks” (Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca) to Intesa Sanpaolo in 2017. Italy’s Interbank Deposit Guarantee Fund (FITD) now owns 80 percent of Banca Carige after an industry-financed rescue in 2019. (Carige had been the smallest Italian bank under ECB supervision.) In February 2022, the board of Modena-based Bper bank approved a binding offer to acquire Carige for the symbolic price of €1 and a €530-million capital injection provided by FTID. The merger requires ECB approval and would create Italy’s fourth largest banking group with about €155 billion in assets. Government loan guarantees (to large companies via SACE, Italy’s export credit agency, and to SMEs via the Central Guarantee Fund, or Fondo Centrale di Garanzia) and repayment moratoriums also helped lead to an 8.5 percent increase in credit to firms in 2020, the fastest rate of growth since 2008. The guarantee on SMEs and large companies (though SACE) is set expire in June 2022, though it may be extended. The repayment moratorium expired in December 2021. Despite some banking-sector M&A activity in the past several years, the ECB, OECD, and Italian government continue to encourage additional consolidation to improve efficiency. In 2020, Italy had 59 (up from 55 in 2019) banking groups and 90 stand-alone banks (of which 39 were cooperative banks), as well as 81 subsidiaries of foreign banks. As of January 2022, there were 13 groups classified as “significant” under the EU’s Single Supervisory Mechanism. These systemically significant banks accounted for around 80 percent of banking groups’ total assets. The Italian banking sector remains overly concentrated on physical bank branches for delivering services, contributing to sector-wide inefficiency and low profitability. Electronic banking is available in Italy, but adoption remains below euro-zone averages. Cash remains widely used for transactions. The limit for cash transactions is €2000 but will be decreased to €1,000 beginning in 2023. Credit is allocated on market terms, with foreign investors eligible to receive credit in Italy. Credit in Italy remains largely bank driven. In practice, foreigners may encounter limited access to finance, as Italian banks may be reluctant to lend to prospective borrowers (even Italians) absent a preexisting relationship. The Ministry of Economy and Finance and BOI have indicated interest in blockchain technologies to transform the banking sector. Beginning in March 2021, the Italian Banking Association (ABI) implemented a Distributed Ledger Technology-based system across the Italian banking sector. The process aims to reconcile material (and not digitalized) products that are exchanged between banks, such as commercial paper or promissory notes. State-owned investment bank Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) launched a strategic wealth fund in 2011, now called CDP Equity (formerly Fondo Strategico Italiano – FSI). CDP Equity has €4.9 billion in invested capital and fourteen companies in its portfolio, holding both majority and minority participations. CDP Equity invests in companies of relevant national interest and on its website ( http://en.cdpequity.it/ ) provides information on its funding, investment policies, criteria, and procedures. CDP Equity is open to capital investments from outside institutional investors, including foreign investors. CDP Equity is a member of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds and follows the Santiago Principles. 10. Political and Security Environment Politically motivated violence is not a threat to foreign investments in Italy. On rare occasion, extremist groups have made threats and deployed letter bombs, firebombs, and Molotov cocktails against Italian public buildings, private enterprises and individuals, and foreign diplomatic facilities. Though many of these groups have hostile views of the United States, they have not targeted U.S. property or citizens in recent years. Italy-specific travel information and advisories can be found at: www.travel.state.gov. Jamaica Executive Summary The Government of Jamaica (GOJ) considers foreign direct investment (FDI) a key driver for economic growth and in recent years has undertaken macroeconomic reforms that have improved its investment climate. However, the reform program was stymied by measures implemented to contain the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. An early lockdown in the Spring of 2020 helped contain the number of Covid-19 cases but the impact on the economy was severe, with real GDP shrinking by 10 percent. To mitigate the impact of the pandemic on public health and the economy, the authorities suspended the fiscal rule for a year and swiftly implemented public health measures and a fiscal package to support jobs and protect the most vulnerable segments of the population. The downturn and the fiscal package resulted in a fiscal deficit of 3.1 percent of GDP in FY2020/21. The Jamaican economy contracted during fiscal year (FY) 2020/21, underpinned by a near collapse in tourism and travel and weaker disposable incomes. But unlike previous shocks, the country did not experience the usual bouts of macroeconomic instability, suggesting the past decade of economic and legislative reforms are beginning to bear fruit. The Jamaican economy is also recovering from the effects of the pandemic well ahead of regional peers, with economic growth of 7-9 percent projected for FY 2021/22. Robust construction activities, a strong rebound in tourist arrivals, and record remittances, both mostly from the United States, provided the impetus for growth. The expansion in economic activity spurred a rebound in employment, with the unemployment rate falling to a historic low of 7.1 percent. The economic recovery combined with strong fiscal management allowed the government to generate the primary surplus required to reverse the debt to GDP ratio, which is expected to return to the pre-pandemic levels. The economic turnaround also contributed to a general improvement in business and consumer confidence. Notwithstanding, inflation and inflationary expectations are beginning to threaten stability, forcing the central bank to tighten monetary policy. On March 09, 2022, Fitch Ratings Agency affirmed Jamaica’s Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at ‘B+’ and assigned a stable outlook. Fitch reported that Jamaica’s ‘B+’ rating was supported by a favorable business climate and government efforts to lower the debt to GDP ratio. The agency explained that the country remained susceptible to external shocks, low growth levels, high public debt and a debt composition that exposes the country to exchange rate fluctuations and interest rate hikes. “The Stable Outlook is supported by Fitch’s expectation that having been interrupted by the pandemic, a downward trend in public debt-to-GDP will be underpinned by political consensus to maintain a high primary surplus,” the agency continued. Jamaica received $366 million in FDI in 2020 (latest available data), a $299 million drop over the previous year. Despite the decline, data from the 2021 UNCTAD World Investment Report showed that Jamaica was the highest FDI destination in the English-Speaking Caribbean. China and Spain were the major drivers of FDI in 2020. Up to the onset of COVID-19, tourism, mining, and energy led investment inflows into the island. Though hard hit by the global pandemic, tourism and mining continued to drive foreign investment. Mineral and Chemicals investments also picked up in 2020. There is a significant host government commitment to mining, tourism, and airport development, which could resume when economic conditions improve. Business process outsourcing (BPO), including customer service and back-office support, continued to attract local and overseas investment. Investments in improved air, sea, and land transportation have reduced time and costs for transporting goods and have created opportunities in logistics. Jamaica’s high crime rate, corruption, and comparatively high taxes have stymied its investment prospects. The country’s Transparency International corruption perception ranking improved marginally from 74 (2019) to 69 (2020) out of 180 countries. Despite laws that prescribe criminal penalties for corrupt acts by officials, there were still reports of corruption at some ministries and agencies. Measures implemented to address crime continued into 2021, including the continuation of Zones of Special Operations in several high crime areas of the island. While these efforts resulted in lower rates of serious crime in the attendant zones, the measures did not significantly impact the overall murder rate, and Jamaica continues to have one of the highest homicide rates in the world. With energy prices a major component of the cost of doing business, the government has instituted a number of policies to address the structural impediment. In early 2020, the government published its Integrated Resource Plan (IRP), outlining the country’s electricity roadmap for the next two decades. The plan, which has been delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic, projected 1,164 MW of new generation capacity at a cost of $7.3 billion, including fuel cost and the replacement of retired plants. Renewable sources are projected to generate 50 percent of electricity by 2037, with Liquified Natural Gas (LNG), introduced in 2016, providing the lion’s share of the other 50 percent. The increased investment in new generation is expected to increase efficiency and reduce the price of electricity to consumers. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 70 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 29.6 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 USD 145 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,670 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Jamaica (GoJ) is open to foreign investment in all sectors of the economy. The GOJ made significant structural changes to its economy, under International Monetary Fund (IMF) guidance during the six-year period to 2019, resulting in an improved investment environment. Since 2013, Jamaica’s Parliament passed numerous pieces of legislation to improve the business environment and support economic growth through a simplified tax system and broadened tax base. The establishment of credit bureaus and a Collateral Registry under the Secured Interest in Personal Property (SIPP) legislation are improving access to credit. Jamaica made starting a business easier by consolidating forms and made electricity less expensive by reducing the cost of external connection works. The GOJ implemented an electronic platform for the payment of taxes and established a 90-day window for development approvals. The GOJ amended its public procurement regime with effect from April 2019, to include provisions for domestic margins of preference, affording preferential treatment to Jamaican suppliers in public contracts in some circumstances, and setting aside a portion of the government’s procurement budget for local micro, small, and medium enterprises. Notwithstanding, U.S. businesses are encouraged to participate in GOJ open procurements, many of which are published in media and via the government’s electronic procurement website: https://www.gojep.gov.jm/epps/home.do . Jamaica’s commitment to regulatory reform is an intentional effort to become a more attractive destination for foreign investment. According to the World Bank’s “Doing Business 2020” report, Jamaica ranked 71 out of 190 economies, above average compared to Latin American and Caribbean countries. The country improved or held firm on all metrics assessed in the 2020 report, moving most significantly in the area registering property. The GoJ replaced the Ad Valorem Stamp Duty rate payable on the registration of collateral, such as property used to secure loan instruments, with a flat rate duty. Additionally, the transfer tax, payable on the change of ownership from one person to another, was also reduced during the year from five to two percent. Jamaica is ranked 80 out of 141 countries in the World Economic Forum’s 2019 Global Competitiveness Index. Bureaucracy remains a major impediment, with the country continuing to underperform in the areas of trading across borders, paying taxes, and enforcing contracts. Jamaica’s trade and investment promotion agency, Jamaica Promotions Corporation (JAMPRO), is the GOJ agency responsible for promoting business opportunities to local and foreign investors. While JAMPRO does not institute general criteria for FDI, the institution targets specific sectors for investment and promotes Jamaican exports (see http://www.jamaicatradeandinvest.org/ ). JAMPRO and the Jamaica Business Development Corporation assist micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSME) primarily through business facilitation and capacity building. MSMEs tend to consist of less than 10 employees. Such fee-based services would be made available to foreign-owned MSMEs (see https://www.jbdc.net/ ). All private entities, foreign and domestic, are entitled to establish and own business enterprises, as well as to engage in all forms of remunerative activity subject to, inter alia, labor, registration, and environmental requirements. Jamaica does not impose limits on foreign ownership or control and local laws do not distinguish between local and foreign investors. There are no sector-specific restrictions that impede market access. A 2017 amendment to the Companies Act requires companies to disclose beneficial owners to the Companies Office of Jamaica (ORC). The law mandates that the company retain records of legal and beneficial owners for seven years. The GOJ proposed new legislation on the incorporation and operation of International Business Companies (IBC), which is designed to attract and facilitate a wide variety of international business activities to include: (1) holding companies providing asset protection for intellectual property rights, real property, and the shares of other companies; (2) serving as vehicles for licensing and franchising; (3) conducting international trade, and investment activities; (4) acting as special purpose vehicles in international financial transactions; and, (5) serving as the international headquarters for global companies. The U.S. government is not aware of any discrimination against foreign investors at the time of initial investment or after the investment is made. However, under the Companies Act, investors are required to either establish a local company or register a branch office of a foreign-owned enterprise. Branches of companies incorporated abroad must register with the Registrar of Companies if they intend to operate in Jamaica. There are no laws or regulations requiring firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association that limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control. Post is not aware of any formal screenings that exist for foreign investments. Incentives are available to local and foreign investors alike, including various levels of tax relief. Jamaica concluded a third-party trade policy review through the WTO in September 2017. The WTO Secretariat’s recommendations are listed here: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp459_e.htm Jamaica has not undertaken any investment policy reviews within the last three years in conjunction with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The GOJ’s previous WTO review took place in 2017 and an OECD review took place in 2004. No domestic or foreign civil society organizations have provided useful reviews of investment policy-related concerns within the past five years. Businesses can easily register using the “Super Form,” a single Business Registration Form for New Companies and Business Names. The ORC acts as a “one-stop-shop,” effectively reducing the registration time to between one and three days. Foreign companies can register using these forms, with or without the assistance of an attorney or notary. The “Super Form” can be accessed under Forms at the ORC’s website (https://www.orcjamaica.com). All that is needed is a device with access to the internet, an approved reserved name, proof of address (any recent document used to verify your current address such as a utility bill or driver’s license), and a valid ID (Driver’s License, Passport or Voters Id). The website gives detailed instructions throughout the process. While the GOJ does not actively promote an outward investment program, it does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Jamaica’s regulatory systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. Proposed legislation is available for public review at japarliament.gov.jm, and submissions are generally invited from members of the public when there is a distinct policy shift or for sensitive changes. There is no law that requires the rulemaking body to solicit comments on proposed regulation and no timeframe for the length of a consultation period when it happens. Furthermore, the law does not require reporting on public consultations, but the government presents the consultations directly to interested stakeholders in one unified report. Laws in effect are available at japarliament.gov.jm or moj.gov.jm. Companies interested in doing business in a particular sector should seek guidance from the relevant regulator(s), including the Office of Utilities Regulation (OUR) for utilities, the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) for deposit taking institutions (DTIs) and the Financial Services Commission (FSC) for non-DTIs. Jamaica is compliant with established benchmarks for public disclosure of its budget, the establishment and functioning of an independent and supreme audit body, and the award of contracts for natural resource extraction. Additionally, Jamaica’s Public Debt Management Act (PDMA) of 2012 has codified a gradual reduction in its contingent liability or Government Guaranteed Loans (GGL). The PDMA targets a three percent GGL-to-GDP ratio by 2027. Jamaica has adopted IFRS Standards including the IFRS for SMEs Standard for all companies. Jamaica adopted IFRS Standards in 2000 by Resolution of the members of the ICAJ. The Jamaica Corporate Governance Code 2021 was officially launched on Friday, February 25, 2022. The Code remains the only tool of its kind to date in the Caribbean aimed at helping entities – public and private – to implement Corporate Governance best practices in keeping with international standards. The Code, which was prepared by the PSOJ Corporate Governance Committee through funding by IDB Invest is available for viewing and download here: https://www.psoj.org/corporate-governance-2/. The GOJ tends to adopt Commonwealth standards for its regulatory system, especially from Canada and the United Kingdom. In 2001, CARICOM member states established the Regional Organization for Standards and Quality (CROSQ) under Article 67 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. CROSQ is intended to harmonize regional standards to facilitate the smooth movement of goods in the common market. Jamaica is also a full member of the WTO and is required to notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee of Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Jamaica has a common law legal system and court decisions are generally based on past judicial declarations. The Jamaican Constitution provides for an independent judiciary with a three-tier court structure. A party seeking to enforce ownership or contractual rights can file a claim in the Resident Magistrate or Supreme Court. Appeals on decisions made in these courts can be taken before the Court of Appeal and then to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the United Kingdom. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), in its original jurisdiction, is the court of the 15-member Caribbean Community (CARICOM), but Jamaica has not signed on to its appellate jurisdiction. Jamaica does not have a single written commercial or contractual law and case law is therefore supplemented by the following pieces of legislation: (1) Arbitration (Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards) Act; (2) Companies Act; (3) Consumer Protection Act; (4) Fair Competition Act; (5) Investment Disputes Awards (Enforcement) Act; (6) Judgment (Foreign) (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act; (7) Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act; (8) Loans (Equity Investment Bonds) Act; (9) Partnership (Limited) Act; (10) Registration of Business Names Act; (11) Sale of Goods Act; (12) Standards Act; and, (13) Trade Act. The commercial and civil divisions of the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to hear intellectual property claims. Jamaica enforces the judgments of foreign courts through: (1) The Judgment and Awards (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act; (2) The Judgment (Foreign) (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act; and (3) The Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act. Under these acts, judgments of foreign courts are accepted where there is a reciprocal enforcement of judgment treaty with the relevant foreign state. International arbitration is also accepted as a means for settling investment disputes between private parties. The Jamaican judicial system has a long tradition of being fair, but court cases can take years or even decades to resolve. A new Chief Justice appointed in 2018 has set aggressive benchmarks to streamline the delivery of judgments, bring greater levels of efficiency to court administration, and target throughput rates in line with international best practice. Efforts are currently underway to provide hearing date certainty and disposition of cases within 24 months, barring exceptional circumstances. The deployment of new courtrooms and the appointment of additional Appeal Court Judges are indicators of Jamaica’s commitment to justice reform. Challenges with dispute resolution usually reflect broader problems within the court system, including long delays and resource constraints. Subsequent enforcement of court decisions or arbitration awards is usually adequate, and the local court will recognize the enforcement of an international arbitration award. A specialized Commercial Court was established in 2001 to expedite the resolution of commercial cases. The rules do not make it mandatory for commercial cases to be filed in the Commercial Court and the Court is largely underutilized by litigants. Jamaica ranked 119 in the 2019 World Bank Doing Business Report on the metric of enforcement of contracts, scoring 64.8 in the length of time taken for enforcement, 43.6 for costs associated with litigation and 52.8 on the quality of judicial processes. There are no specific laws or regulations specifically related to foreign investment. Since foreign companies are treated similar to Jamaican companies when investing, the relevant sections of the applicable laws are applied equally. The Fair-Trading Commission (FTC), an agency of the Ministry of Industry, Investment and Commerce, administers the Fair Competition Act (FCA). The major objective of the FCA is to foster competitive behavior and provide consumer protection. The Act proscribes the following anti-competitive practices: resale price maintenance; tied selling; price fixing; collusion and cartels; and bid rigging. The Act does not specifically prohibit mergers or acquisitions that could lead to the creation of a monopoly. The FTC is empowered to investigate breaches of the Act and businesses or individuals in breach can be taken to court if they fail to implement corrective measures outlined by the FTC. Expropriation is generally not an issue in Jamaica, although land may be expropriated for national development under the Land Acquisition Act, which provides for compensation on the basis of market value. The U.S. government is not aware of any current expropriation-related litigation between the Jamaican government and any private individual or company. However, the U.S. government assisted investors who had property expropriated during the 1970’s socialist regime, with a payment in one such case received in 2010. Jamaica enacted new insolvency legislation in 2014 that replaced the Bankruptcy Act of 1880 and seeks to make the insolvency process more efficient. The Act prescribes the circumstances under which bankruptcy is committed; the procedure for filing a bankruptcy petition; and the procedures to be followed in the administration of the estates of bankrupts. The reform addresses bankruptcy; insolvency, receiverships; provisional supervision; and winding up proceedings. The law addresses corporate and individual insolvency and facilitates the rehabilitation of insolvent debtors, while removing the stigma formerly associated with either form of insolvency. Both insolvents and “looming insolvents” (persons who will become insolvent within twelve months of the filing of the proposal if corrective or preventative action is not taken) are addressed in the reforms. The Act contains a provision for debtors to make a proposal to their creditors for the restructuring of debts, subject to acceptance by the creditor. Creditors can also invoke bankruptcy proceedings against the debtor if the amount owed is not less than the prescribed threshold or if the debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy. The filing of a proposal or notice of intention to file a proposal creates a temporary stay of proceedings. During this period, the creditor is precluded from enforcing claims against the debtor. The stay does not apply to secured creditors who take possession of secured assets before the proposal is filed; gives notice of intention to enforce against a security at least 10 days before the notice of intention or actual proposal is filed; or rejects the proposal. The 2014 legislation makes it a criminal offence if a bankrupt entity defaults on certain obligations set out in the legislation. Jamaica ranked 34 on Resolving Insolvency in the 2020 World Bank’s Doing Business Report. Bankruptcy proceedings take about a year to resolve, costing 18 percent of the estate value with an average recovery rate of 65 percent. The text of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act can be found at: http://www.japarliament.gov.jm/attachments/341_The%20Insolvency%20Act%202014%20No.14%20rotated.pdf 6. Financial Sector Credit is available at market terms, and foreigners are allowed to borrow freely on the local market at market-determined rates of interest. A relatively effective regulatory system was established to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. Jamaica has had its own stock exchange, the Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE), since 1969. The JSE was the top performing capital market indices in 2018 and was among the top five performers in 2019. The Financial Services Commission (FSC) and the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ), the central bank, regulate these activities. Jamaica adheres to IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. At the end of 2021 there were 11 deposit-taking institutions (DTIs) consisting of eight commercial banks, one merchant bank (Licensed under the Financial Institutions Act) and two building societies. The number of credit unions shrank from 47 at the end of 2009 to 25 at the end of 2021. Commercial banks held assets of approximately $14 billion at the end of 2021. Non-performing loans (NPL) of $200 million at end December 2020, were 3 percent of total loans. Five of the country’s eight commercial banks are foreign owned. After a financial sector crisis in the mid-1990s led to consolidations, the sector has remained largely stable. In October 2018, the GOJ took legislative steps to modernize and make the central bank operationally independent through the tabling of amendments to the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) Act. The modernization program includes, inter alia, the institutionalization of the central bank independence, improved governance, and the transitioning of monetary policy towards inflation targeting. The modernization efforts continued in 2020 with the passage of the Bank of Jamaica Amendment Act to allow for, among other things: (1) full-fledged inflation targeting; (2) improved capitalization, governance, transparency, and accountability; (3) monetary policy decisions to be devolved to a monetary policy committee; and (4) the central bank Governor to account to Parliament. The Act will therefore remove the power of the government to give monetary policy direction to the central bank. These changes will move Jamaica’s financial governance framework closer in line with international standards. In May of 2020, the BOJ, as a part of their ongoing retail payments reform, ventured into the digital innovation that is fast becoming a feature of global central banks, central bank digital currency (CBDC). CBDC is a digital form of central bank issued currency and is therefore legal tender. It is not to be confused with cryptocurrency, which is privately issued and not backed by a central authority. CBDC is fully backed by the Central Bank, the sole issuer. The Bank of Jamaica will roll out the digital Jamaican dollar in 2022 after a successful pilot during 2021. Jamaica does not have a sovereign wealth fund or an asset management bureau. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Jamaican SOEs are most prominent in the agriculture, mining, energy, and transport sectors of the economy. Of 149 public bodies, 54 are self-financing and are therefore considered SOEs as either limited liability entities established under the Companies Act of Jamaica or statutory bodies created by individual enabling legislation. SOEs generally do not receive preferential access to government contracts. SOEs must adhere to the provisions of the GOJ (Revised) Handbook of Public Sector Procurement Procedures and are expected to participate in a bidding process to provide goods and services to the government. SOEs also provide services to private sector firms. SOEs must report quarterly on all contracts above a prescribed limit to the Integrity Commission. Since 2002, SOEs have been subject to the same tax requirements as private enterprises and are required to purchase government-owned land and raw material and execute these transactions on similar terms as private entities. Jamaica’s Public Bodies Management and Accountability Act (PBMA) requires SOEs to prepare annual corporate plans and budgets, which must be debated and approved by Parliament. As part of the GOJ’s economic reform agenda, SOE performance is monitored against agreed targets and goals, with oversight provided by stakeholders including representatives of civil society. The GOJ prioritized divestment of SOEs, particularly the most inefficient, as part of its IMF reform commitments. Private firms compete with SOEs on fair terms and SOEs generally lack the same profitability motives as private enterprises, leading to the GOJ’s absorbing the debt of loss-making public sector enterprises. Jamaica’s public bodies report to their respective Board of Directors appointed by the responsible portfolio minister and while no general rules guide the allocation of SOE board positions, some entities allocate seats to specific stakeholders. In 2012, the GOJ approved a Corporate Governance Framework (CGF) under which persons appointed to boards should possess the skills and competencies required for the effective functioning of the entity. With some board members being selected on the basis of their political affiliation, the government is in the process of developing new board policy guidelines. The Jamaican court system, while slow, is respected for being fair and balanced and in many cases has ruled against the GOJ and its agents. As part of its economic reform program, the GOJ identified a number of public assets to be privatized from various sectors. Jamaica actively courts foreign investors as part of its divestment strategy. In certain instances, the government encourages local participation. Restrictions may be placed on certain assets due to national security considerations. Privatization can occur through sale, lease, or concession. Transactions are generally executed through public tenders, but the GOJ reserves the right to accept unsolicited proposals for projects deemed to be strategic. The Development Bank of Jamaica, which oversees the privatization program, is mandated to ensure that the process is fair and transparent. When some entities are being privatized, advertisements are placed locally and through international publications, such as the Financial Times, New York Times, and Wall Street Journal, to attract foreign investors. Foreign investors won most of the privatization bids in the last decade. While the time taken to divest assets depends on state of readiness and complexity, on average transactions take between 18 and 24 months. The process involves pre-feasibility and due diligence assessments; feasibility studies; pre-qualification of bidders; and a public tender. In 2019 the GOJ divested two of its major assets through initial public offerings (IPOs): a 62-megawatt wind farm, which raised almost $40 million, and a toll highway, which raised almost $90 million. The GOJ is in planning to divest the Jamaica Mortgage Bank and its minority interest in the electricity provider, the Jamaica Public Service, through public offerings. In 2018, the GOJ signed a 25-year concession for the management and development of the Norman Manley International Airport in Kingston. Other large privatizations include the 2003 privatization of Sangster International Airport in Montego Bay and the 2015 privatization of the Kingston Container Terminal port facility. A list of current privatization transactions can be found at http://dbankjm.com/current-transactions/. 10. Political and Security Environment Crime poses a greater threat to foreign investment in Jamaica than political violence, as the country has not experienced any major political violence since the early 1980s. Violent crime, mostly attributed to gangs, is rooted in poverty, unemployment, social neglect, and transnational crime, including so-called “lottery-scamming”, and is a serious problem in Jamaica. Gang violence is highly concentrated in inner-city neighborhoods but can occur elsewhere. The Jamaica Constabulary Force recorded 1,463 murders in 2021, a per capita homicide rate of roughly 50 per 100,000, the highest homicide rate in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2021. Jamaica also faces a significant problem with extortion in certain urban commercial areas and on large construction project sites. The security challenges increase the cost of doing business as companies spend on additional security measures. The U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory (of March 2022) assesses Jamaica at Level 3, indicating travelers should exercise increased caution. U.S. companies with personnel assigned to Jamaica are strongly advised to conduct security and cultural awareness training. Please refer to the Jamaica 2019 Crime and Safety Report from the Department of State’s Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) for additional information (https://www.osac.gov/Country/Jamaica/Detail). Japan Executive Summary Japan is the world’s third largest economy, the United States’ fourth largest trading partner, and, as of 2020, the top provider of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States. The Japanese government welcomes and solicits inward foreign investment and has set modest goals for increasing inbound FDI. Despite Japan’s wealth, high level of development, and general acceptance of foreign investment, however, inbound FDI stocks, as a share of GDP, are the lowest among the OECD countries. On the one hand, Japan’s legal and regulatory climate is highly supportive of investors. Courts are independent, but attorney-client privilege does not exist in civil, criminal, or administrative matters, with the exception of limited application in cartel anti-trust investigations. There is no right to have counsel present during criminal or administrative interviews. The country’s regulatory system is improving transparency and developing new regulations in line with international norms. Capital markets are fairly deep and broadly available to foreign investors. Japan maintains strong protections for intellectual property rights with generally robust enforcement. The country remains a large, wealthy, and sophisticated market with world-class corporations, research facilities, and technologies. Nearly all foreign exchange transactions, including transfers of profits, dividends, royalties, repatriation of capital, and repayment of principal, are freely permitted. The sectors that have historically attracted the largest foreign direct investment in Japan are electrical machinery, finance, and insurance. On the other, foreign investors in the Japanese market continue to face numerous challenges. A traditional aversion towards mergers and acquisitions within corporate Japan has inhibited foreign investment, and weak corporate governance, among other factors, has led to low returns on equity and cash hoarding among Japanese firms, although business practices are improving in both areas, at least among leading firms. Investors and business owners must also grapple with inflexible labor laws and a highly regimented system of labor recruitment and management that can significantly increase the cost and difficulty of managing human resources. The Japanese government has recognized many of these challenges and is pursuing initiatives to improve investment conditions. A revised national Climate Law, which the National Diet passed unanimously in May 2021 and enters into full effect on April 1, 2022, will codify Japan’s decarbonization commitments under the Paris Agreement. The new legislation amends the law in three areas: requiring Japan to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, bolstering mechanisms to support and expedite decarbonization at the subnational level, and requiring digitalization and transparency of emissions-related information published by the Government of Japan (GOJ). Levels of corruption in Japan are low, but deep relationships between firms and suppliers as well as between large business and the bureaucrats who regulate them may limit competition in certain sectors and inhibit the entry of foreign firms into local markets. Future improvement in Japan’s investment climate is contingent largely on the success of structural reforms to raise economic growth. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 18 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 13 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 131,643 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 40,360 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Direct inward investment into Japan by foreign investors has been open and free since the Diet amended the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) in 1998. In general, the only requirement for foreign investors making investments in Japan is to submit an ex post facto report to the relevant ministries. The Diet further amended FEFTA in 2019, updating Japan’s foreign investment review regime. The legislation became effective in May 2020 and lowered the ownership threshold for pre-approval notification to the government for foreign investors from ten percent to one percent in industries that could pose risks to Japanese national security. There are waivers for certain categories of investors. The Japanese government explicitly promotes inward FDI and has established formal programs to attract it. In 2013, the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced its intention to double Japan’s inward FDI stock to JPY 35 trillion (USD 318 billion) by 2020 and reiterated that commitment in its revised Japan Revitalization Strategy issued in August 2016. At the end of 2020, Japan’s inward FDI stock was JPY 39.7 trillion (USD 386 billion), a 15.6 percent increase over the previous year, achieving the target. The previous administration set a target for inward FDI stocks to double to JPY 80 trillion ($672.3 billion with 1.0 USD = ¥119) by 2030, set out in the Basic Policies released in June 2021 by then-Prime Minister Suga. Achieving this goal would put Japan’s FDI stock as a percentage of GDP at around 20 percent of the OECD average. From time to time, the government’s “FDI Promotion Council,” composed of government ministers and private sector advisors, releases recommendations on improving Japan’s FDI environment. In a May 2018 report ( http://www.invest-japan.go.jp/documents/pdf/support_program_en.pdf ), the council decided to launch the Support Program for Regional Foreign Direct Investment in Japan, recommending that local governments formulate a plan to attract foreign companies to their regions. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) are the lead agencies responsible for assisting foreign firms wishing to invest in Japan. METI and JETRO have together created a “one-stop shop” for foreign investors, providing a single Tokyo location—with language assistance—where those seeking to establish a company in Japan can process the necessary paperwork (details are available at http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/invest/ibsc/ ). Prefectural and city governments also have active programs to attract foreign investors, but they lack many of the financial tools U.S. states and municipalities use to attract investment. Foreign investors seeking a presence in the Japanese market or seeking to acquire a Japanese firm through corporate takeovers may face additional challenges, however, many of which relate more to prevailing business practices rather than to government regulations, although this varies by sector. Such challenges include an insular and consensual business culture that has traditionally resisted unsolicited mergers and acquisitions (M&A), especially when initiated by non-Japanese entities; a lack of multiple independent directors on many company boards (although board composition is changing); exclusive supplier networks and alliances between business groups that can restrict competition from foreign firms and domestic newcomers; cultural and linguistic challenges; and longstanding labor practices that tend to inhibit labor mobility. Business leaders have communicated to the U.S. Embassy that regulatory and governmental barriers are more likely to exist in mature, heavily regulated sectors than in new industries. Foreign and domestic private enterprises have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. Japan has gradually eliminated most formal restrictions governing FDI. One remaining restriction limits foreign ownership in Japan’s former land-line monopoly telephone operator, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT), to 33 percent. Japan’s Radio Law and separate Broadcasting Law also limit foreign investment in broadcasters to 20 percent, or 33 percent for broadcasters categorized as providers of broadcast infrastructure. Authorities count foreign ownership of Japanese companies invested in terrestrial broadcasters against these limits. The limits do not apply to communication satellite facility owners, program suppliers, or cable television operators. The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, as amended, governs investment in sectors deemed to have national security or economic stability implications. If a foreign investor wants to acquire over one percent of the shares of a listed company in the sectors set out below, it must provide prior notification and obtain approval from the Ministry of Finance and the ministry that regulates the specific industry. Designated sectors include weapons manufacturers, nuclear power, agriculture, aerospace, forestry, petroleum, electric/gas/water utilities, telecommunications, and leather manufacturing. There are waivers for certain categories of investors. U.S. investors, relative to other foreign investors, are not disadvantaged or singled out by any ownership or control mechanisms, sector restrictions, or investment screening mechanisms. The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted its most recent review of Japan’s trade policies in July 2020 (available at directdoc.aspx (wto.org) ). The OECD released its biennial Japan economic survey results in December 2021 (available at http://www.oecd.org/japan/economic-survey-japan.htm ). The Japan External Trade Organization is Japan’s investment promotion and facilitation agency. JETRO operates six Invest Japan Business Support Centers (IBSCs) across Japan that provide consultation services on Japanese incorporation types, business registration, human resources, office establishment, and visa/residency issues. Through its website ( https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/invest/setting_up/ ), the organization provides English-language information on Japanese business registration, visas, taxes, recruiting, labor regulations, and trademark/design systems and procedures in Japan. While registration of corporate names and addresses can be completed online, most business registration procedures must be completed in person. In addition, corporate seals and articles of incorporation of newly established companies must be verified by a notary, although there are indications of change underway. Japan established a new Digital Agency in September 2021 to promote the digital provision of government services and digital transformation in the private sector. According to the 2020 World Bank “Doing Business” Report, it takes eleven days to establish a local limited liability company in Japan. JETRO reports that establishing a branch office of a foreign company requires one month, while setting up a subsidiary company takes two months. Although requirements vary according to the type of incorporation, a typical business must register with the Legal Affairs Bureau (Ministry of Justice), the Labor Standards Inspection Office (Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare), the Japan Pension Service, the district Public Employment Security Office, and the district tax bureau. JETRO operates a one-stop business support center in Tokyo so that foreign companies can complete all necessary legal and administrative procedures at one location. In 2017, JETRO launched an online business registration system that allows businesses to register company documents but not immigration documentation. No laws exist to explicitly prevent discrimination against women and minorities regarding registering and establishing a business. Neither special assistance nor mechanisms exist to aid women or underrepresented minorities. The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) provides a variety of support for outward Japanese foreign direct investment. Most such support comes in the form of “overseas investment loans,” which can be provided to Japanese companies (investors), overseas Japanese affiliates (including joint ventures), and foreign governments in support of projects with Japanese content, typically infrastructure projects. JBIC often supports outward FDI projects to develop or secure overseas resources that are of strategic importance to Japan, for example, construction of liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminals to facilitate sales to Japan and third countries in Asia. (Note: Days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, JBIC announced on March 3, 2022, that it would review the agreement it signed in November 2021 providing for a JPY 220 billion ($1.8 billion) in loans regarding LNG development in Russia.) More information on JBIC is available at https://www.jbic.go.jp/en/index.html . Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI) supports outward investment by providing exporters and investors insurance that protects them against risks and uncertainty in foreign countries that is not covered by private-sector insurers. Together, JBIC and NEXI act as Japan’s export credit agency. Japan also employs specialized agencies and public-private partnerships to target outward investment in specific sectors. For example, the Fund Corporation for the Overseas Development of Japan’s Information and Communications Technology and Postal Services (JICT) supports overseas investment in global telecommunications, broadcasting, and postal businesses. Similarly, the Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport and Urban Development (JOIN) is a government-funded corporation to invest and participate in transport and urban development projects that involve Japanese companies. The fund specializes in overseas infrastructure investment projects such as high-speed rail, airports, and smart city projects with Japanese companies, banks, governments, and other institutions (e.g., JICA, JBIC, NEXI). Finally, the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) is a Japanese government entity administered by the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy under METI. JOGMEC provides equity capital and liability guarantees to Japanese companies for oil and natural gas exploration and production projects. Japan places no restrictions on outbound investment, except under certain circumstances (e.g., with countries under international sanctions) that are listed in the appendix of the FEFTA. 3. Legal Regime Japan operates a highly centralized regulatory system in which national-level ministries and government organs play a dominant role. Regulators are generally sophisticated and there is little evidence of explicit discrimination against foreign firms. Most draft regulations and impact assessments are released for public comment before implementation and are accessible through a unified portal ( http://www.e-gov.go.jp/ ). Law, regulations, and administrative procedures are generally available online in Japanese along with regular publication in an official gazette. The Japanese government also actively maintains a body of unofficial English translations of some Japanese laws ( http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/ ). Some members of the foreign business community in Japan continue to express concern that Japanese regulators do not seek sufficient formal input from industry stakeholders with adequate time for them to prepare, relying instead on formal and informal connections between regulators and domestic firms to arrive at regulatory decisions. This practice may have the effect of disadvantaging foreign firms that lack the benefit of deep relationships with local regulators. The United States has encouraged the Japanese government to improve public notice and comment procedures to ensure consistency and transparency in rule-making and to give fair consideration to comments received. The National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE), issued by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), contains a description of Japan’s regulatory regime as it affects foreign exporters and investors. The Japanese government encourages environmental, social, and governance disclosure (ESG) to assist investors. The Financial Services Agency is coordinating closely with the international community on harmonizing these standards in the G20 and the Financial Stability Board, among other multilateral groups, and is working to implement these best practices domestically. It is working with the Tokyo Stock Exchange to catalogue ESG bonds issued within the exchange. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government provides subsidies that aim to partially cover certification and consulting costs incurred by entities issuing green bonds. Combined with subsidies funded by the Ministry of the Environment, the additional burden incurred by issuing entities can be reduced by as much as 90 percent. The Japanese Industrial Standards Committee (JISC), administered by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, plays a central role in maintaining Japan Industrial Standards (JIS). JISC aims to align JIS with international standards. According to JISC, as of March 31, 2021, 59 percent of Japan’s standards were harmonized with their international counterparts. Nonetheless, Japan maintains a large number of Japan-specific standards that can complicate efforts to introduce new products to the country. Japan is a member of the WTO and notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of proposed regulations. Japan is primarily a civil law country based on codified law. The Constitution and the five major legal codes (Civil, Civil Procedure, Commercial, Criminal, and Criminal Procedure) form the legal basis of the system. Japan has a fully independent judiciary and a consistently applied body of commercial law. An Intellectual Property High Court was established in 2005 to expedite trial proceedings in IP cases. Foreign judgments are recognized and enforced by Japanese courts under certain conditions. Major laws affecting foreign direct investment into Japan include the 1949 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, the 2005 Companies Act, and the 1948 Financial Instruments and Exchange Act. The Japanese government actively encourages FDI into Japan and has sought over the past decades to ease legal and administrative burdens on foreign investors, including with major reforms to the Companies Act in 2005 and the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act in 2008. The Japanese government amended the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act in 2019. The Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) holds sole responsibility for enforcing Japanese competition and anti-trust law, although public prosecutors may file criminal charges related to a JFTC finding. In fiscal year 2020, the JFTC investigated 101 suspected Antimonopoly Act (AMA) violations and completed 91 investigations. During this same time period, the JFTC issued 15 cease and desist orders and issued a total of JPY 4.3 billion (USD 42 million) surcharge payment orders to four companies. In 2019, the Diet amended the AMA and granted the JFTC discretion to incentivize cooperation with investigations and adjust surcharges according to the nature and extent of the violation. The JFTC also reviews proposed “business combinations” (i.e., mergers, acquisitions, increased shareholdings, etc.) to ensure that transactions do not “substantially … restrain competition in any particular field of trade.” In December 2019, amended merger guidelines and policies entered into force to “deal with business combinations in the digital market.” Data enjoys consideration as a competitive asset under these new guidelines along with the network effects characteristic of digital businesses. The JFTC has expanded authority (but under no legal obligation) to review merger cases, including “Non-Notifiable Cases,” when the transaction value is more than JPY 40 billion (USD 370 million) and the merger is expected to affect domestic consumers. Further, the amended policies suggest that parties consult with the JFTC voluntarily when the transaction value exceeds JPY40 billion and when one or more of the following factors is met: (i) When an acquired company has an office in Japan and/or conducts research and development in Japan; (ii) When an acquired company conducts sales activities targeting domestic consumers, such as developing marketing materials (website, brochures, etc.) in the Japanese language; or (iii) When the total domestic sales of an acquired company exceed JPY100 million (USD 920,000) Since 1945, the Japanese government has not expropriated any enterprise, and the expropriation or nationalization of foreign investments in Japan is highly unlikely. The World Bank 2020 “Doing Business” Report ranked Japan third worldwide for resolving insolvency. An insolvent company in Japan can face liquidation under the Bankruptcy Act or take one of four roads to reorganization: the Civil Rehabilitation Law; the Corporate Reorganization Law; corporate reorganization under the Commercial Code; or an out-of-court creditor agreement. The Civil Rehabilitation Law focuses on corporate restructuring in contrast to liquidation, provides stronger protection of debtor assets prior to the start of restructuring procedures, eases requirements for initiating restructuring procedures, simplifies and rationalizes procedures for the examination and determination of liabilities, and improves procedures for approval of rehabilitation plans. Out-of-court settlements in Japan tend to save time and expense but can lack transparency. In practice, because 100 percent creditor consensus is required for out-of-court settlements and courts can sanction a reorganization plan with only a majority of creditors’ approval, the last stage of an out-of-court settlement is often a request for a judicial seal of approval. There are three domestic credit reporting/credit monitoring agencies in Japan. They are not government-run. They are: Japan Credit Information Reference Center Corp. (JICC, https://www.jicc.co.jp/english/index.html ‘, member companies deal in consumer loans, finance, and credit); Credit Information Center (CIC, https://www.cic.co.jp/en/index.html , member companies deal in credit cards and credit); and Japan Bankers Association (JBA, https://www.zenginkyo.or.jp/pcic/ , member companies deal in banking and bank-issued credit cards). Credit card companies, such as Japan Credit Bureau (JCB), and large banks, such as Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (MUFG), also maintain independent databases to monitor and assess credit. Per Japan’s Banking Act, data and scores from credit reports and credit monitoring databases must be used solely by financial institutions for financial lending purposes. This information is provided to credit card holders themselves through services provided by credit reporting/credit monitoring agencies. Increasingly, however, to get around the law, real estate companies partner with a “credit guarantee association” and encourage or effectively require tenants to use its services. According to a 2017 report from the Japan Property Management Association (JPMA), roughly 80 percent of renters in Japan used such a service. While financial institutions can share data to the databases and receive credit reports by joining the membership of a credit monitoring agency, the agencies themselves, as well as credit card companies and large banks, do not necessarily share data with each other. As such, consumer credit information is generally underutilized and vertically siloed. A government-operated database, the Juminhyo or the “citizen documentation database,” is used for voter registration; confirmation of eligibility for national health insurance, national social security, and child allowances; and checks and registrations related to scholarships, welfare protection, stamp seals (signatures), and immunizations. The database is strictly confidential, government-controlled, and not shared with third parties or private companies. For the credit rating of businesses, there are at least seven credit rating agencies (CRAs) in Japan, including Moody’s Japan, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Japan, Tokyo Shoko Research, and Teikoku Databank. See Section 9 for more information on business vetting in Japan. 6. Financial Sector Japan maintains no formal restrictions on inward portfolio investment except for certain provisions covering national security. Foreign capital plays an important role in Japan’s financial markets, with foreign investors accounting for the majority of trading shares in the country’s stock market. Historically, many company managers and directors have resisted the actions of activist shareholders, especially foreign private equity funds, potentially limiting the attractiveness of Japan’s equity market to large-scale foreign portfolio investment, although there are signs of change. Some firms have taken steps to facilitate the exercise of shareholder rights by foreign investors, including the use of electronic proxy voting. The Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) maintains an Electronic Voting Platform for Foreign and Institutional Investors. All holdings of TSE-listed stocks are required to transfer paper stock certificates into electronic form. The Japan Exchange Group (JPX) operates Japan’s two largest stock exchanges – in Tokyo and Osaka – with cash equity trading consolidated on the TSE since July 2013 and derivatives trading consolidated on the Osaka Exchange since March 2014. In January 2014, the TSE and Nikkei launched the JPX Nikkei 400 Index. The index puts a premium on company performance, particularly return on equity (ROE). Companies included are determined by such factors as three-year average returns on equity, three-year accumulated operating profits and market capitalization, along with others such as the number of external board members. Inclusion in the index has become an unofficial “seal of approval” in corporate Japan, and many companies have taken steps, including undertaking share buybacks, to improve their ROE. The Bank of Japan has purchased JPX-Nikkei 400 exchange traded funds (ETFs) as part of its monetary operations, and Japan’s massive Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) has also invested in JPX-Nikkei 400 ETFs, putting an additional premium on membership in the index. The TSE and FSA revised the Corporate Governance Code in 2021 to reflect the realignment of TSE segmentations to be implemented in 2022. The revised guidelines require companies, to be listed in the “Prime Section,” a top-tier TSE section, to have more than one-third external directors. Japan does not restrict financial flows and accepts obligations under IMF Article VIII. Credit is available via multiple instruments, both public and private, although access by foreigners often depends upon visa status and the type of investment. Banking services are easily accessible throughout Japan; it is home to many of the world’s largest private commercial banks as well as an extensive network of regional and local banks. Most major international commercial banks are also present in Japan, and other quasi-governmental and non-governmental entities, such as the postal service and cooperative industry associations, also offer banking services. For example, the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Associations offers services through its bank (Norinchukin Bank) to members of the organization. Japan’s financial sector is generally acknowledged to be sound and resilient, with good capitalization and with a declining ratio of non-performing loans. While still healthy, most banks have experienced pressure on interest margins and profitability as a result of an extended period of low interest rates capped by the Bank of Japan’s introduction of a negative interest rate policy in 2016, especially some of the regional banks. The country’s three largest private commercial banks, often collectively referred to as the “megabanks,” are MUFG Bank (a banking subsidiary of Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group), Mizuho Bank (Mizuho Financial Group), and SMBC (Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group). Collectively, they hold assets reaching USD 6.0 trillion at September end of 2021. Japan’s second largest bank by assets – with more than USD 2.0 trillion – is Japan Post Bank, a financial subsidiary of the Japan Post Holdings(which holds 88.99 percent of the bank’s shares as of September 2021). Japan Post Bank offers services via 23,815 Japan Post office branches, at which Japan Post Bank services can be conducted, as well as Japan Post’s network of 31,901 ATMs nationwide, as of the end of March 2021. Many foreign banks operate in Japan offering both banking and other financial services. Like their domestic counterparts, foreign banks are regulated by the Japan Financial Services Agency (FSA). According to the IMF, there have been no observations of reduced or lost correspondent banking relationships in Japan. There are 518 correspondent financial institutions that have current accounts at the country’s central bank (including 123 main banks; 11 trust banks; 50 foreign banks; and 247 credit unions). Foreigners wishing to establish bank accounts must show a passport, visa, and foreigner residence card; temporary visitors may not open bank accounts in Japan. Other requirements (e.g., evidence of utility registration and payment, Japanese-style signature seal, etc.) may vary according to institution. Language may be a barrier to obtaining services at some institutions; foreigners who do not speak Japanese should research in advance which banks are more likely to offer bilingual services. Japanese regulators are encouraging “open banking” interactions between financial institutions and third-party developers of financial technology applications through application programming interfaces (“APIs”) when customers “opt-in” to share their information. As a result of the government having set a target to have 80 banks adopt API standards by 2020, more than 100 subject banks reportedly have done so. Many of the largest banks are participating in various proofs of concept using blockchain technology. While commercial banks have not yet formally adopted blockchain-powered systems for fund settlement, they are actively exploring options, and the largest banks have announced intentions to produce their own virtual currencies at some point. The Bank of Japan is researching blockchain and its applications for national accounts and established a “Fintech Center” to lead this effort. The main banking regulator, the Japan Financial Services Agency also encourages innovation with financial technologies, including sponsoring an annual conference on “fintech” in Japan. In April 2017, amendments to the Act on Settlements of Funds went into effect, permitting the use of virtual currencies as a form of payment in Japan, but virtual currency is still not considered legal tender (e.g., commercial vendors may opt to accept virtual currencies for transactional payments, though virtual currency cannot be used as payment for taxes owed to the government). The law also requires the registration of virtual currency exchange businesses. There are currently 30 registered virtual currency exchanges in Japan, as of January 2022. Japan does not operate a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Japan has privatized most former state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Under the Postal Privatization Law, privatization of Japan Post group started in October 2007 by turning the public corporation into stock companies. The stock sale of the Japan Post Holdings Co. and its two financial subsidiaries, Japan Post Insurance (JPI) and Japan Post Bank (JPB), began in November 2015 with an IPO that sold 11 percent of available shares in each of the three entities. The postal service subsidiary, Japan Post Co., remains a wholly owned subsidiary of JPH. The Japanese government conducted additional public offerings of stock in September 2017 and October 2021, reducing the government ownership in the holding company to a little over one third. There were offerings in the insurance subsidiary in April 2019 and June 2021. JPH currently owns 88.99 percent of the banking subsidiary and 49.9 percent of the insurance subsidiary. Follow-on sales of shares in the two subsidiary companies will take place over time, but the government’s sale of JPH stocks in October 2021 is considered to be the last. The Postal Privatization Law requires the government to sell a majority share so that the government ownership would be “a little over one third” of all shares in JPH (which was completed in 2021), and JPH to sell all shares of JPB and JPI, as soon as possible. These offerings mark the final stage of Japan Post privatization begun under former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006) and respond to long-standing criticism from commercial banks and insurers—both foreign and Japanese—that their government-owned Japan Post rivals have an unfair advantage. While there has been significant progress since 2013 on private suppliers’ access to the postal insurance network, the U.S. government has continued to raise concerns about the preferential treatment given to Japan Post and some quasi-governmental entities compared to private sector competitors and the impact of these advantages on the ability of private companies to compete on a level playing field. A full description of U.S. government concerns regarding the insurance sector and efforts to address these concerns is available in the annual United States Trade Representative’s National Trade Estimate on Foreign Trade Barriers report for Japan. In sectors previously dominated by state-owned enterprises but now privatized, such as transportation, telecommunications, and package delivery, U.S. businesses report that Japanese firms sometimes receive favorable treatment in the form of improved market access and government cooperation. Deregulation of Japan’s power sector took a step forward in April 2016 with the full liberalization of retail electricity supply, allowing all consumers to choose their electricity provider. This change has led to increased competition from, and rapid growth in the number of, new entrants; as of March 2022, there were almost 750 registered electricity retailers nationwide. While the generation and transmission of electricity remain mostly in the hands of the legacy power utilities, new electricity retailers reached a 21-percent market share of the total volume of electricity sold as of November 2021. Japan implemented the third phase of its power sector reforms in April 2020 by requiring vertically integrated regional monopolies to “legally unbundle” the electricity transmission and distribution portions of their businesses from the power generation and retailing portions. The transmission and distribution businesses retain ownership of, and operational control over, the power grid in their regional service territories. In addition, many of the former vertically integrated regional monopolies created electricity retailers to compete in the fully deregulated retail market. American energy companies have reported increased opportunities in this sector, but also report that the regional power utilities have advantages over new entrants with regard to understanding the regulatory regime, securing sufficient low-cost generation in the wholesale market, and accessing infrastructure. For example, while the wholesale market allows new retailers to buy electricity for sale to customers, legacy utilities, which control most of the generation, sell relatively little power into that market. This limits the supply and increases the cost of electricity that new retailers can sell to consumers. While the liquidity of the wholesale electricity market has increased in recent years, new entrants — including American companies — report that they have few other options for cost-effectively securing the electricity they need to meet their supply obligations. In addition, as the large power utilities still control transmission and distribution lines, new entrants in power generation are not able to compete due to limited access to power grids. More information on the power sector from the Japanese Government can be obtained at: http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/electricity_and_gas/electric/electricity_liberalization/what/ 10. Political and Security Environment Political violence is rare in Japan. Acts of political violence involving U.S. business interests are virtually unknown. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $5,039,813 2020 $5,057,759 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $62,930 2020 $131,643 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $563,367 2020 $647,718 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 7.37% 2020 4.9% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ EconomicTrends/Fdi.html * Source for Host Country Data: *2020 Nominal GDP data from Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Japanese Government. February, 2022. (Note: uses exchange rate of 106.78 Yen to 1 U.S. Dollar and Calendar Year Average Data) The discrepancy between Japan’s accounting of U.S. FDI into Japan and U.S. accounting of that FDI can be attributed to methodological differences, specifically with regard to indirect investors, profits generated from reinvested earnings, and differing standards for which companies must report FDI. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (IMF CDIS, 2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 232,313 100% Total Outward 1,837,075 100% United States 62,748 27% United States 561,736 31% Singapore 35,629 15% China 138,566 8% France 30,774 13% Netherlands 134,492 7% Netherlands 20,886 9% United Kingdom 131,675 7% United Kingdom 14,466 6% Singapore 92,886 5% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Table 4: Portfolio Investment Portfolio Investment Assets (IMF CPIS, 2020 end) Top Five Partners (Millions, current US Dollars) Total Equity Securities Total Debt Securities All Countries 5,073,686 100% All Countries 2,078,430 100% All Countries 2,995,256 100% United States 2,072,497 41% Cayman Islands 777,816 37 United States 1,325,961 44% Cayman Islands 990,422 20% United States 746,535 36% France 263,330 9% France 300,213 6% Luxembourg 103,926 5% Cayman Islands 212,605 7% Australia 189,649 4% Ireland 59,243 3% Australia 163,873 5% United Kingdom 185,243 4% United Kingdom 39,338 2% United Kingdom 145,905 5% Jordan Executive Summary Since King Abdullah II’s 1999 ascension to the throne, Jordan has taken steps to encourage foreign investment and to develop an outward-oriented, market-based, and globally competitive economy. Jordan is also uniquely poised as a platform to host investments focused on the reconstruction of Iraq and other projects in regional markets. Jordan is committed to investment promotion as a key driver of economic growth and job creation, though in practice these policies are implemented unevenly. Traditionally, foreign investment has been concentrated in the energy (from both conventional sources and renewables), tourism, real estate, manufacturing, and services sectors. The Government of Jordan offers a range of incentives to potential investors and has undertaken measures to review and enhance the economic, financial, and legal framework governing the investment process. However, despite improvement on doing business indicators, operating in Jordan is more difficult than elsewhere in the region. U.S. investors specifically cite instability in the tax regime and incentive packages as a key challenge, as well as public-private interface issues including the government’s inconsistent interpretation of its policies and regulations. Jordan’s economic growth has been limited for over a decade by exogenous shocks, including the global financial crisis, energy disruptions during the 2011 Arab Spring, the 2015 closure of Jordans borders with Iraq and Syria, and the Syrian civil war. Although the borders with Iraq fully and Syria partially reopened in 2017 and 2018 respectively, cross-border movements have not recovered to previous levels. After a 1.6 percent GDP contraction in 2020 due to the pandemic, Jordan achieved 2.2 percent real GDP growth in 2021. IMF projections estimate growth will reach 2.7 percent in 2022. In recent years, the government has run large annual budget deficits and reducing the financing gap with loans, foreign grants, and savings. In March 2020, the IMF board approved a $1.3 billion Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program focused on fiscal consolidation, increased revenue collection, targeted social spending, economic growth, and job creation. The IMF also released additional credit from a Rapid Financing Instrument to help Jordan meet its fiscal obligations during the pandemic. In January 2022, Jordan and the IMF completed its third review of the EFF program. In October 2021, Jordan established a dedicated Ministry of Investment, which has absorbed the duties of the Jordan Investment Commission and the Public Private Partnerships (PPP) Unit. The Minister of Investment is charged with all issues related to local and foreign investors and setting policies to stimulate investment and enhance competitiveness. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) dropped slightly by 1.5 percent to JD 509.8 million ($720 million) in 2020 compared to 2019. FDI inflow reached JD 269.4 million ($380 million) during the first three quarters of 2021. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 58 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 81 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD $ 156 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2021 USD 4,310 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Jordan is largely open to foreign investment, and the government is committed to supporting foreign investment. Foreign and local investors are treated equally under the law. In October 2021, a new, dedicated Ministry of Investment absorbed the responsibilities of the Jordan Investment Commission (JIC) and is now responsible for implementing the 2014 Investment Law and promoting new and existing investment in Jordan. The Ministry is the focal point for investors and can expedite government services and investment incentives. The Ministry supervises and approves investment-related matters within guidelines set by the Investment Council and approved by the government. The Investment Council, comprised of the Prime Minister, ministers with economic portfolios, and representatives from the private sector, oversees the management and development of national investment policy and propose legislative and economic reforms to facilitate investment. The Ministry of Investment oversees an “Investment Window” to provide information and technical assistance to investors, with a mandate to simplify registration and licensing procedures for investment projects that benefit from the Investment Law. The Ministry will continue offering the same services that were initiated by The Jordan Investment Commission, including the “Follow-Up and After Care” department established in 2018 and the investor grievance mechanism introduced in 2019 to address investor complaints, with the aim to resolve legal disputes outside of the formal court system. In 2018, the government issued the “Code of Governance Practices of Policies and Legislative Instruments in Government Departments for the Year 2018.” It aims to increase legislative predictability and stability to ensure the confidence of citizens and the business sector. The government developed and adopted guidelines for a Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), to be implemented across all government entities. Investment and property laws allow U.S. entities to establish businesses in many, but not all, sectors. Foreign companies may open regional and branch offices; branch offices may carry out full business activities; and regional offices may serve as liaisons between head offices and Jordanian or regional clients. The Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply’s Companies Control Department implements the government’s policy on the establishment of regional and branch offices. Under the U.S.-Jordan Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. investors are granted several exceptions and are accorded the same treatment as Jordanian nationals, allowing U.S. investors to maintain 100 percent ownership in some restricted businesses. In some sectors, including aerospace and defense, travel and tourism, transportation, and media and entertainment, there are limits to U.S. ownership and/or requirements for key positions to be filled by Jordanian nationals, among other restrictions. The most up-to-date listing of limitations on U.S. investments is available in the FTA Annex 3.1 and may be found at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/jordan-fta/final-text Foreign nationals and firms are permitted to own or lease property in Jordan for investment purposes and are allowed one residence for personal use, provided that their home country permits reciprocal property ownership rights for Jordanians. Depending on the size and location of the property, the Land and Survey Department, the Ministry of Finance, and/or the Cabinet may need to approve foreign ownership of land and property, which must then be developed within five years of the date of approval. In 2020, the government amended its bylaw governing foreign ownership, expanding ownership percentage in some economic activities, while maintaining the following restrictions: Foreigners are prohibited from wholly or partially owning investigation and security services, stone quarrying operations for construction purposes, customs clearance services, and bakeries of all kinds; and are prohibited from trading in weapons and fireworks. The Cabinet, however, may approve foreign ownership of projects in these sectors upon the recommendation of the Investment Council. To qualify for the exemption, projects must be categorized as being highly valuable to the national economy. Investors are limited to 50 percent ownership in certain businesses and services, including retail and wholesale trading, engineering consultancy services, exchange houses apart from banks and financial services companies, maritime, air, and land transportation services, and related services. Foreign firms may not import goods without appointing an agent registered in Jordan; the agent may be a branch office or a wholly owned subsidiary of the foreign firm. The agent’s connection to the foreign company must be direct, without a sub-agent or intermediary. The bylaw authorizes the Council of Ministers, upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister to grant a higher percentage ownership to non-Jordanian investors in any investment based on a certain criterion. The Commercial Agents and Intermediaries Law No. 28/2001 governs contractual agreements between foreign firms and commercial agents. Private foreign entities, whether licensed under sole foreign ownership or as a joint venture, compete on an equal basis with local companies. For national security purposes, foreign investors must undergo security screening through the Ministry of Interior, which can be finalized through the Commission’s “Investment Window” located at the Investment Commission or online https://www.jic.gov.jo/en/home-new/. Jordan has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 2000. The WTO conducted Jordan’s second Trade Policy Review in November 2015. In 2012, the United States and Jordan agreed to Statements of Principles for International Investment and for Information and Communication Technology Services, and a Trade and Investment Partnership Bilateral Action Plan, each of which is designed to increase transparency, openness, and governmental and private sector cooperation. All current treaties and agreements in force between the United States and Jordan may be found here: https://www.state.gov/treaties-in-force/ As a follow-up to OECD’s Investment Policy Review of Jordan and Jordan’s adherence to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises in 2013, the MENA-OECD competitiveness program issued a report in 2018 entitled “Enhancing the legal framework for sustainable investment: Lessons from Jordan” (http://www.oecd.org/mena/competitiveness/Enhancing-the-Legal-Framework-forSustainable-Investment-Lessons-from-Jorden.pdf). The Jordan Strategy Forum (JSF), a leading think tank on economic development, regularly publishes an Investor Confidence Index and Investor Confidence Survey (in Arabic) on its website ( http://www.jsf.org ). JSF has published a policy paper on how to increase FDI inflows into Jordan: http://jsf.org/sites/default/files/Opportunities%20to%20Attract%20Foreign%20Direct%20Investment.pdf . Businesses in Jordan need to register with the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Supply, Companies Control Department, or the Chambers of Commerce or Industry depending on the type of business they conduct. Registration is required to open a bank account, obtain a tax identification number and obtain a VAT number. New businesses also need to obtain a vocational license from the municipality, receive a health inspection, and register with the SSC. In February 2022, the Parliament endorsed a new law for licensing professions within the jurisdiction of the Greater Amman Municipality (GAM) to create a registration fast-track. More than 383 economic activities will be eligible to obtain their licenses within one day, or maximum seven days if the business is considered high-risk. The law also extended the validity of licenses from one to five years. The Ministry of Investment (which has absorbed the responsibilities of the Jordan Investment Commission) maintains an “Investment Window” which serves as a comprehensive investment center for investors. The Investment Window offers technical advice and complete registration and licensing services for investments inside and outside of development zones. Investors can register their businesses in one day if all documents are provided. Approvals for exemptions granted under the investment law can be approved and obtained in one week. Jordan has also adopted a single security approval for new investors. The new approval covers registering and licensing the company, obtaining driving licenses for investors, possessing immovable property for the establishment of investment projects in the industrial and developing zones, in addition to granting residence permits to non-Jordanian investors and their family members. The commission has published a number of online guides, including the investor guide ( Investor Guide – Moin ). In 2018, the Companies Control Department has developed and launched a portal for online registration: http://www.ccd.gov.jo /. Foreign investors can access it to register new companies. However, e-signatures have not been implemented, so investors must sign documents using notary services in their countries. In November 2019, under the Jordan Investment Commission (JIC), the government introduced several new online services including the issuance and renewal investor IDs, issuance and renewal of IDs for investors’ family members, registration of institutions in development zones, first-time registration of individual institutions, changing the method of use, registration and renewal of subscriptions to the Amman Chamber of Commerce (ACC), amendments to subscriptions to the ACC, and issuance of environmental permits. The introduction of these electronic services reduced the time needed to grant or renew the investor identification card (required to facilitate various transactions) to one day. ( home new – Moin ). In December 2020, the Greater Amman Municipality (GAM) digitized thirteen of its licensing related services, including vocational licensing and renewal. In 2018, Jordan launched a National Single Window (NSW) for customs clearance. In 2020, all export and import custom declarations became electronic. In January 2022, the government adopted a simplified import tariff structure and reduced tariff rates. The Ministry of Finance reduced tariff brackets from eleven levels of taxation to four, ranging from zero to 25 percent. The maximum tariff rate (previously 40 percent) was reduced to 25 percent and will be reduced to 15 percent by 2023 ( https://services.customs.gov.jo/JCcits/sections.aspx ). The Ministry of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship continues to encourage the use of e-services and expand the number of government transactions that can be completed online. As of March 2021, 413 e-services are available including services provided by the Greater Amman Municipality, Ministry of Investment, Tax Department, Ministry of Trade, and Jordan Customs. Jordan does not have a mechanism to specifically incentivize outward investment, nor does it restrict it. 3. Legal Regime Legal, regulatory, and accounting policies, applicable to both domestic and foreign investors, are transparent. The Jordanian Companies Law stipulates that all registered companies should maintain sound accounting records and present annual audited financial statements in accordance with internationally recognized accounting and auditing principles. According to the Jordanian Securities Commission (JSC) Law and Directives of disclosures, auditing, and accounting standards (1/1998), all entities subject to JSC’s supervision are required to apply International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In 2018, the government issued the “Code of Governance Practices of Policies and Legislative Instruments in Government Departments” to increase legislative predictability and the stability of legislative environment. Currently, the government is updating its Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) guidelines. Furthermore, it is working to establish a unified public consultation portal to ensure all government entities conduct consultations on all their regulations. In 2020, the Council of Ministers issued a “Legislation Data Memorandum,” which all government entities submitting new regulations are required to fill out. The memorandum provides information on the type and details of consultations conducted with the public and private sector. Laws and regulations are also published on the website of the Legislative and Opinion Bureau for public comment, in addition to executive branch consultations with the legislative branch and key stakeholders. The government is gradually implementing policies to improve competition and foster transparency in implementation. These reforms aim to change an existing system influenced inthe past by family affiliations, business ties, and other entrenched interests. The draft comprehensive business law, currently with the Legislative and Opinion Bureau undergoing an RIA, includes updates that will touch on anti-competitive practices, Investors’ rights, contract enforcement, insolvency, etc. All investments, including public sector projects, are required to conduct an environmental and social impact studies, before receiving final approval. Jordan is committed to its fiscal transparency policy; the Ministry of Finance publishes a monthly “General Government Finance Bulletin” and that includes detailed information on government’s debt obligations. ( arbic_pdf_december2-2021.pdf (mof.gov.jo) ) Jordan recognizes and accepts most U.S. standards and specifications. However, Jordan has occasionally required additional product standards for imports. Some of these measures have been viewed as barriers to trade, such as a 2014 restriction imposed on packaging sizes for poultry available for retail resale. As a member country of the WTO, Jordan is obliged to notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Jordan is a signatory of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. Jordan had implemented 88.7 percent of its commitments. Jordan submitted its notifications for Category A before the agreement came into force, is currently in the final review for categories B and C and must report completion by December 2022. Jordan has a mixed legal system based on civil law, sharia law (Islamic law), and customary law. The Constitution establishes the judiciary as one of three separate and independent branches of government. Jordanian commercial laws do not make a distinction between Jordanian and non-Jordanian investors. However, plaintiffs have complained about judicial backlogs and subsequent delays in legal proceedings. In 2018, Jordan has introduced economic judicial chambers. Jointly the Judicial Council in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice established a unit at the Amman First Instance Court and Amman Magistrate Court that includes judges who are solely dedicated to commercial cases specialized in hearing commercial cases exclusively, in accordance with the provisions of the Law of Formation of the amended Courts No. 30 of 2017. These chambers specialize in the adjudication of certain commercial and investment disputes mentioned in Article 4 of the Courts Formation Law. Jordan’s Investment Law governs local and foreign investment. The law consolidated three entities – the Jordan Investment Board, the Jordanian Development Zones Commission, and the Free Zones Corporation – into the Jordan Investment Commission, which was absorbed by the Ministry of Investment in 2021. The law incorporates a statement of investors’ rights and a legal framework for a single Investment Window. The Ministry published services and licensing guides outlining processes and fees, in addition to other guides on its website ( Publications – Moin ). In 2019, it passed amendments to the Foreign Investors bylaw which allowed larger foreign ownership in previously restricted sectors. In 2018, Jordan passed the Insolvency Law, Movable Assets and Secured Lending Law and Bylaw, the Venture Capital Bylaw, and the Income Tax Law, along with bylaws to ensure proper implementation. The government has worked to train and certify insolvency practitioners. To date, no company has successfully used the insolvency law to re-structure operations and obligations. In October 2019, Jordan published an amended Social Security Law stipulating temporary changes to the social security contributions of newly registered entities that meet specific conditions, with an aim to support new companies and startups. The government also issued the Investor Grievance Bylaw and established a special unit to follow up on investors’ cases. As of 2019, new investors are offered 10-year “incentive stability guarantees.” Since 2020, the Government of Jordan has a Public Private Partnership (PPP) Unit to identify and study investment opportunities. The PPP Unit falls under the Ministry of Investment and has received technical assistance from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and other donors. In 2021, the Parliament approved further amendments to the Companies Law, to allow virtual General Assembly and Board of Directors meetings. The amendments also stipulated companies must keep a record that includes information about the beneficial owner of shares and further obliged companies to disclose to the Companies Control Department the actual beneficiary, in support on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Law. There is no systematic or legal discrimination against foreign participation with respect to ownership and participation in Jordan’s major economic sectors other than the restrictions outlined in the governing regulations. In fact, many Jordanian businesses actively seek engagement with foreign partners to increase their competitiveness and access to international markets. The government’s efforts have made Jordan’s official investment climate welcoming; however, U.S. investors have reported hidden costs, bureaucratic red tape, vague regulations, and unclear or conflicting jurisdictions. Most economic regulations are available on the Ministry of Industry and Trade and Supply website ( https://www.mit.gov.jo/Default/AR ). All regulations are published in the Legislative and Opinion Bureau ( http://www.lob.jo/ ). Parliament passed amendments to Competition Law No. 33/2004 in 2011 to strengthen the local economic environment and attract foreign investment by providing incentives to improve market competitiveness, protect small and medium enterprises from restrictive anticompetitive practices, and give consumers access to high quality products at competitive prices. The Competition Directorate at the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Supply conducts market research, examines complaints, and reports violators to the judicial system. The investor grievance unit established in 2019 at the Ministry of Investment can also investigate unfair competition cases filed by investors. Article 11 of the Jordanian Constitution stipulates those expropriations are prohibited unless specifically deemed to be in the public interest. In cases of expropriation, the law mandates provision of fair compensation to the investor in convertible currency. The Commercial Code, Civil Code, and Companies Law collectively govern bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings. In December 2017, the cabinet endorsed a bankruptcy bylaw which stipulates procedures for optional and compulsory liquidation, along with the mechanism, liquidation plan, and required documentation and reporting. In 2018, Parliament passed the Insolvency Law, which allows individuals and companies to offset their financial position through a debt management plan. The law was designed to help the insolvent entity continue its economic activity, rather than directly resorting to bankruptcy. The law regulates insolvency proceedings for foreign organizations according to international conventions ratified by Jordan. As of 2022, judges had dismissed almost all petitions for insolvency on technical grounds and no company has yet used the insolvency law successfully. Defaulting on loans or issuing checks without adequate available balances is a crime in Jordan and may subject the offender to imprisonment under Jordan’s penal system. While Jordan is reexamining these laws, prison terms for debtors remains a legal practice in Jordan. Investors should conduct thorough due diligence on potential partners and avail themselves of local legal counsel to understand best business practices in Jordan and conform with local laws. The U.S. Commercial Service Office of the Embassy of the United States in Amman can assist American businesses in these endeavors. 6. Financial Sector There are three key capital market institutions: the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), and the Securities Depository Center (SDC). The ASE launched an Internet Trading Service in 2010, providing an opportunity for investors to engage in securities trading independent of geographic location. Jordan’s stock market is one of the most open among its regional competitors, with no cap on foreign ownership. As of end of February 2022, non-Jordanian ownership in companies listed on the ASE represented 48.3 percent of the total market value. The foreign ownership includes governments, institutional investors, and individuals. Non-Jordanian ownership in the financial sector was 52.2 percent, 21.5 percent in the services sector and 53.7 percent in the industrial sector. Despite recent reforms and technological advances, the ASE suffers from intermittent liquidity problems and low trading activity. No new listings have been added since 2008. Market capitalization at end of 2021 reached $21.8 billion, up by almost 20 percent from 2020 levels. The government respects IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms. The private sector has access to a limited variety of credit instruments relative to countries with more developed capital markets. Jordan has 24 banks, including commercial banks, Islamic banks, and foreign bank branches. Jordan does not distinguish between investment banks and commercial banks. Concentration in the banking sector has decreased over the past decade, the assets of the largest five banks accounted for 50.3 percent of licensed banks’ total assets at the end of 2020. The banking system is capably supervised by the CBJ, which publishes an annual Financial Stability Report. JFSR2020 Final 28-11-2021.pdf (cbj.gov.jo) Banks continue to be profitable and well-capitalized with deposits being the primary funding base. Liquidity and capital adequacy indicators remain strong largely due to the banks’ conservative and risk averse approach, and due to strict regulations on lending, particularly mortgage lending. The non-performing loan ratio reached 5.45 percent at the end of 2020. The rate of non-performing loans is expected to increase in 2022 as the CBJ rescinded in December 2021 measures to defer loan payments for pandemic-affected businesses. Jordan has historically had low banking penetration, which the CBJ has worked to improve through its 2018 Financial Inclusion Strategy. As of end of 2020, 50 percent of people and 29 percent of women in Jordan above the age of 15 had bank accounts. Banking Law No. 28 of 2000 does not discriminate between local and foreign banks, however capital requirements differ. The minimum capital requirements for foreign banks are JD 50 million ($70.6 million), and JD 100 million ($141 million) for local banks, although the CBJ has the authority to amend and increase the minimum capital requirement. The law also protects depositors’ interests, diminishes money market risk, guards against the concentration of lending, and includes articles on electronic banking practices and anti-money laundering. The CBJ set up an independent Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) in 2000 that insures deposits up to JOD 50,000 ($71,000). The DIC also acts as the liquidator of banks as directed by the CBJ. Foreigners are allowed to open bank accounts with a valid passport and a Jordanian residence permit. In January 2017, the CBJ established the Jordan Payments and Clearing Company, with an aim to establish and develop digital retail and micro payments along with the investment in innovative technology and digital financial services. The CBJ actively supports technology and is running JoMoPay, a mobile payment system and provides regulatory support to a privately-operated electronic bill payment service eFAWATEER.com. In October 2021, The Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) started a process soliciting comments from local banks over the potential introduction and licensing of digital banks, which aims to automate all front-end, back-end and middle-end operations. The CBJ is also exploring the possibility of launching the central bank digital currency (CBDC) would be linked to the Jordanian dinar and have legal standing. Full adoption and implementation could take five years. Jordan does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Jordan has twenty-two SOEs of different sizes and mandates that are fully owned by the government. Wholly-owned SOEs employ around 11,000 people and have assets exceeding $8 billion. The government has more than 50 percent ownership in six companies, employing around 4,000 individuals, with total assets of $1.3 billion. Most SOEs are small in terms of operations, assets, number of employees, and income. The largest SOEs are: National Electrical Power Company (NEPCO), Samra Electric Power Company, the Yarmouk Water Company, and Aqaba Development Corporation (ADC). On average, since 2010, the private sector has maintained its share in the Jordanian economy’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The proportion remains around the 84% to 86% of GDP. SOEs in Jordan exercise delegated governmental powers and operate in fields not yet open for private investment, such as managing the transmission and distribution of electrical power and water. Other SOE activities include logistics, mining, storage and inventory management of strategic products, and some economic development activities such as Aqaba Port Company, Jordan National Petroleum Company, and Jordan Silos and Supply General Company. The government supports these companies as necessary, for example, the government has issued and guaranteed Treasury bonds for NEPCO since 2011 to ensure continuous power supply for the country. SOEs generally compete on equal terms with private enterprises with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations. The law does not provide preferential treatment to SOEs, and they are held accountable by their Board of Directors, typically chaired by the sector-relevant Minister and the Audit Bureau. Jordan is not a party to the World Trade Agreement (WTO) Government Procurement Agreement. In year 2012, Jordan completed a multi-year privatization program, in the telecom, energy, and transportation sectors. There government has no further plans for additional privatizations. In year 2020, Jordan adopted a new Public Private Partnership Law (PPP) to support the government’s commitment to broadening the utilization of public-private sector partnerships (PPPs) and encouraging the private sector to play a larger role in the economy. The law does not limit PPPs to certain sectors or nationalities. A PPP unit housed at the Ministry of Investment supports the government in identifying and prioritizing projects, provides funding resources to cover pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, and oversees tendering processes. The PPP unit interacts with private sector and potential investors through promotional activities, market sounding exercises, and to discuss proposals. Communication during the bidding phase is strictly governed by the PPPs bylaw in line with international best practices. Once a contract is awarded, line ministries or entities will take over as main POCs for projects and their implementation. The PPP Higher Council will handle investors’ grievances throughout the project’s lifecycle. The unit has already identified a list of potential PPP projects in several sectors: water, energy, transport, tourism, education, health, environment, and ICT. PPPs related regulations and current investment opportunities are listed on the Ministry of Investment website (In Arabic) مشاريع الشراكة بين القطاع العام و الخاص – وزارة الاستثمار الاردنية (moin.gov.jo) 10. Political and Security Environment The threat of terrorism remains high in Jordan. Transnational and indigenous terrorist groups have demonstrated the capability to plan and implement attacks in Jordan. Violent extremist groups in Syria and Iraq, including the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), and al-Qa’ida, directly or indirectly have conducted or supported attacks in Jordan and continue to plot against local security forces, U.S. and Western interests and “soft” targets, such as high-profile public events, hotels, places of worship, restaurants, schools, and malls. Jordan’s prominent role in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and its shared borders with Iraq and Syria increase the potential for future terrorist incidents. Demonstrations occur frequently. They may take place in response to political or economic issues, on politically significant holidays, and during international events. In general, demonstrations remain peaceful. However, some have turned violent, even when intended to be peaceful, leading security officials to intervene. Jordan remained a committed partner on counterterrorism and countering violent extremism in 2021. As a regional leader in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, Jordan played an important role in Coalition successes in degrading the terrorist group’s territorial control and operational reach. Although Jordan experienced a decrease in terrorist activity in 2021 compared to previous years partially due to the continuing COVID-19 pandemic, the country faced a continued threat from terror groups. While the Jordanian security forces thwarted plots and apprehended suspected terrorists, the threat of domestic radicalization, especially online, persisted. Visitors should consult current State Department public announcements at www.travel.state.gov before traveling to Jordan. Kazakhstan Executive Summary Kazakhstan has made significant progress towards creating a market economy since gaining its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. It has attracted significant foreign investment to develop its abundant mineral, petroleum, and natural gas resources. As of October 2021, the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) totaled $170 billion, including $40.4 billion from the U.S., according to official central bank statistics. Publicly available information indicates that U.S. investments in the hydrocarbons sector alone far exceed this official statistic. While Kazakhstan’s vast hydrocarbon and mineral reserves remain the backbone of the economy, the government continues to make incremental progress toward diversification into other sectors. The COVID-19 pandemic gave impetus to efforts by the Government of Kazakhstan (GOK) to remove bureaucratic barriers to trade and investment. The GOK maintains an active dialogue with foreign investors through the President’s Foreign Investors Council and the Prime Minister’s Council for Improvement of the Investment Climate. Kazakhstan is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Widespread civil unrest in January raised concerns about the country’s political and economic stability. President Tokayev has since assured foreign investors that the GOK will ensure a stable investment climate and meet its commitments to investors. He also pledged to reduce the outsized role of monopolies and oligopolies in the economy. President Tokayev announced political and economic reforms in March that may bring positive changes to the country’s investment climate by increasing privatization and combatting corruption. Given Kazakhstan’s long border and extensive economic ties with Russia, Russian aggression against Ukraine and ensuing sanctions against Russia affect Kazakhstan’s investment climate. Some investors will likely be deterred from investing in Kazakhstan, while others may find Kazakhstan an attractive alternative to doing business in Russia. The GOK has expressed a commitment to complying with the western sanctions against Russia and has invited western investors to relocate from Russia to Kazakhstan. Despite President Tokayev’s assurances, concerns remain that some of the underlying economic causes of the January unrest remain unaddressed and sanctions on Russia may exacerbate existing structural weaknesses to cause high inflation, currency devaluation, and logistical impediments to imports and exports. Despite institutional and legal reforms, corruption, excessive bureaucracy, arbitrary law enforcement, and limited access to a skilled workforce in certain regions continue to present challenges. The government’s tendency to increase its regulatory role in relations with investors, to favor an import-substitution policy, to limit the use of foreign labor, and to intervene in companies’ operations continues to concern foreign investors. Foreign firms cite the need for better rule of law, deeper investment in human capital, improved transport and logistics infrastructure, a more open and flexible trade policy, a more favorable work-permit regime, and a more customer-friendly and consistent tax administration. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 102 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 79 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $8,710 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Kazakhstan has attracted significant FDI since independence. As of October 1, 2021, FDI totaled $170 billion, primarily in the oil and gas sector. International financial institutions consider Kazakhstan to be a relatively attractive destination for their operations, and some international firms have established regional headquarters in the country. Kazakhstan adheres to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, meaning it is committed to certain investment standards. In April 2019, the Prime Minister created the Coordination Council for Attracting Foreign Investment. The Prime Minister acts as the Chair and Investment Ombudsman. The Investment Committee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its subsidiary, KazakhInvest, handle investment climate policy issues and work with potential and current investors, while the Ministry of National Economy and the Ministry of Trade and Integration work with international organizations like the OECD, WTO, and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Each regional government designates a representative to work with investors. The GOK established the Astana International Financial Center (AIFC), modelled on the Dubai International Financial Center. It offers foreign investors an alternative jurisdiction for operations, with tax holidays, flexible labor rules, a Common Law-based legal system, and flexibility to carry out transactions in any currency. The GOK recommends that foreign investors use AIFC for contracts with Kazakhstani businesses. By law, foreign and domestic private firms may establish and own business enterprises. While no sectors are completely closed to foreign investors, restrictions on foreign ownership exist, including a 20 percent ceiling on foreign ownership of media outlets, a 49 percent limit on domestic and international air transportation services, and a 49 percent limit on telecom services. Kazakhstan formally removed the limits on foreign ownership of telecom companies, except for the country’s main telecom operator, KazakhTeleCom. Still, foreign investors must obtain a government waiver to acquire more than 49 percent of shares in a telecom company. There are no constraints on the participation of foreign capital in the banking and insurance sectors. However, law limits the participation of offshore companies in banks and insurance companies and prohibits foreign ownership of pension funds and agricultural land. Foreign citizens and companies are restricted from participating in private security businesses. Kazakhstan does not have a screening system in place and does not have legislation specifically focused on the national security implications of FDI akin to the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA). Kazakhstan’s central bank (the National Bank of Kazakhstan) collects standard statistics on FDI and other forms of investments, but mostly for macroeconomic purposes. Foreign companies remain concerned about the risk of preferences for domestic companies and mechanisms for government intervention in foreign companies’ operations, particularly in procurement. The Front Office for Investors assists with investors’ challenges and brings them to the Prime Minister’s Council. The OECD Investment Committee presented its second Investment Policy Review in June 2017, available at: https://www.oecd.org/countries/kazakhstan/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-kazakhstan-2017-9789264269606-en.htm The OECD review recommended Kazakhstan undertake corporate governance reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), implement a more efficient tax system, further liberalize its trade policy, and introduce responsible business conduct principles and standards. Kazakhstan has taken steps to simplify procedures for starting and operating businesses. Most procedures can now be done online. For example, online registration of any business is possible through the unified government website https://egov.kz/cms/en/services/business_registration/pass042com_mu . Non-residents must have a business immigrant visa and submit electronic copies of their IDs, as well as any certification of their companies from their country of origin. Documents must be translated and notarized. Investors may learn more about these services here: https://invest.gov.kz/invest-guide/business-starting/ A foreign-owned company registered in Kazakhstan is considered a domestic company for purposes of currency regulation. Residents may open bank accounts in foreign currency in Kazakhstani banks. In 2021, the GOK introduced a special three percent retail tax for 114 types of small and medium-sized businesses that have been affected the most by the pandemic, available for two years. The GOK also introduced an investment tax credit allowing entrepreneurs to defer taxes for up to three years. In 2020, the government approved new measures aimed to attract FDI. For example, the government introduced a new type of investment agreement (see details in Section 4). In January, Kazakhstan re-instituted visa-free travel for citizens of 54 countries, including the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan. The AIFC offers legal arrangements not normally available under Kazakhstani law, including trusts. AIFC residents have access to simplified procedures for obtaining investor visas. Foreign investors often complain about problems with finalizing contracts and licensing. Tax errors still have not been decriminalized. The controversial taxation of dividends of non-residents came into force in January 2021. The government neither incentivizes nor restricts outward investment. 3. Legal Regime National legislation is enacted by the Parliament and President. The government, ministries, and local executive administrations issue regulations and executive acts in compliance with national laws. Publicly listed companies adhere to international financial reporting standards, but accounting and valuation practices are not always consistent with international best practices. The government does not require companies to disclose environmental, social, and governance (ESG) data. Companies listed on the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange (KASE) and Astana International Exchange (AIX), must, however, disclose information on ESG. All laws and decrees of the President and the government are available in Kazakh and Russian on the websites of the Ministry of Justice: https://adilet.zan.kz/rus and http://zan.gov.kz/en/ . The government consults on some draft legislation with experts and the business community; draft bills are available for public comment at https://legalacts.egov.kz under the Open Government section. The process of public comments seems overregulated. Publication occurs without broad notifications, some bills are excluded from public comment, and those who want to participate must register in advance. The legal and regulatory process is opaque. Implementation and interpretation of commercial legislation sometimes creates confusion. In 2016, the Ministry of Health and Social Development introduced new rules on attracting foreign labor, some of which created significant barriers for foreign investors. After active intervention through the Prime Minister’s Council, the government canceled the most onerous requirements. Decrees and legislative changes frequently do not “grandfather in” existing investments. Penalties are often assessed for periods prior to the change in policy. The new OECD-compliant Environmental Code (Eco Code) mandates that local authorities spend 100 percent of environmental payments on environmental remediation. Public financial reporting, including debt obligations, are published by the National Bank of Kazakhstan at https://nationalbank.kz/en/news/vneshniy-dolg and, in a very limited scope, by the Ministry of Finance on its site: https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/minfin/press/article/details/17399?directionId=261&lang=ru . The Civil Code establishes commercial and contract law principles. The judicial system is officially independent of the executive branch, although the government interferes in judiciary matters. Freedom House’s 2021 Nations in Transit report gave Kazakhstan a very low score (1.25 out of seven) in the Judicial Framework and Independence category, implying that the executive branch effectively dominates the judicial branch. Allegations of pervasive corruption of the courts and the influence of the ruling elite results in low public expectations and trust in the justice system. Parties to commercial contracts, including foreign investors, can seek dispute settlement in Kazakhstan’s courts or international arbitration, and courts nominally enforce arbitration clauses in contracts. However, the Post is aware of at least one case when the government is alleged to have refused to honor a fully litigated international arbitral decision. The AIFC has its own arbitration center and court based on British Common Law and is independent of the judiciary. The government advises foreign investors to use the capacities of the AIFC arbitration center and the AIFC court more actively. Laws provide for non-expropriation, currency convertibility, guarantees of legal stability, transparent government procurement, and incentives for priority sectors. The Entrepreneurial Code outlines basic principles of doing business, the government’s relations with entrepreneurs, and codifies non-discrimination for foreign investors. The code contains incentives and preferences for government-determined priority sectors. A law on Currency Regulation and Currency Control expands the statistical monitoring of transactions in foreign currency and facilitated the process of de-dollarization. The law treats branches of foreign companies in Kazakhstan as residents and enables the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK) to enhance control over cross-border transactions. The Entrepreneurial Code regulates competition-related issues such as cartel agreements and unfair competition. The Agency for Protection and Development of Competition is responsible for reviewing transactions for competition-related concerns. Regulation of natural monopolies remains with the Ministry of National Economy. The bilateral investment treaty between the United States and Kazakhstan requires the government to provide compensation in the event of expropriation. The Entrepreneurial Code allows the state to nationalize property in emergency cases but fails to provide clear criteria for expropriation or to require prompt and adequate compensation at fair market value. The Mission is aware of cases where owners of flourishing and developed businesses have been forced to sell their businesses to companies affiliated with high-ranking and powerful individuals. In 2021, the government amended the Criminal Code and enhanced punishment for raiding by increasing the possible sentence to a range of five to eight years. One hydrocarbons company claims expropriation. The case went to international arbitration and the legal process continues without resolution. Bankruptcy Law protects the rights of creditors during insolvency proceedings. Bankruptcy is not criminalized, unless the court determines the bankruptcy was premeditated, or rehabilitation measures are wrongful. The law eases bureaucratic requirements for bankruptcy filings, gives creditors a greater say in continuing operations, introduces a time limit for adopting rehabilitation or reorganization plans, and adds court supervision requirements. 6. Financial Sector Capital markets remain underdeveloped and illiquid, with small equity and debt markets dominated by SOEs and lacking in retail investors. Most domestic borrowers obtain credit from Kazakhstani banks, although foreign investors often find interest rates and collateral requirements onerous, and it is often cheaper and easier for foreign investors to use retained earnings or borrow from their home country. The government actively seeks to attract portfolio investment. Foreign clients may only trade via local brokerage companies or after registering at KASE or at the AIFC. KASE, with 233 listed companies, trades a variety of instruments, including equities and funds, corporate bonds, sovereign debt, international development institutions’ debt, foreign currencies, repurchase agreements (REPO), and derivatives. KASE launched a new global platform on November 15, which currently trades over 40 U.S. securities listed on NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange. The AIFC has its own stock exchange (AIX), that has partnered with the Shanghai Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, Goldman Sachs International, the Silk Road Fund, and others. AIX currently has 134 listings in its Official List, including 99 traded on its platform. Kazakhstan is bound by Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement which prohibits government restrictions on currency conversions or the repatriation of investment profits. Money transfers associated with foreign investments are unrestricted; however, Kazakhstan’s currency legislation requires that a currency contract must be presented to the servicing bank if the transfer exceeds $10,000. Money transfers over $50,000 require the servicing bank to notify the transaction to the authorities. President Tokayev signed a decree banning the export of foreign currency cash exceeding $10,000 or its equivalent starting March 14. Kazakhstan had 22 commercial banks as of January 1. The five largest banks (Halyk, Sberbank-Kazakhstan, Kaspi, Otbasy, and First Heartland Jusan) held assets of approximately $57.6 billion, accounting for 66.1 percent of the total banking sector. The banking system has been impaired by legacy non-performing loans, poor risk management, weak corporate governance practices, and significant related-party exposures. The GOK has undertaken measures to strengthen the sector, including capital injections, enhanced oversight, and expanded regulatory authorities. As of January, the ratio of non-performing loans to banking assets was 3.4 percent, down from 8.6 percent in April 2019, while the number of commercial banks decreased to 22 from 28 in April 2019 as a result of mergers and liquidation of financially struggling entities. The United States and other countries have imposed sanctions on multiple Russian financial institutions, some of which have subsidiaries in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan has a central bank system led by the NBK and the Agency for Regulation and Development of the Financial Market (ARDFM). ARDFM is the main financial regulator overseeing banks, insurance companies, the stock market, microcredit organizations, debt collection agencies, and credit bureaus, while the NBK performs core central bank functions, as well as management of the country’s sovereign wealth fund and pension system assets. The NBK and ARDFM are committed to the incremental introduction of the Basel III regulatory standard. Kazakhstan allows foreign banks to operate in the country via branches. Foreigners may open bank accounts in local banks if they have a local tax registration number. The National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan was established to support the country’s social and economic development, as well as to reduce the country’s dependence on the oil sector and external shocks. The National Fund’s assets are generated from direct taxes and other payments from oil companies, public property privatization, sale of public farmlands, and investment income. As of January 1, the National Fund’s assets were $55.3 billion or around 30 percent of GDP. The government receives regular transfers from the National Fund for general state budget support, as well as special purpose transfers ordered by the President. The National Fund is required to retain a minimum balance of no less than 30 percent of GDP. Kazakhstan is not a member of the IMF-hosted International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises According to the National Statistical Bureau, as of January 1, there are 25,201 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 617 enterprises where the state has some stake, including all types of enterprises, from small veterinary inspection offices, kindergartens, and regional hospitals, to airlines, mining companies, and the national oil and gas company. A full list of SOEs is available at: https://gr5.gosreestr.kz/p/en/gr-search/search-objects . SOEs play a leading role in the country’s economy. According to the 2017 OECD Investment Policy Review, SOE assets amount to $48-64 billion, approximately 30-40 percent of GDP; net income was approximately $2 billion. In January, President Tokayev enabled the Agency for Development and Protection of Competition to endorse the creation of new state-owned enterprises and to review enlargement of existing ones. Parastatal companies benefit from greater access to subsidies and other government support. The National Welfare Fund Samruk-Kazyna (SK) is the largest national holding company, managing key SOEs in the oil and gas, energy, mining, transportation, and communication sectors. The IMF reports that, as of 2019, SK held assets equivalent to 38 percent of GDP and generated revenues of 15 percent of GDP, which was equivalent to three-quarters of total government revenue. In 2020, SK reported $54 billion in assets and $1.4 billion in consolidated net profit. Political influence continues to dominate SK. SK has special rights to conclude large transactions among members of its holdings without public notification, a pre-emptive right to buy strategic facilities and assets and is exempt from government procurement procedures. More information is available at http://sk.kz/. Two other major SOEs are the national managing holding company Baiterek and national information holding company Zerde. More information about both companies is available on their web-sites: https://www.baiterek.gov.kz/en and http://zerde.gov.kz/. Officially, private enterprises compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions. In some cases, SOEs enjoy better access to natural resources, credit, and licenses than private entities. The government enacted a new comprehensive privatization program in 2020. More information is available at: https://privatization.gosreestr.kz/ . As of March 31, the government has sold 938 organizations for $1.7 billion out of 1,747 organizations subject to privatization. The government sells small, state owned and municipal enterprises through electronic auctions. Foreign investors may participate in privatization projects. However, they may experience challenges in navigating the process. 10. Political and Security Environment During violent civil unrest in January, at least 237 individuals were killed and there were many instances of theft, looting, and arson. More than 1,000 government and commercial buildings were damaged in Almaty and several other cities and rioters briefly seized Almaty International Airport. President Tokayev stated that the initial economic damages were estimated at $2-3 billion. After restoring order, President Tokayev assured foreign investors that the GOK would ensure a stable investment climate. Kenya Executive Summary Kenya has a positive investment climate that has made it attractive to international firms seeking a location for regional or pan-African operations. The novel coronavirus pandemic has negatively affected the short-term economic outlook, but the country remains resilient in addressing the health and economic challenges. In July 2020 the U.S. and Kenya launched negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement, the first in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite this progress, U.S. businesses operating in Kenya still face aggressive tax collection attempts, burdensome bureaucratic processes, and significant delays in receiving necessary business licenses. Corruption remains pervasive and Transparency International ranked Kenya 128 out of 180 countries in its 2021 Global Corruption Perception Index – reflecting modest progress over the last decade but still well below the global average. Kenya has strong telecommunications infrastructure and a robust financial sector and is a developed logistics hub with extensive aviation connections throughout Africa, Europe, and Asia. In 2018, Kenya Airways initiated direct flights to New York City in the United States. Mombasa Port is the gateway for East Africa’s trade. Kenya’s membership in the East African Community (EAC), the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and other regional trade blocs provides it with preferential trade access to growing regional markets. In 2017 and 2018 Kenya instituted broad reforms to improve its business environment, including passing the Tax Laws Amendment (2018) and the Finance Act (2018), which established new procedures and provisions related to taxes, eased the payment of taxes through the iTax platform, simplified registration procedures for small businesses, reduced the cost of construction permits, and established a “one-stop” border post system to expedite the movement of goods across borders. However, the Finance Act (2019) introduced taxes to non-resident ship owners, and the Finance Act (2020) enacted a Digital Service Tax (DST). The DST, which went into effect in January 2021, imposes a 1.5 percent tax on any transaction that occurs in Kenya through a “digital marketplace.” The oscillation between business reforms and conflicting taxation policies has raised uncertainty over the Government of Kenya’s (GOK) long-term plans for improving the investment climate. Kenya’s macroeconomic fundamentals remain among the strongest in Africa, averaging five to six percent gross domestic product (GDP) growth since 2015 (excepting 2020due to the negative economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic), five percent inflation since 2015, improving infrastructure, and strong consumer demand from a growing middle class. There is relative political stability and President Uhuru Kenyatta has remained focused on his “Big Four” development agenda, seeking to provide universal healthcare coverage, establish national food and nutrition security, build 500,000 affordable new homes, and increase employment by growing the manufacturing sector. Kenya is a regional leader in clean energy development with more than 90 percent of its on-grid electricity coming from renewable sources. Through its 2020, second Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Agreement targets, Kenya has prioritized low-carbon resilient investments to reduce its already low greenhouse gas emissions a further 32 percent by 2030. Kenya has established policies and a regulatory environment to spearhead green investments, enabling its first private-sector-issued green bond floated in 2019 to finance the construction of sustainable housing projects. American companies continue to show strong interest to establish or expand their business presence and engagement in Kenya. Sectors offering the most opportunities for investors include: agro-processing, financial services, energy, extractives, transportation, infrastructure, retail, restaurants, technology, health care, and mobile banking. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 128 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 85 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $339 http://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $11,067.86 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Kenya has enjoyed a steadily improving environment for FDI. Foreign investors seeking to establish a presence in Kenya generally receive the same treatment as local investors, and multinational companies make up a large percentage of Kenya’s industrial sector. The government’s export promotion programs do not distinguish between goods produced by local or foreign-owned firms. The primary regulations governing FDI are found in the Investment Promotion Act (2004). Other important documents that provide the legal framework for FDI include the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, the Companies Ordinance, the Private Public Partnership Act (2013), the Foreign Investment Protection Act (1990), and the Companies Act (2015). GOK membership in the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) provides an opportunity to insure FDI against non-commercial risk. In November 2019, the Kenya Investment Authority (KenInvest), the country’s official investment promotion agency, launched the Kenya Investment Policy (KIP) and the County Investment Handbook (CIH) (http://www.invest.go.ke/publications/) which aim to increase inflow of FDI in the country. The KIP intends to guide laws being drafted to promote and facilitate investments in Kenya. KenInvest’s (http://www.invest.go.ke/) mandate is to promote and facilitate investment by helping investors understand and navigate local Kenya’s bureaucracy and regulations. KenInvest helps investors obtain necessary licenses and developed eRegulations, an online database, to provide businesses with user-friendly access to Kenya’s investment-related regulations and procedures (https://eregulations.invest.go.ke/?l=en). KenInvest prioritizes investment retention and maintains an ongoing dialogue with investors. All proposed legislation must pass through a period of public consultation, which includes an opportunity for investors to offer feedback. Private sector representatives can serve as board members on Kenya’s state-owned enterprises. Since 2013, the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), the country’s primary alliance of private sector business associations, has had bi-annual round table meetings with President Kenyatta and his cabinet. President Kenyatta also chairs a cabinet-level committee focused on improving the business environment. The American Chamber of Commerce has also increasingly engaged the GOK on issues regarding Kenya’s business environment. The government provides the right for foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. To encourage foreign investment, in 2015, the GOK repealed regulations that imposed a 75 percent foreign ownership limit for firms listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange, allowing such firms to be 100 percent foreign owned. However, also in 2015, the government established regulations requiring Kenyan ownership of at least 15 percent of the share capital of derivative exchanges, through which derivatives, such as options and futures, can be traded. Kenya’s National Information and Communications Technology (ICT) policy guidelines, published in August 2020, adjusted the requirement for Kenyan ownership in foreign ICT companies from 20 to 30 percent, and broadened its applicability within the telecommunications, postal, courier, and broadcasting industries. Affected companies have 3 years to comply with the new requirement. The Mining Act (2016) reserves mineral acquisition rights to companies registered and established in Kenya, whether local or foreign owned. Mineral dealership licenses are only issued to Kenyan citizens or to corporations where at least 60 percent shareholding is held by Kenyan citizens. The Private Security Regulations Act (2016) restricts foreign participation in the private security sector by requiring at least 25 percent Kenyan ownership of private security firms. The National Construction Authority Act (2011) and the 2014 National Construction Authority regulations impose local content restrictions on “foreign contractors,” defined as companies incorporated outside Kenya or with more than 50 percent ownership by non-Kenyan citizens. The definition excludes companies owned by foreigners but incorporated in Kenya. The act requires foreign contractors enter subcontracts or joint ventures assuring that at least 30 percent of the contract work is done by local firms and locally unavailable skills transferred to a local person. The Kenya Insurance Act (2010) limits foreign capital investment in insurance companies to two-thirds, with no single person holding more than a 25 percent ownership share. In 2019, the World Trade Organization conducted a trade policy review for the East Africa Community (EAC), of which Kenya is a member (https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp484_e.htm). In 2011, the GOK established KenTrade to address trading partners’ concerns regarding the complexity of trade regulations and procedures. KenTrade’s mandate is to facilitate cross-border trade and to implement the National Electronic Single Window System. In 2017, KenTrade launched InfoTrade Kenya (infotrade.gov.ke), which provides a host of investment products and services to prospective investors. The site documents the process of exporting and importing by product, by steps, by paperwork, and by individuals, including contact information for officials responsible for relevant permits or approvals. In February 2019, Kenya implemented a new Integrated Customs Management System (iCMS) that includes automated valuation benchmarking, release of green-channel cargo, importer validation and declaration, and linkage with iTax. The iCMS enables customs officers to efficiently manage revenue and security related risks for imports, exports and goods on transit and transshipment. The Movable Property Security Rights Bill (2017) enhanced the ability of individuals to secure financing through movable assets, including using intellectual property rights as collateral. The Nairobi International Financial Centre (NIFC) Act (2017) seeks to provide a legal framework to facilitate and support the development of an efficient and competitive financial services sector in Kenya. The act created the Nairobi International Financial Centre Authority to establish and maintain an efficient financial services sector to attract and retain FID. The Kenya Trade Remedies Act (2017) provides the legal and institutional framework for Kenya’s application of trade remedies consistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) law, which requires a domestic institution to receive complaints and undertake investigations in line with WTO Agreements. To date, however, Kenya has implemented only 7.5 percent of its commitments under the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, which it ratified in 2015. In 2020, Kenya launched the Kenya Trade Remedies Agency to investigate and enforce anti-dumping, countervailing duty, and trade safeguards, to protect domestic industries from unfair trade practices. The Companies (Amendment) Act (2017) clarified ambiguities in the original act and ensures compliance with global trends and best practices. The act amended provisions on the extent of directors’ liabilities and disclosures and strengthens investor protections. The amendment eliminated the requirements for small enterprises to hire secretaries, have lawyers register their firms, and to hold annual general meetings, reducing regulatory compliance and operational costs. The Business Registration Services (BRS) Act (2015) established the Business Registration Service, a state corporation, to ensure effective administration of laws related to the incorporation, registration, operation, and management, of companies, partnerships, and firms. The BRS also devolves certain business registration services to county governments, such as registration of business names and promoting local business ideas/legal entities- reducing registration costs. The Companies Act (2015) covers the registration and management of both public and private corporations. In 2014, the GOK established a Business Environment Delivery Unit to address investors’ concerns. The unit focuses on reducing the bureaucratic steps required to establish and do business. Its website (http://www.businesslicense.or.ke/) offers online business registration and provides detailed information regarding business licenses and permits, including requirements, fees, application forms, and contact details for the respective regulatory agencies. In 2013, the GOK initiated the Access to Government Procurement Opportunities program, requiring all public procurement entities to set aside a minimum of 30 percent of their annual procurement spending facilitate the participation of youth, women, and persons with disabilities (https://agpo.go.ke/). Kenya’s iGuide, an investment guide to Kenya (http://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/kenya/about#, developed by UNCTAD and the International Chamber of Commerce, provides investors with up-to-date information on business costs, licensing requirements, opportunities, and conditions in developing countries. Kenya is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. The GOK does not promote or incentivize outward investment. Despite this, Kenya is evolving into an outward investor in tourism, manufacturing, retail, finance, education, and media. Kenya’s outward investment has primarily been in the EAC, due to the preferential access afforded to member countries, and in a select few central African countries. The EAC allows free movement of capital among its six member states – Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. 3. Legal Regime Kenya’s regulatory system is relatively transparent and continues to improve. Proposed laws and regulations pertaining to business and investment are published in draft form for public input and stakeholder deliberation before their passage into law (http://www.kenyalaw.org/; http://www.parliament.go.ke/the-national-assembly/house-business/bills-tracker). Kenya’s business registration and licensing systems are fully digitized and transparent while computerization of other government processes, aimed at increasing transparency and efficiency, and reducing corruption, is ongoing. The 2010 Kenyan Constitution requires government to incorporate public participation before officials and agencies make certain decisions. The draft Public Participation Bill (2019) aims to provide the general framework for such public participation. The Ministry of Devolution has produced a guide for counties on how to carry out public participation; many counties have enacted their own laws on public participation. The Environmental Management and Coordination Act (1999) incorporates the principles of sustainable development, including public participation in environmental management. The Public Finance Management Act mandates public participation in the budget cycle. The Land Act, Water Act, and Fair Administrative Action Act (2015) also include provisions providing for public participation in agency actions. Kenya also has regulations to promote inclusion and fair competition when applying for tenders. Executive Order No. 2 of 2018 emphasizes publication of all procurement information including tender notices, contracts awarded, name of suppliers and their directors. The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority publishes this information on the Public Procurement Information Portal, enhancing transparency and accountability (https://www.tenders.go.ke/website). However, the directive is yet to be fully implemented as not all state agencies provide their tender details to the portal. Many GOK laws grant significant discretionary and approval powers to government agency administrators, which can create uncertainty among investors. While some government agencies have amended laws or published clear guidelines for decision-making criteria, others have lagged in making their transactions transparent. Work permit processing remains a problem, with overlapping and sometimes contradictory regulations. American companies have complained about delays and non-issuance of permits that appear compliant with known regulations. Kenya is a member of the EAC, and generally applies EAC policies to trade and investment. Kenya operates under the EAC Custom Union Act (2004) and decisions regarding tariffs on imports from non-EAC countries are made by the EAC Secretariat. The U.S. government engages with Kenya on trade and investment issues bilaterally and through the U.S.-EAC Trade and Investment Partnership. Kenya also is a member of COMESA and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). According to the Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2019, Kenya is the second most integrated country in Africa and a leader in regional integration policies within the EAC and COMESA regional blocs, with strong performance on regional infrastructure, productive integration, free movement of people, and financial and macro-economic integration. The GOK maintains a Department of EAC Integration under the Ministry of East Africa and Regional Development. Kenya generally adheres to international regulatory standards. It is a member of the WTO and provides notification of draft technical regulations to the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Kenya maintains a TBT National Enquiry Point at http://notifyke.kebs.org. Additional information on Kenya’s WTO participation can be found at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/kenya_e.htm. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms. Publicly listed companies adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) that have been developed and issued in the public interest by the International Accounting Standards Board. The board is an independent, non-profit organization that is the standard-setting body of the IFRS Foundation. Kenya is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. Kenya’s legal system is based on English Common Law, and its constitution establishes an independent judiciary with a Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, Constitutional Court, High Court, and Environment and Land Court. Subordinate courts include: Magistrates, Kadhis (Muslim succession and inheritance), Courts Martial, the Employment and Labor Relations Court, and the Milimani Commercial Courts – the latter two have jurisdiction over economic and commercial matters. In 2016, Kenya’s judiciary instituted the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Courts, focused on corruption and economic crimes. There is no systematic executive or other interference in the court system that affects foreign investors, however, the courts often face allegations of corruption, as well as political manipulation, in the form of insufficient budget allocations by the executive branch, which significantly impact the judiciary’s ability to fulfill its mandate. Delayed confirmation of judges nominated by the Judicial Service Commission has in the past resulted in an understaffed judiciary and prolonged delays in cases coming to trial and receiving judgments. The COVID-19 pandemic has also increased case backlogs, as courts reduced operations and turned to virtual hearings, particularly for non-urgent cases. The Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act (2012) provides for the enforcement of judgments given in other countries that accord reciprocal treatment to judgments given in Kenya. Kenya has entered into reciprocal enforcement agreements with Australia, the United Kingdom, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Seychelles. Outside of such an agreement, a foreign judgment is not enforceable in Kenyan courts except by filing a suit on the judgment. Foreign advocates may practice as an advocate in Kenya for the purposes of a specified suit or matter if appointed to do so by the Attorney General. However, foreign advocates are not permitted to practice in Kenya unless they have paid to the Registrar of the High Court of Kenya the prescribed admission fee. Additionally, they are not permitted to practice unless a Kenyan advocate instructs and accompanies them to court. The regulations or enforcement actions are appealable and are adjudicated in the national court system. The 2018 amendment to the Anti-Counterfeit Authority (ACA) Act expanded its scope to include protection of intellectual property rights, including those not registered in Kenya. The amended law empowered ACA inspectors to investigate and seize monetary gains from counterfeit goods. The 2019 amendment to the 2001 Copyright Act (established when the country had less than one percent internet penetration), formed the independent Copyright Tribunal, ratified the Marrakesh Treaty, recognized artificial intelligence generated works, established protections for internet service providers related to digital advertising, developed a register of copyrighted works by Kenya Copyright Board (KECOBO), and protected digital rights through procedures for take down notices. The Competition Act of 2010 created the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK). The law was amended in 2019 to clarify the law with regard to abuse of buyer power and empower the CAK to investigate alleged abuses of buyer power. The competition law prohibits restrictive trade practices, abuse of dominant position, and abuse of buyer power, and it grants the CAK the authority to review mergers and acquisitions and investigate and take action against unwarranted concentrations of economic power. All mergers and acquisitions require the CAK’s authorization before they are finalized. The CAK also investigates and enforces consumer-protection related issues. In 2014, the CAK established a KES one million (approximately USD 10,000) filing fee for mergers and acquisitions valued between one and KES 50 billion (up to approximately USD 500 million). The CAK charges KES two million (approximately USD 20,000) for larger transactions. Company acquisitions are possible if the share buy-out is more than 90 percent, although such transactions seldom occur in practice. The constitution guarantees protection from expropriation, except in cases of eminent domain or security concerns, and all cases are subject to the payment of prompt and fair compensation. The Land Acquisition Act (2010) governs due process and compensation related to eminent domain land acquisitions; however, land rights remain contentious and resolving land disputes is often a lengthy process. However, there are cases where government measures could be deemed indirect expropriation that may impact foreign investment. Some companies reported instances whereby foreign investors faced uncertainty regarding lease renewals because county governments were attempting to confiscate some or all of the project property. The Insolvency Act (2015) modernized the legal framework for bankruptcies. Its provisions generally correspond to those of the United Nations’ Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency. The act promotes fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies to protect the interests of all creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor. The act repeals the Bankruptcy Act (2012) and updates the legal structure relating to insolvency of natural persons, incorporated, and unincorporated bodies. Section 720 of the Insolvency Act (2015) grants the force of law in Kenya to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law model law on cross border insolvency. Creditors’ rights are comparable to those in other common law countries, and monetary judgments are typically made in KES. The Insolvency Act (2015) increased the rights of borrowers and prioritizes the revival of distressed firms. The law states that a debtor will automatically be discharged from debt after three years. Bankruptcy is not criminalized in Kenya. 6. Financial Sector Though relatively small by Western standards, Kenya’s capital markets are the deepest and most sophisticated in East Africa. The 2021 Morgan Stanley Capital International Emerging and Frontier Markets Index, which assesses equity opportunity in 27 emerging economies, ranked the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) as the best performing exchange in sub-Saharan Africa over the last decade. The NSE operates under the jurisdiction of the Capital Markets Authority of Kenya. It is a full member of the World Federation of Exchanges, a founding member of the African Securities Exchanges Association (ASEA) and the East African Securities Exchanges Association (EASEA). The NSE is a member of the Association of Futures Markets and is a partner exchange in the United Nations-led Sustainable Stock Exchanges initiative. Reflecting international confidence in the NSE, it has always had significant foreign investor participation. In July 2019, the NSE launched a derivatives market that facilitates trading in future contracts on the Kenyan market. The bond market is underdeveloped and dominated by trading in government debt securities. The government’s domestic debt market, however, is deep and liquid. Long-term corporate bond issuances are uncommon, limiting long-term investment capital. In November 2019, Kenya repealed the interest rate capping law passed in 2016, which had slowed private sector credit growth. There are no restrictions on foreign investors seeking credit in the domestic financial market. Kenya’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems generally align with international norms. In 2017, the Kenya National Treasury launched the world’s first mobile phone-based retail government bond, locally dubbed M-Akiba. M-Akiba has generated over 500,000 accounts for the Central Depository and Settlement Corporation, and The National Treasury has made initial dividend payments to bond holders. The African Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (AVCA) 2014-2019 report on venture capital performance in Africa ranked Kenya as having the second most developed venture capitalist ecosystem in sub-Saharan Africa. The report also noted that over 20 percent of the venture capital deals in Kenya, from 2014-2019, were initiated by companies headquartered outside Africa. The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) is working with regulators in EAC member states through the Capital Market Development Committee (CMDC) and East African Securities Regulatory Authorities (EASRA) on a regional integration initiative and has successfully introduced cross-listing of equity shares. The combined use of both the Central Depository and Settlement Corporation (CDSC) and an automated trading system has aligned the Kenyan securities market with globally accepted standards. Kenya is a full (ordinary) member of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Money and Banking System. Kenya has accepted the International Monetary Fund’s Article VIII obligation and does not provide restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. In 2021, the Kenyan banking sector included 42 commercial banks, one mortgage finance company, 14 microfinance banks, nine representative offices of foreign banks, eight non-operating bank holdings, 69 foreign exchange bureaus, 19 money remittance providers, and three credit reference bureaus, which are licensed and regulated by the CBK. Fifteen of Kenya’s commercial banks are foreign owned. Major international banks operating in Kenya include Citibank, Absa Bank (formerly Barclays Bank Africa), Bank of India, Standard Bank, and Standard Chartered. The 12 commercial banks listed banks on the Nairobi Securities Exchange owned 89 percent of the country’s banking assets in 2019. The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly affected Kenya’s banking sector. According to the CBK, in 2020, 32 out of 41 commercial banks restructured loans to accommodate affected borrowers. Non-performing loans (NPLs) reached 14.6 percent by the end of 2021 – a three percent year-on-year increase. In March 2017, following the collapse of Imperial Bank and Dubai Bank, the CBK lifted its 2015 moratorium on licensing new banks. The CBK’s decision to restart licensing signaled a return of stability in the Kenyan banking sector. In 2018, Societé Generale (France) also set up a representative office in Nairobi. Foreign banks can apply for license to set up operations in Kenya and are guided by the CBK’s 2013 Prudential Guidelines. In November 2019, the GOK repealed the interest rate capping law through an amendment to the Banking Act. This amendment has enabled financial institutions to use market-based pricing for their credit products. While this change has slightly increased the cost of borrowing for some clients, it effectively ensures the private sector uninterrupted access to credit. The percentage of Kenya’s total population with access to financial services through conventional or mobile banking platforms is approximately 80 percent. According to the World Bank, M-Pesa, Kenya’s largest mobile banking platform, processes more transactions within Kenya each year than Western Union does globally. The 2017 National ICT Masterplan envisages the sector contributing at least 10 percent of GDP, up from 4.7 percent in 2015. Several mobile money platforms have achieved international interoperability, allowing the Kenyan diaspora to conduct financial transactions in Kenya from abroad. In 2019, the National Treasury published the Kenya Sovereign Wealth Fund policy and the draft Kenya Sovereign Wealth Fund Bill (2019), both of which remain pending. The fund would receive income from any future privatization proceeds, dividends from state corporations, oil and gas, and minerals revenues due to the national government, revenue from other natural resources, and funds from any other source. The Kenya Information and Communications Act (2009) provides for the establishment of a Universal Service Fund (USF). The purpose of the USF is to fund national projects that have significant impact on the availability and accessibility of ICT services in rural, remote, and poor urban areas. 7. State-Owned Enterprises In 2013, the Presidential Task Force on Parastatal Reforms (PTFPR) published a list of all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and recommended proposals to reduce the number of State Corporations from 262 to 187 to eliminate redundant functions between parastatals; close or dispose of non-performing organizations; consolidate functions wherever possible; and reduce the workforce — however, progress is slow (https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BytnSZLruS3GQmxHc1VtZkhVVW8/edit). SOEs’ boards are independently appointed and published in Kenya Gazette notices by the Cabinet Secretary of the ministry responsible for the respective SOE. The State Corporations Act (2015) mandated the State Corporations Advisory Committee to advise the GOK on matters related to SOEs. Despite being public entities, only SOEs listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange publish their financial positions, as required by Capital Markets Authority guidelines. SOEs’ corporate governance is guided by the constitution’s chapter 6 on Leadership and Integrity, the Leadership and Integrity Act (2012) (L&I) and the Public Officer Ethics Act (2003), which establish integrity and ethics requirements governing the conduct of public officials. In general, competitive equality is the standard applied to private enterprises in competition with public enterprises. Certain parastatals, however, have enjoyed preferential access to markets. Examples include Kenya Reinsurance, which enjoys a guaranteed market share; Kenya Seed Company, which has fewer marketing barriers than its foreign competitors; and the National Oil Corporation of Kenya (NOCK), which benefits from retail market outlets developed with government funds. Some state corporations have also benefited from easier access to government guarantees, subsidies, or credit at favorable interest rates. In addition, “partial listings” on the Nairobi Securities Exchange offer parastatals the benefit of accessing equity financing and GOK loans (or guarantees) without being completely privatized. In August 2020, the executive reorganized the management of SOEs in the cargo transportation sector and mandated the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC) to oversee rail, pipeline and port operations through a holding company called Kenya Transport and Logistics Network (KTLN). ICDC assumes a coordinating role over the Kenya Ports Authority (KPA), Kenya Railways Corporation (KRC), and Kenya Pipeline Company (KPC). KTLN focuses on lowering the cost of doing business in the country through the provision of cost effective and efficient transportation and logistics infrastructure. SOE procurement from the private sector is guided by the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (2015) and the published Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Regulations (2020) which introduced exemptions from the Act for procurement on bilateral or multilateral basis, commonly referred to as government-to-government procurement; introduced E-procurement procedures; and preferences and reservations, which gives preferences to the “Buy Kenya Build Kenya” strategy (http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/LegalNotices/2020/LN69_2020.pdf). Kenya is neither party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) nor an Observer Government. The Privatization Act (2003) establishes the Privatization Commission (PC) that is mandated to formulate, manage, and implement Kenya’s Privatization Program. GOK has been committed to implementing a comprehensive public enterprises reform program to increase private sector participation in the economy. The privatization commission (https://www.pc.go.ke/) is fully constituted with a board responsible for the privatization program. The PC has 26 approved privatization programs (https://www.pc.go.ke/sites/default/files/2019-06/APPROVED%20PRIVATIZATION%20PROGRAMME.pdf ). In 2020, the GOK began the process of privatizing some state-owned sugar firms through a public bidding process, including foreign investors. 10. Political and Security Environment Kenya’s 2017 national election was marred by violence, which claimed the lives of nearly 100 Kenyans, a contentious political atmosphere, which pitted the ruling Jubilee Party against the opposition National Super Alliance (NASA), as well as political interference and attacks on key institutions by both sides. In November 2017, the Kenyan Supreme Court unanimously upheld the October 2017 repeat presidential election results and President Uhuru Kenyatta’s win in an election boycotted by NASA leader Raila Odinga. In March 2018, President Kenyatta and Odinga publicly shook hands and pledged to work together to heal the political, social, and economic divides highlighted by the election. The GOK, civil society actors, private sector, and religious leaders are implementing a number of initiatives to promote peace in advance of the next national election in August 2022. The United States’ Travel Advisory for Kenya advises U.S. citizens to exercise increased caution due to the threat of crime and terrorism, and not to travel to counties bordering Somalia and to certain coastal areas due to terrorism. Due to the high risk of crime, it is common for private businesses and residences to have 24-hour guard services and well-fortified property perimeters. Instability in Somalia has heightened concerns of terrorist attacks, leading businesses and public institutions nationwide to increase their security measures. Tensions flare occasionally within and between ethnic communities in Kenya. Regional conflict, most notably in Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan, sometimes have spill-over effects in Kenya. There could be an increase in refugees entering Kenya due to drought and instability in neighboring countries, adding to the already large refugee population in the country. Kenya and its neighbors are working together to mitigate threats of terrorism and insecurity through African-led initiatives such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Eastern African Standby Force (EASF). Despite attacks against Kenyan forces in Kenya and Somalia, the Government of Kenya has maintained its commitment to promoting peace and stability in Somalia. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (USD) 2020 $96.01 billion 2019 $101.01 billion https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. MKTP.CD?locations=KE Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $353 M BEA data available at http://bea.gov/international/direct_investment_ multinational_companies_comprehensive_data.htm Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $-16 M BEA data available at http://bea.gov/international/direct_investment_ multinational_companies_comprehensive_data.htm Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 1.2% 2020 0.1% https://unctad.org/webflyer/world-investment-report-2021 *Host Country Statistical Source: Central Bank of Kenya, Foreign Investment Survey 2020 Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. Kosovo Executive Summary Already one of Europe’s poorest countries, Kosovo was hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic but recovered quickly. Although economic growth estimates for 2021 differ significantly between the Central Bank of Kosovo’s 9.9 percent estimate and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 7.5 percent estimate, both point to a robust economic recovery and faster growth rates than initially forecast. A large inflow of remittances and diaspora tourism combined with increased exports contributed to this growth. Although many international financial institutions remain cautious in forecasting economic growth for 2022 given the unpredictability of the pandemic and global supply chain shocks, most expect Kosovo’s GDP to grow between 3.8 and 4 percent. The pandemic has not led to permanent changes in Kosovo’s investment policies. The government enacted several relief measures that are all temporary and focused on maintaining employment levels and helping businesses preserve liquidity. As such, Kosovo’s COVID-19 relief measures did not significantly affect its broader investment policy environment. Kosovo has potential to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), but that potential is constrained by its failure to address several serious structural issues, including limited regional and global economic integration; political interference in the economy; corruption; an unreliable energy supply; a large informal sector; difficulty establishing property rights; and tenuous rule of law, including a glaring lack of contract enforcement. The country’s ability to sustain growth relies significantly on international financial support and remittances. Its ongoing dispute with Serbia and lack of formal recognition by many countries and international organizations, including the lack of membership in the United Nations, also create obstacles to doing business. Increased energy prices throughout Europe, particularly in the last quarter of 2021 through the first quarter of 2022 exposed Kosovo’s vulnerability to energy price shocks and its serious issues with energy reliability. By January 2022, the Kosovo government had to subsidize the energy sector in the amount of €90 million (about 1.3 percent of GDP) and increase energy tariffs to cover the cost of increased energy imports. Kosovo also faced blackouts due to maintenance issues at its two dilapidated coal-fired power plants. The Energy Regulatory Office in February 2022 instituted block tariffs for residential consumers but did not change electricity prices for businesses. In 2021, the net flow of FDI in Kosovo was estimated at $466 million, a significant increase over the 2020 amount of $382 million. Real estate and leasing activities are the largest beneficiaries of FDI, followed by financial services and energy. The food, IT, infrastructure, and energy sectors are growing and are likely to attract new FDI. One key sector of the economy that has sustained strong growth is the wood processing sector. Companies producing kitchens, baths, doors, upholstered furniture, and combined wood, metal and glass have seen increased investment since 2017. The sector is maturing and receiving support in business development services and access to finance. Kosovo is also addressing its energy security by increasing its renewable energy capacity and facilitating more bankable renewable projects. Kosovo has also rapidly increased the exports of bedding, mattresses, and cushions, but this development has mainly been concentrated within a few companies. Kosovo’s laws and regulations are consistent with international benchmarks for supporting and protecting investment, though justice sector enforcement remains weak. Kosovo has a flat corporate income tax of 10 percent. In 2016, the government partnered with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other international donors to launch the Kosovo Credit Guarantee Fund, which improves access to credit. With USAID assistance, Kosovo passed legislation to establish a Commercial Court, which aims to handle business disputes fairly, efficiently, and predictably and is expected to improve the business enabling environment by reducing opportunities for corruption and building investor and private sector trust in the judiciary. Property rights and interests are enforced, but legal system weaknesses and difficulties associated with establishing title to real estate, in part due to competing claims arising from the history of conflict with Serbia, make enforcement difficult. Kosovo has a legal framework for protecting intellectual property rights (IPR), but enforcement remains weak, largely due to a lack of resources. While IPR theft occurs in Kosovo, there is insufficient data on how widespread the issue is. The issue does not get attention in the media, and the U.S. Embassy in Pristina has not had significant complaints of IPR theft in Kosovo from U.S. companies. Anecdotally, the IPR theft that occurs tends to be mostly in lower-value items that likely do not garner significant attention. All legal, regulatory, and accounting systems in Kosovo are modeled on EU standards and international best practices. All large companies are required to comply with international accounting standards. Investors should note that despite regulatory requirements for public consultation and the establishment of an online platform for public comments ( http://konsultimet.rks-gov.net ), some business groups complain that regulations are passed with little substantive discussion or stakeholder input. In Kosovo’s recent history, the political environment has been characterized by short electoral cycles and prolonged periods of caretaker governments. However, the current governing coalition has an overwhelming majority, and all indications point to the likelihood that it will remain in place for much, if not all, of its four-year term. In addition, there have been few substantive changes in legislation and regulations on foreign investment and the general business environment despite previously short electoral cycles. To date, the U.S. Embassy in Pristina is not aware of any damage to commercial projects or installations. The government, which took office March 2021, ran on an anti-corruption platform and has a strong electoral mandate to enact positive change. The public consistently ranks Kosovo’s high unemployment rate (officially 25.9 percent in 2021) as among its greatest concerns. Unemployment levels for first-time job seekers and women are considerably higher than the official rate. Many experts cite a skills gap and high reservation wage as significant contributing factors. Despite the challenges, Kosovo has attracted a number of significant investors, including several international firms and U.S. franchises. Some investors are attracted by Kosovo’s relatively young population, low labor costs, relative proximity to the EU market, and natural resources. Global supply disruptions brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic have sparked greater interest recently from some businesses to utilize Kosovo as a base for near-shoring production destined for the EU market. Kosovo does provide preferential access for products to enter the EU market through a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 87 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 USD 283 Million http://data.imf.org/CDIS World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,480 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Kosovo welcomes FDI. Kosovo’s laws do not discriminate against foreign investors. The current government (as the government before) – including the Prime Minister’s Office; Ministry of Economy; Ministry of Industry, Entrepreneurship and Trade; and the Ministry of Finance, Labor and Transfers – recognizes the importance of FDI to the expansion of the private sector. The mission of the Kosovo Investment Enterprise and Support Agency (KIESA) is to promote and support foreign investments. The agency is tasked with offering a menu of services, including assistance and advice on starting a business in Kosovo, assistance with applying for a site in a special economic zone or as a business incubator, facilitation of meetings with different state institutions, and participation in business-to-business meetings and conferences. In practice, however, many foreign and local companies have complained that KIESA has extremely weak capacity to provide the services under its mandate and must be strengthened. Foreign chambers of commerce – including the American, German, and European – participate in dialogue platforms with the government, although overall communication between the government and the private sector has slightly deteriorated recently. The laws and regulations on establishing and owning business enterprises and engaging in all forms of remunerative activity apply equally to foreign and domestic private entities. Kosovo legislation does not interfere with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or sale of interests in enterprises by private entities. Under Kosovo law, foreign firms and local businesses operating in Kosovo are treated equally. Kosovo does not have an investment screening mechanism, though the U.S. government is actively working with Kosovo on the best practices for developing and implementing such a mechanism. There have been no reports of restrictions from U.S. investors. There are no licensing restrictions particular to foreign investors and no requirement for domestic partners for joint ventures. Kosovo is not a member of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), World Trade Organization (WTO), or United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), so there are no Kosovo-specific investment policy reviews from these organizations. However, Kosovo was profiled as part of the OECD’s report on “Competitiveness in Southeast Europe 2021: A Policy Outlook,” in which Kosovo received an overall score of 2.0 in the area of investment policy and promotion (versus an average of 3.0 across the Western Balkans 6 countries). In February 2017, the Pristina think tank, Group for Legal and Political Studies, published the report, “ How ‘friendly’ is Kosovo for Foreign Direct Investments: A Policy Review of Gaps from a Regional Market Perspective .” The government has taken steps to remove barriers to facilitate businesses’ operations and improve related government services. With USAID’s assistance, the Government of Kosovo continued a series of business climate reforms that have contributed to Kosovo’s improved ranking in the World Bank Doing Business Index over the years. Per the amended Law on Support to Small and Medium Enterprises, KIESA supports both domestic and foreign-owned micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), without any specific eligibility criteria. Such services include voucher programs for training and advisory services, investment facilitation, assistance to women and young business owners, and the provision of business space with complete infrastructure at industrial parks, at minimal cost. The Kosovo Business Registration Agency (KBRA), part of the Ministry of Industry, Entrepreneurship and Trade, registers all new businesses, business closures, and business modifications. The KBRA website is available in English and can be accessed at arbk.rks-gov.net . As of March 2022, some steps in the registration process can be completed online. Successful registrants will receive a business-registration certificate and a VAT number. New businesses must register employees for tax and pension programs with the Tax Administration under the Ministry of Finance, Labor and Transfers. Business registration generally takes one day for an individual business and up to three days for a limited liability company or a joint stock company. A notary is not required when opening a new business unless the business registration also involves a transfer of real property. Kosovo does not promote, incentivize, or restrict outward investment. There are no restrictions on investments abroad. 3. Legal Regime The Law on Public Procurement delegates procurement authority to budgetary units (i.e., ministries, municipalities, and independent agencies) except when the government specifically authorizes the Ministry of Finance, Labor and Transfers’ Central Procurement Agency to procure goods and/or services on its behalf. All tenders are advertised in Albanian and Serbian, and for most important projects, also in English. The Public Procurement Regulatory Commission (PPRC) oversees and supervises all public procurement and ensures that the Law on Public Procurement is fully implemented. As of March 2022, an e-procurement platform is fully operational; all procurements are handled through it, which has greatly enhanced transparency. The PPRC publishes contract award information on its website ( https://e-prokurimi.rks-gov.net/Home/ClanakItemNew.aspx?id=327 ). The National Audit Office conducts annual procurement audits of all Kosovo ministries, municipal authorities, and agencies that receive funds from the Kosovo consolidated budget. The Procurement Review Body (PRB), an independent administrative body, is responsible for handling appeals related to government procurement. The PRB’s Board, its highest decision-making body, has been unable to process appeals at the highest level, due to board vacancies that have gone unfilled by the Government of Kosovo (GoK) for more than a year. The Kosovo Assembly is responsible for rule-making and regulatory actions, while government ministries and agencies draft and authorize secondary legislation (i.e., implementing regulations). Municipal assemblies and mayors have regulatory authority at the local level, which rarely extends to the broader issues of investment climate. The Government of Kosovo is working to align all legal, regulatory, and accounting systems in Kosovo with EU standards and international best practices. Publicly listed companies are required to comply with international accounting standards. The government requires Environmental and Social Impact Assessment studies for many projects, especially those with a large environmental or social footprint, such as in the energy and mining sectors. The Assembly publishes draft laws on its website ( http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/shq/projektligjet-dhe-ligjet/ ). The relevant committees also hold public hearings on proposed laws, including investment laws. The 2016 regulation on the Minimum Standards for Public Consultation Process clarifies the standards, principles, and procedures for consultations during the drafting of legislation. Kosovo has developed an online platform for public comments ( http://konsultimet.rks-gov.net/ ) and publishes all laws and most rules and regulations in the Official Kosovo Gazette ( https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ ) and on the Kosovo Assembly’s website. The Government of Kosovo is currently working to annul, amend, and update all secondary legislation that is outdated or that might otherwise contradict primary legislation. The Government of Kosovo is also working on publishing all secondary legislation in the Official Gazette and relevant ministerial websites. The Law on Public Financial Management and Accountability requires a detailed impact assessment of any budgetary implications before new regulations can be implemented. The Ministry of Finance, Labor and Transfers regularly publishes detailed reports on Kosovo’s public finances and debt obligations. Despite the regulatory requirements, some businesses and business associations complain that regulations are still passed with little substantive discussion or stakeholder input. Kosovo is represented in CEFTA by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and is pursuing EU integration. Through its Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, Kosovo is working to harmonize its laws and regulations with EU standards. Kosovo is not a member of the WTO. Kosovo is a signatory to the July 2017 Multi-Annual Action Plan for a Regional Economic Area in the Western Balkans Six and its subsequent Common Regional Market Action Plan . This action plan aims to increase regional integration in the fields of trade, investment policy, labor force mobility, and digitalization. In 2016, the Kosovo Assembly amended the constitution to enhance the independence of the judiciary in line with EU requirements. Despite significant reforms and improvements in court efficiency, backlog, and sentencing procedures, the judiciary lacks sufficient subject-matter expertise to effectively handle complex economic issues. While complainants have the right to challenge court decisions, regulations, and enforcement actions in the regular court system, as well as the constitutional court, many analysts view Kosovo’s courts as politically influenced by the executive branch, with special treatment or “selective justice” for high-profile, well-connected individuals. While Kosovo court conviction rates generally match regional averages, the rate falls considerably when filtered for high-profile corruption cases. In January 2022, the Kosovo Assembly unanimously adopted the Law on the Commercial Court, which establishes a special court for handling business disputes fairly, efficiently, and predictably. The Commercial Court aims to improve the business enabling environment by reducing opportunities for corruption and building investor and private sector trust in the judiciary. USAID supported the Kosovo Ministry of Justice in developing the law through an inclusive and participatory process with the judiciary, commercial law experts, practitioners, academics, businesses, and civil society representatives. The Kosovo Judicial Council, with the help of USAID, developed and is implementing an Action Plan for operationalizing the Commercial Court, including by developing regulations on internal organization, case transfer, and recruitment of key personnel. Significant legislation overhauling the 2004 Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, amended in 2018, brought Kosovo’s Criminal Law in compliance with the EU Convention on Human Rights, updating definitions and best practices. The Criminal Code contains penalties for tax evasion, bankruptcy, fraud, intellectual property rights offenses, antitrust, securities fraud, money laundering, and corruption. The Special Department of the Special Prosecutor of the Republic of Kosovo handles high-level cases of corruption, organized crime, terrorism, etc. Kosovo’s civil legal system provides for property and contract enforcement. The Department for Economic Affairs within the Basic Court of Pristina has jurisdiction over economic disputes between both legal and natural persons, including reorganization, bankruptcy, and liquidation of economic persons; disputes regarding impingement of competition; and protection of property rights and intellectual property rights across the entire territory of Kosovo. A similar department within the Court of Appeals holds jurisdiction over “disputes between domestic and foreign economic persons in their commercial affairs” and addresses all appeals coming from the Pristina Basic Court’s Department for Economic Affairs. Commercial cases can take anywhere from six months to several years to resolve. The upcoming Commercial Court, expected to open in 2022, will supplant the responsibilities of the Economic Departments of the Pristina Basic Court and the Court of Appeals in handling commercial cases and the Administrative Department of the Pristina Basic Court in handling commercial-related administrative cases. The Law on Enforcement Procedures permits claimants to utilize bailiffs licensed by the Ministry of Justice to execute court-ordered judgments. In addition, the Laws on Arbitration and Mediation have helped to address impediments to alternative dispute resolution and to enforcing arbitral awards. Foreign firms operating in Kosovo are entitled to the same privileges and treatment as local businesses. Kosovo’s commercial laws are available to the public in English, as well as Kosovo’s official languages (Albanian and Serbian) on the Kosovo Assembly’s website ( http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/shq/projektligjet-dhe-ligjet/ ) and on the Official Gazette website ( http://gzk.rks-gov.net/default.aspx ). Laws of particular relevance include: The Law on Foreign Investment: provides a set of fundamental rights and guarantees to ensure protection and fair treatment in strict accordance with accepted international standards and practices. The Law on Business Organizations: regulates the registration and closure of a company and the rights and obligations of shareholders, authorized representatives, and others included in the business management structure. The Law on Late Payments in Commercial Transactions: discourages late payments and regulates the calculation of interest on late payments. The Law on Bankruptcy: regulates all matters related to the insolvency of business organizations; the provisions for the protection, liquidation, and distribution of the assets of a bankrupt debtor to its creditors; and the reorganization and discharge of debt for qualified business organizations. The Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing: enabled Kosovo to join Egmont Group, an inter-governmental network of 152 Financial Intelligence Units whose members exchange expertise and financial intelligence to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The Credit Guarantee Fund Law: increased access to finance for all MSMEss in Kosovo in an effort to increase employment, boost local production, and improve the trade balance. The Law on Foreign Trade, and the Law on Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures: provides a set of principles and rules on trade, as well as provisions for government interventions in cases of dumping and countervailing measures. There are two main laws that regulate transactions for competition-related concerns: The Law on Protection of Competition and the Law on Antidumping and Countervailing Measures. The Competition Authority is responsible for implementing the Law on Protection of Competition, but generally lacks the human resources to conduct thorough investigations. The Authority has lacked a decision-making body since May 2021. The Trade Department of the Ministry of Industry, Entrepreneurship and Trade is responsible for the implementation of the Law on Antidumping and Countervailing Measures. In September 2018, Kosovo’s Assembly approved the Law on Safeguard Measures on Imports, which allows the trade minister to impose a provisional safeguard measure for up to 200 days. Articles seven and eight of the Foreign Investment Law limit expropriation to cases with a clear public interest and protect foreign investments from unreasonable expropriation, guaranteeing due process and timely compensation payment based on fair-market prices. The Law on Expropriation of Immovable Property permits government or municipal expropriation of private property when such action is in the public interest; articles five through thirteen of the Law define expropriation procedures. An eminent domain clause limits legal recourse in cases arising from the expropriation and sale of property through the privatization of state-owned enterprises. There is no history of expropriation other than uncontroversial, undisputed expropriations for work in the public interest, such as roadway construction. 6. Financial Sector Kosovo has an open-market economy, and the market determines interest rates. Individual banks conduct risk analysis and determine credit allocation. Foreign and domestic investors can get credit on the local market. Access to credit for the private sector and financial products are limited but gradually improving. The country generally has a positive attitude towards foreign portfolio investment. Kosovo does not have a stock exchange. The regulatory system conforms with EU directives and international standards. There are no restrictions beyond normal regulatory requirements related to capital sourcing, fit, and properness of the investors. The Central Bank of Kosovo (CBK) has taken all required measures to improve policies for the free flow of financial resources. Requirements under the SAA with the EU oblige the free flow of capital. The government respects the IMF’s Article VIII conditions on the flow of capital. In early 2006, Kosovo created a credit registry managed by the Central Bank of Kosovo. It serves as a database for customers’ credit history and aims to help commercial banks and non-banking institutions assess customers’ credit worthiness. Banks and non-banking institutions are required to report to the Credit Registry of Kosovo, but only authorized banking and non-banking institution personnel can access it. In addition to the Credit Registry of Kosovo, the Ministry of Industry, Entrepreneurship and Trade offers a Pledge Registry Sector, a mechanism that records data for collateral pledges. Kosovo has 11 commercial banks (of which nine are foreign) and 30 micro-finance institutions (of which 13 are foreign). The official currency of Kosovo is the Euro, although the country is not a member of the Eurozone. In the absence of an independent monetary policy, prices are highly responsive to market trends in the larger Eurozone. Kosovo’s private banking sector remains stable, well capitalized, and profitable despite the COVID-19 pandemic’s negative economic shock to the economy. Difficult economic conditions, weak contract enforcement, and a risk-averse posture have traditionally limited banks’ lending activities. However, financial services and bank lending have steadily improved over the years, albeit from a low baseline. In March 2022, the rate of non-performing loans was 2.3 percent, which stands slightly lower than the pre-pandemic February 2020 rate of 2.5 percent. The concentration of the three largest banks’ assets have decreased slightly to 53 percent in March 2022 compared to 56.2 percent in March 2021. The assets of the entire banking sector total 5.9 billion euros; foreign-owned banks have 85.6 percent of the market share. Relatively little lending is directed toward long-term investment activities, although this trend has been changing slowly. Interest rates have dropped significantly in the past decade, from an average of about 12.7 percent in 2012 to an average of 5.7 percent in March 2022. Slower lending is notable in the northern part of Kosovo due to a weak judiciary, informal business activities, and fewer qualified borrowers. The Central Bank of Kosovo (CBK) is an independent government body responsible for fostering the development of competitive, sound, and transparent practices in the banking and financial sectors. It supervises and regulates Kosovo’s banking sector, insurance industry, pension funds, and micro-finance institutions. The CBK also performs other standard central bank tasks, including cash management, transfers, clearing, management of funds deposited by the Ministry of Finance, Labor and Transfers and other public institutions, collection of financial data, and management of a credit register. Although the financial sector remains stable, a prolonged period without a governing board and allegations of mismanagement have caused concern over CBK’s institutional development. Foreign banks and branches can establish operations in the country. They are subject to the same licensing requirements and regulations as local banks. The country has not lost any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years and no such relationship is currently in jeopardy. There are no restrictions on foreigners opening bank accounts; they can do so upon submission of valid identification documentation. Kosovo is a signatory country to the United States’ Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), aimed at addressing tax evasion by U.S. citizens or permanent residents with foreign bank accounts. For more information, visit the FATCA website: https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Foreign-Account-Tax-Compliance-Act-FATCA . Kosovo does not have any sovereign wealth funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Kosovo has 63 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 44 of which are municipality managed. These enterprises are typically utilities, such as water treatment and supply, waste management, energy generation and transmission, but also include SOEs involved in telecommunications, mining, and transportation. SOEs are generally governed by government-appointed boards. The Ministry of Economy monitors SOE operations with a light hand. Private companies can compete with SOEs in terms of market share and other incentives in relevant sectors. State-owned enterprises are subject to the same tax laws as private companies. There are no state-owned banks, development banks, or sovereign funds in Kosovo. The majority of Kosovo’s SOEs are either regulated or operate in the free market but incur losses and depend on government subsidies for their survival. SOEs do not receive a larger percentage of government contracts in sectors that are open to foreign competition. However, the government interprets procurement law in a way that considers SOEs to be public authorities and prevents contracting authorities from procuring goods from other sources if SOEs offer such goods and/or services. SOEs purchase goods and services from the private sector, including international firms. The privatization process has essentially slowed to a halt. Kosovo had been progressively privatizing SOE assets since the early 2000s, but there are few assets left to privatize, and the current governing coalition has traditionally opposed the privatization process. The Privatization Agency of Kosovo (PAK), an independent agency, is still responsible for the disposition of Kosovo’s SOE assets. The Government of Kosovo is currently working on a concept note for the establishment of a Sovereign Fund. As currently written, the Kosovo Government plans to transfer some of the most valuable assets currently under PAK authority to the Sovereign Fund. For those assets put on sale, the privatization process is open to foreign investors. PAK provides a live feed of bidding day procedures on its website ( http://www.pak-ks.org/ ). The website also includes bidding information, the results of sales, and other information. 10. Political and Security Environment In recent history, the political environment has been characterized by short electoral cycles and prolonged periods of caretaker governments. Despite the political instability, there have not been substantial legislative and regulative changes, especially regarding investments and business environment. There have been no reports of any damage to commercial projects or installations. Kosovo held national assembly elections on February 14, 2021, after the Constitutional Court ruled in December 2020 that a convicted Member of Parliament’s (MP) decisive 61st vote to form the government was not valid. For the first time in the last 20 years, the elections produced an overwhelmingly clear victor, the Levizja Vetevendosje (“Self-Determination Movement”) led by Albin Kurti, which formed a government in March 2021 with the help of only a few minority MPs. This was unusual as Kosovo’s proportional electoral system typically favors coalitions and partnerships. The new government has restored perceptions of political stability and is likely to provide a break from Kosovo’s short electoral cycles. The current administration’s electoral victory centered mainly on anti-corruption promises. While the administration has produced some results in fighting corruption, balancing the budget, and reforming the public administration, it has been relatively slow in introducing new laws and regulations as well as drafting strategies that would guide economic policymaking. Kosovo is not a member of the United Nations and regional neighbors Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are among the countries that do not recognize its statehood. In November 2018, Kosovo imposed a 100 percent tariff on all goods from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina but in April 2020 dropped the 100 percent tariff in favor of “reciprocal measures.” The previous administration dropped these “reciprocal measures” temporarily in June 2020 to give way for negotiations on “economic normalization” with Serbia. Despite a White House-brokered set of commitments signed on September 4, 2020, in Washington, DC, by Kosovo’s then-Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, there are numerous issues remaining that might lead to trade and investment barriers between the two countries. In addition, the lack of recognition also exposes Kosovo to subtle technical difficulties in carrying on day-to-day business activities. For example, Kosovo is not listed in the ISO 3166 list of countries, which results in numerous companies and services not listing Kosovo in the drop-down menu of countries and forces businesses in Kosovo to either register and divert their business through a third country or renders them unable to use such services. Due to Kosovo’s lack of Country Code Top-Level Domain (ccTLD), it is more difficult to track cyberattacks. Kuwait Executive Summary The Government of Kuwait launched an ambitious development plan in 2018 known as ‘Vision 2035’ which aims to transform country into an international trade hub and diversify its oil-centric economy. The goal is to increase private sector participation in Kuwait’s economy by creating a more investor-friendly environment as well as to invest in the nation’s economic infrastructure via the construction of new airports, ports, roads, industrial areas, residential developments, hospitals, a railroad, and a metro rail. The Northern Gateway initiative, which encompasses the Five Islands or New Kuwait projects, envisions public and private sector investment in the establishment of an international economic zone that could exceed USD 400 billion over several decades. With one of the world’s largest sovereign funds with more than USD 670 billion in assets as of March 2021, minimal taxes, and low-cost labor, Kuwait provides a great opportunity for investment. However, bureaucratic red tape and the frequent changing of the government has stalled the progress of many initiatives. Several public-private partnerships are in the pipeline in the power, water management, and renewable energy sectors. Two billion-dollar hospitals were completed in the last two years. These institutions need foreign investment to operate and train hospital staff, as well as to deliver world-class equipment and IT infrastructure. With a view to attracting foreign investment, the government passed a foreign direct investment law in 2013 that permits up to 100 percent foreign ownership of a business if approved by the Kuwait Direct Investment Promotion Authority (KDIPA). All other foreign businesses must abide by existing law that mandates that Kuwaitis, or other GCC nationals, own at least 51 percent of any enterprise. In approving applications from foreign investors seeking 100 percent ownership, KDIPA prioritizes local job creation, the provision of training and education to Kuwaiti citizens, technology transfer, diversification of national income sources, contribution to exports, support for small- and medium-sized enterprises, and the utilization of Kuwaiti products and services. KDIPA has sponsored 37 foreign firms, including six U.S. companies. KDIPA also provides certain investment incentives like tax benefits, customs duties relief, and permission to recruit foreign employees. Kuwait has also made great strides in protecting intellectual property. Kuwait’s 2019 Copyright Law addressed serious concerns about Kuwait’s intellectual property protection regime. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) moved Kuwait from the Priority Watch List to the Watch List in its 2020 Special 301 Report because of the new copyright legislation and an increase in intellectual property enforcement actions. The Special 301 Report identifies countries that are trading partners, but which do not adequately or effectively protect and enforce intellectual property rights (IPR). Kuwait has continued to increase enforcement actions in 2021. Kuwait is a country of 1.4 million citizens and 3.3 million expatriates. It possesses six percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and is a major oil exporter. The economy is heavily dependent upon oil production and related industries, which are almost wholly owned and operated by the government. The energy sector accounts for more than half of GDP and close to 90 percent of government revenue. The fall in oil prices after OPEC+ failed to agree on production targets in 2019 and the reduction in global demand for oil upon the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 greatly exacerbated Kuwait’s fiscal deficit. However, the rapid increases in the price of oil since spring 2021 has allowed Kuwait to significantly reduce its deficit from KD 5.4 billion (USD 17.7 billion) in March 2021 to KD 406.4 million (USD 1.3 billion ) as of January 2022. However, reduced stress on the country’s finances has dampened support for economic and business reforms that Kuwait needs to become the investment hub envisioned in New Kuwait Vision 2035. Kuwait’s ability to implement these changes will determine whether the current financial windfall will result in an economically sustainable future. As it develops the private sector to reduce the country’s dependence on oil, the government faces two central challenges. It must improve the business climate to enable the private sector and must prepare its citizens to work in the private sector. Political tension between the government and the elected National Assembly, a slow and overly complicated bureaucracy, inconsistent legal practices, and restrictive economic policies contribute to a challenging business environment for outside investors. More than 85 percent of all Kuwaitis with jobs work in the public sector, where they receive generous salaries and benefits. This makes public sector jobs largely preferable to careers in the private sector. Convincing young Kuwaitis that their future is in the private sector will require changing social attitudes and raising the level of local education so that Kuwaiti businesses can compete internationally in sectors other than fossil fuels. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 73 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 72 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 540 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2019 USD amount 36,290 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 3. Legal Regime Kuwait does not have a centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published akin to the Federal Register in the United States. The regulatory system does not require that regulations be made available for public comment. The government frequently passes draft regulations to interested parties in the private sector, such as the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry or the Bankers Association, for comment. Kuwait does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. However, ESG concepts are increasingly gaining traction in Kuwait with the Kuwait Investment Authority’s January 2022 announcement that it intended to make its investment portfolio ESG compliant. The State Audit Bureau reviews government contracts and audits contract performance but does not publicly share the results. Kuwait does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), nor does it incorporate domestic transparency measures requiring the disclosure of payments made to other governments related to the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or mineral deposits. However, the Kuwait economy is almost wholly dependent upon oil, the extraction of which is deemed a responsibility of the government and is subject to close National Assembly oversight. Kuwait joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1963 and became a founding member of the WTO in 1995. However, Kuwait is not a signatory to every WTO plurilateral agreement, such as the Agreement on Government Procurement. In April 2018, Kuwait deposited its Trade Facilitation Agreement instrument of ratification with the WTO after Kuwait’s National Assembly approved the agreement the previous month. Kuwait has been part of the GCC since its formation in 1981. The GCC launched a common market in 2008 and a customs union in 2015. The GCC continues to forge agreements on regional standards and coordinate trade and investment policies. American standards and internationally recognized standards are typically accepted. For more information regarding GCC standards and policies, please refer to the following GCC website: http://www.gcc-sg.org/en-us/Pages/default.aspx Kuwait has a developed civil legal system, based in part on Egyptian and French law and influenced by Islamic law. Having evolved in a historically active trading nation, the court system in Kuwait is familiar with international commercial law. Kuwait’s judiciary includes specialized courts, including a commercial court to adjudicate commercial law. Residents that are not Kuwaiti citizens involved in legal disputes with citizens have frequently alleged the courts show bias in favor of Kuwaiti citizens. Holders of legal residence have been detained and deported without recourse to the courts. Persons charged with criminal offenses, placed under investigation, or involved in unresolved financial disputes with local business partners have, in some cases, been subjected to travel bans. Travel bans are meant to prevent an individual from leaving Kuwait until a legal matter is resolved or a debt settled. Travel bans may remain in place for a substantial period while the case is investigated, resolved, and/or prosecuted. Failure to repay a debt can result in a prison term ranging from months to years, depending upon the amount owed. U.S. firms are advised to consult with a Kuwaiti law firm or the local office of a foreign law firm before executing contracts with local parties. Fees for legal representation can be very high. Contracts between local and foreign parties serve as the basis for resolving any future commercial disputes. The process of resolving disputes in the Kuwaiti legal system can be subject to lengthy delays, sometimes years, depending on the complexity of the issue and the parties involved. During these delays, U.S. citizens can be deprived of income streams related to their business venture and be forced to surrender assets and ownership rights before being allowed to depart the country. To diversify the economy by attracting foreign investment and grow private sector employment, Kuwait passed a new foreign direct investment law in 2013 permitting up to 100 percent foreign ownership of a business – if approved by KDIPA. Without KDIPA approval, all businesses incorporated in Kuwait must be 51 percent-owned by Kuwaiti or GCC citizens and seek licensing through the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. In reviewing applications from foreign investors, KDIPA places emphasis on creating jobs and the provision of training and education opportunities for Kuwaiti citizens, technology transfer, diversification of national income sources, increasing exports, support for local small- and medium-sized enterprises, and the utilization of Kuwaiti products and services. In addition to assistance in navigating the bureaucracy, available investment incentives through KDIPA include tax benefits, customs duties relief, and permission to recruit required foreign labor. Government control of land limits its availability for development. In 2019, a set of criteria was introduced to assess applications and grant licenses to foreign investors. Decision No. 329 of 2019 enacted five main criteria for assessing licensing and granting incentives. The criteria covered the following: (i) transfer and settlement of technology, including tangible and intangible technological innovation and the enablement of knowledge creation; (ii) human capital, stressing job creation for nationals and employee development programs; (iii) market development; (iv) economic diversification; and (v) sustainable development in the areas of corporate social responsibility and environmental sustainability. Decisions on licenses and the granting of incentives are based on a “Points Scoring Mechanism” (PMS). Other recent legal measures to facilitate foreign direct investment and economic growth include Law No. 116 of 2014 regarding public-private partnerships (PPP) and a new Companies Law No. 1 of 2016. The PPP law created the Kuwait Authority for Partnership Projects ( www.kapp.gov.kw ). Kuwait’s open economy has generally promoted a competitive market. In 2007, the government enacted the Protection of Competition Law No. 10 and by-laws in 2012 that facilitated the establishment of a Competition Protection Authority to safeguard free commerce, ban monopolies, investigate complaints, and supervise mergers and acquisitions. The Competition Protection Authority presented a restructuring plan with the assistance of the World Bank to the Cabinet in 2018, which is still under review. In some previous years, U.S. investors have alleged instances of discrimination. The Commercial Agency Law No. 13 of 2016 removed exclusivity, enabling foreign firms to have multiple agents to market their products. In 2016, the National Assembly passed a new Public Tenders Law No. 49. All bids on government-funded infrastructure projects (excluding military, security, and some oil sector tenders) in excess of KD 75,000 (USD 250,000) must be submitted to the Central Agency for Public Tenders. The law requires that foreign contractors bidding on government contracts purchase at least 30 percent of their inputs locally and award at least 30 percent of the work to local contractors, where available. The law favors local sourcing by mandating a 15 percent price preference for locally- and GCC-produced items, however this provision may be waived on a case-by-case basis. Kuwait has had no recent cases of expropriation or nationalization involving foreign investments. The 2013 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Law guarantees investors against expropriation or nationalization, except for public benefit as prescribed by law. In such cases, investors should be compensated for the real value of their holdings at the time of expropriation. The last nationalization occurred in 1974. Kuwait worked with the World Bank to draft bankruptcy legislation designed to assist businesses to recover from financial difficulties as an alternative to liquidation. The Council of Ministers approved new legislation to support competition and create bankruptcy protections and sent it to the National Assembly. On September 29, 2020, Kuwait’s National Assembly passed the long-awaited law. The new law restructures the legal framework for bankruptcy to focus on rehabilitating troubled companies rather than liquidation. The new law removes these penalties for good faith debtors and creates new mechanisms to allow debtors to avoid liquidation, including a preventive settlement procedure and a restructuring procedure. 6. Financial Sector Foreign financial investment firms operating in Kuwait characterize the government’s attitude toward foreign portfolio investment as welcoming. An effective regulatory system exists to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. Existing policies and infrastructure facilitate the free flow of financial resources into the capital market. Government bodies comply with guidelines outlined by IMF Article VIII and refrain from restricting payments and transfers on current international transactions. In November 2015, the Capital Markets Authority issued a regulation covering portfolio management, but it does not apply to foreign investors. The privatized stock exchange, named the Boursa, currently lists 166 companies. In February 2019, a consortium led by Kuwait National Investment Company that included the Athens Stock Exchange won a tender to acquire 44 percent of the Kuwaiti Boursa. In December 2019, the Capital Markets Authority sold its 50 percent stake in the Kuwaiti Boursa as part of an Initial Public Offering. The offering was oversubscribed by more than 8.5 times. Kuwait’s Public Institution for Social Security owns the remaining six percent of shares. The Boursa is the only stock exchange owned by the private sector in the Middle East. FTSE Russell upgraded the status of the Boursa to Secondary Emerging Market in 2017. On December 1, 2020, Boursa Kuwait completed the Kuwaiti capital market’s inclusion into the MSCI Emerging Markets Indexes with the successful implementation of the first tranche of index inclusion. While the debt market is not well developed, local banks have the capacity to meet domestic demand. Credit is allocated on market terms. Foreign investors can obtain local credit on terms that correspond to collateral provided and intended use of financing. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. The Central Bank restricts commercial banks’ use of structured and complex derivatives but permits routine hedging and trading for non-speculative purposes. In March 2017, the government issued USD 8 billion in five- and ten-year notes but was unable to secure approval from the National Assembly for issuance of 30-year notes. The Central Bank of Kuwait reported that banking sector assets totaled USD 251 billion in September 2021, an increase by 0.6 percent. Twenty-two banks operate in Kuwait: five conventional local banks, five Islamic banks, 11 foreign banks, and one specialized bank. Conventional banks include National Bank of Kuwait, Commercial Bank of Kuwait, Gulf Bank, Al-Ahli Bank of Kuwait, and Burgan Bank. Sharia-compliant banks include Kuwait Finance House, which is the second largest bank in Kuwait, Boubyan Bank, Kuwait International Bank, Al-Ahli United Bank, and Warba Bank. Foreign banks include BNP Paribas, HSBC, Citibank, Qatar National Bank, Doha Bank, Dubai-based Mashreq Bank, the Bank of Muscat, Riyadh-based Al Rajhi Bank (the largest Sharia-compliant bank in the world), the Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait (BBK), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), and Union National Bank. The government-owned Industrial Bank of Kuwait provides medium- and long-term financing to industrial companies and Kuwaiti citizens through customized financing packages. In December 2018, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry began permitting more than 49 percent foreign ownership in local banks with the approval of the Central Bank of Kuwait. Following the global financial crisis in 2008 when large losses reduced confidence in the local banking sector, the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly passed legislation to guarantee deposits at local banks to rebuild confidence. Foreign banks can offer retail services. In 2013, the Central Bank announced that foreign banks could open multiple branches on a case-by-case basis. In 2017, the Al-Rajhi Bank opened its second branch. Qatar National Bank received CBK’s approval in 2014 and opened its second branch in 2018. Kuwaiti law restricts foreign banks from offering investment banking services. Foreign banks are subject to a maximum credit concentration equivalent to less than half the limit of the largest local bank and are prohibited from directing clients to borrow from external branches of their bank. Foreign banks may also open representative offices. The Central Bank of Kuwait announced initial guidelines for digital banking in early 2022. Concurrently, they opened applications for licensing for digital banking and will remain open until June 30, 2022. It is expected many of the existing large banks will apply for a digital license—further crowding the sector. The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) manages the Kuwait General Reserve Fund and the Kuwait Fund for Future Generations. By law, ten percent of oil revenues can be deposited each annually into the Fund for Future Generations in year of budget surplus. Despite rising oil prices, a surplus has not been formally announced and thus the ten percent policy has not been reinstated as of March 2022. KIA management reports to a Board of Directors appointed by the Council of Ministers. The Minister of Finance chairs the board; other members include the Minister of Oil, the Central Bank Governor, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance, and five representatives from Kuwait’s private sector (three of whom must not hold any other public office). An internal audit office reports directly to the Board of Directors and an external auditor. This information is provided to the State Audit Bureau, which audits KIA continuously and reports annually to the National Assembly. The 1982 law establishing the KIA prohibits the public disclosure of the size of sovereign wealth holdings and asset allocations. KIA conducts closed-door presentations for the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly on the full details of all funds under its management, including its strategic asset allocation, benchmarks, and rates of return. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute estimated that KIA manages one of the world’s largest sovereign funds with more than USD 670 billion in assets as of March 2021. Economic stress and budget deficits since 2016 due to diminishing oil revenues and, as of March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had led to the near depletion of the General Reserve Fund. Authorization to issue debt has stalled in the National Assembly. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The energy sector is dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as law precludes private participation in most sector activities. Outside the energy sector, Kuwait has few fully SOEs. One notable exception is Kuwait Airways. No published list of SOEs exists. The government owns shares in various Kuwaiti companies through the Fund for Future Generations managed by the KIA or the Social Security Fund managed by Kuwait’s Public Institution for Social Security. SOEs are permitted to control their own budgets. The National Assembly has passed several privatization laws since 2008. The Supreme Council for Privatization was established under a Privatization Law to increase the role of the private sector in Kuwait’s national economy. The council is chaired by the prime minister and consists of five ministers and three experts from different sectors. The Privatization Law was developed to address all the major issues related to privatization, especially the processes of transferring public projects into joint stock companies, protecting the rights of national manpower, and controlling prices and the controls which govern revenues arising from the privatization process. The Supreme Council and then the Council of Ministers must approve any privatization initiative. Kuwaiti employees have the right to retain their jobs in a privatized company for at least five years with the same salary and benefits. Privatized shares of any public company must be offered as follows: 40 percent of shares reserved for Kuwaiti citizens; 20 percent of shares retained by the government; five percent of shares distributed to Kuwaiti employees, both former and current; and the remaining 35 percent of shares sold at auction to a local or foreign investor. Telecommunications is the largest service sector in Kuwait. The Ministry of Communications owns and operates landlines and owns a fiber optic network. Internet providers may access both landlines and fiber optic networks. Three private mobile telephone companies provide cellular telephone and data services to the country. The government owns a significant minority interest in each, but foreign companies own majority interests in two of them. In 2014, the National Assembly passed legislation creating the independent Communication and Information Technology Regulatory Authority (CITRA), in part to prepare for the liberalization of mobile communications and Internet markets. Officially opened in 2016, CITRA serves as the primary national telecom regulator and cybersecurity agency. In March 2022, Kuwait announced the creation of a cybersecurity center that will eventually assume CITRA’s cybersecurity role, although details have not yet been finalized. CITRA also has a mandate to attract high-tech investment. 10. Political and Security Environment The U.S. Embassy occasionally receives threat information indicating possible targeting of official and private U.S. citizens for terrorist attacks. Soft targets are vulnerable to terrorist attack, although many have improved their perimeters and internal security. There have been no terror incidents in Kuwait since 2016. There have been no attacks targeting businesses or infrastructure. Since late 2013, Kuwait has seen no large-scale, politically motivated demonstrations, although it experienced some small-scale protests against COVID-19 restrictions over the winter of 2020-2021. U.S. citizens are encouraged to enroll in the U.S. Department of State’s Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) for up-to-date information from the Embassy. The Department of State shares credible threat information through its Consular Information Program, including Travel Advisories, Alerts, and Country Information for Kuwait, available at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel.html or the Embassy’s website: https://kw.usembassy.gov/. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics According to the 2020 World Investment Report published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Kuwait attracted a foreign direct investment inflow of USD 104 million in 2019, while divesting USD 2.5 billion of overseas investment. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019 U.S. direct investment in Kuwait was USD 398 million, down from USD 499 million in 2018. Kuwait’s FDI stock position in the United States totaled USD 1.26 billion in 2019. Kuwaiti direct investment in the United States is largely in real estate, stocks, and logistics. Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2019 $136.197 billion http://www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $398 million BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2018 $1,256 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 $398 million 2019-2020 -5.1% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report *Host country source: https://www.cbk.gov.kw/en/statistics-and-publication/publications/quarterly-statistical-bulletin Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward Amount 100% Total Outward Amount 100% Qatar 3,288 X% Cayman Islands 4,451 X% Saudi Arabia 908 X% Bahrain 3.728 X% United Arab Emirates 848 X% Saudi Arabia 3,401 X% Bahrain 746 X% Iraq 3,126 X% Oman 440 X% Turkey 2,932 X% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Kyrgyz Republic Executive Summary The Kyrgyz Republic remains a frontier market oriented towards higher-risk investors, but the government under President Sadyr Japarov has expressed its desire to attract greater, more diversified foreign direct investment (FDI) and to develop a green economy to contribute to sustainable economic growth. In 2021, the President traveled extensively to seek investment partners in different regions, and government officials attended several trade and investment expositions in the region and beyond. While the official attitude toward FDI is positive and by law there are no limits on foreign ownership or control, in practice foreign investors may be subject to greater scrutiny than domestic investors, and the country’s capacity to provide a sound enabling environment for investment still faces many challenges. The legal framework for foreign investment mostly corresponds to international standards, but enforcement of these laws and private property rights is weak, and criminal investigations of commercial disputes is not uncommon. Mining has historically been the industry that attracted the most FDI to the Kyrgyz Republic but a dispute with its largest foreign investor may have damaged investor appetite for this sector. In May 2021, the Kyrgyz government raided the offices of Kumtor Gold Company, a local subsidiary of Canadian mining company Centerra Gold, and fined the Canadian firm $3 billion for alleged environmental damages caused by running the Kumtor gold mine. The national government subsequently took over the mine and pursued Centerra Gold for corruption, criminal violations, and environmental damage in national and international courts. In September 2021, the London Bullion Market Association suspended Kyrgyzaltyn, the state gold refiner, from its Good Delivery List over issues concerning delivery and the potential for fraud, while the sale of Kyrgyz gold still suffers transparency issues. With the creation of the “Heritage of the Great Nomads” national holding company, the government has also signaled it intends to play a greater role in the development of the mining and precious metals industries. In April 2022, the Kyrgyz government and Centerra reached a conditional agreement by which the Kyrgyz government will take full control of the mine and give up its 26 percent stake in Centerra. Still, other growing industries have attracted both domestic and foreign investor interest, including textiles, agriculture, education, franchising, and IT. Green investment is another promising area for potential investors as the Kyrgyz government increased its commitment to fighting climate change and sustainable development. In 2021, the Kyrgyz Republic joined the Global Methane Pledge and unveiled revised Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), which also opened many opportunities for foreign firms seeking to invest in industries such as hydropower, energy efficiency, and methane abatement. Additional challenges to an enabling investment climate include a weak judiciary, lack of incentives for foreign investors, and a banking system highly dependent on the Russian financial system. The local currency, the Kyrgyz som, quickly depreciated against the U.S. dollar after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, making not only imports more expensive but contributing to a drop in value of remittances that Kyrgyz migrant workers in Russia send home, which annually comprise roughly 30 percent of Kyrgyz GDP. *Some information in the report may be subject to change upon date of publication and will be updated in the 2022 ICS. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 144 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 98 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $29 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,160 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Kyrgyz Republic is actively seeking FDI, and the government publicly recognizes that it is an important component of economic development. While the government has implemented laws to attract foreign investment, a move to nationalize the country’s largest gold mine, the use of criminal investigations in commercial disputes, onerous bureaucracy, and an inability to protect investors’ assets continue to deter foreign investors. In particular, government activities, including demands for renegotiation of operating contracts, invasive and time-consuming audits, levies of large retroactive fines, and disputes over licenses, pose significant impediments to attracting foreign investment. Still, net FDI inflows in 2021 recovered somewhat, increasing 30 percent compared to 2020 levels, but remained 65 percent lower than 2019 levels. Since 1993, the United States has had a Bilateral Investment Treaty with the Kyrgyz Republic that encourages and offers reciprocal protection of investment. The newly restructured Kyrgyz Agency of Development and Investment (KADI, formerly IPPA), under the Ministry of Economy and Commerce, serves as a vehicle for ongoing dialogue with foreign investors and advocates for investing in the Kyrgyz Republic. The agency participates in the development and implementation of measures to attract and stimulate investment activity. Its mandate is to coordinate with state bodies, local municipalities, business entities, and non-state actors to promote investment and support investors in the Kyrgyz Republic, including private investment and public-private partnerships, as well as assist local exporters to promote Kyrgyz goods to external markets, and develop Free Economic Zones (FEZ). The KADI has investor support programs to help guide investors through the registration process and conducts outreach aimed at helping create an environment conducive to foreign investment. The KADI often coordinates with international donor organizations on hosting round- tables discussions, exchanges, and capacity building workshops in the field of economic development. The Institute of the Business Ombudsman was created in January 2019 as an independent non-state body, funded by external donor sources, to protect the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of business entities, both local and foreign. In August 2019, the Supervisory Board of the Institute of the Business Ombudsman appointed former UK Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic, Robin Ord-Smith, as Business Ombudsman. The Institute of Business Ombudsman has concluded memorandums of cooperation with leading international business associations, including the American Chamber of Commerce in the Kyrgyz Republic (AmCham), International Business Council (IBC), and the Chamber of Commerce of Industry of the Kyrgyz Republic (CCI). In 2020, the Business Ombudsman recommended that business reform, protection and support of local entrepreneurs and protecting private property rights are key conditions for attracting direct investment. The government has established several committees and councils to coordinate cooperation between the business associations and government bodies. Since 2017, the Business and Entrepreneurship Development Council under the Speaker of the Parliament regularly convenes MPs, business community representatives from various sectors of the economy to discuss measures to improve the investment, promotion of entrepreneurship, and legislation to facilitate doing business in the Kyrgyz Republic. The Committee on Development of Industry and Entrepreneurship under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic serves as a platform for entrepreneurs to turn to in case if their grievances are not addressed by the government. The presidential decree to establish the Committee under the National Council on Sustainable Development of the Kyrgyz Republic was signed on December 24, 2019, with the amendment to designate to the Vice-Prime-Minister for economic development, the Business Ombudsman and heads of business associations. The committee includes platforms to raise investment climate and other business concerns to the offices of the President, Parliament, and Prime Minister (Note: the position of Prime Minister was abolished in the 2021 constitution. End Note). The Kyrgyz government also interacts with the business community via a number of local associations that serve as a voice for entrepreneurs and corporations, including AmCham, IBC, and the National Alliance of Business Associations of the Kyrgyz Republic (http://caa.kg/ru/ru-naba/). The Ministry of Economy and Commerce, Parliamentary Business and Entrepreneurship Development Council, and other government bodies often seek the opinion of these associations during the formulation of policy. While there are still no official limits on foreign control, a large investor in a politically sensitive industry may find that the government imposes investor-specific requirements such as a high percentage of local workforce employment or a minimum number of local seats on a board of directors. Foreigners have the right to establish and own businesses, and there have been no allegations of market access restrictions from U.S. investors since 2016. By law, the Kyrgyz Republic guarantees equal treatment to investors and places no limit on foreign ownership or control. In the last two years, there were no known cases of sector-specific restrictions, limitations, or requirements applied to foreign ownership and control, but the government has intervened in the ownership of politically sensitive industries like mining. Amendments to the “Law on Mass Media” to limit foreign ownership of television (excluding radio and print media) broadcasters to 35 percententered into force in June 2017. Post is unaware of any formal investment screening processes in the Kyrgyz Republic. In 2016, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group, released a report on the Kyrgyz investment climate in January 2016. The report is available at: https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/259411467997285741/investment-climate-in-kyrgyz-republic-views-of-foreign-investors-results-of-the-survey-of-foreign-investors-operating-and-non-operating. The Investment Policy Review (IPR) of The Kyrgyz Republic for 2016 by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is available at https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1436. Starting a business in the Kyrgyz Republic has become easier following the elimination of the minimum capital requirement for business registration, abolition of certain registration fees, and decreases in registration times. The Kyrgyz Republic does not have a business registration website. Registration of legal entities, branches, or representative offices in the Kyrgyz Republic is based on “registration by notification” and the “one stop-shop” practice. State registration of a legal entity is completed within three business days from the date of filing the necessary documents for a specified fee. To stimulate the inflow of direct investment, Parliament passed the law “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Kyrgyz Republic on Investment Support” in December 2020. This law provides for the following rules relating to investment issues: The concept of “investment lots” is introduced, which provides investors with a package of services with the objective of helping the investor start their project; Local authorities have the authority to execute land transfers; Reduction of the investment threshold from $50 to $10 million USD for any investor that wants to negotiate an investment agreement directly with the Kyrgyz government; The Kyrgyz Agency of Development and Investment has the right to issue an application to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for an investor visa for individuals who have invested more than 10 million soms (c. $95,000); and, Changes to public-private partnership (PPP) legislation aimed at simplifying procedure and attracting greater investment. Post is not aware of host government efforts to promote outward investment from the Kyrgyz Republic, nor of any instances in which the government sought to restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The legal and regulatory system of the Kyrgyz Republic remains underdeveloped, and implementation regulations and court orders relating to commercial transactions remain inconsistent with international practices. Heavy bureaucracy, lack of accessibility among decision-makers responsible for investment promotion, and frequent changes in leadership due to political instability all undermine investor confidence. Moreover, there is a significant capacity gap between the capital (Bishkek) and regional municipalities, particularly in remote, rural areas, in terms of institutional legal expertise and local officials and local law enforcement capacity, which hinders the conduct of business especially in the regions of Kyrgyzstan. There have been no known cases of U.S. investors facing discrimination. Rule-making authority is vested in the Kyrgyz Parliament – the Jogorku Kenesh – which has established committees that oversee legislation and regulations affecting several areas of the economy, including: the Committee on Budget, Economic, and Fiscal Policy; the Committee for Fuel and Energy Complex, Subsoil Use and Industrial Policy; the Committee for Transport, Communications, Architecture and Construction; and the Committee on Agrarian Policy, Water Resources, Ecology and Regional Development. The Office of the Prosecutor General is the supreme legal and regulatory enforcement body in the Kyrgyz Republic. The State Service on Financial Market Regulation and Supervision (Financial Supervision) and the State Service on Financial Intelligence (Financial Intelligence) have played important regulatory roles. Accounting procedures tend to adhere to internationally recognized accounting rules, such as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and audits are conducted regularly, often in compliance with agreements with international financial institutions (IFIs). Audit results of state organizations tend to be publicly available, unlike those of private organizations. There have been lapses in the public consultation process, and significant reductions in transparency of Parliamentary committee meetings and failure to circulate draft bills for public review, including the 2022 budget and the new tax code. Draft bills or regulations must be posted on either Parliament’s website or the site of the Ministry that drafted the bill for public comment for 30 days prior to consideration by Parliament and its committees. Parliament is required by regulation to hold public hearings on draft legislation and has historically been open to the participation of representatives of civil society organizations and the business community in relevant hearings when held. Still, in 2021 many business associations complained of lack of transparency in the passing of business-related legislation and insufficient consultation with the private sector. The Kyrgyz Agency of Development and Investment (KADI) assists investors with regulatory compliance. However, the efficacy of this office in assisting firms with setting up shop is limited since official bureaucratic procedures comprise only some of the hurdles to opening a business. Government investment councils exist to further regulatory improvements for the business climate. Since the creation of the Anticorruption Business Council under the Office of the President in 2021, it is unclear under what authority the preexisting Investment Council will fall (the President’s Office or a ministry). Contradictory government decrees often create bureaucratic paralysis or opportunities for bribe solicitation in order to complete normal bureaucratic functions. As often in the Kyrgyz Republic, the legal and regulatory framework is largely sound, but implementation and enforcement are weak. Throughout 2021, the government structure underwent “optimization,” which resulted in the significant downsizing of ministries and the dissolution and re-organization of several independent state regulatory bodies. The Ministries of Economy and Finance were merged, only to be unmerged later in the year, and the Department of Geology and Subsoil Use became a part of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Ecology and Technical Supervision (MRNETS), formerly the State Committee for Ecology and Climate. MRNETS now oversees mining licensing. The State Committee of Information and Communications Technology, responsible for implementation of the Digital Transformation Strategy 2019-2023, became the Ministry of Digital Development. The government also eliminated the State Service of Combating Economic Crimes (Financial Police) and transferred its authority to investigate economic crimes to the Prosecutor General’s Office. The State Inspectorate on Ecological and Technical Safety was dissolved, and transferred to the Ministry of Labor, Social Development, and Migration. This move also shifted labor inspection authority to the labor ministry. In August 2015, the Kyrgyz Republic acceded to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which also includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Belarus. The Kyrgyz Republic continues to harmonize its laws to comply with regulations set by the Eurasian Economic Commission, the executive body of the EAEU. And while Kyrgyz exports to the EAEU steadily increased from $410 million to $642 million in 2019, the Kyrgyz Republic has not fully realized increased bilateral trade with EAEU member countries. Traders cite unilaterally imposed trade barriers restricting the flow of Kyrgyz exports and numerous Kyrgyz entrepreneurs have criticized non-tariff measures that emerged after the country’s accession to the Union, preventing local exporters from fully accessing the wider EAEU market. In addition, Kyrgyz entrepreneurs have experienced issues exporting their goods through Kyrgyz-Kazakh border, which is the only EAEU land export route available. Kyrgyz truck drivers report more onerous technical requirements and inspections for their trucks to cross the border, while Kazakh authorities explain these checks are motivated by a desire to curb the smuggling of Chinese goods through the Kyrgyz Republic to the EAEU. The United States and other international partners provided substantial technical assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic in support of its accession to the WTO in 1998, and the country’s regulatory system reflects many international norms and best practices. The Law on the Fundamentals of Technical Regulation in the Kyrgyz Republic, which provides for standardization principles under the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, entered into force in 2004. To Post’s knowledge, the Kyrgyz government notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). In 2016, the Kyrgyz Republic ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. The government’s self-stated principles of the reformed legal system of the Kyrgyz Republic are “ideological and political pluralism, a socially oriented market economy, and the expansion of individual rights and freedoms.” Major barriers to foreign investment stem largely from a lack of adequate implementation rather than gaps in existing laws. The judicial system is technically independent, but political interference and corruption regularly besmirch its reputation and undermine its effectiveness. Resolution of investment disputes within the Kyrgyz Republic depends on several factors, including who the parties are and the amount of investment. The weak Kyrgyz judicial system often fails to act as an independent arbiter in the resolution of disputes. Since most disputes are lodged by foreign investors against the Kyrgyz Government, local courts often serve as an executor of the authorities’ political agenda. Regulations and enforcement actions can be appealed and are adjudicated in the national court system. International Court of Arbitration at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Kyrgyz Republic (ICA).and the Central Asian Alternative Dispute Resolution Center provide mediation services for public-private disputes, which remain a protracted and often impartial process in the Kyrgyz Republic. In a move to improve the investment climate, the new tax code created arbitration courts where tax disputes with the government can be resolved, rather than in a trial court. Previously, almost 90 percent of tax cases were decided in favor of the state under the trial court system. The hope of the arbitration court system is that it will be more independent and allow for disputes to be resolved faster. The Kyrgyz Republic’s main legal framework for FDI remains the “2003 Law on Investments,” which reflects multiple amendments up until September 2021. One notable amendment lowers the investment threshold for direct negotiations between the investor and the Kyrgyz government (now $10 million compared to $50 million previously). This law contains an important article that is often interpreted differently by foreign investors and the Kyrgyz Republic, and the government has sought to amend it to limit direct access of foreign investors to international arbitration. While foreign investors claim Article 18 contains the Kyrgyz Republic’s consent to arbitration under either the ICSID Convention or UNCITRAL rules, the government argues each side must first seek consent of the other to bring the dispute to arbitration (see Penwell Business vs. Kyrgyz Republic). In 2022 Parliament introduced a bill amending the language of Article 18 to require the investor to receive consent of the Kyrgyz Republic for any dispute to go to arbitration, which may negatively impact foreign investor rights. Post continues to monitor the issue. The justice system in the Kyrgyz Republic is inefficient and lacks independence, and cases can take years to be resolved. The Kyrgyz Republic does not have a business registration website. KADI maintains the country’s main website for investment queries, https://invest.gov.kg/. The State Agency for Anti-Monopoly Regulation of the Kyrgyz Republic conducts unified state antitrust price regulation in the economy. The main tasks of the State Agency are to develop and protect competition, to control compliance with legislation in the field of anti-trust, price regulation, to protect the legal rights of consumers against manifestations of monopoly and unfair competition, to ensure observance of legislation on advertising. To Post’s knowledge, there have been no developments in any significant competition cases over the past year. The Kyrgyz Republic has a written law governing bankruptcy procedures of legal persons and insolvent physical persons (Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On Bankruptcy” September 22, 1997 with multiple amendments in December 30, 1998, July 1999, September 2000, June 2002, March and August 2005, January and July 2006, June 2007, July 2009, April 2015, June, July and December 2016, May 2017, and December 31, 2019), which covers industrial enterprises and banks, irrespective of the type of ownership, commercial companies, private entrepreneurs, or foreign commercial entities. Bankruptcy proceedings are conducted by the court of arbitration competent for the district in which enterprise is located. The procedure of liquidation can be carried out without the involvement of the judicial bodies if all creditors agree on out-of-court proceedings. Chapter 10 of the law on bankruptcy provides for the possibility of an amicable or peaceful settlement between the enterprise and its creditors, which can be made at any stage of the liquidation process. 6. Financial Sector The Kyrgyz government is generally open toward foreign portfolio investment, though experts from international financial institutions (IFIs) have noted that capital markets in the Kyrgyz Republic remain underdeveloped. The economy of the Kyrgyz Republic is primarily cash-based, although non-cash consumer transactions, such as debit cards and transaction machines, are increasing every year. The number of bank payment cards in use increased by 2 times and e-wallets 3 times in the last five years. In January 2022, Moody’s downgraded the Kyrgyz Republic’s sovereign credit rating to B3, and dropped its outlook from stable to negative, citing weak institutions and governance. The government debt market is small and limited to short maturities, though Kyrgyz bonds are available for foreign ownership. Broadly, credit is allocated on market terms, but experts have noted that the subsidized credit from the Russian-Kyrgyz Development Fund subsidized has led to market distortions. Bank loans remain the primary source of private sector credit, and local portfolio investors often highlight the need to develop additional financial instruments in the Kyrgyz Republic. There are two stock exchanges in the Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyz Stock Exchange and Stock Exchange of the Kyrgyz Republic), but all transactions are conducted through the Kyrgyz Stock Exchange. In 2021, the total value of transactions amounted to 9.7 billion Kyrgyz som (approximately USD 115 million). The small market lacks sufficient liquidity to enter and exit sizeable positions. Since 1995, the Kyrgyz Republic has accepted IMF Article VIII obligations. Foreign investors are able to acquire loans on the local market if the business is operating on the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic and collateral meets the requirements of local banks. The average interest rate for loans in USD is 7-15 percent. USAID has assisted small and medium enterprises (SME) through locally registered private equity funds to develop equity and mezzanine financing, which have invested $14.3 million into local SMEs in the past 2 years. The National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic (NBKR) is a nominally independent body whose mandate is to achieve and maintain price stability through monetary policy. The Bank is also tasked with maintaining the safety and reliability of the banking and payment systems. The NBKR licenses, regulates, and supervises credit institutions. The penetration level of the banking sector is 49.9 percent According to the IMF, the Kyrgyz banking system at present remains well capitalized with still sizeable, non-performing loans (NPLs). NPLs increased from 10.5 percent to 11.1 percent in 2021. Net capital adequacy ratio decreased from 24.9 percent to 22.2 percent in 2021. Total assets in the Kyrgyz banking system in 2021 equaled approximately USD 4.2 billion. As of February 2021, the Kyrgyz Republic’s three largest banks by total assets were Optima Bank (approximately USD 846 million), Aiyl Bank (approximately USD 476 million), and Kyrgyz Investment and Credit Bank (KICB; approximately USD 475 million). There are currently 23 commercial banks in the Kyrgyz Republic, with 312 operating branches throughout the country; the five largest banks comprise more than 50 percent of the total market. No U.S. bank operates in the Kyrgyz Republic and Kyrgyz banks do not maintain correspondent accounts from U.S. financial institutions, following widespread de-risking in 2018. There are ten foreign banks operating in the Kyrgyz Republic: Demir Bank, National Bank of Pakistan, Halyk Bank, Optima Bank, Finca Bank, Bai-Tushum Bank, Amanbank, Kyrgyz-Swiss Bank, Chang An Bank, and Kompanion Bank are entirely foreign held. Other banks are partially foreign held, including KICB and BTA Bank. KICB has multinational organizations as shareholders including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Economic Finance Corporation, the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development, and others. The micro-finance sector in the Kyrgyz Republic is robust, representing nearly 10 percent the market size of the banking sector. Trade accounted for 28 percent of the total loan portfolio of the banking sector, followed by agriculture (18 percent) and consumer loans (12 percent). The microfinance sector in the Kyrgyz Republic is rapidly growing, with total assets of microfinance companies growing by 17 percent in 2021 compared to 2020. The three largest microfinance companies (Bai-Tushum, FINCA, and Kompanion) have transformed into banks with full banking licenses. The Kyrgyz Republic has no official Sovereign Wealth Fund, though previously an informal sovereign fund originated from proceeds of the Kumtor gold mine and was comprised of shares in the parent company of the gold mine operator, Centerra Gold. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are approximately 94 SOEs in the Kyrgyz Republic that play a significant role in the local economy. According to 2021 data, 65 of the 94 SOEs were not profitable. Still, SOE income managed to double only for the first nine months of 2021 to $76.4 million dollars. The State Property Management Fund of the Kyrgyz Republic (www.fgi.gov/kg) is the public executive authority representing the interests of the state. The purpose of the Fund is to ensure the efficiency of the use, management, and privatization of state property. Information on allocations to and earnings from SOEs is included in budget execution reports and is published (in Russian) by the Ministry of Finance and Economy (www.minfin.kg). Information on SOE assets, earnings, profitability, working capital, and other financial indicators is available on the State Property Management Fund’s website (http://finance.page.kg/index.php?act=svod_profit), though the website is not actively maintained. The State Property Management Fund also reviews the budgets for the largest SOEs, while the Accounting Chamber reviews the accounts of all SOEs and publishes audit reports on their website (www.esep.kg). The Kyrgyz Republic does not fully adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs. Cronyism and corruption within SOEs are a major obstacle to the Kyrgyz Republic’s economic development. The Heritage Foundation’s 2017 Index of Economic Freedom report noted, elected officials appoint company board members based on political loyalty rather than professional skills and corporate governance knowledge. Positions on boards of directors are frequently used as rewards for political support, and the dynamic has reinforced the patronage system and resulted in poor economic performance and public service delivery. As of February 2021, the presidential decree on “State Personnel Hiring Policy” authorizes the State Personnel Service to direct all state agencies and SOEs to verify the qualifications of all candidates, including education and professional experience, as the basis for personnel appointments. The government has attempted to improve transparency on contracts and bidding processes. Due to widespread corruption, there are common complaints that only individual government officials have access to government contracts and bidding processes. SOEs purchase goods and services from the private firms and usually place the calls for bids either on their websites or in public newspapers, as required. Private enterprises have the same access to financing as SOEs and are subject to the same tax burden. In some cases, SOEs have preferential access to land and raw materials. The Kyrgyz government periodically auctions rights to subsoil usage and broadcasts tender announcements, including disseminating information to diplomatic missions, in order to attract foreign investors. There are no restrictions on foreign investors participating in privatization programs. The privatization process is not well defined and is subject to change. There is ongoing deliberation on the privatization of other state-owned assets, such as the postal service and the capital’s international airport, but lack of interest by private partners has stalled any potential moves. The Kyrgyz government is no longer actively pursuing sale of its 100 percent stake in Megacom, the country’s largest telecommunications company. In December 2021 the Ministry of Finance announced plans to fully or partially sell 25 SOEs in 2022, including the Eurasian Savings Bank and Bakai Bank, among others. Foreign investors – both companies and individuals – are generally able to participate in public auctions of state-owned properties unless specifically prohibited in the terms and conditions. There are, however, some land legislation restrictions concerning the property rights of foreigners. Information about terms and conditions of SOE sales are posted on the State Property Management Fund’s website (www.fgi.gov.kg). 10. Political and Security Environment A history of political upheaval and violent clashes with neighboring Tajikistan over disputed territory in 2021 and early 2022, perpetuate an unstable political and security landscape that negatively impacts the investment environment. Both Freedom House and the Economist Intelligence Unit dropped their ratings of the Kyrgyz Republic’s democracy in 2021, citing the now-annulled October 2020 parliamentary elections and the subsequent concentration of power within the presidency. After protests over highly flawed parliamentary elections led to the resignation of President Sooronbai Jeenbekov, Sadyr Japarov, an opposition figure imprisoned since 2017, took office amid political tumult, and was subsequently elected president in January 2021. Japarov introduced a new constitution, approved by referendum in April 2021, that has transitioned the country to a presidential system, consolidated power in the executive branch, and weakened the power of parliament. Since independence, the Kyrgyz Republic has had 5 presidents and 26 different prime ministers, and the tradition of frequent turnover in the cabinet of ministers continues today, with many ministries also reorganized in 2021. The security environment remains unpredictable across the country. In the days following the October 2020 tumult, political instability spilled over into the commercial sector in Bishkek; following the election protests, local marauders looted and raided the offices and facilities of multiple foreign-joint venture mining enterprises. Foreign-owned extractive resources companies were targeted by local communities in 2018 and 2019, after relative calm in 2015 and 2016. Fighting between Kyrgyz and Tajik border forces broke out in April 2021 in the southwestern Batken region, leading to dozens of casualties and the forced temporary evacuation of thousands of Kyrgyz citizens. Water resources and the border demarcation remain disputed in these areas, along with disputed demarcation along portions of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, although the Kyrgyz and Uzbek governments reportedly reached overall agreement on border issues in 2021.Violence in these border areas has continued to flare up between border guards, sometimes involving civilians. Foreign-affiliated companies have been subject to local protests, at times resulting in vandalism and violence. In 2019, the majority Chinese company Zhong Ji Mining suspended operations at the Solton-Sary gold mine following violent clashes with hundreds of local residents who blamed the company for environmental degradation. In December 2019, hundreds of protestors demanded local authorities of the Naryn Free Economic Trade Zone to cancel the land lease of a Chinese-Kyrgyz enterprise, resulting in the suspension of a major customs and trade logistics complex. Local populations tend to view Chinese investment projects with more scrutiny, due to perceptions that these companies’ activities degrade the environment, such as water sources. Supporters of extremist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Al-Qaeda, and the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) remain active in Central Asia. These groups have expressed anti-U.S. sentiments and could potentially target U.S.-affiliated organizations and business interests. In August 2016, a suicide bomber, reportedly affiliated with ETIM and trained in Syria, detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device inside the Chinese Embassy compound in Bishkek, located less than 200 yards from the U.S. Embassy. The attack reportedly killed the perpetrator and injured four others, in addition to causing extensive damage. The United States has cooperated with the Kyrgyz Government to improve border and internal security and efforts to return Kyrgyz citizens from conflicts in Iraq and Syria are ongoing. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $7.240 2020 $7,736 https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kyrgyzrepublic Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $6.4 2020 $29 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $1.7 2020 $0 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 -4.5% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/EconomicTrends/Fdi.html *Source for Host Country Data: National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic: http://www.stat.kg; http://www.stat.kg/ru/opendata/category/2315/; http://www.stat.kg/ru/opendata/category/4428/; http://www.stat.kg/ru/statistics/investicii/ Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $5,412 100% Total Outward $897 100% Canada $1,683 31% Canada $878 98% China $1,037 19% China $15 2% Russian Federation $968 17% Tajikistan $2 0.2% United Kingdom $380 7% Germany $1 0.1% Kazakhstan $241 4% United Kingdom $0 0% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Host country data differs from IMF data due to differing methodologies. According to host country data, total inward FDI in 2020 amounted to 537.4 million USD. In 2020 the incoming FDI from Canada was 154 million USD and from China is 136 million USD, according to the Kyrgyz National Statistical Committee. The total outward FDI was 939 million USD, according to the Kyrgyz National Statistical Committee; however, outward FDI to Canada reached 6 million USD and to China 592 million USD according to National Statistical Committee in 2020. Laos Executive Summary Laos, officially the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), is a rapidly growing developing economy at the heart of Southeast Asia, bordered by Burma, Cambodia, China, Thailand, and Vietnam. Laos’ economic growth over the last decade, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, averaged just below eight percent, placing Laos amongst the fastest growing economies in the world. Over the last 30 years, Laos has made slow but steady progress in implementing reforms and building the institutions necessary for a market economy, culminating in accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in February 2013. The Lao government’s commitment to WTO accession and the creation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015 led to major reforms of economic policies and regulations with the aim to improve Laos’ business and investment environment. Nonetheless, within ASEAN, Laos ranks only ahead of Burma in the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business’ rankings. The Lao government is increasingly tying its economic fortunes to the economic integration of ASEAN and export-led development and is prioritizing the digital economy, logistics, green growth, and more sustainable development. Prior to Laos’ second COVID lockdown in September 2021, the World Bank predicted that Laos’ economic growth rate would increase from 0.5 percent in 2020 to 3.6 percent in 2021 on the prediction that Laos would soon open its borders. However, limited fiscal and foreign currency buffers have posed a challenge to the government’s ability to mitigate the economic impacts of COVID-19. Overall, the pandemic has resulted in an intensification of the country’s macroeconomic vulnerabilities. When compared to other countries in the region, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Laos have been relatively stable and driven by the construction of infrastructure and power projects. In 2022, if the pandemic is brought under control and the government effectively implements fiscal support measures, international and Lao economists project GDP growth will reach four percent. The exploitation of natural resources and the development of hydropower has driven rapid economic growth over the last decade, with both sectors largely led by foreign investors. However, because growth opportunities in these industries are finite and employ few people, the Lao government has recently begun prioritizing and expanding the development of high-value agriculture, light manufacturing, and tourism, while continuing to develop energy resources and related electrical transmission capacity for export to neighboring countries. The Lao government hopes to leverage its lengthy land borders with Burma, China, Thailand, and Vietnam to transform Laos from “land-locked” to “land-linked,” thereby further integrating the Lao economy with the larger economies of its neighbors. The government hopes to increase exports of agriculture, manufactured goods, and electricity to its more industrialized neighbors, and sees significant growth opportunities resulting from the Laos-China Railway, which connects Kunming in Yunnan Province, China with Laos’ capital city Vientiane. Some businesses and international investors are beginning to use Laos as a low-cost export base to sell goods within the region and to the United States and Europe. The emergence of light manufacturing has begun to help Laos integrate into regional supply chains, and improving infrastructure should facilitate this process, making Laos a legitimate locale for regional manufacturers seeking to diversify from existing production bases in Thailand, Vietnam, and China. New Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Vientiane and Savannakhet have attracted major manufacturers from Europe, North America, and Japan. Chinese and Thai interests also have plans for new SEZ projects. Economic progress and trade expansion in Laos remain hampered by a shortage of workers with technical skills, weak education and health care systems, and poor—although improving—transportation infrastructure. Institutions, especially in the justice sector, remain highly underdeveloped and regulatory capacity is low. Despite recent efforts and some improvements, corruption is rampant and is a major obstacle for foreign investors. Corruption, policy and regulatory ambiguity, and the uneven application of laws remain disincentives to further foreign investment in the country. The Lao government is making efforts to improve the business environment. Its 8thfive-year National Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP) (2016-2020) directed the government to formulate “policies that would attract investments” and to “begin to implement public investment and investment promotion laws.” The former prime minister, now president, has stated his goal was to see Laos improve its World Bank Ease of Doing Business ranking (Laos is currently ranked #154). In February 2018 and January 2020, the Office of the Prime Minister issued orders laying out specific steps ministries were to take to improve the business environment. These efforts made an impact. For example, due to streamlining of application processes, it now takes to less than 17 days to obtain a business license, compared to 174 days a few years ago. In 2021, the former prime minister assumed the presidency of a new administration with a stated focus on economic issues. This continuity provides a foundation to build on Laos’ previous National Socio-Economic Development Plan. Laos’ new development plan, the 9th NSEDP (2021-2025), will be published later this year with a focus on graduating Laos from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 2026 and become an upper-middle income country. One of the government’s priorities is to diversify the economy and improve the investment climate encouraging both domestic and foreign investment to accelerate economic growth. The government is focused on a post-COVID economic recovery through policies to achieve macro-economic stability, connectivity through improved infrastructure, and green, sustainable growth initiatives. Sectors such as agriculture, natural resource development, and tourism are emphasized in the draft 9th NSEDP plan. Further development of investment-related policies and other regulations can be expected from the new government. The current administration remains active in firing or disciplining corrupt officials, with the government and National Assembly in 2019 disciplining hundreds of officials for corruption-related offenses. Despite these efforts, Laos’ Ease of Doing Business ranking fell from 139 in 2016 to154 in 2020. The multiple ministries, laws, and regulations affecting foreign investment in Laos creates confusion, and requires potential investors to engage either local partners or law firms to navigate a confusing and cumbersome bureaucracy. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 128 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 117 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $ 2,520 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Lao government officially welcomes both domestic and foreign investment as it seeks to keep growth rates high and graduate from Least Developed Country status by 2026. The pace of foreign investment has increased over the last several years. According to Lao government statistics, mining and hydropower account for 95.7 percent of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and agriculture accounted for only 2 percent of FDI in 2019. China, Thailand, France, Vietnam, and Japan are the largest sources of foreign investment, with China accounting for a significant share of all FDI in Laos. The government’s Investment Promotion Department encourages investment through its website www.investlaos.gov.la , and the government is attempting to improve the business environment by facilitating a constructive dialogue annually with the private sector and foreign business chambers through the Lao Business Forum, which is managed by the Lao National Chamber of Commerce and Industry LNCCI). The 2009 Law on Investment Promotion was amended in November 2016, with 32 new articles introduced and 59 existing articles revised. Notably, the new law, an English version of which can be found at www.investlaos.gov.la , clarifies investment incentives, transfers responsibility for SEZs from the Prime Minister’s office to the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), and removes strict registered capital requirements for opening a business, deferring instead to the relevant ministry. Foreigners may invest in any sector or business except in cases where the government deems the investment to be detrimental to national security, health, or national traditions, or that have a negative impact on the natural environment. In December 2021, Laos amended the value-added tax (VAT) law following Presidential Decree no. 231/P, which reduced the VAT rate from 10 to 7 percent as part of the government’s effort towards economic recovery. Also, the decree aims to provide a mechanism to facilitate investment towards activities that enable production and export. More importantly, the amended law indicates that more activities are exempted from VAT, while other mineral and electricity-related activities are subject to a specific basis for VAT calculation. Nevertheless, even in cases where full foreign ownership is permitted, many foreign companies seek a local partner. Companies involved in large FDI projects, especially in mining and hydropower, often either find it advantageous or are required to give the government partial ownership. Foreign investors are typically required to go through several procedural steps prior to commencing operations. Many foreign business owners and potential investors claim the process is overly complex and regulations are erratically applied, particularly to foreigner investors. Investors also express confusion about the roles of different ministries, as multiple ministries become involved in the approval process. In the case of general investment licenses (as opposed to concessionary licenses, which are issued by MPI, foreign investors are required to obtain multiple permits, including an annual business registration from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MOIC), a tax registration from the Ministry of Finance, a business logo registration from the Ministry of Public Security, permits from each line ministry related to the investment (i.e., MOIC for manufacturing, and Ministry of Energy and Mines for power sector development), appropriate permits from local authorities, and an import-export license, if applicable. Obtaining the necessary permits can be challenging and time consuming, especially in areas outside the capital. There are several possible vehicles for foreign investment. Foreign partners in a joint venture must contribute at least 30 percent of the company’s registered capital. Wholly foreign-owned companies may be entirely new or a branch of an existing foreign enterprise. Equity in medium and large-sized SOEs can be obtained through a joint venture with the Lao government. Reliable statistics are difficult to obtain, however the trend of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) shows an increase in recent years, mainly driven by large infrastructure projects. Total FDI in Laos increased from $5.7 billion in 2016 to $10 billion in 2019. As discussed above, even though foreigners may invest in most sectors or businesses (subject to previously noted exceptions), many foreign companies seek a local partner to navigate byzantine official and unofficial processes. Companies involved in large FDI projects, especially in mining and hydropower, often either find it advantageous or are required to give the government partial ownership. The OECD released its most recent investment policy review of Laos on July 11, 2017. More details can be found at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-lao-pdr-2017-9789264276055-en.htm Laos does not have a central business registration website yet, but the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MOIC) has improved its online enterprise registration site, http://www.erm.gov.la , to accelerate the registration process. Due to the government’s effort in supporting the ease of doing business, investors recently reported needing less than 17 days to attain an Enterprise Registration Certificate for general business activities, compared to 174 days in the past. Nonetheless, the timeline and process for controlled and concession activities (see https://www.laotradeportal.gov.la/kcfinder/upload/files/Legal_1571216364.pdf for a list) can vary considerably, as it requires the engagement of different government agencies to issue an operating license. As a result, many investors and even locals often hire consultancies or law firms to shepherd the labor-intensive registration process. The Lao government has attempted to streamline business registration using a one-stop shop model. Registration for general business activities can be done at the Department of Enterprise Registration and Management offices, MOIC(see http://www.erm.gov.la for more details), while the service for activities requiring a government concession is through the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI). For investment in special economic zones (SEZ), one-stop registration is run through the MPI or in special one-stop service offices within the SEZs themselves (under the authority of the MPI). To promote and facilitate domestic and foreign investment, the Prime Minister’s Office issued Order 02 and Order 03 in 2018 and 2019 respectively to reform the ease of doing business and improve services on investment and operational licenses. This includes the improvement of the One Stop Service system and conducting business implementation associated with transparency in a uniform and timely manner. The government also encouraged the participation of both domestic and foreign investors to develop infrastructure and public services delivery projects by issuing a public-private partnership (PPP) decree in 2020 aiming to boost economic growth. So far, business owners give the one-stop shop concept mixed reviews. Many acknowledge that it is an improvement but describe it as an incomplete reform with several additional steps that must still be taken outside of the single stop. Businesses also complain that there are often different registration requirements at the central and provincial levels. The Lao government does not actively promote, incentivize, or restrict outward investment. 3. Legal Regime Regulations in Laos can be vague and conflicting, a subject that the private sector raises regularly with the government, including through official fora such as the Lao Business Forum. The 2013 Law on Making Legislation mandated that all laws be available online at the official gazette website, www.laoofficialgazette.gov.la . Draft bills are also available for public comment through the official gazette website, although not all bills are posted for comment or in the official gazette, and the provinces seldom post their local legislation. Although the situation continues to improve, the realities of doing business in Laos can fail to correspond with existing legislation and regulation. Implementation and enforcement often do not strictly follow the letter of the law, and vague or contradictory clauses in laws and regulations provide for widely varying interpretations. Regulations at the national and provincial levels can often diverge, overlap, or contradict one another. Many local firms still complain about informal or gray competition from firms that offer lower costs by flaunting formal registration requirements and operating outside of government regulatory structures. The nascent legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are not particularly conducive to a transparent, competitive business environment. International accounting norms apply, and major international firms are present in the market, though understanding and adherence to these norms is limited to a small section of the business community. Eleven companies are listed on the Lao stock exchange. Regulations dictate that companies listed on the exchange must be held to accounting standards, but the government’s capacity to enforce those standards is low. The government now publicly releases the enacted budget, which includes the total amount of domestic and external debt obligations for the whole country. Laos is a member of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and is seeking to implement all AEC-agreed standards domestically. However, the local capacity to develop regulatory standards is weak, while enforcement of technical regulations is weaker still. The Lao government has been diligent at notifying draft technical regulations – such as its new law on standards – to the WTO committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Laos currently has a poorly developed legal sector. The government adopted the Legal Sector Master Plan with an aim to become a rule of law state by 2020.The plan is now complete however rule of law in Laos is still in its infancy. To improve the country’s legal system, the government will continue to work with many development partners on comprehensive legal sector reform. From 1975 to 1991, Laos did not have a constitution, and government decrees issued by various ministries and officials only exacerbated the country’s poor legal framework. While there have been dramatic improvements in the legal system over the last decade, Laos has relatively few lawyers, many judges lack formal training and experience, and laws often remain vague and subject to broad interpretation. The existing system incorporates some major elements of the French civil law system, but is also influenced by the legal systems of the former Soviet Union and regional neighbors’ systems. Court decisions are neither widely published, nor do they necessarily affect future decisions. Despite being bureaucratically independent of the government cabinet, the Lao judiciary is still subject to government and political interference. Contract law in Laos is lacking in many areas important to trade and commerce. The law provides for the sanctity of contracts, but in practice, contracts are subject to political interference and patronage. Businesses report that contracts can be voided if they are found to be disadvantageous to one party, or if they conflict with state or public interests. Foreign businessmen describe contracts in Laos as being “a framework for negotiation” rather than a binding agreement, and even when faced with a judgment, enforcement is weak and subject to the influence of corruption. Although a commercial court system exists, most judges adjudicating commercial disputes have little training in commercial law. Those considering doing business in Laos are strongly urged to contact a reputable law firm for additional advice on contracts. One positive development from 2019 is that under the leadership of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MOIC), Laos became the 92nd State Party to join the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. As discussed above, the 2009 Law on Investment promotion was amended in November 2016. The new law provides more transparency regarding regulations and procedures and provides greater detail about what specific responsibilities fall under the Ministry of Planning and Investment. The 2016 Law on Investment Promotion introduced uniform business registration requirements and tax incentives that apply equally to foreign and domestic investors. As noted above, foreigners may invest in any sector or business except in cases where the government deems the investment to be detrimental to national security, health, or national traditions, or to have a negative impact on the natural environment. Aside from these sectors, there are no statutory limits on foreign ownership or control of commercial enterprises. For reasons discussed above, despite changes in the law, many companies continue to seek a local partner. Most laws of interest to investors are featured on the Lao Trade Portal website, http://www.laotradeportal.gov.la , with many laws and regulations translated into English, or the Lao Official Gazette, http://laoofficialgazette.gov.la , or the official website of the Investment Promotion Department (MPI), www.investlaos.gov.la , or the newly created “Lao Law” App. In sum, neither the government’s investment bureaucracy nor the commercial court system is well developed, although the former is improving and reforming. Investors have experienced government practices that deviate significantly from publicly available laws and regulations. Some investors decry the courts’ limited ability to handle commercial disputes and vulnerability to corruption. The Lao government has repeatedly underscored its commitment to increasing predictability in the investment environment, but in practice, with some exceptions in the creation and operation of SEZs, and investments by larger companies, foreign investors describe inconsistent application of laws and regulations. There have been no updates since 2017. A new competition law was approved in 2015 that applies to both foreign and domestic individuals and entities. The law was drafted with the assistance of the German government and other donors. The competition law was one of the Lao government’s policy efforts to implement the ASEAN Economic Community, or AEC, before 2016. The law established two new government entities, the Business Competition Control (BCC) Commission and the BCC Secretariat. The BCC Commission is the senior body, and its membership is decided by the Prime Minister with the advice of the Minister of Industry and Commerce (MOIC). According to the legislation, it should include senior officials from multiple ministries as well as businesspeople, economists, and lawyers. The BCC Commission can draft regulations, approve mergers, levy penalties, and provide overall guidance on government competition policy and regulation. The BCC Secretariat, a lower-level institution equivalent to a MOIC department or division, can hear complaints, conduct investigations, and conduct research and reporting at the request of the Commission. According to law, foreign assets and investments in Laos are protected against seizure, confiscation, or nationalization except when deemed necessary for a public purpose. Public purpose can be broadly defined, however, and land grabs are feared by Lao nationals and expatriates alike. In the event of a government expropriation, the Lao government is supposed to provide fair market compensation. Nevertheless, a business relying on a specific parcel of land may lose its investment license if the land is in dispute. Revocation of an investment license cannot be appealed to an independent body, and companies whose licenses are revoked must quickly liquidate their assets. Small landholdings, land with unclear title, or land on which taxes have not been paid are at particular risk of expropriation. ICSID Convention and New York Convention The Decree on the Establishment of Private Economic Dispute Resolution as specified under Article 4 of the Law on Economic Dispute Resolution No.51/NA, (2018) provides for private arbitration bodies in Lao PDR. However, the regulatory framework to enable the private sector to establish an alternative channel for business arbitration is still under development with assistance from international donors such as USAID. Laos is not a member state to the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention). It is, however, a signatory to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention). Investor-State Dispute Settlement According to the Law on Investment Promotion, resolution of a dispute resolution should proceed through the following process: mediation, administrative dispute resolution, dispute resolution by the Committee for Economic Dispute Resolution, and finally, litigation. However, due to the underdeveloped state of the Lao legal system, foreign investors are generally advised to seek arbitration outside of the country. There are few publicly available records on international investment disputes. According to the 2016 investment promotion law, Article 96 on Dispute Resolution by the Office for Economic Dispute Resolution in the Lao PDR or international organization to which Lao PDR is a party states: “When there is an investment-related dispute, either party thereto shall have the rights to request the Office for Economic Dispute Resolution for resolution within the Lao PDR or abroad as agreed by the parties of the dispute. The Lao PDR recognizes and enforces the award of foreign or international arbitration subject to certification by the people’s court of Lao PDR.” However, in practice, the Embassy is not aware of this new article being successfully exercised by a foreign investor. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Beyond those listed above, there are no formal Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms provided in Lao law but based on the amended Investment Promotion Law and the law on Investment Resolution dated June 22, 2018, both parties can decide if they would like to have arbitration in Laos or abroad as mentioned in the contract. There is no known history of Laos enforcing foreign commercial arbitral decisions. The 1994 bankruptcy law permits either the business or creditor the right to petition the court for a bankruptcy judgment and allows businesses the right to request mediation. The law also authorizes liquidation of assets based upon the request of a debtor or creditor. However, there is no record of a foreign-owned enterprise, whether as debtor or as creditor, petitioning the courts for a bankruptcy judgment. According to the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Report, Laos remains at the very bottom of the global rankings for ease of resolving insolvency. 6. Financial Sector Laos does not have a well-developed capital market, although government policies increasingly support the formation of capital and free flow of financial resources. The Lao Securities Exchange (LSX) began operations in 2011 with two stocks listed, both state-owned – the Banque Pour l’CommerceExterieur (BCEL), and the power generation arm of the electrical utility, Electricite du Laos – Generation (EDL-Gen). In 2012, the Lao government increased the proportion of shares that foreigners can hold on the LSX from 10 to 20 percent. As of March 2021, there are eleven companies listed on the LSX: BCEL, EDL-Gen, Petroleum Trading Laos (fuel stations), Lao World (property development and management), Souvanny Home Center (home goods retail), Phousy Construction and Development (Construction and real estate development), Lao Cement (LCC), Mahathuen Leasing (leasing), Lao Agrotech (palm oil plantation and extraction factory), Vientiane Center (property development and management), and Lao ASEAN Leasing (LALCO) (financing and leasing). News and information about the LSX are available at http://www.lsx.com.la/ . Businesses report that they are often unable to exchange kip into foreign currencies through central or local banks, particularly at times when the kip is depreciating against international currencies. Analysts suggest that concerns about dollar reserves may have led to temporary problems in the convertibility of the national currency. Private banks allege that the Bank of Lao PDR (BOL) withholds dollar reserves. The Bank of Lao PDR alleges that private banks already hold sizable reserves and have been reluctant to give foreign exchange to their customers to maintain unreasonably high reserves. Lao and foreign companies alike, and especially small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), note the lack of long-term credit in the domestic market. Loans repayable over more than five years are very rare, and the choice of credit instruments in the local market is limited. The Credit Information Bureau, developed to help inject more credit into markets, still has very little information and has not yet succeeded in mitigating lender concerns about risk. The banking system is under the supervision of the Bank of Lao PDR, the nation’s central bank, and includes 42 banks, most of them commercial. Private foreign banks can establish branches in all provinces of Laos. ATMs have become ubiquitous in urban centers. Technical assistance to Laos’ financial sector has led to some reforms and significant improvements to Laos’ regulatory regime on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, but overall capacity within the financial governance structure remains poor. The banking system is dominated by large, government-owned banks. The health of the banking sector is difficult to determine given the lack of reliable data, though banks are widely believed to be poorly regulated and there is broad concern about bad debts and non-performing loans that have yet to be fully reconciled by the state-run banks. The IMF and others have encouraged the Bank of Lao PDR to facilitate recapitalization of state-owned banks to improve the resilience of the sector. Several banks operate digital payment services, which has facilitated domestic transactions, but also introduced new digital crime risks. While publicly available data is difficult to find, non-performing loans are widely believed to be a major concern in the financial sector, fueled in part by years of rapid growth in private lending. The government’s fiscal difficulties in 2013 and 2014 led to non-payment on government infrastructure projects. The construction companies implementing the projects in turn could not pay back loans for capital used in construction. Many analysts believe the full effects of the government’s fiscal difficulties have not yet worked their way through the economy. In 2021, Laos’ fiscal deficit was estimated to decrease by 4.7 percent as a result of lower spending and improved revenue collection. Total public and publicly guaranteed debt were estimated to reach 72 percent of GDP which adds to concerns about Laos’ fiscal outlook and macroeconomic stability.In 2018 Laos passed a new law on Public Debt Management aimed at reducing Laos’ debt-to-GDP ratio but most economic analysts anticipate Laos’s debt-to-GDP ratio will likely increase as the country navigates an economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Foreign Exchange There are no published, formal restrictions on foreign exchange conversion, though restrictions have previously been reported, and because the market for Lao kip is relatively small, the currency is rarely convertible outside the immediate region. Laos persistently maintains low levels of foreign reserves, which are estimated to cover approximately two months’ worth of total imports. The reserve buffer is expected to remain relatively low due to structurally weak export growth in the non-resource sector and to debt service payments. The decline in reserves was due to a drawdown of government deposits primarily for external debt service payments, some intervention in the foreign exchange market to manage the volatility of the currency and financing the continuing current account deficit. The Bank of the Lao PDR (BOL) occasionally imposes daily limits on converting funds from the Lao kip into U.S. dollars and Thai baht or restricts the sectors able to convert Lao kip into dollars. This can sometimes result in difficulties obtaining foreign exchange in Laos. The BOL issued Notice no.758/MPD in July 2021 to mandate independent exchange bureaus to link with commercial banks in response to the Lao kip’s depreciation against foreign currencies. Such effort reduces the gap between official and gray-market currency rates. However, the Lao kip rapidly depreciated in early 2022 reaching new lows against the dollar and Thai baht. To facilitate business transactions, foreign investors generally open commercial bank accounts in both local and foreign convertible currency at domestic and foreign banks in Laos. The Enterprise Accounting Law places no limitations on foreign investors transferring after-tax profits, income from technology transfer, initial capital, interest, wages and salaries, or other remittances to the company’s home country or third countries if they request approval from the Lao government. Foreign enterprises must report on their performance annually and submit annual financial statements to the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI). According to a recent report from Laos’ National Institute for Socio-Economic Research (NSER), the increasing demand for USD and Thai baht for the import of capital equipment for projects and consumer goods, coupled with growing demand for foreign currency to pay off foreign debts has resulted in a continued depreciation of the exchange rate in 2022. The official nominal kip/U.S. dollar reference rate depreciated by 13.84 percent year-on-year in February 2022, while the kip/baht exchange rate depreciated by 5.62 percent. Remittance Policies There have been no recent changes to remittance law or policy in Laos. Formally, all remittances abroad, transfers into Laos, foreign loans, and payments not denominated in Lao kip must be approved by the BOL. In practice, many remittances are understood to flow into Laos informally, and relatively easily, from a sizeable Lao workforce based in Thailand. Remittance-related rules can be vague and official practice is reportedly inconsistent. There are no known sovereign wealth funds in Laos. 10. Political and Security Environment Laos is generally a peaceful and politically stable country. In 2021, Laos once again had an orderly change of administration under its one-party system. The risk of political violence directed at foreign enterprises or businesspersons is low. There has been little-to-no political violence in the last decade, and Laos’ political stability is an attractive feature for foreign investors. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $14,753 2019 $18,174 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2021 N/A BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2021 N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 N/A 2021 5% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Latvia Executive Summary Located in the Baltic region of northeastern Europe, Latvia is a member of the EU, Eurozone, NATO, OECD, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Latvian government recognizes that, as a small country, it must attract foreign investment to foster economic growth, and thus has pursued liberal economic policies and developed infrastructure to position itself as a transportation and logistics hub. As a member of the European Union, Latvia applies EU laws and regulations, and, according to current legislation, foreign investors possess the same rights and obligations as local investors (with certain exceptions). Any foreign investor is entitled to establish and own a company in Latvia and apply for a temporary residence permit. Latvia provides several advantages to potential investors, including: Regional hub: Latvia is a transportation and logistics hub between West and East, providing strategic access to both the EU market and to Russia and Central Asia. Latvia’s three ice-free ports are connected to the country’s rail and road networks and to the largest international airport in the Baltic region (Riga International Airport). Latvia’s road network is connected to both European and Central Asian road networks. Railroads connect Latvia with the other Baltic States, Russia, and Belarus, with further connections extending into Central Asia and China. Workforce: Latvia’s workforce is highly educated and multilingual, and its culture promotes hard work and dependability. Labor costs in Latvia are the fifth lowest in the EU. Competitive tax system: Latvia ranked second in the OECD’s 2021 International Tax Competitiveness Index Rankings. To further boost its competitiveness, the Latvian government has abolished taxes on reinvested profits and has established special incentives for foreign and domestic investment. There are five special economic zones (SEZs) in Latvia: Riga Free Port, Ventspils Free Port, Liepaja Special Economic Zone, Rezekne Special Economic Zone, and Latgale Special Economic Zone, which provide various tax benefits for investors. The Latgale Special Economic Zone covers a large part of Latgale, which is the most economically challenged region in Latvia, bordering Russia and Belarus. Despite the continued COVID-19 pandemic, Latvia’s GDP increased by 4.8 percent in 2021, rebounding from the 3.6 percent contraction in 2020. According to the government, growth in manufacturing and services sectors contributed to the economic growth. The most competitive sectors in Latvia remain woodworking, metalworking, transportation, IT, green tech, healthcare, life science, food processing, and finance. Recent reports suggest that some of the most significant challenges investors encounter in Latvia are a shortage of available workforce, demography, quality of education, and a significant shadow economy. Latvia has made significant progress combatting money laundering since its non-resident banking sector first came under increased regulatory scrutiny in 2018 because of inadequate compliance with international AML standards. In late 2019 and early 2020, MONEYVAL and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) concluded that Latvia had developed and implemented strong enough reforms for combating financial crimes to avoid inclusion on FATF’s so-called “grey list.” The Government of Latvia continues work to restore confidence in its financial institutions and has passed several pieces of additional reform legislation. Latvia also became the first member state under the MONEYVAL review to successfully implement all 40 FATF recommendations. Some investors note a perceived lack of fairness and transparency with Latvian public procurements. Several companies, including foreign companies, have complained that bidding requirements are sometimes written with the assistance of potential contractors or couched in terms that exclude all but “preferred” contractors. The chart below shows Latvia’s ranking on several prominent international measures of interest to potential investors. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 36 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 38 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 219 EUR* https://statdb.bank.lv/lb/Data/128/128 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 17,880 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD *These figures significantly underestimate the value of U.S. investment in Latvia due to the fact that these do not account for investments by U.S. firms through their European subsidiaries. 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Latvian government actively encourages foreign direct investment (FDI) and works with investors to improve the country’s business climate. Latvia has a dedicated investment promotion agency – Latvian Investment and Development Agency – to provide a full scope of investment services to prospective investors: https://www.liaa.gov.lv/en . As of April 2022, the agency has two dedicated representatives based in the United States (San Francisco, CA and Boston, MA). The Latvian government meets annually with the Foreign Investors Council in Latvia (FICIL), which represents large foreign companies and chambers of commerce, to improve the business environment and encourage foreign investment. The Prime Minister chairs the Coordination Council for Large and Strategically Important Investment Projects. In January 2021, FICIL published its Sentiment Index 2020 – a survey of current foreign investors’ assessments about the investment climate in Latvia. It is available at: https://www.ficil.lv/sentiment-index/ . Latvian legislation, on the basis of national security concerns, requires governmental approval prior to transfers of significant ownership interests in the energy, telecommunications, and media sectors. The government is considering expanding this list of sectors. Detailed information is available here: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/country-navigator/118/latvia. With these limited exceptions, physical and legal persons who are citizens of Latvia or of other EU countries may freely purchase real property. In general, physical and legal persons who are citizens of non-EU countries (third-country nationals) may also freely purchase developed real property. However, third-country nationals may not directly purchase certain types of agricultural, forest, and undeveloped land. Such persons may acquire ownership interest in such land through a company registered in the Register of Enterprises of the Republic of Latvia, provided that more than 50 percent of the company is owned by: (a) Latvian citizens and/or Latvian governmental entities; and/or (b) physical or legal persons from countries with which Latvia signed and ratified an international agreement on the promotion and protection of investments on or before December 31, 1996; or for agreements concluded after this date, so long as such agreements provide for reciprocal rights to land acquisition. The United States and Latvia have such an agreement (a bilateral investment treaty in force since 1996). In addition, foreign investors can lease land without restriction for up to 99 years. The Law on Land Privatization in Rural Areas allows EU citizens to purchase Latvia’s agricultural land and forests. Other restrictions apply (to both Latvian citizens and foreigners) regarding the acquisition of land in Latvia’s border areas, Baltic Sea and Gulf of Riga dune areas, and other protected areas. In May 2017, the President of Latvia promulgated amendments to the Law on Land Privatization in Rural Areas to simplify and clarify the process for local farmers to purchase land. The law, however, also prohibits foreigners who do not have a working knowledge of the Latvian language from purchasing agricultural land. On June 11, 2020 the Court of Justice of the EU found that the law violated European law, but the Latvian government has yet to amend the law. The Latvian constitution guarantees the right to private ownership. Both domestic and foreign private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of commercial activity, except those expressly prohibited by law. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published the latest Latvia Economic Snapshot in March 2022 ( http://www.oecd.org/economy/latvia-economic-snapshot/ ). Although there have been no trade policy reviews specifically involving Latvia, the WTO completed its latest review of the European Union in February 2020. ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp495_e.htm ). Additionally, in October 2017, the World Bank published a review of Latvia’s tax system ( http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/587291508511990249/Latvia-tax-review ). A new business can be registered in Latvia in one day. The Latvian Investment and Development Agency has prepared a guide on starting a business in Latvia: https://www.liaa.gov.lv/en/invest-latvia/business-guide/operating-environment. The official website of the Latvian Commercial Register provides detailed information in English on business registration process in Latvia: https://www.ur.gov.lv/en/ . Latvia has implemented special legislation to encourage startup ventures through favorable tax treatment. For more information, please see here: http://www.liaa.gov.lv/en/invest-latvia/start-up-ecosystem and here: https://labsoflatvia.com/en/resources . Using the European Commission definitions of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), Latvia has established a special tax regime for microenterprises. This special tax regime is available to foreign nationals. Changes introduced as of January 2022, including an increased microenterprise tax rate, now make the tax regime less attractive for most small companies. For additional details on the microenterprise tax regime, see: https://www.fm.gov.lv/en/micro-enterprise-tax Latvia joined other OECD countries in July 2021 in agreeing to a new framework for global tax reform and a global minimum corporate tax rate of 15 percent for multinational enterprises with annual revenue exceeding $868 million. Further detailed technical guidance can be found here: https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/oecd-releases-detailed-technical-guidance-on-the-pillar-two-model-rules-for-15-percent-global-minimum-tax.htm The Latvian government does not incentivize outward investment nor restrict Latvians from investing overseas. 3. Legal Regime The Latvian government has amended its laws and regulatory procedures to bring Latvia’s legislation in compliance with the EU and WTO GPA requirements. The Latvian government has developed a good working relationship with the foreign business community (through FICIL) to streamline various bureaucratic procedures and to address legal and regulatory issues as they arise. Additional information on the regulatory system in Latvia is available here: http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/latvia. The public finance and debt obligations process is transparent. Detailed information on the national budget process is available on the Latvian Ministry of Finance’s website: https://www.fm.gov.lv/en/s/budget/ . As an EU member, Latvia has incorporated European norms and standards into its regulatory system. As an EU member, Latvia is a signatory to the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. As a WTO member, Latvia has the duty to notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Latvia has a three-tier court system comprising district (city) courts, regional courts, and the Supreme Court. In addition, the Constitutional Court reviews the compatibility of decrees and acts of the President of the Republic, the government, and local authorities with the constitution and the law. Unless otherwise stipulated by law, district courts are the courts of first instance in all civil, criminal, and administrative cases. Regional courts have appellate jurisdiction over district court cases and original jurisdiction for certain cases specified in the Civil Code, such as cases on the protection of patent rights, trademarks, and geographic indicators, as well as cases on the insolvency and liquidation of credit institutions. The Supreme Court is the highest-level court in Latvia and – depending on the origin of the case – has either de novo review of both factual and legal findings or, in instances where it is the second appellate court reviewing a case, cassation review of only legal findings. In March 2021, Latvia established a specialized Economic Court to handle cases of corruption, economic crimes, and complex commercial disputes. City and regional courts are administered by the Ministry of Justice (https://www.tm.gov.lv/en ), while the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court are independent. Observers have voiced concerns about the length of criminal and civil cases in Latvia, and the nature and opacity of judicial rulings have led some investors to question the fairness and impartiality of some judges. These concerns are not specific to foreign or local investors, however, and the court system is generally viewed as applying the law equally to the interests of foreign and local investors. Although the Ministry of Justice has enacted reforms designed to reduce the backlog of cases in the lower courts, improvements in the judicial system are still needed to accelerate the adjudication of cases, to strengthen the enforcement of court decisions, and to upgrade professional standards. The Economic Court’s creation was part of an effort by the government to accelerate and improve adjudication of commercial cases and financial crimes. Incoming foreign investment in Latvia is regulated by the Commercial Law. The Latvian Investment and Development Agency’s website is a helpful resource for navigating the rules and procedures governing foreign investment. (http://www.liaa.gov.lv/en/invest-latvia/investor-business-guide/operating-environment ). Competition-related concerns are supervised by the Competition Council. Council’s decisions can be appealed to a court in Latvia. More information can be accessed at: http://www.kp.gov.lv/en. In July 2021, the Competition Council imposed about $18 million in fines on 10 construction companies for entering into long-term prohibited agreements related to participation in public and private procurement in Latvia. This was one of the all-time largest cartel cases in Latvia. More detailed information about the so-called “construction company cartel” case is available here: https://www.kp.gov.lv/en/article/competition-council-fines-10-construction-companies-participating-cartel . Cases of arbitrary expropriation of private property by the Government of Latvia are extremely rare. Expropriation of foreign investment is possible in a very limited number of cases specified in the Law on the Alienation of Immovable Property Necessary for Public Needs: (https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/220517-law-on-the-alienation-of-immovable-property-necessary-for-public-needs ). If the owner of the property claimed by the government deems the compensation inadequate, he or she may challenge the government’s decision in a Latvian court. There are two laws governing bankruptcy procedure: the Law on Insolvency and the Law on Credit Institutions (regulating bankruptcy procedures for banks and other financial sector companies). The business community has expressed concerns over inefficiency and allegations of corruption in Latvia’s insolvency administration system. One way Latvia has addressed the issue was partnering with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the September 2019 launch a project entitled “Support for Debt Restructuring in Latvia.” More information is available here: https://www.ebrd.com/news/2019/support-for-debt-restructuring-in-latvia-project-launched.html. 6. Financial Sector Latvian government policies do not interfere with the free flow of financial resources or the allocation of credit. Local bank loans are available to foreign investors. The NASDAQ/OMX Riga Stock Exchange (RSE) (www.nasdaqomxbaltic.com ) operates in Latvia, and the securities market is based on the continental European model. Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania have agreed to create a pan-Baltic capital market by creating a single index classification for the entire Baltic region. Latvia is currently rated by various index providers as a frontier market due to its small size and limited liquidity. https://www.fm.gov.lv/en/article/latvia-passes-ebrd-supported-covered-bond-law Latvia’s retail banking sector, which is composed primarily of Scandinavian retail banks, generally maintains a positive reputation. Latvian banks servicing non-resident clients, however, have come under increased scrutiny for inadequate compliance with anti-money laundering standards. In 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) identified Latvia’s third-largest bank as a “foreign bank of primary money laundering concern” and issued a proposed rule prohibiting U.S. banks from doing business with or on behalf of the bank. The Latvian bank regulator has also levied fines against several non-resident banks for AML violations in recent years. Latvia is a member of the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. On August 23, 2018, MONEYVAL issued a report finding that Latvia’s AML regime was in substantial compliance with only one out of eleven assessment categories, was in moderate compliance with eight areas, but in low compliance with two areas. In late 2019 and early 2020, MONEYVAL and the FATF concluded that Latvia has developed and implemented strong enough reforms for combating financial crimes to avoid increased monitoring via the so-called “grey list.” With this decision, Latvia became the first member state under the MONEYVAL review to successfully implement all 40 FATF recommendations. The most recent MONEYVAL report can be found at: https://rm.coe.int/anti-money-laundering-and-counter-terrorist-financing-measures-latvia-/16809988c1 . According to Latvian banking regulators, Latvia’s regulatory framework for commercial banking incorporates all principal requirements of EU directives, including a unified capital and financial markets regulator. Existing banking legislation includes provisions on accounting and financial statements (including adherence to international accounting), minimum initial capital requirements, capital adequacy requirements, large exposures, restrictions on insider lending, open foreign exchange positions, and loan-loss provisions. An Anti-Money Laundering Law and Deposit Guarantee Law have been adopted. An independent Financial Intelligence unit (FIU) operates under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. Some of the banking regulations, such as capital adequacy and loan-loss provisions, reportedly exceed EU requirements. According to the Finance Latvia Association, total assets of the country’s banks at the end of 2021 stood at 25.34 billion euros. More information is available at: https://www.financelatvia.eu/en/industry-data/ . Securities markets are regulated by the Law on the Consolidated Capital Markets Regulator, the Law on the Financial Instrument Market, and several other laws and regulations. Latvia does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are active in the energy and mining, aerospace and defense, services, information and communication, automotive and ground transportation, and forestry sectors. Private enterprises may compete with public enterprises on the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations such as licenses and supplies. The Latvian government has implemented the requirements of the EU’s Third Energy Package with respect to the electricity sector, including opening the electricity market to private power producers and allowing them to compete on an equal footing with Latvenergo, the state-owned power company. The country’s natural gas market has also been liberalized, creating competition among privately owned gas suppliers. Latvia, as an EU member, is a party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the World Trade Organization, and SOEs are covered under the agreement. In 2015, the OECD published a review of the corporate governance of Latvia’s SOE and found that Latvia’s SOE sector relative to the size of the national economy was larger than the OECD average. The full report is available here: http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/oecd-review-corporate-governance-soe-latvia.htm . Senior managers of major SOEs in Latvia report to independent boards of directors, which in turn report to line ministries. SOEs operate under the Law on Public Persons Enterprises and Capital Shares Governance. The law also establishes an entity that coordinates state enterprise ownership and requires annual aggregate reporting. Detailed information on Latvian SOEs is available here: http://www.valstskapitals.gov.lv/en/ . For additional information please see here: http://www.oecd.org/latvia/corporate-governance-in-latvia-9789264268180-en.htm . The Law on Privatization of State and Municipal Property governs the privatization process in Latvia. State joint stock company “Possessor” (https://www.possessor.gov.lv/ ) uses a case-by-case approach to determine the method of privatization for each state enterprise. The three allowable methods are: public offering, auction for selected bidders, and international tender. For some of the largest privatized companies, a percentage of shares may be sold publicly on the NASDAQ OMX Riga Stock Exchange. The government may maintain shares in companies deemed important to the state’s strategic interests. Privatization of small and medium-sized state enterprises is considered to be largely complete. Latvian law designates six State Joint Stock Companies that cannot be privatized: Latvenergo (Energy and Mining), Latvijas Pasts (Postal Services), Riga International Airport, Latvijas Dzelzcels (Automotive and Ground Transportation), Latvijas Gaisa Satiksme (Aerospace and Defense), and Latvijas Valsts Mezi (Forestry). Other large companies in which the Latvian government holds a controlling interest include airBaltic (Travel), TET (Information and Communication), Latvian Mobile Telephone (Information and Communication), and Conexus Baltic Grid (Energy). Due to the pandemic, the government invested EUR 250 million into airBaltic equity, thus increasing its stake in the airline to 96.14%. The airline plans to return the investment to the state, via an initial public offering, potentially in 2023-2024. 10. Political and Security Environment There have been no reports of political violence or politically motivated damage to foreign investors’ projects or installations. The likelihood of widespread civil disturbances is very low. While Latvia has experienced peaceful demonstrations related to political issues, there have been few incidents when these have devolved into crimes against property, such as breaking shop windows or damaging parked cars. U.S. citizens are cautioned to avoid any large public demonstrations since even peaceful demonstrations can turn confrontational. The Embassy provides periodic notices to U.S. citizens in Latvia, which can be found on the Embassy’s web site: https://lv.usembassy.gov/. Lebanon Executive Summary Lebanon’s deep economic depression since the end of 2019 is the result of an import-dependent economy out of hard currency and decades of financial mismanagement, including a state-sponsored “Ponzi” scheme that offered high interest rates to attract financial inflows. The August 2020 Port of Beirut explosion and the COVID-19 pandemic further hampered economic growth. A June 2021 World Bank report estimated that Lebanon’s depression is likely to rank among top three most severe economic crises since the 1850s. The World Bank estimated Lebanon’s real GDP fell 10.5 percent in 2021 after a 21.4 percent contraction in 2020. Lebanon’s currency, the Lebanese pound (LBP), has lost more than 90 percent of its value since 2019. As a result, inflation in an import-dependent economy reached 240 percent as of December 2021. Lebanon’s Central Bank is intervening in the foreign exchange market to stem the local currency’s fall at the expense of the country’s limited foreign currency reserves. Lebanon’s banks accumulated around $70 billion in USD losses and are USD insolvent. More than half the country’s population is considered poor, and up to 50 percent are unemployed. On March 7, 2020, Lebanon announced it would default on and restructure its nearly $31 billion dollar-denominated debt, the first such default in Lebanon’s history. Lebanon has not yet entered into negotiations with bondholders and is unable to borrow on international capital markets, reducing the country’s ability to import key commodities and invest in infrastructure. International correspondent banks likely place increased levels of due diligence on domestic banks because of the incomplete implementation of anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards. Correspondent banks have also introduced onerous requirements on their Lebanese counterparts because of increasing country risk. PM Najib Mikati formed a government in September 2021, after a 13-month political vacuum, and his Cabinet resumed talks with the IMF on a potential loan in January 2022. While the Mikati government has drafted a plan to address the $69 billion in financial sector losses, the IMF is looking for the government to develop a more comprehensive social, economic, and financial reform program to stabilize the economy and lay the foundation for future growth. The IMF will likely require deep fiscal reforms to make Lebanon’s debt – which reached 194 percent of GDP in 2021 – more sustainable, including restructuring the financial sector, reforming state-owned enterprises, particularly the energy sector, strengthening governance and anti-corruption efforts, and unifying the country’s system of multiple currencies. Absent holistic economic reforms, preferably as part of an IMF program, analysts assess that Lebanon’s near- and medium-term economic future is bleak, imperiling Lebanon’s potential as a destination for foreign investment. Much depends on how Lebanon implements overdue economic and governance reforms and attracts international assistance and foreign investment. If the country can implement necessary reforms, attract foreign capital, stabilize the exchange rate, and recapitalize its financial sector, then opportunities remain for U.S. companies. Lebanon still has the legal underpinnings of a free-market economy, a highly educated labor force, and limited restrictions on investors. The most alluring sector is the energy sector, particularly for power production, renewable energies, and oil and gas exploration, though challenges remain with corruption and a lack of transparency. Information and communication technology, healthcare, safety and security, waste management, and franchising have historically attracted U.S. investments. However, corruption and a lack of transparency have continued to cause frustration among local and foreign businesses. Other concerns include over-regulation, arbitrary licensing, outdated legislation, ineffectual courts, high taxes and fees, poor economic infrastructure, and a fragmented and opaque tendering and procurement processes. Social unrest driven by a decline in public services and growing food insecurity may further hamper the investment climate. If Lebanon is able to reform its business environment, it may once again attract foreign investment. Lebanon’s economic crisis is likely to be long and painful, however, and recovery can only be accelerated through quick but careful implementation of reforms. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 154 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 82 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $4347 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $5,370 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Lebanon is open to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL) is the national authority responsible for promoting local and foreign investment in Lebanon covering eight priority sectors: industry, media, technology, telecommunications, tourism, agriculture, and agroindustry. IDAL has the authority to award licenses and permits for new investment in specific sectors. It also grants special incentives and tax exemptions for projects implemented by local and foreign investors based on an investment’s geographic location, sector, and number of jobs created (Investment Law No. 360). IDAL publishes its investment incentives online by sector at http://investinlebanon.gov.lb/en/sectors_in_focus . IDAL seeks to facilitate international and local partnerships through joint ventures, equity participation, acquisition, and other mechanisms. Moreover, it provides business intelligence, market studies, and legal and administrative advice to potential investors. In February 2018, IDAL established the Business Support Unit (BSU), which provides free legal, accounting, and financial advice to startups across sectors. IDAL is mandated by law to attract, facilitate, and retain investment in Lebanon. IDAL has proposed draft decrees to facilitate investment and boost its “One-Stop-Shop,” but these remain pending in the Prime Minister’s office. In 2020, IDAL set up a business matchmaking platform to connect Lebanese companies seeking capital with a network of local and foreign investors to help them grow and expand. IDAL is involved in providing after-care services to local and foreign investors alike. Foreign private entities may establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises and may engage in all types of remunerative activities. Lebanese law allows the establishment of joint-stock corporations, limited liability, and offshore and holding companies. According to UNCTAD’s latest investment policy review of Lebanon, the country allows only Lebanese nationals to obtain licenses to manufacture and trade products related to defense and weapons (Legislative Decree 137 of 12 June 1959, Weapons and Ammunition Law). Only Lebanese nationals can own political newspapers and all broadcast media (Press Law of 14 September 1962, Broadcast Law 382 of 4 November 1994). A series of regulatory requirements also effectively restrict FDI in other instances: Two sectors, fixed line telephony and energy transmission, are closed to domestic and foreign investors as they are currently operated by state-owned enterprises, which have a de facto monopoly. Only Lebanese nationals are permitted to practice law. Legislative Decree No. 35 (August 5, 1967), under the Lebanese Commercial Code, permits foreigners to own and manage 100 percent of limited liability companies (LLC or Société à Responsabilité Limitée – SARL), except if the company engages in certain commercial activities such as exclusive commercial representation. In these cases, Lebanese citizens must hold a majority of capital, and the manager must be Lebanese (Legislative Decree No. 34 dated August 5, 1967). An amendment introduced in 2019 allowed the formation of LLCs by only one person. Legislative Decree No. 304 of the Commercial Code (December 24, 1942) governs joint-stock corporations (Société Anonyme Libanaise – SAL) and was amended by Law No. 126 on March 29, 2019. Limitations related to foreign participation stipulate that: 1) one-third of the board of directors should be Lebanese (Article 144 amended); 2) board members can be either shareholders or non-shareholders (Article 147 amended); 3) one-third of capital shares should be held by Lebanese for companies that provide public utility services (Article 78); and 4) capital shares and management in cases of exclusive commercial representation are limited (Legislative Decree No. 34 dated August 5, 1967). Banking, insurance, and cargo, which can only operate as joint-stock corporations (JSCs), are required to have a Lebanese majority on the board, which makes them, in practice, restricted for FDI. Holding and offshore companies are structured as JCSs and governed by Legislative Decree No. 45 (on holdings) and Legislative Decree No. 46 (on offshore companies), both dated June 24, 1983. The law on offshore companies was amended by Law No. 85, dated October 18, 2018, whereby all board members may be non-Lebanese (Article 2, para 4) and the company may be formed by one person (Article 1 in the amendment of the Commercial Code). A foreign non-resident chairman/general manager of a holding or an offshore company is exempt from the obligation of holding work and residency permits. Law No. 772, dated November 2006, exempts holding companies from the obligation to have two Lebanese persons or legal entities on their board of directors. All offshore companies must register with the Beirut Commercial Registry. The law does not permit offshore banking, trust, and insurance companies to operate in Lebanon. There are size and quota limits that effectively curb foreign ownership of real estate as well. Law No. 296, dated April 3, 2001, amended the 1969 Law No. 11614 that governs acquisition of property by foreigners. The 2001 law eased legal limits on foreign ownership of property to encourage investment in Lebanon, especially in industry and tourism, abolished discrimination for property ownership between Arab and non-Arab nationals and set real estate registration fees at approximately six percent for both Lebanese and foreign investors. The law permits foreigners to acquire up to 3,000 square meters (around 32,000 square feet) of real estate without a permit but requires cabinet approval for acquisitions exceeding this threshold. The cumulative real estate acquisition by foreigners may not exceed three percent of total land in any district. Cumulative real estate acquisition by foreigners in the Beirut region may not exceed ten percent of the total land area. The law prohibits individuals not holding an internationally recognized nationality from acquiring property in Lebanon. In practice, this restriction attempts to prevent Palestinian refugees who are long-term residents in Lebanon from owning property. The Lebanese Government does not review FDI transactions for national security considerations. Lebanon is not a member of either the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the World Trade Organization (WTO). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in collaboration with IDAL, published a comprehensive Investment Policy Review for Lebanon in December 2018, which it officially launched in Beirut in March 2019. The report provides a thorough assessment of Lebanon’s business environment, with concrete short-, medium-, and long-term recommendations to revitalize Lebanon’s investment climate. These include creating an FDI promotion strategy and passing or amending legislation, rules, and regulations in the taxation, labor, competition, and governance regimes towards a more conducive business environment. The full report is available at https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d11_en.pdf In March 2022, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and Arabnet published Braving the Storm: Safeguarding the Lebanese Innovation Economy. The report notes that the country’s economic crisis has severely affected the Lebanese innovation ecosystem, much like the wider economy. Between 2017 and 2021, yearly total investments in local startups shrunk by more than 70 percent, from $54 million to $16 million. The number of startup investment deals dropped from 56 to 12, which puts Lebanon in 14th place when it comes to the number of investments among 18 MENA countries, from 2nd place in 2017. The resulting toxic environment has also led several startups to relocate outside of Lebanon, with an estimated 55 percent of companies have moved either their entire or part of their business abroad. Lebanon does not have a business registration website; rather, IDAL provides an information portal about doing businesses in Lebanon and outlines requirements at http://investinlebanon.gov.lb/en/doing_business . According to UNCTAD, company establishment is cumbersome and costly in Lebanon. It takes, on average, more than 15 days to establish an LLC with 15 employees or more in Beirut. Companies must typically register with one of five trade registers (Beirut, Bekaa, Mount Lebanon, North and South), overseen by a magistrate, that operate in the country and are closest to the company’s location. LLCs and JSCs must also retain the services of a lawyer and one auditor on a yearly basis, pay registration fees at the Ministries of Finance and Justice, and register employees at the National Social Security Fund (NSSF). Foreign companies seeking to establish branches in Lebanon must additionally register at the Ministry of Economy. Online establishment is not available for companies wishing to incorporate in Lebanon, and information on establishment is scattered. Foreign branches and representative offices can be partly registered online, but heavy administrative requirements remain. All foreign documents must be certified by the trade register in the company’s country of incorporation and legalized by the Lebanese embassy or consulate there and translated into Arabic. Lebanon neither promotes nor incentivizes outward investment, nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. However, informal capital controls imposed by the Lebanese financial sector since October 2019 prevent nearly all external transfers. Banks do allow outward transfers of money from so-called “fresh dollar” accounts, which include foreign currency inflows that occurred after October 2019. 3. Legal Regime Private firms should exercise caution when bidding on public projects. Lebanese Government agencies often sole-source contracts, undertaking direct contracting processes that operate according to differing standards and without a formal competitive solicitation. Public institutions evade regulations that promote full and open competition by splitting contract requirements into smaller solicitations whose values do not exceed government agency procurement limits. Parliament passed a modern public procurement law consistent with international standards in June 2021, updating Lebanon’s public procurement system for the first time since the 1960s. The Public Procurement Management Administration (PPMA), known as the “Tender Board,” technically has the authority to review terms of reference and evaluate bids for government contracts. The Tender Board is generally transparent, but corruption often arises within the scope of the tenders and the ministries that issue them. The new law would create a new public procurement oversight agency and require public tenders to be published online. The law’s success, however, depends on implementation. The Central Inspection Board (CIB), an oversight body within the Office of the Prime Minister, oversees government administrative processes, and the Court of Audit has oversight over public expenditures. The Social Security Fund and the Council for Development and Reconstruction, public entities that manage large funding flows, remain outside the CIB jurisdiction. Excessive regulation hampers procedures for business entry, operation, and exit. However, the process does not discriminate against foreign investors. International companies face an unpredictable and opaque operating environment and often encounter unanticipated obstacles or costs late in the process. Trademark registration, economic and trade indicators, and market surveillance reports are available online at: http://www.economy.gov.lb . However, some procedures, including those related to branch offices or representative offices of foreign companies, or to protecting intellectual property rights, still require the right-holder to visit the ministry in person to finalize and pay required dues. All legislation, government decrees, decisions, and official announcements are published in the Official Gazette. The government does not publish proposed draft laws and regulations for public comment, but a parliamentary commission may invite private sector stakeholders to comment on legislation. Telecom Law No. 431 requires the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (TRA) to issue regulations in draft for public consultation to promote transparency and enable the general public to shape future regulations. The TRA has not introduced new regulations since the term of its executive board expired in February 2012. Publicly listed companies adhere to international accounting standards. In general, legal, regulatory, and accounting systems for Lebanese businesses in the formal sector accord with international norms. Lebanon passed the Access to Information Law in January 2017 to promote transparency in the public sector. The law permits anyone, including foreigners, to request information from government agencies. A Whistleblower Protection law also passed in October 2018. While the Whistleblower law is in force, the establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Commission to oversee the law’s implementation was only approved by Parliament in April 2020 and its members were appointed in January 2022. In January 2017, Lebanon announced its intent to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI), a global standard to promote transparency of the extractive sector, though Lebanon has not yet joined. In September 2018, Parliament adopted the Transparency in Oil and Gas Law to facilitate the EITI accession process. To complete Lebanon’s candidacy, the Minister of Energy and Water announced that Lebanon would form a Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG), with representatives from government, private firms operating in Lebanon, and civil society. In March 2019, the Minister of Energy and Water invited civil society to choose independently its representative to the MSG, as per the EITI’s requirements. EITI membership will require annual data disclosures on licenses, contracts, beneficial ownership, payments, revenues, and production. Lebanon’s public finances are not transparent; budget documents did not present a full picture of Lebanon’s expenditures and revenue streams, and Lebanon has not published an end-of-year report. Details regarding allocations to and earnings from state-owned enterprises were limited. The information in the budget was not considered reliable or reasonably accurate and did not correspond to actual revenues and expenditures. Lebanon’s supreme audit institution did not make its audit reports publicly available. While Lebanon’s debt obligations are transparent, some analysts have questioned the Central Bank’s reported foreign currency position. The Lebanese government hired three private auditors to audit its Central Bank in September 2020. The audits, including one forensic audit, have reportedly stalled. Lebanon does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance disclosure to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. Lebanon is not part of any regional economic block. It adopts a variety of standards based on the type of product and product destination. Lebanon is not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) but has held observer status since 1999. Lebanon does have a WTO/TBT (technical barriers to trade) Enquiry Point that handles enquiries from WTO Member States and other interested parties. Lebanon has a civil (roman and codified law) legal system inspired by the French civil procedure code (three degrees of jurisdictions: First Instance, Appeal, and Supreme Court). Ownership of property is enforced by registering the deed in the Property Registry. Lebanon has a written commercial law and contractual law. Lebanon has commercial, civil, and penal courts, but no specialized courts to hear intellectual property (IP) claims. Civil and/or penal courts adjudicate IP claims. Lebanon has an administrative court, the State Council, which handles all disputes involving the state. Lebanon has a labor court in seven out of its nine governorates to hear claims of unfair labor practices. Local courts accept investment agreements subject to foreign jurisdictions if they do not contravene Lebanese law. Judgments of foreign courts are enforced subject to the Exequatur obtained. Weak judicial capacity (i.e., shortage of judges, inadequate support structures, administrative delays) results in delays in the handling of cases. The Lebanese Constitution guarantees the judicial system’s independence. However, politicians and powerful lobbying groups often interfere in the court system. Lebanon’s Parliament has discussed a draft law on the independence of the judiciary, but as of March 2022, it remains with Parliament’s Administration and Justice Committee. A foreigner may establish a business under the same conditions as a Lebanese national and must register the business in the Commercial Registry. Foreign investors who do not manage their business from Lebanon need not apply for a work permit. However, foreign investors who own and manage their businesses within Lebanon must apply for an employer work permit and a residency permit. Employer work permits stipulate that a foreign investor’s capital contribution cannot be less than $67,000. The investor must also hire three Lebanese employees and register them in the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) within the first six months of employment. Companies established in Lebanon must abide by the Lebanese Commercial Code and are required to retain the services of a lawyer to serve as a corporate agent. Local courts are responsible for enforcing contracts. There are no sector-specific laws on acquisitions, mergers, or takeovers, except for bank mergers. Lebanese law does not differentiate between local and foreign investors, except in land acquisition (see Real Property section). Foreign investors can generally establish a Lebanese company, participate in a joint venture, or establish a local branch or subsidiary of their company without difficulty. Specific requirements apply for holding and offshore companies, real estate, insurance, media (television and newspapers), and banking. Lebanese law allows the establishment of joint-stock corporations, limited liability, offshore, and holding companies. However, offshore and holding companies must be joint-stock corporations (Société Anonyme Libanaise – SAL). The Lebanese Commercial Code governs these entities. IDAL’s website (http://investinlebanon.gov.lb/ ) provides investors information on investment legislation, regulations, and starting a business. IDAL’s proposed changes to investment-related laws and regulations, including amending requirements for IT companies to benefit from IDAL incentives, are pending government approval. IDAL has finalized a detailed Information and Communications Technology (ICT) plan aimed at expanding facilities, developing incentives, and facilitating investments in the ICT sector; it awaits Cabinet’s approval. IDAL intends to focus its investment promotion strategy on attracting high value-added innovative investments related to all of the sectors under its mandate. Lebanon’s Parliament passed a new law on competition in February 2022. The law will nullify exclusive licenses granted to local companies in certain sectors and create a National Competition Commission to regulate competition. The law’s success in curtailing Lebanon’s many monopolies and attracting foreign investment depends, however, on its implementation. Local courts review claims on competition-related issues under various laws. Land expropriation in Lebanon is relatively rare. The Law on Expropriation (Law No. 58, dated May 29, 1991, Article 1) and Article 15 of the Constitution specify that expropriation must be for a public purpose and calls for fair and adequate compensation. The government pays compensation at the time of expropriation, but the rate is often perceived as below fair market value. The government does not discriminate against foreign investors, companies, or their representatives on expropriations. The government established three real estate companies in the mid-1990s to encourage reconstruction and development in Greater Beirut following the Lebanese Civil War: 1) private corporation Solidere for the development and reconstruction of Beirut’s downtown commercial district, 2) private corporation Linord, for northern Beirut, and 3) public institution Elyssar for the southwest suburbs of Beirut. Linord has been dormant for years, and Elyssar’s projects have stalled since 2007. The government granted these three companies the authority to expropriate certain lands for development under the Law on Expropriation. Landowners and squatters have challenged the land seizures in court. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Lebanon is a member of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention). Lebanon ratified the 1958 Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) in 2007. Lebanese law conforms to both conventions. Investor-State Dispute Settlement The government accepts international arbitration related to investment disputes. In cases involving concessions or public projects, the government does not accept binding international arbitration unless the contract includes an arbitration clause that was obtained through prior approval by Cabinet decree. However, there is an exception for investors from countries that have a signed and ratified investment protection agreement with Lebanon that provides for international arbitration in the case of disputes. In the past, the government has faced challenges related to previously awarded contracts and resorted to international arbitration for resolution. To post’s knowledge, there are no known new cases. In 2010, the government settled a dispute with a China-based contracting company working to expand the northern port of Tripoli. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts International arbitration is accepted as a means to settle investment disputes between private parties. The Lebanese Centre for Arbitration was created in 1995 by local economic organizations, including the Lebanese chambers of commerce, industry, and agriculture. The Centre resolves domestic and international conflicts related to trade and investment. Its statutes are similar to those of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris, and its conciliation and arbitration rules are modeled on those of the Paris ICC. Judgments of foreign courts are enforced subject to the exequatur obtained. Lebanon does not have a Bankruptcy Law. However, the Commercial Code (Book No. 5, Articles 459-668) and the Penal Code govern insolvency and bankruptcy. Workers may resort to the Labor Court and the National Social Security Fund to recover pay and benefits from local and foreign firms that go bankrupt. The law criminalizes fraudulent bankruptcy. 6. Financial Sector There are no restrictions on portfolio investment, and foreign investors may invest in Lebanese equities and fixed income certificates. While legally Lebanon is a free-market economy and does not restrict the movement of capital into or out of the country, the country’s banks have imposed informal capital controls on dollar withdrawals and financial outflows from Lebanon since October 2019. There are de facto restrictions on outbound payments and transfers for current international transactions, but these have yet to be codified into law. Lebanon’s Parliament has debated but never passed, several versions of a capital controls law. Lebanon’s stock market is the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE). Currently, the BSE lists six commercial banks, four companies including Solidere – one of the largest publicly held companies in the region – and eight sovereign Eurobond issues. However, the BSE suffers from a lack of liquidity and low trading volumes in the absence of significant institutional and foreign investors. It had an annual trading volume of only 3.3 percent of market capitalization in 2021. Weak market turnover discourages investors from committing funds to the market and discourages issuers from seeking listings on the BSE. The Capital Markets Authority (CMA) regulates Lebanon’s capital markets. The Governor of Lebanon’s Central Bank oversees the CMA. Politicization of the CMA’s board and frequent vacancies have distracted the CMA from encouraging the development of Lebanon’s capital markets. The Capital Markets Law calls for the corporatization and subsequent privatization of the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE) within a two-year period from the date that the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) is appointed. The Cabinet appointed the CMA in June 2012, and in September 2017 issued a decree to corporatize the BSE. The corporatization has yet to occur. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors may obtain credit facilities on the local market. However, as Lebanon entered its economic crisis in the fall of 2019 and defaulted on its dollar-denominated debt in March 2020, local and international credit is virtually nonexistent. Banks have substantially reduced retail loans, such as housing, consumer, or personal loans, as well as have reduced heavily international limits of credit and debit cards, and maintains commercial loans mainly to agriculture, industrial and trade sectors for SMEs and large corporates. The Lebanese banking sector covers the entire country with 959 operating commercial and investment bank branches as of September 2021. There are 5,214 residents per branch in Lebanon (assuming five million inhabitants), which compares favorably to regional and emerging markets. According to World Bank Development indicators, there are 493 depositors with commercial banks per 1,000 adults, 177 borrowers from commercial banks per 1,000 adults, and 37 ATMs per 100,000 adults. The total domestic assets of Lebanon’s fifteen largest commercial banks reached approximately US$ 150 billion as of the end of 2021 (about 85.3 percent of total banking assets), according to Central Bank data. Lebanon’s banks are insolvent. The government announced in February 2022 that it estimated banks accumulated $69 billion in losses and suggested a plan for distributing those losses, primarily through converting USD deposits into local currency. Banks are no longer serving their core functions: making productive loans or allowing those with dollar deposits to withdraw them. Clients cannot transfer money deposited prior to October 2019 overseas. Lebanon has yet to adopt formal capital controls legislation, but most economic analysts believe such a law is necessary to preserve what limited foreign currency is left in the country, provide a legal framework for banks to limit withdrawals, and provide a level playing field to all Lebanese. At the behest of the Central Bank, in April 2020, banks began providing LBP at rates higher than the official pegged rate to customers with dollar-denominated accounts, but less than 60 percent of the market value of USD banknotes. In December 2021, the Central Bank announced new measures to stabilize the local currency, including allowing banks to provide USD banknotes to clients sourced from the Central Bank’s foreign currency reserves. Banks are acting as de facto foreign exchange houses, providing clients with scarce USD banknotes in exchange for LBP at rates slightly below the actual market rate. This intervention has stemmed the local currency’s fall, but most analysts believe it is only a temporary solution. Lebanon relied on dollar inflows from abroad to finance imports and public spending and to maintain the LBP-to-USD peg, in place since 1997. Those dollars were deposited in Lebanese banks, which in turn lent them to the state in the form of deposits at the Central Bank or Lebanese debt instruments. Nearly 70 percent of bank assets are tied to the sovereign in those two forms. In 2019, as dollar inflows dried up and banking sector assets were tied to long-term deposits at the Central Bank and illiquid debt instruments, banks had trouble meeting their dollar obligations to clients, planting the seeds of the current crisis. Lebanon’s default on its dollar-denominated debt in March 2020 – Lebanese banks at the time held $12.7 billion in Lebanon’s dollar bonds – further eroded the balance sheets of Lebanese banks. Financial experts estimated that 40 percent of loans from Lebanese banks were non-performing in December 2020. Bankers reported that correspondent banks overseas have stopped providing them with lines of credits – or only provide facilities with onerous conditions because of increasing country risk– further hampering bank efficacy in Lebanon. Correspondent banks remain but likely place high levels of due diligence on banks because of the incomplete implementation of anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards. The government’s February 2022 draft financial sector recovery plan hinted at the conversion of dollar denominated deposits into local currency and a potential “haircut” on dollar deposits, in which wealthy account holders could lose some of their deposits to help recapitalize banks after shareholders “bail-in” (convert their deposits into bank shares) their financial institutions. The government has not implemented that plan, however. Lebanon’s Central Bank was established in 1963. Lebanon’s Central Bank imposes strict compliance with regulations on banks and financial institutions, and commercial banks, in turn, maintain strict compliance regimes. However, the United States designated Jammal Trust Bank in August 2019 as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist for its role in financing Foreign Terrorist Organization Hizballah. Foreign banks and branches need the Central Bank’s approval to establish operations in Lebanon. Moreover, any shareholder with more than five percent of a bank’s share capital must obtain prior approval from the Central Bank to acquire additional shares in that bank and must inform the Central Bank when selling shares. In addition, any shareholder needs to obtain prior approval from the Central Bank if he/she wants to become a board member. The use of cryptocurrencies is prohibited in Lebanon by the Central Bank. The Central Bank announced that it is developing a digital currency that it plans to issue for domestic use only. There are no legal restrictions in Lebanon on a foreigner or non-resident’s ability to open a bank account in local or foreign currency, provided they abide by Lebanese compliance rules and regulations. Currently, however, most banks are not taking on new clients or new accounts. Banks claim they have stringent inquiry mechanisms to ensure compliance with international and domestic regulations and implement Lebanon’s anti-money laundering and counter-terror finance laws. Banks inform customers of Know-Your-Customer requirements and ask them about the purpose of opening new accounts and about the sources of funds to be deposited. Lebanese banks note they are compliant with the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Lebanon adopted the OECD Common Reporting Standards since January 1, 2018. Foreign Exchange Commercial banks in late 2019 introduced informal capital controls on Lebanese depositors to stem the outflow of foreign currency; these controls have persisted today, and banks have barred virtually all overseas transfers. Lebanon’s Parliament has debated but never passed, several versions of a capital controls law. In April 2020, Lebanon’s Central Bank required money transfer services such as Western Union and MoneyGram to disburse inbound transfers in local currency, the Central Bank later allowed them to disburse in U.S. dollars in August 2020, ostensibly to attract remittance inflows. In February 2022, the Central Bank allowed money transfer organizations to sell USD at an exchange rate close to the market rate. As of March 2022, Lebanon had several different exchange rates in use: the official, pegged rate; the actual market rate; the Central Bank’s “Sayrafa” rate; and the rate used by money transfer organizations to convert incoming remittances. Since 1997, the LBP has been pegged to the U.S. dollar at 1,507.5 LBP/1 USD. However, as Lebanese continue to demand scarce dollars in the Lebanese financial system, the currency depreciated on the market, the only source of USD banknotes for most Lebanese. The actual market rate reached a peak of 33,000 LBP/USD in January 2022; as of March 2022, the rate was closer to 23,000 LBP/USD. In December 2021, Lebanon’s Central Bank announced banks could convert LBP into USD – sourced from the Central Bank’s foreign currency reserves – using the Central Bank’s “Sayrafa” platform. This intervention stabilized the local currency temporarily; the “Sayrafa rate” and market rate tracked closely for most of February and March 2022 at 20,000 LBP/USD. However, the Sayrafa platform could not satiate local demand for USD banknotes, and the market rate once again increased from the Sayrafa rate. Money transfer organizations such as Western Union or Money Gram can also convert incoming USD to LBP using a separate rate that is usually higher than the Sayrafa rate but below the market rate. While capital controls curtailed the ability of those holding dollar-denominated bank accounts in Lebanon to withdraw or transfer their currencies overseas, those in Lebanon with access to “fresh dollars” (i.e., new dollar bills from abroad or not within the local financial system) were able to access, withdraw, and transfer overseas dollars. For the vast majority of Lebanese and businesses in Lebanon, remitting any money overseas, including investment returns, remained nearly impossible. Most economists believe capital controls must continue for the foreseeable future to prevent a bank run and preserve the limited foreign currency remaining in Lebanon, although they prefer formal and legal capital controls passed by Lebanon’s Parliament. Lebanon does not have a sovereign wealth fund. Lebanon’s Offshore Petroleum Resource Law states that proceeds generated from oil and gas exploration must be deposited in a Sovereign Wealth Fund. Creating the fund requires a separate law, which the government has yet to adopt. Lebanon currently receives no proceeds from natural resources that could flow into a sovereign wealth fund. 10. Political and Security Environment Sustained anti-government protests began on October 17, 2019 and led to the resignation of the government on October 29. The protests continued for months, with demonstrators demanding an end to corruption, poor governance, and economic stagnation. A new government, which drew support from Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Hizballah, did not form until January 21, 2020. This government resigned on August 10, 2020, in the wake of protests after an August 4 explosion at the Port of Beirut killed more than 200 people. Lebanese political leaders took 13 months to form a new government on September 2021. That government will have to resign after scheduled elections on May 15, and it is therefore trying to pursue negotiations with the IMF to secure an economic recovery program. Public demonstrations have continued since October 2019, albeit with lesser frequency. Some protests have turned violent and targeted property, particularly banks and public institutions. Lebanon’s declining economic situation has resulted in more than half of the population falling below the poverty line, according to the World Bank. Hizballah continued fighting in Syria on behalf of the Assad regime, while some Lebanese Sunnis reportedly lent support to the Syrian opposition. Lebanon continues to host more refugees per capita than any other country in the world. The refugee presence led to increased social tensions and competition for low-skill jobs, and strained infrastructure and provision of public services. The U.S. government considers the potential threat to U.S. Embassy personnel assigned to Beirut sufficiently serious enough to require all official personnel to live and work under security restrictions. These limitations occasionally prevent the movement of U.S. Embassy officials and the provision of consular services in certain areas of the country. U.S. citizen visitors are encouraged to contact the Embassy’s Consular Section for the most recent safety and security information concerning travel to Lebanon. More information may be found at https://lb.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services. Lesotho Executive Summary The Kingdom of Lesotho is a country open to and eagerly seeking foreign direct investment (FDI). Government, business, labor, and civil society leaders all strongly agree that attracting FDI is vital to Lesotho’s future. In 2021 the government of the Kingdom of Lesotho (GOKL) undertook many promising initiatives to make doing business in Lesotho easier. However, in 2020 GOKL took or proposed measures that concerned foreign entrepreneurs and investors. These included measures that treat foreign-owned businesses differently than in the past and which suggest to some foreign observers a turn towards economic nationalism. Among the important reforms undertaken in 2020, GOKL introduced new e-licensing and e-registration platforms that promise to greatly reduce the time for business creation and licensing. New protocols for customs procedures promise to streamline importing and exporting. And at the highest levels GOKL has announced that to help Lesotho recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, GOKL will focus on making Lesotho an attractive destination for FDI. While GOKL clearly recognizes the importance of FDI and has continued to enact policies to make foreign investment easier, 2020 also saw the rollout of rules intended to protect local entrepreneurs from foreign competition in designated sectors. In recent years, many migrants from Asia and other parts of Africa have started businesses in these designated sectors and the current government has announced aggressive measures to reverse this trend. These sectors—such as small retail food sales and basic auto repair—are dominated by local small and micro enterprises but some do have participation by medium-sized foreign-owned firms. Although these regulations will have a negative effect on some foreign investors, they will have low impact on overall FDI because most businesses in the designated sectors are relatively small. However, the government has also enacted other regulations, such as requiring foreign investors to renew their business licenses yearly instead of every three years, a condition that many foreign investors describe as onerous to the point of impossibility given the bureaucratic challenges. Moreover, recent policy debates within the government around proposals to mandate a minimum percentage of local ownership enterprises earmarked for the locals have caused real concern. In February, the government implemented the regulations in the used car motor dealership sector causing barriers to entry for investors. Uncertainty concerning the execution of the regulations in other sectors remains. Lesotho’s economy and FDI were badly affected by COVID-19 in 2021, with several foreign-owned textile factories closing or cutting back on operations due to the global downtrend in demand. The government introduced measures to reduce the impact of COVID-19 on the private sector. Other challenges included corruption; while not pervasive, corruption is a problem with Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranking Lesotho as 83rd out of 180 countries. Foreign investors are requested to adhere to international labor standards, however, there were reported instances of Gender Based Violence and Harassment (GBVH) in some textiles factories. The government, in collaboration with the stakeholders, is working to address GBV. Despite these challenges, GOKL is refining the services it offers foreign investors, and Lesotho retains advantages such as ready access to the South African and regional markets as well as lower labor, electricity, and communications costs than neighboring countries. Lesotho also has a government that remains focused on providing jobs to its citizens, and which has publicly proclaimed its eagerness to work with foreign investors—especially those ready to partner with locals. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 96 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2015 118 of 141 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 $3 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2021 $11,067 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Lesotho (GOKL) is generally open to FDI and successive governments have tried to attract FDI as a key component of national development. However, recent years have seen increasing critiques in Lesotho’s press and politics of foreign investors who repatriate their profits rather than reinvesting in Lesotho. This has resulted in a series of populist polices and policy proposals intended to protect opportunities for local investors and entrepreneurs, but which may inadvertently dampen Lesotho’s attractiveness as a destination for foreign investment. Lesotho follows World Trade Organization (WTO) laws and regulations, but local law makes some distinctions between local and foreign investors in some industries (see “Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment”). Lesotho’s investment promotion agency, the Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC), is responsible for the initiation, facilitation, and promotion of Lesotho as an attractive investment destination. LNDC also undertakes investment project appraisals, provides pre-investment and after-care services, risk management, trade and investment research, and strategic planning. It also ensures investors’ compliance with the country’s legal frameworks. Through LNDC, the government actively encourages investment in manufacturing, mining, and agriculture sectors. LNDC also implements the country’s industrial development policies. LNDC provides the support services described above to foreign investors and regularly publishes information on investment opportunities and the services it offers to foreign investors. Furthermore, LNCDC offers incentives such as long-term loans, tax incentives, factory space at discounted rental rates, assistance with work permits and licenses, and logistical support for relocation. LNDC maintains an ongoing dialogue with foreign and domestic investors by attending annual trade and investment forums both locally and internationally. In August 2020 to March 2021, the government launched the LNDC COVID-19 Partial Guarantee Scheme. To date, USD 2.1 million were approved to assist businesses to mitigate the impacts of COVID-19. For, more information on LNDC, please visit: http://www.lndc.org.ls . Lesotho is open to foreign investment and there are no economy-wide restrictions applied to foreign ownership and control. However, GOKL has passed laws and regulations intended to limit foreign ownership to large scale businesses in complex sectors while reserving small scale businesses in designated sectors exclusively for the indigenous citizens of Lesotho (“Basotho”). The Trading Enterprises Regulations of 2011 (TER 2011) and the Business Licensing and Registration Regulations of 2020 (BLRR 2020) reserve certain businesses for Basotho and limit foreign investors to operating these businesses as minority shareholders with a maximum of 49 percent shareholding. The reserved 47 businesses include acting as an agent of a foreign firm, barber, butcher, snack-bar operator, domestic fuel dealer, dairy shop proprietor, general café or dealer, greengrocer, broker, mini supermarket (floor area < 250m2), and hair and beauty salon. Most businesses affected by these regulations are micro or small enterprises, but some mid-sized foreign owned firms will be affected. In 2021, the government amended the BLRR 2020 to allow foreign investors to continue to operate in the used motor dealership sector following a low number of Lesotho citizens willing to venture into the sector which requires high capital. The Business Licensing and Registration Act 2019 (BLRA 2019) requires foreign investors to provide a capital of $123,152 or provide proof of investment of $123,152 during registration or renewal of their traders’ licenses or to have deposited $123,152 with a local institution. However, the Central Bank of Lesotho Act of 2000 stipulates a foreign investment minimum threshold of $250,000. While pleased that the new law indicates a reduction in the minimum sum that they must invest, many foreign investors are concerned that this discrepancy was not clarified in the BLRA 2019 legislation. BLRA 2019 requires foreign investors to renew their business identification card annually while locals are only required to renew their business identification cards after three years. Some foreign entrepreneurs operating in Lesotho have complained that the process of renewing their business identification cards annually is extremely onerous. BLRA 2019 also requires foreign investors to transfer technology and business expertise to local investors. Many foreign entrepreneurs operating in Lesotho complain that this requirement is poorly articulated and arbitrarily enforced. The Mines and Minerals Act No.4 of 2005 restricts mineral permits for small-scale mining operations on less than 100m2 to local ownership. Diamond mining, regardless of the size of the operation, is subject to the large-scale mines licensing regime, which has no restrictions on foreign ownership; however, GOKL reserves the right to acquire at least 20-35 percent ownership in any large-scale mine. By law, the Ministry of Trade and Industry is instructed to screen foreign investments in a routine, nondiscriminatory manner to ensure consistency with national interests. Cabinet approved Lesotho’s investment policy and it became law in early 2016. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development assisted with the development of the policy. (UNCTAD) http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=503 The government has undertaken investment policy reviews in 2020 with the assistance of UNCTAD. In 2016, the government launched a “One Stop Business Facilitation Centre” (OBFC), to make it easier to do business and facilitate FDI. OBFC places all services required for the issuance of licenses, permits, and imports and exports clearances under one roof. The portal provides transparency and predictability to trade transactions and reduces the time and cost of trading across borders. The OBFC web site is http://www.obfc.org.ls/business/default.php . The process of company registration includes: a work permit application with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, a visa application and resident permit with the Ministry of Home Affairs, a trader’s license with the Ministry of Trade and Industry, tax clearance with Lesotho Revenue Authority, a police clearance with the Ministry of Police and Public Safety, the Certificate of Occupancy with Maseru City Council and a medical clearance with the Ministry of Health. In November 2020, the OBFC held a twin launch of e-Regulations and e-Licensing. The e-Regulations provides a clear step by step process to register a business. This also stipulates requirements, costs, time and contact details for registering a business. The e-Licensing allows foreign investors to apply online for obtaining a business license. This initiative has reduced instances of fraud and manipulation. It takes a maximum of 3 days to issue both industrial and traders licenses. For more information on e -licenses, please visit: www.Lesotho.elicenses.org . For more information on e-regulations please visit: http://www.lesotho.eregulations.org . Lesotho provides incentives to investors who export outside the country. Export manufacturers obtain a full rebate of customs duty paid on their inputs imported to produce for markets outside Southern African Customs Union (SACU). The government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. The government facilitates quality standard processes and export permits for outward investment. For AGOA exports, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, LNDC, and Lesotho Revenue Authority provide support including on export requirements. Other agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development Southern Africa Trade Hub provide capacity to the government for the implementation of AGOA. The government has assigned Lesotho Standards Authority to assist investors who export to the Republic of South Africa (RSA). 3. Legal Regime Regulatory enforcement is generally weak and has moderate impact by hindering competition and distorting business and investment practices. The legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. The accounting systems for companies are regulated by the Companies Act of 2011 and Financial Institutions of 2012. International Financial Reporting System (IFRS) is the current financial system used by companies. Rule-making and regulatory mechanisms exist at the local, national, and supra-national levels although the most relevant for foreign investors is the national level. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by the private sector or non-governmental organizations. There are no private sector or government efforts to restrict foreign participation in consortia or organizations that set industry standards. Lesotho has a centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published. However, the website is poorly maintained and rarely updated — https://lesotholii.org/ The government printing office also publishes government gazettes which can be purchased by the public. Businesses in Lesotho are regulated by the Companies Act of 2011. The issuance of traders’ licenses is governed by the Trading Enterprises Order of 1993, as amended in 1996, and the Trading Enterprises Regulations of 1999, as amended in 2011, as well as the Business Licensing and Registration Act of 2019. Trading licenses are required for a wide range of services; some enterprises can require up to four licenses for one location. Manufacturing licenses are covered by the Industrial Licensing Act of 1969 and the Pioneer Industries Encouragement Act of 1969. For most manufacturing license applications, environmental certificates issued by the National Environmental Secretariat (NES) are sufficient. Where manufacturing activities are assumed to have actual or potential environmental impacts, however, an Environmental Impact Assessment is required, which must be approved by the NES. The introduction of the OBFC improved the industrial and trading license system. The OBFC has also streamlined other bureaucratic procedures, including those for licenses and permits. The GOKL modernized the regulatory framework for utilities through the establishment of the independent Lesotho Communications Authority (LCA), which regulates the telecommunications sector, and the Lesotho Electricity and Water Authority (LEWA), which regulates the energy and water sectors. The two authorities set the conditions for entry of new competitive operators. The LEWA allows both the Lesotho Electricity Company and the Water and Sewerage Company to maintain monopolies in their respective sectors. The Mines and Minerals Act of 2005, the Precious Stones Order (1970), and the Mine Safety Act (1981) provide a regulatory framework for the mining industry. The Commissioner of Mines in the Ministry of Mines, supported by the Mining Board, is authorized to issue mineral rights to both foreigners and local investors. On approval, it takes about a month for both prospecting and mining licenses to be issued. Under the Financial Institutions Act of 2012 the Central Bank of Lesotho (CBL) regulates financial services. Tourism enterprises are required to secure licenses under the Accommodation, Catering and Tourism Enterprise Act of 1997. The Act provides for a Tourism Licensing Board that issues and renews licenses for camp sites, hotels, lodges, restaurants, self-catering establishments, bed and breakfasts, youth hostels, resorts, motels, catering, and guest houses. Applicants for any of the above licenses must apply to the Board three months before its next meeting. Several government departments, specifically the Ministries of Health and Tourism, the police and, when the property is in Maseru, the Maseru City Council, must inspect properties and submit inspection reports to the Board on prescribed forms. Licenses are granted for one year and can be renewed. Parliamentary committees may, but are not required to, publish proposed laws and regulations in draft form for public comment. Parliament may also hold public gatherings to explain the contents of the proposed laws, and these provide opportunities for comment on proposed laws and regulations. The committees generally hold such consultations for laws that are perceived to be sensitive, such as: The Land Act, the Penal Code, and the Children’s Welfare and Protection Act. Regulations are developed to enforce the law, to implement objectives of legal frameworks, and to ensure compliance. The following steps are followed when regulations are developed: The initiating ministry or agency writes a cabinet memo reflecting objectives and benefits of the regulations. The cabinet memo is then widely circulated to relevant stakeholders to reflect how the regulations will impact them and to seek concurrence. The initiating agency then makes a cabinet presentation to seek cabinet approval to draft the regulations. The initiating agency drafts regulations and holds meetings with relevant stakeholders to obtain their input. The initiating ministry or agency holds workshops with relevant stakeholders to validate regulations. Draft regulations are submitted to the Attorney General for certification. A Parliamentary presentation is held and updates to the draft are made. A presentation to the Senate is held and updates of the regulations are made. Parliament tables the regulations, and a provision of royal ascent is made by His Majesty King Letsie III. The regulations are published, and the public is given a period of 14 days to review the regulations after which their comments are incorporated, and the regulations are finalized and gazetted. The last step is to sensitize the public on the new regulations. Information on debt obligations is publicly available, including online. The government produces an Annual Public Debt Bulletin, which covers debt management operations, debt portfolio, debt service, and loan guarantees. The government also publishes a Medium-Term Debt Strategy paper. More information is available at: www.finance.gov.ls/ Lesotho is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). SACU strives to promote integration of Member States into the global economy through enhanced trade and investment. SADC aspires to deepen regional integration and sustainable development. Lesotho’s products enjoy duty free access to SADC countries, which has a total population of 277 million. For more information about SADC, visit: www.sadc.int In January 2021, the GOKL ratified the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement. The main objective of the AfCTA is to create a single continental market for goods and services, with free movement of businesspersons and investments. The agreement has been signed by 54 out 55 countries. To date, 35 countries have ratified the agreement. The agreement would provide a market access of over 1 billion people to Lesotho’s products with a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) estimated at $3.4 trillion. Lesotho is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Lesotho’s regulatory systems are independent and not intertwined with regional regulations. In cases where there are gaps with national regulations, the country uses regional regulations to close them. The government does not reference or incorporate U.S. or another country’s regulatory systems. The government notifies all agreements of Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). More information is located at: https://www.tfadatabase.org/members/lesotho The legal system in Lesotho is based on Roman–Dutch Law and English Common Law, combined with precolonial Customary Law. The judicial system is made up of the High Court, the Court of Appeal, subordinate courts, and the Judicial Service Commission (JSC). There is no trial by jury, instead, judges make rulings alone. There are magistrates’ courts in each of the 10 districts, and more than 70 central and local courts. With U.S. support, a Commercial Court was established in 2010 to improve the country’s capacity in resolving commercial cases though backlogs continue to delay processing times. Foreign investors have equal treatment before the courts in disputes with national parties or the government. The SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment enables investors to refer a dispute with the State to international arbitration if domestic remedies have been exhausted. Lesotho is a signatory of the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID) and also accepts ad hoc arbitration. Lesotho is a member of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, and the Arbitration International Investment Disputes Act of 1974 commits Lesotho to accept binding international arbitration of investment disputes. Lesotho does not have any investment laws. The overarching FDI policy is the 2015 National Investment Policy of Lesotho, produced with the assistance of UNCTAD. The Companies Act of 2011 and the Financial Institutions Act of 2012, are the principal laws that regulate incoming foreign investment through acquisitions, mergers, takeovers, purchases of securities and other financial contracts and greenfield investments. The investment treaties also govern conduct toward the entry of foreign investment. In 2021 there were no major cases relating to foreign investment and the 2021 judgments are available at: https://lesotholii.org/courtnames/high-court/202 The OBFC hosts the Lesotho Trade Information Portal, a single online authoritative source of all laws, regulations, and procedures for importing and exporting. The OBFC web site is:HYPERLINK hError! Hyperlink reference not valid. http://www.obfc.org.ls/business/default.php. The OBFC portal provides information on company registration and export and import regulations as well as information and links to key laws and 23 ministries. The government has produced but not yet passed a draft competition bill to improve the regulation of investments. Its goal is to “provide the legal basis for undistorted competition and thus contribute to transparency and predictability in domestic markets.” The are no agencies established to review transactions for competition-related concerns. However, various government sectors deal with competition-related issues through use of available institutional guidelines and procedures. These include the Commercial Court, the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Small Business. The government is also in the process of drafting a consumer protection bill. The constitution provides that the acquisition of private property by the state can only occur for specified public purposes. The processes that are followed during expropriation follow the Land Act of 2010. These include consultations between government/authority and claimant, consultation with the chief, demarcation and survey of the area, publishing a gazette for public notification and information and provision of compensation equal to fair market value of the property. In cases of expropriation where claimants allege a lack of due process, the affected persons may appeal to the High Court as to whether the action is legal and compensation is adequate. The constitution is silent on whether compensation may be paid abroad in the case of a non-resident; such an additional provision would usually be contained in a foreign investment law. The government has no history of discriminating against U.S. or other foreign investments, companies, or representatives in expropriation. The only local ownership law is the Trading Enterprises Act. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Lesotho is a member of the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. There is no specific domestic legislation providing for enforcement of awards under the ICSID Convention. Investor-State Dispute Settlement The government is a signatory to a treaty in which binding international arbitration of investment disputes is recognized. Lesotho has no Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States. The government has little history of investment disputes involving U.S. or other foreign investors or contractors in Lesotho. Foreign investors have full and equal recourse to the Lesotho courts for commercial and labor disputes. Courts are regarded as fair and impartial in cases involving foreign investors. There is no history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Lesotho readily accepts binding international arbitration of investment disputes. Lesotho has entered into a number of bilateral investment agreements that provide for international arbitration. However, Lesotho does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States. The government stands ready to accept and enforce foreign arbitral awards and judgements if they meet the requirements of domestic law (there have been no such awards to date). The Companies Act is the principal commercial and bankruptcy law in Lesotho. According to the law, creditors, equity shareholders, and holders of other financial contracts of a bankrupt company have a right to nominate a person to be a liquidator, however, if there are any disagreements, the person nominated by the creditors shall be the liquidator. All claims against a bankrupt company shall be proved at a meeting of creditors and equity shareholders. If the claim is rejected by the liquidator, the claimant may apply to the court by motion to set aside the rejection. Creditors who will act as witnesses are entitled to witness fees. In a bankruptcy, workers are paid first, then creditors, equity shareholders and holders of other financial contracts are paid. Monetary judgments are usually made in the local currency. 6. Financial Sector Through the Central Bank of Lesotho (CBL), the GOKL promotes the development of financial markets in Lesotho. Lesotho’s capital market is relatively underdeveloped, with no secondary market for capital market transactions. The Maseru Securities Market launched in 2016 under the wing of the CBL listed the first company on its stock exchange. The trading of government bonds; corporate bonds and company shares is strictly electronic— there is no physical building. For now, bond trading is operated by the Central Bank of Lesotho. For the 2021/22 fiscal year, the government financed a fiscal deficit of approximately USD 326 million through external borrowing. The government accepted the obligations of IMF Article VIII in 1997 and has removed restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions. However, the government has put a limit of USD 81,632 for international transactions. Foreign participation in government securities is allowed as long as foreign investors can open accounts with local banks through which funds can be collected. Lesotho is part of the Common Monetary Area (CMA). The current account has been fully liberalized for all inward and outward cross-border transactions. Transactions, however, over USD 272,108 for individuals and USD 34.0 million for businesses still need approval from the Central Bank. A Central Bank Report reflected that private sector credit from the banking sector increased by 0.7 percent in November 2020 while a decline of 0.02 percent was registered in December 2020. On a year-to-year basis, credit rose by 0.01 percent. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors are able to get credit on the local market. Interest rates are quite high by global standards. LNDC does not provide credit to foreign investors but can acquire equity in foreign companies investing in strategic economic sectors. The private sector has access to a limited number of credit instruments, such as credit cards, loans, overdrafts, checks, and letters of credit. In January 2016, Lesotho’s first credit bureau was launched and has been functional. In July 2020, the parliament passed the Secured Interest in Movable Property Act to allow movable property to be considered as collateral in requesting for credit from commercial banks. Lesotho has a central bank and four commercial banks, including subsidiaries of South African banks (subject to measures and regulations under the Institutions Act of 2012) and the government-owned Lesotho Post Bank. Commercial banks in Lesotho are well-capitalized, liquid, and compliant with international banking standards; however, interest rates are high by global standards. Three South African banks account for almost 92.5 percent of the country’s banking assets, which totaled over M21.6 billion (USD 1.5billion) by December 2021. The share of bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans was approximately 4 percent in December 2021. Foreigners are allowed to establish a bank account and may hold foreign currency accounts in local banks; however, they are required to provide a residence permit as a precondition for opening a bank account to comply with the “know your customer” requirements. The country did not lose correspondent banking relationships in the past three years. Currently there are no banking relationships in jeopardy. Foreign Exchange The Lesotho loti is pegged to the South African rand. The currency fluctuates according to market forces. There are restrictions on converting or transferring funds associated with an investment into a freely usable currency and at a legal market-clearing rate. Funds can only be converted into the world’s widely recognized currencies such as the U.S. dollar, British Pound, and the Euro. Incoming funds can be converted into the local currency if the investor does not have the Customer Foreign Currency (CFC) account. If the investor has a CFC account, such funds can remain foreign in that account without any obligation to convert to Maloti. Remittance Policies According to the CBL, there are no plans to change remittance policies. The current average delay period for remitting investment returns such as dividends, return of capital, interest and principal on private foreign debt, lease payments, royalties, and management fees through normal legal channels is 30 days, provided the investor has submitted all the necessary documentation related to the remittance. There has never been a case of blockage of such transfers, and shortages of forex that could lead to blockage are unlikely given that the CBL maintains net international reserves at a target of 4.3 months of import cover. Payments of royalties should seek approval from the Central Bank. Export proceeds should be repatriated into the country within the period of six months (180 days). There is no sovereign wealth fund or asset management bureau in Lesotho. 10. Political and Security Environment Since 2012, Lesotho has been governed through coalition governments which did not last beyond three years resulting in snap elections. In April 2020, the National Assembly passed the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution which curtailed the Prime Minister’s power to call snap elections. (Note: The constitution states that elections should be held every five years and the next elections are scheduled for October 2022. End Note.) The impulsion of the main political party in the current coalition has left the National Assembly increasingly polarized, and the political environment is very unpredictable. On May 14, 2021, textiles factory workers country-wide engaged on a massive violent protest which claimed two lives. They blocked roads and vandalized the buildings to put pressure on the government to publish 2020 and 2021 gazettes. The workers requested wages to be increased by 20 percent while employers offered to provide an increase between 3 and 5 percent. On June 7, the workers ended their three weeks protest following Lesotho Textile Exporter’s Association (LTEA) letter of June 4 to the trade unions which warned workers would be dismissed for participating in an illegal protest. On June 16, the government published a gazette on minimum wage increase reflecting 14 percent increment for the textiles workers and 9 percent for other private sector workers for the 2021/22 financial year. The increment was implemented with effect on July 1. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2019 $2,486 2020 $1,880 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 $1,430 2020 $3 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2018 32.7 2020 19.9 UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Central Bank of Lesotho Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Liberia Executive Summary Liberia offers opportunities for investment, especially in natural resources such as mining, agriculture, fishing, and forestry, but also in more specialized sectors such as energy, telecommunications, tourism, and financial services. The economy, which was severely damaged by more than a decade of civil wars that ended in 2003, has been slowly recovering, but Liberia has yet to attain pre-war levels of development. Liberia’s largely commodities-based economy relies heavily on imports even for most basic needs like fuel, clothing, and rice – Liberia’s most important staple food. The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted many sectors of the economy, which contracted in 2019 and 2020. However, the World Bank and IMF expect per capita GDP to return to pre-COVID-19 levels by 2023. Growth will be driven mainly by the mining sector, although structural reforms are also expected to increase activity in agriculture and construction. Low human development indicators, expensive and unreliable electricity, poor roads, a lack of reliable internet access (especially outside urban areas), and pervasive government corruption constrain investment and development. Most of Liberia lacks reliable power, although efforts to expand access to the electricity grid are ongoing through an extension from the Mount Coffee Hydropower Plant, connection to the West Africa Power Pool, and other internationally supported energy projects. Public perception of corruption in the public sector is high, as indicated by Liberia’s poor showing in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index, where Liberia ranked 136 out of 180 countries. Low public trust in the banking sector and seasonal currency shortages result in most cash being held outside of banks. To remedy this, the Central Bank of Liberia (CBL) in 2021 initiated a plan to print and circulate additional currency. The new printing and minting will provide 48 billion Liberian dollars through 2024. The CBL and commercial banks have also successfully pushed the adoption of mobile money, which Liberians access through their mobile phones to make everyday purchases and pay bills. However, the government has yet to activate the “national switch,” meaning banking instruments like ATMs and mobile money accounts remain unintegrated and are not interoperable. The government-backed Business Climate Working Group (BCWG) works with public and private sector stakeholders to explore how to create a friendlier business environment. International donors also work with the government to improve the investment climate, which ranks toward the global bottom by most global measures. Despite these numerous challenges, Liberia is rich in natural resources. It has large expanses of potentially productive agricultural land and abundant rainfall to sustain agribusinesses. Its rich mineral resources offer significant potential to investors in extractive industries. Several large international concessionaires have invested successfully in agriculture and mining, though negotiating these agreements with the government often proves to be a lengthy and byzantine struggle. The fishing industry, long dormant compared to pre-war levels, is making improvements that should make it more attractive for investment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 136 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in Liberia ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 -$94 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $570 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Liberia describes the country as “open for business” and supports programs and initiatives to foster commerce, including an ad hoc Business Climate Working Group (BCWG) to improve the investment climate. During Liberia’s National Judicial Conference in June 2021, President George Weah called on the Judiciary to partner with agencies on reforms to improve the investment climate. The BCWG, chaired by the Minister of Finance and Development Planning, collaborates with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry , Liberia Business Registry (LBR) , National Investment Commission (NIC) , and Liberia Revenue Authority (LRA) . The National Investment Commission (NIC) is Liberia’s investment promotion agency. It develops investment strategies, policies, and programs to attract foreign investment and negotiates investment contracts and concessions. The NIC oversees the implementation of Liberia’s 2010 Investment Act and chairs an ad hoc Inter-Ministerial Concession Committee (IMCC). In 2021, the NIC became a member of the World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) See link ( https://waipa.org/members/ ). It also participates in the African Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) Forum. In practice, however, the government does much to discourage investors and investment. Some business leaders report it is difficult even to meet with government representatives to discuss new investment or policies damaging to the business climate. A weak legal and regulatory framework, lack of transparency in contract awards, and widespread corruption inhibit foreign direct investment. Investors are often treated as opportunities for graft, and government decisions affecting the business sector are driven more by political cronyism than investment climate considerations. Many businesses find it easy to operate illegally if the right political interests are being paid, whereas those that try to follow the rules receive little if any assistance from government agencies. The Investment Act restricts market access for foreign investors, including U.S. investors, in certain economic sectors or industries. See “Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Foreign Ownership and Establishment” below for more detail. Foreign and domestic private entities may own and establish business enterprises in many sectors. The Liberian constitution restricts land ownership to citizens, but non-Liberians may hold long-term leases to land. Examples are rubber, oil palm, and logging concessions that cover a quarter of Liberia’s total land mass. See Real Property, below, for further details. The National Investment Commission is the oversight agency to screen and monitor investments. The Investment Act and Revenue Code mandate that only Liberian citizens may operate businesses in the following sectors and industries, but it is not clear to what degree this mandate is enforced: Supply of sand Block making Peddling Travel agencies Retail sale of rice and cement Ice making and sale of ice Tire repair shops Auto repair shops with an investment of less than USD 550,000 Shoe repair shops Retail sale of timber and planks Operation of gas stations Video clubs Operation of taxis Importation or sale of second-hand or used clothing Distribution in Liberia of locally manufactured products Importation and sale of used cars (except authorized dealerships, which may deal in certified used vehicles of their make) The Investment Act also sets minimum capital investment thresholds for foreign investors in other business activities, industries, and enterprises. (See Section 16 of the Act: http://www.moci.gov.lr/doc/TheInvestmentActof2010(1).pdf .) For enterprises owned exclusively by non-Liberians, the Act requires at least USD 500,000 in investment capital. For foreign investors partnering with Liberians, the Act requires at least USD 300,000 in total capital investment and at least 25 percent aggregate Liberian ownership. All businesses must register with the Liberia Business Registry (LBR) to conduct business or provide services in Liberia. Investment contracts, such as concessions, are reviewed by the Inter-Ministerial Concessions Committee (IMCC). Concessions are ratified by the national legislature and approved by the president. Businesses register with the Liberia Revenue Authority (LRA) for taxes and the National Social Security and Welfare Corporation (NASSCORP) for social security. It is possible for foreign companies to obtain investment incentives through the National Investment Commission. In 2021, two companies, Mano Manufacturing Company and Jetty Rubber LLC, received long-term investment incentives, according to NIC’s 2021 Annual Report. Foreign companies must use local counsel when establishing a subsidiary. If the subsidiary will engage in manufacturing and international trade, it must obtain a trade license from the LBR. For more information about investment laws, bilateral investment treaties, and other treaties with investment provisions, see: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/country-navigator/121/liberia . Liberia is a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting and a party to the Inclusive Framework’s October 2021 deal on the two-pillar solution to global tax challenges, including a global minimum corporate tax. The government neither promotes nor incentivizes outward investment but it does not restrict Liberian citizens from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Companies are required to adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) consistent with international norms. In many instances, however, authorities do not consistently enforce or apply national laws and international standards. Furthermore, no systematic oversight or enforcement mechanisms exist to ensure government authorities correctly follow administrative rules. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are often not transparent. The government does not require environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate transparency or help investors and consumers distinguish between high-and low-quality investments. Liberia passed a Freedom of Information Law in 2010 requiring government agencies to appoint a public information officer and make records available to the public, but access to government records is often difficult or impossible. Some government ministries and agencies have overlapping responsibilities, resulting in inconsistent application of laws. Government agencies are not legally required to disclose regulations before or after enactment and there is no requirement for public comment, although finalized regulations are often published. No central clearinghouse exists to access proposed regulations. Government finances, including revenues and debt obligations, are partially captured in national budgets, but are not fully transparent. Some budget documents are accessible online. For more information on regulatory transparency, see: https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/liberia . Liberia is a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Mano River Union (MRU) . The Liberia Revenue Authority (LRA) is standardizing the country’s customs and tariff systems and harmonizing its tax regime with the ECOWAS Common External Tariff . Liberia is a member of the World Trade Organization. Liberia’s legal system uses common law alongside local customary law. The common law-based court system operates in parallel with local customary law, which incorporates unwritten, indigenous practices, culture, and traditions. Adjudication under these dual systems often results in conflicting decisions between entities based in Monrovia and communities outside of Monrovia, as well as within communities. The Commercial Court hears commercial and contractual issues, including debt disputes of USD 15,000 and above. In theory, the Commercial Court presides over all financial, contractual, and commercial disputes, serving as an additional avenue to expedite commercial and contractual cases. Under the Liberian constitution, the judicial branch is independent from the executive, but reports regularly indicate that the executive branch frequently interferes in both judicial and legislative matters. Cases can be subject to extensive delays and procedural and other errors, and investors have questioned the fairness and reliability of judicial decisions. There are widespread reports that court officials solicit bribes to act on cases. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable, and appeals are adjudicated in the Supreme Court . The high volume of appeals is a significant burden on the court’s five judges and often results in long delays. Laws guiding foreign investment include the Investment Act of 2010 , the Revenue Code , the Public Procurement and Concessions Act , and the National Competitive Bidding Regulation . No major laws or judicial decisions pertaining to foreign direct investment have come out in the past year. The government does not maintain a “one-stop-shop” website for investment laws, rules, procedures, or reporting requirements. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) reviews domestic and international trade transactions for competition-related concerns. If the MOCI cannot resolve the issue or it requires investigation, it may be referred to the Department of Economic Affairs at the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). The MOJ refers potential violations of civil or criminal law to the court system, including the Commercial Court. There were no significant competition cases during the review period. Liberia does not have anti-trust laws. The Liberian Constitution permits the government to expropriate property for “national security issues or where the public health and safety are endangered, or for any other public purposes.” The government must pay just compensation and landowners may challenge the expropriation in court. When property taken for a purpose is no longer used for that purpose, the former owner has the right of first refusal to reacquire the property. The 2010 Investment Act further defines the circumstances under which the government can legally expropriate property and includes protections for foreign enterprises against expropriation or nationalization. Liberia is a signatory to the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) Convention. 6. Financial Sector The government welcomes foreign investment, but Liberia’s capital market is highly underdeveloped. Private investors have limited credit and investment options. The country does not have a domestic stock market and does not have an effective system to encourage portfolio investments. In 2019, Liberia committed to non-discriminatory foreign exchange auctions consistent with its obligations under IMF Article VIII , and the country does not restrict international payments and transfers. Commercial credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors can get credit on the local market. Many foreign investors prefer to obtain credit from foreign banks. The country’s financial sector regulatory authority is the Central Bank of Liberia . Foreign banks or branches can establish operations in Liberia subject to the CBL’s regulations. There are 10 commercial banks. Most are foreign-owned with branch outlets in the country. Non-bank financial institutions also provide diverse financial services. These include a development finance company, a deposit-taking microfinance institution, numerous non-deposit-taking microfinance institutions, rural community finance institutions, money remittance entities, foreign exchange bureaus, credit unions, and village savings and loans associations. However, chronic liquidity shortages, especially of Liberian dollars in recent years, have undermined confidence in banks. The CBL’s 2021 third-quarter report described the banking industry as “relatively stable” based on indicators such as total assets, deposits, loans, and total capital. As of November 2021, the capital adequacy ratio of 27.47 was well above the 10% regulatory minimum, and the liquidity ratio was 44.17, above the 15% regulatory minimum. Although the banking sector is sufficiently capitalized, it is not well positioned to withstand shocks. The sector’s primary weaknesses include a high number of non-performing loans (21% in November 2021), low profitability due to high operating expenses, periodic cash shortages for depositors, low public confidence, and inadequate policing and prosecution of money laundering and other financial crimes. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account. The Government of Liberia does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) or similar entity. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Liberia has approximately 20 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which are governed by boards of directors and management teams overseen by government ministries. All are wholly government-owned and semi-autonomous. The president of Liberia appoints board members and directors or managers to govern and run SOEs. The Public Financial Management (PFM) Act defines the requirements for SOEs. SOEs employ more than 10,000 people in sea and airport services, electricity supply, oil and gas, water and sewage, agriculture, forestry, maritime, petroleum importation and storage, and information and communication technology services. Not all SOEs are profitable, and some citizens and advocacy groups have called for SOEs to be dissolved or privatized. Liberia does not have a clearly defined corporate code for SOEs. Reportedly, high-level officials, including some who sit on SOE boards, influence government-owned enterprises to conduct business in ways not consistent with standard corporate governance. Not all SOEs pay taxes, or do so transparently, and SOE revenue is not always transparently reported or adequately reflected in national budgets. In 2016 Liberia’s Ministry of Education initiated a school privatization program that, as of the 2021-22 school year, had privatized 525 schools. Operation of the schools was outsourced to domestic and foreign for-profit and nonprofit education providers and NGOs. There have been numerous calls from political leaders and government officials to privatize government-owned enterprises, including the Liberia Electricity Corporation, the Liberia Water & Sewer Corporation, and Liberia Petroleum Refining Company, but the government does not have an official privatization program. 10. Political and Security Environment President Weah’s inauguration in January 2018 marked the first peaceful transfer of power in Liberia from one democratically elected president to another since 1944. International and domestic observers have said midterm senatorial and special elections since then have been largely peaceful, although there were reported instances of vote tempering, election violence, intimidation, and harassment of female candidates. Liberia’s relatively free media landscape has led to vigorous pursuit of civil liberties, resulting in active, often acrimonious political debates, and organized, non-violent demonstrations. Liberia adopted a press freedom law in 2019, but there have been reports and instances of violence and harassment against the media and journalists. Numerous radio stations and newspapers distribute news throughout the country. The government has identified land disputes and high rates of youth and urban unemployment as potential threats to security, peace, and political stability. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), a peacekeeping force, withdrew from Liberia in March 2018 and turned over responsibility for security to the government. Protests and demonstrations may occur with little warning. The Armed Forces of Liberia and law enforcement agencies, including the Liberia National Police (LNP) , Liberia Immigration Service (LIS) , and Liberia Drug Enforcement Agency (LDEA) , maintain security in the country. There are also many private security firms. Most security personnel are in the capital city Monrovia and other urban areas. The effectiveness of soldiers and police is limited by lack of money and poor infrastructure. Libya Executive Summary Libya presents a challenging investment climate. Reconstruction needs, severely underserved consumer demand, and abundant natural resources provide many opportunities for domestic and foreign investors, and the Government of National Unity (GNU), which took office in March 2021, has expressed a strong desire to receive greater foreign investment and partner with foreign companies. Nonetheless, the country’s prospects for foreign investment continue to be hampered by security risks posed by the presence of non-state militias, foreign mercenaries, and extremist and terrorist groups, and opaque bureaucracy, onerous regulations, and widespread rent-seeking activity in public administration. The Libyan government has a long history of not honoring contracts and payments, and several U.S. firms continue to be owed back payments for work done before and after the 2011 revolution. The sectors that have historically attracted the most significant investment into Libya are oil and gas, electricity, and infrastructure. Following years of civil conflict, Libya’s warring parties signed a ceasefire in October 2020 that paved the way for a United Nations-facilitated political process that resulted in the country’s first unified national government since 2014. The GNU is an interim government charged with leading the country toward national elections that were scheduled for December 2021, but ultimately postponed. Since the postponement of elections Libya has entered a new period of political uncertainty that has slowed down any attempts to improve the business climate. Libya holds Africa’s largest (and the world’s ninth largest) proven oil reserves and Africa’s fifth largest gas reserves. Most government revenues derive from the sale of crude oil. Libya’s oil production has been making a gradual recovery from repeated attacks on oil infrastructure by ISIS-Libya and other armed groups in 2016 and a nine-month forced shutdown in 2020 due to the civil conflict. Production has reached 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd) as of March 2022. Technocrats heading the NOC, an independent, apolitical institution, continue to lay the groundwork for the long-term development and stabilization of the energy sector. The Ministry of Oil and Gas has attempted to exert political control over the NOC, at times complicating matters for companies working in the sector. The Privatization and Investment Board (PIB), supervised by the Ministry of Economy, is the primary governmental body for encouraging private foreign investment in Libya.The Investment Law of 2010 provides the primary legal framework for foreign investment promotion. Passed prior to the 2011 revolution that toppled the Qadhafi regime, the law lifted many FDI restrictions and provided a series of incentives to encourage private investment. No significant laws related to investment have been passed since the revolution. No pandemic- or green-related measures have been instituted that can affect the investment climate. Perceived corruption is deeply embedded in Libya and is widespread at all levels of public administration. The lack of transparency or accountability mechanisms in the management of oil reserves and revenues, the issuance of government contracts, and the enforcement of often ambiguous regulations continue to provide government officials with substantial opportunities for rent-seeking activities. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 172 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country (USD Millions, historical stock positions) 2020 341 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita (in USD PPP) 2020 11,250 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Libyan government’s efforts to attract FDI, primarily through the PIB and NOC, are relatively recent. Until the 1990s, FDI was only permitted in the oil sector through sovereign contracts to which the state was a party. A number of foreign investment laws were passed in subsequent years to encourage and regulate FDI, culminating in “Law No. 9 of the year 1378 PD (2010) Regarding Investment Promotion” (known as the 2010 Investment Law). Though promulgated prior to Libya’s 2011 revolution, the law remains in effect. This new law lifted many FDI restrictions and provided a series of incentives to qualifying investments, such as tax and customs exemptions on equipment, a five-year income tax exemption, a tax exemption on reinvested profits and exemptions on production tax expert fees for goods produced for export markets. It also allowed for investors to transfer net profits overseas, defer losses to future years, import necessary goods, and hire foreign labor if local labor was unavailable. Foreign workers may acquire residency permits and entry reentry visas for five years and transfer earnings overseas. The law regulates the establishment of foreign-owned companies and the setting up of branches in representative offices. Branches are allowed to be opened in a large number of sectors, including: construction for contracts over LYD 50 million; electricity works; oil exploration; drilling and installation projects; telecommunications construction and installation; industry; surveying and planning; installation and maintenance of medical machines and equipment; and hospital management. However, the investment law restricts full foreign ownership of investment projects to projects worth over LYD 5 million, except in the case of limited liability companies, and requires 30 percent of workers to be Libyan nationals and to receive training. Foreign investors are prevented from owning land or property in Libya and are allowed only the temporary leasing of real estate. Investment in “strategic industries” – in particular, Libya’s upstream oil and gas sector, which is controlled by the NOC – requires a foreign entity to enter into a joint venture with a Libyan firm that will retain a majority stake in the enterprise. It is not clearly defined which industries other than upstream oil and gas may be considered strategic. The most important investment promotion institution Libya is the PIB, established in 2009 to assume responsibility for the Libyan privatization program and oversee and regulate FDI activities. The PIB’s screening process for incoming FDI to Libya is not clearly defined; the bidding criteria and process for investment are not published or transparent, and it is therefore not clear whether foreign investors have faced discrimination. The PIB states that it reviews bids or proposals for general consistency with Libya’s national security, sovereignty, and economic interest. The Minister of Economy must give final approval to all FDI projects, at the recommendation of the PIB. There is no information available on the timeline of the approval process or any potential outcomes of the process other than an affirmative or negative decision by the PIB or Minister of Economy. The PIB maintains that it keeps all company information confidential. U.S. firms have repeatedly expressed frustration about the slow pace by which the Libyan government makes business-related decisions. Despite these complaints, some U.S. firms have successfully invested in Libya, particularly in the country’s oil and gas sector. The ownership of real estate in Libya is restricted to Libyan nationals and wholly-owned Libyan companies. The 2010 Investment Law permits the ownership of real estate in Libya by locally established project vehicles of foreign investors. However, such ownership is limited to leasehold ownership only. Foreign investors are allowed lease property from public holdings and private Libyan citizens, according to Article 17 of the 2010 Investment Law. There is considerable ambiguity in both the public and private rental markets; many aspects of these arrangements are left to local officials. Libya has not undergone any recent investment policy reviews by the OECD, UNCTAD, WTO, or any other international body. Civil society groups have not expressed nor provided any useful reviews of investment policy-related concerns. However, in July 2021, the UN-sponsored audit of the CBL was released to the stakeholders; the audit did include a number of top-level recommendations such as. Please refer to Section 6: Financial Sector – Money and Banking System for more details. Moreover, the Libya Investment Authority is currently being audited by an international accounting firm. Business registration procedures in Libya are lengthy and complex. The Ministry of Economy is the main institution for processing business registration requirements. The Libyan government does not maintain an online information portal on regulations for new business registration or online registration functionality for registering a new business. There are multiple corporate structures based on the type of business undertaken (e.g. limited liability, joint venture, branch office) and each has specific registration requirements. Some requirements apply to all businesses, including: obtaining a Commercial Register certificate, registering with the Chamber of Commerce and the tax and labor departments, and obtaining a working license. If a company will be importing items, a statistical code will be required. If the company will be obtaining letters of credit in Libya, a Central Bank code will be required. A specialized agent must complete these tasks on behalf of the registering company. For the simplest corporate structure (limited liability with no Central Bank code) the process can take two to three months if the registration agent is familiar with the procedures. Libya is a member of the Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investment and Export Credit, which provides investment and export credit insurance for entities in member states. FDI outflows in 2020 were USD 205 million, compared to USD 2.7 billion in 2010. The Libyan government does not formally promote or incentivize outward investment. Stress in the banking sector has reduced liquidity, and this has negatively affected the ability of Libyan citizens to acquire the hard currency to invest abroad. The advent of a unified exchange rate in January 2021 has, however, facilitated international flow to a certain degree. 3. Legal Regime The Libyan regulatory system lacks transparency, and there is a general lack of clarity regarding the function and responsibilities of Libyan government institutions. Transparency International placed Libya 172 out of 180 countries (“1” indicates least corrupt) in its 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index, and Libya ranked 186 out of 190 on the most recent edition of the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’ Index. Libya’s bureaucracy is one of the most opaque and amorphous in the Middle East region; its legal and policy frameworks are similarly difficult to navigate. The issuance of licenses and permits is often delayed for significant periods for unspecified reasons, and the adjudication of these applications is most often done in a subjective and non-transparent fashion. This has created an environment ripe for graft and rent-seeking behavior. Neither ministries nor regulatory agencies publish the text or summary of proposed regulations before their enactment. Accurate, current information about key commercial regulations is difficult to obtain. These factors serve as a deterrent to foreign investment. Libya does not promote or require companies to disclose environmental, social, and governance information in order to promote transparency. Libya scores zero out of five (with five being the best) in the World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance. Libya is not a member of the WTO. The WTO received Libya’s application on June 10, 2004. The General Council established a Working Party on July 27, 2004, but no formal progress on Libya’s application has been made. The 2011 Constitutional Declaration currently functions as the interim constitution. It states Islam is the state religion and sharia is the principal source of legislation. The Libyan civil code begins with a preliminary title containing general dispositions regarding law, sources of law, application of the law, and general dispositions regarding the legal definition of persons as well as the classification of things and property. Thereafter, the code is divided into two parts and four books. The first part addresses obligations or personal rights and contains similarly named subdivisions: Book I (Obligations in General) and Book II (Specific Contracts). The second part of both codes is entitled “Real Rights” and contains Books III (Principal Real Rights) and Book IV (Accessory Real Rights). In the absence of a legal provision, the Libyan civil code requires courts to adjudicate matters “in accordance with the principles of Islamic law.” In the absence of an Islamic rule on a particular matter, the Libyan civil code requires courts to look to “prevailing custom,” and in the absence of any custom, “to the principles of natural law and the rules of equity.” Article 89 of the Libyan Civil Code states that “a contract is created, subject to any special formalities that may be required by law for its conclusion, from the moment that two persons have exchanged concordant intentions.” The Libyan court system consists of three levels: the courts of first instance; the courts of appeals; and the Supreme Court, which is the final appellate level. Libya’s justice system has remained weak throughout the post-revolutionary period, and enforcement of laws remains a challenge for the government. Laws and regulations on investment and property ownership allow domestic and foreign entities to establish business enterprises and engage in remunerative activities. Investment law and commercial law differ in their foreign ownership restrictions for business enterprises. Article 7 of the 2010 Investment Law specifies, in general accordance with standard international practice, conditions a project must fulfill in part or in full in order to qualify as an investment rather than a commercial vehicle. Investment projects that meet the conditions set out in the 2010 Investment Law enjoy a number of benefits, such as relief from income taxes for a set number of years. Further, a foreign investor may wholly own the enterprise if the foreign investment exceeds LYD 5 million. This is reduced to LYD 2 million if a Libyan partner holds at least half of the investment. For investment projects that do not meet the conditions set out in the 2010 Investment Law, these benefits do not apply and Libya’s Commercial Code stipulates no more than 49 percent foreign ownership unless the enterprise is a branch of a foreign company, which the foreign company can then fully own. Chapter 11 of the Libyan Commercial Code deals with the issue of competition and prohibits market abuse. The Commercial Code provides for the establishment of a Competition Committee to be responsible for reviewing complaints and investigating them and, in cases where the law has been violated, referring the cases to public prosecution. There is not an active Competition Committee at the moment, and since these issues are regulated by law and considered violations, interested/damaged parties can pursue legal action directly. Article 23 of the 2010 Investment Law provides an express guarantee against the nationalization, expropriation, forcible seizure, confiscation, imposition of receivership, freeze or subjection of procedures of similar effect, except by virtue of a law or court ruling and fair and equitable indemnity, and provides such procedures be applied indiscriminately. Article 43 of executive regulation No. 449 of 2010 implementing the law reinforces those provisions. The Libyan government’s history of state expropriation of private property, including the assets of foreign companies, most prevalent during the 1980s, had already been in decline before the law’s passage. There have been no reports of nationalizations or expropriations under the current investment law. Libya does not have a separate bankruptcy law, but bankruptcy issues are covered under articles 1012 and 1013 of the 2010 Commercial Code. According to this legislation, bankruptcy proceeds in two phases. The first is preventative reconciliation, during which the debtor attempts to rectify the financial situation of the business through an agreement with creditors under court supervision. The second phase commences in the event of the agreement’s failure, whereby the court intercedes to protect the rights of the creditors through liquidation. Libya is tied for last for ease of resolving insolvency in the World Bank’s most recent ‘Ease of Doing Business’ index. 6. Financial Sector The Libyan government passed a law in 2007 to establish a stock market, primarily to support privatization of SMEs, but it is not well-capitalized, has few listings, and does not have a high volume of trading. Capital markets in Libya are underdeveloped, and the absence of a venture capital industry limits opportunities for SMEs with growth potential and innovative start-ups to access risk financing for their ventures. Libya has been attempting to modernize its banking sector since before the revolution, including through a privatization program that has opened state-owned banks to private shareholders. The Central Bank of Libya (CBL) owns the Libyan Foreign Bank, which operates as an offshore bank, with responsibility for satisfying Libya’s international banking needs (apart from foreign investment). The banking system is governed by Law No. 1 of 2005, as amended by Law No. 46 of 2012 on Islamic banking. In accordance with that amendment, Law No. 1 of 2013 prohibits interest in all civil and commercial transactions. The banking modernization program has also been seeking, among other components, to establish electronic payment systems and expand private foreign exchange facilities. The CBL is responsible for the receipt of all of Libya’s oil revenues, prints Libyan dinars, and controls the country’s foreign exchange reserves. After being effectively divided since 2014 between its eastern and western branches as a result of the civil conflict, the CBL officially began the process of reunification in January 2022. Based on UN-sponsored audit report conducted by an international accounting firm and completed in July 2021, the CBL is seven work streams to incorporate top-level recommendations such as: strengthen financial accountability and transparency, assess process for letters of credit, adopt widely accepted accounting standards for financial reporting, establish effective governance and internal controls, reconcile the two branches’ balance sheets, unify the ledger system of the two branches, and unify organizational structure, operations, resource needs, and plans. The CBL has put in place seven work streams aimed at incorporating these recommendations. The CBL in Tripoli controls access to all foreign currency in Libya, and it provides Libyans access to hard currency by issuing letters of credit (LCs). Access to LCs in Libya has historically been an issue, but in January 2021, the CBL set a single, unified foreign exchange rate (described in the next section). This has increased importers’ access to hard currency at stable levels. The availability of financing on the local market is weak. Libyan banks can only offer limited financial products, loans are often made on the basis of personal connections (rather than business plans), and public bank managers lack clear incentives to expand their portfolios. Lack of financing acts as a brake on Libya’s development, hampering both the completion of existing projects and the start of new ones. This has been particularly damaging in the housing sector, where small-scale projects often languish for lack of steady funding streams. Libya tied for last on the ease of getting credit in most recent edition of the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’ index. Libya boasts 19 commercial banks, the largest of which are majority-owned by the CBL, and four specialized banks. The six largest banks hold 90 percent of the system’s assets and loans, whereas it is estimated that 30 percent of all cash in Libya is not within the formal banking system. In total, the banking system employs 20,000 persons. Libya maintains a sovereign wealth fund called the Libya Investment Authority (LIA). UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) froze many of the LIA’s assets outside Libya. The freeze on the LIA’s assets is intended to preserve Libya’s assets through its post-revolutionary transition for the benefit of all Libyans. An evaluation of the LIA’s assets in 2019 put their value at USD 69 billion. The international community and private consultancies continue to provide technical assistance to the LIA to help it improve its governance, including adherence to the Santiago Principles, a set of 24 widely accepted best practices for the operation of sovereign wealth funds: the LIA is now compliant with 17 of the 24 best practices. The LIA is also currently undergoing an audit by an international auditing firm. The LIA comes under sporadic political pressure to make administrative and human resources changes to favor certain political actors. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Libyan state is responsible for approximately 85 percent of economic activity in the country. On the periphery of the governmental apparatus, state-owned enterprises (SOE) dominate economic life. The largest are the National Oil Company (NOC), the Libyan Post, Telecommunication, and Information Technology Company (LPTIC), and the General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL). The state is also involved in the following sectors: commercial banks, cement, transportation, airlines, construction, and oil and gas. The PIB is responsible for matters related to privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). All enterprises in Libya were previously state-owned. Except for the upstream oil and gas sector, no state-owned enterprise is considered to be efficient. The state is deeply involved in utilities, oil and gas, agriculture, construction, real estate development and manufacturing, and the corporate economy. Libya has gone through three previous phases of privatization, the latest between 2003 and 2008 during which 360 SOEs ranging from small to large in various sectors were either fully or partially privatized or brought in private partners through public-private partnerships. However, restrictions to individual shares and foreign ownership – individual investors’ share of the capital was restricted to 15 percent and local ownership had to be 30 percent – limited interest in the privatization program. Accusations of fraud further discouraged investments. Nonetheless, the food industry, healthcare, construction materials, downstream oil and gas, and education sectors are now partially or fully privatized. Fragile governments and lack of security since 2011 have impeded implementation of further privatization programs. 10. Political and Security Environment There is a significant recent history of politically-motivated damage and seizure by force of economic infrastructure and installations, particularly in the oil and gas industry. Most recently, forces allied with Libyan National Army Commander Haftar forced the near-total shutdown of Libya’s energy sector in January 2020, which was eventually lifted in September 2020. The October 2020 ceasefire and the peaceful transfer of power in March 2021 to a unity government has markedly reduced the civil disturbances that had been a daily occurrence. However, militias also shut down Libya’s largest oil field in December 2021. Moreover, due to the postponement of elections (scheduled for December 2021), the political scene is further complicated by questions regarding the tenure of the current interim prime minister, as the House of Representatives nominated a new interim prime minister in February 2022, who to date has not been able to take power. As a result of this instability, rival armed groups have continued to jockey for control over the country’s political institutions and economic resources, which means that insecurity and instability remains a cause for concern. Lithuania Executive Summary Lithuania is strategically situated at the crossroads of Europe and Eurasia. It offers investors a diversified economy, EU rules and norms, a well-educated multilingual workforce, advanced IT infrastructure and a stable democratic government. The Lithuanian economy has been growing steadily since the 2009 economic crisis but contracted in 2020 due to economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic. However, it recovered relatively rapidly in 2021, reaching 5.1 percent GDP growth thanks to budget surpluses and accumulated financial reserves prior to the crisis, as well as a well-diversified economy. The country joined the Eurozone in January 2015 and completed the accession process for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in May 2018. Lithuania’s income levels are lower than in most of the EU. Based on the average net monthly wage, Lithuania is 23rd of 27 EU member states. According to Bank of Lithuania statistics, at the end of 2021, the United States was Lithuania’s 15th largest investor, with cumulative investments totaling $366 million (1.3 percent of total FDI). The new government elected at the end of 2020 has continued prior governments’ efforts to improve the business climate and lower barriers to investment. In 2013, the government passed legislation which streamlined land-use planning, saving investors both time and money. In July 2017, the government introduced the new Labor Code which is believed to better balance the interests of both employees and employers, and in 2020 it introduced a law on exemption of profit tax for the period of up to 20 years for large and significant investment to the country. The government provides equal treatment to foreign and domestic investors and sets few limitations on their activities. Foreign investors have the right to repatriate or reinvest profits without restriction and can bring disputes to the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. Lithuania offers special incentives, such as tax concessions, to both small companies and strategic investors. Incentives are also available in seven Special Economic Zones located throughout the country. U.S. executives report some burdensome procedures to obtain business and residence permits, and limited instances of low-level corruption in government. Transportation barriers, especially insufficient direct air links with some European cities, remain a hindrance to investment, as does the lack of transparency in government procurement. Lithuania offers many investment opportunities in most of its economy sectors. The sectors which to date attracted most investment include Information and Communication Technology, Biotech, Metal Processing, Machinery and Electrical Equipment, Plastics, Furniture, Wood Processing and Paper Industry, Textiles and Clothing. Lithuania also offers opportunities for investment in the growing sectors of Real Estate and Construction, Business Process Outsourcing (BPO), Shared Services, Financial Technologies, Biotech and Lasers. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 34 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 39 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $182 https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 19,620 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Lithuania’s laws ensure equal protection for both foreign and domestic investors. No special permit is required from government authorities to invest foreign capital in Lithuania. State institutions have no right to interfere with the legal possession of foreign investors’ property. In the event of justified expropriation, investors are entitled to compensation equivalent to the market value of the property expropriated. The law obligates state institutions and officials to keep commercial secrets confidential and requires compensation for any loss or damage caused by illegal disclosure. As a member of European Union, Lithuania is subject to WTO investment requirements. Invest Lithuania is the government’s principal institution dedicated to attracting foreign investment. It serves as a one-stop-shop to: provide information on business costs, labor, tax and legal considerations, and other business concerns; facilitate the set up and launch of a company; provide help in accessing government financial support; and advocate on behalf of investors for more business friendly laws. In addition to its offices in Vilnius and major Lithuanian cities, Invest Lithuania has representative offices in Germany and the United Kingdom. The government is also expanding its network of commercial representatives, with an attaché appointed to serve at the Consulate General in Los Angeles in 2021 and new postings planned for in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Every year the government holds a conference with foreign investors to discuss their concerns and ways to improve investment climate in Lithuania. Foreign investors have the right to repatriate profits, income, or dividends, in cash or otherwise, or to reinvest the same without any limitation, after paying taxes. The law establishes no limits on foreign ownership or control. Foreign investors have free access to all sectors of the economy with some limited exceptions: The Law on Investment prohibits investment of foreign capital in sectors related to the security and defense of the State. The Law on Investment also requires government permission and licensing for commercial activities that may pose risks to human life, health, or the environment, including the manufacturing of, or trade in, weapons. As of 2014, foreign citizens are allowed to buy agricultural or forest land. The Law on Investment specifically permits the following forms of investment in Lithuania: establishment of an enterprise or acquisition of a part, or the whole, of the authorized capital of an operating enterprise registered in Lithuania; acquisition of securities of any type; creation, acquisition, and increase in the value of long-term assets; lending of funds or other assets to business entities in which the investor owns a stake, allowing control or considerable influence over the company; and performance of concession or leasing agreements. Foreign entities are allowed to establish branches or representative offices. There are no limits on foreign ownership or control. Foreign investors can contribute capital in the form of money, assets, or intellectual or industrial property rights. The State Property Bank screens the performance record and size of companies bidding on state or municipal property and has halted privatizations when it determined that the bidders were not suitable, i.e., for criminal or other reasons. The Lithuanian parliament most recently updated its 2002 law on the Protection of Objects Important to National Security in 2018. The law is aimed at enforcing additional safeguards to avoid threats related to investments into companies of strategic national importance, thus requiring a special government commission to screen investments in identified strategic sectors. http://www.oecd.org/countries/lithuania/economic-survey-lithuania.htm The process of company registration in Lithuania involves the following steps that can be accomplished online at http://www.registrucentras.lt/en/ : Check and reserve the name of the company (limited liability company). It takes about one day and costs approximately $18. Register at the Company Register, including registration with State Tax Inspectorate (the Lithuanian Revenue Authority) for corporate tax, VAT, and State Social Insurance Fund Board (SODRA). It takes one day and costs approximately $64. Complete VAT registration. It takes three days to complete at no charge. The Lithuanian government neither incentivizes nor restricts outward investment. 3. Legal Regime The regulatory system remains a challenge for some investors. Local business leaders report that bureaucratic procedures often are not user-friendly and that the interpretation of regulations is inconsistent and unclear. Businesses and private individuals complain of low-level, but non-systemic corruption, including in the process of awarding government contracts and the granting of licenses and permits. Businesses also note that they would like to have more opportunity to consult with lawmakers regarding new legislation and that new legislation sometimes appears with little advance notice. Public procurement is overseen by the national procurement supervising authority and has a strong reporting system to monitor its activities, making it largely transparent. Nevertheless, problems persist in practice, as some bids are released with technical irregularities and many winning vendors are selected based primarily on price over the quality of the product. However, the government continues to improve transparency. A new anti-corruption law came into effect in 2022 which codified the responsibilities of public institutions to enforce stricter standards of openness and transparency and established a network of trained anti-corruption officials. For example, the parliament’s website contains all draft legislation, and public tenders must be published electronically in a central database. Ministries also post draft laws under consideration. In March 2014, Transparency International released a report recommending new laws aimed at protecting whistle-blowers, encouraging lobbying transparency, preventing and controlling conflicts of interest, and increasing transparency in political party funding. Some of the recommendations have already been addressed by introducing a whistleblower protection law and a new law on lobbying in 2017. The World Bank’s Doing Business Report ranked Lithuania 11th out of 190 in 2020. Lithuania scored especially high in the categories of Registering Property (4th), Enforcing contracts (7th) Dealing with Construction Permits (10th) and Starting a Business (34th). It did less well in the categories of Resolving Insolvency (89th) and Getting Credit (48th). Since May 1, 2004, in accordance with its European Union membership, Lithuania has applied European Union trade policies, such as antidumping or anti-subsidy measures. The European Union import regime applies to Lithuania. The country is a member of the WTO and it notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. The Lithuanian legal system stems from the legal traditions of continental Europe and complies with the EU’s acquis communautaire. New laws enter into force upon promulgation by the President (or in some cases the Speaker of the parliament) and publication in the official gazette, Valstybes Zinios (State News). Several possibilities exist for commercial dispute resolution. Parties can settle disputes in local courts or in the increasingly popular independent, i.e., non-governmental, Commercial Court of Arbitration. Lithuania also recognizes arbitration judgments by foreign courts. Domestic courts generally operate independently of government influence. Lithuania’s EU membership has given foreign firms the additional right to appeal adverse court rulings to the European Court of Justice. The Lithuanian court system consists of courts of general jurisdiction that deal with civil and criminal matters, and includes the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, District Courts, and local courts. In 1999, Lithuania established a system of administrative courts to adjudicate administrative cases, which generally involve disputes between government regulatory agencies and individuals or organizations. The administrative court system consists of the High Administrative Court and District Administrative Courts. The Constitutional Court of Lithuania is a separate, independent judicial body that determines whether laws and legal acts adopted by the parliament, president, and the government violate the Constitution. Lithuanian law provides that foreign entities may establish branches or representative offices, and there are no limits on foreign ownership or control. A foreigner may hold a majority interest in a local company in Lithuania. However, there are some areas of the economy where investment is limited, such as in sectors related to national security and defense of the State, and licensing is necessary for activities related to human life and health, or which are deemed potentially risky. The national investment promotion agency Invest Lithuania provides a detailed overview of the relevant laws and regulations on foreign investment. http://www.investlithuania.com There is a domestic Competition Council, which is responsible for the prevention of competition law violations. For more information: https://kt.gov.lt/en/ Lithuanian law permits expropriation on the basis of public need, but requires compensation at fair market value in a convertible currency. The law requires payment of compensation within three months of the date of expropriation in the currency the foreign investor requests. The compensation must include interest calculated from the date of publication of the notice of expropriation until the payment of compensation. The recipient may transfer this compensation abroad without any restrictions. There have been no cases of expropriation of private property by the Lithuanian government since 1991. There is an ongoing process to restitute property expropriated during World War II and the Soviet occupation. While the Lithuanian government passed a law in 2011 providing for the restitution of communal property, it has not passed legislation to address the restitution of private and heirless property seized during the Holocaust. Lithuania passed the current Enterprise Bankruptcy Law in 2001. This law applies to all enterprises, public establishments, commercial banks, and other credit institutions registered in Lithuania. The law provides a mechanism to override the provisions of other laws regulating enterprise activities, assuring protection of creditors’ rights, recovery of debts, and payment of taxes and other mandatory contributions to the State. This law establishes the following order of creditors’ claims: claims by creditors that are secured by a mortgage/pledge of debtor; claims related to employment; tax, social insurance, and state medical insurance claims; claims arising from loans guaranteed or issued on behalf of the Republic of Lithuania or its government; and other claims. Bankruptcy can be criminalized in cases of intentional bankruptcy. The Law on the Bankruptcy of Natural Persons was introduced in Lithuania in 2013. The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business survey ranks Lithuania 89th in the category of “resolving insolvency”. 6. Financial Sector Government policies do not interfere with the free flow of financial resources or the allocation of credit. In 1994, Lithuania accepted the requirements of Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund to liberalize all current payments and to establish non-discriminatory currency agreements. Lithuania ensures the free movement of capital and does not plan to impose any restrictions. The government imposes no restrictions on credits related to commercial transactions or the provision of services, or on financial loans and credits. Non-residents may open accounts with commercial banks. The banking system is stable, well-regulated, and conforms to EU standards. Currently there are 12 commercial banks holding a license from the Bank of Lithuania, six foreign bank branches, two foreign bank representative offices, the Central Credit Union of Lithuania and 65 credit unions. Two hundred-eighty EU banks provide cross-border services in Lithuania without a branch operating in the country, and three financial institutions controlled by EU licensed foreign banks provide services without a branch. Nearly all foreign banks are headquartered in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. By the end of 2021 the total assets of major Lithuanian banks were $45.4 billion: Swedbank – 37.7% (www.swedbank.lt ) SEB – 26.7% (www.seb.lt ) Luminor 20.8% (www.luminor.lt ) Siauliu Bankas – 9.1% (www.sb.lt ) Other smaller banks: Citadele ( www.citadele.lt ) Siaulius Bankas (www.sb.lt ) Medicinos Bankas (www.medbank.lt ) Finasta (http://finasta.com/lit/lt ) Revolut ( www.revolut.com ) European Merchants Bank ( www.europeanmerchantbank.com ) Mano Bankas (www.mano.bank ) Effective January 1, 2015, all of the banks are controlled by the European Central Bank and the Bank of Lithuania. There is no restriction on portfolio investment. The right of ownership to shares acquired through automatically matched trades is transferred on the third working day following the conclusion of the transaction. The Vilnius Stock Exchange is part of the OMX group of exchanges and offers access to 80 percent of all securities trading in the Nordic and Baltic marketplace. OMX is owned by the U.S. firm NASDAQ and the Dubai Bourse. The supervisory service at the Bank of Lithuania oversees commercial banks and credit unions, securities market, and insurance companies. Lithuanian law does not regulate hostile takeovers. Like much of the rest of the world, rising inflation driven by high global energy prices is a concern in Lithuania. Lithuania experienced 12.4% year-over-year inflation in January 2022, the highest in the EU. Lithuania does not maintain any Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises At the beginning of 2021, the Lithuanian government was majority or full owner of 46 enterprises. Throughout 2017, the government consolidated many duplicative state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in response to OECD recommendations reducing the number of its companies from 130. The SOE sector is valued at approximately $5.8 billion and employs just over 42,000 people. The greatest number of SOEs by value are found in the electricity and gas sector (38%), followed by transportation (36%) and extractive industries including fishing, farming, and mining (21%). The transportation sector (which in Lithuania’s definition includes the postal service) accounts for over half of all SOE employment, followed by the electricity and gas sectors, which accounts for about one fifth. The largest SOE employers are Lithuanian Railways, Ignitis Group, and Lithuanian Post, which collectively employ over 23,000 people. A list of SOEs is available at the Governance Coordination Center site: https://vkc.sipa.lt/apie-imones/vvi-sarasas/ In response to OECD recommendations issued during Lithuania’s accession process, the government passed several laws to reform SOE governance, addressing such issues as the hiring, firing, and oversight of top management, the introduction of independent board members to professionalize and depoliticize SOE boards and strengthen independent and pragmatic decision making, and a requirement for SOE CEOs to certify financial statements. The government has privatized most state enterprises and property, with foreign investors purchasing the majority of state assets privatized since 1990. These include companies in the banking and transportation sectors. Some foreign companies have complained about a lack of transparency or discrimination in certain privatization transactions. Major assets still under government control include the railway company (Lietuvos Gelezinkeliai), Lithuania’s three international airports (Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipeda), Lithuanian post (Lietuvos Pastas), as well as energy companies controlled by Ignitis Group holding company. 10. Political and Security Environment Since its independence in 1991, Lithuania has not witnessed any incidents involving politically motivated damage to projects and/or installations. Luxembourg Executive Summary Luxembourg, the only Grand Duchy in the world, is a landlocked country in northwestern Europe surrounded by Belgium, France, and Germany. Despite its small landmass and small population (634,700), Luxembourg is the second-wealthiest country in the world when measured on a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita basis. Since 2002, the Luxembourg Government has proactively implemented policies and programs to support economic diversification and to attract foreign direct investment. The Government focused on key innovative industries that showed promise for supporting economic growth: logistics, information, and communications technology (ICT), health technologies including biotechnology and biomedical research; clean energy technologies, and most recently, space technology and financial services technologies. With the COVID-19 pandemic, the health-tech sector has become a priority sector to attract to Luxembourg. Luxembourg’s economy proved resilient during the COVID-19 pandemic, as 2020 GDP only contracted by 1.3 percent. Luxembourg’s economy rebounded strongly in 2021 with a growth rate of 6.9 percent. Luxembourg fared better than the EU growth rate of 5 percent. This rebound is due to a well-performing financial sector which managed to quickly revert to telework and only suffered limited effects of the pandemic. The Government of Luxembourg also provided a major economic stimulus package of 11 billion euros ($13 billion), equivalent to 18.5 percent of Luxembourg GDP, which helped stabilize the economy. This package includes direct subsidies and compensatory payments to companies, state-guaranteed loans, deferral of taxes, and social security contributions. The Government of Luxembourg borrowed a total of 5 billion euros ($6 billion) at negative interest rates due to the Grand Duchy’s Triple A credit rating. Unemployment decreased 6.3 to 5.2 percent in 2021 and went back to pre-pandemic levels. This rapid job market recovery was supported by the government’s part-time employment reimbursement scheme, which allows workers to go on extended leave while receiving 80 percent of their salary and keeping their job. This measure cost the State of Luxembourg 1.3 billion euros in 2020 and 216 million euros in 2021. The Russian invasion of Ukraine represents a major downside risk for the Luxembourg economy, with rising energy prices and a general spike in inflation stifling growth in 2022. The forecast 3.5 percent growth rate for 2022 might be out of reach. Luxembourg remains a financial powerhouse thanks to the exponential growth of the investment fund sector through the launch and development of cross-border funds (UCITS) in the 1990s. Luxembourg is the world’s second largest investment fund asset domicile, after only the United States, with over $6 trillion of assets in custody in financial institutions. Luxembourg has committed to the EU target of 55 percent Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions reductions by 2030 and net-zero emission by 2050, and has also set itself a national target of 25 percent renewable energy and 35-40 percent energy efficiency improvement by 2030. Luxembourg is consistently ranked as one of the world’s most open and transparent economies and has no restrictions on foreign ownership. It is also consistently ranked as one of the world’s most competitive and least-corrupt economies. Over the past decade, Luxembourg has adopted major fiscal reforms to counter money-laundering, terrorist-financing, and tax evasion. The Government of Luxembourg actively supports the development of new sectors to diversify the country’s economy, given the dominance of the financial sector. Target sectors include space, logistics, and information technology, including financial technology and biomedicine. Luxembourg launched its SpaceResources.lu initiative in 2016, and, in 2017, announced a fund offering financial support for the space resources industry. More than 50 companies dedicated to space initiatives are now active in Luxembourg. Luxembourg added an additional space fund in early 2020 to further bolster its status as a space startup nation. Luxembourg has positioned itself as “the gateway to Europe” to establish European company headquarters operations by virtue of its central European location and advanced road, railway, and air connectivity. Due to uncertainties related to Brexit, 50 insurers, asset managers and banking institutions have decided to re-locate their EU headquarters to Luxembourg or transfer a significant part of their activity to the country. Luxembourg is actively seeking logistics companies to expand the new logistics hub at Luxembourg Airport, home to Cargolux, Europe’s largest all cargo airline. Inaugurated in 2017, the Luxembourg Intermodal Terminal (LIT) is ideally positioned as an international hub for the consolidation of multimodal transport flows across Europe and beyond. Luxembourg is also seeking ICT companies to use the existing high-security, state-of-the-art datacenters, affording high-speed internet connectivity to major international data hubs. Luxembourg has set up a high-performance computer which will be part of the EU’s high-performance computer network called EURO HPC Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 9 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 23 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 759,400 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 80,860 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Luxembourg offers a public policy framework and political stability, which remain highly attractive for foreign investors, particularly for U.S. investors, given the focus on growth sectors and the historically strong bilateral relationship between the two countries. The government has increased its outreach toward companies looking to expand in Europe. Luxembourg is in the process of implementing the EU standards for the screening of foreign investment but missed the Fall 2020 implementation deadline. In 2017, Luxembourg’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Economy and Foreign Trade, Etienne Schneider, unveiled a strategy to promote economic growth focusing on attracting FDI and supporting companies’ moving into other markets. The Luxembourg “Let’s Make It Happen” campaign, developed by the state Trade and Investment Board, focuses on five key objectives: Improving Luxembourg-based companies’ access to international markets Attracting FDI in a “targeted, service-oriented” way Strengthening the country’s international “economic-promotion network” Improving Luxembourg’s image as a “smart location” for high-performance business and industry Ensuring the coherence of economic promotion efforts There is no overall economic or industrial strategy that has discriminatory effects on foreign investors, either at a market-access or post-establishment phase of investment. Luxembourg strives to attract and retain foreign investors with its unique model of “easy access to decision makers” and its known ability to “act swiftly.” The Trade and Investment Board has taken the lead in investment promotion and includes representatives from the ministries of Economy, Higher Education and Research, Finance, Foreign and European Affairs, and State. Public-private trade associations such as FEDIL (Business Federation of Luxembourg, the main employers’ trade association), the Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce, and the Chamber of Skilled Trades and Crafts, as well as Luxinnovation, are also represented. The Board is working in cooperation with Luxembourg embassies and trade and investment offices worldwide, as well as economic and commercial attachés, honorary consuls, and foreign trade advisers, to attract FDI and retain investors. In 2016, the Ministry of the Economy expanded the role of Luxinnovation to incorporate promotion of Luxembourg abroad and to attract FDI into the country. Luxinnovation is a public private partnership agency that carries out business intelligence to target relevant investors and regions and also provides a soft-landing service for investors as they arrive in Luxembourg. The Covid-19 pandemic has led investor outreach efforts to be carried out virtually, and travel restrictions have led investors to prefer virtual meetings before traveling to the country. There is a right for foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. There are no limits on foreign ownership/control or sector-specific restrictions. General screening of foreign investment exists in line with that of domestic investment. There are no major sectors/matters in Luxembourg in which foreign investors are denied national (domestic) treatment. Luxembourg is in the process of implementing the EU rules for investment screening, to be adopted by Parliament in the Summer of 2022. By implementing these rules, Luxembourg will adopt a formal investment screening process to replace the previous ad-hoc and case by case screening, which lacks transparency. Luxembourg is included in Trade Policy Reviews (TPRs) of the EU/EC; see the TPR gateway for explanations and background. In terms of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Global Action Menu for Investment Facilitation, Luxembourg’s business facilitation efforts are aligned with most of the recommended action points. Over the past decade, Luxembourg has been furthering accessibility and transparency in investment policies and regulations, as well as procedures relevant to investors. Luxembourg ranks 76th in the World Bank’s starting a business ranking, indicating it takes 16.5 days to set up a business in the country. The Government has improved the efficiency of investment administrative procedures, notably in the context of the overall “Digitization” movement to offer a multitude of government services online or electronically. This has led to the time it takes to start a business being reduced by 2-3 months. The Government provides a website in multiple languages, including English, that explains the business registration process: http://www.guichet.public.lu/en . A new business must register with the Registry of Commerce (Registre du Commerce: http://www.lbr.lu.) Foreign companies can use the site (after translating from the original French language), but it is best to consult with a local lawyer or fiduciary to complete the overall process. It is necessary to engage a notary to submit the company’s by-laws for registration. In 2017, the Government reduced the required minimum capitalization of a new company from 12,500 euro to just 1 euro (symbolic), to encourage start-up creation. Between January 2017 and January 2018, over 680 such simplified limited liability companies (Société à responsabilité limitée simplifiée SARL-S) have registered. According to the Luxembourgish Chamber of Commerce, one client out of three has requested information on SARL-S. After receiving a certificate from the Registry of Commerce, companies are required by law to register with and pay annual dues to the Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce, as well as the Social Security Administration, the Tax Administration (Administration des Contributions Directes) and the Value-Added-Tax Authority (TVA = taxe à la valeur ajoutée). The company will receive an official registration number reflecting the date of inception of the entity, and this number will be used in all business transactions and correspondence with administrative authorities. The House of Entrepreneurship (HOA), opened in 2016 within the Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce, also provides guidance on the entire registration and creation process of a business. HOA receives over 10,000 enquiries per year by entrepreneurs interested in setting up a business in the country. The organization plays a key role during the COVID-19 pandemic, as it serves as a point of contact and information for businesses looking to apply for Government aid. The Ministry of Economy continues to support networks and associations acting in favor of female entrepreneurship. The Law of December 15, 2016 incorporated the principle of equal salaries in the Grand Duchy’s legislation, which makes illegal any difference in the salaries paid to men and women carrying out the same task or work of equal value. As a result, Luxembourg had the lowest gender pay gap in the EU in 2021. In general, the instruments that are most effective are outside the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy but are critical. For example, there has been an increase in the number of childcare centers close to business districts which helps dual career families. The same government services website listed above, http://www.guichet.public.lu/en , includes an “International Trade” tab which provides guidance on outward investment by Luxembourgish companies on various topics, including intra-EU trade and services; import, export, and transit; licensing; and transport. The Luxembourg Government promotes outward investment via the Trade and Investment Board, which functions as a promotion entity for both inward and outward investment. The “Let’s Make It Happen” initiative, among its many missions, is working to facilitate access to international markets for Luxembourgish companies and to strengthen Luxembourg’s international economic promotion network. Luxembourg does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. Luxembourg also has a public export credit agency, the Office du Ducroire to help companies engage in export and outward investment through funding and export insurance. In 2020, the Office du Ducroire has insured over 970 million dollars of new transactions and has paid over 1 million dollars of financial support for exports. 3. Legal Regime The Government of Luxembourg uses transparent policies and effective laws to foster competition and establish clear ground rules on a non-discriminatory basis. The legal system is quite welcoming with respect to FDI, and legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. With the exception of the mandatory membership in the Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce, there are no informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. In addition to the Government, the Luxembourg Institute of Regulation, a public agency, proposes regulatory policies. As confirmed by the World Bank report on Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance, the Luxembourg Government develops anticipated and publishes forward looking regulatory plans – a public list of anticipated regulatory changes and proposals intended to be adopted and implemented. These plans are available to the public, as the texts of proposed legislation are published before Parliamentary debate and voting. In addition, plans and proposed legislation is subject to review by the State Council and the Grand Duke. Draft texts are published on a unified website where all proposed regulations are published and directly distributed to interested stakeholders. While the ministries do not have a legal obligation to publish the text of proposed regulations before their enactment, the entire text of the proposed draft law is published. ( www.legilux.lu ) In addition, the Government solicits comments on proposed laws and regulations from the public. The comments are received on the same website (www.legilux.lu), through public meetings, and through targeted outreach to stakeholders, such as business associations. Publicly listed companies adhere to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and their accounts must be audited accordingly by an officially accredited auditor. The Government does not mandate, but strongly encourages companies to disclose information on their environmental, social and governance (ESG) targets. There are multiple ESG labels, international and domestic that are enjoying a strong uptick. Luxembourg has also created an ESG label for investment products called LuxFlag and is home to the first and largest ESG bond exchange in the world, the Luxembourg Green Exchange (LGX). The law requires that the rulemaking body solicit comments on proposed regulations. The consultation period is typically three months, and the Government reports on the results of the consultation in the form of a consolidated response on the same website. The official journal Mémorial publishes the final text of laws, both online and in print. Proposed legislation also includes a factsheet on the impact on public finances. The Luxembourg Government is transparent with its public finances and debt obligations through the annual budget procedure that requires Parliamentary approval. The Government also communicates on issuances of new State borrowing. Luxembourg is a member state of the EU and routinely transposes EU directives and regulations into domestic law. Luxembourg has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995 and notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Luxembourg ratified the TFA on October 5, 2015 and has an implementation rate of 100 percent. Luxembourg is a parliamentary representative democracy headed by a constitutional monarch . The Constitution of 1868 provides for a flexible separation of powers between the executive and the parliament, with the judiciary watching over proper application of laws. The Grand Duchy has a written commercial/contractual law. Magistrates’ courts deal with cases of lesser importance in civil and commercial matters and under the urgent procedure in the field of law enforcement. The district courts , of which there are three, adjudicate civil and commercial matters for all cases not specifically attributed by law to any other court. The current judicial process is considered procedurally competent, fair, and reliable, albeit notably slow (The judicial sector observes all public-school holiday periods). Regulation and enforcement actions are appealable, and they are adjudicated in the national court system Luxembourg has assimilated the laws of neighboring countries according to the nature of the laws: German tax law, French civil law, and Belgian commercial law (written and consistently applied). As previously mentioned, the website for doing business is: www.guichet.public.lu, and the new one-stop-shop for setting up a business is the House of Entrepreneurship within the Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce ( www.houseofentrepreneurship.lu ). The Competition Inspectorate, a department within the Ministry of the Economy, oversees investigating competition cases. The laws governing expropriation of property are quite complex, and the process can be arduous and lengthy, depending on the property. The Ministry of the Interior, along with the Ministry of Justice, sets forth the specific regulations according to each type of case. There have been no known expropriations in the recent past or policy shifts which would indicate such actions soon. There are no tendencies by the Luxembourg Government to discriminate against U.S. investments, companies, or representatives in expropriation. Instances of indirect expropriation or governmental action tantamount to expropriation, such as confiscatory tax regimes, that might warrant special investigation, are non-existent. Luxembourg has assimilated the laws of neighboring countries according to the nature of the laws: German tax law, French civil law, and Belgian commercial law (written and consistently applied). Judgments of foreign courts are accepted and enforced by the local courts, and Luxembourg does have a written and consistently applied bankruptcy law, which is based on European Union-wide legislation. Monetary settlements are usually made in local currency (euro). Bankruptcy is not criminalized. The bankruptcy law is currently under review and the updated law is expected to be adopted by the end of 2022. At the end of 2021, the Luxembourg banking sector comprised 125 credit institutions from 26 different countries. Under Luxembourg law, two types of licenses are possible for the credit institutions: the Universal Banking License, and the Mortgage Bonds Banking License. The Ministry of Finance grants credit institutions operating out of the Grand Duchy an operating license. Since the entry into force of the Single Supervisory Mechanism on November 4, 2014, credit institutions are subjected to the control of the European Central Bank, either directly or indirectly through Luxembourg’s financial sector supervisory authority, the CSSF. The supervision by the ECB/CSSF extends equally to activities performed by these undertakings in another Member State of the EU, whether by means of the establishment of a branch or by free provision of services. 6. Financial Sector Luxembourg government policies, which reflect the European Union’s free movement of capital framework, facilitate the free flow of financial resources to support the product and factor markets. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors can get credit on the local market, thanks to the sophisticated and extremely developed international financial sector, depending on the banks’ individual lending policies. Since the financial crisis and tighter regulation through EU central banking authority and stability mechanisms, banks had become more selective in their lending practices pre-COVID. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments, including those issued by the National Public Investment Agency (SNCI), and there is an effective regulatory system established to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. Luxembourg continues to be recognized as a model of fighting money-laundering activities within its banking system through the enactment of strict regulations and monitoring of fund sources. Indeed, the number of enforcements reflects the degree to which the government remains committed to fighting money-laundering. The country has its own stock market, a sub-set of which was rebranded in 2016 as a “green exchange” (LGX) to promote securities (primarily bonds in Luxembourg) reflecting ecologically sound investments. To this day, LGX has become the largest ESG and Green Bond market in the world. Luxembourg’s banking system is sound and strong, having been shored up following the global financial crisis by emergency investments by the Government of Luxembourg in BGL BNP Paribas (formerly Banque Generale du Luxembourg and then Fortis) and in Banque Internationale a Luxembourg (BIL), formerly Dexia, in 2008. At the end of 2021, 125 credit institutions were operating, with total assets under management by private banking of EUR 508 billion during the first quarter of 2022 (USD 560 bn), and approximately 26,000 employees. Luxembourg has a central bank, Banque Centrale de Luxembourg. Foreign banks can establish operations, subject to the same regulations as Luxembourgish banks. Due to the U.S. FATCA law, local retail bank Raiffeisen bank still refuses U.S. citizens as clients. However, two banks have offered to serve U.S. citizen customers: BIL and the State Bank and Savings Bank (Banque et Caisse d’Epargne de l’Etat). On February 21, 2018, the Luxembourg House of Financial Technology (LHoFT) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the European FinTech platform, B-Hive, based in Brussels, and the Dutch Blockchain Coalition, that will favor collaboration in the field of distributed ledger technology, otherwise known as blockchain. The MoU confirms mutual interest and defines the fields of collaboration, among other things, on how blockchain technology can benefit society and business in general or on how they can help define international and/or European standards for distributed ledger technology. The Ministry of Finance is tracking developments very closely in the field of virtual currencies and has said it will adapt its legislation in accordance with the results of ongoing European and international studies. Luxembourg places virtual currencies under the legal regime of payment companies. The CSSF continues close supervision and oversight of virtual currencies. Luxembourg created a sovereign wealth fund in 2014. The fund is under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance and operates with 234 million euros of assets. Until the fund reaches 250 million euros of assets, it operates a conservative investment policy, with a portfolio of 57% of bonds, 40% of stocks and 3% of liquidities. The sovereign wealth fund only invests outside of Luxembourg and is audited by an independent audit company. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The most prominent state-owned enterprise (SOE) in Luxembourg is POST (formerly P&T, postal and telecommunications), whose sole shareholder is the government of Luxembourg and whose board of directors is composed of civil servants. POST responded to the competition created by new players in the market (Orange, Proximus) by transforming itself from a passive utility company into a commercial enterprise, recruiting from the corporate sector, and improving consumer products and services. POST also publishes an annual report and communicates in a similar manner to a private company. Another sector in which SOEs have been very active is the energy sector (electric and gas utilities), which is now liberalized as well. Anyone can become a provider or distributor (via networks) of electricity and gas. The former state electricity utility, Cegedel, was absorbed into a private company, Encevo, along with a nearby German utility and the former state gas utility, with an independent board of directors. Creos, the new distribution network for energy, is jointly held by the government and private shareholders. Finally, an important market which appears to have barriers to entry is freight air transport, due to the dominance of the majority state-owned Cargolux. It is the largest consumer of U.S. exports to Luxembourg in terms of value, owing to their all-Boeing fleet of 30 747-freighter aircraft (including 14 of the new-generation 747-8F, of which Cargolux was a launch customer). It received a capital increase from the Luxembourg government in return for a larger share ownership of the company. China has invested in Cargolux, with a Chinese regional fund currently holding approximately one-third of the shares. Cargolux has aggressively expanded in China. Private enterprises can compete with public enterprises in Luxembourg under the same terms and conditions in all respects. All markets are now open or have been liberalized via EU directives to encourage market competition over monopolistic entities. There is a national regulator (National Institute of Regulation), which sets forth regulations and standards for economic sectors, mostly derived from EU directives transposed into local law. While markets continue to open, the government has maintained a large enough stake in critical sectors such as energy, to ensure national security. Luxembourg is an OECD member with established practices consistent with OECD guidelines as far as SOEs are concerned. There is no centralized ownership entity that exercises ownership rights for each of the SOEs. In general, if the government has a share in an enterprise, they will receive board of directors’ seats on a comparable basis to other shareholders and in proportion to their share, with no formal management reporting directly to a line minister. The court processes are transparent and non-discriminatory. Foreign investors can participate equally in ongoing privatization programs, and the bidding process is transparent with no barriers erected against foreign investors at the time of the initial investment or after the investment is made. Moreover, there are no laws or regulations specifically authorizing private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association, which limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control. There are no other practices by private firms to force local ownership or restrict foreign investment, participation in, or control of domestic enterprises. There has been no evidence to suggest that potential conflicts of interest exist. Government officials sitting on boards of directors do not appear to have impacted freedom of investment in the private sector. 10. Political and Security Environment Luxembourg has consistently ranked among the most politically stable and overall safest countries in the world. There have been no recent serious incidents involving politically motivated damage to projects or installations. The environment is not growing more politicized such that civil disturbances would be likely. Of note: many of the demonstrations which do occur in Luxembourg are not aimed at the Grand Duchy, but rather at the EU offices located within Luxembourg (for example, the European Court of Justice and periodic European ministerial meetings). There are no known nascent insurrections, belligerent neighbors, or other politically motivated activities. The introduction of COVID-19 restrictions, especially regarding unvaccinated individuals, have led to disruptive protests in the city with isolated incidents of violence, which were dealt with by the Police. These incidents ran counter to the Luxembourg’s track record of peaceful and orderly protest. Macau Executive Summary Macau became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on December 20, 1999. Macau’s status since reverting to Chinese sovereignty is defined in the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration (1987) and the Basic Law (the SAR’s de facto constitution). Under the concept of “one country, two systems” articulated in these documents, Macau enjoys a high degree of autonomy in economic matters, and its economic system is to remain unchanged for 50 years following the 1999 reversion to Chinese sovereignty. Macau, a separate customs territory, describes itself as a liberal economy and a free port. Tourism is the basis of the Macau economy. The Government of Macau (GOM) maintains a transparent, non-discriminatory, and free-market economy. The GOM is committed to maintaining an investor-friendly environment. In 2002, the GOM ended a long-standing gaming monopoly, awarding two gaming concessions and one sub-concession to consortia with U.S. interests. This opening encouraged substantial U.S. investment in casinos and hotels and has spurred rapid economic growth in the tourism, gaming, and entertainment sector, in which the gaming industry constitutes the most important pillar of Macau’s economy. In 2021, gaming taxes accounted for 67 percent of $6 billion total tax revenue collected. Macau is today the biggest gaming center in the world, having far surpassed Las Vegas in gambling revenue. However, Macau has been hit worse by the pandemic than Las Vegas due to inbound travel restrictions mandated by the GOM since January 2020, which drastically reduced the number of travelers from mainland China, who account for about 70 percent of all tourists entering Macau. Although the individual visa scheme that allows for mainland visitors to come to Macau resumed in August 2020, visa processing for tour groups, which have been the main source of tourists for years, is still on hold and its reactivation hinges on Beijing’s revising its rigid Zero-COVID policies. Macau recorded $10.82 billion in full-year casino gross gaming revenue in 2021, a 44 percent increase compared to 2020 figures, but still down 79 percent compared to the 2019 pre-pandemic numbers. U.S. investment over the past decade is estimated to exceed $24 billion. In addition to gaming, Macau aspires to position itself as a regional center for incentive travel, conventions, and tourism, though to date it has experienced limited success in diversifying its economy. In 2007, business leaders founded the American Chamber of Commerce of Macau. Macau also seeks to become a “commercial and trade cooperation service platform” between mainland China and Portuguese-speaking countries. The GOM has various policies to promote these efforts and to create business opportunities for domestic and foreign investors. Many infrastructure projects are currently underway, such as new casinos, hotels, subways, airport expansion, and the Macau-Taipa 4th vehicle harbor crossing that started construction in August 2020. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 N/A of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 $2,530 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2019 $75,690 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Joint Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Portuguese Republic on the question of Macau was signed in March 1987, which established the constitutional principle of “One Country, Two Systems.”. The “One Country, Two Systems” principle guarantees that the rights related to autonomy, its capitalist system, its legal regime, and the liberal society enjoyed by Macau would remain unchanged until at least 2049. Drafted based on the Joint Declaration, Macau’s Basic Law came into effect in December 1999 and laid out the basic principles of Macau’s governance under Chinese sovereignty. The Basic Law also guaranteed that “One Country, Two Systems” would remain essentially unchanged in Macau until at least 2049. Macau has separate membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) from that of mainland China. According to the 2018 Index of Economic Freedom released by The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage Foundation, Macau ranked 34th among 180 worldwide economies and ranked the 9th in the Asia Pacific region. However, Macau was excluded from the 2021 Index published in March 2021. The Heritage Foundation explained the decision to exclude Macau by saying that developments over the past few years have demonstrated unambiguously that those policies offering economic freedom to Macau are ultimately controlled from Beijing. There are no restrictions placed on foreign investment in Macau as there are no special rules governing foreign investment. Both overseas and domestic firms register under, and are subject to, the same regulations on business, such as the Commercial Code (Decree 40/99/M). Macau is heavily dependent on the gaming sector and tourism. The GOM aims to diversify Macau’s economy by attracting foreign investment and is committed to maintaining an investor-friendly environment. Corporate taxes are low, with a tax rate of 12 percent for companies whose net profits exceed MOP 600,000 (USD 75,000). Companies whose net profits are less than USD 75,000 are exempt from tax. The top personal tax rate is 12 percent and the first MOP 144,000 (USD 18,000) of an individual’s taxable income is exempt from personal tax. The tax rate of casino concessionaries is 35 percent on gross gaming revenue, plus a four percent contribution to a combined culture, infrastructure, tourism, and a social security fund. Macau is attempting to position itself as a regional center for incentive travel, conventions, and tourism. The concessions of all six of Macau’s gambling concessionaires and sub-concessionaires are now set to be extended for a period of six months from the original date of expiration to December 31, 2022, as the ongoing legislative review of the gaming law is taking longer than expected. The Legislative Assembly of Macau is currently reviewing and proposing amendments to the draft bill on the amendment to the gaming law ahead of the re-tendering of concessions. A fresh public tender process with up to six winning bidders granted ten-year concessions will follow once the bill is passed. The Macau Trade and Investment Promotion Institute (IPIM) is the GOM agency responsible for promoting trade and investment activities. IPIM provides one-stop services, including notary servicesfor business registration, and it applies legal and administrative procedures to all local and foreign individuals or organizations interested in setting up a company in Macau. Macau maintains an ongoing dialogue with investors through various business networks and platforms, such as the IPIM, the Macau Chamber of Commerce, American Chamber of Commerce Macau, and the Macau Association of Banks. Macau participates in the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries, a liaison platform that strengthens economic and commercial cooperation among Lusophone nations. The Forum hosts a ministerial-level conference in Macau on a triennial basis to gather businesspeople and government officials from the participating countries as well as representatives from international trade organizations and trade promotion entities.. Foreign firms and individuals are free to establish companies, branches, and representative offices without discrimination or undue regulation in Macau. There are no restrictions on the ownership of such establishments. Company directors are not required to be citizens of, or resident in, Macau, except for the following three professional services which impose residency requirements: Education: An individual applying to establish a school must have a Certificate of Identity or have the right to reside in Macau. The principal of a school must be a Macau resident. Newspapers and magazines: Applicants must first apply for business registration and register with the Government Information Bureau as an organization or an individual. The publisher of a newspaper or magazine must be a Macau resident or have the right to reside in Macau. Legal services: Lawyers from foreign jurisdictions who seek to practice Macau law must first obtain residency in Macau. Foreign lawyers must also pass an examination before they can register with the Lawyers’ Association, a self-regulatory body. The examination is given in Chinese or Portuguese. After passing the examination, foreign lawyers are required to serve an 18-month uninterrupted internship before they can practice law in Macau. Macau last conducted the WTO Trade Policy Review in November 2020. See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s402_e.pdf The IPIM helps foreign investors in registering a company and liaising with the involved agencies for entry into the Macau market. The business registration process typically takes less than 10 working days. Company registration procedures can be found here: http://www.ipim.gov.mo/en/services/one-stop-service/handle-company-registration-procedures/ Macau does not promote or incentivize outward investment, nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. In 2020, the latest available data, outward direct investment flows of Macau enterprises increased by 34.6 percent year-on-year to MOP 9.44 billion while the stock of outward direct investment increased 21.6 percent year-on-year to MOP 69.89 billion. Hong Kong and mainland China remained the top two destinations. 3. Legal Regime The GOM typically conducts a two-month public consultation when amending or making legislation, including investment laws, and will prepare a draft bill based on the results of the public consultation. The lawmakers then discuss the draft bill before putting it to a final vote. All of the processes are transparent and consistent with international norms. Public comments received by the GOM are not made available online to the public. The draft bills are made available at the Legislative Assembly’s website (http://www.al.gov.mo/zh/), while this website http://www.io.gov.mo/ links to the GOM’s Printing Bureau, which publishes laws, rules, and procedures. Macau’s anti-corruption agency, the Commission Against Corruption (known by its Portuguese acronym CCAC), carries out ombudsman functions to safeguard rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of individuals and to ensure the impartiality and efficiency of public administration. Macau’s law on the budgetary framework (Decree 15/2017) aims to reinforce monitoring of public finances and to enhance transparency in the preparation and execution of the fiscal budget. Macau does not owe debt to any countries. The public can retrieve up-to-date data on public finance from the Financial Services Bureau website https://www.dsf.gov.mo/financialReport/?lang=en at all times. Macau is a member of the WTO since 1995 and adopts international norms. The GOM notified all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Macau, as a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), has achieved a 100 percent rate of implementation commitments. Under “one country, two systems”, Macau maintains Continental European law as the foundation of its legal system, which is based on the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. The current judicial process is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. Macau has written commercial law and contract law. The Commercial Code is a comprehensive source of commercial law, while the Civil Code serves as a fundamental source of contractual law. Courts in Macau include the Court of Final Appeal, Intermediate Courts, and Primary Courts. There is also an Administrative Court, which has jurisdiction over administrative and tax cases. These provide an effective means for enforcing property and contractual rights. Currently, the Court of Final Appeal has three judges; the Intermediate Courts have nine judges; and the Primary Courts have 33 judges. The Public Prosecutions Office has 36 prosecutors. Macau passed a National Security Law in 2009 that prohibits and punishes crimes against national security, including treason, secession, sedition, subversion, theft of state secrets, and collusion with foreign political organizations. Preparatory acts leading to any of these crimes may also constitute a criminal offense. Macau’s courts still have jurisdiction over all local cases except those related to defense and foreign affairs. The 2009 National Security Law did not affect this jurisdiction. Macau’s legal system is based on the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. Foreign and domestic companies register under the same rules and are subject to the same set of commercial and bankruptcy laws (Decree 40/99/M). Macau has no agency that reviews transactions for competition-related concerns, nor does it have a competition law. The Commercial Code (Law No. 16/2009) contains basic elements of a competition policy for commercial practices that can distort the proper functioning of markets. In response to public outcries of price-fixing schemes in the Macau oil and food retail industries, in March 2019, the GOM commissioned Macau University of Science and Technology to conduct research on how to optimize market institutions to help foster healthy private sector competition. The research results were released to the public in May 2020. Based on this research, the GOM claimed that a legislative solution such as an anti-monopoly or anti-trust law would not necessarily bring about lower prices. Rather, the GOM appointed the Macau Consumer Council to monitor the local market prices and determine when the need for new legislation on market competition is warranted. Speaking at a Legislative Assembly plenary meeting on consumer rights protection law in June 2021, the Secretary for Economy and Finance revealed that the authorities still do not have a specific timetable for enacting competition and antitrust laws, explaining that Macau is a civilized society, and legislation is always the last resort to promote ethical conduct and integrity. The U.S. Consulate General is not aware of any direct or indirect actions to expropriate. Legal expropriations of private property may occur if it is in the public interest. In such cases, the GOM will exchange the private property with an equivalent public property based on the fair market value and conditions of the former. The exchange of property is in accordance with established principles of international law. There is no remunerative compensation. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Both the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) apply to Macau. The Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Decree 55/98/M) provides for enforcement of awards under the 1958 New York Convention. Investor-State Dispute Settlement The U.S. Consulate General is aware of one previous investment dispute involving U.S. or other foreign investors or contractors and the GOM. In March 2010, a low-cost airline carrier was reportedly forced to cancel flight services because of a credit dispute with its fuel provider, triggering events which led to the airline’s de-licensing. Macau courts declared the airline bankrupt in September 2010. The airline’s major shareholder, a U.S. private investment company, filed a case in the Macau courts seeking a judgment as to whether a GOM administrative act led to the airline’s demise. The Court of Second Instance held hearings in May and June 2012. In November 2013, the Court of Second Instance rejected the appeal. Private investment disputes are normally handled in the courts or via private negotiation. Alternatively, disputes may be referred to the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center or the World Trade Center Macau Arbitration Center. The Arrangement for Mutual Service of Judicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Cases between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macau Special Administrative Region came into effect in August 2020, significantly accelerating the service of such judicial documents between the two regions. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Macau has an arbitration law (Decree 55/98/M), which adopts the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model law for international commercial arbitration. The GOM accepts international arbitration of investment disputes between itself and investors. Local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards. The GOM in May 2020 enacted the New Arbitration Law, which unifies the laws governing domestic and international arbitration in Macau. This arbitration reform incorporated best international practices with effective dispute resolution techniques for investment disputes, including the introduction of emergency arbitrator mechanism, limitation on rights of appeal, procedure for courts assistance in taking of evidence, recognition and enforcement of interim measures, and publication of arbitral awards. Macau established the World Trade Center Macau Arbitration Center in June 1998. The objective of the Center is to promote the resolution of disputes through arbitration and conciliation, providing the disputing parties with alternative resolutions other than judicial litigation. Foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters may be enforced in Macau. The enforcement of foreign judgments is stipulated in Articles 1199 and 1200 of the Civil Procedure Code. A foreign court decision will be recognized and enforced in Macau if it qualifies as a final decision supported by authentic documentation and that its enforcement will not breach Macau’s public policy. Commercial and bankruptcy laws are written under the Macau Commercial Code, the Civil Procedure Code, and the Penal Code. Bankruptcy proceedings can be invoked by an application from the bankrupt business, by petition of the creditor, or by the Public Prosecutor. There are four methods used to prevent the occurrence of bankruptcy: the creditors meeting, the audit of the company’s assets, the amicable settlement, and the creditor agreement. According to Articles 615-618 of the Civil Code and Article 351-353 of the Civil Procedure Code, a creditor who has a justified fear of losing the guarantee of his credits may request seizure of the assets of the debtor. Bankruptcy offenses are subject to criminal liability. In October 2020, Macau Post and Telecommunications Bureau announced the establishment of a credit information system, allowing banks to inquire about the credit status of lenders when approving individual customer credit applications, while mandating those who want to borrow money from banks to apply for a personal credit report from the new system for the bank’s assessment. The new system is expected to enter service as soon as the second quarter of 2022. 6. Financial Sector Macau allows free flows of financial resources. Foreign investors can obtain credit in the local financial market. The GOM is stepping up its efforts to develop finance leasing businesses and exploring opportunities to establish a system for trade credit insurance to take a greater role in promoting cooperation between companies from Portuguese-speaking countries. Since 2010, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) has provided cross-border settlement of funds for Macau residents and institutions involved in transactions for RMB bonds issued in Hong Kong. Macau residents and institutions can purchase or sell, through Macau RMB participating banks, RMB bonds issued in Hong Kong and Macau. The Macau RMB Real Time Gross Settlements (RMB RTGS) System came into operation in March 2016 to provide real-time settlement services for RMB remittances and interbank transfer of RMB funds. The RMB RTGS System is intended to improve risk management and clearing efficiency of RMB funds and foster Macau’s development into an RMB clearing platform for trade settlement between China and Portuguese-speaking countries. In December 2019, the PBoC canceled an existing quota of RMB 20,000 (USD 3,057) exchanged in Macau for each individual transaction. Macau has no stock market, but Macau companies can seek a listing in Hong Kong’s stock market. Macau and Hong Kong financial regulatory authorities cooperate on issues of mutual concern. Under the Macau Insurance Ordinance, the MMA authorizes and monitors insurance companies. There are 12 life insurance companies and 13 non-life insurance companies in Macau. In 2021, total net profit from insurance services including life insurance and general insurance amounted to MOP 22.3 billion (USD 2.8 billion). USD. In October 2018, the Legislative Assembly took steps to tackle cross-border tax evasion. Offshore institutions in Macau and their tax benefits, including credit institutions, insurers, underwriters, and offshore trust management companies, were thoroughly abolished starting from January 1, 2021. Decree 9/2012, in effect since October 2012, stipulates that banks must compensate depositors up to a maximum of MOP 500,000 (USD 62,500) in case of a bank failure. To finance the deposit protection scheme, the GOM has injected MOP 150 million (USD 18.75 million) into the deposit protection fund in 2013, with banks paying an annual contribution of 0.05 percent of the amount of protected deposits held. The deposit protection fund had MOP 486 million (USD 60.75 million) available by the end of 2018, according to the MMA. The MMA functions as a de facto central bank. It is responsible for maintaining the stability of Macau’s financial system and for managing its currency reserves and foreign assets. At present, there are thirty-one financial institutions in Macau, including 12 local banks and 19 branches of banks incorporated outside Macau. There is also a finance company with restrictive banking activities, two financial leasing companies and a non-bank credit institution dedicated to the issuance and management of electronic money stored value card services. In addition, there are 11 moneychangers, two cash remittance companies, two financial intermediaries, six exchange counters, two payment service institutions, and two other financial institutions (one is a representative office). The Bank of China (Macau) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) are the two largest banks in Macau, with total assets of USD 79.8 billion and USD 33.9 billion, respectively. Total deposits amounted to USD 83.5 billion by the end of 2021. As of December 2021, total international assets of banks in Macau increased to MOP 2,311.4 billion (USD 287.8 billion). In the third quarter of 2021, banks in Macau maintained a capital adequacy ratio of 14.9 percent, well above the minimum eight percent recommended by the Bank for International Settlements. Accounting systems in Macau are consistent with international norms. The MMA prohibits the city’s financial institutions, banks, and payment services from providing services to businesses issuing virtual currencies or tokens. In December 2020, the MMA said it is communicating with the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) about the feasibility of issuing digital currency in Macau. In a Legislative Assembly plenary meeting in April 2021, Chief Executive Ho Iat-seng continued to reiterate that the GOM is closely following the trend of digital currency development around the world and maintains close communication with the PBoC regarding the implementation of the digital renminbi in Macau. However, no specific timetable or update was given since his remarks in 2021. Foreign Exchange Profits and other funds associated with an investment, including investment capital, earnings, loan repayments, lease payments, and capital gains, can be freely converted and remitted. The domestic currency, Macau Official Pataca (MOP), is pegged to the Hong Kong Dollar at 1.03 and indirectly to the U.S. Dollar at an exchange rate of approximately MOP 7.99 = USD 1. The MMA is committed to exchange rate stability through maintenance of the peg to the Hong Kong Dollar. Although Macau imposes no restrictions on capital flows or foreign exchange operations, exporters are required to convert 40 percent of foreign currency earnings into MOP. This legal requirement does not apply to tourism services. There are no recent changes to or plans to change investment remittance policies. Macau does not restrict the remittance of profits and dividends derived from investment, nor does it require reporting on cross-border remittances. Foreign investors can bring capital into Macau and remit it freely. A Memorandum of Understanding on anti-money laundering (AML) actions between MMA and PBoC, increased information exchanges between the two parties, as well as cooperation on onsite inspections of casino operations. Furthermore, Macau’s terrorist asset-freezing law, which is based on United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions, requires travelers entering or leaving with cash or other negotiable monetary instruments valued at MOP 120,000 (USD 15,000) or more to sign a declaration form and submit it to the Macau Customs Service. In December 2019, the PBoC increased a daily limit set on the amount of RMB-denominated funds sent by Macau residents to personal accounts held in mainland China from RMB 50,000 (USD 6,250) to RMB 80,000 (USD 10,000). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggested in July 2014 that the GOM invest its large fiscal reserves through a fund modeled on sovereign wealth funds to protect the city’s economy from economic downturns. In November 2015, the GOM decided to establish such a fund, called the MSAR Investment and Development Fund (MIDF), through a substantial allocation from the city’s ample fiscal reserves. However, the GOM in 2019 withdrew a draft bill that proposed the use of USD 7.7 billion to seed the MIDF over public concerns about the government’s supervisory capability. 10. Political and Security Environment Macau is politically stable. The U.S. Consulate General is not aware of any incidents in recent years involving politically motivated damage to projects or installations. Macau enacted its own National Security Law (NSL) in 2009. While human rights groups raised concerns at the time that the NSL’s “vague and broad provisions” would erode freedom of association and expression in Macau, the passage of the Macau NSL was not as controversial as the one in Hong Kong, and no one has been charged under the Macau NSL since its enactment in 2009. In 2021, Macau election authorities for the first time in the history of the SAR disqualified 21 pro-democracy candidates from running in its Legislative Assembly election. Macau’s pro-democracy politicians, which traditionally occupied a small minority in its legislature, were disqualified for disloyalty to the Macau SAR and PRC government. The absence of pro-democracy candidates on the ballot caused voter turnout to reach its lowest level in more than twenty years. Macau continues to enforce restrictions of admission and travel controls due to COVID-19 related concerns, including compulsory COVID testing and self-quarantine upon arrival. As of March 16, 2021, foreign nationals from areas outside mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are still prohibited from entering Macau, though exceptions are in place for some foreigners related to Macau residents, students, and essential workers, or for select business or academic reasons. Foreign nationals entering from mainland China will need to have been physically present in mainland China for 21 consecutive days before entering Macau. The Macau government did not provide a timeline for re-opening the borders for foreign nationals apart from those from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Since January 2020, U.S. citizens living in Macau have been unable to obtain in-person consular services due to ongoing COVID-19 restrictions mandated by the Macau government. Mail-in services can be an acceptable alternative in certain situations but cannot replace services that require a personal appearance before a consular officer such as the issuance of citizenship documents for children born in Macau and renewals of minor/first-time adult passports. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $24,300 2020 $25,586 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=MO Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2018 $398 2019 $2,530 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2017 $17 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 80% 2019 71.3% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report *Source for Host Country Data: Macau Statistics and Census Service Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (through 2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 37,012 100% Total Outward 8,557 100% China, P.R: Hong Kong 10,190 28% China, P.R: Mainland 7,480 87% Cayman Island 8,720 24% China, P.R: Hong Kong 1,263 15% China, P.R: Mainland 7,341 20% Vietnam 56 1% British Virgin Islands 5,913 16% United States 2,094 6% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Portfolio Investment Assets Top Five Partners (Millions, current US Dollars) Total Equity Securities Total Debt Securities All Countries 134,753 100% All Countries 46,333 100% All Countries 88,420 100% China, P.R: Mainland 51,181 38% China, P.R: Mainland 16,612 36% China, P.R: Mainland 34,569 39% China, P.R.: Hong Kong 16,327 12% China, P.R.: Hong Kong 8,218 18% British Virgin Islands 10,039 11% United States 14,743 11% Cayman Islands 6,178 13% United States 8,965 10% Cayman Islands 12,119 9% United States 5,777 12% China, P.R.: Hong Kong 8,109 9% British Virgin Islands 10,051 7% Luxembourg 2,964 6% Cayman Islands 5,941 7% Malawi Executive Summary Malawi’s economy was significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Gross domestic product growth slowed to 0.9 percent in 2020, but rebounded slightly in 2021, expanding by 2.2 percent. The government forecasts this trend will continue and forecasts growth of 4.5 percent by 2023. Macroeconomic and fiscal challenges remain, however. The government’s heavy debt burden and persistent fiscal deficits are likely to restrain economic expansion that outpaces population growth. Inflation was 9 percent in 2021, driven largely by currency devaluation and price increases for imported goods, primarily fuel, fertilizers, and food. The economy is heavily dependent on agriculture and is particularly vulnerable to climate related shocks. The Government of Malawi is eager to attract foreign direct investment. Investment opportunities exist in agricultural, mining, health, transportation, information technology, and energy sectors. Transportation is a potential growth sector as the government works to improve the road network and rehabilitate railway lines connecting Malawi to Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania. Public-private partnership opportunities are likely to open in aviation and road networks. Corruption remains a major problem at all levels of the public and private sectors. There is a scarcity of skilled and semi-skilled labor. Political risk in Malawi is manageable and tribal, religious, regional, ethnic, or racial tensions are minimal. The Malawi Investment and Trade Center assists investors and businesses by providing insight and local knowledge to help navigate the myriad regulations, processes, and procedures required to operate a business. Malawi’s legal system is generally unbiased but is notoriously slow. Investors have the right to establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises. Parliament is scheduled to review existing land laws in early 2022. If passed, the reforms may negatively affect foreign ownership and investment in land-based enterprises. Scarcity of foreign exchange (forex) remains a challenge and negatively affects investors. The government aims to maintain a three-month supply of forex, but often falls short of that goal. Forex rationing has led to several months wait for business to remit foreign investment funds. Despite the long wait times, there are currently no restrictions on remittance of foreign investment funds if the capital and loans initially came from foreign sources and were registered with the Reserve Bank of Malawi. Malawi is a land-locked country and the road network connecting to ports in neighboring countries is limited. Investment in infrastructure overall has been limited. Formal and informal trade boundaries may restrict imports and exports, and import tariffs tend to be high. Malawi is one of the least electrified countries in the world; approximately eleven percent of the country has access to regular electricity and internet is unreliable, and expensive. The government is committed to addressing climate change through climate smart policies and programs. The Environmental Management Act provides details on environmental requirements for investors and ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs). Climate change issues are integrated across the public service and national development plans. However, limited resources and issues related to poverty impede the government’s ability to implement climate adaptation and resilience programs and initiatives. Malawi’s borders are open to local and international travelers, but all travelers are required to present negative COVID-19 test results and certificate of COVID-19 vaccination. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 110 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 107 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 188 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 580 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Malawi is open to foreign and domestic investment. Foreign investors may invest in most sectors of the economy and may access government investment incentives. There are no restrictions on ownership, size of investment, source of funds, investment sector, or whether the products are destined for export or for domestic markets. An investor can disinvest 100%, make international payments, and cannot be forced into local partnerships. The Malawi Stock Exchange limits an individual foreign investor to 10% of any company’s initial public offering (IPO) and limits foreign investment to 49% of total shares in the company. The Cabinet Committee on Public Private Partnership was established in 2020 to boost private sector growth. The government utilizes the Malawi Investment and Trade Center ( MITC ), Ministry of Trade and Industry, Malawi Revenue Authority, Reserve Bank of Malawi, and the Public Private Partnership Commission to interface with foreign investors. The Malawi Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry ( MCCCI ) represents all sectors of the economy and has successfully lobbied the government on various private sector issues in the past. The Malawi Investment Forum serves as a platform for marketing the country, fostering partnerships, and bringing in foreign direct investment. The government does not impose restrictions on the ownership or location of investments. Foreign investment is permitted in all sectors of the economy except those that are deemed to pose a danger to health, the environment, or national security. There are no restrictions on funding sources, destinations, or final product. All companies are required to have at least two Malawian residents as directors, and there are limitations on foreign ownership of land. The 2022 session of Parliament is expected to review the current Land Act of 2016. The act states that neither Malawians nor foreigners can acquire freehold land. Foreigners can secure lease-hold land for up to 50 years and may renew the leasehold in most instances. Foreigners can only secure private land when no Malawian citizen has made an equal offer for the same land. The 2022 land act reform is expected to place additional restrictions on ownership and land acquisition by foreigners. Malawian nationals receive preferential treatment during the privatization of government assets; this can include discounted share prices and subsidized credit. The 2017 amendment to the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets (PPDA) Act calls for “the prioritization of all bids submitted to give 60% preference to indigenous black Malawians.” In 2020, the government drafted Indigenous Black Malawian (IBM) Preference regulations. These were approved by Parliament but failed to be gazetted due to pressure from non-indigenous populations. There is a high likelihood that the regulations will be gazetted in 2022. The Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) Participation Order restricts government ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) to allocate procurements below certain thresholds to MSMEs ( PPDA Legal Instruments ). Prior to establishing or conducting business in Malawi, all foreign investors are required to obtain an investment certificate from MITC . As part of the certification process, investors must register with the Registrar General’s office and RBM and have a minimum of $50,000 to invest ( MITC Investment Procedures ). MITC announced plans to revise the threshold for capital requirements in 2019 but provided no concrete timeline for completion. The proposed thresholds will differ by sectors and may go as high as $500,000, if implemented. Registration of borrowed invested funds allows investors to externalize profits to pay back loans contracted abroad and repatriate funds when disinvesting. ( MITC Malawi ). The last Trade Policy Review of Malawi was conducted by the WTO in April 2016. The full report is available at WTO TPR . The OECD and UNCTAD have not conducted investment policy reviews for Malawi. There are no recent policy recommendations by civil society organizations based on reviews of investment policy related concerns. The MITC offers business facilitation services to any foreign or domestic investor through their One Stop Center. The center houses representatives from Registrar General , Malawi Revenue Authority , Department of Immigration , and Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development. Information can also be found on MITC’s main website, the iGuides , and its online trade portal www.trade.mitc.mw ; and http://www.malawitradeportal.gov.mw/ . To operate in Malawi, a business must register with the Registrar General, the Malawi Revenue Authority and the Ministry or regulatory body overseeing their particular sector. Businesses can register online through the Registrar General; however, the online process can be cumbersome and inefficient due to technical constraints. Registering in person is preferred and generally less time consuming. Businesses must also obtain business licenses from the city assembly, register the worksite with the Ministry of Labor, and allow health officials to carry out periodic inspections of the company premises ( https://mitc.mw/invest/index.php ). Malawi does not incentivize or promote outward investment. The Pension Act of 2010 and accompanying regulations prohibit domestic investors from investing pension funds or umbrella funds in foreign schemes. There are no other prohibitions on domestic investors investing abroad. MITC is responsible for the promotion and facilitation of trade and investment. MITC offers services to both local and foreign investors, for both inward and outward facing investments. In practice, most MITC services are for domestic investing and business development. 3. Legal Regime The government continues to work on policy reforms to support business development and investment. The legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are partially transparent and consistent with international norms. Almost all proposed laws, regulations, and policies (including investment laws) are subject to public consultation before submission to the Cabinet, Parliament, or Ministry of Justice. However, public consultation notices are often posted late, resulting in a situation in which only insiders are aware of and able to participate in the consultation process. Enforcement of laws and regulations varies by location and sector and is limited by government resources and capacity. All regulations follow the same approximate process. The relevant government MDA develops technical regulations and forward them to Ministry of Justice for review and gazetting. All regulations are set at the national level with input from relevant stakeholders. Regulations and enforcement actions are legally reviewable in the national court system. The Ministry of Justice provides oversight or enforcement mechanisms to ensure MDAs follow administrative processes for developing and implementing regulations. Private individuals may raise issue with the appropriate MDA, Parliament, or Ombudsman if they feel the aforementioned procedures were not followed. There are no specific regulatory guidelines for reviewing regulations or conducting impact assessments, including scientific or data-driven assessments. There are no specific criteria for determining which proposed regulations are subject to an impact assessment nor is there a specialized government body tasked with reviewing and monitoring regulatory impact assessments conducted by other MDAs. The government uses a mix of fiscal, financial, and regulatory instruments to administer business and economic policies across multiple MDAs. Taxation policy is overseen by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs and the Treasury Department. The Malawi Revenue Authority is responsible for implementation of all tax policies. The Reserve Bank of Malawi administers monetary policy, exchange rate policy, as well as exchange controls to allow free flow of capital and earnings, and repatriation of dividends, profits, and royalties. The Immigration department administers the Employment of Expatriates Policy, Temporary Employment Permits (TEPs), and business residence permit. The Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development is responsible for land policy administration. The Malawi Bureau of Standards is responsible for metrology, standardization, and quality assurance. The Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority administers the communications act. The MITC is responsible for approving business plans and providing investment certificates. The National Construction Industry Council, Malawi Law Society, Malawi Accountants Board, Medical Council of Malawi, and the Employers Consultative Association of Malawi have sectoral rule-making authority, similar to regulatory power. Among the rules established by these associations is the required use of local labor, local contractors, or other means to achieve localization or skills transfer to Malawians. The sector-specific rule-making process is not transparent and can be confusing for firms that are new to the Malawi market. More information on the rule making process can be found at: https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/comparedata/consultation . The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Malawi (ICAM) adopted the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as a common global language in 2001. The Companies Act stipulates that all companies must use IFRS or IFRS accounting standards for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). All public interest entities are required to use full IFRS standards. The government encourages, but does not require environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. The Environmental Management Act provides the authority to the relevant ministry to require environmental and social impact assessment of projects prior to implementation which may significantly impact timelines and limit the use of an environment or natural resources. The government does not maintain a public, central repository for technical regulations. Copies of Acts and Laws are available at the National Library and High Court libraries. Copies of recent laws can be purchased from the government printing office. A limited number of laws are also available online at https://malawilii.org/ . The relevant MDAs manage and publish their respective regulations in the Malawi Government Gazette. MDAs do not generally post their regulations or laws on their websites but have been known to provide them upon request. Recently implemented policy reforms: (2020) Commodity exchange guidelines, the Cannabis Act of 2020, Export Processing Zone (EPZ) regulations: 20% allowance for local sales by an export enterprise under EPZ. Electronic Permit System launched by the Immigration Department. (2021) Control of Goods Act (COGA) Export Mandates: all grains, legume, and oil seed export transactions must take place through licensed commodity exchange. E-Passport System launched by the Immigration Department. Transparency of public finances and debt is inconsistent. Publicly available draft budget documents detail Malawi’s proposed or estimated revenue, and includes natural resources revenues, off-budget donor support, and detailed expenditure lines. The final, approved government budget only provides ministry level expenditure data, line items are generally not disclosed. Actual revenue and expenditures are included in the end of year financial statements. Information about government debt obligations is available in the financial statement and annual debt report. These documents are available at Ministry of Finance . Financial information and contingent liabilities on State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are generally unknown to the public. SOE data is not transparent nor made public. The IMF currently considers Malawi’s debt to be unsustainable. Additional information on Malawi’s debt can be found in the IMF’s publicly available reports. Malawi is a member of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), COMESA Customs Union, and the SADC Free Trade Area. The government develops all new regulations roughly in line with the regulatory policy provisions set out by AfCFTA, COMESA, and SADC but national regulations take precedence if there is a conflict. As a member of AfCFTA, SADC, and COMESA, Malawi is bound by their respective norms and standards. Details on the respective standards can be found at each organization’s website: SADC- SADC Standards-quality-infrastructure ; COMESA- http://www.comesacompetition.org/ ; and AfCFTA- https://au.int/en/cfta . There are no records of Malawi providing notification on draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Malawi submitted a statement on implementation and administration of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade in 2007 and signed the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) on July 12, 2017. Malawi has made progress on implementing the TFA provisions through the launch of a trade information portal at https://www.malawitradeportal.gov.mw/ . As of February 2022, Malawi has implemented 63% of the TFA Commitments . Malawi’s legal system is based on English Common Law. The judiciary consists of local courts and a local appeals court in every district. The higher tiers consist of the Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court, and the Magistrates’ Courts. Judges of the High Court are appointed by the President and posted to one of five divisions on the high court: civil, commercial, criminal, family and probate, or revenue. The High Court has judicial authority over all civil and criminal cases. The High Court hears appeals from the Magistrates’ Courts and the Supreme Court of Appeal in Blantyre hears appeals arising from the High Court. Magistrates’ Courts are located throughout the country. At the end of 2021, there were 36 seated High Court judges and 11 vacancies, and seven Supreme Court judges and six vacancies. The Commercial Division of the High Court deals exclusively with commercial or business disputes; the Revenue Division deals with any revenue or tax related matter. The Industrial Relations Court handles labor disputes and issues relating to employment. The Child Justice Court handles matters affecting children but falls under the High Court. More information on the judicial system can be found at the Judiciary website. The government does not have written commercial or contractual laws but instead relies on legislation that governs commercial transactions. The Sale of Goods Act, Companies Act, Employment Act, Hire Purchase Act, Insolvency Act, Control of Goods Act, Labor Relations Act, Business Licensing Act, Taxation Act, Consumer Protection Act, Copyright Act, and Patents Act, serve as the commercial and contractual framework. Mediation is often used to facilitate agreements prior to court proceedings. Enforcement of judgments can be extremely slow. Foreign and domestic investors have access to Malawi’s legal system, which is generally unbiased but notoriously slow. The legal process is slowed by heavy caseloads, staffing limitations, and inadequate funding. Court injunctions contribute significantly to backlogs and delays. The judicial system is independent of the executive branch. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable and adjudicated in the national court system. In the financial sector, regulations and enforcement actions are appealable through the Financial Services Appeals Committee and investors are free to seek judicial review through the High Court’s Commercial Division. The legal system supports local and foreign investments. The MITC operates a One Stop Center to assist any investor to navigate relevant government regulations and procedures. MITC and MCCCI both offer websites with relevant information on doing business in Malawi. The government established the Competition and Fair-Trading Commission ( CFTC ) in 2005 to promote fair and transparent business procedures. The CFTC is responsible for regulation, monitoring, and prevention of activities likely to negatively impact competition or fair trade in Malawi. CFTC decisions may be appealed at the Commercial Court level. COMESA Competition Commission is responsible for mergers and acquisitions across the COMESA block. It promotes and encourages competition by identifying and preventing restrictive business practices that may impede efficient market operations in COMESA. According to Malawi’s constitution, Section 44, expropriation of property is only permitted when done for public utility and with adequate notification and compensation. Land is generally only expropriated for government development projects, such as road construction. Affected individuals may obtain an independent assessment of the land value and have the right to appeal in court. The Land Acquisition Act of 2016 is currently under review and changes are expected. The reforms will likely impact land expropriation costs. Commercial courts govern all bankruptcies under the provision of the consolidated Insolvency Act of 2016 . The Act encourages the use of receivership or reorganization as an alternative to bankruptcy. Secured creditors are given priority over other creditors. Monetary judgments are usually made in the investor’s currency. Cross-border provisions of the Insolvency Act are modeled after UN Commission on International Trade Law models. 6. Financial Sector The Malawi Stock Exchange ( MSE ) is open to foreign portfolio investment. As of February 2022, the MSE hosts 16 listed companies with a total market capitalization of $3.01 million. The demand and supply of shares for listed companies is limited. The stock exchange is licensed under the Financial Services Act 2010 and operates under the Securities Act 2010 and the Companies Act 2013. Other governing regulations are the Capital Market Development Act 1990, and Capital Market Development Regulations 1992 as amended in 2013. There are no restrictions on foreign investors buying or selling shares listed on the MSE. Trading can be done by the stockholder or through one of four registered brokers. A secondary market offers government securities and is also open to local and foreign investors. Malawi respects the obligations under IMF article VIII. There are no restrictions on making payments or transfers for international transactions and no discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices undertaken without IMF approval. Credit is generally allocated on market terms though the cost of credit is generally high. Foreign investors may utilize domestic credit, but any proceeds from investments made using local resources are not remittable. According to a World Bank Report , only 40 percent of the adult population in Malawi use financial services. Access to and the cost of credit remains one of the biggest challenges for businesses and particularly SMEs. The minimum lending rate in February 2022 was 12 percent with a maximum rate of 24 percent. Mobile banking technology has the potential to increase access to local banking but is very nascent and its implementation is limited by access to reliable electricity and IT infrastructure. Official central bank reports do indicate an increase in electronic transactions over the last 24 months, but mobile banking is still not widely used. The banking sector is generally sound. The sector is overseen and regulated by the Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM). As of February 2022, there are eight full-service commercial banks with 106 branches across the country. The banking sector remained profitable and stable with adequate liquidity and capital positions throughout 2021. Prudential regulations have limited net forex exposure and non-performing loan rates hovers around 6-7 percent and spreads remain high. The sector is highly concentrated and heavily invested in domestic government debt, which is a systemic risk. Total assets as of December 2021 were $3.5 billion. The National Bank of Malawi and Standard Bank Malawi account for 46 percent of total assets. Equity capital of the two banks is approximately 61 percent and total loans 53 percent of total banking sector. The Banking Act provides a supervisory mandate to the RBM. The RBM has supervisory authority over all financial institutions and is responsible for ensuring the efficiency, reliability, and integrity of the financial system. There are no additional restrictions placed on foreign banks in Malawi. As of February 2022, four of the eight banks are foreign owned. The RBM and the major commercial banks maintain correspondent banking relationships with other central banks and major banks in foreign countries. To open a bank account locally, a foreigner must first present a temporary employment permit or business residency permit. Malawi does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund or similar entity. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Malawi has 71 public enterprises, 20 of which are SOEs. A full list of the SOEs is available by request from the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC), but the government does not publish the list in the media or online except in conjunction with the announcement of board members of public enterprises. The government has bailed out several SOEs when they incurred heavy losses. SOE finance and operations data is opaque and not available to the public. Malawi’s SOEs are not required to adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs. Corporate governance for the various SOEs is mandated by the law that established the entity. All public enterprises report to their sector-related line ministry, to the Department of Statutory Corporations in the OPC, and have a Chairperson and Board of Directors. The President appoints the board of directors, usually politicians, religious & traditional leaders, and professionals. Boards also include senior government officials as ex-officio/non-voting members. The participation of members as ex-officio/non-voting members, and of politicians as directors, creates a perceived and/or real conflict of interest. Public and private enterprises are subject to the same terms and conditions, and must compete for access to markets, credit, and business opportunities. Public enterprises are given special preference by the government in the case of public projects. Personal relationships play a significant role in influencing business decision-making. Public enterprises in agriculture, education, and health sectors spend more on research and development than the private sector. Local firms tend to be capital-constrained and highly skilled labor is scarce. There is not a strong tradition of private sector-led research and development in Malawi. There are no immediate plans for privatization of government resources or services. It is unclear how impacts from the proposed Lands Amendment will impact the ability of foreign investors to participate in the privatization sales. Under the current Land Law, if privatization were to take place, any foreign or domestic investor would be allowed to participate, and the government is permitted to offer domestic investors a discount on shares. Business and investment efforts are focused on public-private partnerships and attracting strategic investors rather than outright privatization. These are handled by the Public Private Partnership Commission . 10. Political and Security Environment Malawi continues to enjoy a stable and democratic government. Since the end of one-party rule in 1994, the country has had 7 peaceful presidential and 6 parliamentary elections. In 2020, Malawians voted for a new government in a court sanctioned presidential re-run ousting the then ruling party. Although political divisions exist, Malawi has no significant tribal, religious, regional, ethnic, or racial tensions that might lead to widespread violence. Incidents of labor unrest occasionally occur but are usually non-violent. Despite instances of political uncertainty there are no nascent insurrections or politically motivated activities of major concern to investors. Democratic processes in Malawi are well established, and destabilizing unrest is unlikely. Maldives Executive Summary The Republic of Maldives comprises 1,190 islands in 20 atolls spread over 348 square miles in the Indian Ocean. Tourism is the main source of economic activity for Maldives, directly contributing close to 30 percent of GDP and generating more than 60 percent of foreign currency earnings. The tourism sector experienced impressive growth, from 655,852 arrivals in 2009 to 1.7 million in 2019, before a steep decline in 2020 resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. Tourism began to recover in late 2020 and reached 1.3 million in 2021. This recovery in tourism will likely continue to drive the economy. Following the COVID-19 outbreak, the government re-emphasized the need to diversify, with a focus on the fisheries and agricultural sectors. GDP growth averaged six percent during the decade through 2019, lifting Maldives to middle-income country status. Per capita GDP is estimated at USD 6,698 in 2020, the highest in South Asia. However, income inequality and a lack of employment opportunities remain a major concern for Maldivians, especially those in isolated atolls. Following the COVID-19 outbreak, GDP fell 33.5% percent in 2020. With the tourism industry’s recovery, GDP grew 31.6 percent in 2021. Maldives is a multi-party constitutional democracy, but the transition from long-time autocracy to democracy has been challenging. Maldives’ parliament ratified a new constitution in 2008 that provided for the first multi-party presidential elections. In 2018, Ibrahim Mohamed Solih of the Maldivian Democratic Party was elected president, running on a platform of economic and political reforms and transparency, following former President Abdulla Yameen whose term in office was marked by corruption, systemic limitations on the independence of parliament and the judiciary, and restrictions on freedom of speech, press, and association. The MDP also won a super majority (65 out of 87) seats in parliamentary elections in April 2019, the first single-party majority in Maldives since 2008. President Solih pledged to restore democratic institutions and the freedom of the press, re-establish the justice system, and protect fundamental rights. Corruption across all sectors, including tourism, was a significant issue under the previous government and remains a concern. Serious concerns also remain about a small number of violent Maldivian extremists who advocate for attacks against secular Maldivians and may be involved with transnational terrorist groups. In February 2020, attackers stabbed three foreign nationals – two Chinese and one Australian – in several locations in Hulhumalé. ISIS claimed responsibility for an April arson incident on Mahibadhoo Island in Alifu Dhaalu atoll that destroyed eight sea vessels, including one police boat, according to ISIS’ online newsletter al-Naba. There were no injuries or fatalities. Speaker of Parliament and former President Mohamed Nasheed was nearly killed in a May 6, 2021, IED attack motivated by religious extremism. Nasheed sustained life threatening injuries and several members of his security and bystanders were also injured. Nine individuals have been charged in connection with the attack, with one already convicted. Large scale infrastructure construction in recent years contributed to economic growth but has resulted in a significant rise in debt. The Maldives’ debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 58.5 percent in 2018 to an estimated 61.8 percent in 2019 according to the World Bank (WB); this further increased to 138 percent in 2020 according to the Ministry of Finance (MoF), an increase driven by a sharp drop-off in government revenue. Maldives welcomes foreign investment, although the ambiguity of codified law and competition from politically influential local businesses act as deterrents. U.S. investment in Maldives has been limited and focused on the tourism sector, particularly hotel franchising and air transportation. In 2021, construction, transportation, fisheries, and renewable energy also benefited from increased FDI. On December 28, 2020, Maldives submitted an updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) which includes an enhanced ambition of 26 percent decrease in emissions and carbon neutrality by 2030, conditioned on receiving financial, technological, and technical support. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 85 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $6,490 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Maldives opened to foreign investment in the late 1980s and currently pursues an open policy for foreign investment. A weak and, in some cases, arcane system of laws and regulations deters some investment. Foreign investment in Maldives has primarily involved resort management, but also includes telecommunications, accounting, banking, insurance, air transport, real estate, courier services, and some manufacturing. Invest Maldives, an organization within the Ministry of Economic Development, is the government’s lead investment promotion arm. Services provided by Invest Maldives include promoting Maldives as an investment destination, providing information to potential investors about Maldives, guidance on investment approval and business registration, and facilitating the licensing of business. Every year, Invest Maldives holds forums in collaboration with foreign consulates and embassies, business councils, and other institutions to attract foreign investment. Invest Maldives plans to expand its reach with the aim of diversifying Maldives economy. Maldives allows foreign parties to register companies and partnerships but does not allow foreign parties to register cooperative societies or as a sole proprietor. Under a new Foreign Direct Investment policy established in February 2020, foreign investment is allowed in all major sectors of the economy apart from the following areas, which are restricted for locals only: Forestry Mining of sand Other mining and quarrying Manufacture of tobacco products Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork except furniture Manufacture of rubber and plastics products Manufacture of handicrafts and souvenirs Retail trade Wholesale trade in sectors except construction materials Land transport services and transport via pipelines Postal and courier activities Logistics activities (in transportation and storage) Operating picnic islands Food and beverage service activities (including café, restaurants, bakeries, and other eateries) Programming and broadcasting activities Legal activities (law firms etc.) Photography and videography Rental and leasing activities (including lease of heavy-duty machineries etc.) Employment activities such as employment agencies and recruitment services Travel agency, tour operator, reservation service and related activities Services to building and landscape activities Public administration and defense; compulsory social security Clinics except physiotherapy clinics Repair of computers and personal and household goods The following sectors are open for foreign investment, but with a cap on equity ownership: Manufacture of fish products (75 percent) Manufacture of agricultural products (75 percent) Printing and reproduction of recorded media (49 percent) Manufacture of furniture (75 percent) Repair and installation of machinery and equipment (75 percent) Installation of equipment that forms an integral part of buildings or similar structures, such as installation of escalators and elevators (40 percent) Construction of buildings (65 percent) Civil engineering (65 percent) Wholesale trade of construction materials (75 percent) Franchising in international airports and approved locations (including products & services) (75 percent) Sea transport services (including ownership of vessels) (49 percent) Air transport services (including freight services) (75 percent) Warehousing and support activities for transportation (75 percent) Guest houses in approved locations (inclusive of all services) (49 percent) Real estate activities (65 percent) Accounting activities (75 percent) Architecture and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis (75 percent) Advertising (60 percent) Other professional, scientific, and technical activities (75 percent) Veterinary services (75 percent) Security and investigation activities (75 percent) Office administrative, office support and other business support activities (75 percent) Universities and colleges (75 percent) Private schools (75 percent) Computer training institutions (75 percent) Vocational and technical educational institutes (75 percent) Sports and recreation education (75 percent) Engineering schools (training and conduction of courses related to aircraft engineering) (75 percent) Educational support activities (75 percent) Residential care services (75 percent) Social work activities without accommodation (75 percent) Physiotherapy clinics (75 percent) Creative, arts and entertainment activities (excluding live music bands and DJs) (75 percent) Libraries, archives, museums, and other cultural activities (75 percent) Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities (75 percent) Water sports activities (49 percent) Dive centers and dive schools (75 percent) The following conditions are applied to foreign investments in the construction sector, as per the foreign contractor regulation: Construction companies valued below USD 5,000,000 are required to be at least 35 percent Maldivian owned. Construction companies valued above USD 5,000,000 may be 100 percent foreign owned. There is little private ownership of land; most land is leased from the government, but Maldivians are permitted to hold title to land. In August 2019, parliament repealed a July 2015 constitutional amendment that allowed foreigners to own land and islands in connection with major projects, provided they invested at least USD 1 billion and at least 70 percent of the land was reclaimed. Currently, there are no property and real estate laws or mechanisms to allow foreign persons to hold title to land. The Land Act allows foreigners to lease land on inhabited islands for up to a maximum of 50 years, but there is no formal process for registration of leasehold titles. The Uninhabited Land Act allows foreigners to lease land on uninhabited islands for purposes other than tourism for a maximum of 21 years for investments amounting to less than USD 1 million and up to a maximum of 50 years for investments over USD 10 million. A 2010 amendment to the Tourism Act allows investors to lease an island for 50 years in general. A subsequent 2014 amendment allows the extension of resort leases up to 99 years for a payment of USD 5 million. The changes aim to incentivize investors, make it easier to obtain financing from international institutions, and increase revenue for the government. Leases can be renewed at the end of their terms, but the formula for assessing compensation value of a resort at the end of a lease has not been developed. In 2016, Parliament approved additional amendments to the Tourism Act, whereby islands and lagoons can be leased for tourism development based on unsolicited proposals submitted to the Tourism Ministry (Law No: 13/2016). The Ministry of Economic Development screens and reviews all foreign investment proposals. The process includes standard due diligence efforts such as a local police screening of all investors, determining the financial standing of the proposed shareholders through a bank reference, and performing a background check on the investors involved. According to the government, each case is reviewed based on its merits accounting for factors such as the number of existing investors in the sector and the potential for employment and technology transfer. In practice, the investment review process is not as transparent as policy would indicate, with potential for corruption to influence the decision-making process. The approval procedure for foreign investments is as follows: Submit a completed Foreign Investment Application form to the Ministry of Economic Development, available at . Walk-in consultations are available for foreign investors wishing to discuss their proposals prior to submitting an application. Receive approval The standard processing time is three working days; however, if relevant ministries must be consulted, the approval may take 10-14 days. Register a business vehicle Once approval is received, an investor must register as a company, partnership, or a company which has been incorporated in another jurisdiction. Application forms for registering as a legal vehicle are available from the ministry’s website. Sign the Foreign Investment Agreement with the Ministry of Economic Development. This Agreement outlines the terms and conditions related to carrying out the specific business in Maldives. For tourism sector investments, a Foreign Investment Agreement is not required as the land lease signed with the Ministry of Tourism governs all matters relating to tourism businesses in Maldives. Obtain licenses and permits. Sectors which require operating licenses include fisheries and agriculture, banking and finance, health, tourism, transport, construction, and education. The most recent World Trade Organization trade policy review was conducted in March 2016: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp432_e.html . Maldives ranked 147 out of 190 on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index in 2019, scoring especially low on getting electricity; registering property; trading across borders; protecting minority investors; getting credit; and resolving insolvency. On average, it takes six steps and 12 days to start a business. The Ministry of Economic Development manages the process for business incorporations, permits, licenses and registration of logos, trade markets, seals, and other processes. The Ministry’s website details relevant policies and procedures: http://www.trade.gov.mv The Ministry of Economic Development also maintains an online business portal at https://business.egov.mv to access the following services: Name Reservation; Business Name Registration; Sole Proprietorship registration submission; Company Registration Submission; SME Categorization; Issuance of Corporate Profile Sheet; Logo Registration; Seal Registration; Trade Mark Registration, Request for Certificate of Incumbency; Request for Letter of Good Standing; and a Request for re-issuance of registration certificate. Foreign investment companies, including entities with any foreign shareholding, must receive foreign investment approval before they can register online. As of March 2022, the government had completed draft amendments to the Companies Act, which are scheduled to be submitted to parliament during the first session of 2022. As of March 2022, the Electronic Transactions Bill has been submitted to parliament and was undergoing committee review. A Bankruptcy Bill was submitted to Parliament in 2020 and was in the committee stage as of March 2022. The passage of these bills could affect business facilitation. In June 2019, the government signed a USD 10 million project with the Asian Development Bank to develop a National Single Window project designed to establish a national single window system for international trade and reengineered trade processes which was still ongoing as of March 2022. The government does not promote or incentivize outward investment but does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad either. According to UNCTAD’s 2019 World Investment Report, Maldives has not registered any outward investment since 2005. 3. Legal Regime Maldives’ Parliament (the People’s Majlis) formulates legislation, while ministries and agencies, primarily the Ministry of Economic Development, develop regulations pertaining to investment. The Ministry of Tourism develops regulations relevant to the tourism sector. Certain business sectors require sector-level operating licenses from other ministries/agencies, including fisheries and agriculture, banking and finance, health, tourism, transport, construction, and education. The Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA) regulates the financial sector and issues banking licenses. The Capital Market Development Authority develops regulations for the capital market and pension industry and licenses securities market intermediaries. The current Parliament, sworn in in April 2019, regularly makes draft bills and regulations available for public comment. Since its inauguration in November 2018, the Solih administration has taken steps to improve fiscal transparency. For example, beginning in December 2018, the MoF began issuing weekly updates on fiscal operations on its public website. A limited write-up on total annual debt obligations for 2022 and projected annual debt obligations for 2023 and 2024 were included in a “budget book” published on the MoF website, along with the 2022 proposed budget. It includes the total amount of debt, disaggregated into the totals of domestic and foreign debt; however, it does not include details of contingent or state-owned enterprise (SOE) debt. Statistics on Central Government debt and on debt guaranteed by the government are published on the MoF website on a quarterly basis. Details of government-held debt are published bi-annually. Quarterly debt statistics include details on disbursed outstanding debt (both domestic and guaranteed), active external loans, external grants, and active sovereign guarantees. Quarterly debt can be found at https://www.finance.gov.mv/debt-management/debt-statistics . Details of SOE debt are published in the quarterly and annual reports on SOEs published by Public Enterprise Management (PEM) of the MoF at https://www.finance.gov.mv/public-finance/public-enterprises/audited-financial-statements-of-soes . Details of active sovereign guarantees as of September 21 can be accessed at: https://www.finance.gov.mv/public/attachments/mBb3dwgKLN1YZvSJOkAOdNDmzUSq8bn1uwXovIEK.pdf . The MMA, which functions as Maldives’ Central Bank, includes information on domestic debt obligations on a monthly basis on their website: http://mma.gov.mv/#/research/statisticalPublications/mstat/Monthly percent20Statistics . The MoF published a mid-year “Fiscal and Debt Strategy Report” on their website in July 2021. This report included details of the position of the debt portfolio at the end of 2020 and the estimated position by the end of 2021: https://www.finance.gov.mv/fiscal-and-debt-strategy-report . The website of the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) ( www.mvlaw.gov.mv ) publishes the full text of all existing laws and regulations, but most of the documents are in the Dhivehi language. The AGO is establishing an English language database of laws and regulations while the Judiciary is working on a database of court judgements. Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reporting is voluntary. Listed PLCs voluntarily report on sustainability aspects and Corporate Governance reporting is mandatory for all listed companies. Annual Reports of listed companies: https://www.cmda.gov.mv/en/public/listed-companies . Maldives is a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and is a signatory of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). Trade and investment related legislation and regulation are influenced by common law principles from the United Kingdom and other western jurisdictions. The judiciary has cited foreign case law from jurisdictions from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia when interpreting local trade-related statues. Maldives is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and has submitted some of the notifications under Technical Barriers to Trade. However, the Ministry of Economic Development reports that technical assistance is required for Maldives to fully comply with WTO obligations. The sources of law in Maldives are its constitution, Islamic Sharia law, regulations, presidential decrees, international law, and English common law, with the latter being most influential in commercial matters. The Maldives has a Contract Law (Law No. 4/91) that codifies English common law practices on contracts. The Civil Court is specialized to hear commercial cases. The Employment Tribunal is mandated to hear claims of unfair labor practices. A bill proposing the establishment of a Mercantile Court has been pending in Parliament since 2013. The Judicial Services Commission is responsible for nominating, dismissing, and examining the conduct of all judges. The Attorney General acts as legal advisor to the government and represents the government in all courts except on criminal proceedings, which are represented by the Prosecutor General. A Supreme Court was established as the highest judicial authority in Maldives in 2008 under the new Maldives Constitution. In addition to the Supreme Court, there are six courts: the High Court; Civil Court; Criminal Court; Family Court; Juvenile Court; and a Drug Court. There are approximately 200 magistrate courts, one in each inhabited island. The Supreme Court and the High Court serve as courts of appeal. There are no jury trials. In February 2020, President Solih stated his intent to submit a bill introducing a circuit court system in Maldives. As of March 2022, the government was working on legislative amendments to the Judicature Act to establish the circuit court. Historically, the judicial process has been slow and, often, arbitrary. In August 2010, the Judicial Services Commission (JSC), the judicial watchdog, reappointed—and confirmed for life—191 of the 200 existing judges. Many of these judges held only a certificate in Sharia law, not a law degree. The Maldivian judiciary is a semi-independent institution but has been subjected frequently to executive influence, particularly the Supreme Court. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2015 stated the judicial system is perceived as politicized, inadequate, and subject to external influence. An estimated 25 percent of judges have criminal records. The media, human rights organizations, and civil society had repeatedly criticized the JSC for appointing judges deemed unqualified. This history led President Solih’s administration to make judicial reform a top priority. In 2019, the JSC was overhauled; it removed the former Supreme Court bench and initiated investigations into ethics standards complaints against several judges from the High Court, Criminal Court, Civil Court, Family Court, and several island magistrate courts. In August 2019, Parliament amended the Judicial Service Commission Act to return control of the Department of Judicial Administration (DJA), which is responsible for the management of courts, to the JSC. This amendment was intended to overcome longstanding issues of the former Supreme Court using its direct supervision of the DJA to punish judges exhibiting judicial independence by transferring them to a lower court or another island as retribution. Foreign parties can invest in Maldives through the Foreign Investment Law or the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act. Details are available on the Ministry of Economic Development’s Doing Business in the Maldives Guide and in the tax guide: https://www.maldivesembassy.or.th/media/attachments/2019/08/23/doing-business-maldives-trade-min.pdf https://www.mira.gov.mv/forms/m829-tax-guide-for-foreigners-doing-business-in-the-Maldive.pdf Invest Maldives ( https://investmaldives.gov.mv ) is the primary website for investments and provides information on areas that are open for investment in Maldives. Sector-wise, broad investment opportunities are presented on the website with links to conceptual project briefs for which Invest Maldives is seeking investment from potential investors. A Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy was published in February 2020 to consolidate existing practices and introduce new guidelines, including two new routes to get government approval for foreign direct investments and new caps on equity ownership for investments in certain sectors. The first and second amendments to the FDI policy were announced on June 13 and 15, 2021 respectively. The policy is available at https://trade.gov.mv/laws-regulations under Foreign Investment Act. Foreign investment in Maldives is governed by Law No. 25/79, covering agreements between the government and investors. The Business Registration Act (18/2014) requires foreign businesses to register as a company or partnership. The Companies Act (10/96) governs the registration and regulatory and operational requirements for public and private companies. The Partnership Act of 2011 governs the formation and regulation of partnerships. Foreign investments are currently approved for an initial period of five years, with the option to renew. Maldives introduced income taxes through an Income Tax Act in December 2019. Taxation under the act was set to commence on January 1, 2020 but remuneration was to come within the purview of income effective April 1, 2020. The Business Profit Tax regime imposed under the Business Profit Tax Act and the Remittance Tax regime imposed under the Remittance Tax Act was repealed with the commencement of the Income Tax Act. Under the Act, tax rates remain unchanged for banks at 25 percent on profits, while taxes of 15 percent on profits that exceed USD 32,425 (MVR 500,000) would be levied on corporations, partnerships, and other business entities. In September 2020, President Solih ratified the sixth amendment to the Employment Act, which provides a standalone regulatory framework for overseas employees. It includes guidance on registering with the online x-pat system (work permit processing portal), grant of quotas, collection of quota fees, grant of entry passes and work permits to enter and remain in the country for work, deposits and refunds, accommodation arrangements and standards, regularization and penalties for breaches. In November 2020, President Solih ratified the second amendment to the Maldives Immigration Act. Under the new amendment, there are two additional visa options for foreigners travelling to Maldives: a corporate resident visa and a meeting visa. The corporate resident visa is a permit issued to foreigners who have invested over $250,000 in Maldives or by maintaining $250,000 in a fixed deposit account in a Maldivian bank for five years. According to the amendment, shareholders and partners of companies registered and operating in Maldives may acquire a corporate resident visa for themselves and their families under the established rules and regulations. The meeting visa is a short-duration permit under which foreigners may visit Maldives for professional reasons. This may include attending a business conference, professional convention or a meeting approved by a government agency. A meeting visa is issued according to the guidelines defined by the Registrar of Businesses. In 2019, Maldives drafted the Competition and Fair Business Practices Act to ensure a fair market and equitable opportunities for all small and medium enterprises. President Solih ratified the bill on August 31, 2020, and it came into force in February 2021. The Ministry of Economic Development is the principal agency responsible for implementing the Act, including hearing, reviewing, and acting on competition-related complaints. No competition-related cases have been submitted to Ministry of Economic Development as of March 2022. According to the Law on Foreign Investment (No. 25/79), the government may, with or without notice, suspend an investment when an investor indulges in an act detrimental to the security of the country or where temporary closure is necessary for national security. If, after due investigation, it cannot be concluded within 60 days of the temporary closure that the foreign investor had indulged in an activity detrimental to the security of Maldives, the government will pay compensation. Capital belonging to an investment that is closed for these reasons may be taken out of the country in a mutually agreed upon manner. In December 2012, the Maldivian government took over operation of the Malé International Airport from GMR Infrastructure Limited, an Indian company, after the Maldivian government repudiated the 2012 contract. In 2016, the Maldivian government paid GMR USD 271 million in damages as ordered by a Singaporean Arbitration Tribunal. 6. Financial Sector Maldives Stock Exchange (MSE), first opened in 2002 as a small securities trading floor, was licensed as a private stock exchange in 2008. The Securities Act of January 2006 created the Capital Market Development Authority (CMDA) to regulate the capital markets. The MSE functions under the CMDA. The only investment opportunities available to the public are shares in the Bank of Maldives, Islamic Bank of Maldives, five state-owned public companies, a foreign insurance company, a foreign telecommunications company, and a local shipping company. The market capitalization of all listed companies listed was 1.25 billion dollars as of March 2022. Foreigners can invest in the capital market as both retail and institutional investors. Capital market license holders from other jurisdictions can also seek licenses to carry out services in the Maldives capital market. There are no restrictions on foreign investors obtaining credit from banks in Maldives nor are there restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. The Maldives financial sector is dominated by banking. The banking sector consists of eight banks, of which three are locally incorporated, four are branches of foreign banks and one is a fully owned subsidiary of a foreign bank. There are 52 branches of these banks throughout the country of which 33 are in the rural areas. Additionally, at the end of 2017 there were 116 automatic teller machines (of which 51 were in rural areas) and 230 agent banking service providers. Maldives has correspondent banking relationships with six banks. Maldives has not announced intentions to allow the implementation of blockchain technologies (cryptocurrencies) in its banking system. In October 2021, following an announcement by an international resort management company saying it would accept cryptocurrencies as payment for their services, the MMA announced that Maldivian law does not permit cryptocurrencies for valid business transactions. International money transfer services are offered by four remittance companies through global remittance networks. Two telecommunications companies offer mobile payment services through mobile wallet accounts and this service does not require customers to hold bank accounts. Non-bank financial institutions in the country consist of four insurance companies, a pension fund, and a finance leasing company, a specialized housing finance institution and money transfer businesses. Maldives Real Time Gross Settlement System and Automated Clearing House system is housed in the MMA for interbank payments settlements for large value and small value batch processing transactions respectively. There has been an increase in usage of electronic payments such as card payments and internet banking. All financial institutions currently operate under the supervision of the MMA. Rules relating to the foreign exchange market are stipulated in the Monetary Regulation of the MMA. Both residents and non-residents may freely trade and purchase currency in the foreign exchange market. Residents do not need permission to maintain foreign currency accounts either at home or abroad and there is no distinction made between foreign national or non-resident accounts held with the banks operating in Maldives. The exchange rate is maintained within a horizontal band, with the value of the Rufiyaa allowed to fluctuate against the U.S. dollar within a band of 20 percent on either side of a central parity of MVR12.85 per U.S. dollar. In practice, however, the rufiyaa has been virtually fixed at the band’s weaker end of Rf 15.42 per dollar, according to the IMF. Rules regarding foreign remittances are governed by the Regulation for Remittance Businesses under the Maldives Monetary Authority Act of 1981. There are no restrictions on repatriation of profits or earnings from investments. In 2016, the government imposed a three percent remittance tax on money transferred out of Maldives by foreigners employed in the Maldives. However, Maldives Inland Revenue Authority (MIRA) repealed the remittance tax effective from January 1, 2020, to reduce “out-of-bank” money transactions that had become commonplace following implementation of the tax. In 2016, Maldives Finance Minister announced plans to establish a “Sovereign Development Fund (SDF)” that would support foreign currency obligations incurred to executive public sector development projects. The government has not published any documents related to the SDF and does not have a published policy document regulating funding or a general approach to withdrawals regarding SDF. As of March 2022, the MoF is in the process of drafting a Sovereign Development Fund Act. Allocations to the SDF are included in the budget and published in the MoF’s weekly and monthly fiscal development reports published regularly on its website. The Ministry reported two sources of funding for the SDF – revenue gathered through Airport Development Fees charged to all travelers entering and departing Maldives and ad hoc allocations made by the MoF at its discretion. Expected ADF receipts are included in the Revenue Tables of the Budget. Reports from the MoF show that the size of the SDF fund had amassed USD 206.5 million as of February 25, 2021. 10. Political and Security Environment Maldives is a multi-party constitutional democracy, but the transition from long term autocracy to democracy has been challenging. Maldives gained its independence from Britain in 1965. For the first 40 years of independence, Maldives was run by President Ibrahim Nasir and then President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, who was elected to six successive terms by single-party referenda. August 2003 demonstrations forced Gayoom to begin a democratic reform process, leading to the legalization of political parties in 2005, a new constitution in August 2008, and the first multiparty presidential elections later that year, through which Mohamed Nasheed was elected president. In February 2012 Nasheed resigned under disputed circumstances. President Abdulla Yameen’s tenure, beginning in 2013, was marked by corruption, systemic limitations on the independence of parliament and the judiciary, and restrictions on freedom of speech, press, and association. Yameen’s tenure was also characterized by increased reliance on PRC-financing for large scale infrastructure projects, which were decided largely under non-transparent circumstances and procedures. External debt rose rapidly during his tenure. In September 2018, Solih won his campaign for president running on a platform of economic and political reforms and transparency. His party, the MDP, then won a super majority (65 out of 87) seats in parliamentary elections in April 2019, the first single-party majority since the advent of multi-party democracy. President Solih pledged to restore democratic institutions and the freedom of the press, re-establish the justice system, and protect fundamental rights. There is a global threat from terrorism to U.S. citizens and interests. Attacks could be indiscriminate, including in places visited by foreigners and “soft targets” such as restaurants, hotels, recreational events, resorts, beaches, maritime facilities, and aircraft. Concerns have increased about a small number of potentially violent Maldivian extremists who advocate for attacks against secular Maldivians and are involved with transnational terrorist groups. For more information, travelers may consult the 2020 Country Reports on Terrorism at https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/maldives/. U.S. citizens traveling to Maldives should be aware of violent attacks and threats made against local media, political parties, and civil society. In the past there have been killings and violent attacks against secular bloggers and activists. For more information, travelers may consult the State Department’s 2020 Human Rights Report at https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/maldives/ and https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/Maldives.html. Maldives has a history of political protests. Some of these protests have involved use of anti-Western rhetoric. There are no reports of unrest or demonstrations on the resort islands or at the main Velana International Airport. Travelers should not engage in political activity in Maldives. Visitors should exercise caution, particularly at night, and should steer clear of demonstrations and spontaneous gatherings. Those who encounter demonstrations or large crowds should avoid confrontation, remain calm, and depart the area quickly. While traveling in Maldives, travelers should refer to news sources, check the U.S. Mission to Maldives website and https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/Maldives.html for possible security updates, and remain aware of their surroundings at all times. The U.S. Mission to Maldives is based in Colombo, Sri Lanka. There are no U.S. diplomatic personnel resident in Maldives, constraining the U.S. government’s ability to provide services to U.S. citizens in an emergency. Many tourist resorts are several hours’ distance from Malé by boat, necessitating lengthy response times by authorities in case of medical or criminal emergencies. For more information, visit https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/Maldives.html. Mali Executive Summary Title Despite enthusiasm for U.S. investment, there are significant obstacles to investing in Mali, including political instability, economic sanctions, allegations of corruption, poor infrastructure, and ongoing insecurity throughout the country. Mali remains under transition government rule after a coup d’etat in August 2020, followed by a further consolidation of military power in May 2021. The U.S. Department of State maintains a “Level 4: Do Not Travel” travel advisory for Mali due to crime, terrorism, and kidnapping. Continued insecurity throughout Mali is exacerbated by the minimal presence of the state in many areas and has permitted terrorist groups to conduct attacks against Western targets and Malian security forces. Intercommunal violence stemming from conflict between livestock herders and crop farmers in central Mali further contributes to instability. Mali depends on bilateral donors and multilateral financial institutions, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and African Development Bank, to fund major development projects, particularly in health, infrastructure, education, and agriculture. Mali received significant financial support in 2020 to address the COVID-19 pandemic and to support post-pandemic economic recovery. Since then, however, donors such as Denmark and France have partially or fully interrupted their development support to Mali, intensifying the financing needs. The COVID-19 crisis interrupted a five-year period of consistent growth. As a result, Mali’s growth in 2020 reached only two percent against an initial projection of five percent. The transition government took measures to support households and businesses amid this economic slowdown, further increasing its fiscal deficit, which reached 6.2 percent of GDP in 2020, against an initial projection of 3.5 percent. In March 2021, the IMF projected GDP growth of six percent for Mali, as well as average inflation of two percent. Mali was relying on these positive projections to reduce its budget deficit to 4.5 percent of GDP, down from 5.5 percent a year ago. These projected figures will likely be significantly affected by the ECOWAS and WAEMU sanctions in force during the first half of 2022. Business contacts report both Malian and foreign businesses face corruption in procurement, customs procedures, tax payment, and land administration, although the transition government has committed to undertaking reform, including through improved public financial management practices and increased tax revenues. Efforts to strengthen revenue collection agencies, particularly customs, are ongoing following significant revenue shortfalls in 2018 that the IMF attributed to corruption, weak taxpayer compliance, and fraud. Malian businesses generally view U.S. products favorably and openly search for new partnerships with U.S. firms, particularly in infrastructure, energy, mining, and agriculture. Investors may consult the website of Mali’s Investment Promotion Agency (API-Mali) Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 136 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 124 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 0* https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 830 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD * A nonzero value that rounds to zero. 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Mali encourages foreign investment. In general, the law treats foreign and domestic investment equally. In practice, U.S. investors report facing many of the same challenges as other foreign investors do, including allegedly unfair application of tax collection laws, difficulties clearing goods through customs, and requests for bribes. Corruption in the judiciary is common and foreign companies may find themselves at a disadvantage vis-à-vis Malian investors in enforcing contracts and competing for public procurement tenders. The transition government has instituted policies promoting direct investment and export-oriented businesses. Foreign investors go through the same screening process as domestic investors. Criteria for authorizing an investment under Mali’s 2012 investment code include the size of the proposed capital investment, the use of locally produced raw materials, and the level of job creation. Mali’s Investment Promotion Agency (API-Mali) serves as a one-stop shop for prospective investors and serves both Malian and foreign enterprises of all sizes. API-Mali’s website ( https://apimali.gov.ml/ ) provides information on business registration, investment opportunities, tax incentives, and other topics relevant to prospective investors. Mali maintains an office in charge of business climate reform (Cellule Technique des Réformes du Climat des Affaires or CTRCA). Since 2015, Mali has also had a committee for monitoring business environment reforms that includes both government and private sector members. Mali adopted a law governing public-private partnerships (PPPs) in 2016 and has a dedicated PPP unit charged with reviewing and facilitating implementation of PPP projects in a multitude of sectors. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises with no restriction to forms of remunerative activities. There are some specific limits on ownership in the mining and media sector: Malian law requires the owners and primary shareholders of media companies be Malian nationals. Foreign investors in the mining sector can own up to 90 percent of a mining company. WAEMU, of which Mali is a member, requires Malian and foreign companies to report if they will hold foreign currency reserves in their Malian business accounts and to receive approval from the Ministry of Economy and Finances and from the Central Bank for West African States (BCEAO). The World Trade Organization (WTO) reviewed the trade and investment policies of WAEMU members, including Mali, in 2018. The review can be accessed here . The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner released reports on Mali human rights situation. Mali’s Investment Promotion Agency, API-Mali ( https://apimali.gov.ml/ ), serves as a one-stop shop to facilitate both foreign and local investment. API successfully reduced the average time to start a business in Mali to 72 hours, which it expects to further reduce to 48 hours. API provides investors with information relating to authorizations for business creation, waivers, the organization of investments promotion events, and other information. API opened regional satellite offices in Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Segou, and Mopti. There is no noted discrimination based on gender, age, or ethnicity in the process of business registration. Foreign companies wishing to register in Mali may receive tax and customs benefits depending on the size of investment. Small and medium-sized enterprises (for which there is no common definition across government entities) are also eligible for some fiscal advantages. The transition government has no specific policy to promote outward investment. Mali has gradually begun to introduce economic diplomacy by appointing economic advisors in its diplomatic representations. In general, its outward direct investment flows to neighboring countries. 3. Legal Regime In its 2022 Fiscal Transparency Report Survey, the Department of State determined Mali does not meet the minimum requirements of fiscal transparency nor did it make significant progress toward achieving that goal in the previous year. Mali has adopted laws designed to meet the requirements of fair competition, ease bureaucratic procedures, and facilitate the hiring and firing of employees, but in practice many international firms complain of lack of transparency in the regulatory system and challenges in enforcing regulatory requirements to the detriment of business prospects. There is no public comment period or other opportunity for citizens or businesses to comment upon proposed laws. Mali is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. Mali is also a member of the African Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law (OHADA) and implements the Accounting System of West African States (SYSCOA), which harmonizes business practices among several African countries consistent with international norms. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or associations. Mali’s Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (Autorité de régulation des marchés publics or ARMDS) is tasked with ensuring transparency in public procurement projects and may receive complaints from businesses on public procurement-related issues. ARMDS publishes information about its decisions in disputes as well as key laws relating to public procurement on its website at http://www.armds.ml/ . The transition government regularly reviews regulations in order to adapt them to the current national context or to international standards or commitments. The new mining code and its implementing decree, adopted respectively in 2019 and in 2020, will apply to future mining projects. In February, the ministry of mines declared it is working on the new mining code to improve it and correct deficiencies. In December 2021, the transition government approved a new customs code in order to simplify the customs procedures and facilitate international trade. The government planned also to reform the investment code. The tax code and the tax procedures book (Livre de procédures fiscales) were substantially amended in September 2020, mainly to introduce a mandatory registration of all taxpayers, to operate changes in the VAT refund, to classify companies in terms of risks for the tax office, to digitize tax return and payment. The tax office had also planned to make e-filing mandatory. More information is available on the tax office’s website here . The reform initiatives in Mali capitalize on experience, input from stakeholders (citizens, elected officials, and technical and financial partners), and reflect the requirements of the new directives establishing a harmonized, renewed framework for public finance in WAEMU member states. Mali has enacted the following directives: Law N°2013-031 of July 23, 2013, adopting the Code of Transparency in Public Finances; Law N°2013-028 of July 11, 2013, relating to the Finance Laws; Decree 2014-0349 of May 22, 2014, on the General Regulations of Public Accounting; and Decree 2014-0774 of October 14, 2014, on the State Chart of Accounts. Mali makes public finance documents, including the budgets for all government ministries and offices, available on the Ministry of Economy of Finance’s website (https://www.finances.ml/loidesfinances). Mali’s national budget provides details on the expenditures of government entities (including the presidency and prime minister’s office) and the revenues of tax collection authorities, including customs, the public debt directorate, the land administration directorate, and the treasury and public accounting directorate. The budget also includes information on public debt, as well as government subsidies to petroleum products and to the state-owned utility company (Energie du Mali or EDM). Mali also publishes a simplified version of the budget known as the citizen’s budget. Mali has multiple audit institutions tasked with monitoring public spending. The Malian supreme court’s accounts section is responsible for reviewing and approving the financial statements of all government departments. The Office of the Auditor General (Bureau du Vérificateur General, or BVG) is authorized to audit the accounts of all government entities as well as private companies or other entities that receive public funds. Its reports are made public and can be accessed at http://www.bvg-mali.org/ . Mali has other auditing institutions, including the Office to Fight against Illicit Enrichment (Office central de Lutte contre l’Enrichissement illicite or OCLEI), the General Comptroller of Public Services (Contrôle Général des Services Publics or CGSP), and the Support Unit for Administrative Auditing Bodies (Cellule d’Appui aux Structures de Contrôle de l’Administration or CASCA). Despite the existence of multiple audit institutions, management of public funds remains opaque and subject to corrupt practices, particularly in public procurements. Mali remains a suspended member of WAEMU and ECOWAS. Mali is a member of the WTO. Mali has not notified the WTO of any measures concerning investments related to trade in goods that are inconsistent with the requirements of Trade Related Investment Measures. Information on other notifications from Mali to the WTO can be found at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/mali_e.htm under the “Notifications from Mali” section. Mali’s legal system is based on French civil law. Mali uses its investment code, mining code, commerce code, labor code, and code on competition and price to govern disputes. Disputes occasionally arise between the government or state-owned enterprises and foreign companies. Some investors report certain cases involve wrongdoing on the part of corrupt government officials. Although Mali’s judicial system is independent, many companies have noted it is subject to political influence. Numerous business complaints are awaiting an outcome in the courts. The Minister of Justice wields influence over the career paths of judges and prosecutors, which may compromise their independence. Corruption in the judicial system is common, leading to what foreign investors have characterized as flawed decisions. An independent commercial court was established in 1991 with the encouragement of the U.S. government to expedite the handling of business litigation. Commercial courts, located in Bamako, Kayes, and Mopti, can hear intellectual property rights cases. In areas where there is no commercial court, the local courts of first instance have the jurisdiction to hear business disputes. Decisions made by the courts of first instance are appealable in the court of appeals and/or in the supreme court. Since its inception, the commercial court has handled cases involving foreign companies. The court is staffed by magistrates and is assisted by elected Malian Chamber of Commerce and Industry representatives. Teams composed of one magistrate and two Chamber of Commerce and Industry representatives conduct hearings. The magistrate’s role is to ensure the court renders decisions in accordance with applicable commercial laws, including internationally recognized bankruptcy laws, and court decisions are enforced under Malian law. Mali’s investment code gives the same incentives to both domestic and foreign companies for licensing, procurement, tax and customs duty deferrals, export and import policies, and export zone status if the firm exports at least 80 percent of production. Incentives include exemptions from duties on imported equipment and machinery. Investors may also receive tax exemptions on the use of local raw materials. In addition, foreign companies can negotiate specific incentives on a case-by-case basis. Mali has reduced or eliminated many export taxes and import duties as part of ongoing economic reforms; however, export taxes remain for gold and cotton, Mali’s two primary exports. The government applies price controls to petroleum products and cotton, and occasionally to other commodities (such as rice) on a case-by-case basis. In most cases, foreign investors may own 100 percent of any business they create, except in the mining and media sectors. Foreign investors may also purchase shares in parastatal companies. Foreign companies may also start joint-venture operations with Malian enterprises. The repatriation of capital and profit is guaranteed. Despite having a generally favorable investment regime on paper, foreign investors have complained of facing challenges in practice, including limited access to financing, high levels of corruption, poor infrastructure (including inconsistent electricity access), a non-transparent judicial system, and the lack of an educated workforce. The following websites provide additional information relating to investments in Mali: Investment Promotion Agency: https://apimali.gov.ml/ Mali Trade Portal: https://tradeportal.ml/ National Council of Employers: http://www.cnpmali.org/index.php/lois-et-reglements/codes Niger River Authority (Officer du Niger): https://www.on-mali.org/on/ Ministry of Economy and Finances: http://www.finances.gouv.ml The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is responsible for reviewing free competition in the Malian marketplace. Mali’s national competition law (Law 2016-006 and Decree 2018-0332) and the WAEMU 2002 anti-trust rules are the primary judicial documents that govern competition in Mali. The competition law bans any agreements restricting competition or market access. It also bans control or fixation of prices through agreements. Abuses of dominance are prohibited. The commercial court (Tribunal of Commerce) and ARMDS are the primary judicial bodies that oversee competition-related concerns. Mali’s Organization of Industrial Entrepreneurs (Organisation Patronal des Industriels or OPI) has criticized corruption and smuggling as significant hurdles to fair competition. Contacts report Mali struggles to limit illegal imports of products such as sodas, juices, tobacco, medicines, and textiles (including fabrics). The General Directorate of Customs, the National Directorate for Commerce and Competition, and the Agency for the Sanitary Security of Foods occasionally intervene to address the import and commercialization of smuggled goods but have limited capacity to effectively address the problem. Expropriation of private property other than land for public purposes is rare. Mali has not unfairly targeted U.S. firms for expropriation. Under Malian law, the expropriation process must be public and transparent and follow the principles of international law. Compensation based on market value is awarded by court decision. The government may exercise eminent domain in various situations, including when undertaking large-scale public projects, in cases of bankrupt companies that had a government guarantee for their financing, or when a company has not complied with the requirements of an investment agreement with the government. In cases of illegal expropriations, Malian law affords claimants due process in principle. However, given reported corruption in the land administration sector, impartial adjudication of court cases involving land disputes is rare. Mali’s bankruptcy law is found in its commerce code, which does not criminalize bankruptcy. The commercial code makes a distinction between insolvency and the cessation of payment or accidental difficulty. It defines the judiciary process of compulsory liquidation. Generally, a bankrupt company will be sold piecemeal. 6. Financial Sector Portfolio investment is not a current practice in Mali. In 1994, the government instituted a system of treasury bonds available for purchase by individuals or companies. The payment of dividends or the repurchase of bonds may be done through a compensation procedure offsetting corporate income taxes or other sums due to the government. The WAEMU stock exchange program based in Abidjan has a branch in each WAEMU country, including Mali. One Malian company is quoted in the stock exchange. The planned privatization of EDM, Mali’s state-run electricity company, the telecommunications entity (Societé des Telecommunications du Mali or SOTELMA), the cotton ginning company (Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement du Textile or CMDT), and the Bamako-Senou Airport offer prospects for some companies to be listed on the WAEMU stock exchange. WAEMU statutes and the BCEAO govern the banking system and monetary policy in Mali. Commercial banks in Mali enjoyed considerable liquidity, though this was negatively affected by the imposition of financial sanctions during the first half of 2022. The majority of banks’ loanable funds, however, do not come from deposits, but rather from other liabilities, such as lines of credit from the BCEAO and North African and European banks. Despite having sufficient loanable funds, commercial banks in Mali tend to have highly conservative lending practices. Bank loans generally support short-term activities, such as letters of credit to support export-import activities and short-term lines of credit and bridge loans for established businesses. Small- and medium-sized businesses have reportedly had difficulty obtaining access to credit. The Guarantee Fund for Private Sector (le Fonds de Garantie du Secteur Privé or FGSP) is a partially state-owned financial institution which provides guarantees up to 50 percent of the loan that SMEs/SMIs and microfinance institutions could borrow from commercial banks. The FGSP also provides direct financing to the private sector. Mali recently increased the financial resources of the FGSP as a measure to support the private sector to face the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Mali also created a National Directorate of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in 2020 in part to address the challenges SMEs face in accessing financing. In order to improve the business environment and soundness of the financial system, the BCEAO adopted a uniform law regarding credit reference bureaus. The government aligned its legislation with this regional requirement by authorizing a credit reference bureau in Mali to collect and process information from financial institutions, public sources, water and electricity companies, and other entities to create credit records for clients. The credit rating system aims to increase the solvency of borrowers and improve access to credit. Mali’s microfinance sector has grown rapidly. Despite this growth, microfinance institutions suffer from poor governance and management of resources and have not put in place all government regulations or regional best practices to ensure sufficient financial controls and transparency. Money laundering and terrorist financing are concerns in Mali. Although Mali’s anti-money laundering law designates several reporting entities, companies have noted very few comply with their legal obligations. While businesses are technically required to report cash transactions over approximately $10,000, most reportedly do not. Despite terrorist networks operating throughout Mali, the country’s financial intelligence unit, the National Financial Information Processing Unit (CENTIF), receives relatively few suspicious transaction reports concerning possible cases of terrorist financing. With the exception of casinos, designated non-financial businesses and professions are not subject to customer due diligence requirements. Mali is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Mali’s most recent mutual evaluation report, completed in November 2019, can be found at http://www.giaba.org/reports/mutual-evaluation/Mali.html . Mali does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Mali has privatized or reduced government involvement in many state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, there are still 45 state-owned or partially state-owned companies in Mali, including 12 mining companies, five banks, the national electricity company EDM, the telecommunications entity SOTELMA, the cotton ginning company CMDT, as well as cigarette company (Société nationale de tabac et allumettes du Mali or SONATAM), sugar companies Sukala and N-Sukala, and the Airports of Mali. The government no longer has shares in two banks, Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour l’Investissement et le Commerce (BSIC-Mali), and Coris Bank International-Mali, in which it had respectively 25 and 10 percent shares as of December 2017. The government reduced its shares in the Malian Development Bank (BDM) and Malian Solidarity Bank (BMS) while it maintained its share in the Banque Nationale de Developpement Agricole (BNDA), which increased its total capital stock by 21.5 percent in 2019 compared with 2018. Private and public enterprises compete under the same terms and conditions. No preferential treatment is given to SOEs, although they can be at a competitive disadvantage due to limited flexibility in their management decision-making process. Malian law guarantees equal treatment for financing, land access, tax burden, tax rebate, and access to raw materials for private firms and SOEs. The government is active in the agricultural sector. The parastatal Niger River Authority (Office du Niger) controls much of the irrigated rice fields and vegetable production in the Niger River inland delta, although some private operators have been granted plots of land to develop. The Office du Niger encourages both national and foreign private investment to develop the farmlands it manages. Under a Millennium Challenge Corporation-funded irrigation project, Mali granted titles to small private farmers; an adjacent tranche developed with MCC was to have been open to large-scale private investment through a public tender process. However, all MCC projects were suspended as a result of the coup d’état of March 2012 and discontinued when the projects reached the end of their implementation deadline. The national cotton production company, CMDT, which is yet to be privatized, provides financing for fertilizers and inputs to cotton farmers, sets cotton prices, purchases cotton from producers, and exports cotton fiber via ports in neighboring countries. The agricultural sector, including cotton growing, is subject to erratic rainfalls. The government also remains active in the banking sector. The state owns shares in five of the 14 banks in Mali: BDM (19.5 percent share), Banque Internationale pour le Mali (BIM) (10.5 percent), BNDA (36.5 percent), BMS (13.8 percent), and Banque Commerciale du Sahel (BCS) (3.3 percent). While the government no longer has a majority stake in BDM, it has significant influence over its management, including the privilege to appoint the head of the Board of Directors. Senior transition government officials from different ministries make up the boards of SOEs. Major procurement decisions or equity raising decisions are referred to the Council of Ministers. Government powers remain in the hands of ministries or government agencies reporting to the ministries. No SOE has delegated powers from the government. SOEs are required by law to publish an annual report. They hold a mandatory annual board of directors meeting to discuss financial statements prepared by a certified accountant and certified by an outside auditor in accordance with domestic standards (which are comparable to international financial reporting standards). Mali’s independent Auditor General conducts an annual review of public spending, which may result in the prosecution of cases of corruption. Audits of several state-owned mining companies have revealed significant irregularities. The government’s privatization program for state enterprises provides investment opportunities through a process of open international bidding. Foreign companies have responded successfully to calls for bids in several cases. The government publishes announcements for bids in the government-owned daily newspaper, L’Essor. The process is non-discriminatory in principle; however, there have been many allegations of corruption in public procurement. 10. Political and Security Environment The U.S. Department of State’s Fact Sheet on Mali is available at https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-mali/. The current Travel Advisory for Mali is available at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/mali-travel-advisory.html. Throughout nearly three decades of multi-party democracy, Mali has consistently encouraged private enterprise and investment. However, the destabilizing effects of Mali’s 2012 coup d’état led to a deterioration of the economic situation and uncertainty in the investment climate. The August 2020 coup d’état and the May 2021 consolidation of military power have plunged the country into political uncertainty and instability, further exacerbating existing challenges. Mali remains under transition government rule, although ECOWAS and other international organizations maintain pressure on the government to organize elections in a timely manner. Mali continues to face significant political and security challenges amidst slow implementation of a peace agreement signed in 2015 that aims to resolve the ongoing conflict in northern Mali. A disparate group of signatory armed groups, militias, bandits, and terrorist groups continue to exert influence in wide swathes of Mali’s largely ungoverned northern areas as well as central Mali. Furthermore, terrorist groups have increased the frequency and range of their attacks—particularly against the base camps of the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) and the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) in northern and central Mali—in an effort to destabilize the country. The situation in central Mali—namely in the Segou and Mopti regions—is increasingly unstable due to intercommunal conflict, localized political violence, and the incursion of extremist groups into the region. Terrorist groups with varying degrees of allegiance to al-Qaeda and ISIS operate in Mali, and often pursue local agendas complementary to these global extremist movements. Groups linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which have merged under the banner of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), continued to conduct terrorist attacks throughout 2021, primarily targeting international and Malian military forces. These groups have claimed responsibility for recent gun and improvised explosives attacks, kidnappings, and other violent actions in northern and central Mali. While the MINUSMA peacekeeping effort is still present in Mali, in February French authorities declared their intent to remove troops from the country. Malian security forces have undertaken counterterrorism operations in the central and the tri-border region since November 2021. However, they have been unable to counter every threat, and in many cases they are accused of targeting civilians. In March of this year, extremist groups attacked FAMa in Mondoro, resulting in dozens of dead, including among FAMa. The UN peacekeepers’ northern base camps are often targeted by terrorist groups. Attacks by violent extremist groups have moved beyond the traditional conflict zone in northern Mali to central and southern Mali, where many villages are controlled by extremist groups who prevent farmers from growing crops, destroy planted crops, and impose zakat. The tri-border area (the border with Burkina Faso and Niger) and some remote parts of southern Mali are increasingly under threat of attack. While Malian forces, backed by MINUSMA and French forces, had taken steps to reassert control over most of the major cities, much of northern and central Mali remain unstable, with large swaths of the country outside state control. AQIM, long entrenched in northeastern Mali, remains a threat. AQIM has demonstrated a pattern of kidnapping hostages for ransom and launching operations against neighboring Algeria, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Niger. AQIM and its local affiliates have been involved in various terrorist attacks targeting Westerners in Mali, including at a restaurant in Bamako in March 2015; at a hotel frequented by foreigners in Sevare in August 2015; against the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako in November 2015; and against the Campement de Kangaba hotel in June 2017. While previous extremist attacks have generally spared foreign companies, aside from hotels and restaurants, some attacks have targeted infrastructure projects involving foreign companies. In October 2017, extremists attacked a foreign company in charge of the construction of a road in Timbuktu and destroyed several vehicles. In March 2018, terrorists attacked and destroyed a USD 66 million dam construction project in Djenne. In April 2020, extremist groups carried out attacks in the southwestern region of Kayes, Mali’s gold-mining region. In 2021, extremist groups attacked mobile companies’ infrastructure in different areas of northern Mali, resulting in facility damage and service interruptions. In September 2021, a mining company convoy accompanied by Malian security forces was attacked by terrorists on the road from Bamako to Kayes, resulting in at least five deaths. While Malian armed forces have increased pressure on extremist groups, observers consider that the departure of the French forces may result in increased security challenges, including from signatories of the Algiers Peace Accord. U.S. citizens living or traveling in Mali are encouraged to enroll in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) at https://step.state.gov/step to receive security messages and make it easier to be located in an emergency. Malta Executive Summary The Republic of Malta is a small, strategically located country 60 miles south of Sicily and 180 miles north of Libya, astride some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. A politically stable parliamentary republic with a free press, Malta is considered a safe, secure, and welcoming environment for American investors to do business. Malta joined the European Union in 2004, the Schengen visa system in 2007, and the Eurozone in 2008. With a population of about 516,100 and a total area of only 122 square miles, it is the EU’s smallest country in geographic size. The economy is based on services, primarily shipping, banking and financial services, online gaming, tourism, and professional, scientific, and technical activities. Manufacturing also plays a small, but important role. Maltese and English are the official languages. Given its central location in one of the world’s busiest trading regions, as well as its relatively small economy, Malta recognizes the important contribution that international trade and investment provides to the generation of national wealth. After robust economic growth of 5.3 percent in 2019, the Maltese economy registered a severe contraction in 2020 of -8.2 percent brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, thanks to the improvement of the public health situation in Malta, which allowed for a significant relaxation of restrictive measures, real GDP growth rebounded strongly to 5.9 percent in 2021. Malta’s unemployment rate stood at 3.1 percent in February 2022. While the top three credit rating agencies predicted the economic impact of the pandemic would be less pronounced on the Maltese economy when compared to other EU neighboring countries, Moody’s moved from a stable to a negative outlook. The current sovereign credit ratings are A-/A-2 with a stable outlook (S&P); A2 with a negative outlook (Moody’s); and A+ with a stable outlook (Fitch). Moody’s recent change to a negative outlook on the government’s debt burden is attributed to the Financial Action Task Force’s greylisting and risks linked to the recovery of the tourism sector. In 2020, the Government of Malta revamped its citizenship-by-investment program, which provides citizenship by naturalization to applicants (and their dependents). The new program still offers a track to citizenship through the introduction of a residency requirement before the acquisition of Maltese citizenship. The residency program offers two investment routes to acquire citizenship: i) individuals can apply after a one-year residency period if they invest €750,000 ($875,000) or more; or ii) applicants can opt to pay €600,000 ($700,500) if they apply after a three-year residency period. IIP conditions include a €700,000 ($814,000) minimum for purchasing immovable property, or a €16,000 per year minimum for leasing immovable property (which must be retained for at least five years), and a €150,000 minimum for investment in stocks, bonds, or debentures. Applicants must also make a mandatory €10,000 ($11,600) philanthropic donation and pass a due diligence test before filing the application. In March 2022, the government suspended the processing of applications for nationals of the Russian Federation and Belarus. The suspension applies to both Malta’s citizenship-by-investment scheme as well as a residency through investment scheme, which must be renewed on a yearly basis. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 49 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 27 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $1.5 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 25,370 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Malta seeks foreign direct investment (FDI) to increase its rate of economic growth. Malta provides incentives to attract investment in high-tech manufacturing (including plastics, precision engineering, electronic components, automotive components, and health technologies such as pharmaceuticals manufacturing and biotechnology), information and communications technology (ICT), research and development (R&D), aerospace, aviation maintenance and drones, education and training, registration of ships and aircrafts, transshipment and related service industries, finance services, and digital technologies, including artificial intelligence technologies, blockchain, innovative technologies, and digital gaming. Malta’s comparative advantages include membership in the EU, Eurozone, and Schengen Zone; proximity to European and North African markets; excellent telecommunications and transport connections; a fair and transparent business environment; a skilled, English-speaking labor force; and competitive wage rates (although the cost of living is comparable to many EU countries, labor costs are relatively low by comparison). Malta also offers financial, tax, and other investment incentives to attract FDI, although tax incentives, may change to reflect Malta’s agreement with the global tax harmonization outlined by the OECD. Foreign investment plays an integral part in the Government of Malta’s policies to reduce the role of the state in the economy and increase private sector activity. FDI will also play a key role in building Malta’s economic recovery post-pandemic as the country is in the process of shaping an economic strategy based on tangible niche market opportunities that will help it recover in the new economic and health conditions. Malta Enterprise, a government organization that promotes FDI in Malta, provides information to prospective investors, processes applications for government investment incentives, and serves as a liaison between investors and other government entities. The organization offers an attractive investment package for U.S. and other investors. The government seeks, as a top priority, companies operating in the following fields: High-end manufacturing; ICT, augmented and virtual reality, and digital gaming; Health technologies, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and emerging medical sectors including medical cannabis and medtech; Back office and regional support operations; Digital technologies including blockchain, artificial intelligence, innovative technologies, e-sports, and fintech; Knowledge-based service, including education and training and research and development; Logistics-based services, including marine technology, warehousing, and oil/gas services; and Film industry (Malta has one of the few sets in the world for water/boating scenes). Private foreign investors are free to make equity arrangements as they wish, from joint ventures to full equity ownership, however FDI in Malta is subject to Chapter 620 of the Laws of Malta, in line with EU regulation 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union. The Government of Malta has set up a National Foreign Direct Investment Screening Office (NFDIS), the NFDIS’s scope and remit consists of screening new FDI projects, joint ventures with a foreign component, and the transfer of any shares and/or controlling interests in existing companies where the owner, titleholder, or ultimate beneficial owner originates from any country outside of the European Union. The sectors as per law which are subject to screening include the following: (a) critical infrastructure, whether physical or virtual, including energy, transport, water, health, communications, media, data processing or storage, aerospace, defense, electoral or financial infrastructure, and sensitive facilities, as well as land and real estate crucial for the use of such infrastructure; (b) critical technologies and dual use items, including artificial intelligence, robotics, semiconductors, cybersecurity, aerospace, defense, energy storage, quantum, nuclear technologies, nanotechnologies, and biotechnologies; (c) supply of critical inputs, including energy or raw materials and food security; (d) access to sensitive information, including personal data, or the ability to control such information; and (e) the freedom and pluralism of the media. The Government of Malta recognizes the right to private ownership in theory and in practice. Private entities are free to establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity, following review by NFDIS if necessary. Many U.S. firms sell their products or services in Malta through licensing, franchise agreements, or similar arrangements. The government generally allows foreign companies to operate in merchandising areas, especially if they operate a licensing, franchising, or similar agreement through a local representative. It is the government’s stated policy not to allow public enterprises to operate at the expense of private entities. Some sectors, such as electricity generation, are also open to private sector participation. The government provides private enterprises with the same opportunities as public enterprises for access to markets and other business operations. The Government of Malta has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews through a multilateral or civil society organization in the last five years. The Maltese Commercial Code provides for the establishment of several types of business entities according to the needs of an individual investor when setting up a company in Malta. The following are the available structures: Private limited liability companies; Public limited liability companies; General partnerships; and Limited partnerships. Foreign companies can also open subsidiaries or branch offices in Malta. When setting up a Maltese private company, the minimum share capital amount accepted is €1,165 ($1,300). The minimum for a public company is approximately €46,600 ($51,670), of which 25 percent must be deposited prior to registration. In case of private companies with an authorized share capital exceeding the minimum requirements, only 20 percent of the amount must be deposited. The maximum number of shareholders for limited liabilities companies is 50 and minimum is two (although a single-member company may also be registered under the Companies Act). The following are the main steps required to set up a company in Malta: Reserve a company name with the Maltese Business Registry; Draft the company’s memorandum and articles of association; Deposit the minimum share capital; and File the application with the Malta Business Registry. The documents to be filed with the Malta Registrar of Companies are: The memorandum and articles of association; A confirmation of the company name reservation; The bank receipt confirming the share capital deposit; and Passport copies of the shareholders, directors, and company secretary. The Malta Business Registry (MBR) is responsible for the registration of new commercial partnerships, the registration of documents related to commercial partnership, the issuing of certified documentation including certificates of good standing amongst others, the reservation of company names, the collection of registration and other fees, the publication of notices, and the imposition and collection of penalties. MBR also conducts investigations of companies and maintains the company and partnership register. The memorandum must be presented to MBR, which offers an online system allowing users to register a company and submit commonly used forms (including a bank receipt as proof of payment of the initial share capital). All the statutory forms and notices are available on the website free of charge. MBR may also request that due diligence on the directors, shareholders, and/or beneficial owners be provided before proceeding with the incorporation. Upon incorporation, companies must pay a registration fee payable to MBR according to the amount of share capital held by the company. Once all the requirements above are satisfied, MBR will normally carry out incorporation of a company within two to three working days. Once incorporation is complete, MBR will publish a Certificate of Incorporation that will also display the company registration number. MBR website: https://mbr.mt/ The Government of Malta also offers a one-stop shop for businesses – Business First – that assists companies with all processing of services and information to establish a company. Business First brings more than 50 essential services from various government departments and entities under one roof. It assists all enterprises based in Malta, including microenterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), larger companies, and foreign investors wishing to set up in the country. Business First website: https://businessfirst.com.mt/ TradeMalta, incorporated in 2014, is a public-private partnership between the government and the Chamber of Commerce to help Malta-based enterprises internationalize. TradeMalta is also the national organization tasked with marketing and coordinating both incoming and outgoing trade missions, promoting participation in international trade fairs, facilitating bilateral trade meetings, and researching new market opportunities. Although TradeMalta promotes outward investment and incentives for companies to seek international business, it does not provide financial incentives to set up FDI in other jurisdictions. This quasi-governmental organization is also tasked with maintaining business relationships with countries with whom Malta has a trading activity and dedicates its resources to identifying new markets, which are not considered traditional trading partners. (For the past three years, it has targeted African countries for outgoing trade missions.) The organization provides specialized training programs in international business development and marketing and administers incentive schemes and internationalization programs aimed at both novice and experienced exporters. The government actively supports and promotes franchising, joint-ventures, and other forms of international business opportunities between Malta-based businesses and foreign companies. 3. Legal Regime Malta has transparent and effective policies and regulations to foster competition. It has revised labor, safety, health, and other laws to conform to EU standards. All proposed regulations are published on a unified website, on the website of the relevant ministry or regulator, and directly distributed to interested stakeholders. Stakeholder engagement is currently required for all subordinate regulations as part of the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) process as well as for some primary laws in selected policy areas. Each online consultation is accompanied by a feedback report, summarizing the views of participants and providing feedback on the comments received. According to an OECD 2019 report on Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance, the transparency of the Maltese regulatory framework could be further strengthened by making RIAs available for consultations with stakeholders by systematically engaging with stakeholders during the development of primary laws, specifically at an early stage, before a preferred regulatory decision has been identified. In April 2021, the European Commission (EC) presented its proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD). The Commission plans to introduce extensive mandatory reporting requirements for large companies and separate, proportionate standards for listed SMEs, a requirement that would extend to Malta. Companies will have to report on how sustainability issues affect their business, society, the environment and vice versa. As a result, nearly 50,000 companies in the EU – Maltese companies included – will have to report on sustainability matters. External audits will be required to verify the reported information. Companies will have to digitally report/tag the information, so it is machine readable. Once an agreement is reached in the negotiations on EU level (estimated Q2 2022) and the directive enters into force, the reporting requirements would be applicable from the 2023 financial year onwards for large companies. Listed SMEs would have to comply as of the 2026 financial year. In December 2021, Malta launched its first Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) portal, allowing the general public and investors to evaluate the environmental, social and governance credentials of the largest quoted companies in Malta. The ESG portal, facilitates local and foreign investors’ access to data measuring the level of importance companies are giving to ESG. This platform will serve to further encourage sustainable investment, as investors are increasingly looking into ESG credentials before investing. These companies are quoted on Malta’s Stock Exchange, and their ESG credentials can now be accessed via: https://sustainabledevelopment.gov.mt/esg/ . Malta’s regulatory system is derived from the acquis communautaire, the body of laws, rights, and obligations that are binding on all EU member states. Consequently, trade and investment relations with third countries are an EU responsibility under the Common Commercial Policy. However, with respect to investment, Malta does have some national competences in certain investment areas. In particular, where the EU does not have or is not negotiating an investment protection agreement, Malta can hold or negotiate one unilaterally. Malta also maintains competence in the areas of transport and portfolio investment, as well as corporate taxation. NFDIS implements the EU-wide mechanism for cooperation on investment as required by the new EU framework for investment screening which entered into force on April 10, 2019. Malta became a WTO member on January 1, 1995. However, all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade are now made at the EU level. Malta ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement on October 5, 2015 and is in full compliance with its implementation commitments. Malta’s Commercial Code regulates commercial activities and related legislation, such as the Banking Act, the Central Bank of Malta Act, and bankruptcy. In cases of bankruptcy, the court appoints a curator to liquidate the assets of the bankrupt company, organization, or individual, and distributes the proceeds among the creditors. The Maltese judiciary is independent, and courts are divided into superior courts, presided over by judges, and inferior courts, presided over by magistrates. Inferior courts have jurisdiction over minor offenses of a criminal nature and small civil matters. The judiciary traditionally functions through the Criminal, Civil, and Constitutional courts. The First Hall of the Civil Court hears commercial cases. Malta has a Criminal Court of Appeal and a second Court of Appeal for all other matters. The Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine questions and appeals on constitutional issues. There are also a number of administrative tribunals, such as the Industrial Tribunal, the Rent Regulation Board, the Sanction Monitoring Board, and the Board of Special Commissioners (for income tax purposes). Malta adopted the European Convention of Human Rights as part of its domestic law in 1987. The Maltese judiciary has a long tradition of independence. Once appointed to the bench, judges and magistrates have fixed salaries that do not require annual approval. Judges cannot be dismissed, except by a two-thirds vote in the House of Representatives for proven misbehavior or the inability to exercise properly their function. The Maltese Constitution guarantees the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary and a fair trial. In December 2018, the European Commission for Democracy through Law, known as the Venice Commission, issued an opinion on the constitutional arrangements, separation of powers, and independence of the judiciary and law enforcement bodies of Malta. The Commission recommended setting up an office of an independent Director of Public Prosecutions with security of tenure, being responsible for all public prosecutions, subject to judicial review. The opinion also recommended abolishing the possibility that judges can be dismissed by Parliament and suggested modifications to the system of the judicial appointments. Malta is currently in the process of implementing changes in accordance with the Venice Commission recommendation. Thus far various laws have been enacted to address reforms which include constitutional arrangements that divest powers from the Prime Minister to appoint the judiciary and law enforcement, and separation of powers between the judiciary and law enforcement. In the latest 2021 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on Malta the European Commission noted that Maltese reforms enacted during 2020, in particular the reform of the system of judicial appointments and of judicial discipline, have contributed to strengthening the independence of the Maltese justice system. Additional reforms have been carried out to enhance checks and balances. Reforms of the appointment of persons exercising top executive functions and appointments to certain independent commissions, proposed in 2020, have been adopted. Remaining concerns regarding the appointment process for certain other public bodies will be addressed under the Constitutional Convention. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the timing and organization of this Convention are still to be set. Several laws govern foreign investment in Malta. The Income Tax Act of 1948 (as amended in 1994) establishes a single rate of taxation of 35 percent on income for limited liability companies in Malta. In certain qualifying cases, this rate can fall to five percent through a system of tax refunds on dividends paid. The Business Promotion Act authorizes the Government of Malta to allocate fiscal and other incentives to companies engaged in manufacturing (including software development), repair, or maintenance activities. The Malta Enterprise Act of 2003 enables Malta Enterprise to develop and administer incentives and other forms of support to liberalize and update legislation relevant to FDI. The Companies Act of 1995 regulates the creation of limited liability companies. The Companies Act also provides for the establishment of investment companies with variable share capital (SICAVS) and companies with share capital denominated in a foreign currency. The Malta Financial Services Authority Act of 1989 established the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA), which is responsible for the regulation of banking and investment services in Malta. The Investment Services Act of 1994 regulates investment services in the banking and insurance sectors. In 2018, Malta enacted three new acts related to blockchain. The Malta Digital Innovation Authority Act (MDIA) establishes the Authority that oversees and regulates innovative technologies, along with the Innovative Technology Arrangement and Services Act (ITAS) that regulates Innovative Technology Arrangements and Services, such as the software and coding used in digital ledger technology (DLT), smart contract, and related applications, together with the technical administration and review services. In 2018, the MFSA was entrusted with the Virtual Financial Assets Act (VFA) that regulates Initial Virtual Financial Assets Offerings and delineates their licensing requirements. The National Foreign Direct Investment Screening Office Act of 2020 was set up in order to implement the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union. The purpose of the screening process is to protect European Union intelligence, knowledge and technology, as well as the security interests of the Union. Malta is a free-trade, open-economy country. The government does not approve or restrict any FDI, so long as it complies with EU and national regulations. Malta Enterprise reviews FDI before granting any incentives to a private entity or business. A due diligence process is carried out prior to approving greenfield investments. The MFSA undertakes the filings and regulatory screenings on financial investments. The Office for Competition, currently housed within the Malta Competition and Consumer Affairs Authority (MCCAA), is the office tasked with protecting competition in Malta. The Maltese Competition Act is modelled on EU competition law. The latest amendments to the Competition Act in 2011 strengthened its deterrent effect by widening the decision-making powers of the Office for Competition and further aligned both the substantive and procedural rules with those existing under EU law. The Government of Malta, in exceptional instances, expropriates private property for public purposes. In such cases, the government must take action in a non-discriminatory manner and in accordance with established principles of international law. Investors and lenders of expropriated property receive prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. In 1993, the government’s Property Division started accepting expropriation requests by public bodies only if the requests were accompanied by the compensation due to the landowners. In 2002, this practice was made law. As a result, the government may only expropriate private property if the presidential decree also includes a deposit for the compensation due. In recent years, the government has appropriated land mainly for the widening of roads; however, no particular sectors are at risk for expropriation or similar actions, and no laws force local ownership. The Companies Act and the Commercial Code Bankruptcy in Malta and the Set-off and Netting on Insolvency Act of 2003 regulate bankruptcy. The latter provides for the set-off and netting due to each party with respect to mutual credits, mutual debts, or other mutual dealings that are enforceable whether before or after bankruptcy or insolvency. The Maltese insolvency law regime distinguishes between bankruptcies of a person and bankruptcies of a commercial partnership other than a company. When a company cannot pay its debts, it may initiate insolvency proceedings. In such a case, the court examines carefully whether the financial situation of the company justifies its insolvency or whether it could remain operational and continue to pay its debts. Any officer of a company who, in the twelve months prior to the deemed date of dissolution, concealed assets or documents, disposed of assets, or otherwise acted in a fraudulent manner may be criminally liable. Separately, courts may find any such officers civilly liable for such acts and require them to pay back to the company any moneys due. The law also provides for proceedings in cases of wrongful trading by directors and fraudulent trading by any officer of the company. The Malta Association of Credit Management, known as MACM, is a members-owned, not-for-profit organization, providing a central national organization for the promotion and protection of all credit interests pertaining to Maltese businesses. More information at: https://www.macm.org.mt/ . 6. Financial Sector Malta’s Stock Exchange was established in 1993. In 2002, the Financial Markets Act effectively replaced the Malta Stock Exchange Act of 1990 as the law regulating the operations and setup of the Malta Stock Exchange. This legislation divested the Malta Stock Exchange of its regulatory functions and transferred these functions to the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA). The Financial Markets Act also set up a Listing Authority, which is responsible for granting “Admissibility to Listing” to companies seeking to have their securities listed on the Exchange. To date, the few companies publicly listed on the Malta Stock Exchange have not faced the threat of hostile takeovers. Except for the EU regulation 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments and the subsequent incorporation into the Laws of Malta as Chapter 620, Malta has no laws or regulations authorizing firms to adopt articles of incorporation/association that would limit foreign investment, participation, or control. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms; several U.S. auditing firms have local offices. The Maltese banking system is considered sound. In recent years, local commercial banks expanded the scope of their lending portfolios. Capital is available from both public and private sources; both foreign and local companies can obtain capital from local lending facilities. Commercial banks and their subsidiaries can provide loans at commercial interest rates. It is possible for new investors to negotiate soft loans from the government covering up to 75 percent of the projected capital outlay. No U.S. bank has a branch in Malta. BNF and HSBC Malta currently maintain direct correspondent banking relationships with U.S. banks. Some local banks act as correspondents of several U.S. banks via other EU banks, though such a relationship often results in higher transaction costs. The majority of banks have stopped opening accounts for companies that do not operate in Malta, those that operate in the electronic gaming sector, and those operating in the cryptocurrency sector. The few banks that still offer these services have tightened their due diligence processes, resulting in long delays to open accounts. Malta takes pride in being the first country to propose a legal framework for the creation of an Authority to regulate Blockchain, Artificial Intelligence, and Internet of Things (IOT) devices. In 2018, Government enacted three legislations that provide a regulatory framework on Distributed Ledger Technology, issuers of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), and related service providers dealing in virtual currencies, which currently fall outside the scope of a legislative and regulatory regime. In 2015, Malta established the National Development and Social Fund (NDSF) to manage and administer receipts from the country’s citizenship-by-investment program. Since inception through May 2021, it had raised a total of €599.8 million ($660.7 million). The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute currently ranks Malta’s NDSF the world’s 80th largest sovereign wealth fund. The fund receives 70 percent of its contributions from the country’s citizenship program. Among some of the most noteworthy investments allocated by the NDSF are: €66 million ($72 million) in Social Housing, for the construction of a substantial amount of units; €1.5 million ($1.65 million) as an investment in artistic heritage, €3.5 million ($3.85 million) in Urban Greening projects and €950,000 ($1.46 million) investment in Mater Dei Hospital’s Cardiology Department to upgrade its two catheterization suites. NDSF funds are also being utilized by government to help soften the economic crises brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. The mission of the NDSF is to contribute towards, promote, and support major projects and initiatives of national importance and public interest. These initiatives and projects are intended to develop and improve the economy, public services, and the general well-being of present and future generations. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Malta Investment Management Company Limited (MIMCOL) was established in 1988 to manage, restructure, and selectively divest the Government of Malta from state-owned enterprises (SOEs). MIMCOL also promotes private sector investment using cost-effective business practices across various SOEs. MIMCOL created strategies leading to the dissolution of SOEs with limited commercial prospects, as well as the profitable spin-off of non-core operations with commercial potential. MIMCOL’s focus then turned to SOEs deemed of strategic national value, but whose inefficient operations were reflective of a lack of competition. Eventually, MIMCOL prepared most SOEs for privatization and sold them off. Today, MIMCOL’s role has evolved into specialized assignments, such as strategic reviews of the management and operations of important parastatal companies and corporations operating in various sectors.MIMCOL’s sister company Malta Government Investments (MGI) holds a portfolio of 17 companies (excluding companies falling under the responsibility of other ministries and investments held directly by the government). This portfolio is not well defined. Most government investments are held by either the Board of Trustees within the Ministry for the Economy, European Funds and Lands or by Malta Government Investments Limited (MGI) as an agent for the Government of Malta. In recent years, the Maltese government has privatized a number of state-controlled firms, including the country’s largest bank, the postal service, shipyards, energy generation plants, and the wireless telecommunications industry. Although no plans exist to privatize Air Malta, the national airline, the Government of Malta was considering options for a strategic minority partner, though these plans are currently on hold. Ryanair also operates a subsidiary airline called Malta Air that incorporated its 61 Ryanair routes to and from Malta. The Ryanair fleet was registered with the Malta Aviation Authority. In 2015, the Government of Malta set up Projects Malta and Projects Plus Ltd to coordinate and facilitate public private partnerships between government ministries and the private sector. The government welcomes private investors, Maltese and non-Maltese, in privatization projects. It affords foreign investors equal treatment with domestic investors and sets few limitations on their operations. The government finalized its first international public-private partnership in the healthcare industry in 2015. Foreign investors can repatriate or reinvest profits without restriction and take disputes before the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 10. Political and Security Environment Malta has faced some political turmoil since the 2017 assassination of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia, whose reporting focused on local government corruption and allegations of money laundering. Civil society protests led to resignations of a number of high-level officials, including the Prime Minister. Since then the country has elected a new Prime Minister who expressed commitment to good governance and rule of law reform, including increased protections for journalists. Despite this isolated cased of targeted violence against a journalist, Malta is generally considered to have a safe political system and is secure relative to other countries in the region. Mauritania Executive Summary The deterioration of the global economy that resulted from the COVID-19 pandemic had a severe impact on the Mauritanian economy and reversed the previously bright economic outlook that led to the reduction of the country’s poverty rate from 10.9 percent in 2008 to 6.0 percent in 2014. The Mauritanian government response has been swift in mitigating the impact of the pandemic with the support from international partners by way of assistance funds and debt service suspensions. As a response to the pandemic’s economic impact, President Ghazouani launched the Economic Recovery Plan (ProPEP) in September 2020. ProPEP aims to boost the economy and improve the living conditions of vulnerable populations by reducing extreme poverty, expanding basic socio-economic infrastructures, organizing the information sector, and adopting a regulatory framework conducive to private sector development. As part of his annual speech to the parliament on January 29, Prime Minister Bilal presented a brighter picture of Mauritania’s economic outlook highlighting the government’s push to attract more investors. His presentation highlighted Mauritania’s natural resources which consist of deposits of copper, gypsum, uranium, and hydrocarbons including one of Africa’s largest offshores discoveries, the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim (GTA) natural gas field. The 2022 budget reflects the Mauritanian government’s priorities as it attempts to revitalize the national economy and alleviate poverty, especially in the informal sector which was particularly impacted by COVID-19 and comprises 70 to 75 percent of the total economy. With its considerable natural resources, Mauritania places great importance on foreign direct investment (FDI). The continued global demand for iron-ore boded well for Mauritania throughout the pandemic as iron ore production is a main contributor to the country’s GDP. Real GDP is expected to grow from 2.8 percent in 2021 to 4.2 percent in 2022. Mauritania has substantial renewable energy potential, particularly when it comes to solar, wind, and hydro power resources. The natural gas reserves at GTA are expected to enter production in 2023. The energy sector (hydrocarbons and renewable energy) offers opportunities for increased U.S. direct investment in Mauritania. On February 28, Kosmos Energy announced that it will increase investments in Mauritania and Senegal in 2022 by USD 300 million to accelerate development of the GTA gas field. According to Power Africa, the Government of Mauritania is working to expand its electricity supply and encourage investment in the renewable energy sector to stimulate the economy with the aim of reaching universal access by 2030. To do this, the GIRM will: Increase new production capacity from local resources, mainly natural gas; Increase the share of renewable energies in its total energy production, targeting 60 % by 2030; Further develop the transmission network and interconnections with neighboring countries; and Implement decentralized solutions in isolated areas. Traditionally, U.S. investment in Mauritania has been primarily in the hydrocarbons and mining sectors. However, the Mauritanian government’s efforts to meet the challenges of food self-sufficiency provide an opportunity for U.S. agro-businesses to engage with Mauritania through supplies and equipment sales, as well as technical training. In 2019, Mauritania ranked as the United States’ 157th largest goods export market amounting to USD 91 million. Mauritania’s top export categories were machinery (USD 24 million), meat poultry (USD 15 million), vehicles (used and new) (USD 9 million), minerals fuels (USD 9 million). Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 140 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 USD 96 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 1,670 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania (GIRM) has been proactive in attracting more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and has signed several MOU’s with international firms mainly from the Gulf and Turkey Mauritania is rich in minerals, has one of Africa’s richest fishing grounds and excessive potential in renewable energy, natural gas, and agriculture. Mauritania’s geographical position makes it a potential hub between Europe, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The GIRM promotes international investment through the Agency for the Promotion of Investment in Mauritania (APIM), which was launched in 2021. APIM aims to attract FDI to accelerate the government economic development plan. Through APIM, the government hopes to make Mauritania the new investment frontier for the Sahel by improving the investment code and providing a stable business environment. In addition to APIM, the Economic Governance and Investment Management Support Project (PA2GI) — an African Development Bank project active from 2021-2024 – will prioritize public and private investment in strategic sectors of the President’s Economic Recovery Plan (ProPEP). It is an institutional support project intended to assist Mauritania in its efforts to ensure robust, sustainable and job-creating economic growth. It involves striving to ensure public investment optimization, private investment promotion and the strengthening of tax and land governance in support of Mauritania’s Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Shared Prosperity (SCAPP) and President Ghazouani’s Economic Recovery Plan (ProPEP). There is no law prohibiting or limiting foreign investment in any sector of the economy. There are no laws or regulations specifically authorizing private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association, which limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control. There are no other practices by private firms to restrict foreign investment. The government continues to prioritize foreign investment in all sectors of the economy and is working closely with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the international donor community to improve basic infrastructure and to update laws and regulations. Both domestic and foreign entities can engage in all forms of remunerative activities, except activities involving selling pork meat or alcohol. There are no limits on the transfer of profit or repatriation of capital, royalties, or service fees, provided the investments were authorized and made through official channels. The government performs mandatory screening of foreign investments. These screening mechanisms are routine and non-discriminatory. The “Guichet Unique” created in 2020 is a one-stop shop that takes care of all administrative needs related to registering a company. The Guichet Unique provides the administrative review for all sectors, except for the petroleum and mining sectors, which require approval from a cabinet meeting led by the president. The latest investment policy review occurred in February 2008. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) review is available online, in French, at: http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteipc20085_fr.pdf . The report recommended that Mauritania diversify its economy, improve its investment potential through increasing revenue generated by the exploitation of natural resources, accelerate required reforms, and enhance the business and investment climate. On November 2021, Mauritania joined the Inclusive Framework on BEPS and participates in the agreement to address the tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy. By joining this framework, the GIRM joins the international efforts against tax evasion. In May 2018, Mauritania underwent its third World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review. The report is available online at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp471_e.htm . The report states that, since its second Trade Policy Review (TPR) in 2011, Mauritania has had five years of products (chiefly iron ore) and massive public investment in the new airport, the extension of the port of Nouakchott, and road infrastructure. In addition, the report indicates that Mauritania’s goods imports and export mechanism has been modernized and simplified since 2011. There are no civil society organization within Mauritania and neighboring counties that have provided reviews of investment policy-related concerns. Sporadically, Members of Parliament will request reviews of existing contracts (mainly in the fishing sector), but thus far, no formal results have been shared. The GIRM continues to amend its laws and regulations to facilitate business registration. Under the Ministry of Economy, the Public Private Partnership Unit is responsible for providing technical support and expertise to the inter-ministerial committee during the process of identification, preparation, development, and execution of PPP projects in Mauritania. Created in February 2020, this inter-ministerial committee consists of the Prime Minister, Minister of Commerce, Minister of Economy, Minister of Finance, and the Private Sector Association. The committee is chaired by the Prime Minister and is charged with improving the business climate and driving investment. In March 2021, the government created the Agency for Promotion of Investment in Mauritania to facilitate the administrative work of foreign investors. APIM helps investors navigate the business permit process, various administrative procedures, and the rules and regulations concerning foreign workforces. To further expedite the business registration process, the government moved the one-stop shop Guichet Unique from the Nouadhibou Free Trade Zone Authority ( http://www.ndbfreezone.mr/ ) to become a stand-alone unit ( https://www.guichetunique-mr.info/ ) that is mandated to help set up companies and complete all business registration. This one-stop shop has started digitizing the business registration process which has led to the reduction of the standard registration time from seven days to 48 hours. The government is hoping this move to create an independent one- stop shop will serve to further encourage FDI. Government incentives toward promoting outward investment remain limited. Mauritania’s major exports are iron ore (46 percent), non-fillet frozen fish (16 percent), and gold (11 percent). There are no investment restrictions on domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The government continues to adopt laws and regulations to improve transparency. During the review period, the government passed the 2022 budget through the parliament, accessible to the public via the Ministry of Finance portal ( https://www.finances.gov.mr/ ). The expansionary budget aims to boost the economic recovery and longer-term inclusive growth. The accounting documents provided a complete picture of the government’s planned expenditures and revenue streams, including natural resource revenues. Budget documents were generally prepared according to internationally accepted principles. The government holds full authority in allocating the licenses for all natural resources and controls their finances. The criteria and procedures by which the government awards natural resource extraction contracts or licenses are specified in Mauritania’s investment code, mining code, and a new hydrocarbon law. Basic information on tenders is publicly available on government websites, through the relevant ministry portal, or via the private job search platform ( https://beta.mr/beta/liste_offres/3 ) . There is no law or policy impeding foreign investment in Mauritania. However, there is a complex and often overlapping system of permits and licenses required to establish and run a business. There continues to be a lack of transparency in implementation of the legal and regulatory policies. The government does not require companies environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments Post is not aware of any informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations, and laws and regulations do not discriminate against foreign investment. Please see Section 2- Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties The Mauritanian judicial system combines French and Islamic (Malikite school) judicial systems. The constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary (Article 89), and an organic law also protects judges from undue influence. Civil and Commercial Codes exist and are designed to protect contracts, although dispute settlement can be difficult and court enforcement is slow and often inconsistent. The judicial system remains weak and unpredictable in its application of the law, due in part to the training judges receive in two separate and distinct legal systems: Shari’a law and laws modeled after the French legal system. Judges remain undercompensated and susceptible to tribal pressures and bribery. Specialized commercial law courts exist, but judges sometimes lack training and experience in commercial and financial law. Some judges may only have formal training in the Shari’a legal system, while others are only familiar with the French civil law system. A lack of standardization of applicable legal knowledge in the judiciary leads to inefficiency in the execution of judgments in a timely and efficient manner. Laws and decrees related to commercial and financial sectors exist, but they are not always publicly available. Most judgments are not issued within prescribed time limits and records are not always well maintained. Judgments of foreign courts are recognized by national courts, but enforcement is limited. During the last few years, the government has taken steps to provide training to judges and lawyers as an attempt to professionalize the system to reduce the backlog and work through cases in a more efficient manner. In 2017, the GIRM passed a small new claims law that covers cases valued at less than USD 11,000. In January 2020, the government opened a new international center for mediation and arbitration. The center provides an alternative legal office for settlement of investment disputes and allows arbitration and mediation from international courts. There were no new major investment laws or judicial decisions ratified last year. However, the government launched the Investment Promotion Agency (APIM in French) under the Ministry of Economy to develop and facilitate procedures and processes related to investment. The investment code, which was last updated in June 2012, was designed to encourage direct investment by enhancing the security of investments and facilitating administrative procedures. The code provides for free repatriation of foreign capital and wages for foreign employees. The code also created free points of importation and export incentives. Small and medium enterprises (SME), which register through OPPS, do not pay corporate taxes or customs duties. The Ministry of Economy’s Office of Procurement Commission of the Economic and Finance Sectors is the government agency that reviews tenders and bids in accordance with the law and regulations. Suppliers for large government contracts are selected through a tender process initiated at the ministry level. Invitations for some tenders are publicly announced in local newspapers and on government websites. After issuing an invitation for tenders, the Ministry of Economy’s commission in charge of reviewing tenders selects the offer that best fulfills government requirements. If two offers, i.e., one from a foreign company and one from a Mauritanian company, are otherwise considered equal, statutes require that the government award the tender to the Mauritanian company. In practice, this has resulted in contracts awarded to companies that have strong ties to government officials and tribal leaders, regardless of the merits of an individual offer. Preferential treatment remains common in government procurement, despite the government’s recent efforts to promote transparency in the public sector. In an effort to make tenders more transparent, the National Assembly adopted a bill on December 21, 2021, the Public Procurement Code on December 21, 2021, No. 21-025 repealing and replacing the law No. 044-2010 that was enacted On July 2010. This new code will help the government become more transparent in handling tenders. The current code is structured around: Reducing the measures of the preliminary control of the public procurement control body; Clarifying the circumstances in which the awarding of contracts by mutual agreement becomes possible; Excluding from the provisions of this law, public contracts related to defense and national security needs and procurement operations in emergency situations; Promoting small and medium-sized enterprises by facilitating their access to public contracts; and Making procedures more flexible to speed up the process of concluding public contracts and handling complaints. The revised Investment Code provides more property guarantees and protection to business owners. The Code protects private companies against nationalization, expropriation, and requisition. However, if a foreign enterprise is facing difficulties, the government can propose an expropriation plan to avoid bankruptcy and to protect jobs of local employees, with fair and equitable compensation. The only known case of expropriation since Mauritania’s independence was the nationalization of the French mining MIFERMA in November 1974. In that case, the two parties agreed on a compensation plan. The country has bankruptcy laws which carry the potential for criminal penalties. Mauritania’s bankruptcy laws were last updated in 2001. The bankruptcy law allows for the reorganization or restructuring of a business. There are very few reported cases of these laws being applied Mauritius Executive Summary Mauritius is an island nation with a population of 1.3 million people. The Government of Mauritius (GoM) claims an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of approximately 2.3 million square kilometers, but its undisputed EEZ amounts to approximately 1.3 million square kilometers, in addition to jointly managing about 388,000 square kilometers of continental shelf with Seychelles. Mauritius has maintained a stable and competitive economy. Real GDP grew at an average of 4.7 percent from 1968 to 2017, enabling the country to achieve middle-income status in less than 50 years. In 2020, Mauritius’ GDP was $11 billion and its gross national income per capita amounted to $10,230. In July 2020, the World Bank classified Mauritius as a high-income country based on 2019 data, but Mauritius reverted to upper-middle income status in 2021 due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic severely damaged the economy. Tourism, which contributed around 20 percent to the economy pre-COVID, did not return as expected following the reopening of borders in October 2021. There was a moderate rebound in exports of goods, but exports of services declined further due to the difficult situation in the tourism sector. The GoM estimated that GDP growth would increase 4.8 percent in 2021, with contractions in tourism (18.8 percent) and sugar (9.6 percent), according to Statistics Mauritius. The IMF forecasted that the economy would grow 6.7 percent growth in 2022. Unemployment was estimated at 9.2 percent at the end of 2020, while inflation for 2021 was 4.0 percent. One of the poorest countries in Africa at independence in 1968, Mauritius has become one of the continent’s wealthiest. It successfully diversified its economy away from sugarcane monoculture to a manufacturing and service-based economy driven by export-oriented manufacturing (mainly textiles), tourism, financial and business services, information and communication technology, seafood processing, real estate, and education/training. Before COVID-19, authorities planned to stimulate economic growth in five areas: serving as a gateway for investment into Africa; increasing the use of renewable energy; developing smart cities; growing the blue economy; and modernizing infrastructure, especially public transportation, the port, and the airport. In November 2021 at the Conference of Parties 26 (COP 26), the GoM pledged to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 40 percent of the business-as-usual scenario 2030 figures. To achieve this target, the government plans to undertake major reforms in its energy, transport, waste, refrigeration and air-conditioning, agriculture, and conservation sectors. The government aims to produce 60 percent of the country’s energy from green sources by 2030, to phase out the total use of coal before 2030, and to increase energy efficiency by 10 percent based on 2019 figures. As part of the national strategy to modernize the public transport system, the light rail network that launched in 2019 is expected to be extended. The government was also working to diversify 70 percent of waste from the landfill by 2030 through the implementation of composting plants, sorting units, biogas plants and waste-to-energy plants. In 2020 and 2021, however, officials focused on supporting sectors whose revenue disappeared due to the pandemic. In May 2020, the Bank of Mauritius (BoM) set up the Mauritius Investment Corporation (MIC) to mitigate the economic downturn due to the pandemic. The BoM invested $2 billion of foreign exchange reserves in the MIC which were largely directed towards the pharmaceutical and blue economy sectors, in addition to assisting companies that suffered during the pandemic. The BoM also intervened regularly on the domestic foreign exchange market to supply foreign currency. Government policy in Mauritius is pro-trade and investment. The GoM has signed Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements with 46 countries and maintains a well-regarded legal and regulatory framework. Mauritius has been eager to attract foreign direct investment from China and India, as well as courting more traditional markets like the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. The China-Mauritius free-trade agreement went into effect on January 1, 2021. Mauritius also signed a preferential trade agreement with India, which went into effect in April 2021. The GoM promotes Mauritius as a safe, secure place to do business due to its favorable investment climate and tradition as a stable democracy. Corruption in Mauritius is low by regional standards, but recent political and economic corruption scandals illustrated there was room for improvement in terms of transparency and accountability. For instance, a commercial dispute between a U.S. investor and a parastatal partner that turned into a criminal investigation has raised questions of governmental impartiality. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 49 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 52 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $8,300 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $10,230 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Mauritius actively seeks foreign investment. According to several surveys and metrics, Mauritius is among the freest and most business-friendly countries in Africa. Mauritius outperforms all other African countries on the Human Development Index where, in 2020, it ranked 66 out of 189 countries. The 2022 Index of Economic Freedom, published by the Heritage Foundation, ranked Mauritius first among 47 countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region and 30th globally, compared to being 13th in 2021. This decline in the ranking is due to a drop in the country’s fiscal health score. The index also highlighted that while property rights and judicial effectiveness are strong, government integrity is relatively weak. The Economic Development Board (EDB) is the single gateway government agency responsible for promoting investment in Mauritius and helping guide investors through the country’s legal and regulatory requirements. In terms of investor retention policy, the EDB provides aftercare services that consider future business environment requirements for survival and/or expansion. The EDB has a customer service unit that receives investor suggestions and complaints, and it organizes workshops and roundtable sessions to inform investors about changes in investment policies. In 2021, the EDB also set up a Business Support Facility that provides facilitation and advisory services to all businesses in Mauritius: https://business-support-portal.edbmauritius.org/business-support-facility/ . A non-citizen can hold, purchase, or acquire real property under the Non-Citizens (Property Restriction) Act (NCPRA), subject to government approval. The NCPRA can be accessed on this link: https://dha.govmu.org/Pages/Services/PRA.aspx . A non-citizen is eligible for a residence permit upon purchasing residential property under the government-regulated Property Development Scheme (PDS), Integrated Resort Scheme (IRS), and Real Estate Scheme (RES) as long as the investment exceeds $375,000 or its equivalent in any freely convertible foreign currency. No government approval is required in certain situations provided under the NCPRA, namely: (i) holding of immoveable property for commercial purposes under a lease agreement not exceeding 20 years; (ii) holding of shares in companies that do not own immoveable property; (iii) holding of immoveable property by inheritance or effect of marriage to a citizen under the “régime legal de communauté”; (iv) holding of shares in companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius; and (v) through a unit trust scheme or any collective investment vehicle as defined in the Securities Act. Regarding business activities, the GoM generally does not discriminate between local and foreign investment. There are, however, some business activities where foreign involvement is restricted. These include television broadcasting, sugar production, newspaper and magazine publishing, and certain operations in the tourism sector. In 2019, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) Act was amended to increase the allowable equity participation of a foreign company investing in broadcasting to 49.9 percent from 20 percent. Control by foreign nationals in broadcasting was likewise capped at 49.9 percent. The IBA Act can be accessed via http://www.iba.mu/legal.htm . In the sugar sector, no foreign investor is allowed to make an investment that would result in 15 percent or more of the voting capital of a Mauritian sugar company being held by foreign investors. However, foreign investors may be exempt from this rule subject to authorization by the Financial Services Commission. Further details can be accessed on the following link: https://www.stockexchangeofmauritius.com/media/2124/securities-investment-by-foreign-investors-rules-2013.pdf . In the tourism sector, there are conditions on investment by non-citizens in the following activities: (i) guesthouse/tourist accommodation; (ii) pleasure craft; (iii) diving; and (iv) tour operators. Generally, the conditions include a minimum investment amount, number of rooms, or a maximum equity participation, depending on the business activity. In the construction sector, foreign consultants or contractors are required to register with the Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB). Details on registration procedures are available at http://cidb.govmu.org/English/Consultants-Contractors/Pages/default.aspx . The Investment Office of the EDB screens foreign investment proposals and provides a range of services to potential investors. The EDB is a useful resource for investors exploring business opportunities in Mauritius and assists with occupation permits, licenses, and clearances by coordinating with relevant local authorities. In 2021, the U.S. Embassy in Port Louis did not receive negative comments from U.S. businesses regarding the fairness of the government’s investment screening mechanisms. The Investment Office of the EDB reviews proposals for economic benefit, environmental impact, and national security concerns. The EDB then advises potential investors on specific permits or licenses required, depending on the nature of the business. Foreign investors may apply through the EDB for necessary permits; alternately, investors may apply directly to the relevant authorities. In the event an investment fails the review process, the prospective investor may appeal the decision within the EDB or with the relevant government ministry. In response to the COVID-19 crisis, the GoM relaxed investment terms and conditions for foreign investors in 2020. For instance, the minimum investment for obtaining an occupation permit was halved to $50,000. The GoM also removed the minimum turnover and minimum amount invested for the Innovator Occupation Permit. Professionals with an occupation permit and foreign retirees with a residence permit were able to invest in other ventures without any shareholding restrictions. The permanent residence permit validity was doubled to 20 years. Non-citizens who had a residence permit under the various real estate schemes were no longer required to hold an occupation or work permit to invest and work in Mauritius. Additionally, the GoM introduced a 10-year Family Occupation Permit, which allows foreign families to invest and reside in Mauritius for a period of 10 years in exchange for a minimum contribution of $250,000 to the COVID-19 Projects Development Fund. More information is available at https://residency.mu/ . In 2020, the Non-Citizens (Employment Restriction) Act was amended to enable the following categories of individuals to engage in any occupation without a permit: (a) the holder of an occupation permit issued under the Immigration Act; (b) the holder of a residence permit issued under the Immigration Act; (c) a non-citizen who has been granted a permanent resident permit under the Immigration Act; and (d) a member of the Mauritian diaspora under the Mauritian Diaspora Scheme. In 2021, the GoM also introduced the premium investor certificate, which allows companies investing at least $11 million, as well as companies involved in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals and medical devices, to benefit from incentives. In 2018, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) published its 2017 Report on the Implementation of the Investment Policy Review (IPR) for Mauritius. UNCTAD worked with the GoM on the Industrial Policy and Strategic Plan, launched in December 2020, found here: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/gdsinf2020d5_en.pdf . In November 2021, Mauritius concluded its fifth trade policy review with the World Trade Organization. The review concluded that Mauritius’ openness to trade and its stable and robust democratic system have contributed to its economic success in recent years. The review also highlighted that, after two decades of liberalizing reforms, Mauritius has transformed into an almost duty-free economy, with the notable exception of sugar, on which Most Favored Nation tariff rates reach 100 percent. The trade policy review is available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s417_e.pdf . After the GoM put in place new measures to improve its anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime, in October 2021, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) removed Mauritius from the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring concerning AML/CFT. In January 2022, the European Union Commission likewise removed Mauritius from its list of high-risk third countries. The GoM recognizes the importance of a good business environment to attract investment and achieve a higher growth rate. In 2019, the Business Facilitation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act entered into force. The main reforms brought about by this legislation were expediting trade fee payments, reviewing procedures for construction permits, reviewing fire safety compliance requirements, streamlining of business licenses, and implementing numerous trade facilitation measures. The incorporation of companies and registration of business activities falls under the provisions of the Companies Act of 2001 and the Business Registration Act of 2002. All businesses must register with the Corporate and Business Registration Department (CBRD); the registration can be completed online at https://companies.govmu.org/Pages/default.aspx . In 2020, the Business Registration Act was amended so that the CBRD became the central repository of business licenses and information. According to the amendment, all government agencies must electronically forward a copy of any permit, license, authorization, or clearance to the registrar for publication in the Companies and Businesses Registration Integrated System (“CBRIS”). As a general rule, a company incorporated in Mauritius can be 100 percent foreign owned with no minimum capital. Upon completion of the registration process, the CBRD issues a certificate of incorporation. The company can subsequently apply for occupation permits (work and residence permits) and incentives offered to investors. EDB’s investment facilitation services are available to all investors, domestic and foreign. To this end, a Business Support Facility was established at the EDB in 2021. For more information, see https://business-support-portal.edbmauritius.org/ . In partnership with the Corporate and Business Registration Department, the Mauritius Network Services (MNS) has implemented the Companies and Business Registration Integrated System, a web-based portal that allows electronic submission for incorporation of companies and application for the Business Registration Number, file statutory returns, pay yearly fees, register businesses, and search for business information. In March 2019, the National Electronic Licensing System (NELS), which is co-financed by the European Union, was officially launched. NELS is a single point of entry for the processing of permits and licenses needed to start and operate a business. Through NELS, the submission of business licensing (including the Building and Land Use Permit, Environmental Impact Assessment, Occupation Certificate, Land Conversion Certificate, etc.) can now be done electronically. In 2020, the Economic Development Board Act was amended to allow companies to log any obstacles relating to obtaining licenses, permits, authorizations, or other clearances; to enquire about any issue and make recommendations to government agencies; and to publish any actions taken to resolve the reported obstacles. Mauritius also implemented the e-Registry System, where a national register of real estate properties and statistics on land dispute resolutions are now publicly available. An independent mechanism for filing of complaints was also implemented. The e-Registry System features an electronic dashboard for registry searches, submission of documents, online payment of registration fees, and electronic copies of registered documents. The GoM imposes no restrictions on capital outflows. Due to the small size of the Mauritian economy, the government encourages Mauritian entrepreneurs to invest overseas, particularly in Africa, to expand and grow their businesses. As part of its Africa Strategy, the government established the Mauritius Africa Fund, a public company with a budget of $13.8 million to support Mauritian investment in Africa. Through the Fund, the government participates as an equity partner for up to 10 percent of the seed capital invested by Mauritian investors in projects targeted towards Africa. The government has signed agreements with Senegal, Madagascar, and Ghana to establish and manage Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in these countries. The GoM and has invited local and international firms to set up operations in the SEZs. As per the 2018 Finance Act, Mauritian companies collaborating with the Mauritius Africa Fund for development of infrastructure in the SEZs benefit from a five-year tax holiday. To further facilitate investment, Mauritius has also signed Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements and Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements with African states. Additionally, since 2012, the Board of Investment (now restructured as the Investment Office of the EDB) has been operating an Africa Center of Excellence, a special office dedicated to facilitating investment from Mauritius into Africa. This office also acts as a repository of business information for Mauritian entrepreneurs about investment opportunities in different sectors in Africa. According to the most recent figures available from the Bank of Mauritius, in 2020, gross direct investment flows abroad (excluding the offshore sector) amounted to $68 million. The top three sectors for outward investment were accommodation and food service activities (32 percent), manufacturing (12 percent), and real estate activities (9 percent). Investment abroad was focused mainly on developing countries, particularly in Africa, which received $31 million. Seychelles was the top recipient country, receiving $22 million. 3. Legal Regime Since 2006, the GoM has reformed trade, investment, tariffs, and income tax regulations to simplify the framework for doing business. Trade licenses and many other bureaucratic hurdles have been reduced or abolished. With a well-developed legal and commercial infrastructure and a tradition that combines entrepreneurship and representative democracy, Mauritius is one of Africa’s most successful economies. Business Mauritius, the coordinating body of the Mauritian private sector, participates in discussions with and presents papers to government authorities on laws and regulations affecting the private sector. Regulatory agencies do not request comments on proposed bills from the general public. Both the notice of the introduction of a government bill and a copy of the bill are distributed to every member of the Legislative Assembly and published in the Government Gazette before enactment. Bills with a “certificate of urgency” can be enacted with summary process. All proposed regulations are published on the Legislative Assembly’s website and are publicly available. At the time of writing of this report, the government was drafting a bill that would require regulatory bodies to submit an impact of upcoming regulations on the business environment. Companies in Mauritius are regulated by the Companies Act of 2001, which incorporates international best practices and promotes accountability, openness, and fairness. To combat corruption, money laundering and terrorist financing, the government also enacted the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and the Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act. The National Code on Corporate Governance encourages companies to present a balanced assessment of the organization’s financial, environmental, social, and governance performance and outlook in its annual report and on its website. While Mauritius does not have a freedom of information act, members of the public may request information by contacting the permanent secretary of the relevant ministry. Budget documents, including the executive budget proposal, enacted budget, and end-of-year report, are publicly available and provide a substantial picture of Mauritius’ planned expenditures and revenue streams. Mauritius is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The GoM implements its commitments to these regional economic institutions with domestic legal and regulatory adjustments, as appropriate). Mauritius is a signatory to the Tripartite Free Trade Area and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). AfCFTA took effect in January 2021. Negotiations are still ongoing regarding the Tripartite FTA. Mauritius has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1995. The GoM notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade to the extent possible. In July 2014, Mauritius notified its category A commitments to the WTO, and was among the first African countries to do so. Mauritius was also the fourth country to submit its instrument of acceptance for the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). Mauritius notified its category B & C commitments and its corresponding indicative dates of implementation in 2015. It also indicated its requirements to implement category C measures. With the coming into force of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in February 2017, Mauritius is implementing all its category A commitments. Of TFA’s 36 measures, Mauritius has classified 27 as category A, five as B, and four as C. Discussions with donors to obtain technical assistance to finance trade facilitation projects listed under category C are ongoing. Mauritius has already secured assistance from the World Bank and the World Customs Organization. To coordinate efforts to implement the TFA, in 2015 Mauritius set up a National Committee on Trade Facilitation co-chaired by representatives from government and the private sector. Members include MRA Customs, the Ministry of Agro-Industry and Food Security, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, the Mauritius Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Economic Developments Board, among others. The committee meets twice a year and discussion topics include identification of the TFA, policy recommendations of trade facilitation, dissemination of information on trade facilitation, and addressing the bottlenecks to trade due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Mauritius is also part of the Cotonou Agreement, a 2000 treaty between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States. On December 3, 2020, the EU and the Organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) reached a new agreement that succeeded the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and is expected to be signed in June 2022. The agreement will focus on human rights, democracy, and governance; security; human and social development; environmental sustainability and climate change; sustainable growth; and migration and mobility. The Mauritian legal system is based on a unique mixture of traditions. Mauritius draws legal principles from both French civil law and British common law traditions; its procedures are largely derived from the English system, while its substance is based in the Napoleonic Code of 1804. Commercial and contractual law is also based on the civil code. However, some specialized areas of law are comparable to other jurisdictions. For example, its company law is practically identical to that of New Zealand. Mauritian courts often resolve legal disputes by drawing on current legislation, the local legal tradition, and by means of a comparative approach utilizing various legal systems. The highest court of appeal is the judicial committee of the Privy Council of England. Mauritius is a member of the International Court of Justice. Mauritius established a Commercial Court in 2009 to expedite the settlement of commercial disputes. In 2020, the Courts Act was amended to provide for the creation of a Financial Crimes Division within the Supreme Court and the Intermediate Court. An amendment to the Courts Act provided for the establishment of a Land Division court at the Supreme Court to expedite land dispute resolutions. The GoM and judiciary are supportive of arbitration. Mauritius has two arbitration centers and is a party to the New York Convention 1958 and the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor State Arbitration. Contracts are legally enforceable and binding. Ownership of property is enforced with the registration of the title deed with the Registrar-General and payment of the registration duty. Mauritian courts have jurisdiction to hear intellectual property claims, both civil and criminal. The judiciary is independent, and the domestic legal system is generally non-discriminatory and transparent. U.S. Embassy Port Louis is not aware of any recent cases of government or other interference in the court system affecting foreign investors. The Economic Development Board Act of 2017 governs investment in Mauritius, while the Companies Act of 2001 contains the regulations governing incorporation of businesses. The Corporate and Business Registration Department (CBRD) of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development administers the Companies Act of 2001, the Business Registration Act of 2002, the Insolvency Act of 2009, the Limited Partnerships Act of 2011, and the Foundations Act of 2012. The Economic Development Board website provides information on investment incentives, procedures to establish a company in Mauritius, and occupation/work permits: https://www.edbmauritius.org/. The Competition Commission of Mauritius (CCM) is an independent statutory body established in 2009 to enforce Competition Act 2007. It is mandated to safeguard competition by preventing and remedying anticompetitive business practices in Mauritius. Anticompetitive business practices, also called restrictive business practices, may be in the form of cartels, abuse of monopoly situations, and mergers that lessen competition. The institutional design of the Competition Commission houses both an adjudicative and an investigative organ under one body. While the Executive Director has power to investigate restrictive business practices (the Investigative Arm), the commissioners determine the cases (the Adjudicative Arm) on the basis of reports from the Executive Director. Any party dissatisfied with an order or direction of the commission may appeal to the Supreme Court within 21 days. Since it began operations, the Competition Commission has undertaken 62 investigations, of which 50 have been completed and 12 are ongoing as of March 2022. To date, the commission has also conducted 312 enquiries, which are preliminary research exercises prior to proceeding to investigations. The Competition Commission conducts market studies and five of the eight market studies have been completed. It has also issued six papers to the government on policy matters affecting competition. Regionally, the Competition Commission has assessed 166 mergers across the Common Market for Southern and Eastern Africa Free Trade Area (COMESA) member states that affected Mauritius. It has also assisted the African Competition Forum (ACF) on two cross-country market studies. The Competition Commission has also initiated a process to review and amend the Competition Act of 2007 to enable more effective enforcement. The process is expected to be completed in 2022. The Constitution includes a guarantee against nationalization. However, in 2015, the government passed the Insurance (Amendment) Act to enable the Financial Services Commission (FSC) to appoint special administrators in cases where there is evidence that the liabilities of an insurer and its related companies exceed assets by 1 billion rupees (approximately $25 million) and that such a situation “is likely to jeopardize the stability and soundness of the financial system of Mauritius.” The special administrators are empowered to seize and sell assets. The government enacted this law in the immediate aftermath of the financial scandal explained below. In April 2015, the Bank of Mauritius, the central bank, revoked the banking license of Bramer Bank, the banking arm of Mauritian conglomerate British American Investment (BAI) Group, citing an inadequate capital reserve ratio. As a result, Bramer Bank entered receivership and, by May 2015, the receiver had transferred the assets and liabilities of Bramer Bank to a newly created state-owned bank, the National Commercial Bank Ltd., thus effectively nationalizing Bramer Bank. In January 2016, the GoM merged the National Commercial Bank with another government-owned bank, resulting in Maubank, a new bank dedicated mainly to servicing small- and medium-sized enterprises. The GoM owns over 99 percent of Maubank shares. Efforts to privatize the bank in 2018 did not produce any results. The government likewise took over much of Bramer’s parent, the BAI Group. The FSC placed the BAI Group in conservatorship, alleging fraud and corporate mismanagement in BAI’s insurance business. Following passage of the Insurance (Amendment) Act in 2015, the FSC created the National Insurance Company, which took over the BAI Group’s core insurance business, and the National Property Fund, which took over other BAI Group assets, including a hospital and several retail outlets. CIEL Healthcare, a local private company, bought the hospital in 2017. In 2015, BAI’s former chairman filed a dispute against the GoM with the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), alleging that the government illegally appropriated BAI’s assets. The former chairman, who is a Mauritian-French dual national, claimed that Mauritius had breached the Mauritius-France bilateral investment treaty and requested the restitution of his assets and payment of compensation by way of arbitration administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the dispute and ruled in favor of the GoM. The former chairman had appealed this decision to the French-speaking Court of First Instance in Brussels, which ruled in favor of the GoM in June 2021. In May 2019, the former chairman filed two cases in the Mauritian Supreme Court to challenge the appointment of the special administrator for the Bramer Banking Corporation and BAI Co Ltd, the holding company of the BAI group. Both cases are ongoing. Bankruptcy is not criminalized in Mauritius. The Insolvency Act of 2009 amended and consolidated the law relating to insolvency of individuals and companies and the distribution of assets in the case of insolvency and related matters. Most notably, the Act introduced administration procedures, providing creditors the option of a more orderly reorganization or restructuring of a business than in liquidation. A bankrupt individual is automatically discharged from bankruptcy three years after adjudication but may apply to be discharged earlier. The Act draws on the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law in 1997. There were no special procedures that foreign creditors must comply with when submitting claims in insolvency proceedings. The law provides that foreign creditors have the same rights regarding the commencement of, and participation in, an insolvency proceeding as Mauritian creditors. The Second Schedule to the Insolvency Act applies to foreign creditors with respect to the procedures for proving their debts. The creditor must send to the liquidator of the company an affidavit, sworn by the creditor or an authorized person, that verifies the debt and contains a statement of account showing the particulars of the debt. The affidavit must also state whether the creditor is a secured creditor. Section 132 of the Act outlines the conditions under which a liquidator may be appointed for a foreign company and related procedures. In 2020, the Insolvency Act was amended to give the Bankruptcy Division of the Supreme Court power to order that a deed of company arrangement be binding on the company and all classes of creditors where there are at least two classes of creditors and one of the classes resolves that the company executes the deed. 6. Financial Sector The GoM welcomes foreign portfolio investment. The Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM) was created in 1989 and was opened to foreign investors following the lifting of foreign exchange controls in 1994. Foreign investors do not need approval to trade shares, except for when doing so would result in their holding more than 15 percent in a sugar company, a rule detailed in the Securities (Investment by Foreign Investors) Rules of 2013. Incentives to foreign investors include no restrictions on the repatriation of revenue from the sale of shares and exemption from tax on dividends for all resident companies and for capital gains of shares held for more than six months. The SEM currently operates two markets: the Official Market and the Development and Enterprise Market (DEM). As of December 2020, the shares of 58 companies (local, global business, and foreign companies) were listed on the Official Market, representing a market capitalization of $7.0 billion, a fall of 17 percent from the previous financial year. This fall is mainly attributed to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Unique in Africa, the SEM can list, trade, and settle equity and debt products in U.S. dollars, Euros, Pounds Sterling, South African Rand, as well as Mauritian Rupees. A variety of new asset classes of securities such as global funds, depositary receipts, mineral companies, and specialist securities including exchange-traded funds and structured products have also been introduced on the SEM. In June 2021, guidelines for the issue and listing of sustainable bonds were published. The DEM was launched in 2006 and the shares of 38 companies were listed on this index with a market capitalization of $1.1 billion as of December 2020, falling by 10 percent from December 2019. Foreign investors accounted for 41.2 percent of the trading volume on the exchange for the financial year 2020-2021, which was the highest foreign participation recorded since the financial year 2015-2016. Standard & Poor’s, Morgan Stanley, Dow Jones, and FTSE have included the Mauritius stock market in a number of their stock indices. Since 2005, the SEM has been a member of the World Federation of Exchanges. The SEM is also a partner exchange of the Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative. In 2018, in line with its strategy to digitalize its investor services, the SEM launched the mySEM mobile application. In November 2020, the SEM amended its internal AML/CFT policies and procedures to align with the revamped AML/CFT framework. In 2021, the SEM secured a $600,000 grant from the African Development Bank to implement a state-of-the-art trading platform. The new trading platform is expected to go live by the end of March 2022. In 2020, the slowdown in domestic economic activity resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic caused many listed companies to publish reduced earnings and defer dividend payments. The government respects IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. A variety of credit instruments is available to local and foreign investors through the banking system. Mauritius has a sophisticated banking sector. As of March 2022, 19 banks were licensed to undertake banking business, of which eight were local banks, eight were foreign-owned subsidiaries, and three were branches of foreign banks. One bank conducts solely Islamic banking. One bank, under conservatorship since April 1, 2020, was acquired and recapitalized by a new shareholder on October 15, 2021. Further details can be obtained at https://www.bom.mu/financial-stability/supervision/licensees/list-of-licensees . In 2021, the Mauritian banking sector accounted for an estimated 8 percent of GDP (excluding bank-owned leasing businesses) and is the main component of financial services, which contribute 12 percent of GDP. The total assets of the sector represented 420 percent of GDP at the end of September 2021, compared to 397 percent at the end of March 2021. The banking landscape is relatively concentrated, with the two, long-established domestic entities: the Mauritius Commercial Bank (MCB) and the State Bank of Mauritius (SBM), which together constitute about 46 percent of the market share for total deposits, advances, and assets total domestic market. Maubank, a state-owned bank, became operational in 2016 following a merger between the Mauritius Post & Cooperative Bank and the National Commercial Bank. The Bank of China started operations in Mauritius in 2016. Other foreign banks present in Mauritius include HSBC, Barclays Bank, Bank of Baroda, Habib Bank, BCP Bank (Mauritius), Standard Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, State Bank of India, and Investec Bank. Per the Bank of Mauritius, total banking assets as of December2021 amounted to $48 billion. Mauritian banks are compliant with international norms such as Basel III, IFRS 9, US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), and the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard (CRS). At the end of December 2021, non-banking, deposit-taking institutions, comprising leasing companies and finance companies, held assets amounting to $1.6 billion, an increase of about 2 percent since December 2020. According to the Banking Act of 2004, all banks are free to conduct business in all currencies. There are also six non-bank deposit-taking institutions, as well as 12 money changers and foreign exchange dealers. There are no official government restrictions on foreigners opening bank accounts in Mauritius, but banks may require letters of reference or proof of residence for their due diligence. The Bank of Mauritius carries out the supervision and regulation of banks as well as non-bank financial institutions authorized to accept deposits. The Bank of Mauritius has endorsed the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision as set out by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In July 2017, the Banking Act was amended to double the minimum capital requirement from $ 5.8 million to $11.2 million. The Central Bank began reporting the liquidity coverage ratio in 2017 to improve the liquidity profile of banks and their ability to withstand potential liquidity disruptions. As part of its COVID-19 response, the BoM made $132 million available through commercial banks as special relief funds to help meet cash flow and working capital requirements. The cash reserve ratio applicable to commercial banks was reduced from 9 percent to 8 percent. The BoM also put on hold the Guideline on Credit Impairment Measurement and Income Recognition, which took effect in January 2020. In July 2019, the Bank of Mauritius Act was amended to allow the Bank of Mauritius to use special reserve funds in exceptional circumstances and with approval of the central bank’s board for the repayment of central government external debt obligations, provided that repayments would not adversely affect the bank’s operations. This provision was used in January 2020 to repay government debt worth $450 million, raising concerns about the central bank’s independence. The Mauritius Investment Corporation (MIC), a fully owned subsidiary of BoM, was also established with an initial capital of $2 billion drawn from the BoM’s reserves to provide support to economic operators through a range of equity and quasi-equity instruments. The latest International Monetary Fund Article IV report highlights that in response to the pandemic and in coordination with the government, the BoM deployed policies that led to a substantial deterioration of its balance sheet and could make it challenging to fulfill the price-stability mandate going forward. Most major banks in Mauritius have correspondent banking relationships with large banks overseas. In recent years, according to industry experts, no banks have lost correspondent banking relationships, and none reported being in jeopardy of doing so as of April 2022. The National Payment Systems (Authorization and Licensing) Regulations, which entered into force in June 2021, provides for the authorization of operators of payment systems, clearing systems, and settlement systems and licensing of payment service providers. In October 2021, the Bank of Mauritius launched the Climate Change Centre, which will integrate climate-related and environmental financial risks into its regulatory, supervisory, and monetary policy frameworks, while also supporting the development of sustainable finance. In February 2021, the BoM became a member of the Global Financial Innovation Network (GFIN). The BoM is currently working on a central bank digital currency (CBDC) pilot roll-out with technical assistance from the IMF. In January 2019, the Bank of Mauritius signed a memorandum of cooperation with the Mauritius Police Force on financial crimes and illicit activities relating to the financial services sector. In February 2020, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) named Mauritius as a jurisdiction under increased monitoring, commonly known as the Grey List. At that time, Mauritius made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its Mutual Evaluation Report in 2018, Mauritius has made progress on a number of its recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including amending the legal framework to require legal persons and legal arrangements to disclose of beneficial ownership information and improving the processes of identifying and confiscating proceeds of crimes. In October 2021, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) removed Mauritius from the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring concerning anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) based on the following reforms: (i) outreach work to promote understanding of money-laundering and terrorist financing risks and obligations; (ii) development of effective risk-based supervision plans for the regulator; (iii) improved focus on access to beneficial ownership information in a timely manner; and (iv) training to law enforcement authorities to ensure that they have capabilities to carry out money laundering investigations. In January 2022, the European Union Commission removed Mauritius from its list of high-risk third countries. Effective March 2019, the Financial Services Commission (FSC) allows businesses that provide custodial services for digital assets. The FSC is the integrated regulator for the non-banking financial services sector and global business. In August 2020, the Peer-to-Peer Lending Rules, which enable the operation of peer-to-peer lending platforms in Mauritius by operators holding licenses issued by the FSC, entered into force. And in November 2021, the FSC launched the regulatory framework for crowdfunding. The Virtual Asset and Initial Token Offering Services Act 2021, which sets out a comprehensive legislative framework to regulate the business activities of virtual assets service providers and initial token offerings, entered into force in February 2022. Any person who is a virtual asset service provider, an issuer of initial token offerings in accordance with the Act, or a custodian (digital assets) in accordance with the Financial Services Act, needs to apply for a license or registration with the FSC. The GoM does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The government’s stated policy is to act as a facilitator to business, leaving production to the private sector. The government, however, still controls key services directly or through parastatal companies in the power and water, television broadcasting, and postal service sectors. The government also holds controlling shares in the State Bank of Mauritius, Air Mauritius (the national airline), and Mauritius Telecom. These state-controlled companies have Boards of Directors on which seats are allocated to senior government officials. The government nominates the chairperson and CEO of each of these companies. In April 2020, Air Mauritius requested voluntary administration, similar to Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States, because it could not comply with financial obligations. The national airline exited voluntary administration in September 2021 following a $280 million government bailout in the form of a loan arrangement through the central bank’s Mauritius Investment Corporation. In October 2021, a newly created state-owned enterprise, Airport Holdings Ltd., acquired 9.43 million shares in Air Mauritius, gaining effective control of the airline. The government also invests in a wide variety of Mauritian businesses through its investment arm, the State Investment Corporation. The government is also the owner of Maubank and the National Insurance Company. Two parastatal entities are involved in the importation of agricultural products: the Agricultural Marketing Board (AMB) and the State Trading Corporation (STC). The AMB’s role is to ensure that the supply of certain basic food products is constant, and their prices remain affordable. The STC is the only authorized importer of petroleum products, liquefied petroleum gas, and flour. SOEs purchase from or supply goods and services to private sector and foreign firms through tenders. Audited accounts of SOEs are published in their annual reports. Mauritius is part of the OECD network on corporate governance of state-owned enterprises in southern Africa. The Declaration of Assets Act (DoA Act) was enacted in December 2018 and took effect in June 2019. It provides that certain key officials of the public sector, including chief executives of state-owned enterprises, must declare their assets and liabilities with the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). The declaration includes the assets and liabilities of spouses and minor children. This declaration is published on the website of ICAC. A list of SOEs is published in the Declaration of Assets (State-owned Enterprises) Regulations 2019: https://www.icac.mu/declaration-of-assets/ . The government has no specific privatization program. In 2017, however, as part of its broader water reform efforts, the government agreed to a World Bank recommendation to appoint a private operator to maintain and operate the country’s potable water distribution system. Under the World Bank’s proposed public-private partnership, the Central Water Authority (CWA) would continue to own distribution and supply assets, and will be responsible for business planning, setting tariffs, capital expenditure, and monitoring and enforcing the private operator’s performance. In March 2018, despite protest by trade unions and consumer associations, the Minister of Energy and Public Utilities reiterated his intention to engage by the end of the year a private operator as a strategic partner to take over the water distribution services of the CWA. To date, this has not materialized. The government has said for years it planned to sell control of Maubank, into which it has injected about $173 million since it nationalized the bank in 2015. In the 2019-2020 budget speech, the prime minister said the government would sell non-strategic assets to reduce government debt. The prime minister’s office never identified a list of assets, but in parliament the prime minister has mentioned Maubank, the National Insurance Company, and Casinos of Mauritius as possible divestments. 10. Political and Security Environment Mauritius has a long tradition of political and social stability. Civil unrest and political violence are uncommon. Free and fair national elections are held every five years with the last general elections held in November 2019. Those most recent elections took place without incident. The current prime minister, Pravind Jugnauth previously served as finance minister, and was appointed prime minister 2017 after his father resigned (in accordance with the constitution). Jugnauth won reelection in 2019. In August 2020 and February 2021, civilians engaged in mass protests following allegations of corruption and mismanagement by the government. The protests were orderly and without incident. Crime rates are low, but petty and violent crime can occur. Visitors should keep track of their belongings at all times due to the potential for pickpocketing and purse-snatching, especially in crowded and tourist areas. Visitors should also avoid walking alone, particularly on isolated beaches and at night, and should avoid demonstrations. Mexico Executive Summary In 2021, Mexico was the United States’ second largest trading partner in goods and services. It remains one of our most important investment partners. Bilateral trade grew 482 percent from 1993-2020, and Mexico is the United States’ second largest export market. The United States is Mexico’s top source of foreign direct investment (FDI) with a stock of USD 184.9 billion (2020 per the International Monetary Fund’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey). The Mexican economy averaged 2.1 percent GDP growth from 1994 to 2021, contracted 8.3 percent in 2020 — its largest ever annual decline — and rebounded 5 percent in 2021. Exports surpassed pre-pandemic levels by five percent thanks to the reopening of the economy and employment recovery. Still, supply chain shortages in the manufacturing sector, the COVID-19 omicron variant, and increasing inflation caused the economic rebound to decelerate in the second half of 2021. Mexico’s conservative fiscal policy resulted in a primary deficit of 0.3 percent of GDP in 2021, and the public debt decreased to 50.1 percent from 51.7 percent of GDP in 2020. The newly appointed Central Bank of Mexico (or Banxico) governor committed to upholding the central bank’s independence. Inflation surpassed Banxico’s target of 3 percent ± 1 percent at 5.7 percent in 2021. The administration maintained its commitment to reducing bureaucratic spending to fund an ambitious social spending agenda and priority infrastructure projects, including the Dos Bocas Refinery and Maya Train. The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) entered into force July 1, 2020 with Mexico enacting legislation to implement it. Still, the Lopez Obrador administration has delayed issuance of key regulations across the economy, complicating the operating environment for telecommunications, financial services, and energy sectors. The Government of Mexico (GOM) considers the USMCA to be a driver of recovery from the COVID-19 economic crisis given its potential to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) to Mexico. Investors report the lack of a robust fiscal response to the COVID-19 crisis, regulatory unpredictability, a state-driven economic policy, and the shaky financial health of the state oil company Pemex have contributed to ongoing uncertainties. The three major ratings agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard and Poor’s) maintained their sovereign credit ratings for Mexico unchanged from their downgrades in 2020 (BBB-, Baa1, and BBB, lower medium investment grade, respectively). Moody’s downgraded Pemex’s credit rating by one step to Ba3 (non-investment) July 2021, while Fitch and S&P maintained their ratings (BB- and BBB, lower medium and non-investment grades, respectively. Banxico cut Mexico’s GDP growth expectations for 2022, to 2.4 from 3.2 percent, as did the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to 2.8 percent from the previous 4 percent estimate in October 2021. The IMF anticipates weaker domestic demand, ongoing high inflation levels as well as global supply chain disruptions in 2022 to continue impacting the economy. Moreover, uncertainty about contract enforcement, insecurity, informality, and corruption continue to hinder sustained Mexican economic growth. Recent efforts to reverse the 2013 energy reforms, including the March 2021 changes to the electricity law (found to not violate the constitution by the supreme court on April 7 but still subject to injunctions in lower courts), the May 2021 changes to the hydrocarbon law (also enjoined by Mexican courts), and the September 2021 constitutional amendment proposal prioritizing generation from the state-owned electric utility CFE, further increase uncertainty. These factors raise the cost of doing business in Mexico. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 124 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi# Global Innovation Index 2021 55 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $184,911 1st out of top 5 https://data.imf.org/?sk=40313609- F037-48C1-84B1-E1F1CE54D6D5& sId=1482331048410 World Bank GNI per capita (current US$) 2020 $8,480 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Mexico is open to foreign direct investment (FDI) in most economic sectors and has consistently been one of the largest emerging market recipients of FDI. Mexico’s proximity to the United States and preferential access to the U.S. market, macroeconomic stability, large domestic market, growing consumer base, increasingly skilled workers, and lower labor costs combine to attract foreign investors. The COVID-19 economic crisis showed how linked North American supply chains are and highlighted new opportunities for partnership and investment. Still, recent policy and regulatory changes have created doubts about the investment climate, particularly in the energy, agriculture, and the formal employment pensions management sectors. The United States has been the largest source of FDI in Mexico, with 34 percent of the stock as of 2020 (IMF). According to Mexico’s Secretariat of Economy, total FDI flows for 2021 were USD 31.6 billion, a 13.2 percent increase compared to 2020 (USD 27.9 billion). The automotive, aerospace, telecommunications, financial services, and electronics sectors typically receive large amounts of FDI. Most foreign investment is concentrated in northern states near the U.S. border, where most maquiladoras (export-oriented manufacturing and assembly plants) are located, or to Mexico City and the nearby “El Bajio” (e.g. Guanajuato, Queretaro, etc.) region. In the past, foreign investors have overlooked Mexico’s southern states, although the administration is focused on attracting investment to the region, including through large infrastructure projects such as the Maya Train, the Dos Bocas refinery, and the trans-isthmus logistics and industrial corridor. In 2021, the GOM ramped up public spending and widely promoted private investment in these projects. In December 2021, President Lopez Obrador issued a controversial decree naming these projects “national security” priorities, allowing them to proceed before the completion of environmental and other impact studies. Though courts enjoined the executive decree, it still generated concerns about the Lopez Obrador administration’s commitment to transparency. The 1993 Foreign Investment Law, last updated in March 2017, governs foreign investment in Mexico, including which business sectors are open to foreign investors and to what extent. It provides national treatment, eliminates performance requirements for most foreign investment projects, and liberalizes criteria for automatic approval of foreign investment. Mexico is also a party to several Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) agreements covering foreign investment, notably the Codes of Liberalization of Capital Movements and the National Treatment Instrument. The GOM dissolved the former trade and investment promotion agency ProMexico in 2019, and Mexico’s Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (SRE) assumed most of its responsibilities with the establishment of the General Directorate for Global Investment (GDGI) in June 2021. The GDGI launched three specific projects: the California Economic Council; an interactive data base to attract FDI called the “Atlas Prospectivo;” and the U.S.-Mexico Task Force for Transport Electrification. The GDGI works closely with Mexico’s state secretaries of economy to promote trade and attract FDI through partnerships with SRE’s diplomatic missions overseas. Mexico reserves certain sectors, in whole or in part, for the State, including: petroleum and other hydrocarbons; control of the national electric system, radioactive materials, telegraphic and postal services; nuclear energy generation; coinage and printing of money; and control, supervision, and surveillance of ports of entry. Certain professional and technical services, development banks, and the land transportation of passengers, tourists, and cargo (not including courier and parcel services) are reserved entirely for Mexican nationals. See section six for restrictions on foreign ownership of certain real estate. Reforms over the past decade in the energy, power generation, telecommunications, and retail fuel sales sectors have liberalized access for foreign investors. While reforms have not led to the privatization of state-owned enterprises such as Pemex or the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE), they have allowed private firms to participate. Still, the Lopez Obrador administration has made significant regulatory and policy changes that favor Pemex and CFE over private participants. The changes have led private companies to file lawsuits in Mexican courts and seek compensation through international arbitration. Hydrocarbons: Private companies participate in hydrocarbon exploration and extraction activities through contracts with the government under four categories: competitive contracts, joint ventures, profit sharing agreements, and license contracts. All contracts must include a clause stating subsoil hydrocarbons are owned by the State. The government held nine auctions allowing private companies to bid on exploration and development rights to oil and gas resources in blocks around the country. Between 2015 and 2018, Mexico auctioned more than 100 land, shallow, and deep-water blocks with significant interest from international oil companies. The administration has since postponed further auctions but committed to respecting the existing contracts awarded under the previous administration. Still, foreign players were discouraged when the GOM awarded operatorship of a major shallow water oil discovery made by a U.S. company-led consortium to Pemex. The private consortium had invested more than USD 200 million in making the discovery and is seeking compensation through international arbitration. Telecommunications: Mexican law states telecommunications and broadcasting activities are public services and the government will at all times maintain ownership of the radio spectrum. In January 2021, President Lopez Obrador proposed incorporating the independent Federal Telecommunication Institute (IFT) into the Secretariat of Communications and Transportation (SCT), to save government funds and avoid duplication. Non-governmental organizations and private sector companies said such a move would potentially violate the USMCA, which mandates signatories to maintain independent telecommunications regulators. As of March 2022, the proposal remains pending. Mexico’s Secretary of Economy Tatiana Clouthier underscored in public statements that President López Obrador is committed to respecting Mexico’s obligations under the USMCA, including maintaining an autonomous telecommunications regulator. Aviation: The Foreign Investment Law limited foreign ownership of national air transportation to 25 percent until March 2017, when the limit was increased to 49 percent. The USMCA, which entered into force July 1, 2020, maintained several NAFTA provisions, granting U.S. and Canadian investors national and most-favored-nation treatment in setting up operations or acquiring firms in Mexico. Exceptions exist for investments restricted under the USMCA. Currently, the United States, Canada, and Mexico have the right to settle any legacy disputes or claims under NAFTA through international arbitration for a sunset period of three years following the end of NAFTA. Only the United States and Mexico are party to an international arbitration agreement under the USMCA, though access is restricted as the USMCA distinguishes between investors with covered government contracts and those without. Most U.S. companies investing in Mexico will have access to fewer remedies under the USMCA than under NAFTA, as they will have to meet certain criteria to qualify for arbitration. Sub-national Mexican governments must also accord national treatment to investors from USMCA countries. Approximately 95 percent of all foreign investment transactions do not require government approval. Foreign investments that require government authorization and do not exceed USD 165 million are automatically approved unless the proposed investment is in a legally reserved sector. The National Foreign Investment Commission under the Secretariat of the Economy is the government authority that determines whether an investment in restricted sectors may move forward. The Commission has 45 business days after submission of an investment request to decide. Criteria for approval include employment and training considerations, and contributions to technology, productivity, and competitiveness. The Commission may reject applications to acquire Mexican companies for national security reasons. The Secretariat of Foreign Relations (SRE) must issue a permit for foreigners to establish or change the nature of Mexican companies. There has not been an update to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) trade policy review of Mexico since June 2017 covering the period to year-end 2016. The October 2021 “Human Rights for a Just Energy Transition” report analyzes some of the energy policy decisions taken by the Mexican government in the last two years and provides investment-related recommendations: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/m%C3%A9xico-nuevo-informe-derechos-humanos-para-una-transici%C3%B3n-justa-destaca-regresi%C3%B3n-de-acci%C3%B3n-clim%C3%A1tica-y-derechos-humanos/ According to the World Bank, on average registering a foreign-owned company in Mexico requires 11 procedures and 31 days. Mexico ranked 60 out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s most recent 2020 Doing Business report. In 2016, then-President Pena Nieto signed a law creating a new category of simplified businesses called Sociedad for Acciones Simplificadas (SAS). Owners of SASs are supposed to be able to register a new company online in 24 hours. Still, it can take between 66 and 90 days to start a new business in Mexico, according to the World Bank. The GOM maintains a business registration website, www.tuempresa.gob.mx, and one for general information on opening a business, https://www.gob.mx/tuempresa?tab=Abre. The Secretariat of Economy offers a one-stop shop website “Invest in Mexico” aimed at facilitating the administrative procedures for foreign investors: www.economia.gob.mx/invest-in-mx/. Companies operating in Mexico must register with the tax authority (Servicio de Administracion Tributaria or SAT), the Secretariat of the Economy, and the Public Registry. Additionally, companies engaging in international trade must register with the Registry of Importers, while foreign-owned companies must register with the National Registry of Foreign Investments. Since October 2019, SAT has launched dozens of tax audits against major international and domestic corporations, resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in new tax assessments, penalties, and late fees. Multinational and Mexican firms have reported audits based on diverse aspects of the tax code, including adjustments on tax payments made, waivers received, and deductions reported during the Enrique Peña Nieto administration. Private sector stakeholders reported a continuation of SAT’s aggressive tax auditing practices in 2021. Various offices at the Secretariat of Economy and the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs handle promoting Mexican outward investment and assistance to Mexican firms acquiring or establishing joint ventures with foreign firms. Mexico does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The National Commission on Regulatory Improvement (CONAMER), within the Secretariat of Economy, is the agency responsible for streamlining federal and sub-national regulation and reducing the regulatory burden on business. Mexican law requires secretariats and regulatory agencies to conduct impact assessments of proposed regulations and engage in notice and comment rule making, which CONAMER carries out. Impact assessments are made available for public comment via CONAMER’s website: https://www.gob.mx/conamer. The official gazette of state and federal laws currently in force in Mexico is publicly available via: http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/. Mexican law provides for a 20-day public consultation period for most proposed regulations. Any interested stakeholder can comment on draft regulations and the supporting justification, including regulatory impact assessments. Certain measures are not subject to a mandatory public consultation period. These include measures concerning taxation, responsibilities of public servants, the public prosecutor’s office executing its constitutional functions, and the Secretariats of National Defense (SEDENA) and the Navy (SEMAR). In 2021, there was a rise in rule making with waiver of full notice and public comment processes as President Lopez Obrador rushed regulations through “in the national interest.” Given SAT’s mandate to collect taxes and revenue from international trade, many of its regulations circumvent the notice and public comment process. In 2021, SAT proposed a new requirement for a “digital waybill complement” or “complemento de carta porte” for nearly all goods shipments within Mexican territory effective January 1, 2022. Mexican and U.S. private sector representatives called the digital document “onerous” as it requires 180 data points for shipments across all modalities—rail, truck, air, and maritime shipping—many of which are unknown at the onset of a shipment. Despite the domestic nature of the new requirement, U.S. companies raised concerns about the “carta porte” as a technical barrier to trade given the potential delays it could cause for shipments to and from ports of entry. The U.S. government has pushed for better SAT coordination with the private sector to address compliance challenges with the new requirement. This advocacy led to the postponement of “carta porte’s” entry into force to October 1, 2022 and public-private working groups to discuss implementation in the interim. The National Quality Infrastructure Program (PNIC) is the official document used to plan, inform, and coordinate standardization activities, both public and private. The PNIC is published annually by the Secretariat of Economy in Mexico’s Official Gazette. The PNIC describes Mexico’s plans for new voluntary standards (Normas Mexicanas; NMXs) and mandatory technical regulations (Normas Oficiales Mexicanas; NOMs) as well as proposed changes to existing standards and technical regulations. Interested stakeholders can request the creation, modification, or cancelation of NMXs and NOMs as well as participate in the working groups that develop and modify these standards and technical regulations. Mexico’s antitrust agency, the Federal Commission for Economic Competition (COFECE), plays a key role in protecting, promoting, and ensuring a competitive free market in Mexico as well as protecting consumers. COFECE is responsible for eliminating barriers both to competition and free market entry across the economy (except for the telecommunications sector, which is governed by its own competition authority) and for identifying and regulating access to essential production inputs. In September 2021, COFECE Commissioner President Alejandra Palacios stepped down following several months of public disagreements with President Lopez Obrador’s statist energy policy. Lopez Obrador has not named substitutions for COFECE’s Commissioners since November 2020, leaving the institution without a quorum for resolutions related to barriers to competition or the issuance of regulatory provisions. In addition to COFECE, the Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) and National Hydrocarbon Commission (CNH) are both technical-oriented independent agencies that play important roles in regulating the energy and hydrocarbons sectors. CRE regulates national electricity generation, coverage, distribution, and commercialization, as well as the transportation, distribution, and storage of oil, gas, and biofuels. CNH supervises and regulates oil and gas exploration and production and issues oil and gas upstream (exploration/production) concessions. In addition, the National Center for Energy Control (CENACE) is the independent electricity grid operator. Energy experts assert that these agencies, particularly CRE, are no longer fully independent as they have favored Pemex and CFE with regulations and permits over private participants. Mexico has seen a shift in the public procurement process since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Government entities are increasingly awarding contracts either as direct awards or by invitation-only procurements. In addition, there have been recent tenders that favor European standards over North American standards. Generally speaking, the Mexican government has established legal, regulatory, and accounting systems that are transparent and consistent with international norms. Still, Mexico’s current executive administration has eroded the autonomy and publicly questioned the value of specific antitrust and energy regulators and has proposed dissolving some of them to cut costs. Furthermore, corruption continues to affect equal enforcement of some regulations. The administration rolled out an ambitious plan to centralize government procurement in an effort to root out corruption and generate efficiencies. The administration estimated it could save up to USD 25 billion annually by consolidating government purchases in the Secretariat of Finance. Still, the expedited rollout and lack of planning for supply chain contingencies led to several sole-source purchases. The Mexican government’s budget is published online and readily available. The Bank of Mexico also publishes and maintains data about the country’s finances and debt obligations. Investors are increasingly concerned the administration is undermining confidence in the “rules of the game,” particularly in the energy sector, by weakening the political autonomy of COFECE, CNH, CENACE, and CRE. Still, COFECE has successfully challenged regulatory changes in the electricity sector that favor state-owned enterprises over private companies. The administration has appointed five of seven CRE commissioners over the Senate’s objections, which voted twice to reject the nominees in part due to concerns their appointments would erode the CRE’s autonomy. The administration’s budget cuts resulted in significant government layoffs, which has reportedly hampered agencies’ ability to carry out their work, a key factor in investment decisions. The independence of the CRE and CNH was further undermined by a memo from the government to both bodies instructing them to use their regulatory powers to favor state-owned Pemex and CFE. Investors expressed concern over the current executive administration setting a fee ceiling for AFORES, or private pensions management firms, starting in 2022 using a fast-tracked regulatory process with little industry consultation. Beginning with the Spanish conquest in the 1500s, Mexico had an inquisitorial criminal justice system adopted from Europe in which proceedings were largely carried out in writing and sealed from public view. Mexico amended its Constitution in 2008 to facilitate change to an oral accusatorial criminal justice system to better combat corruption, encourage transparency and efficiency, and ensure respect for the fundamental rights of both the victim and the accused. An ensuing National Code of Criminal Procedure passed in 2014 and is applicable to all 32 states. The national procedural code is coupled with each state’s criminal code to provide the legal framework for the new accusatorial system, which allows for oral, public trials with the right of the defendant to face his/her accuser and challenge evidence presented against him/her, right to counsel, due process, and other guarantees. Mexico fully adopted the new accusatorial criminal justice system at the state and federal levels in June 2016. Mexico’s Commercial Code, which dates to 1889, was most recently updated in 2014. All commercial activities must abide by this code and other applicable mercantile laws, including commercial contracts and commercial dispute settlement measures. Mexico has multiple specialized courts regarding fiscal, labor, economic competition, broadcasting, telecommunications, and agrarian law. The judicial branch and Prosecutor General’s office (FGR) are constitutionally independent from each other and the executive. The Prosecutor General is nominated by the president and approved by a two-thirds majority in the Senate for a nine-year term, effectively de-coupling the Prosecutor General from the political cycle of elections every six years. With the historic 2019 labor reform, Mexico also created an independent labor court system run by the judicial branch (formerly this was an executive branch function). The labor courts are being brought online in a phased process by state with the final phase completed on May 1, 2022. Mexico’s Foreign Investment Law sets the rules governing foreign investment into the country. The National Commission for Foreign Investments, formed by several cabinet-level ministries including Interior (SEGOB), Foreign Relations (SRE), Finance (Hacienda), and Economy (SE) establishes the criteria for administering investment rules. Mexico has two constitutionally autonomous regulators to govern matters of competition – the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT) and the Federal Commission for Economic Competition (COFECE). IFT governs broadcasting and telecommunications, while COFECE regulates all other sectors. For more information on competition issues in Mexico, please visit COFECE’s bilingual website at: www.cofece.mx. As mentioned above, Lopez Obrador has publicly questioned the value of COFECE and his party unsuccessfully introduced a proposal last year which would have dramatically reduced its resources and merged COFECE and other regulators into a less-independent structure. COFECE currently has the minimum quorum required of at least four commissioners in order to operate, out of a seven-members full board. However, COFECE lacks the required quorum of five commissioners in order to issue final resolutions determining competition barriers as well as anti-competitive practices. President Lopez Obrador has not appointed the remaining commissioners as required by law. USMCA (and NAFTA) contain clauses stating Mexico may neither directly nor indirectly expropriate property, except for public purpose and on a non-discriminatory basis. Expropriations are governed by international law and require rapid fair market value compensation, including accrued interest. Investors have the right to international arbitration. The USMCA contains an annex regarding U.S.-Mexico investment disputes and those related to covered government contracts. Mexico’s Reorganization and Bankruptcy Law (Ley de Concursos Mercantiles) governs bankruptcy and insolvency. Congress approved modifications in 2014 to shorten procedural filing times and convey greater juridical certainty to all parties, including creditors. Declaring bankruptcy is legal in Mexico and it may be granted to a private citizen, a business, or an individual business partner. Debtors, creditors, or the Attorney General can file a bankruptcy claim. Mexico ranked 33 out of 190 countries for resolving insolvency in the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report (that last it produced). The average bankruptcy filing takes 1.8 years to be resolved and recovers 63.9 cents per USD, which compares favorably to average recovery in Latin America and the Caribbean of just 31.2 cents per USD. The “Buró de Crédito” is Mexico’s main credit bureau. More information on credit reports and ratings can be found at: http://www.burodecredito.com.mx/. 6. Financial Sector The Mexican government is generally open to foreign portfolio investments, and foreign investors trade actively in various public and private asset classes. Foreign entities may freely invest in federal government securities. The Foreign Investment Law establishes foreign investors may hold 100 percent of the capital stock of any Mexican corporation or partnership, except in those few areas expressly subject to limitations under that law. Foreign investors may also purchase non-voting shares through mutual funds, trusts, offshore funds, and American Depositary Receipts. They also have the right to buy directly limited or nonvoting shares as well as free subscription shares, or “B” shares, which carry voting rights. Foreigners may purchase an interest in “A” shares, which are normally reserved for Mexican citizens, through a neutral fund operated by one of Mexico’s six development banks. Finally, Mexico offers federal, state, and local governments bonds that are rated by international credit rating agencies. The market for these securities has expanded rapidly in past years and foreign investors hold a significant stake of total federal issuances. However, foreigners are limited in their ability to purchase sub-sovereign state and municipal debt. Liquidity across asset classes is relatively deep. Mexico established a fiscally transparent trust structure known as a FICAP in 2006 to allow venture and private equity funds to incorporate locally. The Securities Market Law (Ley de Mercado de Valores) established the creation of three special investment vehicles which can provide more corporate and economic rights to shareholders than a normal corporation. These categories are: (1) Investment Promotion Corporation (Sociedad Anonima de Promotora de Inversion or SAPI); (2) Stock Exchange Investment Promotion Corporation (Sociedad Anonima Promotora de Inversion Bursatil or SAPIB); and (3) Stock Exchange Corporation (Sociedad Anonima Bursatil or SAB). Mexico also has a growing real estate investment trust market, locally referred to as Fideicomisos de Infraestructura y Bienes Raíces (FIBRAS) as well as FIBRAS-E, which allow for investment in non-real estate investment projects. FIBRAS are regulated under Articles 187 and 188 of Mexican Federal Income Tax Law. Financial sector reforms signed into law in 2014 have improved regulation and supervision of financial intermediaries and have fostered greater competition between financial services providers. While access to financial services – particularly personal credit for formal sector workers – has expanded in the past four years, bank and credit penetration in Mexico remains low compared to OECD and emerging market peers. Coupled with sound macroeconomic fundamentals, reforms have created a positive environment for the financial sector and capital markets. According to the National Banking and Stock Commission (CNBV), the banking system remains healthy and well capitalized. Mexico’s banking sector is heavily concentrated and majority foreign-owned: the seven largest banks control 85 percent of system assets and foreign-owned institutions control 70 percent of total assets. The USMCA maintains national treatment guarantees. U.S. securities firms and investment funds, acting through local subsidiaries, have the right to engage in the full range of activities permitted in Mexico. Banxico maintains independence in operations and management by constitutional mandate. Its main function is to provide domestic currency to the Mexican economy and to safeguard the Mexican Peso’s purchasing power by gearing monetary policy toward meeting a 3 percent inflation target over the medium term. Mexico’s Financial Technology (FinTech) law came into effect in March 2018 and administration released secondary regulations in 2019, creating a broad rubric for the development and regulation of innovative financial technologies. The law covers both cryptocurrencies and a regulatory “sandbox” for start-ups to test the viability of products, placing Mexico among the FinTech policy vanguard. The reforms have already attracted significant investment to lending fintech companies and mobile payment companies. However, industry stakeholders suggest insufficient clarity in the authorities’ implementation of the secondary regulations may be eroding the legal certainty the FinTech Law brought to the sector. The CNBV has authorized fourteen fintechs under the FinTech Law to operate in the Mexican market and it is reviewing other applications. The Mexican Petroleum Fund for Stability and Development (FMP) was created as part of 2013 budgetary reforms. Housed in Banxico, the fund distributes oil revenues to the national budget and a long-term savings account. The FMP incorporates the Santiago Principles for transparency, placing it among the most transparent Sovereign Wealth Funds in the world. Both Banxico and Mexico’s Supreme Federal Auditor regularly audit the fund. Mexico is also a member of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds. The Fund resources totaled MXN 23.4 billion (approximately USD 1.2 billion) in 2021. The FMP is required to publish quarterly and annual reports, which can be found at www.fmped.org.mx. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are two main SOEs in Mexico, both in the energy sector. Pemex operates the hydrocarbons (oil and gas) sector, which includes upstream, mid-stream, and downstream operations. Pemex historically contributed one-third of the Mexican government’s budget but falling output and global oil prices alongside improved revenue collection from other sources have diminished this amount over the past decade to about 8 percent. The Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) operates the electricity sector. While the GOM maintains state ownership, the 2013 constitutional reforms granted Pemex and CFE management and budget autonomy and greater flexibility to engage in private contracting. As a result of Mexico’s 2013 energy reform, the private sector is now able to compete with Pemex or enter into competitive contracts, joint ventures, profit sharing agreements, and license contracts with Pemex for hydrocarbon exploration and extraction. Liberalization of the retail fuel sales market, which Mexico completed in 2017, created significant opportunities for foreign businesses. Given Pemex frequently raises debt in international markets, its financial statements are regularly audited. The Natural Resource Governance Institute considers Pemex to be the second most transparent state-owned oil company after Norway’s Equinor. Pemex’s ten-person Board of Directors contains five government ministers and five independent councilors. The administration has identified increasing Pemex’s oil, natural gas, and refined fuels production as its chief priority for Mexico’s hydrocarbon sector. Since taking office in 2018, the administration has taken numerous legal and regulatory steps to limit private competition for Pemex. Changes to the Mexican constitution in 2013 and 2014 opened power generation and commercial supply to the private sector, allowing companies to compete with CFE. Mexico held three long-term power auctions since the reforms, in which over 40 contracts were awarded for 7,451 megawatts of energy supply and clean energy certificates. CFE remains the sole provider of transmission and distribution services and owns all distribution assets. The 2013 energy reform separated CFE from the National Energy Control Center (CENACE), which controls the national wholesale electricity market and ensures non-discriminatory access to the grid for competitors, though recent actions call into question CENACE’s independence. Legal and regulatory changes adopted by the Mexican government attempt to modify the rules governing the electricity dispatch order to favor CFE. Dozens of private companies and non-governmental organizations have successfully sought injunctions against the measures, which they argue discriminate against private participants in the electricity sector. Independent power generators were authorized to operate in 1992 but were required to sell their output to CFE or use it to self-supply. Those legacy self-supply contracts have come under criticism with an electricity reform law and proposed constitutional amendment giving the government the ability to cancel contracts it deems fraudulent. Under the 2013 reform, private power generators may now install and manage interconnections with CFE’s existing state-owned distribution infrastructure. The 2013 reform also required the government to implement a National Program for the Sustainable Use of Energy as a transition strategy to encourage clean technology and fuel development and reduce pollutant emissions. The executive administration has identified increasing CFE-owned power generation as its top priority for the utility, breaking from the firm’s recent practice of contracting private firms to build, own, and operate generation facilities. CFE forced several foreign and domestic companies to renegotiate previously executed gas supply contracts, which raised significant concerns among investors about contract sanctity. One of the main non-market-based advantages CFE and Pemex receive vis-a-vis private businesses in Mexico is related to access to capital. In addition to receiving direct budget support from the Secretariat of Finance, both entities also receive implicit credit guarantees from the federal government. As such, both are able to borrow funds on public markets at below the market rate their corporate risk profiles would normally suggest. In addition to budgetary support, the CRE and SENER have delayed or halted necessary permits for new private sector gas stations, fuel terminals, fuel imports, and power plants, providing an additional non-market advantage to CFE and Pemex. Mexico’s 2014 energy reforms liberalized access to these sectors but did not privatize state-owned enterprises. 10. Political and Security Environment Mass demonstrations are common in the larger metropolitan areas and in the southern Mexican states of Guerrero and Oaxaca. While political violence is rare, drug and organized crime-related violence has increased significantly in recent years. Political violence is also likely to accelerate in the run-up to the June 2022 elections as criminal actors seek to promote election of their preferred candidates. The national homicide rate dropped to 27 homicides per 100,000 residents in 2021 from 29 homicides per 100,000 residents in 2020, although aggregate homicides remain near all-time highs. For complete security information, please see the Safety and Security section in the Consular Country Information page at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/Mexico.html. Conditions vary widely by state. For a state-by-state assessment please see the Consular Travel Advisory at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/mexico-travel-advisory.html. Companies have reported general security concerns remain an issue for those looking to invest in the country. The American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico estimates in a biannual report that security expenses cost business as much as 5 percent of their operating budgets. Many companies choose to take extra precautions for the protection of their executives. They also report increasing security costs for shipments of goods. The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) monitors and reports on regional security for U.S. businesses operating overseas. OSAC constituency is available to any U.S.-owned, not-for-profit organization, or any enterprise incorporated in the United States (parent company, not subsidiaries or divisions) doing business overseas ( https://www.osac.gov/Country/Mexico/Detail ). 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 MXN 26,213 billion* 2021 USD 1,293 billion *https://www.inegi.org.mx/ https://www.imf.org/en/ Publications/WEO Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($billion USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 USD 184.9 billion IMF’s CDIS: https://data.imf.org/?sk=40313609- F037-48C1-84B1-E1F1CE54D6D5&sId= 1482331048410 Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 USD 20.9 billion BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2021 2.45%* 2020 2.7% *https://www.inegi.org.mx/ UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ EconomicTrends/Fdi.html Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data* 2020 From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 545,612 100 % Total Outward 189,536 100 % United States 184,911 34 % United States 96,706 51 % Netherlands 112,657 21 % Spain 21,543 11 % Spain 88,430 16 % United Kingdom 17,163 9 % Canada 35,664 7 % Brazil 10,203 5 % United Kingdom 25,423 5 % Netherlands 8,908 5 % “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. * data from the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CCIS) ( https://data.imf.org/?sk=40313609-F037-48C1-84B1-E1F1CE54D6D5&sId=1482331048410 ) Micronesia Executive Summary The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is a lower middle income island nation of 104,832 in 2021, an eight percent population decline from 2019. The inhabitants live on 607 islands with a total land area of 271 square miles and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of over one million square miles (2.6 million square km) in a remote area of the Western Pacific Ocean. The nation is composed of distinct, separate cultures and languages organized into four states under a weak national government. The FSM is part of the former U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, gaining independence in 1986. Since independence, the United States has provided over $100 million annually to the FSM under a Compact of Free Association (Compact or COFA) with the United States. FSM uses the funds for development under the administration of the U.S. Department of Interior’s Office of Insular Affairs (DOI). The World Bank estimates FSM’s 2020 Gross Domestic Income (GDI) at $3,950 per person, a trend reflecting no growth over the previous 10 years. The national currency is the U.S. dollar. Commercial fishing remains the key economic sector in the FSM. The country’s primary sources of income are the sale of fishing rights ($70 million in FY2020), corporate income taxes, mainly from offshore corporate registrations for captive insurance ($10 million in FY 2020), and special revenue grants ($26 million in FY2020). The FSM continues largely as a subsistence economy, except in larger towns where the economy is centered on government employment and a small commercial sector. The cash economy is primarily fueled by government salaries paid by Compact funds (70 percent of employed adults work in the public sector) and, to a much lesser degree, by family remittances and Social Security benefits paid to FSM citizens who previously worked in the United States or who are the surviving spouse of an American citizen. Compact funding was anticipated to change in 2023 from direct funding in the form of sector grants, to the use by the FSM of proceeds derived from a trust fund developed from U.S. contributions over 20 years. (Note: The Compact of Free Association is under renegotiation as of June 2022 and it cannot be determined if the direct funding mechanism of sector grants will continue or end). As of September 2021, the balance of the Compact Fund stood at $1 billion. FSM has also created its own trust fund, contributing $17 million in FY2020, raising its overall balance to $307 million. (Note: audited balances for the FSM Trust Fund for FY2021 have not yet been published). The FSM GDP for 2018 was $402 million, a 19.5 percent increase from 2017 at constant prices. The economy recorded a trade deficit of $125 million in goods and services for the same year. FSM government debt at $83.2 million was low, giving FSM a low 23.7 debt/GDP ratio, one of the lowest in the Pacific. Major creditors are the Asian Development Bank (52.5 percent of debt) and the U.S. Rural Utility Services (20.7 percent of debt). Despite the low levels of debt in absolute terms, the International Monetary Fund deemed FSM to be at a high level of debt stress due to the uncertainty created by looming Compact Funding reductions in 2023 and the possible need to borrow to maintain operations of state governments. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is almost nonexistent due to prohibitions on foreign ownership of land and businesses (in specified industries), difficulties in registering companies (the process requires approvals from the state governments as well as the national government), poor private sector contract enforcement, poor protection of minority (foreign) investors’ rights, weak courts, and weak bankruptcy processes. In addition, lack of infrastructure, poor health and education systems, the scarcity of commercial flights, and high costs of imported goods and various business services also contribute to the lack of FDI. Pohnpei State’s Legislature amended its laws in September 2018 to reduce requirements on foreign investment. The law specified the business sectors that permit FDI, with the remaining sectors available for Pohnpei citizens only. Domestic capital formation is very low. Commercial banks are classified as foreign entities and their ability to provide commercial loans, especially secured by real estate, is very limited. Banks view all credit to FSM borrowers as essentially unsecured. Most national political power is delegated to the four states by the FSM Constitution, including regulation of foreign investment and restrictions on leases. Thus, investors must navigate nationwide between five different sets of regulations and licenses. U.S. citizens can live and work in the FSM indefinitely without visas under the Compact but cannot own property on most FSM islands. FSM voters select national legislators (senators). The national senators then caucus to select the president and vice-president from among the four at-large senators. There are no political parties. On May 11, 2019, Senators selected David Panuelo and Yosiwo George as president and vice president, respectively, for four-year terms. The most recent elections for Congress were held March 1, 2021. The FSM federal government closed its borders in March 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and did not allow any repatriations until May 2021. Since that time, it has repatriated citizens and essential workers intermittently via a single flight per month into the country. The shut-down has adversely affected the FSM’s tourism industry and the ability of the international community to implement infrastructure programs needed to support investment. Recently, flights have increased in frequency and quarantine has been reduced, with plans to fully reopen in August 2022. Only Yap State has undertaken any green energy initiatives with a single pilot wind project. It has also implemented several small-scale solar projects on outer islands. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 44 of 100(Regional) http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2012 $30 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $3,950 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment There are many structural impediments to increasing foreign investment in the FSM. The FSM has no department dedicated to promoting investment nor any ongoing dialogue with potential investors. These challenges, both regulatory and political, affect foreign investment and economic progress in general, and addressing them requires a constitutional and political will to change that is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Some political leaders at the state and national levels are owners of the largest businesses on the islands and strongly oppose the required structural changes that would result in increased competition. The FSM scores in the lowest quintile in almost all measures and international indices of economic activity and climate for doing business. In theory, the country’s courts support contractual agreements, but enforcement of judicial decisions is weak. Foreign firms doing business in the FSM have difficulty collecting debts owed by FSM governments, companies, and individuals, even after obtaining favorable judgments. For these reasons, the World Bank ranked the FSM very low in protecting minority investors (185th of 190 countries) and enforcing contracts (183rd of 190 countries). U.S. companies and individuals considering doing business with parties in the FSM should exercise due diligence and negotiate credit and payment arrangements that fully protect their interests. All four of the FSM states have limits on foreign ownership of small- and medium-sized businesses. Large projects are assessed by the respective state governments on a case-by-case basis. Each state requires a separate application for foreign investment permits. Foreign investment is strictly limited by local ownership requirements (51-60 percent minimum, depending on sector) and residency requirements of more than five years. Financing through bank loans is limited due to a weak financial sector. Local small- and medium-sized businesses are protected from foreign competition through legal restrictions. Larger projects in competition with a business sector already owned by public figures face strong political opposition. Politicians enthusiastically receive large and unrealistic development proposals, but do not move forward primarily due to land issues and traditional landowner disputes. The FSM does not maintain an investment screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment. N/A FSM lacks a single window for online business registration or information portals providing comprehensive business registration information. The FSM Department of Resources and Development (R&D) maintains information on trade and investment on its website. However, all information is woefully out of date. Post understands obtaining licenses and permits in a timely manner may depend more on the relationship of the investor (or local legal counsel) with the official in charge, rather than any clear procedure or timeline. The World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business report ranked the FSM as 158th of 190 countries globally in terms of procedures to register a business (Note: The World Bank is currently gathering data for its Business Enabling Environment Report that will replace the Ease of Doing Business Report). The FSM government does not promote, incentivize, or restrict outward investment. Given the small population and lack of capital formation, outward investment is negligible. 3. Legal Regime The FSM is not a signatory to any convention on transparency in international investment. Transparency of government actions is typically based more on personalities than on the law. Regulatory bodies sometimes involve themselves in issues beyond their jurisdiction. Conversely, other regulations are not uniformly enforced. It is often difficult to obtain public records, although some states and government organizations do require open meetings. While basic laws are accessible on the internet, text or summaries of proposed regulations are published before enactment but are not printed in an official journal or publication, and there is no appeal or administrative review process. In addition, government audits and statistical reports are not prepared promptly, and timely data are often unavailable (the most recent publications Using three or four year old data). The websites that provide the most relevant economic data on FSM are: National Public Auditor http://www.fsmopa.fm Department of Resources & Development http://www.fsmrd.fm FSM Statistics http://www.fsmstatistics.fm The FSM signed on to the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) in 2001 but did not ratify the agreement. PICTA is a free trade agreement on trade in goods among 14 members of the Pacific Islands Forum (excluding Australia and New Zealand). Eleven countries – Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu — have ratified PICTA. The FSM is not a member of any regional economic block, nor is it a member of the WTO. The FSM follows the U.S. common law system and uses U.S. case law as precedent. There are no specialized courts except for Land Courts in Pohnpei and Kosrae. All four states have State Courts and State Supreme Courts. The judicial system remains independent of the executive branch, but is reported to be slow, weak, and lacking the ability to enforce judgments properly. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable. Appeals may be adjudicated in either the State or National courts. In September 2018, the Pohnpei State Legislature overrode the Governor’s veto of a bill on foreign investment regulations. The bill became state law over the objection of several local business leaders. The new law placed all decision-making power into the hands of one person, the Registrar of Corporations. FSM national and state governments use a “traffic light” system to regulate businesses, with red for prohibited, amber for restricted, and green for unrestricted. Industry classifications in this system vary from state to state. The individual states directly regulate all foreign investment, except in the areas of deep ocean fishing, banking, insurance, air travel, and international shipping, which are regulated at the federal level. Thus, a prospective investor who plans to operate in more than one state must obtain separate permits in each state, and often follow different regulations as well. The following are the regulations pertaining to restrictions by sector in each of the states: FSM National Red: Arms manufacture, minting of currency, nuclear power, radioactive goods. Amber: Increased scrutiny before approval for non-traditional banking services and insurance. Green: Banking, fishing, air transport, international shipping. Kosrae State Red: manufacture of toxic or biohazard materials, gambling, casinos, fishing using sodium/cyanide or compressed air. (Note: There is also currently a ban on all business transactions on Sundays in the capital town. End Note.) Amber: Real estate brokerage, non-ecology-based tourism, trade in reef fish, coral harvesting. Green: Eco-tourism, export of local goods, professional services. Pohnpei State Red: None presently defined, determined by board from among amber candidates. Amber: Everything not classified as green. Green: Businesses with greater than 60 percent FSM ownership, initial capitalization of $250,000 or more, professional services with capitalization of $50,000 or more, and Special Investment Sector businesses with 51 percent FSM ownership in retail, trade, exploration, development, and extraction of land or marine based mineral resources or timber. Chuuk State Red: Determined by the Director, none codified in law. Amber: Casinos, lotteries, and industries that pollute the environment, destroy local culture and tradition, or deplete natural resources. Green: Eco-tourism, professional services, intra-state airline services, exports of local goods. Yap State Red: Manufacture of toxic materials, weapons, ammunition, commercial export of reef fish, activities injurious to the health and welfare of the citizens of Yap. Amber: None at present. Green: All others. There is no law or agency governing competition in the FSM nor does the government require environmental, social, or governance disclosure to help investors and consumers distinguish between high-and-low quality investments. The FSM Foreign Investment Act of 1997 guarantees no compulsory acquisition or expropriation of property of any foreign investment for which a Foreign Investment Permit is issued, except for violation of laws and regulations and in certain extraordinary circumstances. Those extraordinary circumstances include cases in which such action would be consistent with existing FSM eminent domain law, when such action is necessary to serve overriding national interests, or when either the FSM Congress or the FSM Secretary of Resources and Development has initiated expropriation. There has been no history of expropriation involving foreign investors or U.S. companies. A bankruptcy law has been in existence since 2005, but was used only three times, generally to avoid taxes. 6. Financial Sector There are no stock or commodities exchanges in the FSM. The two commercial banks operating in the country, the Bank of Guam and the Bank of the FSM, can only make small, short-term unsecured loans because of the prohibition of using land or businesses as collateral, difficulties inherent in collecting debts, and the inability to identify collateral that can be attached and sold in the event of default. There are no credit reporting agencies. The Bank of the FSM is prohibited by its charter from investing in any securities not insured by the U.S. government, so the bulk of its holdings are in U.S. Treasury bonds. The Bank of Guam operates as a deposit collector and transactions facilitator in the FSM, with most of its loans made in Guam. The Bank of the FSM is protected from takeover by a trigger from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) that will cancel its insurance status if foreign ownership exceeds 30 percent. Foreigners are not allowed to open accounts with the bank unless they provide proof of local residence and work permits and fulfill U.S. Treasury “know thy customer” requirements. Money exchange companies such as Western Union operate within FSM and handle the majority of remittances. Since most businesses are family owned, there are no shares that can be acquired for mergers, acquisitions, or hostile takeovers. The FSM enacted a secured transaction law in 2005 and established a filing office in October 2006 primarily to serve the foreign corporate registration market. The FSM has no sovereign wealth fund, but the government established a national trust fund modeled on the Compact Trust Fund to provide additional government income after 2023. That fund is managed by a U.S.-based commercial fund manager. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The FSM has established state monopolies and maintains state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the areas of fuel distribution, telecommunications, and copra production. These companies are Vital Energy (the parent of FSM Petroleum Corporation, FSMPC), the FSM Telecommunications Corporation, the FSM Telecommunications Cable Corporation, and the FSM Coconut Development Authority, which was folded into Vital Energy in 2014. Legislation passed in 2016 opened the telecom market to private companies to qualify for World Bank funding for broadband development, including a submarine fiber optic cable to Yap and Palau. Other prominent SOEs include the National Fisheries Corporation, the FSM Development Bank, the College of Micronesia, and Caroline Islands Air, Inc. FSM does not currently adhere to the convention on the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs. There is currently no privatization program in the FSM. 10. Political and Security Environment FSM enjoys a stable, democratic form of government with no history of civil or political strife. The islands became part of a UN Trust Territory under U.S. administration following World War II, after periods of Spanish, German, and Japanese control. In 1979, the islands adopted a constitution, formally becoming the Federated States of Micronesia. Independence came in 1986 under a Compact of Free Association with the United States that was amended and renewed in 2004 and portions related to financial assistance currently are being renegotiated. Under this agreement, the U.S. Government guarantees the FSM’s external security. The country’s last presidential election was held in March 2019, in which incumbent Peter Christian lost his bid for a second term to current President David W. Panuelo. The population’s main concerns during the campaign season were related to the high unemployment rate, depletion of marine resources from overfishing, corruption, and a reliance on foreign aid. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) N/A N/A 2020 $3,950 www.worldbank.org/en/country www.fsmstatistics.fm Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $1.0 2012 $30.0 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ www.FSMstatistics.fm Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A $1 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises- comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A UNCTAD data available at: https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ EconomicTrends/Fdi.html Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. Moldova Executive Summary Under the new pro-reform government, Moldova is making progress on economic reforms and strengthening democratic institutions. The pro-reform message voters sent when they chose Maia Sandu as Moldova’s first female President in November 2020 was solidified when the pro-Western, anti-corruption Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) won snap parliamentary elections in July 2021. The government enjoys wide support among the business community. In December 2021, the government secured a 40-month, $560 million governance-focused program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The government also unlocked new EU MicroFinancial assistance and secured an Economic Recovery and Resilience plan of up to $660 million for 2021 – 2024 to help Moldova meet its development priorities. In 2021, Moldova’s economy grew by a record 13.9%, following an almost 8% contraction in 2020. Unemployment decreased, outmigration slowed, and consumer confidence grew. However, there are major concerns facing Moldova’s investment climate in 2022. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had an immediate and significant negative impact on Moldova’s economy. Almost 20% of Moldova’s goods were imported from Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus before the war; with those supply routes now frozen, Moldovans have had to substitute goods from the EU at significantly higher costs. Moldova relied on the port in Odesa and Ukraine’s railway system for much of its trade and now must pay significantly higher transport fees for goods to be trucked in from Romania via the land border. Experts predict GDP will grow by at most 0.3% in 2022. The government is committed to strengthening Moldova’s investment and business climate to attract foreign investment, which will help mitigate the negative economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, energy crisis, and disruptions to Moldovan economy because of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The government continues to deal with the fallout from the massive bank fraud in 2014, when more than a billion dollars was stolen from Moldova’s state coffers. Efforts are being taken to implement reforms, investigate and prosecute those responsible, and tackle the pervasive corruption that continues to undermine public trust and slow economic development. Moldova ranks 105 out of 180 on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. Moldova has adopted modern commercial legislation in accordance with WTO rules following negotiations linked to Moldova’s WTO accession. The main challenges to the business climate remain the lack of effective and equitable implementation of laws and regulations, and arbitrary, non-transparent decisions by government officials to give domestic producers an edge over foreign competitors in certain areas. For example, an environmental tax is applied on bottles and other packaging of imported goods, but not levied on bottles and packaging produced in Moldova. Additionally, the government may liberally cite public security or general social welfare as reasons to intervene in the economy in contravention of its declared respect for market principles. There are reports of problems with customs valuation of goods, specifically that the Customs Service has been applying the maximum possible values to imported goods, even if their actual purchase value was far lower. In June 2014, Moldova signed an Association Agreement (AA) with the European Union (EU), including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), committing the government to a course of reforms to bring its governmental, regulatory, and business practices in line with EU standards. In March 2022, in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine, the government formally applied for EU membership. The DCFTA has helped integrate Moldova further into the European common market and created more opportunities for investment in Moldova as a bridge between Western and Eastern European markets. Moldova now exports over 80 percent of its goods to European, North American, and other non-Russian markets. U.S. assistance, particularly in the agricultural, wine, information technology, and other key sectors, has been critical in promoting a competitive Moldova that is well-integrated into Western markets. While some large foreign companies have taken advantage of tax breaks in the country’s free economic zones, foreign direct investment (FDI) remains low. Finance, automotive, light industry, agriculture, food processing, IT, wine, and real estate have historically attracted foreign investment. Largely through USAID programs, Embassy Chisinau has supported the development of a number of these emerging sectors, yet risks remain. The National Strategy for Investment Attraction and Export Promotion 2016-2020 identified seven priority sectors for investment and export promotion: agriculture and food processing, automotive, business services such as business process outsourcing (BPO), clothing and footwear, electronics, information and communication technologies (ICT), and machinery. Private investors, including several U.S. companies, have shown strong interest in the ICT sector, especially after Moldova established a preferential tax regime for the sector. Improvements in the strength and transparency of the financial sector also helped attract interest. Many U.S. businesses have explored opportunities in the agricultural and energy sectors. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 105 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 64 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 29 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,560 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment One of the poorest countries in Europe, Moldova relies heavily on foreign trade and remittances from abroad for its economic growth. Under Moldovan law, foreign companies enjoy national treatment in most respects. The government views FDI as vital for sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction. In 2021, a lack of qualified labor and the continued emigration of qualified, working-age Moldovans undermined official efforts to attract foreign investment. Moldova ratified its Association Agreement with the EU in 2016, with the intent of bringing closer political association and economic integration with the EU. The DCFTA, a component of the Association Agreement, provides for mutual elimination of customs duties on industrial and most agricultural products and for further liberalization of the services market. It also addresses other barriers to trade and reforms in economic governance, with the goal of strengthening transparency and competition and adopting EU product standards. Given its small economy, Moldova has relied on a liberalized trade and investment strategy to increase the export of its goods and services to the EU. A member of the WTO since 2001, Moldova has signed bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements, including: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Free Trade Agreement Central European Free Trade Agreement EU DCFTA Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the Rebublic of Moldova After Moldova signed the Association Agreement and DCFTA in 2014, Russia sought to pressure Chisinau through a series of politically motivated trade bans on Moldova’s exports of fruit, canned products, and fresh and processed meat. These embargos drove Moldova to expand and diversify its exports outside Russia and the former Soviet Union. The EU has now become the country’s largest export destination, absorbing more than 60% of all Moldovan exports. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 negatively impacted Moldova’s traditional trading partners and routes. Moldova seeks increased cooperation with the EU to eliminate import quotas on certain Moldovan goods to compensate for lost trade with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Trade with Europe is likely to increase. In addition to priority sectors, the government has identified in its national development strategy “Moldova 2020” seven priority public sector areas for development and reform: education; access to financing; road infrastructure; business regulation; energy efficiency; justice system; and social insurance. The government has made a formal commitment to accelerate the country’s development by making the economy more capital-intensive, sustainable, and knowledge-based. The government published an overall Action Plan for 2020-2021 and committed to implement outstanding AA/DCFTA requirements. The government has started work on the new National Action Plan. There are no formal limits on foreign control of property and land, with the significant exception that foreigners are expressly prohibited from owning agricultural or forest land, even via a locally domiciled corporation or business. Foreigners may become owners of such land only through inheritance and may only transfer the land to Moldovan citizens. However, foreigners are permitted to buy all other forms of property in Moldova, including land plots under privatized enterprises and land designated for construction. In 2006, Parliament further restricted the right of sale and purchase of agricultural land to the state, Moldovan citizens, and legal entities without foreign capital. There are reportedly Moldova-registered companies with foreign capital known to own agricultural land through loopholes in the previous law. The only straightforward option available to foreigners who wish to use agricultural land in Moldova is to lease the land. Under Moldovan law, foreign companies enjoy national treatment in most respects. The Law on Investment in Entrepreneurship prohibits discrimination against investments based on citizenship, domicile, residence, place of registration, place of activity, state of origin, or any other grounds. The law provides for equitable conditions for all investors and rules out discriminatory measures hindering management, operation, maintenance, utilization, acquisition, extension, or disposal of investments. The law mandates equitable treatment for local companies and foreigners regarding licensing, approval, and procurement. Companies registered in questionable tax havens are technically prohibited from holding shares in commercial banks. In November 2021, Moldova passed a law establishing a formal screening mechanism for strategic investments. The government has not yet drafted implementing regulations, thus the law has not come into effect. The law outlines a range of industries and assets critical to state security, including energy, transport, strategic infrastructure, electronic communications, mass media, elections, information technologies, high-end technologies, cryptography, defense, radioactive materials, cybersecurity, airspace, hydrometeorology, geophysics, and handling of personal data and state secrets. Any (yet to be defined) strategic investment requires prior approval from a governmental council chaired by the Prime Minister. The law restricts investment opportunities for investors from offshore zones, those convicted of certain crimes, involved in money laundering and financing of terrorism, or known to have links to foreign authorities that pose a risk to national security. The law has not yet come into effect because government has not yet drafted implementing regulations or determined the composition and functions of the governmental council or the timeline for investment reviews. By statute, special forms of legal organizations and certain activities require a minimum of capital to be invested (e.g., MDL 20,000 (USD 1,125) for joint stock companies, MDL 15 million (USD 844,000) for insurance companies, and MDL 100 million (USD 5.6 million) for banks). The latest Investment Policy Review of Moldova was conducted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as part of a broader South-East Europe Review in 2017 and can be accessed at: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d6_en.pdf Moldova underwent a trade policy review by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in October 2015: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp423_e.htm All major business associations usually publish position papers and policy recommendations. These documents can be found on the respective websites: American Chamber of Commerce in Moldova www.amcham.md , European Business Association www.eba.md and Foreign Investors Association www.fia.md . Moldova has an investment promotion agency to assist prospective investors with information about business registration or industrial sectors, facilitate contact with relevant authorities, and organize study visits. The Investment Agency has an investment guide available on its website: invest.gov.md . The government has established a special council to promote investment projects of national importance and tackle bureaucratic impediments to larger investment. It has also taken steps over the years to simplify and streamline business registration and licensing, lower tax rates, strengthen tax administration, and increase transparency. The Public Services Agency, created in 2017, oversees business registrations. By law, registration should take three days for a standard procedure or four hours for an expedited procedure and is done in two stages. The first stage involves submission of an application and a set of documents, the range of which may vary depending on the legal form of the business (LLC, joint-stock company, sole proprietorship, etc.). At the second stage, the Agency issues a registration certificate and a unique identification number for the business, conferring full legal capacity to the entity. In 2010, the government introduced the “one-stop-shop” principle, under which businesses are relieved of the requirement to register separately with fiscal, statistical, social security, or health insurance authorities. There are currently no procedures for online business registration. Certain types of activity listed in the law on licensing require businesses to be first licensed by public authorities. In 2006, the Moldovan Parliament ratified the 1961 Hague Convention on Abolishing the Requirement for Legalization for Foreign Public Documents. Acceptance of U.S. apostilles applied on official documents simplifies the legalization of official documents issued in the United States that are required in the process of business registration. Moldova does not have an official policy or mechanism for promoting or incentivizing outward investment. 3. Legal Regime Laws and regulations are published in the official gazette called Monitorul Oficial, while a database of laws and regulations is available online at http://www.legis.md . The Moldovan government generally publishes significant laws in draft form for public comment. Draft laws are also available online, on the website of the Moldovan Parliament. Consultations with business and trade associations provide other opportunities for comment. A significant exception to these consultations is a mechanism that allows Parliament to also propose draft laws. The Prime Minister chairs an Economic Council, which liaises with the Moldovan business community to discuss government proposals and gather ideas to improve Moldova’s economy, especially in response to the COVID-19 crisis. The Foreign Investors Association (FIA) was established in 2004 with the support of the OECD. FIA engages in a dialogue with the government on topics related to the investment climate and produces an annual publication of concerns and recommendations to improve the investment climate. In 2006, the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) registered in Moldova, presenting another voice for the business community. In 2011, a group of ten large EU investors founded the European Business Association (EBA). These are the three largest foreign business associations, and they regularly engage in policy discussions with the government. All regulations and governmental decisions related to business activity have been published in a special business registry, “Register of Regulations on Business Activity,” to raise the awareness of businesspeople about their rights, increase the transparency of business regulations, and help fight corruption. The government has an approved list of business permits and authorizations. Government agencies and inspectors cannot issue any form of documents not included in the list. The working group of the State Commission for Regulation of Entrepreneurial Activity, which was established as a filter to eliminate excessive business regulations, meets to vet draft governmental regulations dealing with entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, bureaucratic procedures are not always transparent, and red tape often makes processing registrations, ownership, and other procedures unnecessarily long, costly, and burdensome. Discretionary decisions by government officials provide room for abuse and corruption. While the government adopted laws to improve the business climate and reduce excessive state controls and regulation, effective implementation is insufficient. This inconsistent application of laws and regulations undermines fair competition and adds uncertainty particularly for small- and medium-sized businesses as well as new entrants. Moldova committed to implementing International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2008. Use of IFRS is required by law for all public interest entities (financial entities, investment funds, insurance companies, private pension funds, and publicly listed entities) and national accounting standards (which approximate IFRS in many ways) are used by other firms, although many use IFRS as well due to foreign ownership. Moldova has a “one stop window” which provides clear and uniform rules for the release of information and standardized documents for business registration. Moldova launched a Trade Information Portal for the domestic and international traders. The new portal is available at www.trade.gov.md . It is the main source of official specialized information on related procedures and documents required for the import, export, and transit of goods. The Customs Service of Moldova also operates a call center to provide online support and guide economic agents through Moldova’s import/export procedures. A law simplifying the system of inspectorates and various inspection bodies was adopted in 2017 to increase efficiency and reduce regulatory burden. Through the reformation of inspection bodies, the government reorganized the state inspection agencies for better planning and monitoring of inspectors’ activity. By reducing the number of inspection agencies and introducing risk-based criteria for inspections, the government sought to improve the business climate by reducing the opportunity for inspections to be used for political purposes. The government does not have specific policies promoting companies’ environmental, social, and governance disclosure. The EU Association Agreement (AA), including a Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), has binding regulatory provisions committing Moldova to a reform agenda and to approximating domestic legislation to EU standards in a range of areas, including corporate law, labor, consumer protection, competition and market surveillance, general product safety, tax, energy, customs duties, public procurement, intellectual property rights, and others. Under the DCFTA, Moldova will gradually abolish duties and quotas in mutual trade in goods and services. It will also eliminate non-tariff barriers by adopting EU rules on health and safety standards, intellectual property rights, and other fields. The agreement contains a timeframe for implementation, with phase-ins up to ten years. Moldova has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2001 and, as such, is a signatory to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). These agreements contain major investment-related commitments, such as opening to the establishment of foreign service providers, prohibiting local content, trade-balancing, domestic sales requirements (TRIMs), and protection of intellectual property (TRIPS). No major WTO TRIMs inconsistencies have been reported. As a WTO member, Moldova must notify draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. In 2016, Moldova ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement and adopted several measures to conform to WTO requirements. The government has undertaken incremental steps since 2017 to draft a new Customs Code, which merges existing separate laws on customs procedures and goods crossing national borders and approximate national customs rules to the EU Customs Code. In 2017, the government changed customs rules to align with the EU Authorized Economic Operator requirements and Approved Exporter conditions. Moldova’s commercial litigation rules comply with WTO requirements. The main challenges to the business climate remain the lack of effective and equitable implementation of laws and regulations, and arbitrary, non-transparent decisions by government officials to give domestic producers an edge over foreign competitors in certain areas. For example, an environmental tax is applied on bottles and other packaging of imported goods, but not levied on bottles and packaging produced in Moldova. There are reports of problems with customs valuation of goods, specifically that the Customs Service has been applying the maximum possible values to imported goods, even if their actual purchase value was far lower. This has increased customs revenues but disadvantaged importers. Moldova has a civil law legal system with codified laws that govern different aspects of life, including business, trade, and economy. The country’s legal framework consists of its constitution, organic and ordinary laws passed by the Parliament, and administrative acts issued by the government and other public authorities. Although Moldovan courts are constitutionally independent, their structures have facilitated government and political interference; the courts suffer from inefficiency and low public trust. The court system consists of lower courts (i.e., trial courts), four courts of appeal, the Supreme Court of Justice, and a separate Constitutional Court. Moldova has a new justice reform strategy for 2022-2025. The new strategy continues the 2016 parliamentary initiative to “optimize” the country’s court system as part of broader justice sector reforms intended to reduce the number of trial courts in Moldova from 40 to 15. Specialized courts such as the Commercial Circumscription Court and Military Court were eliminated. Five trial courts from Chisinau were conceptually merged into one – the Chisinau trial court – although in 2018 the merged Chisinau trial court was further reorganized to specialize across five districts (investigative and contravention; criminal; administrative; bankruptcy; and civil, which includes adjudication of commercial disputes). The government will review court jurisdictions to ensure that the courts are structured in a way that provides access to justice for all citizens, and will begin to review the jurisdiction of the prosecutor’s offices for the same reason. The 2016 reforms created two specialized quasi-independent prosecution offices. The Anticorruption Prosecution Office is responsible for investigating and prosecuting corruption, bribery, abuse of power by public officials, and money laundering. The Prosecution Office on Combating Organized Crime and Special Cases investigates and prosecutes organized, transnational and particular complex crimes, including tax evasion, smuggling, intellectual property offenses, trafficking in persons, and narcotics. In 2017-2019, the Moldovan Prosecution Service continued the implementation of reforms under a law on the prosecution service passed in 2016. The Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) led the drafting of new regulations for the specialized prosecution offices, regional, district and municipal offices. As of January 1, 2021, the State Tax Service is authorized to investigate economic crimes. The government further plans to restructure the anticorruption agencies to focus on high-level corruption. In addition to its international agreements, Moldovan laws affecting FDI include the Civil Code, the Law on Property, the Law on Investment in Entrepreneurship, the Law on Entrepreneurship and Enterprises, the Law on Joint Stock Companies, the Law on Small Business Support, the Law on Financial Institutions, the Law on Franchising, the Tax Code, the Customs Code, the Law on Licensing Certain Activities, and the Law on Insolvency. The current Law on Investment in Entrepreneurship came into effect in 2004. It was designed to be compatible with European standards in its definitions of types of local and foreign investment. It provides guarantees of investors’ rights, prohibitions against expropriation or similar actions, and for payment of damages if investors’ rights are violated. The law permits FDI in all sectors of the economy, while certain activities require a business license. Parliament adopted a new law setting up an investment screening mechanism in 2021 (see chapter 1 above). In 2012, Parliament passed a law on competition in line with EU practice and legislation. The National Competition Agency was subsequently renamed the Competition Council. The Competition Council oversees compliance with competition and state-aid provisions and initiates examination of alleged violation of competition laws. The Competition Council may request cessation of action, prescribe behavioral or structural remedies, and apply fines. The Law on Investment in Entrepreneurship states that investments cannot be subject to expropriation or to measures with a similar effect. However, an investment may be expropriated for purposes of public utility if it is not discriminatory and just compensation is provided. If a public authority violates an investor’s rights, the investor is entitled to compensation equivalent to the actual damages at the time of occurrence, including any lost profits. The government has given no indication of intent to discriminate against U.S. investments, companies, or representatives by expropriation, or of intent to expropriate property owned by citizens of other countries. No particular sectors are at greater risk of expropriation or similar actions in Moldova. The previous governments have had a history of depriving investors, both national and foreign, of their businesses in various forms. Many of them have sued the government at the European Court for Human Rights for violation of the right to fair trial and of the respect for property, or in international arbitral tribunals. Moldova has a law on insolvency that provides for expedited insolvency proceedings, including by granting priority to secured creditors, restructuring mechanisms, reduced opportunities for appeals, moratorium provisions, strict statutory periods in the proceedings, and enhanced role of insolvency administrators. 6. Financial Sector Moldova’s securities market is underdeveloped. Official National Bank of Moldova (NBM) statistics include data on portfolio investments, yet there is a lack of open-source information fully reflect the trends and relevance of these investments. NBM data shows that most portfolio investments target banks, while the National Statistics Bureau does not differentiate between foreign direct investment and portfolio investments of less than 10 percent in a company. Laws, governmental decisions, NBM regulations, and Stock Exchange regulations provide the framework for capital markets and portfolio investment in Moldova. The government began regulatory reform in this area in 2007 with a view to spurring the development of the weak non-banking financial market. Since 2008, two bodies in particular – the NBM and the National Commission for Financial Markets – have regulated financial and capital markets. Foreign investors are not restricted from obtaining credit from local banks, the main source of business financing. However, stringent lending practices limit access to credit for Moldovan companies, especially SMEs. The government has eased some lending regulations to assist SMEs to obtain credit during the COVID-19 pandemic. Local commercial banks provide mostly short-term, high-interest loans and require large amounts of collateral, reflecting the country’s perceived high economic risk. Progress in lending activity suffered a sharp reversal in 2015 after the late-2014 banking crisis, triggered by a massive bank fraud, which severely weakened the banking system. Extreme monetary tightening by the NBM following significant currency flight connected to the resulting bank bailouts led to prohibitively high interest rates. In recent years, lending conditions improved as interest rates continued to hover around nine percent. However, inflation is expected to reach 28% in 2022 due to high global energy prices and regional instability. Large investments can rarely be financed through a single bank and require a bank consortium. Recent years have seen growth in leasing and micro-financing, leading to calls for clear regulation of the non-bank financial sector. As a result, Parliament passed a new law on the non-bank financial sector, which entered into effect on October 1, 2018. Raiffeisen Leasing remains the only international leasing company which has opened a representative office in Moldova. Even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which exacerbated Moldova’s inflation, the private sector’s access to credit instruments has been limited by the insufficiency of long-term funding, high interest rates, and unrealistic lending forecasts by banks. Financing through local private investment funds is virtually non-existent. A few U.S. investment funds have been active on the Moldovan market. The government adopted a 2018-2022 strategy for the development of the non-banking financial sector aimed at bolstering the capital markets combined with prudential supervision. A new Central Securities Depository was established under the supervision of the National Bank of Moldova to bring greater transparency and integrity to ownership and the recordkeeping associated with it. Acting as an independent regulatory agency, the National Commission for Financial Markets (NCFM) supervises the securities market, insurance sector and non-bank financial institutions. A new capital markets law adopting EU regulations came into effect in 2013. It was designed to open up capital markets to foreign investors, strengthen NCFM’s powers of independent regulator, and set higher capital requirements on capital market participants. In 2014, a crisis at three Moldovan banks (which resulted in their closure and the loss of USD 1.2 billion), two of them among the country’s largest, undermined confidence in the banking system. The role of a Moldovan bank in the “Russian Laundromat” case, estimated to have laundered from USD 20 to 80 billion further underscored these challenges. The crisis shook Moldova’s banking system, causing some foreign correspondent banks to terminate ties with Moldovan banks and others to significantly tighten their lending. In March 2020, Moldova successfully completed its IMF program after implementing reforms in financial and banking sectors. As a result of these reforms, the financial sector is better prepared to withstand the economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis. There is a high degree of capital and liquidity, and an overall reduction of non-performing loans to below eight percent. Moldovan banks remain the main, albeit currently limited, source of business financing. The non-bank financial institutions however have been gaining sizable market share, especially in individual and SME lending, where banks have been encumbered by prudential banking rules. Bank assets account for about 55 percent of GDP. Banks are also the largest loan providers, with loans amounting to approximately USD 3.2 billion. Lending activity decreased in 2019 and 2020, recovered somewhat in 2021, and decreased again in response to high projected inflation. Moldova currently has 11 commercial banks. The NBM regulates the commercial bank sector and reports to Parliament. Foreign bank subsidiaries must register in Moldova and operate under the local banking legislation. Although the integrity of true bank ownership records are questionable, foreign investors’ share in Moldovan banks’ capital is approximately 87 percent of total capital, and includes such major foreign investors as OTP Bank (Hungary), Erste Bank (Austria), Banca Transilvania (Romania) and Doverie Holding (Bulgaria). As of December 31, 2021, total bank assets were MDL 118.5 billion (USD 6.7 billion), a 14.2% increase from 2020. Moldova’s three largest commercial banks account for roughly 65 percent of the total bank assets, as follows: Moldova Agroindbank – MDL 37.2 billion (USD 2.1 billion); Moldindconbank – MDL 24.4 billion (USD 1.4 billion); and OTP Bank – MDL 16.8 billion (USD 949.8 million). To prevent another crisis, the NBM instituted special monitoring of these top three banks over concerns about the transparency of bank shareholders; this monitoring was lifted in April 2020. After 2016, the Moldovan Parliament adopted legislation that would strengthen the independence of decision making at the NCFM and NBM – to help address systemic supervisory problems that had a negative effect on Moldova’s financial sector. To strengthen the system of tracking shares and shareholders, with USAID assistance, authorities put in place a law establishing the aforementioned Centralized Securities Depository. In addition, all bank shares must be sold and purchased on the Moldovan Stock Exchange. These measures have improved the transparency and reliability of the financial sector. NBM’s Banking Law of 2018 and the Bank Recovery and Resolution Law from 2016 bring the financial sector closer to harmonization with EU standards, including through the application of stronger risk-based supervision to banks, increased enforcement powers and monetary penalties applied to banks, structures to address problem banks, and strengthening the NBM’s ability to conduct risk assessments. Also, NBM required banks to increase their credit loss provisioning and take urgent action to reinforce internal risk management as well as procedures on related-party financing. In addition, the NBM developed a methodology to better identify the related parties at banks. The embassy is not aware of any sovereign wealth funds run by the government of Moldova. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Since gaining independence in 1992, Moldova has privatized most State-owned enterprises (SOEs), and most sectors of the economy are almost entirely in private hands. However, the government still fully or partially controls some enterprises operating in a variety of economic sectors. The major SOEs are northern electricity grids, Chisinau heating companies, fixed-line telephone operator Moldtelecom, and the state railway company. The government keeps a registry of state-owned assets, which is available on the website on the Public Property Agency http://www.app.gov.md/registrul-patrimoniului-public-3-384 . SOEs are governed by the law on stock companies and the law on state enterprises as well as several governmental decisions. SOEs have boards of directors usually comprised of representatives of the line ministry, the Ministry of Economy and Infrastructure, and the Ministry of Finance. As a rule, SOEs report to the respective ministries, with those registered as joint stock companies being required to make their financial reports public. Moldova does not incorporate references to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs in its normative acts. Moldovan legislation does not formally discriminate between SOEs and private-run businesses. By law, governmental authorities must provide a level legal and economic playing field to all enterprises. However, SOEs are generally seen as better positioned to influence decision-makers than private sector competitors. In some cases, SOEs have allegedly used these advantages to prevent open competition in individual sectors. The Law on Entrepreneurship and Enterprises has a list of activities restricted solely to SOEs, which includes, among others, human and animal medical research, manufacture of orders and medals, postal services (except express mail), sale and production of combat equipment and weapons, minting, and real estate registration. Moldova launched the first of several waves of privatization in 1994. In 2007, Parliament passed a new law governing management and privatization of SOEs. Two major privatizations in 2013 – of the then-largest bank, Banca de Economii, and the 49-year concession of the Chisinau Airport – subsequently proved highly controversial. Privatization efforts in 2014 and 2015 emphasized public-private partnerships as means for companies to gain access to SOEs in infrastructure-related projects. In 2018, the government held several rounds of privatization, selling its stake in 19 companies, including airline Air Moldova and gas interconnector Vestmoldtransgaz. The government resumed privatizations in 2020 after a moratorium announced in 2019 following controversies over past sales. In the first six months of 2021, the government sold off MDL 91.2 million (USD 5.16 million) worth of state-owned assets in open outcry auctions. To date, Moldova has conducted privatizations through open tenders organized at the stock exchange, open to interested investors. The government may also use open outcry auctions for some properties, so-called investment or commercial tenders to sell entire companies to buyers taking on investment commitments, or to the highest bidders or public-private partnerships for infrastructure related projects. The government publishes privatization announcements on the website of the Public Property Agency and in the official journal Monitorul Oficial. 10. Political and Security Environment Levels of street crime and other types of violent crime are equal or lower in Moldova than in neighboring countries and businesses typically only employ the most basic security procedures to safeguard their personnel. Moldova has not had significant instances of transnational terrorism. While there have been occasional instances of political violence in the past decade, these cases have typically been directed against Moldovan state institutions and have not generally impacted the international business community in Moldova. There have been no significant instances of political violence in the last four years and all recent large demonstrations have been peaceful. The embassy has received no reports over the past ten years of politically motivated damage to business projects or installations in Moldova. In 2015 and early 2016, there was public outcry over the political class’s failure to prevent (and even its facilitation of) a massive bank fraud in which about 11 percent of GDP disappeared from the country’s then-three largest banks. Round-the-clock anti-government protests culminated in January 2016 in clashes with riot police when protesters tried to prevent Parliament from voting in a new government. The clashes were limited and did not turn into full-blown violence or cause extensive damage that would affect businesses in any way, and the government remained in power. In 2021, protesters held rallies in front of Parliament without causing significant damages or clashing violently with police. Separatists control the Transnistria region of Moldova, located between the Nistru River and the eastern border with Ukraine. Although a brief armed conflict took place in 1991-1992, the sides signed a cease-fire in July 1992. Local authorities in Transnistria maintain a separate monetary unit, the Transnistrian ruble and a separate customs system. Despite the political separation, economic cooperation takes place in various sectors. The government has implemented measures requiring businesses in Transnistria to register with Moldovan authorities. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with Russia, and Ukraine acting as guarantors/mediators and the United States and EU as observers, supports negotiations between Moldova and the separatist region Transnistria (known as the “5+2” format). Mongolia Executive Summary Mongolia’s frontier market and vast mineral reserves represent potentially lucrative opportunities for investors but vulnerability to external economic and financial shocks, ineffective dispute resolution, and lack of input from stakeholders during rulemaking warrant caution. Mongolia imposes few market-access barriers, and investors face few investment restrictions, enjoying mostly unfettered market access. Such franchises as fast food and convenience stores, outperforming expectations, suggest that investors can bring successful international business models to Mongolia. The cashmere-apparel and agricultural sectors also show strong promise. However, investing into such politically sensitive sectors as mining carry higher risk. Mongolia attracts investors’ attention but has trouble converting interest into actual investments. Unless and until Mongolia embraces a stable business environment that both transparently creates and predictably implements laws and regulations, many investors will find its market too risky and opt for more competitive countries. An essential step to mitigating these risks is for Mongolia to implement the U.S.-Mongolia Agreement on Transparency in Matters Related to International Trade and Investment (known as the Transparency Agreement), which requires a public-comment period before new regulations become final. Mongolia has implemented some of this agreement but is five years behind full implementation of public-notice commitments. 2021 also saw resolution of some of the disputes hampering progress of the Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold mine, expected to provide 25 percent of Mongolia’s GDP as soon as 2024. Agreements over cost- and debt-sharing of a portion of the mine’s development, and commitments to more transparency by Oyu Tolgoi’s partners over management and development decisions, signals that Mongolia can and will work out disputes within the terms of its contractual obligations. Government and parliament continue to address threats to judicial independence by implementing 2019 constitutional amendments and 2020 statutory judicial reforms that have improved transparency and reduced political influence in the appointment and removal of judges. Investors, however, continue to cite long delays in reaching court judgments, followed by similarly long delays in enforcing decisions, as well as reports that administrative inspection bodies, such as the tax authority, will fail to act on politically sensitive decisions or cases involving politically exposed Mongolians. Businesses note substantial and unpredictable regulatory burdens at all levels; and cite an excessively slow tax dispute resolution process as an indirect expropriation risk. In June 2022, parliament streamlined procedures for, and reduced the required number of, permits and licenses. Government effort to move delivery of most services onto digital platforms may also increase the efficiency of its business registration processes. COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are stressing Mongolia’s economy. In late 2021, Mongolia’s parliament passed its New Recovery Policy, a 10-year development plan to increase national productivity by improving transport logistics, energy production, industrialization, urban and rural infrastructure, and green development. This program depends on restoring market access for mining exports, the primary revenue source. However, as of early 2022, China’s zero-COVID policies continue to create bottlenecks along the Mongolia-China border. Meanwhile, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, prompting unprecedented international sanctions on Russia, has created uncertainty about access to imports of petroleum products, electricity, and such key commodities as wheat and fertilizer. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 110 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 58 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 662 USD Bank of Mongolia World Bank GNI per capita 2020 6,957 USD https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Mongolia generally does not discriminate against foreign investors with two major exceptions. First, foreign investors must invest a minimum of $100,000 to establish a venture; in contrast, Mongolian investors face no investment minimums. Second, only Mongolian adult citizens may own real estate. Additionally, while foreign investors may obtain use rights for the underlying land, these rights last for five years with a one-time, five-year renewal. The government imposes no such restriction on its nationals. Mongolia offers the “One-Stop-Shop for Investors,” which provides investors with services related to visas, taxation, notarization, and business registration. Mongolia’s recently created Ministry of Economy and Development has publicly stated that it will create a new foreign investment and foreign trade support entity to assume the duties of the One-Stop-Shop, which remains operational ( https://investmongolia.gov.mn/ ). Regardless of what shape the new agency takes, investors encourage the government to develop policies aimed at retaining existing foreign direct investment in country. Except for real estate, foreign and domestic investors have the same rights to establish, sell, transfer, or securitize structures, shares, use rights, companies, and movable property. Mongolia generally imposes no statutory or regulatory limits on foreign ownership and control of investments, except for foreign state-owned entities. The Mining Law allows the government to acquire up to 50 percent of mineral deposits deemed of “strategic” value to the state by parliament. Since 2019, Article 6.2 of Mongolia’s Constitution also requires the state to take a “majority” share of the “benefits” of strategic mining projects. Investors are waiting for the government to clarify the meaning of “benefits” derived from mining activities, which according to government officials may mean profit and may also include such non-cash contributions as development programs, employment, or technology transfers. Investors also observe that excessive regulatory discretion allows bureaucrats de facto control over the use of legally granted rights, corporate governance decisions, and ownership stakes, stating that in some cases regulators make up rules beyond their actual statutory remit. Finally, Mongolia has no formal or informal investment-screening mechanism, although the National Security Council has barred investments from some foreign state-owned entities. Mongolia underwent its regular World Trade Organization Trade Policy Review in 2021 (WTO | Mongolia ). Mongolia’s business registration process is reasonably clear. Foreign and domestic enterprises must register with the State Registration Office ( https://burtgel.gov.mn/ ). Registrants can obtain required forms online and submit them by email. The State Registration Office aims at a two-day turnaround for the review and approval process. Investors report bureaucratic discretion often adds weeks or even months to the process and state more transparent adherence to the relevant laws and regulations would yield a consistent, streamlined process. Once approved by the State Registration Office, a company must register with the General Tax Authority ( http://en.mta.mn/ ). Upon hiring its first employees, a company must register with the Social Insurance Agency ( http://www.ndaatgal.mn/v1/ ). The ease of opening a business does not apply to closing a business, however. Foreign investors and legal contacts report the onerous bureaucratic and judicial process of disestablishment takes no less than 18-24 months. While the Mongolian Government neither promotes nor incentivizes outward investment, it does not generally restrict domestic investors from investing abroad, although politically exposed persons and their families may undergo additional scrutiny or may even be barred from investment abroad. 3. Legal Regime The Law on Legislation sets out who may draft and submit legislation; the format of these bills; the respective roles of the Mongolian parliament, government, and president; and the procedures for obtaining and employing public comment on pending legislation. The Law on Legislation states that law initiators – members of parliament, the president of Mongolia, or cabinet ministers – must fulfill these criteria: (1) provide a clear process for developing and justifying the need for draft legislation; (2) set out methodologies for estimating costs to the government related to a bill’s implementation; (3) evaluate the impact of the legislation on the public; and (4) conduct public outreach before submitting bills to parliament. Initiators must post draft legislation for public comment and publish reports evaluating costs and impacts on parliament’s official website ( Parliament of Mongolia/Projects ) at least 30 days prior to submitting bills to parliament. Posts must explicitly state the time for public comment and review. Initiators must solicit comments in writing, organize public meetings, seek comments through social media, and carry out public surveys. No more than 30 days after the public comment period ends, initiators must prepare a matrix of all comments, including those used to revise the bill as well as those not used, which must be posted on parliament’s official web site. After a law’s passage, parliament must monitor and evaluate its implementation and impacts. Investors report that while legislators have not implemented all these requirements, most relevant legislation is posted on parliament’s website before passage. Ministries and agencies have not fulfilled these statutory requirements, according to businesses. While General Administrative Law Article 6 aligns Mongolia’s regulatory drafting process with Transparency Agreement obligations, investors report the government is not generally enforcing it. Under the Transparency Agreement, originators of regulations must seek public comment by posting draft regulations in a single journal of national circulation, designated as LegalInfo.mn ( HYPERLINK “https://www.legalinfo.mn/%22%20/t%20%22_blank” t “_blank” LegalInfo). Drafters must record, report, and respond to significant public comments. The Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs must certify each regulatory drafting process complies with the General Administrative Law before a regulation enters force. After approval, the statutorily responsible government agency monitors implementation and impacts. Businesses also note unpredictable, nontransparent regulatory burdens at the local—province and county—levels. They note inconsistent application of regulations and statutes among central, provincial, and municipal jurisdictions and a lack of expertise among local inspectors. Regional tax, health, and safety inspectors are cited as particularly problematic. The Economic Policy and Competitiveness Research Center of Mongolia annually ranks local regulatory burdens: http://en.aimagindex.mn/competitiveness . Mongolia’s so-called Glass Budget Law requires all levels of government to publicly post proposed and actual budget expenditures, and the law, according to businesses and transparency experts, has generally been followed. However, parliament can waive these transparency requirements for emergencies and for budgetary bills and has on several occasions in 2020 and 2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic. The government neither promotes nor requires companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. The government does, however, limit the right to invest in such high-risk securities as digital tokens and cryptocurrencies to professional investors and other high net-worth individuals. Mongolia, which has generally eschewed regional economic blocs, acceded to the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) in 2021. Also, Mongolia often seeks to adapt European standards and norms in such areas as construction materials, food, and environmental regulations; looks to U.S. standards in the hydrocarbon sector; and adopts a combination of Australian and Canadian standards and norms in the mining sector. Mongolia also tends to employ World Organization for Animal Health standards for its animal health regulations. Mongolia, a member of the WTO, asserts it will notify the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of all draft technical regulations. Investors state that judges frequently avoid controversial decisions in business disputes, preferring to delay judgment for as long as possible—sometimes years. If a decision is made, businesses face similarly long delays enforcing court orders. In some instances, cases have taken so long that by the time an enforcement is executed, the counterparty has liquidated assets and vanished. Investors note similarly long delays with respect to inspection agencies, such as the Tax Dispute Settlement Resolution Council, as well as with other inspection agency panels, especially those related to mineral licenses and health matters. In 2021, parliament revised the Law of the Judiciary to bring it into line with the amended constitution. This law limits the powers of the government, parliament, and the president to influence the selection and removal of judges; and vests the Judicial Disciplinary Council with responsibility for disciplining jurists, except in matters involving criminal acts. Investors have praised these reforms, saying are helping to restore judicial independence severely. Under Mongolia’s hybrid civil law-common law system, trial judges may use prior rulings to adjudicate similar cases but have no obligation to follow legal precedent as such. Mongolian laws, and even their implementing regulations, often lack the specificity needed for consistent judicial and prosecutorial interpretation and application. All courts may rule on matters of fact as well as matters of law at any point in the judicial process. Mongolia has specialized laws for contracts but no dedicated courts for commercial activities. Contractual disputes are usually adjudicated through the Civil Court division of the district court system. Criminal Courts adjudicate crime cases brought by the General Prosecutors Office. Disputants may appeal to the City Court of Ulaanbaatar and ultimately to the Supreme Court of Mongolia. Mongolia has several specialized administrative courts adjudicating cases brought by citizens, foreign residents, and businesses against official administrative acts. Mongolia’s Constitutional Court, the Tsets, rules on constitutional issues. The General Executive Agency for Court Decisions enforces judgments and orders. Investors and legal sector experts say that the Administrative Court is procedurally competent, fair, and consistent but that the Civil Courts deliver highly inconsistent judgments. The 2013 Investment Law sets the general statutory and regulatory frame for all investors in Mongolia. Under the law, foreign investors may access the same investment opportunities as Mongolian citizens and receive the same protections as domestic investors. Investment domicile, not investor nationality, determines if an investment is foreign or domestic. The law provides for a more stable tax environment and offers tax and other incentives for investors; and authorizes a single point of registration, the State Registration Office ( www.burtgel.gov.mn ), for all investors. The law offers qualifying companies transferable tax-stabilization certificates valid for up to 27 years. Affected taxes may include the corporate-income tax, excise taxes, customs duties, value-added tax, and royalties. Investors cite two primary national-treatment issues with respect to investment rules. First, foreign nationals and companies may not own real estate; only Mongolian adult citizens may own real estate. While foreign investors may obtain use rights for the underlying land, these rights expire after a set number of years with limited rights of renewal. Government officials have said that in some cases municipal, provincial, and central government officials may waive land-use rights limits and recommend that investors contact the relevant agency or ministry for more information on how to apply for these waivers. Foreign investors also object to the regulatory requirement that each foreign investor in any given venture must invest a minimum of $100,000. Although the Investment Law has no such requirement, Mongolian regulators impose it on all foreign investors without requiring the same minimum from Mongolian investors. The Ministry of Economy and Development manages the “One-Stop-Shop for Investors,” which provides investor services on visas, taxation, social insurance, notarization, and business registration ( https://investmongolia.gov.mn/ ). The Ministry of Economy and Development has publicly stated that it will establish in 2022 a new foreign investment and foreign trade support entity to assume the duties of the One-Stop-Shop, although no date has been provided. Mongolia’s Agency for Fair Competition and Consumer Protection reviews domestic transactions for competition-related concerns. For a description of the Agency go to AFCCP . The Agency for Fair Competition and Consumer Protection launched no 2021 competition cases affecting U.S. FDI. U.S. investors generally find the AFCCP applies its norms and procedures transparently, although they remain concerned the agency favors local economic interests over foreign interests. AFCCP decisions may be appealed to the courts. State entities at all levels may confiscate or modify land-use rights for purposes of economic development, national security, historical preservation, or environmental protection. Mongolia’s constitution recognizes private real-property rights and derivative rights, and Mongolian law specifically bars the government from expropriating assets without payment of adequate, market-based compensation. Investors express little disagreement with such takings in principle but state that a lack of clear lines of authority among the central, provincial, and municipal governments has led to loss of property and use rights in practice. For example, the Minerals Law provides no clear division of local, regional, and national jurisdictions for issuances of land-use permits and special-use rights. Faced with unclear lines of authority and frequent differences in practices and interpretation of rules and regulations by different levels of government, investors may find themselves unable to fully exercise legally conferred rights. Some expropriation cases involve court expropriations after third-party criminal trials at which investors are compelled to appear as “civil defendants” – but are not allowed to fully participate in the proceedings. In these cases, government officials are convicted of corruption, and the court then orders the civil defendant to surrender a license or property, or pay a tax penalty or fine, for having received an alleged favor from the criminal defendant with no judicial proceedings to determine if property or licenses were obtained illegally. Businesses claim the tax dispute settlement processes has become a form of indirect expropriation. 2020 amendments to the Tax Law allow tax officials to require disputants to place the entire disputed tax assessment in escrow as a precondition for disputing the tax assessments, which encourages officials to issue punitive tax assessments that make using settlement processes prohibitively expensive and confiscatory. Bankruptcy law treats bankruptcy as a civil matter requiring judicial adjudication. Mongolia allows registration of mortgages and other debt instruments backed by real estate, structures, and other immovable collateral (mining and exploration licenses, intellectual property rights, and other use rights); and movable property (cars, equipment, livestock, receivables, and other items of value). Although investors may securitize movable and immovable assets, local law firms hold that the bankruptcy process remains too vague, onerous, and time-consuming for practical use. Reporting that foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings usually require no less than 18 months, with 36 months not uncommon, legal advisors state that a lengthy appeals process, perceived corruption, and government interference may create years of delay. Moreover, while in court, creditors face suspended interest payments and limited access to the asset. 6. Financial Sector Mongolia has few restrictions on capital flows and has respected IMF Article VIII by not restricting international payments and transfers. However, capital markets are underdeveloped, with little ability to trade futures or derivatives on traditional markets. The state-owned Mongolian Stock Exchange ( http://www.mse.mn/en/aboutus_en ) is the primary venue for domestic capital and portfolio investments, although fintech companies have begun promoting investments using digital tokens and other virtual assets. Credit is available on local market terms to foreign investors in a variety of forms. Mongolia’s four largest commercial banks – Khan, Trade and Development Bank (TDB), Xac, and Golomt – are majority owned by combinations of Mongolian and foreign investors and collectively hold 84.3 percent of all banking assets, or about $12.1 billion (as of December 2021). Mongolian commercial banks had rates of non-performing loans (NPLs) averaging 10 percent in December 2021, a decrease from December 2020’s 11.8 percent, although these classifications do not conform with international standards given COVID-19 forbearance measures. Ongoing COVID-19 rules enabling postponement of consumer loan and mortgage payments create additional forbearance risk in the banking sector. The Bank of Mongolia, Mongolia’s central bank, regulates banking operations. Foreigners may establish domestic accounts so long as they can prove lawful residence in Mongolia. Parliament amended Mongolia’s Law on Banking in 2021. The amended law states that ownership by a shareholder and their related parties collectively and as certified by the Bank of Mongolia shall not exceed 20 percent. Banks have until December 31, 2023, to comply with this divestment requirement. In addition, Mongolia’s four systemically important commercial banks – Khan, TDB, Xac, and Golomt – and the state-owned State Bank must list themselves on the Mongolian Stock Exchange by June 30, 2022. The new rules may improve bank governance by creating accountability to a broader group of shareholders, although there are concerns that the stipulated timeline may not be conducive to sector stability. The IMF has reported unaddressed macroprudential concerns regarding the relatively large banking system, resulting in the Extended Fund Facility’s unsuccessful completion in 2020. The banking system is broadly undercapitalized, while commercial banking practices and regulatory supervision are inadequate for ensuring macroeconomic stability. Mongolia also has a significant number of illiquid banks. Potential investors in Mongolia’s banking sector should conduct careful due diligence as sector participants and regulators have expressed concerns that the balance sheets of certain systemically important banks may have been inflated or misreported to create the perception of higher capital-adequacy ratios than is accurate. International and domestic sector participants observe that the Bank of Mongolia does not exercise adequate macroprudential oversight over banks, enabling these banks to misreport their assets. It has also allowed insolvent smaller banks to continue operating despite not having enough assets to cover liabilities. Investors contemplating IPO participation should carefully factor in the additional systemic risk associated with these regulatory concerns. Mongolia’s 2020 removal from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) “grey list” jurisdictions under enhanced monitoring may give confidence to investors that the country takes seriously anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism concerns. However, sector participants note ongoing challenges in developing new correspondent relations with banks in foreign jurisdictions, with some counterparty banks citing high compliance costs. Mongolia’s Ministry of Finance manages two sovereign wealth funds (SWF) funded through diversion of mining sector revenues: the Fiscal Stabilization Fund and the Future Heritage Fund. The Fiscal Stabilization Fund diverts revenues that might promote boom and bust cycles of spending; however, Mongolia’s recent fiscal crises have depleted this fund. The Future Heritage Fund, resembling Norway’s Global Pension Fund, accumulates mining revenues for the future and invests the proceeds exclusively outside Mongolia. Mongolia’s Future Heritage Fund follows the Santiago Principles, and Mongolia is an associate member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. The Ministry of Finance and the IMF project the Future Heritage Fund should start accumulating $104-125 million annually in 2023, coinciding with increased revenues from the Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold mine. These SWFs are not meaningfully funded as of 2022, however. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Mongolia has state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the banking and finance, energy production, mining, and transport sectors. The Ministry of Finance manages the State Bank of Mongolia and the Mongolian Stock Exchange, and the SOE Erdenes Mongol holds most of the government’s mining assets. The Ministry of Roads and Transport Development manages the Mongolian Railway Authority. The Government Agency for Policy Coordination on State Property ( http://www.pcsp.gov.mn/en ) publicly stated that it administers 106 non-mining and non-financial assets but does not provide a complete, official list of its SOEs. State Property Agency representatives have publicly said their SOE count does not include aimag (provincial) and soum (county) level locally-owned enterprises (LOEs), which number in the hundreds. Investors are concerned SOEs crowd out more efficient private-sector investment. Investors can compete with SOEs, but an opaque regulatory framework limits competition. Businesses have observed that government regulators favor SOEs, such as streamlining processes for environmental permits or ignoring health and safety issues at SOEs. Mongolian SOEs do not adhere to the OECD Corporate Governance Guidelines for SOEs. Although legally required to follow the same international best practices on disclosure, accounting, and reporting used by private companies, SOEs tend to follow these rules only when seeking international investment and financing. Many international best practices are not institutionalized in Mongolian law, and SOEs tend to follow existing Mongolian rules. At the same time, foreign-invested firms follow the international rules, causing inconsistencies in corporate governance, management, disclosure, minority-shareholder rights, and finance. The government perennially floats privatization for such state-held assets as the Mongolian Stock Exchange, the national air carrier MIAT, the Mongol Post Office, and mining assets, through sales of shares or equity but has not identified how or when it would do so. 10. Political and Security Environment Mongolia’s political and security environment is peaceful and stable. Crime is low in the capital Ulaanbaatar but fluctuates seasonally. Street-level petty theft and assault occur with some regularity, while more complex financial and fraud-based crimes are rising. U.S. investors are generally welcomed by the Mongolian people; however, in small numbers and in specific areas, anti-foreign sentiment fueled by fringe nationalist groups occurs. These sentiments do not focus on U.S. investors exclusively and are subject to current events. Resource sector investors have reported that disputes between those with legal rights to utilize local resources and residents can lead to protests, disorder, and, in rare cases, violence. Montenegro Executive Summary Montenegro’s economy is centered on three sectors, with the government largely focusing its efforts on developing tourism, energy, and to a lesser extent, agriculture. The tourism sector officially accounts for about 25 percent of GDP, although some analysts believe it accounts for over one-third when taking into account the grey economy. In the energy sector, the most important development project in the transmission system was the construction of a one-way underwater electricity cable to export power to Italy, which included the development of a 433-kilometer-long tunnel approximately 1,200 meters below the Adriatic Sea surface. The project cost 800 million euro and began operation in December 2019. There are several other ongoing energy projects, including the controversial ecological reconstruction of the coal-fired thermal plant in Pljevlja in partnership with China’s Dongfang Electric Corporation, as well as the development of a 55-megawatt wind power plant in Gvozd, a project supported by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The Montenegrin government also signed concession agreements for exploratory offshore oil and gas drilling, which began in March 2021, although preliminary results indicate that the drill site is not feasible for exploitation. According to the Central Bank of Montenegro (CBCG), foreign direct investment (FDI) to Montenegro in 2021 totalled €898.4 million. Although no one source country dominates FDI, significant investments have come from Italy, Hungary, China, Russia, and Serbia, with other investments also coming from the United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the United States. Montenegro has one of the highest public debt-to-GDP ratios in the region, currently at 83 percent. Infrastructure development remains a government priority, including the second section of Montenegro’s first highway, a project designed to better connect the more developed south with the relatively underdeveloped north of the country. The pandemic hit Montenegro’s economy hard, with the unemployment rate reaching 24 percent by the end of 2021. In addition, GDP declined by 15.3 percent in 2020, the biggest drop in Europe. The country enjoyed a strong recovery in 2021, however, with the government announcing a GDP growth rate of 14 percent for the year, one of the highest in Europe. Economic recovery will continue to face challenges, however. Developments in Ukraine and Russia, two of the Montenegro’s main sources of tourists, will threaten economic growth. An internal political crisis, after Parliament in early February 2022 passed a motion of no-confidence in the Government and subsequently removed the Parliament’s Speaker, also threatens economic stability. As of late March 2022, a caretaker Government was running the country’s day-to-day operations and ongoing negotiations to form a new Government were taking place, with the possibility of snap elections if these talks fail. Montenegro began implementing a wide-ranging economic reform program known as Europe Now, which eliminated all individual health care contributions, almost doubled the minimum wage, increased pensions, and introduced a system of progressive taxation. As a candidate country on its path to joining the European Union (EU), Montenegro has opened all 33 negotiating chapters (and closed three). But the county’s candidacy is dependent on progress against interim benchmarks in rule of law. The European Commission’s 2021 Country Report for Montenegro termed progress in this area as “limited.” Despite regulatory improvements, corruption remains a significant concern. Montenegro joined NATO in June 2017. Montenegro has not joined the Open Balkan Initiative, previously known as “Mini-Schengen,” an initiative championed by Serbia and Albania designed to facilitate trade, services, and movement of people throughout the Western Balkans. Table 1 Measure Year Index /Rank Website Address Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 64 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 50 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country (M USD, stock positions) 2021 NA http://www.apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 7,900 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Montenegro regained its independence in 2006, and since then, the country has adopted an investment framework that in principle encourages growth, employment, and exports. Montenegro, however, is still in the process of establishing a liberal business climate that fosters foreign investment and local production. The country remains dependent on imports from neighboring countries despite its significant potential in some areas of agriculture and food production. Although the continuing political transition has obstructed the elimination of all structural barriers, the government generally recognizes the need to remove impediments to remain competitive, reform the business environment, open the economy to foreign investors, and attract further FDI. In general, there are no distinctions made between domestic and foreign-owned companies. Foreign companies can own 100 percent of a domestic company, and profits and dividends can be repatriated without limitations or restrictions. Foreign investors can participate in local privatization processes and can own land in Montenegro generally on the same terms as locals. Expropriation of property can only occur for a “compelling public purpose” and compensation must be made at fair market value. There has been no known expropriation of foreign investments in Montenegro, however long-standing property restitution cases dating back to WWII remain unresolved. International arbitration is allowed in commercial disputes involving foreign investors. Registration procedures have been simplified to such an extent that it is possible to complete all registration processes online. In addition, bankruptcy laws have been streamlined to make it easier to liquidate a company; accounting standards have been brought up to international norms; and custom regulations have been simplified. There are no mandated performance requirements. Montenegro has enacted specific legislation outlining guarantees and safeguards for foreign investors. Montenegro has also adopted more than 20 other business-related laws, all in accordance with EU standards. The main laws that regulate foreign investment in Montenegro are: the Foreign Investment Law; the Enterprise Law; the Insolvency Law; the Law on Fiduciary Transfer of Property Rights; the Accounting Law; the Law on Capital and Current Transactions; the Foreign Trade Law; the Customs Law; the Law on Free Zones; the Labor Law; the Securities Law; the Concession Law, and the set of laws regulating tax policy. Montenegro has taken significant steps in both amending investment-related legislation in accordance with global standards and creating necessary institutions for attracting investments. However, as is the case with other transition countries, implementation and enforcement of existing legislation remains weak and inconsistent. While Montenegro has taken steps to make the country more open for foreign investment, some deficiencies still exist. The absence of fully developed legal institutions has fostered corruption and weak controls over conflicts of interest. The judiciary is still slow to adjudicate cases, and court decisions are not always consistently reasoned or enforced. Montenegro’s significant grey economy impacts its open market, negatively affecting businesses operating in accordance with the law. Favorable tax policies established at the national level are often cancelled out with taxes introduced by different municipalities on the local level. To better promote investment and foster economic development, the government adopted in December 2019 a new Law on Public Private Partnerships and established the Montenegrin Investment Agency (MIA), merging the Montenegrin Investment Promotion Agency (MIPA) and the Secretariat for Development Projects. MIA seeks to promote Montenegro as a competitive investment destination by facilitating investment projects in the country. Together with the Privatization and Capital Investment Council, MIA promotes investment opportunities in various sectors of the Montenegrin economy, primarily focusing on the tourism, energy, technology, and agricultural sectors. These two institutions will maintain an ongoing dialogue with investors already present in Montenegro and, at the same time, seek to promote future projects and attract new investors to do business in Montenegro. MIA is also the state agency that leads the controversial Economic Citizenship Program, which started on January 1, 2019, and was designed to accelerate Montenegro’s economic development by creating new tourism, agriculture and processing capacities and create new jobs, especially in the underdeveloped northern part of the country. The program was intended to last three years and be available for up to 2,000 applicants. Thus far, 700 applications have been submitted, and in December 2021, the program was extended until the end of 2022. More information is available at http://www.mia.gov.me . In September 2021, the U.S.-Montenegro Economic Dialogue was launched to provide a constructive bilateral platform to improve the business climate, explore promising commercial opportunities, and deepen shared prosperity between the two countries. Montenegro’s Foreign Investment Law, which was adopted by the Parliament in 2011, establishes the framework for investment in Montenegro. The law eliminates previous investment restrictions, extends national treatment to foreign investors, allows for the transfer and repatriation of profits and dividends, provides guarantees against expropriation, and allows for customs duty waivers for equipment imported as capital-in-kind. There are no limits on foreign control and right to private ownership or on establishing companies in Montenegro. There are no institutional barriers to foreign investors, including U.S. businesses. As an aspiring EU Member State, Montenegro monitors and implements best practices regarding foreign investments, according to government officials, but the country still has no screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment in Montenegro. In December 2021, the Embassy hosted a presentation to Montenegrin officials by the U.S. Department of Treasury on the U.S. government’s Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) investment screening mechanism. Montenegrin officials have stated the Government’s intention is to have a screening mechanism in place for investment in strategic national security sectors by 2023. The WTO secretariat conducted its first review of Montenegrin trade policies and practices in April 2018 ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp469_e.htm ). The American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in Montenegro prepares a biannual Business Climate Report (BCR), an assessment of issues on which the Government needs to take action to improve the country’s business environment. The most recent 2019-2020 edition was the sixth BCR to date, and recommends that the Government tackle the grey economy, improve public procurement procedures, address weak labor legislation, and correct inconsistencies in the implementation of existing laws. More information is available at http://www.amcham.me/advocacy/publications/ The White Book is the most recognized publication of the Montenegrin Foreign Investors Council. It is published every year and its main goal is to help the improvement of the business environment in the country through various recommendation provided by the Council’s members. All reports are available on the following website: http://mfic.me/activities/white-book Other useful links: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/?&search=Montenegro&language=en https://ejatlas.org/country/montenegro The Central Register of the Commercial Court (CRPS) is responsible for business registration procedures ( www.crps.me ). The court maintains an electronic database of registered business entities, and contracts on financial leasing and pledges. The process to register a business in Montenegro takes an average of 4-5 working days. The minimum financial requirement for a Limited Liability Company (LLC) is just EUR 1 (USD 1.1), and three documents are required: a founding decision, bylaws, and a copy of the passport (if an individual is founding a company) or a registration form for the specific type of company. Samples of all documents are available for download at the CRPS website. Montenegrin law permits the establishment of six types of companies: entrepreneur, limited liability company, joint stock company, general partnership, limited partnership, and part of a foreign company. All included in the business activities need to open a bank account. Once a bank account is established, the company reports to the tax authority in order to receive a PIB (taxation identification number) and VAT (Value Added Tax) number. For classification of companies by size, based on number of employees, the government’s definition is as follows: (i) small enterprises (from one to 49 employees), (ii) medium-sized enterprises (from 50 to 249) and (iii) large enterprises (more than 250 employees). While the Montenegrin government is very active in attracting and inviting foreign investors to do business in Montenegro, the government is not as dedicated to promoting outward investments. There are no government restrictions to domestic investors for their investments abroad. 3. Legal Regime The main law governing foreign investment, the Montenegrin Law on Foreign Investment, is based on the national treatment principle, which is a basic principle of GATT/WTO that prohibits discrimination between imported and domestically produced goods with respect to internal taxation or other government regulation. All proposed laws and regulations put forth by the government are published in draft form and open for public comment, generally for a 30-day period.Regulations are often applied inconsistently, particularly at the municipal level. Many regulations are in conflict with other regulations, or are ambiguous, creating confusion for investors. As noted in the American Chamber of Commerce’s (AmCham) biannual Business Climate Survey conducted in 2020, many municipalities lack adequate detailed urban plans, complicating investment plans. Some municipalities have made efforts to speed up procedures in order to improve the business environment for investors. While at the national level there are fewer obstacles for investments and other activities, many larger-scale projects involve both local and national authorities, and it is often necessary to work with both administrations to complete a project. AmCham members surveyed are dissatisfied with the duration of the court proceedings (79.5 percent) and unequal implementation of the law (63.6 percent). At the same time, over 70 percent of AmCham member companies surveyed believe that conditions for doing business when it comes to the duration of the court proceedings, and unequal implementation of the laws have not changed in the past two years. Foreign investors are subject to the same conditions as domestic investors when it comes to establishing a company and making an investment. There are no other regulations in place which might deprive a foreign investor of any rights or limit the investor’s ability to do business in Montenegro. The Law of Foreign Investments is currently fully harmonized with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.In 2004, the Parliament established an Energy Regulatory Agency, which maintains authority over the electricity, gas, oil, and heating energy sectors. Its main tasks include approving pricing, developing a model for determining allowable business costs for energy sector entities, issuing operating licenses for energy companies and for construction in the energy sector, and monitoring public tenders. The energy law mandates that in the energy sectors, when prices are affected by monopoly positions of some participants, business costs will be set at levels approved by the Agency. In those areas deemed to function competitively, the market will determine prices. The price of gasoline is set nationally every two weeks and is uniform across all petrol stations.The Agency for Electronic Communication and Postal Services (known by its Montenegrin acronym EKIP) was established by the government in 2001. It is an independent regulatory body whose primary purpose is to design and implement a regulatory framework and to encourage private investment in the sector. In March 2021, EKIP prepared a “Study on the Strategy for the Introduction of 5G Mobile Communication Networks in Montenegro”. In December 2021, the Government adopted the “Roadmap for the Introduction of 5G Mobile Communication Networks” and is planning an auction to allocate radio frequencies for the 5G network (700 MHz, 3.5 GHz and 26 GHz) at the end of 2022. A “5G Strategy” is also expected to be adopted by mid-2022. While there is a full legal and regulatory infrastructure in place to conduct public procurement, U.S. companies have complained in numerous cases about irregularities in the procurement process at the national level and maintain there is an inability to meaningfully challenge decisions they believe were erroneously taken through the procurement apparatus. In other cases, the system delivers appropriate outcomes, though in a complex and time-consuming way. Public procurement is conducted jointly by the Public Procurement Directorate, the Ministry of Finance (as the main line ministry for the procurement area), and the State Commission for Control of Public Procurement Procedures in the protection of rights area. The Public Procurement Directorate began operations in 2007 while the State Commission for the Control of Public Procurement Procedures was established in 2011. The State Commission takes decisions in the form of written orders and conclusions made at its meetings. The decisions are made by a majority of present members. The State Commission’s Rules of Procedure specify the method for this work. The revised Law of Public Procurement entered into force in December 2019. The Administrative Court oversees cases involving public procurement procedures. The Montenegro State Audit Institution (SAI) is an independent supreme audit institution for verification of the entire government’s financial statements, including state-owned enterprises. The audits are made publicly available on the SAI’s website (http://www.dri.co.me/). Accounting standards implemented in Montenegro are transparent and consistent with international norms. In addition, various international companies that conduct accounting and auditing procedures are present in the country. More information on whether Montenegrin Government publish or consult with the public about proposed regulations is available at https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/montenegro Montenegro is a candidate country for membership to the EU, with accession negotiations launched on June 29, 2012. All 33 negotiating chapters have been opened, while three are provisionally closed, the last one in 2017. Montenegro is currently taking steps to harmonize its regulations and accepted best practices with those of the EU, as part of the negotiation process. The government has not notified the WTO of any measures that are inconsistent with the WTO’s Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), nor have there been any independent allegations that the government maintains any such measures. Montenegro’s legal system is of a civil, continental type based on Roman law. It includes the legal heritage of the former Yugoslavia, and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. As of 2006, when the country regained its independence, Montenegrin codes and criminal justice institutions were applicable and operational. Montenegro’s Law on Courts defines a judicial system consisting of three levels of courts: Basic, High, and the Supreme Court. Montenegro established the Appellate Court and the Administrative Court in 2005 for the appellate jurisdiction in criminal and commercial matters, and specialized jurisdiction in administrative matters. The specialized Commercial Court has first instance jurisdiction in commercial matters. Apart from those, there are also specialized Misdemeanors Courts. The Basic Courts have first instance jurisdiction in civil cases and criminal cases in which a prison sentence of up to 10 years is possible. There are 15 Basic Courts for Montenegro’s 23 municipalities. Two High Courts in Podgorica and Bijelo Polje have appellate review of basic court decisions. The High Courts also decide on jurisdictional conflicts between the basic courts. They are also first instance courts for serious crimes where prison sentence of more than 10 years is specified. The Podgorica High Court has specialized judges and department who deal with organized crime, corruption, war crimes, money laundering, and terrorism cases.According to the Law on Courts, there is just one Commercial Court based in Podgorica. The Commercial Court has jurisdiction in the following matters: all civil disputes between legal entities, shipping, navigation, aircraft (except passenger transport), and disputes related to registration of commercial entities, competition law, intellectual property rights (IPR), bankruptcy, and unfair trade practices. The High Court hears appeals of Basic Court decisions, and High Courts’ first instance decision may be appealed to the Appellate Court which is also a second instance court for decisions of the Commercial Court. The Supreme Court is the third (and final) instance court for all decisions. The Supreme Court is the court of final judgment for all civil, criminal, commercial, and administrative cases, and it acts only upon irregular (i.e., extraordinary legal remedies). There is also the Constitutional Court of Montenegro, which checks constitutionality and legality of legal acts and acts upon constitutional complaints in relation to human rights violations. The Commercial Court system faces challenges, including weak implementation of legislation and confusion over numerous changes to existing laws; development of a new system of operations, including electronic communication with clients; and limited capacity and expertise among the judges as well as a general backlog in cases. Over the last several years, the adoption of 20 new business laws has significantly changed and clarified the legislative environment. Recently adopted legislative reforms improved the efficiency and effectiveness of court proceedings, a trend which is already visible through the introduction of Public Enforcement Agents. In order to attract foreign investment and to lead interested investors through the process, the government established the Montenegrin Investment Agency (MIA) ( www.mia.gov.me ) and the Privatization and Capital Investment Council https://www.gov.me/cyr/vlada-crne-gore/savjet-za-privatizaciju-i-kapitalne-projekte ). These organizations aim to promote Montenegro’s investment climate and opportunities in the local economy, with a focus on the tourism, energy, infrastructure, and agriculture sectors. In 2013, the Agency for Protection of Competition was established as a functionally independent entity after the Law on Protection of Competition entered into force and the Central Register of Economic Entities registered the law. The area of free market competition, regulated by the law, represents the area that has direct and significant impact on economic development and investment activity, by raising the level of the quality of goods and services, thus creating the conditions for lower prices and creation of a modern, open market economy. This, in turn, provides Montenegro with the possibility to participate in the single market of the EU and in other international markets. More information available on the Agency’s website: http://www.azzk.me/jml/index.php/en/ Montenegro provides legal safeguards against expropriation with protections codified in several laws adopted by the government. There have been no cases of expropriation of foreign investments in Montenegro. However, Montenegro has outstanding claims related to property nationalized under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. A number of unresolved restitution cases involve U.S. citizens. The cases are in various stages of adjudication and have languished for over a decade. At the end of 2007, Parliament passed the new Law on Restitution, which supersedes the 2004 Act. In line with the law, three review commissions have been formed: one in Bar (covering the coastal region); one in Podgorica (for the central region of Montenegro); and one in Bijelo Polje (for the northern region of Montenegro). The basic restitution policy in Montenegro is restitution in kind, when possible, and cash compensation or substitution of other state land when physical return is not possible. In addition, Montenegro provides safeguards from expropriation actions through its Foreign Investment Law. The law states that the government cannot expropriate property from a foreign investor unless there is a “compelling public purpose” established by law or based on the law. If an expropriation is executed, compensation must be provided at fair market value plus one basis point above the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) rate for the period between the expropriation and the date of payment of compensation. The Bankruptcy Law, adopted in 2011, mandates that debtors are designated insolvent if they cannot meet financial obligations within 45 days of the date of maturity of any debt obligation. However, the law still offers some latitude for restrictive measures and discretionary government interference. Bankruptcy is criminalized in Montenegro and a responsible officer in a business entity who caused bankruptcy and damage to another person by irrational spending of assets or their bargain selling, by excessive borrowing, undertaking disproportional obligations, recklessly concluding contracts with insolvent entities, omitting to collect claims in time, by destroying or concealing property or by other acts which are not in compliance with prudent business practices shall be punished by a prison term from six months to five years. 6. Financial Sector The banking sector in Montenegro is fully privatized with 11 privately owned banks operating in the country. The banking sector operates under market terms. Foreign investors can get credit on the local market, and they have access to a variety of credit instruments since the majority of the banks in Montenegro belong to international banking chains. The largest foreign banks are OTP (Hungary) operating as CKB in Montenegro, Erste Bank (Austria) and NLB (Slovenia). The remaining, smaller foreign banks do not belong to large international groups. A new set of banking laws were adopted in December 2019, and some of the existing laws have been amended to improve regulation of the banking sector, provide a higher level of depositor safety, and increase trust in the banking sector itself. The Law on the Protection of Deposits was adopted in the same year to bring local legislation on protecting deposits up to European standards. In accordance with the law, a fund for protecting deposits has been established and deposits are guaranteed up to the amount of EUR 50,000 (approximately USD 55,000). Until 2010, Montenegro had two stock exchanges. After a successful merger (in 2010), only one stock exchange operates on the capital market under the name of Montenegro Stock Exchange (MSE). The turnover of the MSE included 1,618 transactions, which totaled EUR 46.5 million in 2021, a 50 percent increase over 2020. In December 2013, the Istanbul Stock Exchange purchased 24.38 percent of the MSE ( www.montenegroberza.com ). Three types of securities are traded: shares of companies, shares of investment funds, and bonds (old currency savings bonds, pension fund bonds, and bonds from restitution.) The MSE is organized on the principle of member firms, which trade in their own names and for their own account (dealers) in the name and for the account of their clients (brokers). Members of the MSE can be a legal entity registered as a broker under the Law on Securities provided, they meet conditions laid down by the Statute of the Stock Exchange. In addition, members may include banks and insurance companies, once approved by the Commission for Securities to perform stock exchange trade. MSE currently has 6 stockbrokers. According to Central Bank of Montenegro, the banking sector remained solvent and liquid. Total bank assets amounted to EUR 5.33 billion at the end of 2021, an increase of EUR 741.6 million or 16.2 percent over the previous year. Loans make up the dominate share of bank balance sheets, amounting to EUR 3.36 billion at the end of 2021, a 6.4 percent increase over 2020. Non-performing loans accounted for 6.2 percent of the total. In 2021, lending activity grew by 13.9 percent over 2020, while the interest rate dropped to 5.66 percent due to increased competition. Montenegro is one of a few countries that does not belong to the Euro zone but uses the Euro as its official currency (without any formal agreement). Since its authority is limited in monetary policies, the Central Bank, in its role as the state’s fiscal agent, has focused on control of the banking system and maintenance of the payment system. The Central Bank also regulates the process for establishing a bank. A bank can be founded as a joint-stock company and acquire the status of a legal entity by registering in the court register. An application for registration in the court register must be submitted 60 days from when the bank is first licensed. On March 1, 2018, Montenegro’s Parliament approved the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) agreement between the governments of Montenegro and the United States. There are no difficulties in the free transfer of funds exercised on the basis of profit, repayment of resources, or residual assets. The Central Bank of Montenegro publishes statistics on remittances as a proportion of GDP, with the latest data available indicating that in 2020 remittances accounted for approximately 12.3 percent of GDP. There are no sovereign wealth funds in Montenegro. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Since the beginning of the privatization process in 1999, nearly 90 percent of formerly state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been privatized. The most prominent SOEs still in operation include the Port of Bar, Montenegro Railways, Airports of Montenegro, Plantaze Vineyards, Electric Power Industry of Montenegro (EPCG), several companies in the tourism industry, including Ulcinjska and Budvanska Rivijera, and the newly established national carrier ToMontenegro that had its inaugural flight in June 2021. All of these companies are registered as joint-stock companies, with the government appointing one or more representatives to each board based on the ownership structure. All SOEs must provide an annual report to the government and are subject to independent audits. In addition, SOEs are listed and have publicly available auditing accounts on the Montenegrin Securities Commission’s website www.scmn.me . Political affiliation has been known to play a role in job placement in SOEs. In August 2021, the Government of Montenegro established a new state entity known as Montenegro Works that is to have financial and administrative oversight over all SOEs. While it has established a board of directors, hired a management team, and received two years of funding from the Government, its operations remain in their infancy, and it has not yet received approval from Parliament for its long-term objectives and operations. The privatization process in Montenegro is currently in its final phase. The majority of companies that have not yet been privatized are of strategic importance to the Montenegrin economy and operate in such fields as energy, transport, and tourism. Further privatization of SOEs should contribute to better economic performance, increase the competitiveness of the country, and enable the government to generate higher revenues (while lowering its outlays), which will enhance capital investments and reduce debts. The Montenegrin government is the main institution responsible for the privatization process. The Privatization and Capital Investment Council was established in 1996 to manage, control, and implement the privatization process as well as to propose and coordinate all activities necessary for the non-discriminatory and transparent application process for capital projects in Montenegro. The prime minister of Montenegro is the president of the Privatization and Capital Investment Council. More information about the council, the privatization process, and the actual privatization plan is available on the council’s website https://www.gov.me/cyr/vlada-crne-gore/savjet-za-privatizaciju-i-kapitalne-projekte . 10. Political and Security Environment Montenegro has a multi-party-political system with a mixed parliamentary and presidential system. Seventeen months after the August 2020 national elections removed the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) after almost three decades in power and a new Government was formed, the coalition government of Prime Minister Zdravko Krivokapic collapsed on February 4, after Parliament backed a vote of no confidence called by the smallest block within the coalition, Black and White, along with DPS and other opposition parties. President and DPS leader Milo Djukanovic on March 3, 2022, named Deputy Prime Minister and Black and White leader Dritan Abazovic as the Prime Minister designate. The Krivokapic cabinet continued to operate under a “technical mandate” while negotiations on forming a new minority government took place, with the DPS and other opposition parties announcing they would offer their support. As of late March 2022, a caretaker government managed the country’s day-to-day activities; if negotiations to form a new government fail, national elections would be held. Former Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic was elected President of Montenegro in April 2018 for a five-year term. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (M USD) 2019 USD 5,543 2020 USD 4,770 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country (M USD, stock positions) 2019 N/A 2020 N/A BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet Host country’s FDI in the United States (M USD, stock positions) 2019 N/A 2020 N/A BEA data available at http://bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 8.3 2020 10.6 UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/EconomicTrends/Fdi.html Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 5,697 100% Total Outward N/A N/A Russian Federation 619 10.8% Azerbaijan 464 8.1% Italy 367 6.4% Republic of Serbia 334 5.8% Cyprus 329 5.7% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Morocco Executive Summary At the confluence of Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East, Morocco seeks to transform itself into a regional business hub by leveraging its geographically strategic location, political stability, and world-class infrastructure to expand as a regional manufacturing and export base for international companies. Morocco actively encourages and facilitates foreign investment, particularly in export sectors like manufacturing, through positive macro-economic policies, trade liberalization, investment incentives, and structural reforms. The Government of Morocco implements strategies aimed at boosting employment, attracting foreign investment, and raising performance and output in key revenue-earning sectors, with an emphasis placed on value-added industries such as renewables, automotive, aerospace, textile, pharmaceuticals, outsourcing, and agro-food. Most of the government’s strategies are laid out in the New Development Model released in April of 2021. As part of the Government’s development plan, Morocco continues to make major investments in renewable energy, is on track to meet its stated goal of 64 percent total installed capacity by 2030, and announced an even more ambitious goal of 80 percent by 2050. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2021 , Morocco attracted the ninth-most foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa in 2020. Peaking in 2018 when Morocco attracted $3.6 billion in FDI, inbound FDI dropped by 55 percent to $1.7 billion in 2019 and remained largely unchanged at $1.7 billion in 2020. UAE, France, and Spain hold a majority of FDI stocks. Manufacturing attracted the highest share of FDI stocks, followed by real estate, trade, tourism, and transportation. Morocco continues to orient itself as the “gateway to Africa,” and expanded on this role with its return to the African Union in January 2017 and the launch of the African Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) which entered into force in 2021. In June 2019, Morocco opened an extension of the Tangier-Med commercial shipping port, making it the largest in Africa and the Mediterranean; the government is developing a third phase for the port which will increase capacity to five million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). Tangier is connected to Morocco’s political capital in Rabat and commercial hub in Casablanca by Africa’s first high-speed train service. But weak intellectual property rights protections, inefficient government bureaucracy, corruption, inadequate money laundering safeguards and the slow pace of regulatory reform remain challenges. In 2021, Morocco was placed on the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) “grey list” of countries subjected to increased monitoring due to deficiencies int the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. Morocco has ratified 72 investment treaties for the promotion and protection of investments and 62 economic agreements, including with the United States and most EU nations, that aim to eliminate the double taxation of income or gains. Morocco is the only country on the African continent with a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States, eliminating tariffs on more than 95 percent of qualifying consumer and industrial goods. The Government of Morocco plans to phase out tariffs for some products through 2030. The FTA supports Morocco’s goals to develop as a regional financial and trade hub, providing opportunities for the localization of services and the finishing and re-export of goods to markets in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. Since the U.S.-Morocco FTA came into effect bilateral trade in goods has grown nearly five-fold. The U.S. and Moroccan governments work closely to increase trade and investment through high-level consultations, bilateral dialogue, and other forums to inform U.S. businesses of investment opportunities and strengthen business-to-business ties. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 87 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 77 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $457 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $3,020 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Morocco actively encourages foreign investment through macro-economic policies, trade liberalization, structural reforms, infrastructure improvements, and incentives for investors. The Investment Charter, Law 18-95 of October 1995, is the current foundational Moroccan text governing investment and applies to both domestic and foreign investment (direct and portfolio). An updated Investment Charter is under development and is expected to significantly expand incentives for foreign investment. The new charter aims to increase the private investment by two-thirds of total investment by 2035, includes additional incentives to draw investment to promising sectors and less favored regions, and provide additional support for the development of strategic industries such as defense and pharmaceuticals. The Ministry of Industry is executing its second Industrial Acceleration Plan (PAI), running from 2021-2025, which aims to build on the progress made in the previous 2014-2020 PAI and expand industrial development throughout all Moroccan regions. The PAI is based on establishing “ecosystems” that integrate value chains and supplier relationships between large companies and small- and medium-sized enterprises. Moroccan legislation governing FDI applies equally to Moroccan and foreign legal entities, except for certain protected sectors. Morocco’s Investment and Export Development Agency (AMDIE) is the national agency responsible for the development and promotion of investments and exports. Following the reform to law 47-18 governing the country’s Regional Investment Centers (CRIs) in 2019, each of the 12 regions is empowered to lead their own investment promotion efforts. Each of the CRI’s websites aggregate relevant information for interested investors and include investment maps, priority sectors, procedures for creating a business, production costs, applicable laws and regulations, and general business climate information, among other investment services. The websites vary by region, with some functioning better than others. AMDIE and the 12 CRIs work together throughout the phases of investment at the national and regional level. For example, AMDIE and the CRIs coordinate contact between investors and partners. Regional investment commissions examine investment applications and send recommendations to AMDIE. The inter-ministerial investment committee, for which AMDIE acts as the secretariat, approves any investment agreement or contract which requires financial contribution from the government. The CRIs also provide an “after care” service to support investments and assist in resolving issues that may arise. Over the last year, AMDIE made a significant push to promote international investment into Morocco under its “Morocco Now” branded campaign. Further information about Morocco’s investment laws and procedures is available on AMDIE’s “Morocco Now” website or through the individual websites of each of the CRIs. For information on agricultural investments, visit the Agricultural Development Agency website or the National Agency for the Development of Aquaculture website . When Morocco acceded to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises in November 2009, it guaranteed national treatment of foreign investors. The only exception to this national treatment of foreign investors is in those sectors closed to foreign investment (noted below), which Morocco delineated upon accession to the Declaration. The National Contact Point for Responsible Business Conduct (NCP), whose presidency and secretariat are held by AMDIE, is the lead agency responsible for the adherence to this declaration. Foreign and domestic private entities may establish and own business enterprises, barring certain restrictions by sector. While the U.S. Mission is unaware of any economy-wide limits on foreign ownership, Morocco places a 49 percent cap on foreign investment in air and maritime transport companies and maritime fisheries. Foreigners from cannot own agricultural land, though they can lease it for up to 99 years; however, a new law opening agricultural land to foreign ownership has passed into law and its implementing text is forthcoming. The Moroccan government holds a monopoly on phosphate extraction through the 95 percent state-owned Office Cherifien des Phosphates (OCP). The Moroccan state also has a discretionary right to limit all foreign majority stakes in the capital of large national banks but apparently has never exercised that right. The Moroccan Central Bank (Bank Al-Maghrib) may use regulatory discretion in issuing authorizations for the establishment of domestic and foreign-owned banks. In the oil and gas sector, the National Agency for Hydrocarbons and Mines (ONHYM) retains a compulsory share of 25 percent of any exploration license or development permit. As part of law 47-18 governing the country’s Regional Investment Centers, a reform mandated the various approval authorities for investment projects be consolidated into one “Unified Regional Commission” which has since turned an approval process which averaged 180 days into a process which takes 30 days or less, and sometimes as little as one business day. The U.S. Mission is not aware of instances in which the Moroccan government refused foreign investors for national security, economic, or other national policy reasons, nor is it aware of any U.S. investors disadvantaged or singled out by ownership or control mechanisms, sector restrictions, or investment screening mechanisms, relative to other foreign investors. The last third-party investment policy review of Morocco was the World Trade Organization (WTO) 2016 Trade Policy Review (TPR), which found that the trade reforms implemented since the prior TPR in 2009 contributed to the economy’s continued growth by stimulating competition in domestic markets, encouraging innovation, creating new jobs, and contributing to growth diversification. Although some civil society organizations have been critical of certain development projects/initiatives, particularly those with environmental or social impacts, Post is unaware of a comprehensive review focused on investment policy concerns. Prior to its discontinuation of the Doing Business Report, in 2020 the World Bank ranked Morocco 53 out of 190 economies, rising seven places since from the previous report in 2019 and climbing 75 places during the last decade from 128 in 2010. Since 2012, Morocco has implemented reforms that facilitate business registration, such as eliminating the need to file a declaration of business incorporation with the Ministry of Labor, reducing company registration fees, and eliminating minimum capital requirements for limited liability companies. Each of the 12 Regional Investment Centers (CRI) maintains a website which guides investors through the registration process. Foreign companies may use the online business registration mechanism. Foreign companies, except for French companies, are required to provide an apostilled Arabic translated copy of their articles of association and an extract of the registry of commerce in their country of origin. Moreover, foreign companies must report the incorporation of the subsidiary a posteriori to the Foreign Exchange Office (Office de Changes) to facilitate repatriation of funds abroad such as profits and dividends. According to the World Bank, registering a business in Morocco takes an average of nine days, significantly less than the Middle East and North Africa regional average of 20 days. Morocco does not require that the business owner deposit any paid-in minimum capital. Following the passing of electronic creation of businesses law 18-17 , the new system went live in 2021, allowing for the creation of businesses online via an electronic platform managed by the Moroccan Office of Industrial and Commercial Property (OMPIC). All procedures related to the creation, registration, and publication of company data can be carried out via this platform. A new national commission will monitor the implementation of the procedures. The Simplification of Administrative Procedures Law 55-19, passed in 2020, aims to streamline administrative processes by identifying and standardizing document requirements, eliminating unnecessary steps, and making the process fully digital via the National Administration Portal , the site launched in 2021 but is currently only available in Arabic. The business facilitation mechanisms provide for equitable treatment of women and underrepresented minorities in the economy. Notably, according to the World Bank, the procedure, length of time, and cost to register a new business is equal for men and women in Morocco. The U.S. Mission is unaware of any official assistance provided to women and underrepresented minorities through the business registration mechanisms. In cooperation with the Moroccan government, civil society, and the private sector, there have been several initiatives aimed at improving gender equality in the workplace and access to the workplace for foreign migrants, particularly those from sub-Saharan Africa. The Government of Morocco prioritizes investment in Africa as part of its strategy to expand its commercial and trade connections throughout the continent and secure its self-proclaimed title of “Gateway to Africa”. The African Development Bank ranks Morocco as the second biggest African investor in Sub-Saharan Africa, after South Africa, and the largest African investor in West Africa. OCP Africa, a subsidiary of Morocco’s state-owned phosphate giant OCP, has presence in 16 African countries and continues to invest in infrastructure supporting its phosphate exports. According to Morocco’s Office of Exchange, under the supervision of Minister of Economy and Finance, $808 million, or 43 percent of Morocco’s total outward FDI, was invested in the African continent in 2021. The U.S. Mission is not aware of a standalone outward investment promotion agency, although AMDIE’s mission includes supporting Moroccans seeking to invest outside of the country for the purpose of boosting Moroccan exports. Nor is the U.S. Mission aware of any restrictions for domestic investors attempting to invest abroad. However, under the Moroccan investment code, repatriation of funds is limited to “convertible” Moroccan Dirham accounts. Morocco’s Foreign Exchange Office (“Office des Changes,” OC) implemented several changes for 2022 that liberalize the country’s foreign exchange regulations. Moroccans going abroad for tourism can now exchange up to $10,000 in foreign currency per year, with the possibility to attain further allowances indexed at 30 percent of income tax filings with a maximum cap of $30,000. Business travelers can also obtain larger amounts of foreign currency, provided their company has properly filed and paid corporate income taxes. Another new provision permits banks to use foreign currency accounts to finance investments in Morocco’s Industrial Acceleration Zones. 3. Legal Regime Morocco is a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament and a mixed legal system of civil law based primarily on French law, with some influences from Islamic law. Legislative acts are subject to judicial review by the Constitutional Court excluding royal decrees (Dahirs) issued by the King, which have the force of law. Legislative power in Morocco is vested in both the government and the two chambers of Parliament, the Chamber of Representatives (Majlis Al-Nuwab) and the Chamber of Councilors (Majlis Al Mustashareen). The principal sources of commercial legislation in Morocco are the Code of Obligations and Contracts of 1913 and Law No. 15-95 establishing the Commercial Code. The Competition Council and the National Authority for Detecting, Preventing, and Fighting Corruption (INPPLC) have responsibility for improving public governance and advocating for further market liberalization. All levels of regulations exist (local, state, national, and supra-national). The most relevant regulations for foreign businesses depend on the sector in question. Ministries develop their own regulations and draft laws, including those related to investment, through their administrative departments, with approval by the respective minister. Each regulation and draft law is made available for public comment. Key regulatory actions are published in their entirety in Arabic and usually French in the official bulletin on the website of the General Secretariat of the Government. Once published, the law is final. Public enterprises and establishments can adopt their own specific regulations provided they comply with regulations regarding competition and transparency. Morocco’s regulatory enforcement mechanisms depend on the sector in question; enforcement is legally reviewable, and made publicly available via the different agencies’ websites. The National Telecommunications Regulatory Agency (ANRT), for example, is the public body responsible for the control and regulation of the telecommunications sector. The agency regulates telecommunications by participating in the development of the legislative and regulatory framework. Morocco does not have specific regulatory impact assessment guidelines, nor are impact assessments required by law. Morocco does not have a specialized government body tasked with reviewing and monitoring regulatory impact assessments conducted by other individual agencies or government bodies. The U.S. Mission is not aware of any informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. The Moroccan Ministry of Finance posts quarterly statistics (compiled in accordance with IMF recommendations) on public finance and debt on their website. A report on public debt is published on the Ministry of Economy and Finance’s website and is used as part of the budget bill formulation and voting processes. The fiscal year 2022 debt report was published on December 20, 2021. Morocco joined the WTO in 1995 and reports technical regulations that could affect trade with other member countries to the WTO. Morocco is a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement and has a 91.2 percent implementation rate of TFA requirements. European standards are widely referenced in Morocco’s regulatory system. In some cases, U.S. or international standards, guidelines, and recommendations are also accepted. The Moroccan legal system is a hybrid of civil law (French system) and some Islamic law, regulated by the Decree of Obligations and Contracts of 1913 as amended, the 1996 Code of Commerce, and Law No. 53-95 on Commercial Courts. These courts also have sole competence to entertain industrial property disputes, as provided for in Law No. 17-97 on the Protection of Industrial Property, irrespective of the legal status of the parties. According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s 2015 Morocco Commercial Law Assessment Report , Royal Decree No. 1-97-65 (1997) established commercial court jurisdiction over commercial cases including insolvency. Although this led to some improvement in the handling of commercial disputes, the lack of training for judges on general commercial matters remains a key challenge to effective commercial dispute resolution in the country. In general, litigation procedures are time consuming and resource-intensive, and there is no legal requirement with respect to case publishing. Disputes may be brought before one of eight Commercial Courts located in Morocco’s main cities and one of three Commercial Courts of Appeal located in Casablanca, Fes, and Marrakech. There are other special courts such as the Military and Administrative Courts. Title VII of the Constitution provides that the judiciary shall be independent from the legislative and executive branches of government. The 2011 Constitution also authorized the creation of the Supreme Judicial Council, headed by the King, which has the authority to hire, dismiss, and promote judges. Enforcement actions are appealable at the Courts of Appeal, which hear appeals against decisions from the court of first instance. The principal source of investment legislation in Morocco is Law No. 18-95 that established the 1995 Investment Charter. An updated Investment charter is under development and is expected to go into effect in 2022 Morocco’s CRIs and AMDIE provide users with investment-related information on laws and regulations, both general and specific to various industry sectors and geographic jurisdictions along with procedural information, calls for tenders, and additional resources for business creation. Each CRI hosts a website that is meant to act as an entry point to their “one-stop-shop” services that guide investors through the investment process. These websites have improved significantly and are regularly updated. Morocco’s Competition Law No. 06-99 on Free Pricing and Competition outlines the authority of the Competition Council as an independent executive body with investigatory powers. Together with the INPPLC, the Competition Council is one of the main actors charged with improving public governance and advocating for further market liberalization. Law No. 20-13, adopted on August 7, 2014, amended the powers of the Competition Council to bring them in line with the 2011 Constitution. The Competition Council’s responsibilities include making decisions on anti-competition practices and controlling concentrations, with powers of investigation and sanction; providing opinions in official consultations by government authorities; and publishing reviews and studies on the state of competition. In January 2022, the Competition Council published a legal compliance guide , in partnership with the Moroccan Employers Association, to provide additional guidance for companies and professional organizations in establishing a competition law compliance program. In February 2022, Tangier-based Moroccan Association of Transport and Logistics (AMTL), a labor union, called on transport professionals to raise transport fees by 20 percent, citing the rise in diesel prices. Soon after, Morocco’s Competition Council announced an investigation. Under Morocco’s liberal market laws, prices are determined according to offer and demand principles, and no single entity holds the right to fix market prices. At the same time that the AMTL issued the memo, Morocco’s government stepped into open dialogue with labor unions, causing the AMTL to retract their memo. Following reported mishandling of an investigation into the alleged collusion by oil distribution companies in 2020, King Mohammed VI convened an ad hoc committee to investigate the Competition Council’s dysfunctions. In March 2021, the king appointed a new council president, and parliament adopted a new bill strengthening the Competition Council by improving its legal framework and increasing transparency. Expropriation may only occur in the public interest for public use by a state entity, although in the past, private entities that are public service “concessionaires,” mixed economy companies, or general interest companies have also been granted expropriation rights. Article 3 of Law No. 7-81 (May 1982) on expropriation, the associated Royal Decree of May 6, 1982, and Decree No. 2-82-328 of April 16, 1983, regulate government authority to expropriate property. The process of expropriation has two phases: in the administrative phase, the State declares public interest in expropriating specific land and verifies ownership, titles, and appraised value of the land. If the State and owner can come to agreement on the value, the expropriation is complete. If the owner appeals, the judicial phase begins, whereby the property is taken, a judge oversees the transfer of the property, and payment compensation is made to the owner based on the judgment. The U.S. Mission is not aware of any recent, confirmed instances of private property being expropriated for other than public purposes (eminent domain), or in a manner that is discriminatory or not in accordance with established principles of international law. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Morocco is a member of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and signed its convention in June 1967. Morocco is a party to the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Law No. 08-05 provides for enforcement of awards made under these conventions. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Morocco is signatory to over 70 bilateral treaties recognizing binding international arbitration of trade disputes, including one with the United States. Law No. 08-05 established a system of conventional arbitration and mediation, while allowing parties to apply the Code of Civil Procedure in their dispute resolution. Foreign investors commonly rely on international arbitration to resolve contractual disputes. Commercial courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitration awards. Generally, investor rights are backed by a transparent, impartial procedure for dispute settlement. There have been no claims brought by foreign investors under the investment chapter of the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement since it came into effect in 2006. The U.S. Mission is not aware of any investment disputes over the last year involving U.S. investors. Morocco officially recognizes foreign arbitration awards issued against the government. Domestic arbitration awards are also enforceable subject to an enforcement order issued by the President of the Commercial Court, who verifies that no elements of the award violate public order or the defense rights of the parties. As Morocco is a member of the New York Convention, international awards are also enforceable in accordance with the provisions of the convention. Morocco is also a member of the Washington Convention for the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and as such agrees to enforce and uphold ICSID arbitral awards. The U.S. Mission is not aware of extrajudicial action against foreign investors. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Morocco has a national commission on Alternative Dispute Resolution with a mandate to regulate mediation training centers and develop mediator certification systems. Morocco seeks to position itself as a regional center for arbitration in Africa, but the capacity of local courts remains a limiting factor. To remedy this shortcoming, the Moroccan government established the Center of Arbitration and Mediation in Rabat, and the Casablanca Finance City Authority established the Casablanca International Mediation and Arbitration Center, which now see a majority of investment disputes. The U.S. Mission is aware of several investment and commercial disputes and has advocated on behalf of U.S. companies to resolve the disputes. Morocco’s bankruptcy law is based on French law. Commercial courts have jurisdiction over all cases related to insolvency, as set forth in Royal Decree No. 1-97-65 (1997). The Commercial Court in the debtor’s place of business holds jurisdiction in insolvency cases. The law gives secured debtors priority claim on assets and proceeds over unsecured debtors, who in turn have priority over equity shareholders. Bankruptcy is not criminalized. The World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report ranked Morocco 73 out of 190 economies in “Resolving Insolvency”. The GOM revised the national insolvency code in March of 2018, but further reform is needed. 6. Financial Sector Morocco encourages foreign portfolio investment and Moroccan legislation applies equally to Moroccan and foreign legal entities and to both domestic and foreign portfolio investment. The Casablanca Stock Exchange (CSE), founded in 1929 and re-launched as a private institution in 1993, is one of the few exchanges in the region with no restrictions on foreign participation. The CSE is regulated by the Moroccan Capital Markets Authority. Local and foreign investors have identical tax exposure on dividends (10 percent) and pay no capital gains tax. With a market capitalization of around $68 billion and 75 listed companies, CSE is the second largest exchange in Africa (after the Johannesburg Stock Exchange). Nonetheless, the CSE saw only 10 new listings between 2012-2022. There was only one new initial public offering (IPO) in 2021. Short selling, which could provide liquidity to the market, is not permitted. The Moroccan government initiated the Futures Market Act (Act 42-12) in 2015 to define the institutional framework of the futures market in Morocco and the role of the regulatory and supervisory authorities. As of March 2022, futures trading was still pending implementation and is not expected to commence until 2023. The Casablanca Stock Exchange demutualized in November of 2015. This change allowed the CSE greater flexibility and more access to global markets, and better positioned it as an integrated financial hub for the region. The Moroccan government holds a 25 percent share of the CSE but has announced its desire to sell to another major exchange to bring additional capital and expertise to the market. Morocco has accepted the obligations of IMF Article VIII, sections 2(a), 3, and 4, and its exchange system is free of restrictions on making payments and transfers on current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors are able to obtain credit on the local market. Morocco has a well-developed banking sector, where penetration is rising rapidly and recent improvements in macroeconomic fundamentals have helped resolve previous liquidity shortages. Morocco has some of Africa’s largest banks, and several are major players on the continent and continue to expand their footprint. The sector has several large, homegrown institutions with international footprints, as well as several subsidiaries of foreign banks. According to Bank Al-Maghrib (the Moroccan central bank) there are 24 banks operating in Morocco (five of which are Islamic “participatory” banks), six offshore institutions, 27 finance companies, 12 micro-credit associations, and 20 intermediary companies operating in funds transfer. Among the 19 traditional banks, the top seven banks comprise 90 percent of the system’s assets (including both on- and off-balance-sheet items). Attijariwafa, Morocco’s largest bank, is the sixth largest bank in Africa by total assets (approximately $63 billion in December 2021) and operates in 25 countries, most of which are in sub-Saharan Africa. Al Mada, the Moroccan royal family holding company is the largest shareholder holding 47 percent of the company’s stock. Foreign (mainly French) financial institutions are majority stakeholders in seven banks and nine finance companies. Moroccan banks have built up their presence overseas mainly through the acquisition of local banks, thus local deposits largely fund their subsidiaries. The overall strength of the banking sector has grown significantly in recent years. Since financial liberalization, credit is allocated freely and Bank Al-Maghrib has used indirect methods to control the interest rate and volume of credit. According to the World Bank, only 41 percent of Moroccan adults use formal financial products or services, leaving significant opportunities remaining for firms pursuing rural and less affluent segments of the market. At the start of 2017, Bank Al-Maghrib approved five requests to open Islamic banks in the country. By mid-2018, over 80 branches specializing in Islamic banking services were operating in Morocco. The first Islamic bonds (sukuk) were issued in October 2018. In 2019, Islamic banks in Morocco granted $930 million in financing. The GOM passed a law authorizing Islamic insurance products (takaful) in 2019, which became commercially available in early 2022. Following an upward trend beginning in 2012, the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) to bank credit stabilized in 2017 through 2019 at 7.6 percent. COVID-related complications caused the NPL rate to jump to 9.9 percent in the end of 2020 but it had partially recovered to 8.4 percent in January 2022. Morocco’s accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms. Morocco is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. Bank Al-Maghrib is responsible for issuing accounting standards for banks and financial institutions. Bank Al Maghrib requires that all entities under its supervision use International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The Securities Commission is responsible for issuing financial reporting and accounting standards for public companies. Moroccan Stock Exchange Law ( Law 52-01 ) stipulates that all companies listed on the Casablanca Stock Exchange (CSE), other than banks and similar financial institutions, can choose between IFRS and Moroccan Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). In practice, most public companies use IFRS. Legal provisions regulating the banking sector include Law No. 76-03 on the Charter of Bank Al-Maghrib, which created an independent board of directors and prohibits the Ministry of Finance and Economy from borrowing from the Central Bank except under exceptional circumstances. Even with the financial crisis caused by COVID-19, the central bank did not provide financing directly to the state, but instead used other monetary tools (such as reducing reserve requirements) to intervene and reinforce the banking sector. Law No. 34-03 (2006) reinforced the supervisory authority of Bank Al-Maghrib over the activities of credit institutions. Law No. 51-20, passed in 2021, aims to further the strengthen the financial systems by reinforcing the supervision of financial conglomerates, improving interest rate targeting to protect consumers while, at the same time, increasing financial inclusion, and providing enhanced privacy protections. Foreign banks and branches are allowed to establish operations in Morocco and are subject to provisions regulating the banking sector. At present, the U.S. Mission is not aware of Morocco losing correspondent banking relationships. There are no restrictions on foreigners’ abilities to establish bank accounts. However, foreigners who wish to establish a bank account are required to open a “convertible” account with foreign currency. The account holder may only deposit foreign currency into that account; at no time can they deposit dirhams. There are anecdotal reports that Moroccan banks have closed accounts without giving appropriate warning and that it has been difficult for some foreigners to open bank accounts. A Crowdfunding law (15-18) was passed into law in 2021, establishing a legal regulatory and legal framework for collaborative financing. The law aims to increase the financial inclusion by providing new source of financing to entrepreneurs. Morocco prohibits the use of cryptocurrencies, noting that they carry significant risks that may lead to penalties. Notwithstanding the current ban, Bitcoin trading in Morocco is among the highest in North Africa, with an estimated 2.4 percent of the population owning the cryptocurrency. Foreign Exchange The income from foreign investments financed in foreign currency can be transferred tax-free, without amount or duration limits. This income can be dividends, attendance fees, rental income, benefits, and interest. Capital contributions made in convertible currency, contributions made by debit of forward convertible accounts, and net transfer capital gains may also be repatriated. For the transfer of dividends, bonuses, or benefit shares, the investor must provide balance sheets and profit and loss statements, annexed documents relating to the fiscal year in which the transfer is requested, as well as the statement of extra-accounting adjustments made to obtain the taxable income. A currency-convertibility regime is available to foreign investors, including Moroccans living abroad, who invest in Morocco. This regime facilitates their investments in Morocco, repatriation of income, and profits on investments. Morocco guarantees full currency convertibility for capital transactions, free transfer of profits, and free repatriation of invested capital, when such investment is governed by the convertibility arrangement. Generally, the investors must notify the government of the investment transaction, providing the necessary legal and financial documentation. With respect to the cross-border transfer of investment proceeds to foreign investors, the rules vary depending on the type of investment. Investors may import freely without any value limits to traveler’s checks, bank or postal checks, letters of credit, payment cards or any other means of payment denominated in foreign currency. For cash and/or negotiable instruments in bearer form with a value equal to or greater than 100,000 Moroccan Dirham, importers must file a declaration with Moroccan Customs at the port of entry. Declarations are available at all border crossings, ports, and airports. Morocco has achieved relatively stable macroeconomic and financial conditions under an exchange rate peg (60/40 Euro/Dollar split), which has helped achieve price stability and insulated the economy from nominal shocks. In March of 2020, the Moroccan Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Administrative Reform, in consultation with the Central Bank, adopted a new exchange regime in which the Moroccan dirham may now fluctuate within a band of ± 5 percent compared to the Bank’s central rate (peg). The change loosened the fluctuation band from its previous ± 2.5 percent. The change is designed to strengthen the capacity of the Moroccan economy to absorb external shocks, support its competitiveness, and contribute to improving growth. Remittance Policies Amounts received from abroad must pass through a convertible dirham account. This type of account facilitates investment transactions in Morocco and guarantees the transfer of proceeds for the investment, as well as the repatriation of the proceeds and the capital gains from any resale. AMDIE recommends that investors open a convertible account in dirhams on arrival in Morocco to quickly access the funds necessary for notarial transactions. Ithmar Capital is Morocco’s investment fund and financial vehicle, which aims to support the national sectorial strategies. Ithmar Capital is a full member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds and follows the Santiago Principles. The $1.8 billion fund was launched in 2011 by the Moroccan government, supported by the royal Hassan II Fund for Economic and Social Development. This fund initially supported the government’s long-term Vision 2020 strategic plan for tourism and has several large-scale development projects under development. The fund is currently part of the long-term development plan initiated by the government in multiple economic sectors. 10. Political and Security Environment Morocco enjoys political stability. There has not been any recent damage to commercial facilities and/or installations with a continued impact on the investment environment. Demonstrations occur in Morocco and usually center on economic, social, or labor issues. Demonstrations can attract hundreds to thousands of people in major city centers. Participants are typically, but not always, non-violent and the demonstrations are peaceful and orderly. Morocco has historically experienced terrorist attacks. Travelers should generally exercise increased caution due to terrorism as terrorist groups continue plotting possible attacks in Morocco. Terrorists may attack with little or no warning, targeting tourist locations, transportation hubs, markets/shopping malls, and local government facilities. Visitors are encouraged to consult the Department of State’s Morocco Travel Advisory for the most current information. Mozambique Executive Summary Mozambique’s lengthy coastline, deep-water ports, favorable climate, rich soil, and vast natural resources give the country significant potential, but investors face challenges related to the business environment. The Government of the Republic of Mozambique (GRM) made progress on public financial management reforms and publishing budget and debt figures, took steps to reform State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and arrested or prosecuted high-level officials on corruption-related charges. It reached an agreement with the IMF and promoted dialogue with the private sector and donor community on economic reforms. Challenges include Mozambique’s opaque and complicated taxation policies, barriers to private land ownership, corruption, an underdeveloped financial system, high interest rates, poor infrastructure, and difficulties obtaining visas. Infrastructure outside of Maputo is often poor, while bureaucracy and corruption slow trade at many points of entry. Mozambican labor law makes it difficult to hire and fire workers, and court systems are bogged down in labor disputes. The domestic workforce also lacks many advanced skills needed by industry, and the visa regime makes bringing in foreign workers difficult. Insecurity related to a terrorist insurgency in northern Mozambique has resulted in multi-billion-dollar onshore LNG projects being delayed, although a smaller offshore floating LNG platform remains on track to begin production by October 2022. The COVID-19 pandemic negatively impacted the extractive industry and tourism sector, and pandemic-related restrictions affected many other economic sectors. Following a recession in 2020, the economy returned to 2.5 percent economic growth in 2021. In 2022, the GRM began to ease some restrictions, although COVID-19 measures have continued to limit the hours restaurants and other businesses can operate and impose testing requirements on travelers. Mozambique is eager to partner with the United States on climate issues, although it lacks resources. It joined the Agricultural Innovation Mission for Climate (AIM4C) and is considering joining the Global Methane Pledge. As the GRM made progress on rural electrification, it incorporated solar energy and solicited investment for hydropower projects. U.S. development agencies and international financial institutions contributed to energy projects in solar and natural gas. The U.S. Department of Energy helped identify areas where small renewable solar and wind projects could be built alongside agricultural activities. These areas may provide opportunities for sustainable foreign direct investment in the renewable energy market. Mozambique is a growing producer of critical minerals, including graphite, lithium, and titanium. In 2021, Mozambique joined the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, enabling Mozambique to legally export diamonds. The GRM worked constructively with the United States and other members of the donor community. In March 2022, it reached an agreement with the IMF for a three-year, $470 million program that aims to reinforce economic recovery while addressing challenges related to debt and financing and encouraging good governance and improved management of public resources. The GRM is working with the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) towards signing a second MCC compact (Compact II) in 2023. Compact II will entail business-enabling reforms and will undertake investments in Zambézia Province that focus on transportation infrastructure, commercial agriculture, and climate change mitigation. While Compact II is still under development, it has potential to contribute to key sectors and help create an enabling environment for additional investments. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 147 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 122 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2018 $491 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita (USD) 2020 $460 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GRM welcomes foreign investment and sees it as a critical driver of economic growth and job creation. Except for a few sectors related to national security, all business sectors are open to foreign investment. Mozambique’s 1993 Investment Law (no. 3/93) and a 2009 decree (no. 43/2009) govern foreign investments. Many observers perceive the Investment Law as obsolete, although the GRM has not yet taken steps to revise it. In general, large investors receive more support from the GRM than small and medium-sized investors. GRM authorities must approve all foreign and domestic investment, including guarantees and incentives. Regulations for the 2009 Code of Fiscal Benefits law (no. 4/2009), were established under a 2009 Decree (no. 56/2009). The Agency for Promotion of Investments and Exports (APIEX, Agencia para a Promocao de Investimentos e Exportacoes) is the primary investor contact within the GRM, operating under the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC), with the objective of promoting and facilitating private and public investment. APIEX also oversees the promotion of national exports and assists investors with administrative, financial, and property issues. Through APIEX, investors can receive exemptions from some customs and value-added tax (VAT) duties when importing “Class K” equipment, which includes capital investments. Contact information for APIEX is: Agency for Promotion of Investments and Exports http://www.apiex.gov.mz/ Rua da Imprensa, 332 (ground floor) Tel: (+258) 21313310 Ahmed Sekou Touré Ave., 2539 Maputo Telephone: (+258) 21 321291 Mobile: (+258) 823056432 GRM dialogue with the private sector is primarily coordinated by Mozambique’s Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC). Most businesses in Mozambique interact with the GRM via the country’s largest business association, the Confederation of Economic Associations (CTA, Confederação das Associações Económicas de Moçambique). CTA was formed in 1996 and continues to be the most influential business association in Mozambique. CTA hosts an annual conference for private sector dialogue with the GRM (Conferencia Annual do Sector Privado; CASP), which is usually attended by the President of Mozambique and senior cabinet officials. With some exceptions, Mozambique’s Investment Law and its regulations generally do not distinguish between investor origin or limit foreign ownership or control of companies. The 2011 “Mega-Projects Law” (no. 15/2011) stipulates that 5 – 20 percent of the equity capital of public-private partnerships, large-scale ventures, and major business concessions be owned by Mozambicans. The Petroleum Law (no. 14/2014) states that the GRM regulates the exploration, research, production, transportation, trade, refinery, and transformation of liquid hydrocarbons and their by-products, including petrochemical activities. Article 4.6 of this law establishes the state-owned oil company, the National Hydrocarbon Company (Empresa National das Hidrocarbonetos; ENH) as the GRM’s exclusive representative for investment and participation in oil and gas projects. ENH typically owns up to 15 percent of shares in oil and gas projects in the country. Depending on the size of the investment, the GRM approves both domestic and foreign investments at the provincial or national level, but there is no other formal investment screening process. In March 2022, CTA published a report entitled “ Accelerating actions for economic recovery in Mozambique’s Private Sector.” The report lists seven key recommendations announced at the March 30-31 CASP conference: 1) Reduce the number of days required to obtain a business license; 2) reduce the cost of finance; 3) apply incentives to increase industrialization; 4) increase the number of products certified at international standards; 5) strengthen small and medium enterprises through legal reforms and payment of all government debts to companies; 6) increase agricultural productivity through fiscal reform; and 7) increase influx of international tourists to Mozambique by facilitating visas and lowering value added taxes paid by tourists. Starting a business in Mozambique is a lengthy, bureaucratic, and complex process that has contributed to Mozambique’s relatively low score on the World Bank’s Doing Business Report. In the 2020 report (the most recent available), Mozambique ranked 176 out of 190 economies worldwide for ease of starting a new business, scoring well below the regional average for sub-Saharan Africa. Its low rank is due in part to the relatively high cost of registering a business and number of procedures required to complete the process. Registering a business typically involves many steps including reserving a name, signing an incorporation contract, paying registration fees, publishing the company’s name and statutes in the national gazette, registering with the tax authority, and notifying relevant agencies of the start of activity. According to the World Bank, this process takes approximately seventeen days. There is not a business registration website; however, APIEX maintains a guide to starting a business with some resources. In 2020, the City of Maputo consolidated some of the steps by establishing a “one stop shop” (balcão de atendimento unico; BAU), reducing the number of days required to register a new company to eleven. The GRM has initiated several projects to promote competitiveness within the private sector. The MIC collaborated with CTA to create an action plan for improving the business environment (Plano de Acção para Melhorar a Ambiente de Negocios; PAMAN) in the 2019-2021 period, although the GRM achieved only 38.6 percent of the proposed reforms. In 2020, the GRM partnered with CTA to launch the Programa Nacional de Certificação Empresarial (PRONACER) to support small and medium enterprises. The GRM does not promote or incentivize outward investment. It also does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. However, Mozambique does require domestic investors to remit investment income from overseas, except for amounts required to pay debts, taxes, or other expenses abroad. 3. Legal Regime Investors face numerous requirements for permits, approvals, and clearances, which often take substantial time and effort to obtain. The difficulty of navigating the system creates vulnerabilities to corruption, a risk that is aggravated by relatively low wages earned by administrative clerks. Labor, health, safety, and environmental regulations may go unenforced or are selectively enforced. In some cases, civil servants have reportedly threatened to enforce antiquated regulations that remain on the books in order to obtain favors or bribes. The private sector, through CTA, maintains an ongoing dialogue with the GRM, holding quarterly meetings with the Prime Minister and an annual meeting with the President. On behalf of its members and other business associations, CTA provides feedback to the GRM on laws and regulations that impact the business environment. However, because of its exclusive role in communicating with the GRM on behalf of the private sector, some businesses have expressed concerns that not all voices are heard. In addition, some businesses have argued that CTA is not an effective advocate given its political affiliation with long-time ruling party Frelimo. Numerous other business associations exist, including a newly accredited American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham), formed in 2019 to represent the interests of the U.S. business community in Mozambique. The GRM requires businesses in certain sectors to apply for an Environmental License, via the Environmental Impact Evaluation Process, regulated under the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulation (no. 54/2015). The Ministry of Land and Environment and its subordinate institutions and directorates issue licenses following the Environmental Impact Evaluation Process, which entails creation of an Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP). Draft bills are made available for public comment through business associations or in public meetings. The GRM publishes changes to laws and regulations in the National Gazette, which is available electronically. Public comments are usually limited to input from a few private sector organizations, such as CTA. There have been complaints of short comment periods and that comments are not properly reflected in the National Gazette. Overall fiscal transparency in Mozambique is improving in the wake of the “hidden debts” scandal, which broke in 2016. GRM reporting on public debts has improved, with SOE debt now included in the national budget. However, publicly available budget documents still do not provide a complete picture of the GRM’s revenue streams, particularly with regard to SOE earnings, which generally do not have publicly available audited financial statements. The GRM also maintains off-budget accounts not subject to adequate audit or oversight. For published portions of the budget that were relatively complete, the information provided was generally reliable. The March 2022 IMF agreement contains reform measures designed to improve the GRM’s public financial management. Mozambique is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In 2016, Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Eswatini (then-Swaziland), signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union. Mozambique exports aluminum under this EPA agreement. The GRM ratified the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in July 2016 and notified the WTO in January 2017. The GRM established a National Trade Facilitation Committee to coordinate the implementation of the TFA. Mozambique is a member of the WTO and generally notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of all draft technical regulations. The National Institute of Norms and Quality (Instituto Nacional de Normalização e Qualidade, INNOQ) falls under the supervision of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and is the WTO enquiry point for TBT-related issues. INNOQ is a member of the International Standards Organization (ISO) and carries the mandate to issue ISO 9001 certificates. According to the WTO’s 2017 Trade Policy Review of Mozambique , no specific trade concerns have been raised about Mozambique’s TBT measures in the WTO TBT Committee. Like most countries in Africa, Mozambique generally uses standards based on existing ISO and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standards for most products. Mozambique’s legal system is based on Portuguese civil law and customary law. The GRM updated its Commercial Code in 2005 and 2018. In recent years, Mozambique’s legal system has shown a degree of independence. In August 2021, the Maputo City Judicial Court began proceedings for 19 defendants in the “hidden debts” trial, who were accused of illicitly acquiring over $2 billion in state-backed loans under the guise of developing a tuna fishing fleet and coastal protection system. The court completed hearings in March 2022, and anticipated verdicts to be announced on August 1, 2022. It is unclear whether Mozambique’s General Prosecutor will pursue further indictments. The former Finance Minister responsible for signing the illicit state-backed loan guarantees in the scandal remains under custody in South Africa, pending possible extradition to the United States. The General Prosecutor’s office has also pursued suspects in separate corruption-related cases. The 2009 Code of Fiscal Benefits (no. 4/2009) and 2009 Decree (no. 56/2009) form the legal basis for foreign direct investment in Mozambique. Operating within these regulations, APIEX analyzes the fiscal and customs incentives available for a particular investment. Investors must establish foreign business representation and acquire a commercial representation license. During project development, investors must document their community consultation efforts related to the project. If the investment requires the use of land, the investor must present, among other documents, a topographic plan or an outline of the site where the project will be developed. If the investment involves an area under 1,000 hectares and the investment is under approximately $25 million, the governor of the province where it will be located can approve the investment. While APIEX has the authority to approve any project up to $40 million, the Minister of Economy and Finance (MEF) must approve national or foreign investments between $40 million and $225 million. If the investment occupies an area of 10,000 hectares, or an area greater than 100,000 hectares for a forestry concession, or it amounts to more than $225 million, the Council of Ministers must approve it. APIEX provides additional information regarding Mozambique’s investment requirements. The 2013 “Competition Law” (no. 10/2013), established a modern legal framework for competition and created the Competition Regulatory Authority, inspired by the Portuguese competition enforcement system. Violating the prohibitions contained in the Competition Law (either by entering into an illegal agreement or practice or by implementing a concentration subject to mandatory filing) could result in a fine of up to five percent of the turnover of the company in the previous year. Competition Regulatory Authority decisions may be appealed in the Judicial Court in Maputo for cases leading to fines or other sanctions, or to the Administrative Court for merger control procedures. There have been no significant cases of nationalization since the adoption of the 1990 Constitution. Mozambican law holds that “when deemed absolutely necessary for weighty reasons of national interest or public health and order, the nationalization or expropriation of goods and rights shall result in the owner being entitled to just and equitable compensation.” The GRM adopted a comprehensive legal regime for bankruptcy in 2013 known as the “Insolvency Law” (no. 1/2013). This law streamlines the bankruptcy process, sets the rules for business recovery, facilitates potential recovery for struggling businesses, and establishes legal methods to declare bankruptcy. Under the law, creditors can approve a proposed rescue plan, request that a debtor be declared insolvent, and challenge suspicious transactions. 6. Financial Sector The Mozambique Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de Mocambique, BVM) is a public institution under the guardianship of the MEF and the supervision of the Central Bank of Mozambique. In general, the BVM is underutilized as a means of financing and investment. However, the GRM has expressed interest in reforming market rules to increase capitalization and potentially prepare to require foreign companies active in Mozambique to be listed on the local stock exchange. Corporate and GRM bonds are traded on the BVM, but there is only one dealer that operates in the country, with all other brokers incorporated into commercial banks, which act as primary dealers for treasury bills. The secondary market in Mozambique remains underdeveloped. Available credit instruments include medium- and short-term loans, syndicated loans, foreign exchange derivatives, and trade finance instruments, such as letters of credit and credit guarantees. The BVM remains illiquid, in the sense that very limited activity occurs outside the issuing time. Investors tend to hold their instruments until maturity. The market also lacks a bond yield curve as GRM issuances use a floating price regime for the coupons with no price discovery for tenures above 12 months. In 2022 the Central Bank accepted technical assistance manuals from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission related to regulation of the BVM. The GRM notified the IMF that it has accepted the obligations of Article VIII sections 2, 3, and 4 of the IMF Articles of Agreement, effective May 20, 2011. According to a December 2021 Mozambican Bank Association (MBA) survey, there are 20 commercial banks operating in Mozambique. The top three banks – Banco Comercial e de Investimentos (BCI), Banco Internacional de Moçambique SA (BIM), and Standard Bank – account for 68 percent of total banking assets. However, Mozambique’s other banks have been gaining market share. MyBucks Banking Corporation SA, Societe Generale Mocambique SA and Banco Nacional de Investimento SA have recorded impressive asset growth rates of 78 percent, 64 percent, and 51 percent respectively in recent years. The non-performing loan ratio for the sector improved from 11.3 percent in December 2019 to 10.2 percent in December 2020, the most recent years for which such figures are available. It was possible to see an increase in the expected credit losses going into the income statement for the year 2020 when compared to the year 2019. The total level of impairment going into the income statement increased from 4.8 billion meticais to 6.3 billion meticais for the period 2019 to 2020. Despite recent challenges including the COVID-19 pandemic, damaging cyclones, and terrorist activity in Cabo Delgado province, Mozambique’s economy has been recovering following a recession in 2020. According to the 2021 MBA survey, Mozambique’s banking system has continued to grow at around 17 percent annually, with an annual increase in the volume of deposits of 22 percent, an increase in financing by 10 percent, and an expansion in the number of bank branches nationwide by 2 percent over the previous year. According to 2019 FinScope data, only 21 percent of the population had access to a bank account, which is well below the country’s target of 60 percent. As of March 2021, Mozambique had 719 bank agencies, 1,742 ATMs, and 36,839 point of sale devices. Most banking locations are concentrated in provincial capitals, and rural districts often have no banks at all. Thanks to the partnership between mobile communications companies and banks for electronic or mobile-money transactions, access to financial services is improving, with many Mozambicans using the mobile money service M-PESA. The number of services available from ATMs is also increasing. There are 1,697 banking agents in the country that provide basic banking services to customers without access to a bank branch. With financing already prohibitively expensive for most Mozambicans, the Central Bank increased interest rates by 200 basis points to 15.25 percent in March 2022, following commodity price rises associated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Credit is allocated on market terms, but eligibility requirements exclude much of the population from obtaining credit. Banks request collateral, but since DUATs generally cannot be used as collateral, the majority of Mozambican applicants do not qualify for loans. Foreign investors’ export activities in food, fuel, and health markets have access to credit in foreign currency. All other sectors have access to credit only in the local currency. In October 2020, Mozambique’s Central Bank published an initial proposal for a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) to manage the expected increase in GRM revenues from natural gas projects in northern Mozambique. The GRM is still studying the proposal, although the March 2022 IMF program includes adoption of a SWF law as one of its proposed reforms, and President Nyusi has recently signaled that implementing the SWF remains a GRM priority. The initial SWF draft from the Central Bank calls for 50 percent of GRM revenue from extractive industries to be used to fund the SWF for a period of 20 years, and sets up strict payout criteria for any withdrawals from the SWF before it reaches maturity. In general, the GRM’s proposal follows the Santiago Principles, and the Central Bank consulted with the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds to refine its proposal. The GRM’s National Petroleum Institute (INP) estimates total government revenues from LNG projects in the Rovuma Basin would amount to $49.4 billion over the lifetime of the projects through 2048. A Central Bank proposed model published in 2020 had estimated total revenues could amount to as much as $96 billion. However, delay of both the Area 1 and Area 4 onshore projects and fluctuating international energy prices could impact Mozambique’s real returns from this sector. In March 2021, TotalEnergies declared force majeure and halted work on its Area 1 project, citing concerns over insecurity around the project site in Cabo Delgado province. The Exxon-Mobil-led Area 4 onshore project has yet to see a Final Investment Decision (FID). The Eni-led Floating LNG platform, also part of Area 4, is set to begin LNG production in 2022, with projected production of 3.4 million tons per annum. 7. State-Owned Enterprises According the State Holdings Management Institute (IGPE), Mozambique has twelve SOEs , 18 companies that are majority state-owned, and 23 companies with minority state ownership, which IGPE does not consider to be SOEs. Some of the largest SOEs, such as Airports of Mozambique (Aeroportos de Moçambique) and Electricity of Mozambique (Electricidade de Moçambique), have monopolies in their respective industries. In some cases, SOEs enter into joint ventures with private firms to deliver certain services. For example, Ports and Railways of Mozambique (CFM, Portos e Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique) offers some concessions. Many SOEs benefit from state subsidies. In some instances, SOEs have benefited from non-compete contracts that should have been competitively tendered. SOE accounts are generally not transparent and not thoroughly audited by the Supreme Audit Institution. Unsustainable SOE debt represents a liability for the GRM, and SOEs were at the heart of the hidden debt scandal revealed in 2016. In 2018, the Parliament passed Law no. 3/2018, which broadens the definition of SOEs to include all public enterprises and shareholding companies. The law seeks to unify SOE oversight and harmonize the corporate governance structure, instituting additional financial controls, borrowing limits, and financial analysis and evaluation requirements for SOEs. The law requires the oversight authority to publish a consolidated annual report on SOEs, with additional reporting requirements for individual SOEs. The Council of Ministers approved regulations for the SOE law in early 2019, and in 2020 the MEF published limited information on SOE debt. The GRM is working with the IMF and the international donor community in an effort to reform its SOEs. In March 2021, the GRM hired a consulting company to study models for restructuring SOEs and selected four SOEs to be restructured: Mozambican Insurance Company (EMOSE), the Correios de Moçambique (Post Office), the Sociedade de Gestão Imobiliária (DOMUS) and the Matola Silos and Grain Terminal (STEMA). Mozambique’s privatization program has been relatively transparent, with tendering procedures that are generally open and competitive. Most remaining parastatals operate as state-owned public utilities with GRM oversight and control, making their privatization more politically sensitive. While the GRM has indicated an intention to include private partners in most of these utility industries, progress has been slow. 10. Political and Security Environment In July 2021, Mozambican security forces deployed to Cabo Delgado Province were joined by Rwandan and SADC military contingents. Since that time, the combined forces have made security gains against the Islamic State in Mozambique (ISIS-M). However, the ongoing insurgency continues to deter investment in northern Mozambique. Sporadic terrorist attacks continue to occur, mainly against civilians, in the northern provinces. As of mid-2022, TotalEnergies had yet to resume construction of its Area 1 LNG facility following suspension of its operations and declaration of force majeure in April 2021. The United States designated ISIS-M as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group in March 2021. ISIS provides support to combatants in northern Mozambique and occasionally claims credit for their attacks. Since 2017, the ISIS affiliate carried out more than 500 deliberate attacks against unarmed civilians, causing an estimated 3,100 deaths and up to 800,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs). As of April 2022, the GRM had begun implementing plans to stabilize the region with support from the international donor community and encouraging IDPs to return to their homes. Following the ceasefire and peace agreement signed in August 2019, Mozambique’s disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration (DDR) of ex-combatants from political opposition group Renamo is nearing conclusion. The October 2021 death of Mariano Nhongo, leader of the Renamo Military Junta splinter group, corresponded with a drop in the number of attacks along major highways in Manica and Sofala provinces. Namibia Executive Summary The Namibian government prioritizes attracting more domestic and foreign investment to stimulate economic growth, combat unemployment, and diversify the economy. The Ministry of Industrialization and Trade (MIT) is the governmental authority primarily responsible for carrying out the provisions of the Foreign Investment Act of 1993 (FIA). The MIT is working on new business legislation, the Namibia Investment Promotion and Facilitation Act, but the legislation is still in draft form. As a result, the FIA remains the guiding legislation on investment. The FIA calls for equal treatment of foreign investors and Namibian firms, including the possibility of fair compensation in the event of expropriation, international arbitration of disputes, the right to remit profits, and access to foreign exchange. The government emphasizes the need for investors to partner with Namibian-owned companies and/or have a majority of local employees to operate in country. The mining, fishing, and tourism sectors have historically attracted significant investment in Namibia. There are large Chinese foreign investments, particularly in the uranium mining sector. South Africa has considerable investments in the diamond mining and banking sectors, while Canada has investment in gold, zinc, and lithium mining. Spain and Russia have investments in the fishing industry. Foreign investors from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States, and other countries have investment in oil exploration off the Namibian coast. Logistics, manufacturing, and mining for diamonds and critical minerals such as gold lithium, and uranium also attract investment. The investment climate in Namibia is generally positive. Despite global economic disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Namibia has maintained political stability and continues to offer key advantages for inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), such as an independent judicial system, protection of property and contractual rights, good quality physical and telecommunications infrastructure, and easy access to South Africa and the region. Namibia is upgrading its transportation infrastructure to facilitate investment and position itself as a regional logistics hub. An expansion at Walvis Bay Port concluded in 2019, renovations at Hosea Kutako International Airport are ongoing, and there are plans to extend and rehabilitate the national rail line, notably to improve connection from Walvis Bay port to neighboring countries. Namibia has the best roads on the African continent, according to the World Economic Forum. Namibia also has access to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU, which is also headquartered in Namibia), the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Free Trade Area, and markets in Europe and Asia. With the second highest solar radiation in the world and vast land and wind resources, Namibia is also positioning itself to be a global leader in renewable energies and green hydrogen, with potential to improve local and regional access to energy and efforts to combat climate change. Factors that may inhibit FDI into Namibia are the country’s relatively small domestic market, high transport costs, high energy prices, and limited skilled labor pool. Corruption is a problem but not endemic. A recent scandal in the fishing sector resulted in the arrests of ministers and business leaders, cost Namibia around a billion USD, and strained public trust. As a post-apartheid country with one of the highest rates of inequality in the world, Namibia continues to look for ways to address historic economic imbalances. Proposed legislation, the New Equitable Economic Empowerment Bill (NEEEB), which has been in draft form for more than a decade, will look to create economic and business opportunities for disadvantaged groups, including in the areas of ownership, management, human resource development, and value addition. Parliament aims to pass the bill in 2022, but further delays are possible. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 58 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 100 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2017 USD -78 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,500 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Namibian government welcomes increased foreign investment to help develop the national economy and benefit its population. The Foreign Investment Act of 1993 (FIA) currently governs Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Namibia and guarantees equal treatment for foreign investors and Namibian firms, including the possibility of fair compensation in the event of expropriation, international arbitration of disputes between investors and the government, the right to remit profits, and access to foreign exchange. Investment and tax incentives are also available for the manufacturing sector. The government prioritizes investment retention and maintains ongoing dialogue with investors, including through investment conferences, international events such as the Dubai Expo, and high-level meetings with investors. The government is cognizant that some of its bureaucratic processes (such as the time it takes to get a business visa) impede the ease of doing business and is working to address such challenges. The Namibian Investment Promotion Act, which would replace the FIA, has been under review since 2016. The Namibia Investment Promotion and Development Board (NIPDB) housed in the Office of the President, serves as Namibia’s official investment promotion and facilitation office. Established in 2020, the NIPDB is tasked with assisting investors in minimizing bureaucratic red tape, including obtaining work visas for foreign investors, by coordinating with government ministries as well as regulatory bodies. The NIPDB is the first point of contact for potential investors and offers comprehensive services from the initial inquiry stage through to operational stages. The NIPDB also provides general information packages, coordinates trade delegations, and assists with advice on investment opportunities, incentives, and procedures. The NIPDB is headed by a highly regarded chartered accountant, and analysts agree that it is doing a better job at facilitating investment compared to past investment promotion mechanisms. The NIPDB website is https://nipdb.com/ . Under the FIA, foreign and domestic entities may establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activities. The Ministry of Home Affairs, Immigration, Safety, and Security grants renewable and non-renewable temporary employment permits for a period of up to 12 months for skills not locally or readily available. However, work permits and long-term residence permits are subject to bureaucratic hurdles and are hard to obtain for jobs that could be performed by a Namibian. Complaints about delays in renewing visas and work permits are common. Foreigners must pay a 10 percent non-resident shareholder tax on dividends. There are no capital gains or marketable securities taxes, although certain capital gains are taxed as normal income. As a member of the Common Monetary Area, the Namibian dollar (NAD) is pegged at parity with the South African rand. There are no general mandatory limits on foreign ownership, but some sectors have a mandatory joint ownership between a local firm and foreign firm, such as in the natural resources sector. Government procurements usually also require a variable percentage of local ownership. Post is not aware of any investment screening mechanism recently introduced by Namibia. Namibia has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews in the last five years by the OECD, WTO, or UNCTAD. The Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), of which Namibia is a member and host, was last reviewed by the WTO in 2015. In the past five years, several think tanks – such as the highly regarded Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) and the Economic Policy Research Association (EPRA) – have provided reviews of investment policy-related concerns, including on the draft Namibia Investment Promotion and Facilitation Bill, which prompted the government to reconsidering the bill’s passage. Links to some examples: https://ippr.org.na/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/IPPR-Improving-the-Business_WEB.pdf ; https://www.epra.cc/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/EPRA-report-on-2021-INVESTMENT-BILL-FINAL.pdf Foreign and domestic investors may conduct business in the form of a public or private company, branch of a foreign company, closed corporation, partnership, joint venture, or sole trader. Companies are regulated under the 2004 Companies Act, which covers both domestic companies and those incorporated outside Namibia but traded through local branches. To operate in Namibia, businesses must also register with the relevant local authorities, the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, and the Social Security Commission. Most investors find it helpful to have a local presence or a local partner in order to do business in Namibia, although this is not currently a legal requirement, except in sectors that require a joint venture partner. Companies usually establish business relationships before tender opportunities are announced. Some accounting and law firms provide business registration services. The Business and Intellectual Property Authority (BIPA) is the primary institution which serves the business community and ensures effective administration of business and intellectual property rights (IPRs) registration. BIPA serves as a one-stop-center for all business and IPR registrations and related matters. It also provides general advisory services and information on business registration and IPRs. Website: http://www.bipa.gov.na/. Namibia provides incentives for outward investment mainly aimed at stimulating manufacturing, attracting foreign investment to Namibia, and promoting exports. To take advantage of the incentives, companies must be registered with MIT and the Ministry of Finance. Tax and non-tax incentives are accessible to both existing and new manufacturers. The list of Namibia’s investment incentives can be found online at: https://www.namibweb.com/tin.htm . Namibia is in the process of creating Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to offer favorable conditions for companies wishing to manufacture and export products. The planned SEZs would replace the old Export Processing Zone regime. 3. Legal Regime Namibia’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are relatively transparent and consistent with international norms. Post is not aware of any government requirements for companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate investments. Draft bills, proposed legislation, and draft regulations are normally not available for public comment and are not required to be, although there are consultations on such documents throughout the government. Depending on the topic, bills are customarily drafted within the relevant ministry with stakeholder or public consultation and then presented to the parliament for debate. Comments on draft legislation and regulations may also be solicited through public meetings or targeted outreach to stakeholder groups. Such comments are also not required to be made public and generally are not. There is no formal process of appeal or reconsideration of published regulations. Approved legislation and regulations are publicly available and published in the Government Gazette, the official journal of the government of Namibia. The Government Gazette is digitalized and public. Public finances are generally transparent, with the annual budget and mid-term budget reviews published on the Ministry of Finance’s website and in the Government Gazette. The Ministry of Finance has begun in the past few years holding consultations with interest groups during the budget preparation process. The Bank of Namibia publishes the Government of Namibia’s debt position – including explicit and contingent liabilities – in its annual reports and quarterly bulletins. The national coordinating bureau for standards is the Namibian Standards Institution. Namibia is also a member of the International Organization for Standardization. As a member of SACU and SADC, Namibia’s national regulations conform to both regional agreements. Namibia is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and notifies the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade on draft technical regulations. The Namibian court system is independent and is widely perceived to be free from government interference. Namibia’s legal system, based on Roman Dutch law, is similar to that of South Africa. The system provides effective means to enforce property and contractual rights, but the speed of justice is generally very slow due to a backlog of cases across the judicial spectrum. Regulation and enforcement actions are appealable. The Minister of Justice may introduce legislation in Parliament in 2022 that would permit plea bargains to expedite cases and reduce backlog to advance rule of law in Namibia. The Foreign Investment Act (FIA) provides for liberal foreign investment conditions and equal treatment of foreign and local investors. With limited exceptions, all sectors of the economy are open to foreign investment. There is no local participation requirement in the FIA, but the Namibian government is increasingly emphasizing the need for investors to partner with Namibian-owned companies and/or to have a majority of local employees in order to operate in the country. The FIA reiterates the protection of investment and property provided for in the Namibian Constitution. It also provides for equal treatment of foreign investors and Namibian firms, including the possibility of fair compensation in the event of expropriation, international arbitration of disputes between investors and the government, the right to remit profits, and access to foreign exchange. The Business and Intellectual Property Agency (BIPA) acts as a one-stop-shop for business registrations and provides information on relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirement for investors. More information is available online at: http://www.bipa.na/ . In August 2016, Namibia promulgated and gazetted the Namibia Investment Promotion Act (NIPA). However, the Minister of Industrialization and Trade pulled back the legislation in November 2021 due to substantive legal concerns raised by the private sector and the NIPBD. The revised Namibia Investment Promotion Act (NIPA) will replace the FIA once revisions are complete and approved by Parliament. The NIPA provides for transparent admission procedures for investors, the reservation of certain categories of business and sectors, and the establishment of an integrated client service facility or one-stop-shop for investors within the NIPDB. Established in 2009, the Namibia Competition Commission (NaCC) is the principal institution that promotes and safeguards fair competition in Namibia. The Commission is tasked with: providing consumers with competitive prices and product choices; promoting employment and advancing the social economic welfare of Namibians; expanding opportunities for Namibian participation in world markets while recognizing the role of foreign competition in Namibia; ensuring that small businesses have an equitable opportunity to participate in the Namibian economy; and promoting a greater spread of ownership, particularly increasing ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons. The NaCC has the mandate to review any potential mergers and acquisitions that might limit the competitive landscape or adversely impact the Namibian economy. For example, in August 2020, the NaCC blocked the sale of Schwenk Namibia’s stake in Ohorongo Cement to West China Cement Ltd. over fears the deal could lead to anti-competitive behavior in the local cement market. In the ruling, the competition watchdog said that, if the USD 870 million deal was allowed to proceed, it would stifle competition and lead to possible collusion and price-fixing. The Minister of Industrialization and Trade is the final arbiter on merger decisions and may accept or reject a NaCC decision. Any investor can file an appeal with the ministry, though no formal process for doing so has been established. The Namibian Constitution enshrines the right to private property but allows the state to expropriate property in the public interest subject to the payment of just compensation. The Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995 (ACLRA) is the primary legal mechanism allowing for expropriation, but the government has adhered to a “willing seller/willing buyer” policy as part of land reform programs. In 2004, the government announced it would proceed with land expropriations after much criticism about the slow pace of land reform. To date, the government has only expropriated farms from a small number of owners, and in each instance ultimately either compensated the owner or returned the land. In March 2008, Namibia’s High Court ruled against the government in Gunter Kessl v. Ministry of Lands and Resettlement – the sole instance in which expropriation was legally challenged – and in doing so established a strong legal precedent protecting individual land rights. Non-binding resolutions adopted at the Second National Land Conference in 2018 resolved to abolish the “willing seller/willing buyer” policy and bar foreign ownership of agricultural land; however, no legislation formalizing these resolutions has been proposed. The Namibian Constitution makes pragmatic provision for different types of economic activity and a “mixed economy” (Article 98), accepts the importance of foreign investment (Article 99), and enshrines the principle that the ownership of natural resources is vested in the Namibian state (Article 100) and the right to property (Article 16). Section 11 of the FIA reiterates the commitment to market compensation in the case of expropriation, which is also codified in Article 16 of the Constitution. Holders of a Certificate of Status Investment must be compensated in foreign currency and can opt for international arbitration if any disputes arise. The Companies Act of 1973, amended in 2004, governs company and corporate liquidations while the Insolvency Act 12 of 1936, as amended by the Insolvency Amendment Act of 2005, governs insolvent individuals and their estates. The Insolvency Act details sequestration procedures and the rights of creditors. Through the law, all debtors (whether foreign or domestic) may file for both liquidation and reorganization, and a creditor may file for both liquidation and reorganization. However, as reorganization (judicial management) is rarely successful in Namibia, the most likely insolvency procedure is liquidation. International credit monitoring agency TransUnion is a licensed credit bureau in Namibia. 6. Financial Sector There is a free flow of financial resources within Namibia and throughout the Common Monetary Area (CMA) countries of the SACU, which include Namibia, Botswana, eSwatini, South Africa, and Lesotho. Capital flows with the rest of the world are relatively free, subject to the South African currency exchange rate. The Namibia Financial Institutions Supervisory Authority (NAMFISA) registers portfolio managers and supervises the actions of the Namibian Stock Exchange (NSX) and other non-banking financial institutions. Although the NSX is the second-largest stock exchange in Africa, this ranking is largely because many South African firms listed on the Johannesburg exchange are also listed (dual-listed) on the NSX. By law, Namibia’s Government Institution Pension Fund (GIPF) and other Namibian funds are required to allocate a certain percentage of their holdings to Namibian investments. Namibia has a world-class banking system that offers all the services needed by a large company. Foreign investors are able to get credit on local market terms. There are no laws or practices by private firms in Namibia to prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control; nor are there any laws or practices by private firms or government precluding foreign participation in industry standards-setting consortia. Namibia’s central bank, the Bank of Namibia (BON), regulates the banking sector. Namibia has a highly sophisticated and developed commercial banking sector that is comparable with the best in Africa. There are eight commercial banks: Standard Bank, Nedbank Namibia, Bank Windhoek, First National Bank (FNB) Namibia, Trustco Bank, Letshego Bank Limited, Banco BIC, and Banco Atlantico. Bank Windhoek and Trustco Bank are the only locally-owned banks; Trustco Bank specializes in micro-finance. Standard Bank, Nedbank, and FNB are South African subsidiaries; Banco BIC and Banco Atlantico are Angolan. A significant proportion of bank loans come in the form of bonds or mortgages to individuals. There is little or no investment banking activity. The Development Bank of Namibia (DBN) and Agribank are Namibian government-owned banks with a mandate for development project financing. Agribank’s mandate is specifically to serve the agriculture sector. While there are no restrictions on foreigners’ ability to open bank accounts, a non-resident must open a “non-resident” account at a Namibian commercial bank to facilitate loan repayments. This account would normally be funded from abroad or from income from rentals received on the property purchased, subject to the bank holding the account being provided with a copy of any rental contract. Non-residents who are in possession of a valid Namibian work permit/permanent residency are considered to be residents for the duration of their work permit and are therefore not subject to borrowing restrictions placed on non-residents without the necessary permits. The BON does not recognize cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, as legal tender in Namibia. The BON is reluctant to allow the implementation of blockchain technologies in banking transactions. Namibia does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF), but the government has publicly stated its intention to create one. The Government Institution Pension Fund (GIPF) provides retirement and benefits for employees in the service of the Namibian government as well as institutions established by an act of the Namibian Parliament. 7. State-Owned Enterprises While Namibian companies are generally open to foreign investment, government-owned enterprises have generally been closed to all investors (Namibian and foreign), with the exception of joint ventures discussed below. More than 90 state-owned enterprises (SOEs, also known as parastatals) include a wide variety of commercial companies, financial institutions, regulatory bodies, educational institutions, boards, and agencies. Generally, employment at SOEs is highly sought-after because their remuneration packages are not bound by public service constraints. Parastatals provide most essential services, such as telecommunications, transport, water, and electricity. A list of SOEs can be found on the Ministry of Public Enterprises’ website: www.mpe.gov.na . The following are the most prominent SOEs: Namibia Airports Company (airport management company) Namibia Institute of Pathology (medical laboratories) Namibia Wildlife Resorts (tourism) Namport (maritime port authority) Nampost (postal and courier services) Namwater (water sanitation and provisioning) Roads Contractor Company Telecom Namibia (primarily fixed-line) TransNamib (rail company) NamPower (electricity generation and transmission) Namcor (national petroleum company) Epangelo (mining) In 2021, the government liquidated the state-owned airline, Air Namibia, which had become a financial burden. When the Minister of Finance tabled the budget in March 2021, he announced that the Namibian government will reduce its stake in state-owned enterprises as a way of raising capital, unburdening the government from the budgetary drain of perpetual SOE-bailouts, and giving room for the private sector to play a more prominent role in the economy. The government is looking to reduce its stake or completely divest in certain SOEs. The government owns numerous other enterprises, from media ventures to a fishing company. Parastatals own assets worth approximately 40 percent of GDP and most receive subsidies from the government. Most SOEs are perennially unprofitable and have only managed to stay solvent with government subsidies. In industries where private companies compete with SOEs (e.g., tourism and fishing), SOEs are sometimes perceived to receive favorable concessions from the government. Foreign investors have participated in joint ventures with the government in a number of sectors, including mobile telecommunications and mining. In 2015, the Namibian President created a new Ministry of Public Enterprises intended to improve the management and performance of SOEs. Legislation to shift oversight of commercial SOEs from line ministries to the Ministry of Public Enterprises was passed by Parliament in 2019. However, the Ministry of Public Enterprises reached the end of its mandate in 2022 and will be absorbed into the Ministry of Finance. Namibia does not have a privatization program, but the government has taken steps towards privatization of certain SOEs. In 2021, the government sold its shares in Namibia’s biggest telecommunications company, Mobile Telecommunications Company (MTC), and purportedly used the proceeds to reduce the government’s debt. 10. Political and Security Environment Namibia has been a stable multiparty and multiracial democracy since becoming independent in 1990. The protection of human rights is enshrined in the Namibian Constitution, and the government generally respects those rights. Political violence is rare and damage to commercial projects and/or installations as a result of political violence is unlikely. The State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights for Namibia provides additional information. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($B USD) 2021 $12.2 2020 $10.6 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 $-78 2018 N/A BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $0 2020 $0 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2021 49.3% 2018 48.7% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2021_en.pdf * Source for Host Country Data: Namibia Statistics Agency and Bank of Namibia A glaring omission from the International Monetary Foundation’s (IMF) report on inward direct investment to Namibia is China’s contribution, which the Bank of Namibia reports as 42.4% of the total in 2021 and 39.5% in 2020. China is included in the Bank of Namibia’s report but is omitted from the IMF reports. The Embassy assesses that China’s investment in Namibia is increasing not decreasing. Notorious tax haven British Virgin Islands is a notable top destination for inward direct investment sources into Namibia. There are some other discrepancies between the information reported in the IMF report and the Bank of Namibia’s report, such as the inclusion of Botswana in 2020. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 6,342 100% Data Not Available China 1,975 39.5% South Africa 1,975 29.7% Mauritius 517 8% United Kingdom 353 4.2% British Virgin Islands 136 2.3% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Source: IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) https://data.imf.org/?sk=40313609-F037-48C1-84B1-E1F1CE54D6D5&sId=1482331048410 and the Bank of Namibia’s 2021 Annual Report . Nepal Executive Summary Nepal’s annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is approximately USD33.7 billion, and trade totaling USD13.6 billion. Despite considerable potential – particularly in the energy, tourism, information and communication technology (ICT), infrastructure and agriculture sectors – political instability, widespread corruption, cumbersome bureaucracy, and inconsistent implementation of laws and regulations have deterred potential investment. While the Government of Nepal (GoN) publicly states its keenness to attract foreign investment, this has yet to translate into meaningful practice. The COVID pandemic further slowed reform efforts that might have made Nepal a more attractive investment destination. Despite these challenges, foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country has been increasing in recent years. Historically, few American companies have invested in Nepal; and yet the U.S. still features among the top 10 foreign investors in Nepal, constituting about 3% of the total FDI stock. In 2017, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) signed a USD500 million Compact with the GoN that will focus on electricity transmission and road maintenance. The GoN has agreed to contribute an additional USD130 million for these Compact programs. Following years of delay, the GoN ratified the Compact on February 27 and attention has now turned to implementation. Despite the delay, MCC ratification showed that the GoN is committed to honoring its international commitments. Nepal’s location between India and China presents opportunities for foreign investors. Nepal also possesses natural resources that have significant commercial potential. Hydropower – Nepal has an estimated 40,000 megawatts (MW) of commercially-viable hydropower electricity generation potential, which could become a major source of income through electricity exports. Other sectors offering potential investment opportunities include agriculture, tourism, the ICT sector, and infrastructure. The tourism sector is slowly recovering from the downturn due to the pandemic. Nepal offers opportunities for investors willing to accept inherent risks and the unpredictability of doing business in the country and possess the resilience to invest with a long-term mindset. While Nepal has established some investment-friendly laws and regulations in recent years, significant barriers to investment remain. Corruption, laws limiting the operations of foreign banks, lingering challenges in the repatriation of profits, controlled currency exchange facilities, prohibition of FDI in certain sectors as well as a minimum foreign investment threshold of NPR 50 million (USD415,000), and the government’s monopoly over certain sectors of the economy (such as electricity transmission and petroleum distribution), undermine foreign investment in Nepal. Millions of Nepalis seek employment overseas, creating a talent drain, especially among educated youth. A lack of understanding of international business standards and practices among the political and bureaucratic class, and a legal and regulatory regime that is not quite aligned with international practices also hinder, impede and frustrate foreign investors. Nepal’s tax regime, in particular, may be inconsistent with international practices, and could trip-up foreign investors as has happened in two cases in recent years. Immigration laws and visa policies for foreign workers are cumbersome. Inefficient government bureaucratic processes, a high rate of turnover among civil servants, and corruption exacerbate the difficulties for foreigners seeking to work in Nepal. Political uncertainty is another continuing challenge for foreign investors. Nepal’s ruling parties have spent much of their energy over the last years on internal political squabbles instead of governance. Nepal’s geography also presents challenges. The country’s mountainous terrain, land-locked geography, and poor transportation infrastructure increases costs for raw materials and exports of finished goods. Trade unions – each typically affiliated with parties or even factions within a political party – and unpredictable general strikes create business risk. The persistent use of intimidation, extortion, and violence – including the use of improvised explosive devices – by insurgent groups targeting domestic political leaders, GoN entities, and businesses remains a source of potential instability, although the country’s most prominent insurgent group (led by Netra Bikram Chand, also known as Biplav) agreed in March 2021, to enter peaceful politics, which may reduce this threat. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 117 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 111 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 N/A https://www.bea.gov/data/economic-accounts/international World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD1,190 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment There is recognition within the GoN that foreign investment is necessary to boost economic growth to meet the GoN’s target of becoming a middle-income country by 2030. While the GoN’s stated attitude toward FDI is positive, this has yet to translate into meaningful practice. The most significant foreign investment laws are the revised Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act (FITTA) of 2019, the Public-Private Partnership and Investment Act (PPIA) of 2019, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1962, the Immigration Rules of 1994, the Customs Act of 2007 (a revised act is under Parliamentary review), the Industrial Enterprise Act of 2016 (and its 2020 revision), the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act of 2016 (and its 2019 amendment), the Company Act (2006), the Electricity Act of 1992, the Privatization Act of 1994, and the Income Tax Act (2002). Also important is the annual budget, which outlines customs, duties, export service charges, sales, airfreight and income taxes, and other excise taxes that affect foreign investment. The FITTA attempted to create a friendlier environment for foreign investors. It streamlined the process for inbound foreign investment by requiring approval of FDI within seven days of application. Similarly, the FITTA streamlined the profit repatriation approval process, mandating decisions within 15 days. The revised FITTA set up a Single Window Service Center, through which foreign investors can avail themselves of the full range of services provided by the various government entities involved in investment approvals, including the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and Supplies (MOICS), the Labor and Immigration Departments, and the Central Bank. The FITTA included a provision requiring the government to set a minimum threshold for foreign investment and publish it in the Nepal Gazette. On May 23, 2019, citing that provision, the government raised the minimum foreign investment threshold ten-fold to NPR 50 million (USD415,000) from the existing NPR 5 million (USD41,500). The new FITTA commits to providing “national treatment” to all foreign investors and that foreign companies will not be nationalized. Under the FITTA, investments up to NPR 6 billion (USD52 million) come under the purview, including approval authority, of the MOICS Department of Industry (DOI), and anything above that amount falls under the authority of the Investment Board of Nepal (IBN). Other relevant laws include the Industrial Enterprise Act, the SEZ Act, an updated Labor Act (2017), and a pending Intellectual Property Rights Act. The Industrial Enterprise Act is intended to promote industrial growth in the private sector, includes a “no work, no pay” provision, and allows companies to take certain steps – such as buying land and establishing a line of credit – while environmental assessments and other regulatory requirements are being carried out. In practice, U.S. and other foreign companies comment that corruption, bureaucracy, inefficient implementation of existing procedures and requirements, and a weak regulatory environment make investing in Nepal a tough proposition. Another significant piece of legislation that could affect investment decisions in Nepal is the Customs Act (2007), which established invoice-based customs valuations and replaced many investment tax incentives with a lower, uniform rate. In 2017, the Department of Customs started to use the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) world software platform. In addition, the Electricity Act includes special terms and conditions for investment in hydropower development and the Privatization Act of 1994 authorizes and defines the procedures for privatization of state-owned enterprises. There is no public evidence of direct executive interference in the court system that could affect foreign investors. However, in recent years there has been public and media criticism of the politicization of the judiciary, including appointments of judges to Appellate Courts and the Supreme Court allegedly based on their political affiliations. The IBN, a high-level government body chaired by the Prime Minister, was formed in 2011 to promote economic development in Nepal. In addition to approving large-scale investment projects, the IBN is also the GoN body charged with assessing and managing public-private partnership (PPP) projects. It has the task of attracting large foreign investors to Nepal and was a key organizer of the last two Investment Summits in 2017 and 2019. It is the primary point of contact for large investors (above USD50 million), especially those engaged in public infrastructure projects. The Nepal Business Forum (http://www.nepalbusinessforum.org/) was formed in 2010 with the “aim of improving the business environment in Nepal through better interaction between the business community and government officials.” The NBF does not meet according to a regularized schedule, and the Embassy is not aware of any formal mechanisms or platforms to enable on-going dialogue, aside from the IBN, DOI, and the NBF. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises in Nepal and engage in various forms of remunerative activity. The FITTA 2019 slightly increased the number of sectors open to foreign investment. Outside of the restricted sectors listed below, foreign investment up to 100 percent ownership is permitted in most sectors. The GoN announced the opening of FDI in the primary agricultural sector for exports in January 2021. However, the matter is sub judice at the Supreme Court (as of March 2022), and so remains unimplemented. During 2018 and 2019, the Market Monitoring Unit of the MOICS’s Department of Supply Management raided business establishments, seized records, closed business outlets, and brought charges against private businesses in various sectors, including retail, healthcare, and education, alleging that companies were charging prices that were too high. Such raids are sporadic rather than a matter of sustained policy but contribute to creating an uncertain business environment. The sectors excluded from foreign investment are listed in the annex of the FITTA 2019 and include: Primary agricultural sectors including animal husbandry, fisheries, beekeeping, oil-processing (from seeds or legumes), milk-based product processing; (Note: The GoN is attempting to open this sector for FDI if 75 percent of the products are exported. However, the matter is under review at the Supreme Court.) Small and cottage enterprises; Personal business services (haircutting, tailoring, driving, etc.); Arms and ammunition, bullets, gunpowder and explosives, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, industries related to atomic energy and radioactive materials; Real estate (excluding construction industries), retail business, domestic courier services, catering services, money exchange and remittance services; Tourism-related services – trekking, mountaineering and travel agents, tourist guides, rural tourism including arranging homestays; Mass media (print, radio, television, and online news), feature films in national languages; Management, accounting, engineering, legal consultancy services, language, music, and computer training; and Any consultancy services in which foreign investment is above 51 percent. Investment proposals are screened by the DOI or the IBN to ensure compliance with the FITTA and other relevant laws. Historically, the lack of clear, objective criteria and timeframes for decisions have resulted in complaints from prospective investors. While the GoN intended the FITTA to address these issues, the regulations enabling the implementation of the Act were only completed in January 2021, and anecdotal evidence suggests services to prospective investors through the One Window Service Center at the DOI are slowly improving. The IBN website provides resources to prospective investors including the Nepal Investment Guide (http://www.ibn.gov.np/). Similarly, the DOI maintains a website that should be helpful to investors (http://www.investnepal.gov.np). U.S. investors are not disadvantaged or singled out relative to other foreign investors by any of the ownership or control mechanisms, sector restrictions, or investment screening mechanisms. U.S. companies often note that they struggle to compete with firms from neighboring countries when it comes to cost, but this is not a factor resulting from any specific GoN policy. There have been no recent investment policy reviews of Nepal. The last one by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was conducted in 2003. The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted a trade policy review in 2019, available online at: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=((%20@Title=%20nepal)%20or%20(@CountryConcerned=%20nepal))%20and%20(%20(%20@Symbol=%20wt/tpr/g/*%20))&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true# and https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm#bycountry. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) conducted a Country Private Sector Diagnostics, available at: https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/publications_ext_content/ifc_external_publication_site/publications_listing_page/creating+markets+in+nepal+country+private+sector+diagnostic. In recent years, GoN officials have proclaimed Nepal “open for business” and explicitly welcomed foreign investment. While the GoN likes to appear enthusiastic in its efforts to attract foreign investors, the reality has not yet matched the rhetoric. Three laws directly affecting foreign investment (FITTA, PPP, and SEZ) were hurriedly revised and passed by Parliament but left little time for stakeholder consultations or transparency in the process. Both foreign and domestic private sector representatives often state that the GoN has not done enough to improve the business environment. While welcome provisions were included in the FITTA—for example, a streamlined approval process and single window service center—an assessment of the true effects of the reforms await full implementation. After obtaining a letter of approval from DOI or IBN, Nepal’s Office of Company Registrar (OCR) maintains a website (http://ocr.gov.np/index.php) on which foreign companies can register. OCR’s website also links to an information portal (http://www.theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/nepal), maintained by UNCTAD and the International Chamber of Commerce, with resources and information for potential investors interested in Nepal. According to the portal, registering a company takes “between three days and a week with the law authorizing up to 15 days.” Independent think tanks, however, have noted the online system does not eliminate corruption, and bureaucrats frequently request additional documentation that must be submitted in person, rather than online. Users ranked the Nepal portion of the OCR business registration website a four out of ten, according to the UNCTAD supported Global Enterprise Registration website www.GER.co. The Act Restricting Investment Abroad (ARIA) of 1964 prohibits outbound investment from Nepal. Some enterprising Nepalis have found ways around the Act, but for most Nepali investors, outward investment is a practical impossibility. The GoN is currently in the process of revising the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, which is expected to annul the ARIA, paving the way to limited capital account convertibility. 3. Legal Regime The GoN has many laws, policies, and regulations that look good on paper, but are often not fully and consistently enforced. Frequent government changes and staff rotations within the civil service result in officials who are often unclear on applicable laws and policies or interpret them differently than their predecessors. Many foreign investors note that Nepal’s regulatory system is based largely on personal relationships with government officials, rather than systematic and routine processes. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are not transparent and are not consistent with international norms. The World Bank gives Nepal a score of 1.75 (on a scale of one to five) on its “Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance” index https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/nepal, and notes that ministries in Nepal do not routinely create lists of “anticipated regulatory changes or proposals” and do not have the “legal obligation to publish the text of proposed regulations before their enactment.” Historically, rule-making and regulatory authority resided almost exclusively with the central government in Kathmandu. Nepal’s 2015 Constitution outlines a three-tiered federalist model. Following elections in 2017, seven provincial governments and 753 local government units were established. Foreign businesses can expect to continue to interact with bureaucrats at the central government level in the near term, as national regulations remain the most relevant for foreign businesses. However, this could change over time as provincial governments become more established. Traditionally, once acts are drafted and passed by Parliament, it has been incumbent upon the related government agencies and ministries to draft regulations to enforce the acts. Regulations are passed by the cabinet and do not need parliamentary approval. Nepal still lacks an established mechanism or system for the review of regulations based on scientific or data-driven assessments, or for conducting quantitative analyses for such purposes. The World Bank notes that the GoN is not required by law to solicit comments on proposed regulations, nor do ministries or regulatory agencies report on the results of the consultation on proposed regulations. Post is not aware of any informal regulatory processes that are managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are neither fully transparent nor consistent with international norms. Though auditing is mandatory, professional accounting standards are low, and practitioners may be poorly trained. As a result, published financial reports can be unreliable, and investors often rely instead on businesses reputations unless companies voluntarily use international accounting standards. Publicly listed companies in Nepal follow the 2013 Nepal Financial Reporting Standards (NFRSs), which were prepared on the basis of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) 2012, developed by the IFRS Foundation and their standard-setting body, the International Accounting Standards Board. Audited reports of publicly listed companies are usually made available. Draft bills or regulations are sometimes made available for public comment, although there is no legal obligation to do so. The government agency that drafts the bill is responsible for undertaking a public consultation process with key stakeholders by issuing federal notices for comments and recommendations, although it is unclear in practice how many government agencies actually do so. Additionally, all parliamentarians are given copies of the draft bills to share with their constituencies. This applies to all draft laws, regulations, and policies. Parliamentary rules, however, require that draft amendments to bills be proposed only within 72 hours of a bill’s introduction, giving minimal time for lawmakers, constituents, or stakeholders to submit considered feedback. In practice, post’s observation has been that there is no clear timeline for the process of creating and passing bills, including the time period provided for public or stakeholder consultation. Generally, the government agency that drafted the bill, legislation, policy, or regulation posts the actual draft (in Nepali language) online. Once approved, the Department of Printing, an office that is part of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, posts all acts online. Regulatory actions and summaries of these actions are available at the Office of the Auditor General and the Ministry of Finance. Both of these government agencies post periodic reports on the regulatory actions taken against agencies violating laws, rules, and regulations. Such summaries and reports are available online in Nepali. Individual ministries are responsible for enforcement of regulations under their purview. The enforcement process is legally reviewable, making the agencies publicly accountable. There are several government entities, including the Parliamentary Accounts Committee, the Office of the Auditor General, and the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) that oversee the government’s administrative and regulatory processes. Post is not aware of any regulatory reform efforts. Nepal’s budget and information on debt obligations are widely and easily accessible to the general public. The annual budget is substantially complete and considered generally reliable. Nepal’s supreme audit institution reviews the government’s accounts, and its reports are publicly available. Nepal is one of eight members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), an intergovernmental organization and geopolitical union of nations in South Asia including: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Under SAARC, Nepal is also a member of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) which came into force on January 1, 2006 with the goal of creating a duty-free trade regime among SAARC member countries. According to SAFTA rules, member countries were supposed to reduce formal tariff rates to zero by 2016. However, tariff barriers remain in place for hundreds of “sensitive” goods produced by various SAARC member countries that do not qualify for duty-free status. Nepal is also a member of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), an international organization of seven South Asian and Southeast Asian nations: Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan, and Nepal. Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal – known collectively as BBIN – are working together to develop a platform for sub-regional cooperation in such areas as water resources management, power connectivity, transportation, and infrastructure development. The four BBIN nations agreed on a motor vehicle agreement (MVA – both cargo and passengers) in 2015. In early 2018, Bangladesh, India, and Nepal also agreed on operating procedures for the movement of passenger vehicles, and in early 2020, the same three countries met to draft a memorandum of understanding to implement the MVA, without obligation to Bhutan. Nepal’s regulatory system generally relies on international norms and standards developed by the United Nations, World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), and other international organizations and regulatory agencies. Nepal joined the WTO in March 2004. According to its WTO accession commitments, the GoN agreed to provide notice of all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). However, GoN officials are unable to confirm whether this procedure is followed consistently. Nepal ratified the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in January 2017. As a least developed country (LDC), Nepal could benefit from additional technical assistance from WTO members through the TFA Facility. A 2017 Asia Development Bank report noted, “Nepal has been making progress in undertaking trade facilitation reforms over the years, particularly those related to the customs.” The WTO’s December 2018 policy review (https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp481_crc_e.htm) noted Nepal’s efforts to diversify its narrow production and export base and encouraged Nepal to pursue further economic reform, including through its National Trade Integration Strategy (https://www.oecd.org/aidfortrade/countryprofiles/dtis/Napal-DTIS-2016.pdf) as well as address its supply side constraints, most notably high transit and transportation costs. According to the TFA Facility’s website (http://www.tfafacility.org), Nepal has submitted provisions for all three categories, a key step for implementing TFA Category A, B, and C requisites. Nepal’s court system is based on common law and its legal system is generally categorized under civil and criminal offences and laws. Contract law is codified. In theory, contracts are automatically enforced, and a breach of contract can be challenged in a court of law. In practice, enforcement of contracts is weak. Nepal’s contracts are guided by the Contract Act of 2000. Nepal does not have a commercial code. All civil courts are authorized to hear commercial complaints. A ‘commercial bench’ has been established at the High Court, but judges who preside on this bench are the same judges dealing with civil and criminal cases as well. The judicial system is independent of the executive branch. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable, and they are adjudicated in the national court system. In general, the judicial process is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. In some isolated or high-profile cases, however, court judgments have come under criticism for alleged political interference favoring particular individuals and groups. There remains widespread public perception that bribery and judicial conflicts of interest affect some judicial outcomes. In March 2019, three laws directly affecting foreign investment (FITTA, PPP, and SEZ) were hurriedly revised and passed by Parliament ahead of the 2019 Investment Summit. This left little time for effective stakeholder consultations and transparency. While welcome provisions were included in the FITTA (a promised single window service center and a streamlined approval process, for example), the regulations to implement the reforms were only completed in January 2021 and observers remain skeptical given the GoN’s record of making lofty announcements without delivering on them in practice. As drafted, even these pieces of reform legislation retain various institutional and procedural impediments to smooth businesses practices which will dissuade all but the most risk-tolerant investors. The Competition Promotion and Market Protection Board, comprised of GoN officials from various ministries and chaired by the Minister of Industry, Commerce, and Supplies, is responsible for reviewing competition-related concerns. Post is not aware of any competition cases that have involved foreign investors. MOICS’ Department of Supplies Management has a mandate to crack down on cartels and protect consumers. In the previous two years, it has played a more active role in cracking down on businesses—ranging from retailers to healthcare facilities to private schools—for alleged price-gouging. However, private sector representatives have said that this department is interfering with the free market and is being used by businesses with political connections to target competitors, rather than as a mechanism to protect consumers. Nepal’s private sector is dominated by cartels and syndicates—often under the banner of business associations – which are often successful in limiting competition from new market entrants in multiple sectors. In 2018, the GoN issued new permits for transportation companies, and the Minister of Physical Infrastructure and Transport called the cartels “a curse to the nation.” Subsequently, however, the GoN has taken few additional steps to crack down on cartels. The Industrial Enterprise Act of 2016 states that “no industry shall be nationalized.” To date, there have been no cases of nationalization in Nepal, nor are there any official policies that suggest expropriation should be a concern for prospective investors. However, companies can be sealed or confiscated if they do not pay taxes in accordance with Nepali law, and bank accounts can be frozen if authorities have suspicions of money laundering or other financial crimes. Nepal does not have a history of expropriations. There have been no government actions or shifts in government policy that indicate expropriations will become more likely in the foreseeable future. There is no single specific act in Nepal that exclusively covers bankruptcy. The 2006 Insolvency Act provides guidelines for insolvency proceedings in Nepal and specifies the conditions under which such proceedings can occur. Additionally, the General Code of 1963 covers bankruptcy-related issues. Creditors, shareholders, or debenture holders can initiate insolvency proceedings against a company by filing a petition at the court. If a company is solvent, its liquidation is covered by the Company Act of 2006. If the company is insolvent and unable to pay its liabilities, or if its liabilities exceed its assets, then liquidation is covered by the Insolvency Act of 2006. Under the Company Act, the order of claimant priority is as follows: 1) government revenue; 2) creditors; and 3) shareholders. Under the Insolvency Act, the government is equal to all other unsecured creditors. Monetary judgments are made in local currency. Firms and entrepreneurs who have declared bankruptcy are blacklisted from receiving loans for 10 years. 6. Financial Sector The Nepal Stock Exchange (NEPSE) is the only stock exchange in Nepal. The majority of NEPSE’s 255 listed companies are hydropower companies and banks, with the NEPSE listings for banks driven primarily by a regulatory requirement rather than commercial considerations. There are few opportunities for foreign portfolio investment in Nepal. Foreign investors are not allowed to invest in the Nepal Stock Exchange nor permitted to trade in the shares of publicly listed Nepali companies; only Nepali citizens and Non-Resident Nepalis (NRNs) are allowed to invest in NEPSE and trade stock. The FITTA, however, allows for the creation of a “venture capital fund” to enable foreign institutional investors to take equity stakes in Nepali companies. The Securities Board of Nepal (SEBON) regulates NEPSE, but the Board does little to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. While both NEPSE and SEBON have been enhancing their capabilities in recent years, Post’s view is that the NEPSE is far from becoming a mature stock exchange and likely does not have sufficient liquidity to allow for the entry and exit of sizeable positions. Some experts have raised concerns about the Ministry of Finance’s degree of influence over both SEBON and NEPSE and have cited lack of independence from government influence as an impediment to the development of Nepal’s capital market. (See: https://milkeninstitute.org/reports/framing-issues-modernizing-public-equity-market-nepal.) Nepal moved to full convertibility (no foreign exchange restrictions for transactions in the current account) when it accepted Article VIII obligations of IMF’s Articles of Agreement in May 1994. In line with this, the GoN and NRB refrain from imposing restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is generally allocated on market terms, although special credit arrangements exist for farmers and rural producers through the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal. Foreign-owned companies can obtain loans on the local market. The private sector has access to a variety of credit and investment instruments. These include public stock and direct loans from finance companies and joint venture commercial banks. Foreign investors can access equity financing locally, but in order to do so, the investor must be incorporated in Nepal under the Companies Act of 2006 and listed on the stock exchange. The banking sector has grappled with shortages of loanable funds in the last couple of years resulting in high interest rates on loans. One of the major reasons for this is slow and inefficient government spending leading to lack of liquidity in the system. With the return of relative political stability in 2018, it was hoped this problem would be reduced but it has continued. The NRB has promoted mergers in the financial sector and published merger bylaws in 2011 to help consolidate and better regulate the banking sector. As of January 2021, there were 27 commercial banks, 19 development banks, and 21 finance companies registered with the NRB. This total does not include micro-finance institutions, savings and credit cooperatives, non-government organizations (NGOs), and other institutions, which provide many of the functions of banks and financial institutions. There are no legal provisions to defend against hostile takeovers, but there have been no reports of hostile takeovers in the banking system. Nepal’s poor infrastructure and challenging terrain has meant that many parts of the country do not have access to financial services. A 2015 study by the UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) reported that 61 percent of Nepalis had access to formal financial services (40 percent to formal banking). Following local elections in 2017, the GoN established 753 local government units and promised that each unit would be served by at least one bank. As of January 2020, 8 local units were still without a bank. Most of the local units without banks are in remote locations with few suitable buildings and a lack of proper security and internet connectivity. Nepal’s banking sector is relatively healthy, though fragmented, and NRB bank supervision, while improving, remains weak, allegedly due to political influence according to several private sector representatives. The GoN hopes to strengthen the banking system by reducing the number of smaller banks and it has actively encouraged consolidation of commercial banks; there are currently 27 commercial banks, down from 78 in 2012. Most banks locate their branches in and around Kathmandu and in the large cities of southern Nepal. Some banks are owned by prominent business houses, which could create conflicts of interest. There are also a large number of cooperative banks that are governed not by the NRB but by the Ministry of Agricultural, Land Management, and Cooperatives. These cooperatives compete with banks for customers. In January 2017, Parliament approved the Bank and Financial Institutions (BAFI) Act. First introduced in 2013, BAFI is designed to strengthen corporate governance by setting term limits for Chief Executive Officers and board members at banks and financial institutions. The legislation also aims to reduce potential conflicts of interest by prohibiting business owners from serving on the board of any bank from which their business has taken loans. In 2018, NRB was criticized for not taking action to relieve a liquidity crunch and the Nepal Banker’s Association came to a gentlemen’s agreement to limit deposit rates. The NRB did not protest this action, leading to some criticism that it was not fulfilling its role as a regulator against what many perceived as cartel behavior. The NRB regulates the national banking system and also functions as the government’s central bank. As a regulator, NRB controls foreign exchange; supervises, monitors, and governs operations of banking and non-banking financial institutions; determines interest rates for commercial loans and deposits; and determines exchange rates for foreign currencies. As the government’s bank, NRB manages all government income and expenditure accounts, issues Nepali bills and treasury notes, makes loans to the government, and determines monetary policy. Existing banking laws do not allow retail branch operations by foreign banks, which compels foreign banks to set up a local bank if choosing to operate in Nepal. For example, Standard Chartered formed Standard Chartered Nepal. All commercial banks have correspondent banking arrangements with foreign commercial banks, which they use for transfers and payments. Standard Chartered is the only correspondent bank with a physical presence in Nepal and handles foreign transactions for the NRB. Nepal will be undergoing a review by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2021 to assess its anti-money laundering regime. Although unlikely, Nepal risks losing its correspondent banking relationships or increased FATF monitoring if it fails this assessment. Foreigners who are legal residents of Nepal with proper work permits and business visas are allowed to open bank accounts. Nepal has no sovereign wealth funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are 36 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Nepal, including Nepal Airlines Corporation, Nepal Oil Corporation, and the Nepal Electricity Authority. Since 1993, Nepal has initiated numerous market policy and regulatory reforms in an effort to open eligible government-controlled sectors to domestic and foreign private investment. These efforts have had mixed results. The majority of private investment has been made in manufacturing and tourism—sectors where there is little government involvement and existing state-owned enterprises are not competitive. Many state-owned sectors are not open for foreign investment. Information on the annual performance of Nepal’s SOEs’ can be found on this website. https://mof.gov.np/uploads/document/file/Annual%20Status%20Review%20of%20Public%20Enterprises%202019_20200213054242.pdf. Corporate governance of SOEs remains a challenge and executive positions have reportedly been filled by people connected to politically appointed government ministers. Board seats are generally allocated to senior government officials and the SOEs are often required to consult with government officials before making any major business decisions. A 2011 executive order mandates a competitive and merit-based selection process but has encountered resistance within some ministries. Third-party market analysts consider most Nepali SOEs to be poorly managed and characterized by excessive government control and political interference. According to local economic analysts, SOEs are sometimes given preference for government tenders, although official policy states that SOEs and private companies are to compete under the same terms and conditions. Private enterprises do not have the same access to finance as SOEs. Private enterprises mostly rely on commercial banks and financial institutions for business and project financing. SOEs, however, also have access to financing from state-owned banks, development banks, and other state-owned investment vehicles. Similar concessions or facilities are not granted to private enterprises. SOEs receive non-market-based advantages, given their proximity to government officials, although these advantages can be hard to quantify. Some SOEs, such as the Nepal Electricity Authority or the Nepal Oil Corporation have monopolies that prevent foreign competitors from entering those market sectors. The World Bank in Nepal assesses corporate governance benchmarks (both law and practice) against the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, focusing on companies listed on the stock market. Awareness of the importance of corporate governance is growing. The NRB has introduced higher corporate governance standards for banks and other financial institutions. Under the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, the World Bank recommended in 2011 that the GoN strengthen capital market institutions and overhaul the OCR. Although some reforms were initiated, many were never finalized and no reforms have been instituted at the OCR. The Privatization Act of 1994 authorizes and defines the procedures for privatization of state-owned enterprises to broaden participation of the private sector in the operation of such enterprises. The Privatization Act of 1994 generally does not discriminate between national and foreign investors, however, in cases where proposals from two or more investors are identical, the government gives priority to Nepali investors. Economic reforms, deregulation, privatization of businesses and industries under government control, and liberalized policies toward FDI were initiated in the early 1990s. During this time, sectors such as telecommunications, civil aviation, coal imports, print and electronic media, insurance, and hydropower generation were opened for private investment, both domestic and foreign. The first privatization of a state-owned corporation was conducted in October 1992 through a Cabinet decision (executive order). Since then, a total of 23 state-owned corporations have been privatized, liquidated, or dissolved, though the process has been static since 2008. The last company to be (partially) privatized was Nepal Telecom in 2008 (although the GoN still is the majority shareholder). Since then, no SOEs have been privatized. In the past, privatization was initiated with a public bidding process that was transparent and non-discriminatory. Procedural delays, resistance from trade unions, and a lack of will within the GoN, however, have created obstacles to the privatization process. The Corporate Coordination and Privatization Division of the Ministry of Finance is responsible for management of the privatization program. Foreign investors can participate in privatization programs of state-owned enterprises. 10. Political and Security Environment In 2017, Nepal successfully held local, provincial, and national elections to fully implement its 2015 constitution. The Madhesi population in Nepal’s southern Terai belt, together with other traditionally marginalized ethnic and caste groups, believes the constitution is insufficiently inclusive and that its grievances are not being addressed. Post-election, however, this feeling of disenfranchisement may be somewhat assuaged due to the fact that Madhesi parties achieved a majority in the Province 2 provincial assembly elections. The Nepal Communist Party (NCP)—formed by the merger of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist (UML)) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Center)—swept the 2017 elections to form a two-thirds majority government in 2018. However, internal wrangling within the NCP broke into the open and dominated much of 2020, resulting in Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli dissolving the parliament in December 2020. Although the parliament was reinstated by the Supreme Court on February 23, 2021, a March 7 Supreme Court ruling broke up the NCP into its original constituents, the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN)-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) and CPN-Maoist Center (CPN-MC) parties. Eventually, PM Oli was ousted, and a coalition government under Nepali Congress PM Sher Bahadur Deuba is currently in office with the responsibility to hold new elections during 2022. Criminal violence, sometimes conducted under the guise of political activism, remains a problem. Bandhs (general strikes) called by political parties and other agitating groups sometimes halt transport and shut down businesses, sometimes nationwide. However, in the last several years, few bandhs have been successfully carried out in Kathmandu. Americans and other Westerners are generally not targets of violence. U.S. citizens who travel to or reside in Nepal are urged to register with the Consular Section of the Embassy by accessing the Department of State’s travel registration site at https://step.state.gov/step,. The Consular Section provides updated information on travel and security on the embassy website, http://np.usembassy.gov., and can be reached through the Embassy switchboard at (977) (1) 423-4500, by fax at (977) (1) 400-7281, by email at consktm@state.gov. U.S. citizens also should consult the Department of State’s Consular Information Sheet for Nepal and Worldwide Caution Public Announcement on the Department of State’s home page at http://travel.state.gov, by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll free in the United States and Canada, or, for callers outside the United States and Canada, by a regular toll line at 1-202-501-4444. These numbers are available from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Time, Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays). Over the last ten years, there have been frequent calls for strikes, particularly in the Terai. Occasionally, protesters have vandalized or damaged factories and other businesses. On February 22, 2019, a small improvised explosive device (IED) was placed overnight outside the entrance of NCell, Nepal’s second largest mobile carrier. One person died and two others were injured. The Indian-run Arun 3 hydro-power plant has been targeted by IEDs on three occasions and in early-2018 the U.S. Embassy issued a security notice about credible threats of violence targeting the private Chandragiri Hills Cable Car attraction. Such incidents remain infrequent, but unpredictable. Demonstrations have on occasion turned violent, although these activities generally are not directed at U.S. citizens or businesses. Biplav, a splinter Maoist group that threatened or attempted to extort NGOs, businesses, and educational institutions across Nepal in recent years, reached an agreement with the government in March 2021 to give up violence and enter peaceful politics. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) N/A N/A 2020 USD33.7 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 USD51.7 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 USD 0 2021 USD 0 Not permitted under Nepali law Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A 2020 5% https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Nepal Rastra (central) Bank Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward USD1,682 100% Total Outward Amount 100% India USD529 31% N/A China, P.R.: Mainland USD262 16% N/A West Indies (St. Kitts & Nevis) USD129 8% N/A Ireland USD109 7% N/A Singapore USD105 6% N/A “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Nepalis are prohibited from investing abroad as per the Act Restricting Investment Abroad (ARIA), 1964. Post has heard this Law might be abrogated soon, but as of April 2022, no outward investment is permitted from Nepal. New Zealand Executive Summary After weathering the pandemic better than most countries, the New Zealand economy has begun to overheat. Net debt to GDP has increased from 19.5 percent prior to the onset of Covid restrictions to 34.5 percent at the end of 2021. The increase in debt has been due in part to spending measures the government has undertaken for Covid response and recovery. These measures were able to support economic activity during extensive Covid-related domestic lockdowns and travel restrictions, but along with supply chain disruptions, they have begun to contribute to higher inflation. Nationwide labor shortages across a variety of sectors have also had a sizeable impact on the economy. In response to war in Ukraine, the New Zealand government rapidly passed historic sanctions legislation targeting individuals, companies, and assets associated with Russia’s invasion. Sanctions are expected to have a limited direct impact on the investment climate in New Zealand. While a swift border closure and the imposition of lockdowns originally helped stamp out community transmission of Covid, the appearance of the Omicron variant in January 2022 resulted in an outbreak that put pressure on the health system. At time of writing, border restrictions were being phased out in favor of a management approach to the pandemic. The government announced its plans to open the New Zealand border to travelers from visa-waiver countries on May 1. By October, it is expected that the border will fully reopen. Since 2020, the tourism sector has suffered the most, while primary exports and the housing market have helped to sustain the economy. Unemployment is currently 3.2 percent, a record low. New Zealand has an international reputation for an open and transparent economy where businesses and investors can make commercial transactions with ease. Major political parties are committed to an open trading regime and sound rule of law practices. This has been regularly reflected in high global rankings in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report and Transparency International’s Perceptions of Corruption index. New Zealand is party to a multitude of free trade agreements (FTA). In February 2022, the country signed its latest, an FTA with the United Kingdom. Successive governments accept that foreign investment is an important source of financing for New Zealand and a means to gain access to foreign technology, expertise, and global markets. Some restrictions do apply in a few areas of critical interest including certain types of land, significant business assets, and fishing quotas. These restrictions are facilitated by a screening process conducted by a government agency. The current Labour-led government welcomes productive, sustainable, and inclusive foreign investment, but since being elected in October 2017 and reelected in October 2020, there has been a modest shift in economic priorities to social initiatives while continuing to acknowledge New Zealand’s dependence on trade and foreign investment. Cabinet has agreed a whole-of-government framework that will drive climate change policy. This national initiative is currently underway to reduce the country’s emissions and is developing a pathway for farmers to reduce agricultural emissions. The rapidly developing digital and e-commerce landscape is supported by government initiatives that expand the knowledge base, while making a priority of digital inclusion. Along with its focus on post-pandemic recovery, the New Zealand government has invested in a digital, innovative future that aims to secure multilateral agreements with e-commerce rules that address the complexities of the evolving digital economy. The 2022 Investment Climate Statement for New Zealand uses the exchange rate of NZD 1 = USD 0.70 Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 1 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021 Global Innovation Index 2021 26 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $12,900 https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/new-zealand World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $41,550 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment New Zealand has an open and transparent economy. Foreign investment is generally encouraged without discrimination. Some restrictions do apply in a few areas of critical interest including certain types of land, significant business assets, and fishing quotas. These restrictions are facilitated by a screening process conducted by the Overseas Investment Office (OIO), described in the next section. New Zealand maintains an expanding network of bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements that include investment components. New Zealand also has a well-developed legal framework and regulatory system, and the judicial system is generally effective in enforcing property and contractual rights. Investment disputes are rare, and there have been no major disputes in recent years involving U.S. companies. The Labour Party-led government elected in 2017 and re-elected in 2020 has continued its program of tighter screening of some forms of foreign investment and has moved to restrict the availability of permits for oil and gas exploration by applying section 20B of the Overseas Investment Act 2005, which will be discussed in greater detail below for its discretionary aspect. The opposition National Party, gaining ground in early 2022 polling, wants to lift restrictions on exploration, as well as ease requirements for “responsible mining.” The current Labour government has also focused on different aspects of trade agreement negotiation compared with the previous government, such as an aversion to investor-state dispute settlement provisions. New Zealand otherwise screens overseas investments to ensure quality investments are made that benefit New Zealand. The screening process is undertaken by the Overseas Investment Office (OIO), the government agency responsible for regulating foreign direct investment into the country. The Office is responsible for high value investments in “significant business assets,” investments in sensitive land, and investments in fishing quota. The Overseas Investment Act (OIA) 2005 was amended in 2021 with a package of reforms aimed at strengthening aspects of the OIA for high-risk investments, while also seeking to streamline the approval process for low-risk applications. Depending on the type of investment, overseas investors must pass one or more of a series of tests. They are as follows: Investor Test Benefit to New Zealand Test National Interest Assessment The Investor Test: The purpose of this test is to determine if an overseas investor is qualified to own or control assets considered sensitive to New Zealand. The Investor Test assesses the potential for the investor to be a risk to New Zealand by assessing the investor’s character and capability. Factors considered include past convictions, immigration or tax disputes, and any past probation on serving as a company director. More information can be found here: https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2005/0082/latest/LMS468073.html Investors who have met the conditions of the screening process for the Investor Test, and whose circumstances have not changed, do not need to be reassessed for any subsequent approval. More information can be found here: https://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/discover/overseas-investment-tests/investor-test The Benefit to New Zealand Test: The purpose of this test is to screen for the investment’s potential to benefit New Zealand. This test is applied to investments involving sensitive land or a fishing quota. Benefit is assessed against seven factors, including the potential for positive impact on the economy or the environment, enhanced public access, and protection of sacred indigenous land. The OIO considers the potential for economic benefit to be the most important of these factors. The Benefit to New Zealand Test also screens for participation in the investment by New Zealanders. Applications by overseas investors that include oversight or participation by New Zealanders are given greater weight. More information can be found here: https://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/discover/overseas-investment-tests/benefit-new-zealand-test/oversight-or-participation-new-zealanders National Interest Test: In 2020, due to the stress placed on businesses by Covid, the Labour Government introduced a further National Interest Assessment. This threshold serves to potentially deny overseas investment that is at cross purposes with New Zealand’s strategic interests. The Minister of Finance, along with the OIO, reviews these applications. The National Interest Test is mandatory for applications that involve either land or assets that will be used for Strategically Important Businesses (SIBs) or land or assets that involve investment by a foreign government. SIBs include a wide cross-section of investment interests that impact national security, such as critical infrastructure or companies that are direct suppliers to the security agencies. More information can be found here: https://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/discover/overseas-investment-tests/national-interest-assessment During the peak of the Covid pandemic in 2020, the Government put in place the Emergency Notification Regime (ENR), a temporary protocol requiring investments of any type to go through a screening process. The ENR aimed to protect New Zealand assets from fire sales during a period of heightened market uncertainty. It was lifted in 2021 when it became clear to the Government that the impact to the economy of Covid had been mitigated, though the ENR still applies to transactions entered into prior to June 7, 2021. The ENR was replaced with the National Security and Public Order notification protocol, which applies to overseas investments in SIBs or Significant Business Assets (SBAs). More information can be found here: https://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/discover/find-out-if-you-need-notify-us-your-transaction SIBs versus SBAs: The OIO screens for investments in both Strategically Important Businesses (see above), and for Significant Business Assets (SBAs). The vast majority (70-80 percent) of investor applications trigger the SBA screening. An SBA is defined as an investment in New Zealand securities, assets, or businesses worth more NZD 100 million (USD 70 million), or an investment that acquires 25 percent or more ownership or controlling interest in a New Zealand asset. For some investors, the dollar threshold is higher, such as those investors who are citizens of countries with whom New Zealand has an FTA. For Australian investors, the threshold is NZD 552 million (USD 386 million). Consent is needed for overseas investors who want to invest in a significant business asset or in New Zealand business assets worth less than NZ$ 100 million if those assets involve sensitive land or fishing quota. Land is considered “sensitive” if it is residential, larger than five hectares (12 acres) of farmland, or if it is any land that is used for commercial or industrial purposes. Sensitive land is also located on some domestic islands, where there is no size threshold. In marine and coastal areas, there is no minimum size to meet the sensitivity threshold. For a detailed table explaining the different types of sensitivities and what land may be subject to greater restrictions, please visit: https://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/discover/our-investment-pathways/investing-land-provide-benefit-new-zealand/identifying-sensitive-land Crown entity New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE) is New Zealand’s primary investment promotion agency. In addition to its domestic presence, NZTE has 41 international offices, including four in the United States. The NZTE helps investors develop investment plans, access opportunities, and facilitate connections with private sector advisors based in New Zealand. They also offer ongoing support once an investment has been made. https://www.nzte.govt.nz/investment-and-funding/how-we-help . Under certain conditions, foreign investors can bid alongside New Zealand businesses for government funding for research and development (R&D) grants. For more see: https://www.mbie.govt.nz/science-and-technology/science-and-innovation/international-opportunities/new-zealand-r-d/ . Most of the programs that are operated by NZTE, the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment (MBIE), and Callaghan Innovation, provide financial assistance, and support through skills and knowledge, or supporting innovative business ventures in the early stages of operation. For more see: https://www.business.govt.nz/how-to-grow/getting-government-grants/what-can-i-get-help-with/ . The New Zealand-United States Business Council, established in 2001, is a non-partisan organization funded by business and the government. It fosters a strong and mutually beneficial relationship between New Zealand and the United States through both government-to-government contacts, and business-to-business links. The American Chamber of Commerce in Auckland provides a platform for New Zealand and U.S. businesses to network among themselves and with government agencies. To visit Council’s and the Chamber’s websites, please visit: https://www.nzuscouncil.org/ https://www.amcham.co.nz/ The New Zealand government does not discriminate against U.S. or other foreign investors in their rights to establish and own business enterprises. It has placed separate limitations on foreign ownership of strategic businesses, such as airline Air New Zealand and telecommunications infrastructure provider Chorus Limited. While waivers are granted, in some cases for investment of “significant economic value,” they are limited and subject to a technical, bespoke process that requires direct contact with the OIO: https://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/contact The 2022 OECD Economic Survey of New Zealand offered a number of key recommendations, particularly around growth sustainability and the Government’s response to Covid-19. Link to the OECD Survey here: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-new-zealand-2022_a4fd214c-en The most recent WTO Trade Policy review was in 2015. Linked here: https://bit.ly/35uMLDq In 2022, the NZUS Business Council, along with economics consultancy Sense Partners, produced a report on New Zealand’s bilateral trade relationship with the United States. The report highlighted a trade relationship in the services sector (e.g., computer services, gaming) that is becoming increasingly important: the United States is now New Zealand’s largest services export market. The report’s key takeaway is that the bilateral relationship is strong and presents ample opportunity for future growth. To read the report, please visit: https://www.nzuscouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/REPORT-NZUS-trade-relationship-Stability-and-diversity-in-a-time-of-change.pdf The New Zealand government has shown a strong commitment to continue efforts to facilitate business. There are no restrictions on the movement of funds into or out of the country. Overseas investors are required to adhere to legislation that applies equally domestic businesses. The global trend to tighten anti-money laundering laws has increased the reporting requirements of the banking sector. To prevent the increasing use of New Zealand-based shell companies for illegal activities, legislation was introduced in 2014 that requires a New Zealander to serve as company director. For more information: https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2014/0046/latest/DLM4094913.html The Companies Office maintains a business registry of publicly available information on company directors. The website is accessed by creditors and those interested in doing business with the company or its directors. Registration is completed online. Those registering a new company typically register with the Companies Office, along with the Inland Revenue Department (IRD): https://companies-register.companiesoffice.govt.nz/ https://www.ird.govt.nz/ The New Zealand Business Number (NZBN) Act 2016 allocates unique identifiers to eligible businesses to allow them to conduct business efficiently. Tax registration is required if a company is an employer or if the company pays the Goods and Services Tax (GST), which is currently 15 percent. The threshold for GST registration is NZD 60,000 (USD 42,000) of turnover over a one-year period. For more information about New Zealand and taxation, including the 2016 extension of GST registration to overseas suppliers of “remote services” to New Zealanders, please visit: https://www.ird.govt.nz/gst/registering-for-gst The New Zealand government does not place restrictions on domestic investors to invest abroad. NZTE is the government’s international business development agency. It promotes outward investment and provides resources and services for New Zealand businesses to prepare for export and advice on how to grow internationally. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and Customs New Zealand each operates business outreach programs that advise businesses on how to maximize the benefit from FTAs to improve the competitiveness of their goods offshore. They also provide information on how to meet requirements such as rules of origin. 3. Legal Regime New Zealand laws governing competition are transparent, non-discriminatory, and consistent with international norms. The country ranks high on the World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance, scoring 4.25 out of a possible 5.0, but is marked down for lack of transparency at some government departments responsible for communicating regulatory plans that are in the pipeline. Draft bills and regulations, including those related to FTAs and investment law, are generally made available for public comment through a consultation process. The Treaty of Waitangi – New Zealand’s founding document that commits to protect the indigenous Māori culture and to enable Māori to live in New Zealand as Māori – is foundational to public policy in the country. Governing the Crown’s relationship with Māori, the Treaty’s impact on regulation and investment has resulted in a focus on equitable outcomes for Māori in relevant sectors. For more information on Treaty principles, please visit: https://www.mbie.govt.nz/business-and-employment/employment-and-skills/employment-strategy/maori-employment-action-plan/te-tiriti-principles/ More information about regulations, including The Overseas Investment Regulatory System and a regulatory timeline can be found here: https://www.treasury.govt.nz/information-and-services/regulation Most standards are developed through Standards New Zealand, a business unit within MBIE. And most standards in New Zealand are set in coordination with Australia. Regulations are developed by “Order in Council,” or law made by someone other than Parliament, that give effect to the government’s decisions. Orders in Council are the main method the Government uses to put into action the decisions that need legal force, such as new or amended regulations. MBIE is responsible for the stewardship of 16 regulatory systems covering about 140 statutes. In June 2019, MBIE released a discussion paper on the proposed IP Laws Amendment Bill, an omnibus bill that is intended to make technical amendments to the Patents Act 2013, the Trademarks Act 2002, and the Designs Act 1953 to ensure that they remain workable. In November 2019, the Regulatory Systems (Economic Development) Amendment Act 2019 passed and amended about 14 Acts including laws regarding business insolvency, takeovers, trademarks, and limited partnerships. More information about these proposed amendments can be found here: https://www.mbie.govt.nz/have-your-say/proposed-intellectual-property-laws-amendment-bill/ Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and widely available online. New Zealand accounting standards are issued by the New Zealand Accounting Standards Board. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are adopted via New Zealand equivalents, which fully adhere to IFRS. These Standards are developed by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB). Foreign companies whose securities are publicly traded in New Zealand are required to apply NZ IFRS, although the Registrar of Companies and the Financial Markets Authority can give exceptions in certain circumstances. For more information, please visit: https://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/use-of-ifrs-standards-by-jurisdiction/view-jurisdiction/new-zealand/ New Zealand does not have a government-mandated Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) sustainability reporting framework or standard. In October 2021, the government approved legislation for a mandatory climate disclosure law that will require financial entities with assets greater than NZD 1 billion (USD 700 million) to report the expected impact of climate change on businesses, such as how they will manage climate risks. Draft bills and regulations including those relating to FTAs and investment law, are generally made available for public comment, through a public consultation process. In a few instances there has been criticism of New Zealand governments choosing to follow a “truncated” or shortened public consultation process or adding a substantive legislative change after public consultation through the process of adding a Supplementary Order Paper to the Bill. While regulations are not in a centralized location in a form similar to the United States Federal Register, the New Zealand government requires the major regulatory departments to publish an annual regulatory stewardship strategy. The Regulatory Quality Team within the New Zealand Treasury is responsible for the strategic coordination of the Government’s regulatory management system. Treasury exercises stewardship over the regulatory management system to maintain and enhance the quality of government-initiated regulation. The Treasury’s responsibilities include the oversight of the performance of the regulatory management system as a whole and making recommendations on changes to government and Parliamentary systems and processes. These functions complement the Treasury’s role as the government’s primary economic and fiscal advisor. New Zealand’s major regulatory departments are the Department of Internal Affairs, IRD, MBIE, Ministry for the Environment, Ministry of Justice, the Ministry for Primary Industries, the Ministry of Transport, and the Financial Markets Authority. In recent years, there has been a revision to the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) requirements in order to help New Zealand’s regulatory framework keep up with global standards. To improve transparency in the regulatory process, RIAs are published on the Treasury’s website at the time the relevant bill is introduced to Parliament, or the regulation is published in the newspaper, or at the time of Ministerial release. An RIA provides a high-level summary of the problem being addressed, the options and their associated costs and benefits, the consultation undertaken, and the proposed arrangements for implementation and review. In 2018, the government introduced three omnibus bills that contain amendments to legislation including economic development, employment relations, and housing: https://www.mbie.govt.nz/cross-government-functions/regulatory-stewardship/regulatory-systems-amendment-bills/ . The government’s objective with this package of legislation is to ensure that they are effective, efficient, and accord with best regulatory practice by providing a process for making continuous improvements to regulatory systems that do not warrant standalone bills. In November 2019, the Regulatory Systems (Economic Development) Amendment Act 2019 passed and amended about 14 Acts including laws regarding business insolvency, takeovers, trademarks, and limited partnerships. In June 2019, MBIE released a discussion paper on the proposed IP Laws Amendment Bill, an omnibus bill that is intended to make technical amendments to the Patents Act 2013, the Trademarks Act 2002, and the Designs Act 1953 to ensure that they remain workable. The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) has drawn criticism from foreign and domestic investors as a barrier to investment in New Zealand. The RMA regulates access to natural and physical resources such as land and water. Critics contend that the resource management process mandated by the law is unpredictable, protracted, and subject to undue influence from competitors and lobby groups. In some cases, companies have been found to exploit the RMA’s objections submission process to stifle competition. Investors have raised concerns that the law is unequally applied between jurisdictions because of the lack of implementing guidelines. The Resource Management Amendment Act 2013 and the Resource Management (Simplifying and Streamlining) Amendment Act 2009 were passed to help address these concerns. In 2020, the Resource Management Act was amended under the RMA Act 2020. The objectives of the amendment were to reduce the complexity of the RMA, increase certainty, restore public participation opportunities, and improve RMA processes. For more information: https://environment.govt.nz/acts-and-regulations/acts/resource-management-amendment-act-2020/#overview-of-the-changes The Covid pandemic has encouraged New Zealand’s efforts to boost the digitization of government services. In 2022, the Digital Identity Program was introduced, which aims to incorporate the country’s long-term strategy for a digital public service. The Program offers a regulatory framework that sets out rules for the delivery of digital identity services. It modernizes the digital identity system by innovating how people access and share their information. And under the concept of mutual recognition, it aligns with other likeminded countries such as Australia and Canada in its provision of digital identity services. The Program also touches on free trade agreements by considering a digital trust framework that promotes privacy and security, and allows for easier electronic transacting, thereby reducing barriers in digital trade. For more information, please visit: https://www.digital.govt.nz/digital-government/programmes-and-projects/digital-identity-programme/about-the-digital-identity-programme/ The Government of New Zealand is generally transparent about its public finances and debt obligations. The annual budget for the government and its departments publish assumptions, and implications of explicit and contingent liabilities on estimated government revenue and spending. In recent years, the Government of New Zealand has introduced laws to enhance regulatory coordination with Australia as part of their Single Economic Market agenda. In February 2017, the Patents (Trans-Tasman Patent Attorneys and Other Matters) Amendment Act took effect creating a single body to regulate patent attorneys in both countries. Other areas of regulatory coordination include insolvency law, financial reporting, food safety, competition policy, consumer policy and the 2013 Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement Treaty, which allows the enforcement of civil judgements between both countries. On December 1, 2020, the Privacy Act 2020 came into force, replacing the Privacy Act 1993. The Privacy Act 2020 provides the rules in New Zealand for protecting personal information and puts responsibilities on agencies and organizations about how they must go about fulfilling this statutory requirement. The Act has 13 Information Privacy Principles and requires agencies to report to the Privacy Commissioner if they have a “notifiable privacy breach.” New Zealand is a Party to the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Standards New Zealand is responsible for operating the TBT Enquiry Point on behalf of MFAT. From 2016, Standards New Zealand became a business unit within MBIE administered under the Standards and Accreditation Act 2015. Standards New Zealand establishes techniques and processes built from requirements under the Act and from the International Organization for Standardization. New Zealand ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2015 and it entered into force in February 2017. New Zealand was already largely in compliance with the TFA which is expected to benefit New Zealand agricultural exporters and importers of perishable items to enhanced procedures for border clearances. New Zealand’s legal system is derived from the English system and comes from a mix of common law and statute law. The judicial system is independent of the executive branch and is generally transparent and effective in enforcing property and contractual rights. The highest appeals court is a domestic Supreme Court, which replaced the Privy Council in London and began hearing cases July 1, 2004. New Zealand courts can recognize and enforce a judgment of a foreign court if the foreign court is considered to have exercised proper jurisdiction over the defendant according to private international law rules. New Zealand has well-defined and consistently applied commercial and bankruptcy laws. Arbitration is a widely used dispute resolution mechanism and is governed by the Arbitration Act of 1996, Arbitration (Foreign Agreements and Awards) Act of 1982, and the Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act 1979. Legislation to modernize and consolidate laws underpinning contracts and commercial transactions came into effect in September 2017. The Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017 consolidates and repeals 12 acts that date between 1908 and 2002. The Private International Law (Choice of Law in Tort) Act, passed in December 2017, clarifies which jurisdiction’s law is applicable in actions of tort and abolishes certain common law rules, and establishes the general rule that the applicable law will be the law of the country in which the events constituting the tort in question occur. Overseas investments in New Zealand assets are screened only if they are defined as sensitive by the Overseas Investment Office (OIO). The OIO, a dedicated unit located within Land Information New Zealand (LINZ), administers the Overseas Investment Act, which sets out the criteria for assessing applications for foreign investment. The government ministers for finance, land information, and primary industries are responsible for assessing OIO recommendations and can choose to override OIO recommendations on approved applications. Ministers’ decisions on OIO applications can be appealed by the applicant in the New Zealand High Court. Ministers have the power to confer a discretionary exemption from the requirement for a prospective investor to seek OIO consent under certain circumstances. For more see: http://www.linz.govt.nz/regulatory/overseas-investment . The OIO monitors foreign investments after approval. All consents are granted with reporting conditions, which are generally standard in nature. Investors must report regularly on their compliance with the terms of the consent. Offenses include: defeating, evading, or circumventing the OIO Act; failure to comply with notices, requirements, or conditions; and making false or misleading statements or omissions. If an offense has been committed under the Act, the High Court has the power to impose penalties, including monetary fines, ordering compliance, and ordering the disposal of the investor’s New Zealand holdings. In 2017 the Government announced a reform of the Overseas Investment Act shortly after being elected and has already implemented Phase One reforms with strengthened requirements for screening foreign investment in residential houses, building residential housing developments, and farmland acreage. Screening for investments in forestry were eased slightly to help meet the Government’s One Billion Tree policy. Phase Two began in 2019 when the Government consulted on and released details for the introduction of a National Interest test to the screening process to protect New Zealand assets deemed sensitive and “high-risk.” In 2020, in response to the economic impact of COVID-19, the Government agreed to further changes to the OIA. Measures were introduced to reduce the regulatory burden of the screening process for inward foreign investment and implementations from Phase Two reforms were delayed. In February 2022, the private sector called on the OIO to remove its “Forestry Pathway” exemption due to over-investment in the sector by foreign investors who are reportedly sidelining farmland for forestry, a situation that is also impacting New Zealand’s access to domestic carbon credits. In February 2020 New Zealand reported its first conviction under the Overseas Investment Act. The offender was charged for obstructing an OIO investigation that was initiated because he had not obtained OIO consent for his property purchase and for later submitting a fraudulent application. A second criminal conviction was reported in June 2020 after the offender was found to have submitted a fraudulent loan agreement. The Land Information New Zealand (LINZ) website reports on enforcement actions taken against foreign investors, including the number of compliance letters issued, the number of warnings and their circumstances, referrals to professional conduct body in relation to an OIO breach, and disposal of investments. For more see: https://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-investment/enforcement/enforcement-action-taken . The Commerce Act 1986 prohibits contracts, arrangements, or understandings that have the purpose, or effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market, unless authorized by the Commerce Commission, an independent Crown entity. Before granting such authorization, the Commerce Commission must be satisfied that the public benefit would outweigh the reduction of competition. The Commerce Commission has legislative power to deny an application for a merger or takeover if it would result in the new company gaining a dominant position in the New Zealand market. The Commerce Commission also enforces certain pieces of legislation that, through regulation, aim to provide the benefits of competition in markets with certain natural monopolies, such as the dairy, electricity, gas, airports, and telecommunications industries. The Dairy Industry Restructuring Act of 2001 (DIR) established dairy co-operative Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited (Fonterra). The DIR is designed to manage Fonterra’s dominant position in the domestic dairy market, until sufficient competition has emerged. A review by the Commerce Commission in 2016 found competition insufficient, but the findings from a subsequent review in 2018 resulted in the introduction of the DIR Amendment Bill (No 3) which passed its first reading in August 2019 and was finalized and passed on August 6, 2020. This amendment aims to ease the requirement that Fonterra accept all milk from new suppliers, allowing the cooperative the option to refuse milk if it does not meet environmental standards or if it comes from newly converted dairy farms. The bill will also limit Fonterra’s discretion in calculating the base milk price. It also requires Fonterra’s dairy companies to enable supplying shareholders to transfer their shares to share milkers by agreement. The Commerce Commission is also charged with monitoring competition in the telecommunications sector and motor fuel market. It has a regulatory role to promote competition within the electricity industry, which has natural monopolies in the transmission and distribution businesses. In March 2020, the Commission completed a project that set a default to determine price caps that will apply to the 17 electricity distributors in New Zealand from April 2020 to March 2025. The Commerce (Criminalization of Cartels) Amendment Act was passed in April 2019 to align New Zealand law with other jurisdictions – particularly Australia – by criminalizing cartel behavior. The Commerce Commission has international cooperation arrangements with Australia since 2013 and Canada since 2016, to allow the sharing of compulsorily acquired information, and provide investigative assistance. The arrangements help effective enforcement of both competition and consumer law. In May 2020, the Commerce Commission issued guidance easing restrictions on businesses to collaborate in order to ensure the provision of essential goods and services to New Zealand consumers during the COVID-19 pandemic. In January 2019, the Government announced proposed amendments to section 36 of the Commerce Act, which relates to the misuse of market power. The government is seeking consultation on repealing sections of the Commerce Act that shield some intellectual property arrangements from competition law, to prevent dominant firms misusing market power by enforcing their patent rights in a way they would not do if there were a more competitive market. It also seeks to strengthen laws and enforcement powers against the misuse of market power by aligning it with Australia and other developed economies, particularly because New Zealand competition law currently does not prohibit dominant firms from engaging in conduct with an anti-competitive effect. Section 36 of the Act only prohibits conduct with certain anti-competitive purposes. Expropriation is generally not an issue in New Zealand, and there are no outstanding cases. The government’s KiwiBuild program aims to build 100,000 affordable homes by 2028, with half being in Auckland. The NZD 3.8 billion (USD 2.7 billion) Housing Acceleration Fund also targets the national housing shortage with an infrastructure fund of public and private developments. Recent and legacy legislation has made it easier for the government and developers to acquire and develop land, particularly in high-density urban areas. Under the Public Works Act 1981, the New Zealand government has the ability to force landowners to sell in order to facilitate public works projects. There is little public dissent over the issue; New Zealanders are generally satisfied with the Act’s provisions for fair market value compensation, although there have been high-profile disputes over sacred Māori land that have been litigated in court. In August 2020, the Urban Development Act (UDA) was passed into law. The Act established powers for Kainga Ora, a newly created Crown Agency that provides rental housing for families in need and facilitates urban development through residential building projects. Under the UDA, compulsory acquisition powers were created for Kainga Ora, who can theoretically make a forced acquisition of residential land after meeting critical thresholds, such as the establishment of a Special Development Project process that has government oversight. In December 2021, the Resource Management Act was amended, weakening the consent process required in order to build residential developments in medium- to high-density urban areas. While the aim of the Act was to urgently address the housing shortage, for which there is bipartisan agreement, there was some concern that the consultation process was overly swift. Overall, the thrust of all three pieces of legislation is to support needed development. The most recent legislation makes this process easier for residential development. To date, there have been no cases involving compulsory acquisition of residential property, nor has the issue been of great concern. The lack of precedent for due process in the treatment of residents affected by liquefaction of residential land caused by the Canterbury earthquake in 2011 resulted in prolonged court cases against the Government based largely on the amount of compensation offered to insured home and/or landowners and the lack of any compensation for uninsured owners. One offer made by the government to uninsured Christchurch landowners for 50 percent of the rated value of their property was deemed unlawful in the Court of Appeal in 2013. A later offer was made by the government to uninsured residents, but only for the value of their land and not their house. In 2018, the government opted to settle with a group of uninsured home and landowners, but some objected to the compensation because it was based on 2007/08 rating valuations. There were also reports some insurance companies paid out less to policy holders than the full value of some houses if they found based on the structural characteristics of the house that it was repairable, even though the repairs would be legally prohibited if in the RRZ. LINZ currently manages Crown-owned land in the Christchurch Residential Red Zone (RRZ) and can temporarily agree short-term leases of this land under the Greater Christchurch Regeneration Act 2016. For more see: https://www.linz.govt.nz/crown-property/types-crown-property/christchurch-residential-red-zone . Bankruptcy is addressed in the Insolvency Act 2006, the Receiverships Act 1993, and the Companies Act 1993. New Zealand bankrupts are subject to conditions on borrowing and international travel, and violations are considered offences and punishable by law. The registration system operated by the Companies Office within MBIE, is designed to enable New Zealand creditors to sue an overseas company in New Zealand, rather than forcing them to sue in the country’s home jurisdiction. An overseas company’s assets in New Zealand can be liquidated for the benefit of creditors. All registered ‘large’ overseas companies are required to file financial statements under the Companies Act of 1993. See: https://www.companiesoffice.govt.nz/companies/learn-about/overseas-companies/managing-an-overseas-company-in-new-zealand The government has recognized the need for more insolvency law reform beyond the 2006 Act which repealed the Insolvency Act 1967. The Regulatory Systems (Economic Development) Amendment Act which passed in November 2019 included amendments to the Insolvency Act that strengthened some regulations and assigned more powers to the Official Assignee. After the previous government established an Insolvency Working Group in 2015, MBIE published a proposed set of reforms in November 2019, based on the group’s recommendations from 2017. The current government plans to introduce an insolvency law reform bill in early 2020. The omnibus COVID-19 Response (Further Management Measures) Legislation Bill passed on May 15 included provisions to provide temporary relief for businesses facing insolvency, and exemptions for compliance, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 6. Financial Sector The New Zealand government has a generally positive attitude toward foreign portfolio investment, provided the investment is not considered to be sensitive in nature by the screening body, the Overseas Investment Office (OIO). New Zealand welcomes sustainable, productive, and inclusive investment. The New Zealand Exchange, or the NZX, is the country’s securities and futures exchange. The Financial Market Authority (FMA) is the government agency responsible for regulating investments and financial markets. The regulatory system is effective, transparent, and supportive of inward flows. In 2020, the market capitalization of listed domestic companies in New Zealand was 63 percent of GDP, at USD 132 billion. The small size of the market reflects in part the risk averse nature of New Zealand investors, preferring residential property and bank term deposits over equities or credit instruments for investment. As of year-end 2021, New Zealand’s stock of investment in residential property is valued at NZD 1.7 trillion (USD 1.2 trillion). New Zealand adheres to International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII and does not place restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms for a variety of instruments, but foreigners and non-residents find difficulty in securing lending in New Zealand. To open a bank account, the applicant must be a permanent resident. Bank deposits are currently not guaranteed. In 2022, the Labour government plans to introduce a bill that will guarantee deposits up to NZD 100,000 (USD 70,000) from 2023. Banking services in the country are robust; bank account penetration is nearly 100 percent. The sector is dominated by Australian banks; by total assets, three of the country’s four largest banks are Australian owned. Overall, the banking sector is worth NZD 644 billion (USD 450 billion) by total assets, small by global standards. Loans and advances account for the vast majority (80 percent) of bank assets. Derivatives are held mainly for hedging purposes. The RBNZ estimates that the non-performing loans ratio is 0.4 percent – out of a total loan portfolio worth NZD 522 billion (USD 350 billion). The banking sector has undergone reforms to better withstand shocks. In 2019, the RBNZ proposed a significant increase to banks’ capital requirements to safeguard them from shocks to the financial system. Increased capital requirements will now be phased in over a five- to seven-year period. By the end of the transition period in 2028, all registered banks in the country will have to meet the new requirements, which will be some of the most stringent in the world and may squeeze access to credit. Worth NZD 60 billion (USD 42 billion), the New Zealand Superannuation Fund (NZ Super) is the country’s sovereign wealth fund. 85 percent of the fund is invested offshore in both developed and emerging markets, the bulk of it in passive funds in North America. 4 percent of the fund is invested domestically in timber, bonds, private companies, rural land, and infrastructure. NZ Super is a member country of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF) and assesses the performance of the fund against the Santiago Principles. The fund has historically ranked as fully compliant with the Principles. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Treasury monitors 12 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), three mixed-ownership-model entities, and 29 Crown entities. Together, these entities make up the broader SOE sector in New Zealand, which is concentrated in the energy and transportation sectors. In the year to June 2021, the asset base of the 12 SOEs was NZD 50.7 billion (USD 35.5 billion). While figures for net income are not available, the operating balance for the sector was NZD 184 million (USD 129 million). In the same period, mixed ownership companies reported an asset base of NZD 28.8 billion (USD 20.2 billion) and an operating balance of NZD 410 million (USD 287 million). For more information on the financial performance of the SOEs and Crown entities, please visit https://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/year-end/financial-statements-2021-html where a partial list of SOEs is available. The Treasury’s Governance & Appointments team provides advice to Ministers on board appointments, which typically involve local personnel. Legislation of SOEs falls under the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, which sets up processes to improve efficiency in the sector. All SOEs are registered as public companies and are bound by the Companies Act and the Fair Trade Act, which clearly define the relationships between companies and their directors/shareholders, and the market. In the late 1990s, competition law under the Commerce Act was strengthened to provide for penalties for misuse of a dominant position. The Commerce Commission “ComCom” sets out guidelines and policies for anti-competitive behavior. A suspected breach of the Commerce Act, inclusive of those involving an SOE, is reported to ComCom’s website at https://comcom.govt.nz/contact-us and is immediately investigated. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the government began a rapid course of deregulation and privatization that lasted through the late 1990s. The Ports of Auckland were partially privatized in 1988. The government sold its holdings in Bank of New Zealand, one of the country’s largest banks, in 1992 to National Australian Bank. Air New Zealand was sold to a consortium in 1988. Other telecoms, and energy and transportation companies were sold off. Some of these interests were re-purchased by the government, such as Air New Zealand moving back to into government ownership in 2001. In 2014 the government completed a program of asset sales to raise funds to reduce public debt. It involved the partial sale of three energy companies and Air New Zealand, with the government retaining its majority share in each. The bulk of the initial share float was made available to New Zealand share brokers and international institutions, and unsold shares were made available to foreign investors. Foreign investors are free to purchase shares on the secondary market. Subsequent “public private partnerships” in the infrastructure space in the mid-2000s offered the public a chance to participate in government-sponsored projects. In 2019, the Infrastructure Transaction Unit was created within Treasury as an interim measure to provide support to agencies and local authorities in planning and delivering major infrastructure projects. The New Zealand Infrastructure Commission Act was passed in September 2019, to create Crown Entity InfraCom, and it will be responsible for delivering New Zealand’s Public Private Partnership (PPP) Program https://infracom.govt.nz/major-projects/public-private-partnerships/ . The government is increasing its focus on PPP due to its significant NZD 15 billion (USD 10.5 billion) funding package announced in December 2019 and May 2020. MBIE administers the procurement process. In October 2019, MBIE issued substantive changes to the New Zealand Government’s Procurement Rules. The Procurement Rules contain a specific section on non-discrimination, which in part states, “All suppliers must be given an equal opportunity to bid for contracts. Agencies must treat suppliers from another country no less favorably than New Zealand suppliers. Procurement decisions must be based on the best value for money, which isn’t always the cheapest price, over the whole-of-life of the goods, services or works. Suppliers must not be discriminated against because of a) the country the goods, services or works come from; or b) their degree of foreign ownership or foreign business affiliations.” Where applicable foreign bidders who are ultimately successful, may still be required to meet tax obligations and approval from the Overseas Investment Office. More information can be found here: www.procurement.govt.nz 10. Political and Security Environment New Zealand is a stable liberal democracy with almost no record of significant political violence. The New Zealand government raised its national security threat level for the first time from “low” to “high” after the terrorist attack on two mosques in Christchurch on March 15, 2019. One month later it lowered the risk to “medium” where a “terrorist attack, or violent criminal behavior, or violent protest activity is assessed as feasible and could well occur.” The incident led to wide-ranging gun law reform that restricts semi-automatic firearms and magazines with a capacity of more than ten rounds. An amnesty buy-back scheme of prohibited firearms administered by the NZ Police ran until December 20, 2019. A series of anti-vaccine mandate protests in Wellington commenced February 8, 2022, and lasted for 23 days. Although not overtly violent, they included groups that blocked roads, trespassed, and caused general disruption. The issue has not been politicized, however, with complete cross-aisle agreement from all parties in Parliament not to respond to the demands of the protestors – who remain a tiny minority in a country that is among the most completely vaccinated in the world. Nicaragua Executive Summary Investors should be extremely cautious about investing in Nicaragua. The regime of President Ortega and Vice President Murillo continues to suspend constitutionally guaranteed civil rights, detain political prisoners, and disregard the rule of law, creating an unpredictable investment climate rife with reputational risk and arbitrary regulation. President Ortega awarded himself a fourth consecutive term in November 2021 after arbitrarily jailing opposition figures, barring all credible opposition political parties from participating in elections, blocking legitimate international election observation efforts, and committing widespread electoral fraud. Through a sham judicial process, regime-controlled courts subsequently convicted more than 40 political prisoners – including all of those who aspired to run against Ortega as presidential candidates – on vague, spurious charges. The Ortega-Murillo regime has also targeted the independent media and journalists and in 2021 seized La Prensa, Nicaragua’s only print newspaper. Independent universities have faced invasive governmental investigations and extreme budget cuts, causing 14 university closures. The regime-controlled National Assembly subsequently took control of six universities, leaving 30,000 students in limbo. In 2020, the National Assembly approved six repressive laws that alarmed investors. Some of the most concerning include: a gag law that criminalizes political speech; a foreign agents law that requires organizations and individuals to report foreign assistance and prevents any person receiving foreign funding from running for office; and a consumer protection law that could prevent financial institutions from making independent decisions on whether to service financial clients, including OFAC-sanctioned entities. Tax authorities have seized properties following reportedly arbitrary tax bills and jailed individuals without due process until taxes were negotiated and paid. Arbitrary fines and customs inspections prejudice foreign companies that import products. In response to the Ortega-Murillo regime’s deepening authoritarianism, almost all international financial institutions have stopped issuing new loans to Nicaragua, and external financing will fall sharply beyond 2022. The regime is publicly betting that a new economic partnership with the People’s Republic of China – following a break in diplomatic relations with Taiwan and establishment of ties with China in December 2021 – will provide fresh investment and financing to make up for its growing isolation. Nicaragua’s economic forecast is uncertain and subject to downside risks. Independent economists predict Nicaragua’s economic growth will slow considerably to a rate of less than 3 percent in 2022. Growth in 2021 was unexpectedly high at more than 9 percent but followed three years of contractions from 2018 to 2020. Official estimates from the Nicaraguan Central Bank project growth between 4 and 5 percent in 2022. Inflation increased to 7 percent in 2021. The number of Nicaraguans insured through social security, a measure of the robustness of the formal economy, remains 6 percent below 2018 levels. After several years of very low activity, Nicaragua’s credit market began expanding in 2021. The uncertainty surrounding the government’s 2019 tax reforms – and multiple years of still-unresolved legal challenges – continue to pause companies’ plans for expansion or reinvestment. Nicaragua’s economy still has significant potential for growth if investor confidence can be restored by strengthening institutions and improving the rule of law. Its assets include: ample natural resources; a well-developed agricultural sector; an organized and sophisticated private sector committed to a free economy; ready access to major shipping lanes; and a young, low-cost labor force that supports the manufacturing sector. The United States is Nicaragua’s largest trading partner – it is the source of roughly one quarter of Nicaragua’s imports, and the destination of approximately two-thirds of Nicaragua’s exports. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 164 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 1,850 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Nicaraguan government seeks foreign direct investment to project normalcy and signal international support. As traditional sources of foreign direct investment have declined amid the ongoing political crisis, the government has increasingly pursued investment from ideologically friendly countries such as Iran, Russia, and China. Investment incentives target export-focused companies that require large amounts of unskilled or low-skilled labor. Local laws and practices generally do not treat foreign and domestic investors differently. Foreign investors report significant delays in receiving residency permits, requiring frequent travel out of the country to renew visas. ProNicaragua is the country’s official investment and export promotion agency. The agency is highly politicized and run by the President’s and Vice President’s OFAC-sanctioned son Laureano Ortega. ProNicaragua provides information packages, investment facilitation, and prospecting services to interested investors. Personal connections and affiliation with influential industry associations and chambers of commerce are critical for foreigners investing in Nicaragua. Though municipal and ministerial authorities may enact decisions relevant to foreign businesses, all actions are subject to de facto approval by the Presidency. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. Any individual or entity may make investments of any kind. In general, Nicaraguan law provides equal treatment for domestic and foreign investment. Investors should be cautious of the 2020 Foreign Agents Law. While the law targets NGOs and exempts business entities, some companies have been required to register or end their social responsibility efforts. The law requires anyone receiving funding from foreign sources to register with the Ministry of the Interior and provide monthly, detailed accounts of how funds are intended to be used. The government used the law to strip 48 NGOs of their legal status as of April 2022. Nicaragua allows foreigners to be shareholders of local companies, but the company representative must be a Nicaraguan citizen or a foreigner with legal residence in the country. Many companies satisfy this requirement by using their local legal counsel as a representative. Legal residency procedures for foreign investors can take up to 18 months and require in-person interviews in Managua. The government can limit foreign ownership for national security or public health reasons under the Foreign Investment Law. The government generally requires all investments in the petroleum and mining sectors to include one of Nicaragua’s state-owned enterprises as a partner. Investments in the mining sector have similar requirements. The government does not formally screen, review, or approve foreign direct investments. However, in practice, President Ortega and Vice President Murillo maintain de facto review authority over any foreign direct investment. This review process is not transparent. The WTO conducted a trade policy review of Nicaragua in 2021. The review noted that Nicaragua’s trade policy had remained largely unchanged since the previous review in 2012. While the Government of Nicaragua is eager to attract foreign investment, it lacks a systematic business facilitation effort and instead relies on one-on-one engagement with potential investors. Nicaragua does not have an online business registration system. Companies must typically register with the national tax administration, social security administration, and local municipality to ensure the government can collect taxes. Those registers are typically not available to the public. According to the Ministry of Growth, Industry, and Trade (MIFIC), the process to register a business takes a minimum of 14 days. In practice, registration usually takes much longer. Establishing a foreign-owned limited liability company takes eight procedures and 42 days. Nicaragua does not promote or incentivize outward investment and does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The Nicaraguan government does not use transparent policies to establish clear “rules of the game.” Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems exist but implementation is opaque. The government does not foster competition on a non-discriminatory basis. The Ortega-Murillo regime maintains direct control over various sectors of the economy to enrich loyalists. Investors regularly complain that regulatory authorities are arbitrary, negligent, or slow to apply existing laws, at times in an apparent effort to favor one competitor over another. The executive branch retains ultimate rule-making and regulatory authority. In practice, the relevant government agency is empowered to levy fines directly. In some instances, the prosecutor’s office may also enforce regulations. These actions are widely perceived to be controlled by the executive branch and are neither objective nor transparent. There have not been recent regulatory or enforcement reforms. Prior to 2018, leading business chambers managed some informal regulatory processes. Leading business chambers filled policy voids left by inadequate government institutions and procedures, meeting with influential government officials to resolve common business issues. This model largely collapsed, however, as business chambers wanted to avoid the reputational risks of making ad hoc deals with the increasingly authoritarian Ortega-Murillo regime. There are currently few options to resolve commercial issues with the government. There is no accountancy law in Nicaragua. International accounting standards are not a focus for most of the economy, but major businesses typically use IFRS standards or U.S. GAAP standards. The national banking authority officially requires loans to be submitted using IFRS standards. There is no legal requirement to disclose environmental, social, or governance indicators. Draft legislation is ostensibly made available for public comment through meetings with associations that will be affected by the proposed regulations. In practice, drafts are typically not published on official websites or made available to the public. The legislature is not required by law to give notice. The executive branch proposes most investment legislation, and the regime-controlled National Assembly rarely makes modifications. Nicaragua publishes regulatory actions in La Gaceta, the official journal of government actions, including official summaries and the full text of all legislation. La Gaceta is available online. There are no effective oversight or enforcement mechanisms to ensure the government follows administrative processes. Public finances and debt obligations are not transparent, with little accountability or oversight. The Central Bank has increasingly refused to publish key economic data starting in 2018, including public finances and debt obligations. The Central Bank published limited data in 2020 as a condition of funding from the International Monetary Fund. All CAFTA-DR provisions are fully incorporated into Nicaragua’s national regulatory system. However, authorities regularly flout national regulations, and investors claim that customs practices regularly violate CAFTA-DR provisions. Nicaragua is a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement and reported in July 2018 that it had implemented 81 percent of its commitments to date; however, Nicaragua’s trade facilitation is challenged by bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, and lack of transparency. Nicaragua is a member of the WTO and generally notifies draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Nicaragua is a civil law country in which legislation is the primary source of law. The legislative process is found in Articles 140 to 143 of the Constitution. However, implementation and enforcement of these laws is neither objective nor transparent. Contracts are ostensibly legally enforced through the judicial system, but extrajudicial factors are more likely to influence rulings than the facts at issue. The legal system is weak and cumbersome. Nicaragua has a Commercial Code, but it is outdated and rarely used. There are no specialized courts. Members of the judiciary, including those at senior levels, are widely believed to be corrupt and subject to significant political pressure and direction from the executive branch, specifically the President and Vice President. The judicial process is neither competent, fair, nor reliable. Regulations and enforcement actions are technically subject to judicial review, but appeals procedures are neither transparent nor objective. Nicaragua has laws that relate to foreign investment, but implementation, enforcement, and interpretation are subject to corruption and political pressure. The CAFTA-DR Investment Chapter establishes a secure, predictable legal framework for U.S. investors in Central America and the Dominican Republic. The agreement provides six basic protections: 1) nondiscriminatory treatment relative to domestic investors and investors from third countries; 2) limits on performance requirements; 3) the free transfer of funds related to an investment; 4) protection from expropriation other than in conformity with customary international law; 5) a minimum standard of treatment in conformity with customary international law; and 6) the ability to hire key managerial personnel without regard to nationality. The full text of CAFTA-DR contains additional details. Nicaragua’s Foreign Investment Law (2000/344) defines the legal framework for foreign investment. It permits 100 percent foreign ownership in most industries. (See Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment for exceptions.) It also establishes national treatment for investors, guarantees foreign exchange conversion and profit repatriation, clarifies foreigners’ access to local financing, and reaffirms respect for private property. The Ministry of Growth, Industry, and Trade’s (MIFIC) information portal details applicable laws and regulations for trade and investment. It contains administrative procedures for investment and income generating operations such as the number of steps, contact information for relevant entities, required documents costs, processing time, and applicable laws. The site is available only in Spanish. The mission of the Institute for the Promotion of Competition (Procompetencia) includes investigating and disciplining businesses engaged in anticompetitive practices. In practice, it has no effective power, and the Ortega-Murillo regime controls decisions regarding competition. Nicaragua has a long history of government expropriation without due process. Considerable uncertainty remains in securing property rights (see Protection of Property Rights). Conflicting land title claims are abundant and judicial appeals are very challenging. Since 2018, the government has cancelled the legal status of 118 NGOs, including 14 universities. The government seized six universities’ assets and is turning them into publicly administered and controlled institutions. In December 2021, the government broke diplomatic ties with Taiwan and officially recognized the People Republic of China (PRC). Subsequently, the government blocked Taiwan’s donation of its former Embassy, confiscated the property, and gave it to the PRC. Multiple landowners have reported land invasions by government-affiliated actors since the political crisis began in 2018. Landowners were sometimes able to end these invasions through government connections or bribes. In instances where the government claimed legal right to the land, offers of compensation – if any – were calculated on cadastral value, a vast underestimate of market value. The Ortega-Murillo regime has stated on numerous occasions that it would not act to evict those who had illegally taken possession of private property. In late 2020 and early 2021, the Government of Nicaragua disposed of real property seized from independent news outlets. The Government did not follow due process and transferred the facilities to the Ministry of Health to install health clinics. Bankruptcy provisions are included in the Civil and Commercial Codes, but there is no tradition of bankruptcy in Nicaragua. Nicaragua’s rules on bankruptcy focus on the liquidation of business entities rather than the reorganization of debts and do not provide equitable treatment of creditors. Insolvent companies usually close without going through formal bankruptcy proceedings and set up a new entity. Creditors are effectively unprotected. Creditors typically attempt to collect as much as possible directly from the debtor to avoid an uncertain judicial process or abandon any potential claims. 6. Financial Sector There are no restrictions on foreign portfolio investment. Nicaragua does not have its own equities market and there is no regulatory structure to facilitate publicly held companies. There is a small bond market that trades primarily in government bonds but also sells corporate debt to institutional investors. The Superintendent of Banks and Other Financial Institutions (SIBOIF) supervises the bond market. The overall size and depth of Nicaragua’s financial markets and portfolio positions are very limited. Nicaragua has officially accepted the obligations of IMF Article VIII and maintains an exchange system that is free of restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions. New policies, however, threaten the free flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets, as well as foreign currency convertibility. Banks must now request foreign currency purchases in writing, 48 hours in advance, and the Central Bank reserves the right to deny these requests. While the banking system has grown and developed in the past two decades, Nicaragua remains underbanked relative to other countries in the region. Only 31 percent of Nicaraguans aged 15 or older have bank accounts, and only 8 percent have any savings in such accounts, approximately half the rate of other countries in the region according to World Bank data. Nicaragua also has one of the lowest mobile banking rates in Central America. Following a sharp contraction in 2018, the banking sector recovered slightly in 2019 and 2020. In 2021, liquidity ratios continued high and stable at 45 percent and portfolios increased 5.5 percent. Despite expanded lending, banks remain cautious when granting new financing. The ratio of non-performing loans to banking sector assets was 15 percent in 2021. Despite improving indicators, the banking sector remains vulnerable to sociopolitical uncertainty. Since 2018, banks have reduced their branches from 612 to 445 across the country. The banking industry remains conservative and highly concentrated, with four banks – Banpro, LAFISE, BAC, and Fichosa – controlling an estimated 77 percent of the country’s market. The 2018 crisis sparked large withdrawals of deposits from the banking system. Those withdrawals have stabilized, but total assets remain below pre-crisis levels. In 2021, the financial system had total assets worth $4.7 billion – a 9 percent increase over 2020’s $4.3 billion, but 14 percent lower than in March 2018’s $5.5 billion. The Central Bank of Nicaragua was established in 1961 as the regulator of the monetary system with the sole right to issue the national currency, the córdoba. Foreign banks can open branches in Nicaragua. Since 2018, Nicaragua has lost several correspondent banking relationships. Wells Fargo Bank withdrew altogether, and Bank of America withdrew correspondent services from a local bank. Recent amendments to the Consumer Protection Law could force local banks to service suspicious account holders – including persons designated under international sanctions regimes – further jeopardizing correspondent banking relationships. Foreigners can open bank accounts if they are legal residents in the country. The Foreign Investment Law allows foreign investors residing in the country to access local credit, and local banks have no restrictions on accepting property located abroad as collateral. In 2019, the Department of Treasury’s OFAC designated Bancorp – a subsidiary of ALBANISA, a joint venture between the state-owned oil companies of Nicaragua and Venezuela – for money laundering and corruption. Bancorp submitted its dissolution to the Superintendency of Banks and Other Financial Institutions (SIBOIF), but the closure was secretive and outside the legal framework that governs financial institutions in Nicaragua. In 2021, OFAC designated two senior government officials overseeing the banking system. OFAC designated the President of the Central Bank for implementing Nicaragua’s consumer protection law that could obligate Nicaraguan financial institutions to facilitate sanctionable transactions. OFAC also designated the head of SIBOIF for forcing commercial banks to provide financial information on the regime’s political opponents. Nicaragua does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises It is virtually impossible to identify the number of companies that the Nicaraguan government owns or controls, because they are not subject to any regular audit or accounting measures and are not fully captured by the national budget or in other public documents. Beyond the official state-owned enterprises (SOE), which are not transparent or subject to oversight, the Ortega-Murillo regime uses a vast network of front men to control companies. State-controlled companies receive non-market-based advantages, including tax exemption benefits not granted to private actors. In some instances, these companies are given monopolies through implementing legislation. In other instances, the government uses formal and informal levers to advantage its businesses. The government owns and operates the National Sewer and Water Company (ENACAL), National Port Authority (EPN), National Lottery, and National Electricity Transmission Company (ENATREL). Private sector investment is not permitted in these sectors. In sectors where competition is allowed, the government owns and operates the Nicaraguan Insurance Institute (INISER), Nicaraguan Electricity Company (ENEL), Las Mercedes Industrial Park, Nicaraguan Food Staple Company (ENABAS), Nicaraguan Post Office, International Airport Authority (EAAI), Nicaraguan Mining Company (ENIMINAS), and Nicaraguan Petroleum Company (Petronic). Many of Nicaragua’s SOEs and quasi-SOEs were established using ALBANISA, now OFAC sanctioned. The Ortega-Murillo regime used ALBANISA funds to purchase television and radio stations, hotels, cattle ranches, power plants, and pharmaceutical laboratories. ALBANISA’s large presence in the Nicaraguan economy and its ties to the government disadvantage companies trying to compete in industries dominated by ALBANISA or government-managed entities. In 2020, the government nationalized Nicaragua’s main electricity distributor Disnorte-Dissur, which was previously owned by ALBANISA. In 2020, following the OFAC designation of state-owned petroleum distributor Distribuidor Nicaraguense de Petroleo (DNP), the government created four new entities: the Nicaraguan Gas Company (ENIGAS); the Nicaraguan Company to Store and Distribute Hydrocarbons (ENIPLANH); the Nicaraguan Company for Hydrocarbon Exploration (ENIH); and the Nicaraguan Company to Import, Transport, and Commercialize Hydrocarbons (ENICOM). Through the Nicaraguan Social Security Institute (INSS), the government owns a pharmaceutical manufacturing company, and other companies and real estate holdings. The Military Institute of Social Security (IPSM), a state pension fund for the Nicaraguan military, controls companies in the construction, manufacturing, and services sectors. In January 2022, OFAC sanctioned three members of the IPSM board of directors. Nicaragua does not have an active privatization program. 10. Political and Security Environment The regime of President Daniel Ortega and his wife and Vice President Rosario Murillo dominates Nicaragua’s highly centralized, authoritarian political system. Ortega is serving in his fourth consecutive term as president following rigged elections in November 2021. The regime’s rule has been marked by increasing human rights abuses, consolidation of executive control, and consolidation of strategic business sectors that enrich Ortega and his inner circle. Political risk remains high, and the future of the country’s political institutions remains uncertain. An ongoing sociopolitical crisis began in April 2018 when regime-controlled police violently crushed a peaceful student protest. The ensuing conflict killed more than 325 people, injured thousands, imprisoned hundreds of peaceful protestors, and exiled more than 100,000. The regime amended terrorism laws to include prodemocracy activities and used the legislature and justice system to characterize civil society actors as terrorists, assassins, and “coup-mongers.” The regime continues to hold 170 political prisoners – most suffering from a lack of adequate food and proper medical care. Prisoners were arrested for activities considered normal in a free society, including practicing independent journalism, working for civil society organizations, seeking to compete in elections, or publicly expressing an opinion contrary to the government. Excessive use of force, false imprisonment, and other harassment against opposition leaders – including many private sector leaders – is common. The regime-controlled Nicaraguan National Police maintains a heavy presence throughout Nicaragua, including randomized checkpoints. In response to the Ortega-Murillo regime’s antidemocratic behavior and human rights abuses, the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Treasury have imposed visa and financial restrictions on multiple government agencies and hundreds of individuals. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $12,621 2020 $12,621 World Bank: www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 -$3 BEA: https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $3 BEA: https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 7.7% 2020 7.1 % UNCTAD: https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Nicaraguan Central Bank https://www.bcn.gob.ni/publicaciones/periodicidad/anual/informe_anual/index.php Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Niger Executive Summary Niger is eager to attract foreign investment and has taken slow but deliberate steps to improve its business climate, including making reforms to liberalize the economy, encourage privatizations, appeal to foreign investors, increase imports and exports, and create new export processing zones. In April 2021, newly elected President Bazoum Mohamed was inaugurated in Niger’s historic first democratic transfer of executive power. Bazoum intends to build upon the advancement of his predecessors to continue to develop the nation’s mineral and petroleum wealth, while seeking to develop agricultural businesses that can take advantage of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement. Pre-COVID economic growth averaged roughly six percent per year and the government managed positive 1.5 percent growth through the 2020 pandemic year. The Government of Niger (GoN) continues to seek foreign investment – U.S. or otherwise. President Bazoum frequenty reiterates the need for FDI during official visits. In 2017, the GoN created the High Council for Investment, which is an organization tasked with supporting and promoting foreign direct investments in Niger, and is furthering appeals for foreign investment with the development of the GUCE, Guichet Unique du Commerce Exterieur, an information and facilitation system for foreign trade, electronic and dematerialized, intended to simplify and modernize procedures to facilitate the passage of goods entering and leaving the national territory. U.S. investment in the country is very small; there is currently only one U.S. firm operating in Niger outside of U.S. Government-related projects. Many U.S. firms see risk due to the country’s limited internet, transport, and energy infrastructure, terrorist threats, the perception of political instability, lack of educated and skilled/experienced workers, and a climate that is dry and very hot. Foreign investment dominates key sectors: France in the the uranium sector, Morocco is making inroads with telecommunications, bank and real estate development, while Chinese and Turkish investment is paramount and expanding in the oil, mining,construction, and hospitality sectors. Much of the country’s retail stores, particularly those related to food, dry goods and clothing are operated by Lebanese and Moroccan entrepreneurs. GoN focus areas for investment include the mining and petroleum sector, infrastructure and construction, transportation, and agribusiness. The GoN also hopes to draw investment into petroleum exploration into proven reserves with the 2023 target completion of a crude oil export pipeline. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 124 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 129 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $550 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GoN is committed to attracting FDI and has repeatedly pledged to take whatever steps necessary to encourage the development of private sector and increase trade. The country offers numerous investment opportunities, particularly in agriculture, livestock, energy, telecommunication, industry, infrastructure, hydrocarbons, services and mining. In the past several years, new investor codes have been implemented, the most recent being in 2014. A Public-Private Partnership law was adopted in 2018, transparency has improved, and customs and taxation procedures have been simplified and computirized. There are no laws that specifically discriminate against foreign and/or U.S. investors. The GoN has demonstrated a willingness to negotiate with prospective foreign investors on matters of taxation and customs, despite some difficulties recently observed on the introduction of an electronic system for VAT. The Investment Code adopted in 2014 guarantees the reception and protection of foreign direct investment, as well as tax advantages available for investment projects. The Investment Code allows tax exemptions for a certain period and according to the location and amount of the projects to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis with the Ministry of Commerce. The code guarantees fair treatment of investors regardless of their origin. The code also offers tax incentives for sectors that the government deems to be priorities and strategic, including energy production, agriculture, fishing, social housing, health, education, crafts, hotels, transportation and the agro-food industry processing. The code allows free transfer of profits and free convertibility of currencies. The Public-Private Partnership law adopted in 2018 and implemented since then gives projects of the public private partnership type for their operations in the design and /or implementation phase, total exemption from duties and taxes collected by the State, including VAT, on the provision of services, works and services directly contributing to the realization of the project. However, parts and spare parts, and raw materials intended for projects benefit from a duty exemption and customs taxes only when not available in Niger. In the design and /or production phase, private public partnership type benefit from free registration agreements and all acts entered into by the contracting authority and the contracting partner within the framework of the project. There are no laws or practices that discriminate against foreign investors including U.S. investors. The High Council for Investment of Niger (HCIN) reports directly to the President of the Republic. HCIN is the platform of public-private dialogue with a view to increasing Foreign Direct Investments, improving Niger’s business environment, and defining private sector priorities to possible investors. In 2018, the GoN added by Presidential Decree a Nigerien Agency for the Promotion of Private Investment and Strategic Projects (ANPIPS). This new agency reports to the HCIN and implements the lead agencies policy initiatives. The government put in place an Institutional Framework for Improving Business Climate Indicators office (Dispositif Institutionnel d’Amélioration et de Suivi du Climat des Affaires), within the Ministry of Commerce, focused on improving business climate indicators. Its goal is to create a framework that permits the implementation of sustainable reforms. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises. Energy, mineral resources, and national security related sectors restrict foreign ownership and control; otherwise, there are no limitations on ownership or control. In the extractive industries, any company to which the GoN grants a mining permit must give the GoN a minimum 10 percent share of the company. This law applies to both foreign and domestic operations. The GoN also reserves the right to require companies exploiting mineral resources to give the GoN up to a 33 percent stake in their Nigerien operations. Although Ministry of Planning authorization is required, foreign ownership of land is permitted. In 2015, under the auspices of the Ministry of Commerce, the GoN validated a new Competition and Consumer Protection Law, replacing a 1992 law that was never operational. Niger adheres to the Community Competition Law of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and directives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as those offered to investors by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) all of which provide benefits and guarantees to private companies. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises. A legal Investment Code governs most activities except accounting, which the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) governs. The Mining Code governs the mining sector and the Petroleum Code governs the petroleum sector, with regulations enforced through their respective ministries. The investment code guarantees equal treatment of investors regardless of nationality. Companies are protected against nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning throughout the national territory, except for reasons of public utility. The state remains the owner of water resources through the Niger Water Infrastructure Corporation (SPEN), created in 2001, and is responsible for the management of the state’s hydraulic infrastructure in urban and semi-urban areas, of its development, and project management. Concessions for the use of water and for the exploitation of works and hydraulic installations may be granted to legal persons governed by private law, generally by presidential decree. An investment screening mechanism does not exist under the Investment Code. The Office of the President, however, will review investment proposals for administration approval prior to further negotiation. In the past five years, the government has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews through a multi-lateral organization. Neither the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), nor the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has carried out a policy review for Niger. Niger’s one-stop shop, the Maison de l’Entreprise (Enterprise House) is mandated to enhance business facilitation by mainstreaming and simplifying the procedures required to start a business within a single window registration process. From 2016 to 2019, the cost and time needed to register businesses dropped from 100,000 CFA (about $190) to 17,500 CFA (about $33), including reducing the time to get construction permits and the cost of getting access to the water and electricity networks. Further reforms have included the creation of an e-regulations website (https://niger.eregulations.org/procedure/2/1?l=fr ), which allows for a clear and complete registration process. Foreign companies may use this website. The website lists government agencies, with which a business must register. The business registration process is about 3 days. Company registration can be done at the Centre de Formalités des Entreprises (CFE), at the Maison de l’Entreprise. Applicants must file the documents with the Commercial Registry (Registre du Commerce et du Crédit Mobilier – RCCM), which has a representative at the one-stop shop. At the same location, a company can register for taxes, obtain a tax identification number (Numéro d’Identification Fiscale – NIF), register with social security (Caisse nationale de Sécurité Sociale – CNSS), and with the employment agency (Agence Nationale pour la Promotion de l’Emploi – ANPE). Employees can be registered with CNSS at the same location. Professional activity carried out in Niger is governed by the General Tax Code. Commercial activities are subject to income tax and the general VAT regime unless specific investment clauses have been codified. Granted exemptions normally only concern activities in line with the object of the institution and a specific investment clause (humanitarian activities, health, education, etc.). Companies with a turnover excluding tax of more than 50 million CFA per calendar year($80,000) are subject to Value Added Tax. Companies with a lower turnover are not subject to VAT. As such, they cannot charge VAT, nor deduct that which has been paid upstream (suppliers). From January 1, 2021, any taxable person who delivers goods or provides services for the needs of another taxable person or an ordinary consumer is required to issue them an electronic invoice. The Investment Code offers VAT-inclusive tax exemptions depending on the size of the business. At the moment of company registration, the applicant may also request for the publication of a notice of company incorporation on the Maison de l’Entreprise website: http://mde.ne/spip.php?rubrique10 . The notice of company incorporation can alternatively be published in an official newspaper (journal d’annonces légales). The government does not promote outward investment. The government’s policy objectives, as specified in the second Nigerien Renaissance Program (section 1.2), is the development of international markets, especially that of ECOWAS, for Nigerien exports rather than investment. The GON does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The GoN possesses transparent policies and requisite laws to foster competition on a non-discriminatory basis, but does not enforce them equally, in large part due to corruption and weak governmental systems. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The Legal Regime – related to the Investment Code, Labor Code and Commercial Acts – applies the provisions of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA). It also offers free access to public procurement and with a moderate transparency in the procedures for awarding contract. Niger does not have any regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. A company in Niger must be entered in the Register of Companies, must obtain a Tax Identification Number (TIN), be registered with the National Social Security Fund (CNSS), and with the National Employment Promotion Agency (ANPE). There, however, is a large informal sector that does not submit to any of the legal provisions and is not formally regulated. Rule-making regulatory, and anti-corruption authorities exist in telecommunication, public procurement, and energy, all of which are relevant for foreign businesses, and are exercised at the national level. Law No 2015-58 established the Energy Sector Regulatory Agency, an independent administrative authority, to regulate the energy sector at the national level, but effectively only in major cities. The December 2012 law No 2012-70 created the Telecommunications and Post Office Regulatory Authority (ARTP). ARTP regulates all aspects of telecommunications operators. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The Legal Regime – related to the Tax Code, Customs Code, Investment Code, Mining Code, Petroleum Code, Labor Code and Commercial Acts – applies the provisions of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa OHADA. It also offers free access to public procurement and transparency in the procedures for awarding contracts. GoN officials have confirmed their intent to comply with international norms in its legal, regulatory, and accounting systems, but frequently fall short. Clear procedures are frequently not available. Draft bills are not always available for public comment, although some organizations, such as the Chamber of Commerce, are invited to offer suggestions during the drafting process. The GoN encourages but does not require companies to disclose environmental, social, and governance (ESG) policies. Niger does not have a centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published but does have a Directorate of National Archives where key regulatory actions are kept in print; this direction is under the Ministry Secretary of Government. Foreign and national investors, however, can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment at the following site: http://niger.eregulations.org/ . The site includes information on income generating operations including the number of steps, name and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal basis justifying the procedures. The General Inspectorate of Administrative Governance and the Regional Directorates of Archives are in place to oversee administrative processes. Their efforts are reinforced by incentives for state employees, unannounced inspections in public administrations, and an introduction of a sign-in system and exchange meetings. No major regulatory system and/or enforcement reforms were announced in 2021. Regulations are developed via a system of ministerial collaborations and discussions, consultation with the State Council and the Council of Ministers. This is followed by discussions in the National Assembly, approval by the Constitutional Council and finally approved by the President for publication and distribution to interested stakeholders. Based on the Constitution of 2011, the regulatory power belongs to the President and the Prime Minister to issue regulations for the national territory. Other administrative authorities also have regulatory power, such as ministers, governors, or prefects and mayors, who have the power of enforcement at the local level. Ministries or regulatory agencies do not conduct impact assessments of proposed regulations. However, ministries or regulatory agencies solicit comments on proposed regulations from the general public through public meetings and targeted outreach to stakeholders, such as business associations or other groups. Public comments are generally not published. Public finances and debt obligations are not sufficiently transparent. The International Monetary Fund and the European Union, however, are currently funding projects to improve financial oversight and debt transparency. The 2021 assessment indicated some progress for public information on debt obligations and the release of a bi-annual national debt report. Niger is a part of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a 15-member West African trade block. National policy generally adheres to ECOWAS guidelines concerning business regulations. Niger is a member of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development’s international network of transparent investment procedures: http://niger.eregulations.org/ (French language only). Niger is a member of the WTO, but as a lower income member, is exempt from Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) obligations. The GoN does not notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Niger ratified a Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in August 2015. The country has reported some progress on implementing the TFA requirements. Niger’s legal system is a legacy of the French colonial system. The legal infrastructure is insufficient, making it difficult to use the courts to enforce ownership of property or contracts. While Niger’s laws protect property and commercial rights, the administration of justice can be slow and unequal. Niger has a written commercial law that is heavily based on the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA). Niger has been a member of OHADA since 1995. OHADA aims to harmonize business laws in 16 African countries by adopting common rules adapted to their economies, setting up appropriate judicial procedures, and encouraging arbitration for the settlement of contractual disputes. OHADA regulations on business and commercial law include definition and classification of legal persons engaged in trade, procedures for credit and recovery of debts, means of enforcement, bankruptcy, receivership, and arbitration. In 2015, Niger set up a Commercial Court in Niamey. In 2020, 453 cases, including 24 inherited from 2019, were in summary proceedings, of which 351 were the subject of a judgment and whose minutes are available, 38 conciliation, 68 cases canceled and two remaining and postponed to 2021. The average processing time is 37 days. Article 116 of the constitution clearly states that the judicial system is independent of the executive and legislative branches. However, the personnel management process for assignments and promotions is through politically appointed personnel in the Ministry of Justice, seriously weakening the independence of the judiciary and raising questions about the fairness and reliability of the judicial process. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable and adjudicated in the court system. However, it is extremely rare for individuals or corporations to challenge government regulations or enforcement actions in court due to costs and administrative obstacles. For example, the GoN may require companies to submit up to 75 percent of a claimed tax discrepancy prior to legal appeal. Niger offers guarantees to foreign direct investors pertaining to security of capital and investment, compensation for expropriation, and equality of treatment. Foreign investors may be permitted to transfer income derived from invested capital and from liquidated investments, provided the original investment is made in convertible currencies. Law 2015-08 from 2015 established a specialized Commercial Court in Niamey. This is a mixed court with professional magistrates, who are lawyers by training, who work in tandem with lay-judges, and who generally come from the commercial sector. The concept was to have commercial disputes resolved by a panel of judges with legal training, combined with judges who have experience in the commercial sector. The Commercial Court has 26 judges, who make up five chambers. Unlike U.S. trial courts, where cases are handled by a single judge, in Niger, cases are adjudicated by a panel of judges. Judicial decisions that have come out in the past years can be found on the Commerce Tribunal of Niamey’s website: http://www.tribunalcommerceniamey.org/index.php . The Chamber of Commerce and Industry houses a specialized institution, known as the Investment Promotion Center (CPI) which supports domestic and foreign investors in terms of business creation, extension and rehabilitation. The GoN also established the The Single Window for Foreign Trade (Guichet Unique du Commerce Exterieur), an information and facilitation system for foreign trade, electronic and dematerialized, intended to simplify and modernize procedures to facilitate the passage of goods entering and leaving the national territory of Niger. Its main missions are to: facilitate foreign trade operations by improving procedures and information flows among stakeholders; facilitate, simplify and rationalize the procedures relating to the application, issue and collection of authorizations prior to import, export and transit operations; facilitate, simplify and rationalize, for all the modes of transport concerned, the procedures relating to the processing, entry and exit of goods from the territory of the Republic of Niger; and facilitate and simplify the completion of administrative and logistical formalities while respecting the prerogatives of all stakeholders. In 2015, the Ministry of Trade validated a new Competition and Consumer Protection Law, replacing a 1992 law that was never fully operational. Niger also adheres to the Community Competition Law of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The Investment Code guarantees that no business will be subject to nationalization or expropriation except when deemed “in the public interest” as prescribed by the law. The code requires that the government compensate any expropriated business with just and equitable payment. There have been a number of expropriations of commercial and personal property, most of which were not conducted in a manner consistent with Nigerien law requiring “just and prior compensation.” It is in fact rare for property owners to be compensated by the government after expropriations of property. In cases of expropriation carried out by the GoN, claimants and community leaders have alleged a lack of due process. These complaints are currently limited to community forums and press coverage. Many of the families impacted lack the knowledge and ability to exercise their rights under the law. High rates of illiteracy, complexity of the legal system, and lack of resources to retain competent legal counsel present insurmountable barriers to legal remedies for people whose property has been expropriated. Even in situations where educated and wealthy business owners have had their property expropriated, legal challenges to expropriation are not lodged. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Niger is a contracting state of both the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention of 1958. There is no domestic legislation providing for enforcement of awards under the 1958 New York Convention and/or under the ICSID Convention. Investor-State Dispute Settlement The Investment Code offers the possibility for foreign nationals to seek remedy through the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. Niger does not have a BIT or FTA with the United States that would provide dispute settlement processes. Over the past 10 years, there were no investment disputes that involved a U.S. person. Local courts are generally reluctant to recognize foreign arbitral awards issued against the GoN. Niger does not have a record of extrajudicial actions against foreign investors. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Niger has an operational center for mediation and arbitration of business disputes. The center’s stated aim is to maintain investor confidence by eliminating long and expensive procedures traditionally involved in the resolution of business disputes. The Investment Code provides for settlement of disputes by arbitration or by recourse to the World Bank’s International Center for Settlement of Disputes on Investment. However, investment dispute mechanisms in contracts are not always respected and exercising due diligence is extremely important. There was no publicly available information in 2021on foreign arbitral award enforcement in Niger. Procedures are in place but are often not adhered to because of a lack of resources and corruption in the judicial system. The Investment Code offers the possibility for foreign nationals to seek remedy through the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. Niger has laws related to insolvency and/or bankruptcy. Creditors have the right to object to decisions accepting or rejecting a creditor’s claims and may vote on debtors’ bankruptcy reorganization plans. However, the creditors’ rights are limited: creditors do not have the right to receive from a reorganized firm as much as they may have received from one that had been liquidated. Likewise, the law does not require that creditors be consulted on matters pertaining to an insolvency framework following the declaration of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is not criminalized. According to data collected by the World Bank’s Doing Business survey, resolving insolvency takes five years on average and costs 18 percent of the debtor’s total assets. Globally, Niger stands at 114 in the 2020 ranking of 190 economies on the ease of resolving insolvency. Niger strength of insolvency framework index (0–16) is 9. 6. Financial Sector Niger’s government welcomes foreign portfolio investment where possible. Niger’s capital markets are extremely underdeveloped, and the country do not have its own stock market. However, the country shares a regional stock market The Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières (BRVM) with the eight (8) Member States in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). This is the only stock market in the world shared by several countries, run totally in digital format. Although an effective regulatory system exists, and policies in fact encourage portfolio investment, there is little market liquidity and hence little opportunity for such investment. The agency UMOA-Titres (AUT), a regional agency to support public securities issuance and management in the WAEMU (bonds market), is dedicated to helping member states use capital markets to raise the resources they need to fund their economic development policies at reasonable cost. There are no limits on the free flow of financial resources. The government works closely with the IMF to ensure that payments and transfers overseas occur without undue restrictions. Credit is allocated on market terms and foreigners do not face discrimination. Credit is allocated on market terms through large corporations. Although foreign investors are generally able to get credit on the local market, limited domestic availability tends to drive investors to international markets. To access a variety of credit instruments, the private sector often looks to multinational institutions in Niger or international sources for credit. Private actors in the agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fisheries sectors (which account for more than 40 percent of GDP) receive less than one percent of total bank credit. The banking sector in Niger is generally healthy and well capitalized, but suffers from low financial inclusion. The gross domestic savings rate increased by 1.4 percentage points, standing at 17.4% in 2017 (including the decentralized financial system). According to the Central Bank statistics, only 8 % of th active adult population have bank accounts (2020). In the WAEMU States, the average is 45%. The proportion of women excluded from financial services is 89% and that of people living in rural areas is 85% in 2020. As of December 31, 2020, the resources mobilized by the banking system amounted to 1250.67 billion CFA (2.23 billion USD), an increase of 164.73 billion cfaf (294.1 million USD) or 15.2 percent compared to the same period of 2019. Foreign banks control about 80 percent of the sector’s assets, with SONIBANK, BIA Niger, Ecobank and Bank of Africa (BOA) being the largest banks operating in the country. The Central Bank of West African States governs Niger’s banking institutions and sets minimum reserve requirements through its national Central Bank representation. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account, and foreign banks and their subsidiaries operate within the economy without undue restrictions. Niger is a part of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), which utilizes the CFA, pegged to the Euro at 655.61 CFA per euro. Foreign Exchange There are no restrictions or limitations placed on foreign investors in converting, transferring, or repatriating funds associated with an investment, including remittances. Funds are freely convertible into any world currency. However, the government must approve currency conversions above 2 million CFA (approximately 3,413 USD). The exchange rate is determined via the euro’s fluctuations on the international currency market. The CFA is pegged to the euro. Remittance Policies Niger’s Investment Code offers the possibility to transfer income of any kind, including capital investment and the proceeds of investment liquidation, regardless of the destination. There are no limitations or waiting periods on remittances, though the Ministry of Finance must approve currency conversions above 2 million CFA (approximately 3,250 USD). Niger does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF), and does not subscribe to the Santiago Principles. The government has plans for a build-up of reserves at the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) using oil revenues. 10. Political and Security Environment Niger has been politically stable since 2010, when the most recent of Niger’s coup d’états (there have been four since 1990) concluded within less than a year in a return to democratic governance. The most recent general elections were held in in December 2020, with a presidential run-off in February 2021. President Bazoum Mohamed was elected in the first democratic transfer of executive power in Niger’s history. Although Niger’s politics are often contentious and antagonistic, political violence is rare. Most parties agree that national security and peaceful cohabitation among Niger’s ethnicities are the government’s principal priority. However, protests and strikes about non-payment of salaries for public employees, lack of funding for education, and general dissatisfaction with social conditions remain a concern. Public protest over issues like poverty, corruption, and unemployment can also sometimes turn violent. In 2020, police arrested several protesters engaged in burning tires and vandalizing property in protest of embezzlement at the Ministry of National Defense. Protests also followed the government’s announcement of social lockdown procedures in March 2020 to respond to COVID-19. Niger experiences security threats on three distinct border areas. Niger is a founding member of the G5 Sahel fighting terrorism in the Sahel while integrating the poverty reduction dimension to mitigate the effects of youth underemployment and violent extremism. The collapse of the Libyan state to the north has resulted in a flow of weapons and extremists throughout the Sahel region. Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa terrorists regularly launch attacks in the Diffa Region in Niger’s southeast. Jama’at al Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), which is a loose affiliation of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), Ansar Dine, and al-Mourabitoun; along with ISIS-Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS), threaten Niger’s northern and northwestern borders. Terrorists regularly crossed the Mali border to attack civilian and security sites in the Tillaberi and Tahoua regions. Niger has a history of western residents and aid workers being kidnapped by terrorist groups or kidnapping for ransom gangs, as recently as October 2020. So far, more than 40 out of the 266 communes in Niger are in a state of emergency. The State Department’s Travel Advisory for Niger from April 2022 advises travels to be aware that violent crimes including robbery are common and terrorism is a threat. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2019 $11,191 2020 $13,741 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A N/A N/A UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: https://data.worldbank.org/country/niger Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (through 2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 6,617 100% Total Outward N/A N/A France 2,836 42% China 2,678 40% Turkey 240 4% India 133 2% Algeria 113 2% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Nigeria Executive Summary Nigeria’s economy – Africa’s largest – exited recession with a 3.4% GDP growth rate in 2021 following a contraction of 1.9% the previous year. The IMF forecasts growth rates of under 3% in 2022 and 2023 while the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics predicts a more robust 4.2% growth rate in 2022. President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration has prioritized diversification of Nigeria’s economy beyond oil and gas, with the stated goals of building a competitive manufacturing sector, expanding agricultural output, and capitalizing on Nigeria’s technological and innovative advantages. With the largest population in Africa, Nigeria is an attractive consumer market for investors and traders, and offering abundant natural resources and a low-cost labor pool. The government has undertaken reforms to help improve the business environment, including by facilitating faster business start-up by allowing electronic stamping of registration documents and making it easier to obtain construction permits, register property, obtain credit, and pay taxes. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows nevertheless declined from roughly $1 billion in 2020 to $699 million in 2021 as persistent challenges remain. Corruption is a serious obstacle to Nigeria’s economic growth and is often cited by domestic and foreign investors as a significant barrier to doing business. Nigeria’s ranking in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index fell slightly from its 2020 score of 149 out of 175 countries to154 of 180 in 2021. Businesses report that corruption by customs and port officials often leads to extended delays in port clearance processes and to other issues importing goods. Nigeria’s trade regime is protectionist in key areas. High tariffs, restricted foreign exchange availability for 44 categories of imports, and prohibitions on many other import items have the aim of spurring domestic agricultural and manufacturing sector growth. The government provides tax incentives and customs duty exemptions for pioneer industries including renewable energy. A decline in oil exports, rising prices for imported goods, an overvalued currency, and Nigeria’s expensive fuel subsidy regime continued to exert pressure on the country’s foreign exchange reserves in 2021. Domestic and foreign businesses frequently cite lack of access to foreign currency as a significant impediment to doing business. Nigeria’s underdeveloped power sector is a bottleneck to broad-based economic development and forces most businesses to generate a significant portion of their own electricity. Reform of Nigeria’s power sector is ongoing, but investor confidence continues to be weakened by regulatory uncertainty and limited domestic natural gas supply. Security remains a concern to investors in Nigeria due to violent crime, kidnappings for ransom, and terrorism in certain parts of the country. The ongoing Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa (ISIS-WA) insurgencies have included attacks against civilian and military targets in the northeast of the country. Nigeria has experienced a rise in kidnappings for ransom and attacks on villages by armed gangs in the North West and North Central regions. Criminal attacks on oil and gas infrastructure in the Niger Delta region that restricted oil production in 2016 have eased, but a significant rise in illegal bunkering and oil theft has left the sector in a similar state of decreased output. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 154 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 118 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $6,811 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $2,000 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) Act of 1995, amended in 2004, dismantled controls and limits on FDI, allowing for 100% foreign ownership in all sectors, except those prohibited by law for both local and foreign entities. These include arms and ammunitions, narcotics, and military apparel. In practice, however, some regulators include a domestic equity requirement before granting foreign firms an operational license. Nevertheless, foreign investors receive largely the same treatment as domestic investors in Nigeria, including tax incentives. The Act also created the NIPC with a mandate to encourage and assist investment in Nigeria. The NIPC features a One-Stop Investment Center (OSIC) that includes participation by 27 governmental and parastatal agencies to consolidate and streamline administrative procedures for new businesses and investments. The NIPC is empowered to negotiate special incentives for substantial and/or strategic investments. The Act also provides guarantees against nationalization and expropriation. The NIPC occasionally convenes meetings between investors and relevant government agencies with the objective of resolving specific investor complaints. The NIPC’s role and effectiveness is limited to that of convenor and moderator in these sessions as it has no authority over other government agencies to enforce compliance. The NIPC’s ability to attract new investment is thus limited due to its inability to resolve certain such investment challenges. The Nigerian government continues to promote import substitution policies such as trade restrictions, foreign exchange restrictions, and local content requirements in a bid to funnel investment toward domestic production capacity and to reduce Nigeria’s reliance on foreign imports. The import bans and high tariffs used to advance Nigeria’s import substitution goals have been undermined by smuggling of targeted products through the country’s porous borders, and by corruption in the import quota systems developed by the government to incentivize domestic investment. The government opened land borders in December 2020, which were progressively closed to commercial trade starting in August 2019 with the aim of curbing smuggling and bolstering domestic production. Investment by foreign and domestic private entities is prohibited in industries contained in the “negative list.” These include production of arms and ammunition, narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, and military and paramilitary wear and accoutrements. The Federal Executive Council maintains the right to amend the list as it deems fit. There are currently no limits on foreign control of investments; however, some Nigerian regulatory bodies have insisted on domestic equity as a prerequisite to doing business. The NIPC Act of 1995, amended in 2004, liberalized the ownership structure of business in Nigeria, allowing foreign investors to own and control 100% of the shares in any company. One hundred percent ownership of firms is allowed in the oil and gas sector while ownership of mineral resources is vested in the federal government. However, the dominant models for oil extraction are joint venture and production sharing agreements between oil companies (both foreign and local) and the federal government. Foreign investors must register with the NIPC after incorporation under the Companies and Allied Matters Act reviewed in 2020. A foreign company intending to operate in Nigeria must incorporate a company or subsidiary. It may apply for an exemption to this requirement if it meets certain conditions including working on a specialized project specifically for the government, or on a project funded by a multilateral or bilateral donor or a foreign state-owned enterprise. However, a foreign entity can invest in a Nigerian company without incorporation. Importers of foreign technology must obtain a certificate from the National Office of Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP). One of the prerequisites for obtaining the certificate is the provision of a Technology Transfer Agreement duly approved by NOTAP. The NIPC Act prohibits the nationalization or expropriation of foreign enterprises except in cases of national interest and stipulates modalities for “fair and adequate” compensation should that occur. The World Bank published an Investment Policy and Regulatory Review of Nigeria in 2019. It provides an overview of Nigeria’s legal and regulatory framework as it affects FDI, foreign investors, and businesses at large and is available at https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/305141586325201141/nigeria-2019-investment-policy-and-regulatory-review. The WTO published a trade policy review of Nigeria in 2017, which also includes a brief overview and assessment of Nigeria’s investment climate. That review is available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp456_e.htm. The government established the Presidential Enabling Business Environment Council (PEBEC) in 2016 with the objective of removing constraints to starting and running a business in Nigeria. PEBEC’s implementation was supported by Presidential Executive Orders aimed at improving business transparency and efficiency. PEBEC’s focus areas include: starting a business, cross-border and domestic movement of people and goods, obtaining credit and resolving insolvency, enforcing contracts, registering property, acquiring construction permits and electricity, and paying taxes. PEBEC’s significant achievements were in the areas of starting a business, acquiring construction permits and electricity, registering property, and enforcing contracts. Despite these improvements, Nigeria remains a difficult place to do business, with companies suffering from regulatory uncertainty, policy inconsistency, poor infrastructure, foreign exchange shortages and customs inconsistency and inefficiency. These many challenges are reflected in the fact that Nigeria’s leading trade indices lag behind regional averages. The One-Stop Investment Center (OSIC), housed within the NIPC, co-locates 27 relevant government agencies including the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), and the Immigration Service to provide fast-tracked, efficient, and transparent services to investors. The OSIC assists with visas for investors, company incorporation, business permits and registration, tax registration, immigration, and customs issues. Investors may pick up documents and approvals that are statutorily required to establish an investment project in Nigeria. In 2021, NIPC launched the electronic OSIC which allows investors to register businesses, submit documents, and pay fees remotely on its Single Window Investors’ Portal (SWIP). All businesses, both foreign and local, are required to register with CAC before commencing operations. CAC began online registration as part of PEBEC reforms. Online registration is straightforward and consists of three major steps: name search, reservation of business name, and registration. A registration guideline is available on the website as is a post-registration portal for enacting changes to company details. The CAC online registration website is https://pre.cac.gov.ng/home. The registration requires the signature of a Legal Practitioner and attestation by a Notary Public or Commissioner for Oaths. Business registration can be completed online but the certificate of incorporation is usually collected at a CAC office upon presentation of the original application and supporting documents. Online registration can be completed in as little as three days if there are no issues with the application. On average, a limited liability company (LLC) in Nigeria can be established in seven days. This average is significantly faster than the 22-day average for Sub-Saharan Africa. It is also faster than the OECD average of nine days. Timing may vary in different parts of the country. Companies must register with the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) for tax payments purposes. If the company operates in a state other than the Federal Capital Territory, it must also register with the relevant state tax authority. CAC issues a Tax Identification Number (TIN) to all businesses on completion of registration which must be validated on the FIRS website https://apps.firs.gov.ng/tinverification/ and subsequently used to register to pay taxes. The FIRS then assigns a tax office with which the business will engage for tax payments purposes. Some taxes may also be filed and paid online on the FIRS website. Foreign companies are also required to register with NIPC which maintains a database of all foreign companies operating in Nigeria. Investors can register online through NIPC’s SWIP platform: https://swip.nipc.gov.ng/auth.php?a=r. Companies which import capital must do so through an authorized dealer, typically a bank, after which they are issued a Certificate of Capital Importation. This certificate entitles the foreign investor to open a bank account in foreign currency and provides access to foreign exchange for repatriation, imports, and other purposes. A company engaging in international trade must get an import-export license from the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS). Businesses may also be required to register with and/or obtain licenses from other regulatory agencies which supervise the sector within which they operate. Nigeria does not promote outward direct investments. Instead, it focuses on promoting exports especially as a means of reducing its reliance on oil exports and diversifying the sources of its foreign exchange earnings. The Nigerian Export Promotion Council (NEPC) administered a revised Export Expansion Grant (EEG) in 2018 when the federal government set aside 5.1 billion naira ($13 million) in the 2019 budget for the EEG scheme. The Nigerian Export-Import (NEXIM) Bank provides commercial bank guarantees and direct lending to facilitate export sector growth, although these services are underused. NEXIM’s Foreign Input Facility provides normal commercial terms of three to five years (or longer) for the importation of machinery and raw materials used for generating exports. Agencies created to promote industrial exports remain burdened by uneven management, vaguely defined policy guidelines, and corruption. Nigeria’s inadequate power supply and lack of infrastructure, coupled with the associated high production costs, leave Nigerian exporters at a significant disadvantage. Many Nigerian businesses fail to export because they find meeting international packaging and safety standards is too difficult or expensive. Similarly, firms often are unable to meet consumer demand for a consistent supply of high-quality goods in sufficient quantities to support exports and meet demand. Most Nigerian manufacturers remain unable to or uninterested in competing in the international market, given the size of Nigeria’s domestic market. Domestic firms are not restricted from investing abroad. However, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN mandates that export earnings be repatriated to Nigeria, and controls access to the foreign exchange required for such investments. Noncompliance with the directive carries sanctions including expulsion from accessing financial services and the foreign exchange market. Nigeria’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in April 2020 prohibited investment and trading platforms from facilitating Nigerians’ purchase of foreign securities listed on other stock exchanges. SEC cites Nigeria’s Investment and Securities Act of 2007, which mandates that only foreign securities listed on a Nigerian exchange should be sold to the Nigerian investing public. 3. Legal Regime Nigeria’s legal, accounting, and regulatory systems comply with international norms, but application and enforcement remain uneven. Opportunities for public comment and input into proposed regulations rarely occur. Professional organizations set standards for the provision of professional services, such as accounting, law, medicine, engineering, and advertising. These standards usually comply with international norms. No legal barriers prevent entry into these sectors. Ministries and regulatory agencies are meant to develop and make public anticipated regulatory changes or proposals and publish proposed regulations before their application. The general public should have the opportunity to comment through targeted outreach, including business groups and stakeholders, and during the public hearing process before a bill becomes law, but this is not always the case. There is no specialized agency tasked with publicizing proposed changes and the time period for comment may vary. Ministries and agencies do conduct impact assessments, including environmental, but assessment methodologies may vary. The National Bureau of Statistics reviews regulatory impact assessments conducted by other agencies. Laws and regulations are publicly available. Fiscal management occurs at all three tiers of government: federal, 36 state governments and Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja, and 774 local government areas (LGAs). Revenues from oil and non-oil sources are collected into the federation account and then shared among the different tiers of government by the Federal Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) in line with a statutory sharing formula. All state governments can collect internally generated revenues, which vary from state to state. The fiscal federalism structure does not compel states to be accountable to the federal government or transparent about revenues generated or received from the federation account. However, the federal government can demand states meet predefined minimum fiscal transparency requirements as prerequisites for obtaining federal loans. For instance, compliance with the 22-point Fiscal Sustainability Plan, which focused on ensuring better state financial performance, more sustainable debt management, and improved accountability and transparency, was a prerequisite for obtaining a federal government bailout in 2016. The federal government’s finances are more transparent as budgets are made public and the financial data are published by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Debt Management Office (DMO), the Budget Office of the Federation, and the National Bureau of Statistics. The state-owned oil company (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)) began publishing audited financial data in 2020. Foreign companies operate successfully in Nigeria’s service sectors, including telecommunications, accounting, insurance, banking, and advertising. The Investment and Securities Act of 2007 forbids monopolies, insider trading, and unfair practices in securities dealings. Nigeria is not a party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Nigeria generally regulates investment in line with the WTO’s Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) Agreement, but the government’s local content requirements in the oil and gas sector and the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector may conflict with Nigeria’s commitments under TRIMS. ECOWAS implemented a Common External Tariff (CET) beginning in 2015 with a five-year phase in period. An internal CET implementation committee headed by the Fiscal Policy/Budget Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) was set up to develop the implementation work plans that were consistent with national and ECOWAS regulations. The CET was slated to be fully harmonized by 2020, but in practice some ECOWAS Member States have maintained deviations from the CET beyond the January 1, 2020, deadline. The country has put in place a CET monitoring committee domiciled at the Ministry of Finance, consisting of several ministries, departments, and agencies related to the CET. The country applies five tariff bands under the CET: zero duty on capital goods, machinery, and essential drugs not produced locally; 5% duty on imported raw materials; 10% duty on intermediate goods; 20% duty on finished goods; and 35% duty on goods in certain sectors that the Nigerian government seeks to protect including palm oil, meat products, dairy, and poultry. The CET permits ECOWAS member governments to calculate import duties higher than the maximum allowed in the tariff bands (but not to exceed a total effective duty of 70%) for up to 3% of the 5,899 tariff lines included in the ECOWAS CET. Nigeria has a complex, three-tiered legal system comprised of English common law, Islamic law, and Nigerian customary law. Most business transactions are governed by common law modified by statutes to meet local demands and conditions. The Supreme Court is the pinnacle of the judicial system and has original and appellate jurisdiction in specific constitutional, civil, and criminal matters as prescribed by Nigeria’s constitution. The Federal High Court has jurisdiction over revenue matters, admiralty law, banking, foreign exchange, other currency and monetary or fiscal matters, and lawsuits to which the federal government or any of its agencies are party. The Nigerian court system is generally slow and inefficient, lacks adequate court facilities and computerized document-processing systems, and poorly remunerates judges and other court officials, all of which encourages corruption and undermines enforcement. Judges frequently fail to appear for trials and court officials lack proper equipment and training. The constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary; however, the judicial branch remains susceptible to pressure from the executive and legislative branches. Political leaders have influenced the judiciary, particularly at the state and local levels. The Doing Business report credited business reforms for improving contract enforcement by issuing new rules of civil procedure for small claims courts, which limit adjournments to unforeseen and exceptional circumstances but noted that there can be variation in performance indicators between cities in Nigeria (as in other developing countries). For example, resolving a commercial dispute takes 476 days in Kano but 376 days in Lagos. In the case of Lagos, the 376 days includes 40 days for filing and service, 194 days for trial and judgment, and 142 days for enforcement of the judgment with total costs averaging 42% of the claim. In Kano, however, filing and service only takes 21 days with enforcement of judgement only taking 90 days, but trial and judgment accounts for 365 days with total costs averaging lower at 28% of the claim. In comparison, in OECD countries the corresponding figures are an average of 589.6 days and averaging 21.5% of the claim and in sub-Saharan countries an average of 654.9 days and averaging 41.6% of the claim. The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) Act allows 100 percent foreign ownership of firms. Foreign investors must register with the NIPC after incorporation under the Companies and Allied Matters Act of 2020. The NIPC Act prohibits the nationalization or expropriation of foreign enterprises except in case of national interest, but the Embassy is unaware of specific instances of such interference by the government. The NIPC website (nipc.gov.ng) provides information on investing in Nigeria, and its One-Stop Investment Center co-locates 27 government agencies with equities in the foreign company registration process. The Nigerian government enacted the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection (FCCPC) Act in 2019. The Act repealed the Consumer Protection Act of 2004 and replaced the previous Consumer Protection Council with a Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission while also creating a Competition and Consumer Protection Tribunal to handle issues and disputes arising from the operations of the Act. Under the terms of the Act, businesses will be able to lodge anti-competitive practices complaints against other firms in the Tribunal. The Act prohibits agreements made to restrain competition, such as price fixing, price rigging, collusive tendering, etc. (with specific exemptions for collective bargaining agreements and employment, among other items). The Act empowers the President of Nigeria to regulate prices of certain goods and services on the recommendation of the Commission. The law prescribes stringent fines for non-compliance. The law mandates a fine of up to 10% of the company’s annual turnover in the preceding business year for offences. The law harmonizes oversight for consumer protection, consolidating it under the FCCPC. An entity may seek redress from a court of law if it is not satisfied with the ruling of the FCCPC. The federal government has not expropriated or nationalized foreign assets recently, and the NIPC Act forbids nationalization of a business or assets unless the acquisition is in the national interest or for a public purpose. In such cases, investors are entitled to fair compensation and legal redress. The federal government’s drive to domesticate foreign investments has led to a number of seemingly discriminatory actions against a prominent South African firm. Nigeria’s attorney general demanded the payment of $2 billion which he alleged the company owed in taxes over ten years, a suit which was later dropped in 2020 in favor of negotiations with the FIRS. In 2018, the company paid $53 million to settle a CBN case in which it was accused of illegally repatriating $8.1 billion. Another South African company is involved in a $4.7 billion tax dispute with the FIRS. Reflecting Nigeria’s business culture, entrepreneurs generally do not seek bankruptcy protection. Claims often go unpaid, even in cases where creditors obtain judgments against defendants. Under Nigerian law, the term bankruptcy generally refers to individuals whereas corporate bankruptcy is referred to as insolvency. The former is regulated by the Bankruptcy Act of 1990, as amended by Bankruptcy Decree 109 of 1992. The latter is regulated by the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) revised in 2020. Insolvency solutions in CAMA 2020 focus on rescuing insolvent corporates, where debt recovery options are feasible, instead of the former objective which focused largely on the wind-up process. Once determined insolvent, company shareholders are allowed to enter into a binding agreement with creditors or apply to a court to appoint an administrator thereby obviating the need for claims by creditors. The debt threshold required for triggering compulsory liquidation is 200,000 naira ($480). The Act also ranks the claims of secured creditors above all other claims and forbids shareholders or administrators from favoring a creditor above another within the same creditor class. The Embassy is not aware of U.S. companies that have had to avail themselves of the insolvency provisions under Nigerian law. 6. Financial Sector The NIPC Act of 1995, amended in 2004, liberalized Nigeria’s foreign investment regime, which has facilitated access to credit from domestic financial institutions. The government, and the CBN in particular, has sought to diversify foreign exchange inflows by encouraging foreign portfolio investments (FPI). High returns on the CBN’s open market operation (OMO) bills as well as the exclusion of certain classes of domestic investors from the market yielded high levels of FPI. However, a tightening of monetary policy, foreign exchange shortages, revised CBN guidelines on OMO bills, and capital restrictions amidst COVID-19 disruptions have led to a decline in FPI. CBN officials indicate that OMO offerings to foreigners will be phased out – a departure from its strategy of attracting hard currency investments to shore up foreign exchange supply – once current obligations have been redeemed due to the large interest repayment burden placed on the CBN. Foreign investors who have incorporated their companies in Nigeria have equal access to all financial instruments. Some investors consider the capital market, specifically the Nigerian Exchange Group (NXG), a financing option, given commercial banks’ high interest rates and the short maturities of local debt instruments. Financial institutions provide credit on market terms, but rates are relatively high due to high inflation and a high benchmark interest rate. The NXG completed a demutualization process in 2021 which transformed the company, previously privately held and called the Nigerian Stock Exchange, to a public company limited by shares. The NXG all-share index closed 2021 with over 42,000 points, a 4% increase from the end of 2020. As of December 2021, the NXG had 157 listed companies with an equity market capitalization of 22.3 trillion naira ($53.5 billion), an increase of 6% from 2020. The share of foreign investment in equity trading declined to 22% in 2021 from 35% in 2020 and over 50% in 2018. This decline is indicative of foreign investors’ diminishing appetite for Nigerian securities especially as repatriation concerns continue to mount. The NXG sovereign bond index declined year-on-year by 14% in 2021. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the government agency tasked with regulating and developing the capital market. SEC creates operational guidelines and licenses securities and market intermediaries. The Nigerian government has considered requiring companies in certain sectors such as telecoms, oil, and gas, or over a certain size to list on the NXG as a means to encourage greater corporate participation and sectoral balance in the Nigerian stock exchange, but those proposals have not been enacted. The government employs debt instruments, issuing treasury bills of one year or less, and bonds of various maturities ranging from two to 30 years. Nigeria is increasingly relying on the bond market to finance its widening deficit, especially as domestic bond rates fell well below Nigeria’s Eurobond rates in 2021. In addition, Nigeria continues its reluctance or refusal to accept certain conditionalities attached to multilateral borrowing, and has increasingly forgone World Bank and Africa Development Bank loans that have required it to free the exchange rate, eliminate subsidies, create an agricultural exchange, easing trade restrictions, amont other macro/fiscal reforms. The government’s preferred option in recent times has been the capital market, foreign or domestic. It has also made increased use of Export–Import Bank of China loans, as these conditions are not as rigorous as is the case with multilateral institutions. Domestic borrowing accounted for 76% of new government borrowings in the first eleven months of 2021. Some state governments have issued bonds to finance development projects, while some domestic banks have used the bond market to raise additional capital. Nigeria’s SEC has issued stringent guidelines for states wishing to raise funds on capital markets, such as requiring credit assessments conducted by recognized credit rating agencies. The CBN is the apex monetary authority of Nigeria; it was established by the CBN Act of 1958 and commenced operations on July 1, 1959. It has oversight of all banks and other financial institutions and is designed to be operationally independent of political interference although the CBN governor is appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. The amended CBN Act of 2007 mandates the CBN to have the overall control and administration of the monetary and financial sector policies of the government. The new Banking and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) of 2020 broadens CBN’s regulatory oversight function to include financial technology companies as it prohibits the operations of unlicensed financial institutions. The revised BOFIA also grants partial immunity to the CBN and its officials from judicial intervention on actions arising from activities undertaken to implement the Act. Furthermore, the Act forbids restorative orders and limits remedies sought against the CBN where it has revoked a license to monetary compensation. Foreign banks and investors are allowed to establish banking business in Nigeria provided they meet the current minimum capital requirement of 25 billion naira ($60 million) and other applicable regulatory requirements for banking license as prescribed by the CBN. The CBN regulations for foreign banks regarding mergers with or acquisitions of existing local banks in the country stipulate that the foreign institutions’ aggregate investment must not be more than 10% of the latter’s total capital. Any foreign-owned bank in Nigeria that wishes to acquire or merge with a local bank must have operated in Nigeria for a minimum of five years. To qualify for merger or acquisition of any of Nigeria’s local banks, the foreign bank must have achieved a penetration of two-thirds of the states of the federation, that is, to have branches in at least 24 out of the 36 states in Nigeria. The CBN also stipulates that the foreign bank or investors’ shareholding arising from the merger or acquisition should not exceed 40% of the total capital of the resultant entity. The CBN currently licenses 24 deposit-taking commercial banks in Nigeria. Following a 2009 banking crisis, CBN officials intervened in eight commercial banks and worked to stabilize the sector through reforms, including the adoption of uniform year-end International Financial Reporting Standards to increase transparency, a stronger emphasis on risk management and corporate governance, and the nationalization of three distressed banks. The CBN has since intervened in the sector using bridge banks and capital injections to avoid bank failures. The CBN has licensed three non-interest banks since it released operational guidelines in 2011. There are six licensed merchant banks which provide asset management and capital market activities, the latter through a subsidiary registered by SEC, and 882 microfinance banks licensed by the CBN to provide services largely to those not served by conventional banks. The CBN reiterated its commitment to increasing the level of financial inclusion in the country from 60% in 2020 to 95% by 2024. The CBN plans to achieve this goal by leveraging technology and relaxing its criteria for financial services market entry. Most notably, telecom companies previously excluded from providing financial services are now eligible for payment service banking and digital financial services licenses. The CBN also licenses agents to provide financial services on behalf of commercial banks and other licensed financial services providers in underserved areas. According to the IMF’s Financial Access Survey for 2021, there were 5,158 bank branches in Nigeria in 2020 which amounted to 4.5 branches per 100,000 adults; the number of automated teller machines per 100,000 adults was to 16.1; there were 142 mobile money agents per thousand square kilometers; and the number of registered mobile money agents per thousand adults fell by more than half to 61. The banking sector remained resilient in 2021 despite the risks and challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The five largest banks recorded 3%, 9% and 6% increases in revenues, profits, and assets, respectively, in the first half of the year. The CBN reported that non-performing loans (NPLs) declined to 4.9% in December 2021, breaching the 5% prudential threshold for the first time in over a decade. This is a significant decline from 6.4% and 9.4% in June of 2020 and 2021, respectively. The steady fall in NPLs is attributable to the CBN’s post-COVID forbearance measures as well as increased banking sector recoveries, disposals, and write-offs. The industry average capital adequacy ratio (CAR) was 14.5% as of December 2021, compared to a minimum regulatory threshold of 10% for ordinary banks and 15% for domestically systemically important banks (D-SIBS) and banks with international authorization. According to the CBN’s 2019 Financial Stability Report, seven D-SIBs account for 64% of banking assets, 65% of industry deposits, and 66% of industry loans, hence their failure could disrupt the entire financial system and the country’s economy. D-SIBS usually record higher CARs while smaller banks pull down the industry average. D-SIBS recorded an average CAR of 19.8% compared to the then average of 15.2%. Weaker banks thereby pose a risk to Nigeria’s financial system stability. In its first monetary policy meeting of 2022, the CBN noted downside risks to the sector were associated with sluggish post-COVID growth and resolved to “closely monitor” and “swiftly respond to emerging challenges.” Total banking sector assets rose from 51 trillion naira ($122.3 billion) in 2020 to 59 trillion naira ($141.4 billion) while deposits increased to 38.4 trillion naira ($92 billion) in 2021. Nigeria’s five largest banks by assets, considered Tier 1 banks by the CBN, recorded combined total assets of 40 trillion naira ($96 billion) – about two-thirds of the industry total – in the first half of 2021. Access Bank leads the pack with 10.1 trillion naira ($24.2 billion) in assets, followed by Zenith Bank with 8.5 trillion naira (20.4 billion), UBA with 8.3 trillion naira ($20 billion), First Bank with 8 trillion naira ($19.2 billion), and GTB with 5 trillion naira ($12 billion). The CBN has continued its system of liquidity management using unorthodox monetary policies. The measures included an increase in the cash reserve ratio (CRR) to 27.5% – among the highest globally – to absorb the excess liquidity within the system which was a direct consequence of the lack of investment opportunities. The CBN arbitrarily debited banks for carrying excess loanable deposits on their books resulting in the effective CRR for some banks rising as high as 50%, which limited banks’ capacity to lend. The CBN also enforced a 65% minimum loan to deposit ratio in order to increase private sector credit and boost productivity. In December 2020, the CBN released some of the excess CRR back to banks by selling them special bills in an attempt to improve liquidity and support economic recovery. Under Nigerian laws and banking regulations, one of the conditions any foreigner seeking to open a bank account in Nigeria must fulfill is to be a legal resident in Nigeria. The foreigner must have obtained the Nigerian resident permit, known as the Combined Expatriate Residence Permit and Aliens Card which can only be processed by a foreigner that has been employed by a Nigerian company through an expatriate quota. Another requirement is the biometric BVN, which every account holder in Nigeria must have according CBN regulations. Only a company duly registered in Nigeria can open a bank account in the country. Therefore, a foreign company is not entitled to open a bank account in Nigeria unless its subsidiary has been registered in Nigeria. The Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority (NSIA) manages Nigeria’s sovereign wealth fund. It was created by the NSIA Act in 2011 to harness Nigeria’s robust oil revenues toward economic stability, wealth creation, and infrastructure development. The NSIA received $1 billion seed capital in 2013 which grew to $2.1 billion in 2020 as a result of additional investments and retained earnings. The NSIA manages an additional $1.5 billion from third-party-managed funds for a total assets under management of $3.6 billion. The NSIA is a public agency that subscribes to the Santiago Principles, which are a set of 24 guidelines that assign “best practices” for the operations of Sovereign Wealth Funds globally. The NSIA invests through three ring-fenced funds: the Future Generations Fund is assigned 30% of NSIA’s assets with the objective of preserving and growing the value of said assets for the benefit of future Nigerians. The minimum investment horizon is 20 years, the investment base currency is the U.S. dollar, and the minimum target return is U.S. inflation + 4%. The Fund invests primarily in “growth assets,” “deflation hedges,” and “inflation hedges.” the Nigeria Infrastructure Fund aims to plug Nigeria’s infrastructure gap by investing in, and catalyzing foreign investments for, domestic infrastructure projects. The Fund is assigned 50% of NSIA’s assets. Investments are in naira and U.S. dollars and the return-on-investment target is U.S. inflation plus 5%. The Fund cannot allocate more than 50% of its assets to investment managers (not more than 25% to a single manager) or more than 35% to a single infrastructure sector. The Fund may also invest not more than 10% of its assets in “development projects’ in underserved regions or sectors. Priority sectors are power, healthcare, real estate, technology and communications infrastructure, aviation assets, agriculture, water and sewage treatment and delivery, roads, port, and rail. the Stabilization Fund was created to act as a buffer against short-term economic instability and is assigned 20% of NSIA’s assets. The Fund invests in conservative, short-term, and liquid assets since it may be drawn down to augment government revenue shortages. The base currency is the U.S. dollar. Investment options range from global sovereign and corporate debt, credit focused debt, cash, and to an extent, derivatives. The minimum credit quality rating is “A” over a 12-month period. At least 50% of the NSIA’s assets are invested domestically in infrastructure projects. The NSIA does not take an active role in the management of companies. The Embassy has not received any report or indication that NSIA activities limit private competition. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The government does not have an established practice consistent with the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but SOEs have respective enabling legislations that govern their ownership. To legalize the existence of state-owned enterprises, provisions have been made in the Nigerian constitution relating to socio-economic development and in section 16 (1). The government has privatized many former SOEs to encourage more efficient operations, such as state-owned telecommunications company Nigerian Telecommunications and mobile subsidiary Mobile Telecommunications in 2014. SOEs operate in a variety of sectors ranging from information and communication; power; oil and gas; transportation including rail, maritime, and airports; and finance. Nigeria does not operate a centralized ownership system for its state-owned enterprises. Most SOEs are 100% government owned. Others are owned by the government through the Ministry of Finance Incorporated (MOFI) or solely or jointly by MOFI and various agencies of government. The enabling legislation for each SOE also stipulates its governance structure. The boards of directors are appointed by the president and occasionally on the recommendation of the relevant minister. The boards operate and are appointed in line with the enabling legislation which usually stipulates the criteria for appointing board members. Directors are appointed by the board within the relevant sector. In a few cases, however, appointments have been viewed as a reward to political allies. Operational autonomy varies amongst SOEs. Most SOEs are parastatals of a supervising ministry or the presidency with minimal autonomy. SOEs with regulatory or industry oversight functions are often technically independent of ministerial supervision; however, ministers and other political appointees often interfere in their operations. All SOEs are required to remit a share of their profits or operational surpluses to the federal government. This “independent revenue” more than doubled from 2020 to 1.1 trillion naira ($2.6 billion) in 2021 and exceeded budget projections by 13%. This was as a result of the government’s drive to increase non-oil revenues as well as increasingly stringent oversight of SOE remittances. The 60 largest SOEs (excluding the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)) generated a combined 1.2 trillion naira ($2.9 billion) in revenues and spent a total 410 billion naira ($983 million) in the first eleven months of 2021. The government often provides certain grants to SOEs that are inefficiently run and/or loss-making. For example, and over the past five years, the government has allocated 102 billion naira ($245 million) to the Transmission Company of Nigeria, 402 billion naira ($964 million) to the Nigerian Bulk Electricity Trading Company, 154 billion naira ($369 million) to the Nigerian Railway Corporation, and 24 billion naira ($58 million) to the Ajaokuta Steel Company. These SOEs wereall ostensibly established to generate and remit revenue. NNPC is Nigeria’s most prominent state-owned enterprise. Under the implementation of the Petroleum Industry Act, NNPC was incorporated as a limited liability company in September 2021, although the incorporation process does not appear to have led to a de facto change in the company’s operations and the government maintains 100% ownership. NNPC Board appointments are made by the presidency, but day-to-day management is overseen by the Group Managing Director (GMD). The GMD reports to the Minister of Petroleum Resources. In the current administration, the President has retained that ministerial role for himself, and the appointed Minister of State for Petroleum Resources acts as the de facto Minister of Petroleum in the president’s stead with certain limitations. NNPC is Nigeria’s biggest and arguably most important state-owned enterprise and is involved in exploration, refining, petrochemicals, products transportation, and marketing. It owns and operates Nigeria’s four refineries (one each in Warri and Kaduna and two in Port Harcourt), all of which are currently and largely inoperable. NNPC remits proceeds from the sale of crude oil less operational expenses to the federation account which is managed by the federal government on behalf of all tiers of government. It is also expected to pay corporate and petroleum profits taxes to the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS). NNPC began publishing audited financial statements in 2020 for the three prior fiscal years, a significant step toward improving transparency of NNPC operations. The government generated crude oil net revenue of 1.5 trillion naira ($3.6 billion) in 2020 in large part due to NNPC’s $10 billion gross revenue and the government’s removal of the gasoline subsidy for half of 2020 in the face of low global oil prices. However, despite higher oil prices, crude oil revenue fell to 970 billion naira ($2.3 billion) in the first eleven months of 2021. This is largely due to declining crude production and the significant subsidy costs which NNPC deducts from revenue before remitting the balance to the government. NNPC’s dual role as industry operator and unofficial regulator as well as its proximity to government lends it certain advantages its competitors lack. For instance, the CBN often prioritizes NNPC’s foreign exchange requests and has offered the corporation a subsidized exchange rate for its importation of petroleum products in the past. In addition, its proximity to government affords it high-level influence. NNPC’s inputs formed a critical part of the government’s position during the drafting of the Petroleum Industry Act of 2021. NNPC’s objection to the sale of an international oil company’s subsidiary with which it operates a joint venture has stayed the government approval required for the divestment. The government also owns equity in some private-sector-run entities. It retained 60% and 40% equity in the generation and distribution companies, respectively, that emerged from the power sector privatization exercise in 2013. Despite being privately-run, revenues across the power sector value chain are hindered by the overall inefficiencies and illiquidity in the sector. Consequently, a government facility finances a sizeable portion of the sector’s activities. The Transmission Company of Nigeria, of which the government retained full ownership, is largely financed by the government. The government owns 49% of Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) Limited (NLNG) with the balance held by several international oil companies. NLNG is one of Nigeria’s most profitable companies and the dividends paid to the government accounted for nearly 3% of federal government revenues in 2021. The Privatization and Commercialization Act of 1999 established the National Council on Privatization, the policy-making body overseeing the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), the implementing agency for designated privatizations. The BPE has focused on the privatization of key sectors, including telecommunications and power, and calls for core investors to acquire controlling shares in formerly state-owned enterprises. The BPE has privatized and concessioned more than 140 enterprises since 1999, including an aluminum complex, a steel complex, cement manufacturing firms, hotels, a petrochemical plant, aviation cargo handling companies, vehicle assembly plants, and electricity generation and distribution companies. The electricity transmission company remains state-owned. Foreign investors can and do participate in BPE’s privatization process. The government also retains partial ownership in some of the privatized companies. The federal government and several state governments hold a 40% stake, managed by BPE, in the power distribution companies. The National Assembly has questioned the propriety of some of these privatizations, with one ongoing case related to an aluminum complex which is the subject of a Supreme Court ruling on ownership. In addition, the failure of the 2013 power sector privatization to restore financial viability to the sector has raised criticism of the privatized power generation and distribution companies. The federal government estimates it will raise 91 billion naira ($218 million) from privatization proceeds in 2022. The government did not earn any revenues from privatization in 2021 despite a 205-billion-naira ($492 million) budget projection. BPE has several ongoing transactions including the sale of government assets in the agricultural sector, the concession of trade fair complexes, and private-public partnership in the Nigeria Commodity Exchange amongst others. Additional information on ongoing transactions can be found on the BPE website: https://bpe.gov.ng/category/transactions/on-going-transactions/. 10. Political and Security Environment Political, criminal, and ethnic violence continue to affect Nigeria. Boko Haram and Islamic State – West Africa (ISIS-WA) have waged violent terrorist campaigns, killing of thousands of people in the country’s North East. Boko Haram and ISIS-WA attacked civilians, military, police, humanitarian, and religious targets; recruited and forcefully conscripted child soldiers; and carried out scores of attacks on population centers in the North East and in neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Abductions by Boko Haram and ISIS-WA continue. These attacks resulted in thousands of deaths and injuries, numerous human rights abuses, widespread destruction, the internal displacement of more than three million persons, and the external displacement of at least 327,000 Nigerian refugees to neighboring countries as of the end of 2021. ISIS-WA terrorists demonstrated increased ability to conduct complex attacks against military outposts and formations. During 2021, ISIS-WA terrorists took over significant territory formerly held by Boko Haram. ISIS-WA expanded efforts to implement shadow governance structures in large swaths of Borno State. President Buhari has sought to address matters of insecurity in Nigeria. While the terrorists maintain the ability to stage forces in rural areas and launch attacks against civilian and military targets across the North East, Nigeria is also facing rural violence in many parts of the country carried out by criminals who raid villages and abduct civilians for ransom. Longstanding disputes between migratory pastoralist and farming communities, exacerbated by increasingly scarce resources and intensified by climate change impacts, also continue to afflict the country. Due to challenging security dynamics throughout the country, the U.S. Mission to Nigeria has significantly limited official travel in the North East, and travel to other parts of Nigeria requires security precautions. The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a political separatist group declared a terrorist organization by the Nigerian government in 2013, established a militant arm in December 2020, the Eastern Security Network (ESN). ESN has been blamed for a surge in attacks in early 2021 against Nigerian police and security installations across the South East, the region in which IPOB claims the most support. Following extradition from Kenya and subsequent arrest of IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu in June 2021, IPOB/ESN issued a “stay at home” order on Mondays for the five states of the South East (Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo). Residents or visitors to the area who disobey the order have faced violent intimidation, which has led to a near complete shutdown of activity across the South East each Monday and other days significant to Kanu’s trial. The U.S. Mission to Nigeria does not allow official travel in those states on days that a stay-at-home order is in place. Decades of neglect, persistent poverty, and environmental damage caused by oil spills and illegal refining activities have left Nigeria’s oil rich Niger Delta region vulnerable to renewed violence. Though each oil-producing state receives a 13% derivation of the oil revenue produced within its borders, and several government agencies, including the Niger Delta Development Corporation (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, are tasked with implementing development projects, bureaucratic mismanagement and corruption have prevented these investments from yielding meaningful economic and social development in the region. Niger Delta criminals have demonstrated their ability to attack and severely damage oil instillations at will, as seen when they cut Nigeria’s production by more than half in 2016. Attacks on oil installations decreased due to a revamped amnesty program and high-level engagement with the region at the time, but the underlying economic woes and historical grievances of the local communities were not addressed. As a result, insecurity in various forms continues to plague the region. More significant in recent years is the region’s shift from attacks against oil infrastructure to illegal oil bunkering and illicit refining. In its July 2021 audit, the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) reported that Nigeria lost 42.25 million barrels of crude oil to oil theft in 2019, valued at $2.77 billion. While the Nigerian Navy Eastern Naval Command disclosed that it had deactivated 175 illegal refineries and seized 27 vessels throughout its area of operation over a period of 11 months during 2021, such illegal activities have nonetheless continued, and oil theft remains a significant issue for both the industry and the region’s environment. In 2021, Nigeria reportedly lost $3.5 billion in revenue to crude oil theft, representing approximately 10% of the country’s foreign reserves, and the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) still reports hundreds of oil spills each year. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $422,240 2020 $432,294 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=NG Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $9,405 BEA data available at BEA : Nigeria – International Trade and Investment Country Facts Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $132 BEA data available at BEA : Nigeria – International Trade and Investment Country Facts Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 0.55% https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS?locations=NG * Source for Host Country Data: Nigerian Bureau of Statistics Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $74,256 100% Total Outward $13,213 100% Netherlands, The $13,640 18% United Kingdom $2,380 18% United States $9,405 13% Netherlands, The $1,217 9% France $8,798 12% Bermuda $1,014 8% United Kingdom $8,132 11% Ghana $917 7% Bermuda $7,696 10% Norway $808 6% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. North Macedonia Executive Summary The Republic of North Macedonia, an EU candidate country, and a NATO member since March 2020, continues to be receptive to U.S. commercial investments. The COVID-19 pandemic has deeply impacted North Macedonia’s economy and delayed foreign direct investment inflow. The government’s COVID stimulus measures helped limit the economic drop to 6.1 percent in 2020, and assisted the recovery in 2021, which saw four percent GDP growth. Government support also cushioned the impact of the crisis on the labor market, with unemployment falling to 15.7 percent in 2021 and then to 15.2 percent in Q1 of 2022. In its Growth Acceleration Plan, the government set targets to double average annual GDP growth rate from 2.5 percent to 5 percent in the period 2022-2026, create 156,000 new jobs, and reduce unemployment to 8.6 percent. It also committed to “green growth” by accelerating the energy transition and reducing greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with the Declaration on Green Agenda signed November 2020. Although economic effects of the pandemic linger, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is exacerbating the energy crisis and supply chain woes. While doing business is generally easy in North Macedonia and the legal framework is largely in line with international standards, corruption is a consistent issue. Large foreign companies operating in the Technological Industrial Development Zones (TIDZ) generally report positive investment experiences and maintain good relations with government officials. However, the country’s overall regulatory environment remains complex, and frequent regulatory and legislative changes, coupled with inconsistent interpretation of the rules, create an unpredictable business environment conducive to corruption. The government generally enforces laws, but there are numerous reports that some officials remain engaged in corrupt activities. Transparency International ranked North Macedonia 87th out of 180 countries in its Corruption Perceptions Index in 2021, 24 spots higher from the prior year, with a score of 39/100 in absolute terms. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs continues to coordinate government activities related to foreign investments. The government made limited efforts in 2021 to attract new investment, focusing instead on economic recovery from the pandemic. However, the government did court foreign companies and investors for public projects in transportation and energy infrastructure. The State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption has opened number of corruption-related inquiries, including several involving high-level officials, and the government appointed a new Deputy Prime Minister for Good Governance, who will focus on structural and procedural changes to reduce opportunities for corruption. Fitch Ratings reaffirmed North Macedonia’s previous credit rating of BB+ with a negative outlook, and Standard & Poor’s reaffirmed its credit rating at BB- with a stable outlook. There are several areas to watch in 2022. In 2021, Embassy Skopje identified digitalization and green energy as areas ripe for U.S. investment due to the government’s growing commitment to invest in these strategic sectors. North Macedonia’s location, at the crossroads of pan-European transport corridors VIII and X, is an advantage as companies consider “near-shoring” their production to be closer to consumption centers in Europe as fallout from the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continue to snarl global supply chains. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 87 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 59 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 12 https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 5,750 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Attracting FDI remains one of the government’s main pillars of economic growth and job creation, although the COVID-19 pandemic prevented government officials from greater engagement with potential investors in 2021. There are no laws or practices that discriminate against foreign investors. In March 2018, the government passed its “Plan for Economic Growth” ( https://vicepremier-ekonomija.gov.mk/?q=node/275 ), and in 2021 it amended the Law on Financial Support of Investments ( https://vicepremier-ekonomija.gov.mk/sites/default/files/dokumenti/Izmeni%20i%20dopolnuvanja%20ZFPI%202021.pdf ), which provides substantial incentives to foreign companies operating in the 15 free economic zones. The incentives include a variety of measures such as job creation subsidies, capital investment subsidies, and financial support to exporters. North Macedonia is a signatory to multilateral conventions protecting foreign investors and is party to a number of bilateral investment protection treaties, though none with the United States. Since August 2020, the office of the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs ( https://vicepremier-ekonomija.gov.mk ) has coordinated the government’s activities related to foreign investments. Invest North Macedonia—the Agency for Foreign Investments and Export Promotionis the primary government institution in charge of facilitating foreign investments. It works directly with potential foreign investors, provides detailed explanations and guidance for registering a business in North Macedonia, produces analysis on potential industries and sectors for investing, shares information on business regulations, and publishes reports about the domestic market. The North Macedonia Free Zones Authority, http://fez.gov.mk/ , a governmental managing body responsible for developing free economic zones throughout the country, also assists foreign investors interested in operating in the zones. It manages all administrative affairs of the free economic zones and assists foreign investors to identify appropriate investment locations and facilities. North Macedonia does not maintain a “one-stop-shop” for FDI, requiring investors to navigate through several bureaucratic institutions to implement their investments. The government maintains contact with large foreign investors through frequent meetings and formal surveys to solicit feedback. Large foreign investors have direct and easy access to government leaders, whom they can contact for assistance to resolve issues. The Foreign Investors Council, https://www.fic.mk/Default.aspx?mId=1 , advocates for foreign investors and suggests ways to improve the business environment. Foreign investors can invest directly in all industry and business sectors except those limited by law. For instance, investment in the production of weapons and narcotics remains subject to government approval, while investors in sectors such as banking, financial services, insurance, and energy must meet certain licensing requirements that apply equally to domestic and foreign investors. Foreign investment may be in the form of money, equipment, or raw materials. Under the law, if assets are nationalized, foreign investors have the right to receive the full value of their investment. This provision does not apply to national investors. North Macedonia does not have a national investment screening mechanism in line with international standards. Invest North Macedonia conducts screening and due diligence reviews of foreign direct investments in a non-standard, non-public procedure and on an ad-hoc basis. The main purpose of the screening is to ensure the investment will bring economic benefits for the country and to protect national security. The process does not disadvantage foreign investors. More information about the screening process is available directly from Invest North Macedonia, at https://investnorthmacedonia.gov.mk/. U.S. investors are not disadvantaged or singled out by any of the ownership or control mechanisms, sector restrictions, or investment screening mechanisms. The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) latest review of North Macedonia’s trade policy (2019) is available at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/TPR/S390R1.pdf&Open=True . The most recent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) investment policy review on North Macedonia, from March 2012, is available at https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2011d3_en.pdf . A 2017 regional investment policy review of South-East Europe covering seven economies, including North Macedonia, is available at https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d6_en.pdf . The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has not done an investment policy review on North Macedonia to date. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have mentioned aspects of the government’s policies for attracting foreign investment in their regular country reports but have not provided specific policy recommendations. There have been no useful reviews of investment policy and practice from domestic or third country civil society organizations. All legal entities in the country must register with the Central Registry of the Republic of North Macedonia (Central Registry). Foreign businesses may register a limited liability company, single-member limited liability company, joint venture, or joint stock company, as well as branches and representative offices. There is a one-stop-shop system which enables investors to register their businesses within a day by visiting one office, obtaining the information from a single place, and addressing one employee. Once the company is registered with the Central Registry, the registration is valid for all other agencies. In addition to registering, some businesses must obtain additional working licenses or permits for their activities from relevant authorities. More information on business registration documentation and procedures is available at the Central Registry’s website, http://www.crm.com.mk . All investors may register a company online at http://e-submit.crm.com.mk/eFiling/en/home.aspx . Applications must be submitted by an authorized registration agent. The online business registration process is clear, complete, and available for use by foreign companies. The government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad, but it does not promote or provide incentives for outward investments. The publicly reported total stock of outward investments is small, worth approximately $138 million, the majority of which is in production facilities, pharmaceuticals, metal processing, and wholesale and retail trade in the Balkan region, the Netherlands, Germany, and Russia. 3. Legal Regime The government has made progress adopting reform priorities called for by the EU, NATO, and other bodies, leading to well-defined laws, institutional structures, and regulatory legal frameworks. However, laws are not regularly drafted based on data-driven evidence or assessments and, at times, move through parliament using shortened legislative procedures. While laws are in place, enforcement and universal implementation of laws and regulations are generally lacking and can be a problem for businesses and citizens. North Macedonia has simplified regulations and procedures for large foreign investors operating in the Technological Industrial Development Zones (TIDZ). While the country’s overall regulatory environment is complex and not fully transparent, the government is making efforts to improve transparency. The government is implementing reforms designed to avoid frequent regulatory and legislative changes, coupled with inconsistent interpretations of the rules, which create an unpredictable business environment that enables corruption. The current government has published all incentives for businesses operating in North Macedonia, which are standardized and available to domestic and international companies. However, companies worth more than $1 billion that want to invest in North Macedonia can negotiate terms different from the standard incentives. The government can offer customized incentive packages if the investment is of strategic importance. Rule-making and regulatory authorities reside within government ministries, regulatory agencies, and parliament. Almost all regulations most relevant to foreign businesses are on the national level. Regulations are generally developed in a four-step process. First, the regulatory agency or ministry drafts the proposed regulation. The proposal is then published in the Unique National Electronic Register of Regulations (ENER: https://ener.gov.mk/ ) for public review and comment. After public comments are considered and properly incorporated into the draft, it is sent to the central government to be reviewed and adopted in an official government session. Once the government has approved the draft law, it is sent to parliament for full debate and adoption. The public consultation process has improved, with businesses, the public, and NGOs having an increasing role in commenting on draft regulations and proposing changes through ENER. There is no single centralized location which maintains a copy of all regulatory actions. All newly adopted regulations, rules, and government decisions are published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of North Macedonia after they are adopted by the government or parliament or signed by the corresponding minister or director. Public comments are neither published nor made public as part of the regulation, and limited information is available in English. North Macedonia accepts International Accounting Standards, and the legal, regulatory, and accounting systems used by the government are consistent with international norms. North Macedonia has aligned its national law with EU directives on corporate accounting and auditing. The government has systems in place to regularly communicate and consult with the business community and other stakeholders before amending and adopting legislation, through ENER and through dialogues with businesses, the civil sector, and academia. Interested parties, including chambers of commerce, can review the legislation published on ENER. The online platform is intended to facilitate public participation in policymaking, increase public comment, and provide a phase-in period for legal changes to allow enterprises to adapt. Key institutions influencing the business climate publish official and legally-binding instructions for the implementation of laws. These institutions are obliged to publish all relevant laws, by-laws, and internal procedures on their websites; however, some do not make regular updates. The government makes significant efforts to ensure respect for the principles of transparency, merit, and equitable representation. The government continued to implement the Strategy for Public Administration Reform and Action Plan (2018-2022), and the National Plan for Quality Management of Public Administration, which focus on policy creation and coordination, strengthening public service capacities, and increasing accountability and transparency, in close coordination with the EU. The Open Data Strategy (2018-2020) and Transparency Strategy (2019-2021) put forth measures to encourage the release and use of public data as an effective tool for innovation, growth, and transparent governance and contributed to greater transparency of government bodies, both at the central and local levels. In 2022, Prime Minister Dimitar Kovachevski introduced a new Deputy Prime Minister for Good Governance Policies, who is responsible for good governance, anticorruption policies, and the digitalization of government services. The DPM’s office will replace the previous Cabinet for the Fight Against Corruption and Crime, Sustainable Development and Human Resources. The new DPM is expected to oversee the implementation of the Public Administration Reform Strategy under development by the Ministry of Information Society and Administration during 2022. Public finances and debt obligations are fairly transparent. The Ministry of Finance publishes budget execution data monthly; public debt figures, including contingent liability, quarterly; and the fiscal strategy is updated annually. As a candidate country for accession to the EU, North Macedonia is gradually harmonizing its legal and regulatory systems with EU standards. As a member of the WTO, North Macedonia regularly notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade of proposed amendments to technical regulations concerning trade. North Macedonia ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in July 2015, the 50th out of 134 members of the WTO to do so. In October 2017, the government formed a National Trade Facilitation Committee, chaired by the Minister of Economy, which includes 22 member institutions. The Committee identified areas which need harmonization with the TFA and is working toward implementation. North Macedonia’s legal system is based on the civil law tradition, with increasing adversarial-style elements, and includes an established legal framework for both commercial and contract law. The Constitution established independent courts to rule on commercial and contractual disputes between business entities, and court rulings are legally executed by private enforcement agents. Enforcement actions may be appealed before the court. The enforcement procedure fees were lowered and simplified in 2019. Commercial disputes up to €15,000 require mediation as a precondition to initiating legal action within the courts. Cases involving international elements may be decided using international arbiters. Ratified international instruments are considered an integral part of national legislation and cannot be altered by a national law, per the Constitution. Throughout 2021, businesses complained that lengthy and costly commercial disputes adjudicated through the court system created legal uncertainty. Businesses, however, have not been inclined to use mediation, despite it being a swifter and often less costly way to resolve disputes. In December 2021, Parliament adopted a new and improved Mediation Law providing for broader use of mediation as a voluntary, contract-based, or legally-mandated alternative prior to addressing a matter in court. Numerous international reports note rule of law remains a key challenge in North Macedonia, pointing to undue executive, business, and political interference in the judiciary, and poor funding for and management of administrative courts. These obstacles often result in lengthy and costly trials. The government continued major reforms throughout 2021 to improve judicial independence and impartiality, but contract enforcement and a perceived lack of transparent public procurement practices remain challenges for businesses. There is no single law regulating foreign investments, nor a “one-stop-shop” website which provides all relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. Rather, the legal framework is comprised of several laws including the Trade Companies Law, the Securities Law, the Profit Tax Law, the Customs Law, the Value Added Tax (VAT) Law, the Law on Trade, the Law on Acquiring Shareholding Companies, the Foreign Exchange Operations Law, the Payment Operations Law, the Law on Foreign Loan Relations, the Law on Privatization of State-owned Capital, the Law on Investment Funds, the Banking Law, the Labor Law, the Law on Financial Discipline, the Law on Financial Support of Investments, and the Law on Technological Industrial Development Zones (free economic zones). An English language version of the consolidated Law on Technological Industrial Development Zones is available at https://fez.gov.mk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/law-in-tidz-eng.pdf , and additional information at https://www.worldfzo.org/Portals/0/OpenContent/Files/487/Macedonia_FreeZones.pdf . No new major laws, regulations, or judicial decisions related to foreign investments were passed during the past year; however, some existing laws were amended slightly. The Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC) is responsible for enforcing the Law on Protection of Competition. The CPC issues opinions on draft legislation which may impact competition. The CPC reviews the impact on competition of proposed mergers and can prohibit a merger or approve it with or without conditions. The CPC also reviews proposed state aid to private businesses, including foreign investors, under the Law on Control of State Aid and the Law on State Aid . The CPC determines whether the state aid in question gives economic advantage to the recipient, is selective, or adversely influences competition and trade. More information on the CPC’s activities is available at http://kzk.gov.mk/en . There were no significant competition cases in 2021. The Law on Expropriation ( http://www.mioa.gov.mk/sites/default/files/pbl_files/documents/legislation/zakon_za_eksproprijacija_konsolidiran_032018.pdf ) states the government can seize or limit ownership and real estate property rights to protect the public interest and to build facilities and carry out other activities of public interest. According to the Constitution and the Law on Expropriation, property under foreign ownership is exempt from expropriation except during instances of war or natural disaster, or for reasons of public interest. Under the Law on Expropriation, the state is obliged to pay market value for any expropriated property. If the payment is not made within 15 days of the expropriation, interest will accrue. The government has conducted a number of expropriations, primarily to enable capital projects of public interest, such as highway and railway construction, for which the government offered market value compensation. Expropriation procedures have followed strict legal regulations and due process. The government has not undertaken any measures that have been alleged to be, or could be argued to be, indirect expropriation, such as confiscatory tax regimes or regulatory actions that deprive investors of substantial economic benefits from their investments. North Macedonia’s bankruptcy law governs the settlement of creditors’ claims against insolvent debtors. Bankruptcy proceedings may be initiated over the property of a debtor, be it a legal entity, an individual, a deceased person, joint property of spouses, or a business. However, bankruptcy proceedings may not be implemented over a public legal entity or property owned by the Republic of North Macedonia. The Government of North Macedonia’s suspension of bankruptcy proceedings for the duration of the COVID-19 crisis continued throughout 2021. The 2020 World Bank Doing Business Report ranked North Macedonia 30th out of 190 countries for resolving insolvency. The Macedonian Credit Bureau ( https://mkb.mk/en/ ), commercial banks, and the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia serve as credit monitoring authorities. 6. Financial Sector The government openly welcomes foreign portfolio investors. The establishment of the Macedonian Stock Exchange (MSE) in 1995 made it possible to regulate portfolio investments, although North Macedonia’s capital market is modest in turnover and capitalization. Market capitalization in 2021 was $4.3 billion, a 22.2 percent increase from the previous year. The main index, MBI10, increased by 30.8 percent, reaching 6,153 points at year-end. Foreign portfolio investors accounted for an average of 10.5 percent of total MSE turnover, 2.9 percentage points more than in 2020. The current regulatory framework does not appear to discriminate against foreign portfolio investments. There is an effective regulatory system for portfolio investments, and North Macedonia’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates the market and licenses all MSE members to trade in securities. In 2021, the total number of listed companies was 96, four less than in 2020, and total turnover increased by 56.8 percent. Compared to international standards, overall liquidity of the market is still modest for entering and/or exiting sizeable positions. Individuals generally trade on the MSE as individuals, rather than through investment funds, which have been present since 2007. There are no legal barriers to the free flow of financial resources into the products and factor markets. The National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia (NBRNM) respects IMF Article VIII and does not impose restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. A variety of credit instruments are provided at market rates to both domestic and foreign companies. In its regular report on Article IV consultations, published January 2021, the International Monetary Fund noted that North Macedonia’s banking system was well-capitalized and profitable, but emphasized the need for continued vigilance. It assessed the monetary policy as appropriately accommodative and encouraged the Central Bank to stand ready to tighten monetary policy if inflation were expected to become persistently higher than in the euro area, or if sustained pressure on foreign currency reserves materialized. Besides their own cash flow, domestic companies secure their financing mostly from bank loans due to the lack of corporate bonds and other securities as credit instruments. Financial resources are almost entirely managed through North Macedonia’s banking system, consisting of 13 banks and a central bank, the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia (NBRNM). The number of banks dropped by one with the merger of Austrian-owned Sparkasse Bank with French-owned Ohridska Bank, completed in July 2021. The banking sector is highly concentrated, with three of the largest banks controlling 58.2 percent of the banking sector’s total assets of about $11.7 billion and collecting 71 percent of total household deposits. The largest commercial bank in the country had total assets of $2.8 billion, or 27.3 percent of the banking sector’s total assets. The seven smallest banks, which have individual market shares of less than 5 percent each, accounted for 12.7 percent of total banking sector assets. Foreign banks or branches are allowed to establish operations in the country on equal terms as domestic operators, subject to licensing and prudent supervision from the NBRNM. In 2021, foreign capital was present in 12 of North Macedonia’s 13 banks, and was dominant in 9 banks, controlling 71.1 percent of total banking sector assets, 81.8 percent of total loans, and 69.1 percent of total deposits. According to the NBRNM, the banking sector’s non-performing loans at the end of Q3 of 2021 ( were 3.6 percent of total loans, increasing by 0.2 percentage points on an annual basis. Non-performing loans remained low despite the lifting of the NBRNM’s anti-COVID crisis measures in March 2021, which for almost a year allowed temporary postponement of loan installment payments. Total profits at the end of Q3 of 2021 reached $138 million, 22.1 percent higher than the same period in 2020. Banks’ liquid assets at the end of Q3 of 2021 were 31.6 percent of total assets, 1.7 percentage points higher than in the same period in 2020, remaining comfortably high. In 2021, the NBRNM conducted different stress-test scenarios on the banking sector’s sensitivity to increased credit risk, liquidity shocks, and insolvency shocks, all of which showed the banking sector is healthy and resilient, with a capital adequacy ratio remaining above the legally required minimum of eight percent. The actual capital adequacy ratio of the banking sector at the end of Q3 of 2021 was 17.3 percent, 0.4 percentage points higher than the same period in 2020, with all banks maintaining a ratio above 15 percent. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account. All commercial banks and the NBRNM have established and maintain correspondent banking relationships with foreign banks. The banking sector lost no correspondent banking relationships in the past three years, nor were there any indications that any current correspondent banking relationships were in jeopardy. There is no intention to implement or allow the implementation of blockchain technologies in banking transactions in North Macedonia. Alternative financial services do not exist in the economy. The transaction settlement mechanism is solely through the banking sector. North Macedonia does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are about 120 State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in North Macedonia, the majority of which are public utilities, predominately owned by the central government or the 81 local governments. The government estimates about 8,600 people are employed in SOEs. SOEs operate in several sectors of the economy, including energy, transportation, and media. There are also industries such as arms production and narcotics in which private enterprises may not operate without government approval. SOEs are governed by boards of directors, consisting of members appointed by the government. All SOEs are subject to the same tax policies as private sector companies. SOEs are allowed to purchase or supply goods or services from the private sector and are not given non-market-based advantages, such as preferential access to land or raw materials. There is no published registry with complete information on all SOEs in the country. The government has yet to implement broad public administration reform, which would also include SOEs, especially addressing their employment policies and governance. North Macedonia is not a signatory to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. In February 2018, the government sent its bid to the World Trade Organization to upgrade its status from observer to a full member of the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). The negotiation process is still ongoing. North Macedonia’s privatization process is almost complete, and private capital is dominant in the market. The government is trying to resolve the status of one remaining state-owned loss-making company in a non-discriminatory process through an international tender. Foreign and domestic investors have equal opportunity to participate in the privatization of the remaining state-owned assets through an easily understandable, non-discriminatory, and transparent public bidding process. Neither the central government nor any local government has announced plans to fully or partially privatize any of the utility companies or SOEs in their ownership. 10. Political and Security Environment North Macedonia generally has been free from political violence over the past decade, although interethnic relations have been strained at times. Public protests, demonstrations, and strikes occur sporadically, and often result in traffic jams, particularly near the center of Skopje. Following 2016 parliamentary elections, an organized group of protestors leveraged ongoing protests and eventually stormed the parliament building on April 27, 2017, in reaction to the change of government and the election of Talat Xhaferi as Speaker of Parliament, the first ethnic Albanian to assume that post since the country’s independence. More than 100 people were injured, including several members of the government and seven MPs. On March 18, 2019, 16 individuals were convicted and given lengthy prison sentences for their involvement in the attack, including the former head of the Public Security Bureau (who had previously served as Minister of Interior) and former security officers. On July 26, 2021, in the so-called Parliament Violence Organizers’ case, the trial court issued roughly six-year prison sentences against the former VMRO-DPMNE Speaker of Parliament Trajko Veljanoski, former Minister of Education and Science Spiro Ristovski, former Minister of Transport and Communications Mile Janakieski, and former Administration for Security and Counterintelligence Director Vladimir Atanasovski, for organizing the attack on Parliament. Prosecutor and defense appeals were pending before the appellate court as of March 8, 2022. The related cases against the former VMRO-DPMNE Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski and former counter-intelligence official Nikola Boshkoski, both fugitives, were ongoing. There is neither widespread anti-American nor anti-Western sentiment in North Macedonia. A poll released February 2022 showed that 45.2 percent of all respondents saw the United States as the most influential foreign actor in country. There have been no incidents in recent years involving politically motivated damage to U.S. projects or installations. Violent crime against U.S. citizens is rare. Theft and other petty street crimes do occur, particularly in areas where tourists and foreigners congregate. North Macedonia has been a member of NATO since 2020. The country has been an EU candidate country since December 2005 and, in March 2020, the General Affairs Council of the European Union decided to open accession negotiations with North Macedonia, which was endorsed by the European Council the following day. However, Bulgaria refused to approve North Macedonia’s EU negotiating framework in November 2020, effectively blocking the official launch of EU accession talks. In January 2022, the new governments of North Macedonia and Bulgaria re-launched efforts to resolve outstanding bilateral issues through intensified talks with a view to lifting Bulgaria’s veto. Norway Executive Summary Norway is a modern, highly developed country with a small but very strong economy. Per capita GDP is among the highest in the world, boosted by decades of success in the oil and gas sector and other world-class industries like shipping, shipbuilding, and aquaculture. The major industries are supported by a strong and growing professional services industry (finance, ICT, legal), and there are emerging opportunities in fintech, cleantech, medtech, and biotechnology. Strong collaboration between industry and research institutions attracts international R&D activity and funding. Norway is a safe and straightforward place to do business, ranked 9 out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, and fourth out of 180 on Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. Norway is politically stable, with strong property rights protection and an effective legal system. Productivity is significantly higher than the EU average. Norway has managed the coronavirus pandemic with relative success two years in, maintaining a low death rate, protecting health facilities’ capacity, and cushioning economic shocks. Swift implementation of social mobility restrictions, strong political unity, and broad public support were among the country’s key success factors. Norway’s solid financial footing, including fiscal reserves in its trillion-dollar sovereign wealth fund and monetary policy maneuverability, enabled the government to finance generous support packages to mitigate the pandemic’s economic impact on workers and businesses. Norwegian lawmakers and businesses welcome foreign investment as a matter of policy and the government generally grants national treatment to foreign investors. Some restrictions exist on foreign ownership and use of natural resources and infrastructure. The government remains a major owner in the Norwegian economy and retains monopolies on a few activities, such as the retail sale of alcohol. While not a member of the European Union (EU), Norway is a member of the European Economic Area (EEA, which also includes Iceland and Liechtenstein) with access to the EU single market’s movement of persons, goods, services, and capital. The Norwegian government continues to liberalize its foreign investment legislation with the aim of conforming more closely to EU standards and has cut bureaucratic regulations over the last decade to make investment easier. Foreign direct investment in Norway stood at USD 160 billion at the end of 2021 and has more than doubled over the last decade. There are approximately 8,100 foreign-owned companies in Norway, and over 700 U.S. companies have a presence in the country, employing more than 58,000 people. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 4 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 20 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 21.5 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 78,290 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Norwegian lawmakers and businesses welcome foreign investment as a matter of policy and the government generally grants national treatment to foreign investors. The Government established “Invest in Norway,” an official investment promotion agency, to help attract and assist foreign investors, including in the key offshore energy sector and in less developed regions such as northern Norway. While not a member of the European Union, Norway is an EEA signatory and continues to liberalize its foreign investment legislation to conform more closely to EU standards. Current laws, rules, and practices follow below. Norway’s investment policies vis-á-vis third countries, including the United States, will likely continue to be governed by reciprocity principles and by bilateral and international agreements. The European Economic Area (EEA) free trade accord, which came into force for Norway in 1995, requires the country to apply principles of national treatment to EU members and the other EEA members – Iceland and Liechtenstein – in certain areas where foreign investment was prohibited or restricted in the past. Norway’s investment regime is generally based on the national treatment principle, but ownership restrictions exist on some natural resources and on some activities (fishing/ maritime/ road transport). State ownership in companies can be used as a means of ensuring Norwegian ownership and domicile for these firms. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) conducted an Economic Survey for Norway in 2022: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-norway-2022_df7b87ab-en The OECD also conducted a Peer Review of Norway in 2019: https://www.oecd.org/dac/oecd-development-co-operation-peer-reviews-norway-2019-75084277-en.htm The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted a Trade Policy Review for Norway in 2018: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/TPR/S373.pdf Altinn.no is a web portal that serves as a one-stop shop for establishing a company and contains the necessary forms; it also provides an electronic platform for dialogue between the business/industry sector, citizens and other stakeholders, and government agencies. The business registration processes are straight-forward, complete, and open to foreign companies. Please note, however, that registration of Norwegian Registered Foreign Business Enterprises (NUF) cannot be done electronically. A guide for establishing a business is available at the following address: https://www.altinn.no/en/start-and-run-business/ The government does not directly incentivize outward investment. However, the Government of Norway (GON) acknowledges that for Norwegian companies to be successful, they need to grow in markets and economies that are larger than Norway, so the trade and investment promotion agency Innovation Norway has offices in key foreign markets, including four offices in the United States, in Houston, New York City, San Francisco and Washington D.C.. Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global, the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world, owns 1.4 percent of all listed companies in the world. 3. Legal Regime The transparency of Norway’s regulatory system is generally on par with that of the EU. Norway is obliged to adopt EU directives under the terms of the EEA accord in the areas of social policy, consumer protection, environment, company law, and statistics. The Norwegian Accounting Act requires, in line with EU Directive 2014/95/EU, Norwegian public companies and other large companies to publish annual reports on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors. In addition, ESG implementation is receiving increasing public attention and support, and companies with strong ESG profiles may experience a competitive advantage. All draft bills are made available for comment through a public consultation process. The Norwegian parliament, the Storting, exercises legislative power in Norway and must approve all formal laws (acts, directives, and regulations). Draft bills are available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/find-document/consultations/id1763/ Norwegian laws and regulations are available at: https://lovdata.no/info/information_in_english Norway’s public finances and debt obligations are transparent. The Government publishes the National Budget and revised budget on the website http://www.statsbudsjettet.no and an annual White Paper to Parliament on the State’s account: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/okonomi-og-budsjett/statlig-okonomistyring/statsregnskapet/id438868 . The Ministry of Finance has a webpage on Government debt: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/the-economy/economic-policy/the-central-governments-outstanding-debt/id443404/ Norway is a member of the European Economic Area (EEA) and as such implements applicable EU directives under the terms of the agreement. Norway is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and notifies draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The Norwegian legal system is similar to that of other Nordic countries but does not consist of a single comprehensive civil code. Norwegian law is based on the principle of freedom of contract, subject only to limited restrictions. Contracts, whether oral or written, are generally binding on the parties. Norway welcomes foreign investment as a matter of policy and generally grants national treatment to foreign investors. Ownership restrictions exist on some natural resources and on some activities (fishing/maritime road transport). A new National Security Act entered into force January 1, 2019, and provides the legal foundation for enhanced government screening of foreign investments based on national security concerns. Norway’s legal system is robust and trusted. Current legislation governing competition went into effect in 2004 and is enforced by the Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA). Under the authority of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries the NCA is authorized to conduct non-criminal proceedings and impose fines, or “infringement fees,” for anti-competitive behavior. The size of the fees may vary according to a number of factors, including company turnover and severity of the offense. The 2004 legislation also empowers the NCA to halt mergers or acquisitions that threaten to significantly weaken competition. Companies planning such transactions are generally obliged by law to report their plans to the NCA, which may conduct a review. However, if the combined annual turnover in Norway does not exceed NOK 1 billion (USD 113 million) or the annual turnover of one of the companies is less than NOK 100 million (USD 11.3. million), notification is not required. There have been no cases of questionable expropriation in recent memory. Government takings of property are generally limited to non-discriminatory land and property condemnation for public purposes (road construction, etc.). The Embassy is not aware of any cases in which compensation has not been prompt, adequate, and effective. Norway has strong bankruptcy laws and is ranked 5 out of 190 for ease of “resolving insolvency” on the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report. According to the World Bank, the average duration for bankruptcy proceedings in Norway is half that of the OECD, at just under a year. A new temporary Restructuring Act entered into force on May 11, 2020, making the judicial restructuring process applicable to companies in financial difficulties. The Act, which was adopted in response to the economic consequences of the global Covid-19 pandemic, replaces the National Bankruptcy Act until 1 July 2023. The Storting hopes to enact permanent legislation based on the experience gained from this interim period. 6. Financial Sector Norway has a highly computerized banking system that provides a full range of banking services, including internet banking. There are no significant impediments to the free market-determined flow of financial resources. Foreign and domestic investors have access to a wide variety of credit instruments. The financial regulatory system is transparent and consistent with international norms. The Oslo Stock Exchange, which was acquired by Europe’s largest stock exchange Euronext in 2019, facilitates portfolio investment and securities transactions in general. Norwegian banks are generally considered to be on a sound financial footing, and the banking sector holds around USD 530 billion in assets. Conservative asset/liquidity requirements limited the exposure of banks to the global financial crisis in 2008-2009. The Ministry of Finance reduced the requirement for banks’ countercyclical capital buffer from 2.5 percent to 1 percent in March 2020 as part of the government’s economic response to COVID-19. Norges Bank’s (Norway’s Central Bank) Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Committee has advised the Ministry of Finance to raise the countercyclical capital buffer requirement to 1.5 percent, effective from June 30, 2022. The Ministry of Finance increased the systemic risk buffer requirement for banks from 3 percent to 4.5 percent from year-end 2020. Foreign banks have been permitted to establish branches in Norway since 1996. Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), was established in 1990 and was valued at NOK 11.673 trillion (USD 1.356 trillion) at year-end 2021. The management mandate requires the fund to be invested widely, outside Norway. Petroleum revenues are invested in global stocks and bonds, and the current portfolio includes over 9,100 companies and approximately 1.4 percent of global stocks. The fund is invested across four asset classes. The fund aims to invest in most markets, countries, and currencies to achieve broad exposure to global economic growth. 41.6 percent of the fund’s investments in 2021 were in the United States, which is its single largest market. The fund plays an active role in its investments and aims to vote in almost all general shareholder meetings. In 2004, Norway adopted ethical guidelines for GPFG investments that prohibit investment in companies engaged in various forms of weapons production, environmental degradation, tobacco production, human rights violations, and what it terms “other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical norms.” In March 2019 the GON announced that companies classified by index provider FTSE Russell as being in the subsector “0533 Exploration & Production” in the sector “0001 Oil & Gas” no longer would be part of the GPFG portfolio. Current holdings in these companies will be phased out over time. More broadly focused energy companies, which have investments in renewable and sustainable energy sources as well as oil & gas divisions, may still be included. The fund currently has over 174 companies on its exclusion and observation list, at least 45 of which are U.S. companies. The ethical guidelines also highlight seven focus areas in term of sustainability: children’s rights, climate change, water management, human rights, tax and transparency, anti-corruption, and ocean sustainability. The fund adheres to the Santiago Principles and is a member of the IMF-hosted International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The government continues to play a strong role in the Norwegian economy through its ownership or control of many of the country’s leading commercial firms. The public sector accounts for nearly 66 percent of GDP. The Norwegian government is the largest owner in Norway, with ownership stakes in a range of key sectors (e.g., energy, transportation, finance, and communications). 74 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are managed directly by the relevant government ministries, and approximately 33 percent of the stock exchange’s capitalization is in government hands. State ownership in companies can be used as a means of ensuring Norwegian ownership and domicile for these firms. Norway is party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a signatory to all relevant annexes. SOEs are thus covered under the agreement. Successive Norwegian governments have sustained stable levels of strong, transparent, and predictable government ownership. The former center-right government took limited steps to reduce ownership stakes. The GON publishes the annual state ownership report, available in English here: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/business-and-industry/state-ownership/statlig-eierskap-publikasjoner/id737457/ and a white paper on state ownership in companies available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/meld.-st.-8-20192020/id2678758 . Norway has no current plans to privatize any SOEs. 10. Political and Security Environment Norway is a vibrant, stable democracy. Violent political protests or incidents are extremely rare, as are politically motivated attacks on foreign commercial projects or property. However, on July 22, 2011, a Norwegian individual motivated by extreme anti-Islam ideology carried out twin attacks on Oslo’s government district and on the Labor Party’s youth summer camp in Utøya, killing 77 people. The individual, now in prison, operated alone and this incident is not generally considered an indicator of increased political violence in the future. Oman Executive Summary Oman’s location at the crossroads of the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, and South Asia and in proximity to larger regional markets is an attractive feature for potential foreign investors. Some of Oman’s most promising development projects and investment opportunities involve its ports and free zones, most notably in Duqm, where the government envisions a 2,000 square-kilometer free trade zone and logistics hub. With a “friends of all, enemies of none” foreign policy, Oman does not face the external security challenges of some of its neighbors. Oman’s domestic political situation remains stable, despite increasing economic pressure and the need to create employment for young Omanis. Oman’s economy and government finances rely heavily on oil and gas revenue. High energy prices in 2022 are improving Oman’s economic prospects but will not immediately overcome the effects of years of relatively low energy prices, weak economic growth, budget deficits, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The government announced a medium-term fiscal plan in November 2020 to fix its heavily indebted finances by cutting down on spending and raising revenues, primarily through taxes. Some of the measures negatively affected capital flow, and in an economy dependent on state spending the suspension or cancellation of government projects during Oman’s economic contraction further hit the struggling private sector. Government leadership recognizes these challenges and is working to improve Oman’s investment climate and to achieve its economic development goals under Oman’s Vision 2040 development plan. Omani Sultan Haitham bin Tarik al Said, who assumed the sultancy in January 2020, has prioritized foreign direct investment (FDI) attraction as an imperative to boost local job creation, particularly as COVID-19-related restrictions have loosened. Toward this end, Oman is in the process of developing further advantages for foreign investors, including a program of tax and fee incentives, permissions to invest in several new industries in the economy, expanded land use, increased access to capital, and labor and employment incentives for qualifying companies. In September 2021, Oman allowed expatriate residents with work visas to own residential units and offered long-term residency visas to attract investors. Five- and 10-year renewable residence visas are available to foreign investors in the tourism, real estate, education, health, information technology, and other key sectors. In March 2022, Oman announced that it would reduce the cost of foreign worker permit fees by up to 85 percent, reversing a hike in the fees it had implemented in June 2021 that some businesses had found problematic. The success of Oman’s reform efforts will depend on its ability to open key sectors to private sector competition and foreign investment, minimize bureaucratic red tape, pay off its overdue bills, balance its desire for “Omanization” with the realities of training and restructuring its work force, and translate its promises of economic reform into increased FDI flows and job creation. The government also needs to undertake more fundamental reforms for investment such as making its tender system transparent, increasing access to credit, and speeding up approvals for new businesses. Sultan Haitham and his government are actively courting FDI into many of its sectors. In February 2021, the Ministry of Finance signed three memoranda of understanding with the Saudi Fund for Development to finance several projects amounting to about $244 million. In January 2022, Oman also signed a Sovereign Investment Partnership with the United Kingdom, its largest FDI partner, to facilitate joint investments in both countries. Sultan Haitham and his government are also seeking to make fuller use of the 2009 U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement (FTA), under which U.S. businesses and investors have the right to 100-percent ownership of their companies and can import their products to Oman duty-free. U.S. companies operating in Oman sometimes raise concerns over a lack of clarity and consistency on business license and visa renewal criteria, as well as an increase in associated costs. The top complaints of businesses relate to requirements for hiring and retaining Omani national employees and a heavy-handed application of “Omanization” quotas. Payment delays to companies that completed work on government infrastructure projects are also a problem across various sectors. Smaller companies without in-country experience or a regional presence face considerable bureaucratic obstacles conducting business here. Beginning in 2020, the government also temporarily ceased the issuance of most new project awards and purchases to curb expenditures. Companies created under Oman’s new Foreign Capital Investment Law (FCIL), promulgated in 2020, have come under the government’s radar and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Investment Promotion (MOCIIP) is re-evaluating investor visas that it issued in 2020. The FCIL removed minimum-share capital requirements and limits on the amount of foreign ownership in an Omani company. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 56 of 179 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 76 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 USD 197 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2019 USD 14, 170 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Oman actively seeks foreign direct investment and is in the process of improving the regulatory framework to encourage such investments. The Foreign Capital Investment Law (FCIL) allowed 100-percent foreign ownership in most sectors and removed the minimum capital requirement. The law effectively provided all foreign investors with an open market in Oman, privileges already extended to U.S. nationals due to the provisions in the 2009 U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement (FTA), although the FTA goes further in providing American companies with national treatment. The Omani government’s “In-Country Value” (ICV) policy seeks to incentivize companies, both Omani and foreign, to procure local goods and services and provide training to Omani national employees. The government includes bidders’ demonstration of support for ICV as one factor in government tender awards. While the government initially applied ICV primarily to oil and gas contracts, the principle is now embedded in government tenders in all sectors, including transportation and tourism. New-to-market foreign companies, including U.S. firms, may find the bid requirements related to ICV prohibitive. With the implementation of the FTA in 2009, U.S. firms may establish and fully own a business in Oman without a local partner. Although U.S. investors are provided national treatment in most sectors, Oman has an exception in the FTA for legal services, limiting U.S. ownership in a legal services firm to no more than 70 percent. Foreign lawyers may not represent cases in Omani courts at any level. The government also has a “negative list” that restricts foreign investment to safeguard national security interests. The list includes some services related to radio and television transmission as well as air and internal waterway transportation. MOCIIP further extended this list to include approximately 70 sectors when the FCIL came into effect. Since late 2021, the government is employing stringent screening requirements for the issuance and renewals of investor visas, criteria which the government has not made public. U.S. investors raise concerns that these rules are neither consistent nor transparent, and result in a significant increase in renewals costs. Oman bans non-Omani ownership of real estate and land in various governorates and in some restricted areas. Non-Omanis can buy property only in designated areas called “Integrated Tourism Complexes” and in certain Ministry of Housing-designated multi-story, commercial and residential real estate buildings in Muscat, subject to eligibilities. Oman permits the establishment of real estate investment funds (REIFs) to encourage new inflows of capital into Oman’s property sector. Foreign investors, as well as expatriates in Oman, may own property units in REIFs. The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted a Trade Policy Review of Oman in November 2021. The 2021 report is not yet publicly available. The previous WTO Trade Policy Review was in April 2014 (Link to 2014 report: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp395_e.htm .) The Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Investment Promotion (MOCIIP) works to attract foreign investors and smooth the path for business formation and private-sector development. It works closely with government organizations and businesses in Oman and abroad to provide a range of business support. MOCIIP also offers a range of business investor advice geared to support foreign companies considering investment in Oman, based on company-specific needs and key target sectors that the country’s diversification program identifies. Oman’s “Invest in Oman” website ( https://investinoman.om ) provides information on Oman as a business location. MOCIIP has an online business registration site, known as “Invest Easy” ( business.gov.om ), through which businesses can obtain a Commercial Registration certificate from MOCIIP. MOCIIP can normally complete most registrations in approximately three or four business days; however, some commercial registration and licensing decisions may require the approval of multiple ministries and could take longer. The “Invest Easy” portal integrates several government agencies into a single portal and serves as a single window for businesses in Oman. The government neither promotes nor provides incentives for outward investment but does not restrict its citizens from investing abroad. 6. Financial Sector Oman has no restrictions on the flow of capital and the repatriation of profits. Foreigners may invest in the Muscat Stock Exchange so long as they do so through an authorized broker. Access to Oman’s limited commercial credit and project financing resources is open to Omani firms with foreign participation. As of 2022, the market does not have sufficient liquidity to allow for the entry and exit of sizeable amounts of capital. According to the 2020 annual report on exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions of the International Monetary Fund, Article VIII practices are reflected in Oman’s exchange system. The Commercial Companies Law requires the listing of joint stock companies with capital in excess of $5.2 million. The law also requires companies to exist for two years before their owners can float them for public trading. Publicly traded firms in Oman are still a relatively rare phenomenon; most businesses are private family enterprises. The banking system is sound and well capitalized with low levels of non-performing loans and generally high profits. Oman’s banking sector consists of 16 licensed local and foreign commercial banks, two specialized banks and eight Islamic commercial banks. Bank Muscat, the largest domestic bank operating in Oman, has $32.7 billion in assets. The Central Bank of Oman (CBO) is responsible for maintaining the internal and external value of the national currency. It is also the single integrated regulator of Oman’s financial services industry. The CBO issues regulations and guidance to all banks operating within Oman’s borders. Foreign businesspeople must have a residence visa or an Omani commercial registration to open a local bank account. Oman imposes no restrictions for foreign banks to establish operations in the country so long as they comply with CBO instructions. The Oman Investment Authority (OIA) is Oman’s principal Sovereign Wealth Fund. OIA is a full member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds and follows the Santiago Principles. Omani law does not require sovereign wealth funds to publish an annual report or submit their books for an independent audit. The OIA focuses on two main investment categories: tradable public markets assets that include global equity, fixed income bonds and short-term assets; and non-tradable private markets assets, which include private investments in real estate, logistics, services, commercial, and industrial projects. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are active in many sectors in Oman, including oil and gas extraction, oil and gas services, oil refining, liquefied natural gas processing and export, manufacturing, telecommunications, aviation, infrastructure development, and finance. The government does not have a standard definition of an SOE but tends to limit its working definition to companies wholly owned by the government and more frequently refers to companies with partial government ownership as joint ventures. Almost all SOEs in Oman fall under the Oman Investment Authority (OIA). The government does not publish a complete list of companies in which it owns a stake. In theory, the government permits private enterprises to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with access to markets, and other business operations, such as licenses and supplies, except in sectors deemed sensitive by the Omani government such as mining and telecommunications. SOEs purchase raw materials, goods, and services from private domestic and foreign enterprises. Public enterprises, however, have comparatively better access to credit. Board membership of SOEs is traditionally composed of various government officials, with a cabinet-level senior official usually serving as chairperson. Especially since the government reorganization began in August 2020, the government is making efforts to include private-sector officials on SOE boards. OIA has made efforts to enhance the efficiency and governance of SOEs, including by publishing audited financial statements, assessing each entity’s business strategy and public policy considerations, and mitigating financial exposures. OIA is developing a code of governance for SOEs. It restructured several companies under its supervision and formed new boards of directors drawing from both the public and private sectors. SOEs receive operating budgets, but, like budgets for ministries and other government entities, the budgets are flexible and not subject to hard constraints. The information that the Omani government published about its 2022 budget did not include allocations to and earnings from most SOEs. The Omani government has indicated that it hopes to reduce its budget deficits by privatizing or partially privatizing some state-owned enterprises. Although the plan for privatization is not publicly available, the Omani government has already reorganized some of its holdings for public offerings. In March 2020, for example, State Grid Corporation of China acquired a 49-percent stake in the Oman Electricity Transmission Company from Nama Holding, a government-owned holding company for five electricity transmission and distribution companies. The government’s divestment of a portion of its ownership in telecommunications firm Omantel is also an example of a partial privatization. In this case, the government in 2014 offered 19 percent of Omantel’s ownership as stock on the Muscat Stock Exchange, but only to Omani investors. The government today owns a 51-percent share of Omantel, according to the company’s website. The government allows foreign investors to participate fully in some privatization programs, including in drafting public-private partnership frameworks. In December 2021, the Ministry of Finance, which has the mandate to procure projects and services via the Public–Private Partnership (PPP) route, initiated the bidding process for its first PPP infrastructure project under the Law of Partnership between Public and Private Sectors (the PPP Law). 10. Political and Security Environment Oman is stable, and politically motivated violence is rare. Oman’s first head of state transition since 1970 occurred on January 11, 2020, with the peaceful rise to power of Sultan Haitham bin Tarik, in accordance with Oman’s Basic Law of the State. Omani law provides for limited freedom of assembly, and the government allows some peaceful demonstrations to occur. Oman experienced Arab Spring-related demonstrations in 2011. These were far smaller than in other Arab countries, although demonstrations in the northwestern Omani city of Sohar resulted in casualties, property destruction, and the blocking of pedestrian and vehicle access to the city’s port. In recent years, high youth unemployment has been among the Omani government’s most significant concerns, and the government prioritizes providing employment opportunities for Omani nationals. On regional security, Oman is committed to securing its border with Yemen, ensuring that Yemen’s instability does not affect Oman, countering illicit trade and terrorist travel, and supporting freedom of navigation through its strategic territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics According to the Oman’s National Centre for Statistics and Information (NCSI) — the only host-country source of foreign direct investment (FDI) data — total FDI in the Sultanate through the third quarter of 2021 was RO 16.43 billion, representing a 5.6-percent increase over the same period in 2020. FDI inflow at the end of the third quarter of 2020 stood at RO 0.88 billion ($2.29 billion). The United Kingdom remains by far the biggest investor in FDI (RO 8.3 billion – $21.6 billion), followed by the United States (RO 2 billion – $5.2 billion), UAE (1.2 billion – $3 billion), Kuwait (RO 914 million – $2.4 billion), and China (RO 773.4 million – $2 billion). Major foreign investors that have entered the Omani market that include SV Pittie Textiles (India), Moon Iron & Steel Company (India), Sebacic Oman (India), BP (UK), Sembcorp (Singapore), Daewoo (Korea), LG (Korea), Veolia (France), Huawei (China), SinoHydro (China), DEME (Belgium), ACME Group (India), Equinix (United States), Oracle (United States), and Vale (Brazil). Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $73,886 2020 $64,648 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 N/A 2020 197 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 -18 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 56.1 UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx * Source for Host Country Data: National Centre for Statistics and Information (NCSI). Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment* Outward Direct Investment** Total Inward 42,739 100% Total Outward 16,764 100% United Kingdom 21,662 51% UAE 1,099 N/A% USA 5,247 12% Saudi Arabia 288 N/A% UAE 3,087 7% India 205 N/A% Kuwait 2,2,378 6% United Kingdom 77 N/A% China 2,011 5% Kuwait 77 N/A% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. *Source for Host Country Data: National Centre for Statistical Analysis, 2021 Q3 (Inward). **2017 Q4 (Outward). Data on Oman from the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey is not available. Pakistan Executive Summary Pakistan has sought to foster inward investment, restructure tax collection, boost trade and investment, and fight corruption. It entered a $6 billion IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program in July 2019, committing to carry out structural reforms that have been delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In February 2022, the IMF Board authorized release of the latest tranche of the program, bringing the total disbursed to $3 billion. Nevertheless, progress has been slow in reforming taxation and privatizing state-owned enterprises. Pakistan has successfully tapped global bond markets three times since March 2021. Pakistan’s economy outperformed downbeat forecasts during the COVID-19 pandemic, with GDP expanding 5.6 percent in FY 2021 (July 2020 – June 2021). Pakistan has made significant progress since 2019 in transitioning to a market-determined exchange rate. The current account deficit, on the decline through 2020, has increased substantially and constrains policy efforts. Rising inflation is another major constraint on policy, having risen in FY 2021 and reaching 13 percent in January 2022. While Pakistan has a nominally open foreign direct investment (FDI) regime, it remains a challenging environment for investors. The security situation has improved in recent years but remains dynamic, dispute resolution processes are lengthy, enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) is weak, taxation is inconsistent, and regulations vary across Pakistan’s provinces. Incoming FDI declined by 8.9 percent in FY 2021 compared to FY 2020, and levels of investment have historically lagged behind Pakistan’s regional peers. The Pakistani government updated its National Climate Change Policy and National Wildlife Policy in 2021, which address issues in water, agriculture, forestry, coastal areas, biodiversity, and vulnerable ecosystems. Pakistan also introduced the 2020-2023 National Energy Efficiency Strategic Plan, the 2020-2025 National Electric Vehicle Policy for 2-3 Wheelers and Commercial Vehicles, and the Alternative and Renewable Energy Policy in 2019. The United States has consistently been one of Pakistan’s largest sources of FDI. In FY 2021, the PRC was Pakistan’s number one source of new FDI, largely due to projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) for which only PRC-approved companies could bid. Over the last three years, U.S. companies have pledged more than $1.5 billion of investment in Pakistan. American companies have profitable operations across a range of sectors, notably fast-moving consumer goods, agribusiness, and financial services. Other sectors attracting U.S. interest include franchising, information and communications technology (ICT), renewable energy, and healthcare services. The Karachi-based American Business Council, a local affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, has 61 U.S. member companies, most of which are Fortune 500 companies and span a wide range of sectors. The Lahore-based American Business Forum, with 23 founding members and 22 associate members, also helps U.S. investors. The U.S.-Pakistan Business Council, a division of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supports U.S.-based companies who do business with Pakistan. In 2003, the United States and Pakistan signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) as the primary vehicle to address impediments to bilateral trade and investment flows and to grow commerce between the two economies. In March 2022, the United States and Pakistan held TIFA intersessional talks. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 140 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 99 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 USD 256 https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/south-central-asia/pakistan World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 1416.1 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Pakistan seeks inward investment to boost economic growth, particularly in the energy, agribusiness, information and communications technology, and industrial sectors. Since 1997, Pakistan has established and maintained a largely open investment regime. Pakistan introduced an Investment Policy in 2013 that further liberalized investment policies in most sectors to attract foreign investment and signed an economic co-operation agreement with China, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), in April 2015. CPEC Phase I, which concluded in late 2019, focused primarily on infrastructure and energy production. CPEC Phase II, which is ongoing, is reportedly pivoting away from infrastructure development to mainly promote Pakistan’s industrial growth by establishing special economic zones throughout the country. The PRC has also pledged to provide $1 billion in socio-economic initiatives focused on agriculture, health, education, poverty alleviation, and vocational training by 2024. However, progress on Phase II is significantly delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, fiscal constraints, and regulatory issues. The government took almost two years to pass legislation formalizing the CPEC Authority (a centralized federal body charged with overseeing CPEC implementation across the country). Some opportunities are only open to approved Chinese companies, and CPEC has ensured those projects and their investors receive authorities’ attention. To support its Investment Policy, Pakistan also has implemented sectoral policies designed to provide additional incentives to investors in those specific sectors. The Automotive Policy 2016, Export Enhancement Package 2019, Alternative and Renewable Energy Policy 2019, Merchant Marine Shipping Policy 2019 (with 2020 updates), the Electric Vehicle Policy 2020-2025, the Textile Policy 2021 (which took over two years for final approval), and then Prime Minister Imran Khan’s reform package for IT sector development (announced in February 2022) are a few examples of sector-specific incentive schemes. Sector-specific incentives typically include tax breaks, tax refunds, tariff reductions, the provision of dedicated infrastructure, and investor facilitation services. The last Strategic Trade Policy Framework (STPF) – which lays out the government’s broad trade policy outlooks and priorities – expired in 2018; the Cabinet approved an updated STPF 2020-25 in November 2021. Following the expiration, incentives introduced through STPF 2015-18 remained in place until the updated STPF came into effect. Nonetheless, foreign investors continue to advocate for Pakistan to improve legal protections for foreign investments, protect intellectual property rights, and establish clear and consistent policies for upholding contractual obligations and settlement of tax disputes. The Foreign Private Investment Promotion and Protection Act (FPIPPA), 1976, and the Furtherance and Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, provide legal protection for foreign investors and investment in Pakistan. The FPIPPA stipulates that foreign investment will not be subject to higher income taxes than similar investments made by Pakistani citizens. All sectors and activities are open for foreign investment unless specifically prohibited or restricted for reasons of national security and public safety. Specified restricted industries include arms and ammunitions; high explosives; radioactive substances; securities, currency and mint; and consumable alcohol. There are no restrictions or mechanisms that specifically exclude U.S. investors. Pakistan’s investment promotion agency is the Board of Investment (BOI). BOI is responsible for attracting investment, facilitating local and foreign investors, implementation of projects, and enhancing Pakistan’s international competitiveness. BOI assists companies and investors who seek to invest in Pakistan and facilitates the implementation and operation of their projects. BOI is not a one-stop shop for investors, however. Pakistan pursues investor retention through “business dialogues” such as webinars and seminars with existing and potential investors. BOI plays the leading role in initiating and managing these dialogues. However, Pakistan does not have a dedicated ombudsman’s office focused on investment retention. Foreigners, other than Indian and Israeli citizens/entities, can establish, own, operate, and dispose of interests in most types of businesses in Pakistan, excepting those involved in arms and ammunitions; high explosives; radioactive substances; securities, currency and mint; and consumable alcohol. There are no restrictions or mechanisms that specifically exclude U.S. investors. There are no laws or regulations authorizing domestic private entities to adopt articles of incorporation discriminating against foreign investment. Pakistan does not place limits on foreign ownership or control. The 2013 Investment Policy eliminated minimum initial capital requirements across sectors so that there is no minimum investment requirement or upper limit on the allowed share of foreign equity, with the exception of investments in the airline, banking, agriculture, and media sectors. Waiver to these limits require approval from the cabinet and prime minister. Foreign investors in the services sector may retain 100 percent equity, subject to obtaining permission, a “no objection certificate,” and license from the concerned agency, as well as fulfilling the requirements of the respective sectoral policy. In the education, health, and infrastructure sectors, 100 percent foreign ownership is allowed, while in the agriculture sector, the threshold is 60 percent, with an exception for corporate agriculture farming, where 100 percent ownership is allowed. Small-scale mining valued at less than PKR 300 million (roughly $1.7 million) is restricted to Pakistani investors. Foreign banks may establish locally incorporated subsidiaries and branches, provided they have $5 billion in paid-up capital or belong to one of the regional organizations or associations to which Pakistan is a member (e.g., Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) or the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)). Absent these requirements, foreign banks are limited to a 49-percent maximum equity stake in locally incorporated subsidiaries. There are no restrictions on payments of royalties and technical fees for the manufacturing sector, but there are restrictions on other sectors, including a $100,000 limit on initial franchise investments and a cap on subsequent royalty payments of 5 percent of net sales for five years. Royalties and technical payments are subject to remittance restrictions listed in Chapter 14, Section 12 of the SBP Foreign Exchange Manual (http://www.sbp.org.pk/fe_manual/index.htm). Pakistan maintains investment screening mechanisms for inbound foreign investment. The BOI is the lead organization for such screening. Pakistan blocks foreign investments where the screening process determines the investment could negatively affect Pakistan’s national security. Though BOI is the official lead agency for investment screening mechanism, they lack in-house capacity for running such screenings and rely heavily on intelligence agencies for the required due diligence. Pakistan has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews in the past three years. Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) is the leading civil society think tank in Pakistan and in 2020 reported on “excessive regulations” as the key barrier to attracting more foreign investment. Details are at https://sdpi.org/excessive-regulations-hurdle-to-foreign-investment/news_detail. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (SDPI), a public sector think tank, produced a report in 2021 on reasons Pakistan has attracted less investment than China or India. Details are at https://pide.org.pk/research/why-do-we-have-less-investment-than-china-and-india/. The Board of Investment’s “Doing Business Reform Strategy 2018-21” is the national roadmap for improving Pakistan’s investment climate. In last few years, the government has simplified pre-registration and registration facilities and automated land records to simplify property registration, eased requirements for obtaining construction permits and utilities, introduced online/electronic tax payments, and facilitated cross-border trade by expanding electronic submissions and processing of trade documents. The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) manages company registration, which is available to both foreign and domestic companies. Companies first provide a company name and pay the requisite registration fee to the SECP. They then supply documentation on the proposed business, including information on corporate offices, location of company headquarters, and a copy of the company charter. Both foreign and domestic companies must apply for national tax numbers with the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) to facilitate payment of income and sales taxes. Industrial or commercial establishments with five or more employees must register with Pakistan’s Federal Employees Old-Age Benefits Institution (EOBI) for social security purposes. Depending on the location, registration with provincial governments may also be required. The SECP website (https://www.secp.gov.pk/) offers a Virtual One Stop Shop (OSS) where companies can register with the SECP, FBR, and EOBI simultaneously. The OSS can be used by foreign investors. Pakistan does not promote or incentivize outward investment. While Pakistan does not explicitly restrict domestic investors from investing abroad, cumbersome and time-consuming approval processes, involving multiple entities including the SBP, SECP, and the Ministries of Finance, Economic Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, discourage outward investments. Despite those processes, larger Pakistani corporations have made investments in the United States in recent years. 3. Legal Regime Pakistan generally lacks transparency and effective policies and laws that foster market-based competition in a non-discriminatory manner. The Competition Commission of Pakistan has a mandate to ensure market-based competition, but laws and regulations are opaque, vary among provinces, and are sometimes applied to benefit domestic businesses. All businesses in Pakistan are required to adhere to certain regulatory processes managed by the chambers of commerce and industry. Rules, for example on the requirement for importers or exporters to register with a chamber, are equally applicable to domestic and foreign firms. To date, Post is not aware of incidents where such rules have been used to discriminate against foreign investors in general or U.S. investors specifically. The Pakistani government is responsible for establishing and implementing legal rules and regulations, but sub-national governments have a role as well depending on the sector. Prior to implementation, non-government actors and private sector associations can provide feedback to the government on regulations and policies, but governmental authorities are not bound to follow their input. Regulatory authorities are required to conduct in-house post-implementation reviews of regulations in consultation with relevant stakeholders. However, these assessments are not made publicly available. Since the 2010 introduction of the 18th amendment to Pakistan’s constitution, which delegated significant authorities to provincial governments, foreign companies must comply with provincial, and sometimes local, laws in addition to federal law. Foreign businesses complain about the inconsistencies in the application of laws and policies from different regulatory authorities. There are no rules or regulations in place that discriminate specifically against U.S. firms or investors, however. The SECP is the main regulatory body for foreign companies operating in Pakistan, but it is not the sole regulator. Company financial transactions are regulated by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), labor by Social Welfare or the Employee Old-Age Benefits Institution (EOBI), and specialized functions in the energy sector are administered by bodies such as the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA), the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA), and Alternate Energy Development Board (AEDB). Each body has independent management, but all must submit draft regulatory or policy changes through the Ministry of Law and Justice before any proposed rules or regulations may be submitted to parliament or, in some cases, the executive branch. The SECP is authorized to establish accounting standards for companies in Pakistan, however, execution and implementation of those standards is poor. Pakistan has adopted most, though not all, International Financial Reporting Standards. Though most of Pakistan’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms, execution and implementation is inefficient and opaque. The Pakistani government requires companies to provide environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures on their projects in country, but there is no single regulatory mechanism or central regulation for such requirements. For instance, companies must work with the Ministry of Climate Change on environmental disclosures; the EOBI on social disclosures, such as those that concern pensions; and SECP on governance disclosures. However, implementation and monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for such requirements are weak and opaque. Most draft legislation is made available for public comment but there is no centralized body to collect public responses. The relevant authorities, usually the responsible ministry for proposed legislation, gathers public comments as it deems necessary; otherwise, the government submits legislation directly to the legislative branch. For business and investment laws and regulations, the Ministry of Commerce relies on stakeholder feedback obtained from chambers and associations – such as the American Business Council (ABC) and Overseas Investors Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OICCI) – rather than publishing regulations online for public review. There is no centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published. Different regulators publish their regulations and implementing actions on their respective websites. In most cases, regulatory implementing actions are not published online. Businesses impacted by non-compliance with government regulations may seek relief from the judiciary, Ombudsman’s offices, and the Parliamentary Public Account Committee. These forums are designed to ensure the government follows required administrative processes. Pakistan did not announce any enforcement reforms during the last year. Pakistan is in the process of updating its IPR laws to make them consistent and to improve IPR enforcement through draft amendments on trademark, patent, and copyright legislation. If drafted according to international IP treaties, and fully implemented, updated laws can improve IPR enforcement in Pakistan and boost foreign investor willingness to bring innovations to Pakistan. Enforcement processes are legally reviewable – initially by specialized IP Tribunals, but also through the High and Supreme Courts of Pakistan. Few of these processes are digitalized. The government publishes limited debt obligations in the budget document in two broad categories: capital receipts and public debt, which are published in the “Explanatory Memorandum on Federal Receipts.” These documents are available at http://www.finance.gov.pk/, https://www.fbr.gov.pk/, and http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/index2.asp . The government does not publicly disclose the terms of bilateral debt obligations. Pakistan is a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), and Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). However, there is no regional cooperation between Pakistan and other member nations on regulatory development or implementation. Pakistan’s judicial system incorporates British standards. As such, most of Pakistan’s regulatory systems use British norms to meet international standards. Pakistan has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since January 1, 1995, and provides most favored nation (MFN) treatment to all member states, except India and Israel. In October 2015, Pakistan ratified the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). Pakistan is one of 23 WTO countries negotiating the Trade in Services Agreement. Pakistan notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, albeit at times with significant delays. Most international norms and standards incorporated in Pakistan’s regulatory system, including commercial matters, are influenced by UK law. Laws governing domestic or personal matters are strongly influenced by Islamic Sharia law. Regulations and enforcement actions may be appealed through the court system. The Supreme Court is Pakistan’s highest court and has jurisdiction over the provincial courts, referrals from the federal government, and cases involving disputes among provinces or between a province and the federal government. Decisions by the courts of the superior judiciary (the Supreme Court, the Federal Sharia Court, and five High Courts – Lahore High Court, Sindh High Court, Balochistan High Court, Islamabad High Court, and Peshawar High Court) have national standing. The lower courts are composed of civil and criminal district courts, as well as various specialized courts, including courts devoted to banking, intellectual property, customs and excise, tax law, environmental law, consumer protection, insurance, and cases of corruption. Pakistan’s judiciary is influenced by the government and other stakeholders. The lower judiciary is influenced by the executive branch and seen as lacking competence and fairness. It currently faces a significant backlog of unresolved cases. Pakistan’s Contract Act of 1872 is the main law that regulates contracts with Pakistan. British legal decisions, under some circumstances, are also cited in court rulings. While Pakistan’s legal code and economic policy do not discriminate against foreign investments, enforcement of contracts remains problematic due to a weak and inefficient judiciary. Theoretically, Pakistan’s judicial system operates independently of the executive branch. Although higher courts are widely viewed as credible, lower courts are often considered corrupt, inefficient, and subject to pressure from outside influences including the executive branch, the military, and other prominent figures. As a result, there are doubts concerning the competence, fairness, and reliability of Pakistan’s judicial system. In addition, concern over potential contempt of court proceedings inhibits businesses and the public from reporting on perceived weaknesses of the judicial system. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable. Specialized tribunals and departmental adjudication authorities are the primary forum for such appeals. Decisions made by a tribunal or adjudication authority may be appealed to a high court and then to the Supreme Court. Pakistan’s investment and corporate laws permit wholly owned subsidiaries with 100 percent foreign equity in most sectors of the economy. In the education, health, and infrastructure sectors, 100 percent foreign ownership is allowed. In the agricultural sector, the threshold is 60 percent, with an exception for corporate agriculture farming, where 100 percent ownership is allowed. Most foreign companies operating in Pakistan are “private limited companies,” which are incorporated with a minimum of two shareholders and two directors registered with the SECP. While there are no regulatory requirements on the residency status of company directors, the chief executive must reside in Pakistan to conduct day-to-day operations. If the chief executive is not a Pakistani national, she or he is required to obtain a multiple-entry work visa. Corporations operating in Pakistan are statutorily required to retain full-time audit services and legal representation. Corporations must also register any changes to the name, address, directors, shareholders, CEO, auditors/lawyers, and other pertinent details to the SECP within 15 days of the change. To address long process delays, in 2013, the SECP introduced the issuance of a provisional “Certificate of Incorporation” prior to the final issuance of a “No Objection Certificate” (NOC). The certificate of incorporation includes a provision noting that company shares will be transferred to another shareholder if the foreign shareholder(s) and/or director(s) fails to obtain a NOC. No new law, regulation, or judicial decision was announced or went into effect during the last year which would be significant to foreign investors. There is no “single window” website for investment in Pakistan which provides direct access to all relevant laws, rules, and reporting requirements for investors. Established in 2007, the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) is designed to ensure private and public sector organizations are not involved in any anti-competitive or monopolistic practices. Complaints regarding anti-competitive practices can be lodged with CCP, which conducts the investigation and is legally empowered to impose penalties; complaints are reviewable by the CCP appellate tribunal in Islamabad and the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The CCP appellate tribunal is required to issue decisions on any anti-competitive practice within six months from the date in which it becomes aware of the practice. As of early 2022, the CCP was investigating a cement sector cartel; it found that cement manufacturers in Pakistan established a cartel and kept prices at an artificially high level, raising excess revenues worth $250 million, but its review was not yet final. In 2021, the CCP also conducted an inquiry into sugar prices and submitted a report to the Prime Minister’s office, with the Federal Investigation Agency tasked to follow up on the inquiry. However, to date no action has been taken on the report’s findings. The CCP has also conducted an inquiry regarding the banking sector on the charges of forming a cartel to bid up interest rates for public sector debt. The CCP generally adheres to transparent norms and procedures. Agency decisions are reviewable by the CCP appellate tribunal and the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Two Acts, the Protection of Economic Reforms Act 1992 and the Foreign Private Investment Promotion and Protection Act 1976, protect foreign investment in Pakistan from expropriation, while the 2013 Investment Policy reinforced the government’s commitment to protect foreign investor interests. Pakistan does not have a strong history of expropriation. Pakistan does not have a single, comprehensive bankruptcy law. Foreclosures are governed under the Companies Act 2017 and administered by the SECP, while the Banking Companies Ordinance of 1962 governs liquidations of banks and financial institutions. Court-appointed liquidators auction bankrupt companies’ property and organize the actual bankruptcy process, which can take years to complete. On average, Pakistan requires 2.6 years to resolve insolvency issues and has a recovery rate of 42.8 percent. Pakistan was ranked 58 of 190 for ease of “resolving insolvency” rankings in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report. The Companies Act 2017 regulates mergers and acquisitions. Mergers are allowed between international companies, as well as between international and local companies. In 2012, the government enacted legislation for friendly and hostile takeovers. The law requires companies to disclose any concentration of share ownership over 25 percent. Pakistan has no dedicated credit monitoring authority. However, SBP has authority to monitor and investigate the quality of the credit commercial banks extend. 6. Financial Sector Pakistan’s three stock exchanges (Lahore, Islamabad, and Karachi) merged to form the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) in January 2016. As a member of the Federation of Euro-Asian Stock Exchanges and the South Asian Federation of Exchanges, PSX is also an affiliated member of the World Federation of Exchanges and the International Organization of Securities Commissions. Per the Foreign Exchange Regulations, foreign investors can invest in shares and securities listed on the PSX and can repatriate profits, dividends, or disinvestment proceeds. The investor must open a Special Convertible Rupee Account with any bank in Pakistan in order to make portfolio investments. In 2017, the government modified the capital gains tax and imposed a 15 percent tax on stocks held for less than 12 months, 12.5 percent on stocks held for more than 12 but less than 24 months, and 7.5 percent on stocks held for more than 24 months. The 2012 Capital Gains Tax Ordinance appointed the National Clearing Company of Pakistan Limited to compute, determine, collect, and deposit the capital gains tax. The SBP and SECP provide regulatory oversight of financial and capital markets for domestic and foreign investors. Interest rates depend on the reverse repo rate (also called the policy rate). Pakistan has adopted and adheres to international accounting and reporting standards – including IMF Article VIII, with comprehensive disclosure requirements for companies and financial sector entities. Foreign-controlled manufacturing, semi-manufacturing (i.e. goods that require additional processing before marketing), and non-manufacturing concerns are allowed to borrow from the domestic banking system without regulated limits. Banks are required to ensure that total exposure to any domestic or foreign entity should not exceed 25 percent of a bank’s equity. Foreign-controlled (minimum 51 percent equity stake) semi-manufacturing concerns (i.e., those producing goods that require additional processing for consumer marketing) are permitted to borrow up to 75 percent of paid-up capital, including reserves. For non-manufacturing concerns, local borrowing caps are set at 50 percent of paid-up capital. While there are no restrictions on private sector access to credit instruments, few alternative instruments are available beyond commercial bank lending. Pakistan’s domestic corporate bond, commercial paper and derivative markets remain in the early stages of development. The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) is the central bank of Pakistan. According to the most recent statistics published by the SBP (2021), only 23 percent of the adult population uses formal banking channels to conduct financial transactions, while 24 percent are informally served by the banking sector. The remaining 53 percent of the adult population do not utilize formal financial services. Women are more likely to be unbanked than men. Pakistan’s financial sector has improved in recent years according to international banks and lenders. The SBP’s most recent review of the banking sector, in July 2021, noted improving asset quality, stable liquidity, robust solvency, and a slow pick-up in private sector advances. The asset base of the banking sector expanded by 12.2 percent during 2021 due to a surge in banks’ deposits and investments, which increased by 10.4 percent and 18.7 percent respectively. The five largest banks, one of which is state-owned, control 57.8 percent of all banking sector assets. SBP conducted the 8th wave of the Systemic Risk Survey in July 2021. The survey results indicated respondents perceived key risks for the financial system to be mostly exogenous and global in nature. Importantly, the policy measures rolled out by SBP to mitigate the effects of COVID-19 have been very well received by the stakeholders. The risk profile of the banking sector remained satisfactory, and moderation in profitability and asset quality improved as non-performing loans as a percentage of total loans (infection ratio) was at 8.9 percent at the end of FY 2021 (June 30, 2021). In FY 2021, total assets of the banking industry were estimated at $165.7 billion and net non-performing bank loans totaled approximately $5 million. The penetration of foreign banks in Pakistan is low, making a small contribution to the local banking industry and the overall economy. According to a study conducted by the World Bank Group in 2018 (the latest data available), the share of foreign bank assets to GDP stood at 3.5 percent while private credit by deposit stood at 15.4 percent of GDP. Foreign banks operating in Pakistan include Citibank, Standard Chartered Bank, Deutsche Bank, Samba Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of Tokyo, and the Bank of China. International banks are primarily involved in two types of international activities: cross-border flows, and foreign participation in domestic banking systems through brick-and-mortar operations. SBP requires foreign banks to hold at minimum $300 million in capital reserves at their Pakistani flagship location and maintain at least an 8 percent capital adequacy ratio. In addition, foreign banks are required to maintain the following minimum capital requirements, which vary based on the number of branches they are operating: 1 to 5 branches: $28 million in assigned capital; 6 to 50 branches: $56 million in assigned capital; Over 50 branches: $94 million in assigned capital. Foreigners require proof of residency – a work visa, company sponsorship letter, and valid passport – to establish a bank account in Pakistan. There are no other restrictions to prevent foreigners from opening and maintaining a bank account. Pakistan does not have its own sovereign wealth fund (SWF) and no specific exemptions for foreign SWFs exist in Pakistan’s tax law. Foreign SWFs are taxed like any other non-resident person unless specific concessions have been granted under an applicable tax treaty to which Pakistan is a signatory. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Pakistan has 212 SOEs operating in various sectors: 85 commercial SOEs, 83 subsidiaries of those commercial SOEs, and 44 non-commercial SOEs (defined as not-for-profits, trusts, universities, training institutions, and welfare funds). The commercial SOEs mainly operate in seven sectors: power; oil and gas; infrastructure, transport, and communication; manufacturing, mining, and engineering; finance; industrial estate development and management; and wholesale, retail, and marketing. They provide stable employment and other benefits for more than 450,000 workers, but a number require annual government subsidies to cover their substantial losses. Three of the country’s largest SOEs include: Pakistan Railways (PR), Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), and Pakistan Steel Mills (PSM). According to the IMF, the total debt of SOEs amounts to 2.3 percent of GDP – just over $7 billion in 2019. Note: IMF and WB data for 2020-21 regarding SOEs is not yet available, however, according to SBP provisional data from December 2021, the total debt of Pakistani SOEs is $8.59 billion. End Note. The IMF required audits of PIA and PSM by December 2019 as part of Pakistan’s IMF Extended Fund Facility. PR is the only provider of rail services in Pakistan and the largest public sector employer with approximately 90,000 employees. PR has received commitments for $8.2 billion in CPEC loans and grants to modernize its rail lines. PR relies on monthly government subsidies of approximately $2.8 million to cover its ongoing obligations. In 2019, government payments to PR totaled approximately $248 million. The government provided a $37.5 million bailout package to PR in 2020. The Government of Pakistan extended bailout packages worth $89 million to PIA in 2019 and $250 million in 2021. Established to avoid importing foreign steel, PSM has accumulated losses of approximately $3.77 billion per annum. The government has provided $562 million to PSM in bailout packages since 2008. In September 2020, Pakistan’s Cabinet approved a $124 million restructuring plan of PSM, offering its employees a Voluntary Separation Scheme to Cut Losses. The company loses $5 million a week, and has not produced steel since June 2015, when the national gas company shut off supplies to PSM facilities due to its greater than $340 million in outstanding unpaid utility bills. SOEs competing in the domestic market receive non-market-based advantages from the host government. Two prominent examples are carrier PIA and steelmaker PSM, which operate at a loss while receiving financial bailouts from the federal government. Post is not aware of negative impacts to U.S firms as a result. The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) introduced corporate social responsibility (CSR) voluntary guidelines in 2013. Adherence to the OECD guidelines is not known. Terms to purchase public shares of SOEs and financial institutions are the same for both foreign and local investors. On March 7, 2019, the government announced plans to carry out a privatization program but postponed plans because of significant political resistance. Even though the government is still publicly committed to privatizing its national airline (PIA), the process has been stalled since early 2016 when three labor union members were killed during a violent protest in response to the government’s decision to convert PIA into a limited company, a decision which would have allowed shares to be transferred to a non-government entity and pave the way for privatization. A bill passed by the legislature requires the government retain 51% equity in the airline in the event it is privatized, reducing the attractiveness of the company to potential investors. The Privatization Commission describes the privatization process as transparent and non-discriminatory; the process described at http://privatisation.gov.pk/?page_id=88. A description of privatization transactions since 1991 is at http://privatisation.gov.pk/?page_id=125 10. Political and Security Environment Despite improvements to the security situation in recent years, the presence of foreign and domestic terrorist groups within Pakistan continues to pose threats to U.S. interests and citizens. Many multinational companies operating in Pakistan employ private security and risk management firms to mitigate the significant threats to their business operations. Although the number of attacks by terrorist groups has declined over the last decade, increased activity since 2021 has renewed security concerns in some regions. Baloch militant groups continue to target the Pakistani military as well as PRC-affiliated installations in Balochistan, where Gwadar port is being developed under CPEC. There are greater security resources and infrastructure in the major cities, particularly Islamabad, and security forces in those areas may be better able to respond to emergencies. The BOI, along with provincial investment promotion agencies, can coordinate airport-to-airport security and secure lodging for foreign investors. To inquire about this service, investors can contact the BOI for additional information – https://www.invest.gov.pk/ Abductions/kidnappings of foreigners for ransom remains a concern. While security challenges exist in Pakistan, the country has not grown increasingly politicized or insecure in the past year. Palau Executive Summary The Republic of Palau is a small island nation of about 350 islands in the western Pacific Ocean, with an estimated population of about 21,000 people. The government is the country’s largest employer, with approximately 30 percent of the workforce, and the tourism sector is Palau’s biggest economic driver, contributing an estimated 40 percent to GDP. GDP in 2021 was $257 million, approximately $14,243 per capita. Palau’s official currency is the U.S. dollar, and the country has three FDIC–insured U.S. banks. Apart from tourism, commercial industries include wholesale/retail trade, business services, commercial fisheries, and construction. Fish, coconuts, breadfruit, bananas, and taro cultivation constitute the subsistence sector, though the country’s agricultural base is small. Palau has a limited export base and production capacity, thus highly vulnerable to external shocks. Primary exports include frozen fish (tuna), tropical aquarium fish, ornamental clams and corals, coconut oil, and handicrafts. Palau continues to rely heavily on imports and continues to run trade deficits ($45.8 million in 2018). The country exports $0.5 million to the United States in 2021. Palau’s economy remains dependent on donor funding. Since independence, Palau has operated under a Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the United States, which provides it with U.S. direct assistance, subsidies, and other financial support. In 2019, U.S. assistance to Palau was $32 million, roughly one-fourth of government spending. Palau receives additional aid from Australia, Japan, Taiwan, and international organizations such as the World Bank, ADB, and UDP. Palau’s economy was hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic, which had a devastating effect on tourism. The economy shrank 8.7% and 19.7% in 2020 and 2021, respectively. To offset COVID-related losses, the ADB provided Palau with $41 million in 2020. The Foreign Investment Act guides the foreign investment process in Palau, and Foreign Investment Regulations restrict some sectors to Palauan citizens, including wholesale or retail sale of goods, all land and water transportation, travel and tour agencies, and commercial fishing. Other sectors are semi-restricted, requiring a Palauan partner. Foreigners cannot own land in Palau, but they can lease land and own buildings on leased land. While the government welcomes foreign investors, Palau’s investment climate poses challenges. Some U.S. investors have made allegations of corrupt practices when seeking government permits, doing business with local partners, and in public procurement processes. Establishing secure land title may be complicated due to the complexity of Palau’s traditional land ownership system and occasional over-lapping claims. Palau is not a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization, the WTO, or any other organization or convention protecting intellectual property rights. Palau has no bilateral investment protection agreements and is not a member of any free trade associations. Human resource constraints are a challenge for foreign investors and, third country nationals from Bangladesh and the Philippines comprise a large proportion the labor force. FDI flows accounted for $24 million in 2020, up slightly compared to 2019 ($22 million), despite the pandemic. The stock of FDI grew to $488 million in 2020. Traditionally, FDI has be is mostly directed towards the tourism and real estate sectors. Main investment partners include China, Taiwan, and Singapore. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 N/A http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $10 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2021 $14,243 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The government actively seeks foreign direct investment, and the country’s Foreign Investment Board (FIB) is responsible for approving and regulating foreign investment. There are no specific financial incentives extended to foreign investors. The Foreign Investment Regulations detail the significant number of restricted and semi-restricted sectors. Semi-restricted businesses can include foreign ownership, as long as a Palauan citizen also has an ownership interest. These semi-restricted businesses are as follows: handicraft and gift shops; bakeries; bar services; operations [selling] products being produced by wholly Palauan-owned manufacturing enterprise; equipment rentals for both land and water within the Republic, including equipment for purpose of tourism; and any such other businesses, as the Foreign Investment Board may determine. Sectors not listed as either closed or semi-restricted are presumed to be open for foreign investment. The Foreign Investment Board may, however, amend the semi-restricted sector list for “any such other businesses as the Board may determine.” The Government of Palau has not conducted an investment policy review through any organization or institution in the past five years. 3. Legal Regime Regulatory and accounting systems are largely consistent with international norms. Bureaucratic procedures (e.g. permitting processes, approvals, etc.) may lack transparency and be influenced by cronyism, partly due to the country’s small size and extensive family networks. Proposed laws and regulations are available in draft form for public comment pursuant to the Administration Procedures Act, Title 6 of the Palau National Code. Generally, tax, labor, environment, health and safety, and other laws and policies do not impede investment. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. The Government of Palau, through the Financial Investment Act and the Environmental Protection Act, requires companies’ ESG disclosure to facilitate transparency and inform the application process in distinguishing between low- and high-end investment. The Pacific Island Forum, of which Palau is a member, has a model regulatory and policy framework focused on competition, fair trading, and consumer protections. Palau is not a WTO member. The legal system in Palau is composed of a mix of civil, common, and customary law. Palau also has a specialized Land Court for disputes arising from conflicting claims of land ownership, which is a complex issue in the country. The legal system is patterned on common law proceedings as they exist in the United States. The judiciary comprises a four-member Supreme Court, a Court of Common Pleas, and a Land Court. The Supreme Court has a trial division and an appellate division. Court rulings, legal codes, and public law can be found on their website: http://www.palausupremecourt.net/ . All non-citizens wishing to invest in the Republic of Palau must obtain a Foreign Investment Business License (FIBL). The FIBL is obtained from the Registrar of Foreign Investment in the office of the Attorney General. In coordination with the Investment Promotion Unit at the Ministry of Natural Resources and Commerce, the Ministry of Finance reviews the application and ensures that the business does not fall under the categories of the National Reserved List listed above. The application process usually takes 7-10 working days. Palau does not currently have any anti-trust legislation, although the Foreign Investment Board considers competition-related concerns in its review process. Although the Palauan constitution provides for the right of the government to condemn land for national interest (“eminent domain”), there are no reported property-expropriation cases. Most of the land is privately owned by Palauan citizens through complex family lineages. There is no legal provision for bankruptcy in the Republic of Palau. It ranks 166 out of 190 for resolving insolvency in World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report. 6. Financial Sector There are no stock exchanges or financial regulatory institutions in the country. Palau uses the U.S. dollar and has no central bank. The country has three FDIC–insured banks: Bank of Hawaii, Bank Pacific, and Bank of Guam. All three are publicly owned U.S. companies with headquarters in Guam. There are several smaller private banks and a national bank, the National Development Bank of Palau. The Palau Financial Institutions Commission is the regulatory body responsible for establishing and maintaining the financial supervisory system in Palau. Palau has no sovereign wealth fund (SWF) or asset management bureau (AMB), but the Compact of Free Association established a Trust Fund for Palau that is independently overseen by the COFA Trust Fund Board composed 5 members who are appointed by the President of Palau and confirmed by the Senate. 7. State-Owned Enterprises In Palau, most of the major industries are controlled by state-owned- or quasi-state enterprises. These include the utilities sector, telecommunications, and the national bank. The SOE sector continues to underperform and to impose significant risks and burden on the fiscal system and economy. Palau has no on-going privatization program. 10. Political and Security Environment Palau is stable, and not prone to political violence. The World Bank placed Palau in the 84th percentile in its 2015 rating of country political stability. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2015 $287 2019 $274 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $10 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A N/A N/A UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Panama Executive Summary Panama’s investment climate is mixed. Over the last decade, Panama was one of the Western Hemisphere’s fastest growing economies. Its economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic is outpacing most other countries in the region, with a 15.3 percent growth rate in 2021 (after a contraction of 17.9 percent in 2020) and a projected growth rate of 7.8 percent for 2022, according to the World Bank. Panama also has one of the highest GDP per capita rates in the region and has several investment incentives, including a dollarized economy, a stable democratic government, the world’s second largest free trade zone, and 14 international free trade agreements. Although Panama’s market is small, with a population of just over 4 million, the Panama Canal provides a global trading hub with incentives for international trade. However, Panama’s structural deficiencies weigh down its investment climate with high levels of corruption, a reputation for government non-payment, a poorly educated workforce, a weak judicial system, and labor unrest. Panama’s presence on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list since June 2019 for systemic deficiencies in combatting money laundering and terrorist financing increases the risk of investing in Panama, notwithstanding the government’s ongoing efforts to increase financial transparency. The government is eager for international investment and has several policies in place to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). As such, it continues to attract one of the highest rates of FDI in the region, with $4.6 billion in 2020, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. As of March 18, 2022, Panama’s sovereign debt rating remains investment grade, with ratings of Baa2 (Moody’s), BBB- (Fitch), and BBB (Standard & Poor’s with a negative outlook). Panama’s high vaccination rates of 80 percent of the eligible population with at least one dose and 70 percent with at least two doses as of March 21 have contributed to its economic recovery. As the global economy rebounded, Panama’s services and infrastructure-reliant industries bounced back significantly in 2021. Sectors with the highest economic growth in 2021 included mining (148 percent increase), construction (29 percent), commerce (18 percent), industrial manufacturing (11 percent), and transportation, storage, and communications (11 percent). Panama ended 2021 with a year-on-year inflation rate variation of 2.6 percent, according to data from the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC). The government’s assertion that it is climate-negative creates opportunities for economic growth, aided by laws 37, 44, and 45 that provide incentives to promote investment in clean energy sources, specifically wind, solar, hydroelectric, and biomass/biofuels. Panama’s investment climate is threatened, however, by high government fiscal deficits, unemployment, and inequality. The pandemic resulted in government debt ballooning by $3 billion in 2021 to over $40 billion. The country’s debt-to-GDP ratio stands at around 64 percent, well above the 46 percent it stood at before the pandemic. Unemployment peaked at 18.5 percent in September 2020, a 20-year high, but has since fallen to 11.3 percent as of October 2021. Yet high levels of labor informality persist. Additionally, Panama is one of the most unequal countries in the world, with the 14th highest Gini Coefficient and a national poverty rate of 14 percent. The World Bank’s 2022 Global Economic Prospects Report and the World Economic Forum’s 2022 Global Risks Report noted that Panama should focus on inclusive economic growth and structural reforms to avoid economic stagnation and an employment crisis. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 105 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 83 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $4.6 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $12,420 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Panama welcomes FDI and relies heavily on investment to fuel its economy. With few exceptions, the Government of Panama makes no distinction between domestic and foreign companies for investment purposes. Panama benefits from stable and consistent economic policies, a dollarized economy, and a government that consistently supports trade and open markets and encourages foreign direct investment. Panama has had one of the highest levels of FDI in Central America, a trend that continued even during the pandemic. Through the Multinational Headquarters Law (SEM), the Multinational Manufacturing Services Law (EMMA), and a Private Public Partnership framework, Panama offers tax breaks and other incentives to attract investment. Executive Decree No. 722 of October 2020 created a new immigration category: Permanent Residence as a Qualified Investor, after an initial investment of $300,000. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MICI) is responsible for overseeing foreign investment, prepares an annual foreign investment promotion strategy, and provides services required by investors to expedite investments and project development (for more details, please visit: https://www.mici.gob.pa/noticias/gobierno-nacional-crea-programa-de-residencia-para-inversionistas-calificados). The Cortizo administration created a new Minister Counselor for Investment position that reports directly to the President, with the aim of attracting new investors and dislodging barriers that confront current ones. MICI, in cooperation with the Minister Counselor for Investment, facilitates the initial investment process and provides integration assistance once a company is established in Panama. The Export and Investment Promotion Authority “PROPANAMA” was created by Law 207 on April 5, 2021. It provides investors with information, expedites specific projects, leads investment-seeking missions abroad, and supports foreign investment missions to Panama. In some cases, other government offices work with investors to ensure that regulations and requirements for land use, employment, special investment incentives, business licensing, and other conditions are met. Entities that carry out a minimum investment of two million dollars in Panama enjoy the benefits of legal stability, with national, municipal, and customs tax incentives and stability in the labor regime for a period of ten years. In 2021, the United States ran a $7.5 billion trade surplus in goods with Panama. The U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) entered into force in October 2012. The TPA has significantly liberalized trade in goods and services, including financial services. The TPA also includes sections on customs administration and trade facilitation, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, government procurement, investment, telecommunications, electronic commerce, intellectual property rights, and labor and environmental protections. In March 2022, however, the Panamanian government (GoP) formally asked the U.S. government to review certain agricultural tariff provisions of the TPA. Over the last year, Panamanian producers have become increasingly vocal in demanding that their government renegotiate new protections in the face of declining Panamanian tariffs on U.S. agricultural exports. As of March 2022, the U.S. government was reviewing the GoP’s request. Panama is one of the few economies in Latin American that is predominantly services-based. Services represent nearly 80 percent of Panama’s GDP. The TPA has improved U.S. firms’ access to Panama’s services sector and gives U.S. investors better access than other WTO members under the General Agreement on Trade in Services. All services sectors are covered under the TPA, except where Panama has made specific exceptions, such as for postal services, air transportation, and water distribution. Under the agreement, Panama has provided improved access to sectors like express delivery and granted new access in certain areas that had previously been reserved for Panamanian nationals. However, some American companies face problems in this sector, including allegations of tax evasion by some local companies. In addition, Panama is a full participant in the WTO Information Technology Agreement. Panama passed a Private Public Partnership (PPP) law in 2019 (Ley 93) and published regulations for the program in 2020 (Decree 840) as an incentive for private investment, social development, and job creation. The law is a first-level legal framework that orders and formalizes how the private sector can invest in public projects, thereby expanding the State’s options to meet social needs. Panama’s 2022 budget includes funding to implement PPP projects. Panama has been selected to host Bloomberg’s “New Economy Gateway” forum in May 2022, which will cover sustainable investment and the future of trade. It will be the first time that this forum has been held outside of Asia. The Panamanian government imposes some limitations on foreign ownership in the retail, maritime, and media sectors, in which, in most cases, owners must be Panamanian. However, foreign investors can continue to use franchise arrangements to own retail within the confines of Panamanian law (under the TPA, direct U.S. ownership of consumer retail is allowed in limited circumstances). There are also limits on the number of foreign workers in some foreign investment structures. In addition to limitations on ownership, around 200 professions in both the public and private sectors, including within the Panama Canal Authority, are reserved for Panamanian nationals. Medical practitioners, lawyers, engineers, accountants, and customs brokers must be Panamanian citizens. Furthermore, the Panamanian government instituted a regulation that rideshare platforms must use drivers who possess commercial licenses, which are available only to Panamanians, and is considering the implementation of additional regulations that would further restrict American ride-sharing companies. With the exceptions of retail trade, the media, and many professions, foreign and domestic entities have the right to establish, own, and dispose of business interests in virtually all forms of remunerative activity, and the Panamanian government does not screen inbound investment. Foreigners do not need to be legally resident or physically present in Panama to establish corporations or obtain local operating licenses for a foreign corporation. Business visas (and even citizenship) are readily obtainable for significant investors. Panama generally allows private entities to establish and own businesses and engage in remunerative activities. It does not have a formal investment screening mechanism, but the government monitors large foreign investments, especially in the energy sector. Panama does not currently impose any sector-specific restrictions or limitations on foreign ownership or control. There are no licensing restrictions, although Executive Decree 81 of May 25, 2017, established controls over dual-use goods for reasons of national security. Panama does not currently have any requirements for controls over technology transfers. Panama has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews (IPRs) through a multilateral organization in the past three years. The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted a “Trade Policy Review” of Panama as of December 2021. Trade Policy Reviews are an exercise mandated in WTO agreements in which member countries’ trade and related policies are examined and evaluated at regular intervals: WTO | Trade policy review -Panama2022 Post has no knowledge of any civil society organization that has provided comprehensive reviews of concerns about investment policy. Procedures regarding how to register foreign and domestic businesses, as well as how to obtain a notice of operation, can be found on the Ministry of Commerce and Industry’s website ( https://www.panamaemprende.gob.pa/ ), where one may register a foreign company, create a branch of a registered business, or register as an individual trader from any part of the world. Corporate applicants must submit notarized documents to the Mercantile Division of the Public Registry, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Social Security Institute. Panamanian government statistics show that applications from foreign businesses typically take between one to six days to process. Historically, government procurement procedures have presented barriers to trade with Panama. The Cortizo administration has publicly committed to ensuring greater transparency in the award of government tenders. Law 153, officially passed in May 2020, provides greater transparency in public procurement by mandating that all public entities use an electronic procurement system https://www.panamacompra.gob.pa/Inicio/#!/ . Other agencies where companies typically register are: Business Registration: https://ampyme.gob.pa/?page_id=144 Tax administration: https://dgi.mef.gob.pa/ Corporations, property, mortgage: https://www.rp.gob.pa Social security: http://www.css.gob.pa Municipalities: https://mupa.gob.pa Panama does not incentivize outward investment, nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The Panamanian legal, accounting, and regulatory systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. Panama has five regulatory agencies, four that supervise the activities of financial entities (banking, securities, insurance, and “designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs)” and a fifth that oversees credit unions. Each of the regulators regularly publishes on their websites detailed policies, laws, and sector reports, as well as information regarding fines and sanctions. Panama’s banking regulator began publishing fines and sanctions in late 2016, which tend to be significantly lower than neighboring countries. The securities and insurance regulators have published fines and sanctions since 2010. Law 23 of 2015 created the regulator for DNFBPs, which began publishing fines and sanctions in 2018. In January 2020, the regulator for DNFBPs was granted independence and superintendency status like that of the banking regulator. The Superintendency of the Securities Market is generally considered a transparent, competent, and effective regulator. Panama is a full signatory to the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Post is not aware of any informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. Relevant ministries or regulators oversee and enforce administrative and regulatory processes. Any administrative errors or omissions committed by public servants can be challenged and taken to the Supreme Court for a final ruling, a process that often involves a long and arduous dispute resolution. Regulatory bodies can impose sanctions and fines which are made public and can be appealed. Panama does not promote or require companies to disclose environmental, social, and governance (ESG) data to facilitate transparency and/or help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. Laws are developed in the National Assembly. A proposed bill is discussed in three rounds, edited as needed, and approved or rejected. The President then has 30 days to approve or veto a bill the Assembly has passed. If the President vetoes the bill, it can be returned to the National Assembly for changes or sent to the Supreme Court to rule on its constitutionality. If the bill was vetoed for reasons of unconstitutionality, and the Supreme Court finds it constitutional, the President must sign the bill. Regulations are created by agencies and other governmental bodies but they can be modified or overridden by higher authorities. In general, draft bills, including those for laws and regulations on investment, are made available on the National Assembly’s website and can be introduced for discussion at the bill’s first hearing. All bills and approved legislation are published in the Official Gazette in full and summary form and can also be found on the National Assembly’s website: https://www.asamblea.gob.pa/buscador-de-gacetas . Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures in Panama are based on standards set by the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Foundation, including financial reporting standards for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Panama is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. Foreign and national investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations, including the number of steps, the names and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing times, and legal bases justifying the procedures. Information on public finances and debt obligations (includes explicit and contingent liabilities) is transparent. It is published on the Ministry of Economy and Finance’s website under the directorate of public finance, but not consistently updated: https://fpublico.mef.gob.pa/en . Mining regulations are changing. In 2018, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the law on which the country largest mining investment contract was based. According to some industry experts, the ruling was a deliberate move to force contract renegotiations and achieve more favorable terms for the government. In 2022, the same company’s concession was renegotiated for renewal, with its royalties to the government increasing significantly as a result. Panama’s enormous potential for generating mining income is undercut by long delays in the government’s concession and permit approval process, according to foreign investor contacts. Panama is part of the Central American Customs Union (CACU), the regional economic block for Central American countries. Panama has adopted many of the Central American Technical Regulations (RTCA) for intra-regional trade in goods. Panama applies the RTCA to goods imported from any CACU member and updates Panama’s regulations to be consistent with RTCA. However, Panama has not yet adopted some important RTCA regulations, such as for processed food labeling, and dietary supplements/vitamins. The United States and Panama signed an agreement regarding “Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and Technical Standards Affecting Trade in Agricultural Products,” which entered into force on December 20, 2006. The application of this agreement supersedes the RTCA for U.S. food and feed products imported into Panama. A 2006 law established the Panamanian Food Safety Authority (AUPSA) to issue science-based sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) import policies for food and feed products entering Panama. Since 2019, AUPSA and other government entities have implemented or proposed measures that restrict market access. These measures have also increased AUPSA’s ability to limit the import of certain agricultural goods. The Panamanian government, for example, has issued regulations on onions and withheld approval of genetically-modified foods, limiting market access and resulting in the loss of millions in potential investment. In March 2021, Panama passed a bill to eliminate the AUPSA. In its place, the bill created the Panamanian Food Agency (APA). APA began operations on October 1, 2021, and has responsibility for both imports and exports. The APA intends to improve efficiency for agro-exports and industrial food processes, as well as increase market access. Historically, Panama has referenced or incorporated international norms and standards into its regulatory system, including the Agreements of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Codex Alimentarius, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), the International Plant Protection Convention, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the World Customs Organization, and others. Also, Panama has incorporated into its national regulations many U.S. Food and Drug Administration regulations, such as the Pasteurized Milk Ordinance. Panama, as a member of the WTO, notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). However, in the last five years it has ignored comments on its regulations offered by other WTO members, including but not limited to the United States. When ruling on cases, judges rely on the Constitution and direct sources of law such as codes, regulations, and statutes. In 2016, Panama transitioned from an inquisitorial to an accusatory justice system, with the goal of simplifying and expediting criminal cases. Fundamental procedural rights in civil cases are broadly similar to those available in U.S. civil courts, although some notice and discovery rights, particularly in administrative matters, may be less extensive than in the United States. Judicial pleadings are not always a matter of public record, nor are processes always transparent. Panama has a legal framework governing commercial and contractual issues and has specialized commercial courts. Contractual disputes are normally handled in civil court or through arbitration, unless criminal activity is involved. Some U.S. firms have reported inconsistent, unfair, and/or biased treatment from Panamanian courts. The judicial system’s capacity to resolve contractual and property disputes is often weak, hampered by a lack of technological tools and susceptibility to corruption. The World Economic Forum’s 2019 Global Competitiveness Report rated Panama’s judicial independence at 129 of 141 countries. The Panamanian judicial system suffers from significant budget shortfalls that continue to affect all areas of the system. The transition to the accusatory system faces challenges in funding for personnel, infrastructure, and operational requirements, while addressing a significant backlog of cases initiated under the previous inquisitorial system. The judiciary still struggles with lack of independence, a legacy of an often-politicized system for appointing judges, prosecutors, and other officials. On January 11, 2022, President Cortizo committed $15 million to the Judicial Branch to implement Law 53 of August 27, 2015, which mandates that judges be selected by a merit-based process instead of by appointment, but implementation still faces serious challenges. Under Panamanian law, only the National Assembly may initiate corruption investigations against Supreme Court judges, and only the Supreme Court may initiate investigations against members of the National Assembly, which has led to charges of a de facto “non-aggression pact” between the two branches. Regulations and enforcement actions can be appealed through the legal system from Municipal Judges, to Circuit Judges, to Superior Judges, and ultimately to the Supreme Court. Panama has different laws governing investment incentives, depending on the activity, including its newest law intended to draw manufacturing investment, the 2020 Multinational Manufacturing Services Law (EMMA). In addition, it has a Multinational Headquarters Law (SEM), a Tourism Law, an Investment Stability Law, and miscellaneous laws associated with particular sectors, including the film industry, call centers, certain industrial activities, and agricultural exports. In addition, laws may differ in special economic zones, including the Colon Free Zone, the Panama Pacifico Special Economic Area, and the City of Knowledge. Government policy and law treat Panamanian and foreign investors equally with respect to access to credit. Panamanian interest rates closely follow international rates (i.e., the U.S. federal funds rate, the London Interbank Offered Rate, etc.), plus a country-risk premium. The Ministries of Tourism, Public Works, and Commerce and Industry, as well as the Minister Counselor for Investment, promote foreign investment. However, some U.S. companies have reported difficulty navigating the Panamanian business environment, especially in the tourism, branding, imports, and infrastructure development sectors. Although individual ministers have been responsive to U.S. companies, fundamental problems such as judicial uncertainty are more difficult to address. U.S. companies have complained about several ministries’ failure to make timely payments for services rendered, without official explanation for the delays. U.S. Embassy Panama is aware of tens of millions of dollars in overdue payments that the Panamanian government owes to U.S. companies. Some private companies, including multinational corporations, have issued bonds in the local securities market. Companies rarely issue stock on the local market and, when they do, often issue shares without voting rights. Investor demand is generally limited because of the small pool of qualified investors. While some Panamanians may hold overlapping interests in various businesses, there is no established practice of cross-shareholding or stable shareholder arrangements designed to restrict foreign investment through mergers and acquisitions. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry’s website lists information about laws, transparency, legal frameworks, and regulatory bodies. https://www.mici.gob.pa/direccion-general-de-servicios-al-inversionista/informacion-para-el-inversionista-direccion-general-de-servicios-al-inversionista Panama’s Consumer Protection and Anti-Trust Agency, established by Law 45 on October 31, 2007, and modified by Law 29 of June 2008, reviews transactions for competition-related concerns and serves as a consumer protection agency. Panamanian law recognizes the concept of eminent domain, but it is exercised only occasionally, for example, to build infrastructure projects such as highways and the metro commuter train. In general, compensation for affected parties is fair. However, in at least one instance a U.S. company has expressed concern about not being compensated at fair market value after the government revoked a concession. There have been no cases of claimants citing a lack of due process regarding eminent domain. The World Bank 2020 Doing Business Indicator, the most recent report available, ranked Panama 113 out of 190 jurisdictions for resolving insolvency because of a slow court system and the complexity of the bankruptcy process. Panama adopted a new insolvency law (similar to a bankruptcy law) in 2016, but the Doing Business Indicator ranking has not identified material improvement for this metric. 6. Financial Sector Panama has a stock market with an effective regulatory system developed to support foreign investment. Article 44 of the constitution guarantees the protection of private ownership of real property and private investments. Some private companies, including multinational corporations, have issued bonds in the local securities market. Companies rarely issue stock on the local market and, when they do, often issue shares without voting rights. Investor demand is generally limited because of the small pool of qualified investors. While some Panamanians may hold overlapping interests in various businesses, there is no established practice of cross-shareholding or stable shareholder arrangements designed to restrict foreign investment through mergers and acquisitions. Panama has agreed to IMF Article VIII and pledged not to impose restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. In 2012, Panama modified its securities law to regulate brokers, fund managers, and matters related to the securities industry. The Commission structure was modified to follow the successful Banking Law model and now consists of a superintendent and a board of directors. The Superintendency of the Securities Market is generally considered a competent and effective regulator. Panama is a full signatory to the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Government policy and law with respect to access to credit treat Panamanian and foreign investors equally. Panamanian interest rates closely follow international rates (i.e., the U.S. federal funds rate, the London Interbank Offered Rate, etc.), plus a country-risk premium. Panama’s banking sector is developed and highly regulated and there are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account. Foreigners are required to present a passport and taxpayer identification number and an affidavit indicating that the inflow and outflow of money meets the tax obligations of the beneficiary’s tax residence. The adoption of financial technology in Panama is nascent, but there are several initiatives underway to modernize processes. Some U.S. citizens and entities have had difficulty meeting the high documentary threshold for establishing the legitimacy of their activities both inside and outside Panama. Banking officials counter such complaints by citing the need to comply with international financial transparency standards. Several of Panama’s largest banks have gone so far as to refuse to establish banking relationships with whole sectors of the economy, such as casinos and e-commerce, in order to avoid all possible associated risks. Regulatory issues have made it difficult for some private U.S. citizens to open bank accounts in Panama, leaving some legitimate businesses without access to banking services in Panama. Panama has no central bank. The banking sector is highly dependent on the operating environment in Panama, but it is generally well-positioned to withstand shocks. The banking sector could be impacted if Panama’s sovereign debt rating continues to fall. As of March 18, 2022, the sovereign debt rating remains investment grade, with ratings of Baa2 (Moody’s), BBB- (Fitch), and BBB (Standard & Poor’s). Approximately 4.7 percent of total banking sector assets are estimated to be non-performing. Panama’s 2008 Banking Law regulates the country’s financial sector. The law concentrates regulatory authority in the hands of a well-financed Banking Superintendent ( https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/ ). Traditional bank lending from the well-developed banking sector is relatively efficient and is the most common source of financing for both domestic and foreign investors, offering the private sector a variety of credit instruments. The free flow of capital is actively supported by the government and is viewed as essential to Panama’s 68 banks (2 official banks, 39 domestic banks, 17 international banks, and 10 bank representational offices). Foreign banks can operate in Panama and are subject to the same regulatory regime as domestic banks. Panama has not lost any correspondent banking relationships in the last three years despite its inclusion on the FATF grey list since June 2019. There are no restrictions on, nor practical measures to prevent, hostile foreign investor takeovers, nor are there regulatory provisions authorizing limitations on foreign participation or control, or other practices that restrict foreign participation. There are no government or private sector rules that prevent foreign participation in industry standards-setting consortia. Financing for consumers is relatively open for mortgages, credit cards, and personal loans, even to those earning modest incomes. Panama’s strategic geographic location, dollarized economy, status as a regional financial, trade, and logistics hub, and favorable corporate and tax laws make it an attractive destination for money launderers. Money laundered in Panama is believed to come in large part from the proceeds of drug trafficking. Tax evasion, bank fraud, and corruption are also believed to be major sources of illicit funds in Panama. Criminals have been accused of laundering money through shell companies and via bulk cash smuggling and trade at airports and seaports, and in active free trade zones. In 2015, Panama strengthened its legal framework, amended its criminal code, harmonized legislation with international standards, and passed a law on anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). Panama also approved Law 18 (2015), which severely restricts the use of bearer shares; companies still using them must appoint a custodian and maintain strict controls over their use. In addition, Panama passed Law 70 (2019), which criminalizes tax evasion and defines it as a money laundering predicate offense. In 2021, Panama passed Law 254, which modifies six distinct laws in order to give the non-financial regulator more authority and strengthen know-your-customer (KYC) requirements. For example, it modifies Law 23 of 2015 to align Panama with accounting records standards and increase sanctions for money laundering violations from $1 million to $5 million; it also modifies Law 52 of 2016 to require resident agents for offshore corporations to hold or have access to a copy of the company’s accounting records. In June 2019, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) added Panama to its grey list of jurisdictions subject to ongoing monitoring due to strategic AML/CFT deficiencies. FATF cited Panama’s lack of “positive, tangible progress” in measures of effectiveness. Panama agreed to an Action Plan in four major areas: 1) risk, policy, and coordination; 2) supervision; 3) legal persons and arrangements; and 4) money laundering investigation and prosecution. The Action Plan outlined concrete measures that were to be completed in stages by May and September 2020. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, FATF granted Panama two extensions, pushing the deadline to January 2021. In its March 2022 plenary, FATF recognized that Panama had largely completed eight of fifteen items on its Action Plan and highlighted the items Panama must still address, while noting the country’s progress since the last plenary meeting. In February 2022, the European Union (EU) kept Panama on its tax haven blacklist along with American Samoa, Fiji, Guam, Palau, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Vanuatu. The EU does not consider Panama to have met international criteria on transparency and exchange of tax information. Panama, however, remains committed to complying with the recommendations of the OECD’s domestic tax base erosion and profit shifting action plan. Panama has made strides in increasing criminal prosecutions and convictions related to money laundering and tax evasion. However, law enforcement needs more tools and training to conduct long-term, complex financial investigations, including undercover operations. The criminal justice system remains at risk for corruption. Panama has made progress in assessing high-risk sectors, improving inter-ministerial cooperation, and approving – though not yet implementing – a law on beneficial ownership. Additionally, the GoP and the United States signed an MOU in August 2020 that created an anti-money laundering and anti-corruption task force that has advanced investigations of financial crimes. The United States provides training to the task force to combat money laundering and corruption, as well as training for judicial investigations and prosecutions. Panama started a sovereign wealth fund, called the Panama Savings Fund (FAP), in 2012 with an initial capitalization of $1.3 billion. The fund follows the Santiago Principles and is a member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. The law mandates that from 2015 onward contributions to the National Treasury from the Panama Canal Authority in excess of 3.5 percent of GDP must be deposited into the Fund. In October 2018, the rule for accumulation of the savings was modified to require that when contributions from the Canal exceed 2.5 percent of GDP, half the surplus must go to national savings. At the end of 2021, the value of the FAP’s assets totaled $1.4 billion. Since the beginning of its operations, FAP has generated returns of $455.6 million and contributions to the National Treasury of $235.6 million. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Panama has 16 non-financial State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) and 8 financial SOEs that are included in the budget and broken down by enterprise. Each SOE has a Board of Directors with Ministerial participation. SOEs are required to send a report to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Comptroller General’s Office, and the Budget Committee of the National Assembly within the first ten days of each month showing their budget implementation. The reports detail income, expenses, investments, public debt, cash flow, administrative management, management indicators, programmatic achievements, and workload. SOEs are also required to submit quarterly financial statements. SOEs are audited by the Comptroller General’s Office. The National Electricity Transmission Company (ETESA) is an example of an SOE in the energy sector, and Tocumen Airport and the National Highway Company (ENA) are SOEs in the transportation sector. Financial allocations and earnings from SOEs are publicly available at the Official Digital Gazette ( http://www.gacetaoficial.gob.pa/ ). There is a website under construction that will consolidate information on SOEs: https://panamagov.org/organo-ejecutivo/empresas-publicas/ #. Panama’s privatization framework law does not distinguish between foreign and domestic investor participation in prospective privatizations. The law calls for pre-screening of potential investors or bidders in certain cases to establish technical capability, but nationality and Panamanian participation are not criteria. The Government of Panama undertook a series of privatizations in the mid-1990s, including most of the country’s electricity generation and distribution, its ports, and its telecommunications sector. There are presently no privatization plans for any major state-owned enterprise. 10. Political and Security Environment Panama is a peaceful and stable democracy. On rare occasions, large-scale protests can turn violent and disrupt commercial activity in affected areas. Mining and energy projects have been sensitive issues, especially those that involve development in designated indigenous areas called comarcas. One U.S. company has reported not only protests and obstruction of access to one of its facilities, but costly acts of vandalism against its property. The unrest is related to disagreements over compensation for affected community members. The GoP has attempted to settle the dispute, but without complete success. In May 2019, Panama held national elections that international observers agreed were free and fair. The transition to the new government was smooth. Panama’s Constitution provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the government respects this right. No authorization is needed for outdoor assembly, although prior notification for administrative purposes is required. Unions, student groups, employee associations, elected officials, and unaffiliated groups frequently attempt to impede traffic and disrupt commerce in order to force the government or private businesses to agree to their demands. Homicides in Panama increased by 11 percent in 2021, to 554, 57 more than were recorded in 2020. Strife among rival gangs and turf battles in the narcotrafficking trade contributed significantly to the increase in the homicide rate in 2021. Panamanian authorities assess that 70 percent of homicides in the country are linked to organized crime, especially transnational drug trafficking and gangs. The 2021 homicide rate of 12.95 per 100,000 people is still among the lowest in Central America, but is consistent with an upward trend since 2019, year-on-year. Papua New Guinea Executive Summary Papua New Guinea (PNG) is the largest economy among the Pacific Islands and offers enormous trade and investment potential. Key investment prospects are in infrastructure development, a growing urban-based middle-class market, abundant natural resources in mining, oil and gas, forestry, and fisheries. Under the banner of “Take-Back PNG,” Prime Minister James Marape’s government endorsed a fair, open, and collective approach in its decision-making processes, especially decisions concerning the proper management of the country’s resources and investment returns. Under Marape, PNG reaffirmed its openness to trade and investment, is stepping up reforms to recover from high debt levels and seeks to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI), especially in the natural resources sector to stimulate its economy. Since taking office, the Marape Administration – despite being comprised of many of the same officials as the prior O’Neill Administration – blamed the O’Neill Government for the country’s poor fiscal regime, lack of infrastructure development, the high cost of logistical services, the breakdown of law and order, a cumbersome public sector, and poorly performing state-owned enterprises. To address these problems, the government regularly reaffirmed its need for FDI to stimulate its economy, announced a fiscal stimulus package which supports funding for local business to aid PNG’s economic recovery. The country has faced dwindling FDI compared to pre-COVID-19 years, however investments increased at the start of 2021. Business confidence increased in 2022 sparked by renewed interest in PNG and evidenced by several key mergers and acquisitions in late 2021. Mining companies continue to be an attractive investment destination. Growth in mining industry is estimated to be 5.4%, underpinned by the expected reopening of the Porgera mine and improvements in OK Tedi and Wafi Golpu production in 2022. Furthermore, telecommunication companies are also anticipating growth and seen as good foreign investment opportunities in PNG and the Pacific. Telstra Australia acquired telecommunication giant Digicel Pacific which has the largest market share in PNG. Vodafone PNG – Amalgamated Telecom Holdings Ltd which operates across Fiji, Western Samoa, American Samoa, Kiribati, Cook Island and Vanuatu started operations as the third mobile operator in PNG with an anticipated investment exceeding US $399 million. Australia was the top investing country in 2021, followed by Malaysia, the USA, Hong Kong, and the PRC. By sector investments, the energy sector had the highest investments, and investment proposals, followed by the retail, and wholesale sector, then manufacturing, mining and petroleum, and other sectors; despite recording increase in investments. The government recognizes the need for climate change action and has submitted its Enhanced National Determined Contributions (NDC). PNG’s proposed climate change mitigation, and adaptation strategies to achieve full carbon neutrality by 2050 are conditionally. The government has mainstreamed climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies into its national long-term visions, plans, and strategies. PNG’s climate change envoy at the COP26, stressed, and leveraged preservation of the country’s rainforests for climate change action, and the need for economic development and sustainable FDI along these lines. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 124 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2016 $ 235 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $2.72 billion https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 3. Legal Regime The Independent Consumer and Competition Commission (ICCC) is charged with fostering competition. While there are transparent policies in place, the competition regime is oriented towards regulating existing monopolies and does little to foster competition. Tax, labor, environment, health, and safety and other laws do not distort or impede investment. There are long bureaucratic delays in the processing of work permits and frequent complaints about corruption and bribery in government departments. The IPA and the Government are moving, with the assistance of the International Finance Corporation, towards a more streamlined regulatory framework to encourage foreign investment. One example of this trend is the IPA’s move to an online registration process for businesses. There are informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations and private sector associations. There are impediments to the licensing of skilled foreign labor that are imposed by local professional associations, such as the Papua New Guinea Institute of Engineers and the Law Society (both of which have their own regulatory processes), that foreigners must go through before they can work/practice in the country. There are no private sector or government efforts to restrict foreign participation in industry standards-setting consortia or organizations. Proposed laws and regulations are made available for public comment, but comments are not always taken into consideration or acted on by lawmakers or regulators. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms, but there are delays in the dispute resolution system due to a lack of human resources in the judiciary. The Companies Act requires all banks and financial institutions, insurance companies, listed companies on the stock exchange, securities companies, superannuation funds, and private companies (including exempt companies) to utilize the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) when preparing their financial statements. Foreign companies and their subsidiaries are required to follow similar financial reporting and audit requirements as domestic companies, regardless of size. Although the Listing Rules of the Port Moresby Stock Exchange do not set out additional financial reporting requirements for listed companies, the rules do require listed companies to publicly disclose their audited financial statements. The government, through the Environmental Act 2000, encourages businesses to prevent and minimize environmental harm. The Conservation Environmental and Protection Authority (CEPA) ensures businesses comply with environmental regulations imposed under the Environmental Act 2000. Companies seeking to invest in businesses that pose a threat to the environment are required to conduct an environmental impact assessment report. However, these reports are rarely made available to the public. When possible, proposed laws are made available for public comment, but comments are not always taken into consideration or acted on by lawmakers. Frequently, important Parliamentary decisions, such as the annual budget, are taken with no hearings and little or no debate before voting. Regulatory decisions can sometimes be capricious and opaque, but they do not specifically target foreign-owned businesses. Most regulatory decisions can be appealed to courts with jurisdiction. Many PNG government functions and documents are available online, but not all, and they are not centralized. Government agencies have acts and regulations that encourage transparency in the administrative process, which are rarely enforced. The Treasurer, Ian Ling-Stuckey commissioned the review and amendment of the Central Bank Act 2000 by an appointed independent advisory group. The findings were made public and proposed amendments to the act were passed in parliament which included governance reforms. The reserve bank’s objectives were also expanded from primarily controlling inflation and unemployment to now include economic growth, the general development of PNG economy, and managing national economic crises. Following these changes, the government appointed a monetary policy board and replaced the head of the reserve bank. The Marape government also amended the Kumul Consolidated Holdings Act to promote good governance, increase transparency, and improve the performance of the country’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). There is strong political will in PNG to restore public confidence and engagement in the government’s fiscal reporting systems. However, greater action by reporting agencies is critical to realize full and timely reporting practices in PNG’s public finance management systems. Overall, the government needs greater coordination among reporting agencies to deliver their mandated functions and responsibilities effectively. This includes all government agencies consistently and fully reporting all required financial activities, with proper financial statements to the supreme audit institution. The lack of full and timely reporting practices continues to undermine public finance management systems, and publicly available budget information. At the same time, most budget documents remain incomprehensible to many ordinary citizens due to low financial literacy levels and the lack of proper public and civic awareness programs. PNG is a party to the Melanesian Free Trade Agreement. The agreement came into effect in 2017 and does address the need for competent regulatory authorities in each country (PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Fiji). However, the regulatory chapter is small and is designed to be strengthened and improved going forward. When international standards are used in PNG, they are most often Australian models due to PNG’s history under Australian colonial governance and their continuing close economic ties. The government has notified the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade only once. That notification covered food safety issues and was issued in 2006. The legal system is based on English common law. Contract law in Papua New Guinea is very similar to and applies in much the same way as in other common law countries such as Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. There is, however, considerably less statutory regulation of the application and operation of contracts in Papua New Guinea than in those other countries. The Supreme Court is the nation’s highest judicial authority and final court of appeal. Other courts are the National Court; district courts, which deal with summary and non-indictable offenses; and local courts, established to deal with minor offenses, including matters regulated by local customs. While often painstakingly slow, the judiciary system is widely viewed as independent from government interference. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in matters of constitutional interpretation and enforcement and has appellate jurisdiction in appeals from the National Court, certain decisions of the Land Titles Commission, and those of other regulatory entities as prescribed in their own Acts. The National Court also has original jurisdiction for certain constitutional matters and has unlimited original jurisdiction for criminal and civil matters. The National Court has jurisdiction under the Land Act in proceedings involving land in Papua New Guinea other than customary land. Foreign investors can either be incorporated in PNG as a subsidiary of an overseas company or incorporated under the laws of another country and therefore registered as an overseas company under the Companies Act 1997. The 1997 Companies Act and 1998 Companies Regulation oversee matters regarding private and public companies, both foreign and domestic. All foreign business entities must have IPA approval and must be certified and registered with the government before commencing operations in PNG. While government departments have their own procedures for approving foreign investment in their respective economic sectors, the IPA provides investors with the relevant information and contacts. In 2013, the government amended the Takeovers Code to include a test for foreign companies wishing to buy into the ownership of local companies. The new regulation states that the Securities Commission of Papua New Guinea (SCPNG) shall issue an order preventing a party from acquiring any shares, whether partial or otherwise, if the commission views that such acquisition or takeover is not in the national interest of PNG. This applies to any company, domestic or foreign, registered under the PNG Companies Act, publicly traded, with more than 5 million US$ 1.53 million in assets, with a minimum of 25 shareholders, and more than 100 employees. In recent years, this law was not used to prevent ExxonMobil’s acquisition of InterOil or Chinese company Zijin Mining’s purchase of 50 percent of the Porgera Joint Venture gold mine. The IPA website (https://www.ipa.gov.pg/ ) is the official online information platform to engage with the public on matters relating to the IPA’s mandated roles and function. The 2002 Independent Consumer and Competition Commission Act is the law that governs competition. It also established the Independent Consumer & Competition Commission (ICCC), the country’s premier economic regulatory body and consumer watchdog; introduced a new regime for the regulation of utilities, in relation to prices and service standards; and allowed the ICCC to take over the price control tasks previously undertaken by the Prices Controller as well as the consumer protection tasks previously undertaken by the Consumer Affairs Council. The ICCC’s website is http://www.iccc.gov.pg . The ICCC reviewed the merger and acquisition of Oil Search Limited by Santos Australia, Digicel Pacific by Telstra Australia, and the proposal by Kina Bank to acquire Westpac. ICCC conducted stakeholder consultations for each of the mergers and acquisitions to determine the effect on consumers and market competition. It approved the Santos/Oil Search and Digicel/Telstra deals while denying the acquisition of Westpac by Kina. The judicial system upholds the sanctity of contracts, and the Investment Promotion Act of 1992 expressly prohibits expropriation of foreign assets. The 2013 nationalization of the Ok Tedi copper-gold-silver mine was an Act of Parliament, considered and voted on in the regular order of business. There was no recourse or due process beyond the Parliament. ICSID Convention and New York Convention PNG signed the instrument of Accession to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention) on June 22, 2019. The Instrument of Accession was deposited with the UN Treaties Depository in New York on July 17, 2019, and PNG became the 160th country to accede to the New York Convention. As a signatory to the New York Convention, PNG’s National Executive Council endorsed reform to the country’s outdated Arbitration Act 1951 (Chapter 46 of the Revised Laws of PNG) through the adoption of new legislation based on international model laws to implement the New York Convention and to provide enhanced support for modern arbitration in PNG. PNG has been a member of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention) since 1978. In agreements with foreign investors, GPNG traditionally adopts the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL model law). While no specific domestic legislation exists for enforcement of awards under the 1958 New York Convention or ICSID Convents, in early 2018, an Arbitration Technical Working Committee (ATWC) was formed to advance arbitration reform in PNG. Consisting of members of the PNG Judiciary and representatives of the First Legislative Counsel and other relevant inter-governmental departments and agencies, the ATWC produced a draft Arbitration Bill 2019 in consultation with the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Asian Development Bank and internationally recognized arbitration experts. The draft Arbitration Bill 2019 aims to conform with best modern international arbitration law practice. The draft bill is subject to further vetting before its enactment. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Investment disputes may be settled through diplomatic channels or through the use of local remedies before having such matters adjudicated at the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes or through another appropriate tribunal of which Papua New Guinea is a member. The Investment Promotion Act 1992, which is administered by the IPA, also protects against expropriation, cancellation of contracts, and discrimination through the granting of most favored nation treatment to investors. PNG does not have a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States, and no claims have been made under such an agreement. There is not a recent history of international judgments against GoPNG nor is there a recent history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors. PNG does not have a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) or Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with an investment chapter with the United States. Over the last 10 years, there here have been no known disputes involving a U.S. person or other foreign investors, nor have the local courts heard cases to recognize or enforce foreign arbitral awards issued against the governments. There is no history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts According to the Port Moresby Chamber of Commerce & Industry, local and foreign parties settle disputes in Papua New Guinea through the courts. Litigation in PNG is perceived to be an expensive and drawn-out process, sometimes taking years for a decision to be handed down. There is no domestic arbitration body outside of the courts and contract enforcement. A 2015 international arbitration decision in favor of Interoil (which has since been acquired by ExxonMobil) and against Oil Search was reportedly respected in PNG. To date, there have been no cases in which SOEs were involved in investment disputes. Papua New Guinea’s bankruptcy laws are included in chapter 253 of the Insolvency Act of 1951 and sections 254 through 362 of the Companies Act of 1997, which covers receivership and liquidation. Bankruptcy and litigation searches can only be conducted in person at the National Court in Port Moresby. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business Report, resolving insolvency in Papua New Guinea takes an average of three years, and typically costs 23 percent of the debtor’s estate. The average recovery rate is 25.2 cents on the dollar. Globally, Papua New Guinea stands at 141 out of 189 economies for the Ease of Resolving Insolvency on the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Survey. 6. Financial Sector Portfolio investments are unregulated and limited to the availability of stocks. PNG has one stock market in Port Moresby, PNGX Limited (Formerly POMSoX). Founded in 1999, it is closely aligned with the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and mimics its procedures. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors are able to get credit on the local market, much more so than in previous years due to the liberalization of policies, provided those foreign investors have a good credit history. Credit instruments are limited to leasing and bank finance. PNG’s commercial banking sector comprises four commercial banks. Two are Australian institutions, Westpac and Australian and New Zealand Group (ANZ) banks, with local banks Bank of South Pacific (BSP) and Kina Bank. BSP is both the largest bank and non-mining taxpayer in PNG. BSP operates 79 branches, 52 sub-branches, 351 agents, 499 ATMs, 11,343 electronic funds transfer at point of sale (EFTPOS) units and 4261 employees. Official government sources indicate that much remains to be done in terms of financial inclusion, with nearly three quarters of PNG’s population lacking access to formal financial services. Most of those excluded represent the low-income population in rural areas, urban settlements, especially women. Based on the Oxford Business Group business update issue of 2018, assets in the commercial sector have recorded exponential growth since 2002, with the Bank of PNG reporting that total commercial banking assets rose from US $1.2 billion in that year to reach US $6.3 billion in 2011. Growth has been slower in recent years, however, with total assets rising from US $7.1 billion in 2012 to a high of US $8.49 billion 2020. The banking system in Papua New Guinea is sound. The Bank of Papua New Guinea acts as the central bank for Papua New Guinea. The Central Banking Act of 2000 outlines the powers, functions, and objectives of the Bank. Foreigners are required to show documentation either of their employment or their business along with proof of a valid visa in order to register for a bank account. Foreign Exchange While there are no legal restrictions on such activities, a lack of available foreign exchange makes such conversions, transfers, and repatriations time consuming. Bank of Papua New Guinea requires that all funds held in PNG be held in PNG kina. This rule was announced with little notice and caught many businesses off-guard in 2016. While there was an appeal process for businesses that wished to keep non-PGK accounts, none of the appeals were granted. Due to the backlog on demand, and insufficient foreign exchange, the reserve bank rations foreign exchange. The reserve bank rations foreign exchange, by prioritizing business activities, and demand. The reserve bank determines the exchange rate policy, and since 2014 uses a crawling pegged foreign exchange rate policy, such that the local currency is pegged and fluctuates, with its major trading partners currencies including the USD. Remittance Policies There have been no recent changes or plans to change remittance policies. Remittance is done only through direct bank transfers. All remittances overseas in excess of US$ 15,340 per year require a tax clearance certificate issued by the Internal Revenue Commission (IRC). In addition, approval of PNG’s Central Bank – the Bank of Papua New Guinea – is required for annual remittances overseas in excess of US$ 153,420 While there are no legal time limitations on remittances, foreign companies have waited many months for large transfers or performed transfers in small increments over time due to a shortage of foreign exchange. Sovereign Wealth Funds A Sovereign Wealth Fund Bill was passed in Parliament on July 30, 2015. However, falling commodity prices have severely impacted government revenues. Plans for the SWF have been put on hold indefinitely. Following legislative changes to SOE’s policy on dividend payments to the government, enabling the Marape administration to transfer annually seven percent of dividends received from SOE’s in the resources sector to the SWF. 10. Political and Security Environment Tribal conflicts occur regularly, particularly in the Highlands and Sepik regions of the country, and election-related violence broke out following the 2017 national elections. While foreign investors/interests are not generally the target of these confrontations, project infrastructure can be inadvertently damaged, or their operations disrupted. Most of the disruption and damage caused to projects is due to disputes between landowners and the central government, which are fueled by an often-true perception that the central government has failed to uphold its financial commitments to landowners. Landowners in these disputes have taken out their frustration with the central government by damaging the infrastructure or disrupting the operations of foreign projects in their regions. The central bureaucracy is increasingly politicized, which has eroded the capacity of government departments and allowed nepotism and political cronyism to thrive in parts the public service. Civil disturbances have been triggered by the government’s failure to deliver financial and development commitments, particularly to landowners in the resource project areas. They have also occurred in major urban areas based on disputes between long-term residents and newly arrived migrants or between competing criminal networks. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $23.26 2020 $23.59 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2018 $2411 2016 $235 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2020 $2 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 27.1% 2020 16.6% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report * Host Country Source: Central Bank of PNG,PNG Investment Promotion Authority. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI No updated data is available. Paraguay Executive Summary Paraguay has a small but growing open economy, which for the past decade averaged 3.2 percent Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth per year, and has the potential for continued growth over the next decade. Major drivers of economic growth in Paraguay are the agriculture, retail, and construction sectors. The Paraguayan government encourages private foreign investment. Paraguayan law grants investors tax breaks, permits full repatriation of capital and profits, supports maquila operations (special benefits for investors in manufacturing of exports), and guarantees national treatment for foreign investors. Standard & Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s all have upgraded Paraguay’s credit ratings over the past several years. In December 2021, Fitch maintained Paraguay’s credit rating at BB+ with a stable outlook, despite the COVID-19 pandemic. Paraguay scores at the mid-range or lower in most competitiveness indicators. Judicial insecurity hinders the investment climate, and trademark infringement and counterfeiting are major concerns. Since President Mario Abdo Benitez took office, his government passed several new laws to combat money laundering. Previously, the government has taken measures to improve the investment climate, including the passage of laws addressing competition, public sector payroll disclosures, and access to information. A number of U.S. companies, however, continue to have issues working with government offices to solve investment disputes, including the government’s unwillingness to pay debts incurred under the previous administration and even some current debts. Paraguay was the first country in the region to quarantine as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, which considerably impacted the services sector of the economy. Since March 2020, the government of Paraguay took a series of economic measures in response to the pandemic, which included tax breaks for some sectors, lower policy rates, new financing for health supplies, subsidies for suspended formal and informal sector workers, and soft loans for businesses, among others. Although Paraguay lifted most sanitary restrictions, some of these economic measures, such as tax breaks in the form of VAT reductions in rent and activities linked to the hotel, tourism, and service sectors, are still in force. These prompt measures to mitigate the economic and social impact of the pandemic, caused Paraguay to incur additional debt, resulting in an increase in its debt to GDP ratio from 22.4 percent in 2019 to 33.6 percent in 2021. The government also has a sustainable government procurement policy and, although it does not have climate change regulatory incentives, it does have policies and regulations that support the preservation of biodiversity, forests, clean air and water, the use of nature-based solutions, and seek other ecological benefits. Despite the government’s significant advancement in efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor, it continues to occur in agriculture and ranching as well as in the production of bricks. Children of impoverished families also accompanied a parent or guardian in his or her work activities and work in the streets begging or selling small merchandise. Paraguay’s export and investment promotion bureau, REDIEX, prepares comprehensive information about business opportunities in Paraguay. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 128 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 88 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $197 https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $5,180 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Paraguayan government publicly encourages private foreign investment, but U.S. companies often struggle with practices that inhibit or slow their activities. Paraguay guarantees equal treatment of foreign investors and permits full repatriation of capital and profits. Paraguay has historically maintained the lowest tax burden in the Latin American region, with a 10 percent corporate tax rate and a 10 percent value added tax (VAT) on most goods and services. Despite these policies, U.S. companies continue to have difficulty with investments and contracts in Paraguay, including questionable public procurement adjudications, seemingly frivolous legal entanglements taking multiple years to resolve, non-payment and delayed payments from Paraguayan government customers, and opaque permitting processes that slow project execution. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC) signed in February 2021 an MOU with the Ministry of Justice to strengthen the rule of law and provide additional legal security to foreign investments in the country. Within MIC, REDIEX provides useful information for foreign investors, including business opportunities in Paraguay, registration requirements, laws, rules, and procedures. Foreign and domestic private entities may establish and own business enterprises. Foreign businesses are not legally required to be associated with Paraguayan nationals for investment purposes, though this is strongly recommended on an unofficial basis, by national authorities. There is no restriction on repatriation of capital and profits. Private entities may freely establish, acquire, and dispose of business interests. Under the Investment Incentive Law (60/90) and the maquila program, the government has an approval mechanism for foreign investments that seeks to estimate the proposed investment’s economic impact in areas including employment, incorporation of new technologies, and economic diversification. The WTO conducted an Investment Policy Review in 2017. Please see following website: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp460_e.htm Paraguay has responded to complaints about its traditionally onerous business registration process — previously requiring new businesses to register with a host of government entities one-by-one — by creating a portal in 2007 that provides one-stop service. The Sistema Unificado de Apertura y Cierre de Empresas – SUACE ( www.suace.gov.py ) – is the government’s single platform for registering a local or foreign company. The process takes about 35 days. On January 8, 2020, President Abdo Benitez signed law 6480 to facilitate the creation of SMEs. A new registration process allows individuals to complete the required forms online and at no cost. The approval process takes between 24 and 72 hours. This new registration process has been operational since July 2020 and can be accessed through http://eas.suace.gov.py/suace_frontend/ . There are no restrictions to Paraguayans investing abroad. The Paraguayan government does not incentivize or promote outward investment. 3. Legal Regime Proposed Paraguayan laws and regulations, including those pertaining to investment, are usually available in draft form for public comment after introduction into senate and lower house committees. In most instances, there are public hearings where members of the general public or interested parties can provide comments. Regulatory agencies’ supervisory functions over telecommunications, energy, potable water, and the environment are inefficient and opaque. Politically motivated changes in the leadership of regulating agencies negatively impact firms and investors. Although investors may appeal to the Comptroller General’s Office in the event of administrative irregularities, corruption has historically been common in Paraguayan institutions, as time-consuming processes provide opportunities for front-line civil servants to seek bribes to accelerate the paperwork. While regulatory processes are managed by governmental organizations, the Investment Incentive Law (60/90) establishes an Investment Council that includes the participation of two private sector representatives. Public finances and debt obligations of government institutions, agencies, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are available online and mostly centralized by the Ministry of Finance. As Mercosur’s purpose is to promote free trade and fluid movement of goods, people, and currency, each country member is expected to adjust their regulations based on multilateral treaties, protocols, and agreements. Paraguay is a member of the WTO and notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade of all draft technical regulations. Paraguay has a Civil Law legal system based on the Napoleonic Code. A new Criminal Code went into effect in 1998, with a corresponding Code of Criminal Procedure following in 2000. A defendant has the right to a public and oral trial. A three-judge panel acts as a jury. Judges render decisions on the basis of (in order of precedence) the Constitution, international agreements, the codes, laws Private entities may file appeals to government regulations they assess to be contrary to the constitution or Paraguayan law. The Supreme Court is responsible for answering these appeals. The judiciary is a separate and independent branch of government, however there are frequent media reports of political interference with judicial decision making. Judicial corruption also remains a concern, including reports of judges investing in plaintiffs’ claims in return for a percentage of monetary payouts. Paraguay has a specialized court for civil and commercial judicial matters. The Investment Incentive Law (60/90) passed in 1990 permits full repatriation of capital and profits. No restrictions exist in Paraguay on the conversion or transfer of foreign currency, apart from bank reporting requirements for transactions in excess of USD 10,000. This law also grants investors a number of tax breaks, including exemptions from corporate income tax and value-added tax. The 1991 Investment Law (117/91) guarantees equal treatment of foreign investors and the right to real property. It also regulates joint ventures (JVs), recognizing JVs established through formal legal contracts between interested parties. This law allows international arbitration for the resolution of disputes between foreign investors and the Government of Paraguay. In December 2015, the president signed an Investment Guarantee Law (5542/15) to promote investment in capital-intensive industries. Implementing regulations were published in 2016. The law protects the remittance of capital and profits, provides assurances against administrative and judicial practices that might be considered discriminatory, and permits tax incentives for up to 20 years. There is no minimum investment amount, but projects must be authorized by a joint resolution by the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Industry and Commerce. In 2013 the Paraguayan Congress passed a law to promote public-private partnerships (PPP) in public infrastructure and allow for private sector entities to participate in the provision of basic services such as water and sanitation. The government signed implementing regulations for the PPP law in 2014. As a result, the Executive Branch can now enter into agreements directly with the private sector without the need for congressional approval. In 2015, the Government of Paraguay implemented its first contract under the new law. In 2016, it awarded its second PPP to a consortium of Spanish, Portuguese, and local companies to expand and maintain two of the country’s federal highways. Paraguay’s bid for an airport expansion PPP in Asuncion in 2016, was officially cancelled in October 2018 due to concerns over the contracting process. No other PPPs have been awarded since, although some are under consideration by the Ministry of Public Works. Large infrastructure projects are usually open to foreign investors. Paraguay took steps in 2019 to demonstrate increased transparency in its financial system with the aim of attracting additional foreign investment. In December 2019, President Abdo Benitez signed into law the last of a series of twelve anti-money laundering laws at the recommendation of the Financial Action Task Force against Money Laundering in Latin America (GAFILAT). The laws comply with international standards and facilitate the fight against money laundering, terrorist financing, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. More information on the anti-money laundering laws and regulations can be found here: http://www.seprelad.gov.py/disposiciones-legales-i68 Paraguay’s budget and information on debt obligations were widely and easily accessible to the general public, including online. The published budget was adequately detailed and considered generally reliable. Revised estimates were made public in end-of-year and in-year execution reports. Paraguay’s Comptroller’s Office selected sections of the government’s accounts for audit according to a risk assessment because it lacks sufficient resources to audit the entire executed budget annually. REDIEX provides a website to facilitate access to relevant legislation, laws, and regulations for investors, also available in English: www.bit.do/REDIEX20 Paraguay passed a Competition Law in 2013, which entered into force in April 2014. Law 4956/13 explicitly prohibits anti-competitive acts and created the National Competition Commission (CONACOM) as the government’s enforcement arm. Private property has historically been respected in Paraguay as a fundamental right. Expropriations must be sanctioned by a law authorizing the specific expropriation. There have been reports of expropriations of land without prompt and fair compensation. Paraguay has a bankruptcy law (154/63) under which a debtor may suspend payments to creditors during the evaluation period of the debtors’ restructuring proposal. If no agreement is reached, a trustee may liquidate the company’s assets. According to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, Paraguay stands at 105 in the ranking of 190 economies on the ease of resolving insolvency. The report states resolving insolvency takes 3.9 years on average and costs nine percent of the debtor’s estate, with the most likely outcome being that the company will be sold as piecemeal sale. The average recovery rate is 23 cents on the dollar. Bankruptcy is not criminalized in Paraguay. 6. Financial Sector Credit is available but expensive. As of January 2021, banks charged on average 23 percent interest on consumer loans (up to 32 percent), with the vast majority favoring repayment horizons of one year. Loans for up to 10 years are available at higher interest rates. High collateral requirements are generally imposed. Private banks, in general, avoid mortgage loans. Because of the difficulty in obtaining bank loans, Paraguay has seen growth in alternative and informal lending mechanisms, such as “payday” lenders. These entities can charge up to 85 percent interest on short-term loans according to banking contacts. The high cost of capital makes the stock market an attractive, although underdeveloped option. Paraguay has a relatively small capital market that began in 1993. As of March 2022, the Asuncion Stock exchange consisted of 119 companies. Many family-owned enterprises fear losing control, dampening enthusiasm for public offerings. Paraguay passed a law in 2017 abolishing anonymously held businesses, requiring all holders of “bearer shares” to convert them. Foreign banks and branches are allowed to establish operations in country, as such Paraguay currently has three foreign bank branches and four majority foreign-owned banks. The Paraguayan government issued Paraguay’s first sovereign bonds in 2013 for USD 500 million to accelerate development in the country. Since then, Paraguay has issued bonds each year. During 2021, Paraguay issued sovereign bonds for a total of USD 826 million and recently in 2022 for USD 501 million. The debt component of the 2021 bond raised USD 500 million of new money at the lowest cost ever for a Paraguayan sovereign bond (2.74 percent). The transaction’s historically low interest rate, oversubscription, and its extension of Paraguay’s maturity profile reflect increased investor confidence in Paraguay. Proceeds are expected to finance key infrastructure development programs designed to promote economic and social development and job creation, cover health needs, and re-finance previous debt at a lower interest rate. Commercial banks also issue debt to fund long-term investment projects. Paraguay became an official member of the IMF in December 1945 and its Central Bank respects IMF Article VIII related to the avoidance of restrictions on current payments. Paraguay’s banking system includes 17 banks with an approximate total USD 25.5 billion in assets and USD 18.4 billion in deposits. The banking system is generally sound but remains overly liquid. Long-term financing for capital investment projects is scarce. Most lending facilities are short-term. Banks and finance companies are regulated by the Banking Superintendent, which is housed within, and is under the direction of, the Central Bank of Paraguay (BCP, in Spanish). The Paraguayan capital markets are essentially focused on debt issuances. As the listing of stock is limited, with the exception of preferred shares, Paraguay does not have clear rules regarding hostile takeovers and shareholder activism. Paraguay has a high percentage of unbanked citizens. Six out of ten adults do not have bank accounts. Many Paraguayans use alternative methods to save and transfer money. In recent years, the use of e-wallets has grown considerably to fill this void. According to the BCP, the total transactions increased by 70 percent, from USD 1.1 million in 2020 to USD 1.9 million in 2021. Although active e-wallets accounts increased from 1.6 million in 2019 to 3.1 million in December 2020, BCP reports show active e-wallet accounts decrease to 2.4 million in December 2021. This reduction can be attributed to a decrease in COVID-19 subsidies transferred to the e-wallet of beneficiaries outside of the formal banking sector. The growth experienced in the e-wallets sector made the Central Bank publish regulations on e-wallets in February 2020 to expand their “know your customer” (KYC) and other requirements to match those of traditional bank operations. Paraguay does not have a sovereign wealth fund. However, in December 2020, the Ministry of Finance presented to Congress the draft law for the Strengthening of Fiscal Governance that will reform Paraguay´s current Fiscal Responsibility Law and create Paraguay´s first wealth fund to strengthen the country´s macroeconomic stability in years of poor economic development and/or emergency situations. The bill has not been voted by Congress as of March 2022. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Paraguay has seven major state-owned enterprises (SOEs), active in the petroleum distribution, cement, electricity (distribution and generation), water, aviation, river navigation, and cellular telecommunication sectors. Paraguay has another two minor SOEs, one dedicated to the production of alcoholic beverages through raw sugar cane and another, essentially inactive, focused on railway services. In general, SOEs are monopolies with no private sector participation. Most operate independently but maintain an administrative link with the Ministry of Public Works & Communications. SOEs have audited accounts, and the results are published online. Public information and audited accounts from 2020 indicate SOEs employ over 16,500 people and have assets for $4.6 billion. Reported net incomes in 2020 of all SOEs are less than $36 million. SOEs’ corporate governances are weak. SOEs operate with politically appointed advisors and executives and are often overstaffed and an outlet for patronage, resulting in poor administration and services. Some SOEs burden the country’s fiscal position, running deficits most years. SOEs are not required to have an independent audit. The Itaipu and Yacyreta bi-national hydroelectric dams, which are considered semi-autonomous entities administered by joint bilateral government commissions (since they are on shared international borders), have a board of directors. Link to the list of Paraguayan SOEs: https://www.economia.gov.py/index.php/dependencias/direccion-general-de-empresas-publicas/direccion-general-de-empresas-publicas Paraguay does not have a privatization program. 10. Political and Security Environment In March 2021 protesters gathered daily for more than two weeks to call for the resignations of President Abdo Benitez and Vice President Velazquez for their inadequate efforts to address the COVID-19 pandemic, and to repudiate the corruption within their administration. Clashes between police and protesters on the first night of protests resulted in 20 wounded (eight protesters, 12 police) and protesters set fire to the ruling ANR party headquarters March 17. Paraguay does not have large numbers of kidnappings, but a few high-profile cases have occurred in recent years, most of them attributed to suspected members of the organized criminal group Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP). In September 2020, the EPP kidnapped former Vice President Oscar Denis and his employee Adelio Mendoza near Denis’ property in Concepcion department. The Paraguayan government has responded to the EPP threat with combined military and police operations, but its failure to recover hostages – including Denis, whose whereabouts are still unknown at the time of this report – from such a small group has seriously damaged its credibility. Land invasions, marches, and organized protests occur, mostly by rural and indigenous communities making demands on the government, but these events have rarely turned violent. Paraguay experienced an unprecedented and sustained increase in violence that has permeated the country in 2021 and continued in 2022. The violence particularly intensified before the municipal elections carried out in October 2021. According to the Interdisciplinary Center of Social Investigation, sicarios (hitmen) have killed 150 Paraguayans between January and October 2021 and such cases have been in an upward trend since then. Most of these reported homicides are drug-related. In a September report, the Global Organized Crime Index ranked Paraguay fourth highest in criminality among 35 countries in the Americas. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($B USD) 2020 $36.1 2020 $35.7 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $796 2020 $197 BEA data available at http://bea.gov/international/direct_ investment_multinational_companies_ comprehensive_data.htm Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct- investment-and-multinational-enterprises- comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 17.1% 2020 19.0% UNCTAD data available at https://unctadstat.unctad.org/ wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx Significant discrepancies can be noted between the local and the USG statistical sources in terms of U.S. FDI in Paraguay for 2020. UNCTAD total inbound of FDI as a percentage of Paraguay’s GDP differs less than two percent when compared to Paraguay’s local statistics. However, if compared to other international statistics, such as the World Bank and the IMF, the relation between total inbound stocks of FDI as a percentage of Paraguay’s GDP is consistent with local statistics. *Host country statistical data source: Central Bank of Paraguay Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $6,180 100% Total Outward N/A N/A Spain $801 12.9% N/A N/A N/A USA $796 12.9% N/A N/A N/A The Netherlands $759 12.3% N/A N/A N/A Brazil $715 11.6% N/A N/A N/A Uruguay $431 6.9% N/A N/A N/A “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. The information obtained through the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey is consistent with the information provided by the Central Bank of Paraguay. Peru Executive Summary The Government of Peru’s (GOP’s) focus on sound fiscal management and macroeconomic fundamentals contributed to the country’s region-leading economic growth since 2002. The COVID-19 pandemic caused a severe economic contraction of over 11 percent in 2020, but Peru recovered with 13.3 percent GDP growth in 2021. Recent political instability (Peru has had four presidents since 2020) is restricting near-term growth, with consensus forecasts calling for approximately 3.0 percent GDP growth in 2022, and 2.9 percent in 2023. COVID-19 health costs and an economic stimulus package strained Peru’s fiscal accounts somewhat, but the deficit stabilized to 2.6 percent of GDP in 2021. The surge in spending, however, continues to impact Peru’s debt, which increased from 26.8 percent of GDP in 2019 to 36.1 percent in 2021. Net international reserves remain strong at $78.4 billion. Global price pressures moved inflation higher, to 4.0 percent in 2021, a significant spike from the 1.8 percent in 2020. Inflation continued in 2022, with Peru’s 12-month rate through March reaching 6.8 percent. Along with recent political instability, corruption, and social conflict negatively impact Peru’s investment climate. As of April 1, 2022, President Castillo had appointed four cabinets since taking office in July 2021. Allegations of corruption plague the current and previous administrations. Transparency International ranked Peru 105th out of 180 countries in its 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. Peru’s Ombudsman office reported 157 active social conflicts in the country as of February 2022. More than half of them (86) occurred in the mining sector, which represents 10 percent of Peru’s economic output. Citing political instability, including contentious relations between the administration and congress, and governance challenges, the three major credit rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P) downgraded Peru’s sovereign credit ratings since Castillo’s inauguration. All three, however, maintained Peru at investment grade. Peru fosters an open investment environment, which includes strong protections for contract and property rights. Peru is well integrated in the global economy including with the United States through the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA), which entered into force in 2009. Peru’s investment promotion agency ProInversion seeks foreign investment in nearly all areas of the economy, particularly to support infrastructure. Prospective investors would benefit from seeking local legal counsel to navigate Peru’s complex bureaucracy. Private sector investment made up more than two-thirds of Peru’s total investment in 2021. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank/Amount Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 105 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 70 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 7,394 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 6,030 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Peru seeks to attract investment, both foreign and domestic, in nearly all sectors. Peru reported $2 billion in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2021 and seeks increased investment for 2022. It has prioritized public-private partnership projects in transportation infrastructure, electricity, education, telecommunications, ports, health, and sanitation, among other sectors. Peru’s 1993 Constitution grants national treatment for foreign investors and permits foreign investment in almost all economic sectors. Under the constitution, foreign investors have the same rights as national investors to benefit from investment incentives, such as tax exemptions. In addition to the constitutional provisions, Peru has several laws governing FDI including the Foreign Investment Promotion Law (Legislative Decree (DL) 662 of September 1991) and the Framework Law for Private Investment Growth (DL 757 of November 1991). Other important laws include the Private Investment in State-Owned Enterprises Promotion Law (DL 674) and the Private Investment in Public Services Infrastructure Promotion Law (DL 758). Article 6 of Supreme Decree No. 162-92-EF (the implementing regulations of DLs 662 and 757) authorized private investment in all industries except within natural protected areas and weapons manufacturing. Peru and the United States benefit from the United States-Peru Free Trade Agreement (PTPA), which entered into force on February 1, 2009. The PTPA established a more secure, predictable legal framework for U.S. investors in Peru. The PTPA protects all forms of investment. U.S. investors enjoy the right to establish, acquire, and operate investments in Peru on an equal footing with local investors in almost all circumstances. The PTPA can be found here: https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa The GOP created the investment promotion agency ProInversion in 2002 to manage privatizations and concessions of state-owned enterprises and natural resource-based industries. The agency currently focuses on private concessions in the energy, education, transportation, health, sanitation, and telecommunication sectors, and organizes international roadshow events to attract investors. Specific project opportunities are available on the ProInversion website: https://www.investinperu.pe/es/app/cartera-de-proyectos-de-proinversion . Companies are required to register all foreign investments with ProInversion. Peru’s National Competitiveness Plan 2019 – 2030 outlined a set of recommendations aimed to make Peru’s economy and investment climate more competitive. The 2019 National Infrastructure Plan (PNIC) identified 52 priority infrastructure projects to help address an estimated $110 billion infrastructure gap, some of which are underway including construction of Lima metro lines, an expansion to the Jorge Chavez International Airport, and multiple energy projects. Investors report in recent years that Peru’s energy projects advance more quickly than transport and agricultural projects, which can suffer extended delays. The GOP announced in February 2022 that it will update the PNIC by July 2022 with an emphasis on sustainable development opportunities. Of note, in May 2021, Peru signed a government-to-government (G2G) agreement with France for a $3.1 billion highway project, an opportunity that was not included in the PNIC. Although Peru has generally supported private investments since the 1990s, administrations occasionally pass measures that some observers regard as contrary to the nation’s open and free market orientation. In December 2011, for example, Peru signed into law a 10-year moratorium on the entry of live genetically modified organisms (GMOs) for cultivation. In December 2020, the government extended the moratorium for an additional 15 years, until 2035. Peru’s Constitution (Article 6 under Supreme Decree No. 162-92-EF) authorizes foreign investors to carry out economic activity provided that investors comply with all constitutional precepts, laws, and treaties. Exceptions exist, including exclusion of foreign investment activities in natural protected reserves and military weapons manufacturing. Peruvian law requires majority Peruvian ownership in media; air, land, and maritime transportation infrastructure; and private security surveillance services. Foreign interests cannot “acquire or possess under any title, mines, lands, forests, waters, or fuel or energy sources” within 50 kilometers of Peru’s international borders. However, foreigners can obtain concessions in these areas and in certain cases the GOP may grant a waiver. The GOP does not screen, review, or approve foreign direct investment outside of those sectors that require a governmental waiver. The World Trade Organization (WTO) published a Trade Policy Review ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm#bycountry ) on Peru in February 2020. The WTO commented that foreign investors received the same legal treatment as local investors in general, although Peru restricted foreign investment on property at the country’s borders, and in air transport and broadcasting. The report highlighted the government’s ongoing efforts to promote public-private partnerships (PPPs) and strengthen the PPP legal framework with Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) principles. The report noted that Peru maintained a regime open to domestic and foreign investment that fostered competition and equal treatment. In January 2022, the OECD formally opened accession discussions with Peru. The GOP expects the OECD will adopt an individual Accession Roadmap for Peru later in 2022, which will establish the terms, conditions, and process for accession. The process will include a rigorous evaluation by more than 20 OECD technical committees that will establish expectations covering a wide range of policy areas, including open trade and investment, public governance, integrity and anti-corruption, and environmental protection. There is no deadline for completion of the accession processes, although typically the process takes three-to-five years or more. The outcome and timeline will depend on Peru’s political will and capacity to adjust its regulations and policies to further align with OECD standards and best practices. Peru has not had a third-party investment policy review through the OECD or UNCTAD in the past five years. Post is also not aware of any major civil society-led investment policy review within the last five years. The GOP does not have a specific regulatory agency that facilitates business operations, but the Institute for the Protection of Intellectual Property, Consumer Protection, and Competition (INDECOPI) reviews the enactment of new regulations by government entities that can place burdens on business operations. INDECOPI has the authority to block any new business regulation. INDECOPI also has a Commission for Elimination of Bureaucratic Barriers: https://www.indecopi.gob.pe/web/eliminacion-de-barreras-burocraticas/presentacion . Peru allows foreign business ownership, provided that a company has at least two shareholders and that its legal representative is a Peruvian resident. Businesses must reserve a company name through the national registry, SUNARP, and prepare a deed of incorporation through a Citizen and Business Services Portal ( https://www.serviciosalciudadano.gob.pe/ ). After a deed is signed, businesses must file with a public notary, pay notary fees of up to one percent of a company’s capital, and submit the deed to the Public Registry. The company’s legal representative must obtain a certificate of registration and tax identification number from the national tax authority SUNAT (www.sunat.gob.pe). Finally, the company must obtain a license from the municipality of the jurisdiction in which it is located. Depending on the core business, companies may need to obtain further government approvals such as sanitary, environmental, or educational authorizations. Peru’s Trade Commission Offices (OCEXs), which promote the exports of Peruvian goods and services, under the supervision of Peru’s export promotion agency PromPeru, are located in numerous countries, including the United States. The GOP does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Laws and regulations most relevant to foreign investors are enacted and implemented at the national level. Most ministries and agencies make draft regulations available for public comment. El Peruano, the state’s official gazette, publishes regulations at the national, regional, and municipal level. Ministries generally maintain current regulations on their websites. Rule-making and regulatory authority also exists through executive agencies specific to different sectors. The Supervisory Agency for Forest Resources and Wildlife (OSINFOR), the Supervisory Agency for Energy and Mining (OSINERGMIN), and the Supervisory Agency for Telecommunications (OSIPTEL), all of which report directly to the President of the Council of Ministers, can enact new regulations that affect investments in the economic sectors they manage. These agencies also have the right to enforce regulations with fines. Regulation is generally reviewed on the basis of scientific and data-driven assessments, but public comments are not always received or made public. The government does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. Accounting, legal, and regulatory standards are consistent with international norms. Peru’s Accounting Standards Council endorses the use of IFRS standards by private entities. Public finances and debt obligations, including explicit and contingent liabilities, are transparent and publicly available at the Ministry of Economy and Finance website: https://www.mef.gob.pe/es/estadisticas-sp-18642/deuda-del-sector-publico . Peru is a member of regional economic blocs. Under the Pacific Alliance, Peru looks to harmonize regulations and reduce barriers to trade with other members: Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. Peru is a member of the Andean Community (CAN), which issues supranational regulations (based on consensus of its members) that supersede domestic provisions. Peru follows international food standard bodies, including: CODEX Alimentarius, World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) guidelines for Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) standards. When CODEX does not have limits or standards established for a product, Peru defaults to the U.S. maximum residue level or standard. Peru’s system is generally more aligned with the U.S. regulatory system and standards than with its other trading partners. Peru notifies all agricultural-related technical regulations to the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) committee. Peru uses a civil law system. Companies are generally regulated through Peru’s civil code, which includes sections governing contracts and general corporate law. Peru’s civil court system resolves conflicts between companies. Companies can also access conflict resolution services in civil courts. Litigation processes in Peruvian courts are slow. Peru has an independent judiciary. The executive branch does not interfere with the judiciary as a matter of policy. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable through administrative process and the court system. Peru is in the process of reforming its justice system. The National Justice Board (Junta Nacional de Justicia), which began operating in January 2020, supervises the selection processes, appointments, evaluations, and disciplinary actions for judges. Peru has a stable and attractive legal framework used to promote private investment. The 1993 Peruvian Constitution includes provisions that establish principles to ensure a favorable legal framework for private investment, particularly for foreign investment. A key constitutional and regulatory principle is equal treatment of domestic and foreign investment. Some of the main private investment regulations include: Legislative Decree 662, which establishes foreign investment legal stability regulations; Legislative Decree 757, which establishes Peru’s private investment growth framework law; and Supreme Decree 162-92-EF, which establishes private investment guarantee mechanism regulations. Peru’s legal system is available to investors. All laws relevant to foreign investment along with pertinent explanations and forms can be found on the ProInversion website: https://www.investinperu.pe/en/climate/legal-framework-for-investments . INDECOPI is the GOP agency responsible for reviewing domestic competition-related concerns. Congress published a mergers and acquisitions (M&A) control law in January 2021. The law currently requires INDECOPI to review and approve M&As involving companies, including multinationals, that have combined annual sales or gross earnings over $146 million in Peru and if the value of the sales or annual gross earnings in Peru of two or more of the companies involved in the proposed M&A operation exceed $22 million each. A legislative decree issued in September 2018 (DL 1444) modified the public procurement law to allow government agencies to use government-to-government (G2G) agreements to facilitate procurement processes. The GOP considers the G2G procurement model as a suitable method for expediting priority infrastructure projects in a manner that is more transparent and less susceptible to corruption. However, the USG, outside of the US Army Corps of Engineers, does not have a mechanism to support Peru’s G2G contracts. Peru expanded the use of G2G agreements in 2021 to include large infrastructure projects including a $1.6 billion general reconstruction initiative (related to damages caused by the El Nino event of 2017) and a $3.0 billion Central Highway project. The Peruvian Constitution states that Peru can only expropriate private property based on public interest, such as public works projects or for national security. Article 70 of the Constitution establishes that the State can only expropriate through a judicial process or prior mandate of the law, and only after payment of compensation, including for damages. Peruvian law bases compensation for expropriation on fair market value. Article 70 also guarantees the inviolability of private property. Public dialogue has at times touched the theme of expropriation or nationalization of the extractives sectors, including during political campaigns, but the GOP has not to date moved forward with any direct expropriation of sectors or businesses. Landowners have alleged indirect expropriation due to government inaction and corruption in “land-grab” cases that have, at times, been linked to projects endorsed by subnational governments. Peru has a creditor rights hierarchy similar to that established under U.S. bankruptcy law, and monetary judgments are usually made in the currency stipulated in the contract. However, administrative bankruptcy procedures are slow and subject to judicial intervention. Compounding this difficulty are occasional laws passed to protect specific debtors from action by creditors that would force them into bankruptcy or liquidation. In August 2016, the GOP extended the period for bankruptcy from one year to two years. Peru does not criminalize bankruptcy. 6. Financial Sector Peru allows foreign portfolio investment and does not place restrictions on international transactions. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. Peruvian mutual funds managed $8 billion in December 2021. Private pension funds managed a total of $33 billion in December 2021. The Lima Stock Exchange (BVL) is a member of the Integrated Latin American Market, which includes stock markets from Pacific Alliance countries. As of July 2018, mutual funds registered in Pacific Alliance countries may trade in the Lima Stock Exchange. The Securities Market Superintendent (SMV) regulates the securities and commodities markets. SMV’s mandate includes controlling securities market participants, maintaining a transparent and orderly market, setting accounting standards, and publishing financial information about listed companies. SMV requires stock issuers to report events that may affect the stock, the company, or any public offerings. Trading on insider information is a crime, with some reported prosecutions in past years. SMV must vet all firms listed on the Lima Stock Exchange or the Public Registry of Securities. SMV also maintains the Public Registry of Securities and Stockbrokers. London Stock Exchange Group FTSE Russell downgraded Peru from Secondary Emerging Market to Frontier status in March 2020. In a statement, the BVL stated that the decision is not necessarily replicable among the other index providers adding that Morgan Stanley Capital International, which is considered a main benchmark for emerging markets, is not expected to reconsider the BVL’s status. Citing, in part, political instability that has undermined investor confidence and constrained growth prospects, the three major credit agencies downgraded Peru’s sovereign credit ratings since the beginning of President Pedro Castillo’s term in July 2021: Moody’s downgraded in September 2021, Fitch in October 2021, and S&P Ratings in March 2022. Despite the downgrades, all three agencies maintain investment grade ratings for Peru. Peru’s banking sector is highly consolidated. Sixteen commercial banks account for 90 percent of the financial system’s total assets, valued at $172 billion in December of 2021. In 2021, three banks accounted for 72 percent of loans and 69 percent of deposits among commercial banks. Peru has a relatively low level of access to financial services (50 percent nationwide), with access significantly lower outside of Lima and other major urban areas. The Central Bank of Peru (BCRP) is an independent institution, free to manage monetary policy to maintain financial stability. The BCRP’s primary goal is to maintain price stability via inflation targeting between one to three percent. Year-end inflation rose to 4.0 percent in 2021, up from 1.8 percent in 2020. Inflation continued in 2022, with Peru’s 12-month rate through March reaching 6.8 percent. President Castillo reappointed the BCRP’s well-respected President Julio Velarde for a fourth consecutive five-year term in October 2021. Analysts consider the banking system to be generally sound, thanks in part to lessons learned during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. Non-performing bank loans accounted for 3.9 percent of gross loans as of December 2021, nearly identical to the 3.8 percent registered in 2020. The rapid implementation of the $39.5 billion BCRP loan guarantee program in response to the COVID-19 pandemic attenuated loan default risk and prevented any major systemic risk to the financial system. Under the PTPA, U.S. financial service firms have full rights to establish subsidiaries or branches for banks and insurance companies. While foreign banks are allowed to freely establish banks in the country, they are subject to the supervision of Peru’s Superintendent of Banks and Securities (SBS). Peruvian law and regulations do not authorize or encourage private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association to limit or restrict foreign participation. However, larger private firms often use “cross-shareholding” and “stable shareholder” arrangements to restrict investment by outsiders (not necessarily foreigners) in their firms. As families or close associates often control ownership of Peruvian corporations, hostile takeovers are practically non-existent. In the past few years, several companies from the region, China, North America, and Europe have begun actively buying local companies in power transmission, retail trade, fishmeal production, and other industries. Peru’s Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) manages the Fiscal Stabilization Fund which serves as a buffer for the GOP’s fiscal accounts in the event of adverse economic conditions. It consists of treasury surplus, concessional fees, and privatization proceeds, and is capped at four percent of GDP. The fund was nearly completely exhausted to finance increased spending in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, dropping from $5.5 billion at the end of 2019 to $1 million at the end of 2020, but has since recovered to $4.3 billion by the end of 2021. The Fund is not a party to the IMF International Working Group or a signatory to the Santiago Principles. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Peru wholly owns 35 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 34 of which are under the parastatal conglomerate FONAFE. The list of SOEs under FONAFE can be found here: https://www.fonafe.gob.pe/empresasdelacorporacion . FONAFE appoints an independent board of directors for each SOE using a transparent selection process. There is no notable third-party analysis on SOEs’ ties to the government. SOE ownership practices are generally consistent with OECD guidelines. The largest SOE is PetroPeru which refines oil, operates Peru’s main oil pipeline, and maintains a stake in select concessions. In March 2022, S&P Ratings downgraded PetroPeru’s global foreign currency rating to “junk” status, citing PricewaterhouseCoopers’ refusal to sign the firm’s 2021 financial audit. The GOP initiated an extensive privatization program in 1991, in which foreign investors were encouraged to participate. Since 2000, the GOP has promoted multi-year concessions as a means of attracting investment in major projects, including a 30-year concession to a private group (Lima Airport Partners) to operate the Lima airport in 2000 and a 30-year concession to Dubai Ports World to improve and operate a new container terminal in the Port of Callao in 2006. 10. Political and Security Environment President Pedro Castillo is Peru’s fifth president in five years (and fourth president since 2020), a reflection of both deep polarization and continued power struggles between the legislative and executive branches over multiple administrations. Allegations of corruption and incompetence among cabinet ministers spurred Castillo to designate four cabinets in seven months. There are also ongoing investigations of persons close to the president for alleged high-level corruption. Castillo’s Peru Libre party holds the largest congressional voting bloc, 34 of 130 seats, in an opposition-led congress that took office July 28. Eleven political parties in the legislature divide the congress in thirds among left, right, and center. Pedro Castillo has been subject to two failed impeachment motions since his July 2021 inauguration, one in December and the second in March. According to a March 2022 IPSOS poll, Castillo held just a 26 percent approval rating, while President of Congress Maricarmen Alva held just 20 percent approval. According to the Ombudsman, there were 157 active social conflicts in Peru as of March 2022. Although political violence against investors is rare, protests are common. In many cases, protestors sought public services not provided by the government. Widespread protests in late 2020 across several agricultural producing regions resulted in the repeal and rewriting of the nation’s agricultural law. Protests throughout 2021 and 2022 across several mining producing regions also resulted in temporary suspension of activities at several mining operations, including an intermittent suspension at Peru’s second largest copper mine, Las Bambas, for several months in 2021 and 2022. Violence remains a concern in coca-growing regions. The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, “SL”) narco-terrorist organization continued to conduct a limited number of attacks in its base of operations in the Valley of the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro Rivers (VRAEM) emergency zone, which includes parts of Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, Huanuco, and Junin regions. Estimates vary, but most experts and Peruvian security services assess SL membership numbers between 250 and 300, including 60 to 150 armed fighters. SL collects “revolutionary taxes” from those involved in the drug trade and, for a price, provides security and transportation services for drug trafficking organizations to support its terrorist activities. At present, there is little government presence in the remote coca-growing zones of the VRAEM. The U.S. Embassy in Lima restricts visits by official personnel to these areas because of the threat of violence by narcotics traffickers and columns of the Shining Path. Information about insecure areas and recommended personal security practices can be found at http://www.osac.gov or http://travel.state.gov. Poland Executive Summary Poland’s strong fundamentals and timely macroeconomic policies have enabled the country’s economy to withstand several recent turbulent periods. In 2021, the Polish economy was recovering rapidly from the pandemic-induced recession, which had interrupted almost 30 years of continuous economic expansion. Policy actions including broad fiscal measures and unprecedented monetary support cushioned the socio-economic impact of the pandemic. Already in the second quarter of 2021, output returned to pre-crisis levels and annual growth in 2021 averaged 5.7 percent. The post-pandemic recovery has been sustained by robust private consumption. Despite pandemic-related challenges and the deterioration of some aspects of the investment climate, Poland remained an attractive destination for foreign investment. Solid economic fundamentals and promising post-COVID recovery forecasts continued to draw foreign, including U.S., capital. The Family 500+ program and additional pension payments continued in 2021 as key elements of the Law and Justice (PiS) party’s social welfare and inequality reduction agenda. The government increased the minimum wage and the labor market remained relatively strong, supported by a package of measures introduced in 2020 and continued in 2021 known as the “Anti-Crisis Shield.” The support measures amounted to approximately $55 billion. Prospects for future growth of the Polish economy are uncertain due to the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. High inflation, the highest in 20 years, is likely to continue and interest rates, which will rise along with it, will negatively impact the economy. The approval of Poland’s National Recovery Plan (KPO), however, and the transfer of EU funds envisaged therein, should make a positive impact. In 2021, the government introduced an “Anti-Inflation Shield’ including a temporary reduction in value added tax (VAT) on electricity, gas, and heating as well as foodstuffs to prevent significant deterioration in consumption. A fiscal stimulus program (the “Polish Deal”) was also introduced and took effect in 2022. After only a few months of its implementation, the government has radically amended it. New solutions aimed at insulating the economy from the effects of the war in Ukraine will be introduced under the banner of an “Anti-Putin Shield.” These measures will include compensation to Polish businesses that operated in Russia, Ukraine, or Belarus; subsidies to the state-owned gas pipeline operator; regulated gas tariffs for households and “sensitive recipients” such as hospitals; subsidies for farmers to combat rising fertilizer prices; and a reduction of the income tax threshold. The proposal is still subject to consultations but is expected to be enacted into law in 2022. The current anti-inflationary measures are likely to be extended until the end of 2022. All of these policies will drastically increase fiscal spending and curtail tax revenue. The Polish government has made gradual progress in simplifying administrative processes for firms, supported by the introduction of digital public services, but weaknesses persist in the legal and regulatory framework. Implemented and proposed legislation dampened optimism in some sectors (e.g., retail, media, energy, digital services, and beverages). Investors point to lower predictability and the outsized role of state-owned and state-controlled companies in the Polish economy as an impediment to long-term balanced growth. The government continues to push for the creation of state-controlled “national champions” that are large enough to compete internationally and lead economic development. Despite a polarized political environment, and a few less business-friendly sector-specific policies, the broad structures of the Polish economy are solid. Foreign investors are not abandoning projects planned before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and some are even transferring activities from Ukraine and Belarus to Poland. Prospects for future growth will depend on the course of the war in Ukraine, but in the near-term, external and domestic demand and inflows of EU funds, as well as various government aid programs, are likely to continue to attract investors seeking access to Poland’s market of over 38 million people, and to the broader EU market of over 500 million. In mid-2021, the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology finished public consultations on its Industry Development White Paper, which identifies the government’s views on the most significant barriers to industrial activity and serves as the foundation for Poland’s Industrial Policy (PIP) – a strategic document focused on digitization, security, industrial production location, the Green Deal, and modern society which sets the direction for long-term industrial development. In early 2022, the Ministry announced there was need for further analysis and introduction of new economic solutions due to the considerable changes in the EU energy policy, supply chain disruptions, and the geopolitical situation. Poland’s well-diversified economy reduces its vulnerability to external shocks, although it depends heavily on the EU as an export market. Foreign investors also cite Poland’s well-educated work force as a major reason to invest, as well as its proximity to major markets such as Germany. U.S. firms represent one of the largest groups of foreign investors in Poland. The volume of U.S. investment in Poland was estimated at over $4.2 billion by the National Bank of Poland in 2020 and at around $25 billion by the Warsaw-based American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham). With the inclusion of indirect investment flows through subsidiaries, it may reach over $62 billion, according to KPMG and AmCham. Historically, foreign direct investment (FDI) was largest in the automotive and food processing industries, followed by machinery and other metal products and petrochemicals. “Shared office” services such as accounting, legal, and information technology services, including research and development (R&D), is Poland’s fastest-growing sector for foreign investment. The government seeks to promote domestic production and technology transfer opportunities in awarding defense-related tenders. There are also investment and export opportunities in the energy sector—both immediate (natural gas), and longer term (nuclear, hydrogen, energy grid upgrades, photovoltaics, and offshore wind)—as Poland seeks to diversify its energy mix and reduce air pollution. Biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and health care industries opened wider to investments and exports as a result of the COVID-19 experience. 2021 turned out to be a record year for venture capital investment in Poland. Compared to 2020, the value of investments in this area increased by 66 percent, exceeding $800 million. Around 15 percent of these transactions were investments in the sector of medical technologies. Defense remains a promising sector for U.S. exports. The Polish government is actively modernizing its military inventory, presenting good opportunities for the U.S. defense industry. A law increasing the defense budget was adopted in March 2022. The law also amends the mechanism of military financing, expansion, and procurement. The defense budget is to increase to 3 percent of GDP from 2023, exceeding the NATO target of 2 percent. Under the new law, the Council of Ministers will be tasked with determining, every four years, the direction of the modernization and development of the armed forces for a 15-year planning period. Information technology and cybersecurity along with infrastructure also are sectors that show promise for U.S. exports, as Poland’s municipalities focus on smart city networks. A $10 billion central airport project may present opportunities for U.S. companies in project management, consulting, communications, and construction. The government seeks to expand the economy by supporting high-tech investments, increasing productivity and foreign trade, and supporting entrepreneurship, scientific research, and innovation through the use of domestic and EU funding. The Polish government is interested in the development of green energy, hoping to utilize the large amounts of EU funding earmarked for this purpose in the coming years and decades. The Polish government plans to allocate money from the EU Recovery Fund (once Poland’s plan is approved) to pro-development investments in such areas as economic resilience and competitiveness, green energy and the reduction of energy intensity, digital transformation, the availability and quality of the health care system, and green and intelligent mobility. A major EU project is to synchronize the Baltic States’ electricity grid with that of Poland and the wider European network by 2025. Another government strategy aims for a commercial fifth generation (5G) cellular network to become operational in all cities by 2025, although planned spectrum auctions have been repeatedly delayed. Some organizations, notably private business associations and labor unions, have raised concerns that policy changes have been introduced quickly and without broad consultation, increasing uncertainty about the stability and predictability of Poland’s business environment. For example, the government had announced an “advertising tax” on media companies with only a few months warning after firms had already prepared budgets for the current year. Broadcasters were concerned the tax, if introduced, could irreparably harm media companies weakened by the pandemic and limit independent journalism. Other proposals to introduce legislation on media de-concentration and limitations on foreign ownership have raised concern among foreign investors in the sector; however, those proposals seem to have stalled for the time being. The Polish tax system has undergone a major transformation with the introduction of many changes over recent years, including more effective tax auditing and collection, with the aim of increasing budget revenues. Through updated regulations in November 2020, Poland has adopted a range of major changes concerning the taxation of doing business in the country. The changes include the double taxation of some partnerships; deferral of corporate income tax (CIT) for small companies owned by individuals; an obligation to publish tax strategies by large companies; and a new model of taxation for real estate companies. In the financial sector, legal risks stemming from foreign exchange mortgages constitute a source of uncertainty for some banks. The Polish government has supported taxing the income of Internet companies, proposed by the European Commission, considering it a possible new source of financing for the post-COVID-19 economic recovery. A tax on video-on-demand services and the proposed advertising tax are two examples of this trend. On April 8, 2021, Poland’s president signed legislation amending provisions of Poland’s customs and tax laws in an effort to simplify certain customs and tax procedures. The “Next Generation EU” recovery package will benefit the Polish economic recovery with sizeable support. Under the 2021-2027 European Union budget, Poland will receive $78.4 billion in cohesion funds as well as approximately $27 billion in grants and $40 billion in loan access from the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility. The Polish government projects this injection of funds, amounting to around 4.5 percent of Poland’s 2021 GDP, should contribute significantly to the country’s growth over the period 2021-2027. As the largest recipient of EU funds (which have contributed an estimated 1 percentage point to Poland’s GDP growth per year), any significant decrease in EU cohesion spending would have a large negative impact on Poland’s economy. The risk of a suspension of EU funds is low, but the government has refused to comply with several rulings of the European Court of Justice. Observers are closely watching the European Commission’s three open infringement proceedings against Poland regarding rule of law and judicial reforms initiated in April 2019, April 2020, and December 2021. The Commission’s concerns include the introduction of an extraordinary appeal mechanism in the enacted Supreme Court Law, which could potentially affect economic interests in that final judgments issued since 1997 can now be challenged and overturned in whole or in part, including some long-standing judgments on which economic actors have relied. Other issues regard the legitimacy of judicial appointments after a reform of the National Judicial Council that raise concerns about long-term legal certainty and the possible politicization of judicial decisions and undermining of EU law. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to an increase in economic, financial, and political risks. Managing the fallout from the war in Ukraine will be the government’s priority. Poland faces a large-scale refugee influx and, as of April 2022, has already received close to three million refugees. The Polish government reacted rapidly, granting refugees the right of temporary residence and access to key public services (health, education), social assistance, and housing. According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the war in Ukraine, if it ends within a few months, will cause a small and short slowdown in the growth of the Polish economy. The relatively limited consequences of the invasion for Poland’s economy are primarily due to the large influx of refugees to Poland. The EBRD expects this to be a strong consumption stimulus that will cushion the impact of weakening exports due to the war. The Polish and global economies are currently operating in conditions of high uncertainty. Any forecasts, therefore, are subject to a large margin of error. The state of the Polish economy and the validity of forecasts will depend on the further course of the war in Ukraine, the decision of Ukrainian refugees on whether to stay in Poland, and the EU’s approval of Poland’s KPO. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 42 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 40 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 11,127 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 15,240 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Poland welcomes foreign investment as a source of capital, growth, and jobs, and as a vehicle for technology transfer, research and development (R&D), and integration into global supply chains. The government’s Strategy for Responsible Development identified key goals for attracting investment, including improving the investment climate, a stable macroeconomic and regulatory environment, and high-quality corporate governance, including in state-controlled companies. By the end of 2020, according to IMF and National Bank of Poland data, Poland had attracted around $250 billion (cumulative) in foreign direct investment (FDI), principally from Western Europe and the United States. In 2020, reinvested profits again dominated the net inflow of FDI to Poland. The greatest reinvestment of profits occurred in services and manufacturing, reflecting the change of Poland’s economy to a more service-oriented and less capital-intensive structure.Foreign companies generally enjoy unrestricted access to the Polish market. However, Polish law limits foreign ownership of companies in selected strategic sectors, and limits acquisition of real estate, especially agricultural and forest land. Additionally, the current government has expressed a desire to increase the percentage of domestic ownership in some industries such as media, banking, and retail which have large holdings by foreign companies and has employed sectoral taxes and other measures to advance this aim. In March 2018, Sunday trading ban legislation went into effect, which has gradually phased out Sunday retail commerce in Poland, especially for large retailers. Since February 1, 2022, changes to the ban on Sunday trading are in force. According to these rules, it is possible to open stores that provide postal services on non-trading Sundays if the revenues from this activity exceed 40 percent of the total revenues of a given branch. Sales records must be kept separately for each commercial outlet, even if the entrepreneur has several such outlets. Fines for breaking the Sunday trading ban are from $230 to $23,250 (PLN 1,000 to PLN 100,000). From February 1, 2022, the same penalty applies for not keeping required monthly records. From 2020, the trade ban applies to all but seven Sundays a year. In 2020, a law was adopted requiring producers and importers of certain sugary and sweetened beverages to pay a fee. The government has been planning to introduce an advertising tax – hailed as a “solidarity fee”- covering a wide array of entities including publishers, tech companies and cinemas. Only small media businesses would be exempt from the new levy. Polish authorities have also publicly favored introducing a comprehensive digital services tax. While the government continues to acknowledge the value of FDI as a driver of growth, it has tended to focus on lessening Poland’s dependence on foreign capital by championing re-industrialization largely in the knowledge-based industries as well as shifting to more self-reliance in lending to small- and medium-sized firms in the banking sector. There are a variety of agencies involved in investment promotion: The Ministry of Economic Development and Technology has two departments involved in investment promotion and facilitation: the Investment Development and the Trade and International Relations Departments. The Deputy Minister supervising the Investment Development Department is also the ombudsman for foreign investors. https://www.gov.pl/web/przedsiebiorczosc-technologia/ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) promotes Poland’s foreign relations including economic relations, and along with the Polish Chamber of Commerce (KIG), organizes missions of Polish firms abroad and hosts foreign trade missions to Poland. https://www.msz.gov.pl/ ; https://kig.pl/ The Polish Investment and Trade Agency (PAIH) is the main institution responsible for promotion and facilitation of foreign investment. The agency is responsible for promoting Polish exports, for inward foreign investment and for Polish investments abroad. The agency operates as part of the Polish Development Fund, which integrates government development agencies. PAIH coordinates all operational instruments, such as commercial diplomatic missions, commercial fairs, and programs dedicated to specific markets and sectors. The Agency has opened offices abroad including in the United States (Washington, D.C, Chicago, Houston, and New York). PAIH’s services are available to all investors. https://www.paih.gov.pl/en The American Chamber of Commerce has established the American Investor Desk – an investor-dedicated know-how gateway providing comprehensive information on investing in Poland and investing in the USA: https://amcham.pl/american-investor-desk In July 2021, PAIH and AmCham signed a cooperation agreement. Its purpose is to promote and create favorable conditions for the development of exports and investments on the Polish and American markets. Poland allows both foreign and domestic entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in most forms of remunerative activity per the Entrepreneurs’ Law which went into effect on April 30, 2018. Forms of business activity are described in the Commercial Companies Code. Poland does place limits on foreign ownership and foreign equity for a limited number of sectors. Polish law limits non-EU citizens to 49 percent ownership of a company’s capital shares in the air transport, radio and television broadcasting, and airport and seaport operations sectors. Licenses and concessions for defense production and management of seaports are granted on the basis of national treatment for investors from OECD countries. Pursuant to the Broadcasting Law, a television broadcasting company may only receive a license if the voting share of foreign owners does not exceed 49 percent and if the majority of the members of the management and supervisory boards are Polish citizens and hold permanent residence in Poland. In 2017, a team comprised of officials from the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT), and the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) was created in order to review and tighten restrictions on large media and limit foreign ownership of the media. In December 2021, the President vetoed modifications to the media law limiting foreign ownership of the sector. There is concern that governing party politicians have not completely abandoned their plans and may attempt to bypass the president’s veto in such a way as to modify the media law. Over the past six years, Poland’s ranking on Reporters without Borders’ Press Freedom Index has dropped to 64th from 18th. The governing Law and Justice (PiS) party aims to decrease foreign ownership of media, particularly outlets critical of their governing coalition. Approaches have included proposals to set caps on foreign ownership, the use of a state-controlled companies to purchase media, and the application of economic tools (taxes, fines, advertising revenue) to pressure foreign and independent media. In the insurance sector, at least two management board members, including the chair, must speak Polish. The Law on Freedom of Economic Activity (LFEA) requires companies to obtain government concessions, licenses, or permits to conduct business in certain sectors, such as broadcasting, aviation, energy, weapons/military equipment, mining, and private security services. The LFEA also requires a permit from the Ministry of Economic Development for certain major capital transactions (i.e., to establish a company when a wholly or partially Polish-owned enterprise has contributed in-kind to a company with foreign ownership by incorporating liabilities in equity, contributing assets, receivables, etc.). A detailed description of business activities that require concessions and licenses can be found here: https://www.paih.gov.pl/publications/how_to_do_business_in_Poland Polish law restricts foreign investment in certain land and real estate. Land usage types such as technology and industrial parks, business and logistic centers, transport, housing plots, farmland in special economic zones, household gardens and plots up to two hectares are exempt from agricultural land purchase restrictions. Since May 2016, foreign citizens from European Economic Area member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, as well as Switzerland, do not need permission to purchase any type of real estate including agricultural land. Investors from outside of the EEA or Switzerland need to obtain a permit from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration (with the consent of the Defense and Agriculture Ministries), pursuant to the Act on Acquisition of Real Estate by Foreigners, prior to the acquisition of real estate or shares which give control of a company holding or leasing real estate. The permit is valid for two years from the day of issuance, and the ministry can issue a preliminary document valid for one year. Permits may be refused for reasons of social policy or public security. The exceptions to this rule include purchases of an apartment or garage, up to 0.4 hectares of undeveloped urban land, and “other cases provided for by law” (generally: proving a particularly close connection with Poland). Laws to restrict farmland and forest purchases (with subsequent amendments) came into force April 30, 2016, and are addressed in more detail in Section 5, Protection of Property Rights. Since September 2015, the Act on the Control of Certain Investments has provided for the national security-related screening of acquisitions in high-risk sectors including: energy generation and distribution; petroleum production, processing and distribution; telecommunications; media; mining; and manufacturing and trade of explosives, weapons and ammunition. Poland maintains a list of strategic companies which can be amended at any time, but is updated at least once a year, usually in late December. The national security review mechanism does not appear to constitute a de facto barrier for investment and does not unduly target U.S. investment. According to the Act, prior to the acquisition of shares of strategic companies (including the acquisition of proprietary interests in entities and/or their enterprises) the purchaser (foreign or local) must notify the controlling government body and receive approval. The obligation to inform the controlling government body applies to transactions involving the acquisition of a “material stake” in companies subject to special protection. The Act stipulates that failure to notify carries a fine of up to PLN 100,000,000 ($22,300,000) or a penalty of imprisonment between six months and five years (or both penalties together) for a person acting on behalf of a legal person or organizational unit that acquires a material stake without prior notification. As part of the COVID-19 Anti-Crisis Shield, on June 24, 2020, legislation entered into force extending significantly the FDI screening mechanism in Poland for 24 months. In the absence of new permanent regulations and due to the Russian invasion in Ukraine, there is a high probability that this legislation will be extended. An acquisition from a country that is not a member of the EU, the EEA, or the OECD requires prior clearance from the President of the Polish Competition Authority if it targets a company generating turnover exceeding EUR 10 million ($10.5 million) that either: 1) is a publicly-listed company, 2) controls assets classified as critical infrastructure, 3) develops or maintains software crucial for vital processes (e.g., utilities systems, financial transactions, food distribution, transport and logistics, health care systems); or 4) conducts business in one of 21 specific industries, including energy, gas and oil production, storage, distribution and transportation; manufacture of chemicals, pharmaceuticals and medical instruments; telecommunications; and food processing. The State Assets Ministry is preparing similar and more permanent measures. In November 2019, the governing PiS party reestablished a treasury ministry, known as the State Assets Ministry, to consolidate the government’s control over state-owned enterprises. The government dissolved Poland’s energy ministry, transferring that agency’s mandate to the State Assets Ministry. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State Assets announced he would seek to consolidate state-owned companies with similar profiles, including merging Poland’s largest state-owned oil and gas firm PKN Orlen with state-owned Lotos Group and establishing a National Food Holding. At the same time, the government is working on changing the rules of governing state-owned companies to have better control over the firms’ activities. The government has not undergone any third-party review focused on investment policy by a multilateral or civil society organization in the last five years, The OECD published its 2020 economic survey of Poland. It can be found here: https://www.oecd.org/economy/poland-economic-snapshot/ Additionally, the OECD Working Group on Bribery has provided recommendations on the implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Poland here: https://www.oecd.org/poland/poland-should-urgently-implement-reforms-to-boost-fight-against-foreign-bribery-and-preserve-independence-of-prosecutors-and-judges.htm In 2021, government activities and regulations focused primarily on addressing challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Polish government has continued to implement reforms aimed at improving the investment climate with a special focus on the small- and medium-enterprise (SME) sector and innovations. Poland reformed its R&D tax incentives with new regulations and changes encouraging wider use of the R&D tax breaks. As of January 1, 2019, a new mechanism reducing the tax rate on income derived from intellectual property rights (IP Box) was introduced. Please see Section 5, Protection of Property Rights of this report for more information. A package of five laws referred to as the “Business Constitution”—intended to facilitate the operation of small domestic enterprises—was gradually introduced in 2018. The main principle of the Business Constitution is the presumption of innocence of business owners in dealings with the government. Poland made enforcing contracts easier by introducing an automated system to assign cases to judges randomly. Despite these reforms and others, some investors have expressed serious concerns regarding over-regulation, over-burdened courts and prosecutors, and overly burdensome bureaucratic processes. Tax audit methods have changed considerably. For instance, in many cases an appeal against the findings of an audit must now be lodged with the authority that issued the initial finding rather than a higher authority or third party. Poland also enabled businesses to get electricity service faster by implementing a new customer service platform that allows the utility to better track applications for new commercial connections. The Ministry of Finance and the National Tax Administration have launched an e-Tax Office, available online at https://www.podatki.gov.pl/ . The website, which will be constructed in stages through September 2022, will make it possible to settle all tax matters in a single user-friendly digital location. Running a business in Poland will be facilitated by e-invoices. From January 2022, entrepreneurs will be able to use it voluntarily. Taxpayers choosing an e-invoice will receive a VAT refund faster – the refund period will be shortened by 20 days (from 60 to 40). The government plans, starting in 2023, to have entrepreneurs use this solution obligatorily. A special tax unit, the “Investor Desk,” has been established at the Finance Ministry to handle tax matters of strategic investors. This unit, working with other agencies focused on foreign investments in Poland, will support large investors with administrative requirements. In Poland, business activity may be conducted in the forms of a sole proprietorship, civil law partnership, as well as commercial partnerships and companies regulated in provisions of the Commercial Partnerships and Companies Code. Sole proprietorship and civil law partnerships are registered in the Central Registration and Information on Business (CEIDG), which is housed with the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology here: https://prod.ceidg.gov.pl/CEIDG.CMS.ENGINE/?D;f124ce8a-3e72-4588-8380-63e8ad33621f Commercial companies are classified as partnerships (registered partnership, professional partnership, limited partnership, and limited joint-stock partnership) and companies (limited liability company and joint-stock company). A partnership or company is registered in the National Court Register (KRS) and maintained by the competent district court for the registered office of the established partnership or company. A 2018 law introduced a new type of company—PSA (Prosta Spółka Akcyjna – Simple Joint Stock Company). PSAs are meant to facilitate start-ups with simpler and cheaper registration procedures. The minimum initial capitalization is 1 PLN ($0.23) while other types of registration require 5,000 PLN ($1,126) or 50,000 PLN ($11,260). A PSA has a board of directors, which merges the responsibilities of a management board and a supervisory board. The provision for PSAs entered into force in July 2021. From October 12, 2022, an amendment to the Commercial Companies Code and certain other acts will enter into force. It introduces the so-called “holding law,” developed by the Commission for Owner Oversight Reform in the Ministry of State Assets. The amendment lays down the principles of how a parent company may instruct its subsidiaries and stipulates the parent company’s liability and the principles of creditor, officer, and minority shareholder protections. This amendment constitutes an important change for many companies operating in Poland, including foreign parent companies. Holding companies meeting certain requirements will be eligible for an exemption from CIT of 95 percent of dividends received from subsidiaries and full exemption from CIT of capital gains from the sale of shares of subsidiaries for unrelated entities. Only a limited liability company or a joint stock company, being considered a Polish tax resident, may be considered a holding company. The requirement of holding at least 10 percent of shares of a subsidiary and for a period of at least one year applies. Both the holding company and the subsidiary cannot belong to a tax capital group and cannot benefit from tax exemptions (e.g., activity in the special economic zone). The holding company must conduct genuine business activity in Poland. Capital gains from the sale of real estate-rich companies are not exempt. New regulations will apply only to capital companies. On January 1, 2021, a new law on public procurement entered into force. This law had been adopted by the Polish Parliament on September 11, 2019. The new law aims to reorganize the public procurement system, further harmonize it with EU law, and improve transparency. Beginning in July 2021, commercial companies were required to submit electronically all applications for registration, deletion, and changes to the National Court Register. All company files are now available electronically and the registration process should speed up significantly. National Court Register (KRS): https://www.gov.pl/web/gov/uslugi-dla-przedsiebiorcy A certified e-signature may be obtained from one of the commercial e-signature providers listed on the following website: https://www.nccert.pl/ Agencies with which a business will need to file in order to register in the KRS include: Central Statistical Office to register for a business identification number (REGON) for civil-law partnership http://bip.stat.gov.pl/en/regon/subjects-and-data-included-in-the-register/ ZUS – Social Insurance Agency http://www.zus.pl/pl/pue/rejestracja Ministry of Finance http://www.mf.gov.pl/web/bip/wyniki-wyszukiwania/?q=business percent20registration Both registers (KRS and REGON) are available in English and foreign companies may use them. Poland’s Single Point of Contact site for business registration and information is: https://www.biznes.gov.pl/en/ The Polish Agency for Investment and Trade (PAIH), under the umbrella of the Polish Development Fund (PFR), plays a key role in promoting Polish investment abroad. More information on PFR can be found in Section 6, Financial Sector and at its website: https://pfr.pl/ . PAIH has 58 offices worldwide, including four in the United States. PAIH assists entrepreneurs with the administrative and legal procedures related to specific projects. PAIH also works with entrepreneurs in the development of legal solutions and finding suitable locations, reliable partners, and suppliers. The agency implements pro-export projects such as “Polish Tech Bridges” dedicated to the outward expansion of innovative Polish SMEs. Poland is a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Poland co-founded and actively supports the Three Seas Initiative, which seeks to improve north-south connections in road, energy, and telecom infrastructure in 12 countries on NATO’s and the EU’s eastern flank. In May 2019, the national development bank, Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), and the Romanian development bank EximBank founded the Three Seas Fund, a commercial initiative to support the development of transport, energy and digital infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe. As of March 2022, there were nine core sponsors involved in the Fund. There were no breakthroughs in 2021 for the Three Seas Initiative, however, 2021 did bring long-awaited stabilization as well as the recognition of the initiative among the majority of international partners in the region. The Three Seas Initiative may be able to play a significant role in the inclusion process for Ukraine in European structures. Under the Government Financial Support for Exports Program, BGK grants foreign buyers financing for the purchase of Polish goods and services. The program provides the following financing instruments: credit for buyers granted through the buyers’ bank; credit for buyers granted directly from BGK; the purchase of receivables on credit from the supplier under an export contract; documentary letters of credit post-financing; the discounting of receivables from documentary letters of credit; confirmation of documentary letters of credit; and export pre-financing. BGK has international offices in London and Frankfurt. In July 2019, BGK, the European Investment Bank, and four other development banks (French Deposits and Consignments Fund, Italian Deposits and Loans Fund, the Spanish Official Credit Institute, and the German Credit Institute for Reconstruction), began the implementation of the “Joint Initiative on Circular Economy” (JICE), the goal of which is to eliminate waste, prevent its generation, and increase the efficiency of resource management. PFR TFI S.A, an entity also under the umbrella of PFR, supports Polish investors planning to or already operating abroad. PFR TFI manages the Foreign Expansion Fund (FEZ), which provides loans, on market terms, to foreign entities owned by Polish entrepreneurs. See https://www.pfrtfi.pl/ and https://pfr.pl/en/offer/polish-international-development-fund.html 3. Legal Regime The Polish Constitution contains a number of provisions related to administrative law and procedures. It states administrative bodies have a duty to observe and comply with the law of Poland. The Code of Administrative Procedures (CAP) states rules and principles concerning participation and involvement of citizens in processes affecting them, the giving of reasons for decisions, and forms of appeal and review. As a member of the EU, Poland complies with EU directives by harmonizing rules or translating them into national legislation. Rule-making and regulatory authority exist at the central, regional, and municipal levels. Various ministries are engaged in rule-making that affects foreign business, such as pharmaceutical reimbursement at the Ministry of Health or incentives for R&D at the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology. Regional and municipal level governments can levy certain taxes and affect foreign investors through permitting and zoning. Polish accounting standards do not differ significantly from international standards. Major international accounting firms provide services in Poland. In cases where there is no national accounting standard, the appropriate International Accounting Standard may be applied. However, investors have complained of regulatory unpredictability and high levels of administrative red tape. Foreign and domestic investors must comply with a variety of laws concerning taxation, labor practices, health and safety, and the environment. Complaints about these laws, especially the tax system, center on frequent changes, lack of clarity, and strict penalties for minor errors. Poland has improved its regulatory policy system over the last several years. The government introduced a central online system to provide access for the general public to regulatory impact assessments (RIA) and other documents sent for consultation to selected groups such as trade unions and business. Proposed laws and regulations are published in draft form for public comment, and ministries must conduct public consultations. Poland follows OECD recognized good regulatory practices, but investors say the lack of regulations governing the role of stakeholders in the legislative process is a problem. Participation in public consultations and the window for comments are often limited. New guidelines for RIA, consultation and ex post evaluation were adopted under the Better Regulation Program in 2015, providing more detailed guidance and stronger emphasis on public consultation. Like many countries, Poland faces challenges to fully implement its regulatory policy requirements and to ensure that RIA and consultation comments are used to improve decision making. The OECD suggests Poland extend its online public consultation system and consider using instruments such as green papers more systematically for early-stage consultation to identify options for addressing a policy problem. OECD considers steps taken to introduce ex post evaluation of regulations encouraging. Bills can be submitted to Parliament for debate as “citizens’ bills” if authors collect 100,000 signatures in support for the draft legislation. NGOs and private sector associations most often take advantage of this avenue. Parliamentary bills can also be submitted by a group of parliamentarians, a mechanism that bypasses public consultation and which both domestic and foreign investors have criticized. Changes to the government’s rules of procedure introduced in June 2016 reduced the requirements for RIA for preparations of new legislation. Administrative authorities are subject to oversight by courts and other bodies (e.g., the Supreme Audit Chamber – NIK), the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsperson, special commissions and agencies, inspectorates, the Prosecutor and parliamentary committees. Polish parliamentary committees utilize a distinct system to examine and instruct ministries and administrative agency heads. Committees’ oversight of administrative matters consists of: reports on state budget implementation and preparation of new budgets, citizens’ complaints, and reports from NIK. In addition, courts and prosecutors’ offices sometimes bring cases to Parliament’s attention. The Ombudsperson’s institution works relatively well in Poland. Polish citizens have a right to complain and to put forward grievances before administrative bodies. Proposed legislation can be tracked on the Prime Minister’s webpage, RPL Strona Główna (rcl.gov.pl) and the Parliament’s webpage: https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm9.nsf/proces.xsp The government promotes and encourages companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. For example, the Strategic Investments Program launched by Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK) offers co-financing, up to 95 percent of the value, for investments by local governments. As part of the assessment of applications, implementation of innovative technologies and compliance with sustainable development goals are taken into account. Tax relief for corporate social responsibility (CSR), intended for all entrepreneurs, will come into force in 2022. Companies will be able to deduct an additional 50 percent from the tax base for costs incurred on activities such as sports, culture, higher education, and science. CSR relief may be deducted up to the amount of income obtained in the tax year. The government also organizes or supports conferences and campaigns such as “Our Climate” and “TOGETAIR 2022,” with the aim of raising awareness of ways to transition to a climate-neutral, green, competitive, and inclusive economy. Poland has consistently met the Department of State’s minimum requirements for fiscal transparency: 2021 Fiscal Transparency Report – United States Department of State Poland’s budget and information on debt obligations were widely and easily accessible to the general public, including online. The budget was substantially complete and considered generally reliable. NIK audited the government’s accounts and made its reports publicly available, including online. The budget structure and classifications are complex, and the Polish authorities agree more work is needed to address deficiencies in the process of budgetary planning and procedures. State budgets encompass only part of the public finances sector. The European Commission regularly assesses the public finance sustainability of Member States based on fiscal gap ratios. In 2022, Poland’s public finances will be exposed to a higher general government deficit, uncertainty in financial markets resulting from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the macroeconomic environment with elevated inflation, and the monetary policy of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) and major central banks, including the European Central Bank and the U.S. Federal Reserve. Since its EU accession in May 2004, Poland has been transposing European legislation and reforming its own regulations in compliance with the EU system. Poland sometimes disagrees with EU regulations related to renewable energy and emissions due to its important domestic coal industry. Poland participates in the process of creation of European norms. There is strong encouragement for non-governmental organizations, such as environmental and consumer groups, to actively participate in European standardization. In areas not covered by European normalization, the Polish Committee for Standardization (PKN) introduces norms identical with international norms, i.e., PN-ISO and PN-IEC. PKN actively cooperates with international and European standards organizations and with standards bodies from other countries. PKN has been a founding member of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and a member of the International Electro-technical Commission (IEC) since 1923.PKN also cooperates with the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) International and the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Poland has been a member of the WTO since July 1, 1995 and was a member of GATT from October 18, 1967. All EU member states are WTO members, as is the EU in its own right. While the member states coordinate their positions in Brussels and Geneva, the European Commission alone speaks for the EU and its members in almost all WTO affairs. PKN runs the WTO/TBT National Information Point in order to apply the provisions of the TBT with respect to information exchange concerning national standardization.Useful Links: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/european-standards/harmonised-standards/ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/oj/direct-access.html?locale=en ) The Polish legal system is code-based and prosecutorial. The main source of the country’s law is the Constitution of 1997. The legal system is a mix of Continental civil law (Napoleonic) and remnants of communist legal theory. Poland accepts the obligatory jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), but with reservations. In civil and commercial matters, first instance courts sit in single-judge panels, while courts handling appeals sit in three-judge panels. District Courts (Sad Rejonowy) handle the majority of disputes in the first instance. When the value of a dispute exceeds a certain amount or the subject matter requires more expertise (such as those regarding intellectual property rights), Circuit Courts (Sad Okregowy) serve as first instance courts. Circuit Courts also handle appeals from District Court verdicts. Courts of Appeal (Sad Apelacyjny) handle appeals from verdicts of Circuit Courts as well as generally supervise the courts in their region. The Polish judicial system generally upholds the sanctity of contracts. Foreign court judgements, under the Polish Civil Procedure Code and European Community regulation, can be recognized. There are many foreign court judgments, however, which Polish courts do not accept or accept partially. There can also be delays in the recognition of judgments of foreign courts due to an insufficient number of judges with specialized expertise. Generally, foreign firms are wary of the slow and over-burdened Polish court system, preferring other means to defend their rights. Contracts involving foreign parties often include a clause specifying that disputes will be resolved in a third-country court or through offshore arbitration. (More detail in Section 4, Dispute Settlement.) Since coming to power in 2015, the PiS-led government has pursued far-reaching reforms to Poland’s judicial system. The reforms have led to legal disputes with the European Commission over threats to judicial independence. The reforms have also drawn criticism from legal experts, NGOs, and international organizations. Poland’s government contends the reforms are needed to purge the old Communist guard and increase efficiency and democratic oversight in the judiciary. Observers have noted, in particular, the introduction of an extraordinary appeal mechanism in the 2017 Supreme Court Law. The extraordinary appeal mechanism states that final judgments issued since 1997 can be challenged and overturned in whole or in part during a three-year period starting from the day the legislation entered into force, April 3, 2018. On February 25, 2021, the lower house of Parliament (Sejm) passed an amendment to the law further extending the deadline for submitting extraordinary complaints by three years (until April 3, 2024). The President signed the bill into law on March 31, 2021. During 2021, the Extraordinary Appeals Chamber received 744 new complaints of which 280 were recognized and accepted for examination. During 2021, the Chamber reviewed 103 complaints. On April 8, 2020, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) issued interim measures ordering the government to suspend the work of the Supreme Court Disciplinary Chamber with regard to disciplinary cases against judges. The ECJ is evaluating an infringement proceeding launched by the European Commission in April 2019 and referred to the ECJ in October 2019. The Commission has argued that the country’s disciplinary regime for judges “undermines the judicial independence of…judges and does not ensure the necessary guarantees to protect judges from political control, as required by the Court of Justice of the EU.” The Commission stated the disciplinary regime did not provide for the independence and impartiality of the Disciplinary Chamber, which is composed solely of judges selected by the restructured National Council of the Judiciary, which is appointed by the Sejm. The ECJ has yet to make a final ruling. The European Commission and judicial experts have complained the government has ignored the ECJ’s interim measures. On April 29, 2020, the European Commission launched another infringement procedure regarding a law that came into effect on February 14, 2020. The law allows judges to be disciplined for impeding the functioning of the legal system or for questioning another judge’s professional state or the effectiveness of his or her appointment. It also requires judges to disclose memberships in associations. The Commission stated the law “undermines the judicial independence of Polish judges and is incompatible with the primacy of EU law.” It also stated the law “prevents Polish courts from directly applying certain provisions of EU law protecting judicial independence and from putting references for preliminary rulings on such questions to the [European] Court of Justice.” On December 3, 2020, the Commission expanded its April 29 complaint to include the continued functioning of the Disciplinary Chamber in apparent disregard of the ECJ’s interim measures in the prior infringement procedure. On January 27, 2021, the European Commission sent a reasoned opinion to the Polish government for response. On July 14 and 15, 2021, the ECJ issued two rulings against Polish government changes to Poland’s judicial disciplinary system. These rulings directly conflicted with a July 14, 2021, Polish Constitutional Tribunal ruling that said the ECJ had exceeded its authority. On July 20, 2021, the European Commission threatened financial sanctions and gave the Polish government until August 16, 2021, to confirm compliance with the ECJ rulings. On August 16, the Polish government sent a letter to the Commission in response to the ultimatum, promising new legislation in “the coming months” to fix Poland’s judicial disciplinary regime and liquidate the controversial Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court. On September 7, 2021, the Commission announced it had requested the ECJ impose financial penalties against Poland for not complying with ECJ rulings. The Commission also initiated a new infringement procedure against Poland to ascertain details about the Polish government’s planned legislation. On October 27, 2021, the ECJ imposed a €1 million daily fine against Poland for the government’s failure to suspend the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, as ordered by the ECJ in July. As of April 2022, the Polish Parliament has not completed the legislative process to consider legislation that responds to the European Commission’s concerns. Foreign nationals can expect to obtain impartial proceedings in legal matters. Polish is the official language and must be used in all legal proceedings. It is possible to obtain an interpreter. The basic legal framework for establishing and operating companies in Poland, including companies with foreign investors, is found in the Commercial Companies Code. The Code provides for establishment of joint-stock companies, limited liability companies, or partnerships (e.g., limited joint-stock partnerships and professional partnerships). These corporate forms are available to foreign investors who come from an EU or European Free Trade Association (EFTA) member state or from a country that offers reciprocity to Polish enterprises, including the United States.With few exceptions, foreign investors are guaranteed national treatment. Companies that establish an EU subsidiary after May 1, 2004 and conduct or plan to commence business operations in Poland must observe all EU regulations. However, in some cases they may not be able to benefit from all privileges afforded to EU companies. Foreign investors without permanent residence and the right to work in Poland may be restricted from participating in day-to-day operations of a company. Parties can freely determine the content of contracts within the limits of European contract law. All parties must agree on essential terms, including the price and the subject matter of the contract. Written agreements, although not always mandatory, may enable an investor to avoid future disputes. The Civil Code is the law applicable to contracts. Useful websites (in English) to help navigate laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for foreign investors: Polish Investment and Trade Agency: https://www.paih.gov.pl/en Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF): https://www.knf.gov.pl/en/ Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKIK): https://uokik.gov.pl/legal_regulations.php Biznes.gov.pl is intended for people who plan to start a new business in Poland. The portal is designed to simplify the formalities of setting up and running a business. It provides up-to-date regulations and procedures for running a business in Poland and the EU; it supports electronic application submission to state institutions; and it answers questions regarding running a business. Information is available in Polish and English. https://www.biznes.gov.pl/en/przedsiebiorcy/ In 2022, the Polish Government introduced a new measure – an investment agreement – for strategic investors who would like to obtain clarity and certainty regarding the tax consequences of a given investment. The agreement (commonly referred to as “Interpretation 590”) is concluded with the Ministry of Finance and will be binding on the tax administration. An Interpretation 590 includes the following features: Its objective is to provide flexibility, completeness, and comprehensiveness in determining the tax consequences of an investment project. It is available to investors planning an investment in Poland worth at least PLN 100 million (approximately $22 million) and, from 2025 onward, PLN 50 million (approximately $11 million). The agreement will be valid for the stated period, limited to five tax years (with the possibility to extend). Separate applications to various tax authorities (e.g., individual tax rulings, advance pricing arrangements (APA), anti-GAAR clearance, etc.) are not required as all of these matters would be covered with one investment agreement. The scope of information provided in the agreement should not be limited by the provisions of the Tax Code governing individual tax rulings. One agreement could cover all potential tax consequences of an investment. The agreement will be subject to a fee of PLN 50,000 (approximately $11,200) for the initial application and PLN 100,000 to 500,000 (approximately $22,400 to $112,000) after concluding the agreement, with the exact fee depending on the volume of the investment and scope of the investment agreement). The above changes reflect an increasing focus of the Polish Government to attract significant investments into Poland. A special tax unit, the “Investor Desk” has been established, at the Finance Ministry, to handle tax matters of strategic investor. This unit, along with other agencies focused on foreign investments in Poland, will support significant investors passing through administrative requirements. The tax authorities are often open to discussing strategic investments and providing support in applying formal measures which, with new measures in place, should be even more common and accessible to investors. Poland has a high level of nominal convergence with the EU on competition policy in accordance with Articles 101 and 102 of the Lisbon Treaty. Poland’s Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) is well within EU norms for structure and functioning, with the exception that the Prime Minister both appoints and dismisses the head of UOKiK. This is supposed to change to be in line with EU norms, however, as of April 2022, the Prime Minister was still exercising his right to remove and nominate UOKiK’s presidents. The Act on Competition and Consumer Protection was amended in mid-2019. The most important changes, which concern geo-blocking and access to fiscal and banking secrets, came into force on September 17, 2019. Other minor changes took effect in January 2020. The amendments result from the need to align national law with new EU laws. Starting in January 2020, UOKiK may intervene in cases when delays in payment are excessive. UOKiK can take action when the sum of outstanding payments due to an entrepreneur for three subsequent months amounts to at least PLN 5 million ($1.1 million). In 2022, the minimum amount decreases to PLN 2 million ($450,000). The President of UOKiK issues approximately 100 decisions per year regarding practices restricting competition and infringing on collective interests of consumers. Enterprises have the right to appeal against those decisions to the court. In the first instance, the case is examined by the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection, and in the second instance, by the Appellate Court. The decision of the Appellate Court may be challenged by way of a cassation appeal filed to the Supreme Court. In major cases, the General Counsel to the Republic of Poland will act as the legal representative in proceedings concerning an appeal against a decision of the President of UOKiK. As part of COVID-related measures, the Polish Parliament adopted legislation amending the Act of July 24, 2015, on the Control of Certain Investments, introducing full-fledged foreign direct investment control in Poland and giving new responsibilities to UOKiK. Entities from outside the EEA and/or the OECD have to notify the Polish Competition Authority of the intention to make an investment resulting in acquisition, achievement or obtaining directly or indirectly “significant participation” or the status of a dominant entity within the meaning of the Act of July 24, 2015, on the Control of Certain Investments in an entity subject to protection. The law entered into force on July 24, 2020 and is valid for 24 months. In view of the war taking place across Poland’s eastern border and in the absence of significant amendments to the original Act on the Control of Certain Investments, there is a high likelihood that the temporary amendment adopted in 2020 will be extended, with possible modifications. In late 2020, the government proposed legislation concerning UOKiK’s investigative powers, cooperation between anti-monopoly authorities, and changes to fine imposition and leniency programs. One of the amendments also stipulates that the President of UOKiK will be elected to a 5-year term and the dismissal of the anti-monopoly authority will only be possible in precisely defined situations, such as a legally valid conviction for a criminal offense caused by intentional conduct and the deprivation of public rights or of Polish citizenship. Adoption of these solutions is linked to the implementation of the EU’s ECN+ directive. All multinational companies must notify UOKiK of a proposed merger if any party to it has subsidiaries, distribution networks, or permanent sales in Poland. Examples of competition reviews can be found at: https://uokik.gov.pl/aktualnosci.php?news_id=17406 (PKN Orlen/Polska Press) https://www.uokik.gov.pl/news.php?news_id=17198 (Agora/Eurozet) https://www.uokik.gov.pl/news.php?news_id=17202 (Orlen/Polska Press) https://www.uokik.gov.pl/news.php?news_id=17198 (BPH Bank spread clauses) Decisions made by the President of UOKiK can be searched here: https://decyzje.uokik.gov.pl/bp/dec_prez.nsf In December 2021, UOKiK launched its first competition probe into a major online platform, beginning an investigation into whether Apple’s latest privacy update unlawfully favors its own personalized advertising service. UOKiK has also initiated two proceedings concerning the application of competition law to employment-related arrangements. This follows a growing global trend of competition authorities combating no-poach or wage-fixing arrangements. The President of UOKiK has the power to impose significant fines on individuals in management positions at companies that violate the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements and in the case of violations of consumer rights. The maximum fine that can be imposed on a manager is PLN 2 million ($450,000) and, in the case of managers in the financial sector, up to PLN 5 million ($1.12 million). UOKiK imposed such fines on individuals for the first time in 2021 and as of March 2022, they have been imposed in three cases. Two cases concerned horizontal agreements regarding price fixing and market sharing, and one case concerned vertical restraints on resale prices. More decisions imposing fines on individuals can be expected as there are additional pending cases. In October 2020, UOKiK issued a €6.48 billion ($6.8 billion) fine on Gazprom for failing to notify the agency about a joint financing agreement. Article 21 of the Polish Constitution states that “expropriation is admissible only for public purposes and upon equitable compensation.” The Law on Land Management and Expropriation of Real Estate states that property may be expropriated only in accordance with statutory provisions such as construction of public works, national security considerations, or other specified cases of public interest. The government must pay full compensation at market value for expropriated property. Acquiring land for road construction investment, and recently also for the Central Communication Port and the Vistula Spit projects, has been liberalized and simplified to accelerate property acquisition, particularly through a special legislative act. Most acquisitions for road construction are resolved without problems. There have been a few cases, however, in which the inability to reach agreement on remuneration has resulted in disputes. Post is not aware of any recent expropriation actions against U.S. investors, companies, or representatives. Poland’s bankruptcy law has undergone significant change and modernization in recent years. There is now a bankruptcy law and a separate, distinct restructuring law. Bankruptcy in Poland is criminalized if a company’s management does not file a petition to declare bankruptcy when a company becomes illiquid for an extended period of time or if a company ceases to pay its liabilities. https://www.paih.gov.pl/polish_law/bankruptcy_law_and_restructuring_proceedings In order to reduce the risk of overwhelming the bankruptcy courts with an excess of cases resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, changes were introduced in the bankruptcy process for consumers, shifting part of the duties to a trustee. A second significant change was the introduction of simplified restructuring proceedings. During restructuring proceedings, a company appoints an interim supervisor and is guaranteed protection against debt collection while seeking approval for specific restructuring plans from creditors. The simplified proceedings enjoy great support among entities at risk of insolvency. These changes were originally intended to remain in force only until June 30, 2021, later extended until November 30, 2021. The popularity of simplified restructurings among distressed entrepreneurs led the Polish Parliament to retain them for an indefinite period of time. The latest implementation of the amendments to the bankruptcy law brought about other amendments to the proceedings, as follows: The announcement on the opening of the proceedings to approve the arrangement will be made by the arrangement supervisor, not by the debtor himself or herself; The announcement may be made only after the debtor has submitted the list of receivables and the list of disputed receivables; The arrangement supervisor will list the agreements that are essential for the functioning of the debtor’s enterprise so as to prevent its termination; The court’s decision on the cancellation of the effects of making the announcement may be appealed; and The case files will be kept by the arrangement supervisor. These amendments entered into force on December 1, 2021. On December 1, 2021, the National Debtors Register (NDR or Krajowy Rejestr Zadluzonych) began operations. Its purpose is to increase the safety of business transactions through easier verification of contractors, as well as to contribute to the acceleration of bankruptcy and restructuring proceedings. This registry makes proceedings more transparent and easier to follow because all important information regarding the proceedings is available online in one place. In addition to its informational function, the National Debtors Register also serves as a platform for bankruptcy and restructuring proceedings. Applications and letters in proceedings are filed exclusively via the NDR system. Voting on the arrangement and collecting creditors’ votes also takes place via this system, as does the preparation and delivery of court judgments. Certain statutorily defined groups of entities will be exempt from the obligation to file letters in bankruptcy and restructuring proceedings through the NDR. 6. Financial Sector The Polish regulatory system is effective in encouraging and facilitating portfolio investment. Both foreign and domestic investors may place funds in demand and time deposits, stocks, bonds, futures, and derivatives. Poland’s equity markets facilitate the free flow of financial resources. Poland’s stock market is the largest and most developed in Central Europe. In September 2018, it was reclassified as developed market status by FTSE Russell’s country classification report. The stock market’s capitalization generally falls in the range of 30-40 percent, however, in 2021 it reached 50 percent of GDP. Although the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) is itself a publicly traded company with shares listed on its own exchange after its partial privatization in 2010, the state retains a significant percentage of shares which allows it to control the company. In April 2021, the WSE celebrated its 30-year anniversary. Over the three decades, it has become a hub for foreign institutional investors targeting equity investments in the region. It has also become an increasingly significant source of capital. In addition to the equity market, Poland has a wholesale market dedicated to the trading of treasury bills and bonds (Treasury BondSpot Poland). This treasury market is an integral part of the Primary Dealers System organized by the Finance Ministry and part of the pan-European bond platform. Wholesale treasury bonds and bills denominated in zlotys and some securities denominated in euros are traded on the Treasury BondSpot market. Non-government bonds are traded on Catalyst, a WSE managed platform. The capital market is a source of funding for Polish companies. While securities markets continue to play a subordinate role to banks in the provision of finance, the need for medium-term financial support for the modernization of the electricity and gas sectors is likely to lead to an increase in the importance of the corporate bond market. The Polish government acknowledges the capital market’s role in the economy in its development plan. Foreigners may invest in listed Polish shares, but they are subject to some restrictions in buying large packages of shares. The impact of the pandemic was still being felt in 2021, stimulating volatility in financial markets and improving liquidity. The Capital Markets Development Strategy, published in 2018, identifies 20 key barriers and offers 60 solutions. Some key challenges include low levels of savings and investment, insufficient efficiency, transparency, and liquidity of many market segments, and lack of taxation incentives for issuers and investors. The primary aim of the strategy is to improve access of Polish enterprises to financing. The strategy focuses on strengthening trust in the market, improving the protection of individual investors, the stabilization of the regulatory and supervisory environment, and the use of competitive new technologies. The strategy is not a law but sets the direction for further regulatory proposals. The Ministry of Finance assumes in its development directions for 2021-2024, the liquidation of approximately 50 percent of barriers to the development of the financial market identified in the strategy. The development activities pursued in 2021 included the adoption of the WSE Group ESG Strategy 2025 in December 2021. The ESG Strategy sets out the ambitions and objectives in the area of sustainable development for 2022-2025. In 2021, the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) published its first ESG reporting guidelines for listed companies – a handbook developed in collaboration with industry experts. WSE joined a group of approximately 60 stock exchanges around the world that have written guidance on ESG reporting. Poland’s consumer and business environment is increasingly concerned with environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors, although a lack of standardized reporting mechanisms is leaving investors confused about the true extent of their portfolio’s ESG performance. The guidelines provide small and mid-sized companies with a roadmap for measuring their impact on the environment while defining a code of good practice for market leaders. From the international perspective, the guidelines will strengthen the position of the Polish capital market and investor interest in companies listed on the WSE. In December 2020, the WSE partnered with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to bring clarity to ESG reporting by listed companies in Poland and the region of Central and Southeast Europe. Poland is one of the most rigorously supervised capital markets in Europe according to the European Commission. The Employee Capital Plans program (PPK)—which is designed to increase household saving to augment individual incomes in retirement—could provide a boost to Poland’s capital markets and reduce dependence on foreign saving as a source for investment financing. The program has been delayed due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.High-risk venture capital funds are an increasingly important segment of the capital market which is developing fast. The funds remain active and Poland is a leader in this respect in Central and Eastern Europe. 2021 was a breakthrough year for Polish start-up firms and most of these firms have shrugged off the impact of the pandemic or even benefitted from it. The development of Polish start-ups also translates into jobs creation. The 15 companies that raised the most venture capital (VC) funding in 2019–2021 employed more than 1,300 people in 2021. The average share of Polish employees in these companies was 58 percent. Poland had its first two start-ups reach “unicorn” status in 2021, medical appointment service DocPlanner and hair appointment app Booksy. More unicorns are expected to emerge in 2022. VC funding most often goes to companies working in the health innovation domain, according to a report by PFR Ventures and Inovo Venture Partners. In 2021, they accounted for more than 14 percent of all transitions. SaaS (subscription model) remains the most popular business model. VC investment hit a record high in Poland in 2021, increasing 66 percent over the year before to reach almost $900 million. The government’s package of tax relief for IPOs, investment in stock exchange debutants, and VC fund investing became available in January 2022. Poland provides full IMF Article VIII convertibility for current transactions. Banks can and do lend to foreign and domestic companies. Companies can and do borrow abroad and issue commercial paper, but the market is less robust than in Western European countries or the United States. The Act on Investment Funds allows for open-end, closed-end, and mixed investment funds, and the development of securitization instruments in Poland. In general, no special restrictions apply to foreign investors purchasing Polish securities.Credit allocation is on market terms. The government maintains some programs offering below-market rate loans to certain domestic groups, such as farmers and homeowners. Foreign investors and domestic investors have equal access to Polish financial markets. Private Polish investment is usually financed from retained earnings and credits, while foreign investors utilize funds obtained outside of Poland as well as retained earnings. Polish firms raise capital in Poland and abroad.Recent changes in the governance structure of the Polish Financial Supervisory Authority (KNF) are aimed at increasing cross governmental coordination and a better-targeted response in case of financial shocks, while achieving greater institutional effectiveness through enhanced resource allocation. KNF’s supplementary powers have increased, allowing it to authorize the swift acquisition of a failing or likely to fail lender by a stronger financial institution. On July 20, 2021, a draft act was published on the amendment of certain acts in connection with ensuring the development of the financial market and protection of investors in this market. As follows from the justification to the draft act, the act aims to organize and improve the functioning of financial market institutions by eliminating barriers to access to the financial market, improving supervision over the financial market, protecting clients of financial institutions and minority shareholders, and increasing the level of digitization in performance of supervisory duties by KNF. The draft act provides for tightening of many administrative sanctions that may be imposed on entities subject to the supervision of KNF. In practice, this may lead to the imposition of fines in a much higher amount, which in turn will significantly increase the risk related to the conduct of business activity subject to supervision. On July 21, 2021, the Polish Financial Supervision Authority presented its strategy for the years 2021-2025. The document is the overarching plan that defines the mission, vision, and values of the KNF organization. The Polish financial sector is well capitalized and has limited direct exposure to Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The economic fallout from the pandemic has not threatened banking sector stability. Fiscal, monetary, and macroprudential support measures implemented at the beginning of the pandemic have helped the sector emerge from the pandemic-induced recession relatively unscathed. The banking sector plays a dominant role in the financial system, accounting for about 70 percent of financial sector assets. The sector is mostly privately owned, with the state controlling about 40 percent of the banking sector and the biggest insurance company. Poland had 30 locally incorporated commercial banks at the end of 2021, according to KNF. The number of locally-incorporated banks has been declining over the last five years. Poland’s 520 cooperative banks play a secondary role in the financial system but are widespread. The state owns eight banks. Over the last few years, growing capital requirements, lower prospects for profit generation, and uncertainty about legislation addressing foreign currency mortgages has pushed banks towards mergers and acquisitions. KNF welcomes this consolidation process, seeing it as a “natural” way to create an efficient banking sector.The Polish National Bank (NBP) is Poland’s central bank. At the end of 2021, the banking sector was overall well capitalized and solid. Poland’s banking sector meets European Banking Authority regulatory requirements. The share of non-performing loans decreased in 2021 after a sharp rise in 2020. In December 2021, the share of non-performing loans was 5.7 percent of portfolios, an improvement from 6.8 percent a year earlier. Poland’s central bank is willing and able to provide liquidity support to the banking sector, in local and foreign currencies, if needed. Poland is a member of the EU, but not of the euro currency area or banking union. As a result, it shares a single market and many harmonized economic rules with the EU but retains its own currency and monetary policy. The banking sector is liquid, remains profitable, and major banks are well capitalized, although disparities exist among banks. Banks remained under pressure in 2020 and the first half of 2021 due to low interest rates, the issue of conversion of Swiss francs mortgage portfolios into Polish zlotys, and a special levy on financial institutions (0.44 percent of the value of assets excluding equity and Polish sovereign bonds). Banks managed to restore their profits in 2021, but the low profitability of the banking sector remains a challenge, especially for smaller banks, although it does not generate risks to the system’s stability. Legal risks for foreign exchange mortgages issued in primarily Swiss francs during 2006-2008, remain a major source of risk in the banking system. The probability of the most costly scenarios unfolding for banks, however, has diminished. In a process begun by the government and shaped by court decisions handed down by the European Court of Justice and Poland’s Supreme Court, since 2019, Polish citizens have been able to convert Swiss franc denominated loan principal into local currency while continuing to pay interest on the terms of the original loan agreement (Swiss franc LIBOR) with the banks absorbing any foreign exchange loss. About one-third of housing loans are still in foreign currency, particularly Swiss francs, according to the NBP. This is down from 62 percent at the start of 2011, but the fall in the value of the zloty has made such loans costly for borrowers and a risk to commercial banks’ asset quality. The financial regulator has restricted the availability of loans in euros or Swiss francs in order to minimize the banking system’s exposure to exchange risk resulting from fluctuations. Only individuals who earn salaries denominated in these currencies continue to enjoy easy access to loans in foreign currencies. Since 2015, the Polish government established an active campaign aiming to increase the market share of national financial institutions. Since 2017, Polish investors’ share in the banking sector’s total assets exceeds the foreign share in the sector. The state controls around 40 percent of total assets, including the two largest banks in Poland. These two lenders control about one third of the market. Rating agencies warn that an increasing state share in the banking sector might impact competitiveness and profits in the entire financial sector. There is concern that lending decisions at state-owned banks could come under political pressure. Nevertheless, Poland’s strong fundamentals and the size of its internal market mean that many foreign banks will want to retain their positions. Poland has well developed payments systems, integrated with those of the EU and overseen by the NBP. Apple Pay and Google Pay have launched operations in Poland. In 2020, NBP had relationships with 27 commercial and central banks and was not concerned about losing any of them. Poland does not have a sovereign wealth fund sensu stricto. However, the Polish Development Fund (PFR) is often referred to as Poland’s Wealth Fund. PFR is an umbrella organization pooling resources of several governmental agencies and departments, including EU funds. A strategy for PFR was adopted in September 2016 registered in February 2017. PFR supports the implementation of the Responsible Development Strategy. PFR operates as a group of state-owned banks and insurers, investment bodies, and promotion agencies. The group implements programs enhancing long-term investment and economic potential and supporting equal opportunities as well as environmental protection. The budget of PFR initially reached PLN 14 billion ($3.1 billion), which managers estimate is sufficient to raise capital worth PLN 90-100 billion ($20-22 billion). Various actors within the organization can invest through acquisition of shares, through direct financing, seed funding, and co-financing venture capital. Depending on the instruments, PFR expects different rates of return. While supportive of overseas expansion by Polish companies, the PFR’s mission is domestic. PFR directs the strategic vision for the corporate group which includes four distinct subsidiaries: PFR Ventures – the largest fund of funds (FoF) in the CEE region offering repayable financing to innovative SMEs through selected financial intermediaries such as venture capital funds or business angels; PFR Portal PPK – a company dedicated to supervising the Employee Capital Plans (PPK), which is a common and voluntary long-term saving system for employees in Poland, developed and co-financed by employers and the state; PFR TFI – a company focused on incepting and managing closed-end investment funds oriented towards alternative assets (e.g., real estate, infrastructure projects, PE or VC) as well as managing a part of the assets raised in the PPK program; PFR Nieruchomosci – the real estate arm of the group which aims to improve the potential of the national housing market by implementing investments of significant importance to local communities. PFR’s core function was initially focused on fostering private sector development by direct (equity) and indirect investment across a wide range of sectors, including technology, infrastructure, and energy. Over the years, the group’s mandate has broadened and now includes the following areas: Bridging infrastructure gaps in the Polish economy (including transport, municipal, and digital infrastructure); Venture capital market development (direct investment and via existing private sector venture capital funds); Facilitating the government’s pension reform by managing a long-term pension savings scheme; and Fostering investment in affordable housing and developing the housing rental market. PFR group has been used by the government to implement several unique policy projects, including emergency support to private sector entities, promotion of the private pension savings scheme and, more recently, the provision of sizable financial support (PLN 100 billion or $22 billion) to the private sector amid the COVID-19 pandemic. PFR ‘s assets currently represent about 3.2 percent of Poland’s GDP. ESG (environmental, social, and corporate governance) reporting is becoming a standard for more and more organizations. To meet the needs of entrepreneurs, the PFR team has prepared a special list of start-ups and tools supporting ESG reporting, which is aimed at facilitating the adaptation of companies to the new standards. In March 2022, the European Investment Bank and PFR signed an agreement on strategic cooperation. The cooperation agreement concerns the co-financing of investments mainly in the areas of sustainable economy development, environmental protection, climate change mitigation and adaptation, improvement of energy efficiency and increasing the use of renewable energy sources. In the period 2022-2025, financing the energy transformation will be one of the three basic pillars of the Polish Development Fund’s activity. The main emphasis will be placed on the development of infrastructure contributing to increasing energy security and reducing the emission intensity of the Polish energy sector, both at the national and local levels. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) exist mainly in the defense, energy, transport, banking, and insurance sectors. The main Warsaw stock index (WIG) is dominated by state-controlled companies. The government intends to keep majority share ownership and/or state-control of economically and strategically important firms and is expanding the role of the state in the economy, particularly in the banking, energy, foodstuffs, and media sectors. Some U.S. investors have expressed concern that the government favors SOEs by offering loans from the national budget as a capital injection and unfairly favoring SOEs in investment disputes. Since Poland’s EU accession, government activity favoring state-owned firms has received careful scrutiny from Brussels. Since the Law and Justice (PiS) government came to power in 2015, there has been a considerable increase in turnover in managerial positions of state-owned companies (although this has also occurred in previous changes of government, but to a lesser degree) and increased focus on building national champions in strategic industries to be able to compete internationally. There have also been cases of takeovers of foreign private companies by state-controlled companies the viability of which has raised doubts. SOEs are governed by a board of directors and most pay an annual dividend to the government, as well as prepare and disclose annual reports. A list of companies classified as “important for the economy” is at this link: https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/wykaz-spolek Among them are companies of “strategic importance” whose shares cannot be sold, including: Grupa Azoty S.A., Grupa LOTOS S.A., KGHM Polska Miedz S.A., Energa S.A., and the Central Communication Port. The government sees SOEs as drivers and leaders of its innovation policy agenda. For example, several energy SOEs established a company to develop electro mobility. The performance of SOEs has remained strong overall and broadly similar to that of private companies. International evidence suggests, however, that a dominant role of SOEs can pose fiscal, financial, and macro-stability risks. As of June, 2021 there were 349 companies in partnership with state authorities. Among them there are companies under bankruptcy proceedings and in liquidation and in which the State Treasury held residual shares. According to the Minister of State Assets, companies controlled by the state create 15 percent of GDP. Here is a link to the list of companies, including under the control of which ministry they fall: http://nadzor.kprm.gov.pl/spolki-z-udzialem-skarbu-panstwa . The Ministry of State Assets, established after the October 2019 post-election cabinet reshuffle, has control over almost 180 enterprises. Their aggregate value reaches several dozens of billions of Polish zlotys. Among these companies are the largest chemical, energy, and mining groups; firms in the banking and insurance sectors; and transport companies. This list does not include state-controlled public media, which are under the supervision of the Ministry of Culture, or the State Securities Printing Company (PWPW) supervised by the Interior Ministry. Supervision over defense industry companies has been shifted from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of State Assets. The same standards are generally applied to private and public companies with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations such as licenses and supplies. Government officials occasionally exercise discretionary authority to assist SOEs. In general, SOEs are expected to pay their own way, finance their operations, and fund further expansion through profits generated from their own operations. On February 21, 2019, an amendment to the Act on the Principles of Management of State-Owned Property was adopted, which provides for the establishment of a new public special-purpose fund – the Capital Investment Fund. The fund is a source of financing for the purchase and subscription of shares in companies. The fund is managed by the Prime Minister’s office and financed by dividends from state-controlled companies. Starting October 12, 2022, the Act amending the Commercial Companies Code and certain other acts will enter into force. It introduces the so-called “holding law” developed by the Commission for Owner Oversight Reform with the Ministry of State Assets. It lays down the principles of how a parent company may instruct its subsidiaries and stipulates the parent company’s liability and the principles of creditor, officer, and minority shareholder protections. This amendment constitutes an important change for many companies operating in Poland including foreign parent companies. The new regulations, which have encountered some controversy, will apply only to capital companies. The legislation distinguishes between the separate activities of holding companies and of groups of companies. Protections have been extended to minority shareholders and creditors of subsidiaries, identifying threats that may result from binding instructions of the parent company for these groups. The PiS-led government has increased control over Poland’s banking and energy sectors. Proposed legislation to “deconcentrate” and “repolonize” Poland’s media landscape, including through the possible forced sale of existing investments, has met with domestic and international protest. Critical observers allege that PiS and its allies are running a pressure campaign against foreign and independent media outlets aimed at destabilizing and undermining their businesses. These efforts include blocking mergers through antimonopoly decisions, changes to licensing requirements, and the proposed new advertising tax. Increasing government control over state regulatory bodies, advertising agencies and infrastructure such as printing presses and newsstands, are other possible avenues. Since 2015, state institutions and state-owned and controlled companies have ceased to subscribe to or place advertising in independent media, cutting off an important source of funding for those media companies. At the same time, public media has received generous support from the state budget. In December 2020, state-controlled energy firm PKN Orlen, headed by PiS appointees, acquired control of Polska Press in a deal that gives the governing party indirect control over 20 of Poland’s 24 regional newspapers. Because this acquisition was achieved without legislative changes, it has not provoked diplomatic repercussions with other EU member states or a head-on collision with Brussels over the rule of law. Having successfully taken over a foreign-owned media company with this model, there are concerns PKN Orlen will continue to be used for capturing independent media not supportive of the government. In Poland, the same rules apply to SOEs and publicly-listed companies unless statutes provide otherwise. The state exercises its influence through its rights as a shareholder in proportion to the number of voting shares it holds (or through shareholder proxies). In some cases, an SOE is afforded special rights as specified in the company’s articles, and in compliance with Polish and EU laws. In some non-strategic companies, the state exercises special rights as a result of its majority ownership but not as a result of any specific strategic interest. Despite some of these specific rights, the state’s aim is to create long-term value for shareholders of its listed companies by adhering to the OECD’s SOE Guidelines. State representatives who sit on supervisory boards must comply with the Commercial Companies Code and are expected to act in the best interests of the company and its shareholders. The European Commission noted that “Polska Fundacja Narodowa” (an organization established to promote Polish culture worldwide and funded by Polish SOEs) was involved in the organization and financing of a campaign supporting the controversial judiciary changes by the government. The Commission stated this was broadly against OECD recommendations on SOE involvement in financing political activities. SOE employees can designate two fifths of the SOE’s Supervisory Board’s members. In addition, according to Poland’s privatization law, in wholly state-owned enterprises with more than 500 employees, the employees are allowed to elect one member of the management board. SOEs are subject to a series of additional disclosure requirements above those set forth in the Company Law. The supervising ministry prepares specific guidelines on annual financial reporting to explain and clarify these requirements. SOEs must prepare detailed reports on management board activity, plus a report on the previous financial year’s activity, and a report on the result of the examination of financial reports. In practice, detailed reporting data for non-listed SOEs is not easily accessible. State representatives to supervisory boards must go through examinations to be able to apply for a board position. Many major state-controlled companies are listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange and are subject to the “Code of Best Practice for WSE Listed Companies.” On September 30, 2015, the Act on Control of Certain Investments entered into force. The law creates mechanisms to protect against hostile takeovers of companies operating in strategic sectors (gas, power generation, chemical, copper mining, petrochemical and telecoms) of the Polish economy (see Section 2 on Investment Screening), most of which are SOEs or state controlled. In 2020, the government amended the legislation preventing hostile take overs. The amendments will be in force for 24 months. They are a part of the pandemic-related measures introduced by the Polish government. The SOE governance law of 2017 (with subsequent amendments) is being implemented gradually. The framework formally keeps the oversight of SOEs centralized. The Ministry of State Assets exercises ownership functions for the majority of SOEs. A few sector-specific ministries (e.g., Culture and Infrastructure) also exercise ownership for SOEs with public policy objectives. The Prime Minister’s office oversees development agencies such as the Polish Development Fund, the Industry Development Agency, and ElectroMobility Poland S.A. The Polish government has completed the privatization of most of the SOEs it deems not to be of national strategic importance. With few exceptions, the Polish government has invited foreign investors to participate in major privatization projects. In general, privatization bidding criteria have been clear and the process transparent. The majority of SOEs classified as “economically important” or “strategically important” are in the energy, mining, media, telecommunications, and financial sectors. The government intends to keep majority share ownership of these firms, or to sell tranches of shares in a manner that maintains state control. The government is currently focused on consolidating and improving the efficiency of the remaining SOEs. 10. Political and Security Environment Poland is a politically stable country. Constitutional transfers of power are orderly. The last presidential elections took place in June 2020 and parliamentary elections took place in October 2019; observers considered both elections free and fair. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which conducted the election observation during the June 2020 presidential elections, found the presidential elections were administered professionally, despite legal uncertainty during the electoral process due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic. Prime Minister Morawiecki’s government was re-appointed in November 2019. Local elections took place in October 2018. Elections to the European Parliament took place in May 2019. The next parliamentary elections are scheduled for the fall of 2023. There have been no confirmed incidents of politically motivated violence toward foreign investment projects in recent years. The February 24, 2022, Russian invasion of Ukraine is likely to have major consequences for Poland. Poland, a leading NATO member, has become a special hub for transporting military equipment to the Ukrainian armed forces. Poland is dealing with a massive inflow of refugees, which could impact domestic political stability. Portugal Executive Summary The Portuguese economy bounced back from the pandemic, expanding by 4.9 percent in 2021 after an 8.4 percent contraction the prior year, benefitting from EU fiscal and monetary stimulus and a very high vaccination rate. The labor market has shown remarkable resiliency, with unemployment at 6 percent in January 2022, down from 7 percent a year before. GDP is expected to grow again by an estimated 5 percent in 2022, despite the economic shocks from the Russian war against Ukraine The country will have a chance to boost its economic recovery, deploying more than €16 billion in EU grants and credit expected to fund state coffers between 2021 and 2026. It is expected these funds will be allocated in support of energy and digital transitions. Increased flows of fossil fuels contributed to a 40 percent jump in trade in goods and services between Portugal and the United States to a record $10 billion in 2021. However, bilateral trade remains lop-sided with a large U.S. trade deficit of around $2.2 billion. Many U.S. companies nvest in business/service delivery centers in Portugal, taking advantage of Portugal’s relatively low-cost, talented, and multilingual labor force. The country continues to push to improve market attractiveness. Portugal’s export and FDI promotion agency (AICEP) celebrated a record €2.7 billion of contracted FDI in 2021, double that locked-in during the last (2019) high mark. Portugal’s metalworking, auto component, and machinery industries predominate the recent FDI trends, accounting for about 30 percent of the contracted flows, according to the Government . Portugal’s tech startup scene is thriving, featuring at least six fast-growing firms with ‘Portuguese-U.S. DNA’ that achieved ‘unicorn’ status with valuations above $1 billion– Outsystems, Talkdesk, Feedzai, Remote, SwordHealth and Anchorage. These high-tempo firms are flourishing after tapping into opportunities in the U.S. startup ecosystem that provides not only funding but also knowhow, networks, and customers, ultimately producing jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. Established in 2012, Portugal’s “Golden Visa” program gives fast-track residence permits to foreign investors who meet certain conditions, such as making substantial capital transfers or certain real estate acquisitions. Between 2012 and February 2022, Portugal issued 10,442 ‘Golden Visas’, representing €6.2 billion of investment, of which more than €5.6 billion went to real estate. Chinese nationals have been the main beneficiaries of the special program for residence permits, accounting for almost 50 percent (5,066) of the 10,442 total, followed by Brazilians with 1,072. Russian citizens were assigned 431 Golden visas since 2012. As of January 2022, Portugal modified the “Golden Visa” program to restrict the purchase of real estate to regions outside urban hotspots such as Lisbon, Porto, and overbuilt areas of the popular Algarve with the aim of boosting rural investment. Loopholes in the program appear to be enabling urban purchases in any event. On March 28, the European Commission urged member states to immediately repeal existing investor citizenship schemes, which the Commission claimed pose inherent risks. In terms of risks, the independent Portuguese data protection agency (CNPD) has targeted U.S. companies by issuing a succession of judicial opinions warning against the use of U.S. technology firms – including Cloudflare, Respondus, and Amazon Web Services (AWS), arguing that as they are headquartered in the United States and therefore subject to U.S. law, by definition, they have inadequate data privacy standards. CNPD has not found any specific wrongdoing by any U.S. technology firm but bases its rulings on the grounds that a target company is headquartered in the United States. On March 25, President Biden and EU Commission President von der Leyen announced a deal in principle on the Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework, which will supplement the U.S.-EU Privacy Shield Framework (Privacy Shield). However, it remains to be seen how this new Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework will affect EU-U.S. data flows in Portugal. Portugal ranks second highest in terms of PRC investments in Europe (in relation to GDP). These investments are predominantly in the premier Portuguese companies, which the PRC leverages to reach other markets in Europe, Latin America, and Africa. Portugal’s investment screening regime was established in 2014, but the Government of Portugal has never strictly enforced it. Despite the security risks, the Government continues to allow investments by and collaboration with untrusted vendors in 5G and Artificial Intelligence (AI). Huawei is using its educational and gender-equity programs to increase influence with high achieving students and access to key technology policymakers in the Government and private sector. The PRC is also attempting to gain a foothold in Portuguese 5G, AI, solar, and related infrastructure industries. Portugal’s public debt, estimated at 127percent of GDP at the end of 2021, remains an issue, particularly if there is a shift in the benign monetary and sovereign risk sentiment that enabled Lisbon to enjoy issuing debt at record low prices in the last few years. The pace of corporate and household indebtedness has also increased. Portugal’s primary trading partners are Spain, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Portugal suffers an acute brain drain, with high emigration rates among professionals leaving for higher paying careers in Switzerland, France, the UK, and elsewhere. Beyond Europe, Portugal maintains significant links with Portuguese-speaking countries including Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Guinea-Bissau. Portugal has one of the lowest fertility rates in Europe and net immigration (from Ukraine, Brazil, and other Portuguese-speaking countries) has prevented a fall in population. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will impact the Portuguese growth curve. Except for grain imports from Ukraine, energy intermediate goods, and liquified natural gas (LNG) imports from Russia, the country’s trade and investment relationship with both countries is limited. In LNG specifically, Russia accounted for 15 percent of imports, well below the 45 percent EU average. However, Portugal is a net importer of energy products, fully dependent on outside supply of crude and refined fossil fuels. It also imports natural gas for energy and generation, which acts as a key complement to the fast-growing renewable energy footprint of its solar, wind and hydro power assets. The country’s commercial balance will be negatively impacted by a long period of high global energy prices. Portugal’s low installed solar capacity of about 7 percent of the energy mix is expected to reach 8 GW of solar capacity, or 27 percent of the mix by 2030. The Government is promoting significant investments in wind and solar energy development to meet its target of 47 percent energy from renewables by 2030. By 2021 the country reduced its external energy dependence by 9 percentage points (from 2005), seeking greater supply security by increasing domestic energy generation and reducing the consumption of primary energy by 17 percent. The Government has also talked about plans to launch a 2-5 GW offshore wind auction this summer (without providing details), in hopes of speeding up the deployment of large-scale offshore wind capacity to reduce energy dependence on Russia. Portugal’s path to a carbon neutral economy includes incentives for energy efficiency; promoting diversification of energy sources; increasing electrification; reinforcing and modernizing infrastructure; developing more interconnections; market stability for investors; reconfiguring and digitalizing the market; incentives for research and innovation, promoting low-carbon processes, products and services; and improving energy services and information for consumers. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 32 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 31 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 2.54 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 21,790 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Portugal (GOP) actively pursues and protects foreign investment, seeing it as a driver of economic growth, with a very positive attitude toward foreign direct investment (FDI). Portuguese law is based on non-discrimination principles, meaning foreign and domestic investors are subject to the same rules. Foreign investment is not subject to any special registration or notification to any authority, with exception of a few specific activities. The Portuguese Agency for Foreign Investment and Commerce (AICEP) is the lead for promotion of trade and investment. AICEP is responsible for attracting FDI, global promotion of Portuguese brands, and export of goods and services. It is the primary point of contact for investors with projects over € 25 million or companies with a consolidated turnover of more than € 75 million. For foreign investments not meeting these thresholds, AICEP will make a preliminary analysis and direct the investor to assistance agencies such as the Institute of Support to Small- and Medium- Sized Enterprises and Innovation (IAPMEI), a public agency within the Ministry of Economy that provides technical support, or to AICEP Capital Global, which offers technology transfer, incubator programs, and venture capital support. AICEP does not favor specific sectors for investment promotion. It does, however, provide a “Prominent Clusters” guide on its website, where it advocates investment in Portuguese companies by sector. Additionally, Portugal has introduced the website Simplex, designed to help navigate starting a business. The Portuguese government maintains regular contact with investors through the Confederation of Portuguese Business (CIP), the Portuguese Commerce and Services Confederation (CCP), the Portuguese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCIP) and other industry associations. There are no legal restrictions in Portugal on foreign investment. To establish a new business, foreign investors must follow the same rules as domestic investors, including mandatory registration and compliance with regulatory obligations for specific activities. There are no nationality requirements and no limitations on the repatriation of profits or dividends. Non-resident shareholders must obtain a Portuguese taxpayer number for tax purposes. EU residents may obtain this number directly from the tax administration (in person or by means of an appointed proxy); non-EU residents must appoint a Portuguese resident representative to handle matters with tax authorities. Portugal enacted a national security investment review framework in 2014 which gave the Council of Ministers authority to block specific foreign investment transactions that would compromise national security. Reviews can be triggered on national security grounds in strategic industries like energy, transportation, and communication. Investment reviews can be conducted in cases where the purchaser acquiring control is an individual or entity not registered in an EU member state. In such instances, the review process is overseen by the relevant Portuguese Ministry based on the assets in question. Portugal has yet to activate its investment screening mechanism. Portuguese government approval is required in the following sensitive sectors: defense, water management, public telecommunications, railways, maritime transportation, and air transport. Any economic activity that involves the exercise of public authority also requires government approval; private sector companies can operate in these areas only through a concession contract. Portugal additionally limits foreign investment with respect to the production, transmission, and distribution of electricity, the production of gas, the pipeline transportation of fuels, wholesale services of electricity, retailing services of electricity and non-bottled gas, and services incidental to electricity and natural gas distribution. Concessions in the electricity and gas sectors are assigned only to companies with headquarters and effective management in Portugal. Investors wishing to establish new credit institutions or finance companies, acquire a controlling interest in such financial firms, and/or establish a subsidiary must have authorization from the Bank of Portugal (for EU firms) or the Ministry of Finance (for non-EU firms). Non-EU insurance companies seeking to establish presence in Portugal must post a special deposit and financial guarantee and must have been authorized for such activity by the Ministry of Finance for at least five years. In the past five years, the Government has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews (IPRs) through a multilateral organization such as the OECD, WTO, UNCTAD, or UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights. To combat the perception of a cumbersome regulatory environment, the government has created ‘cutting red tape’ measures described in the website Simplex (simplex.gov.pt) that details steps taken since 2005 to reduce bureaucracy, and the Empresa na Hora (“Business in an Hour”) program that facilitates company incorporations by citizens and non-citizens. In 2007, the government established AICEP, a promotion agency for investment and foreign trade that also manages industrial parks and provides business location solutions for investors through its subsidiary AICEP Global Parques. Established in 2012, Portugal’s “Golden Visa” program gives fast-track residence permits to foreign investors who meet certain conditions, such as making substantial capital transfers, creating and certain real estate acquisitions. Between 2012 and February 2022, Portugal issued 10,442 ‘Golden Visas’, representing €6.2 billion of investment, of which more than €5.6 billion went to real estate. Chinese nationals have been the main beneficiaries of the special program for residence permits, accounting for almost 50 percent (5,066) of the 10,442 total, followed by Brazilians with 1,072. Russian citizens were assigned 431 Golden visas since 2012. As of January 2022, Portugal modified the “Golden Visa” program to restrict the purchase of real estate to regions outside urban hotspots such as Lisbon, Porto and overbuilt areas of the popular Algarve with the aim of boosting rural investment. Loopholes in the program appear to be enabling urban purchases in any event. On March 28, the European Commission urged member states to immediately repeal existing investor citizenship schemes, which the Commission claimed pose inherent risks. Other measures implemented to help attract foreign investment include the easing of some labor regulations to increase workplace flexibility and EU-funded programs. Portuguese citizens can alternatively register a business online through the “Citizen’s Portal” available at Portal do Cidadão . Companies must also register with the Directorate General for Economic Activity (DGAE), the Tax Authority (AT), and with the Social Security administration. The government’s standard for online business registration is a two to three day turnaround, but the online registration process can take as little as one day. Portugal defines an enterprise as micro-, small-, and medium-sized based on its headcount, annual turnover, or the size of its balance sheet. To qualify as a micro-enterprise, a company must have fewer than 10 employees and no more than €2 million in revenues or €2 million in assets. Small enterprises must have fewer than 50 employees and no more than €10 million in revenues or €10 million in assets. Medium-sized enterprises must have fewer than 250 employees and no more than €50 million in revenues or €43 million in assets. The Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprise (SME) Support Institute ( IAPMEI ) offers financing, training, and other services for SMEs based in Portugal. More information on laws, procedures, registration requirements, and investment incentives for foreign investors in Portugal is available at AICEP’s website . The Portuguese government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. On the contrary, it promotes outward investment through AICEP’s customer managers, export stores and its external commercial network that, in cooperation with the diplomatic and consular network, are operating in about 80 markets. AICEP provides support and advisory services on the best way of approaching foreign markets, identifying international business opportunities for Portuguese companies, particularly SMEs. 3. Legal Regime The government of Portugal employs transparent policies and effective laws to foster competition, and the legal system welcomes FDI on a non-discriminatory basis, establishing clear rules of the game. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are consistent with international norms. Public finances and debt obligations are transparent, with data regularly published by the Bank of Portugal, the IGCP debt management agency, and the Ministry of Finance. Regulations drafted by ministries or agencies must be approved by Parliament and, in some cases, by European authorities. All proposed regulations are subject to a 20-to-30-day public consultation period during which the proposed measure is published on the relevant ministry or regulator’s website. Only after ministries or regulatory agencies have conducted an impact assessment of the proposed regulation can the text be enacted and published. The process can be monitored and consulted at the official websites of Parliament and the Official Portuguese Republic Journal. Ministries or regulatory agencies report the results of the consultations through a consolidated response published on the website of the relevant ministry or regulator. Rule-making and regulatory authorities exist across sectors including energy, telecommunications, securities markets, financial, and health. Regulations are enforced at the local level through district courts, on the national level through the Court of Auditors, and at the supra-national level through EU mechanisms including the European Court of Justice, the European Commission, and the European Central Bank. The OECD, the European Commission, and the IMF also publish key regulatory actions and analysis. UTAO , the Parliamentary Technical Budget Support Unit, is a nonpartisan body composed of economic and legal experts that support parliamentary budget deliberations by providing the Budget Committee with quality analytical reports on the executive’s budget proposals. In addition, the Portuguese Public Finance Council conducts an independent assessment of the consistency, compliance with stated objectives, and sustainability of public finances, while promoting fiscal transparency. The legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. Since 2005, all listed companies must comply with International Financial Reporting Standards as adopted by the European Union (“IFRS”), which closely parallels the U.S. GAAP-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Portugal’s Competition Authority enforces adherence to domestic competition and public procurement rules. The European Commission further ensures adhesion to EU administrative processes among its member states. Public finances are generally deemed transparent, closely scrutinized by Eurostat and monitored by an independent technical budget support unit, UTAO, and the Supreme Audit Institution ‘Tribunal de Contas.’ Over the last decades, Portugal has also consolidated within the State accounts many state-owned enterprises, making budget analysis more accurate. Portugal has been a member of the EU since 1986, a member of the Schengen area since 1995, and joined the Eurozone in 1999. With the Treaty of Lisbon’s entry into force in 2009, trade policy and rules on foreign direct investment became mostly EU competencies, as part of the bloc’s common commercial policy. The European Central Bank is the central bank for the euro and determines monetary policy for the 19 Eurozone member states, including Portugal. Portugal complies with EU directives regarding equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors. Portugal has been a member of the World Trade Organization since 1995. The Portuguese legal system is a civil law system, based on Roman law. The hierarchy among various sources of law is as follows: (i) Constitutional laws and amendments; (ii) the rules and principles of general or common international law and international agreements; (iii) ordinary laws enacted by Parliament; (iv) instruments having an effective equivalent to that of laws, including approved international conventions or decisions of the Constitutional Court; and (v) regulations used to supplement and implement laws. The country’s Commercial Company Law and Civil Code define Portugal’s legal treatment of corporations and contracts. Portugal has a Supreme Court and specialized family courts, labor courts, commercial courts, maritime courts, intellectual property courts, and competition courts. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable, and are adjudicated in national Appellate Courts, with the possibility to appeal to the European Court of Justice. The judicial system is independent of the executive branch and the judicial process procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable. The Bank of Portugal defines FDI as “an act or contract that obtains or increases enduring economic links with an existing Portuguese institution or one to be formed.” A non-resident who invests in at least 10 percent of a resident company’s equity and participates in the company’s decision-making is considered a foreign direct investor. Current information on laws, procedures, registration requirements, and investment incentives for foreign investors in Portugal is available at AICEP’s website . The domestic agency that reviews transactions for competition-related concerns is the Portuguese Competition Authority and the international agency is the European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition. Portuguese law specifically prohibits collusion between companies to fix prices, limit supplies, share markets or sources of supply, discriminate in transactions, or force unrelated obligations on other parties. Similar prohibitions apply to any company or group with a dominant market position. The law also requires prior government notification of mergers or acquisitions that would give a company more than 30 percent market share in a sector, or mergers or acquisitions among entities whose total sales exceeded €150 million during the preceding financial year. The Competition Authority has 60 days to determine if the merger or acquisition can proceed. The European Commission may claim authority on cross-border competition issues or those involving entities large enough to have a significant EU market share. Under Portugal’s Expropriation Code, the government may expropriate property and its associated rights if it is deemed to support the public interest, and upon payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. The code outlines criteria for calculating fair compensation based on market values. The decision to expropriate as well as the fairness of compensation can be challenged in national courts. Portugal’s Insolvency and Corporate Recovery Code defines insolvency as a debtor’s inability to meet commitments as they fall due. Corporations are also considered insolvent when their liabilities clearly exceed their assets. A debtor, creditor or any person responsible for the debtor’s liabilities can initiate insolvency proceedings in a commercial court. The court assumes the key role of ensuring compliance with legal rules governing insolvency proceedings, with particular responsibility for ruling on the legality of insolvency and payment plans approved by creditors. After declaration of insolvency, creditors may submit their claims to the court-appointed insolvency administrator for a specific term set for this purpose, typically up to 30 days. Creditors must submit details regarding the amount, maturity, guarantees, and nature of their claims. Claims are ranked as follows: (i) claims over the insolvent’s estate, i.e. court fees related to insolvency proceedings; (ii) secured claims; (iii) privileged claims; (iv) common, unsecured claims; and (v) subordinated claims, including those of shareholders. 6. Financial Sector The Portuguese stock exchange is managed by Euronext Lisbon, part of the NYSE Euronext Group, which grants listed companies access to a global and diversified pool of investors. The Portuguese Stock Index-20 (PSI20) is Portugal’s benchmark index representing the largest (only 19, not 20) and most liquid companies listed on the exchange. The Portuguese stock exchange offers a diverse product portfolio: shares, funds, exchange traded funds, bonds, and structured products, including warrants and futures. The Portuguese Securities Market Commission (CMVM) supervises and regulates securities markets, and is a member of the Committee of European Securities Regulators and the International Organization of Securities Commissions. Additional information on CMVM can be found here: http://www.cmvm.pt/en/Pages/homepage.aspx . Portugal respects IMF Article VIII by refraining from placing restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors are eligible for local market financing. Private sector companies have access to a variety of credit instruments, including bonds. Portugal has 145 credit institutions, of which 61 are banks. Portugal’s banking assets totaled €431 billion at the end of June 2021. Portuguese banks’ non-performing loan portfolios improved markedly since the global financial crisis. Total loans stood at around €244 billion in mid-2021, 4.3 percent of which constitute non-performing loans, above the Eurozone average of around 2.2 percent. Banks’ return on equity was 4.6 percent in the first half of 2021 versus 0.3 percent the year before. In terms of capital buffers, the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio stabilized at 15.3 percent as of June 2021. Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in Portugal. In terms of decision-making policy, a general ‘four-eyes policy,’ with two individuals approving actions, must be in place at all banks and branches operating in the country, irrespective of whether they qualify as international subsidiaries of foreign banks or local banks. Foreign branches operating in Portugal are required to have such decision-making powers that enable them to operate in the country, but this requirement generally does not prevent them from having internal control and rules governing risk exposure and decision-making processes, as customary in international financial groups. No restrictions exist on a foreigners’ ability to establish a bank account and both residents and non-residents may hold bank accounts in any currency. However, any transfers of €10,000 or more must be declared to Portuguese customs authorities. See more at: https://www.bportugal.pt/ . The Ministry of Labor, Solidarity, and Social Security manages Portugal’s Social Security Financial Stabilization Fund (FEFSS), with total assets of around €22 billion. It is not a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) and does not subscribe to the voluntary code of good practices (Santiago Principles), or participate in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on SWFs. Among other restrictions, Portuguese law requires that at least 25 percent of the fund’s assets be invested in Portuguese public debt, and limits FEFSS investment in equity instruments to that of EU or OECD members. FEFSS acts as a passive investor and does not take an active role in the management of portfolio companies. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are currently over 40 major state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating in Portugal in the banking, health care, transportation, water, and agriculture sectors. Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD) has revenues greater than one percent of GDP. The bank has the largest market share in customer deposits, commercial loans, mortgages, and many other banking services in the Portuguese market. Parpublica is a government holding company for several smaller SOEs, providing audits and reports on these. More information can be found at: http://www.parpublica.pt/ . The activities and accounts of Parpublica are fully disclosed in budget documents and audited annual reports. In addition, the Ministry of Finance publishes an annual report on SOEs through a specialized monitoring unit (UTAM) that presents annual performance data by company and sector: In 2020, Parpublica managed assets totaling €11 billion, employs 4,400 workers and the net income of the holding was €80 million. When SOEs are wholly owned, the government appoints the board, although when SOEs are majority-owned the board of executives and non-executives’ nomination depends on the negotiations between government and the remaining shareholders, and in some cases on negotiations with EU authorities as well. According to Law No. 133/2013, SOEs must compete under the same terms and conditions as private enterprises, subject to Portuguese and EU competition laws. Still, SOEs often receive preferential financing terms from private banks. In 2008 Portugal’s Council of Ministers approved resolution no. 49/2007, which defined the Principles of Good Governance for SOEs according to OECD guidelines. The resolution requires SOEs to have a governance model that ensures the segregation of executive management and supervisory roles, to have their accounts audited by independent entities, to observe the same standards as those for companies publicly listed on stock markets, and to establish an ethics code for employees, customers, suppliers, and the public. The resolution also requires the Ministry of Finance’s Directorate General of the Treasury and Finances to publish annual reports on SOEs’ compliance with the Principles of Good Governance. Credit and equity analysts generally tend to criticize SOEs’ over-indebtedness and inefficiency, rather than any poor governance or ties to government. Portugal launched an aggressive privatization program in 2011 as part of its EU-IMF-ECB bailout, including SOEs in the air transportation, land transportation, energy, communications, and insurance sectors. Foreign companies have been among the most successful bidders in these privatizations since the program’s inception. The bidding process was public, transparent, and non-discriminatory to foreign investors. On July 2, 2020, the government of Portugal nationalized a 71.7 percent stake in energy company Efacec, controlled by Angola’s Isabel dos Santos, given its strategic importance for the economy, in a move aimed at ending legal uncertainty and facilitating the sale of her shares. On February 24, 2022, the government approved the sale of Efacec to Portuguese group DST, which pledged to inject €81 million to strengthen the firm’s capital structure. In December 2021, the European Commission approved a €2.55 billion state aid package for Portugal’s State-owned air carrier TAP. In exchange, the airline is executing a restructuring plan, reducing its workforce, and implementing pay cuts. It also pledged to reduce its fleet by twelve aircraft to 88 by the end of 2021. The plan expects TAP to produce €1.3 billion in operating cost reductions per year by 2025 and return TAP Portugal to profitability by 2023-2024. Infrastructure Minister Pedro Nuno Santos has flagged that the Government will look for private investors and there already several interested parties. 10. Political and Security Environment Since the 1974 Carnation Revolution, Portugal has had a long history of peaceful social protest. Portugal experienced its largest political rally since its revolution in response to proposed budgetary measures in 2012. Public workers, including nurses, doctors, teachers, aviation professionals, and public transportation workers organized peaceful demonstrations periodically in protest of insufficient economic support, low salary levels, and other measures. Qatar Executive Summary The State of Qatar is one of the world’s largest exporters of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and has one of the highest per capita incomes in the world. Despite a decrease in the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020, which stemmed from depressed hydrocarbon sales and the COVID-19-induced economic slowdown, Qatar’s real GDP recovered by the second quarter of 2021 and is expected to grow by four percent in 2022, according to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) projections. This positive outlook is driven mainly by Qatar Energy’s ambitious plans to expand LNG production by more than 60 percent over the next five years. To maintain high-level government spending on projects in preparation for the 2022 FIFA World Cup, Qatar projects a modest $2.2 billion budget deficit in 2022, based on an oil price assumption of $55 per barrel. The government remains the dominant actor in the economy, though it encourages private investment in many sectors and continues to take steps to encourage more foreign direct investment (FDI). The dominant driver of Qatar’s economy is the energy sector, which has attracted tens of billions of dollars in FDI. In line with the country’s National Vision 2030’sgoal of establishing a knowledge-based and diversified economy, the government of Qatar has recently introduced reforms to its foreign investment and foreign property ownership laws. These recent legislations allow up to 100 percent foreign ownership of businesses in most sectors and real estate in newly designated areas. In 2020, the government also enacted legislation to regulate and promote public-private partnerships. There are significant opportunities for foreign investment in infrastructure, healthcare, education, tourism, energy, information and communications technology, and services. The government allocated $20 billion for major projects in these sectors in 2022. Measured by the amount of inward FDI stock, manufacturing, mining and quarrying, finance, and insurance are the primary sectors that attract foreign investors. The government provides various incentives to attract local and foreign investments, including exemptions from customs duties and certain land-use benefits. The corporate tax rate is 10 percent for most sectors, and there is no personal income tax. One notable exception is the corporate tax of 35 percent on foreign firms in the extractive industries, including but not limited to those in natural gas extraction. Although the government of Qatar took recent measures to prosecute human rights violations, including improving its human trafficking legislation, addressing forced labor, and setting minimum wages, the country continues to face significant challenges that may affect foreign businesses. These include but are not limited to restrictions on free expression and peaceful assembly, restrictions on labor unions, discrimination against women in law and practice, and reports of forced labor. To curb corruption and anti-competitive practices, the government created a regulatory regime consisting of various enabled government agencies, including the Transparency Authority, the National Competition Protection Authority, and the Anti-Monopoly Committee. To improve transparency, the government streamlined its procurement processes in 2016, creating an online portal for all government tenders. Nonetheless, personal connections reportedly play a significant role in business deals. In recent years, Qatar has significantly bolstered its U.S. investments through its sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), and its subsidiaries, notably Qatari Diar. In 2019, QIA pledged to allocate $45 billion to U.S. investments, after it opened an office in New York City in 2015 to facilitate its U.S. investments. The November 2021 fourth annual U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue further strengthened strategic and economic partnerships and addressed obstacles to investment and trade. The fifth round of strategic talks is expected to take place in Doha in 2022. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 31 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 68 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 15.5 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 55,990 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Over the past few years, the government of Qatar enacted reforms to incentivize and attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Recent FDI-friendly legislations include Law 1/2019 permitting full foreign ownership in most economic sectors, Law 16/2018 regulating foreign real estate investment and ownership, and Law 12/2020 regulating public-private partnerships. Implementing regulations for some of these laws is still pending. In 2019, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry set up the Investment Promotion Agency-Qatar to further attract inward FDI. Other FDI facilitating bodies include the Qatar Financial Centre, Qatar Science and Technology Park, and the Qatar Free Zones Authority, all of which offer full foreign ownership and repatriation of profits, tax incentives, and investment funds for small- and medium-sized enterprises. The government’s economic spending plans are also expected to create additional opportunities for foreign investors. For 2022, the government has allocated $20 billion for new non-oil sector projects, including new residential land development and the improvement of public services. The government also plans to increase LNG production, its primary source of revenue, to 126 million metric tons by 2027, and Qatari officials expect significant investment opportunities for international companies in the upstream and downstream sectors. The government extends preferential treatment to suppliers who use local content in their bids on government contracts. Participation in tenders with a value of five million Qatari riyals ($1.37 million) or less is limited to local contractors, suppliers, and merchants registered with the Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Higher-value tenders, in theory, do not require any local commercial registration; in practice, certain exceptions exist. Qatar maintains an ongoing dialogue with the United States through both official and private sector tracks, including the annual U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue and official trade missions. Qatari officials have repeatedly emphasized a desire to increase American investments in Qatar and Qatari investments in the United States. Although Law 1/2019 on Regulating the Investment of Non-Qatari Capital in Economic Activity (replacing Law 13/2000) grants foreign investors the ability to invest in Qatar – either by partnering with a Qatari investor owning 51 percent or more of the enterprise or by applying to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for up to 100 percent foreign ownership – not all sectors are open to foreign investment. Law 1/2019 limits foreign ownership to 49 percent in the sectors of banking, insurance, and commercial agencies, barring a special dispensation from the Cabinet. Some sectors, such as telecommunications, are monopolized by local state-owned enterprises and are closed off to domestic or foreign competition. Law 16/2018 on Regulating Non-Qatari Ownership and Use of Properties allows foreign individuals, companies, and real estate developers freehold ownership of real estate but limits ownership to nine designated zones and usufructuary rights up to 99 years in 16 other zones. Foreigners may also own villas within selected residential complexes and retail outlets in specific commercial complexes. Foreign real estate investors and owners are eligible for residency in Qatar for as long as they own their property. The Ministry of Justice created a Committee on Non-Qatari Ownership and Use of Real Estate in December 2018 to regulate non-Qatari real estate ownership and use. The Invest in Qatar Center within the Ministry of Commerce and Industry is the entity responsible for vetting full foreign ownership applications. U.S. investors and companies are not disadvantaged by existing ownership or control mechanisms, sector restrictions, or investment screening mechanisms more than other foreign investors. Qatar underwent a World Trade Organization (WTO) policy review in April 2021. The review may be viewed on the WTO website: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp396_e.htm Recent reforms have further streamlined the commercial registration process. Local and foreign investors may apply for a commercial license through the Ministry of Commerce and Industry’s physical one-stop-shop or online through the Invest in Qatar Center’s portal. Per Law 1/2019, upon submitting a complete application, the Ministry will issue its decision within 15 days. Rejected applications can be resubmitted or appealed. Upon approval, registering a small-size limited liability company in Qatar is estimated to take eight to nine days. For more information on the application and required documentation, visit: https://invest.gov.qa Domestic and foreign companies may also opt to register in one of Qatar’s economic zones: Qatar Financial Centre: http://www.qfc.qa/ Qatar Free Zones Authority: https://qfz.gov.qa/ Qatar Science and Technology Park: https://qstp.org.qa/ Qatar does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. According to the World Bank, Qatar’s outward foreign investment stock reached $2.7 billion in 2020. Sectors that accounted for most of Qatar’s outward FDI are finance and insurance, transportation, storage, information and communication, and mining and quarrying. Per the latest statistics, Qatari investment firms held investments in over 80 countries, the top destinations being the European Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and other Arab countries. 3. Legal Regime Qatar has taken measures to protect competition and ensure a free and efficient economy. The World Trade Organization recognizes Qatar’s legal framework to be conducive to private investment and entrepreneurship and enabling the development of an independent judiciary system. In addition to the National Competition Protection and Anti-Monopoly Committee, regulatory authorities exist for most economic sectors and are mandated to monitor economic activity and ensure fair practices. According to the World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance, Qatar lacks a transparent rulemaking mechanism. Government ministries and regulatory agencies do not share regulatory plans or publish draft laws for public consideration. An official public consultation process does not exist in Qatar. Relevant ministries develop Laws and regulations. The 45-member Shura Council (30 of which are publicly elected officials) must reach a consensus to pass draft legislation, which is then returned to the Cabinet for further review and to the Amir for final approval. The text of all legislation is published online and in local newspapers upon approval by the Amir. All Qatari laws are issued in Arabic and eventually translated to English. Qatar-based legal firms provide translations of Qatari legislation to their clients. Each approved law explicitly tasks one or more government entities with implementing and enforcing legislation. These entities are clearly defined in the text of each law. In some cases, the law also sets up regulatory and oversight committees consisting of representatives of concerned government entities to safeguard enforcement. Qatar’s official legal portal is http://www.almeezan.qa . Qatar’s primary commercial regulator is the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Commercial Companies’ Law 11/2015 requires that publicly traded companies submit financial statements to the Ministry in compliance with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the International Accounting Standards (IAS). Publicly listed companies must also publish financial statements at least 15 days before annual general meetings in two local newspapers (in Arabic and English) and on their websites. All companies must prepare accounting records according to standards promulgated by the IAS Board. Since joining the United Nations’ initiative on sustainable development (SSEI) in 2016, the Qatar Stock Exchange (QSE) has encouraged, but not required, publicly traded companies to report on environmental, social, and governance issues (ESG). In November 2021, the QSE launched an ESG Index listing the top 20 securities with the best ESG profile, indicating that ESG disclosures may soon become a requirement of all listed companies. The Qatar Central Bank (QCB) is the primary financial regulator that oversees all financial institutions in Qatar, per Law 13/2012, which established a Financial Stability and Risk Control Committee to promote financial stability and enhance regulatory coordination, headed by the QCB Governor. According to Law 7/2005, the Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) Regulatory Authority is the independent regulator of the QFC firms and individuals conducting financial services in or from the QFC. Still, the QCB also oversees financial markets housed within QFC. QFC regulations are available at http://www.qfcra.com/en-us/legislation/ . The government of Qatar is transparent about its public finances and debt obligations. QCB publishes quarterly banking data, including external government debt, government bonds, treasury bills, and Sukuk (Islamic bonds) at http://qcb.gov.qa/English/Publications/Pages/Publications.aspx Qatar is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – a political and economic regional bloc. Laws based on GCC regulations must be approved through Qatar’s domestic legislative process and are reviewed by the Qatari Cabinet and the Shura Council before implementation. Qatar has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1996 and usually notifies its draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Qatar’s legal system is based on civil and Islamic Sharia laws. The Constitution takes precedence over all laws, followed by legislation, decrees, and ministerial resolutions. The Supreme Judicial Council appoints all judges under Law 10/2003, oversees Qatari courts, and functions independently from the executive branch of the government, per the Constitution. Qatari courts adjudicate civil and commercial disputes per civil and Sharia laws. International agreements have equal status with Qatari laws; the Constitution ensures that international pacts, treaties, and agreements to which Qatar is party are respected. Contract enforcement is governed by the Civil Code Law 22/2004. Law 21/2021 promogulated the establishment of an Investment and Commerce Court to oversee all commercial lawsuits and disputes. Pending the establishment of the new court, domestic and commercial disputes continue to be settled in civil courts. Decisions made in civil courts and the new Investment and Commerce Court can be appealed before the Court of Appeals or later the Court of Cassation. Law 20/2021 on Mediation in the Settlement of Civil and Commercial Disputes is applied when parties agree to mediate and settle commercial disputes. Companies registered with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry are subject to Qatari courts and laws, primarily the Commercial Companies Law 11/2015. Meanwhile, companies set up through Qatar Financial Center (QFC) are regulated by commercial laws based on English Common Law and the courts of the QFC Regulatory Authority. The QFC legal regime is separate from the Qatari legal system—except for criminal law—and is only applicable to companies licensed by the QFC. Similarly, companies registered within the Qatar Free Zones Authority are governed by specialized regulations. Law 1/2019 on Regulating the Investment of Non-Qatari Capital in Economic Activity and Law 16/2018 on Regulating Non-Qatari Ownership and Use of Properties aim to encourage greater foreign investment in the economy by authorizing, incentivizing, and protecting foreign ownership. The MOCI’s Invest in Qatar Center is Qatar’s main investment registration body. It gives preference to investments that add value to the local economy and align with the country’s national development plans. It has a physical “one-stop-shop” and an online portal. For more information on investment opportunities, commercial registration application, and required documentation, visit https://invest.gov.qa . Different laws and regulations govern foreign direct investment at the Qatar Financial Centre ( http://www.qfc.qa/ ), the Qatar Free Zones Authority (https://qfz.gov.qa/), the Qatar Science and Technology Park ( https://qstp.org.qa/ ), and Manateq ( https://www.manateq.qa/ ). Specific sectors are not open for domestic or foreign competition, such as public transportation and fuel distribution and marketing. In such sectors, semi-public companies maintain a predominant role. Law 19/2006 for the Protection of Competition and Prevention of Monopolistic Practice established the Competition Protection and Anti-Monopoly Committee to receive complaints about anti-competition violations. The law protects against monopolistic behavior by entities outside the state if deemed to impact the Qatari market. The law also allows state institutions and government-owned companies absolute or predominant roles in some sectors. Qatari laws permit international law firms with at least 15 years of continuous experience in their countries of origin to operate in Qatar; however, they can only be licensed if Qatari authorities deem their fields of specialization useful to Qatar. Cabinet Decision Number 57/2010 stipulates that the Doha office of an international law firm can practice in Qatar only if its main office in the country of origin remains open. Under current legislation (Law 1/2019 and Law 16/2018), the government protects foreign investment and property from direct or indirect expropriation, unless for public benefit, in a non-discriminatory manner, and after providing adequate compensation. Law 13/1988 covers the rules of expropriation for public benefit. The same procedures are applied to the expropriated property of Qatari citizens. Expropriation is unlikely to occur in the investment zones where foreigners may purchase or obtain rights to property. However, the law does not restrict the expropriation power in these areas. There were two Cabinet-approved expropriation decisions in 2021 and one decision in 2020. Two concurrent bankruptcy regimes exist in Qatar. The first is the local regime, set out in Commercial Law 27/2006 (Articles 606-846). The bankruptcy of a Qatari citizen or a Qatari-owned company is rarely announced. The law aims to protect creditors from a bankrupted debtor whose assets are insufficient to meet the amount of the debts. The government sometimes plays the role of the guarantor to prop up domestic businesses and safeguard creditors’ rights. Bankruptcy is punishable by imprisonment, but the length of the prison sentence depends on violations of other penal codes, such as concealment or destruction of company records, embezzlement, or knowingly contributing to insolvency. The second bankruptcy regime is encoded in QFC’s Insolvency Regulations of 2005 and applies to corporate bodies and branches registered within the QFC. Some firms offer full dissolution bankruptcy services to QFC-registered companies. The Qatar Central Bank (QCB) established the Qatar Credit Bureau in 2010 to promote credit growth in Qatar. The Credit Bureau provides QCB and the banking sector with a centralized credit database to inform economic and financial policies and support the implementation of risk management techniques as outlined in the Basel II Accord. 6. Financial Sector The Government of Qatar has permitted foreign portfolio investment since 2005. There are no restrictions on the flow of capital in Qatar. The Qatar Central Bank (QCB) adheres to conservative policies to maintain a stable banking sector. It respects IMF Article VIII and does not restrict payments or transfers for international transactions. It allocates loans on market terms and treats foreign companies the same way it does local ones. Existing legislation currently limits foreign ownership of Qatari companies listed on the Qatar Stock Exchange to 49 percent. In April 2021, the Cabinet approved a draft law (still pending implementation) that will allow full foreign ownership of the capital of listed companies. Foreign portfolio investment in national oil and gas companies or companies with the right to explore national resources cannot exceed 49 percent. Almost all import transactions require standard letters of credit from local banks and their correspondent banks in the exporting countries. Financial institutions extend credit facilities to local and foreign investors within standard international banking practices. Creditors typically require foreign investors to produce a letter of guarantee from their local sponsor or equity partner. Under QCB guidelines, banks operating in Qatar give priority to Qataris and public development projects in their financing operations. Additionally, banks usually refrain from extending credit facilities to single customers exceeding 20 percent of the bank’s capital and reserves. QCB does not allow cross-sharing arrangements among banks. QCB requires banks to maintain a maximum credit ratio of 90 percent. The Qatar Stock Exchange (QSE) was found in 1997, is a member of the World Federation of Exchanges, and was recently upgraded by MSCI and the S&P Dow Jones Indices. QSE has 43 listed companies and aims to include many other local SMEs in the mid-term. QSE has been appointed by the Qatar Central Bank as the main entity tasked with promoting Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) reporting among listed companies. Qatar has a comprehensive banking sector that offers conventional and Shariah-compliant products and services. The country’s banking sector is composed of 16 banks, 9 of which are Qatari banks, and the remaining 7 are foreign financial institutions. The industry is dominated by government-owned Qatar National Bank (QNB) which enjoys around 50% of domestic market share in total assets, loans, and deposits with smaller lenders competing for the remaining opportunities. Qatar also has a state-run Development Bank created to support local SMEs. Qatari banks are well capitalized with a low non-performing loans ratio that stood at 2.3% in 2020 and is expected to remain low in 2021. The GOQ has always supported its banking sector where necessary (recent examples include during the GCC rift in 2017 and COVID-19 pandemic in 2020) and is expected to continue to do so, given the country’s substantial resources. To open a bank account in Qatar, foreigners must present proof of residency and have a minimum salary of QAR 5000 ($1300). The Qatar Central Bank (QCB) is the primary regulator of the financial sector in the country and governs both conventional and Shariah-compliant institutions. QCB manages liquidity by mandating a reserve ratio of 4.5 percent and utilizing treasury bonds, bills, and other macroprudential measures. Banks that do not abide by the required reserve ratio are penalized. QCB uses repurchase agreements backed by government securities to inject liquidity into the banks. According to QCB data, total domestic liquidity reached $170.1 billion in November 2021, and only two percent of Qatar’s bank loans in 2020 were nonperforming. The Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund, was established in 2005 and is chaired by the Amir. The fund does not publicly disclose the size of its investments, but they are estimated to amount to $450 billion, according to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (SWFI). QIA pursued at first direct investments in luxury brands, prime real estate, and banks abroad. The fund is now looking for opportunities in healthcare, technology industry, and infrastructure investments. In 2015, QIA opened an office in New York City and is now on track to complete a $45 billion commitment of investments in the United States, in addition to a $10 billion that will be invested in infrastructure projects. QIA’s real estate subsidiary, Qatari Diar, has operated an office in Washington, D.C., since 2014. QIA announced in May 2020 that it planned to increase its exposure in Asia and Africa, away from Europe, where the fund had invested heavily over the past decade. QIA has domestic investments including in Qatar National Bank (50%), the country’s largest lender by assets, Qatar Islamic Bank (16%) and flag carrier Qatar Airways (100%). The fund has also subsidiaries that invest locally in sports, hospitality and real estate development. QIA was one of the early supporters of the Santiago Principles and among the few members who drafted the principles’ initial and final versions. It continues to be a proactive supporter of its implementation. QIA supported the establishment of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds and helped create the Forum’s constitution. QIA was also a founding member of the IMF-hosted International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The State Audit Bureau oversees state-owned enterprises (SOEs), several operating as monopolies or holding exclusive rights in most economic sectors. Despite the dominant role of SOEs in Qatar’s economy, the government has affirmed support for the local private sector. It encourages small and medium-sized enterprise development as part of its National Vision 2030. The Qatari private sector is favored in bids for local contracts and generally receives favorable terms for financing at local banks. The following are Qatar’s major SOEs: Energy and Power: Qatar Energy, its subsidiaries, and its partners operate all oil and gas activities in the country. The government wholly owns QE. Non-Qataris can invest in its stock exchange listed subsidiaries, but shareholder ownership is limited to two percent and total non-Qatari ownership to 49 percent. Qatar General Electricity and Water Corporation (Kahramaa) is the sole utility provider in the country and is majority-owned by Qatari government entities. To privatize the sector, the Qatar Electricity and Water Company (QEWC) was established in 2001 as a separate and private provider that sells its desalinated water and electricity to Kahramaa. Other privatization efforts included the Ras Laffan Power Company, based in 2001, and 55 percent owned by a U.S. company. Aerospace: Qatar Airways is the country’s national carrier and is wholly owned by the state. Services: Qatar General Postal Corporation is a state-owned postal company. Several other delivery companies compete in the courier market, including Aramex, DHL Express, and FedEx Express. Information and Communication: Ooredoo Group is a telecommunications company founded in 2013. Ooredoo (previously known as Q-Tel) dominates both the cell and landline telecommunications markets in Qatar and partners with telecommunications companies in 13 Middle East, North Africa, and Asia markets. It is the dominant player in the Qatari telecommunications market and is 70 percent owned by Qatari government entities. Ooredoo Group is listed on the Qatari Stock Exchange. Vodafone Qatar is Qatar’s only other telecommunications operator, with the quasi-governmental entity Qatar Foundation owning 62 percent of its shares. Other Qatari government entities and Qatar-based investors own the remaining 38 percent. Vodafone Qatar is listed on the Qatari Stock Exchange. Qatari SOEs may adhere to their own corporate governance codes and are not required to follow the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance. Some SOEs publish online corporate governance reports to encourage transparency, but there is no general framework for corporate governance across all Qatari SOEs. SOEs listed on the stock exchange must publish financial statements at least 15 days before annual general meetings in two local newspapers (in Arabic and English) and on their websites. When an SOE is involved in an investment dispute, the case is reviewed by the appropriate sector regulator (for example, the Communications Regulatory Authority for the information and communication sector). There is no ongoing official privatization program for major SOEs. 10. Political and Security Environment Qatar is a politically stable country with low rates of crime. There are no political parties, labor unions, or organized domestic political opposition. The U.S government rates Qatar as a medium risk country for terrorism, including threats from transnational actors. The State Department encourages U.S. citizens in Qatar to stay in close contact with the U.S. Embassy in Doha for up-to-date threat information. The Department invites U.S. visitors to Qatar to enroll in its Smart Traveler Enrollment Program to receive further information on safety conditions in Qatar: https://step.state.gov/step/. Republic of the Congo Executive Summary The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank of Central African States (BEAC), and the Government of Republic of the Congo (ROC) project an increase of 2.3 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2022, a recovery from a 0.8 percent GDP decline in 2021. Before the COVID-19 outbreak, the ROC struggled with the effects of the 2014 drop in oil prices. Poor governance and a lack of economic diversification pushed the ROC to near insolvency, reduced its creditworthiness, and forced the central bank to expend significant foreign currency reserves. Oil represents the largest sector of the economy and contributes upwards of 60 percent of the government’s annual declared revenue. The primary non-oil sectors are timber, telecommunications, banking, construction, and agriculture. ROC has resources for economic diversification, with vast swaths of arable land, some of the largest iron ore and potash deposits in the world, a heavily forested land mass, and a deep-water International Ship and Port Facility Security Code-certified port. ROC is eligible for the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade preferences since October 2000, providing incentive for export-related investment. ROC also participates in the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). The largest current infrastructure project is major road repairs on the section of highway between Brazzaville and Owando; the initial project was completed in 2016. ROC’s nascent internet and inconsistent supplies of electricity and water present major hurdles to and opportunities for foreign direct investment. Significant sections of the country’s road system need maintenance or paving. The limited railroad network competes with truck and bus traffic for commercial cargo. However, large infrastructure projects are in progress in several major cities, and the government reports spending significant amounts on infrastructure improvements. Investors report that the commercial environment in ROC has not improved substantially in recent years. ROC ranked 162 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. American businesses operating in ROC and those considering establishing a presence regularly report obstacles linked to corruption, lack of transparency, subjective application of legal codes and host government inefficiency in matters such as registering businesses, obtaining land titles, paying taxes, and negotiating natural resource contracts. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 162 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 1,770 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The ROC government welcomes FDI in most sectors, particularly in the oil sector, which accounts for 90 percent of FDI inflows. The government stated an urgent need to attract investment outside of the petroleum sector in March 2021. Since March 2021, the country has attracted additional investment interest from the United Arab Emirates, Italy, Turkey, Russia, the People’s Republic of China, France, Egypt, Rwanda, and the United States. As a stipulation of the International Monetary Fund’s Extended Credit Facility awarded in January 2022, ROC pledged to undertake legislative, regulatory, and institutional reforms to improve the investment climate. No known laws or practices discriminate against foreign investors, including U.S. investors, by prohibiting, limiting, or conditioning foreign investment in any sector of the economy. The United States and ROC signed an investment agreement in 1994. ROC’s Agency for the Promotion of Investments (API), established in 2013, promotes economic diversification by seeking to expand the pool of external investors into government-directed sectors. API provides French-language advisory services to potential investors and maintains a database of government projects seeking private investor partners. To benefit from API services, the interested company must match with pre-determined preferred sectors. The government has made no significant efforts at a systemic level to retain foreign investments or to maintain dialogue with investors, however, officials maintain strong personal ties with investors to support investment, but rarely share these connections throughout the government, resulting in competition amidst ministers for investment contacts and dollars. The High Committee for Public-Private Dialogue, established in 2012, convened one meeting in 2021. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. ROC has no known limits on foreign ownership or control. Foreign business entities investing in the petroleum sector must pursue a joint venture with the Congolese National Petroleum Company (SNPC). An ROC executive order from November 15, 2019, requires foreign companies in the hydrocarbons sector to employ Congolese in 80 percent of management positions and 90 percent of all employee positions. ROC has no formal investment screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment. The government has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews in the past five years. No civil society organization provided useful reviews of investment policy-related concerns in the past five years. The ROC Agency for Business Creation, (French acronym ACPCE), serves as a “one-stop shop” for establishing a business. ACPCE has offices in Brazzaville, Pointe-Noire, N’kayi, Ouesso, and Dolisie. To establish a business in ROC, investors must provide ACPCE with two copies of the company by-laws, two copies of capitalization documents (e.g. a bank letter or an affidavit), a copy of the company’s investment strategy, ownership documents or lease agreements for the company’s offices in ROC, and CPA-approved financial statements within three years after operations start. The ACPCE website https://dgpme.cg/acpce.php serves as an information-only website. Business registration cannot be completed through the website. The business registration process takes from 4 to 12 weeks normally for all companies and must be initiated in person with ACPCE. The ROC government does not publicly promote or incentivize outward investment. The ROC government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Lack of transparency poses one of the greatest hurdles to FDI, as investors must navigate an opaque regulatory bureaucracy. Companies routinely find themselves embroiled in tax, customs, and labor disputes arbitrated by court officials who make decisions that do not conform with Congolese law and ROC Ministry of Justice regulations. ROC has no known informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. The government develops new regulations internally and rarely requests formal input from industry representatives. Various ministries have regulatory authority over the individual industries in their area of responsibility, with overall authority coordinated by the Ministry of Economy. The government does not usually offer a formal, public-comment period. ROC’s accounting, legal, and regulatory frameworks are transparent in their structure, though the application often lacks transparency and fairness. ROC uses Francophone Africa’s Organization for Business and Customs Harmonization (French acronym OHADA) system of accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures. The government does legally require extractive industries to conduct environmental impact surveys ahead of activities. Mining and timber sector companies are required to do ongoing environmental and social offset activities. Oversight on these required activities is self-reported from businesses. The GROC lacks the capacity to enforce and assure disclosures. The government does not make draft bills or regulations available for public comment. The government publishes new laws and regulations in ROC’s Official Journal. The Official Journal is available for download at the website of the Secretary General of the Government who maintains the Official Journal online at http://www.sgg.cg . Most government ministries have an inspector general that conduct oversight to ensure that government agencies follow administrative processes. The Office of the President has an inspector general who oversees the entire government. In 2021, the government passed the new Anti-Corruption Law, aiming to target corruption among public officials across all sectors of government. The new legislation is a complement to the 2017 Public Transparency and Financial Management law that focused on transparency of public funds and the officials managing them. The new law increases fines and potential jail time for corruption and is meant to mitigate loss of funds to corruption. No new reforms were made in the reporting period. The inspector general process is not legally reviewable, digitalized, nor accountable to the public. The government publishes some public finances and debt obligations, including explicit and contingent liabilities. The Ministry of Finance publishes the arrangements on its website, https://www.finances.gouv.cg/ . ROC participates as a member in the Economic Community of Central African States (French acronym CEEAC), a regional economic cooperation community, and in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (French acronym CEMAC), a monetary union of six Central African states. CEMAC forms the base of local regulatory systems, including the stock exchange, the central bank, and the language for rules and regulations on investment and the economy. CEMAC sets the regional debt threshold for member countries and limits external cash transfers for companies based in member countries, and institutes banking regulations shared by member countries. ROC’s regulatory system for business disputes and regulations governing company registration structure and incorporation incorporates Francophone African regulatory norms promulgated by Organization for the Harmonization of African Business Rights (OHADA). ROC participates as a member country of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The government did not provide information as to whether it notifies the WTO Committee of all draft regulations relating to Technical Barriers to Trade. ROC signed the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement but has not begun implementing the agreement. The French civil law legal system serves as the basis of the Congolese legal system. Contracts are enforced by referring to the commercial court system. OHADA provides the basis for ROC’s national commercial law, supplemented by ROC-specific provisions, such as requiring companies to register with the commercial courts. A commercial court exists in ROC but has not convened since 2016. The judicial system remains independent in principle. In practice, however, the executive branch intervenes in the judicial system on an ad hoc basis. The judicial process is procedurally competent, but its fairness and the reliability of judgments and applications of the legal code are questionable. Appellate courts exist and receive appeals of enforcement actions. Public Law 6-2003, which established the country’s Investment Charter, states that Congolese law will resolve investment disputes. Judgments of foreign courts are difficult to enforce in ROC. Though the government does not usually deny foreign court judgments outright, it may propose process or procedural delays that prolong matters indefinitely without resolution. ROC’s commercial court has authority over any legal disputes involving foreign investors. Investors may also file legal complaints in the OHADA court – based in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire – which has jurisdiction throughout Francophone Africa. ROC’s Hydrocarbons Law and Mining Code of 2016 contain industry-specific regulations for foreign investments. The government published no substantive changes to laws, regulations, or judicial decisions related to foreign investment during the reporting period. The ROC Agency for Business Creation ACPCE is the first stop for establishing a business. Its website has limited information about laws, rules, and reporting requirements: https://dgpme.cg/acpce.php . The newly formed American Chamber of Commerce also serves as a resource for American investors. No agencies review transactions for competition-related concerns, either domestic or international in nature. Ministries in general monitor individual industries and review industry-related transactions. The ROC government may legally expropriate property if it finds a public need for a given public facility or infrastructure (e.g. roads, hospitals, etc.). No recent history of expropriation regarding private companies exists. Historically, however, the ROC government has expropriated private property from Congolese citizens to build roads and stadiums. Law entitles the claimants to a fair market value compensation, but the government distributed such compensation inconsistently. Beginning in 2012, the ROC government expropriated land of Congolese private property owners in the Kintele suburb of Brazzaville to build a sports complex for the 2015 African Games. The government offered minimal compensation to property owners. At the time, citizens publicly complained of a lack of legal recourse against the government. The government has not taken any measures alleged to be indirect expropriations such as confiscatory tax regimes or regulatory actions that deprive investors of substantial economic benefits from their investments during the reporting period. However, there is an abundance of corrupt employees within the tax authority who charge companies more than they are due, irrespective of the legal tax regime. ROC has no specific law that governs bankruptcy. As a member of OHADA, ROC applies OHADA bankruptcy provisions in the event of corporate or individual insolvency. No laws criminalize bankruptcy. ROC does not have a credit bureau or other credit monitoring authority serving the country’s market. 6. Financial Sector The ROC government maintains a neutral attitude toward foreign portfolio investment and does not widely practice foreign portfolio investment. ROC does not have a national stock exchange. ROC-based companies may seek regional listing on the Douala Stock Exchange, which merged with the CEMAC Zone Stock Exchange. BEAC puts in place a regulatory system to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. The government and Central Bank respect IMF Article VIII in principle, however, within the last year the BEAC imposed restrictions on international payments and transfers. Mining and oil companies expressed concerns about the new restrictions. The BEAC monitors credits and market terms. Foreign investors can obtain credit on the local market so long as they have a locally registered company. ROC, however, offers only a limited range of credit instruments. Banking penetration is estimated at 10- to 12-percent. High intermediation costs and high collateral requirements limit the pool of customers. Microfinance banks and mobile banking remain the fastest growth areas in the banking sector. The current economic crisis and the government’s consecutive years of fiscal deficits strained the banking sector over the past five years. Overall loan default is around 20 percent in the reporting period. Non-performing loans amount to approximately 20 percent in 2022. The Republic of the Congo’s largest banks is BGFI Congo with estimated total assets of about $200 million in 2021. Fiscal transparency issues limit any estimate of the total assets controlled by ROC’s largest banks. The assets of the largest banks decreased in recent years as a result of the economic crisis. ROC participates in the CEMAC zone and the BEAC system. BEAC’s regulatory body, the Banking Commission of Central Africa (French acronym COBAC), supervises the Congolese banking sector. Foreign banks and branches may operate in ROC and constitute the majority of banking operations in ROC. BEAC banking regulations govern foreign and domestic banks in ROC. No banks have left ROC in the past fifteen years. No known restrictions exist on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account. GROC maintains no formal Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). An ROC law legalized the framework to establish an SWF in 2016 at the BEAC, intending to open ROC to mostly risk-free foreign assets. The SWF has yet to be established. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominated the Congolese economy in the 1970s and 1980s. The number of SOEs remains comparatively small following a wave of privatization in the 1990s. The national oil company (SNPC), electricity company (E2C), and water supply company (LCDE) constitute the largest remaining SOEs. SOEs report to their respective ministries. The government publishes no official list of SOEs. Constraints on SOEs operating in the non-oil sector appear to be monitored sufficiently and are subject to civil society and media scrutiny. The operations of SNPC, however, continue to be opaque. SOEs must publish annual reports subject to examination by the government’s supreme audit institution. In practice, these examinations do not always occur. Private companies may compete with public companies and have in some cases won contracts sought by SOEs. Government budget constraints limit SOE’s operations. The Republic of the Congo has not adhered to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. ROC has no known privatization programs. 10. Political and Security Environment The most recent period of civil strife and violence ended in December 2017, when anti-government forces in the Pool region, which surrounds the capital of Brazzaville, signed a ceasefire agreement with the government. Before this violence, the country was in civil conflict from 1997 to 1999. There are no known examples of damage to commercial projects and/or installations in the past ten years. Civil disturbances have occasionally resulted in damage to high-profile, public places such as police stations. While elections in 2021 were peaceful, political violence and civil unrest may occur. In the past, political demonstrations have led to armed clashed, deaths, and injuries. Romania Executive Summary Title Romania welcomes all forms of foreign investment. The government provides national treatment for foreign investors and does not differentiate treatment due to source of capital. Romania’s strategic location, membership in the European Union (EU), relatively well-educated workforce, competitive wages, and abundant natural resources make it a desirable location for firms seeking to access European, Central Asian, and Near East markets. U.S. investors have found opportunities in the information technology, automotive, telecommunications, energy, services, manufacturing, healthcare, consumer products, insurance, and banking sectors. Since the 1989 revolution, Romania has embarked on an uneven, but ascending economic growth path. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Romania’s economy declined by 3.9 percent in 2020, and rebounded with a 5.9 percent real GDP growth rate in 2021. As of February, the European Commission (EC) projected 4.2 percent real GDP growth for Romania in 2022. However, spillover effects from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, rising global energy prices, and an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic have led several international financial institutions to adjust the growth rate downwards, predicting closer to 3 percent GDP growth in 2022. On March 9, 2022, Romania lifted all COVID-19 pandemic restrictions. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government of Romania supported businesses and workers by broadening eligibilities for unemployment benefits, enabling employers to adopt flexible work models, and instituting a temporary credit and lease payment moratorium. Romania stands to receive 27 billion EUR in grants and loans from “Next Generation EU” funding via the National Resilience and Recovery Plan (NRRP). The NRRP funding, which will be disbursed between 2021 to 2026, aims to support Romania’s green transition, digitalization efforts, and health system resilience. However, a demonstrated lack of administrative capacity to absorb and implement projects using EU funding may impact Romania’s ability to absorb the funds and dampen the NRRP’s impact. As an EU member state, Romania’s climate objectives align with EU strategies, including the 2030 Agenda and the European Green Deal. However, legacy environmental issues limit Romania’s ability to deliver on biodiversity and clean air goals. Environmental challenges include poor air quality, inadequate waste management practices, and insufficient protective measures for natural areas. Illegal logging remains a concern despite progress towards improved traceability of extracted wood. The investment climate in Romania remains a mixed picture, and potential investors should undertake due diligence when considering any investment. The European Commission’s 2020 European Semester Country Report for Romania pointed to persistent legislative instability, unpredictable decision-making, low institutional quality, and corruption as factors eroding investor confidence. Frequent reorganizations of public institutions also contributed to a significant degree of instability. The government’s sale of minority stakes in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in key sectors, such as energy generation and exploitation, has stalled since 2014. In 2020, the Romanian government enacted a two-year ban on the sale of state equities of SOEs. Successive governments have weakened enforcement of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) corporate governance code by resorting to appointments of short-term interim managers to bypass the leadership requirements outlined in the corporate governance code. Instability in the management of SOEs hinders the ability to plan and invest. Consultations with stakeholders and impact assessments are required before enacting legislation. However, these requirements have been unevenly followed, and public entities generally do not conduct impact assessments. Frequent government changes have led to rapidly changing policies and priorities that serve to complicate the business climate. Romania has made significant strides to combat corruption, but it remains an ongoing challenge. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 66 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 48 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country historical stock positions) 2020 $3.93B https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $12,580 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Romania actively seeks foreign direct investment and offers a market of around 19.2 million consumers, a relatively well-educated workforce at competitive wages, a strategic location, and abundant natural resources. To date, favored areas for U.S. investment include IT and telecommunications, energy, services, manufacturing – especially in the automotive sector, healthcare, consumer products, insurance, and banking. InvestRomania, within the Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Tourism, is the government’s lead agency for promoting and facilitating foreign investment in Romania. Romania’s accession to the EU on January 1, 2007, helped solidify institutional reform. However, the lack of legislative and regulatory predictability and impact assessments, as well as low institutional capacity, continue to negatively affect the investment climate. As in any foreign country, prospective U.S. investors should exercise careful due diligence, including consultation with competent legal counsel, when considering an investment in Romania. Governments in Romania have repeatedly allowed political interests or budgetary imperatives to supersede accepted business practices in ways harmful to investor interests. The energy sector has suffered from unanticipated changes. In 2018, offshore natural gas companies benefited from a streamlined permitting process but were hit with a windfall profit tax that previously applied only to onshore gas production. Additionally, in February 2018, legislation changed the reference price for natural gas royalties from the Romanian market price to the Vienna Central European Gas Hub (CEGH) price, significantly increasing royalties. The Government of Romania (GOR) liberalized the natural gas market on July 1, 2020, and the electricity market as of January 1, 2021, for both household and non-household consumers. As energy prices surged during the winter of 2021-2022, the GOR capped energy prices for households and subsidized remaining balances. To reduce the effect on the state budget, the GOR levied a windfall tax on natural gas and electricity producers’ 2021 profits. In March 2021, the Romanian Parliament passed a bill reinforcing the government’s authority to vet transfers of petroleum agreements to companies from non-EU countries, and to determine if a transfer poses a threat to Romania’s national security. Transfer of a petroleum agreement must be approved through a government decision. Investments involving public authorities can be more complicated than investments or joint ventures with private Romanian companies. Large deals involving the government, particularly public-private partnerships, can be stymied by vested political and economic interests or bogged down due to a lack of coordination between government ministries. Designed to recoup drug reimbursement costs that exceeded state-budgeted amounts, Romania’s claw back tax was 27.65 percent in 2019. In May 2020, the GOR approved a revised and differentiated claw back tax, capped at 25 percent for innovative medicines, 20 percent for generic medicines, and 15 percent for locally produced medicines. While the 2020 legislation provided some relief to pharmaceutical companies, the claw back tax continued to negatively affect the availability of drugs in the Romanian marketplace. In February 2022, the Romanian Competition Council fined five plasma therapies producers for allegedly colluding to limit immunoglobulin supplies in the Romanian market between 2015 – 2018. Foreign and domestic private entities are free to establish and own business enterprises, and to engage in all forms of remunerative activity. Romanian legislation and regulation provide national treatment for foreign investors, guarantee free access to domestic markets, and allow foreign investors to participate in privatizations. There is no limit on foreign participation in commercial enterprises. Foreign investors are entitled to establish wholly foreign-owned enterprises in Romania (although joint ventures are more typical), and to convert and repatriate 100 percent of after-tax profits. Romania has established legal parameters to resolve contract disputes expeditiously. Mergers and acquisitions are subject to review by the Competition Council. Under the Competition Law, the Competition Council must notify Romania’s Supreme Defense Council of mergers or acquisitions of stocks or assets that could affect national security. The Supreme Council of National Defense (CSAT) then reviews the referred mergers and acquisitions for potential threats to national security. The Romanian capital account was fully liberalized in 2006, prior to joining the EU in 2007. Foreign firms are allowed to manage and administer their investments, and to assign their contractual obligations and rights to other Romanian or foreign investors. Romania has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews through multilateral organizations in over ten years. In January 2022, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) opened accession discussions with Romania. Over a multi-year period, OECD technical commissions will assess Romania’s candidacy against OECD standards and policies in areas such as the investment climate, governance, and environmental protection. In January 2022, the OECD published an economic survey with initial recommendations on how Romania can further its socioeconomic development. Among other findings, the report recommended that Romania continue to digitalize and modernize its tax administration to raise tax collection and improve tax compliance; to strengthen its administrative capacity to absorb EU funds; and to address gaps in transportation infrastructure. The National Trade Registry has an online service available in Romanian at https://portal.onrc.ro/ONRCPortalWeb/ONRCPortal.portal . InvestRomania offers free assistance and advisory services to foreign investors and international companies for business activities, such as project implementation and opening new offices or manufacturing facilities. More information is available at http://www.investromania.gov.ro/web/ . According to the World Bank, it takes six procedures and 20 days to establish a foreign-owned limited liability company (LLC) in Romania compared to the regional average for Europe and Central Asia of 5.2 procedures and 11.9 days. In addition to the procedures required of a domestic company, a foreign parent company establishing a subsidiary in Romania must authenticate and translate its documents. As of March 2022, foreign companies did not need to seek investment approval. A Trade Registry judge must hold a public hearing on the company’s application for registration within five days of submission of the required documentation. Applicants can submit and monitor the status of their registration documents online. Companies in Romania are free to open and maintain bank accounts in any foreign currency, although, in practice, Romanian banks offer services only in Romanian lei (RON) and certain hard currencies (Euros and U.S. dollars). The minimum capital requirement for domestic and foreign LLCs is RON 200 (USD 45). Areas for improvement include making all registration documents available to download online in English. Romania defines microenterprises as having less than nine employees, small enterprises as having less than 50 employees, and medium-sized enterprises as having less than 250 employees. Regardless of ownership, microenterprises and SMEs enjoy “de minimis” and other state aid schemes from EU funds or from the state budget. Business facilitation mechanisms provide for equitable treatment of women in the economy. There are no restrictions or incentives on outward investment. 3. Legal Regime Romanian law requires consultations with stakeholders, including the private sector, and a 30-day comment period on legislation or regulation affecting the business environment (the “Sunshine Law”). Some draft pieces of legislation pending with the government are available in Romanian at http://www.sgg.ro/acte-normative/ . Proposed items for cabinet meetings are not always publicized in advance or in full. Generally, the agenda of cabinet meetings should include links to the draft pieces of legislation (government decisions, ordinances, emergency ordinances, or memoranda) slated for government decision, but this is not always the case. Pending parliament legislation is available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/proiecte/upl_pck.home for the Chamber of Deputies and at https://www.senat.ro/legis/lista.aspx for the Senate. The Chamber of Deputies is the decision-making body for economic legislation. Foreign investors point to the excessive time required to secure necessary zoning permits, environmental approvals, property titles, licenses, and utility hook-ups. The Sunshine Law (Law 52/2003 on Transparency in Public Administration) requires public authorities to allow the public to comment on draft legislation and sets the general timeframe for stakeholders to provide input; however, comments received are not published. The Sunshine Law’s public consultation timelines do not have enforceable penalties or sanctions, and thus public authorities can bypass its provisions without harm. In some cases, public authorities have set deadlines much shorter than the standards set forth in the law or passed a piece of legislation before the deadline for public input expired. The regulatory enforcement process is not digitalized and is not made accountable to the public. As an EU member state since 2007, Romanian legislation is largely driven by the EU Acquis Communautaire, the accumulated body of EU legislation. European Commission (EC) regulations are directly applicable while national legislation implements directives at the national level. Romania’s regulatory system incorporates European standards. Romania has been a WTO member since January 1995 and a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since November 1971. Technical regulation notifications submitted by the EU are valid for all Member States. The EU signed the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in October 2015. Romania has implemented all TFA requirements. Romania recognizes property and contractual rights, but enforcement through the judicial process can be lengthy, costly, and difficult. Foreign companies engaged in trade or investment in Romania often express concern about the Romanian courts’ lack of expertise in commercial issues. Romania has no specialized commercial courts, but it does have specialized civil courts. Judges generally have limited experience in the functioning of a market economy, international business methods, intellectual property rights, or the application of Romanian commercial and competition laws. As stipulated in the Constitution, the judicial system is independent from the executive branch and generally considered procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. Affected parties can challenge regulations and enforcement actions in court. Such challenges are adjudicated in the national court system. Inconsistency and a lack of predictability in the jurisprudence of the courts or in the interpretation of the laws remains a major concern for foreign and domestic investors and for wider society. Even when court judgments are favorable, enforcement of judgments is inconsistent and can lead to lengthy appeals. Failure to implement court orders or cases where the public administration unjustifiably challenges court decisions constitute obstacles to the binding nature of court decisions. Mediation as a tool to resolve disputes is gradually becoming more common in Romania, and a certifying body, the Mediation Council, sets standards and practices. The professional association, the Union of Mediation Centers in Romania, is the umbrella organization for mediators throughout the county. Court-sanctioned and private mediation is available at recognized mediation centers in every county seat. Romania has no legal mechanism for court-ordered mediation, but judges can encourage litigants to use mediation to resolve their cases. If litigants opt for mediation, they must present their proposed resolution to a judge upon completion of the mediation process. The judge must then approve the agreement. Since Romania joined the EU in 2007, the country has worked assiduously to create an EU-compatible legal framework consistent with a market economy and investment promotion. At the same time, implementation of these laws and regulations frequently lags or is inconsistent, and lack of legislative predictability undermines Romania’s appeal as an investment destination. Romania’s legal framework for foreign investment is encompassed within a substantial body of law largely enacted in the late 1990s. It is subject to frequent revision. Romania enacted major changes to the Civil Code in October 2011, including replacing the Commercial Code, consolidating provisions applicable to companies and contracts into a single piece of legislation, and harmonizing Romanian legislation with international practices. The Civil Procedure Code, which provides detailed procedural guidance for implementing the new Civil Code, came into force in February 2013. Fiscal legislation is revised frequently, often without scientific or data-driven assessment of the impact the changes may have on the economy. Given the state of flux of legal developments, investors are strongly encouraged to engage local counsel to navigate the various laws, decrees, and regulations as several pieces of investor-relevant legislation have been challenged in both local courts and the Constitutional Court. Few hostile takeover attempts have been reported in Romania. Romanian law has not focused on limiting potential mergers or acquisitions. No Romanian laws prohibit or restrict private firms’ free association with foreign investors. Romania has extensively revised its competition legislation, bringing it closer to the EU Acquis Communautaire and corporate best practices. As of 2014, companies with a market share below 40 percent were no longer considered to have a dominant market position. This approach eliminates the need for the Romanian Competition Council (RCC) to conduct full investigations, saving considerable time and money for all parties involved. Resale price maintenance and market and client sharing are still prohibited, regardless of the size of either party’s market share. The authorization fee for mergers or takeovers ranges between EUR 10,000 (USD 11,944) and EUR 50,000 (USD 59,720). The Fiscal Procedure Code requires companies that challenge an RCC ruling to front a deposit while awaiting a court decision on the merits of the complaint. Romania’s Public Procurement Directives outline general procurements of goods and equipment, utilities procurement (“sectorial procurement”), works and services concessions, and remedies and appeals. An extensive body of secondary and tertiary legislation accompanies the four 2016 laws and has been subject to repeated revisions. Separate legislation governs defense and security procurements. In a positive move, this body of legislation moved away from the previous approach of using lowest price as the only public procurement selection criterion, allowing authorities to use price, cost, quality-price ratio, or quality-cost ratio. The revised laws also allow bidders to provide a simple form (the European Single Procurement Document) to participate in the award procedures. Only the winner must later submit full documentation. As of April 2021, only companies from EU member states or signatory countries of the WTO Public Procurement Agreement have been allowed to bid on public procurements in Romania. Public procurement laws stipulated that challenges regarding procedure or an award can be filed with the National Complaint Council (NCC) or the courts. Disputes regarding execution, amendment, or termination of public procurement contracts can be subject to arbitration. The revised laws also stipulated that a bidder must notify the contracting authority before challenging either the award or procedure. Not fulfilling this notification requirement can result in the NCC or the courts rejecting the challenge. The EC’s 2020 European Semester Country Report for Romania noted that despite improved implementation, public procurement remained inefficient. According to the report, 97 percent of businesses thought corruption was widespread in Romania, and 87 percent said it was widespread in public procurements managed by national authorities. The law on direct investment includes a guarantee against nationalization and expropriation or other equivalent actions. The law allows investors to select the court or arbitration body of their choice to settle disputes. Several cases involving investment property nationalized during the Communist era remain unresolved. In doing due diligence, prospective investors should conduct a thorough title search to ensure land or assets are not subject to any pending restitution claims. Romania’s bankruptcy law contains provisions for liquidation and reorganization that are generally consistent with Western legal standards. These laws usually emphasize enterprise restructuring and job preservation. To mitigate the time and financial cost of bankruptcies, Romanian legislation provides for administrative liquidation as an alternative to bankruptcy. However, investors and creditors have complained that liquidators sometimes lack the incentive to expedite liquidation proceedings and that, in some cases, their decisions have served vested outside interests. Both state-owned and private companies tend to opt for judicial reorganization to avoid bankruptcy. In December 2009, the debt settlement mechanism Company Voluntary Agreements (CVAs) was introduced as a means for creditors and debtors to establish partial debt service schedules without resorting to bankruptcy proceedings. However, global economic crisis prompted Romania to shorten insolvency proceedings in 2011. According to the World Bank 2020 Doing Business Report, resolving insolvency in Romania takes 3.3 years on average compared to 2.3 years in Europe and Central Asia. Such cases cost 10.5 percent of the debtor’s estate with the most likely outcome being a piecemeal sale of the company. The average recovery rate is 34.4 cents on the dollar. 6. Financial Sector Romania welcomes portfolio investment. In September 2019, the Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange (FTSE Russell) promoted the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BVB) to Emerging Secondary Capital Market status from Frontier Capital Market classification. The Financial Supervision Authority (ASF) regulates and supervises securities and insurance markets as well as private pension funds. The ASF implements the registration and licensing of brokers and financial intermediaries, the filing and approval of prospectuses, and the approval of capital market mechanisms. The BVB resumed operations in 1995 after a nearly 50-year hiatus. The BVB operates a two-tier system with the main market consisting of 83 companies. The official main index, BET, is based on an index of the 19 most active stocks. BET-TR is the total return on market capitalization index, adjusted for the dividends distributed by the companies included in the index. Overall, the BVB calculates and distributes in real time 11 indexes. In 2015, the BVB opened an alternative trading system (MTS-AeRO) with relaxed listing criteria. MTS-AeRO has 298 listed companies, which are mostly small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The BVB allows trade in corporate, municipal, and international bonds. Investors can use gross basis trade settlements, and trades can be settled in two net settlement cycles. The BVB’s integrated group includes trading, clearing, settlement, and registry systems. The BVB’s Multilateral Trading System (MTS) allows trading in local currency of 15 foreign stocks listed on international capital markets. Public institutions do not impose restrictions on payments and transfers. Country funds, hedge funds, private pension funds, and venture capital funds continue to participate in the capital markets. Minority shareholders have the right to participate in any capital increase. Romanian capital market regulation complies with EU standards with accounting regulations incorporating EC Directives IV and VII. Thirty-three banks and one credit cooperative national union currently operate in Romania. The largest is the privately-owned Transilvania Bank (19.5 percent market share), followed by Austrian-owned Romanian Commercial Bank (BCR-Erste, 13.9 percent); French-owned Romanian Bank for Development (BRD-Société Générale, 10.5 percent); Dutch-owned ING (9.3 percent); Austrian-owned Raiffeisen (9.2 percent); state-owned National Savings Bank (CEC Bank) (7.9 percent); and Italian-owned UniCredit (7.8 percent). The banking system is stable, well-provisioned, and profitable relative to its European peers. According to the National Bank of Romania (BNR), despite the COVID-19 pandemic, NPLs accounted for 3.35 percent of total bank loans as of December 31, 2021. As of September 2021, the banking system’s solvency rate was 23.07 percent, which has remained steady over recent years, while the banking system’s return on equity was 13.6 percent compared to an EU average of only 7.4 percent. The government and the BNR have encouraged foreign investment in the banking sector, and mergers and acquisitions are not restricted. The only remaining state-owned banks are the CEC Bank and EximBank, comprising 11.43 percent of the market combined, which grew after the latter’s 2020 acquisition of Banca Romaneasca from Greek-owned NBG. While the BNR must authorize all new non-EU banking entities, banks and non-banking financial institutions already authorized in other EU countries need only notify the BNR of plans to provide local services based on the EU passport. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government instituted a credit/lease installment moratorium in 2020 and extended it to March 15, 2021. Borrowers were permitted a total of nine months of non-payment of their installments. About 240,838 borrowers applied and were approved for the installment moratorium. The residual stock at the end of the application period represented 12.7 percent of the total non-government credit balance. In January 2020, the government repealed plans to establish a Sovereign Development and Investment Fund (SDIF). 7. State-Owned Enterprises According to the World Bank, Romania has approximately 1,200 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) of which around 300 are majority-owned by the Romanian government. There is no published list of all SOEs, as some are subordinated to the national government and some to local authorities. SOEs are governed by executive boards under the supervision of administration boards. Implementation of the Corporate Governance Code (Law 111/2016) remains incomplete and uneven. SOEs are required by law to publish an annual report. Majority state-owned companies that are publicly listed, as well as state-owned banks, are required to be independently audited. Many SOEs are currently managed by interim boards, often with politically appointed members that lack sector and business expertise. The EC’s 2020 European Semester Country Report for Romania noted that the Corporate Governance Law is still only loosely applied. The appointment of interim boards has become standard practice. Administrative offenses carry symbolic penalties, which do not change behavior. The operational and financial results of most SOEs deteriorated in 2019 and 2020. Successive governments have resorted to distributing the dividends of profitable SOEs to increase state budget revenues. Privatization has stalled since 2014. The government has repeatedly postponed the initial public offering (IPO) for hydropower producer Hidroelectrica. Fondul Proprietatea, a minority owner in Hidroelectrica, announced its intent to divest its 15 percent stake of the company through a separate IPO. As a member of the EU, Romania is required to notify the EC’s General Directorate for Competition of significant privatizations and related state aid. Prospective investors should seek legal counsel to ensure compliance with relevant legislation. In previous privatizations, the government’s failure to consult with, and then formally notify the EC resulted in delays and complications. State aid schemes aim to enhance regional development and job creation through financial support for new jobs or investment in new manufacturing assets. The Ministry of Finance issues public calls for applications under the schemes. Private enterprises compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to market access and credit. Energy production, transportation, and mining are majority state-owned sectors. The GOR retains majority equity in electricity and natural gas transmission. The Ministry of Energy has authority over energy generation assets and natural gas production. According to the EU’s Third Energy Package directives, the same entity cannot control generation, production and/or supply activities, and at the same time control or exercise any right over a transmission system operator (TSO). Consequently, natural gas carrier Transgaz and national electricity carrier Transelectrica are under the Government’s General Secretariat. The Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure has authority over the entities in the transportation sector, including rail carrier CFR Marfa, national air carrier Tarom, and the Constanta Port Administration. Romania currently has no plans to privatize companies in the transportation sector. Romanian law allows for the inclusion of confidentiality clauses in privatization and public-private partnership contracts to protect business proprietary and other information. In some high-profile privatizations, Parliament has compelled the public disclosure of such provisions. 10. Political and Security Environment Romania does not have a history of politically motivated damage to foreign investors’ projects or installations. Major civil disturbances are rare, though some have occurred in past years. In 2021, the extreme-right party Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR) capitalized on widespread discontent with the government’s response to the pandemic, a sluggish economy, and surging energy prices to organize a series of protests. The current coalition, one in a series of coalitions over the past two years, supports economic reform and a business-friendly environment, but it is uncertain how much progress the coalition will make on its goals. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (USD) 2020 $249B 2020 $249B www.worldbank.org/en/country https://insse.ro/cms/ Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data U.S. FDI in 2020 partner country (stock positions, USD)** 2020 $1.26B $7.52B 2020 $3.93B BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States (stock positions, USD) N/A N/A 2020 $80M BEA data available at ttps://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % of host GDP N/A N/A 2020 0.93% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/EconomicTrends/Fdi.html * Host Country Data Sources: BNR: https://www.bnr.ro/ ONRC: https://www.onrc.ro/ ** The BNR calculated 2020 U.S. FDI in Romania at USD 1.26 billion when using the immediate investor origin principle, and at USD 7.52 billion when using the final investor origin principle. Separately, the Romanian National Trade Register Office (ONRC) calculated 2021 U.S. FDI in Romania at USD 1.22 billion when using only registered capital. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment (as of December 31, 2020) Total Inward $110,743 100% 1. The Netherlands $24,392 22.0% 2. Germany $13,505 12.2% 3. Austria $13,247 12.0% 4. Italy $9,335 8.4% 5. France* $6,883 6.2% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. * The BNR estimated the United States to be #5 when accounting for investments made by foreign subsidiaries of origin country companies. Rwanda Executive Summary Rwanda has a history of strong economic growth and a reputation for low corruption. Though Rwanda averaged high GDP growth of 7.1 percent from 2009-2019, its economy suffered from the COVID-19 pandemic. According to Government of Rwanda (GOR) statistics, GDP growth was 9.5 percent in 2019 before the economy went into its first recession since 1994 with a 3.4 percent GDP contraction in 2020. The Rwandan economy is now showing signs of recovery, as GDP grew 10.9 percent in 2021. Rwanda has relied on a multi-round domestic economic stimulus plan to fuel a recovery, though some worry about the effect of these policies on the country’s sovereign debt. In late 2020 and early 2021, the GOR took significant policy reforms intended to return the economy to growth, improve Rwanda’s competitiveness in selected strategic growth sectors, increase foreign direct investment (FDI), and attract foreign companies to operate in the newly created Kigali International Financial Centre. The country presents several FDI opportunities in sectors including: manufacturing, infrastructure, energy distribution and transmission, finance, fintech, off-grid energy, agriculture and agro-processing, affordable housing, tourism services, and information and communications technology (ICT). Rwanda has a partnership with Qatar to construct a new greenfield international airport at Bugesera, just outside of Kigali (estimated completion in 2025 or 2026). This project has already generated significant opportunities for foreign investment and will continue to do so as related projects (roads, hotels, logistics, etc.) come online. The Rwandan Investment Code calls for equal treatment for both foreigners and nationals in certain operations, free transfer of funds, and compensation in cases of expropriation. Some investors have voiced concerns that a new land law passed in 2021 may run counter to some of the provisions in the Investment Code and similar provisions in the 2008 U.S.-Rwanda Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). Many companies report that although it is easy to start a business in Rwanda, it can be difficult to operate a profitable or sustainable business due to a variety of hurdles and constraints. These include the country’s landlocked geography and resulting high freight transport costs, a small domestic market, limited access to affordable financing, payment delays with government contracts, challenges with tax administration, low-level corruption, and issues in competing with state-owned or affiliated enterprises. Government interventions designed to support overall economic growth can significantly affect investors, with some expressing frustration that they were not consulted prior to the abrupt implementation of government policies and regulations that affected their businesses. The American business community in Rwanda is well-established and represents a variety of sectors. The American Chamber of Commerce-Rwanda was founded in 2019. As of March 2022, it had 39 members. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 52 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 102 of 132 https://www.globalinnovation index.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $114 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ (most recent year available) World Bank GNI per capita 2019 $830 https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Over the past decade, the GOR has undertaken a series of policy reforms intended to improve the investment climate, wean Rwanda’s economy off foreign assistance, and increase FDI levels. Rwanda enjoyed strong economic growth until the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, averaging 7.1 percent annual GDP growth over the prior decade. Rwanda also enjoys a reputation for low corruption. In 2020, Rwanda experienced a 3.4 percent GDP contraction, marking its first recession since the 1994 genocide. Rwanda’s economy is now showing signs of recovery, as GDP grew 10.9 in 2021. The Rwanda Development Board (RDB) was established in 2006 to fast-track investment projects by integrating all government agencies responsible for the entire investor experience under one roof. This includes key agencies responsible for business registration, investment promotion, environmental compliance clearances, export promotion, and other necessary approvals. New investors can register online at the RDB’s website and receive a certificate in as few as six hours, and the agency’s “one-stop shop” helps investors secure required approvals, certificates, and work permits. In February 2021, Rwanda made significant changes to the Investment Code to address previous investor complaints and included new incentives to attract investments in strategic growth sectors. The GOR created the Rwanda Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), passed an anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing law, and passed a law on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters to fully criminalize money laundering and terrorism financing and align the country with OECD rules. The GOR also amended the Company Act and passed a law on partnerships to allow professional service providers to register as partners rather than limited liability companies. Several investors have said tax policy implementation is a top concern affecting their operations in Rwanda. Investors cited instances in which tax incentives and deals negotiated with RDB and line ministries were interpreted differently by the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA). Several investors reported their initial tax incentives packages were well-respected by all government agencies, including the RRA, but later attempts to expand the business or scale up faced significant obstacles when some of the investment incentives were changed or no longer honored. Officials at RRA recognized these gaps but stated investors were welcome to work with them to resolve tax disputes. RRA officials added that the RRA’s supervisory ministry, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN), was often called upon to resolve line ministries’ divergent interpretations of tax policy. Under Rwandan law, foreign firms should receive equal treatment regarding taxes and equal access to licenses, approvals, and procurement. Foreign firms should receive value added tax (VAT) rebates within 15 days of receipt by the RRA, but firms complain that the process for reimbursement can take months and occasionally years. Refunds can be further delayed pending the results of RRA audits. A few investors cited punitive retroactive fines arising from audits that took many years to complete. RRA aggressively enforces tax requirements and imposes penalties for errors – deliberate or not – in tax payments. Investors cited lack of coordination among ministries, agencies, and local government authorities (for example, district-level officials) leading to inconsistencies in implementation of promised incentives. Others pointed to a lack of clarity on who the regulator is on certain matters. Rwanda has neither statutory limits on foreign ownership or control nor any official economic or industrial strategy that discriminates against foreign investors. Local and foreign investors have the right to own and establish business enterprises in all forms of remunerative activity. Foreign nationals may hold shares in locally incorporated companies. The GOR has continued to privatize state holdings, though the government, ruling party, and military continue to play a dominant role in Rwanda’s private sector. Under the 2021 land law, foreign investors can acquire real estate subject to a general limit on land ownership. Some foreign investors expressed fear implementation of the land law would pose new barriers to investment and/or place existing investments at risk due to the law’s requirements for foreign investors to acquire investment certificates. Freehold is granted only to Rwandan citizens for properties of no more than two hectares but may also be granted to foreigners for properties in designated Special Economic Zones or through a Presidential Order for exceptional circumstances of strategic national interests. Long-term leases (emphyteutic leases) in residential and commercial areas are available to both citizens and foreigners acquiring land through private means. These leases typically last 99 years and are renewable. Foreign investors can also acquire land through concessional agreements to use government private land. Such agreements cannot exceed 99 years but can be renewed. In February 2019, The World Trade Organization (WTO) published a Trade Policy Review for the East African Community (EAC) covering Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, along with an annex specific to Rwanda . RDB offers one of the fastest business registration processes in Africa. New investors can register online at RDB’s website ( https://rdb.rw/neworg1/business-registration/ ) or register in person at RDB offices in Kigali. Once RDB generates a certificate of registration, company tax identification and employer social security contribution numbers are automatically created. The RDB “One Stop Center” assists firms in acquiring visas and work permits and connections to electricity and water. It also provides support with conducting required environmental impact assessments. The Investment Code provides incentives for internationalization. A small- or medium-sized registered investor with an investment project involved in export is entitled to a 150 percent tax deduction of all qualifying expenditures relating to internationalization. Emerging investors are entitled to the same deduction. Eligible registered investors receive pre-approval of qualifying expenditures through a joint review process administered by the RRA, RDB and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM). The Commissioner General of RRA ultimately approves qualifying expenditures in consultation with the CEO of RDB. An eligible registered investor may claim the tax deduction on a maximum of $100,000 of qualifying expenditures each year. There are no restrictions limiting domestic firms seeking to invest abroad. 3. Legal Regime The GOR generally employs transparent policies and effective laws that are largely consistent with international norms. Rwanda is a member of the UN Conference on Trade and Development’s international network of transparent investment procedures. The Rwanda eRegulations system is an online database designed to bring transparency to investment procedures in Rwanda. Investors can find further information on administrative procedures here . The GOR publishes Rwandan laws and regulations in the Official Gazette, which is available online here . Government institutions generally have clear rules and procedures, but implementation can sometimes be uneven. Investors have cited breaches of contracts and incentive promises and the short time given to comply with changes in government policies as hurdles to complying with regulations. Government institutions generally have clear rules and procedures, but implementation can sometimes be uneven. Investors have cited breaches of contracts and incentive promises and the short time given to comply with changes in government policies as hurdles to complying with regulations. There is no formal mechanism to publish draft laws for public comment, although civil society sometimes has the opportunity to review them. There is no informal regulatory process managed by nongovernmental organizations. Regulations are usually developed rapidly to achieve policy goals. Some investors have complained this process results in new regulations being adopted without the backing of scientific or data-driven assessments. Regulators do not publicize comments they receive. Public finances and debt obligations are generally made available to the public before budget enactment. Finances for State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are not publicly available, though in 2021 some limited financial information for a small group of large SOEs was made public. Civil society organizations may request SOEs’ financial information by providing a legitimate reason, but these requests are not routinely granted. There is no government effort to restrict foreign participation in industry standards-setting consortia or organizations. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms but are not always enforced. Consumer protection associations exist but are largely ineffective. The business community has been able to lobby the government and provide feedback on some draft government policies through the Private Sector Federation (PSF), a business association with strong ties to the government. In some cases, the PSF has welcomed foreign investors’ efforts to positively influence government policies. On the other hand, some investors have criticized the PSF for advocating for the government’s positions more so than conveying business concerns to the government. Rwanda is a member of the EAC Standards Technical Management Committee. Approved EAC measures are generally incorporated into the Rwandan regulatory system within six months and are published in the Official Gazette like other domestic laws and regulations. Rwanda is also a member of the Standards Technical Committee for the International Standardization Organization, the African Organization for Standardization, and the International Electrotechnical Commission. Rwanda is a member of the International Organization for Legal Metrology and the International Metrology Confederation. The Rwanda Standards Board represents Rwanda at the African Electrotechnical Commission. Rwanda has been a member of the WTO since May 22, 1996, and Rwanda notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade on draft technical regulations. The Rwandan legal system was originally based on the Belgian civil law system. Following the revision of the legal framework in 2002, the introduction of a new constitution in 2003, and the country’s entrance to the Commonwealth in 2009, the Rwandan legal system now consists of a mixture of civil law and common law. The judiciary addresses commercial disputes and facilitates enforcement of property and contract rights. Though it suffers from a lack of resources and capacity, it continues to improve. The judiciary is generally independent and impartial in civil matters, with some exceptions involving state interests. Investors state the government occasionally takes a casual approach to contract sanctity and sometimes fails to enforce court judgments in a timely fashion. National laws governing commercial establishments, investments, privatization and public investments, land, and environmental protection are the primary directives governing investments in Rwanda. Since 2011, the government has reformed tax payment processes and enacted additional laws on insolvency and arbitration. The Investment Code establishes policies on FDI, including dispute settlement (Article 13). The RDB publishes investment-related regulations and procedures here . According to a WTO policy review report dated January 2019, Rwanda is not a party to any countertrade and offsetting arrangements or agreements limiting exports to Rwanda. The most recent laws (passed between 2020-22) on FDI are below: Amended Company Act Law on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Finance Law on Partnerships Law on Transfer Pricing Law on Insolvency Law on Land Reference Prices 2021 New Instructions on Modalities of Management, Lease, Auction and Acquisition of Mortgage Law on Financial Service Consumer Protection New Land Law The GOR created the Competition and Consumer Protection Unit at MINICOM in 2010 to address competition and consumer protection issues. The government is now setting up the Rwanda Inspectorate, Competition and Consumer Protection Authority (RICA), a new independent body with the mandate to promote fair competition among producers. The body will reportedly aim to ensure consumer protection and enforcement of standards. To learn more on competition laws in Rwanda, please review the law and related policy here . Market forces determine most prices in Rwanda, but in some cases, the GOR intervenes to fix prices for items considered sensitive. On international tenders, a 10 percent price preference is available for local bidders, including those from regional economic integration bodies in which Rwanda is a member. Some U.S. companies expressed frustration that while authorities require them to operate as a formal enterprise that meets all Rwandan regulatory requirements, some local competitors are allowed to operate informally without complying fully with all regulatory requirements. Other investors have claimed SOEs, ruling party-aligned, and politically connected business competitors receive preferential treatment in securing public incentives and contracts. Some investors reported it was not always possible to compete aggressively in some sectors in which the existing domestic competition enjoyed strong political ties. Those who attempted to compete aggressively in those sectors risked losing their investment because of political interference, they explained. More information on specific types of agreements, decisions and practices considered to be anti-competitive in Rwanda can be found here . The Investment Code forbids the expropriation of investors’ property in the public interest unless the investor is fairly compensated. A 2015 expropriation law includes explicit protections for property owners. A 2017 study by Rwanda Civil Society Platform stated the government conducted expropriations on short notice and did not provide sufficient time or support to help landowners negotiate fair compensation. The report included a survey that found only 27 percent of respondents received information about planned expropriation well in advance of action. While mechanisms exist to challenge the government’s offer, the report noted that landowners are required to pay all expenses for the second valuation, which represents a prohibitive cost for rural farmers or the urban poor. Media have reported that wealthier landowners used their position to challenge valuations and have received higher amounts. Political exiles and other embattled opposition figures have been involved in taxation lawsuits that resulted in their “abandoned properties” being sold at auction, allegedly at below market values. Rwanda ranked 38 out of 190 economies for resolving insolvency in the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report and is number two in Africa. It takes an average of two and a half years to conclude bankruptcy proceedings in Rwanda. Per the World Bank 2020 Doing Business Report, the recovery rate for creditors on insolvent firms was reported at 19.3 cents on the dollar, with judgments typically made in local currency. In April 2018, the GOR instituted a new insolvency and bankruptcy law. One major change was the introduction of an article on “pooling of assets” allowing creditors to pursue parent companies and other members of the group (for example, in cases in which a subsidiary is in liquidation). The law can be accessed here . . On February 8, 2021, Rwanda passed a new Company Act with several bankruptcy and insolvency provisions. The new law can be found here . On February 17, 2021, Rwanda published a new law on partnerships with several provisions on partnerships’ insolvency. The new law can be accessed here . 6. Financial Sector In February 2021, the GOR introduced new incentives to support the Rwanda Stock Exchange and the Capital Market Authority through the Investment Code. A preferential withholding tax of five percent is applicable to dividends and interest income paid to investors in companies listed on the Rwanda Stock Exchange. A preferential corporate income tax rate of three percent applies to collective investment schemes. A preferential corporate income tax rate of fifteen percent applies to fund management entities, wealth management services, financial advisory entities, financial technology entities, captive insurance schemes, mortgage finance institutions, fund administrators, finance lease entities, and asset backed securities. In December 2017, the GOR established Rwanda Finance Limited (RFL), a state-owned enterprise charged with creating the Kigali International Financial Centre (KIFC). The goal is to create a conducive ecosystem to entice pan-African and international financial service providers and investment funds to Rwanda. KIFC is scheduled to be launched on the sidelines of the Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting (CHOGM) taking place in Kigali in June 2022. RFL has successfully pushed the GOR to change many Rwandan investment, banking, and commercial laws to align with OECD/EU and AML/CFT requirements. Many U.S. investors express strong concern over local access to affordable credit and advise that those interested in doing business in Rwanda arrive with their own financing already in place. Interest rates are high for the region, banks offer predominantly short-term loans, collateral requirements can be higher than 100 percent of the value of the loan, and Rwandan commercial banks rarely issue significant loan values. The prime interest rate is 16-18 percent. Large international transfers are subject to authorization. Investors who seek to borrow more than $1 million must often engage in multi-party loan transactions, usually by leveraging support from larger regional banks. Credit terms generally reflect market rates, and foreign investors can negotiate credit facilities from local lending institutions if they have collateral and “bankable” projects. In some cases, preferred financing options may be available through specialized funds including the Export Growth Fund, BRD, or FONERWA. The banking sector holds more than 67 percent of total financial sector assets in Rwanda. In total, Rwanda’s banks have assets of around $3.8 billion, which reflects an 18.5 percent increase from June 2018 to June 2020, according to the National Bank of Rwanda (NBR). Rwanda’s financial sector remains highly concentrated. The share of the three largest banks’ assets increased from 46.5 percent in December 2018 to 48.4 percent in December 2019. The largest, the partially state-owned Bank of Kigali (BoK), holds more than 30 percent of all assets. The total number of bank and micro-finance institution (MFI) accounts increased from 7.1 million to 7.7 million between 2018 and 2019. Local banks often generate significant revenue from holding government debt and from charging a variety of fees to banking customers. The capital adequacy ratio decreased to 23.7 percent in June 2020 from 24.1 percent over the year but was still well above the prudential minimum of 15 percent, suggesting the Rwandan banking sector continues to be generally risk averse. Non-performing loans increased from 4.9 percent in December 2019 to 5.5 percent in June 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic’s disruption of economic activities. The IMF gives the NBR high marks for its effective monetary policy. NBR introduced a new monetary policy framework in 2019, which shifted toward an inflation-targeting monetary framework in place of a quantity-of-money framework. In April 2020, the NBR arranged a $53.4 million liquidity fund for local banks facing challenges from COVID-19. The NBR allowed banks to restructure loans affected by the pandemic by authorizing an average of four months in loan holidays. Additionally, in March 2020, the NBR took a decision to suspend distribution of dividends from profits generated in 2019. Foreign banks are permitted to establish operations in Rwanda. Several Kenya-based banks operate in the country. In November 2020, the GOR signed an MOU with the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) to host the permanent headquarters of Afrexim Fund for Export Development in Africa (FEDA) in Kigali. Rwandans primarily rely on cash or mobile money to conduct transactions, though use of debit and credit cards is expanding. Use of mobile money has grown by more than 500 percent since March 2020 due in part to changes brought about by COVID-19 and business closures. In 2012, the Rwandan government launched the Agaciro Development Fund (ADF), a sovereign wealth fund that includes investments from Rwandan citizens and the international diaspora. By September 30, 2019, the fund was worth 235.02 billion RWF in assets ($235 million). The ADF operates under the custodianship of the NBR and reports quarterly and annually to MINECOFIN. ADF is a member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds and is committed to the Santiago Principles. In addition to returns on investments, voluntary contributions from citizens and the private sector, and other donations, ADF receives around $5 million every year from tax revenues and five percent of proceeds from every public asset that the GOR has privatized. The fund also receives five percent of royalties from minerals and other natural resources each year. ADF invests mainly in Rwanda. While the fund can invest in foreign non-fixed income investments, such as publicly listed equity, private equity, and joint ventures, the AGDF Corporate Trust Ltd (the fund’s investment arm) held no financial assets and liabilities in foreign currency, according to the 2018 annual report (the most recent report available). 7. State-Owned Enterprises Rwandan law allows private enterprises to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations. Since 2006, the GOR has made efforts to privatize SOEs; reduce the government’s non-controlling shares in private enterprises; and attract FDI, especially in the ICT, tourism, banking, and agriculture sectors, but progress has been slow. Currently there are 17 SOEs including water and electricity utilities, as well as companies in construction, ICT, aviation, mining, insurance, agriculture, finance, and other sectors. Some investors complain about unfair competition from state-owned and ruling party-aligned businesses. SOEs are governed by boards with most members having other government positions. Rwanda continues to carry out a privatization program that has attracted foreign investors in strategic areas ranging from telecommunications and banking to tea production and tourism. As of 2017 (the latest data available), 56 companies have been fully privatized, seven were liquidated, and 20 more were in the process of privatization. RDB’s Strategic Investment Department is responsible for implementing and monitoring the privatization program. Some observers have questioned the transparency of certain transactions, noting that a number of transactions were undertaken not through public offerings but through mutual agreements directly between the government and the private investors, some of whom have personal relationships with senior government officials. 10. Political and Security Environment Rwanda is a stable country with relatively little violent crime. According to a 2017 report by the World Economic Forum, Rwanda is the ninth safest country in the world. Gallup’s Global Law and Order Index report of 2020 ranked Rwanda as the second safest place in sub-Saharan Africa. Investors have cited the stable political and security environment as an important driver of investments. A strong police and military provide a security umbrella that minimizes potential criminal activity. The U.S. Department of State recommends that U.S. citizens exercise caution when traveling near the Rwanda-Democratic Republic of Congo border, given the possibility of fighting and cross-border attacks involving armed rebel and militia groups. Relations between Burundi and Rwanda are currently warming but have been tense in recent years, and there remains a risk of cross-border incursions and armed clashes. Since 2018, there have been a few incidents of sporadic fighting in districts bordering Burundi and the DRC and in Rwanda’s Nyungwe National Park and Volcanoes National Park. In 2021, Rwandan authorities arrested several individuals accused of being ISIS members. Authorities stated the individuals were planning an imminent attack in Kigali. There have been several reported cross-border attacks in Western Rwanda on Rwandan police and military posts since 2016. Despite occasional violence along Rwanda’s borders with the DRC and Burundi, there have been no incidents involving politically motivated damage to investment projects or installations since the late 1990s. Relations with Uganda have been tense in recent years, but leaders continue to emphasize they are seeking a political solution. As of March 2022, Rwanda-Uganda relations appear to be improving. For example, in early 2022, Rwandan and Ugandan officials agreed to reopen the largest border crossing between the two countries. The border crossing had been largely closed to regular traffic since February 2019. Please see the following link for State Department Country Specific Information. Saint Kitts and Nevis Executive Summary The Federation of St. Christopher and Nevis (St. Kitts and Nevis) is a member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). The government seeks to facilitate a conducive business climate to attract more foreign investment. St. Kitts and Nevis remains vulnerable to external shocks such as climate change impacts, natural disasters, and global economic downturns. According to Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) figures, the economy of St. Kitts and Nevis had an estimated GDP of $745 million (2 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) in 2021, after contracting in 2020 due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting impact on the tourism sector. The IMF forecasts real GDP growth of 10 percent in 2022, effectively reversing this contraction. The COVID-19 pandemic significantly reduced the economic gains St. Kitts and Nevis had made in recent years. The impact of the pandemic on tourism, a mainstay of St. Kitts and Nevis’s economy that generates over 60 percent of GDP, has had ripple effects across the economy. The government has introduced measures to protect workers and key economic sectors. After the introduction of vaccines in 2021 the government lifted a strict quarantine for visitors, effectively rebooting the tourism industry. St. Kitts and Nevis has identified priority sectors for investment. These include financial services, tourism, real estate, agriculture, information technology, education services, renewable energy, and limited light manufacturing. The government provides some investment incentives for businesses that are considering establishing operations in St. Kitts or Nevis, encouraging both domestic and foreign private investment. Foreign investors can repatriate all profits, dividends, and import capital. The country’s legal system is based on British common law. It does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States. It has a Double Taxation Agreement with the United States, although the agreement only addresses social security benefits. In 2016, St. Kitts and Nevis signed an Intergovernmental Agreement in observance of the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), making it mandatory for banks in St. Kitts and Nevis to report banking information of U.S. citizens. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index N/A N/A http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 476 http://www.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita ($M USD) 2020 19,080 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The government of St. Kitts and Nevis strongly encourages foreign direct investment, particularly in industries that create jobs, earn foreign currency, and have a positive impact on its citizens. The country is home to the ECCB, the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange (ECSE), and the Eastern Caribbean Securities Regulatory Commission. In the federation, each island has a separate investment promotion agency, the St. Kitts Investment Promotion Agency (SKIPA), and the Nevis Investment Promotion Agency (NIPA). Both agencies have introduced several investment incentives for businesses that consider locating in the federation. SKIPA and NIPA provide “one-stop shop” facilitation services to investors, guiding them through the various stages of the investment process. The government encourages investment in all sectors, but targeted sectors include financial services, tourism, real estate, agriculture, information and communication technologies, international education services, renewable energy, ship registries, and limited light manufacturing. Local laws do not dictate any limits on foreign control in St. Kitts and Nevis. Foreign investors may hold up to 100 percent of an investment. Local enterprises generally welcome joint ventures with foreign investors to access technology, expertise, markets, and capital. Foreign investment in St. Kitts and Nevis is generally not subject to any restrictions, and foreign investors receive the same treatment as citizens. The only exception to this is the requirement that foreign investors obtain an Alien Landholders License to purchase residential or commercial property. The OECS, of which St. Kitts and Nevis is a member, has not conducted a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review in the last three years. No civil society organization has provided a review of investment policy-related concerns. SKIPA and NIPA facilitate domestic and foreign direct investment in priority sectors and advise the government on the formation and implementation of policies and programs to attract investment. Both agencies provide business support services and market intelligence to investors. Businesses must register with the Financial Services Regulatory Commission, the Registrar of Companies, the Ministry of Finance, the Inland Revenue Department, and the Social Security Board. It is not mandatory to use an attorney prepare to incorporation documents. Local laws do not place any restrictions domestic investors seeking to do business abroad. Local companies in St. Kitts and Nevis are actively encouraged to take advantage of export opportunities specifically related to the country’s membership in the OECS Economic Union and the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy (CSME), which enhance the competitiveness of the local and regional private sectors across traditional and emerging high-potential markets. 3. Legal Regime The Government of St. Kitts and Nevis provides a legal framework to foster competition and establish clear rules for foreign and domestic investors in the areas of tax, labor, environment, health, and safety. The St. Kitts Ministry of Finance and SKIPA and the Nevis Ministry of Finance and NIPA provide oversight of the system’s transparency as it relates to investment. The government does not promote or require environmental, social, and governance disclosures by companies. The incorporation and registration of companies differs somewhat on the country’s two constituent islands. In St. Kitts, the Companies Act regulates the process. In Nevis, the Nevis Island Business Corporation Ordinance regulates the incorporation of companies. There are no nationality restrictions for directors in a company, and in general, national treatment is applied. All registered companies must have a registered office in St. Kitts and Nevis. Rulemaking and regulatory authority lies with the unicameral parliament of St. Kitts and Nevis. The parliament consists of 11 members elected in single-seat constituencies (eight from St. Kitts and three from Nevis) for a five-year term. Although St. Kitts and Nevis does not have legislation that guarantees access to information or freedom of expression, access to information is generally available in practice. The government maintains an information service and a website where it posts information such as directories of officials and a summary of laws and press releases. The government budget and limited debt obligation information are available on the website: https://www.gov.kn/ . Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The International Financial Accounting Standards, which stem from the General Accepted Accounting Principles, govern the accounting profession in St. Kitts and Nevis. The independent Office of the Ombudsman guards against abuses by government officers in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman is responsible for investigating any complaint relating to any decision or act of any government officer or body in any case in which a member of the public claims to be aggrieved or appears to the Ombudsman to be the victim of injustice due to the exercise of the administrative function of that officer or body. Regulations are developed nationally and regionally. Nationally, the relevant line ministry reviews regulations. Ministries then submit the results of their reviews to the Ministry of Justice, Legal Affairs and Communications for the preparation of the draft legislation. Subsequently, the Ministry of Justice, Legal Affairs and Communications reviews all agreements and legal commitments (national, regional, and international) to be undertaken by St. Kitts and Nevis to ensure consistency prior to finalization. SKIPA has the main responsibility for project-level supervision, while the Ministry of Finance monitors investments to collect information for national statistics and reporting purposes. Regulatory actions under the purview of the country’s Financial Services Regulatory Commission are posted on its website. St. Kitts and Nevis’s membership in regional organizations, particularly the OECS and its Economic Union, commits it to implement all appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of its various treaty obligations. For example, the Banking Act, which establishes a single banking space and the harmonization of banking regulations in the Economic Union, is uniformly in force in the eight member territories of the ECCU, although there are some minor differences in implementation from country to country. The enforcement mechanisms of these regulations include penalties or legal sanctions. As a member of the OECS and the Eastern Caribbean Customs Union, St. Kitts and Nevis subscribes to a set of principles and policies outlined in the Revised Treaty of Basseterre. The relationship between national and regional systems is such that each participating member state is expected to coordinate and adopt, where possible, common national policies aimed at the progressive harmonization of relevant policies and systems across the region. Thus, St. Kitts and Nevis is obligated to implement regionally developed regulations, such as legislation passed under OECS authority, unless specific concessions are sought. The St. Kitts and Nevis Bureau of Standards develops, establishes, maintains, and promotes standards for improving industrial development, industrial efficiency, the health and safety of consumers, the environment, food and food products, and the facilitation of trade. It also conducts national training and consultations in international standards practices. As a signatory to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade, St. Kitts and Nevis, through the St. Kitts and Nevis Bureau of Standards, is obligated to harmonize all national standards to international norms to avoid creating technical barriers to trade. St. Kitts and Nevis ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2016. Ratification of the Agreement is an important signal to investors of the country’s commitment to improving its business environment for trade. The TFA aims to improve the speed and efficiency of border procedures, facilitate reductions in trade costs, and enhance participation in the global value chain. St. Kitts and Nevis has already implemented some TFA requirements. A full list is available at: https://tfadatabase.org/members/saint-kitts-and-nevis. St. Kitts and Nevis bases its legal system on the British common law system. The Attorney General, the Chief Justice of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (ECSC), junior judges, and magistrates administer justice in the country. The ECSC Act establishes the Supreme Court of Judicature, which consists of the High Court and the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal. The High Court hears criminal and civil matters and makes determinations on interpretation of the Constitution. Parties may appeal to the ECSC, an itinerant court that hears appeals from all OECS members. Final appeal is to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the UK. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is the regional judicial tribunal. The CCJ has original jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. In its appellate jurisdiction, the CCJ considers and determines appeals from CARICOM member states, which are parties to the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice. Currently, St. Kitts and Nevis is subject only to the original jurisdiction of the CCJ. The United States and St. Kitts and Nevis are both parties to the WTO. The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body resolve disputes over WTO agreements, while courts of appropriate jurisdiction in both countries resolve private disputes. St. Kitts and Nevis’ policy is to attract foreign direct investment into the priority sectors identified under its National Diversification Strategy. These include financial services, tourism, real estate, agriculture, information technology, education services, and limited light manufacturing. However, investment opportunities also exist in renewable energy and other services. The main laws concerning foreign investment include the Fiscal Incentive Act, the Hotels Aid Act, and the Companies Act. SKIPA and NIPA offer websites useful for navigating procedures and registration requirements for foreign investors at https://investstkitts.kn and https://investnevis.org . St. Kitts also offers an online investment handbook at https://goldenbookskn.com . Under St. Kitts and Nevis’ citizenship by investment (CBI) program, foreign individuals can obtain citizenship without needing to establish residence (or gaining voting rights). Applicants are required to undergo a due diligence process before citizenship can be granted. A minimum investment for a single investor to qualify is $200,000 in real estate or a $150,000 contribution to the Sustainable Growth Fund. Applicants must also provide a full medical certificate and evidence of the source of funds. Applications for CBI status for real estate projects should be submitted to SKIPA for review and processing. Further information is available at: http://www.ciu.gov.kn/ . Chapter 8 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas outlines the competition policy applicable to CARICOM states. Member states are required to establish and maintain a national competition authority for implementing the rules of competition. CARICOM established a Caribbean Competition Commission to apply rules of competition regarding anti-competitive cross-border business conduct. CARICOM competition policy addresses anti-competitive business conduct such as agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises, and concerted practices by enterprises that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within CARICOM, and actions by which an enterprise abuses its dominant position within CARICOM. St. Kitts and Nevis does not have domestic legislation regulating competition. St. Kitts and Nevis employs eminent domain laws which allow the government to expropriate private property. The government is required to compensate owners. There are also laws that permit the acquisition of private businesses, and the government claims such laws are constitutional. The concept of eminent domain and the expropriation of private property is typically governed by laws that require governments to adequately compensate owners of the expropriated property at the time of its expropriation or soon thereafter. In some cases, the procedure for compensation of owners favors the government valuation. The U.S. Embassy in Bridgetown is aware of two separate and outstanding cases involving the seizure of private land by the government. In the first case, the government of St. Kitts and Nevis was ordered in 2013 to pay a judgement to the American claimant in a series of installments. After completing the first two installments to the American claimant in 2013 and 2014, the government subsequently defaulted. Although a local court ordered the government to pay the 2015 and 2016 installments, it has yet to do so. The government alleges that another individual has made a claim on part of the property and that it must wait until a court determines the outcome of the other claim before completing payments to the American claimant. In 2020, a court ruled that the balance of payment due was to be deposited by the government into a court-controlled account to facilitate payment upon resolution of the other property claim. During the reporting period, the government did not deposit the balance into a court-controlled account. By the end of 2021, no further payments had been made to the estate of the American claimant. The court case deciding on the competing claim has not yet been scheduled. In the second case, in 2015, an American company signed an agreement with the government to provide 2 million gallons of water. According to the American company, the government expropriated the company’s drilling equipment in 2018 without compensation. In 2019, the government agreed to pay a $1 million settlement to the company and to deposit an additional $500,000 into an escrow account. The company subsequently agreed to a settlement of $750,000 in addition to the escrow deposit. Although the government agreed to the payments, it has not released the funds. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an additional agreement was reached between the parties in December 2020, regarding the delivery of water and the payment of all fees. The U.S. Embassy in Bridgetown continues to recommend caution when conducting business in St. Kitts and Nevis. St. Kitts and Nevis has a bankruptcy framework that grants certain rights to debtor and creditor, including the ability of creditors to pursue necessary actions to resolve outstanding debts. 6. Financial Sector St. Kitts and Nevis is a member of the ECCU. As such, it is also a member of the ECSE and the Regional Government Securities Market. The ECSE is a regional securities market established by the ECCB and licensed under the Securities Act of 2001, a uniform regional body of legislation governing the buying and selling of financial products for the eight member territories. In 2021, the ECSE listed 164 securities, comprising 140 sovereign debt instruments, 13 equities, and 11 corporate debt securities. Market capitalization stood at $1.9 billion. St. Kitts and Nevis is open to portfolio investment. St. Kitts and Nevis accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF Agreement, Sections 2, 3 and 4 and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on making payments and transfers for current international transactions. The private sector has access to credit on the local market through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, trade credits, and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. The eight participating governments of the ECCU have passed the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement Act. The Act provides for the establishment of the ECCB, its management and administration, its currency, relations with financial institutions, relations with the participating governments, foreign exchange operations, external reserves, and other related matters. St. Kitts and Nevis is a signatory to this agreement, and the ECCB controls St. Kitts and Nevis’s currency and regulates its domestic banks. Domestic and foreign banks can establish operations in St. Kitts and Nevis. The Banking Act requires all commercial banks and other institutions to be licensed in order to conduct any banking business. The ECCB regulates financial institutions. As part of ongoing supervision, licensed financial institutions are required to submit monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports to the ECCB. In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector as stable. Assets of commercial banks totaled $2.5 billion (6.8 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) at the end of 2019. St. Kitts and Nevis is well served by bank and non-bank financial institutions. There are minimal alternative financial services. Some citizens still participate in informal community group lending. The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S. and European banks. CARICOM remains committed to engaging with key stakeholders and appointed a Committee of Ministers of Finance on Correspondent Banking to monitor the issue. In 2019, the ECCB started an 18-month financial technology pilot to launch a Digital Eastern Caribbean dollar (DXCD) with its partner, Barbados-based Bitt Inc. An accompanying mobile application, DCash, was officially launched in March 2021 in four pilot countries including St. Kitts and Nevis. While initially declared a success, its platform crashed in early 2022 and remained offline for almost two months before resuming in March, raising questions about the project’s reliability. The digital Eastern Caribbean currency was intended to operate alongside physical Eastern Caribbean currency. St. Kitts and Nevis enacted the Virtual Assets Bill, 2020, to regulate virtual currencies with the expectation that they will become increasingly prevalent. The bill is intended to facilitate the ease of doing business in a cashless society, and to combat theft, fraud, money laundering, Ponzi schemes, and terrorist financing. Neither the government of St. Kitts and Nevis, nor the ECCB, of which St. Kitts and Nevis is a member, maintains a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in St. Kitts and Nevis work in partnership with ministries, or under their remit to carry out certain specific ministerial responsibilities. There are currently ten SOEs in St. Kitts and Nevis in areas such as tourism, investment services, broadcasting and media, solid waste management, and agriculture. They are all wholly owned government entities. Each is headed by a board of directors to which senior managers report. A list of SOEs can be found at http://www.gov.kn . St. Kitts and Nevis does not currently have a targeted privatization program. 10. Political and Security Environment St. Kitts and Nevis does not have a recent history of politically motivated violence or civil disturbance. St. Kitts and Nevis’ general elections are constitutionally due in 2025. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2 Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2019 927.4 2019 1,053 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 472 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A N/A N/A UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Eastern Caribbean Central Bank https://www.eccb-centralbank.org/statistics/dashboard-datas/ . Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI St. Kitts and Nevis does not appear in the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS). Saint Lucia Executive Summary Saint Lucia is a member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). Saint Lucia had an estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $1.6 billion in 2020 according to the latest figures obtained from the World Bank. Tourism is Saint Lucia’s main economic sector, while real estate and transport are other leading sectors. The Saint Lucian economy continues to be impacted by the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. The country has seen a slight economic rebound with the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank forecasts 12.1 percent growth in 2022. The government remains committed to creating a welcoming and open business climate to attract more foreign investment to the country. Investment opportunities are focused primarily in tourism and hotel development, information and communication technology, manufacturing, international financial services, agribusiness, and creative industries. The Government of Saint Lucia provides several incentives to encourage domestic and foreign private investment. For example, foreign investors in Saint Lucia can repatriate all profits, dividends, and import capital. The Saint Lucia legal system is based on the British common law system, but its civil code and property law are greatly influenced by French law. Saint Lucia does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States but has bilateral investment treaties with the United Kingdom and Germany. In 2014, the Government of Saint Lucia signed an Intergovernmental Agreement in observance of the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), making it mandatory for banks in Saint Lucia to report the banking information of U.S. citizens. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2022 42/180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 433 http://www.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita ($M USD) 2019 10,950 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Saint Lucia strongly encourages foreign direct investment (FDI). Invest Saint Lucia has introduced several investment incentives for businesses that consider locating in Saint Lucia, encouraging both domestic and foreign private investment. Invest Saint Lucia is managed by a Chief Executive Director and is overseen by a board of directors appointed by the government under the Office of the Prime Minister and Minister of Commerce, International Trade, Investment, Enterprise Development and Consumer Affairs. The state-run agency Invest Saint Lucia provides “one-stop shop” facilitation services to investors, helping to guide them through the various stages of the investment process. It assesses investment proposals for viability and in accordance with the laws of Saint Lucia and provides investment promotion services. Applicable government agencies, rather than Invest Saint Lucia, grant investment concessions. Government policies provide liberal tax holidays, a waiver of import duty on imported plant machinery and equipment and imported raw and packaging materials, and export allowance or tax relief on export earnings. Various laws provide fiscal incentives to encourage establishing and expanding foreign and domestic investment. The Saint Lucian government encourages investment in all sectors, but targeted sectors include tourism, smart manufacturing and infrastructure, information and communication technologies, alternative energy, education, and business/knowledge processing operations. Local laws do not place any limits on the amount of foreign ownership or control in the establishment of a business in Saint Lucia. The government allows 100 percent foreign ownership of companies in any sector. Currently, there are no restrictions on foreigners investing in military or security-related businesses or natural resources. Trade licenses and other approvals/licenses may be required before establishment. Invest Saint Lucia evaluates all FDI proposals and provides intelligence, business facilitation, and investment promotion to establish and expand profitable business enterprises in Saint Lucia. Invest Saint Lucia also advises the government on issues that are important to the private sector and potential investors and advocates for an improved business climate, growth in investment opportunities, and improvements in the international competitiveness of the local economy. It focuses on building and promoting Saint Lucia as an ideal location for investors, seeking and generating new investment in strategic sectors, facilitating domestic and foreign direct investment as a one stop shop for investors, and identifying major issues and measures geared towards assisting the government in the ongoing development of a National Investment Policy. The Government of Saint Lucia treats foreign and local investors equally with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory. The OECS, of which Saint Lucia is a member, has not conducted a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review since 2014. There have also not been any investment policy reviews by civil society organizations in the past five years. All potential investors applying for government incentives must submit their proposals for review by Invest Saint Lucia to ensure the projects are consistent with the national interest and provide economic benefits to the country. Invest Saint Lucia offers an online resource that is useful for navigating the laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors. It is available at http://www.investstlucia.com/ . The Registry of Companies and Intellectual Property office maintains an e-filing portal for most of its services, including company registration. Relevant officials can review applications submitted electronically. Applicants, however, must pay the registration fee in-person at the Registry office. The Registry of Companies and Intellectual Property office can only accept payment in the form of cash and checks. Personal checks are not accepted. It is advisable to consult a local attorney prior to starting the process. Further information is available at http://www.rocip.gov.lc . The general practice for starting a business is to retain an attorney to prepare all incorporation documents. A business must register with the Registry of Companies and Intellectual Property Office, the Inland Revenue Authority, and the National Insurance Corporation. The Government of Saint Lucia continues to support the growth of women-led businesses. The government seeks to support equitable treatment of women in the private sector through non-discriminatory processes for business registration, awarding of fiscal incentives, and assessing investments. The Government of Saint Lucia is committed to the full participation of people with disabilities in the society and the economy. It actively engages with people with disabilities in society to ensure the equal participation of people with disabilities in formal and informal sectors of the economy. The Government of Saint Lucia prioritizes investment retention as a key component of its overall economic strategy. While the Government of Saint Lucia is encouraging more domestic savings, it continues to require significant foreign investment to fill the investment gap. Local laws do not place ay restrictions on domestic investors seeking to do business abroad. The government actively encourages local companies in Saint Lucia to take advantage of export opportunities specifically related to the country’s membership in the OECS Economic Union and the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy (CSME), which enhance the competitiveness of the local and regional private sectors across traditional and emerging high-potential markets. 3. Legal Regime The legal framework in Saint Lucia seeks to foster competition and establish clear rules for foreign and domestic investors in the areas of tax, labor, environment, health, and safety. The Ministry of Commerce, International Trade, Investment, Enterprise Development, and Consumer Affairs in the Office of the Prime Minister and Invest Saint Lucia provide oversight on the transparency of the system as it relates to investment. The government offers a range of incentives for foreign investors. The Invest Saint Lucia Act addresses government policy for attracting investment. The Trade License Act, Aliens Licensing Act, Special Development Areas Act, Income Tax Act, Free Zones Act, Tourism Incentives Act, Investment and Stimulus Act, and Fiscal Incentives Act also impact foreign investment. The government announced plans to update these pieces of legislation to ensure that Saint Lucia remains compliant with international tax and exchange of information requirements. Rulemaking and regulatory authority lie with the bicameral parliament. The parliament consists of a lower house, which has 17 members elected for five-year terms in single-seat constituencies, and a Senate with 11 appointed members. Relevant laws govern all regulations relating to foreign investment in Saint Lucia. These laws are developed in the respective ministries and drafted by the Office of the Attorney General. FDI is covered by the enacting legislation for Invest Saint Lucia, the citizenship by investment program, and some sector-specific laws such as the Fiscal Incentives Act or tourism-related laws. Saint Lucia’s laws are available online at http://www.govt.lc . Although some draft bills are not subject to public consultation, the government often solicits input from various stakeholder groups and via town hall meetings when formulating new legislation. The government also uses public awareness efforts such as television and radio call-in programs to inform and shape public opinion. The government publishes copies of proposed laws and regulations in the Official Gazette before they are presented in the House of Assembly. Although Saint Lucia does not have legislation guaranteeing access to information or freedom of expression, access to information is generally available in practice. The government maintains an information service website on which it posts information such as directories of officials and a summary of laws and press releases. The government budget and an audit of that budget are available on the website. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The International Financial Accounting Standards, which stem from the General Accepted Accounting Principles, govern the accounting profession in Saint Lucia. The most recent Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) Mutual Evaluation assessment found Saint Lucia to be largely compliant. The ECCB is the supervisory authority over financial institutions registered under the Banking Act of 2015. The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner or Ombudsman is a constitutional entity created to guard against abuses of power by government officers in the performance of their duties. The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner is independent. The Parliamentary Commissioner investigates complaints relating to actions or omissions by any government official or government body where such actions or omissions cause an injustice or harm a member of the public. In developing regulations, respective ministries advise the Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice, and National Security regarding necessary elements and parameters of proposed legislation. The Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice, and National Security subsequently drafts legislation, ensuring compatibility with the nation’s domestic and international legal commitments. Invest Saint Lucia has the main responsibility for investment supervision, whereas the Ministry of Finance monitors investments to collect information for national statistics and reporting purposes. Saint Lucia’s membership in regional organizations, particularly the OECS and its Economic Union, commits the state to ensure the fulfillment of its various treaty obligations, although there are some minor differences in implementation from country to country. The enforcement mechanisms of these regulations include financial penalties and other sanctions. As a member of the OECS and the ECCU, Saint Lucia subscribes to a set of principles and policies outlined in the Revised Treaty of Basseterre. Each participating member state is expected to coordinate and adopt, where possible, common national policies, with the objective of progressive harmonization of relevant policies and systems across the region. Saint Lucia is obligated to implement regionally developed regulations, such as legislation passed under OECS authority, unless it seeks specific concessions not to implement such regulations. The Saint Lucia Bureau of Standards is a statutory body established under the Standards Act. It establishes, maintains, and promotes standards for improving industrial development and efficiency, promoting the health and safety of consumers, and protecting the environment, food products, quality of life, and the facilitation of trade. It also conducts international standards consultations and training. As a signatory to the WTO Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade, Saint Lucia is obligated to harmonize all national standards to international norms to avoid creating technical barriers to trade. Saint Lucia is working to improve customs efficiency, modernize customs operations, and address inefficiencies in the clearance of goods. Saint Lucia ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in December 2015. Ratification of the Agreement is an important signal to investors of the country’s commitment to improving its business environment for trade. The TFA aims to improve the speed and efficiency of border procedures, facilitate reductions in trade costs, and enhance participation in the global value chain. Saint Lucia has already implemented several TFA requirements. Saint Lucia bases its legal system on the British common law system, but its civil code and property law are influenced by French law. The Attorney General, the Chief Justice of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, junior judges, and magistrates administer justice. The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Act establishes the Supreme Court of Judicature, which consists of the High Court and the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal. The High Court hears criminal and civil matters and makes determinations on the interpretation of the constitution. Parties may appeal first to the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court. The final court of appeal is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the United Kingdom. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is the regional judicial tribunal, established in 2001 by the Agreement Establishing the CARICOM Single Market and Economy. The CCJ has original jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. In its appellate jurisdiction, the CCJ considers and determines appeals from the CARICOM member states that are parties to the Agreement Establishing the CCJ. Currently, Saint Lucia is subject only to the original jurisdiction of the CCJ. The United States and Saint Lucia are both parties to the WTO. The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body resolve disputes over WTO agreements, while courts of appropriate jurisdiction in both countries resolve private disputes. The judicial system remains relatively independent of the executive branch of government and is free of political interference in judicial matters. Invest Saint Lucia’s FDI policy is to actively pursue FDI in priority sectors and advise the government on the formation and implementation of policies and programs to attract sustainable investment. Invest Saint Lucia reviews all proposals for investment concessions and incentives to ensure the projects are consistent with the national interest and provide economic benefits to the country. Invest Saint Lucia provides “one-stop shop” facilitation services to investors to guide them through the various stages of the investment process. Invest Saint Lucia offers a website that is useful to navigate the laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors: http://www.investstlucia.com/ . Under Saint Lucia’s CBI program, foreign individuals may obtain citizenship in accordance with the Citizenship by Investment Act of 2015, which grants the right to citizenship by investment. Program applicants are required to submit to a due diligence process before citizenship can be granted. The minimum investment for a single applicant to qualify is a $100,000 contribution to the National Economic Fund. A $190,000 contribution covers a family of four made up of the principal applicant, spouse, and up to two dependents. Alternatively, a real estate purchase valued at $300,000 or more will also qualify. There are also provisions for enterprise investment in approved projects and a government bond option. In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the unit also created a special Covid-19 Relief Bond with a minimum investment of $250,000. This bond option is available until the end of 2022. More information on the citizenship by investment program is available at https://www.cipsaintlucia.com . Chapter 8 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas outlines the competition policy applicable to CARICOM member states. Member states are required to establish and maintain a national competition authority. CARICOM established a Caribbean Competition Commission to apply rules of competition regarding anti-competitive cross-border business conduct. CARICOM competition policy addresses anti-competitive business conduct such as agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises, and concerted practices by enterprises that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within CARICOM, and actions by which an enterprise abuses its dominant position within CARICOM. Saint Lucia does not yet have legislation regulating competition. The OECS agreed to establish a regional competition body to handle competition matters within its single market. Under the Land Acquisition Act, the government can acquire land for a public purpose. The government must serve a notice of acquisition to the person from whom the land is acquired. Saint Lucia employs a system of eminent domain to pay compensation in such cases. There were no reports that the government discriminated against U.S. investments, companies, or landholdings. There are no laws forcing local ownership in specified sectors. There is one case of expropriation involving an American citizen-owned property. An American citizen purchased 32 acres of land in Saint Lucia in 1970. The government expropriated the land in 1985 by an act of law. The claimant has been seeking redress and those efforts have been unsuccessful to date. The government denied the claimant’s request without explanation in 2014. The government has been largely unresponsive to repeated attempts by the claimant to appeal the decision. The government also claims to have lost property records that the claimant says support their ownership claim. The U.S. Embassy in Bridgetown continues to advocate with the government to ensure the claimant is allowed to fully exercise their due process rights. Saint Lucia has a limited bankruptcy framework that grants certain rights to debtors and creditors. The act was updated in 2020. 6. Financial Sector Saint Lucia is a member of the ECCU. As such, it is a member of the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange (ECSE) and the Regional Government Securities Market. The ECSE is a regional securities market established by the ECCB and licensed under the Securities Act of 2001, a uniform regional body of legislation governing the buying and selling of financial products for the eight member territories. As of March 2021, there were 164 securities listed on the ECSE, comprising 140 sovereign debt instruments, 13 equities, and 11 corporate debt securities. Market capitalization stood at $703 million (1.9 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars), representing a 6.9 percent increase from 2020. Saint Lucia is open to portfolio investment. Saint Lucia has accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund Agreement, Sections 2, 3, and 4, and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on making payments and transfers for current international transactions. Foreign tax credit is allowed for the lesser of the tax payable in the foreign country or the tax charged under Saint Lucia tax law. The private sector has access to credit on the local market through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. The eight participating governments of the ECCU have passed the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement Act. The act provides for the establishment of the ECCB, its management and administration, its currency, relations with financial institutions, relations with the participating governments, foreign exchange operations, external reserves, and other related matters. Saint Lucia is a signatory to this agreement and the ECCB controls Saint Lucia’s currency and regulates its domestic banks. The Banking Act is a harmonized piece of legislation across the ECCU. The Minister of Finance usually acts in consultation with, and on the recommendation of, the ECCB with respect to those areas of responsibility within the Minister of Finance’s portfolio. Domestic and foreign banks can establish operations in Saint Lucia. The Banking Act requires all commercial banks and other institutions to be licensed in order to conduct any banking business. The ECCB regulates financial institutions. As part of ongoing supervision, licensed financial institutions are required to submit monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports to the ECCB. In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector in Saint Lucia as stable. Assets of commercial banks totaled $2.8 billion (6.4 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) at the end of 2019. In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector in Saint Lucia as stable. Saint Lucia is well-served by bank and non-bank financial institutions. The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by the U.S. and European banks. CARICOM remains committed to engaging with key stakeholders on the issue and appointed a Committee of Ministers of Finance on Correspondent Banking to monitor the issue. Bitt, a Barbadian company, developed digital currency DCash in partnership with the ECCB. The first successful DCash retail central bank digital currency (CDBC) consumer-to-merchant transaction took place in Grenada in February 2021 following a multi-year development process. The CBB and the FSC established a regulatory sandbox in 2018 where financial technology entities can do live testing of their products and services. This allowed regulators to gain a better understanding of the product or service and to determine what, if any, regulation is necessary to protect consumers. Bitt completed its participation and formally exited the sandbox in 2019. Bitt launched DCash in Saint Lucia in March 2021. In January 2022, the platform experienced a system interruption, and its operation was suspended. The platform regained full functionality at the end of March 2022 following system upgrades. Saint Lucia does not have any specific legislation to regulate cryptocurrencies. Neither the Government of Saint Lucia, nor the ECCB (of which Saint Lucia is a member) maintains a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Saint Lucia work in partnership with ministries or under their remit, carrying out specific ministerial responsibilities. There are 39 SOEs in Saint Lucia operating in areas such as tourism, investment services, broadcasting and media, solid waste management, and agriculture. SOEs in Saint Lucia do not generally pose a threat to investors. The Saint Lucian government established most SOEs with the goal of creating economic activity in areas where it perceives the private sector has very little interest. SOEs are wholly owned government entities and are headed by boards of directors to which senior management reports. A list of SOEs in Saint Lucia is available at http://www.govt.lc/statutory-bodies . Saint Lucia currently does not have a targeted privatization program. 10. Political and Security Environment Saint Lucia is considered politically stable and does not have a recent history of political violence. Elections are peaceful and considered generally free and transparent. The next election is constitutionally due in 2026. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) N/A N/A 2019 2119 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 433 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 11 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 65.7% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Eastern Caribbean Central Bank – https://www.eccb-centralbank.org/statistics/gdp-datas/comparative-report/1 Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available; Saint Lucia does not appear in the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS). Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available; Saint Lucia does not appear in the IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Executive Summary St. Vincent and the Grenadines is a member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). In the most recent available figures from the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), St. Vincent and the Grenadines’ 2020 estimated gross domestic product (GDP) was 783 million USD (2.12 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) in 2020. St. Vincent and the Grenadines is still recovering from the explosive eruptions from La Soufriere volcano in April 2021. Volcanic ash blanketed most of the northern half of the St. Vincent, which includes much of the country’s agricultural districts. This, coupled with the ongoing challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic, has exacerbated the economic situation in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The government is hoping that construction projects in the tourism sector and civil infrastructure will provide a much-needed economic boost this year. The economy might struggle to hit its forecasted growth of around 4.57 percent in 2022, as the agriculture and tourism sectors are impacted by the ongoing pandemic and volcanic reconstruction efforts. The country seeks to diversify its economy across several niche markets, particularly tourism, international financial services, agricultural processing, scientific and medical research, light manufacturing, renewable energy, creative industries, and information and communication technologies. The Government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines strongly encourages foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly in industries that create jobs and earn foreign exchange. Through the Invest St. Vincent and the Grenadines Authority (Invest SVG), the government facilitates FDI and maintains an open dialogue with current and potential investors. The government does not impose limits on foreign control, nor are there requirements for local ownership or ownership in locally registered companies. The island’s legal system is based on the British common law system. St. Vincent and the Grenadines does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States. It has double-taxation treaties with the United States, Canada, the UK, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. In 2016, St. Vincent and the Grenadines signed an intergovernmental agreement in observance of the United States’ Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), making it mandatory for banks in St. Vincent and the Grenadines to report the banking information of U.S. citizens. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2022 36 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 7 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2019 7,460 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, through Invest SVG, strongly encourages FDI, particularly in industries that create jobs and earn foreign currency. The government is open to all investment, but is currently prioritizing investment in niche markets, particularly tourism, international financial services, agricultural processing, light manufacturing, renewable energy, scientific and medical research, creative industries, and information and communication technologies. Invest SVG’s FDI policy is designed to attract investment into priority sectors. It advises the government on the formation and implementation of policies and programs that attract and facilitate investment. The government offers special incentive packages for foreign investments in the hotel industry and light manufacturing. The government offers other incentive packages on an ad hoc basis. There are no limits on foreign control in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, nor are there requirements for local investment or ownership in locally registered companies, although non-nationals must apply for a license from the Prime Minister’s Office to acquire more than 50 percent of a company. An attorney must submit the application and Cabinet must approve it. Companies holding at least five acres of land may restrict or prohibit the issue or transfer of their shares or debentures to non-nationals. The government has not officially closed any industries to private investment, although some activities such as telecommunications, utilities, broadcasting, banking, and insurance require a government license. The OECS, of which Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is a member, has not conducted a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review since 2014. There have also not been any investment policy reviews by civil society organizations in the past five years. Invest SVG facilitates domestic and foreign direct investment in priority sectors and advises the government on the formation and implementation of policies and programs to attract investment. Invest SVG provides business support services and market intelligence to all investors. It also reviews all investment projects applying for government incentives to ensure they conform to national interests and provide economic benefits to the country. Its website is http://www.investsvg.com . In addition to its website, the country offers an online guide that is useful for navigating the laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors. The guide is available at http://theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/saintvincentandthegrenadines . The general practice is to retain an attorney to prepare all incorporation documents. Local laws dictate that a business must register with the Commerce and Intellectual Property Office (CIPO), the Ministry of Trade, the Inland Revenue Department, and the National Insurance Service. The CIPO has an online information portal that describes the steps to register a business in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. There is no online registration process, but the required forms are available online. These must be printed and submitted to the CIPO. More information is available at http://www.cipo.gov.vc . There is no restriction on domestic investors seeking to do business abroad. Local companies are actively encouraged to take advantage of export opportunities specifically related to the country’s membership in the OECS Economic Union and the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME), which enhances the competitiveness of the local and regional private sectors across traditional and emerging high-potential markets. 3. Legal Regime St. Vincent and the Grenadines uses transparent policies and laws to foster competition and establish clear rules for foreign and domestic investors in the areas of tax, labor, environment, health, and safety. Accounting, legal, and regulatory practices are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The International Financial Accounting Standards, which stem from the General Accepted Accounting Principles, govern the profession in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Rulemaking and regulatory authority rests in the unicameral House of Assembly, which has fifteen elected members and six appointed senators who sit for a five-year term. The Public Accounts Committee and Director of Audits ensure the government follows administrative processes. National laws govern all regulations relating to foreign investment. Ministries develop these laws, and the Ministry of Legal Affairs drafts them. Laws pertaining to Invest SVG also govern FDI. Invest SVG has the main responsibility for investment supervision, while the Ministry of Economic Planning, Sustainable Development, Industry, Information, and Labor tracks investments to collect information for national statistics and reporting purposes. The government publishes most draft bills in local newspapers for public comment. In addition, the government circulates bills at stakeholder meetings. Some bills and laws are published on the government website at www.gov.vc . The government sometimes establishes a select committee to suggest amendments to specific draft bills. In some instances, these mechanisms may also apply to investment laws and regulations. There is no obligation for the government to consider proposed amendments prior to implementation. The government discloses information on public finances and debt obligations. The annual budget address can be found online. The country’s membership in regional organizations, particularly the OECS and its Economic Union, commits the state to implement all appropriate measures to fulfill its various treaty obligations. For example, the Banking Act, which establishes a single banking space and the harmonization of banking regulations in the Economic Union, is uniformly in force in the eight member territories of the ECCU, although there are some minor differences in implementation from country to country. The most recent Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) Mutual Evaluation assessment found St. Vincent and the Grenadines to be largely compliant. The ECCB is the supervisory authority over financial institutions registered under the Banking Act of 2015. Local laws dictate that an external company must be registered with the Commercial Registry in St. Vincent and the Grenadines if it wishes to operate in the country. Companies using or manufacturing chemicals must first obtain approval of their environmental and health practices from the St. Vincent and the Grenadines National Standards Institution and the Environmental Division of the Ministry of Health. As a member of the OECS and the ECCU, St. Vincent and the Grenadines subscribes to a set of principles and policies outlined in the Revised Treaty of Basseterre. The relationship between national and regional systems is such that each participating member state is expected to coordinate and adopt, where possible, common national policies aimed at the progressive harmonization of relevant policies and systems across the region. Thus, the country must implement regionally developed regulations, such as legislation passed under the OECS Authority, unless it seeks specific concessions not to do so. The country’s Bureau of Standards is a statutory body which prepares and promulgates standards in relation to goods, services, processes, and practices. As a signatory to the WTO Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade, St. Vincent and the Grenadines must harmonize all national standards to international norms to avoid creating technical barriers to trade. St. Vincent and the Grenadines ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2017 and subsequently notified its Category A measures. Included in the Trade Facilitation Agreement are measures to improve risk management techniques and a post-clearance audit system to eliminate delays and congestion at the port. While St. Vincent and the Grenadines has implemented some TFA requirements, it has missed two implementation deadlines. A full list of measures undertaken pursuant to the TFA is available at https://tfadatabase.org/members/saint-vincent-and-the-grenadines . The country’s legal system is based on the British common law system. The constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary. The judicial system consists of lower courts, called magistrates’ courts, and a family court. The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Act establishes the Supreme Court of Judicature, which consists of the High Court and the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal. The High Court hears criminal and civil (commercial) matters and makes determinations on constitutional matters. Parties may appeal first to the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, a court that hears appeals from all OECS members. The final court of appeal is the Judicial Committee of the UK Privy Council. The country has a strong judicial system that upholds the sanctity of contracts and prevents unwarranted discrimination towards foreign investors. The government treats foreign investors and local investors equally with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory. The police and court systems are generally unbiased in commercial matters. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is the regional judicial tribunal. The CCJ has original jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. St. Vincent and the Grenadines is only subject to the original jurisdiction of the CCJ. The United States and St. Vincent and the Grenadines are both parties to the WTO. The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body resolve disputes over WTO agreements, while courts of appropriate jurisdiction in both countries resolve private disputes. Invest SVG provides guidance on the relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. Invest SVG has the authority to screen and review FDI projects. The review process is transparent and contingent on the size of capital investment and the project’s projected economic impact. The investor must complete a series of steps to obtain a business license. These steps are listed at http://www.investsvg.com . All potential investors seeking an incentive package must submit their proposals for review by Invest SVG to ensure the project is consistent with the nation’s laws and interests and would provide economic benefits to the country. Local enterprises generally welcome joint ventures with foreign investors to access technology, expertise, markets, and capital. Chapter 8 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas outlines the competition policy applicable to CARICOM states. Member states are required to establish and maintain a national competition authority for implementing the rules of competition. CARICOM established a Caribbean Competition Commission to apply rules of competition regarding anti-competitive cross-border business conduct. CARICOM competition policy addresses anti-competitive business conduct such as agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises, and concerted practices by enterprises that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within CARICOM, and actions by which an enterprise abuses its dominant position within CARICOM. There is no legislation to regulate competition in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Under the Land Acquisition Act, the government may acquire land for a public purpose. The government must serve a notice of acquisition to the person from whom the land is acquired. A Board of Assessment determines compensation and files its award in the High Court. The value of the land is based on the amount for which the land would be sold on the open market by a willing seller. Under the Alien’s (Land-Holding Regulation) Act, the government can hold properties forfeit without compensation if the terms of investment are not met. The U.S. Embassy is not aware of any outstanding expropriation claims or nationalization of foreign enterprises in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act governs the country’s bankruptcy framework and grants certain rights to debtors and creditors. 6. Financial Sector St. Vincent and the Grenadines is a member of the ECCU. As such, it is also a participant on the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange (ECSE) and the Regional Government Securities Market. The ECSE is a regional securities market established by the ECCB and regulated by the Eastern Caribbean Securities Regulatory Commission. The Securities Act of 2001 regulates activities on the ECSM. The ECSE and its subsidiaries, the Eastern Caribbean Central Securities Depository and the Eastern Caribbean Central Securities Registry, facilitate activities on the ECSE. The main activities are the primary issuance and secondary trading of corporate and sovereign securities, the clearance and settlement of issues and trades, maintaining securities holders’ records, and providing custodial, registration, transfer agency, and paying agency services while respecting listed and non-listed securities. As of March 2021, there were 164 securities listed on the ECSE, comprising 140 sovereign debt instruments, 13 equities, and 11 corporate debt securities. Market capitalization stood at $703 million (1.9 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars), representing a 6.9 percent increase from 2020. St. Vincent and the Grenadines is open to portfolio investment. St. Vincent and the Grenadines accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund Agreement, sections 2, 3, and 4, and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on making international payments and transfers. St. Vincent and the Grenadines does not have a credit bureau. Eight participating governments passed the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement Act. The act provides for the establishment of the ECCB, its management and administration, its currency, relations with financial institutions, relations with the participating governments, foreign exchange operations, external reserves, and other related matters. St. Vincent and the Grenadines is a signatory to this agreement. Therefore, the ECCB controls the country’s currency and regulates its domestic banks. The Banking Act 2015 is a harmonized piece of legislation across all ECCU member states. The ECCB and the Ministers of Finance of member states jointly carry out banking supervision under the act. The Ministers of Finance usually act in consultation with the ECCB with respect to those areas of responsibility within the Minister of Finance’s portfolio. Domestic and foreign banks can establish operations in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The Banking Act requires all commercial banks and other institutions to be licensed. The ECCB regulates financial institutions. As part of supervision, licensed financial institutions are required to submit monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports to the ECCB. In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector in St. Vincent and the Grenadines as stable. Assets of commercial banks totaled $833 million (2.25 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) at the end of December 2019. The reserve requirement for commercial banks was six percent of deposit liabilities. The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S., Canadian, and European banks due to risk management concerns. CARICOM remains committed to engaging with key stakeholders on the issue and appointed a Committee of Ministers of Finance on Correspondent Banking to continue to monitor the issue. Bitt, a Barbadian company, developed digital currency DCash in partnership with the ECCB. The first successful DCash retail central bank digital currency (CDBC) consumer-to-merchant transaction took place in Grenada in February 2021 following a multi-year development process. The CBB and the FSC established a regulatory sandbox in 2018 where financial technology entities can do live testing of their products and services. This allowed regulators to gain a better understanding of the product or service and to determine what, if any, regulation is necessary to protect consumers. Bitt completed its participation and formally exited the sandbox in 2019. Bitt launched DCash in St. Vincent and the Grenadines in August 2021. In January 2022, the platform experienced a system interruption, and its operation was suspended. The platform regained full functionality at the end of March 2022 following system upgrades. St. Vincent and the Grenadines does not have any specific legislation to regulate cryptocurrencies. Neither the government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines nor the ECCB, maintains a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are several state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating in the following sectors: water, transportation, housing, transportation (ports), electricity, tourism, information and communication, telecommunications, investment and investment services, financial services, fisheries, agriculture, sports and culture, civil engineering, and infrastructure. SOEs in St. Vincent and the Grenadines are wholly owned government entities. They are headed by boards of directors to which senior managers report. They are governed by their respective legislation and do not generally pose a threat to investors, as they do not have a mandate to compete with private-sector companies. There is no single published list of SOEs, though information about individual SOEs is available. There are no targeted privatization programs in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 10. Political and Security Environment St. Vincent and the Grenadines does not have a recent history of politically motivated violence or civil disturbance. Elections are peaceful and regarded as being free and fair. The next general elections are constitutionally due in 2025. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2019 $823 2019 825 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 7 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 1 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2019 199.5 UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Eastern Caribbean Central Bank https://eccb-centralbank.org/statistics/dashboard-datas/ Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. Samoa Executive Summary The Independent State of Samoa is a peaceful parliamentary democracy within the Commonwealth of Nations. It has a population of approximately 220,000 and a nominal GDP of USD 799 million. Samoa became the 155th member of the WTO in May 2012. Samoa is experiencing a deep recession due in large part to the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. In July 2021, the World Bank downgraded Samoa’s classification to “lower-middle income” from its previous status as an “upper-middle income” country. Samoa is one of the most politically and economically stable democratic island countries in the Pacific, featuring a history of strong sociocultural structures and values. Following a months-long peaceful political impasse, Samoa experienced its first political transition in almost 40 years in 2021 and Fiame Naomi Mata’afa became Samoa’s first-ever female prime minister. Samoa has a free press, independent judiciary, and the government has a strong record in protecting human rights. Samoa is located south of the equator, about halfway between Hawaii and New Zealand in the Polynesian region of the Pacific Ocean. Samoa’s total land area is 1,097 square miles, consisting of the two main islands of Upolu and Savai’i, which account for 99 percent of the total land area, and eight small islets. About 80 percent of land is customary land, owned by villages, with the remainder either freehold or government-owned. Customary land can be leased, but not sold. In the past decade, Samoa has taken steps to align its systems more closely with nations in the Southern Hemisphere and Asia. Samoans drove on the right side of the road (like the United States) until 2009, at which time the country shifted to driving on the left side as done in Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Until 2011, Samoa was located east of the international dateline in the same time zone as Hawaii but is now one of the first countries in the world to start each day. The small island country has experienced catastrophic natural disasters, including a 2009 earthquake and tsunami that killed hundreds, and severe cyclones in 2012 and 2018. These calamities have inflicted damage equivalent to a quarter of Samoa’s GDP, representing significant setbacks to the economy. In February 2021, the Central Bank of Samoa stated that the country’s economy was in full recession as the impact of COVID-19 global pandemic affected all sectors. From a peak in the third quarter of 2019, Samoa’s GDP has contracted by 12 percent in real terms through the end of 2021. The recession was caused by declines in tourism, business services, transport, and the communications sector. Samoa’s government understands that that its economy needs external investment and is generally welcoming of FDI. The service sector accounts for nearly three-quarters of GDP and employs approximately 65 percent of the formally employed labor force (roughly 30 percent of the population). Pre-COVID-19, tourism was the largest single activity, though the government shut Samoa’s borders in March 2020 in response to the pandemic and had not reopened to tourism as of the end of 2021. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 N/A http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 20M https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,050 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Samoa welcomes business and investors. Samoa’s fertile soil, English-speaking and educated workforce, and tropical climate offer advantages to focused investors, though the country’s distance from major markets affects the cost of imports and exports. Historically the main productive sectors of the economy are agriculture and tourism, and the economy depends heavily on overseas remittances. For investors, Samoa offers a trained, productive and industrially adaptable work force that communicates well in English; competitive wage rates; free repatriation of capital and profits; well-developed, reasonably priced transport infrastructure, telecommunications, water supply, and electricity; industry incentive packages for tourism and manufacturing sectors; a stable financial environment with single-digit inflation; a balanced budget and international reserves; relatively low corporate and income taxes; and a pleasant and safe lifestyle. All businesses in the greater Apia area have access to broadband and Wi-Fi, which is reasonably reliable and fast, but relatively expensive. In rural Upolu and on Savaii Island there is limited availability of high-speed internet, but reliable Wi-Fi through personal mobile routers is universal. In 2018, Samoa completed the installation of a National Broadband Highway which provides fiber optic data services and 4G LTE cellular data speeds to the entire country. 4G LTE data speeds are operative and commercially available nationwide. Foreign Investors are permitted 100% ownership in all different sectors of industry except for restricted activities below. The following businesses are reserved for Samoan Citizens only: Bus transport services for the general public; Taxi transport services for the general public; Rental vehicles; Retailing; Saw milling; and Traditional elei garment designing and printing. Please see Samoa’s Foreign Investment Amendment Act 2011 for a more detailed Restricted List: http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/ws/legis/consol_act_2020/fia2000219/fia2000219.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=foreign%20investment%20act . The Investment Promotion division of the Ministry of Commerce Industry and Labor (MCIL) provides information about investing and doing business in Samoa: https://www.mcil.gov.ws/services/investment-promotion-and-industry-development/investment-promotion/ . Foreign Investors are permitted 100% ownership in all different sectors of the industry except for conditions for restricted activities listed above. Please see Samoa’s Foreign Investment Amendment Act 2011 for a more detailed Restricted List at: http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/ws/legis/consol_act_2020/fia2000219/fia2000219.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=foreign%20investment%20act The World Trade Organization conducted a Trade Policy review of Samoa in 2019: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp486_e.htm . The IMF’s regular Article IV reports are available at: https://www.imf.org/en/countries/wsm?selectedfilters=Article%20IV%20Staff%20Reports#whatsnew . Samoa’s latest national investment policy statement can be found here: https://www.mcil.gov.ws/services/investment-promotion-and-industry-development/investment-promotion/ . The Strategy for the Development of Samoa can be found here: https://www.mof.gov.ws/services/economic-policy-planning/national-development-plans-for-samoa/ . Samoa’s Trade, Commerce, and Manufacturing Sector Plan 2017/2018 – 2020/2021 are available here: https://www.mof.gov.ws/services/economic-policy-planning/sector-plans/ . The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labor (MCIL) administers Samoa’s foreign investment policy and regulations ( https://www.mcil.gov.ws/ ). To open a branch of an existing corporation in Samoa, one must register the company for about USD 115. For a company to qualify as a “Samoan company,” the majority of shareholders must be Samoan. The fee to register an overseas company is about USD 115. All businesses with foreign shareholdings must obtain and hold valid foreign investment registration certificates. The application fee is about USD 50 and can be obtained by contacting MCIL. Certificates are valid until the business terminates activity. If a business does not commence activity within 2 years after a certificate is issued, the certificate becomes invalid. Upon approval of the FIC, the foreign investor is then required to apply for a business license before operating in Samoa. Fees range from USD 100-USD $250, depending on the type of business. Land has a special status in Samoa, as it does in most Pacific Island countries. Under the country’s land classification system, about 80 percent of all land is customary land, owned by villages, with the remainder either freehold (private) or government-owned. The standard method for obtaining customary land, which cannot be bought or sold, is through long-term leases that must be negotiated with the local communities. A typical lease for business use might be for 30 years, with the option of a further 30 years after that, but longer terms can be negotiated. It should be noted that customary land cannot be mortgaged, and thus cannot be used as collateral to raise capital or credit. Freehold land, mostly based in and around Apia can be bought, sold and mortgaged. Only Samoan citizens may buy freehold land unless approval is obtained from Samoa’s Head of State. The Foreign Investment Amendment Act 2011 is the preeminent legislation on foreign investment: http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/ws/legis/consol_act_2020/fia2000219/fia2000219.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=foreign%20investment%20act . Business Registration Step 1: Register your company and obtain a Foreign Investment Certificate at MCIL. https://www.mcil.gov.ws/services/business-registration/foreign-investment-registration/ Step 2: Obtain a business license and register for VAGST and PAYE from the Ministry of Revenue. https://www.revenue.gov.ws/business-license-matters/ Step 3: Register with the National Provident Fund. http://npf.ws/empregistration Step 4: Register with the Accident Compensation Corporation. https://acc.gov.ws/levy-registration/ Step 5: Apply for Foreign Employment Employee Permit. https://www.mcil.gov.ws/services/employment/foreign-employment-employee/ Step 6: Apply for Residence Permit. This allows non-citizens to reside in Samoa. https://mpmc.gov.ws/divisions/immigration/ Many parts of these registrations can be done online, but some may require payment in person. MCIL has an Investment Promotion and Industry Development Division (IPIDD) with services available to all investors: https://www.mcil.gov.ws/services/investment-promotion-and-industry-development/ . Samoa’s Ministry of Revenue only distinguishes between small/medium enterprises (less than USD 400,000 in annual turnover) and large enterprises (over USD 400,000 in annual turnover). Priority service is given to large enterprises. There is minimal outward investment from Samoa beyond several stationery and apparel stores having branches in New Zealand and American Samoa. The government and economy are more focused on increasing exports of Samoan products. The government does not appear to restrict investment abroad. Pacific Islands Trade and Invest ( https://pacifictradeinvest.com/about/ ) is a resource for companies looking to establish themselves overseas. 3. Legal Regime The Government uses transparent policies and effective laws to establish “clear rules of the game.” Accounting, legal and regulatory procedures are all consistent with international norms. According to the Samoa Institute of Accountants, businesses adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and International Standards on Auditing and Quality Assurance. Draft bills are made available through the parliamentary website, https://www.palemene.ws/parliament-business/bills/ , but are not made available for formal public comment. Those who wish to make a comment on the bill are given the opportunity to do so before a Parliamentary Committee. Public notices are televised and printed on local newspaper for the awareness of the public that there is an avenue to voice their opinions on drafted Government policies. The Office of the Regulator (OOTR) was established in 2006 under the Telecommunications Act 2005 to provide regulatory services for the telecommunications sector in Samoa. However, the Broadcasting and Postal Services Acts 2010 were recently approved by Parliament, which also provide regulatory framework for broadcasting and postal sectors in Samoa. These Acts require the Regulator to establish a fair, unbiased and ethical regime for implementing the objects of these Acts including licensing of telecommunications, broadcasting and postal services, promotion of new services and investment, consumer protection, prevention of anti-competitive activities by service providers, and management of the radio spectrum and national number plans. OOTR also approves the Electric Power Corporation’s Power Purchase Agreements with Independent Power Providers and reviews EPC’s Power Extension Plan. Finances and expenditures of the government are published twice on an annual basis, and available through the parliament website. Debt obligations are published on a quarterly basis by the Samoa Bureau of Statistics through its quarterly reports. Samoa is a member of the Pacific Islands Forum, which is an 18-member inter-governmental organization that aims to enhance cooperation between the independent countries of the Pacific Ocean. Samoa’s system of government is based on the Westminster Parliamentary system. Samoa’s Companies Act 2001 contains a modern regulatory regime based on New Zealand company law. The Samoan legal system has its foundations in English and Commonwealth statutory and common law. Various business structures utilized in common law are recognized: sole traders, partnerships, limited liability companies, joint ventures and trusts (including unit trusts). These structures are regulated by legislation including the Companies Act 2001, Partnership Act 1975, Trustee Act 1975 and Unit Trusts Act 2008. Samoa’s Companies Act 2001 contains a modern regulatory regime based on New Zealand company law. It allows the incorporation of a sole person company (i.e., one person being both shareholder and director) and directors need not be resident in Samoa. A Samoa incorporated private company is a separate legal entity and a corporation under Samoan law. It must file an annual return with the Registrar of Companies specifying details of directors, shareholders, registered office etc. There is no requirement for private companies to file annual financial reports with the Companies Registry nor are there any minimum capital requirements. The judicial system is largely independent from the executive branch. In December 2020, the National Parliament passed into law three controversial bills that fundamentally changed country’s constitution and judicial system. The three bills, the Constitution Amendment Bill, Lands and Titles Bill, and Judicature Bill, were passed by Parliament with a vote of 41-4. The bills were opposed by the judiciary and the Samoa Law Society for lack of consultation and the impact on human rights and rule of law. The Australian and New Zealand Law Societies, and other international organizations issued statements in support of the judiciary and the law society. The new laws have in effect divided the judicial system into parallel courts of equal standing: one to deal with criminal and civil matters, and the other with customary land and titles. There are outstanding questions about the constitutionality of the new laws. The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labor administers Samoa’s foreign investment policy and regulations under the Foreign Investment Amendment Act 2011. All businesses with any foreign ownership require foreign investment approval by MCIL. ( https://www.mcil.gov.ws/ ). The Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Labor’s Fair Trading and Codex Alimentarius Division (FTCD) handles competition related concerns. The main pieces of legislation regarding competition are the Fair Trading Act 1998, the Consumer Information Act 1989, and the Measures Ordinance 1960. Samoa’s constitution prohibits expropriation without compensation, and expropriation cases in Samoa are rare. There was one significant case that occurred in 2009 over land designated for a new six-story government building. A business signed a 20-year lease with the government in 2005 but was then asked to move in 2008 to make way for the new building. The business moved but won a settlement in the Court of Appeals against the government for a much larger sum than the government initially offered the business for vacating the land. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2007 (amended 2013) outlines ADR procedures for both criminal and civil proceedings. Samoa has an Accredited Mediators of Samoa Association that was put in place to help resolve (largely commercial) disputes. Bankruptcies are governed by the Samoa Bankruptcy Act of 1908, which gives broad rights to the judiciary to issue orders related the property of any debtor or bankrupt who becomes subject to the Act. The judiciary has the authority to decide all questions of priorities. 6. Financial Sector The capital market is regulated by the Central Bank of Samoa (CBS). Since January 1998, the Central Bank has implemented monetary policy by issuing its own Securities using market-based techniques – commonly known as Open Market Operations (OMO). CBS Securities are the predominant monetary policy instrument, which is issued to influence the amount of liquidity in the financial system. Capital markets in Samoa are in their infancy with the Unit Trust of Samoa (UTOS) domestic market established in 2010, and no international stock exchange. Samoa has accepted the obligations of IMF Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4, and maintains an exchange system that is free of restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Samoa is well-served with banking and finance infrastructure. It has four commercial banks, complimented by a dynamic development bank. The sector is ably regulated by the Central Bank of Samoa. The largest banks are regional operators ANZ and BSP, which offer a wide range of services based upon electronic banking platforms. Although they service all markets, they tend to dominate the top-end, encompassing corporate, government and high net worth individuals. Samoa is still a cash-based society, however, and this has enabled two locally owned entrants, the National Bank of Samoa and Samoa Commercial Bank, to each garner double-digit market share, despite entering the market quite recently. The banking sector appears healthy although recent reports have indicated the state-owned development bank is carrying a significant amount of bad debt, over 20% of its loan portfolio. The government also interfered with the bank’s attempts to foreclose on non-performing assets. With its International Finance Centre (Samoa International Finance Authority – SIFA)—the first Pacific center to be white-listed by the OECD—and a well-structured financial services sector, Samoa is well placed to service the needs of both local and offshore businesses. The Government, through the Central Bank, has been largely resistant of block chain technologies. Their skepticism is somewhat warranted with the discovery of several cryptocurrency schemes operating in the country widely believed to be scams. There is no sovereign wealth fund or asset management bureau in Samoa. The country has the Samoa National Provident Fund which manages and invests members’ savings for their retirement. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Private enterprises are allowed to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions. Laws and rules do not offer preferential treatment to SOEs. State-owned enterprises are subject to budget constraints, and these are enforced. SOEs are active in the Energy, Water, Tourism, Aviation, Banking, Agriculture supplies, and Ports/Airports sectors. Laws do not provide for a leading role for SOEs or limit private enterprise activity in sectors in which SOEs operate. SOEs have government-appointed boards and operate with varying degrees of autonomy with respect to their governing Ministry. SOEs follow a normal corporate structure with a board of directors and executive management. All SOEs have boards of directors who are appointed by a cabinet minister. Some SOEs have board seats allocated specifically to the heads of certain government ministries. By law SOEs are required to present financials to their board of directors, shareholding Ministry and the National Auditor. Timely compliance, however, varies between SOEs. Samoa does not have an active privatization program. The most recent major privatizations in Samoa were in broadcasting (2008) and telecommunications (2011), both resulting in significant gains in efficiency and benefits to both producer and consumer. The 2011 telecommunications privatization was to a foreign company. Procedures for establishing all businesses are provided under existing legislation, including the Companies Amendment Act 2006, the Foreign Investment Amendment Act 2011, the Business License Act 1998, the Labour and Employment Relations Act 2013, the Central Bank Act and Guidelines, and the Health Ordinance 1959 (Part 11, 111 clause 13 & 15). 10. Political and Security Environment Samoa is a peaceful parliamentary democracy with no history of politically motivated violence or civil disturbance. The risk of civil disorder is low. There is no civil strife or insurrection. There are no significant border disputes at risk of escalating into conflict. Law and order is well maintained by the Samoa Police Service with support from the village chiefs and other traditional/church authorities if required. There are no examples of politically motivated damage to projects or installations in recent years. Samoa experienced a measles epidemic in 2019 and the government implemented strict border closures in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Both severely affected local business with varying degrees of cessation of economic activity. Samoa has demonstrated that it will take extreme measures to prevent loss of life, even at the expense of massive economic losses. Sao Tome and Principe Executive Summary São Tomé and Príncipe (STP) is a stable, multi-party democracy. It is a developing country with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of roughly USD $427.4 million and a population of 215,048 (World Bank, 2019 estimate). Due to STP’s very limited revenue sources, foreign donors finance roughly 90 percent or more of its public investment budget. For the 2021 budget, these donors were China, Japan, Portugal, the World Bank, European Union, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the African Development Bank, and the Arab Bank for Economic Development (BADEA.) STP has taken positive steps over the last decade to improve its investment climate and to make the country a more attractive destination for foreign direct investment (FDI), including by working to combat corruption and create an open and transparent business environment. In 2021, VISA cards were introduced in the country. To improve the appeal of tourism during the pandemic, the Tourism Directorate launched its “Seal of Clean” Program in 2021. The Value Added Tax (VAT) Law (13/2019) enacted in 2019 to facilitate tax collection and enforcement of the tax code is scheduled for adoption. A modern Labor Code (6/2019) came into force in 2019 to make it easier for investors to understand and abide by the labor standards. In June 2019, STP also became the 25th African country to ratify the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). In 2018, it passed its Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Law, Notary Code, and Commercial Register Code. The Regulation of Investment Code was adopted in 2017 and the Investment Code and Code of Fiscal Benefits and Incentives were previously adopted in 2016. The 2013 anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing law brought STP into compliance with international standards. A Millennium Challenge Corporation Country Threshold Program, completed in 2011, modernized STP’s customs administration, reformed its tax policies, and made it less burdensome to start a new business. Together, these efforts helped to develop a modern and transparent legal framework for foreign investment. Due to its reliance on outside investment, STP remains committed to improving its investment climate. The government continues to work with the business community to develop the country economically and to improve basic social services for the country’s young and growing population. In 2018, it approved a four-year program to promote “robust economic growth” focused on the provision of services, including tourism, the financial sector, technology, logistics, and health services associated with the digital economy. Special attention is also being given to traditional sectors, mainly agriculture, livestock, and marine resources. STP’s extensive maritime domain (160,000 km2) may hold opportunities for hydrocarbon production as technology improves. In cooperation with China, STP is seeking to modernize its port infrastructure and capitalize on its fishing potential. In 2020, China also announced funding for airport rehabilitation and upgrades. STP is using Word Bank funding to rehabilitate the road linking the capital to the north of the island. However, foreign investors continue to face challenges identifying viable investment opportunities due to STP’s small and fragile domestic market, inadequate infrastructure, slow moving justice system, high cost of credit, and limited access and expensive electricity. Prime Minister Jorge Bom Jesus is focused on fighting corruption, improving the business environment, attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and promoting economic growth. In his inaugural address in 2021, President Carlos Vila Nova expressed support for protecting the environment and investments. The President also welcomed U.S. cooperation. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 66 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/sao-tome-and-principe Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $21 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.html#451 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $2,060 https://data.worldbank.org/country/sao-tome-and-principe?view=chart 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment According to Article 4 of the Investment Code, both domestic and foreign investors are free to establish and own business enterprises, as well as engage in all forms of business activity in STP, except in the sectors defined by law as reserved for the state, specifically military and paramilitary activities and Central Bank operations. STP is gradually moving towards open competition in all sectors of the economy, and competitive equality is the official standard applied to private enterprises in competition with public enterprises regarding access to markets, credit, and other business activities. The government has eliminated former public monopolies in farming, banking, insurance, airline services, telecommunications, and trade (export and import). São Tomé and Príncipe is taking steps toward sustainable economic growth. Its economic prospects depend on the government’s ability to reinforce the capacity of its small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and attract sustainable foreign direct investment. Therefore, the government is eager to improve the country’s investment climate to make it a more attractive destination for foreign investors. Under Article 14 of the Investment Code, the State guarantees equal and non-discriminatory treatment to both foreign and domestic investors operating in the country. The Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APCI, www.apcistp.com ), housed in the Ministry of Planning, Finance, and Blue Economy, promotes and facilitates investment through “single-window” service and multi-sectoral coordination. However, the agency is still struggling to fully comply with its mandate due to a lack of capacity. There are no limits on foreign ownership or control except for activities customarily reserved for the state. The form of public participation, namely the percentage of government ownership in joint ventures, varies according to the agreement. Based on Article 8 of the Regulation of the Investment Code, all inbound investment proposals must be screened and approved by the applicable ministry for the economic sector in coordination with APCI. According to Article 14, an investment proposal can be rejected if it threatens national security, public health, or ecological equilibrium, and if the proposal has a negative effect or insufficient contribution to country’s economy. However, these mechanisms do not go beyond the law’s mandate and are not considered barriers to investment. STP is not a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), nor has the government participated in in any investment policy reviews provided through the body. Neither the World Trade Organization (WTO) nor United National Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has conducted a review, either. STP currently has observer status in the World Trade Organization, and it is a member of UNCTAD. STP has taken steps to facilitate investment and improve the business environment in recent years. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) worked with STP from 2007 to 2011 on a Threshold Country Program to improve investment opportunities, including by creating a “one-stop shop” to help encourage new investments by making it easier and cheaper to import and export goods, reducing the time required to start a new business, and improving STP’s tax and customs clearance administration. Currently a business can be registered within one to five days. In 2013, with the support of the International Trade Center, the Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APCI) was created. APCI’s business facilitation services, including a “one-stop shop” for business registration, offer equal treatment for women and underrepresented minorities in the economy; however, there is no special assistance provided to these groups. A Single Window website ( http://gue-stp.net/spip.php?article24 ; in Portuguese only) provides information and the application form needed to create and register companies in STP. While STP’s government does not actively promote outward investment, it does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. STP also has signed Investment Protection Agreements with several countries. 3. Legal Regime The laws and regulations that affect direct investment, including environmental, health, and safety rules and regulations, apply equally to foreign and domestic firms. Before approval, investment proposals are evaluated for their environmental and social impacts. STP tax laws reward citizens who return to STP to invest, while also containing provisions for attracting foreigners to invest in STP. The STP legal code is based on Portuguese law, and laws and regulations are applied at the national level. Rule-making and regulatory authority exist at the national level and regulations are developed at the ministerial level, approved by the National Assembly, and promulgated by the President. The ministry concerned is responsible for any regulatory enforcement mechanisms. Rarely, drafted bills or regulations are made available for public comment. Copies of most regulations can be purchased online at https://www.legis-palop.org/ or directly at the Ministry of Justice, Public Administration, and Human Rights in the format of the Official Gazette. The public finances and debt obligations are relatively transparent and are periodically available on the finance ministry website: https://financas.gov.st/ STP is a member of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), whose fundamental goals are to promote exchange and collaboration among the member countries and provide an institutional and legal framework to their cooperative efforts. ECCAS is the largest economic community in Central Africa, including Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) member states (Gabon, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, and Equatorial Guinea), as well as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Rwanda, and STP. The archipelago is a member of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) and its economic confederation (CE). STP is not a member of the WTO, but it does have observer status. STP is among the 44 African Nations to have signed the agreement on African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in March 2018 in Kigali, Rwanda, and became the 25th African country to ratify the AfCFTA in June 2019. Disputes are generally solved through dialogue or negotiations between parties without litigation. However, there was a dispute in May 2018 between a local businessman and an Angolan investor that led to the unconstitutional dismissal of Supreme Court Judges by the parliament. Relatedly, there have been a few instances of disagreements involving foreign investors reaching international courts. The country has a written commercial law but does not have specialized courts. Overall, the legal system is perceived as acting independently. The judicial process is fair but is subject to manipulation on occasion. All regulations or enforcement actions are appealable to the Supreme Court. The VAT Law was approved in 2019, but it has yet to be legally implemented. A modern Labor Code (6/2019) enacted in April 2019, is designed to make labor standards easier for investors to understand and implement. In June 2019, STP ratified the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement (AfCFTA). The Public Private Partnership (PPP) Law, the new Notary Code, and the Commercial Register Code all entered into force in 2018; the Regulation of Investment Code was adopted in 2017; and the Investment Code and Code of Fiscal Benefits and Incentives were adopted in 2016. The Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APCI) is a one-stop shop for all investment information. Due to the establishment of APCI, the cost and waiting period to start a new business have been substantially reduced. A new business can obtain expedited registration within 24 hours for approximately STN10,190 ($456) and between three to five days for approximately STN 5,190 ($232). Despite this improvement, STP was downgraded to 150 out of 190 countries in terms of starting a new business according to the 2020 World Bank Ease of Doing Business Report. In comparison, the country ranked 35 out of 190 economies in the 2017 survey. Although no online business registration process exists, companies can easily register their businesses at the counter. The following is a general description of how a foreign company can establish a local office: Provide full company documentation, translated into Portuguese. Check the uniqueness of the proposed company name and reserve a name. Notarize the company statutes with the registration office at the Ministry of Justice. File a company declaration with the Tax Administration Office at the Ministry of Finance, Commerce, and Blue Economy. Register with the Social Security Office at the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. Publish the incorporation notice in the official government gazette (Diário da República). Publish the incorporation notice in a national newspaper. Register the company with the Commercial Registry Office at the Ministry of Finance, Commerce, and Blue Economy. Apply for a commercial operations permit (also known as an “alvara”). Apply for a taxpayer identification number with the Office of Tax Administration at the Ministry of Finance, Commerce, and Blue Economy. Register employees with the Social Security Office. Other required documents include: 1) copies of the by-laws of the parent company and of the minutes of the meeting of the board of directors in which the opening of the STP branch is approved; 2) a certificate of appointment of the general manager for the STP office; 3) a copy of any agreement signed with a São Toméan company or with the STP government; 4) two copies of permits from the Court authorization to operate; and 5) two photographs and a copy of the passport of the General Manager. In addition, the Single Window website ( http://www.gue-stp.net/spip.php?article24 ; in Portuguese only) provides information on creating and registering companies in STP. Beyond the APCI’s “one-stop shop,”, there are no agencies or brokers that provide services to further simplify the procedures for establishing an office in STP. Some companies consult with a legal office for assistance. DRCAE (Directorate of Regulation and Control of Economic Activities) has the mandate to inspect all economic activities and impose penalties, but it lacks the resources necessary to fully perform its duties. DRCAE is housed under the Secretary of State for Commerce and Industry. AGER (General Regulatory Authority of the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe) was created to promote competition and prevent operator abuses in the water, electricity, and telecommunications sectors, as well as in the postal service. The AGER was established in 2005 and is housed under the Ministry of Public Works, Infrastructures, Natural Resources, and Environment. The STP Constitution and the Expropriation Code allows only the central government to expropriate private property. The law permits expropriation of private property only if it is deemed to be in the national public interest and only with adequate compensation. There is no evidence to suggest that the government would undertake expropriation in a discriminatory manner or in violation of established principles of international law and standards. Aside from a massive land expropriation from colonial farmers in 1976 – later recognized by the government as detrimental to STP’s economy – there have not been any documented cases of expropriation of foreign-owned properties. The government has reportedly considered expropriating land to expand the runway at the international airport, but thus far has reportedly been reluctant to do so out of concern that any expropriation will deter new investment. STP has a bankruptcy law, but it is not well developed. In the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, STP ranked 168 out of 190 economies on the ease of resolving insolvency, the same rank it has in 2019. In January 2022, the STP-based commercial bank Energy Bank, founded in 2011 by a Nigeria investor, declared bankruptcy. This led to the Central Bank cancelling all of the bank’s financial operations in STP. 6. Financial Sector Portfolio investment is undeveloped and unclear. The Central Bank of STP (BCSTP) issued Treasury bills (T-bills) for the first time on June 29, 2015 for STN 75 million (approximately $3.7 million) at the fixed interest rate of 6.2 percent, with a maturity of six months. The demand was 20 percent higher than the offer, due to the participation of three domestic banks. The most recent issuance occurred on March 15, 2018. STP does not have a stock market. Articles 13 and 14 of the Foreign Exchange Regulations facilitate the free flow of financial resources under the supervision of the Central Bank. Foreign investors are able to get credit on the local market; however, access to credit is difficult due to the limited variety of credit instruments, high interest rates, and the number of guarantees requested by the commercial banks. As a result, on the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Report 2020, STP ranked 165 out 190 economies regarding access to credit, a 4-point drop compared to the previous year. There are currently no significant U.S. investors active in STP. STP has four private commercial banks. Portuguese, Angolan, Cameroonian, Gabonese, Togolese, and as well as Säo Toméan interests are represented in the ownership and management of the commercial banks. The International Bank of STP (BISTP) is believed to be the largest bank in terms of assets; however, banks’ asset estimations are not publicly available. In January 2022, STP-based commercial bank Energy Bank, founded in 2011 by a Nigeria investor, declared bankruptcy leading the Central Bank to cancel all its financial operations in STP. In early 2018, the BCSTP declared the commercial bank “Private Bank” insolvent and opened a public tender to liquidate its assets and liabilities. The Gabonese investment bank BGFI opened its São Toméan operation in March 2012. Banking services, especially from BISTP, are available in the capital with a few smaller branches in cities in the north, south, and center of the country, as well as in Príncipe. In 2021, VISA card was introduced into the country’s financial system In addition to retail banking, commercial banks offer most corporate banking services, or can procure them from overseas. Local credit to the private sector is limited and expensive, but available to both foreign and local investors on equal terms. The country’s main economic actors finance themselves outside STP. Foreigners must establish residency to open a bank account. STP does not have a traditional sovereign wealth fund (SWF) in existence. It does have a small National Oil Account (NOA). The NOA was previously funded by signing bonuses paid by energy and oil companies to gain rights to conduct exploration and production activities. According to officials from the budget department, the Law of Petroleum allows the government to withdraw up to 20 percent of the balance of the NOA every year as calculated on June 30 of the previous year. Details are available on the state budget and under NOA online: www.grip.st/?cntnr_informac=informac&ficherselt=DT-166- Envio de Extracto da Conta Nacional de Petroleo junto BCSTP.pdf 10. Political and Security Environment STP is relatively stable, has no ethnic tensions, and has a relaxed lifestyle, which locals refer to as leve-leve (“take it easy”). Since its democratic reforms in 1990, the archipelago has been a good example of democracy in the sub-region with a history of peaceful transfers of power and consensus in decision-making. In July 2021, following the results of the first round of the presidential elections, the third ranked candidate contested the election’s results, alleging massive fraud. After back-and-forth decisions from the Constitutional Court there was a delay in the holding of the second round of the presidential election. Ultimately, the second round took place and observers announced that they found it to be free, fair, and transparent. The President took office in 2021 without incident. There were some protests in 2018 over the creation of the Constitutional Court, and a lower court decision to recount the votes of the October 7 legislative, local, and regional elections. Despite the post-election protests, the legislative elections led to the peaceful formation of a new coalition Government. STP generally has a good human rights record and demonstrates a respect for citizens’ and workers’ rights. Strikes are not seen as the primary means to settle labor disputes and labor strikes have been sporadic in recent times. Since independence in 1975, there have been no incidents of politically motivated attacks on projects or installations. There is no anti-American sentiment and instances of civil disorder are rare. Recently maritime piracy has affected STP’s territorial waters in the Gulf of Guinea, though the threat of terrorism remains limited. STP has sought to be an active partner in regional maritime security efforts, although its capacity and resources are minimal. Despite two violent murders in early 2020, violent crime rates are at a historical low. Saudi Arabia Executive Summary In 2021, the Saudi Arabian government (SAG) continued its ambitious socio-economic reforms, collectively known as Vision 2030. Spearheaded by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Vision 2030 provides a roadmap for the development of new economic sectors and a transition to a digital, knowledge-based economy. The reforms aim to diversify the Saudi economy away from oil and create more private sector jobs for a young and growing population. To accomplish these ambitious Vision 2030 reforms, the SAG is seeking foreign investment in burgeoning sectors such as infrastructure, tourism, entertainment, and renewable energy. Saudi Arabia aims to become a major transport and logistics hub linking Asia, Europe, and Africa. Infrastructure projects related to this goal include various “economic cities” and special economic zones, which will serve as hubs for petrochemicals, mining, logistics, manufacturing, and digital industries. The SAG plans to double the size of Riyadh city and welcomes investment in its multi-billion-dollar giga-projects (including NEOM, Qiddiya, the Red Sea Project, and Amaala), which are the jumping-off points for its nascent tourism industry. The Kingdom is also developing tourism infrastructure at natural sites, such as AlUla, and the SAG continues to grow its successful Saudi Seasons initiative, which hosts tourism and cultural events throughout the country. The Saudi entertainment and sports sector, aided by a relaxation of social restrictions, is also primed for foreign investment. The country hopes to build hundreds of movie theaters and the SAG aims to sign agreements for production studios in Saudi Arabia for end-to-end film production. The SAG seeks to host world class sporting events and has already hosted the European Golf Tour, Diriyah ePrix, Dakar Rally, and Saudi Formula One Grand Prix. In addition, recent film festivals and concerts have demonstrated strong demand for art and cultural events. Lastly, the SAG is eager for foreign investment in green projects related to renewable energy, hydrogen, waste management, and carbon capture to reach net-zero emissions by 2060. It is particularly interested in green capacity-building and technology-sharing initiatives. Despite these investment opportunities, investor concerns persist regarding business predictability, transparency, and political risk. Although some activists have recently been released, the continued detention and prosecution of activists remains a significant concern, while there has been little progress on fundamental freedoms of speech and religion. The pressure to generate non-oil revenue and provide increased employment opportunities for Saudi citizens has prompted the SAG to implement measures that may weaken the country’s investment climate going forward. Increased fees for expatriate workers and their dependents, as well as “Saudization” policies requiring certain businesses to employ a quota of Saudi workers, have led to disruptions in some private sector activities. Additionally, while specific details have not yet been released, Saudi Arabia announced in 2021 that multinational companies wanting to contract with the SAG must establish their regional headquarters in Saudi Arabia by 2024. The SAG has taken important steps since 2018 to improve intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, enforcement, and awareness. While some concerns remain regarding IPR protection in the pharmaceutical sector, no new incidents related to regulatory data protection for health and safety information have been reported since October 2020, and in March 2022 Saudi Arabia issued a public statement stipulating that data protection in the Kingdom is for five years. While the sharp downturn in oil prices in 2020 put pressure on Saudi Arabia’s fiscal situation, the subsequent spike in oil prices has increased government revenue and the SAG expects a budget surplus in 2022. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 52 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 66 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $11,386 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $21,930 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The SAG seeks to attract $3 trillion in foreign investment to promote economic development, transfer foreign expertise and technology to Saudi Arabia, create jobs for Saudi nationals, and increase Saudi Arabia’s non-oil exports. In October 2021, Saudi Arabia announced its National Investment Strategy, which will help it deliver on its Vision 2030 goals. The National Investment Strategy outlines investment plans for sectors including manufacturing, renewable energy, transport and logistics, tourism, digital infrastructure, and health care. The strategy aims to grow the Saudi economy by raising private sector contribution to 65 percent of total GDP and increasing foreign direct investment to 5.7 percent of total GDP. The National Investment Strategy aims to raise net foreign direct investment flows to $103 billion annually and increase domestic investment to about $450 billion annually by 2030. The Ministry of Investment of Saudi Arabia (MISA), formerly the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), governs and regulates foreign investment in the Kingdom, issues licenses to prospective investors, and works to foster and promote investment opportunities across the economy. Established originally as a regulatory agency, MISA has increasingly shifted its focus to investment promotion and assistance, offering potential investors detailed guidance and a catalogue of current investment opportunities on its website https://investsaudi.sa/en/sectors-opportunities /. The SAG has adopted reforms to improve the Kingdom’s attractiveness as an investment destination. It has reduced the license approval period from days to hours, decreased required customs documents, reduced the customs clearance period from weeks to hours, and increased the investor license period to five years. It has launched e-licenses to provide a more efficient and user-friendly process and an online “instant” license issuance or renewal service to foreign investors that are listed on a local or international stock market and meet certain conditions. The SAG allows 100 percent foreign ownership in most sectors. Saudi Arabia’s burgeoning entertainment sector provides opportunities for foreign investment. In a country where most public entertainment was once forbidden, the SAG now regularly sponsors and promotes entertainment programming, including live concerts, dance exhibitions, sports competitions, and other public performances. The audiences for many of these events are now gender-mixed, representing a larger consumer base. In addition to reopening cinemas in 2018, the SAG has hosted Formula One and Formula E races, professional golf and tennis tournaments, and a world heavyweight boxing title match. Saudi Arabia’s General Entertainment Authority launched the Saudi Seasons initiative in 2019, which hosts tourism and cultural events in each of the country’s 11 regions. The second iteration of Saudi Seasons began in October 2021 after a pause due to COVID. Riyadh Season attracted more than 15 million people and more than 1,200 companies participated, providing 150,000 job opportunities. The program included more than 7,500 entertainment events, including Arab and international concerts, international exhibitions, theatrical shows, and a freestyle wrestling tournament. The initiative also featured 200 restaurants and 70 coffee shops at 14 entertainment zones across Riyadh. The SAG is also seeking foreign investment for its “economic cities” and “giga-projects” that are at various stages of construction. These projects are large-scale, self-contained developments in different regions focusing on particular industries, such as technology, energy, logistics, tourism, entertainment, and infrastructure. These projects include: NEOM: a $500 billion long-term development project to build a futuristic “independent economic zone” and city in northwest Saudi Arabia. This initiative aims to create 380,000 jobs and contribute $48 billon to domestic GDP by 2030. This project includes: The Line: a 100 mile-long, urban smart city that will have no cars, no streets, and no carbon emissions. Oxagon: NEOM’s economic and industrial hub focusing on innovation, research, and technology. Built on the coast, it will include the world’s largest floating structure. Trojena: NEOM’s mountain destination blending natural and developed landscapes. This project will include a man-made lake, a wildlife reserve, and a ski resort. Qiddiya: a large-scale entertainment, amusement, sports, and cultural complex near Riyadh. King Abdullah Financial District: a commercial center development with nearly 60 skyscrapers in Riyadh. Red Sea Project: a massive tourism development on the archipelago of islands along the western Saudi coast, which aims to create 70,000 jobs and attract one million tourists per year. Diriyah Gate: a $50 billion project transforming Diriyah, a suburb of Riyadh, into a premiere destination for culture and heritage, entertainment, hospitality, retail, and education. Amaala: a wellness, healthy living, and meditation resort on the Kingdom’s northwest coast, projected to include more than 2,500 luxury hotel rooms and 700 villas. Asir: a $13 billion project to develop the southwestern region of Asir into a global tourism hub, aiming to attract more than 10 million visitors by 2030. To attract tourists to these new sites, the SAG introduced a new tourism visa in 2019 for non-religious travelers, and the Kingdom no longer requires foreign travelers staying in the same hotel room to provide proof of marriage or family relations. The SAG is facilitating private investments through its Tourism Development Fund, which has initial capital of $4 billion, and the Kafalah program, which provides loan guarantees of up to $400 million. In addition, the Tourism Fund signed MOUs with local banks to finance projects valued up to $40 billion to stimulate tourism investment and increase the sector’s contribution to GDP. Investment opportunities in Saudi Arabia’s mining sector continue to expand. In June 2020, the SAG approved a new law allowing foreign companies to enter the mining sector and invest in the Kingdom’s vast mining resources. The law will facilitate the establishment of a mining fund to provide sustainable finance, support geological survey and exploration programs, and optimize national mineral resources valued at $1.3 trillion. The law could increase the sector’s contribution to GDP by $64 billion, reduce imports by $9.8 billion, and create 200,000 direct and indirect jobs by 2030. Saudi Arabia’s national mining company, Ma’aden, has a $12 billion joint venture with Alcoa for bauxite mining and aluminum production and a $7 billion joint venture with the leading American fertilizer firm Mosaic and the Saudi chemical giant SABIC to produce phosphate-based fertilizers. Saudi Arabia’s transportation sector also provides ample opportunity for international investment. In June 2021, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman launched the National Transport and Logistics Strategy to upgrade transportation infrastructure throughout Saudi Arabia. The strategy aims to enhance Saudi Arabia’s position as a global logistics center, improve quality of life, and balance the public budget. The strategy calls for the launch of a new national air carrier, with the goal of increasing the number of international destinations served by the country to more than 250. The SAG also aims to raise air freight sector capacity to more than 4.5 million tons. The strategy includes an initiative to connect Saudi Arabia with the other Arab Gulf states via a railway line. The SAG plans to invest $147 billion in transport and logistics over the next eight years. Lastly, the Kingdom’s infrastructure sector is open to foreign investment. The SAG launched an $800 billion project to double the size of Riyadh city in the next decade and transform it into an economic, social, and cultural hub for the region. The project includes 18 “mega-projects” in the capital city to improve livability, strengthen economic growth, and more than double the population to 15-20 million by 2030. The SAG is seeking private sector financing of $250 billion for these projects, with similar contributions from income generated by its financial, tourism, and entertainment sectors. Saudi Arabia fully recognizes rights to private ownership and the establishment of private business. However, the SAG excludes foreign investors from some economic sectors and places some limits on foreign control. Foreign investors must contend with increasingly strict requirements to base a certain percentage of production within Saudi Arabia (localization), labor policy requirements to hire more Saudi nationals (usually at higher wages than expatriate workers), an increasingly restrictive visa policy for foreign workers, and gender segregation in business and social settings (though this is becoming more relaxed as socio-economic reforms progress). The SAG implemented new taxes and fees in 2017 and early 2018, including significant visa fee increases. In 2020, the SAG increased the value-added tax (VAT) from five to 15 percent. In February 2021, MISA and the Royal Commission for Riyadh City (RCRC) announced a new directive requiring that companies wanting to contract with the SAG establish their regional headquarters in Saudi Arabia – preferably in Riyadh – by 2024. MISA has yet to publish details regarding this mandate. According to MISA, companies that relocate their regional headquarters to Riyadh will benefit from incentives including relaxed Saudization, spouse work permits, waivers of professional accreditation, visa acceleration, and end-to-end business, personal, and concierge services. Saudi officials have confirmed that offices cannot be headquarters “in name only” but, rather, must be legitimate headquarters offices with C-level executive staff in Riyadh overseeing operations and staff in the rest of the region. Companies choosing to maintain their regional headquarters in another country will not be awarded public sector contracts beginning in 2024. Implementing regulations for this new directive have not been issued and it remains unclear if the rule would affect contracting by parastatal organizations such as Saudi Aramco. Foreign investment is currently prohibited in ten sectors: Oil exploration, drilling, and production except services related to the mining sector listed under Central Product Classification (CPC) 5115+883 Catering to military sectors Security and detective services Real estate investment in the holy cities, Mecca and Medina (Note: Foreign investment in real estate in Mecca and Medina is allowed in certain locations and limited to 99-year leases.) Tourist orientation and guidance services for religious tourism related to Hajj and Umrah Recruitment offices Commission agents internationally classified under CPC 621 Services provided by midwives, nurses, physical therapy services, and quasi-doctoral services classified under CPC 93191 Fisheries Poison centers, blood banks, and quarantine services Foreign firms are barred from investing in the upstream hydrocarbon sector, but the SAG permits foreign investment in the downstream energy sector, including refining and petrochemicals. ExxonMobil, Shell, China’s Sinopec, and Japan’s Sumitomo Chemical are partners with Saudi Aramco in domestic refineries. ExxonMobil, Chevron, Shell, and other international investors have joint ventures with Saudi Aramco and/or the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Saudi Aramco since 2020) in large-scale petrochemical plants. The Dow Chemical Company and Saudi Aramco are partners in the $20 billion Sadara joint venture with the world’s largest integrated petrochemical production complex. Saudi Aramco also maintains a group of contractors to provide engineering, procurement, construction, hook-up, commissioning and maintenance, and modifications and operations jobs for its offshore oil and gas infrastructure. Joint ventures almost always take the form of limited liability partnerships in Saudi Arabia, to which there are some disadvantages. Foreign partners in service and contracting ventures organized as limited liability partnerships must pay, in cash or in kind, 100 percent of their contribution to authorized capital. MISA’s authorization is only the first step in setting up such a partnership. Professionals, including architects, consultants, and consulting engineers, are required to register with, and be certified by, the Ministry of Commerce. In theory, these regulations permit the registration of Saudi-foreign joint venture consulting firms. As part of its WTO commitments, Saudi Arabia generally allows consulting firms to establish a local office without a Saudi partner. Foreign engineering consulting companies, however, must have been incorporated for at least 10 years and have operations in at least four different countries to qualify. Foreign entities practicing accounting and auditing, architecture, and civil planning, or providing healthcare, dental, or veterinary services, must still have a Saudi partner. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has opened additional service markets to foreign investment, including financial and banking services; aircraft maintenance and repair; computer reservation systems; wholesale, retail, and franchise distribution services; basic and value-added telecom services; and investment in the computer and related services sectors. In 2016, Saudi Arabia formally approved full foreign ownership of retail and wholesale businesses in the Kingdom. While some companies have already received licenses under the new rules, the restrictions attached to obtaining full ownership – including a requirement to invest over $50 million during the first five years and ensure that 30 percent of all products sold are manufactured locally – have proven difficult to meet and have precluded many investors from taking full advantage of the reform. Saudi Arabia completed its third WTO trade policy review in March 2021, which included investment policies. The review can be found on WTO’s website https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp507_e.htm . In addition to applying for a license from MISA, foreign and local investors must register a new business via the Ministry of Commerce (MOC), which has begun offering online registration services for limited liability companies at https://mc.gov.sa/en/ . Though users may submit articles of association and apply for a business name within minutes on MOC’s website, final approval from the Ministry often takes a week or longer. Applicants must also complete several other steps to start a business, including obtaining a municipality (baladia) license for their office premises and registering separately with the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development, Chamber of Commerce, Passport Office, Tax Department, and the General Organization for Social Insurance. From start to finish, registering a business in Saudi Arabia takes about three weeks. Saudi officials have stated their intention to attract foreign small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to the Kingdom. Under Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia aims to increase SME contribution to its GDP to 35 percent by 2030. To facilitate and promote the growth of the SME sector, the SAG established the Small and Medium Enterprises General Authority, Monsha’at, in 2015 and released a new Companies Law in 2016, which was amended in 2018 to update the language vis-à-vis Joint Stock Companies (JSC) and Limited Liability Companies (LLC). It also substantially reduced the minimum capital and number of shareholders required to form a JSC from five to two. The SAG continues to roll out initiatives to spur the development of the SME ecosystem in Saudi Arabia. As of 2019, women no longer need a male guardian to apply for a business license. In February 2021, Monsha’at launched the Bank of Small and Medium Enterprises to provide a one-stop shop for SME financing. In March 2022, Monsha’at and the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology inaugurated the National Business Innovation Portal, which provides guidance and resources for SMEs. Private Saudi citizens, Saudi companies, and SAG entities hold extensive overseas investments. The SAG has transformed its Public Investment Fund (PIF), into a major international investor and sovereign wealth fund. The PIF’s outward investment projects are covered in Section 6 (Financial Sector). Saudi Aramco and SABIC are also major investors in the United States. In 2017, Saudi Aramco acquired full ownership of Motiva, the largest refinery in North America, in Port Arthur, Texas. In December 2021, the ExxonMobil-SABIC $10-billion-dollar joint venture, Gulf Coast Growth Ventures, commenced operations at its new petrochemical facility near Corpus Christi, Texas. 3. Legal Regime Saudi Arabia received the lowest score possible (zero out of five) in the World Bank’s 2017-2018 Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance project, which places the Kingdom in the bottom 13 countries among 186 countries surveyed ( http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/ ). Few aspects of the SAG’s regulatory system are entirely transparent, although Saudi investment policy is less opaque than other areas. Bureaucratic procedures are cumbersome, but red tape can generally be overcome with persistence. Foreign portfolio investment in the Saudi stock exchange is well-regulated by the Capital Markets Authority (CMA), with clear standards for interested foreign investors to qualify to trade on the local market. The CMA has progressively liberalized requirements for “qualified foreign investors” to trade in Saudi securities. Insurance companies and banks whose shares are listed on the Saudi stock exchange are required to publish financial statements according to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) accounting standards. All other companies are required to follow accounting standards issued by the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants. Stakeholder consultation on regulatory issues is inconsistent. Some Saudi organizations are diligent in consulting businesses affected by the regulatory process, while others tend to issue regulations with no consultation at all. Proposed laws and regulations are not always published in draft form for public comment. An increasing number of government agencies, however, solicit public comments through their websites. In addition, in March 2021, Saudi Arabia’s National Competitiveness Center launched a public consultation platform called “Istitlaa” to solicit feedback on proposed laws and regulations before they are approved. That said, the processes and procedures for stakeholder consultation remain generally opaque and are not codified in law or regulations. There are no private sector or government efforts to restrict foreign participation in the industry standards-setting consortia or organizations that are available. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by NGOs or private sector associations. Saudi Arabia uses technical regulations developed both by the Saudi Arabian Standards Organization (SASO) and by the Gulf Standards Organization (GSO). Although the GCC member states continue to work towards common requirements and standards, each individual member state, and Saudi Arabia through SASO, continues to maintain significant autonomy in developing, implementing, and enforcing technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures in its territory. More recently, Saudi Arabia has moved towards adoption of a single standard for technical regulations. This standard is often based on International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standards, to the exclusion of other international standards, such as those developed by U.S.-domiciled standards development organizations (SDOs). Saudi Arabia’s exclusion of these other international standards, which are often used by U.S. manufacturers, can create significant market access barriers for industrial and consumer products exported from the United States. The United States government has engaged Saudi authorities on the principles for international standards per the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Committee Decision and encouraged Saudi Arabia to adopt standards developed according to such principles in their technical regulations, allowing all products that meet those standards to enter the Saudi market. Several U.S.-based standards organizations, including SDOs and individual companies, have also engaged SASO, with mixed success, in an effort to preserve market access for U.S. products, ranging from electrical equipment to footwear. A member of the WTO, Saudi Arabia must notify the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade of all draft technical regulations. The Saudi legal system is derived from Islamic law, known as sharia. Saudi commercial law, meanwhile, is still developing. In 2016, Saudi Arabia took a significant step in improving its dispute settlement regime with the establishment of the Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration (see “Dispute Settlement” section below). Through its Commercial Law Development Program, the U.S. Department of Commerce has provided capacity-building programs for Saudi stakeholders in the areas of contract enforcement, public procurement, and insolvency. The Saudi Ministry of Justice oversees the sharia-based judicial system, but most ministries have committees to rule on matters under their jurisdictions. Judicial and regulatory decisions can be appealed. Many disputes that would be handled in a court of law in the United States are handled through intra-ministerial administrative bodies and processes in Saudi Arabia. Generally, the Saudi Board of Grievances has jurisdiction over commercial disputes between the government and private contractors. The Board also reviews all foreign arbitral awards and foreign court decisions to ensure that they comply with sharia. This review process can be lengthy, and outcomes are unpredictable. The Kingdom’s record of enforcing judgments issued by courts of other GCC states under the GCC Common Economic Agreement, and of other Arab League states under the Arab League Treaty, is somewhat better than enforcement of judgments from other foreign courts. Monetary judgments are based on the terms of the contract – e.g., if the contract is calculated in U.S. dollars, a judgment may be obtained in U.S. dollars. If unspecified, the judgment is denominated in Saudi riyals. Non-material damages and interest are not included in monetary judgments, based on the sharia prohibitions against interest and against indirect, consequential, and speculative damages. As with any investment abroad, it is important that U.S. investors take steps to protect themselves by thoroughly researching the business record of a proposed Saudi partner, retaining legal counsel, complying scrupulously with all legal steps in the investment process, and securing a well-drafted agreement. Even after a decision is reached in a dispute, enforcement of a judgment can still take years. The U.S. government recommends consulting with local counsel in advance of investing to review legal options and appropriate contractual provisions for dispute resolution. In 2021, the Crown Prince announced draft legal reforms including a new personal status law, civil transactions law, evidence law, and discretionary sentencing law that aim to increase predictability and transparency in the legal system, facilitating commerce and expanding protections for women. To date, Saudi Arabia has published the new evidence law and the new personal status law. The two new laws have not yet come into force, but if implemented effectively, these reforms could be a major step towards modernizing the Saudi legal system. In January 2019, the Saudi government established the General Authority for Foreign Trade (GAFT), which aims to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s non-oil exports and investment, increase the private sector’s contribution to foreign trade, and resolve obstacles encountered by Saudi exporters and investors. The authority monitors the Kingdom’s obligations under international trade agreements and treaties, negotiates and enters into new international commercial and investment agreements, and represents the Kingdom before the WTO. The Governor of GAFT reports to the Minister of Commerce. Despite the list of activities excluded from foreign investment (see “Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment” section), foreign minority ownership in joint ventures with Saudi partners may be allowed in some of these sectors. Foreign investors are no longer required to take local partners in many sectors and may own real estate for company activities. They are allowed to transfer money from their enterprises out of the country and can sponsor foreign employees, provided that “Saudization” quotas are met (see “Labor Policies” section). Minimum capital requirements to establish business entities range from zero to $8 million, depending on the sector and the type of investment. MISA offers detailed information on the investment process, provides licenses and support services to foreign investors, and coordinates with government ministries to facilitate investment. According to MISA, it must grant or refuse a license within five days of receiving an application and supporting documentation from a prospective investor. MISA has established and posted online its licensing guidelines, but many companies looking to invest in Saudi Arabia continue to work with local representation to navigate the bureaucratic licensing process. MISA licenses foreign investments by sector, each with its own regulations and requirements: (i) services, which comprise a wide range of activities including IT, healthcare, and tourism; (ii) industrial, (iii) real estate, (iv) public transportation, (v) entrepreneurial, (vi) contracting, (vii) audiovisual media, (viii) science and technical office, (ix) education (colleges and universities), and (x) domestic services employment recruitment. MISA also offers several special-purpose licenses for bidding on and performance of government contracts. Foreign firms must describe their planned commercial activities in some detail and will receive a license in one of these sectors at MISA’s discretion. Depending on the type of license issued, foreign firms may also require the approval of relevant competent authorities, such as the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Tourism. An important MISA objective is to ensure that investors do not just acquire and hold licenses without investing, and MISA sometimes cancels licenses of foreign investors that it deems do not contribute sufficiently to the local economy. MISA’s periodic license reviews, with the possibility of cancellation, add uncertainty for investors and can provide a disincentive to longer-term investment commitments. MISA has agreements with various SAG agencies and ministries to facilitate and streamline foreign investment. These agreements permit MISA to facilitate the granting of visas, establish MISA branch offices at Saudi embassies in different countries, prolong tariff exemptions on imported raw materials to three years and on production and manufacturing equipment to two years, and establish commercial courts. To make it easier for businesspeople to visit the Kingdom, MISA can sponsor visa requests without involving a local company. Saudi Arabia has implemented a decree providing that sponsorship is no longer required for certain business visas. While MISA has set up the infrastructure to support foreign investment, many companies report that despite some improvements, the process remains cumbersome and time-consuming. The General Authority for Competition (GAC) reviews merger transactions for competition-related concerns, investigates business conduct, including allegations of price fixing, can issue fines, and can approve applications for exemptions for certain business conduct. The competition law, as amended in 2019, applies to all entities operating in Saudi Arabia, and covers all activities related to the production, distribution, purchase, and sale of commodities inside the Kingdom, as well as practices that occur outside of Saudi Arabia and that have an impact on domestic competition. The competition law prohibits anti-competitive practices and agreements. This may include certain aspects of vertically integrated business combinations. Consequently, companies doing business in Saudi Arabia may find it difficult to register exclusivity clauses in distribution agreements but are not necessarily precluded from enforcing such clauses in Saudi courts. Certain merger transactions must be notified to the GAC, and each entity involved in the merger is obligated to notify the GAC. GAC may approve, conditionally approve, or reject a merger transaction. The Embassy is not aware of any cases in Saudi Arabia of expropriation from foreign investors without adequate compensation. Some small- to medium-sized foreign investors, however, have complained that their investment licenses have been cancelled without justification, causing them to forfeit their investments. In August 2018, the SAG implemented new bankruptcy legislation that seeks to “further facilitate a healthy business environment that encourages participation by foreign and domestic investors, as well as local small and medium enterprises.” The law clarifies procedural processes and recognizes distinct creditor classes (e.g., secured creditors). It also includes procedures for continued operation of a distressed company via financial restructuring. Alternatively, the parties may pursue an orderly liquidation of company assets, which would be managed by a court-appointed licensed bankruptcy trustee. Saudi courts have begun to accept and hear cases under this new legislation. 6. Financial Sector Saudi Arabia’s financial policies generally facilitate the free flow of private capital and currency can be transferred in and out of the Kingdom without restriction. Saudi Arabia maintains an effective regulatory system governing portfolio investment in the Kingdom. The Capital Markets Law, passed in 2003, allows for brokerages, asset managers, and other nonbank financial intermediaries to operate in the Kingdom. The law created a market regulator, the Capital Market Authority (CMA), established in 2004, and opened the Saudi stock exchange (Tadawul) to public investment. Since 2015, the CMA has progressively relaxed the rules applicable to qualified foreign investors, easing barriers to entry and expanding the foreign investor base. The CMA adopted regulations in 2017 permitting corporate debt securities to be listed and traded on the exchange; in March 2018, the CMA authorized government debt instruments to be listed and traded on the Tadawul. The Tadawul was incorporated into the FTSE Russell Emerging Markets Index in March 2019, resulting in a foreign capital injection of $6.8 billion. Separately, the $11 billion infusion into the Tadawul from integration into the MSCI Emerging Markets Index took place in May 2019. The Tadawul was also added to the S&P Dow Jones Emerging Market Index. In November 2021, the CMA allowed financial market institutions to accept subscriptions from non-Saudis in real estate funds that invest in assets within the boundaries of Mecca and Medina. The banking system in the Kingdom is generally well-capitalized and healthy. The public has easy access to deposit-taking institutions. The legal, regulatory, and accounting systems used in the banking sector are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. In November 2020, the SAG approved the Saudi Central Bank Law, which changed the name of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) to the Saudi Central Bank. Under the new law, the Saudi Central Bank is responsible for maintaining monetary stability, promoting the stability of and enhancing confidence in the financial sector, and supporting economic growth. The Saudi Central Bank continues to use the acronym “SAMA” due to its widespread use. SAMA generally gets high marks for its prudential oversight of commercial banks in Saudi Arabia. SAMA is a member and shareholder of the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland. In 2017, SAMA enhanced and updated its previous Circular on Guidelines for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. The enhanced guidelines have increased alignment with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 Recommendations, the nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. Saudi Arabia is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA-FATF). In 2019, Saudi Arabia became the first Arab country to be granted full membership to the FATF, following the organization’s recognition of the Kingdom’s efforts in combating money laundering, financing of terrorism, and proliferation of arms. Saudi Arabia had previously been an observer member since 2015. Saudi Arabia is forward leaning on the development of financial technology. In February 2022, the Saudi cabinet approved a license for a local digital bank, D360, to be established with capital of $440 million. In March 2022, SAMA announced the licensing of a new payment financial technology company, Moyasar Financial Company, to provide e-commerce payment services, bringing the number of payment companies licensed by SAMA to 16 companies. In 2021, SAMA introduced the new Instant Payment System (Sarie) to facilitate instant, 24/7 money transfers across local banks. STC Pay, which provides digital payment solutions, achieved a $1.3 billion valuation in 2020, and the SAG recently approved its conversion into a digital bank. Credit is normally widely available to both Saudi and foreign entities from commercial banks and is allocated on market terms. The Saudi banking sector has one of the world’s lowest non-performing loan (NPL) ratios, roughly two percent in 2020. In addition, credit is available from several government institutions, such as the SIDF, which allocates credit based on government-set criteria rather than market conditions. Companies must have a legal presence in Saudi Arabia to qualify for credit. The private sector has access to term loans, and there have been a number of corporate issuances of sharia-compliant bonds, known as sukuk. The New Government Tenders and Procurement Law (GTPL) was approved in 2019. The New GTPL applies to procurement by government entities and procurements executed outside of Saudi Arabia. The Ministry of Finance has a pivotal role under the new GTPL to set policies and issue directives, collate and distribute information, maintain a list of boycotts, and approve tender and prequalification forms, contract forms, performance evaluation forms, and other documents. In 2018, the Ministry of Finance launched the Electronic Government Procurement System (Etimad Portal) to consolidate and facilitate the process of bidding and government procurement for all government sectors, enhancing transparency amongst government sectors and competing entities. The Public Investment Fund (PIF, www.pif.gov.sa ) is the Kingdom’s officially designated sovereign wealth fund. While PIF lacks many of the attributes of a traditional sovereign wealth fund, it has evolved into the SAG’s primary investment vehicle. Established in 1971 to channel oil wealth into economic development, the PIF has historically been a holding company for government shares in partially privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including SABIC, the National Commercial Bank, Saudi Telecom Company, Saudi Electricity Company, and others. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is the chairman of the PIF and announced his intention in April 2016 to grow the PIF more than five-fold to a $2 trillion global investment fund by 2030, relying in part on proceeds from the initial public offering of 1.5 percent of Saudi Aramco shares. Under the Vision 2030 reform program, the PIF is financing several of the country’s giga-projects, including NEOM, Qiddiya, the Red Sea Project, and Amaala. The PIF increased its holding of U.S. equities to nearly $44 billion in Q3 2021, acquiring new stakes in 19 firms. In February 2022, the PIF advanced in the global ranking to become the sixth largest sovereign wealth fund with $580 billion in assets under management after receiving a four percent stake in Saudi Aramco, according to data released by the Sovereign Wealth Funds Institute. In an effort to rebalance its investment portfolio, the PIF has divided its assets into six investment pools comprising local and global investments in various sectors and asset classes: Saudi holdings; Saudi sector development; Saudi real estate and infrastructure development; Saudi giga-projects; international strategic investments; and an international diversified pool of investments. In 2021, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman launched a new five-year strategy for the PIF. The strategy focuses on launching new sectors, empowering the private sector, developing the PIF’s portfolio, achieving effective long-term investments, supporting the localization of sectors, and building strategic economic partnerships. Under the new strategy, by 2025 the PIF aims to invest $267 billion into the local economy, contribute $320 billion to non-oil GDP, and create 1.8 million jobs. In practice, SAMA’s foreign reserve holdings also operate as a quasi-sovereign wealth fund, accounting for the majority of the SAG’s foreign assets. SAMA invests the Kingdom’s surplus oil revenues primarily in low-risk liquid assets, such as sovereign debt instruments and fixed-income securities. SAMA’s foreign reserve holdings peaked at $746 billion in 2014 but have since fallen to $429 billion in January 2022, the lowest level since 2010. This decline may be due to transfers to the PIF, as well as SAMA’s efforts to finance a recovery in import demand following the COVID-19 pandemic. Though not a formal member, Saudi Arabia serves as a permanent observer to the International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises SOEs play a leading role in the Saudi economy, particularly in water, power, oil, natural gas, petrochemicals, and transportation. Saudi Aramco, the world’s largest exporter of crude oil and a large-scale oil refiner and producer of natural gas, is 94.5 percent SAG-owned, and its revenues typically contribute the majority of the SAG’s budget. Four of the eleven representatives on Aramco’s board of directors are from the SAG, including the chairman, who serves concurrently as the Managing Director of the PIF. In December 2019, the Kingdom fulfilled its long-standing promise to publicly list shares of Saudi Aramco. The initial public offering (IPO) of 1.5 percent of Aramco’s shares on the Saudi Tadawul stock market on December 11, 2019, was the largest-ever IPO and valued Aramco at $1.7 trillion. The IPO generated $25.6 billion in proceeds, exceeding the $25 billion Alibaba raised in 2014 in the largest previous IPO in history. In February 2022, the SAG announced the transfer of four percent of Aramco’s shares to the PIF. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman announced that after the transfer, the state will remain Aramco’s largest shareholder, retaining more than 94 percent of the total shares. In March 2019, Saudi Aramco signed a share purchase agreement to acquire 70 percent of SABIC, Saudi Arabia’s leading petrochemical company and the fourth largest in the world, from the PIF in a transaction worth $69.1 billion; the acquisition was completed in 2020. Five of the nine representatives on SABIC’s board of directors are from the SAG, including the chairman and vice chairman. The SAG is similarly well-represented in the leadership of other SOEs. The SAG either wholly owns or holds controlling shares in many other major Saudi companies, such as the Saudi Electricity Company, Saudia Airlines, the Saline Water Conversion Company, Ma’aden, the National Commercial Bank, and other leading financial institutions. Saudi Arabia has undertaken a limited privatization process for state-owned companies and assets dating back to 2002. The process, which is open to domestic and foreign investors, has resulted in partial privatizations of state-owned enterprises in banking, mining, telecommunications, petrochemicals, water desalination, insurance, and other sectors. As part of Vision 2030 reforms, the SAG has announced its intention to privatize additional sectors. Privatization is a key element underpinning the Vision 2030 goal of increasing the private sector’s contribution to GDP from 40 percent to 65 percent by 2030. The program endorses several approaches to privatization, including full and partial asset sales, initial public offerings, management buy-outs, public-private partnerships (build-operate-transfer models), concessions, and outsourcing. The Privatization Program report identifies 16 targeted sectors but does not include an exhaustive list of assets to be privatized. The report references education, healthcare, transportation, renewable energy, power generation, waste management, sports clubs, grain silos, and water desalination facilities as prime areas for privatization or public-private partnerships. The full Privatization Program report is available online at http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/ncp . In 2017, Saudi Arabia established the National Center for Privatization and Public Private Partnerships (NCP), which oversees and manages the Privatization Program. The NCP’s mandate is to introduce privatization through the development of programs, regulations, and mechanisms for facilitating private sector participation in entities now controlled by the government. The Center’s website is http://www.ncp.gov.sa/en/pages/home.aspx . In March 2021, Saudi Arabia approved the Private Sector Participation (PSP) Law, which aims to increase private sector participation in infrastructure projects and in the provision of public services. 10. Political and Security Environment The Department of State regularly reviews and updates travel advisories to apprise U.S. citizens of the security situation in Saudi Arabia and frequently reminds U.S. citizens of recommended security precautions. Please visit www.travel.state.gov for further information, including the latest travel advisory. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $700,118 2020 $700,118 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $11,386 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $6,262 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 34.5% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: Saudi General Authority for Statistics According to the UNCTAD World Investment Report, in 2020 Saudi Arabia’s total FDI inward stock was $241.862 billion and total FDI outward stock was $128.759 billion. Detailed data for inward direct investment (below) is as of 2010, which is the latest available breakdown of inward FDI by country. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $169,206 100% Total Outward N/A N/A Kuwait $16,761 10% Country #1 N/A N/A France $15,918 9% Country #2 N/A N/A Japan $13,160 8% Country #3 N/A N/A United Arab Emirates $12,601 7% Country #4 N/A N/A China, P.R. $9,035 5% Country #5 N/A N/A “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. *Source: IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (2010 – latest available complete data) Senegal Executive Summary Senegal’s stable democracy, relatively strong economic growth, and open economy offer attractive opportunities for foreign investment. Senegal’s macroeconomic environment remains generally stable, although aggressive measures to counter the economic impact of COVID-19 and rising commodity costs are pushing public debt to nearly 70 percent of GDP, the internal debt distress threshold of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The currency – the CFA franc used in eight West African countries – is pegged to the Euro and remains stable. The Government of Senegal (GOS) welcomes foreign investment and has prioritized efforts to improve the business climate, and many companies choose Senegal as a base for operations in Francophone Africa. Since 2012, Senegal has pursued an ambitious development program, the Plan Senegal Emergent (Emerging Senegal Plan, or “PSE”), to improve infrastructure, achieve economic reforms, increase investment in strategic sectors, and strengthen private sector competitiveness. The GOS expanded the “single window” system to provide services to companies, opening new service centers across the country, harmonizing more than 60 GOS websites, and digitizing dozens of government services and payment mechanisms. The national digital agency, ADIE, plans to lay 4,500 kilometers of additional fiberoptic cable to increase internet access. Senegal has plans to transition power plants from fuel oil to domestic natural gas starting in 2023, when two recently discovered oil and gas fields come online. A new Public-Private Partnership (PPP) law entered into force in November 2021, modernizing and clarifying PPP procedures and encouraging local content. With good air transportation links, a modern airport, expanding seaports, availability of mobile money and other financial technologies, and improving ground transportation, Senegal aims to become a regional commercial and services hub. Three Special Economic Zones offer investors tax exemptions and other benefits. Repatriation of capital and income is generally straightforward, although the regional central bank sometimes limits the number of “offshore accounts” for companies registered in Senegal and engaged in project finance. Although some companies report problems, Senegal scores favorably on corruption indicators compared to other countries in the region. Despite Senegal’s many advantages, significant challenges remain. Investors at times cite burdensome and unpredictable tax administration, complex customs procedures, bureaucratic hurdles, opaque public procurement practices, an inefficient judicial system, inadequate access to financing, and a rigid labor market as obstacles. High real estate and energy costs, as well as high costs of inputs for manufacturing, also constrain Senegal’s competitiveness. High levels of unemployment and underemployment, especially among the country’s large youth population, represent a long-term macroeconomic challenge. A U.S.-Senegal Bilateral Investment Treaty went into effect since 1990. Senegal’s stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) increased from $3.4 billion in 2015 to $6.4 billion in 2019, according to UNCTAD data. U.S. investment in Senegal has expanded since 2014, including investments in power generation, renewable energy, industry, and offshore oil and gas. The IMF reports that U.S. FDI stock in Senegal was approximately $114 million in 2019 (Table 1; up from $91 million in 2018). Although France is historically Senegal’s largest source of FDI, China overtook France as Senegal’s largest bilateral trade partner in 2019. Turkish economic influence is also rising, particularly in construction. Other important investment partners include Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf States, as well as the EU. Sectors attracting substantial investment include petroleum and natural gas, agribusiness, mining, tourism, manufacturing, and fisheries. Investors can consult Senegal’s investment promotion agency (APIX) at www.investinsenegal.com for information on opportunities, incentives, and procedures for foreign investment, including a copy of Senegal’s investment code. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 73 of 180 Transparency International Global Innovation Index 2021 105 of 131 Global Innovation Index U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 $114.0 million U.S. Foreign Direct Investment World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,430 World Bank Gross National Income 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GOS welcomes foreign investment. The investment code provides for equitable treatment of foreign and local firms. There is no restriction on ownership of businesses by foreign investors in most sectors. Foreign firms generally can invest in Senegal free from systematic discrimination in favor of local firms. However, some U.S. and other foreign firms have noted that, in practice, Senegal’s investment environment favors incumbents and insiders – often other foreign firms – at the expense of new market entrants. Common complaints include excessive and inconsistently applied bureaucratic processes; nontransparent, slow judicial processes; and an opaque decision-making process for public contracts. Financial and capital markets are open, attracting domestic, regional, and international capital. In the wake of COVID-19, President Sall called for greater “economic sovereignty” in strategic sectors such as food production, pharmaceuticals, and digital technology to strengthen the country’s resilience to external shocks. The GOS consults with the private sector through the Conseil Presidentiel de l’Investissement (Presidential Council on Investment, or “CPI”). Among other activities, the CPI for investor-government dialogue. Another important venue for dialogue is the annual Assises de l’Entreprises (Company Meetings) sponsored by the Conseil National du Patronat (www.cnp.sn), the national employers’ association. Senegal does not have a business ombudsman or other official charged with resolving business disputes. In practice, investors must often engage directly at the minister level to resolve business climate concerns. Senegal’s investment promotion agency, APIX, facilitates government review of investment proposals and the project approval process. APIX is also the exclusive administrator of all special economic zones in Senegal. There are no barriers to ownership of businesses by foreign investors in most sectors. Exceptions include strategic sectors such as water, electricity distribution, and port services, where the government and state-owned companies maintain responsibility for most physical infrastructure but allow private companies to provide services. Senegal allows foreign investors equal access to ownership of property and does not impose any general limits on foreign control of investments. Senegal’s Investment Code includes guarantees for equal treatment of foreign investors, including the right to acquire and dispose of real property. GOS Ministries offer guidance on large projects, primarily to verify compatibility with the country’s overall development goals and compliance with environmental regulations. The Ministry of Finance and Budget reviews project financing arrangements for projects requiring public funds to ensure compatibility with budget and debt policies. In October 2017, Senegal, along with other members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) underwent a Trade Policies Review by WTO. In January 2020, the Executive Board of the IMF approved a new three-year Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI) for Senegal. The IMF published its Second Review under the PCI ( IMF PCI ) on January 19, 2021. The point of entry for business registration is Senegal’s Investment Promotion Agency, APIX, www.investinsenegal.com , which provides a range of administrative services to foreign investors. The World Bank estimates it takes six days to register a firm. In addition to other bureaucratic and documentary requirements, registering a business requires certification of certain documents by a public notary registered in Senegal. Senegalese law provides special preferences to facilitate investment and business operations by medium-sized and small enterprises, including reduced interest rates for Senegalese-owned companies. The GOS continues to expand its “single window” system, offering one-stop government services for businesses and opening new service centers. Since 2019, the GOS has made 25 government processes available online, including applications for construction permits, tax information searches, and tax and customs payments. In 2020, the GOS continued to expand its eGovernance program, harmonizing 60 government websites and creating 30 online service platforms. In 2019, APIX launched an online portal containing extensive information regarding regulations applicable to businesses and investments in Senegal. Senegal’s Agency for the Development and Supervision of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (ADEPME) supports small and medium-sized enterprises (defined as having fewer than 50 employees and annual revenues less than 5 billion CFA (about $9 million)). These include tax incentives, grants for capacity building and feasibility studies, and technical assistance to help firms operating in the informal sector formalize and register. ADEPME has also launched a program to certify the creditworthiness of SMEs, making them eligible for loans at preferential rates. Senegal’s budget and information on debt obligations are generally accessible to the public, including online. Although Senegal included state-owned enterprise (SOE) debt in its overall debt figures, detailed information on the debt of individual SOEs was not available to the public. The budget was substantially complete and considered generally reliable. Senegal’s supreme audit institution reviews the government’s accounts, and its reports are published online. However, the GOS has not released an audit report since 2017. Senegal is the first Francophone country in sub-Saharan Africa to submit to a fiscal transparency evaluation (FTE) by the IMF. In its January 2019 FTE, the IMF rated Senegal “average” overall for countries of similar income and institutional capacity. Senegal was rated “advanced” or “good” on fiscal forecasting, budgeting, and fiscal reporting. It was rated “basic” on monitoring risks triggered by subnational governments. The process for allocating licenses and contracts for natural resource extraction was outlined in law and appeared to be followed in practice. In 2019, Senegal approved a new Petroleum Code, clarifying investment terms and local content requirements for foreign investment. Senegal is currently offering new offshore exploration blocks through an open tender process conducted in accordance with international standards. In February 2020, Senegal finalized a new Gas Code to govern development of a mid-stream gas distribution network. Basic information on natural resource extraction awards is publicly available, and the government participated actively in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. The government neither promotes nor restricts outward investment. 3. Legal Regime Senegal has made some progress towards establishing independent regulatory institutions, having set up regulators for energy, telecommunications, and finance. While Senegal lacks established procedures for a public comment process for proposed laws and regulations, the GOS sometimes holds public hearings and workshops to discuss drafts. Suggested regulations are not always made available to the public in a timely manner, however. Although Senegalese law requires proposed legislation to be published in advance in the government’s official gazette, the GOS does not consistently update its website. The government does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance disclosure to facilitate transparency or help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. Authority to make and enforce rules rests with the relevant government ministry unless there is a separate regulatory authority. Local government bodies do not have a decisive role in regulatory decisions. The Commission de Régulation du Secteur de l’Electricité (Electricity Sector Regulatory Commission, CRSE) was established in 1998 to regulate the electricity sector and set electricity tariffs. Although the CRSE is by law an independent agency, observers note that the government frequently exercises influence over its decisions. Under the Millennium Challenge Corporation Senegal Power Compact, the GOS has committed to reforms, including adopting a new electricity code in 2021 and strengthening the CRSE’s capacity and independence. The Autorité de Régulation des Télécommunications et des Postes (Telecommunications and Postal Regulatory Authority, ARTP) is responsible for licensing and regulating telecommunications and postal services in Senegal. The Dakar-based Central Bank of West African States (known by its French acronym, BCEAO) regulates banking. There is no legal requirement to conduct impact assessments of proposed regulations, and regulatory agencies rarely do so. There is no specialized government body tasked with reviewing and monitoring regulatory impacts. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems closely follow French models. Financial statements must be prepared in accordance with the SYSCOHADA system, based on generally accepted accounting principles in France. As a member of ECOWAS, Senegal generally adheres to regional requirements concerning the movement of people and goods. Similarly, fiscal policy directives of WAEMU are enforced in Senegal, as are regulations issued by the BCEAO. Senegal is a WTO member and generally notifies draft regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. However, since 2005, Senegal has banned imports of uncooked poultry and poultry products without notifying the WTO. In March 2019, Senegal ratified the AfCFTA, which went into effect in January 2021. Senegal’s legal system is based on French civil law and has well-developed commercial and investment laws. Although settlement of commercial disputes has historically been cumbersome and slow, Senegal launched a new commercial court system in 2018 with jurisdiction over commercial matters and a mandate to resolve cases within three months. The business community welcomed the move, and in the past two years, the court has heard 11,054 cases with a combined value of nearly $500 million. While Senegal’s constitution mandates that the judiciary operate independently of the legislature and executive, the executive frequently exerts influence, particularly in high-profile criminal cases. This type of influence is rare in strictly commercial matters. Some foreign investors, however, report discriminatory treatment by local courts. Investors may consider including binding arbitration in their contracts to avoid prolonged legal entanglements. Companies may seek judicial redress against regulatory decisions. Regulatory appeals are heard in administrative tribunals that specialize in adjudicating claims against the state. Senegal is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization and the Berne Copyright Convention, and in 2019 hosted a regional workshop on protecting intellectual property in the pharmaceutical and pesticide industries that gathered prosecutors, customs, and law enforcement officers. Nevertheless, the country has insufficient capacity to reliably protect intellectual property rights. Senegal’s 2004 Investment Code provides basic guarantees for equal treatment of foreign investors and repatriation of profit and capital. It also specifies tax and customs exemptions according to investment volume and company size and location, with investments outside of Dakar eligible for longer tax exemptions. A law to enhance transparency in public procurement and public tenders entered into force in 2008, establishing a public procurement regulatory body, the Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics (Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, ARMP), which publishes annual reviews of public procurement. In February 2021, Senegal’s National Assembly signed into law the long-awaited update to the law governing public-private partnership (PPP) contracts, followed by the implementing decree in November 2021. The amended law includes several important innovations, including: a unified legal framework for private sector-led, GOS-supported projects; a streamlined institutional framework to simplify procedures and avoid incompatibilities; a strengthened monitoring and control system; and provisions about local content requirements. The GOS has stated that the new law will introduce a more flexible and attractive framework for blended finance projects. Some U.S. companies have raised concerns about the local content requirements included in the law. BCEAO regulations proscribe the use of offshore accounts in project finance transactions within the WAEMU, except when approved by ministries of finance with the express consent of the BCEAO. According to BCEAO, these restrictions allow visibility over international transactions, deter money laundering, and help it maintain adequate foreign currency reserves. BCEAO emphasizes the importance of these rules in enabling it to fulfill its mandate of maintaining the stability of the CFA franc’s peg to the Euro. Since 2018, the BCEAO and Senegalese Ministry of Finance and Budget have tightened their approach to the approvals of offshore accounts. Although there is no “maximum” number of accounts permitted, informal guidelines suggest that transactions using one to three accounts have the greatest chance of being approved. According to the BCEAO, the intent is to encourage the minimum number of such accounts necessary to legitimately conduct the transaction. Managers and lenders should raise the subject of offshore accounts with the Ministry of Finance as early in the process as possible and should be prepared to submit a functional justification for each requested account. All offshore accounts must be “reauthorized” annually. The Investment Code, the Mining Code, the Petroleum Code, and a government services one-stop can be found at the following: Investment Code Mining Code Petroleum Code Senegal Services Senegal’s national competition commission, the Commission Nationale de la Concurrence, is responsible for reviewing transactions for competition-related concerns. Senegal’s Investment Code includes protection against expropriation or nationalization of private property, with exceptions for “reasons of public utility” provided there is “just compensation” in advance. In general, Senegal has no history of expropriation or creeping expropriation against private companies. The government may sometimes use eminent domain justifications to procure land for public infrastructure projects, with compensation provided to landowners. The U.S.-Senegal BIT specifies that international legal standards are applicable to any cases of expropriation. Senegal is a member of the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and a signatory of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”). Senegalese law recognizes the Cour d’Appel (Appeals Court) as the competent authority for the recognition and enforcement of awards rendered pursuant to ICSID. Senegal is also a signatory to the Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa Treaty (OHADA). This agreement supports enforcement of awards under the New York Convention. The Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics (Public Procurement Regulatory Authority or ARMP) manages a dispute-resolution mechanism for public tenders. Senegal has growing experience in using international arbitration for resolution of investment disputes with foreign companies, including some cases involving tax disputes with U.S. firms. The government has also prevailed in some arbitration cases, including a 2013 arbitration decision in a high-profile case with a multinational company over an integrated mining/railway/port project, fostering greater confidence within the government in the arbitration process. Senegal’s BIT with the United States includes provisions to facilitate the referral of investment disputes to binding arbitration. International firms have pursued a variety of investment disputes during the last decade, including at least two U.S. firms involved in tax and customs disputes. Other foreign companies in mining and telecommunications have pursued commercial disputes over licensing. These disputes have often been resolved through arbitration or an amicable settlement. Senegal has no history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors. The GOS has commercial courts and uses alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to expedite dispute resolution. Under the OHADA treaty, Senegal recognizes the corporate law and arbitration procedures common to the 16 member states in Western and Central Africa. Senegalese courts routinely recognize arbitration clauses in contracts and agreements. It is not unusual for courts to rule against SOEs in disputes involving private enterprises. Senegal has commercial and bankruptcy laws that address liquidation of business liabilities. Foreign creditors receive equal treatment under Senegalese bankruptcy law in making claims against liquidated assets. Monetary judgments are normally in local currency. As a member of OHADA, Senegal permits three different types of bankruptcy: liquidation through a negotiated settlement; company restructuring; or complete liquidation of assets. 6. Financial Sector Senegalese authorities take a generally positive view of portfolio investment. Assisted by the debt management office of the BCEAO and thanks to a well-functioning regional debt market, Senegal has historically issued regular debt instruments in local currency to manage its finances. Beginning in 2011, the government began accessing international debt markets, issuing U.S. dollar-denominated Eurobonds in 2011, 2014, 2017, and 2018. In June 2021, the authorities issued a 775-million-Euro Eurobond’ its first Euro-denominated obligation. Some observers, including the IMF, have expressed concern over the continued rise in Senegal’s public debt, which has more than doubled over the last decade, in part due to the country’s significant investments associated with the PSE. With the ongoing effects of COVID-19 and the consequences of the political turmoil of March 2021, Senegal’s 2021 debt-to-GDP ratio rose to 73 percent, compared to 52 percent in 2018. In late 2020, Senegal took advantage of the G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative, receiving relief from $163 million in debt service payments (0.6 percent of GDP) through the end of 2021. The GOS aims to mitigate concerns about its public debt by containing energy subsidies, prioritizing concessional borrowing, and taking steps to increase government revenues. Senegal does not have its own stock market. A handful of Senegalese companies are listed on the West African Regional Stock Exchange (BRVM), headquartered in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire. The BRVM also has local offices in each of the WAEMU member countries, offering additional opportunities to attract foreign capital and access diversified sources of financing. In 2018, the BCEAO launched the region’s first certification program for dealers in securities and other financial instruments. Modeled on accreditation programs offered by the Chartered Institute for Securities and Investment, the new program was supported by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance. While Senegal’s banking system is generally sound, the financial sector is underdeveloped. Senegal’s 26 commercial banks, primarily based in France, Nigeria, Morocco, and Togo, follow conservative lending guidelines, with collateral requirements that most potential borrowers cannot meet. Few firms are eligible for long-term loans, and small and medium-sized enterprises have little access to credit. According to a 2016 government survey, about 17 percent of enterprises in the formal sector receive financing from commercial banks, compared to 6 percent for informal enterprises. Authorities have committed to implement the national financial inclusion strategy (2021-25) and achieve a financial inclusion rate of 65 percent of adults and 90 percent of SMEs. Senegal’s banking sector is regulated by the BCEAO and the WAEMU regional banking commission. Increasingly available mobile money services offer Senegalese consumers alternatives to traditional banking and credit services. In 2012, Senegal established a sovereign wealth fund (Fonds Souverain d’Investissements Strategiques, FONSIS) with a mandate to leverage public assets to support equity investments in commercial projects supporting economic development objectives. FONSIS invests primarily in strategic sectors defined in the PSE, including agriculture, fishing, infrastructure, energy, mining, tourism, and services. Senegal maintains several taxes and funds allocated for specific purposes such as expanding access to transportation, energy, and telecommunications, including the autonomous road maintenance fund and the energy support fund. For these funds, some information is included in budget annexes; these funds are subject to the same auditing and oversight mechanisms as ordinary budgetary spending. FONSIS reports that it abides by the Santiago Principles for sovereign wealth funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Senegal has generally reduced government involvement in SOEs during the last three decades. However, the GOS still owns full or majority interests in 24 SOEs, including the national electricity company (Senelec), Dakar’s public bus service, the Port of Dakar, National Post, the national rail company, and the national water utility. Senelec retains control over power transmission and distribution, but it relies increasingly on independent producers to generate power. The GOS has also retained control of the national oil company, PETROSEN, which is involved in hydrocarbon exploration in partnership with foreign oil companies and operates a small refinery dependent on government subsidies. The GOS has modest and declining ownership of agricultural enterprises, including one involved in rice production. In 2018, the government revived the state-owned airline, Air Senegal. The GOS also owns a minority share in Sonatel-Orange Senegal, the country’s largest internet and mobile communications provider. The Direction du Secteur Parapublic, an agency within the Ministry of Finance, manages the government’s ownership rights in SOEs. The GOS’s budget includes financial allocations to these enterprises, including subsidies to Senelec. SOE revenues are not projected in budget documents, but actual revenues are included in quarterly reports published by the Ministry of Finance. Senegal’s supreme audit institution (the Cour des Comptes) conducts audits of the public sector and SOEs. The government has no program for privatizing the remaining SOEs. 10. Political and Security Environment Senegal has long been regarded as an anchor of stability in politically unstable West Africa. It is the only regional country that has never had a coup d’état. International observers assessed the February 2019 presidential election, in which President Sall won a second term, as free and fair, despite a few instances of campaign violence. Public protests occasionally spawn isolated incidents of violence when unions, opposition parties, merchants, or students demand better salaries, working conditions, or other benefits. The March 2021 arrest of opposition figure Ousmane Sonko on alleged rape charges led to several days of intense protests that spiraled into widespread riots and looting. The unrest, Senegal’s worst in decades, was fueled by pandemic-related hardship, particularly among the youth. According to press reports, 14 people died, hundreds were injured, and private businesses across the country were damaged. While a few local businesses were damaged, firms associated with France – historically targeted by some groups as relics of the colonial past — bore the brunt of the looting and property damage. Despite this bout of unrest, foreign investors largely remained confident in Senegal’s stability and economic rebound. Most observers agreed that strong private sector investment, facilitated by improvements to the business climate and better mobilization of capital, is needed to address youth employment. Years of declining violence in the Casamance region, home of a four-decade-old separatist conflict, ignited into a full military conflict between Senegal’s army and elements of the Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamance (MFDC) in March 2022. The Senegalese government indicated that the military operation would continue until MFDC resistance is eradicated, putting an end to the armed separatist movement. Security is a top priority for the government, which increased its defense and security budget by 92 percent between 2012 and 2017. The Armed Forces Ministry noted a 32 percent budget increase for the fiscal year 2021. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) N/A N/A 2020 $25,051 Senegal GDP U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $114 U.S. FDI in Senegal Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $0 Senegal FDI in United States Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 34.6% Total FDI in Senegal “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) in 2019 Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $4,688 100% Total Outward $949 100% France #1 $2,333 50% France #1 $409 43% Mauritius #2 $636 14% Mali #2 $129 14% Canada #3 $626 14% Cote d’Ivoire #3 $127 13% Nigeria #4 $200 4% India #4 $93 10% China #5 $180 4% Mauritius #5 $69 7% Data Serbia Executive Summary Serbia’s investment climate has modestly improved in recent years, driven by macroeconomic reforms, financial stability, and fiscal discipline. Attracting foreign investment is an important priority for the government. In 2020, Serbia improved four places to number 44 on the World Bank’s Doing Business index. Serbia launched a new 30-month Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in June 2021. U.S. investors in Serbia are generally positive due to the country’s strategic location, well-educated and English-speaking labor force, competitive labor costs, generous investment incentives, and free-trade arrangements with the EU and other key markets. U.S. investors generally enjoy a level playing field. The U.S. Embassy in Belgrade often assists investors when issues arise, and Serbian leaders are responsive to investment concerns. In 2021, the United States and Serbia signed a new Investment Incentive Agreement that may facilitate opportunities in a variety of sectors. Challenges remain, particularly bureaucratic delays and corruption, as well as loss-making state-owned enterprises (SOEs), a large informal economy, and an inefficient judiciary. Political influence on the economy is also a concern; this issue was highlighted in January 2022 when the government abruptly withdrew licenses related to a major proposed lithium-mining project in response to public protests. The Serbian government has identified economic growth and job creation as top priorities and has passed significant reforms to labor law, construction permitting, inspections, public procurement, and privatization that have helped improve the business environment. If the government delivers on promised reforms during its EU accession process, business opportunities should continue to grow. Sectors that stand to benefit include agriculture and agro-processing, solid-waste management, sewage, environmental protection, information and communications technology (ICT), renewable energy, health care, mining, and manufacturing. In April 2021, Serbia adopted its first renewable energy law, which should contribute to scaling up renewable energy capacities. Companies and officials have noted that the adoption of reforms has sometimes outpaced implementation. Digitizing certain government functions (e.g., construction permitting, tax administration, and e-signatures) has not yet brought a dramatic improvement in processing times and may not be consistently implemented. The government is slowly making progress on resolving troubled SOEs, through bankruptcy or privatization actions where possible. The government plans to privatize 64 more companies and is also slowly reducing Serbia’s bloated public-sector workforce, mainly through attrition and hiring caps. Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022 initially had a limited economic impact on Serbia, and the banking system remains well capitalized and liquid; but inflation, as well as energy and agricultural supply disruptions are likely if the war continues, despite Serbia’s refusal to join U.S. and EU sanctions on Russian entities. Public fear of price spikes and shortages initially led to sporadic panic buying at supermarkets and gas pumps, but fuel and other consumer goods have remained available. Russia continues to supply natural gas and crude oil to Serbia, but supplies are vulnerable due to heavy Russian influence in the sector and the potential effect of sanctions. Serbia’s trade with Russia is otherwise limited, but agricultural exports could suffer from contraction or loss of the Russian market due to sanctions and resulting financial and logistical barriers. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 96 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/srb Global Innovation Index 2021 54 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M, historical stock positions) 2019 $149 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $7,420 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Attracting FDI is a priority for the Serbian government. The Law on Investments extends national treatment to foreign investors and prohibits discriminatory practices against them. The Law also allows the repatriation of profits and dividends, provides guarantees against expropriation, allows waivers of customs duty for equipment imported as capital in-kind, and enables foreign investors to qualify for government incentives. The government’s investment-promotion authority is the Development Agency of Serbia (Razvojna agencija Srbije – RAS: http://ras.gov.rs/ ). RAS offers a wide range of services, including support of direct investments, export promotion, and coordinating the implementation of investment projects. RAS serves as a one-stop-shop for both domestic and international companies. The government maintains a dialogue with businesses through associations such as the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, American Chamber of Commerce in Serbia, Foreign Investors’ Council (FIC), and Serbian Association of Managers (SAM). Serbia has attracted over $39 billion of foreign direct investment since 2007, according to RAS. Serbia’s strong FDI track-record is substantiated by international awards. The country was ranked at the top of the Financial Times’ FDI 2019 Europe list, based on the criteria of Greenfield investments relative to the size of economy (Financial Times, fDi Report 2020). Serbia was ranked first globally for the fourth consecutive year for creating the most FDI-related jobs per million inhabitants, according to “IBM Global Location Trends 2020”. The government prompted concerns about its commitment to the protection of foreign investors’ rights in 2022 when it halted a lithium-borate mining project which promised to become the country’s largest-ever foreign direct investment. In July 2021, multinational mining firm Rio Tinto committed $2.4 billion to developing a mine and processing plant at the Jadar deposit in western Serbia, which could potentially supply up to 10% of global lithium demand. However, the project became a lightning rod for criticism by environmental activists, resulting in months of public protests targeting Rio Tinto in period prior to Serbia’s national elections in April 2022. The government reacted by first delaying additional permits and then, in January 2022, withdrawing the spatial plan and revoking existing licenses for the project’s development. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own businesses and to engage in all forms of remunerative activity. Serbia has no investment screening or approval mechanisms for inbound foreign investment. U.S. investors are not disadvantaged or singled out by any rules or regulations. For some business activities, licenses are required (e.g., financial institutions must be licensed by the National Bank of Serbia prior to registration). Licensing limitations apply to both domestic and foreign companies active in finance, energy, mining, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, tobacco, arms and military equipment, road transportation, customs processing, land development, electronic communications, auditing, waste management, and production and trade of hazardous chemicals. Serbian citizens and foreign investors enjoy full private-property ownership rights. Private entities can freely establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises. By law, private companies compete equally with public enterprises in the market and for access to credit, supplies, licenses, and other aspects of doing business. Food and Agriculture: Foreign citizens and foreign companies are prohibited from owning agricultural land in Serbia. However, foreign ownership restrictions on farmland do not apply to companies registered in Serbia, even if the company is foreign-owned. Unofficial estimates suggest that Serbian subsidiaries of foreign companies own some 20,000 hectares of farmland in the country. EU citizens are exempt from this ban, although they may buy up to two hectares of agricultural land under certain conditions: they must permanently reside in the municipality where the land is located for at least 10 years, practice farming on the land in question for at least three years, and own adequate agriculture machinery and equipment. Defense: The Law on Investments adopted in 2015 ended discriminatory practices that prevented foreign companies from establishing companies in the production and trade of arms (for example, the defense industry) or in specific areas of the country. Further liberalization of investment in the defense industry continued via a new Law on the Production and Trade of Arms and Ammunition, adopted in May 2018. The law enables total foreign ownership of up to 49% in seven SOEs, collectively referred to as the “Defense Industry of Serbia,” so long as no single foreign shareholder exceeds 15% ownership. The law also cancels limitations on foreign ownership for arms and ammunition manufacturers. Serbia has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews in the past five years. The following is a sample of articles that have appeared in 2021 and early 2022 providing reviews of concerns related to investment policy. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/serbians-are-protesting-against-lithium-mine-and-new-draft-laws-which-allegedly-benefit-business/ https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/serbia-chinese-project-raises-concern-over-tender-procedure-transparency-corruption-ngos-warn/ In addition, the Environmental Justice Atlas ( https://ejatlas.org/ ) listed several investments that resulted or could result in environmental degradation in Serbia, including investments in the city of Pancevo, relocation of Vreoci village in the Kolubara coal basin, the highway that killed a 600-year-old oak tree, pollution of Veliki Backi channel, municipal waste in the city of Kraljevo, the potential impact of the planned Buk Bjela hydropower plant on Tara River canyon, and remediation of Palic lake. According to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report, seven procedures and seven days are required to establish a foreign-owned limited liability company in Serbia. This is fewer days but more procedures than the average for Europe and Central Asia. In addition to the procedures required of a domestic company, a foreign parent company establishing a subsidiary in Serbia must translate its corporate documents into Serbian. Under the Business Registration Law, the Serbian Business Registers Agency (SBRA) oversees company registration. SBRA’s website (in Serbian) is www.apr.gov.rs/home.1435.html . All entities applying for incorporation with SBRA can use a single application form and are not required to have signatures notarized. Companies in Serbia can open and maintain bank accounts in foreign currency, although they must also have an account in Serbian dinars (RSD). The minimum capital requirement is symbolic at RSD 100 (less than $1) for limited liability companies, rising to RSD 3 million (approximately $29,900) for a joint stock company. Some foreign companies have difficulties opening bank accounts due to a provision in the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing that requires companies to disclose their ultimate owner. A single-window registration process enables companies that register with SBRA to obtain a tax-registration number (poreski identifikacioni broj – PIB) and health-insurance number with registration. In addition, companies must register employees with the Pension Fund at the Fund’s premises. Since December 2017, the Labor Law requires employers to register new employees before their first day at work; previously, the deadline was registration within 15 days of employment. These amendments represent an attempt by the government to decrease the gray labor market by empowering labor inspectors to penalize employers if they find unregistered workers. Pursuant to the Law on Accounting, companies in Serbia are classified as micro, small, medium, and large, depending on the number of employees, operating revenues, and value of assets. The Development Agency of Serbia supports direct investment and promotes exports. It also implements projects aimed at improving competitiveness, supporting economic development, and supporting small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and entrepreneurs. More information is available at http://ras.gov.rs . Serbia’s business-facilitation mechanisms provide for equitable treatment of both men and women when a registering company, according to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Index. The government declared 2017-2027 a “Decade of Entrepreneurship” with special programs to support women’s entrepreneurship. Since 2017, the government has provided approximately $1 million annually in grants to support women’s innovative entrepreneurship. The Serbian government neither promotes nor restricts outward direct investment. Restrictions on short-term capital transactions (i.e., portfolio investments) were lifted in April 2018 through amendments to the Law on Foreign Exchange Operations for short-term securities issued or purchased by EU countries and international financial institutions. Prior to this, residents of Serbia were not allowed to purchase foreign short-term securities, and foreigners were not allowed to purchase short-term securities in Serbia. There are no restrictions on payments related to long-term securities. Capital markets are not fully liberalized for individuals. Citizens of Serbia are not allowed to keep accounts abroad except in exceptional situations (such as work or study abroad) listed in the Law on Foreign Exchange Operations. 3. Legal Regime The harmonization of Serbian with EU law in accordance with the EU’s acquis communautaire has created a more favorable legal environment; however, Serbia still needs to address problems with transparency in the development, adoption, and implementation of regulations. The website of Serbia’s unicameral legislature, the National Assembly ( www.parlament.gov.rs ), provides a list of both proposed and adopted legislation. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are required for publicly listed companies and financial institutions, as well as for the following large legal entities, regardless of whether their securities trade in a public market: insurance companies, financial leasing lessors, voluntary pension funds and their management companies, investment funds and their management companies, stock exchanges, securities brokerages, and factoring companies. Additionally, IFRS standards are required for all foreign companies whose securities trade on any public market. On January 1, 2021, Serbia introduced environmental, social, and governance disclosure (non-financial reporting) with the new Law on Accounting (Article 37), which obliges all companies with over 500 employees in Serbia to publish non-financial reports. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by NGOs or the private sector. The Law on Ultimate Beneficial Owners Central Registry (2018) introduced a single, public, online database maintained by the Serbian Business Registers Agency (www.apr.gov.rs), which contains information on natural persons who are ultimate beneficial owners of the companies. Nationally, there are 37 different inspectorates operating within 12 different ministries that do not significantly cooperate or coordinate with one another, despite the existence of the Coordination Commission for Inspection Supervision. The administrative court is the legal entity that considers appeals on inspection decisions. Serbia’s public finances are relatively transparent. The government regularly publishes information related to public debt on the website www.javnidug.gov.rs . Serbia is not a member of the World Trade Organization or the EU. Serbia became an EU candidate country and opened formal accession negotiations in 2012. Details on EU-Serbia relations and the status of Serbia’s accession process are available through the EU Delegation to Serbia at https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/serbia_en/ . The WTO accepted Serbia’s application for accession on February 15, 2005, and Serbia currently has observer status. Serbia has a civil law system. The National Assembly codifies laws. The courts have sole authority to interpret legislation, with the exception of so-called “authentic interpretation” which is reserved for the legislature. According to the Constitution, Serbia’s judicial system is legally independent of the executive branch; but in practice, significant obstacles prevent judicial independence. Serbia’s judicial system distinguishes between commercial courts and courts of general jurisdiction. Commercial courts adjudicate commercial matters, including disputes involving business organizations, business contracts, foreign investment, foreign trade, maritime law, aeronautical law, bankruptcy, civil economic offenses, intellectual property rights, and misdemeanors committed by commercial legal entities. When only one of the parties is a business and the other is not, the courts of general civil jurisdiction decide the dispute. The Appellate Commercial Court rules on appeals of commercial courts’ decisions. The average waiting time to bring a case to trial in the Commercial Courts is high. Case processing time for commercial litigation is in line with EU averages, but the law is inconsistently applied. In general, contract enforcement is weak, and the courts responsible for enforcing property rights are overburdened. Under Serbian commercial law, the Law on Obligations regulates contractual relations (also known as the Law on Contracts and Torts). Civil Procedure Law governs contract-related disputes. Serbian law need not be the governing law of a contract entered into in Serbia. The Law on Resolution of Disputes with the Regulations of Other Countries, as well as bilateral agreements, regulates procedures for recognition of foreign court decisions. Significant laws for investment, business activities, and foreign companies in Serbia include: the Law on Investments, the Law on Foreign Trade, the Law on Foreign Exchange Operations, the Law on Markets of Securities and other Financial Instruments, the Law on Registration of Commercial Entities, the Law on Banks and Other Financial Institutions, the Law on Construction and Planning, the Company Law, the Law on Financial Leasing, the Law on Concessions, and Regulations on Conditions for Establishing and Operation of Foreign Representative Offices in Serbia. Other relevant laws include: the Law on Value Added Tax, the Law on Income Tax, the Law on Corporate Profit Tax, the Law on Real Estate Tax, and the Law on Mandatory Social Contributions. Laws and regulations on portfolio investments are on the Securities Commission’s website at https://www.sec.gov.rs/index.php/en/. Laws and regulations related to payment operations can be found on the National Bank of Serbia’s website at https://nbs.rs/sr_RS/drugi-nivo-navigacije/propisi/ . Serbia lacks a primary or “one-stop-shop” website for investment that provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. However, numerous Serbian firms that provide legal and other professional services publish comprehensive information for foreign investors, including PricewaterhouseCoopers . The Commission for the Protection of Competition is responsible for competition-related concerns and in principle implements the law as an independent agency reporting directly to the National Assembly. In some cases, companies have reported perceptions that political factors have influenced the Commission’s decision-making. Annual reports of the Commission’s actions are published online at http://www.kzk.gov.rs/izvestaji . Laws and regulations related to market competition are available at http://www.kzk.gov.rs/en/zakon-2 . A foreign investor is guaranteed national treatment, which means that any legal entity or natural person investing in Serbia enjoys full legal security and protection equal to those of local entities. A stake held by a foreign investor or a company with a foreign investment cannot be the subject of expropriation. The contribution of a foreign investor may be in the form of convertible foreign currency, contribution in kind, intellectual property rights, and securities. Serbia’s Law on Expropriation authorizes expropriations that have been determined to be in the public interest and for a compensation in the form of similar property or cash approximating the current market value of the expropriated property. The local municipal court is authorized to intervene and decide the level of compensation if there is no mutually agreed resolution within two months of the expropriation order. The Law on Investment provides safeguards against arbitrary government expropriation of investments. There have been no cases of expropriation of foreign investments in Serbia since the dissolution of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2003. There are, however, outstanding claims against Serbia related to property nationalized under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was dissolved in 1992. The 2014 Law on Restitution of Property and Compensation applies to property seized by the government since March 9, 1945, shortly before the end of World War II, and includes special coverage for victims of the Holocaust, who are authorized to reclaim property confiscated by Nazi occupation forces. Heirless property left by victims of the Holocaust is subject to a separate law, which was approved in February 2016. The deadline for filing restitution applications was March 1, 2014. The Agency for Restitution received 75,414 property claims, and the adjudication process is still ongoing. Information about the Agency for Restitution, restitution procedures and the status of cases is available on its website at www.restitucija.gov.rs/eng/index.php . Serbia’s bankruptcy law is consistent with international standards. According to the Bankruptcy Law, its goal is to provide compensation to creditors via the sale of the assets of a debtor company. The law stipulates automatic bankruptcy for legal entities whose accounts have been blocked for more than three years, and it allows debtors and creditors to initiate bankruptcy proceedings. The law ensures a faster and more equitable settlement of creditors’ claims, lowers costs, and clarifies rules regarding the role of bankruptcy trustees and creditors’ councils. Foreign creditors have the same rights as Serbian creditors with respect to initiating or participating in bankruptcy proceedings. Claims in foreign currency are calculated in dinars at the dinar exchange rate on the date the bankruptcy proceeding commenced. Serbia’s Criminal Code criminalizes intentionally causing bankruptcy, as well as fraud in relation to a bankruptcy proceeding. The 2020 World Bank Doing Business index ranked Serbia 41 out of 190 economies with regards to resolving insolvency, with an average time of two years needed to resolve insolvency and average cost of 20% of the estate. The recovery rate was estimated at 34.5 cents on the dollar. 6. Financial Sector Serbia welcomes both domestic and foreign portfolio investments and regulates them efficiently. The government removed most restrictions on short-term portfolio investments in April 2018. Residents of Serbia, both companies and persons, are now allowed to purchase foreign short-term securities issued by EU residents and EU countries, and by international financial organizations who have EU countries in their membership. Banks registered in Serbia can also purchase short-term securities issued by OECD countries. Foreigners may only purchase short-term securities in Serbia if they have residency and/or headquarters in EU countries. Payments related to long-term securities have no restriction. In 2021, Serbia recorded net inflows of $1.6 billion in portfolio investment, according to the National Bank of Serbia. Analysts have explained this inflow mostly as a result of Serbia’s issuance of Eurobonds. The government regularly issues bonds to finance its budget deficit, including short-term, dinar-denominated T-bills, and dinar-denominated, euro-indexed government bonds. The total value of government debt securities issued on the domestic market reached $12.1 billion in December 2021, with 79% in dinars and 21% in euros. In addition, Serbia issued a total value of €7.3 billion of Eurobonds on the international market. The share of dinar denominated securities held by non-residents was 18%, which was equal to $1.8 billion at the end of December 2021. Total Serbian government-issued debt instruments on the domestic and international markets stood at $20 billion in December 2021. Serbia’s international credit ratings have improved since 2019 but remain below investment grade. In March 2021, Moody’s Investors Service upgraded Serbia’s long-term issuer and senior unsecured ratings from Ba3 to Ba2 while adjusting its outlook from positive to stable. In December 2021, S&P improved Serbia’s outlook from stable to positive and confirmed its BB+ rating. In February 2022, Fitch confirmed Serbia’s credit as BB+ with a stable outlook. Serbia’s equity and bond markets are underdeveloped. Corporate securities and government bonds are traded on the Belgrade Stock Exchange (BSE) ( www.belex.rs ). Of 990 companies listed on the exchange, shares of fewer than 100 companies are traded regularly (more than once a week). Total annual turnover on the BSE in 2021 was $380 million, a decrease of 16% from the prior year. Trading volumes have declined from a peak of $2.7 billion in 2007. The Securities Commission, established in 1995, regulates the Serbian securities market. The Commission also supervises investment funds in accordance with the Investment Funds Law. As of February 2022, 19 registered investment funds operate in Serbia: http://www.sec.gov.rs/index.php/en/public-registers-of-information/register-of-investment-funds . Market terms determine credit allocation. In December 2021, the total volume of issued loans in the financial sector stood at $30 billion. Average interest rates, while, decreasing, are still higher than the EU average. The business community cites tight credit policies and expensive commercial borrowing for all but the largest corporations as impediments to business expansion. Around 62% of all lending is denominated in euros, 0.1% in Swiss francs, and 0.2% in U.S. dollars, all of which provide lower rates, but also shift exchange-rate risk to borrowers. Foreign investors are able to obtain credit on the domestic market. The government and central bank respect IMF Article VIII, and do not place restrictions on payments or transfers for current international transactions. Hostile takeovers are extremely rare in Serbia. The Law on Takeover of Shareholding Companies regulates defense mechanisms. Frequently after privatization, the new strategic owners of formerly state-controlled companies have sought to buy out minority shareholders. Serbian SMEs often do not access credit, instead turning to friends or family when they need investment and operational funds. Only a few corporate and municipal bonds have been issued, and the financial market is not well developed. In April 2020, the government amended corporate-bond issuance legislation to increase companies’ access to financing in response to COVID-19’s economic impact. The amendments cut the timeline for issuing corporate bonds from 77 to 17 days and the price to issue a corporate bond from $88,000 to $11,000. This measure was in force until November 2020, during which time the total value of corporate bonds issued was $503 million, of which $440 million were issued by state-owned companies. Media reported that the National Bank of Serbia (NBS) purchased $275 million worth of the bonds. NBS regulates the banking sector. Foreign banks may establish operations in Serbia, and foreigners may freely open both local currency and hard currency non-resident accounts. The banking sector comprises 91% of financial sector assets. As of November 2021, consolidation had reduced the sector to 23 banks with total assets of $49 billion (about 85% of GDP), with 89% of the market held by foreign-owned banks. The top ten banks, with country of ownership and estimated assets, are Banca Intesa (Italy, $7.6 billion in assets); OTP (Hungary, $6.4 billion); UniCredit (Italy, $5.3 billion); Komercijalna Banka (recently sold to Slovenia’s NLB Bank, $4.8 billion); Raiffeisen (Austria, $4.3 billion); Postanska Stedionica (Serbian government, $3.3 billion); Erste Bank (Austria, $3.1 billion) AIK Banka Nis (Serbia, $2.2 billion); Eurobank EFG (Greece, $2.1 billion); and Naša AIK Banka (Serbia – formerly Sberbank, $1.9 billion). The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions against Russian banks, including Sberbank, on February 25, 2022, due to Russian aggression in Ukraine and prohibited corresponding relations with these banks. Serbia has not joined U.S. and EU sanctions against Russia. Still, these banks are likely to face significant obstacles in their operations in Serbia, including the inability to transfer assets to and from foreign countries. Until the imposition of banking sanctions, Sberbank’s Serbian affiliate was the only significant Russian bank in Serbia. Its sale to Serbia’s privately owned Agroindustrial Commercial Bank (AIK Bank) was completed March 1, 2022, and it changed its name to Naša AIK Banka. Only two Russian banks are now operating in Serbia: API Bank and Expobank, with combined assets of approximately $300 million, constituting less than one percent of Serbia’s banking-sector assets. For more information, see: https://www.nbs.rs/sr_RS/finansijske-institucije/banke/bilans-stanja/ https://www.nbs.rs/export/sites/NBS_site/documents/kontrola-banaka/kvartalni_izvestaj_IV_19.pdf The IMF assessed in its December 2021 report on Serbia’s Policy Coordination Instrument that the banking system has been stable owing to adequate capitalization, high liquidity, and profitability. As of June 2021, banks’ capital adequacy was stable at 22.2%, well above the regulatory minimum of 8%, while asset quality is improving. Banks’ profitability remains robust with return-on-assets and return-on-equity ratios of 1.2% and 7.4% respectively in August 2021. From 2015 to December 2021, non-performing loans (NPLs) declined from 21.6% to 3.5 % of total Serbian loan portfolios, and NPLs are fully provisioned. Significant foreign-exchange risks remain, as 67% of all outstanding loans are indexed to foreign currencies, primarily the euro. In 2019, the government adopted a law that protected consumers who had taken mortgage loans denominated in Swiss francs by converting them into euros. Banks and the state shared losses resulting from the accompanying reduction of outstanding principal and interest balances. This law enabled borrowers to continue servicing debt on more favorable terms. Serbia does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate many sectors of the economy, including energy, transportation, utilities, telecommunications, infrastructure, mining, and natural resource extraction. Serbia’s Agency for Business Registers (ABR) maintains a publicly available database of all SOEs on its website at https://pretraga2.apr.gov.rs/EvidencijaPSRS . As of March 2022, according to this database, 266 SOEs are in normal operation, 42 are in bankruptcy, and two are in liquidation. However, the most recently available ABR annual report (pp. 29-32) recorded 545 SOEs employing a total of more than 114,000 people, or approximately 4% of the formal workforce and accounting for 6% of total business sector revenues. (The report for 2021 is expected to be published in June 2022.) At the beginning of 2022, 64 SOEs with a total of nearly 25,000 employees were slated to be resolved through privatization or bankruptcy, down from 90 companies in early 2019. The government has launched a privatization tendering process for two of those companies, and the Ministry of Economy is preparing 10-15 additional companies for divestiture (see Privatization Program, below). The Law on Public Enterprises, adopted in February 2016, defines a public enterprise as “an enterprise pursuing an activity of common interest, founded by the State or Autonomous Province or a local government unit.” The law also defines “strategically important companies” as those in which the state has at least a 25% ownership share. The law aimed to introduce responsible corporate management in public companies and strengthen supervision over public companies’ management. The law requires that directors of public companies be selected through a public application procedure and that they not hold any political party positions while serving. The law also requires that a portion of public companies’ profits be paid directly to the state, provincial, or local government budget. However, Transparency International Serbia analyzed implementation of the law in an ad hoc report in September 2017 and concluded that almost none of these requirements have been implemented, including the professionalization and transparency of management. The full report can be seen at: http://transparentnost.org.rs/images/publikacije/Political_influence_on_public_enterprises_and_media.pdf SOEs can purchase goods from the private sector and foreign firms under the Public Procurement Law. For example, foreign companies regularly win public tenders for the construction of roads and other infrastructure projects. Under the Public Procurement Law, a buyer must select a domestic supplier if the domestic supplier’s price is no more than 5% higher than a foreign supplier’s price. The Public Procurement Office, an independent state body, supervises implementation of the Law on Public Procurement. Serbia, not yet a member of the WTO, is not a party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement. Private enterprises have the same access to financing, land, and raw materials as SOEs, as well as the same tax burden and rebate policies. However, the IMF estimated that in 2014, SOEs enjoyed benefits amounting to approximately 2% of GDP. The IMF has recommended that the government phase out support for SOEs. In 2016, Serbia committed to significantly reduce the fiscal cost of SOEs by curtailing direct and indirect subsidies, strictly limiting the issuance of new guarantees, and enhancing the accountability, transparency, and monitoring of SOEs. This goal remains a key element of Serbia’s current IMF program. The government decreased the level of quasi-fiscal support (issuing of new guarantees) from $860 million in 2016 to $110 million in 2020. In the latest IMF program, launched in June 2021, the IMF stressed the importance of advancing the SOE reform agenda, including improving corporate governance. Serbia, with EBRD support, adopted an action plan to implement a new ownership and governance strategy for SOEs in June 2021. The Action Plan is posted online at: https://privreda.gov.rs/lat/dokumenta/propisi/strategije/akcioni-plan-za-sprovodjenje-strategije-drzavnog-vlasnistva-i . From 2001 through 2015, the Serbian government privatized 3,047 SOEs. The government cancelled 646 of these privatizations, alleging that investors did not meet contractual obligations related to employment and investment. According to the Privatization Law, the deadline for the privatization of the 646 companies in the Privatization Agency’s portfolio was December 31, 2015. However, 62 companies were still unresolved as of February 2022. These companies include health spas, veterinary stations, and companies located in Kosovo, among others. Most significantly, the Ministry of Economy must still resolve several large, strategically important SOEs including the Resavica coal mine in east-central Serbia, chemical company MSK Kikinda, and others. In many cases, closing these companies would do serious damage to their local economies, where they are key employers. The government continues to engage foreign investors in the privatization process, inviting them to submit bids, participate in auctions, and purchase company shares. Invitations for privatization and bidding are published on the Ministry of Economy website at http://www.priv.rs/Naslovna . In December 2018, France-based Vinci Airports took over operation of Belgrade’s Nikola Tesla Airport under a 25-year concession agreement. According to official statements, Vinci had offered €501 million to manage the airport and €732 million in investment, as well as an annual fee of up to €16 million. At the end of 2020, the government completed the sale of the country’s second largest bank, Komercijalna Banka, to Slovenia’s NLB bank. The government sold the petrochemical company Petrohemija to the Russian majority-owned petroleum company Naftna Industrija Serbije (NIS) in December 2021. The government has started the process of converting the country’s largest SOE, the power utility EPS, into a joint share-holding company as recommended by the IMF, but the IMF has not recommended fully privatizing the company, and the government has no plans to do so. The government plans to privatize three companies in 2022: river shipping company Jugoslovensko rečno brodarstvo, Hotel Slavija in Belgrade, and transport company Lasta. 10. Political and Security Environment Since October 2000, Serbia has had democratically elected governments that have committed publicly to supporting regional stability and security. Governments, however, frequently call early elections at the local and national level, which often leave politicians and elected officials focused on the next campaign. Serbia held parliamentary elections in June 2020. President Aleksandar Vucic’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) won an overwhelming majority, with more than 60 percent of the vote and obtained 188 of 250 parliamentary seats. Vucic and his party benefitted from prolific media access unavailable to other parties, the effectively blurred distinction between campaign and official activities, and the inability of other parties to campaign during the COVID-19 state of emergency. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) concluded that, aside from state-of-emergency restrictions, candidates were able to campaign, and fundamental freedoms of expression and assembly were respected. However, the advantage enjoyed by the governing party, the decision of some opposition parties to boycott the elections, and limited policy debate narrowed the choice and information available to voters, according to ODIHR. The government has made EU membership a primary goal. Serbia has opened 22 of 35 chapters in the EU accession acquis and provisionally closed two. After a long delay in Serbia’s accession process the European Commission in 2021 recommended opening a new “cluster” of accession chapters, pointing to some progress in judicial and rule-of-law reform. Protests are not uncommon, particularly in urban areas, and most protests are peaceful. In late 2021 and in early 2022, environmental activists staged regular nationwide protests that occasionally blocked highways or resulted in a few minor incidents of violence, although police response to these protests was restrained. Past protests, particularly in Belgrade, were at times violent, with protestors attempting to enter the parliament building during protests against COVID lockdown measures in 2020. Press noted that in addition to concerns regarding COVID, many of the demonstrators during these protests were also protesting political corruption. Although previous years had seen some assaults against participants in LGBTQI events in Serbia, following its seventh successive incident-free Pride Parade, Serbia was selected to host EuroPride in 2022. Although this indicates some confidence that a recurrence of wide-scale violence against Serbia’s LGBTQI community is unlikely, discrimination and physical attacks continue. Criminal activity linked to transnational organized crime groups is a regular phenomenon in Serbia. Sport hooliganism is often associated with organized crime, and violent hooliganism remains a concern at matches of rival soccer teams within Serbia. A significant police operation in January 2021 against a major organized crime group linked to Belgrade’s Partizan football club resulted in the arrest of the group’s leader, who was suspected of multiple crimes. Several ultra-nationalist organizations in Serbia have harassed Serbian political leaders, local NGOs, minority groups, migrants, and media outlets considered to be pro-Western, but these incidents are infrequent. Seychelles Executive Summary Seychelles is an archipelagic nation of 115 islands located off the eastern coast of Africa in the Indian Ocean. The majority of the country’s 99,202 inhabitants live on three most-populated islands of Mahé, Praslin, and La Digue. Seychelles gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1976, at which time the population lived at near subsistence level. With a GDP of $1.1 billion as of 2021, Seychelles has the highest GDP per capita in Africa at $10,764. Although the World Bank has designated Seychelles as a high-income country since 2015, the country’s wealth is not evenly distributed. According to the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report for 2020, the richest 10 percent of Seychellois earn 40 percent of the total income. Seychelles’ main economic activities are tourism and fishing, and the country aspires to be a financial hub. Seychelles experienced a coup d’etat in 1977, just a year after independence, which brought to power a one-party socialist government. Multiparty democracy was restored in 1993 after the adoption of a new constitution, but the United Seychelles Party (USP) continued to hold power until October 2020, when the opposition coalition Seychellois Democratic Union(Linyon Demokratik Seselwa, or LDS) won both the presidential and legislative elections. This opposition victory ushered in the first democratic transition of power in the country’s history. LDS holds 25 of the 35 assembly seats and includes four main parties: the Seychelles National Party (SNP); the Lalyans Seselwa (Seychellois Alliance); the Seychelles Party for Social Justice and Democracy (SPSD); and the Seychelles United Party (SUP). The former ruling United Seychelles Party (USP currently holds 10 seats in the National Assembly. The next presidential and legislative elections will be held in 2025. Heavy reliance on the tourism industry makes the overall economy vulnerable to external shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. In January 2021, the Central Bank of Seychelles (CBS) announced that January to November 2020 tourism revenues decreased by 78 percent. Tourism-related contributions to GDP fell from 22.3 percent in 2019 to 15.5 percent in 2020, per the National Bureau of Statistics. The CBS estimated that the economy contracted 11.3 percent in 2020 compared to 3 percent growth in 2019. Following the reopening of borders in March 2021, tourism in Seychelles gradually picked up, with the country registering a total of 182,849 tourist arrivals for the January to December 2021 period, compared to 114,858 visitors for the same period in 2020 and 384,224 visitors in 2019. According to the IMF, real GDP grew by 6.9 percent in 2021, compared to a decline of 12.9 percent in 2020. The Seychelles National Bureau of Statistics reported a year-on-year percentage increase of 21.7 percent in real GDP for the third quarter of 2021 as compared to the same quarter in 2020. The main drivers of this increase were the accommodation industry, transport and storage, and the information and communication sector. The IMF forecasted that real GDP would increase by 7.7 percent in 2022. In 2019, the government was on track to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to 50 percent by the end of 2021. According to the Ministry of Finance, however, by the end of 2020 the debt-to-GDP ratio had spiked to 99.4 percent. As was the case during the global economic crisis in 2008, the government turned to the IMF for support. In July 2021, Seychellois authorities and the IMF reached an agreement on economic and structural policies that would be supported by $107 million under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for the duration of 28 months. Seychellois authorities and the IMF agreed to reduce fiscal and debt vulnerabilities while promoting economic growth and protecting the environment and the most vulnerable segments of the population. Governance and transparency commitments included the completion of an audit of COVID-19 emergency spending and related procurement, and improvements in the AML/CFT regime. In November 2021, the IMF assessed that the Seychellois government was making impressive progress in implementing the IMF-supported program and restoring macroeconomic balances. Per the Ministry of Finance, by December 2021, the total government and government-guaranteed debt represented about 74 percent of GDP. Despite the government’s attempts to diversify the economy, activity remained focused on fishing and tourism. However, Seychelles’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which spans 1.3 million square kilometers, is a potential source of untapped oil reserves and represents potential business opportunities for U.S. companies. Seychelles also has a small but growing offshore financial sector. There is also potential for U.S. investment in renewable energy, as Seychelles seeks to reduce its heavy dependence on imported fossil fuels while preserving its natural environment. The Seychellois government planned to reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions by 26.4 percent of the business-as-usual scenario 2030 value by undertaking reforms in its energy, refrigeration and air conditioning, transport, and waste sectors. Authorities planned to use solar and wind energy to increase the share of renewable energy production from 5 to 15 percent by 2030. While Seychelles welcomes foreign investment though the Seychelles Investment Act, related regulations restrict foreign investment in a number of sectors where local businesses are active, including artisanal fishing, small boat charters, taxi driving, and scuba diving instruction. The country’s investment policies encourage the development of Seychelles’ natural resources, improvements in infrastructure, and increases to productivity levels, but stress that these changes must be implemented in an environmentally sound and sustainable manner. Seychelles puts a premium on maintaining its unique ecosystems and screens all potential investment projects to ensure that any economic, social, or industrial benefits will not compromise the country’s international reputation for environmental stewardship. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 23 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $575 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $12,200 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Seychelles has a favorable attitude toward most foreign direct investment, though the government reserves certain types of business activities for domestic investors only. The Reserved Economic Activity Policy, enacted in April 2020, provides a detailed list of the types of business in which only Seychellois may invest and is available here: https://www.investinseychelles.com/component/edocman/reserved-economic-activities-policy,-april-2020/download . The Seychelles Investment (Economic Activities) Regulations also provide details on the limitations on foreign equity for certain types of businesses, as well as a list of economic activities in which need-based investment may be allowed by a foreigner: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/syc_e/WTACCSYC61_LEG_4.pdf . In June 2015, Seychelles implemented a moratorium on the construction of large hotels (25 rooms and above) on the country’s inner islands. This includes the three most-populated islands of Mahé, Praslin, and La Digue. The Seychelles Investment Board (SIB) is the national gateway agency for the promotion and facilitation of investment in Seychelles. The government’s objective is to promote economic and commercial relationships to diversify the economy, as well as to sustain its tourism and fishing industries, which are currently the main drivers of economic growth. The SIB periodically organizes sector-specific meetings with investors and hosts a National Business Forum every two years to engage with the private sector. The 2010 Seychelles Investment Act and 2014 Seychelles Investment (Economic Activities) Regulations govern foreign direct investment (FDI) in Seychelles. These documents are available at: https://www.investinseychelles.com/investors-guide/investor-resources/policies-guidelines-acts . Since the implementation of IMF reforms after the 2008 financial crisis, Seychelles has successfully attracted FDI. According to the Central Bank of Seychelles, gross FDI inflows amounted to $149 million in 2020, representing a decrease of $105 million compared to 2019. This decrease is principally due to investments that were put on hold because of the pandemic. The SIB advises foreign investors on the laws, regulations, and procedures for their activities in Seychelles. The 2014 Seychelles Investment (Economic Activities) Regulations and the 2020 Reserved Economic Activity Policy list the economic activities in which only Seychellois can invest. This regulation is currently being converted into a list of foreign activities in which foreigners can invest to allow for increased transparency and better governance. In the 2021 budget speech, the minister of finance highlighted that the current government aims to protect Seychellois businesses and plans to review the categories in which only Seychellois can invest. This review was still ongoing as of March 2022. Seychelles also places financial limits on foreign equity in certain types of resident companies. These limits are detailed in the 2014 Seychelles Investment (Economic Activities) Regulations. The regulations also provide a list of economic activities in which need-based foreign investment may be allowed. While the SIB and the government encourage foreign investors to collaborate with a local partner, there is no formal requirement to do so. The SIB, in cooperation with other government agencies, also assists in screening potential investment projects. For a business to operate, investors must apply for a license from the Seychelles Licensing Authority. In 2012, the government also established an Investment Appeal Panel to provide a mechanism for investors to challenge the government’s decisions regarding existing or proposed investments in Seychelles. More information is available in the 2010 Seychelles Investment Act: https://www.investinseychelles.com/component/edocman/seychelles-investment-act-2010/download?Itemid=0 . To date, Seychelles has not conducted an investment policy review through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the World Trade Organization (WTO). Seychelles became the 161st WTO member in April 2015. The investment policy review of Seychelles by UNCTAD was published in November 2020: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/publications/1238/investment-policy-review-of-seychelles . The Seychellois government is committed to improving the business environment through public-private partnerships (PPP) to upgrade the country’s infrastructure. In March 2021, the cabinet of ministers approved the migration from the 2017 version of the harmonized system of classification to the 2022 version. The government is also currently reviewing the 1972 Companies Act. On average, it takes eight days to obtain a certificate of incorporation and 14 days to obtain a business license. Information on registering a business in Seychelles can be obtained on the SIB website: https://www.investinseychelles.com/investors-guide/start-your-business . Companies, including those that are foreign owned, can register business names online through the following portal: http://www.sqa.sc/BizRegistration/WebBusinessRegsitration.aspx . However, parts of the registration process, such as payments of fees, still must be completed in person. A full digitalization of the registration process is currently ongoing and is expected to be completed in June 2022. Since December 2021, applications for business licenses can be completed online at https://eservice.egov.sc/eGateway/homepage.aspx. SIB also provides post-investment support in the form of consultancy services regarding the laws, regulations, guidelines, minimum operational standards, and land acquisition. This service is provided free of charge and is available to every investor, regardless of the size or nature of the business. The Enterprise Seychelles Agency (ESA) is responsible for providing business development services to improve the performance of micro, small, and medium enterprises in Seychelles. Services provided by ESA include business planning, training, marketing expertise, and identification of business opportunities for SMEs. The Seychellois government does not promote or incentivize outward investment. However, it does not restrict local investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Although the Seychellois government has made considerable efforts to liberalize the economy, the country continues to suffer from overregulation. There is a lack of transparency in the privatization and allocation of government-owned land and businesses. To promote transparency in the public procurement system, Seychelles’ National Tender Board publishes all tenders both on its website (http://www.ntb.sc) and in local newspapers. The board publicizes contracts that have been awarded and includes the names of successful bidders and bid amounts. The government has also set up a Procurement Oversight Unit, which serves as a public procurement policy and monitoring body (http://www.pou.gov.sc/ ). Following the 2016 election victory of the opposition Seychelles Democratic Union (LDS) in winning a majority in the National Assembly for the first time in 40 years, significant procedural changes were implemented. The government also took several measures to combat corruption and nepotism, including establishing the Anti-Corruption Commission; more frequently publishing special audits by the Auditor General’s Office of questionable government transactions; and appointing opposition supporters to various boards of national organizations and important positions. Since 2017, the government has held budget preparation focus group discussions, including key stakeholders such as the business community and civil society organizations. Additionally, there has been considerably more legislative debate on the annual government budget. Increased budget debate and scrutiny has continued following the October 2020 presidential and legislative elections, in which the LDS won the presidency for the first time in the country’s history, and again won a majority in the National Assembly. Every government agency is called to the National Assembly to answer questions on their proposed budgets, as well as general questions related to their organizations. Proposed laws and regulations, as well as final laws, are published in the official gazette on a monthly basis and are available online at https://www.gazette.sc/ . Regulatory transparency improved with the balance of power between the opposition-controlled National Assembly and ruling party-controlled presidency following the 2016 elections. This included several new laws, such as the Freedom of Information Act. In 2018, the access to information law came into force. In 2019, the government appointed a chief executive officer for the Seychelles Information Commission, and appointed information officers in all ministries and departments. The law makes provisions for how citizens may access government information that is not classified as sensitive for security and defense reasons. It also makes provisions for how agencies should respond to requests, mandates proactive disclosure and a duty to assist requestors, and defines information that is deemed classified for security and defense. In 2020, the government also published a manual for using the Freedom of Information Act and accessing information. Additionally, ministries are now required to submit white papers and consult with stakeholders before legislation is adopted. Seychelles’ budget is easily accessible to the general public: http://www.finance.gov.sc/national-budget/47 . Budget documents, including the executive budget proposal and the enacted budget, provide a substantially full picture of Seychelles’ planned expenditures and revenue streams. Publicly available budgets included expenditures broken down by ministry and revenues broken down by source and type. Information on debt obligations is also readily available. In 2019, the government also included a fiscal risk statement, which identified substantial fiscal risks emanating from public enterprises in Seychelles. The statement also contains details on explicit and contingent liabilities, and is available at https://bit.ly/3ivTzDq In its 2022 budget, the government announced a bill for the oversight of public enterprises to be presented to the National Assembly in early 2022. This legislation will establish new obligations for public enterprises and will help the Public Enterprise Monitoring Commission (PEMC) be more efficient and rigorous in its supervisory function. The PEMC oversees 32 state-owned enterprises, which have either been established using public financial resources, or of which the government is a significant shareholder. Other measures to improve transparency and accountability announced by the Seychellois government in 2021 include: (a) a framework for better transparency and justice related to taxes paid by charitable organizations on private sector donations; (b) review of the Income and Non-Monetary Benefits Tax Act to bring more transparency to salaries that are not taxed; (c) implementation of a Results Based Management (RBM) framework to inculcate principles of efficiency, transparency and accountability in public service; and (d) creation of a Public Sector Commission to ensure better transparency and to remove any political agenda in the appointment of senior executives in the public sector. In November 2021, the Seychellois government also announced the establishment of a high-level domestic regulations (HLDRC) committee to represent the public sector and members of the National Assembly. This committee will discuss ways of improving the transparency and efficiency of licensing administrative procedures, especially with regards to business with foreign investors. Seychelles has signed trade agreements with regional blocs such as COMESA, SADC, and the EU. Seychelles has also signed the COMESA- East African Community (EAC)-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (TFTA) and AfCFTA. Seychelles ratified the AfCFTA in June 2021 and announced its withdrawal from the TFTA in September 2021 to focus its resources on the AfCFTA. The AfCFTA started during the TFTA negotiations but moved at a faster pace and covers a larger number of African countries (54), including the 28 countries negotiating the TFTA. In January 2019, four eastern and southern African (ESA) countries, including Seychelles, signed the UK-ESA Economic Partnership Agreement, which safeguards trade preferences currently enjoyed under iEPA post Brexit. Seychelles joined the WTO in 2015, becoming the 161st member. Seychelles does notify draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. In 2016, Seychelles ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). Further details on Seychelles’ TFA notifications to the WTO can be found at https://tfadatabase.org/members/seychelles . Seychelles’ legal system is a blend of English common law, the Napoleonic Code, and customary law. Civil matters, such as contracts and torts, are governed by the Civil Code of Seychelles, which is derived from the French Napoleonic Code. However, the company law and criminal laws are based on British law. In both civil and criminal matters, the procedural rules derive from British law. Seychelles does not maintain a specialized commercial court. Judgments of foreign courts are governed by Section 3 of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1961. Under the current government, the perception among Seychellois is that the judiciary is no longer influenced by the executive. In its 2022 budget, the government announced that it will start working with the judiciary to introduce a separate court that will deal specifically with commercial cases. The Seychellois government established the SIB (Seychelles Investment Bureau, https://www.investinseychelles.com/ ) as a one-stop-shop for all matters relating to business and investment in Seychelles. The SIB’s main functions are to promote investment and facilitate investment processes within the country’s administrative and legal framework. The SIB, in cooperation with other government agencies, also assists in screening potential investment projects. It has also implemented a digital customer relations management system to follow up on applications submitted by investors. In 2021, the government announced that it is working on a digital system to integrate functions of all government agencies involved in the administration of online business applications to further improve ease of doing business. The government is keen to ensure that business activities are not conducted at the expense of Seychelles’ natural environment. For a business to operate, investors must apply for a license from the Seychelles Licensing Authority (http://www.sla.gov.sc/ ). The government established an Investment Appeal Panel in 2012 to provide an appeal mechanism for investors to challenge the government’s decisions regarding investments or proposed investments in Seychelles. The SIB only reviews competition cases initiated by other government authorities, private sector entities, or investors. Current legislation does not empower SIB to review on its own accord all transactions for competition-related concerns. The Fair-Trading Commission (http://ftc.sc/ ) is responsible for investigating competition-related concerns. Such investigations may be initiated by the Commission or may be carried out following a complaint. In November 2021, the government announced new measures to promote competition in the financial services sector: (a) modernization of the National Payments System; (b) a new fintech strategy; and (c) the introduction of financial consumer protection legislation, which will give the central bank and financial services authority more power to protect the interests of financial consumers. This new law will likely be complemented by other actions to enhance competition, such as reducing or eliminating costs for switching providers, eliminating abusive practices aimed at keeping customers tied to one particular service provider, and educating the public on its rights. The government also announced measures to promote competition in the telecommunication sector. A new bill that will be presented to the National Assembly in 2022 will address competition issues and establish legal provisions to enable consumers to switch operators. The 1978 Lands Acquisition Act, last amended in 1990, states that when the government takes possession of property, it must pay prompt and full compensation for the property. The government may expropriate property in cases of public interest or for public safety. Following the 1977 socialist takeover, the government engaged in expropriation of land for redistribution or for use by the state. With the return of a multi-party-political system in 1993, the government compensated some of those who had lost land to expropriation/redistribution in the late 1970s. In 2017, Seychelles established the Land Compensation Tribunal to investigate cases where compulsory land acquisition was made by the government without adequate compensation. Seychellois whose land was taken by the government from 1977 to 1993 had until December 2020 to make their claims. The Land Compensation Tribunal completed judgments in all its cases in 2021. The Land Compensation Tribunal also works in close collaboration with the Truth Reconciliation and National Unity Commission (TRNUC), which is investigating cases of human rights abuses prior to and after the 1977 takeover. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, both the Land Compensation Tribunal and the TRNUC have not been able to function as planned. The TRNUC’s work is further hindered by an insufficient budget. Illegal land acquisition by the government also forms part of the TRNUC’s mandate. In October 2021, the Seychellois government also introduced a program to return land that was forcibly acquired between 1977 and 1993. This program applies to land acquired through the 1977 Lands Acquisition Act or purchased under a private agreement. The measure is based on the principle that land acquired by the government either compulsorily or through private agreement for a public purpose or in the national interest and which is still undeveloped and not earmarked by the government to be utilized in the public interest or for a public purpose will be considered for return to the original owner or his executor or heir. More information on this is available here: https://bit.ly/3IOIGY3 . U.S. Embassy Port Louis does not anticipate major expropriations in the near future, nor is it aware of any pattern of discrimination against U.S. persons. ICSID Convention and New York Convention In 1978, Seychelles joined the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention). In February 2020, Seychelles deposited its instrument of accession to the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention), which entered into force in May 2020. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Seychelles has been a party to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States since April 1978. Seychelles has signed five bilateral investment treaties (BITs), of which two are currently in force: the 2007 France-Seychelles BIT and the 1998 Cyprus-Seychelles BIT. U.S. Embassy Port Louis is aware of at least one investor-government dispute in the current reporting period. The dispute involves the operation of a large hotel resort by a company with U.S. shareholders, in which the Seychellois government also owned a small percentage share. In 2008, the Seychellois government sought to close the company on the grounds that it “had disappeared in its ability to operate as a hotel resort,” allowing the hotel to fall into disrepair. The government’s effort was successful and resulted in the cancellation of the hotel’s operating license. The liquidation and subsequent sell-off of the hotel, formerly the country’s second largest hotel, raised suspicions of government corruption among local press outlets and business institutions, including the chamber of commerce. The former majority shareholder of the hotel claimed that he was threatened into selling the hotel by a businessman with ties to the government. The purchasers of the hotel, a newly formed group allegedly led by the same businessman who threatened the previous owner, were the lowest bidder. In October 2019, the Seychellois Supreme Court recommended that the Seychellois president establish a commission of inquiry to investigate the sale of the hotel, and, in June 2020, then-President Danny Faure appointed such a commission. The commission’s report was expected to be published by the end of May 2021 but has not yet been published as of March 2022. Parties involved in investment disputes are encouraged to resolve their disputes through arbitration and negotiation. The Seychelles Investment Act created the Investment Appeal Panel to which aggrieved investors may appeal a decision made by a public sector agency regarding their investments or proposed investments in Seychelles. In the event investors are not satisfied with the decision of the Investment Appeal Panel, they may appeal to the Court of Appeal. Seychelles has acceded to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which entered into force in May 2020. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts The legal framework for international arbitration exists through the Commercial Code of Seychelles, the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure, and Seychelles Investment Act. Seychelles has acceded to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which entered into force in May 2020. Arbitration legislation in the Seychelles is not based on the UNCITRAL Model Law; however, several provisions are compatible with the Model Law. In general, international arbitration is not yet a regular feature of dispute resolution in Seychelles, even though arbitration clauses are used in contracts. Bankruptcy in Seychelles is governed under the Insolvency Act of 2013 (https://www.seylii.org/sc/legislation/act/2013/4 ). According to his act, an individual may be discharged from bankruptcy three years from the date of its declaration. Bankruptcy is not criminalized in Seychelles. 6. Financial Sector Seychelles welcomes foreign portfolio investment. The Seychelles Securities Act (https://fsaseychelles.sc/component/edocman/securities-act-2007/download?Itemid=0 ) provides the legal framework for the Seychelles’ stock market. The Seychelles securities exchange, now known as MERJ Exchange, has operated since 2012. Listing and trading are available in Euros, Pounds Sterling, Seychelles Rupees, South African Rand, and Australian Dollars. MERJ is an affiliate of the World Federation of Exchanges, a full member of ANNA and a partner exchange of the Sustainable Stock Exchange Initiative. By the end of 2021, MERJ reported a total of 54 listings (49 equity and 5 debt listings) with a total market capitalization of $1.29 billion. SECDEX Exchange Limited is the second exchange licensed by the Seychelles Financial Services Authority in 2020 to operate as a multi-asset securities and derivatives exchange. Portfolio investment in Seychelles is limited by the small size of the economy and banking sector. The buying and selling of sizeable positions may have an outsized impact on the Seychelles Rupee and the economy in general. There are no restrictions on trading by foreigners. Existing policies facilitate the free flow of financial resources in and out of the economy. The government respects IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Foreign investors are able to obtain credit on the local market and through the Seychelles banking system, and a variety of credit instruments are available to both local and foreign investors. Seychelles has a two-tier banking system that separates the central and commercial bank functions and roles. Commercial banks, both domestic and foreign, are regulated and supervised by the Central Bank of Seychelles (CBS). According to the 2004 Central Bank of Seychelles Act, the CBS is responsible for the formulation and implementation of Seychelles’ monetary and exchange rate policies. The CBS is the only administrative body responsible for receiving applications for banking licenses, whether domestic or offshore, and issuing the corresponding licenses. As of March 2022, there were seven commercial banks in operation: Absa Bank, Bank of Baroda, Mauritius Commercial Bank (Seychelles), Nouvobanq, Seychelles Commercial Bank, Al Salam Bank Seychelles Ltd, and Bank of Ceylon. The Pakistani Bank AL Habib Limited closed its branch in Seychelles in September 2021. According to a 2016 report by the CBS, 94 percent of Seychellois use banks. Seychelles also has three non-banking financial institutions: the Seychelles Credit Union, a savings and credit cooperative society; the Development Bank of Seychelles, which provides flexible financing for businesses and projects to promote economic growth and employment; and the Housing Finance Corporation, a government-owned company that provides financing to Seychellois for the purchase of land, the construction of homes, and financing home improvements. Seychelles has multiple laws that govern the financial services sector: the 2004 Financial Institutions Act; the 2004 Prevention of Terrorism Act; the 2004 Central Bank Act; the 2007 Data Protection Act; the 2007 Mutual and Hedge Fund Act; the 2016 International Business Companies Act; the 2020 Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Act, and the 2020 Beneficial Ownership Act. The Seychellois banking sector is generally healthy, though it is limited by its small size and reliance on correspondent bank relationships. Due to concerns about money-laundering and illicit finance in the Seychellois financial sector, some local banks have lost their correspondent banking relationship with foreign banks, a phenomenon known as de-risking, thus making it difficult for local banks to perform international transactions. In 2017, the CBS and the Financial Services Authority visited foreign financial centers to address de-risking. The government is actively working with international experts, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, to ensure Seychelles is not perceived as high-risk jurisdiction. In February 2020, the EU added Seychelles to the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes, as Seychelles had not implemented the tax reforms by the mutually agreed deadline of December 2019. In December 2019, France added Seychelles to its blacklist of tax havens for not providing adequate information on French offshore entities operating in the island nation’s jurisdiction. In 2020, the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Act and the Beneficial Ownership (BO) Act. These two pieces of legislation address the deficiencies identified in the 2018 Mutual Evaluation Report of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). The Beneficial Ownership Act (Compliance of Legal Persons and Legal Arrangements) Notice was enacted in September 2021 and the Beneficial Ownership Data Base digital platform, managed by the Financial Intelligence Unit, became operational in November 2021. All domestic registered companies, partnerships and associations are required to comply with the provisions of the 2020 Beneficial Ownership Act by January 31, 2022, to populate the information about their beneficial owners on the Beneficial Ownership Data Base, and to keep an up-to-date register of all their beneficial owners or shareholders. In December 2021, the National Assembly approved five bills to make the jurisdiction compliant with FATF recommendations: the Anti-Corruption (Amendment No.3) Bill, the Licenses (Amendment) Bill, the Custody, Management and Disposal of Seized, Forfeited or Confiscated Properties Bill, the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Amendment) Bill, and the Prevention of Terrorism (Second Amendment) Bill. In February 2022, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) announced that it was conducting a risk assessment of virtual assets and virtual assets service providers. This exercise will guide the authorities on policy decisions related to the development of laws that will allow Seychelles to comply with FATF’s Recommendation 15. The outcome of the risk assessment will feed into the Seychelles National Risk Assessment scheduled for publication in 2022. Other laws enacted during 2021 to upgrade the country’s financial services legal framework include: the Trusts Act, the Foundations (Amendment) Act, the International Service Providers (Amendment) Act, the International Business Companies (Amendment) Act, and the Limited Partnership (Amendment) Act. In September 2021, the Business Tax (Amendment)(Commencement) Notice and the Business Tax (Amendment of Eleventh Schedule) were also enacted to bring into effect certain changes in Seychelles’ territorial tax system. As a result of these new laws and amendments, the EU removed Seychelles from Annex I of its list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes in October 2021. Seychelles has been moved to Annex II of the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions (the “EU grey list”) for criterion 1.2 (tax transparency), with removal from Annex II pending the positive outcome of a Global Forum supplementary review, scheduled in 2022. According to the CBS in January 2022, non-performing loans to total gross loans in the Seychellois banking sector stood at 5.39 percent, and foreign currency deposits totaled 12.5 billion Seychelles Rupees (approx. $870 million). A wide range of financial services, such as checking accounts, savings accounts, loans, transactions in foreign currencies, and foreign currency accounts are available in the banking system. Foreigners and foreign/offshore firms must establish residency or proof of business registration to obtain a bank account. Foreign Exchange Since the 2008 IMF reform package, the Seychellois government places no restrictions or limitations on foreign investors converting, transferring, or repatriating funds associated with investment. Funds are freely converted. Seychelles maintains a floating exchange rate for the Seychelles Rupee (SCR), which fluctuated between SCR 12 and SCR 14.5 to $1 from 2015 to 2019. In 2020, the SCR depreciated by 53 percent with the average rate in January 2020 being SCR 14 to $1 compared to SCR 21.5 in December 2020, due to the unprecedented impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the tourism sector. The average exchange rate gradually appreciated through 2021 and was back to SCR14 to $1 in February 2022 as tourism and other economic activities rebounded in the country. Remittance Policies Foreign exchange controls were removed in 2008 and foreign investors are free to repatriate their profits and other incomes. U.S. Embassy Port Louis is unaware of any planned changes to remittance policies, time limits on remittances, or use of any legal parallel market. Sovereign Wealth Funds Seychelles does not maintain any sovereign wealth funds. However, in the 2022 state of the nation address, the president announced that a sovereign wealth fund will be established. This fund had not yet materialized at the time of this report. 10. Political and Security Environment The current constitution, promulgated in 1993, provides citizens the right to change their government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through periodic elections based on universal suffrage. Seychelles has not experienced large-scale political violence since the late 1970s. The United Seychelles party, formerly known as Parti Lepep (People’s Party), governed Seychelles following the 1977 coup d’etat and won every election from the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1993 until 2016, when a coalition of opposition parties won the majority of the National Assembly seats. The October 2020 election was the first time since 1976 that Seychellois voters elected an opposition party candidate as president and there was a peaceful and smooth transfer of power. East Africa Standby Force election observers declared the election to have been peaceful, transparent, and orderly. Seychelles remained politically stable at the time of this report. Sierra Leone Executive Summary Sierra Leone, with an estimated population of 8.2 million people (2022 World Population Review), is located on the coast of West Africa between the Republic of Guinea in the north and northeast, the Republic of Liberia in the south and southeast, and the Atlantic Ocean on the west, with a land area of 71,740 square kilometers and a humid tropical climate. Sierra Leone emerged from a decade-long civil war in 2002 and has been politically stable with remarkable religious tolerance among its people. Since 2002, the country economically outperformed other west African countries before it was struck by an outbreak of the Ebola epidemic in 2014. When the country emerged out of the Ebola scourge in 2015, the government turned to foreign direct investment (FDIs) to return the economy to the pre-Ebola growth trajectory. Sierra Leone was recovering from the ravages of the Ebola epidemic of 2014-15 when the COVID-19 pandemic struck in March 2020 and took a heavy toll on the economy. The government’s quick and decisive response, which comprised the COVID-19 Health Preparedness and Response Plan and the Quick Action Economic Response Program (QAERP), focused on saving lives and livelihoods to prevent a more significant outbreak. The containment measures addressed broader economic and social concerns combined with strained debt. The government’s 2021 budget prioritized COVID-19 and was augmented by concessional support, primarily in the form of grants from development partners. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in August 2021, Sierra Leone grappled with severe and persistent effects of the COVID-19 pandemic amidst signs of early economic recovery. Economic activity dipped sharply in 2020 with elevated inflation and limited fiscal space. Sierra Leone offers significant investment potential across numerous sectors. The country is rich in mineral reserves and natural resources with a favorable tropical climate, fertile soil advantageous for agriculture, extensive continental shelf with multiple varieties of fishery resources, a natural environment offering touristic prospects, and vast mineral resources, especially iron ore, diamonds, gold, rutile, ilmenite, and bauxite. Possibilities also exist in energy, water, telecommunications, and other infrastructure. FDIs are crucial to the country’s economic recovery. Therefore, there has been a continuous drive and policy focus on encouraging FDIs into the country. There are, however, legislative, institutional, and regulatory challenges to investment, including governance, the rule of law, business and human rights, dispute resolution, finance, and banking. Poor quality and limited infrastructure also pose significant investment challenges as the country lacks the capacity necessary to support practical commercial activities. Challenges similarly persist in corruption, skilled labor, accessing land, high-interest rates, and contract enforcement. The government’s policy focus has been to address all these impediments and shape the economic fundamentals for investment to flourish. Sierra Leone has potential in six primary areas: agriculture, fisheries, mining, tourism, energy, and construction. The country is endowed with a favorable tropical climate with a wide-ranging fertile soil advantageous for agriculture. It also provides an extensive continental shelf with numerous fishery resources, a natural environment offering touristic prospects, and vast mineral resources, especially iron ore, diamonds, gold, rutile, ilmenite, and bauxite. There are also opportunities for public-private partnership projects in energy, water, telecommunications, and other infrastructure. Opportunities further exist for investors to benefit from several preferential trade agreements. These include duty-free access to the Mano River Union market of more than 50 million, ECOWAS market of over 420 million, and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement of about fifty-four African countries with a combined population of more than one billion. The country also benefits from the European Union’s Everything but Arms initiative and the United States African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). President Julius Maada Bio of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP), who ruled briefly as head of a military regime in 1996, replaced President Ernest Bai Koroma in April 2018. His administration took over a poverty-stricken and debt-burdened country with an elevated level of corruption and fiscal indiscipline. His development aspirations are outlined in the comprehensive medium-term National Development Plan (MTNDP) launched in 2019 to span through 2023. The plan is built on human capital development and economic diversification in agriculture, fisheries, and tourism to facilitate the country’s transformation from a fragile state to a stable and prosperous democracy that would achieve middle-income status by 2035. His foreign policy agenda prioritized economic diplomacy and he has traveled to many countries seeking and marketing Sierra Leone as an investor-friendly country. The government is calling on investors in all sectors of the economy as it looks for private sector-led economic growth and development. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 115 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country (stock positions) 2021 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $510 USD http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) has a strong and positive attitude towards foreign direct investment (FDI) required to invigorate the country’s economic growth and development. The GoSL’s Medium-Term National Development Plan (2019-2023) sets a growth agenda to support economic diversification and competitiveness towards promoting and developing a viable private sector to increase participation in global trade. The Sierra Leone Investment and Export Promotion Agency (SLIEPA) is the government’s lead agency established to oversee trade policy, improve the investment climate, and provide information on business registration, applicable incentives, and licenses. The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) supervises the registration of limited liability companies. Simultaneously, the Public-Private Partnership Unit, established in the Office of the President, facilitates, and streamlines all public-private partnership agreements. A bill to establish a National Investment Board (NIB) awaits Parliamentary ratification. When established, the NIB will regularize the activities previously marred by bureaucracy and fraud. The NIB will create an Investment and Export Promotion Unit to replace SLIEPA, the Corporate Affairs Unit will take over the management of the Public Private Partnership Unit (PPPU) from the Office of the President, and establish a Business Facilitation Unit. The Investment and Export Promotion Unit will oversee trade policy and improve the investment climate, while the Corporate Affairs Unit will supervise and regulate company incorporation. The PPPU will promote, facilitate, and streamline all public-private agreements, whereas the Business Facilitation Unit will serve as a one-stop shop to facilitate the setting up of businesses and provide support and information to start and operate a business. The aim is to create a conducive and safer investment environment to end the corrupt ways investment has been handled in the past. Sierra Leone allows foreign investors to compete on the same terms as domestic firms. The Investment Promotion Act of 2004 protects foreign entities from discriminatory treatment. The Act creates incentives and customs exemptions, provides for investors to freely repatriate proceeds and remittances, and protects against expropriation without adequate compensation. The Act further provides for arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules in the event of a commercial dispute. However, a draft arbitration bill, which incorporates the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), presently awaits Parliamentary domestication. The diversification initiative of the GoSL is largely directed towards agriculture, fisheries, tourism, and infrastructure. The government is promoting sustainable investment in mechanized commercial agriculture, value addition, and agricultural research. The fishery sector is pushing for investment in lawful cultivation, commercial farming, and preservation of fish products. In the tourism sector, priority areas are investment in the hospitality industry, rehabilitation of historical and cultural sites, and promotion of tourism-based activities that link with the rural economy. The government focuses on public-private partnerships for major infrastructural projects in energy, water, roads, ports, and telecommunications, and encourages investments in local industries like agro-processing, other value addition industries, and small enterprise development. Conversely, poor quality and limited infrastructure pose significant challenges to investment and practical commercial activity. The shortage of skilled labor, the slow legal system, the high level of corruption, and political violence are significant obstacles to FDI. However, Sierra Leone made significant reforms in simplifying the process of setting up a business, and the World Bank ranked the country 58 out of 190 countries in 2020. The country also migrated to the UNCTAD ASYCUDA World System to further enhance trading across borders. In addressing corrupt practices, the country progressed 14 places up in the Transparency International Corruption ranking from 129/180 in 2018 to 115/180 in 2021. Similarly, the government passed the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s indicator on the control of corruption four times in a row, from 71 percent in FY19 to 83 percent in FY22. The disruption of COVID-19 has been widespread and has severely impacted the economy. To mitigate the shock and accelerate economic recovery, the government initiated the Quick Action Economic Response Plan (QAERP), which aimed at saving lives and sustaining livelihoods. QAERP maintained adequate stock of essential commodities, supported hardest-hit businesses and labor-based public works, and assisted local production and processing of food items. After the July 2021 review of Sierra Leone’s Extended Credit Facility, the International Monetary Fund underscored the government’s strong economic and health responses to mitigate the immediate impact of the crisis and safeguard macroeconomic stability. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activities. Foreigners are free to establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises. However, foreign investors cannot invest in arms and ammunition, cement block manufacturing, granite and sandstone excavation, manufacturing of certain consumer durable goods, and military, police, and correctional officers’ apparel and accouterments. Furthermore, there are limits to land ownership by foreign entities and individuals; the limitations vary depending on the location of the land being used and are discussed below in the “Real Property” section. Sierra Leone has few specific restrictions, controls, fees, or taxes on foreign ownership of companies that can outrightly own Sierra Leonean companies subject to certain registration formalities. However, investment in mining of less than $500,000 is an exception as this requires a 25 percent Sierra Leonean holding. Foreign technical and unskilled labor can be used but must seek approval from the Corporate Affairs Commission to transfer shares. Export licenses are required only for certain goods and materials. In comparison, the export of gold and diamonds must comply with internationally accepted standards such as Kimberley Process certification. The permits required to export goods such as cocoa and coffee are issued automatically and at no cost. Small mining investments require a minority partnership with a Sierra Leonean company. The Sierra Leone National Carrier Ratification Agreement Act of 2012 mandates the use of the Sierra Leone National Shipping Company for 40 percent of all goods imported or exported from Sierra Leone. The Petroleum Act 2001 restricts petroleum exploration and production licenses to companies registered or incorporated in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone has also identified certain restrictions on foreign investment in its Schedule of Specific Commitments to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, from August 1995, which established limited restrictions on the business services, financial services, and maritime and airport sectors. The Local Content Policy, adopted in 2012, promotes the utilization of locally produced goods and locally provided services and the employment of Sierra Leonean nationals. While failure to follow the policy previously resulted only in denying investment incentives, the Sierra Leone Local Content Agency Act 2016 requires compliance. More information is available below in the “Performance Requirements” section. The 2016 local content policy requires investors to utilize local goods in place of imported goods, promote the employment of citizens, and develop the human capacity of these citizens through training. The legal system generally treats foreign investors in a non-discriminatory fashion, though investors comment that judicial application of the laws is often subject to financial and political influence. The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted a trade policy review for Sierra Leone in 2017. The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) last conducted an investment policy review for Sierra Leone in 2010. Sierra Leone has progressed in simplifying its business registration process in recent years. The Corporate Affairs Commission manages the registration of limited liability companies and provides a “one-stop-shop,” including an online business registration system. The entire process involves five steps and takes, on average, ten days. Additional information is available from the CAC’s website: http://cac.gov.sl . The Sierra Leone Investment and Export Promotion Agency also provides helpful guidance on starting a business, sector-specific business licenses, mining licensing, and certification fees, and marine resources and fisheries. Sierra Leone has no program to promote or incentivize outward investment and places no restrictions on such activity. 3. Legal Regime The Sierra Leone Parliament is the country’s supreme legislative authority. Generally, Parliament enacts bills that the President signs into law. The judiciary interprets and applies the laws to ensure impartial justice and provides a mechanism for dispute resolution. However, the regulatory system is not entirely consistent with international norms. Laws and regulations are developed at the national level, and the Constitution requires publication of proposed laws and regulations in a government journal, the Gazette, for 21 days. A series of legislative reforms have been carried out since the second trade policy review in 2017 to create a conducive business environment and attract FDI. These include the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Banking Act, the Bank of Sierra Leone Act, the Extractive Industries Revenue Act, and several Finance Acts, to name a few. To strengthen the legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks, Sierra Leone established a fast-track commercial court, the Credit Reference Bureau, the Corporate Affairs Commission, revised the legislation of company activities, and developed the Local Content Policy. Also, Sierra Leone has taken steps to promote and improve regulatory transparency. The Right to Access Information Commission was established in 2014 to make government records available to the public and imposes a penalty for failure to make information available. Sierra Leone joined the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in 2014, an initiative that empowers citizens to fight corruption and promotes transparent and accountable governance. The OGP, now led by the National Council for Civic Education and Development (NaCCED), made significant progress in access to justice, gender, education, and open Parliament, thereby assuring citizens of government’s commitment to provide for the public and to consolidate democracy. In 2020, Parliament passed the Independent Commission for Peace and National Cohesion law and repealed Part 5 of the Public Order Act of 1965 that criminalized libel. In 2021, the government enacted the Cyber Security and Crime Act, signed the abolition of the death penalty, created a fast-track court to try sexual offenders, and a Gender Empowerment Bill 2021 currently before Parliament for enactment. The Audit Service Act of 1998 established the Audit Service Sierra Leone (ASSL) and further strengthened to carry out audits of all government entities, including statutory corporations and organizations, by the Audit Service Act of 2014. Sierra Leone became a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2008, established the Sierra Leone Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (SLEITI), and became compliant with EITI rules in 2014. In 2019, the EITI Board agreed that Sierra Leone had made meaningful progress in implementing the EITI Standard but should undertake corrective actions before the second validation in December 2020. However, in 2020, recognizing the challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, the EITI Board introduced flexible measures in EITI implementation and tasked the multi-stakeholder group (MSG) to focus on ensuring EITII’s commitment to transparency and accountability. The Public Financial Management Act of 2016 reformed the budget process and improved transparency in the expenditure of public funds. While the Fiscal Management and Control Act of 2017 directed government ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) to transfer all revenues into the Treasury Single Account, domestically referred to the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF), which was fully complied with in 2018 on the executive order of President Maada Bio. Sierra Leone joined the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade (GATT) in 1961 and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Sierra Leone is committed to the multilateral trading system and has not notified the WTO of any inconsistent measures with the WTO’s Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) obligations. It acceded to the Kyoto Protocol in 2006 and the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures, otherwise referred to as the Revised Kyoto Convention in 2015. It became a contracting party to the International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS Convention) in 2015. It replaced its pre-shipment inspection with a destination inspection in 2009 and notified the WTO of the Agreement on Trade facilitation in May 2017. The Customs Act of 2011 upheld the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement, which prohibits the use of arbitrary or fictitious values. However, it has not notified the WTO of its sanitary and phytosanitary legislation required for the international movement of any plant materials or products or any state-trading activity. Sierra Leone is not a signatory to any plurilateral agreements concluded under the WTO but established a mission to the WTO in 2011. It ratified six multilateral investment agreements, including the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) Conventions, so that foreign investments in Sierra Leone are covered against non-commercial risks such as currency transfer risks, expropriation risks, risks of war and civil disturbance, and repudiation risk. The legal system is derived from the English common law system, but local courts apply customary law to many disputes outside of the capital, Freetown. The courts provide a venue to enforce property and contract rights. The country does not have a consolidated written commercial or contractual law, and disparate pieces of legislation sometimes lead to the uneven treatment of commercial disputes. The Superior Court of Judicature consists of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, and the High Court, while the lower courts consist of the magistrate court and the local courts. In 2010, Sierra Leone created a Fast-Track Commercial Court to reduce the duration of commercial cases to as low as six months. In 2017, Sierra Leone hosted a commercial law summit to address gaps in the justice system, resulting in concrete recommendations in critical areas, including arbitration, anti-corruption and bribery, public-private partnerships, and reform of the court process. A draft arbitration bill will bring arbitration proceedings in Sierra Leone up to international standards when passed into law. Foreign investors have equal access to the judicial system, which is slow and often subject to financial and political influence. However, Sierra Leonean courts may acknowledge foreign judgment from specific jurisdictions with reciprocal enforcement arrangements with Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, and the Gambia. Generally, Sierra Leonean courts do not apply foreign law, but foreign judgment can be enforced when registered with the high court. However, the registration may be refused when enforcement is contrary to public policy. On depositing its instrument for accession to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), Sierra Leone became the 166th state party to the Convention, which came into force in January 2021. Recommended during the inaugural Commercial Law Summit of May 2017, the accession will promote FDI by resolving disputes by arbitration without interference from local courts and will enforce arbitral awards consistently and predictably. The Companies Act of 2009, the Registration of Business Act of 2007, and their subsequent amendments are the primary laws governing the registration of all businesses before commencing operations. The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) deals with the incorporation of companies. In contrast, the Office of the Administrator and Registrar General (OARG) deals with sole proprietorships and partnerships, with the process streamlined into a stop-shop. Sierra Leonean law ensures that foreign investors may compete on the same terms as domestic firms. The Investment Promotion Act 2004 protects foreign entities from discriminatory treatment. The law creates incentives for customs exemptions, allows investors to repatriate proceeds and remittances freely, and protects against expropriation without prompt and adequate compensation. The law establishes a dispute settlement framework that will enable investors to submit disputes to arbitration under the UN Commission on International Trade Laws (UNCITRAL). Sierra Leonean authorities do not screen, review, or approve foreign direct investments. Companies must register to do business in Sierra Leone, and there are no reports that the registration process has blocked investments or discriminated against investors. In the case of investment guarantees, the government established specific procedures with the U.S. government in agreements signed on December 28, 1962, and November 13, 1963, whereby Sierra Leone authorities approved external investment guarantees in Sierra Leone. Additional information about the laws and regulations applicable to foreign investments is available on the SLIEPA website: https://www.sliepa.gov.sl/ . Sierra Leone does not have a competition law. The European Union and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have supported the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s attempt to develop a competition policy. This ministry oversees the regulation of anti-competitive practices. Whereas consumer protection has been passed, the cabinet has approved a competition policy but awaits parliamentary ratification. The Constitution authorizes the government to confiscate property only when necessary, in the interest of national defense, public safety, order, morality, town and country planning, or the public benefit or welfare. In such cases, the Constitution guarantees the prompt payment of adequate compensation, with a right of access to a court or other independent authority to consider legality, determine the amount of compensation, and ensure prompt payment. The Bankruptcy Act 2009 establishes a process of bankruptcy for individuals and companies. Bankruptcy is a civil matter, but it may disqualify an individual from holding certain elected public offices and practicing certain professions. The Bankruptcy Act 2009 also encourages and facilitates reorganization as an alternative to liquidation. The World Bank ranked Sierra Leone 162, with a score of 24.7, in the ease of resolving insolvency in 2020. After passing a Credit Reference Act in 2011, Sierra Leone established a Credit Reference Bureau within the Bank of Sierra Leone, mandating all financial institutions to give all information regarding loan applications for credit history checks. The credit history checks will detail all outstanding loans, when and where a loan was taken, and the repayment history guiding financial institutions in their loan decision. The Bureau now operates a digital identification system to control credit information and ensure citizens have secure and complete ownership of their data and information, transforming the financial inclusion landscape. 6. Financial Sector Limited capital market and portfolio investment opportunities exist in Sierra Leone. The country established a Stock Exchange in 2009 to provide a place for enterprise formation and a market for trading stocks and bonds. The exchange initially listed only one stock, a state-controlled bank, but in early 2017, it had three listings that expressed willingness to trade their shares at the exchange. Sierra Leone acceded to the IMF Article VIII in January 1996, which removed all restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. The regulatory system does not interfere with the free flow of financial resources. Nonetheless, foreign and domestic businesses alike have difficulty obtaining commercial credit. Foreign interests may access credit under the same market conditions as Sierra Leoneans, but banks loan small amounts at high-interest rates. Foreign investors typically bring capital in from outside the country. Sierra Leone’s banking sector, supervised by the central bank of Sierra Leone, consists of 14 commercial banks, 66 foreign exchange bureaus, 18 community banks including Apex Bank, 39 credit-only microfinance, five deposit-taking microfinance, two discount houses, a home mortgage finance company, a leasing company, two mobile financial services providers, and a stock exchange. Bank branches exist throughout the country, with activity concentrated in Freetown. The banking system currently has seven correspondent banks. While the commercial banking sector is characterized by poor performance with significant financial vulnerability, the central bank of Sierra Leone in 2018 approved the takeover of a commercial bank acquired in 2016 by a foreign investor. Foreign individuals and companies are permitted to establish bank accounts. The use of mobile money is becoming more popular. Other electronic payments and ATM usage are available in urban areas but limited in rural settings, while the Bank of Sierra Leone is set to roll out a “national payment switch” to facilitate connectivity among different banks’ electronic systems. Telecommunications companies are upgrading to enhance mobile money services and e-commerce specifically. In December 2021, the Parliament, upon the request of the Bank of Sierra Leone, passed into law the redenomination of the Leone bill. The bill authorizes the elimination of three zeros from the currency- Le 1,000 will now be Le1, and so on. The redenomination is planned to take place in 2022. According to the governor of the central bank, the move is to reduce transaction costs, standardize the Leones bill and save the cost of currency printing. The bank is now embarking on a sensitization campaign. Sierra Leone suffers from a high inflation rate and deteriorating currency exchange rate. In December 2021, the annual national consumer price or inflation rate was 17.94 percent. As part of structural reforms in the banking sector under the Extended Credit Facility of the International Monetary Fund, the Bank of Sierra Leone pledged to establish a particular resolution framework for troubled financial institutions, establish a deposit insurance system, strengthen its capacity to supervise and oversee the non-bank financial institution sector, and facilitate the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) both internally and across the financial industry. Inadequate supervisory oversight of financial institutions, weak regulations, and corruption have made Sierra Leone vulnerable to money laundering. While the country’s anti-money laundering (AML) controls remain underdeveloped and underfunded, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) completed a national risk assessment in 2017. The FIU is currently working with the Economic Crime Team of the Office of Technical Assistance, U.S. Department of the Treasury, to enhance its capacity with technical visits to the FIU. The GIABA (a French acronym for Groupe Intergouvernemental d’Action Contre la Blanchiment d’Argent en Afrique de l’Ouest, which in English is, ‘The Inter-Government Action against Money Laundering in West Africa’) and the EU also funded a workshop on designated non-financial business and professions on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing Terrorism (AML/CFT) preventive measures. Sierra Leone has a floating exchange rate regime. The Leone, has depreciated slowly over the years mainly due to the increasing demand to finance current consumption and a decreasing inflow of foreign currency resulting from decreased exports and remittances. Sierra Leone has not established a sovereign wealth fund which was legislated under the 2018 Extractive Industries Revenue Act and the 2016 Public Financial Management Act. The implementation was delayed because of the collapse of the international iron ore prices in 2014-16, which coincided with the Ebola outbreak, both of which deteriorated the economy’s fundamentals. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Sierra Leone has more than 20 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) mainly active in the utilities, transport, and financial sectors. There is no official or comprehensive government-maintained list of SOEs. There is no official or comprehensive government-maintained list of SOEs. However, notable examples include the Guma Valley Water Company, the Sierra Leone Telecommunication Company, the Electricity Distribution, and Supply Authority, the Electricity Generation and Transmission Company, the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation, the Rokel Commercial Bank, the Sierra Leone Commercial Bank, the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Company, to name but a few. Some of these SOEs are governed by an independent board of directors, while the relevant government ministries supervise others. Sierra Leone is not a party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the WTO Framework. SOEs may engage in commerce with the private sector, but they do not compete on the same terms as private enterprises, and they often have access to government subsidies and other benefits. SOEs in Sierra Leone do not play a significant role in funding or sponsoring research and development. The National Commission for Privatization was established in 2002 to facilitate the privatization of various SOEs. With support from the World Bank, the commission has focused on privatizing the country’s port operations and other unsuccessful public enterprises. It continues to seek investments in public-private partnerships for SOEs with significant infrastructure, including telecommunications, energy, housing, etc. Privatization processes are open to foreign investors and could be integrated into plans for better capitalizing the stock exchange in Freetown via new equity listings. 10. Political and Security Environment Sierra Leone is a constitutional republic with a directly elected president and a unicameral legislature. In March 2018, the opposition Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) presidential candidate, Julius Maada Bio, won the fourth cycle of presidential elections since the civil war ended in 2002. It was deemed “free and fair” by international observers. The Sierra Leone Police, supervised by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, is responsible for law enforcement and maintaining security within the country, but it is poorly equipped and lacks sufficient investigative and forensic capabilities. The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) is responsible for external security and has some domestic security responsibilities to assist police upon request in extraordinary circumstances. The RSLAF reports to the Ministry of Defense and the Office of National Security. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security forces. Sierra Leone, in 2020, made a historical “Freedom of Speech” move by repealing Part 5 of the Public Order Act of 1965 that criminalized libel. President Bio has also signed into law the abolition of the death penalty. There is tension between social, political, and cultural institutions over power and resources. Policies and positions are sometimes sought for control over public finances. The government launched three Commissions of Inquiry (COI) to probe into the governance activities of the immediate past administration, which created further tensions. The COI was concluded in March 2020, and a government White Paper issued in September 2020 assuring citizens of the full implementation of the recommendations, which included recovery of all monies and confiscation of all assets as detailed in the COI reports. At the outbreak of COVID-19, the government implemented nationwide restrictions and curtailed movement to reduce the risk of the infection. Enforcement provoked sporadic violent clashes around the country, leaving some people dead, many hospitalized, and property destroyed. The President blamed it on the opposition as trying to make the country ungovernable and raised concerns about peace and national cohesion. He cautioned that reverting to the dark days of the war will only make things very difficult for Sierra Leoneans. Sierra Leone’s relations with the neighboring countries of Guinea and Liberia are peaceful. However, Guinea laid claim over the border village of Yenga, in the Kailahun District of Sierra Leone, despite the several meetings between the Presidents of the two countries. There have been isolated incidents of politically motivated violence during and after the 2018 national and local elections. Sierra Leone has declared June 24, 2023, as the official date for the next presidential, parliamentary, and local council elections and will register voters for that election from September 3 to October 4, 2023. Thirteen opposition political parties have established a coalition, the Coalition Progressive Political Party (COPPP), to challenge the current administration in the next presidential election. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (USD) 2020 $4.11 2020 $4.06 billion https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/ Sierra-Leone/ Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $12 million https://ustr.gov/countries- regions/africa/sierra-leone Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A https://ustr.gov/countries- regions/africa/sierra-leone Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A N/A N/A https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/ Sierra-Leone/ *Host Country Source: https://www.statistics.sl/index.php/gdp.html# Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey data are not available for Sierra Leone. Singapore Executive Summary Singapore maintains an open, heavily trade-dependent economy that plays a critical role in the global supply chain. The government utilized unprecedented levels of public spending to support the economy during the COVID-19 pandemic. Singapore supports predominantly open investment policies and a robust free market economy while actively managing and sustaining Singapore’s economic development. U.S. companies regularly cite transparency, business-friendly laws, tax structure, customs facilitation, intellectual property protection, and well-developed infrastructure as attractive investment climate features. Singapore actively enforces its robust anti-corruption laws and typically ranks as the least corrupt country in Asia. In addition, Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perception Index placed Singapore as the fourth-least corrupt nation globally. The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA), which entered into force in 2004, expanded U.S. market access in goods, services, investment, and government procurement, enhanced intellectual property protection, and provided for cooperation in promoting labor rights and environmental protections. Singapore has a diversified economy that attracts substantial foreign investment in manufacturing (petrochemical, electronics, pharmaceuticals, machinery, and equipment) and services (financial, trade, and business). The government actively promotes the country as a research and development (R&D) and innovation center for businesses by offering tax incentives, research grants, and partnership opportunities with domestic research agencies. U.S. direct investment (FDI) in Singapore in 2020 totaled $270 billion, primarily in non-bank holding companies, manufacturing, finance, and insurance. Singapore received more than double the U.S. FDI invested in any other Asian nation. The investment outlook was positive due to Singapore’s proximity to Southeast Asia’s developing economies. Singapore remains a regional hub for thousands of multinational companies and continues to maintain its reputation as a world leader in dispute resolution, financing, and project facilitation for regional infrastructure development. Singapore is poised to attract future foreign investments in digital innovation, pharmaceutical manufacturing, sustainable development, and cybersecurity. The Government of Singapore (hereafter, “the government”) is investing heavily in automation, artificial intelligence, integrated systems, as well as sustainability, and seeks to establish itself as a regional hub for these technologies. Singapore is also a well-established hub for medical research and device manufacturing. Singapore relies heavily on foreign workers who make up 34 percent of the workforce. The COVID-19 pandemic was initially concentrated in dormitories for low-wage foreign workers in the construction and marine industries, which resulted in strict quarantine measures that brought the construction sector to a near standstill. The government tightened foreign labor policies in 2020 to encourage firms to improve productivity and employ more Singaporean workers, and lowered most companies’ quotas for mid- and low-skilled foreign workers. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the government introduced more programs to partially subsidize wages and the cost to firms of recruiting, hiring, and training local workers Singapore plans to reach net-zero by or around mid-century but faces alternative energy diversification challenges in setting 2050 net-zero carbon emission targets. Singapore launched its national climate strategy – the Singapore Green Plan 2030 – in February 2021, and focuses on increased sustainability, carbon emissions reductions, fostering job and investment opportunities, and increasing climate resilience and food security. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 4 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 8 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 270,807 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 54,920 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Singapore maintains a heavily trade-dependent economy characterized by an open investment regime, with some licensing restrictions in the financial services, professional services, and media sectors. The government was committed to maintaining a free market, but also actively plans Singapore’s economic development, including through a network of state wholly owned and majority-owned enterprises (SOEs). As of April, the top three Singapore-listed SOEs (DBS, Singtel, CapitaLand Investment Limited) accounted for 15.6 percent of the Singapore Exchange (SGX) capitalization. Some observers have criticized the dominant role of SOEs in the domestic economy, arguing that they have displaced or suppressed private sector entrepreneurship and investment. Singapore’s legal framework and public policies are generally favorable toward foreign investors. Foreign investors are not required to enter joint ventures or cede management control to local interests, and local and foreign investors are subject to the same basic laws. Apart from regulatory requirements in some sectors (see also: Limits on National Treatment and Other Restrictions), eligibility for various incentive schemes depends on investment proposals meeting the criteria set by relevant government agencies. Singapore places no restrictions on reinvestment or repatriation of earnings or capital. The judicial system, which includes international arbitration and mediation centers and a commercial court, upholds the sanctity of contracts, and decisions are generally considered to be transparent and effectively enforced. The Economic Development Board (EDB) is the lead promotion agency that facilitates foreign investment into Singapore ( https://www.edb.gov.sg ). EDB undertakes investment promotion and industry development and works with foreign and local businesses by providing information and facilitating introductions and access to government incentives for local and international investments. The government maintains close engagement with investors through EDB, which provides feedback to other government agencies to ensure that infrastructure and public services remain efficient and cost competitive. EDB maintains 18 international offices, including in Chicago, Houston, New York, San Francisco, and Washington D.C. Exceptions to Singapore’s general openness to foreign investment exist in sectors considered critical to national security, including telecommunications, broadcasting, domestic news media, financial services, legal and accounting services, ports, airports, and property ownership. Under Singaporean law, articles of incorporation may include shareholding limits that restrict ownership in such entities by foreign persons. Since 2000, the Singapore telecommunications market has been fully liberalized. This move has allowed foreign and domestic companies seeking to provide facilities-based (e.g., fixed line or mobile networks) or services-based (e.g., local and international calls and data services over leased networks) telecommunications services to apply for licenses to operate and deploy telecommunication systems and services. Singapore Telecommunications (Singtel) – majority owned by Temasek, a state-owned investment company with the Ministry of Finance as its sole shareholder – faces competition in all market segments. However, its main competitors, M1 and StarHub, are also SOEs. In April 2019, Australian company TPG Telecom began providing telecommunications services. Approximately 30 mobile virtual network operator services (MVNOs) have also entered the market. The four Singapore telecommunications companies compete primarily on MVNO partnerships and voice and data plans. As of April, Singapore had 76 facilities-based operators offering telecommunications services. Since 2007, Singtel has been exempted from dominant licensee obligations for the residential and commercial portions of the retail international telephone services. Singtel is also exempted from dominant licensee obligations for wholesale international telephone services, international managed data, international intellectual property transit, leased satellite bandwidth (including VSAT, DVB-IP, satellite TV Downlink, and Satellite IPLC), terrestrial international private leased circuit, and backhaul services. The Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) granted Singtel’s exemption after assessing the market for these services had effective competition. IMDA operates as both the regulatory agency and the investment promotion agency for the country’s telecommunications sector. IMDA conducts public consultations on major policy reviews and provides decisions on policy changes to relevant companies. To facilitate the 5th generation mobile network (5G) technology and service trials, IMDA waived frequency fees for companies interested in conducting 5G trials for equipment testing, research, and assessment of commercial potential. In April 2020, IMDA granted rights to build nationwide 5G networks to Singtel and a joint venture between StarHub and M1. In December 2021, IMDA also extended license and granted rights for TPG Telecom to build 5G networks. IMDA announced a goal of full 5G coverage by the end of 2025. These three companies, along with TPG Telecom, are also now permitted to launch smaller, specialized 5G networks to support specialized applications, such as manufacturing and port operations. Singapore’s government did not hold a traditional spectrum auction, instead charging a moderate, flat fee to operate the networks and evaluating proposals from the MVNOs based on their ability to provide effective coverage, meet regulatory requirements, invest significant financial resources, and address cybersecurity and network resilience concerns. The announcement emphasized the importance of the winning MVNOs using multiple vendors, to ensure security and resilience. Singapore has committed to being one of the first countries to make 5G services broadly available, and its tightly managed 5G-rollout process continues apace, despite COVID-19. The government views this as a necessity for a country that prides itself on innovation, even as these private firms worry that the commercial potential does not yet justify the extensive upfront investment necessary to develop new networks. The local free-to-air broadcasting, cable, and newspaper sectors are effectively closed to foreign firms. Section 44 of the Broadcasting Act restricts foreign equity ownership of companies broadcasting in Singapore to 49 percent or less, although the act does allow for exceptions. Individuals cannot hold shares that would make up more than 5 percent of the total votes in a broadcasting company without the government’s prior approval. The Newspaper and Printing Presses Act restricts equity ownership (local or foreign) of newspaper companies to less than 5 percent per shareholder and requires that directors be Singaporean citizens. Newspaper companies must issue two classes of shares, ordinary and management, with the latter available only to Singaporean citizens or corporations approved by the government. Holders of management shares have an effective veto over selected board decisions. Singapore regulates content across all major media outlets through IMDA. The government controls the distribution, importation, and sale of media sources and has curtailed or banned the circulation of some foreign publications. Singapore’s leaders have also brought defamation suits against foreign publishers and local government critics, which have resulted in the foreign publishers issuing apologies and paying damages. Several dozen publications remain prohibited under the Undesirable Publications Act, which restricts the import, sale, and circulation of publications that the government considers contrary to public interest. Examples include pornographic magazines, publications by banned religious groups, and publications containing extremist religious views. Following a routine review in 2015, IMDA’s predecessor, the Media Development Authority, lifted a ban on 240 publications, ranging from decades-old anti-colonial and communist material to adult interest content. Singaporeans generally face few restrictions on the internet, which is readily accessible. The government, however, subjected all internet content to similar rules and standards as traditional media, as defined by the IMDA’s Internet Code of Practice. Internet service providers are required to ensure that content complies with the code. The IMDA licenses the internet service providers through which local users are required to route their internet connections. However, the IMDA has blocked various websites containing objectionable material, such as pornography and racist and religious-hatred sites. Online news websites that report regularly on Singapore and have a significant reach are individually licensed, which requires adherence to requirements to remove prohibited content within 24 hours of notification from IMDA. Some view this regulation as a way to censor online critics of the government, and in September 2021 IMDA suspended the license of alternative news website The Online Citizen with immediate effect for allegedly failing to declare its sources of funding. In April 2019, the government introduced legislation in parliament to counter “deliberate online falsehoods.” The legislation, called the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) entered into force on October 2, 2019, requires online platforms to publish correction notifications or remove online information that government ministers classify as factually false or misleading, and which they deem likely to threaten national security, diminish public confidence in the government, incite feelings of ill will between people, or influence an election. Non-compliance is punishable by fines and/or imprisonment and the government can use stricter measures such as disabling access to end-users in Singapore and forcing online platforms to disallow persons in question from using its services in Singapore. Opposition politicians, bloggers, alternative news websites, and as of recent posts about COVID-19 have been the target of the majority of POFMA cases thus far and many of them used U.S. social media platforms. Besides those individuals, U.S. social media companies were issued most POFMA correction orders and complied with them. U.S. media and social media sites continue to operate in Singapore, but a few major players have ceased running political ads after the government announced that it would impose penalties on sites or individuals that spread “misinformation,” as determined by the government. On January 31, 2020, the Singaporean government temporary lifted the exemption of social media platforms, search engines and Internet intermediaries from complying with POFMA, with the goal of combatting false information on the evolving COVID-19 situation. In September, the Ministry of Home Affairs introduced the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) to strengthen the country’s ability to “prevent, detect, and disrupt foreign interference” in domestic politics conducted through hostile information campaigns and the use of local proxies. The bill was passed in October 2021 and expanded the government’s powers and tools to control “foreign influence,” but has yet to take effect. Under FICA, the minister for home affairs could compel internet and social media service providers to disclose information, remove online content, block user accounts, and take “countermeasures” against “politically significant persons” who are or are suspected of working on behalf of or receiving funding from “foreign political organizations” and “foreign principals.” While the government provided assurances that “legitimate business activities” would not be targeted by the legislation, opposition parties, foreign businesses, and civil society groups expressed concerns about the law’s expansion of executive powers and potential impacts on the rights to freedom of expression, association, participation in public affairs, and privacy. Mediacorp TV is the only free-to-air TV broadcaster and is 100 percent owned by the government via Temasek Holdings (Temasek). Mediacorp reported that its free-to-air channels are viewed weekly by 80 percent of residents. Local pay-TV providers are StarHub and Singtel, which are both partially owned by Temasek or its subsidiaries. Local free-to-air radio broadcasters are Mediacorp Radio Singapore (owned by Temasek Holdings), SPH Radio (owned by SPH Media Limited), and So Drama! Entertainment (owned by the Ministry of Defense). BBC World Services is the only foreign free-to-air radio broadcaster in Singapore. To rectify the high degree of content fragmentation in the Singaporean pay-TV market and shift the focus of competition from an exclusivity-centric strategy to other aspects such as service differentiation and competitive packaging, the IMDA implemented cross-carriage measures in 2011, requiring pay-TV companies designated by IMDA to be Receiving Qualified Licensees (RQL) – currently Singtel and StarHub – to cross-carry content subject to exclusive carriage provisions. Correspondingly, Supplying Qualified Licensees (SQLs) with an exclusive contract for a channel are required to carry that content on other RQL pay-TV companies. In February 2019, the IMDA proposed to continue the current cross-carriage measures. The Motion Picture Association (MPA) has expressed concern this measure restricts copyright exclusivity. Content providers consider the measures an unnecessary interference in a competitive market that denies content holders the ability to negotiate freely in the marketplace, and an interference with their ability to manage and protect their intellectual property. More common content is now available across the different pay-TV platforms, and the operators are beginning to differentiate themselves by originating their own content, offering subscribed content online via personal and tablet computers, and delivering content via fiber networks. Streaming services have entered the market, which MPA has found leads to a significant reduction in intellectual property infringements. StarHub and Singtel have both partnered with multiple content providers, including U.S. companies, to provide streaming content in Singapore and around the region. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) regulates all banking activities as provided for under the Banking Act. Singapore maintains legal distinctions between foreign and local banks and the type of license (i.e., full service, wholesale, and offshore banks) held by foreign commercial banks. As of April, 30 foreign full-service licensees and 97 wholesale banks operated in Singapore. An additional 21 merchant banks were licensed to conduct corporate finance, investment banking, and other fee-based activities. Offshore and wholesale banks are not allowed to operate Singapore dollar retail banking activities. Only full banks and “Qualifying Full Banks” (QFBs) can operate Singapore dollar retail banking activities but are subject to restrictions on their number of places of business, ATMs, and ATM networks. Additional QFB licenses may be granted to a subset of full banks, which provide greater branching privileges and greater access to the retail market than other full banks. As of April, there were 10 banks operating QFB licenses. China Construction Bank received the most recent QFB award in December 2020. Following a series of public consultations conducted by MAS over a three-year period, the Banking Act 2020 came into operation on February 14, 2020. The amendments include, among other things, the removal of the Domestic Banking Unit (DBU) and Asian Currency Unit (ACU) divide, consolidation of the regulatory framework of merchant banks, expansion of the grounds for revoking bank licenses and strengthening oversight of banks’ outsourcing arrangements. Newly granted digital banking licenses under foreign ownership apply only to wholesale transactions. The government initiated a banking liberalization program in 1999 to ease restrictions on foreign banks and has supplemented this with phased-in provisions under the USSFTA, including removal of a 40 percent ceiling on foreign ownership of local banks and a 20 percent aggregate foreign shareholding limit on finance companies. The minister in charge of MAS must approve the merger or takeover of a local bank or financial holding company, as well as the acquisition of voting shares in such institutions above specific thresholds of 5, 12, or 20 percent of shareholdings. Although Singapore’s government has lifted the formal ceilings on foreign ownership of local banks and finance companies, the approval for controllers of local banks ensures that this control rests with individuals or groups whose interests are aligned with the long-term interests of the Singapore economy and Singapore’s national interests. Of the 30 full-service licenses granted to foreign banks, three have gone to U.S. banks (Bank of America, Citibank, JP Morgan Chase Bank). U.S. financial institutions enjoy phased-in benefits under the USSFTA. Since 2006, only one U.S.-licensed full-service banks has obtained QFB status (Citibank). U.S. and foreign full-service banks with QFB status can freely relocate existing branches and share ATMs among themselves. They can also provide electronic funds transfer and point-of-sale debit services and accept services related to Singapore’s compulsory pension fund. In 2007, Singapore lifted the quota on new licenses for U.S. wholesale banks. Locally and non-locally incorporated subsidiaries of U.S. full-service banks with QFB status can apply for access to local ATM networks. However, no U.S. bank has come to a commercial agreement to gain such access. Despite liberalization, U.S. and other foreign banks in the domestic retail-banking sector still face barriers. Under the enhanced QFB program launched in 2012, MAS requires QFBs it deems systemically significant to incorporate locally. If those locally incorporated entities are deemed “significantly rooted” in Singapore, with a majority of Singaporean or permanent resident members, Singapore may grant approval for an additional 25 places of business, of which up to ten may be branches. Local retail banks do not face similar constraints on customer service locations or access to the local ATM network. As noted above, U.S. banks are not subject to quotas on service locations under the terms of the USSFTA. Credit card holders from U.S. banks incorporated in Singapore cannot access their accounts through the local ATM networks. They are also unable to access their accounts for cash withdrawals, transfers, or bill payments at ATMs operated by banks other than those operated by their own bank or at foreign banks’ shared ATM network. Nevertheless, full-service foreign banks have made significant inroads in other retail banking areas, with substantial market share in products like credit cards and personal and housing loans. In January 2019, MAS announced the passage of the Payment Services Bill after soliciting public feedback. The bill requires more payment services such as digital payment tokens, dealing in virtual currency, and merchant acquisition, to be licensed and regulated by MAS. In order to reduce the risk of misuse for illicit purposes, the new law also limits the amount of funds that can be held in or transferred out of a personal payment account (e.g., mobile wallets) in a year. Regulations are tailored to the type of activity performed and addresses issues related to terrorism financing, money laundering, and cyber risks. In December 2020, MAS granted four digital bank licenses: two to Sea Limited and a Grab/Singtel consortium for full retail banking and two to Ant Group and the Greenland consortium (a China-based conglomerate). Singapore has no trading restrictions on foreign-owned stockbrokers. There is no cap on the aggregate investment by foreigners regarding the paid-up capital of dealers that are members of the SGX. Direct registration of foreign mutual funds is allowed provided MAS approves the prospectus and the fund. The USSFTA relaxed conditions foreign asset managers must meet in order to offer products under the government-managed compulsory pension fund (Central Provident Fund Investment Scheme). The Legal Services Regulatory Authority (LSRA) under the Ministry of Law oversees the regulation, licensing, and compliance of all law practice entities and the registration of foreign lawyers in Singapore. Foreign law firms with a licensed Foreign Law Practice (FLP) may offer the full range of legal services in foreign law and international law, but cannot practice Singapore law except in the context of international commercial arbitration. U.S. and foreign attorneys are allowed to represent parties in arbitration without the need for a Singaporean attorney to be present. To offer Singapore law, FLPs require either a Qualifying Foreign Law Practice (QFLP) license, a Joint Law Venture (JLV) with a Singapore Law Practice (SLP), or a Formal Law Alliance (FLA) with a SLP. The vast majority of Singapore’s 130 foreign law firms operate FLPs, while QFLPs and JLVs each number in the single digits. The QFLP licenses allow foreign law firms to practice in permitted areas of Singapore law, which excludes constitutional and administrative law, conveyancing, criminal law, family law, succession law, and trust law. As of December 2020, there are nine QFLPs in Singapore, including five U.S. firms. In January 2019, the Ministry of Law announced the deferral to 2020 of the decision to renew the licenses of five QFLPs, which were set to expire in 2019, so the government can better assess their contribution to Singapore along with the other four firms whose licenses were also extended to 2020. Decisions on the renewal considers the firms’ quantitative and qualitative performance, such as the value of work that the Singapore office will generate, the extent to which the Singapore office will function as the firm’s headquarter for the region, the firm’s contributions to Singapore, and the firm’s proposal for the new license period. A JLV is a collaboration between a FLP and SLP, which may be constituted as a partnership or company. The director of legal services in the LSRA will consider all the relevant circumstances including the proposed structure and its overall suitability to achieve the objectives for which JLVs are permitted to be established. There is no clear indication on the percentage of shares that each JLV partner may hold in the JLV. Law degrees from designated U.S., British, Australian, and New Zealand universities are recognized for purposes of admission to practice law in Singapore. Under the USSFTA, Singapore recognizes law degrees from Harvard University, Columbia University, New York University, and the University of Michigan. Singapore will admit to the Singapore Bar law school graduates of those designated universities who are Singapore citizens or permanent residents, and ranked among the top 70 percent of their graduating class or have obtained lower-second class honors (under the British system). Engineering and architectural firms can be 100 percent foreign owned. Engineers and architects are required to register with the Professional Engineers Board and the Board of Architects, respectively, to practice in Singapore. All applicants (both local and foreign) must have at least four years of practical experience in engineering, of which two are acquired in Singapore. Alternatively, students can attend two years of practical training in architectural works and pass written and/or oral examinations set by the respective board. Many major international accounting firms operate in Singapore. Registration as a public accountant under the Accountants Act is required to provide public accountancy services (i.e., the audit and reporting on financial statements and other acts that are required by any written law to be done by a public accountant) in Singapore, although registration as a public accountant is not required to provide other accountancy services, such as bookkeeping, accounting, taxation, and corporate advisory work. All accounting entities that provide public accountancy services must be approved under the Accountants Act and their supply of public accountancy services in Singapore must be under the control and management of partners or directors who are public accountants ordinarily resident in Singapore. In addition, if the accounting entity firm has two partners or directors, at least one of them must be a public accountant. If the business entity has more than two accounting partners or directors, two-thirds of the partners or directors must be public accountants. Singapore further liberalized its gas market with the amendment of the Gas Act and implementation of a Gas Network Code in 2008, which were designed to give gas retailers and importers direct access to the onshore gas pipeline infrastructure. However, key parts of the local gas market, such as town gas retailing and gas transportation through pipelines remain controlled by incumbent Singaporean firms. Singapore has sought to grow its supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG), and BG Singapore Gas Marketing Pte Ltd (acquired by Royal Dutch Shell in February 2016) was appointed in 2008 as the first aggregator with an exclusive franchise to import LNG to be sold in its re-gasified form in Singapore. In October 2017, Shell Eastern Trading Pte Ltd and Pavilion Gase Pte Ltd were awarded import licenses to market up to 1 million tons per annum or for three years, whichever occurs first. This also marked the conclusion of the first exclusive franchise awarded to BG Singapore Gas Marketing Pte Ltd. Beginning in November 2018 and concluding in May 2019, Singapore launched an open electricity market (OEM). Previously, Singapore Power was the only electricity retailer. As of October 2019, 40 percent of resident consumers had switched to a new electricity retailer and were saving between 20 and 30 percent on their monthly bills. During the second half of 2020, the government significantly reduced tariffs for household consumption and encouraged consumer OEM adoption. To participate in OEM, licensed retailers must satisfy additional credit, technical, and financial requirements set by Energy Market Authority in order to sell electricity to households and small businesses. There are two types of electricity retailers: Market Participant Retailers (MPRs) and Non-Market Participant Retailers (NMPRs). MPRs have to be registered with the Energy Market Company (EMC) to purchase electricity from the National Electricity Market of Singapore (NEMS) to sell to contestable consumers. NMPRs need not register with EMC to participate in the NEMS since they will purchase electricity indirectly from the NEMS through the Market Support Services Licensee (MSSL). As of April 2020, there were 12 retailers in the market, including foreign and local entities. In 2021, a number of the electricity retailers withdrew from selling electricity due to high natural gas prices globally, resulting in unfavorable market conditions. Foreign and local entities may readily establish, operate, and dispose of their own enterprises in Singapore subject to certain requirements. A foreigner who wants to incorporate a company in Singapore is required to appoint a local resident director; foreigners may continue to reside outside of Singapore. Foreigners who wish to incorporate a company and be present in Singapore to manage its operations are strongly advised to seek approval from the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) before incorporation. Except for representative offices (where foreign firms maintain a local representative but do not conduct commercial transactions in Singapore) there are no restrictions on carrying out remunerative activities. As of October 2017, foreign companies may seek to transfer their place of registration and be registered as companies limited by shares in Singapore under Part XA (Transfer of Registration) of the Companies Act ( https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/CoA1967 ). Such transferred foreign companies are subject to the same requirements as locally incorporated companies. All businesses in Singapore must be registered with the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA). Foreign investors can operate their businesses in one of the following forms: sole proprietorship, partnership, limited partnership, limited liability partnership, incorporated company, foreign company branch or representative office. Stricter disclosure requirements were passed in March 2017 requiring foreign company branches registered in Singapore to maintain public registers of their members. All companies incorporated in Singapore, foreign companies, and limited liability partnerships registered in Singapore are also required to maintain beneficial ownership in the form of a register of controllers (generally individuals or legal entities with more than 25 percent interest or control of the companies and foreign companies) aimed at preventing money laundering. While there is currently no cross-sectional screening process for foreign investments, investors are required to seek approval from specific sector regulators for investments in certain firms. These sectors include energy, telecommunications, broadcasting, the domestic news media, financial services, legal services, public accounting services, ports and airports, and property ownership. Under Singapore law, Articles of Incorporation may include shareholding limits that restrict ownership in corporations by foreign persons. Singapore does not maintain a formalized investment screening mechanism for inbound foreign investment. There are no reports of U.S. investors being especially disadvantaged or singled out relative to other foreign investors. Singapore underwent a trade policy review with the World Trade Organization (WTO) in July 2016, after which no major policy recommendations were raised. ( https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/singapore_e.htm ) The OECD and UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) released a joint report in February 2019 on the ASEAN-OECD Investment Program. The program aims to foster dialogue and experience sharing between OECD countries and Southeast Asian economies on issues relating to the business and investment climate. The program is implemented through regional policy dialogue, country investment policy reviews, and training seminars. ( http://www.oecd.org/investment/countryreviews.htm ) The OECD released a Transfer Pricing Country Profile for Singapore in February. The profiles focus on countries’ domestic legislation regarding key transfer pricing principles, including the arm’s length principle, transfer pricing methods, comparability analysis, intangible property, intra-group services, cost contribution agreements, transfer pricing documentation, administrative approaches to avoiding and resolving disputes, safe harbors, and other implementation measures. ( https://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/transfer-pricing-country-profile-singapore.pdf ) The OECD released a peer review report in March 2018 on Singapore’s implementation of internationally agreed tax standards under Action Plan 14 of the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project. Action 14 strengthens the effectiveness and efficiency of the mutual agreement procedure, a cross-border tax dispute resolution mechanism. ( http://www.oecd.org/corruption-integrity/reports/singapore-2018-peer-review-report-transparency-exchange-information-aci.html ) As of June 2021, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report assessed how Singapore fared during the global COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent recovery. (https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2021_en.pdf) Singapore’s online business registration process is clear and efficient and allows foreign companies to register branches. All businesses must be registered with ACRA through Bizfile, its online registration and information retrieval portal ( https://www.bizfile.gov.sg/), including any individual, firm or corporation that carries out business for a foreign company. Applications are typically processed immediately after the application fee is paid, but could take between 14 to 60 days, if the application is referred to another agency for approval or review. The process of establishing a foreign-owned limited liability company in Singapore is among the fastest in the world. ACRA ( www.acra.gov.sg ) provides a single window for business registration. Additional regulatory approvals (e.g., licensing or visa requirements) are obtained via individual applications to the respective ministries or statutory boards. Further information and business support on registering a branch of a foreign company is available through the EDB ( https://www.edb.gov.sg/en/how-we-help/setting-up.html ) and GuideMeSingapore, a corporate services firm Hawskford ( https://www.guidemesingapore.com /). Foreign companies may lease or buy privately or publicly held land in Singapore, though there are some restrictions on foreign property ownership. Foreign companies are free to open and maintain bank accounts in foreign currency. There is no minimum paid-in capital requirement, but at least one subscriber share must be issued for valid consideration at incorporation. Business facilitation processes provide for fair and equal treatment of women and minorities, and there are no mechanisms that provide special assistance to women and minorities. Singapore places no restrictions on domestic investors investing abroad. The government promotes outward investment through Enterprise Singapore, a statutory board under the Ministry of Trade and Industry. It provides market information, business contacts, and financial assistance and grants for internationalizing companies. While it has a global reach and runs overseas centers in major cities across the world, a large share of its overseas centers are located in major trading and investment partners and regional markets like China, India, the United States, and ASEAN. 3. Legal Regime In May 2021, DBS Bank (DBS), SGX, Standard Chartered and Temasek started a joint venture to establish a global exchange and marketplace for high-quality carbon credits, called Climate Impact X (CIX). In March, SGX and OCBC established a low-carbon index to analyze the top 50 free-float market capitalization companies based on fossil fuel engagement in an effort to improve sustainable financing. This index plans to exclude companies with high involvement in the fossil fuel sector. The government establishes clear rules that foster competition. The USSFTA enhances transparency by requiring regulatory authorities to consult with interested parties before issuing regulations, and to provide advance notice and comment periods for proposed rules, as well as to publish all regulations. Singapore’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. Rule-making authority is vested in the parliament to pass laws that determine the regulatory scope, purpose, rights, and powers of the regulator and the legal framework for the industry. Regulatory authority is vested in government ministries or in statutory boards, which are organizations that have been given autonomy to perform an operational function by legal statutes passed as acts of parliament, and report to a specific ministry. Local laws give regulatory bodies wide discretion to modify regulations and impose new conditions, but in practice agencies use this positively to adapt incentives or other services on a case-by-case basis to meet the needs of foreign as well as domestic companies. Acts of parliament also confer certain powers on a minister or other similar persons or authorities to make rules or regulations in order to put the act into practice; these rules are known as subsidiary legislation. National-level regulations are the most relevant for foreign businesses. Singapore has no local or state regulatory layers. Before a ministry instructs the Attorney-General’s Chambers (AGC) to draft a new bill or make an amendment to a bill, the ministry has to seek in-principle approval from the cabinet for the proposed bill. The AGC legislation division advises and helps vet or draft bills in conjunction with policymakers from relevant ministries. Public and private consultations are often requested for proposed draft legislative amendments. Thereafter, the cabinet’s approval is required before the bill can be introduced in parliament. All bills passed by parliament (with some exceptions) must be forwarded to the Presidential Council for Minority Rights for scrutiny, and thereafter presented to the president for assent. Only after the president has assented to the bill does it become law. While ministries or regulatory agencies do conduct internal impact assessments of proposed regulations, there are no criteria used for determining which proposed regulations are subjected to an impact assessment, and there are no specific regulatory impact assessment guidelines. There is no independent agency tasked with reviewing and monitoring regulatory impact assessments and distributing findings to the public. The Ministry of Finance publishes a biennial Singapore Public Sector Outcomes Review ( http://www.mof.gov.sg/Resources/Singapore-Public-Sector-Outcomes-Review-SPOR ), focusing on broad outcomes and indicators rather than policy evaluation. Results of scientific studies or quantitative analysis conducted in review of policies and regulations are not made publicly available. Industry self-regulation occurs in several areas, including advertising and corporate governance. Advertising Standards Authority of Singapore (ASAS) ( https://asas.org.sg/ ), an advisory council under the Consumers Association of Singapore, administers the Singapore Code of Advertising Practice, which focuses on ensuring that advertisements are legal, decent, and truthful. Listed companies are required under the SGX Listing Rules to describe in their annual reports their corporate governance practices with specific reference to the principles and provisions of the Code. Listed companies must comply with the principles of the code, and, if their practices vary from any provisions of the code, they must note the reason for the variation and explain how the practices they have adopted are consistent with the intent of the relevant principle. The SGX plays the role of a self-regulatory organization (SRO) in listings, market surveillance, and member supervision to uphold the integrity of the market and ensure participants’ adherence to trading and clearing rules. There have been no reports of discriminatory practices aimed at foreign investors. Singapore’s legal and accounting procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms and rank similar to the United States in international comparisons according to the World Justice Project ( http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index ). The prescribed accounting standards for Singapore-incorporated companies applying to be listed in the public market are known as Singapore Financial Reporting Standards (SFRS(I)), which are identical to those of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Non-listed Singapore-incorporated companies can voluntarily apply for SFRS(I). Otherwise, they are required to comply with Singapore Financial Reporting Standards (SFRS), which are also aligned with those of IASB. For the use of foreign accounting standards, the companies are required to seek approval of the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA). For foreign companies with primary listings on the Singapore Exchange, the SGX Listing Rules allow the use of alternative standards such as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP). Accounts prepared in accordance with IFRS or U.S. GAAP need not be reconciled to SFRS(1). Companies with secondary listings on the Singapore Exchange need only reconcile their accounts to SFRS(I), IFRS, or U.S. GAAP. Notices of proposed legislation to be considered by parliament are published, including the text of the laws, the dates of the readings, and whether or not the laws eventually pass. The government has established a centralized Internet portal ( www.reach.gov.sg ) to solicit feedback on selected draft legislation and regulations, a process that is being used with increasing frequency. There is no stipulated consultative period. Results of consultations are usually consolidated and published on relevant websites. As noted in the “Openness to Foreign Investment” section, some U.S. companies, in particular in the telecommunications and media sectors, are concerned about the government’s lack of transparency in its regulatory and rule-making process. However, many U.S. firms report they have opportunities to weigh in on pending legislation that affects their industries. These mechanisms also apply to investment laws and regulations. The Parliament of Singapore website ( https://www.parliament.gov.sg/parliamentary-business/bills-introduced ) publishes a database of all bills introduced, read, and passed in parliament in chronological order as of 2006. The contents are the actual draft texts of the proposed legislation/legislative amendments. All statutes are also publicly available in the Singapore Statutes Online website ( https://sso.agc.gov.sg ). However, there is no centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published. Regulatory actions are published separately on websites of Statutory Boards. Enforcement of regulatory offences is governed by both acts of parliament and subsidiary legislation. Enforcement powers of government statutory bodies are typically enshrined in the act of parliament constituting that statutory body. There is accountability to parliament for enforcement action through question time, where members of parliament may raise questions with the ministers on their respective ministries’ responsibilities. Singapore’s judicial system and courts serve as the oversight mechanism in respect of executive action (such as the enforcement of regulatory offences) and dispense justice based on law. The Supreme Court, which is made up of the Court of Appeal and the High Court, hears both civil and criminal matters. The chief justice heads the judiciary. The president appoints the chief justice, the judges of appeal and the judges of the High Court if she, acting at her discretion, concurs with the advice of the prime minister. No systemic regulatory reforms or enforcement reforms relevant to foreign investors were announced in 2021. The Monetary Authority of Singapore focuses enforcement efforts on timely disclosure of corporate information, business conduct of financial advisors, compliance with anti-money laundering/combatting the financing of terrorism requirements, deterring stock market abuse, and insider trading. In March 2019, MAS published its inaugural Enforcement Report detailing enforcement measures and publishes recent enforcement actions on its website ( https://www.mas.gov.sg/regulation/enforcement/enforcement-actions ). Singapore was the 2018 chair of ASEAN. ASEAN is working towards the 2025 ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint aimed at achieving a single market and production base, with a free flow of goods, services, and investment within the region. While ASEAN is working towards regulatory harmonization, there are no regional regulatory systems in place; instead, ASEAN agreements and regulations are enacted through each ASEAN Member State’s domestic regulatory system. The WTO’s 2016 trade policy review notes that Singapore’s guiding principle for standardization is to align national standards with international standards, and Singapore is an elected member of the International Organization of Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Councils. Singapore encourages the direct use of international standards whenever possible. Singapore standards (SS) are developed when there is no appropriate international standard equivalent, or when there is a need to customize standards to meet domestic requirements. At the end of 2015, Singapore had a stock of 553 SS, about 40 percent of which were references to international standards. Enterprise Singapore, the Singapore Food Agency, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry are the three national enquiry points under the TBT Agreement. There are no known reports of omissions in reporting to TBT. A non-exhaustive list of major international norms and standards referenced or incorporated into the country’s regulatory systems include Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project, Common Reporting Standards (CRS), Basel III, EU Dual-Use Export Control Regulation, Exchange of Information on Request, 27 International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions on labor rights and governance, UN conventions, and WTO agreements. Singapore is signatory to the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). The WTO reports that Singapore has fully implemented the TFA ( https://www.tfadatabase.org/members/singapore ). Singapore’s legal system has its roots in English common law and practice and is enforced by courts of law. The current judicial process is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. In the 2021 Rule of Law Index by World Justice Project, it is ranked 17th in the world overall, third on order and security, fourth on regulatory enforcement, third in absence of corruption, eighth on civil justice, seventh on criminal justice, 32nd on constraints on government powers, 34th on open government, and 38th on fundamental rights. The judicial system remains independent of the executive branch and the executive does not interfere in judiciary matters. Singapore strives to promote an efficient, business-friendly regulatory environment. Tax, labor, banking and finance, industrial health and safety, arbitration, wage, and training rules and regulations are formulated and reviewed with the interests of both foreign investors and local enterprises in mind. Starting in 2005, a Rules Review Panel, comprising senior civil servants, began overseeing a review of all rules and regulations; this process will be repeated every five years. A Pro-Enterprise Panel of high-level public sector and private sector representatives examines feedback from businesses on regulatory issues and provides recommendations to the government. (https://www.mti.gov.sg/PEP/About) The Cybersecurity Act, which entered into force in August 2018, establishes a comprehensive regulatory framework for cybersecurity. The act provides the Commissioner of Cyber Security with powers to investigate, prevent, and assess the potential impact of cyber security incidents and threats in Singapore. These can include requiring persons and organizations to provide requested information, requiring the owner of a computer system to take any action to assist with cyber investigations, directing organizations to remediate cyber incidents, authorizing officers to enter premises, installing software, and taking possession of computer systems to prevent serious cyber-attacks in the event of severe threat. The act also establishes a framework for the designation and regulation of critical information infrastructure (CII). Requirements for CII owners include a mandatory incident reporting regime, regular audits and risk assessments, and participation in national cyber security stress tests. In addition, the act will establish a regulatory regime for cyber security service providers and required licensing for penetration testing and managed security operations center (SOC) monitoring services. U.S. business chambers have expressed concern about the effects of licensing and regularly burdens on compliance costs, insufficient checks and balances on the investigatory powers of the authorities, and the absence of a multidirectional cyber threat sharing framework that includes protections from liability. Under the law, additional measures, such as the Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme (October 2021), continue to be introduced. Authorities stress that, “in view of the need to strike a good balance between industry development and cybersecurity needs, the licensing framework will take a light-touch approach.” The Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (CCCS) is a statutory board under the Ministry of Trade and Industry and is tasked with administering and enforcing the Competition Act. The act contains provisions on anti-competitive agreements, decisions, and practices; abuse of dominance; enforcement and appeals process; and mergers and acquisitions. The Competition Act was enacted in 2004 in accordance with U.S-Singapore USSFTA commitments, which contains specific conduct guarantees to ensure that Singapore’s government linked companies (GLC) will operate on a commercial and non-discriminatory basis towards U.S. firms. GLCs with substantial revenues or assets are also subject to enhanced transparency requirements under the FTA. A 2018 addition to the act gives the CCCS additional administrative power to protect consumers against unfair trade practices. Singapore has not expropriated foreign-owned property and has no laws that force foreign investors to transfer ownership to local interests. Singapore has signed investment promotion and protection agreements with a wide range of countries. These agreements mutually protect nationals or companies of either country against certain non-commercial risks, such as expropriation and nationalization and remain in effect unless otherwise terminated. The USSFTA contains strong investor protection provisions relating to expropriation of private property and the need to follow due process; provisions are in place for an owner to receive compensation based on fair market value. No disputes are pending. Singapore has bankruptcy laws allowing both debtors and creditors to file a bankruptcy claim. While Singapore performed well in recovery rate and time of recovery following bankruptcies, the country did not score well on cost of proceedings or insolvency frameworks. In particular, the insolvency framework does not require approval by the creditors for sale of substantial assets of the debtor or approval by the creditors for selection or appointment of the insolvency representative. Singapore has made several reforms to enhance corporate rescue and restructuring processes, including features from Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Amendments to the Companies Act, which came into force in May 2017, include additional disclosure requirements by debtors, rescue financing provisions, provisions to facilitate the approval of pre-packaged restructurings, increased debtor protections, and cram-down provisions that will allow a scheme to be approved by the court even if a class of creditors oppose the scheme, provided the dissenting class of creditors are not unfairly prejudiced by the scheme. The Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act passed in 2018 and entered into force in July 2020. It updates the insolvency legislation and introduces a significant number of new provisions, particularly with respect to corporate insolvency. It mandates licensing, qualifications, standards, and disciplinary measures for insolvency practitioners. It also includes standalone voidable transaction provisions for corporate insolvency and, a new wrongful trading provision. The act allows “out of court” commencement of judicial management, permits judicial managers to assign the proceeds of certain insolvency related claims, restricts the operation of contractual “ipso facto clauses” upon the commencement of certain restructuring and insolvency procedures, and modifies the operation of the scheme of arrangement cross class “cram down” power. Authorities continue to seek public consultations of subsidiary legislation to be drafted under the act. Two MAS-recognized consumer credit bureaus operate in Singapore: the Credit Bureau (Singapore) Pte Ltd and Experian Credit Bureau Singapore Pte Ltd. U.S. industry advocates enhancements to Singapore’s credit bureau system, in particular, adoption of an open admission system for all lenders, including non-banks. Bankruptcy is not criminalized in Singapore. https://www.acra.gov.sg/CA_2017/ 6. Financial Sector The government takes a favorable stance towards foreign portfolio investment and fixed asset investments. While it welcomes capital market investments, the government has introduced macro-prudential policies aimed at reducing foreign speculative inflows in the real estate sector since 2009. The government promotes Singapore’s position as an asset and wealth management center, and assets under management grew 17 percent in 2020 to $3.3 trillion (4.7 trillion Singapore dollars (SGD)), according to MAS’s Singapore Asset Management Survey 2020. The government facilitates the free flow of financial resources into product and factor markets, and the SGX is Singapore’s stock market. An effective regulatory system exists to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. Credit is allocated on market terms and foreign investors can access credit, U.S. dollars, Singapore dollars (SGD), and other foreign currencies on the local market. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments through banks operating in Singapore. The government respects IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Singapore’s banking system is sound and well regulated by MAS, and the country serves as a financial hub for the region. Banks have a very high domestic penetration rate, and according to World Bank Financial Inclusion indicators, over 97 percent of persons held a financial account in 2017 (latest year available). Local Singapore banks saw net profits rise some 40 percent in 2021. Banks are statutorily prohibited from engaging in non-financial business. Banks can hold 10 percent or less in non-financial companies as an “equity portfolio investment.” The non-performing loans ratio (NPL ratio) of Singapore’s banking system was 3 percent in the third quarter of 2021. Foreign banks require licenses to operate in the country. The tiered license system for Merchant, Offshore, Wholesale, Full Banks, and Qualifying Full Banks (QFBs) subject banks to further prudential safeguards in return for offering a greater range of services. U.S. financial institutions enjoy phased-in benefits under the USSFTA. Since 2006, U.S.-licensed full-service banks that are also QFBs have been able to operate at an unlimited number of locations (branches or off-premises ATMs) versus 25 for non-U.S. full service foreign banks with QFB status. Under the OECD Common Reporting Standards (CRS), which has been in effect since January 2017, Singapore-based financial institutions – depository institutions such as banks, specified insurance companies, investment entities, and custodial institutions – are required to: 1) establish the tax residency status of all their account holders; 2) collect and retain CRS information for all non-Singapore tax residents in the case of new accounts; and 3) report to tax authorities the financial account information of account holders who are tax residents of jurisdictions with which Singapore has a Competent Authority Agreement to exchange the information. U.S. financial regulations do not restrict foreign banks’ ability to hold accounts for U.S. citizens. U.S. citizens are encouraged to alert the nearest U.S. Embassy of any practices they encounter with regard to the provision of financial services. Fintech investments in Singapore rose from $2.48 million in 2020 to $3.94 billion in 2021. To strengthen Singapore’s position as a global Fintech hub, MAS has created a dedicated Fintech Office as a one-stop virtual entity for all Fintech-related matters to enable experimentation and promote an open-API (Application Programming Interfaces) in the financial industry. Investment in payments start-ups accounted for about 40 percent of all funds. Singapore has more than 50 innovation labs established by global financial institutions and technology companies. MAS also aims to be a regional leader in blockchain technologies and has worked to position Singapore as a financial technology center. MAS and the Association of Banks in Singapore are prototyping the use of distributed ledger technology for inter-bank clearing and settlement of payments and securities. Following a five-year collaborative project to understand the technology, a test network launched to facilitate collaboration in the cross-border blockchain ecosystem. Technical specifications for the functionalities and connectivity interfaces of the prototype network are publicly available. ( https://www.mas.gov.sg/schemes-and-initiatives/Project-Ubin ). Alternative financial services include retail and corporate non-bank lending via finance companies, cooperative societies, and pawnshops; and burgeoning financial technology-based services across a wide range of sectors including: crowdfunding, initial coin offerings, and payment services and remittance. In January 2020, the Payment Services Bill went into effect, which will require all cryptocurrency service providers to be licensed with the intent to provide more user protection. Smaller payment firms will receive a different classification from larger institutions and will be less heavily regulated. Key infrastructure supporting Singapore’s financial market include interbank (MEP), Foreign exchange (CLS, CAPS), retail (SGDCCS, USDCCS, CTS, IBG, ATM, FAST, NETS, EFTPOS), securities (MEPS+-SGS, CDP, SGX-DC) and derivatives settlements (SGX-DC, APS) ( https://www.mas.gov.sg/regulation/payments/payment-systems ). The government has three key investment entities: GIC Private Limited (GIC) is the sovereign wealth fund in Singapore that manages the government’s substantial foreign investments, fiscal, and foreign reserves, with the stated objective to achieve long-term returns and preserve the international purchasing power of the reserves. Temasek is a holding company wholly owned by the Ministry of Finance with investments in Singapore and abroad. MAS, as the central bank of Singapore, manages the Official Foreign Reserves, and a significant proportion of its portfolio is invested in liquid financial market instruments. GIC does not publish the size of the funds under management, but some industry observers estimate its managed assets may exceed $600 billion. GIC does not invest domestically, but manages Singapore’s international investments, which are generally passive (non-controlling) investments in publicly traded entities. The United States is its top investment destination, accounting for 34 percent of GIC’s portfolio as of March 2021, while Asia (excluding Japan) accounts for 26 percent, the Eurozone 9 percent, Japan 8 percent, and UK 5 percent. Investments in the United States are diversified and include industrial and commercial properties, student housing, power transmission companies, and financial, retail and business services. GIC is a member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. Although not required by law, GIC has published an annual report since 2008. Temasek began as a holding company for Singapore’s state-owned enterprises, now GLCs, but has since branched out to other asset classes and often holds significant stake in companies. As of March 2021, Temasek’s portfolio value reached $267 billion, and its asset exposure to Singapore is 24 percent; 40 percent in the rest of Asia, and 20 percent in Americas. According to the Temasek Charter, Temasek delivers sustainable value over the long term for its stakeholders. Temasek has published a Temasek Review annually since 2004. The statements only provide consolidated financial statements, which aggregate all of Temasek and its subsidiaries into a single financial report. A major international audit firm audits Temasek Group’s annual statutory financial statements. GIC and Temasek uphold the Santiago Principles for sovereign investments. Other investing entities of government funds include EDB Investments Pte Ltd, Singapore’s Housing Development Board, and other government statutory boards with funding decisions driven by goals emanating from the central government. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Singapore has an extensive network of full and partial state-owned enterprises (SOEs) held under the umbrella of Temasek Holdings, a holding company with the Ministry of Finance as its sole shareholder. Singapore SOEs play a substantial role in the domestic economy, especially in strategically important sectors including telecommunications, media, healthcare, public transportation, defense, port, gas, electricity grid, and airport operations. In addition, the SOEs are also present in many other sectors of the economy, including banking, subway, airline, consumer/lifestyle, commodities trading, oil and gas engineering, postal services, infrastructure, and real estate. The government emphasizes that government-linked entities operate on an equal basis with both local and foreign businesses without exception. There is no published list of SOEs. Temasek’s annual report notes that its portfolio companies are guided and managed by their respective boards and management, and Temasek does not direct their business decisions or operations. However, as a substantial shareholder, corporate governance within government linked companies typically are guided or influenced by policies developed by Temasek. There are differences in corporate governance disclosures and practices across the GLCs, and GLC boards are allowed to determine their own governance practices, with Temasek advisors occasionally meeting with the companies to make recommendations. GLC board seats are not specifically allocated to government officials, although it “leverages on its networks to suggest qualified individuals for consideration by the respective boards,” and leaders formerly from the armed forces or civil service are often represented on boards and fill senior management positions. Temasek exercises its shareholder rights to influence the strategic directions of its companies but does not get involved in the day-to-day business and commercial decisions of its firms and subsidiaries. GLCs operate on a commercial basis and compete on an equal basis with private businesses, both local and foreign. Singapore officials highlight that the government does not interfere with the operations of GLCs or grant them special privileges, preferential treatment, or hidden subsidies, asserting that GLCs are subject to the same regulatory regime and discipline of the market as private sector companies. However, observers have been critical of cases where GLCs have entered into new lines of business or where government agencies have “corporatized” certain government functions, in both circumstances entering into competition with already existing private businesses. Some private sector companies have said they encountered unfair business practices and opaque bidding processes that appeared to favor incumbent, government-linked firms. In addition, they note that the GLC’s institutional relationships with the government give them natural advantages in terms of access to cheaper funding and opportunities to shape the economic policy agenda in ways that benefit their companies. The USSFTA contains specific conduct guarantees to ensure that GLCs will operate on a commercial and non-discriminatory basis towards U.S. firms. GLCs with substantial revenues or assets are also subject to enhanced transparency requirements under the USSFTA. In accordance with its USSFTA commitments, Singapore enacted the Competition Act in 2004 and established the Competition Commission of Singapore in January 2005. The Competition Act contains provisions on anti-competitive agreements, decisions, and practices, abuse of dominance, enforcement and appeals process, and mergers and acquisitions. The government has privatized GLCs in multiple sectors and has not publicly announced further privatization plans, but is likely to retain controlling stakes in strategically important sectors, including telecommunications, media, public transportation, defense, port, gas, electricity grid, and airport operations. The Energy Market Authority is extending the liberalization of the retail market from commercial and industrial consumers with an average monthly electricity consumption of at least 2,000 kWh to households and smaller businesses. The Electricity Act and the Code of Conduct for Retail Electricity Licensees govern licensing and standards for electricity retail companies. 10. Political and Security Environment Singapore’s political environment is stable and there is no recent history of incidents involving politically motivated damage to foreign investments in Singapore. The ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) has dominated Singapore’s parliamentary government since 1959 and currently controls 83 of the 92 regularly contested parliamentary seats. Singaporean opposition Workers’ Party, which currently holds nine regularly contested parliamentary seats, does not usually espouse views that are radically different from mainstream public opinion. The opposition Progress Singapore Party, which is represented in parliament since 2020 after winning two additional parliamentary seats reserved to the best performing losing candidates, advocates for more protectionist policies. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $373,346 2020 $339,998 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $370,115 2020 $270,800 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $26,668 2020 $27,300 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 449.6% 2020 545.7% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report * Source for Host Country Data: https://www.singstat.gov.sg/ Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 1,465,070 100% Total Outward 727,627 100% United States 370,090 25% Mainland China 106,406 15% Cayman Islands 172,690 12% Netherlands 73,272 10% British Virgin Islands 114,520 8% India 46,240 6% Japan 97,930 7% United Kingdom 45,413 6% United Kingdom 88,900 6% Indonesia 44,589 6% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Slovakia Executive Summary Slovakia is a small, open, export-oriented economy with a population of 5.5 million people. It joined the EU and NATO in 2004 and the Eurozone in 2009. Slovakia is an attractive destination for foreign direct investment (FDI), with a favorable geographic location in the heart of Europe and an investment-friendly regulatory environment. The current ruling coalition, which took power in March 2020, has implemented a range of measures to improve the investment and business climate. The Slovak economy grew by 3.1 percent in 2021, slowed by three waves of COVID-19, which profoundly affected the hospitality, tourism, retail, sports and recreation, transport, and culture sectors. These industries remained shuttered for extended periods of time or were open only to limited groups of the population based on their COVID-19 or vaccination status. Business representatives noted that pandemic measures changed frequently, were announced at the last moment, or lacked sufficient clarity. Anti-pandemic measures were lifted in March 2022. Employers’ combined social and health contributions are equivalent to 35 percent of wages. The corporate income tax is 21 percent for companies with revenues at or above €100,000. The tax rate for companies with revenues below €100,000 is 15 percent. Attracting higher value-added investment is a priority for the current ruling coalition, as well as attracting investment in less-developed regions of Slovakia. In April 2021, the government approved Slovakia’s Recovery and Resilience Plan, which presents a roadmap for spending €6.3 billion in EU grants by 2026 on key reforms and investments in the areas of green economy, education and research, healthcare, digitization, and rule of law. Inefficiencies in drawing EU funds persist, however. Slovakia’s government continued its anti-corruption agenda and measures in 2021, resulting in an improvement in the business community’s perception of its impact on the business environment. Slovakia’s economy relies heavily on energy-intensive manufacturing. These companies were particularly affected by global supply chain disruptions leading to shortages of key components including semiconductors and chips, as well as by the rapid price growth of key inputs, including raw materials and energy. Slovakia remains the largest per capita car producer in the world, with four major car producers and hundreds of suppliers. Manufacturing industries, including automotive; machinery and transport equipment; metallurgy and metal processing; electronics; chemicals; and pharmaceuticals remain attractive and have the potential for further growth. Positive aspects of the Slovak investment climate include: Membership in the EU and the Eurozone An open, export-oriented economy close to western European markets Investment incentives, including for foreign investors A firm government commitment to EU deficit and debt targets A sound banking sector deeply integrated with Europe Negative aspects of the Slovak investment climate include: High sensitivity to regional economic developments Weak public administration and an inefficient judiciary Significant regional disparities, suboptimal national transport network Low rates of public and private R&D investment Heavy reliance on EU structural funds, chronic deficiencies in allocation of funds Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 56 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 37 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $778 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $18,920 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Slovakia has one of the most open economies in the EU. The government’s overall attitude toward foreign direct investment (FDI) is positive, and the government does not limit or discriminate against foreign investors. FDI plays an important role in the country’s economy, with major foreign investments in manufacturing and industry, financial services, information and communication technologies (ICT), and business service centers, where U.S. companies have a significant presence. The benefits of investing in Slovakia, including access to skilled labor, the country’s EU and Eurozone membership, and its central location in Europe have attracted a significant U.S. commercial and industrial presence, with investments from Accenture, Adient, Amazon, Amphenol, AT&T, Cisco, Dell, Garrett, GlobalLogic, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Lear, Oracle, U.S. Steel, Whirlpool, and others. The Ministry of Economy coordinates efforts to improve the business environment, stimulate innovation, and attract investment, and it also coordinates support for less-developed regions. Within the Ministry of Economy, the Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency (SARIO) is responsible for identifying and advising potential investors, as well as for providing in-depth information on the Slovak business environment, investment incentives, the process for setting up a business, and advising on suitable locations and real estate leasing. The government encourages investment through tax incentives and grants to support employment, regional development, and training. The current ruling coalition, in power since March 2020, has made it clear that it intends to award government incentives primarily for investments in less-developed regions of Slovakia. Section Four of the Regional Investment Aid Act (57/2018 Coll.) specifies the eligibility criteria for receiving assistance. According to the National Bank of Slovakia’s preliminary data, in 2020, inward FDI flows to Slovakia reached €1.7 billion, and inward FDI stock was €52 billion. EU Member States, including the Netherlands, Austria, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, and Germany are the largest foreign investors in Slovakia. South Korea remains by far the largest investor among non-EU countries. The Act on a Special Levy on Regulated Sectors (235/2012 Coll.) imposes a special tax on regulated industries, including the energy and network industries, insurance companies, electronic communications companies, healthcare, air transport, and others. The levy applies to profits generated from regulated activities above €3 million. A special levy on the banking sector, in effect since January 2012, was abolished effective January 2021. The Slovak government requires ride-sharing and app-based hospitality platforms that are active on the local market to register a permanent office in Slovakia for tax collection purposes. Those that do not face withholding taxes ranging from 19 to 35 percent on the fees collected that are paid to foreign entities. The government has a formalized process in place to involve employers in policymaking, including in the process of setting the minimum wage, via a social dialog process that includes government representatives, trade unions, and employer/business associations. The government also regularly engages in bilateral talks with major investors and employers to address their needs or concerns. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity in Slovakia. Businesses can contract directly with foreign entities. Private enterprises are free to establish, acquire, and dispose of business interests, but must pay all Slovak obligations of liquidated companies before transferring any remaining funds out of Slovakia. All new businesses registered from October 2020 onwards must provide the national registration numbers of their partners, authorized representatives, and members of the boards of directors and supervisory boards when registering a business. Foreigners must provide their passport or residence permit numbers when registering a business. In February 2021, the Slovak Parliament approved legislation, over the opposition of representatives of the business community, requiring government review of ownership transfers larger than 10 percent of companies considered “critical infrastructure,” which includes a number of companies with foreign ownership. The law was passed through a fast-track procedure in response to a reported demand from Russian Sberbank that Slovakia’s electricity generator Slovenske Elektrarne back its debt to the bank with equity. While the Economy Ministry announced it would replace the fast-tracked legislation with a more robust Foreign Investment Screening Mechanism in 2021, based on EU Investment Screening Regulation 2020/1298, as of March 2022 the mechanism is pending government and parliamentary approval. Slovakia has no formal performance requirements for establishing, maintaining, or expanding foreign investments. Large-scale privatizations are possible via direct sale or public auction. Apart from the above-mentioned procedure for reviewing ownership changes in “critical infrastructure” installations, there are no formal requirements to approve FDI, though the government ultimately approves investment incentives. If investment incentives apply, the Economy Ministry manages the associated government approval process. The Act on Regional Investment Aid (57/2018 Coll.) specifies that only three categories of projects may be subsidized: industrial production, technology, or business services. An amendment to the Act in force from January 2021 slightly relaxed the conditions for receiving investment aid by increasing the maximum time to finish work on an investment project from three to five years. The Slovak government treats foreign entities established in Slovakia in the same manner as domestic entities, and foreign entities face no impediments to participating in R&D programs financed and/or subsidized by the Slovak government. Since January 2020, up to 200 percent of R&D spending is tax deductible. In 2023 this share is set to decrease to 100 percent, but a new deductible in the amount of 15 to 55 percent for selected higher value-added investments into moveable property will enter into force. The Slovak government holds stakes in a number of energy companies. It has historically been less open to private investment in energy assets that it considers to be in the national security interest. There are no domestic ownership requirements for telecommunications and broadcast licenses. The Act on Civil Air Transport (143/1998 Coll.) sets out rules for foreign airline operators seeking to operate in Slovakia. Please consult the following websites for more information: R&D Tax-Deductions: Slovakia’s investment and business climate is independently assessed on an annual basis by the European Commission in the course of the so-called European Semester. For more information, please see the European Commission’s latest Country Report on Slovakia from 2020 as well as the its Analysis of the Recovery and Resilience Plan of Slovakia from 2021, which replaced the Country Report for 2021. The OECD’s Economic Survey of Slovakia , released in January 2022, provides an independent assessment of major challenges faced by Slovakia, evaluates the short-term outlook, and makes specific policy recommendations. The following local civil society organizations carry out regular reviews of investment policy-related concerns in Slovakia – the Institute of Economic and Social Studies (INESS ), the Institute for Economic and Social Reforms (INEKO ), Transparency International Slovakia (TIS ). According to the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report, the last one available, Slovakia ranks 118 out of 190 countries surveyed on the ease of starting a business, up from 127 in 2019. It takes, on average, 21.5 days to start a business, versus 26.5 days in 2019, and involves seven procedures. There are private business development companies that help navigate the process of establishing a new business. The main agencies with which a company must register are the business registry, tax office, social security agency, and, if the company employs at least one employee, a healthcare insurance company. In 2022, the government approved a package of nearly 200 measures meant to decrease the administrative burden on businesses, adding to 114 measures introduced by a previous package focused on cutting red tape, which was adopted in 2020. The Ministry of Economy also implemented regular regulatory fitness checks and reviews of EU directive implementing legislation to ensure that implementing laws do not create additional administrative burdens beyond what is required by EU law. The Central Government Portal “slovensko.sk” provides useful information on e-Government services for starting and running a business, citizenship, registering vehicles, social security, etc. Checklists of procedures necessary for registrations, applications for permits, etc., are currently available on the websites of the business registry, tax office, social security agency and health insurance companies. The Economy Ministry is working on streamlining the information into one common platform. The government has also announced plans for a major overhaul to the e-Government service portal to streamline access to public services. Please consult the following websites for more information: Central Government Portal: Commercial Register: Slovak Business Agency: Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency: Due to their limited size, Slovak companies have not made significant outward foreign direct investments, registering just €5.2 million in 2020. Several state agencies share responsibility for facilitating outward investment and trade. SARIO is officially responsible for export facilitation and attracting investment. The Slovak Export-Import Bank supports exports and outward investments with financial instruments to reduce risks related to insurance, credit, credit guarantees, and financial activities. It assists both large companies and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), and is the only institution in Slovakia authorized to provide export and outward investment-related government financial assistance. The Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs runs a business center that provides services for exporters and helps identify investment opportunities. Slovakia’s diplomatic missions, the Ministry of Finance’s Slovak Guarantee and Development Bank, and the Ministry for Investments, Informatization, and Regional Development (MIRRI) also play a role in facilitating external economic relations. Slovakia does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Companies in Slovakia frequently complain about the country’s complex and unpredictable legislative and regulatory environment. The current ruling coalition is making significant efforts to address this issue. Starting June 1, 2021, all government ministries as well as 20 non-ministry central government institutions are legally bound to adhere to a “one-in-one-out” principle, meaning every new regulation that will increase administrative burden by €1 must be matched with a proposal to decrease the administrative burden by €1. As of January 2022, the principle has been further expanded to “one-in-two-out.” Failure to comply does not, however, result in the annulment of the regulation or any other material consequences. The Ministry of Economy flags violations through a mandatory interdepartmental consultation procedure on all draft legislation and prepares an annual report on implementation of the rule. Regulations are drafted on the local and national level with the latter usually having more direct consequences to foreign investors. The Legislative and Information Portal of the Ministry of Justice, Slov-Lex, is a publicly accessible centralized online portal for laws and regulations, including draft texts and information about the interdepartmental and public review processes. Draft bills, including investment laws proposed by ministries through a standard legislative procedure, are available for public comment through the portal, with a comment period of usually between two to three weeks. When fast tracking legislation and regulations comment periods may shrink to one-week, leaving little time for public comment. Affected business associations note that government reactions to comments are often superficial and generic, rather than substantive. While the process of adopting new laws and regulations follows clearly defined rules, MPs or parliamentary groups have the option of proposing legislation without having to adhere to the same legislative rules as the government and without having to hold any public consultations, thus rendering the legislative process less predictable and less transparent than draft laws introduced by the government. Legislative rules are also frequently circumvented by using the “accelerated legislative procedure.” This procedure is, by law, conditioned on extraordinary circumstances, threat to public safety, or imminent economic damage. However, in practice, the procedure is sometimes used to approve bills that do not appear to meet these criteria. In an effort to reduce abuse of the procedure, the President has repeatedly exercised her suspensive veto right in cases when the accelerated procedure was used to pass legislation without clearly meeting the aforementioned criteria. Legislation and regulations are, in most cases, not reviewed on the basis of scientific data assessments and critics assert that some mandatory impact assessments are conducted superficially. Analytical institutes at some ministries produce data-driven assessments of proposed policies or large investment projects, but not all ministries have the needed personnel and/or technical capacity to ensure a uniform and high-quality level of data-driven policymaking across the whole of government. Impact assessments for proposed legislation are available online, as are most policy and/or investment assessments prepared by the analytical units at government ministries. The Commercial Code ( 98/1991 Coll.) and the Act on Protection of Economic Competition (136/2001 Coll.) govern competition policy in Slovakia. As an EU Member State, Slovakia follows relevant EU legislation. The Anti-Monopoly Office, a part of the EU’s European Competition Network (ECN), is an independent state administrative body responsible for ensuring a competitive marketplace. The Public Procurement Office (PPO) supervises and administers public procurement. Public procurement legislation is frequently amended, and challenges remain in striking an adequate balance between protecting competition and eliminating corruption, while keeping the bureaucratic burden and average tendering time at acceptable levels. The PPO has made efforts to improve transparency and communication with stakeholders, as well as to strengthen supervisory activities. Since March 2021, the PPO accepts self-declarations from U.S. companies that are bidding in public procurements, rather than requiring companies to produce non-standard documentation issued by U.S. state or federal entities – which had been overly burdensome to obtain. In October 2021, parliament approved an amendment to the public procurement act aimed at accelerating and streamlining the public procurement process by increasing the threshold for when public tenders are required from €5,000 to €10,000 and by preventing the abuse of the complaint procedures to stall tenders via repetitive formal complaints. The amendment also introduces changes to increase the transparency of the tendering process by moving all tender-related communication online via a specialized electronic platform, by strengthening the independence of the PPO, and by prohibiting selected public servants from doing business with the state. The amendment to the public procurement act will enter into force on March 31, 2022. Oversight over the legality of administrative and regulatory processes, and decisions of the central government, as well as municipalities, is carried out by the prosecution service and an administrative court system consisting of first-instance courts, which are part of regional courts, and a Supreme Administrative Court. Complaints related to administrative malpractice can also be raised via the Public Defender of Rights and, in case these include breaches of fundamental rights and freedoms, also via the Constitutional Court. The government does not proactively promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. As an EU member state, Slovakia is bound by the EU Taxonomy Regulation, which seeks to create a common framework to determine whether certain economic activities can be regarded as environmentally sustainable. All measures implemented through Slovakia’s Recovery and Resilience Plan, including investments and reforms, must be in line with the environmental objectives laid down by the EU Taxonomy and must not breach the ‘do no significant harm’ principle. As an EU Member State, Slovakia conforms to the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 2010), which is the EU’s most recent internationally compatible accounting framework, as well as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS-EU). Slovakia meets the minimum criteria of the U.S. Fiscal Transparency Report. Budget proposals, enacted budgets, and closing statements are substantially complete and publicly available. Departures from budget goals are common. The current ruling coalition introduced a number of changes to the 2021 and 2022 national budgets that have improved transparency and led to better projections compared to previous years. The Ministry of Finance publishes monthly reviews of budget execution, which provide an overview of public revenues and expenditures broken down by source and type. Annex 6 of the State budget describes the Debt Management Strategy including volume, total cost, debt service, structure, financing, forecast, and risk assessments. In February 2022, the government adopted sweeping changes to construction and zoning legislation with the aim to significantly accelerate, streamline, and digitize the process of obtaining construction permits and prevent the ex-post legalization of buildings built without requisite permits. While the business community generally welcomed the legislative changes as long overdue, municipalities and some non-governmental organizations argue that the legislation will strengthen the position of large real-estate developers, while reducing public scrutiny over proposed construction projects. Please consult the following websites for more information: Legislative and Information Portal Slov-Lex: (Note: all legal acts and regulations mentioned throughout this report can be found on this portal.) World Bank: Anti-Monopoly Office of the Slovak Republic: Office for Public Procurement: Public Administration Budget, Ministry of Finance: The European Commission Country Report – Slovakia 2020: Slovakia is subject to European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction and must comply with all EU legislation and standards, including the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). The national regulatory system is enforced in areas not governed by EU regulatory mechanisms. Slovakia is a WTO member, and the government notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade of technical regulations. Please consult the following websites for more information: WTO: Slovakia is a civil law country. The Slovak judicial system is comprised of the Constitutional Court and general courts, including the Specialized Criminal Court, the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Administrative Court, functional from August 1, 2021. General courts decide civil, commercial, and criminal matters, and review the legality of decisions by administrative bodies. However, as of March 2022, a proposal to create a new system of separate first-instance administrative courts in January 2023 is pending Parliament’s approval, as part of the government’s judicial reform plan. The Supreme Administrative Court serves as the second-instance administrative court, including as a disciplinary court for judges, prosecutors, and some other legal professions. The Specialized Criminal Court focuses on cases involving corruption, organized crime, serious crimes like premeditated murder, crimes committed by senior public officials, and crimes related to extremism, such as hate crimes. Enforcement actions are appealable and are adjudicated in the national court system. The right to appeal regulations is limited to some state institutions and selected public officials. The Slovak Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights guarantee property rights. Slovakia has a written Commercial Code including contract law in the civil and commercial sectors. The basic framework for investment protection and dispute resolution between Slovakia and the U.S. is outlined in the 1992 U.S.-Slovakia Bilateral Investment Treaty. Court rulings by EU Member States are recognized and enforced in compliance with existing EU regulations. Third country rulings are governed by bilateral treaties or by the Act on International Private Law. Contracts are enforced through litigation or arbitration. Laws guarantee judicial independence; however, public perception of judicial independence is among the lowest in the EU. According to the 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard, public trust in the judiciary is low, with trust among the general public standing at 28 percent and 30 percent among the business community. The trend has been improving, however, with the trust in the judiciary among businesses doubling since 2020. In 2019 and 2020 numerous investigations into judicial corruption were opened and about 20 judges were arrested on suspicion of corruption, while several additional judges resigned from office. Businesses and NGOs report that the justice system remains relatively slow and inefficient, and characterizing some verdicts as unpredictable and often poorly justified. Investors generally prefer international arbitration to resolution in the national court system. The government is pursuing an ambitious set of judicial reforms, aiming to address alleged corruption ties, low public trust, and inefficiency, and is also following the recommendations of the Council of Europe Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ). Judges remain divided on the need for reform though, and a consensus on the reform’s elements within the ruling coalition has not been reached as of March 2022. Accountability mechanisms ensuring judicial impartiality and independence exist and are increasingly utilized. Courts use a digital system for random case assignment to increase transparency. As of 2021, the functional immunity of judges related to their decision-making was significantly reduced, to prevent arbitrary and poorly justified rulings, and a new offence of “abuse of law”, inspired by German law, was introduced to enable prosecution of judges for arbitrary, unlawful decisions. Please consult the following websites for more information: Constitutional Court: Supreme Court: Supreme Administrative Court: Ministry of Justice, Analytical Centre, judicial map reform plan: EU Justice Scoreboard: European Commission 2021 Rule of Law Report: European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) 2017 report on the Slovak judiciary: Slovakia is a politically and economically safe destination for foreign investment. Investment incentives are available to motivate investors to place new projects in regions with higher unemployment and to attract projects with higher added value. In February 2021, the government approved a law that allows the Economy Ministry to review and potentially stop ownership transfers larger than 10 percent of companies classified as critical infrastructure (see Section 1 for more detail). The Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency (SARIO) is a specialized government agency in charge of attracting foreign investments to Slovakia and serves as a one-stop shop for foreign investors. Their website offers easily accessible information on laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements relevant to investors or those wanting to register a business. The Slovak Business Agency (SBA) runs a National Business Center (NBC) in Bratislava and several other cities; it provides information and services for starting and establishing businesses. Startups can use a simplified procedure to register their company in order to facilitate the entry of potential investors. The Interior Ministry operates Client Centers around the country where many formal administrative procedures can be completed under one roof. In the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report, the most recently published edition, Slovakia placed 45 out of 190 countries in the report’s overall ranking. Please consult the following websites for more information: Ministry of Economy: Startup Visa: https://www.economy.gov.sk/inovacie/podnikatelsky-zamer-na-realizaciu-inovativneho-projektu Slovak Business Agency: Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency: Information on requirements for investing or registering a business: https://sario.sk/sites/default/files/data/pdf/sario-invest-in-slovakia-ENG.pdf Central Public Administration Portal: Interior Ministry: World Bank Ease of Doing Business Ranking: The Anti-Monopoly Office of the Slovak Republic is an independent body charged with the protection of economic competition. This office intervenes in cases of cartels, abuse of a dominant position, vertical agreements, and validates that state aid and mergers comply with antitrust law. Decisions of the Anti-Monopoly Office can be appealed to an independent committee and, in the second instance, to administrative courts. The key antitrust legislation regarding fair competition is the Competition Law (136/2001 Coll.). Slovakia complies with EU competition policy. Certain decisions related to competition policy and enforcing competition rules are directly under the purview of the European Commission. In January 2022, the Anti-Monopoly Office fined three Slovak companies nearly €9 million, the second highest issued fine in the authority’s history, for allegedly entering an illegal cartel agreement related to a €38 million renovation of an electricity substation for the Slovak transmission system operator. The involved companies appealed the decision to the Committee of the Anti-Monopoly Office and the case is pending. Please consult the following website for more information: The Anti-Monopoly Office: The European Commission: The Slovak Constitution guarantees the right to property. There is an array of legal acts stipulating property rights, including the Constitution. The Act on Expropriation of Land and Buildings (282/2015 Coll.) mandates that expropriation must only occur to the extent necessary, be in the public interest, provide appropriate compensation based on fair market value, and shall only occur when the goal of expropriation cannot be achieved through agreement or other means. In April 2021, the Slovak Parliament voted to extend by 10 years a sunset clause on expropriations of property for roads, which expired at the end of 2020. Expropriations are used by the government primarily for acquiring land on which planned highways are built, or large industrial parks, and only in the event that direct negotiations with landowners fail. In February 2022, the government proposed, without prior stakeholder consultation, and adopted a 50 percent tax on “excess profit” from electricity generated in nuclear power plants. Reportedly, this would have cost Slovakia’s nuclear operator, a majority foreign-owned company (with state minority ownership), more than €300 million annually, depending on wholesale electricity prices. The proposed tax was withdrawn just before parliamentary approval, after the government and the utility signed an MOU, under which the electricity generation company will provide a set volume of electricity at below market rates for household consumers through the end of 2024. According to a joint press conference announcing the agreement, the government, in turn, agreed to not alter the business environment for the company through 2025. The company is reportedly set to lose an estimated €850 million on the deal. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Slovakia is a contracting state to the International Centre for Settling International Disputes (ICSID) and the World Bank’s Commercial Arbitration Tribunal (established under the 1966 Washington Convention). Slovakia is a member of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitrage Awards, which obligates Slovakia to accept binding international arbitration. The Finance Ministry leads on bilateral investment treaty matters and manages and represents Slovakia in international arbitration. Investment contracts with foreign investors in Slovakia are covered by respective ministries depending on the sector, in most cases by the Ministry of Economy. Investor-State Dispute Settlement The basic framework for investment protection and dispute resolution between Slovakia and the United States is governed by the 1992 U.S.-Slovakia Bilateral Investment Treaty with an additional protocol that came into force in 2004. To date, twelve known cases of international arbitration have concluded, all of which Slovakia won. In one of the international arbitrations, a U.S. investor made claims under the U.S.-Slovakia Bilateral Investment Treaty, but respected the decision of ICSID, which ruled in Slovakia’s favor. In October 2021, a U.S. firm registered a request to commence arbitration proceedings against Slovakia at the ICSID, with a claim under the U.S.- Slovakia BIT related to oil and gas extraction. As of February 2022, the case remained pending. The legal system generally enforces property and contractual rights, but decisions may take years, thus limiting the relevance of the courts in dispute resolution. According to the World Bank Doing Business 2020 report, the last one available, Slovakia ranked 46 out of 190 countries in the “enforcing contracts” indicator, with a 775-day average for enforcing contracts. The report notes that Slovakia made enforcing contracts easier by implementing electronic processing services. Slovak courts recognize and enforce foreign judgments, subject to the same delays. Although the commercial code generally appears to be applied consistently, the business community continues to cite a lack of legislation protecting creditor rights, corruption, political influence, lengthy procedures, and weak enforcement of court rulings as persistent problems. U.S. and other investors privately described instances of multi-million-dollar losses that were settled out of court because of doubts about the court system’s ability to offer a credible legal remedy. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts There are two acts applicable to alternative dispute resolution in Slovakia – the Act on Mediation (420/2004 Coll.) and the Act on Arbitration (244/2002 Coll.). The Slovak Act on Arbitration is largely modeled after UNCITRAL model law. Local courts in Slovakia recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards. The alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in Slovakia are relatively fast compared to the court system. The list of permanent arbitration courts authorized by the Slovak Ministry of Justice is published on the Ministry’s website. Decisions should be reached within 90 days of the date when the lawsuit was filed. It is possible to lodge an appeal to a civil court against an arbitration decision within three months of the date of its issuance or lodge a complaint about an arbitration decision to the chairman of the permanent arbitration court or to the Ministry of Justice. Alternative dispute resolution proceedings for consumer disputes can also be initiated by filing a motion with one of the alternative dispute resolution entities from a list maintained by the Ministry of Economy. Dispute settlement takes place through written communication and has a 90-day timeframe for completion. Unless the parties reach an agreement, the alternative dispute resolution entity will prepare a justified opinion. If any attempt to settle the dispute by mutual agreement fails, and the arbitration entity issues an opinion, there is no avenue for appeal. The other option for extrajudicial dispute settlement is mediation. Mediation can be used even after a court proceeding has started. The agreement resulting from mediation is legally enforceable only if it has the form of a notarial record or court settlement. The list of mediators is published on the website of the Association of Mediators. In the case of an unsuccessful mediation, parties can still take the case to arbitration or to court. Please consult the following websites for more information: List of alternative dispute resolution entities: List of permanent arbitration courts: List of Mediators: U.S.- Slovakia Bilateral Investment Treaty: Finance Ministry – International Arbitrations: Slovak Chamber of Commerce: World Bank Ease of Doing Business Ranking: The Law on Bankruptcy and Restructuring (377/2016 Coll.) governs bankruptcy issues. Companies can undergo court-protected restructuring, and both individuals and companies can discharge their debts through bankruptcy. After its implementation, the International Monetary Fund praised this law for speeding up the bankruptcy process, strengthening creditor rights, limiting the discretion bankruptcy judges may use in adjudicating cases, and randomizing the allocation of cases to judges to reduce potential corruption. The Law on Bankruptcy and Restructuring contains provisions to prevent preferential treatment for creditors over company shareholders, reduce arbitrariness in bankruptcy administrators’ conduct, and impose stricter liability rules for those initiating the bankruptcy proceedings. The Commercial Code also contains provisions on bankruptcy and restructuring preventing speculative mergers during ongoing bankruptcy proceedings. Slovakia ranked 46 out of 190 in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 ranking of the ease of resolving insolvency, with an average of four years for resolving insolvency. Please consult the following websites for more information: Slovak Banking Credit Bureau: Non-Banking Credit Bureau: Justice Ministry: Insolvency Register: Dlznik.sk: Central Register of Debtors: 6. Financial Sector The Bratislava Stock Exchange (BSSE) is a member of the Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE). An effective regulatory system exists that encourages and facilitates portfolio investment. BSSE is a joint-stock company whose activities are governed primarily by the Stock Exchange Act (429/2002 Coll.) on the Stock Exchange and Stock Exchange Rules. The stock market in Slovakia is among the smallest in Europe, and dominated by bonds, which constitute 95 percent of sales volume. In 2021, the total volume of transactions at the BSSE was slightly less than €240 million (a 23 percent increase compared to 2020). As of December 31, 2021, the total nominal value of book-entry securities in Slovakia’s Central Depository of Securities reached €102 billion, compared to €94 billion in 2020. The nominal value of shares was roughly €37 billion and the value of bonds €64 billion. The European Single Market and existing European policies facilitate the free flow of financial resources. Slovakia respects International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII by refraining from restricting payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms in Slovakia and is available to foreign investors on the local market. Please consult the following websites for more information: Bratislava Stock Exchange: Central Depository of Securities: Central Bank of Slovakia: Central Register of Regulated Information: Slovakia joined the Eurozone on January 1, 2009, becoming part of the Euro system, which forms the central banking system of the euro area within the European System of Central Banks. The Central Bank of Slovakia (NBS) is the independent central bank of the Slovak Republic. Most banks operating in Slovakia are subsidiaries of foreign-owned institutions. Slovak branches operate conservatively and showed strong resilience during the 2009 financial crisis and subsequent EU-wide stress tests. The combined total assets of the financial institutions active in the Slovak market were more than €106 billion and the total capital adequacy ratio of Slovak banks was on average 19.67 percent at the end of 2021. Significant negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the local banking sector, anticipated at the onset of the pandemic, have failed to fully materialize and the Slovak financial and banking sector continues to be stable and profitable. Owing to two serious waves of the pandemic crisis and associated closures of certain economic segments in early and late 2021, the non-performing loan (NPL) ratios increased slightly across all products but remained at sustainable levels with the ratio for non-performing housing loans standing at just 2.2 percent. The NPL ratio for consumer credit stood at 8.8 percent and the ratio for loans to non-financial corporations at 3 percent in September 2021. The net profit of Slovak banks in 2021 is estimated at €229 million, compared to €185 million in 2020 and €167 million in pre-pandemic 2019. The annualized return on equity of Slovak banks increased from 5.88 percent to 7.33 percent q-o-q in Q2 2021 and stood just below the EU median of 7.96 percent. The rise in profitability is attributed primarily to the abolishment of a special levy on the banking industry in 2021. Foreign nationals can open bank accounts by presenting their passport and/or residence permit, depending on the bank. Please consult the following websites for more information: Central Bank of Slovakia: Foreign Exchange and Remittances Foreign Exchange Slovakia joined the Eurozone on January 1, 2009. The exchange rate is free floating. The Foreign Exchange Act (312/2004 Coll.) governs foreign exchange operations and allows for easy conversion or transfer of funds associated with an investment. The Act liberalizes operations with financial derivatives and abolishes any limits on the export and import of domestic and foreign banknotes and coins. It also authorizes Slovak residents to open accounts abroad and eliminates the obligation to transfer financial assets acquired abroad to Slovakia. Slovakia meets all international standards for conversion and transfer policy. Non-residents may hold foreign exchange accounts. No permission is needed to issue foreign securities in Slovakia, and Slovak citizens are free to trade, buy, and sell foreign securities. Remittance Policies The basic framework for investment transfers between Slovakia and the United States is set within the 1992 US-Slovakia Bilateral Investment Treaty. Following Slovakia’s approval of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) in July 2015, and per the Act on Automatic Exchange of Information on Financial Accounts (359/2015 Coll.), Slovak financial institutions are obligated to report tax information of American account holders to the Slovak Government, which then forwards that information to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. Slovakia does not impose limitations on remittances. Dividends are taxed at seven percent. Transfer pricing for controlled transactions must be based on market prices. An obligation to pay a 21 percent tax applies to companies that are moving their assets or activities abroad. Please consult the following websites for more information: U.S.-Slovakia Bilateral Investment Treaty: U.S.- Slovakia Bilateral Taxation Treaty: MONEYVAL: Slovakia does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund. Slovak Investment Holding (SIH) is a fund of funds fully owned by the Slovak Guarantee and Development Bank. Resources are allocated as revolving financial instruments, through financial intermediaries or directly to final beneficiaries, and focus on strategic investment priorities in transport infrastructure, energy efficiency, waste management, SMEs, and social economy. Please consult the following websites for more information: Slovak Investment Holding: 10. Political and Security Environment Politically motivated violence and civil disturbances are rare in Slovakia, but as the government continued imposing stringent measures and a series of lockdowns in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the country has seen an increase in the number of anti-government demonstrations. The protests often attracted hundreds to thousands of people and remained largely peaceful, though several protests resulted in minor damage to government property, riot police intervention, traffic disruptions, arrests, and minor injuries to police officers and participants. During two separate protests against anti-pandemic measures in July 2021, protestors paralyzed traffic in downtown Bratislava for several hours and verbally and physically harassed journalists. One of the protests resulted in a crowd of several dozen attempting to forcibly enter the parliament building. There have been no recent reports of politically motivated damage to property, projects, and installations nor violence directed toward foreign-owned companies. However, in October and November 2021, coordinated groups targeted large grocery stores (which were generally international grocery retailers) for anti-mask defiance actions, in protest against anti-pandemic measures. On several occasions the incidents resulted in hours-long store closures, causing financial losses to the retailers. In response, an association of the largest companies in retail and wholesale sector in Slovakia, including Billa, Kaufland, Lidl, Metro, and Tesco, issued a call to public authorities to urgently address the situation and take swift and effective action, which drew increased police engagement. There have been no recent reports of similar incidents after government relaxed anti-pandemic rules. The two years of the COVID-19 pandemic measures and their politicization, as well as an antagonistic domestic political scene have contributed to increased political and societal polarization and made space for extremist rhetoric in the mainstream. While some threats were made against Slovak politicians for their support of a politicized international agreement, there have been no reports, however, of actual politically motivated violence. Slovenia Executive Summary Several factors make Slovenia an attractive location for foreign direct investment (FDI): modern infrastructure with access to important EU transportation corridors, a major port on the Adriatic Sea with access to the Mediterranean, a highly educated and professional workforce, proximity to Central European and Balkan markets, and membership in the Schengen Area, EU, and Eurozone. With a small domestic market of just over two million people, Slovenia’s economy is heavily dependent on foreign trade and susceptible to international price and currency fluctuations as well as economic conditions among its major trading partners. In recent years, Slovenia’s economic growth rate has outpaced those of most other EU member states, and the country has enjoyed rising incomes, growing domestic consumption, falling unemployment, low inflation, and burgeoning consumer confidence. However, in 2020, GDP contracted by 4.2 percent to EUR 46.9 billion due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic impacted certain industries, including retail and hospitality sectors, more severely than others. Overall, the economy faired relatively well, with a series of government COVID-19 stimulus measures – worth approximately EUR 2.5 billion (USD 2.9 billion) – mainly focused on preserving jobs. Slovenia’s economy rebounded in 2021 with GDP growth of 8.1 percent, exceeding the eurozone average. However, Slovenia is expecting more modest GDP growth in 2022 and 2023, with the Bank of Slovenia estimating growth of 4.0 percent and 3.3 percent, respectively. The central bank warned that the country was experiencing supply chain issues as well as labor shortages and expressed concern about rising inflation and energy prices. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is expected to exacerbate inflationary pressures, making a slowdown more likely. Despite a number of privatizations in the banking sector in 2019 and 2020, approximately 25 percent of Slovenia’s economy remains state-owned or state-controlled based on consultations with economic and financial experts. While estimates of the percentage of state involvement in the economy vary, most experts agree that it is among the highest among EU member states. There is widespread skepticism in some quarters toward privatization and foreign direct investment, despite general awareness of FDI’s importance to economic growth, job creation, and developing new technologies. Potential investors in Slovenia may face significant challenges, including a lack of transparency in economic and commercial decision-making, time-consuming bureaucratic procedures, opaque public tender processes, regulatory red tape, and a heavy tax burden for high earners. According to Bank of Slovenia figures, FDI in Slovenia totaled EUR 16.6 billion (35.3% of GDP) in 2020, a 2.4 percent increase over the previous year. The relatively modest growth in investment flows were largely attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic. Slovenia’s most important sources for direct foreign investment were Austria (25.6 percent), Luxembourg (13.0 percent), Switzerland (10.7percent), Germany (8 percent), and Italy (7.3 percent). However, Bank of Slovenia data indicated U.S. companies accounted for 9.4 percent of total inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2020, EUR 66 million (USD 72.5 million) invested directly and an additional EUR 1.48 billion (USD 1.63 billion) invested indirectly through U.S. subsidiaries in other European countries. This combined investment of EUR 1.55 billion (USD 1.78 billion) placed the United States as Slovenia’s third largest source of direct and indirect foreign investment, behind Austria (EUR 2.58 billion) and Germany (EUR 2.40 billion). The most important sectors for FDI were manufacturing (33.5 percent), financial and insurance activities (22.5 percent), wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (17.1 percent). Although firms with foreign owners represented just 1.8 percent of all Slovenian firms in 2020, firms with FDI accounted for 24.2 percent of capital, 25.9 percent of assets, and 23.5 of corporate sector employees. Their capital and workforce generated EUR 29.0 billion in net sales revenue and EUR 1.1 billion in operating profit. Foreign companies accounted for 47.7 percent of corporate sector exports and 52.5 percent of corporate sector imports. Slovenia, in line with the European Union (EU), committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 percent by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels) and achieving climate neutrality by 2050. Slovenia’s long-term climate strategy, approved in July 2021, includes a provision specifying that the country will use nuclear energy in the long term, clarifying the country’s energy future and committing to produce a large percentage of its energy supply domestically. In July 2021, the EU approved Slovenia’s national recovery and resilience plan, allowing funds up to EUR 2.5 billion (EUR 1.8 billion in grants and 700 million in loans) to be drawn from the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility. 42.5 percent of the funds are earmarked for green transition projects. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 41 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 32 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 265 https://www.bea.gov/data/economic-accounts/international World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 25,360 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Although Slovenia has no formal business roundtable or foreign investment ombudsman, the Slovenian Public Agency for the Promotion of Entrepreneurship, Innovation, Development, Investment and Tourism (SPIRIT) promotes FDI and advocates for foreign investors in Slovenia, often in collaboration with diplomatic missions and business associations based in Slovenia. Its mission is to enhance Slovenia’s economic competitiveness through technical and financial assistance to entrepreneurs, businesses, and investors. Foreign companies conducting business in Slovenia have the same rights, obligations, and responsibilities as domestic companies. The principles of commercial enterprise, including national treatment, apply to the operations of foreign companies as well. The Law on Commercial Companies and the Law on Foreign Transactions guarantee their basic rights. According to SPIRIT’s annual survey on foreign investors’ perceptions of Slovenia’s business environment, investors cite the high quality of Slovenia’s labor force as the deciding factor in choosing the country as an investment destination, followed by widespread knowledge of foreign languages, employees’ technical expertise, innovation potential, and strategic geographic position offering easy access to EU and Balkan markets. While generally welcoming greenfield investments, Slovenia presents a number of informal barriers that may prove challenging to foreign investors. According to SPIRIT’s survey, the most significant disincentives to FDI are high taxes, high labor costs, lack of payment discipline, an inefficient judicial system, difficulties in firing employees, and excessive bureaucracy. There are no formal limits on foreign investors’ ability to establish an investment or operate in the market. Foreign companies doing business in Slovenia and the local American Chamber of Commerce have also cited additional factors that adversely affect the local investment climate, including the lack of a high-level FDI promotion strategy, a sizable judicial backlog, difficulties in obtaining building permits, labor market rigidity, and disproportionately high social contributions and personal income taxes coupled with excessive administrative tax burdens. Businesses have also reported a lack of transparency in public procurement, unnecessarily complex and time-consuming bureaucracy, frequent changes in regulation, relatively high real estate prices in some parts of the country, and confusion over lead responsibility or jurisdiction regarding foreign investment among government agencies. The government recognizes some of these constraints and is taking steps to address them. It adopted a De-bureacratization Act in 2021 that simplified administrative procedures, improved communication with government offices, and broadened the authority for signing ministry decisions to state secretaries. The newly-established Government Office for Digital Transformation implemented several measures to advance digitalization and reduce red tape, including plans to introduce new digital services in healthcare, education, and public administration by 2023. This new office also committed to improving the business environment for technology companies, including through offering tax incentives for IT experts and opening a new government center to cater to and reduce red tape for foreigners and Slovenians returning from overseas. The government also succeeded in reducing the income tax rate in the highest tax bracket from 50 percent to 45 percent, but failed to take further action on tax policies that are an impediment to foreign investment and lead to brain drain. Both foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in different forms of remunerative activity. Slovenia has relatively few formal limits on foreign ownership or control. In May 2020, Slovenia enacted a screening mechanism for foreign investments that will remain in force until June 2023. The investment screening mechanism was enacted as part of the COVID-19 stimulus package and will need to be made permanent before the legislation sunsets. The investment screening mechanism stipulates that foreign investments acquiring at least 10 percent of share capital or voting rights in Slovenian companies with activities involving critical infrastructure, critical technologies and dual use items, supply of critical inputs, access to sensitive information, the freedom and pluralism of the media, and certain projects and programs in the interest of the EU must seek approval from the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology. The ministry was also authorized to retroactively screen foreign direct investment transactions within the past five years. The application for such approval must be submitted to the ministry within 15 days from the date of the execution of the agreement. The Slovenian government envisages that the review process can take up to two months. Failure to comply to this new legislation may result in a fine ranging between EUR 50,000 and EUR 500,000 for companies based on their size and a fine of EUR 10,000 for individuals. Sector-specific restrictions: Professional services: There are limits on banking and investment services, private pensions, insurance services, asset management services, and settlement, clearing, custodial, and depository services provided in Slovenia by companies headquartered in non-EU countries. Companies from non-EU countries can operate freely only through an affiliate with a license granted by an appropriate Slovenian or EU institution. Gaming: There is a 20 percent cap on private ownership of individual companies. Air transport: Aircraft registration is only possible for aircraft owned by Slovenian or EU nationals or companies controlled by such entities. Companies controlled by Slovenian nationals or carriers complying with EU regulations on ownership and control are the only entities eligible for Air Operator’s Certificates (AOC) for performing airline services. Maritime transport: The law forbids majority ownership by non-EU residents of a Slovenian-flagged maritime vessel unless the operator is a Slovenian or other EU national. Slovenia underwent an OECD Investment Policy Review and a WTO Trade Policy Review in 2002. The Economist Intelligence Unit and World Bank’s “Doing Business 2020” provide current economic profiles of Slovenia. Individuals or businesses may adopt a variety of different legal and organizational forms to conduct economic activities. Businesses most commonly incorporate legally as limited liability companies (LLC or d.o.o.) and public limited companies (PLC or d.d.). Non-residents of the Republic of Slovenia must obtain a Slovenian tax number before beginning the process of establishing a business. Slovenia’s Companies Act, which is fully harmonized with EU legislation, regulates the establishment, management, and organization of companies. Generally, bureaucratic procedures and practices for foreign investors wishing to start a business in Slovenia are sufficiently streamlined and transparent. Start-up costs for businesses are among the lowest in the EU. To establish a business in Slovenia, a foreign investor must produce capital of at least EUR 7,500 (USD 8,835) for a limited liability company and EUR 25,000 (USD 29,450) for a stock company. The investor must also establish a business address and file appropriate documentation with the courts. The entire process usually takes three weeks to one month, but may take longer in Ljubljana due to court backlogs. Individuals or legal entities may establish businesses through a notary, one of several VEM (Vse na Enem Mestu or “all in one place”) point offices designated by the Slovenian government, or online. A list of VEM points is available at http://www.podjetniski-portal.si/ustanavljam-podjetje/vem-tocke/seznam-vstopnih-tock-vem. More information on how to invest and register a business in Slovenia is available at http://www.investslovenia.org/business-environment/establishing-a-company/ and http://www.eugo.gov.si/en/starting/business-registration/. Slovenia does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad, nor are there any incentives for outward investments. The majority of Slovenia’s outward investments are in the Western Balkans. Croatia is the most popular destination for Slovenian outward investment, constituting 32.9 percent of Slovenia’s investments abroad, followed by Serbia (17.9 percent), Bosnia and Herzegovina (7.9 percent), Russia (6.1 percent), and North Macedonia (6 percent). 3. Legal Regime Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures in Slovenia are transparent and consistent with international norms. Financial statements should be prepared by the Slovenian Institute of Auditors in accordance with the Slovenian Accounting Standards and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), as adopted by the EU. Annual reports of for-profit business entities are publicly available on the website of AJPES, the Slovenian Business Database. There are three levels of regulatory authority: supra-national (Slovenia is a member of the EU), national, and sub-national (municipalities have limited regulatory power over local affairs, and regulations must comply with state regulations). Laws may be proposed by the government, member(s) of parliament, or through signatures of at least 5,000 voters. Slovenia adopted a comprehensive regulatory policy in 2013, focusing on measures aimed at raising the quality of the regulatory environment to improve the business environment and increase competitiveness. Slovenia’s Ministry of Public Administration is required by several legal and policy documents to solicit and include public stakeholder engagement in decision-making processes. Public authorities must solicit stakeholder engagement and inform the public about their work to the greatest extent possible. Government entities that propose regulations must invite experts and the general public to participate by publishing a general invitation, together with a draft regulation, on their websites. The experts and general public must respond by the deadline, ranging from 30 to 60 days from the day of its publication. In addition to the relevant ministry, the proposals are also published on government websites and on the Ministry of Public Administration’s eDemocracy portal. Through the eDemocracy web portal, citizens may actively cooperate in the decision-making process by expressing opinions and submitting proposals and comments on draft regulations. When possible, government entities take into consideration proposals and opinions on proposed regulations submitted by experts and the general public. If such opinions and proposals are not taken into consideration, those proposing the regulation must inform stakeholders in writing and explain the reasons. The public, however, is not invited to comment on proposed regulations when the nature of the issue precludes such consideration, such as in emergency situations and in matters relating to the national budget, the annual financial statement, the rules of procedure of the government, ordinances, resolutions, development and planning documents, development policies, declarations, acts ratifying international treaties, and official decisions. A regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is obligatory for all primary legislation; however, the quality of such assessments varies, and analyses are often only qualitative or incomplete due to the lack of an external body to conduct quality control. The quality of such assessments has improved, however, since the Ministry of Public Administration introduced its Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) test in 2012 to measure regulatory impacts on small and medium-sized businesses. The General Secretariat of the Republic of Slovenia is responsible for administrative oversight to ensure the government follows administrative procedures. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. Slovenia’s executive branch initiates approximately 92 percent of primary laws, with regulations often developed rapidly. The government’s frequent use of urgent procedures (normally reserved for national emergencies) to pass legislation often limits the stakeholder engagement process. After the adoption of new legislation, the text is published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia and online at https://www.uradni-list.si/glasilo-uradni-list-rs. Slovenia lacks a systematic process to evaluate regulations after their implementation. To measure regulatory burdens on businesses, Slovenia adopted the Standard Cost Model, which has led to a significant reduction of such burdens. The United Nations awarded its Public Service Award to Slovenia in 2009 for its system of one-stop shops (the so-called “VEM points”) to incorporate and establish businesses. The introduction of e-government processes has simplified administrative procedures. The World Bank assigned Slovenia a score of 4.75 out of 5 on its Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance measure in 2018, while the International Budget Partnership gave Slovenia 68 points out of 100 on its Open Budget Survey 2019, assessing Slovenia’s budget transparency as sufficient with substantial information available. Slovenia meets the Department of State’s minimum requirements for fiscal transparency. In 2021, Slovenia’s budget and information on debt obligations were widely and easily accessible to the general public, including online. The budget was substantially complete and considered generally reliable. Slovenia’s supreme audit institution reviewed the government’s accounts and made its reports publicly available. The criteria and procedures by which the national government awards contracts or licenses for natural resource extraction were outlined in law and appeared to be followed in practice. Basic information on natural resource extraction awards was public. Slovenia joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, and to date there have been no cases of Slovenia violating WTO rules. The law treats domestic and foreign investors equally. The government does not impose performance requirements or any condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding an investment. As a WTO member country, Slovenia is required by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) to report to the WTO all proposed technical regulations that could affect trade with other member countries. Slovenia is a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and has implemented all TFA requirements. As an EU member state, Slovenia applies two principles in its regulatory system: the supremacy of EU laws and the principle of direct effect. In areas subject to EU responsibility, EU laws override any conflicting member state laws. Direct effect enables Slovenians and other EU citizens to use EU laws in national courts against the government or private parties. Slovenia is a civil law jurisdiction with a codified system of law. It has a well-developed, independent legal system based on a five-tier (district, regional, appeals, supreme, and administrative) court system. These courts deal with a wide array of legal cases, including criminal, probate, domestic relations, land disputes, contracts, and other business-related issues. A separate social and labor court system, comprised of regional, appeals, and supreme courts, deals strictly with labor disputes, pensions, and other social welfare claims. As with most other European countries, Slovenia has a Constitutional Court which hears complaints alleging violations of human rights and personal freedoms. The Constitutional Court also issues opinions on the constitutionality of international agreements and state statutes and deals with other high-profile political issues. In 1997, Slovenia’s National Assembly established an administrative court to handle legal disputes among local authorities, between state and local authorities, and between local authorities and executors of public authority. In 1999, the National Assembly passed legislation to streamline legal proceedings and speed up administrative judicial processes. The law established a stricter and more efficient procedure for serving court documents and providing evidence. In commercial cases, defendants are required to file their defense within 15 days of receiving a notice of a claim. In 2018, the National Assembly passed Slovenia’s Investment Promotion Act, defining the types of incentives, criteria, and procedures to promote long-term investment in Slovenia. The act establishes that domestic and foreign investors are equal and mandates priority treatment of strategic investments, defined as investments totaling EUR 40 million or more and creating 400 new jobs in manufacturing and services, while R&D strategic investments are defined as totaling at least EUR 200 million and creating 200 new jobs. Under the law, a working group headed by the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology will assist strategic investors in obtaining necessary permits. The Invest Slovenia website serves as a resource for investors to obtain relevant information on investment regulations and incentives. Slovenia’s Prevention of Restriction of Competition Act regulates restrictive practices, concentrations, unfair competition, regulatory restrictions of competition, and measures to prevent restrictive practices and concentrations that significantly impede effective competition. The law applies to corporate bodies and natural persons engaged in economic activities regardless of their legal form, organization, or ownership. The law also applies to the actions of public companies and complies with EU legislation. Slovenia’s competition and anti-trust laws prohibit restrictive agreements; direct or indirect price fixing; sharing markets or supply sources; limiting or controlling production, sales, technical progress, or investment; applying dissimilar conditions to different trading parties; or subjecting the conclusion of contracts to acceptance of supplementary obligations that, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of their contracts. Companies and entities whose domestic market share exceeds 40 percent for a single undertaking and 60 percent for two or more undertakings (joint dominance) are prohibited from abusing dominant market positions. Slovenian law defines a non-exhaustive list of dominant position abuses describing the most common practices. The government may, however, prescribe market restrictions by means of regulatory instruments and actions in cases of natural disasters, epidemics, or states of emergency; significant market disturbances due to a shortage of goods or disturbances in other fields that represent a risk to the safety and health of the population; or when necessary to satisfy product requirements, raw materials, and semi-finished goods of special or strategic importance to the defense of the nation. The fines for restrictive agreements and abuses of dominant positions may total as much as 10 percent of an undertaking’s annual turnover in the preceding business year. Those legally responsible for a legal entity or sole proprietorship may be subject to a fine of EUR 5,000-10,000, or EUR 15,000-30,000 for more serious violations. Slovenia’s Competition Protection Agency (CPA) supervises the implementation of the Restriction of Competition Act. The agency monitors market conditions to ensure effective competition, conducts procedures and issues decisions, and submits opinions to the National Assembly and the government. The CPA is also responsible for the enforcement of Slovenia’s antitrust and merger control rules. An independent administrative authority, the CPA was established in 2013 through a reorganization of the former Slovenian Competition Protection Office, which was part of the Ministry of the Economy. Some private sector representatives expressed concern about the CPA’s susceptibility to outside influence and ability to reach timely decisions on complex cases, which added an element of unpredictability for some investors and their legal counsel. According to Article 69 of Slovenia’s Constitution, the government may take real property or limit rights to possess real property for public purposes in the public interest, in exchange for in-kind compensation or financial compensation under conditions determined by law. Article 7 of Slovenia’s Investment Promotion Act stipulates that, if the government deems an investment strategic, it may expropriate private property for construction in exchange for compensation, under conditions determined by law. In such cases, a special government task force monitors the investment and coordinates the acquisition of environmental and building permits. The current government is not involved in any expropriation-related investment disputes. National law offers adequate protection to all investments. However, legal disputes continue over private property expropriated by the former Yugoslav government for state purposes. Following its secession from Yugoslavia, Slovenia’s 1991 Denationalization Act established a process to “denationalize” these properties, return them to their rightful owners or their heirs, or pay just compensation if returning the property was not feasible. In some of these cases, the rightful owners and heirs are U.S. citizens. Since the 1993 deadline for filing claims, over 99 percent of denationalization cases have been closed, although only 88 percent of cases involving American owners and heirs have been resolved. Cases involving U.S. citizens have taken longer in part because the claimants generally do not live in Slovenia. In such cases, the Ministry of Justice must determine the nationality of the property’s former owners at the time the property was seized – a generally simple question for Slovenians who never acquired another citizenship, but more complicated in cases involving naturalized American citizens. In addition, some claims may involve property currently controlled by prominent and influential Slovenians, thereby creating additional informal obstacles to restitution. Competition is lively in Slovenia, and bankruptcies are an established and reliable means of working out firms’ financial difficulties. By law, there are three procedural methods for dealing with bankrupt debtors. The first procedure, compulsory settlement, allows the insolvent debtor to submit a plan to the court for financial reorganization. Creditors whose claims represent more than 60 percent of the total amount owed may vote on the proposed compulsory settlement plan. If the settlement is accepted, the debtor is not obligated to pay the creditor any amount exceeding the payment agreed to in the confirmed settlement. The procedure calls for new terms, extended in accordance with the conditions of forced liquidation settlement (see below). Confirmed compulsory settlement agreements affect creditors who have voted against the compulsory settlement as well as creditors who have not reported their claims in the settlement procedure. Creditors or debtors may also initiate bankruptcy proceedings. In such instances, the court names a bankruptcy administrator who sells the debtor’s property according to a bankruptcy senate, the senate president’s instructions, and court-sponsored supervision. Generally, the debtor’s property is sold at public auction. Otherwise, the creditors’ committee may prescribe a different mode of sale such as collecting offers or placing conditions on potential buyers. The legal effect of the completed bankruptcy is the termination of the debtor’s legal status to conduct business, and distribution of funds from the sale of assets to creditors according to their share of total debt. In accordance with the Law on Commercial Companies, the state can impose forced liquidation on a debtor subject to liquidation procedures and legal conditions for ending its existence as a business entity. This would occur, for example, in cases in which an entity’s management has ceased operations for more than 12 months, if the court finds the registration void, or by court order. In 2013, the National Assembly adopted an amendment to the Financial Operations, Insolvency Procedures, and Compulsory Dissolution Act to simplify and speed up bankruptcy procedures and deleveraging. Slovenia ranked as 8th out of 168 economies for ease of “resolving insolvency” in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report. 6. Financial Sector Capital markets remain relatively underdeveloped given Slovenia’s level of prosperity. Enterprises rarely raise capital through the stock market and tend to rely on the traditional banking system and private lenders to meet their capital needs. Established in 1990, the Ljubljana Stock Exchange (LSE) is a member of the International Association of Stock Exchanges (FIBV). In 2015, the Zagreb Stock Exchange acquired the LSE. However, the number of companies listed on the exchange is limited and trading volume is very light, with annual turnover similar to a single day’s trading on the NYSE. Low liquidity remains an issue when entering or exiting sizeable positions. In 1995, the Central Securities Clearing Corporation (KDD) was established to provide central securities custody services, clear and settle securities transactions, and maintain the central securities registry on the LSE electronic trading system. In 2017, KDD successfully aligned its procedures to that of the uniform European securities settlement platform TARGET2-Securities (T2S). In 2019, Slovenia’s Securities Market Agency (ATVP) licensed KDD to operate under the EU’s Central Securities Depository Regulation (CSDR) and provide services as a Central Securities Depository (CSD), pursuant to Article 17 of the Regulation (EU) 909/2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories. Established in 1994, the ATVP has powers similar to those of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and supervises investment firms, the Ljubljana Stock Exchange (LSE), the KDD, investment funds, and management companies. It also shares responsibility with the Bank of Slovenia for supervision of banking and investment services. Slovenia adheres to Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund’s Article of Agreement and is committed to full current account convertibility and full repatriation of dividends. The LSE uses different dissemination systems, including real-time online trading information via Reuters and the Business Data Solutions System. The LSE also publishes information on the Internet at http://www.ljse.si/. Foreign investors in Slovenia have the same rights as domestic investors, including the ability to obtain credit on the local market. There is a relatively high degree of concentration in Slovenia’s banking sector, with 11 commercial banks, three savings banks, and two foreign bank branches in Slovenia serving two million people. All commercial banks are private as of January 2021, and most have foreign owners and shareholders. SID Bank (Slovenian Export and Development Bank), which supports Slovenian companies’ export activities and provides financing for economic development, remains state-owned. In 2008, the combined effects of the global financial crisis, the collapse of the construction sector, and diminished demand for exports led to significant capital shortfalls. Bank assets declined steadily after 2009 but rebounded in 2016 and have remained steady since then. Since the crisis, most banks have refocused their business activities towards SMEs and individuals/households, prompting larger companies to search for alternative financing sources. According to European Banking Federation data, Slovenia’s banking sector assets totaled EUR 44.7 billion (USD 48.9 billion) at the end of 2020, equaling approximately 96.5 percent of GDP, still EUR 8.2 billion less than the total banking assets volume at the end of 2009, when banking sector assets equaled 146 percent of GDP. Slovenia’s banking sector was devastated by the 2009 economic crisis. Nova Ljubljanska Banka (NLB) and Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM) faced successive downgrades by credit rating agencies due to the large numbers of nonperforming loans in their portfolios. In 2013, the government established a Bank Asset Management Company (BAMC) with a management board comprised of financial experts to promote stability and restore trust in the financial system. In exchange for bonds, BAMC agreed to manage the nonperforming assets of three major state banks, conducting three such operations from December 2013 through March 2014. The government also injected EUR 3.5 billion (USD 4.2 billion) into Slovenia’s three largest banks, NLB, NKBM, and Abanka. These measures helped recapitalize and revitalize the country’s largest commercial banks. According to World Bank data, 2.8 percent of NLB’s total assets and an estimated 3.0 percent of all Slovenian banking assets were non-performing as of the end of 2020. According to the Bank of Slovenia, the Slovenian banking sector’s exposure to non-performing loans was 1.2 percent, as of January 2022. NLB, the country’s largest bank, was privatized in 2019, although the government remains a major shareholder with a 25 percent plus one share stake. Of the remaining shares, more than fifty percent are spread among several international investors on fiduciary account at the Bank of New York, while a number of Slovenian institutional and private investors purchased the remainder. The country’s second largest bank, Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM), was sold to an American fund (80 percent) and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (20 percent) in 2016. In 2020, NKBM acquired the country’s third largest state-owned bank, Abanka. As of January 2021, the banks have been fully merged. With a total asset of EUR 9.2 billion (USD 11 billion) and approximately 22 percent market share, NKBM is on par with the country’s largest commercial bank, NLB. In May 2021, Hungary’s OTP Bank signed a contract to acquire NKBM, Slovenia’s second largest bank. The deal is expected to be finalized in 2022, pending approval from regulatory authorities. Following sanctions imposed as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Central Bank (ECB) assessed in February 2022 that Sberbank Europe and its two subsidiaries in Croatia and Slovenia were failing or likely to fail due to a deterioration in their liquidity situation. In March 2022, the Bank of Slovenia announced that the country’s largest bank, NLB, acquired Sberbank Slovenia, including its assets, liabilities, and clients. The Bank of Slovenia noted that the swift sale of Sberbank Slovenia helped preserve the banking sector stability in the country. Banking legislation authorizes commercial banks, savings banks, and stock brokerage firms to purchase securities abroad. Investment funds may also purchase securities abroad, provided they meet specified diversification requirements. The Slovenian government adopted in March 2021 a draft banking legislation, which transposed provisions of an EU directive on exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers, and capital conservation measures. The new legislation also addresses the 2019 Constitutional Court decision that invalidated a provision that exempted banks from worker representation requirements in corporate governance. Under the proposed legislation, workers will be entitled to at least one seat of a bank’s supervisory board, but these workers’ representatives must meet professional qualifications of the supervisory board. The banking legislation was passed by the National Assembly in June 2021. In February 2022, Slovenia’s National Assembly passed a bill that retroactively forced Slovenian banks to share the burden of exchange rate fluctuations beyond 10 percent on Swiss Franc loans issued between June 28, 2004, and December 31, 2010, imposing an estimated cost of more than EUR 300 million on banks. The bill also required banks to amend loan contracts within 60 days to include this foreign exchange rate cap or face penalties, including up to revocation of banking licenses. Banks and business associations broadly opposed the bill, expressing concern about the bill’s inconsistencies with existing EU and Slovenian laws and regulations, disproportionately high penalties for incompliance, and the retroactively nature of the bill that calls into question the sanctity of legal contracts in Slovenia. These groups worried that this precedent created unpredictability in the economy and negatively impacted the business climate in Slovenia. Soon after the bill was passed, nine banks with operations in Slovenia requested a constitutionality review. In March 2022, the Constitutional Court stayed the enactment of the bill and will ultimately decide on its legality. Despite Slovenia’s vibrant blockchain technology ecosystem and several global blockchain companies headquartered in the country, Slovenian banks have been slow to adopt blockchain technologies to process banking transactions. The Bank of Slovenia, established on June 25, 1991, is Slovenia’s central bank. The Bank of Slovenia has been a member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) since Slovenia joined the European Union in 2004. The Bank of Slovenia gave up responsibility for monetary policy to the Eurosystem when Slovenia adopted the euro as its currency in 2007. As a member of the Eurosystem, the Bank of Slovenia coordinates with other EU central banks to implement the common monetary policy, manage foreign exchange reserves, ensure the smooth functioning of payment systems, and issue euro banknotes. Slovenian law allows non-residents to open bank accounts in Slovenia on presentation of a passport, a Slovenian tax number, and a foreign tax number. Company owners must be present to open a business bank account. Slovenia’s takeover legislation is fully harmonized with EU regulations. In 2006, Slovenia implemented EU Directive 2004/25/ES by adopting a new takeover law. The law was amended in 2008 to reflect Slovenia’s adoption of the euro as its currency. The law defines a takeover as a party’s acquisition of 25 percent of a company’s voting rights and requires the public announcement of a potential takeover offer for all current shareholders. The acquiring party must publicly issue a takeover offer for each additional acquisition of 10 percent of voting rights until it has acquired 75 percent of voting rights. The law also stipulates that the acquiring party must inform the share issuer whenever its stake in the target company reaches, surpasses, or drops below five, 10, 20, 25, 33, 50, or 75 percent. The law applies to all potential takeovers. It is common for acquisitions to be blocked or delayed, and drawn out negotiations and stalled takeovers have hurt Slovenia’s reputation in global financial markets. In 2015, the privatization of Slovenia’s state-owned telecommunications company, Telekom Slovenije, failed in large part due to political attempts to discourage the sale of a state-owned company. Slovenia’s biggest retailer, Mercator, faced similar challenges in 2014 when a lengthy and arduous process and strong domestic opposition preceded its eventual sale to a Croatian buyer. The U.S.-owned Central European Media Enterprises dropped its politically controversial sale of Slovenian media house Pro Plus to then-U.S. owned United Group in January 2019 after the Competition Protection Agency failed to issue a ruling on the proposed acquisition despite reviewing the case for more than 18 months. The government has also struggled to meet its commitment to open Slovenia’s economy to international capital markets. Thirteen insurance companies, two re-insurance companies, three retirement companies, and five branches of foreign firms operate in Slovenia. The three largest insurance companies in Slovenia account for over 60 percent of the market, with the largest, state-owned Triglav d.d., controlling 37 percent, while foreign insurance companies constitute less than 10 percent. In 2016, two Slovenian and two Croatian insurance companies merged into a new company, SAVA. Insurance companies primarily invest their assets in non-financial companies, state bonds, and bank-issued bonds. Since 2000, there have been significant changes in legislation regulating the insurance sector. The Ownership Transformation of Insurance Companies Act, which seeks to privatize insurance companies, has stalled on several occasions due to ambiguity over the estimated share of state-controlled capital. Although plans for insurance sector privatization have been under discussion since 2005, there has been no implementation. Slovenia currently has three registered health insurance companies and a variety of companies offering other kinds of insurance. Under EU regulations, any insurance company registered in the EU can market its services in Slovenia, provided the insurance supervision agency of the country where the company is headquartered has notified the Slovenian Supervision Agency of the company’s intentions. Not applicable/information not available. Slovenia does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Private enterprises compete on the same terms and conditions as public enterprises with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations. State-owned and partially state-owned enterprises (SOE) are present across most industries in Slovenia. The state has never undergone a wholesale privatization program and has retained significant ownership shares in many large companies since independence. According to a 2017 OECD report on SOEs, 37 companies with a total value of USD 12.5 billion and employing 47,000 people were majority state owned. In 2020, an OECD report assessed that privatization has progressed slowly, with the Slovenian Sovereign Holdings (SSH) maintaining controlling shares in most SOEs. Most state-owned companies are in the energy, transportation, public utilities, telecommunications, insurance, and financial sectors, although the government successfully completed the privatization of the three largest state-owned banks by 2020. Other economic sectors, including retail, entertainment, construction, tourism, and manufacturing, include important firms that are either wholly state-owned or in which the state maintains a controlling interest by virtue of holding the largest single block of shares. In general, SOEs do not receive a greater share of contracts or business than private sector competitors in sectors that are open to private and foreign competition. SOEs acquire goods and services from private and foreign firms. SOEs must follow strict government procurement agreements which require transparent procedures available to all firms. Private firms compete under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, products, and incentives. All firms have the same access to financing. SOEs are subject to the same laws as private companies and must fully comply with all legal obligations. They must submit to independent audits and publish annual reports if required (for example, if the SOE is listed on the stock exchange or the size of the company meets a certain threshold). Reporting standards are comparable to international financial reporting standards. Slovenia is an active participant in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Working Party on State Ownership and Privatization Practices and adheres to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. Following OECD recommendations, the government established the Capital Asset Management Agency (AUKN) in 2010 to increase transparency and promote more efficient management of SOEs. In 2013, authorities transformed the AUKN into the Slovenian Sovereign Holding (SSH), which is charged with simplifying and shortening the administrative process of privatizing state assets. SSH took over all AUKN portfolios as well as the portfolios of two other smaller state-owned funds. More than 95 percent of SSH funds are invested domestically. SSH is an independent state authority that reports to the National Assembly. It provides the National Assembly with annual reports regarding the previous year’s implementation of the Annual Plan of the Corporate Governance of Capital Investments. The government then adopts the Annual Plan of the Corporate Governance of Capital Investments based on SSH’s proposal. A list of SSH’s SOEs is available at https://www.sdh.si/en-gb/asset-management/list-of-assets. Foreign investors may participate in the public-bidding processes on an equal basis. However, interested parties often describe the bidding process as opaque, with unclear or unenforced deadlines. In 2015, the government prepared an asset management strategy that classified state-owned assets as strategic, important, or portfolio assets. In companies classified as strategic, the state will maintain or obtain at least a 50 percent plus one share. In companies classified as important, the state will maintain a controlling share (25 percent plus one share). In companies classified as portfolio, it is not mandatory for the state to maintain a controlling share. The government reclassified the list of companies in 2017. SSH publishes online the latest list of state stakes for sale. It is available in Slovenian at https://www.sdh.si/sl-si/prodaje-nalozb/kapitalske-nalozbe-v-postopku-prodaje. 10. Political and Security Environment Except for its brief, 10-day war of independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, there have been no significant incidents of political violence in Slovenia since independence. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $53.59 2020 $53.59 https://data.worldbank.org/country/slovenia Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $75 2020 $265 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $57 2018 $5 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/di1fdibal Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 35% 2020 39% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report *Bank of Slovenia; published in October 2021 N.B.: The Bank of Slovenia (BoS), in its official data, lists U.S. FDI at approximately EUR 66 million in 2020, or 0.4 percent of total inward FDI. However, this amount does not reflect significant investments by U.S. firms not listed as U.S. in origin by the BoS, as U.S. funds are often routed through third-country subsidiaries. In 2017, the BoS began reporting FDI according to the ultimate investing country or originating country of capital. It estimated that USD 1.71 billion (EUR 1.55 billion euros) or 9.4 percent of Slovenia’s total FDI originated in the United States in 2020, putting the United States behind Austria andGermany as a source of foreign investment in Slovenia. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 20,319 100% Total Outward 8,533 100% Austria 5,210 26% Croatia 2,808 33% Luxembourg 2,648 13% Serbia 1,531 18% Switzerland 2,176 11% Bosnia-Herzegovina 672 8% Germany 1,629 8% Russian Federation 522 6% Italy 1,493 7% North Macedonia 515 6% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Source: IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (2020) https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61227424 Comment: IMF data are consistent with Bank of Slovenia data. Note: The Bank of Slovenia has made an additional breakdown of inward FDI according to the ultimate source of capital. It shows that Germany, the United States, Japan, the Russian Federation, and Mexico are all much more important investor countries in Slovenia than is suggested by the breakdown by the immediate partner country. The U.S. ranks third with 1.48 billion euros (USD 1.71 billion) in 2020. Somalia Executive Summary The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) welcomes foreign direct investment and offers a variety of opportunities for investment, especially in natural resources and agriculture, but remains a difficult place to do business. The government’s collapse in 1991 led to a period of conflict and clan warfare. While there has been some progress since the establishment of the FGS in 2012, potential investors still face challenges such as the lack of a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework, a civil judicial system incapable of solving disputes and enforcing contracts, and endemic corruption. Investors also face threats from the al-Shabaab terrorist group, which controls portions of the country and routinely extorts taxes from businesses. Businesses also face challenges moving money into and out of Somalia, enforcing protection of intellectual property, and maintaining access to inexpensive and reliable electricity. The current government was elected in 2017 and has pursued a policy of economic reforms that broadened the government’s tax base and strengthened tax administration, resulting in steady increases in domestic revenue for the first time in two decades. These reforms enabled Somalia to re-engage international financial institutions and, in March 2020, the IMF and the World Bank approved Somalia’s eligibility for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. If Somalia takes the additional steps required to reach “Completion Point,” the final stage of debt relief, the country’s total external debt will be reduced from $5.2 billion to $557 million, or nine percent of GDP. Somalia’s economy is rebounding from the “triple shock” that ravaged the country in 2020: the COVID-19 pandemic, extreme flooding, and the locust infestation. GDP grew at two percent in 2021, mostly due to household consumption driven by increased remittances, as well as new export markets for goods. It could expand by an estimated 3.2 percent in 2022 if political challenges are resolved, according to the IMF. Low human development indicators, expensive and unreliable electricity, poor roads, a lack of reliable internet access (especially outside urban areas), and pervasive government corruption constrain investment and development. Moving money into and out of Somalia remains difficult, and the financial sector is constrained by the lack of private sector correspondent banking relationships. The main obstacles are weak “know your customer” (KYC) capabilities and concerns that al-Shabaab is using Somalia’s financial institutions to collect, store, and move money. To address these concerns, the Financial Reporting Center (FRC), Somalia’s financial investigation body, hired its first investigators in 2019 and is slowly improving its capabilities to investigate illegal transactions. Additionally, the Central Bank of Somalia (CBS) is becoming increasingly professional and asserting its jurisdiction over additional financial activities, such as mobile money. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 178 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2021 N/A https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The FGS and the Federal Member States (FMS) have a positive attitude towards foreign direct investment (FDI) and describe Somalia as “open for business.” However, insecurity and uncertainty driven by terrorist groups, lack of transparency, failure to fully constitute governing bodies per the 2012 provisional constitution, and widespread corruption in government sectors present considerable barriers to FDI. Parliament passed a foreign investment law in 2015 to promote and protect foreign investment. The law also provides some incentives to foreign investors, such as tax advantages and guarantees against expropriation. The FGS lacks the capacity to fully enforce these laws. Administration of tax laws across the FMS is not uniform and is inconsistent. In September 2020, Somalia’s investment promotion authority (SOMINVEST) released a five-year National Investment Promotion Strategy , which aims to improve Somalia’s image abroad. The strategy paints a rosy picture of doing business in Somalia, highlighting agriculture, fishing, energy, infrastructure, and banking as keys areas ripe for FDI. The Somalia Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCI) prioritizes investment retention and maintains an ongoing dialogue with investors. SCCI safeguards business interests, liaises with government officials on behalf of investors, and engages with civil society, local media, and the press. There are no laws that address private ownership rights or limit foreign control. There has not yet been a third-party investment review of Somalia. The FGS is an observer to the World Trade Organization. The FGS is not a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. In 2017, Somalia submitted a notification of intent to join the WTO. After working through the accession stages in May 2020, Somalia submitted a Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime, a document that outlines its trade and economic policies and its trade agreements with other countries. In October 2020, the WTO confirmed Somalia’s Working Party chairperson, Swedish Ambassador to the WTO Mikael Anzen, and was planning the first Working Party meeting for mid-2021. The engagements were put on hold as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and have continued on hold due to political instability. The FGS rejoined the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa in July 2018. As a member, Somalia is required to undertake several institutional, policy, and regulatory reforms to meet the organization’s free trade protocols. The FGS has also applied for East African Community (EAC) membership, which would allow Somalia to formalize trade with its neighbors and facilitate movement of Somali citizens to other EAC member states through acquisition of the common EAC passport. However, at the February 2021 Heads of State Summit, the EAC found that Somalia’s application was not yet ready for a decision. Somalia has also indicated its intent to participate in negotiations on the African Continent Free Trade Agreement. In 2019, the FGS passed a company law formalizing the legal requirements to create and register a company. On March 30, 2022, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry officially launched the Somali Business Registration System (SBRS), which will serve as a “one-stop shop” business registration website to streamline licensing approvals and reduce corruption. The World Bank ranked Somalia 190 of 190 countries in its 2020 Ease of Doing Business Report. In 2021, the World Bank discontinued producing the Ease of Doing Business report, due to several limitations/shortcoming identified in the tool’s accuracy in assessing a country’s business/investment climates. USAID is now working with the World Bank to develop a new methodology. In 2019, the FGS passed a company law formalizing the legal requirements to create and register a company. On January 27, 2021, the FGS Ministry of Commerce issued a supplementary regulation (001/2021) to support enforcement of the company law. Regulation 001/2021 established the Office of the Registrar of Companies, defined its roles/functions, and set the requirements and processes for business registration, licensing fees, and penalties. Because of this regulation, the new Somali Business Registration System (SBRS) was established. 3. Legal Regime Somalia’s regulatory system is largely nonexistent. The 2012 provisional constitution has not been finalized, and there is not yet a constitutional court to enforce it. Many of the current investment laws and regulations predate the 1991 government collapse. The FGS has revised some of these regulations and has begun to develop modern business and investment legislation to conform to the global business environment, but it has a long way to go. Somalia has a procurement act that is intended to provide for transparency in public contracts and concessions, but it is not always followed. In 2020, the FGS passed a petroleum law that provides a regulatory framework for issuing exploration and development licenses. Somalia is a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, as well as the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. In 2018, Somalia obtained provisional membership in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, but it has several conditions to fulfill before achieving full membership. Somalia is an observer, but not yet a member, of the WTO. Somalia’s legal system derives from Italian and British law, customary dispute resolution (xeer) principles, and Islamic law. The provisional constitution establishes a judicial system that is theoretically independent of the executive and the legislature, but in practice the legal system depends on the executive. There are no courts dedicated to commercial disputes. A November 2020 USAID-funded report found that the courts lack political independence, are marked by “pervasive graft,” and face competition from a parallel al-Shabaab court system. There are reports that some citizens choose to bring cases to al-Shabaab courts, finding them less corrupt than government courts. Somalia’s 2015 foreign investment law provides some guidance for foreign investors, but a comprehensive investor and investment bill remains stuck in parliament. In 2019, the Ministry of Planning opened its investment promotion office, SOMINVEST , to provide potential investors with guidance on investing in Somalia. Competition and anti-trust laws do not exist in Somalia. Local business disputes often are informally settled through the intervention of traditional elders. Somalia is rebuilding from decades of civil war, and its legal and regulatory environment remains undeveloped. There are no laws that define how the government can expropriate private property. However, the provisional constitution provides a right to just compensation from the government if property has been compulsorily acquired in the public interest. After the 1991 government collapse, many state-owned properties ended up in private hands, and the FGS has indicated interest in repossessing these properties. There is a draft investor protection bill in parliament that will address expropriation, dispute resolution, and the transfer and repatriation of investments. Somalia does not have any bankruptcy laws. 6. Financial Sector Somalia has no structured financial system and does not have portfolio investment financial products in the market. Somalia does not issue government bonds or corporate bonds. There is one private stock exchange operating in Somalia, but the government has no authority to regulate trade in stocks and securities. Somalia’s banking system has yet to recover from years of conflict. Moving money into and around the country through traditional banking mechanisms is difficult. The Somali shilling lacks legitimacy, as it has not been printed since 1991, and more than 98 percent of the bills in circulation are counterfeit, printed by warlords and rogue business owners. Consequently, much of the Somali economy relies on the U.S. dollar. Since the FGS reestablished the Central Bank of Somalia (CBS) in 2009, it has been slowly developing the tools and capabilities to oversee licensing and supervision of commercial banks and money transfer businesses. The CBS has issued licenses to 10 banks and seven informal money transfer systems known as hawalas. A 2019 anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism law requires enhanced KYC controls and created the government’s financial investigation unit, the Financial Reporting Center. Nevertheless, a 2020 UN report found that al-Shabaab moves millions of dollars through the formal banking system, which keeps Somalia’s financial risk profile high. Somalia’s banks are also stymied by the lack of any national identification, which creates challenges in verifying client identity. Only 15 percent of Somalis have formal bank accounts due to a lack of branches in many towns and the difficulty of obtaining acceptable forms of identification to open accounts. Mobile finance therefore plays an important role in the economy. Mobile money platforms have been essentially unregulated since their introduction in 2012. In February 2021, the CBS issued its first mobile money license. There is no publicly available data regarding the assets of privately owned banks. No foreign banks operate in Somalia. There are no sovereign wealth funds or any other state-owned investment fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Somalia does not have any fully or partially state-owned enterprises. Since the government does not own any business entities, there are no entities to privatize. The World Bank has supported the development of a public-private partnership law, but parliament has not yet acted on it. 10. Political and Security Environment Somalia has a long history of political and clan-based violence, which destroyed the basic state institutions that support eco/nomic development. Most of Somalia’s infrastructure was destroyed during 30 years of civil war and violence. There are pockets of stability, but Somalia remains an insecure environment. Attacks by al-Shabaab, clan-based militias, and others affect individuals and businesses throughout the country, often with loss of life. The U.S. Department of State advises U.S. citizens against traveling to Somalia due to crime, terrorism, and civil unrest. South Africa Executive Summary South Africa boasts the most advanced, broad-based economy in sub-Saharan Africa. The investment climate is fortified by stable institutions; an independent judiciary and robust legal sector that respects the rule of law; a free press and investigative reporting; a mature financial and services sector; and experienced local partners. In dealing with the legacy of apartheid, South African laws, policies, and reforms seek economic transformation to accelerate the participation of and opportunities for historically disadvantaged South Africans. The Government of South Africa (GoSA) views its role as the primary driver of development and aims to promote greater industrialization, often employing tariffs and other trade measures that support domestic industry while negatively affecting foreign trade partners. President Ramaphosa’s October 2020 Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan unveiled the latest domestic support target: the substitution of 20 percent of imported goods in 42 categories with domestic production within five years. Other GoSA initiatives to accelerate transformation include labor laws to achieve proportional racial, gender, and disability representation in workplaces and prescriptive government procurement requirements such as equity stakes and employment thresholds for historically disadvantaged South Africans. In January 2022, the World Bank approved South Africa’s request for a USD 750 million development policy loan to accelerate the country’s COVID-19 response. South Africa previously received USD 4.3 billion from the International Monetary Fund in July 2020 for COVID-19 response. This is the first time that the institutions have supported South Africa’s public finances/fiscus since the country’s democratic transition. In November 2021 at COP 26 the GoSA, the United States, the UK, France, Germany, and the European Union (EU) announced the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP). The partnership aims to accelerate the decarbonization of South Africa’s economy, with a focus on the electricity system, to help achieve the ambitious emissions reduction goals laid out in South Africa’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) in an inclusive, equitable transition. The partnership will mobilize an initial commitment of USD 8.5 billion over three-to-five years using a variety of financial instruments. South Africa continues to suffer the effects from a “lost decade” in which economic growth stagnated, hovering at zero percent pre-COVID-19, largely due to corruption and economic mismanagement. During the pandemic the country implemented one of the strictest economic and social lockdown regimes in the world at a significant cost to its economy. South Africa suffered a four-quarter technical recession in 2019 and 2020 with economic growth registering only 0.2 percent growth for the entire year of 2019 and contracting -6.4 percent in 2020. In a 2020 survey of over 2,000 South African businesses conducted by Statistics South Africa (StatsSA), over eight percent of respondents permanently ceased trading, while over 36 percent indicated short-term layoffs. Although the economy grew by 4.9 percent in 2021 due to higher economic activity in the financial sector, the official unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of 2021 was 34.9 percent. Other challenges include policy certainty, lack of regulatory oversight, state-owned enterprise (SOE) drain on the fiscus, widespread corruption, violent crime, labor unrest, lack of basic infrastructure and government service delivery and lack of skilled labor. Due to growth in 2021, Moody’s moved South Africa’s overall investment outlook to stable; however, it kept South Africa’s sovereign debt at sub-investment grade. S&P and Fitch ratings agencies also maintain assessments that South Africa’s sovereign debt is sub-investment grade at this time. Despite structural challenges, South Africa remains a destination conducive to U.S. investment as a comparatively low-risk location in Africa, the fastest growing consumer market in the world. Google (US) invested approximately USD 140 million, and PepsiCo invested approximately USD 1.5 billion in 2020. Ford announced a USD 1.6 billion investment, including the expansion of its Gauteng province manufacturing plant in January 2021. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 70 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 61 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $3.5 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $6,010 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GoSA is generally open to foreign investment to drive economic growth, improve international competitiveness, and access foreign markets. The Department of Trade and Industry and Competition’s (DTIC) Trade and Investment South Africa (TISA) division assists foreign investors. It actively courts manufacturing in sectors where it believes South Africa has a competitive advantage. It favors sectors that are labor intensive and with the potential for local supply chain development. DTIC publishes the “Investor’s Handbook” on its website: HYPERLINKError! Hyperlink reference not valid. and TISA provides investment support through One Stop Shops in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, and online at http://www.investsa.gov.za/one-stop-shop/ (see Business Facilitation). The 2018 Competition Amendment Bill introduced a government review mechanism for FDI in certain sectors on national security grounds, including energy, mining, banking, insurance, and defense (see section on Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment). The private sector has expressed concern about the politicization of mergers and acquisitions. Currently, there are few limitations on foreign private ownership and South Africa has established several incentive programs to attract foreign investment. Under the Companies Act, which governs the registration and operation of companies in South Africa, foreign investors may establish domestic entities as well as register foreign-owned entities. However, the Act requires that external companies submit their annual returns to the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission Office (CIPC) for review. Although generally there are no rules that would prohibit foreign companies from purchasing South African assets or engaging in takeovers, the Act does contain national security interest criteria for certain industries, including energy, mining, banking, insurance, and defense (see section on Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment), that could potentially subject transactions covered to additional scrutiny. Reviews will be conducted by a committee comprised of 28 ministers and officials chosen by President Ramaphosa. The law also states that the president must identify and publish in the Gazette, the South African equivalent of the U.S. Federal Register, a list of national security interests including the markets, industries, goods or services, sectors or regions for mergers involving a foreign acquiring firm. In addition to the Companies Act national security review provisions, there are a small number of industries that are subject to additional requirements through separate acts. On September 28, 2021, President Ramaphosa signed the Private Security Industry Regulation Amendment Act, which limits foreign ownership of private security companies to 49 percent based on national security concerns. The Banks Act of 1990 permits a foreign bank to apply to the Prudential Authority (operating within the administration of the South African Reserve Bank) to establish a representative office or a local branch in South Africa. The Insurance Act of 2017 prohibits persons from conducting insurance business in South Africa without being appropriately licensed by the Prudential Authority. The Insurance Act permits a foreign reinsurer to conduct insurance business in South Africa, subject to that foreign reinsurer being granted a license and establishing both a trust (for the purposes of holding the prescribed security) and a representative office in South Africa. The Electronic Communications Act of 2005 imposes limitations on foreign control of commercial broadcasting services. The Act Provides that a foreign investor may not, directly or indirectly, (1) exercise control over a commercial broadcasting licensee; or (2) have a financial interest or an interest in voting shares or paid-up capital in a commercial broadcasting licensee exceeding 20 percent. The Act caps the percentage of foreigners serving as directors of a commercial broadcasting licensee at 20 per cent. Lastly, foreign purchasers of South African securities are obliged to notify an authorized dealer (generally commercial banks) of the purchase and have the securities endorsed “non-resident.” DTIC’s TISA division assists foreign investors, actively courting manufacturers in sectors where it believes South Africa has a competitive advantage. DTIC publishes the “Investor’s Handbook” on its website: www.the DTIC.gov.za and TISA provides investment support through One Stop Shops in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, and online at http://www.investsa.gov.za/one-stop-shop/ (see Business Facilitation). Foreign companies may be eligible for incentives in South Africa under several ad hoc initiatives as well as the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) Act of 2014, which promotes regional industrial development by providing incentives for foreign (and local) investors that elect to operate within the country’s SEZs. More information regarding incentive programs may be found at: http://www.thedtic.go/v.za/financial-and-non-financial-support/incentives/ and below in Incentives. The 2018 Competition Amendment Bill introduced a government review mechanism for FDI in certain sectors on national security grounds, Although South Africa welcomes foreign investment, there are policies that potentially disadvantage foreign companies, including the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2013 (B-BBEE). B-BBEE represents one avenue that South Africa has taken to re-integrate historically disadvantaged individuals (HDIs) into the economy by requiring companies meet certain thresholds of black ownership and management control to participate in government tenders and contracts. While companies support the Act’s intent, it can be difficult to meet the B-BBEE requirements, which are tallied on B-BBEE scorecards and are periodically re-defined. The higher the score on the scorecard, the greater preferential access a company must bid on government tenders and contracts. In recognition of the challenge the scorecards place on foreign business, the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition created an alternative Equity Equivalence Investment Program (EEIP) program for multinational or foreign owned companies to allow them to show alternative paths to meeting B-BBEE ownership and management requirements under the law. Many companies still view the terms as onerous and restrictive. Multinationals, primarily in the technology sector such as Microsoft and Amazon Web Services, participate in the EE program. J.P. Morgan was the first international investment bank in South Africa to launch a DTIC-approved equity equivalent investment program in August 2021. The company will deploy R340 million (approximately USD 22 million) of financing into the South African economy and create more than 1000 permanent jobs. The B-BBEE program has come under sharp criticism in the past several years on the grounds that the Act has not gone far enough to shift ownership and management control in the commercial space to HDIs. In response, the GoSA has increasingly taken measures to strengthen B-BBEE through more restrictive application, increasing investigations into the improper use of B-BBEE scorecards, and is considering additional legislation to support B-BBEE’s policies. For instance, the GoSA is considering a new Equity Employment Bill that will set a numerical threshold, purportedly at the discretion of each Ministry, for employment based on race, gender, and disability, over and above other B-BBEE criteria. The bill is currently with the National Council of Provinces and if it passes, it will move to President Ramaphosa for signature. South Africa has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews through organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), World Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), or UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights. In November 2021, civil society organizations launched a constitutional lawsuit against the GoSA, demanding that it cancel plans to build 1,500 Mega Watts (MW) of coal-fired power because this would worsen air and water pollution along with health hazards and global warming. They filed the case in the North Gauteng High Court on the grounds that the new power would pose “significant unjustifiable threats to constitutional rights” and to the climate by pushing up greenhouse gas emissions. South Africa is the 12th worst greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter in the world. The Center for Environmental Rights provided a review at: https://cer.org.za/news/new-coal-power-will-cost-south-africans-much-more-report-shows . In November 2021, environmental activists gathered at the oil and gas giant Sasol’s annual general meeting demanding commitment to move away from fossil fuels. Activists also want Sasol and its shareholders to accelerate the country’s just transition, which commits to significantly reducing carbon dioxide emissions, and moving towards greener energy alternatives. A domestic shareholder activism organization called JustShare released a report on Sasol and climate change claiming that Sasol is not planning to decarbonize, despite climate science. DTIC has established One Stop Shops (OSS) to simplify administrative procedures and guidelines for foreign companies wishing to invest in South Africa in Cape Town, Durban, and Johannesburg. In theory, OSS should be staffed by officials from government entities that handle regulation, permits and licensing, infrastructure, finance, and incentives, with a view to reducing lengthy bureaucratic procedures, reducing bottlenecks, and providing post-investment services. However, some users of the OSS complain that some of the inter-governmental offices are not staffed, so finding a representative for certain transactions may be difficult. The virtual OSS web site is: http://www.investsa.gov.za/one-stop-shop/ . The CIPC issues business registrations and publishes a step-by-step guide for online registration at ( http://www.cipc.co.za/index.php/register-your-business/companies/ ), which can be done through a self-service terminal, or through a collaborating private bank. New businesses must also request through the South African Revenue Service (SARS) an income tax reference number for turnover tax (small companies), corporate tax, employer contributions for PAYE (income tax), and skills development levy (applicable to most companies). The smallest informal companies may not be required to register with CIPC but must register with the tax authorities. Companies must also register with the Department of Labour (DoL) – www.labour.gov.za – to contribute to the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) and a compensation fund for occupational injuries. DoL registration may take up to 30 days but may be done concurrently with other registrations. South Africa does not incentivize outward investments. South Africa’s stock foreign direct investments in the United States in 2019 totaled USD 4.1 billion (latest figures available), a 5.1 percent increase from 2018. The largest outward direct investment of a South African company was a gas liquefaction plant in the State of Louisiana by Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and NASDAQ dual-listed petrochemical company SASOL. There are some restrictions on outward investment, such as a R1 billion (USD 83 million) limit per year on outward flows per company. Larger investments must be approved by the South African Reserve Bank and at least 10 percent of the foreign target entities’ voting rights must be obtained through the investment. https://www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/FinancialSurveillanceAndExchangeControl/FAQs/Pages/Corporates.aspx 3. Legal Regime South African laws and regulations are generally published in draft form for stakeholder comment at: https://www.gov.za/document?search_query=&field_gcisdoc_doctype=545&field_gcisdoc_subjects=All&start_date=&end_date= . South Africa’s process is similar to the U.S. notice and comment consultation process and full draft texts are available to the public; however, foreign stakeholders have expressed concern over the adequacy of notice and the GoSA’s willingness to address comments. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The GoSA’s regulatory regime and laws enacted by Parliament are subject to judicial review to ensure they follow administrative processes. DTIC is responsible for business-related regulations. It develops and reviews regulatory systems in the areas of competition, standards, consumer protection, company and intellectual property registration and protections, as well as other subjects in the public interest. It also oversees the work of national and provincial regulatory agencies mandated to assist DTIC in creating and managing competitive and socially responsible business and consumer regulations. DTIC publishes a list of bills and acts that govern its work at: http://www.theDTIC.gov.za/legislation/legislation-and-business-regulation/?hilite=%27IDZ%27 South Africa has a number of public laws that promote transparency of the business regulatory regime to aid the public in understanding their rights. For instance, South Africa’s Consumer Protection Act (2008) reinforces various consumer rights, including right of product choice, right to fair contract terms, and right of product quality. The law’s impact varies by industry, and businesses have adjusted their operations accordingly. A brochure summarizing the Consumer Protection Act can be found at: http://www.theDTIC.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/CP_Brochure.pdf . Similarly, the National Credit Act of 2005 aims to promote a fair and non-discriminatory marketplace for access to consumer credit and for that purpose to provide the general regulation of consumer credit and improves standards of consumer information. A brochure summarizing the National Credit Act can be found at: http://www.theDTIC.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/NCA_Brochure.pdf The South African National Treasury is developing new legislation that will “seek to enhance the transformation imperatives of the South African financial services sector.” In August 2021, the former Minister of Finance Tito Mboweni said that a new version of the Conduct of Financial Institutions (COFI) bill contains provisions that, if enacted, will require financial institutions to develop transformation plans and commitments around B-BBEE. The bill seeks to enhance market conduct, market development and financial inclusion. National Treasury also published a draft policy document on financial inclusion for public comment, which focuses on general ‘economic inclusiveness’ for South Africa. A summary statement of the draft policy can be found at: http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2020/20201028%20Media%20Statement%20-%20Updated%20Financial%20Inclusion%20Policy.pdf. Parliament’s National Assembly passed the Employment Equity Amendment Bill in November 2021 and has sent the draft law to the National Council of Provinces for concurrence. The bill will allow the Employment and Labor minister to set employment equity targets for different business sectors and for different designated groups (that is, black people, women, and persons with disabilities). In South Africa the financial sector has been a leader in integrating environmental, social, and governance issues into its practices. For example, regulation 28 of the Pension Funds Act, 1956 requires a pension fund and its board to “before investing in, and whilst invested in an asset, consider any factor which may materially affect the sustainable long-term performance of the asset including but not limited to those of an environment, social and governance character.” There are no specific ESG disclosure rules for companies, but several ESG related laws include a carbon tax law and energy efficiency legislation. The Financial Sector and Deposit Insurance Levies (Administration) and Deposit Insurance Premiums Bill was tabled in parliament in January 2022. The National Treasury had published the bill for comment in December 2021. The bill seeks to “facilitate the funding of financial sector regulators, ombuds and other bodies, to ensure that they are able to effectively regulate the financial sector for the benefit of financial customers.” According to the bill’s memorandum, the deposit insurance premiums will be imposed on licensed banks, mutual banks, co-operative banks and branches of foreign banks that conduct business in South Africa. The model imposes huge expenses on the financial sector and results in an increased burden on already over-taxed citizens. Under the current disclosure regime in South Africa, there is no explicit duty to provide disclosures on ESG matters. However, JSE-listed companies are subject to general continuing disclosure obligations under the JSE Listing Requirements, which apply to financially material ESG issues. Regulatory enforcement processes are legally reviewed and made publicly available for stakeholder comments. The country’s fiscal transparency is overall very good. National Treasury publishes the executive budget online and the enacted budget is usually published within three months of enactment. End of year reports are published within twelve months of the end of the fiscal year. Information on debt obligations (including explicit and contingent liabilities) is made publicly available and updated at least annually. Public finances and debt obligations are fairly transparent. The year ending March 2021 report is not yet published. South Africa is a member of the African Continental Free Trade Area, which commenced trading in January 2021. It is a signatory to the SADC-EAC-COMESA Tripartite FTA and a member of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), which has a common external tariff and tariff-free trade between its five members (South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Eswatini, formerly known as Swaziland). South Africa has free trade agreements with the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) between South Africa and the European Union (EU); the EFTA-SACU Free Trade Agreement between SACU and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) – Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland; and the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the SADC EPA States (South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Eswatini, Lesotho, and Mozambique) and the EU and its Member States. SACU and Mozambique (SACUM) and the United Kington (UK) signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in September 2019. South Africa is a member of the WTO. While it notifies some draft technical regulations to the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), these notifications may occur after implementation. In November 2017, South Africa ratified the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement, implementing many of its commitments, including some Category B notifications. The GoSA is not party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). South Africa has a strong legal system composed of civil law inherited from the Dutch, common law inherited from the British, and African customary law. Generally, South Africa follows English law in criminal and civil procedure, company law, constitutional law, and the law of evidence, but follows Roman-Dutch common law in contract law, law of delict (torts), law of persons, and family law. South African company law regulates corporations, including external companies, non-profit, and for-profit companies (including state-owned enterprises). Funded by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, South Africa has district and magistrate courts across 350 districts and high courts for each of the provinces. Cases from Limpopo and Mpumalanga are heard in Gauteng. The Supreme Court of Appeals hears appeals, and its decisions may only be overruled by the Constitutional Court. South Africa has multiple specialized courts, including the Competition Appeal Court, Electoral Court, Land Claims Court, the Labor and Labor Appeal Courts, and Tax Courts to handle disputes between taxpayers and SARS. Rulings are subject to the same appeals process as other courts. The major laws affecting foreign investment in South Africa are: The Companies Act, which governs the registration and operation of companies in South Africa. The Protection of Investment Act, which provides for the protection of investors and their investments. The Labor Relations Act, which provides protection for employees against unfair dismissal and unfair labor practices. The Customs and Excise Act, which provides for general incentives to investors in various sectors. The Competition Act, which is responsible for the investigation, control and evaluation of restrictive practices, abuse of dominant position, and mergers. The Special Economic Zones Act which provides national economic growth and exports by using support measures to attract foreign and domestic investments and technology. In July 2021, the SARS updated the SARS Customs and Excise Client Accreditation rules. Section 64E deals with SARS client accreditation rules and is of interest to importers and exporters who wish to apply for accredited client status in South Africa. An accredited client, or preferred trader, is similar to the authorized economic operator found in many other countries. The new rules set out two levels of accredited client status: Level 1 – Authorized Economic Operator (Compliance) and Level 2 – Authorized Economic Operator (Security). A person that is registered for customs and excise activities in South Africa may apply for Level 1 or 2 accredited client status. According to the new rules, all customs activities for which an applicant is registered or licensed under the provisions of the Act will be considered when assessing applications for either level of accredited client status. The new rules also set out the application process, the validity of the person applying, the renewal process for accredited client status, criteria for levels of accredited client status, and the benefits of the two levels of accredited client status. The Ease of Doing Business Bill was introduced in Parliament in February 2021 and is currently under consideration by the Portfolio Committee on Public Service and Administration. If passed, the bill will provide for a mechanism to allow the executive, Parliament. and others to assess the socio-economic impact of regulatory measures, including the detection and reduction of measures that increase the cost of doing business. DTIC has a one-stop-shop website for investment that provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors (refer to section one for details). South Africa’s Competition Commission is empowered to investigate, control, and evaluate restrictive business practices, abuse of dominant positions, and review mergers to achieve equity and efficiency. Its public website is www.compcom.co.za . The Competition Commission is an investigative body. The Competition Tribunal, an adjudicative body that may review Competition Committee actions, functions very much like a court. It has jurisdiction throughout South Africa and adjudicates competition matters. Tribunal decisions may be appealed through the South African court system. International and domestic investors have raised concern the Commission has taken an increasingly social activist approach by prioritizing the public interest criteria found in the Competition Amendment Bill of 2018 over other more traditional anti-trust and monopoly criteria to push forward social and economic policies such as B-BBEE. Concerns include that the new Commission approach has led to more ambiguous, expensive, and lengthy review processes and often result in requests to alter previously agreed-upon terms of the merger and acquisition at a late stage. In January 2021, GovChat, South Africa’s official citizen-government engagement platform, asked the Competition Tribunal to prevent its removal from a U.S.-owned platform, which charges a fee to business and GoSA clients for contacting customers or citizens. The tribunal granted GovChat’s application for interim relief, stating: “The respondents are interdicted and restrained from off-boarding the applicants from their WABA pending the conclusion of a hearing into the applicants’ complaint lodged with the [Competition] Commission, or six months of date hereof, whichever is the earlier.” On March 14, 2022, the Competition Commission referred the investigation to the Tribunal for review, alleging that the U.S. party’s actions against GovChat constituted an “abuse of dominance.” The Commission asked the Tribunal to assess the U.S. party with a maximum penalty constituting 10 percent of its annual turnover, and to enjoin the U.S. party from removing GovChat from the WhatsApp platform. The Competition Commission prohibited the sale of the South African operations of a U.S. fast food chain and Grand Food Meat Plant, its main supplier, by Grand Parade Investments (GPI) to a U.S. private equity firm in June 2021 on the grounds that the sale would reduce the proportion of black ownership from 68 percent to zero percent. The regulator found this to be “a significant reduction in the shareholding of historically disadvantaged persons.” By August 2021, the parties and the Commission had agreed to a revised set of conditions which include the new owner’s commitment to improving its rating for the enterprise and supplier development element under its B-BBEE scorecard, which relates to empowering black-owned and smaller enterprises. In addition, the U.S. private equity firm agreed to establish an employee share ownership program that will entitle workers to a five percent stake in the company. Racially discriminatory property laws and land allocations during the colonial and apartheid periods resulted in highly distorted patterns of land ownership and property distribution in South Africa. Given land reform’s slow and mixed success, the National Assembly (Parliament) passed a motion in February 2018 to investigate amending the constitution (specifically Section 25, the “property clause”) to allow for land expropriation without compensation (EWC). Some politicians, think-tanks, and academics argue that Section 25 already allows for EWC in certain cases, while others insist that amendments are required to implement EWC more broadly and explicitly. Parliament tasked an ad hoc Constitutional Review Committee composed of parliamentarians from various political parties to report back on whether to amend the constitution to allow EWC, and if so, how it should be done. In December 2018, the National Assembly adopted the committee’s report recommending a constitutional amendment. Following elections in May 2019 the new Parliament created an ad hoc Committee to Initiate and Introduce Legislation to Amend Section 25 of the Constitution. The Committee drafted constitutional amendment language explicitly allowing for EWC and accepted public comments on the draft language through March 2021. After granting a series of extensions to complete its work, Parliament finally voted on the Committee’s draft bill on December 7, 2021. Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds parliamentary majority (267 votes) to pass, as well as the support of six out of the nine provinces in the National Council of Provinces. Because no single political party holds such a majority, a two-third vote can only be achieved with the support of two or more political parties. Because the ruling ANC could not garner enough supporting votes from the left-leaning Economic Freedom Fighters, who sought more drastic “state custodianship” of all property, nor the right-leaning Democratic Alliance, which rejected EWC as an investment-killing measure, the bill failed. However, on December 8, Justice Minister Ronald Lamola told media that the ruling party would use its simple majority to pass EWC legislation, which requires a lower threshold than a constitutional amendment. The ANC’s EWC bill is still making its way through Parliament but will likely see constitutional challenges from opposing parties. In October 2020, the GoSA published the draft expropriation bill in its Gazette, which would introduce the EWC concept into its legal system. The application of the draft’s provisions could conflict with South Africa’s commitments to international investors under its remaining investment protection treaties as well as its obligations under customary international law. Submissions closed in February 2021 and the Public Works committee is currently finalizing the language. Existing expropriation law, including The Expropriation Act of 1975 (Act) and the Expropriation Act Amendment of 1992, entitles the GoSA to expropriate private property for reasons of public necessity or utility. The decision is an administrative one. Compensation should be the fair market value of the property as agreed between the buyer and seller or determined by the court per Section 25 of the Constitution. In 2018, the GoSA operationalized the 2014 Property Valuation Act that creates the office of Valuer-General charged with the valuation of property that has been identified for land reform or acquisition or disposal. The Act gives the GoSA the option to expropriate property based on a formulation in the Constitution termed “just and equitable compensation.” The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA), enacted in 2004, gave the state ownership of South Africa’s mineral and petroleum resources. It replaced private ownership with a system of licenses controlled by the GoSA and issued by the Department of Mineral Resources. Under the MPRDA, investors who held pre-existing rights were granted the opportunity to apply for licenses, provided they met the licensing criteria, including the achievement of certain B-BBEE objectives. Parliament passed an amendment to the MPRDA in 2014 but President Ramaphosa never signed it. In August 2018, Minister for the Department of Mineral Resources Gwede Mantashe called for the recall of the amendments so that oil and gas could be separated out into a new bill. He also announced the B-BBEE provisions in the new Mining Charter would not apply during exploration but would start once commodities were found and mining commenced. In November 2019, the newly merged Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE) published draft regulations to the MPRDA. In December 2019, the DMRE published the Draft Upstream Petroleum Resources Development Bill for public comment. Parliament continues to review this legislation. Oil and gas exploration and production is currently regulated under MPRDA, but the new Bill will repeal and replace the relevant sections pertaining to upstream petroleum activities in the MPRDA. On September 27, 2018, the Minister of the DMRE released a new mining charter, stating that the new charter would be operationalized within the next five years to bolster certainty in the sector. The charter establishes requirements for new licenses and investment in the mining sector and includes rules and targets for black ownership and community development in the sector to redress historic economic inequalities from the apartheid era. The new rules recognize existing mining right holders who have a minimum 26 percent B-BBEE ownership as compliant but requires an increase to 30 percent B-BBEE ownership within a five-year transitional period. Recognition of B-BBEE ownership compliance is not transferable to a new owner. New mining right licenses must have 30 percent B-BBEE shareholding, applicable to the duration of the mining right. In March 2019 the Minerals Council of South Africa applied for a judicial review of the 2018 Mining Charter. The court was asked to review several issues in the Mining Charter including: the legal standing of the Mining Charter in relation to the MPRDA; the levels of black ownership of mines under B-BBEE requirements; the levels of ownership required when B-BBEE partners sell their shares, and if B-BBEE ownership levels must be maintained in perpetuity, especially when levels of ownership preceded the current Mining Charter. In September 2021, the Pretoria high court ruling set aside key aspects of the Mining Charter, notably those related to black ownership targets. The DMRE resolved not to appeal the high court ruling. The Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 sets out liquidation procedures for the distribution of any remaining asset value among creditors. Financial sector legislation such as the Banks Act or Insurance Act makes further provision for the protection of certain clients (such as depositors and policy holders). South Africa’s bankruptcy regime grants many rights to debtors, including rejection of overly burdensome contracts, avoiding preferential transactions, and the ability to obtain credit during insolvency proceedings. 6. Financial Sector South Africa recognizes the importance of foreign capital in financing persistent current account and budget deficits, and South Africa’s financial markets are regarded as some of the most sophisticated among emerging markets. A sound legal and regulatory framework governs financial institutions and transactions. The fully independent SARB regulates a wide range of commercial, retail and investment banking services according to international best practices, such as Basel III, and participates in international forums such as the Financial Stability Board and G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. The JSE serves as the front-line regulator for listed firms but is supervised by the Financial Services Board (FSB). The FSB also oversees other non-banking financial services, including other collective investment schemes, retirement funds and a diversified insurance industry. The GoSA has committed to tabling a Twin Peaks regulatory architecture to provide a clear demarcation of supervisory responsibilities and consumer accountability and to consolidate banking and non-banking regulation. South Africa has access to deep pools of capital from local and foreign investors that provides sufficient scope for entry and exit of large positions. Financial sector assets are more than GDP by approximately 48 percent, and the JSE is the largest on the continent with market capitalization of approximately USD 1.282 billion as of October 2021 and 442 companies listed on the main, alternative, and other smaller boards as of January 2021. Non-bank financial institutions (NBFI) hold about two thirds of financial assets. The liquidity and depth provided by NBFIs make these markets attractive to foreign investors, who hold more than a third of equities and government bonds, including sizeable positions in local-currency bonds. A well-developed derivative market and a currency that is widely traded as a proxy for emerging market risk allows investors considerable scope to hedge positions with interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives. SARB’s exchange control policies permit authorized currency dealers, to buy and borrow foreign currency freely on behalf of domestic and foreign clients. The size of transactions is not limited, but dealers must report all transactions to SARB. Non-residents may purchase securities without restriction and freely transfer capital in and out of South Africa. Local individual and institutional investors are limited to holding 25 percent of their capital outside of South Africa. Banks, NBFIs, and other financial intermediaries are skilled at assessing risk and allocating credit based on market conditions. Foreign investors may borrow freely on the local market. In recent years, the South African auditing profession has suffered significant reputational damage with allegations that two large foreign firms aided, and abetted irregular client management practices linked to the previous administration or engaged in delinquent oversight of listed client companies. South Africa’s WEF competitiveness rating for auditing and reporting fell from number one in the world in 2016, to number 60 in 2019. South African banks are well capitalized and comply with international banking standards. There are 19 registered banks in South Africa and 15 branches of foreign banks. Twenty-nine foreign banks have approved local representative offices. Five banks – Standard, ABSA, First Rand (FNB), Capitec, and Nedbank – dominate the sector, accounting for over 85 percent of the country’s banking assets, which total over USD 390 billion. SARB regulates the sector according to the Bank Act of 1990. There are three alternatives for foreign banks to establish local operations, all of which require SARB approval: separate company, branch, or representative office. The criteria for the registration of a foreign bank are the same as for domestic banks. Foreign banks must include additional information, such as holding company approval, a letter of comfort and understanding from the holding company and a letter of no objection from the foreign bank’s home regulatory authority. More information on the banking industry may be found at www.banking.org.za . The Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA) is the dedicated market conduct authority in South Africa’s Twin Peaks regulatory model implemented through the Financial Sector Regulation Act. The FSCA’s mandate includes all financial institutions that provide a financial product and/or a financial service as defined in the Financial Sector Regulation Act. The JSE Securities Exchange South Africa, the sixteenth largest exchange in the world measured by market capitalization, enjoys the global reputation of being one of the best regulated. Market capitalization stood at USD 1.282 billion as of October 2021, with 442 firms listed. The Bond Exchange of South Africa (BESA) is licensed under the Financial Markets Control Act. Membership includes banks, insurers, investors, stockbrokers, and independent intermediaries. The exchange consists principally of bonds issued by the GoSA, state-owned enterprises, and private corporations. The JSE acquired BESA in 2009. More information on financial markets may be found at www.jse.co.za . Non-residents can finance 100 percent of their investment through local borrowing. A finance ratio of 1:1 also applies to emigrants, the acquisition of residential properties by non-residents, and financial transactions such as portfolio investments, securities lending and hedging by non-residents. Although President Ramaphosa and the finance minister announced in February 2020 the aim to create a Sovereign Wealth Fund, no action has been taken. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) play a significant role in the South African economy in key sectors such as electricity, transport (air, rail, freight, and pipelines), and telecommunications. Limited competition is allowed in some sectors (e.g., telecommunications and air). The GoSA’s interest in these sectors often competes with and discourages foreign investment. There are over 700 SOEs at the national, provincial, and local levels. Of these, seven key SOEs are overseen by the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) and employee approximately 105,000 people. These SOEs include Alexkor (diamonds); Denel (military equipment); Eskom (electricity generation, transmission, and distribution); Mango (budget airlines); South African Airways (national carrier); South African Forestry Company (SAFCOL); and Transnet (transportation). For other national-level SOEs, the appropriate cabinet minister acts as shareholder on behalf of the state. The Department of Transport, for example, oversees South African’s National Roads Agency (SANRAL), Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA), and Airports Company South Africa (ACSA), which operates nine of South Africa’s airports. The Department of Communications oversees the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). A list of the seven SOEs that are under the DPE portfolio are found on the DPE website at: https://dpe.gov.za/state-owned-companies/ . The national government directory contains a list of 128 SOEs at: https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/soe-s . SOEs under DPE’s authority posted a combined loss of R13.9 billion (USD 0.9 billion) in 2019 (latest data available). Many are plagued by mismanagement and corruption, and repeated government bailouts have exposed the public sector’s balance sheet to sizable contingent liabilities. The debt of Eskom alone represents about 10 percent of GDP of which two-thirds is guaranteed by government, and the company’s direct cost to the budget has exceeded nine percent of GDP since 2008/9. Eskom, provides generation, transmission, and distribution for over 90 percent of South Africa’s electricity of which 80 percent comes from 15 coal-fired power plants. Eskom’s coal plants are an average of 41 years old, and a lack of maintenance has caused unplanned breakdowns and rolling blackouts, known locally as “load shedding,” as old coal plants struggle to keep up with demand. Load shedding reached a record 1136 hours as of November 30, 2021, costing the economy an estimated USD eight billion and is expected to continue for the next several years until the GoSA can increase generating capacity and increase its Energy Availability Factor (EAF). In October 2019 the DMRE finalized its Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) for electricity, which outlines South Africa’s policy roadmap for new power generation until 2030, which includes replacing 10,000 MW of coal-fired generation by 2030 with a mix of technologies, including renewables, gas and coal. The IRP also leaves the possibility open for procurement of nuclear technology at a “scale and pace that flexibly responds to the economy and associated electricity demand” and DMRE issued a Request for Information on new nuclear build in 2020. In accordance with the IRP, the GoSA approved the procurement of almost 14,000 MW of power to address chronic electricity shortages. The GoSA held the long-awaited Bid Window 5 (BW5) of the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Program (REIPPPP) in 2021, the primary method by which renewable energy has been introduced into South Africa. The REIPPPP relies primarily on private capital and since the program launched in 2011 it has already attracted approximately ZAR 210 billion (USD 14 billion) of investment into the country. All three major credit ratings agencies have downgraded Eskom’s debt following Moody’s downgrade of South Africa’s sovereign debt rating in March 2020, which could impact investors’ ability to finance energy projects. Transnet National Ports Authority (TNPA), the monopoly responsible for South Africa’s ports, charges some of the highest shipping fees in the world. High tariffs on containers subsidize bulk shipments of coal and iron. According to the South African Ports Regulator, raw materials exporters paid as much as one quarter less than exporters of finished products. TNPA is a division of Transnet, a state-owned company that manages the country’s port, rail, and pipeline networks. In May 2020 S&P downgraded Transnet’s local currency rating from BB to BB- based on a generally negative outlook for South Africa’s economy rather than Transnet’s outlook specifically. South Africa’s state-owned carrier, South African Airways (SAA), entered business rescue in December 2019 and suspended operations indefinitely in September 2020. The pandemic exacerbated SAA’s already dire financial straits and complicated its attempts to find a strategic equity partner to help it resume operations. Industry experts doubt the airline will be able to resume operations. United Airlines and Delta Air Lines provide regular service between Atlanta (Delta) and Newark (United) to Johannesburg and Cape Town. The telecommunications sector, while advanced for the continent, is hampered by poor implementation of the digital migration. In 2006, South Africa agreed to meet an International Telecommunication Union deadline to achieve analogue-to-digital migration by June 1, 2015. The long-delayed migration is scheduled to be completed by the end of March 2022, and while potential for legal challenges remain, most analysts believe the migration will be completed in 2022. The independent communications regulator initiated a spectrum auction in September 2020, which was enjoined by court action in February 2021 following suits by two of the three biggest South African telecommunications companies. After months of litigation, the regulator agreed to changes some terms of the auction, and the auction took place successfully in March 2022. One legal challenge remains, however, as third-largest mobile carrier Telkom has alleged the auction’s terms disproportionately favored the two largest carriers, Vodacom and MTN. Telkom’s case is due to be heard in April 2022, and its outcome will determine whether the spectrum allocation will proceed. The GoSA appears not to have fulfilled its oversight role of ensuring the sound governance of SOEs according to OECD best practices. The Zondo Commission of Inquiry into allegations of state capture in the public sector has outlined corruption at the highest echelons of SOEs such as Transnet, Eskom, SAA and Denel and provides some explanation for the extent of the financial mismanagement at these enterprises. The poor performance of SOEs continues to reflect crumbling infrastructure, poor and ever-changing leadership, corruption, wasteful expenditure and mismanagement of funds. The GoSA has taken few concrete actions to privatize SOEs; on the contrary, even minor reorganizations are roundly criticized as attempts to privatize state assets. Meanwhile, failing SOEs like PRASA are propped up by the fiscus. In 2021, the GoSA sought to sell a controlling 51 percent interest in South African Airways to a bespoke consortium funded in large part by the Public Investment Corporation, which controls investments of state pensions. A year later, however, the airline remains under government control because critical terms of the deal, including the sale price, have not been agreed upon. Transnet, Eskom, and defense contractor Denel have been subjects of various reorganization plans, but ultimately remain accountable to Cabinet shareholders. President Ramaphosa, during his February 10, 2022, State of the Nation Address (SONA), announced that the cabinet had approved amendments to the Electricity Regulations Act (ERA) that would liberalize South African electricity markets. The amendment provides changes to definitions that will enable the legal framework for a liberalized energy market and allow for a more competitive and open electricity market in the country including the establishment of a Transmission System Operator, a necessary part of state-owned utility Eskom’s unbundling process. The Eskom generation and distribution divisions are set to be restructured by December 2022. The market structure in the bill provides for a shift to a competitive multimarket electricity supply industry, which represents a significant departure from South Africa’s long-standing vertically integrated model monopolized by Eskom. According to a press release from the DMRE, the changes will provide for “an open market that will allow for non-discriminatory, competitive electricity-trading platform.” 10. Political and Security Environment South Africa has strong institutions and is relatively stable, but it also has a history of politically motivated violence and civil disturbance. Violent protests against the lack of effective government service delivery are common. Killings of, and by, mostly low-level political and organized crime rivals occur regularly. In May 2018, President Ramaphosa set up an inter-ministerial committee in the security cluster to serve as a national task force on political killings. The task force includes the Police Minister‚ State Security Minister‚ Justice Minister‚ National Prosecuting Authority, and the National Police Commissioner. The task force ordered multiple arrests, including of high-profile officials, in what appears to be a crackdown on political killings. Criminal threats and labor-related unrest have impacted U.S. companies in the past. In July 2021 the country experienced wide-spread rioting in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal provinces sparked by the imprisonment of former President Jacob Zuma for contempt of court during the deliberations of the “Zondo Commission” established to review claims of state-sponsored corruption during Zuma’s presidency. Looting and violence led to over USD 1.5 billion in damage to these province’s economies and thousands of lost jobs. U.S. companies were amongst those impacted. Foreign investors continue to raise concern about the government’s reaction to the economic impacts, citing these riots and deteriorating security in some sectors such as mining to be deterrents to new investments and the expansion of existing ones. South Korea Executive Summary The Republic of Korea (ROK) offers foreign investors political stability, public safety, world-class infrastructure, a highly skilled workforce, and a dynamic private sector. Following market liberalization measures in the 1990s, foreign portfolio investment has grown steadily, exceeding 37 percent of the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) total market capitalization as of February 2022. Studies by the Korea International Trade Association, however, have shown that the ROK underperforms in attracting FDI relative to the size and sophistication of its economy due to a complicated, opaque, and country-specific regulatory framework, even as low-cost producers, most notably China, have eroded the ROK’s competitiveness in the manufacturing sector. A more benign regulatory environment will be crucial to foster innovative technologies that could fail to mature under restrictive regulations that do not align with global standards. The ROK government has taken steps to address regulatory issues over the last decade, notably with the establishment of a Foreign Investment Ombudsman inside the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) to address the concerns of foreign investors. In 2019, the ROK government created a “regulatory sandbox” program to spur creation of new products in the financial services, energy, and tech sectors, adding mobility and biohealth in 2021 and 2022. Industry observers recommend additional procedural steps to improve the investment climate, including Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) and wide solicitation of substantive feedback from foreign investors and other stakeholders. The revised U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) entered into force January 1, 2019, and helps secure U.S. investors broad access to the ROK market. Types of investment assets protected under KORUS include equity, debt, concessions, and intellectual property rights. With a few exceptions, U.S. investors are treated the same as ROK investors in the establishment, acquisition, and operation of investments in the ROK. Investors may elect to bring claims against the government for alleged breaches of trade rules under a transparent international arbitration mechanism. The ROK has taken a transparent approach in its COVID-19 response, under the leadership of the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency. Public health experts brief the public almost every day and the public has largely complied with social distancing guidelines and universal mask-wearing. These measures largely staved off the disease through the end of 2021, by which time over 80 percent of Koreans had been vaccinated and the government began relaxing social distancing measures. In February and March 2022, however, a new wave fueled by the omicron variant rapidly spread, peaking at over 621,000 positive cases on March 17. As of March 28, 2022, more than 12 million Koreans have tested positive for COVID-19 and total infections rose over ten million and deaths mounted. The pandemic’s economic impact has been limited. GDP dropped a mere one percent in 2020 before recovering by four percent in 2021, in part due to aggressive stimulus including more than USD 220 billion in 2020. As a result, the Korean domestic economy fared better than nearly all its OECD peers. The economic impact of the omicron outbreak remains uncertain, and Korea’s export-oriented economy remains vulnerable to external shocks, including supply chain disruptions and high energy prices, going forward. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 32 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 5 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $33,888 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $32,960 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The ROK government welcomes foreign investment. In a February 2022 meeting with foreign business leaders, President Moon Jae-in emphasized the ROK’s status as a stable investment destination and promised to increase tax incentives for foreign firms, especially companies working on strategic technologies, such as semiconductors, batteries, and vaccines. The ROK government plans to spend $40 million on supporting foreign businesses that make an investment in fields related to stable supply chains and carbon neutrality and another $26 million to support foreign investors finding plant locations. Hurdles for foreign investors in the ROK include regulatory opacity, inconsistent interpretation of regulations, unanticipated regulatory changes, underdeveloped corporate governance, rigid labor policies, Korea-specific consumer protection measures, and the political influence of large conglomerates, known as chaebol. The 1998 Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA) is the principal law pertaining to foreign investment in the ROK. FIPA and related regulations categorize business activities as open, conditionally- or partly-restricted, or closed to foreign investment. FIPA also includes: Simplified procedures to apply to invest in the ROK; Expanded tax incentives for high-technology investments; Reduced rental fees and lengthened lease durations for government land (including local government land); Increased central government support for local FDI incentives; Creation of “Invest KOREA,” a one-stop investment promotion center within the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) to assist foreign investors; and Establishment of a Foreign Investment Ombudsman to assist foreign investors. The ROK National Assembly website provides a list of laws pertaining to foreigners, including FIPA, in English ( http://korea.assembly.go.kr/res/low_03_list.jsp?boardid=1000000037 ). The Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) facilitates foreign investment through its Invest KOREA office (also on the web at http://investkorea.org ). For investments exceeding 100 million won (about USD 83,577), KOTRA helps investors establish domestically-incorporated foreign-invested companies. KOTRA and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) organize a yearly Foreign Investment Week to attract investment to South Korea. In February 2022, President Moon met with executives of foreign-invested firms in the ROK and encouraged them to expand their investments, noting the stable environment the ROK provided for businesses throughout the pandemic. The ROK’s key official responsible for FDI promotion and retention is the Foreign Investment Ombudsman. The position is commissioned by the ROK President and heads a grievance resolution body that collects and analyzes concerns from foreign firms; coordinates reforms with relevant administrative agencies; and proposes new policies to promote foreign investment. More information on the Ombudsman can be found at http://ombudsman.kotra.or.kr/eng/index.do . Foreign and domestic private entities can establish and own business enterprises and engage in remunerative activity across many sectors of the economy. However, under the Foreign Exchange Transaction Act (FETA), restrictions on foreign ownership remain for 30 industrial sectors, including three that are closed to foreign investment (see below). Relevant ministries must approve investments in conditionally- or partially-restricted sectors. Most applications are processed within five days; cases that require consultation with more than one ministry can take 25 days or longer. The ROK’s procurement processes comply with the World Trade Organization (WTO) Government Procurement Agreement. The following is a list of restricted sectors for foreign investment. Figures in parentheses generally denote the Korean Industrial Classification Code, while those for air transport industries are based on the Civil Aeronautics Laws: Completely Closed Nuclear power generation (35111) Radio broadcasting (60100) Television broadcasting (60210) Restricted Sectors (no more than 25 percent foreign equity) News agency activities (63910) Restricted Sectors (less than 30 percent foreign equity) Newspaper publication, daily (58121) (Note: Other newspapers with the same industry code 58121 are restricted to less than 50 percent foreign equity.) Hydroelectric power generation (35112) Thermal power generation (35113) Solar power generation (35114) Other power generation (35119) Restricted Sectors (no more than 49 percent foreign equity) Newspaper publication, non-daily (58121) (Note: Daily newspapers with the same industry code 58121 are restricted to less than 30 percent foreign equity.) Television program/content distribution (60221) Cable networks (60222) Satellite and other broadcasting (60229) Wired telephone and other telecommunications (61210) Mobile telephone and other telecommunications (61220) Other telecommunications (61299) Restricted Sectors (no more than 50 percent foreign equity) Farming of beef cattle (01212) Transmission/distribution of electricity (35120) Sale of electricity (35130) Wholesale of meat (46313) Coastal water passenger transport (50121) Coastal water freight transport (50122) International air transport (51) Domestic air transport (51) Small air transport (51) Publishing of magazines and periodicals (58122) Open but Separately Regulated under Relevant Laws Growing of cereal crops and other food crops, except rice and barley (01110) Other inorganic chemistry production, except fuel for nuclear power generation (20129) Other nonferrous metals refining, smelting, and alloying (24219) Domestic commercial banking, except special banking areas (64121) Radioactive waste collection, transportation, and disposal, except radioactive waste management (38240) The Special Act to Protect National Strategic Industries will take effect from August 4, 2022, which will require stricter investment screening on foreign investments into companies with national core and strategic technologies as prescribed in the National Core Technology list. The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) is currently drafting the implementation regulations. The WTO conducted its eighth Trade Policy Review of the ROK in October 2021. The Review does not contain any explicit policy recommendations. It can be found at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp514_e.htm The ROK has not undergone investment policy reviews from the OECD or United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) within the past three years. The Korea International Trade Association (KITA) published a report on September 3, 2018 on foreign direct investment in the ROK and its impact on exports. It can be found at: https://www.kita.net/cmmrcInfo/internationalTradeStudies/researchReport/focusBriefDetail.do?pageIndex=4&no=1842&classification=7&searchReqType=detail&pcRadio=7&searchClassification=7&searchStartDate=&searchEndDate=&searchCondition=TITLE&searchKeyword=&continent_nm=&continent_cd=&country_nm=&country_cd=§or_nm=§or_cd=&itemCd_nm=&itemCd_cd=&searchOpenYn= Registering a business remains a complex process that varies according to the type of business, and requires interaction with KOTRA, court registries, and tax offices. Foreign corporations can enter the market by establishing a local corporation, local branch, or liaison office. The establishment of local corporations by a foreign individual or corporation is regulated by the Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA) and the Commercial Act; the latter recognizes five types of companies, of which stock companies with multiple shareholders are the most common. Although registration can be filed online, there is no centralized online location to complete the process. For small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and micro-enterprises, the online business registration process takes approximately three to four days and is completed through Korean language websites. Registrations can be completed via the Smart Biz website, https://www.startbiz.go.kr/ . The UN’s Global Enterprise Registration (GER), which evaluates whether a country’s online registration process is clear and complete, awarded Smart Biz 5.5 of 10 possible points and suggested improvements in registering limited liability companies. The Invest KOREA information portal received 2 of 10 points. The Korea Commission for Corporate Partnership and the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family ( http://www.mogef.go.kr/ ) are charged with improving the business environment for minorities and women. (Note: President-elect Yoon, who takes office on May 10, 2022, pledged during the campaign to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF).) The ROK does not restrict outward investment. The ROK has several institutions to assist small business and middle-market firms with such investments. KOTRA has an Outbound Investment Support Office that provides counseling to ROK firms and holds regular investment information sessions. The ASEAN-Korea Centre, which is primarily funded by the ROK government, provides counseling and business introduction services to Korean SMEs considering investments in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region. The Defense Acquisition Program Administration opened an office in 2019 to advise Korean defense SMEs on exporting unrestricted defense articles. 3. Legal Regime ROK regulatory transparency has improved, due in part to Korea’s membership in the WTO and negotiated FTAs. However, the foreign business community continues to face numerous rules and regulations unique to the ROK. National Assembly legislation on environmental protection or the promotion of SMEs, while broadly targeting big businesses, has created new trade barriers that disadvantage foreign companies. Also, some laws and regulations lack sufficient detail and are subject to differing interpretations by government regulatory officials. In other cases, ministries issue non-legally binding guidelines on implementation of regulations, yet these become the bases for legal decisions in ROK courts. Regulatory authorities also issue oral or internal guidelines or other legally-enforceable dictates that prove burdensome for foreign firms. Intermittent ROK government deregulation plans to eliminate oral guidelines or impose the same level of regulatory review as written regulations have not led to concrete changes. Despite KORUS FTA provisions designed to address transparency issues, they remain persistent and prominent. The ROK constitution allows both the legislative and executive branches to introduce bills. Ministries draft subordinate statutes (presidential decrees, ministerial decrees, and administrative rules), which largely govern the procedural matters addressed by the respective laws. Administrative agencies shape policies and draft bills on matters within their respective jurisdictions. Drafting ministries must clearly define policy goals and complete regulatory impact assessments (RIAs). When a ministry drafts a regulation, it must consult with other relevant ministries before it releases the regulation for public comment. The constitution also allows local governments to exercise self-rule legislative authority to draft ordinances and rules within the scope of federal acts and subordinate statutes. The enactment of laws and their subordinate statutes, ranging from the drafting of bills to their promulgation, must follow formal ROK legislative procedures in accordance with the Regulation on Legislative Process enacted by the Ministry of Government Legislation. Since 2011, all publicly listed companies must follow International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS, or K-IFRS in the ROK). The Korea Accounting Standards Board facilitates ROK government endorsement and adoption of IFRS and sets accounting standards for companies not subject to IFRS. According to the Administrative Procedures Act, authorities proposing laws and regulations (acts, presidential decrees, or ministerial decrees) must seek public comments at least 40 days prior to their promulgation. Regulations are sometimes promulgated after only the minimum required comment period and with minimal consultation with industry. The Official Gazette and the websites of relevant ministries and the National Assembly simultaneously post the Korean language text of draft acts and regulations, accompanied by executive summaries, for a 40-day comment period. Comments are not made public, and firms may struggle to translate complex documentation, analyze, and respond adequately before the expiration of this period. After the comment period, the Ministry of Government Legislation reviews the laws and regulations to ensure they conform to the constitution and monitors government adherence to the Regulation on Legislative Process. While the Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC), under the executive branch, reviews all laws and regulations to minimize government intervention in the economy and to abolish all economic regulations that fall short of international standards or hamper national competitiveness, the committee has been less active in recent years. In January 2019, Korea introduced a “regulatory sandbox” program intended to reduce the regulatory burden on companies that seek to test innovative ideas, products, and services. Depending on the business sector in which a particular proposal falls, either MOTIE, the Ministry of Science and ICT, or the Financial Services Commission manages the program. The program is open to Korean companies and foreign companies with Korean branch offices. Websites and applications are only available in Korean. The business community has welcomed this effort by regulators to spur innovation. The ROK government has taken major steps to promote the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices of companies in the past year with the goal to require ESG disclosure for all listed companies with total assets valued at 2 trillion won (about $1.7billion) or more by 2025, and all listed companies by 2030. In December 2021, Korea’s Financial Services Commission and the Korea Exchange launched a an ESG information platform for listed companies ( http://esg.krx.co.kr/ ). Korea’s National Pension Service also plans to invest half of its assets into ESG companies by the end of 2022. The ROK government enforces regulations through penalties (fines, enforcing corrective measures, or criminal charges) in the case of violations of the law. The government’s enforcement actions can be challenged through an appeal process or administrative litigation. The CEOs of local branches can be held legally responsible for all actions of their company and at times have been arrested, charged for company infractions, and placed under travel bans while awaiting or undergoing court procedures. Foreign CEOs have cited this as a significant burden to their business operations in Korea. For large companies with over 5 trillion won of local assets (about $4.2 billion), the ROK Government may designate a single person or entity (for example, the largest subsidiary) to be subject to additional regulatory scrutiny and potential liability for company actions. Industry contacts have indicated the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) is considering making such designations for foreigners or entities based outside of the ROK. The ROK’s public finances and debt obligations are generally transparent, with the exception of state-owned enterprise debt. The ROK has revised local regulations to implement commitments under international treaties and trade agreements. Treaties duly concluded and promulgated in accordance with the constitution and the generally recognized rules of international law are accorded the same standing as domestic laws. ROK officials consistently express intent to harmonize standards with global norms by benchmarking the United States and the EU. The U.S., U.K., and Australian governments exchange regulatory reform best practices with the ROK government to encourage local regulators to employ more regulatory analytics, increase transparency, and improve compliance with international standards; however, unique local rules and regulations continue to pose difficulties for foreign companies operating in the ROK. The ROK is a member of the WTO and notifies the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade of all draft technical regulations. The ROK is also a signatory of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). The ROK amended the ministerial decree of the Customs Act in 2015, creating a committee charged with implementing the TFA. The ROK is a global leader of modernized and streamlined procedures for transportation and customs clearance. Industry sources report the Korea Customs Service enforces rules of origin issues largely in compliance with ROK obligations under its free trade agreements. The ROK legal system is based on civil law. Subdivisions within the district and high courts govern commercial activities and bankruptcies and enforce property and contractual rights with monetary judgments, usually levied in the domestic currency. The ROK has a written commercial law, and matters regarding contracts are covered by the Civil Act. There are also three specialized courts in the ROK: patent, family, and administrative courts. The ROK court system is independent and not subject to government interference in cases that may affect foreign investors. Foreign court judgments, with the exception of foreign arbitral rulings that meet certain conditions, are not enforceable in the ROK. Rulings by district courts can be appealed to higher courts and to the Supreme Court. There is no principle of stare decisis or precedent. The Constitutional Court rules on constitutional issues and is comprised of nine justices who are appointed by the President. The ROK has a transparent legal system with a strong rule-of-law tradition and an independent judiciary. FIPA is the principal basic law pertaining to foreign investment in the ROK. The Invest KOREA website ( http://investkorea.org ) provides information on relevant laws, rules, and procedures for foreign investment in the ROK. Laws and regulations enacted within the past year include: On April 6, 2021, an amended Labor Standards Act (LSA) took effect. The amendments modify certain restrictions on allowable work hours for employees and add certain health and safety requirements for overtime labor. On January 26, 2021, the Serious Accidents Punishment Act (SAPA) was enacted. The law entered into force for businesses with 50 or more employees on January 27, 2022. The Act holds CEOs personally accountable for workplace accidents and occupational illnesses. It also expands the scope of obligations for worker protections and strengthens penalties for violations. In August 2021, the ROK became the first country in the world to pass legislation banning digital platform operators from requiring app developers to use the platforms’ in-app payment systems. The law entered into force on March 15, 2022. Key pending/proposed laws and regulations as of March 2022 include: The 2011 Personal Information Protection Act imposed stringent requirements on service providers seeking to transfer customers’ personal data outside Korea. In September 2021, the Personal Information Protection Commission submitted a proposed amendment to increase the fines to three percent of a company’s total global revenue. The proposed amendment would also grant the Personal Information Protection Committee the authority to suspend a company’s cross border data transfers in the case of a significant violation. As of March 2022, there are several proposed bills in the National Assembly seeking to mandate global over-the-top (OTT) providers pay network usage fees to Korean internet service providers. The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) reviews and regulates competition and consumer safety matters under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA). The amended MRFTA, which came into effect in December 2021, includes strengthened provisions on information exchange between companies, cartel law enforcement, and administrative fine levels. KFTC has a broad mandate that includes promoting competition, strengthening consumer rights, and creating a suitable environment for SMEs. In addition to investigating corporate and financial restructuring, the KFTC can levy sizeable administrative fines and issue corrective measures for violations of law and for failure to cooperate with investigators. Decisions by KFTC are subject to appeal in Korean courts. As part of KORUS implementation, KFTC instituted a “consent decree” process in 2014, whereby firms can settle disputes with KFTC without resorting to the court system. Over the last several years, a number of U.S. firms have raised concerns that KFTC targets foreign companies with aggressive enforcement. An amendment to the MRFTA in September 2020 improved the administrative decision-making process by the KFTC, including permitting access to confidential business information, limited to outside legal counsel, in order to protect possible trade secrets. The ROK follows generally-accepted principles of international law with respect to expropriation. ROK law protects foreign-invested enterprise property from expropriation or requisition. Private property can be expropriated for public purposes such as urban redevelopment, new industrial complexes, or constructing roads, and claimants are afforded due process and compensation. Private property expropriation in the ROK for public use is generally conducted in a non-discriminatory manner, with claimants compensated at or above market value. Embassy Seoul is aware of one case in which a U.S. investor filed an investor-state dispute lawsuit in 2018 against the ROK government, claiming that the government had violated the KORUS FTA in expropriating the investor’s land. The case was dismissed in the ROK judicial system on jurisdictional grounds in September 2019. The ROK government allotted USD 26 billion in its 2022 budget for land expropriation – a 36 percent decrease from the previous year. The Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act (DRBA) stipulates that bankruptcy is a court-managed liquidation procedure where both domestic and foreign entities are afforded equal treatment. The procedure commences after a filing by a debtor, creditor, or a group of creditors, and determination by the court that a company is bankrupt. The court designates a Custodial Committee to take an accounting of the debtor’s assets, claims, and contracts. The Custodial Committee may grant voting rights among creditors. Shareholders and contract holders may retain their rights and responsibilities based on shareholdings and contract terms. Debtors may be subject to arrest once a bankruptcy petition has been filed, even if the debtor has not been declared bankrupt. Individuals found guilty of negligent or false bankruptcy are subject to criminal penalties. The Seoul Bankruptcy Court (SBC) has nationwide jurisdiction to hear major bankruptcy or rehabilitation cases and to provide effective, specialized, and consistent guidance in bankruptcy proceedings. Any Korean company with debt equal to or above KRW 50 billion (about USD 41.8 million) and/or 300 or more creditors may file for bankruptcy rehabilitation with the SBC. Thirteen local district courts continue to oversee smaller bankruptcy cases in areas outside Seoul. 6. Financial Sector The ROK has an effective regulatory system that encourages portfolio investment. The Korea Exchange (KRX) is comprised of a stock exchange, futures market, and stock market following the 2005 merger of the Korea Stock Exchange, Korea Futures Exchange, and Korean Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (KOSDAQ) stock markets. It is tracked by the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI). There is sufficient liquidity in the market to enter and exit sizeable positions. At the end of February 2022, over 2,496 companies were listed with a combined market capitalization of USD 21 trillion. The ROK government uses various incentives, such as tax breaks, to facilitate the free flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets. The ROK does not restrict payments and transfers for current international transactions, in accordance with the general obligations of member states under International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII. Credit is allocated on market terms. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. While non-resident foreigners can issue bonds in South Korean won, they are otherwise unable to borrow money in local currency. Foreign portfolio investors enjoy open access to the ROK stock market. Aggregate foreign investment ceilings were abolished in 1998, and foreign investors owned 36.7 percent of benchmark KOSPI stocks and 9.9 percent of the KOSDAQ as of February 2022. Foreign portfolio investment decreased slightly over the past year. Foreign investors owned 32.4 percent of benchmark stocks and 9.4 percent of listed bonds, according to the Korea Exchange. U.S. investors represent 40.4 percent of total foreign holdings, which has been increasing gradually over the last three years. The ROK Financial Services Commission in March 2020 banned the short-selling of stocks to stabilize stock price volatility during the COVID-19 pandemic. The ban partially expired only for short-selling stocks from companies included in the KOSPI 200 and KOSDAQ 150 in May 2021. The ban on short-selling stock from other companies is set to expire in May 2022. Financial sector reforms enacted to increase transparency and promote investor confidence are often cited as a reason for the ROK’s rapid rebound from the 2008 global financial crisis. Since 1998, the ROK government has recapitalized its banks and non-bank financial institutions, closed or merged weak financial institutions, resolved many non-performing assets, introduced internationally accepted risk assessment methods and accounting standards for banks, forced depositors and investors to assume appropriate levels of risk, and taken steps to help end the policy-directed lending of the past. These reforms addressed the weak supervision and poor lending practices in the Korean banking system that helped cause and exacerbate the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. The ROK banking sector is healthy overall, with a low non-performing loan ratio of 0.5 percent at the end of 2021, dropping 0.14 percentage points from the prior year. Korean commercial banks held more than USD 2.7 trillion in total assets at the end of 2021. Foreign commercial banks or branches can establish local operations, which would be subject to oversight by ROK financial regulators. The ROK has not lost any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years, nor are any relationships in jeopardy. There are no legal restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account in the ROK; however, commercial banks may refuse to accept foreign nationals as customers unless they show local residency or identification documents. The Bank of Korea (BOK) is the central bank. The Korea Investment Corporation (KIC) is a wholly government-owned sovereign wealth fund established in July 2005 under the KIC Act. KIC’s steering committee is comprised of its Chief Executive Officer, the Minister of Economy and Finance, the Bank of Korea Governor, and six private sector members appointed by the ROK President. KIC is on the Public Institutions Management Act (PIMA) list. The KIC Act mandates that KIC manage assets entrusted by the ROK government and central bank; the KIC generally adopts a passive role as a portfolio investor. The corporation’s assets under management stood at USD 201 billion at the end of August 2021. KIC is required by law to publish an annual report, submit its books to the steering committee for review, and follow all domestic accounting standards and rules. It follows the Santiago Principles and participates in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds. The KIC does not invest in domestic assets, aside from a one-time USD 23 million investment into a domestic real estate fund in January 2015. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Many ROK state-owned enterprises (SOEs) continue to exert significant control over the economy. There are 36 SOEs active in the energy, real estate, and infrastructure (i.e., railroad and highway construction) sectors. The legal system has traditionally ensured a role for SOEs as sectoral leaders, but in recent years, the ROK has sought to attract more private participation in the real estate and construction sectors. SOEs are currently subject to the same regulations and tax policies as private sector competitors and do not have preferential access to government contracts, resources, or financing. The ROK is party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement; a list of SOEs subject to WTO government procurement provisions is available in Annex 3 of Appendix I to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). The state-owned Korea Land and Housing Corporation enjoys privileged status on state-owned real estate projects, notably housing. The court system functions independently and gives equal treatment to SOEs and private enterprises. The ROK government does not provide official market share data for SOEs. It requires each entity to disclose financial information, number of employees, and average compensation figures. The PIMA gives the Ministry of Economy and Finance oversight authority over many SOEs, mainly pertaining to administration and human resource management. However, there is no singular government entity that exercises ownership rights over SOEs. SOEs subject to PIMA must report to a cabinet minister. Alternatively, the ROK President or relevant cabinet minister appoints a CEO or director, often from among senior government officials. PIMA explicitly obligates SOEs to consult with government officials on budget, compensation, and key management decisions (e.g., pricing policy for energy and public utilities). For other issues, government officials informally require either prior consultation or subsequent notification of SOE decisions. Market analysts generally acknowledge the de facto independence of SOEs listed on local security markets, such as the Industrial Bank of Korea and Korea Electric Power Corporation; otherwise, SOEs are regarded either as fully-guaranteed by the government or as parts of the government. The ROK adheres to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and reports significant changes in the regulatory framework for SOEs to the OECD. A list of South Korean SOEs is available in Korean at: http://www.alio.go.kr/home.html . The ROK government does not confer advantages on SOEs competing in the domestic market. Although the state-owned Korea Development Bank may enjoy lower financing costs because of a governmental guarantee, this does not appear to have a major effect on U.S. retail banks operating in Korea. Privatization of government-owned assets has historically faced protests by labor unions and professional associations, and has sometimes suffered a lack of interested buyers. No state-owned enterprises were privatized between 2002 and November 2016. In December 2016, the ROK sold part of its stake in Woori Bank, recouping USD 2.1 billion. As of March 2021, the government holds a 17.25 percent stake in Woori Bank. Most analysts do not expect significant movement toward privatization in the near future. Foreign investors may participate in privatization programs if they comply with ownership restrictions stipulated for the 30 industrial sectors indicated in the FETA (see Section 1: Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment). These programs have a public bidding process that is clear, non-discriminatory, and transparent. 10. Political and Security Environment Enshrined by the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S.-ROK alliance has supported the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula and broader region for nearly seven decades. At their May 2021 summit, President Biden and President Moon upgraded our countries’ relationship to a comprehensive partnership – an acknowledgment of the alliance’s evolution from its security-based origins to a future-oriented, multi-pillared relationship. The ROK’s elevation to one of the world’s top ten economies in 2021 and aspirations to build its “Global Korea” brand herald a new era in U.S.-ROK relations, especially as we seek overlap and coordination on our international economic policies. The ROK and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remain separated by the world’s most heavily fortified border. After a flurry of diplomatic engagement in 2018-2019, including three inter-Korean summits and two U.S.-DPRK summits, engagement between the ROK and the DPRK has stagnated as North Korea shut its borders in January 2020 in response to the pandemic and resumed its missile testing in 2021. The ROK’s relations with Japan remained strained in 2021, primarily due to the ROK Supreme Court’s 2018 decisions directing Japanese companies to compensate South Koreans subjected to forced labor during World War II, including the court-directed seizure of defendant company assets, as well as Japan’s subsequent tightening of export controls against the ROK in 2019. This prompted consumer boycotts in the ROK against Japanese goods in July 2019, causing a significant drop in local sales for certain products, including beer and automobiles, as well as at certain Japanese retail chains. The ROK does not have a history of political violence directed against foreign investors. There have not been reports of politically-motivated threats of damage to foreign-invested projects or foreign-affiliated installations of any sort, nor of any incidents that might be interpreted as having targeted foreign investments. Labor violence unrelated to the issue of foreign ownership, however, has occurred in foreign-owned facilities in the past. There have also been protests in the past directed at U.S. economic, political, and military interests (e.g., beef imports in 2008 or the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system in 2017 with protests continuing into 2022). The ROK is a modern democracy with active public political participation, and well-organized political demonstrations are common. For example, large-scale rallies were a regular occurrence throughout former President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment proceedings in 2016 and 2017. The protests were peaceful and orderly. South Sudan Executive Summary Trade and investment conditions in South Sudan improved slightly in the past year, but many challenges remain. The Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) continued to implement the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), although key provisions on security, governance, and transitional justice remain outstanding. The transitional government continued implementing public financial management (PFM) reforms including stabilizing the South Sudanese Pound (SSP). In its February 2022 report entitled “ Towards a Jobs Agenda,” the World Bank provided a “cautiously positive” forecast the economy could grow by 3.5 to 5.0 percent in productive sectors including household processing and artisanal production “if the peace process holds.” However, peace agreement implementation is significantly behind schedule. The country remains plagued by large-scale population displacement, widespread food insecurity, restricted humanitarian access, harassment of aid workers and journalists, and catastrophic flooding for the third straight year. The South Sudan economy is highly dependent on oil-revenue. The transitional government did not institute any new programs in the past year to diversify the country’s economy. South Sudan’s oil sector is fraught with corruption and mismanagement. The country’s oil-producing firms and the Ministry of Petroleum remain on the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Entity List . The U.S. government assesses the 15 entities BIS added to the Entity List are contributing to the ongoing crisis in South Sudan “because they are a source of substantial revenue that, through public corruption, is used to fund the purchase of weapons and other material that undermine the peace, security, and stability of South Sudan rather than support the welfare of the South Sudanese people.” Corruption and malfeasance extend beyond the oil sector. Transparency International ranked South Sudan the world’s most corrupt country in its 2021 rankings . Additionally, a September 2021 UN Human Rights Commission report highlighted the link between South Sudan’s human rights violations and economic crimes. Humanitarian and development aid is a major source of employment. The difficulties humanitarian service providers face of arbitrary and conflicting regulations, multiple layers of taxation, airport and border obstructions, labor harassment, and looting of warehouses demonstrate what private investors can expect to encounter. The legal system is underfunded, dysfunctional, and subject to corrupt practices and interference. Government entities do not enforce laws equitably or consistently. Corrupt government officials operate with impunity. The legal framework governing investment and private enterprises remains underdeveloped. Contract dispute litigants are sometimes arrested and imprisoned until they agree to pay a financial settlement even when never charged an offense or brought to court. Other factors inhibiting investment in South Sudan include a lack of skilled and unskilled labor and limited physical infrastructure riddled with arbitrary checkpoints. The International Peace Information Service (IPIS) published a December 2021 report that found checkpoints make transport in South Sudan among the most expensive in the world. The U.S. Department of State maintains a Do Not Travel Advisory for South Sudan due to crime, kidnapping, and armed conflict. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 180 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2015 1,090 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Ministry of Investment continued to refine South Sudan’s investment policies in 2021 and into 2022 to increase opportunities for international investors. The Council of Ministers approved some of those investment policies in September 2021, including re-establishing directorates to manage administration and finance, research and planning, investment promotion, service, and investment coordination at the state level. The government seeks to unlock South Sudan’s economic potential and boost diversified growth by facilitating investment in economic priority sectors such as agriculture, transport infrastructure, petroleum, mining, and energy. But while the government claims to have such incentives, it is difficult to take advantage of them. In theory the Ministry of Investment has a One Stop Shop Investment Center. However, both organizations are poorly resourced and neither maintains an active website. The ministries that handle company registration include the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Investment, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Justice. There is no single window registration process, and an investor must visit all the above-mentioned agencies to complete the registration of a company. It is estimated that the registration process could take several months with companies routinely approached to provide bribes to move the process forward. Because registering a business in South Sudan is a lengthy, laborious process involving multiple national, state, and local entities, the Chamber of Commerce recommends hiring a local lawyer to register a business. South Sudan is a member of the African Trade and Insurance Agency , which provides export insurance and other assistance to foreign investors and traders. Local lawyers, some of whom are listed in the Legal Assistance section of the U.S. Embassy Juba website, are willing to advise investors and guide them through the registration process, for a fee. South Sudan’s Chamber of Commerce is government-run with a government-employed director and private business chairpersons whose business interests are linked to government contracts. There is no ombudsman. Despite these resources, foreign investors continue reporting unfair practices including expropriation of assets, unpredictable tax policies, harassment by security services, extortion attempts, and inconsistent results in legal proceedings and labor disputes. Years of conflict and internal displacement have left a complex land rights picture with many properties occupied by squatters or soldiers. Land-based ventures often encounter pre-existing ownership claims and, therefore, claims on royalties or rents. There is no title insurance and no formal way to determine ownership outside of current possession. Under the 2009 Land Act, non-citizens may lease – not own – land in South Sudan. Under the Tax Exemptions and Concessions schedule of the 2009 Investment Promotion Act, foreign investors may lease agricultural land for 30-60 years with the possibility of renewal while mining leases may not exceed the life of the mine or quarry. The 2012 South Sudan Companies Act allows non-South Sudanese to invest in medium and large size companies on the condition a South Sudanese has at least a 31 percent share. Government officials will not issue a business license to a foreign investor without such a local shareholder. Foreign companies that want to establish a subsidiary in South Sudan are not subject to local shareholder requirements. Private security companies operating in South Sudan must have a South Sudanese citizen hold a 51 percent share of the company pursuant to the 2013 Private Security Companies Rules and Regulations. Extractives sector companies must have a South Sudanese national as part owner, but the exact percentage of ownership required is unclear. According to the 2009 Investment Act, foreign investors must apply for an investment certificate from the Ministry of Investment to ensure the project will benefit South Sudan’s society and economy. The government does not make public statements about how it screens applications. Investors must rely on the Act’s language. The Ministry of Investment began issuing a new type of investment certificate in February 2022 citing malpractices and forgeries with older versions. The Third Schedule of the 2009 Investment Act states South Sudanese will receive preferential treatment if they invest in micro-enterprises, postal services, car hire and taxi operations, public relations, retail, and security services, and the cooperative services. The last time a third-party conducted an investment policy review was the 2016 East African Community’s assessment. South Sudan is yet to harmonize its internal laws to conform to the East African Community plans for regional integration. An investor looking to establish a business in South Sudan may spend months interacting with the Ministries of Investment, Justice, Trade and Industry, and Finance and Planning. The 2009 Investment Promotion Act requires the Ministry of Investment to create a “One Stop Shop” investment center, but there is still no active website for this center. The Ministry of Justice established a business registration website ( https://business.eservices.gov.ss/ ) in 2021 offered through the government’s broader eServices.gov.ss platform. There is little information regarding how effective this new registration process is due to the platform’s newness. Investors may still need to hire a local lawyer to register a business. South Sudan does not have a formal mechanism to promote or incentivize outward investment nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. However, due to the lack of banking services, it is difficult for investors to move money outside the country. 3. Legal Regime Opening a business can be especially challenging for foreigners trying to navigate the bureaucratic system without the assistance of a well-connected national. The private sector is governed by a mix of legacy pre-independence laws from Sudan and post-independence South Sudan laws. South Sudan has no securities exchange or publicly listed companies. Post-independence, the national legislature passed laws to improve the transparency of the regulatory system, including the 2012 Companies Act and the 2012 Banking Act. However, enforcement regulations remain lacking and there is little transparency. The national legislature historically passed most bills and regulations without public comment or quantitative analysis. It did not adequately disseminate finalized laws publicly. This trend continues with the Transnational Legislative Assembly (TNLA). The TNLA formed several committees in late 2021 and early 2022, a development that may improve capacity and transparency. Most government ministries and agencies do not hold notice and comment periods before finalizing regulations. There is no centralized online platform for publishing regulatory actions similar to the U.S. Federal Register. A notable exception is the Bank of South Sudan , which lists banking regulations on its website. South Sudan’s 2011 Public Finance and Accountability Act requires budget documents to comply with International Public Sector Accounting Standards; however, published documents often do not comply and therefore are difficult to decipher. There have not been public budget hearings since 2019. The legislature failed to pass a budget for fiscal year 2020/2021, which began in July 2020, and did not table the fiscal year 2021/2022 budget until February 2022, even though the fiscal year began in July 2021. The oil sector attracts the most FDI, but transparency is absent, despite statutory reporting requirements. The Ministry of Finance and Planning does not share foreign debt data at an institutional level and does not release it to the public. The government occasionally releases limited debt obligation information about certain infrastructure loans, but to date has not disclosed the amount of oil it has committed to pay for infrastructure projects. This makes it difficult for analysts to determine how much money the government has available to service debt and pay for public services. The contract process for oil companies that are planning to bid and invest in South Sudan is controlled by the Ministry of Petroleum, but paragraph 11 of the 2012 Petroleum Act says the National Petroleum and Gas Commission is empowered to approve all petroleum agreements on behalf of the government and ensure that they are consistent with the Act. Bidding and tender information is not publicly available. There are no known informal regulatory processes managed by NGOs or private sector associations that would affect U.S. investors. National and state bodies are the main source of regulation, but county and sub-county level officials also impose regulations. NGOs regularly report discrepancies between tax, labor, and import rules issued by the national government and those enforced by local authorities. Humanitarian service providers moving goods earmarked for humanitarian relief claim state officials have, at times, barred them entry at state borders. Tax collection and enforcement at the state level is limited, uneven, and unpredictable. The Ministry of Labor has not conducted labor inspections since March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but when it did NGOs and foreign investors reported employees colluded with labor inspectors to extort fines from business managers. Nationally non-oil tax revenue increased dramatically in 2021 as South Sudan improved its collection methods for personal income tax and customs revenue. Some months saw a 100 percent year-over-year increase suggesting prior revenue collection efforts were corrupt, inept, or both. Much of this improvement is due to public financial management (PFM) reforms aimed at strengthening the National Revenue Authority. Despite significant PFM reforms, the government did not announce or implement new enforcement reforms in 2021. The legislative body does not provide effective administrative compliance oversight of government ministers nor do ministries or agencies adequately regulate one another. There were no significant corruption prosecutions in 2021. Media reported in February 2022 that President, Salva Kiir Mayardit, blocked the investigation of former Minister of Petroleum Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth for allegedly stealing millions of dollars in oil revenues between 2016 and 2017. South Sudan is not a WTO member but joined the African Union in 2012 and the East African Community (EAC) in April 2016. It is currently behind in membership payments to both and has its voting rights suspended. The Ministry of East African Community Affairs is responsible for integration into the EAC. South Sudan is adapting its national regulatory system to regional standards. It joined the customs union of the EAC but is behind in implementing regulations, prompting the EAC in February 2022 to urge the government to fully implement the EAC’s Single Customs Territory to boost intra-regional trade. The National Revenue Authority assists in implementing EAC customs regulations and procedures. South Sudan currently has nine members in the EAC parliament. U.S. companies seeking to invest in South Sudan face a complex commercial environment with weak legal enforcement mechanisms. Large U.S. and multinational companies may have enough leverage to extricate themselves from business disputes, but medium-sized enterprises (the more natural counterparts to South Sudan’s fledgling business community) do not. South’s Sudan’s legal system is a combination of statutory and customary laws. There are no dedicated commercial courts and no effective arbitration bodies to handle business disputes. The only official means of settling disputes between private parties is civil court. Enforcement of judgements and awards is weak or nonexistent, leading businesses to seek informal mediation, including through private lawyers, tribal elders, law enforcement officials, and business organizations. Corrupt practices are widespread and undermine pending cases. The lack of a unified, formal judicial system encourages “forum shopping” by businesses motivated to find the venue in which they can achieve the most favorable outcome. As an East African Community (EAC) member, South Sudan is subject to the jurisdiction of the East African Court of Justice (EACJ). The EAC treaty gives the EACJ broad jurisdiction including trade disputes and human rights violations. However, the court only reviews 40 cases annually and results for the South Sudanese legal community have been inconclusive. Hope for Humanity Africa, an advocacy group, sued the government in the EACJ in June 2021 over oil waste mismanagement that allegedly caused health and environmental damage. The EACJ allowed the government to resolve the case through mediation, although there have not been any published results of the mediation. The executive branch regularly interferes with the work of the judicial branch. State security forces arrest and detain parties to business disputes without charging them with a crime. Security forces continue detaining the person until they agree to make a payment as directed to “resolve” the case. High-level government and military officials are immune from prosecution in practice and frequently interfere with court decisions. Foreign investors face a lack of transparency and capacity in South Sudan’s legal system as well as inconsistent laws and regulations. Most foreign direct investment rules can be found in the 2009 Land Act, the 2009 Investment Promotion Act, and the 2012 Companies Act. The relevant ministries do not have implementing regulations or they do not publish them for public review. The Ministry of Justice has a business registration website, but a foreign investor may still need local counsel to register the business and obtain an investment certificate. South Sudan does not review transactions for competition-related concerns. There were no significant developments in 2021. Investors should be prepared to face a complex commercial environment with a weak civil justice system in which contract disputes are common and often resolved without due process. The 2009 Investment Promotion Act prohibits nationalization of private enterprises unless the expropriation is in the national interest for a public purpose. The Act does not define the terms “national interest” or “public purpose.” According to the Act, expropriation must be in accordance with due process and provide fair and adequate compensation, which is ultimately determined by local domestic courts. While some donor agreements call for the government to receive goods at the conclusion of a project, local government officials have seized assets even without a formal agreement and did not offer compensation for the expropriated property. Although officially denied, credible reports from humanitarian aid agencies indicate both government and opposition forces routinely extort money at checkpoints throughout the country before allowing the delivery of humanitarian aid, amongst several other bureaucratic access impediments. The 2011 Insolvency Act provides for both personal and corporate bankruptcies. Given the lack of commercial courts, there is little information available about the rights of creditors in practice. 6. Financial Sector South Sudan does not have a functioning stock market or any other system of exchange for financial assets. It is difficult for foreign investors to obtain credit on the local market due to the shortage of hard currency, the inability to obtain reliable figures or audited accounts, the absence of a credit reference bureau, and South Sudan’s failure to document land ownership properly. Banks are often unwilling to lend because they claim lenders receive inadequate legal protection and because South Sudan lacks verifiable state or national personal identification methods, making most borrowers high risk. Depositors are still reluctant to deposit money in banks after the Bank of South Sudan in 2015 confiscated commercial banks’ deposits at the central bank and diverted then to the government, making it difficult or impossible for companies and individuals to access their funds. The Bank of South Sudan issued treasury bills briefly between 2016 and 2017 and said it would issue them again in 2020, but still has not. The Bank of South Sudan, the central bank, has limited assets and functions more as a commercial bank servicing the federal governments’ transactions; however, in 2021 ongoing public financial management reforms implemented by the Bank of South Sudan led to a change in monetary policy. The central bank helped stabilize the South Sudanese Pound through currency auctions. The banking sector faces significant challenges because of U.S. and United Nations sanctions against certain South Sudanese entities and individuals. South Sudan is on the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) “grey list,” meaning FATF increased its monitoring due to South Sudan’s deficiencies in countering money laundering and terrorist financing. South Sudan’s banking sector is small and underdeveloped with limited use of demand deposits and few foreign banks. Analysts believe many domestic banks are undercapitalized. South Sudan is one of the most underbanked countries. Most people hold their savings in cash. Banks usually only lend to businesses with well-documented contracts with international organizations. There are two main mobile payment providers: mGurush and Nilepay. However, users of these platforms must have a bank account, which over 90 percent of South Sudanese do not have. There are no known restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account. The 2013 Petroleum Revenue Management Act created a Petroleum Revenue Savings Fund consisting of two accounts into which the government was to deposit oil revenues. One was the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account, which was to receive 10 percent of oil revenues and serve as a buffer against volatility in oil prices in South Sudan’s budgeting process. The other was the Future Generation Fund, which was to receive 15 percent of oil proceeds and serve as a repository for funds meant to help future generations transition to a post-oil economy. To date, however, neither has received any financing despite the government sometimes including allocations to these accounts in the budget process. The revenue sharing provisions in the 2013 Petroleum Revenue Management Act require the national government to distribute two percent of oil revenue to oil-producing states and three percent to local oil-producing communities. There are no publicly available documents that explain how the states and localities use those funds or whether the funds are actually provided. None of these wealth funds follow the voluntary code of good practices for transparency and accountability known as the Santiago Principles. South Sudan does not participate in the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Nile Petroleum Corporation (Nilepet) is the primary SOE in South Sudan. The government, through Nilepet, holds minority stakes in other oil producing joint ventures operating in South Sudan. The 2013 Petroleum Revenue Management Act governs how Nilepet’s profits are invested, but Nilepet does not release information on its activities, even though Chapter IX of the 2013 Petroleum Revenue Management Act states comprehensive, audited reports on the company’s finances must be made publicly available. Nilepet’s revenues and expenditures are not disclosed in the central government budget. Nilepet’s director does not report to the Minister of Petroleum and the government is not transparent about how it exercises ownership or control of Nilepet. Nilepet is on the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Entity List. See 83 FR 12475 . The government also owns stakes in construction and trade companies and several banks. It is difficult to obtain information on the number, total income, and employment figures of SOEs in South Sudan. There is no published list of SOEs. The country does not adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. South Sudan does not have a privatization program. 10. Political and Security Environment There is a long history of politically motivated violence in South Sudan. Warring parties concluded a peace agreement in September 2018 to stop the civil war that broke out in 2013. The conflict severely disrupted trade, markets, and agricultural activities, while claiming hundreds of thousands of lives and spurring a severe humanitarian crisis the country still grapples with. The conflict was marked by grave human rights abuses, including conflict-related sexual violence. South Sudan is slowly implementing the 2018 revitalized peace agreement and routinely misses critical deadlines associated with implementing the peace agreement. Political and sub-state violence is frequent throughout the country. The country is plagued by large-scale displacement of people (internally and as refugees), widespread food insecurity, severe human-rights abuses, restricted humanitarian assistance access, and harassment of aid workers and journalists. In its January 2022 South Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot , the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that out of a population 12.1 million, South Sudan has two million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 2.3 million South Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries. The government stabilized conditions in the country to allow IDPs and refugees to safely return to their homes. The country has 8.3 million people who need humanitarian assistance to survive. Humanitarian partners and international donors are reviewing South Sudan’s Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) IPC ratings and expected to provide revised ratings in spring 2022. Previous violence during conflict with Sudan resulted in damage to installations in one of the major oil producing areas in the country, shutting down production in that region. Repairs to these facilities began in 2018, allowing oil production to increase, although production declined again in 2021 due mostly to the third year of sustained flooding South Sudan is experiencing. Fighting continues in some parts of the country between the government and non-signatories to the 2018 peace deal. Generally, the ceasefire is holding between the government and main opposition groups, but under increasing stress. Persistent sub-national violence stemming from complex socioeconomic, ethnic, and political causes is present throughout South Sudan and has increased since 2019. The government continued to detain political opposition leaders in 2021. The government periodically detained journalists and temporarily shut down media outlets (print and radio) it accused of publishing articles or broadcasting radio programs that allegedly threatened the government, challenged its competence, or reported instances of corruption. NGOs complained of harassment, and armed groups continued to attack aid convoys and depots in 2021 and early 2022. NGOs periodically report ambushes along major supply routes in South Sudan. Such attacks resulted in death and injury to, and even killing of, NGO personnel, vehicles destroyed, and supplies looted or destroyed. Such attacks hinder the delivery of aid to countless South Sudanese throughout the country who area dependent on such assistance to survive. Five aid workers were killed in 2021, and at least three have been killed since January 2022. Since the civil war started in 2013, at least 130 aid workers have been killed, most between 2013 and 2015 when violence peaked. Spain Executive Summary Spain is open to foreign investment and actively seeks additional investment as a key component of its COVID-19 recovery. After six years of growth (2014-2019), Spain’s GDP fell 11 percent in 2020 – the worst performance in the Eurozone – due in large part to high COVID-19 infection rates, a strict three-month lockdown, border closures, and pandemic-related restrictions that decimated its tourism and hospitality sectors. By building on healthy fundamentals and fueled by up to 140 billion euros in Next Generation EU recovery funds, Spain rebounded with 5.1 percent GDP growth in 2021, and unemployment improved to 13.3 percent. Economic activity is expected to return to its pre-crisis level in 2023, though Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine could threaten the recovery by pushing up energy prices, compounding supply chain disruptions, and stoking inflation. Service-based industries, particularly those related to tourism, and energy-intensive industries remain most vulnerable to the economic shock. Spain’s key economic risks are high public debt levels and ballooning pension costs for its aging population, though these areas are targets for government reforms. Despite COVID-19’s economic shock, Spain’s excellent infrastructure, well-educated workforce, large domestic market, access to the European Common Market, and leadership on renewable energy make it an appealing foreign investment destination. Spanish law permits up to 100 percent foreign ownership in companies, and capital movements are completely liberalized. According to Spanish data, in 2021, foreign direct investment flow into Spain was EUR 28.8 billion, 17.7 percent more than in 2020. Of this total, EUR 1.6 billion came from the United States, the fifth largest investor in Spain in new foreign direct investment. Foreign investment is concentrated in the energy, real estate, financial services, engineering, and construction sectors. Spain aims to use its Next Generation EU recovery funds to transform the Spanish economy, especially through digitalization and greening of the economy, to achieve long-term increases in productivity and growth. Full financing is contingent on additional economic reforms beyond labor reform. Spain’s credit ratings remain stable, and issuances of public debt – especially for green bonds – have been oversubscribed, reflecting strong investor appetite for investment in Spain. However, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which account for more than 99 percent of Spanish businesses and have been acutely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, still have some difficulty accessing credit and rely heavily on bank financing. Small firms also experience more challenges accessing EU recovery funds. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 34 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 30 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $38,500 https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 27,360 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Foreign direct investment (FDI) played a significant role in modernizing the Spanish economy during the past 40 years. Foreign companies set up operations in large numbers to take advantage of Spain’s large domestic market, export possibilities, and growth potential. Spain’s automotive industry is mostly foreign-owned, and multinationals control half of the food production companies, one-third of chemical firms, and two-thirds of the cement sector. Foreign firms control about one-third of the insurance market. The Government of Spain recognizes the value of foreign investment and sees it as a key part of its post COVID-19 economic recovery. U.S. FDI is especially attractive as Spain looks to deepen its transatlantic ties after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Spain offers investment opportunities in sectors and activities with significant added value. Spanish law permits 100 percent foreign ownership in investments (limits apply regarding audio-visual broadcast licenses and strategic sectors of the economy; see next section), and capital movements are completely liberalized. Due to its openness and the favorable legal framework for foreign investment, Spain has received significant foreign investments in knowledge-intensive activities. New FDI into Spain increased by 17.7 percent in 2021 compared to 2020 when the COVID-19 pandemic reduced FDI, according to data from Spain’s Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Tourism. In 2020, acquisitions of existing companies were the predominant form of foreign investment, representing 42.7 percent of the total, compared to 17.8 percent of new greenfield and brownfield investments. In 2021 the United States, as ultimate beneficial owner, had a gross direct investment in Spain of EUR 4.2 billion, accounting for 14.5 percent of total investment and representing an increase of 1.5 percent compared to 2020. According to the latest available Spanish data, U.S. FDI stock in Spain totaled about $88.6 billion in 2019. Spain has a favorable legal framework for foreign investors. The Spanish Constitution and Spanish law establish clear rights to private ownership, and foreign firms receive the same legal treatment as Spanish companies. There is no discrimination against public or private firms with respect to local access to markets, credit, licenses, and supplies. Spain adapted its foreign investment rules to a system of general liberalization, and its inbound investment screening mechanism is focused on protecting national security. Law 18/1992, which established rules on foreign investments in Spain, provides a specific regime for non-EU persons investing in defense, aerospace, gambling, television, and radio. For EU investors, the only sectors with a specific regime are the manufacture and trade of weapons or national defense-related activities. For non-EU investors, the Spanish government restricts individual ownership of audio-visual broadcasting licenses to 25 percent. Specifically, Spanish law permits non-EU companies to own a maximum of 25 percent of a company holding a digital terrestrial television broadcasting license; and for two or more non-EU companies to own a maximum of 50 percent in aggregate. In addition, under Spanish law a reciprocity principle applies (art. 25.4 General Audiovisual Law). The home country of the (non-EU) foreign company must have foreign ownership laws that permit a Spanish company to make the same transaction in the audio-visual sector. The Spanish government issued new regulations on foreign investment in March 2020 that stipulate prior authorization for foreign investments in critical sectors. Prior approval is also required if the foreign investor is controlled directly or indirectly by the government of another country, if the investor has invested or participated in sectors affecting the security, public order, or public health in another EU Member State, or if administrative or judicial proceedings have been initiated against the investor for exercising illegal or criminal activities. Failure to request authorization for a transaction is a serious infringement of the law. These new regulations are outlined below (see Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment). Spain is a signatory to the convention on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Spain is also a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Spain has not undergone Investment Policy Reviews with these three organizations within the past three years. To set up a company in Spain, the two basic requirements include incorporation before a Public Notary and filing a public deed with the Mercantile Register (Registro Mercantil). The public deed of incorporation of the company can be submitted electronically by the Public Notary. The Central Mercantile Register is an official institution that provides access to companies’ information supplied by the Regional Mercantile Registers after January 1, 1990. Any national or foreign company can use it but must also be registered and pay taxes and fees. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business report, it takes on average about two weeks to start a business in Spain. “Invest in Spain” is the Spanish investment promotion agency to facilitate foreign investment. Services are available to all investors. It has partner offices in five major U.S. cities. Useful web sites: Mercantile register: http://www.rmc.es/Home.aspx Mercantile register for the Madrid region: https://www.rmercantilmadrid.com/RMM/Home/Index.aspx Investment promotion agency: http://www.investinspain.org/invest/es/cabecera/faq-s/establecimiento-de-una-empresa/index.html Among the financial instruments approved by the Spanish Government to provide official support for the internationalization of Spanish enterprise are the Foreign Investment Fund (FIEX), the Fund for Foreign Investment by Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (FONPYME), the Enterprise Internationalization Fund (FIEM), and the Fund for Investment in the Tourism Sector (FINTUR). The Spanish Government also offers financing lines for investment in the electronics, information technology and communications, energy (renewables), and infrastructure concessions sectors. 3. Legal Regime There is transparency throughout the rule making process at all levels of government. The Spanish government launched a transparency website in 2014 that makes more than 500,000 items of public interest freely accessible to all citizens (http://transparencia.gob.es/transparencia/en/transparencia_Home/index.html ). The website offers details about the central government, public institutions such as the Royal House, the Parliament, the Constitutional Court, the Judicial Power, the Ombudsman, the Audit Court, the Central Bank, and the Economic and Social Council, and other organisms such as the European Commission. Regional and local authorities have developed their own transparency portals and related legislation. Spain’s Boletin Oficial de Estado ( https://www.boe.es/ ) publishes key regulatory actions. Many large established Spanish companies have not yet fully adopted environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria, though companies are increasingly committed to making positive impact on society. New companies, especially startups, tend to incorporate ESG values into their operations from the start, acting with transparency and adopting innovative, modern technologies for continuous improvement. Several official Spanish certifications recognized at European and global level accredit companies that meet ESG and CSR criteria, such as Norma SGE21, B Corp Spain, and SDG Certificate (AENOR.) To promote transparency in the disclosure of non-financial information and its impact on corporate governance of companies, the Spanish government published Law 11/2018 on non-financial and diversity matters ( https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2018/12/29/pdfs/BOE-A-2018-17989.pdf ). The law reinforces requirements that companies disclose relevant information about their management in five areas: environment; social impact and workers’ rights; respect for human rights; fight against corruption and bribery; and impact on society. Spain is a member of the European Union, and its local regulatory framework compares favorably with other major European countries, although permitting and licensing processes may result in significant delays. The efficacy of regulation at the regional level is uneven. With a license from only one of Spain’s 17 regional governments or two enclaves, companies can operate throughout Spanish territory. The measures are designed to reduce business operating costs, improve competitiveness, and attract foreign investment. The Spanish judiciary has a well-established tradition of supporting and facilitating the enforcement of both foreign judgments and awards. For a foreign judgment to be enforced in Spain, an order declaring it is enforceable or exequatur is necessary. Once the order is granted, enforcement itself is quite fast, provided that the assets are identified. First instance courts are responsible for the enforcement of foreign rulings. Local legislation establishes mechanisms to resolve disputes if they arise. Spain’s civil (Roman-based) judicial system is fair and accessible, although sometimes slow-moving. Investigating judges are in charge of the criminal investigation, assuring independence from the executive branch of the government. The Spanish judicial system allows for successive appeals to a higher court. The number of civil claims has grown significantly over the past decade, due in part to litigation stemming from Spain’s financial 2008 crisis, resulting in an increased openness to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Although ordinary proceedings are relatively straightforward, due to the significant number of cases within each court, it can take years for a case to come to trial. Domestic court decisions are subject to appeal, and the average time taken for a final judgment to be issued by the Court of Appeal can be anywhere from months to years. A decision may still be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court (although the grounds for appeal are quite limited), a process that generally takes two to three years to produce a final ruling. Due to the uncertainty surrounding the duration of appeals, disputes involving large companies or significant amounts of money tend to be resolved through arbitration. The Spanish government issued new regulations on foreign investment in March 2020 (Royal Decrees 8/2020, 11/2020, and 34/2020) that require prior authorization for foreign investors seeking to acquire more than a 10 percent stake in the following critical sectors: critical infrastructures, both physical and virtual (energy industries, transportation, water, healthcare, communications, media, data storage and processing, aerospace, defense, financial services, and sensitive installations) critical technology and dual-use products; essential supplies (energy, hydrocarbons, electricity, raw materials and food and agriculture value chains); sectors with sensitive information such as personal data or with capacity to control such information and; the media. Purchases of less than 10 percent are also subject to authorization if they result in participation in the control or management of the company. Under these new Royal Decrees, foreign investments in any industry must also receive prior approval if the foreign investor is controlled directly or indirectly by the government of another country; if the investor has invested or participated in sectors affecting the security, public order, or public health in another EU Member State; or if administrative or judicial proceedings have been initiated against the investor for exercising illegal or criminal activities. Investments less than EUR 1 million are exempted, and investments between EUR 1 and 5 million are subject to a simplified review. Spanish law conforms to multi-disciplinary EU Directive 88/361, which prohibits all restrictions of capital movements between Member States as well as between Member States and other countries. The Directive also classifies investors according to residence rather than nationality. However, Royal Decree 34/2020 also temporarily requires residents of the European Union and European Free Trade Association to receive prior approval for investments into companies listed in Spain or investments exceeding EUR 500 million. This temporary requirement has been extended several times and is valid until December 31, 2022. Registration requirements are straightforward and apply equally to foreign and domestic investments. They aim to verify the purpose of the investment, not block any investment. On September 1, 2016, a resolution established new forms for declaration of foreign investments before the Investment Registry, which oblige the investor(s) to declare foreign participation in the company. In 2015, changes to the Personal Income Tax Law affected the transfer of investments outside of Spain by creating a tax on unrealized gains from investment. Residents who have resided in Spain for at least 10 of the previous 15 years are subject to a tax of 19-23 percent if they relocate their holdings or investments outside of Spain if the market value of the shares held exceeds EUR 4 million or if the individual holds 25 percent or more shares in a venture whose market value exceeds EUR 1 million. A Protocol to the 1990 Income Tax Convention between the United States and Spain entered into force in November 2019. The Protocol significantly reduces taxes on interest, royalties, certain direct dividends, and capital gains. It also provides for mandatory binding arbitration to streamline dispute resolutions between the two countries’ tax administrations. Spain’s digital services tax on companies, approved in January 2021, was dropped as of January 2022 in response to the OECD/G20’s multilateral agreement during international tax negotiations. Spain will credit amounts paid in excess of the global minimum tax from January 2022 against future taxes owed. Useful websites: Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Tourism page on Foreign Investment: https://comercio.gob.es/InversionesExteriores/Paginas/control-inversiones.aspx Invest in Spain (investment promotion agency): http://www.investinspain.org/invest/en/index.html Investment aid and incentives in Spain: https://guidetobusinessinspain.com/en/ The parliament passed Act 3/2013 on June 4, 2013, by which the entities that regulated energy (CNE), telecoms (CMT), and competition (CNC) merged into a new entity: the National Securities Market Commission (CNMC). The law attributes practically all functions entrusted to the National Competition Commission under the Competition Act 15/2007, of July 3, 2007 (LDC), to the CNMC. The CNMC’s website ( https://www.cnmv.es/Portal/home.aspx ) provides information to the public about major cases. Spanish legislation set up safeguards to prevent the nationalization or expropriation of foreign investments. Since the 2008 economic crisis, Spain has altered its renewables policy several times, creating regulatory uncertainty and resulting in losses to U.S. companies’ earnings and investments. As a result, Spain accumulated more than 32 lawsuits, totaling about EUR 7.6 billion in claims. Spain now faces an array of related international claims for solar photovoltaic and other renewable energy projects. Spain registered one case with ICSID in 2021 related to renewable energy generation. Spain has a fair and transparent bankruptcy regime. In 2014, the government approved a reform of the bankruptcy law to promote Spain’s economic recovery by establishing mediation mechanisms. These reforms – nicknamed the Second Chance Law – aimed to avoid the bankruptcy of viable companies and preserve jobs by facilitating refinancing agreements through debt write-off, capitalization, and rescheduling. However, declaring bankruptcy remains less prevalent in Spain than in other parts of the world. 6. Financial Sector The Spanish government welcomes all forms of investment, including portfolio investment, and actively courts foreign investment as part of its COVID-19 recovery plan. Foreign investors do not face discrimination when seeking local financing for projects. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors are eligible to receive credit in Spain. A large range of credit instruments are available through Spanish and international financial institutions. Many large Spanish companies rely on cross-holding arrangements and ownership stakes by banks rather than pure loans. However, these arrangements do not restrict foreign ownership. Several of the largest Spanish companies that engage in this practice are also publicly traded in the United States. There is a significant amount of portfolio investment in Spain, including by U.S. entities. Spain has an actively traded and liquid stock market, the IBEX 35. In 2019, the United States and Spain amended their bilateral tax agreement to prevent double taxation of each other’s nationals and firms and to improve information sharing between tax authorities. Spain has accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4, and maintains an exchange rate system free of restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions, other than restrictions notified to the Fund under Decision No. 144 (52/51). In January 2021, Spain’s new Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) or “Tobin tax,” entered into force. The FTT is an indirect tax of 0.2 percent on the acquisition of Spanish companies with a market capitalization of at least EUR 1 million EUR. The financial intermediary executing the transaction – not the seller or acquirer of the shares – pays the tax. There were about 50 commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults in Spain in 2019, down from 104 in 2007 but still more than twice the eurozone average, according to the IMF. There are 20,421 financial institution branches as of December 2021, after having closed 2,488 offices in 2021, according to the Bank of Spain. Spain’s domestic housing crisis, which began in 2007, was linked to poor lending practices by Spanish savings banks. The government subsequently created a Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB) through Royal Decree-law 9/2009, which restructured credit institutions to bolster capital and provisioning levels. The number of Spanish financial entities dropped significantly since 2009 through consolidation as banks have faced increased capital requirements and shrinking profit margins. The COVID-19 pandemic adversely affected the outlook for Spanish banks, though the government’s income support measures, fiscal support for ailing firms, and loan guarantees helped reduce the pressure on the sector. Slim profit margins for the Spanish financial sector are also likely to persist, however, due to slowing growth, low (or negative) interest rates, and nonperforming loans (NPLs). The NPL ratio in Spain – 4.3 percent in December 2021 – was a marked improvement from 2014 levels. The sector has capital buffers to absorb the unexpected losses associated with this crisis, though there is significant disparity between institutions. Spanish financial institutions have significantly higher capital levels than the minimum regulatory requirements, which can be used to absorb unexpected losses from the economic fallout of pandemic. Total profit for the Spanish banking system was about EUR 19.8 billion euros in 2021, compared to the losses of 5.5 billion registered in 2020. The Bank of Spain, Spain’s central bank, is a member of the euro system and the European System of Central Banks. Within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Bank of Spain and European Central Bank (ECB) jointly supervise the Spanish banking system. Foreign banks can establish themselves in Spain and are subject to the same conditions as Spanish banks to access the Spanish financial system. Foreign banks with authorization in another EU member state do not need to get authorization from the Bank of Spain to establish a branch or representative office in Spain. The National Securities Market Commission (CNMV) is responsible for the supervision and inspection of Spanish securities markets. Since its creation in 1988, the CNMV’s regime has been updated to adapt to the evolution of financial markets and to introduce new measures to protect investors. Total assets for the five biggest banks in Spain at the end of 2021 were EUR 3.3 trillion: Banco Santander: EUR 1.6 trillion Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA): EUR 662.9 billion CaixaBank: EUR 680 billion Banco Sabadell: EUR 251.9 billion Bankinter: EUR 107.6 billion To open a bank account as a non-resident, a foreigner needs a proof of identity, proof of address in Spain, and proof of employment status or where the funds originated. All documents that are not in Spanish or issued by Spanish authorities must be translated into Spanish. Spain does not have a sovereign wealth fund or similar entity. Spain was among the top ten receiving countries for sovereign wealth investments, attracting EUR 2.8 billion between October 2020 and December 2021. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Spain’s public enterprise sector is relatively small, and the role and importance of state-owned enterprises (SOE) decreased since the privatization process started in the early 1980s. The reform of SOE oversight in the 1990s led the government to create the State Holding for Industrial Participations (SEPI) in 1995. SEPI has direct majority participation in 15 SOEs, which make up the SEPI Group, with a workforce of more than 78,000 employees. It is a direct minority shareholder in nine SOEs (five of them listed on stock exchanges) and participates indirectly in ownership of more than one hundred companies. Either legislative chamber and any parliamentary group may request the presence of SEPI and SOE representatives to discuss issues related to their performance. SEPI and the SOEs are required to submit economic and financial information to the legislature on a regular basis. The European Union, through specialized committees, also controls SOEs’ performance on issues concerning sector-specific policies and anti-competitive practices. Companies with a majority interest: Agencia Efe, Cetarsa, Ensa, Grupo Cofivacasa, Grupo Correos, Grupo Enusa, Grupo Hunosa, Grupo Mercasa, Grupo Navantia, Grupo Sepides, GrupoTragsa, Hipodromodo la Zarzuela, Mayasa, Saeca, Defex (in liquidation) Companies with a minority interest: Airbus Group, Alestis Aerospace, Enagas, Enresa, Hispasat, Indra, International Airlines Group, Red Electrica Corporacion, Ebro Foods Attached companies: RTVE, Corporacion de Radio y Television Espanola SEPI also has indirect participation in more than 100 subsidiaries and other investees of the majority companies, which make up the SEPI Group. Corporate Governance of Spain’s SOEs uses criteria based on OECD principles and guidelines. These include the state ownership function and accountability, as well as issues related to performance monitoring, information disclosure, auditing mechanisms, and the role of the board in the companies. Spain does not have a formal privatization program. 10. Political and Security Environment There are periodic peaceful demonstrations calling for salary and pension increases and other social or economic reforms. Public sector employees and union members organize frequent small demonstrations in response to service cuts, privatization, and other government measures. Demonstrations and civil unrest in Catalonia have resulted in vandalism and damage to store fronts and buildings in Barcelona and other cities. Some regional business leaders have expressed concern that disturbances could negatively affect business operations and investments in the region. Sri Lanka Executive Summary Sri Lanka, a lower middle-income country with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of about $3,680 and a population of approximately 22 million, is experiencing an economic crisis stemming from an unsustainable debt load and perennial deficits on both the international balance of payments and the government budget. The island’s strategic location off the southern coast of India along the main east-west Indian Ocean shipping lanes gives Sri Lanka a regional logistical advantage, especially as India does not have deep-water ports comparable to what Sri Lanka offers. Sri Lanka is transitioning from a predominantly rural-based economy to a more urbanized economy focused on manufacturing and services. Sri Lanka’s export economy is dominated by apparel and cash-crop exports, mainly tea, but technology service exports are a significant growth sector. Prior to the April 21, 2019, Easter Sunday attacks, the tourism industry was rapidly expanding, but the attacks led to a significant decline in tourism that continued into 2020 and 2021 due to COVID-19 and the government’s related decision to close its main international airport for commercial passenger arrivals in March 2020. After reopening to visitors early in 2021, tourism revenue for the year reached $261 million, dropping 61 percent year-over-year (YoY) compared to $682 million in 2020. Migrant labor remittances are a significant source of foreign exchange, which saw an increase in 2020 due to the collapse of informal money transfer systems during the pandemic, despite the job losses to Sri Lankan migrant workers, especially in the Middle East. However, worker remittances saw a decline of 22.7 percent in 2021, largely due to inflationary pressures and the expectation of a future depreciation of the exchange rate, which occurred in March 2022. Remittances totaled $5.4 billion for 2021 in comparison to $7.1 billion in 2020. The administration of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who was elected in November 2019, has attempted to promote pro-business positions, including announcing tax benefits for new investments to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). As outlined in its election manifesto, the Rajapaksa government’s economic goals include positioning Sri Lanka as an export-oriented economic hub at the center of the Indian Ocean (with government control of strategic assets such as Sri Lankan Airlines), improving trade logistics, attracting export-oriented FDI, and boosting firms’ abilities to compete in global markets. However, COVID-19 and the subsequent lockdowns brought new economic challenges, forcing the government to adapt policies to the situation on the ground. In April 2020, the Ministry of Finance restricted imports of luxury and semi-luxury consumer products such as consumer durables, motor vehicles, and the import of certain agricultural products as a means of saving foreign reserves and creating employment in labor intensive agriculture. Further restrictions on goods deemed non-essential were added in March 2022. With the IMF estimating a public debt-to-GDP ratio at 118.9 percent (of which 65.6 percent is foreign debt), Sri Lanka is facing a liquidity crisis that is exacerbated by an increasing trade deficit. Exports have helped buoy Sri Lankas FX reserves, growing 19.9 percent in 2021. However, imports continued to outstrip this growth by a significant margin with an increase of 46.8 percent in 2021. Exports of goods increased by 24.4 percent to $12.5 billion in 2021, up from $10 billion in 2020. Exports of services for the year 2020 amounted to $3 billion, down from $7.5 billion in 2019. In September 2021, the government committed to cease building new coal-fired power plants and achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 at the United Nations International Energy Forum. Sri Lanka has set a target of achieving 70 percent of all its electricity generation from renewable sources by 2030. However, renewable energy companies accuse the Ceylon Electricity Board of being in arrears to the tune of $60 million (as of May 2022) after not paying for renewable energy supplied to the national grid since August 2021. FDI in Sri Lanka has largely been concentrated in tourism, real estate, mixed development projects, ports, and telecommunications in recent years. With a growing middle class, investors also see opportunities in franchising, information technology services, and light manufacturing for the domestic market. The Board of Investment (BOI) is the primary government authority responsible for investment, particularly foreign investment, aiming to provide “one-stop” services for foreign investors. The BOI is committed to facilitating FDI and can offer project incentives, arrange utility services, assist in obtaining resident visas for expatriate personnel, and facilitate import and export clearances. Sri Lanka’s GDP grew by 3.6 percent according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2021 and is expected to grow by 3.3 percent in 2022. FDI rose to approximately 0.9 percent of GDP in 2021, higher than the 0.5 percent in 2020 and 0.8 percent in 2019 and half of the 1.8 percent in 2018. The IMF projects a GDP growth of 1.2 percent in 2022. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 102 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 95of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD $165 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD $3,720 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Sri Lanka is a constitutional multiparty socialist republic. In 1978, Sri Lanka began moving away from socialist, protectionist policies and increasing foreign investment, although changes in government are often accompanied by swings in economic policy. While the incumbent government largely promoted pro-business positions, including announcing tax benefits for new investments to attract FDI, the government also made interventionist policies to arrest the ongoing economic fallout from COVID-19. This in turn has altered the field of foreign direct investment towards manufacturing intended to the domestic market. The BOI (www.investsrilanka.com ), an autonomous statutory agency, is the primary government authority responsible for investment, particularly foreign investment, with BOI aiming to provide “one-stop” services for foreign investors. BOI’s Single Window Investment Facilitation Taskforce (SWIFT) helps facilitate the investment approvals process and works with other agencies in order to expedite the process. BOI can grant project incentives, arrange utility services, assist in obtaining resident visas for expatriate personnel, and facilitate import and export clearances. Importers to Sri Lanka face high barriers. According to a World Bank study, Sri Lanka’s import regime is one of the most complex and protectionist in the world. U.S. stakeholders have raised concerns the government does not adequately consult with the private sector prior to implementing new taxes or regulations – citing the severe import restrictions imposed as a reaction to COVID-19 as an example. These restrictions, quickly imposed without consulting the private sector, further complicated Sri Lanka’s import regime. Similarly, stakeholders have raised concerns that the government does not allow adequate time to implement new regulations. Additionally, the Sri Lankan government has banned the importation of several “non-essential” items since April 2020 in an attempt to curtail foreign exchange outflow which has now expanded in 2022 to additional goods subject to import licenses. Sri Lanka is a challenging place to do business, with high transaction costs aggravated by an unpredictable economic policy environment, inefficient delivery of government services, and opaque government procurement practices. Investors noted concerns over the potential for contract repudiation, cronyism, and de facto or de jure expropriation. Public sector corruption is a significant challenge for U.S. firms operating in Sri Lanka and a constraint on foreign investment. While the country generally has adequate laws and regulations to combat corruption, enforcement is weak, inconsistent, and selective. U.S. stakeholders and potential investors expressed particular concern about corruption in large infrastructure projects and in government procurement. Historically, the main political parties do not pursue corruption cases against each other after gaining or losing political positions. While Sri Lanka is a challenging place for businesses to operate, investors report that starting a business in Sri Lanka is relatively simple and quick, especially when compared to other lower middle-income markets. However, scalability is a problem due to the lack of skilled labor, a relatively small talent pool and constraints on land ownership and use. Investors note that employee retention is generally good in Sri Lanka, but numerous public holidays, a reluctance of employees to work at night, a lack of labor mobility, and difficulty recruiting women decrease efficiency and increase start-up times. A leading international consulting firm claims the primary issue affecting investment is lack of policy consistency. Foreign ownership is allowed in most sectors, although foreigners are prohibited from owning land with a few limited exceptions. Foreigners can invest in company shares, debt securities, government securities, and unit trusts. Many investors point to land acquisition as the biggest challenge for starting a new business. Generally, Sri Lanka prohibits the sale of public and private land to foreigners and to enterprises with foreign equity exceeding 50 percent. However, on July 30, 2018, Sri Lanka amended the Land (Restriction of Alienation) Act of 2014 to allow foreign companies listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) to acquire land. Foreign companies not listed on the CSE—but engaged in banking, financial, insurance, maritime, aviation, advanced technology, or infrastructure development projects identified and approved as strategic development projects—may also be exempted from restrictions imposed by the Land Act of 2014 on a case-by-case basis. The government owns approximately 80 percent of the land in Sri Lanka, including the land housing most tea, rubber, and coconut plantations, which are leased out, typically on 50-year terms. Private land ownership is limited to fifty acres per person. Although state land for industrial use is usually allotted on a 50-year lease, the government may approve 99-year leases on a case-by-case basis depending on the project. Many land title records were lost or destroyed during the civil war, and significant disputes remain over land ownership, particularly in the North and East. The government has started a program to return property taken by the government during the war to residents in the North and East. The government allows up to 100 percent foreign investment in any commercial, trading, or industrial activity except for the following heavily regulated sectors: banking, air transportation; coastal shipping; large scale mechanized mining of gems; lotteries; manufacture of military hardware, military vehicles, and aircraft; alcohol; toxic, hazardous, or carcinogenic materials; currency; and security documents. However, select strategic sectors, such as railway freight transportation and electricity transmission and distribution, are closed to any foreign capital participation. Foreign investment is also not permitted in the following businesses: pawn brokering; retail trade with a capital investment of less than $5 million; and coastal fishing. Foreign investments in the following areas are restricted to 40 percent ownership: a) production for export of goods subject to international quotas; b) growing and primary processing of tea, rubber, and coconut, c) cocoa, rice, sugar, and spices; d) mining and primary processing of non-renewable national resources, e) timber based industries using local timber, f) deep-sea fishing, g) mass communications, h) education, i) freight forwarding, j) travel services, k) businesses providing shipping services. In areas where foreign investments are permitted, Sri Lanka treats foreign investors the same as domestic investors. However, corruption reportedly may make it difficult for U.S. firms to compete against foreign bidders not subject to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act when competing for public tenders. Sri Lanka has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews in the last five years. 2004 UNCTAD Report: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/publications/82/investment-policy-review-of-sri-lanka The Department of Registrar of Companies ( www.drc.gov.lk ) is responsible for business registration. Online registration ( http://eroc.drc.gov.lk/ ) was introduced and registration averages four to five days. In addition to the Registrar of Companies, businesses must register with the Inland Revenue Department to obtain a taxpayer identification number (TIN) for payment of taxes and with the Department of Labor for social security payments. The government supports outward investment, and the Export Development Board offers subsidies for companies seeking to establish overseas operations, including branch offices related to exports. New outward investment regulations came into effect November 20, 2017. Sri Lankan companies, partnerships, and individuals are permitted to invest in shares, units, debt securities, and sovereign bonds overseas subject to limits specified by the new Foreign Exchange Regulations. Sri Lankan companies are also permitted to establish overseas companies. Investments over the specified limit require the Central Bank Monetary Board’s approval. All investments must be made through outward investment accounts (OIA). All income from investments overseas must be routed through the same OIA within three months of payment. (Note: In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Sri Lankan government introduced a series of measures attempting to ease pressure on the Sri Lankan rupee. These measures included a temporary suspension on OIA transactions and additional foreign exchange controls for outward investments) 3. Legal Regime Many foreign and domestic investors view the regulatory system as unpredictable with outdated regulations, rigid administrative procedures, and excessive leeway for bureaucratic discretion. BOI is responsible for informing potential investors about laws and regulations affecting operations in Sri Lanka, including new regulations and policies that are frequently developed to protect specific sectors or stakeholders. Effective enforcement mechanisms are sometimes lacking, and investors cite coordination problems between BOI and relevant line agencies. Lack of sufficient technical capacity within the government to review financial proposals for private infrastructure projects also creates problems during the tender process. Corporate financial reporting requirements in Sri Lanka are covered in a number of laws, and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka (ICASL) is responsible for setting and updating accounting standards to comply with current accounting and audit standards adopted by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB). Sri Lanka follows International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for financial reporting purposes set by the IASB. Sri Lankan accounting standards are applicable for all banks, companies listed on the stock exchange, and all other large and medium-sized companies in Sri Lanka. Accounts must be audited by professionally qualified auditors holding ICASL membership. ICASL also has published accounting standards for small companies. The Accounting Standards Monitoring Board (ASMB) is responsible for monitoring compliance with Sri Lankan accounting and auditing standards. Overall legislative authority lies with Parliament. Line ministries draft bills and, together with regulatory authorities, are responsible for crafting draft regulations, which may require approval from the National Economic Council, the Cabinet, and/or Parliament. Bills are published in the government gazette http://documents.gov.lk/en/home.php at least seven days before being placed on the Order Paper of the Parliament (the first occasion the public is officially informed of proposed laws) with drafts being treated as confidential prior to this. Any member of the public can challenge a bill in the Supreme Court if they do so within one week of its placement on the Order Paper of the Parliament. If the Supreme Court orders amendments to a bill, such amendments must be incorporated before the bill can be debated and passed. Regulations are made by administrative agencies and are published in a government gazette, similar to a U.S. Federal Notice. In addition to regulations, some rules are made through internal circulars, which may be difficult to locate. The Central Bank and the Finance Ministry published information on Central Government debt including contingent liabilities and government finance. Central Bank publishes information on debt of major SOE’s. Debt obligations are available online in the Central Bank Annual Report; Fiscal Management Report of the Finance Ministry; Annual Report of the Ministry of Finance. Information on contingent liabilities is available in the Annual Report of the Ministry of Finance. Since 2018, the Central Bank published guaranteed debt and central government debt annually. The government does not promote or require companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures, however most large companies listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange disclose these. Sri Lanka is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and has made WTO notifications on customs valuation, agriculture, import licensing, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Sri Lanka ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2016 and a National Trade Facilitation Committee was tasked with undertaking reforms needed to operationalize the TFA. The WTO conducted a review of the TFA in June 2019 in which Sri Lankan officials noted challenges related to accessing technical assistance and capacity building support for implementation of TFA recommendations. In September 2021 Sri Lanka requested for extension of its definitive implementation dates on certain provisions based on Article 17 of the Trade Facilitation Agreement. Sri Lanka’s legal system reflects diverse cultural influences. Criminal law is fundamentally British-based while civil law is Roman-Dutch. Laws on marriage, divorce, inheritance, and other issues can also vary based on religious affiliation. Sri Lankan commercial law is almost entirely statutory, reflecting British colonial law, although amendments have largely kept pace with subsequent legal changes in the United Kingdom. Several important legislative enactments regulate commercial issues: the BOI Law; the Intellectual Property Act; the Companies Act; the Securities and Exchange Commission Act; the Banking Act; the Inland Revenue Act; the Industrial Promotion Act; and the Consumer Affairs Authority Act. Sri Lanka’s court system consists of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, provincial High Courts, and the Courts of First Instance (district courts with general civil jurisdiction) and Magistrate Courts (with criminal jurisdiction). Provincial High Courts have original, appellate, and reversionary criminal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal is an intermediate appellate court with a limited right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court exercises final appellate jurisdiction for all criminal and civil cases. Citizens may apply directly to the Supreme Court for protection if they believe any government or administrative action has violated their fundamental human rights. The principal law governing foreign investment is Law No. 4 (known as the BOI Act), created in 1978 and amended in 1980, 1983, 1992, 2002, 2009 and 2012. The BOI Act and implementing regulations provide for two types of investment approvals, one for concessions and one without concessions. Under Section 17 of the Act, the BOI is empowered to approve companies satisfying minimum investment criteria with such companies eligible for duty-free import concessions. The BOI acts as the “one-stop-shop” to facilitate all the requirements of the foreign investors to Sri Lanka. Investment approval under Section 16 of the BOI Act permits companies to operate under the “normal” laws and applies to investments that do not satisfy eligibility incentive criteria. From April 1, 2017, Inland Revenue Act No. 24 of 2017 created an investment incentive regime granting a concessionary tax rate (for specific sectors) and capital allowances (depreciation) based on capital investments. Commercial Hub Regulation No 1 of 2013 applies to transshipment trade, offshore businesses, and logistic services. The Strategic Development Project Act of 2008 (SDPA) provides tax incentives for large projects that the Cabinet identifies as “strategic development projects.” https://investsrilanka.com/ Sri Lanka does not have a specific competition law. Instead, the BOI or respective regulatory authorities may review transactions for competition-related concerns. In March of 2017, Parliament approved the “Anti-Dumping and Countervailing” and “Safeguard Measures” Acts. These laws provide a framework against unfair trade practices and import surges and allow government trade agencies to initiate investigations relating to unfair business practices to impose additional and/or countervailing duties. Since economic liberalization policies began in 1978, the government has not expropriated a foreign investment, with the last expropriation dispute resolved in 1998. The land acquisition law (Land Acquisition Act of 1950) empowers the government to take private land for public purposes with compensation based on a government valuation. The Companies Act and the Insolvency Ordinance provide for dissolution of insolvent companies, but there is no mechanism to facilitate the reorganization of financially troubled companies. Other laws make it difficult to keep a struggling company solvent. The Termination of Employment of Workmen Special Provisions Act (TEWA), for example, makes it difficult to fire or lay off workers who have been employed for more than six months for any reason other than serious, well-documented disciplinary problems. In the absence of comprehensive bankruptcy laws, extra-judicial powers granted by law to financial institutions protect the rights of creditors. A creditor may petition the court to dissolve the company if the company cannot make payments on debts in excess of LKR 50,000 ($320.00). Lenders are also empowered to foreclose on collateral without court intervention. However, loans below LKR 5 million ($32,000) are exempt, and lenders cannot foreclose on collateral provided by guarantors to a loan. Sri Lanka ranked 94 out of 190 countries in the resolving insolvency index in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2020. Resolving insolvency takes, on average, 1.7 years at a cost equivalent to 10 percent of the estate’s value. 6. Financial Sector The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) governs the CSE, unit trusts, stockbrokers, listed public companies, margin traders, underwriters, investment managers, credit rating agencies, and securities depositories. https://cse.lk/ Foreign portfolio investment is encouraged. Foreign investors can purchase up to 100 percent of equity in Sri Lankan companies in permitted sectors. Investors may open an Inward Investment Account (IIA) with any commercial bank in Sri Lanka to bring in investments. As of January 31, 2022, 297 companies representing 20 business sectors are listed on the CSE. As stock market liquidity is limited, investors need to manage exit strategies carefully. In accordance with its IMF Article VIII obligations, the government and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) generally refrain from restrictions on current international transfers. When the government experiences balance of payments difficulties, it tends to impose controls on foreign exchange transactions. Due to pressures on the balance of payments caused by the COVID-19 and the subsequent economic crisis, Sri Lanka took several measures to restrict imports and limit outward capital transactions in 2020, these limits are still in place as of March 2022. Further, import restrictions The state consumes over 50 percent of the country’s domestic financial resources and has a virtual monopoly on the management and use of long-term savings. This inhibits the free flow of financial resources to product and factor markets. High budget deficits have caused interest rates to rise and resulted in higher inflation. On a year-to-year basis, inflation was approximately 17.5 percent in February of 2022, and the average prime lending rate was 9.91 percent. Retained profits finance a significant portion of private investment in Sri Lanka with commercial banks as the principal source of bank finance and bank loans as the most widely used credit instrument for the private sector. Large companies also raise funds through corporate debentures. Credit ratings are mandatory for all deposit-taking institutions and all varieties of debt instruments. Local companies can borrow from foreign sources. FDI finances about 6 percent of overall investment. Foreign investors can access credit on the local market and are free to raise foreign currency loans. Sri Lanka has a diversified banking system. In terms of physical access to outlets, Sri Lanka also enjoys high levels of banking penetration, with bank branch density at 17 per 100,000 adults, compared to the South Asia regional average of 10.2. There are 25 commercial banks: 13 local and 12 foreign. In addition, there are seven specialized local banks. Citibank N.A. is the only U.S. bank operating in Sri Lanka. Several domestic private commercial banks have substantial government equity acquired through investment agencies controlled by the government. Banking has expanded to rural areas, and by end of 2020 there were over 3,619 commercial bank branches and over 6,176 Automated Teller Machines throughout the country. Both resident and non-resident foreign nationals can open foreign currency banking accounts. However, non-resident foreign nationals are not eligible to open Sri Lankan Rupee accounts. A foreign individual can open a Personal Foreign Currency Account or (PFC account). This is a special type of account that can be opened in foreign currencies carried by the overseas client. Just like an ordinary bank account, this type of account gives interests against the deposits. CBSL https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/ is responsible for supervision of all banking institutions and has driven improvements in banking regulations, provisioning, and public disclosure of banking sector performance as well as setting exchange rates, which have shifted regularly with the ongoing economic crisis. Credit ratings are mandatory for all banks. CBSL introduced accounting standards corresponding to International Financial Reporting Standards for banks on January 1, 2018, and the application of the standards substantially increased impairment provisions on loans. The migration to the Basel III capital standards began in July of 2017 on a staggered basis, with full implementation was kicking in on January 1, 2019 and some banks having had to boost capital to meet full implementation of Basel III requirements. In addition, banks must increase capital to meet CBSL’s new minimum capital requirements deadline, which is set for December 31, 2022. A staggered application of capital provisions for smaller banks unable to meet capital requirements immediately will likely be allowed. Total assets of the banking industry stood at LKR 16,923 billion ($64 billion) as of December 31, 2020. The two fully state-owned commercial banks – Bank of Ceylon and People’s Bank – are significant players, accounting for about 33 percent of all banking assets. The Bank of Ceylon currently holds a non-performing loan (NPL) ratio of 6 percent (up from 4.89 percent in 2020). The People’s Bank currently holds a NPL ratio of 3.85 percent (up from 3.68 percent in 2019). Both banks have significant exposure to SOEs but, these banks are implicitly guaranteed by the state. The debt moratorium issued by the CBSL for distressed borrowers will expired in 2022, the impact of this is yet to be reflected on the banking sector NPLs. In October 2019, Sri Lanka was removed from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) gray list after making significant changes to its Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Finance of Terrorism (AML/CFT) laws. CBSL is exploring the adoption of blockchain technologies in its financial transactions and appointed two committees to investigate the possible adoption of blockchain and cryptocurrencies. Sri Lanka has a rapidly growing alternative financial services industry that includes finance companies, leasing companies, and microfinance institutes. In response, CBSL has established an enforcement unit to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory framework of non-banking financial institutions. Credit ratings are mandatory for finance companies as of October 1, 2018. The government also directed banks to register with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to comply with the U.S. Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Almost all commercial banks have registered with the IRS. Sri Lanka does not have a sovereign wealth fund. The government manages and controls large retirement funds from private sector employees and uses these funds for budgetary purposes (through investments in government securities), stock market investments, and corporate debenture investments. 7. State-Owned Enterprises SOEs are active in transport (buses and railways, ports and airport management, airline operations); utilities such as electricity; petroleum imports and refining; water supply; retail; banking; telecommunications; television and radio broadcasting; newspaper publishing; and insurance. Following the end of the civil war in 2009, Sri Lankan armed forces began operating domestic air services, tourist resorts, and farms crowding out some private investment. In total, there are over 400 SOEs of which 55 have been identified by the Sri Lanka Treasury as strategically important, and 345 have been identified as non-commercial. The current government has not adopted a strategy of privatizing SOEs. Several attempts to sell the government’s stake in the heavily indebted national carrier, Sri Lankan Airlines, were not successful. The government is also seeking to improve the efficiency of SOEs through private sector management practices. SOE labor unions and opposition political parties often oppose privatization and are particularly averse to foreign ownership. Privatization through the sale of shares in the stock market is likely to be less problematic. 10. Political and Security Environment The government’s military campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ended in May 2009 with the defeat of the LTTE. During the civil war, the LTTE had a history of attacks against civilians, although none of the attacks were intentionally directed against U.S. citizens. On April 21, 2019, terrorist attacks targeted several churches and hotels throughout Colombo and in the eastern city of Batticaloa, killing more than 250 people, including over 40 foreigners, five of whom were Americans. In the aftermath of the attacks, the government imposed nationwide curfews and a temporary ban on some social media outlets. Public opposition to the current government and growing outrage over power, fuel, and food shortages morphed into a largescale protest movement in March 2022. Since then, peaceful protests have been noted nearly every day both in Colombo and across the country, including an ongoing encampment in central Colombo next to the Presidential Secretariat. As public concern grows, some protests have turned violence due to clashes with pro-government protesters or security forces, such as a confrontation between protesters and police on April 19 in a city about 100 km from Colombo. In addition, protesters have surrounded and entered (or attempted to enter) the residences and offices of MPs and officials, and police have sometimes used tear gas and water cannons to disperse protesters. The worst violence occurred on May 9, when attacks by pro-government supporters on two major protest sites in Colombo triggered a wave of retaliatory violence in which anti-government protesters set fire to or vandalized approximately 100 homes and other properties around the country belonging to or affiliated with government MPs and officials. Violence continued into the next day, with busses and cars burned on the streets and dozens of people seriously injured. Declaring a state of emergency, the government worked with the military to restore order to the streets. While subsequent protests have mostly been peaceful, the situation remains volatile and ongoing shortages of essentials and power cuts continue to cause distress. Sudan Executive Summary Following the end of the 30-year regime of Omar Bashir in 2019, Sudan’s military and a coalition of civilian opposition groups agreed to a three-year power-sharing agreement under the Civilian-Led Transitional Government (CLTG) that was to culminate with a popularly elected government in 2022. The clock on that agreement was reset to 2024 with the integration of former armed opposition groups into the CLTG following the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement on October 3, 2020. The transition ended abruptly on October 25, 2021, when the country’s military, led by General Abdul Fattah al-Burhan, seized power and ousted the CLTG, including Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. The military takeover precipitated a political crisis that continues into 2022. Sudanese citizens, angered and frustrated by the military’s seizure of power, initiated a series of regular nationwide protests demanding a return to civilian rule. In January 2022, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) launched a mediation effort aimed at bringing together a broad range of civilian actors to begin negotiations on a political solution to restore Sudan’s democratic transition; the African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development later joined that effort. During its two-year administration, the CLTG initiated a series of political, economic, and legal reforms. In cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government pursued a program that reduced or eliminated several costly subsidy programs, improved fiscal discipline and public financial management, adopted currency and tariff reforms, and launched a revision of its commercial laws. The international community, under U.S. government leadership, took actions to dramatically reduce Sudan’s outstanding $56 billion international debt by paying off debt arrears owed to International Financial Institutions and organizing debt relief among creditors nations. A popularly supported “Dismantling Committee,” in concert with the Ministry of Justice, was intended to root out corruption, identify and seize illegally obtained assets, and return much of the national wealth that was spirited out of the country by Bashir-era cronies. The October 25 military takeover stalled most CLTG reform efforts and threatens to reverse the gains of the previous two years. Sudan’s current military leadership dismissed most of the civilian ministers, including the Prime Minister, appointing in their place “caretaker” ministers absent legal authority to do so. The international community has imposed significant costs on Sudan’s military regime for its actions. The United States has paused all non-humanitarian assistance to Sudan, and much assistance from bilateral donors and International Financial Institutions also remain paused. The United States government has been clear that the only path to restoring financial assistance is predicated on restoring Sudan’s democratic transition. The ongoing political turmoil has produced economic uncertainty, a depreciating national currency, price increases, and shortages of grain, fuel, medicine, and other imported commodities. The sectors of greatest interest to foreign investors remain mineral extraction (primarily gold, non-precious metals, oil, and natural gas) and agriculture. Sudan’s infrastructure is in significant need of modernization and expansion. Many American companies have inquired about investment opportunities and visited Sudan with an expressed interest in direct investment and promotion of U.S. products. The Sudanese have expressed a robust interest in obtaining U.S. goods, services, technologies, and training/capacity building programs. However, a lack of domestic investment capital, poor infrastructure, burdensome bureaucracy, endemic corruption, and low household incomes create challenges for any company considering the Sudanese market. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 164 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $650 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Sudanese government eagerly encourages foreign direct investment (FDI). The Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation acts as the government’s investment promotion agency for foreign investors seeking to initiate projects that include domestically produced content. The Ministry offers, depending on the type of project, a range of tax incentives, customs exclusions, and land grants to attract investment. The Ministry provides “single window” service for potential investors who submit project proposals and feasibility studies for review and possible approval. Project proposals are reviewed by officials and technical experts from related ministries. Potential investors are informed in writing of decisions to approve or reject project proposals. The Investment Encouragement Act of 2021 establishes equal treatment to foreign and domestic business owners, allowing foreign investors to own business enterprises in Sudan. [Note: The law is new and its applicability untested. Officials at the Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation strongly encourage foreign investors to engage with a Sudanese partner when considering entering the market.] The Act requires foreign investors to deposit at least $250,000 to obtain a business license. Furthermore, it clarifies the definitions of the various types of investment projects which were regulated in the 2013 Act, including state projects, investment projects, national projects, and strategic projects. There are foreign investment restrictions in the transportation sector, specifically in railway, freight transportation, inland waterways barge service, and airport operations. Most telecommunications and media, including television broadcasting and newspaper publishing, are closed to foreign capital participation. Foreign ownership is also restricted in the electrical power generation and financial services sectors. In addition to those overt statutory ownership restrictions, a comparatively large number of sectors are dominated by government monopolies, including those mentioned above. Such monopolies, together with a high perceived difficulty of obtaining required operating licenses, make it more difficult for foreign companies to invest. Sudan has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews (IPR) through the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), or the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in the last five years. No civil society organization, including those based in the host country or in third countries, have published reviews of investment policy-related concerns. UNCTAD’s last IPR of Sudan was in 2015. In late 2020, the CLTG launched a series of economic reforms designed to meet the benchmarks established under the IMF’s Staff Monitored Program (SMP). The SMP focused on addressing major macroeconomic imbalances caused by decades of mismanagement, laying the groundwork for inclusive growth, and establishing a track record of sound policies required for debt relief. The CLTG subsequently enacted structural reforms which slashed costly and unsustainable subsidies, adopted foreign exchange liberalization, reduced the government’s fiscal gap, and improved public financial management. The CLTG’s significant progress under the SMP led to an Extended Credit Facility (ECF) program launched in June 2021. However, most IMF assistance was paused after the military’s October 25 government takeover. On March 7, 2022, the Central Bank of Sudan abandoned its managed float policy and allowed the Sudanese Pound to freely float against other currencies. However, Sudan faces a severe foreign exchange reserves shortage and the national currency faces depreciation pressures. Domestic businesses have no assurance of obtaining needed levels of foreign currency for international transactions. The government strictly controls incoming hard currency from exports and business owners wishing to retrieve cash can only make withdrawals denominated in Sudanese pounds at the time of this report. Foreign companies operating in Sudan must have the Central Bank of Sudan’s permission to repatriate profits and foreign currency. The Investment Act of 2013 enshrines the right to repatriate capital and profits, provided the investor has opened an investment account at the Central Bank of Sudan before entering into business. To avoid banking delays, many Sudanese firms complete a significant number of transactions outside of official channels or complete transactions abroad in U.S. Dollars, Euros, Riyals, or Dirhams. Whether or not the government will revise its practices to ensure a steady stream of foreign exchange, if international correspondent banking ever resumes, remains to be seen. The Investment Act also established courts to handle investment issues and disputes. According to the 2015 UNCTAD report, Sudan has put in place a relatively open investment legislative framework and many laws are in line with international best practices. However, their implementation is often impeded by the absence of secondary legislation, insufficient institutional capacity, and lack of coordination between different levels of government. https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-review/205/sudan Sudan’s investment authority lists the process by which businesses must register to operate at: http://www.sudaninvest.org/English/Default.htm . The website outlines procedures for companies that wish to invest, including forming and ending relationships and license applications. There is no online business registration process. Officials at the Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation recommend enlisting the service on an agent to help facilitate the business registration process. http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Publications/Details/148 provides an outline of investment facilitation proposals. www.GER.co provides links to business registration sites worldwide. Sudan’s government does not have policies in place to promote outward investment. It does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. http://www.sudaninvest.org/English/Invest-Services.htm 3. Legal Regime Some ministries and regulatory agencies distribute the text or summary of proposed regulations before their enactment to interested stakeholders but are under no legal obligation to do so. There is no period of time set by law for the text of proposed regulations to be publicly available. Some agencies make received comments publicly accessible. There is no specialized government body or department tasked with soliciting and receiving these comments. Some ministries and agencies report on the results of the consultation on proposed regulations in the form of one consolidated response in an official gazette, journal, or other publication or directly distributed to interested stakeholders. This reporting on the results of the consultation is not required by law. https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/sudan# . There is no centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published. https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/sudan# Regulations are developed at the federal (national), state, and local levels. Ministries develop regulations to support federal laws, while state and local jurisdictions can adopt additional regulations to address local concerns. Federal legislation is the most relevant to foreign businesses. Under the CLTG, legislation was drafted using a consensus approach that included input from affected ministries, consultations with local academics, business leaders, and international experts. The consultation period did not make the draft legislation available for public comment. The legislation was next reviewed by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) to determine if it conformed to the Sudanese Constitution. After receiving MoJ approval, the legislation was reviewed and endorsed independently by the civilian Council of Ministers and the joint military-civilian Sovereign Council. Following endorsement, the bill would receive final approval by a majority vote during a joint Council of Ministers/Sovereign Council. The approved legislation would become law once it was published in the MoJ’s Official Gazette. [Note: With the ouster of Prime Minister Hamdok and dissolution of the CLTG’s Council of Ministers, military authorities have governed through the Sovereign Council by decree. End Note.] New regulations are posted on ministry websites and made available in printed pamphlets and booklets. Regulations are legally reviewable in court. Several ministries have committees that review complaints and arbitrate regulatory disputes. The CLTG committed to strengthen governance and improve fiscal transparency by establishing civilian control over all public finances and assets, including those under the control of the Sudanese security and intelligence services, and to develop a transparent budget that accounts for all public expenditures. The government sought to institutionalize its commitment to accountability and good governance through the development and adoption of a Public Financial Management (PFM) roadmap by September 2021. The roadmap would seek to outline a series of medium-term actions to address identified PFM vulnerabilities. Although finalization of the roadmap was derailed by the military takeover, the draft roadmap would provide a useful reference point for future civilian leadership to adopt. Sudan’s Ministry of Industry and Trade provides a list of all of Sudan’s bilateral and regional trade agreements: http://www.tpsudan.gov.sd/index.php/en/pages/details/154/Agreements Sudan is a signatory of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area Agreement (GAFTA) and a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMSEA). It is not a member of the WTO. Sudan does not currently qualify for the U.S Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Sudan’s legal code is a mixture of British common law practices, Islamic law, and customary law. Contracts are enforced through the courts. Sudan has written commercial and contractual laws. Business regulations or enforcement actions are appealable and are adjudicated in the national court system. The Investment Act of 2013 established courts to handle disputes. Sudan’s investment authority lists the process by which businesses much register to operate at: http://www.sudaninvest.org/English/Default.htm . The website outlines procedures for companies that wish to invest, including forming and ending relationships and license applications. There is not an online business registration process. On May 12, 2021, Sudan passed Public Private Partnership Law No. 10 of 2021, which aims to create a business-friendly environment that attracts foreign investors. The law is part of a set of reforms driven by the transitional government to achieve a successful transition to an open, dynamic, and business-friendly economy. The law organizes and promotes public private partnerships (PPPs) to encourage private entities to invest and participate in projects alongside public entities. It also intends to ensure transparency and integrity in procedures and equal and fair treatment for bidders. The law creates a central unit with an independent budget to ensure the development, management, and implementation of PPP projects. It allows both the public and private sectors to suggest PPP projects. The Investment Encouragement Act, which was issued on 11 April 2021, seeks to improve on the 2013 Investment Act in terms of treatment of investors regardless of their nationality, and to create a more predictable and transparent regime that facilitates investment. Key changes include: (i) provision of new tax exemptions, including as regards the business profits tax; (ii) creation of an investment register for collecting data on investing entities; (iii) introduction of an online investment guide to clarify and facilitate investment procedures; (iv) creation of a specialized insurance company that insures investors against various risks (e.g., risks of nationalization, risks of war, domestic conflict and civil disobedience, risks of recession, etc.) for an annual premium, and (v) publication of a special exclusion list detailing the sectors and activities not available to foreign investors. The new law also requires foreign investors to deposit at least $250,000 to obtain a license. Furthermore, it clarifies the definitions of the various types of investment projects which were regulated in the 2013 Act, including State Projects, Investment projects, National Projects, and Strategic Projects. The law was published in the official Sudan Gazette of 12 May 2021 and is available at: https://moj.gov.sd/files/index/28 . The Economic Security Department of the General Intelligence Service (GIS) reviews transactions (mergers, acquisitions, etc.) and conduct (cartels, monopolization) for competition-related concerns (whether domestic or international in nature). This system is opaque; however, its decisions can be appealed through the judicial system. The government has the legal right to expropriate private property for public use under its eminent domain powers. The government has a history of expropriating private property without adequately compensating owners. In certain circumstances the government has incarcerated owners who refused to surrender their property. The CLTG formed the Empowerment Elimination, Anti-Corruption, and Funds Recovery Committee (commonly called the Dismantling Committee) in November 2019 after the CLTG approved a law to dismantle the institutions established under the Bashir regime. Despite initial steps by the Committee to recover assets stolen during the Bashir dictatorship and remove Bashir allies from leadership positions in government institutions, its efforts lacked a clear strategy and legal framework for recovering assets domestically and abroad associated with the banned National Congress Party, its officials, and its affiliates. Some of the Committee’s actions appeared partisan, capricious, and undertaken unilaterally without coordination with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, the agency that should, in theory, lead on asset recovery efforts. For example, the Committee oversaw the firing of over two hundred Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS) technical experts in March 2021 but provided no recourse for those who contested their supposed affiliation with the National Congress Party. After the military takeover, members of the Committee were explicitly targeted for arrest. Several former members remain in custody on charges of criminal breach of trust, illicit wealth, and dealing in foreign exchange. Meanwhile, hundreds of government officials dismissed by the Committee were reinstated at the CBOS, Ministries, and other government agencies, although it is unclear how many of those reinstated are genuinely affiliated with the Bashir regime and how many are merely long-serving civil servants. The government controls most of the agricultural land in Sudan and has sold or leased millions of acres to Saudi Arabia and other countries. Land laws have historically been an issue of dispute between local communities and the government. The most recent examples of government expropriations were in 2019 when the Bashir regime bulldozed churches and sold the land to private investors. The government claimed the churches did not have permits. Some churches which had existed for decades lacked permits because the government would not issue them. The government claimed the churches were simply squatting on the land illegally. According to the law, for eminent domain claims the government should have compensated the churches. That did not happen in all cases. Government and Arab militias’ expropriation of land in Darfur, Gedaref, and Kassala states without compensation have been reported. In some cases, displaced persons returned to their land only to be denied access. In most instances, the government did not adequately respond to appeals. The Bankruptcy Act of 1929, Companies Act of 2003, and Insolvency Act of 2011 are the key bankruptcy laws currently in force in Sudan. The bankruptcy system is based on British legal traditions. 6. Financial Sector Sudan has a stock market (KSE) which is located in Khartoum. The KSE has over 67 companies ( http://www.kse.com.sd/ ) that include banks, brokerage firms, communication/media companies, investment and development houses, and industrial firms. Market trading occurs Sunday-Thursday from 1000-1200 local time. KSE has not published an annual report since 2019. Historically, Sudan has not had access to international banking institutions as it was under comprehensive U.S. economic and financial sanctions until late 2017. The U.S. government delisted Sudan as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in December 2022. Despite lifting of these comprehensive sanctions, international banks remain reluctant to operate in Sudan. Most foreign banks operating in Sudan are based in Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, or Qatar. Sudan faces a monetary crisis, with limited foreign exchange and a significant currency black market. The Central Bank of Sudan lists banks operating in Sudan at: https://cbos.gov.sd/en/content/operating-banks-sudan Under the IMF’s ECF program, Sudan has committed to strengthening financial sector soundness and mitigating risks, including through enhanced risk-based anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing (AML/CTF) supervision. In June 2021, Sudanese authorities had completed ten required AML/CTF onsite inspections of local banks. The inspections focused on politically exposed persons, suspicious transaction reporting, and higher-risk customers and transactions in the real estate sector. Following the conclusion of these onsite inspections, the Central Bank planned to provide aggregate data to the IMF on violations identified and sanctions levied, in line with Sudan’s existing legal framework. Under the ECF, Sudan has agreed to complete a money laundering and terrorist financing national risk assessment (NRA) and to disseminate the results of the NRA to financial institutions, designated non-financial businesses and professions, and the general public. Sudanese civilian authorities also committed to endorse and adopt a national AML/CTF strategy to mitigate risks identified in the NRA. These are fundamental steps necessary to building an AML/CTF regime which can effectively respond to identified money laundering and terrorist financing threats. Sudan has a sovereign wealth fund called the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account, established in 2008. The Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) ranked it 32 out of 34 funds in its 2017 Resource Governance Index, and eight of nine funds in sub-Saharan Africa, ahead of Nigeria’s Excess Crude Account. ( https://resourcegovernanceindex.org/country-profiles/SDN/oil-gas .) The CLTG established a sovereign wealth fund in 2020 to manage real estate recovered by the Dismantling Committee. This fund is not operational. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) associated with the military and security services play an unusually large role in the Sudanese economy and are currently involved in a range of commercial activities, including fuel storage, natural gas projects, solar panel manufacturing, infrastructure, the railroad sector, cotton and textiles, and food industries, including flour milling, bread production, and animal husbandry. Approximately 220 out of approximately 650 SOEs cataloged by the CLTG are associated with Sudan’s military and security services. Reportedly, many of these SOEs are inefficient and poorly managed; however, reforming and transferring them to civilian control has been politically sensitive. Although the CLTG made SOE reform a centerpiece of its broader economic and governance reform program, this agenda has stalled because of the military takeover. As part of the IMF’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) program, Sudanese authorities committed to take the following actions by June 2022: (1) endorse an ownership strategy that sets forth the oversight and management framework for SOEs and guiding principles for a review of the existing stock of SOEs; (2) publish end-2021 financial statements and audit reports for ten priority SOEs and creating a calendar for annual publication of these reports thereafter; and (3) publish a complete list of SOEs, including those in the intelligence sector. SOE audits from previous years exist but authorities have not yet made them public. The U.S. government, in concert with the IMF, continues to press the Sudanese authorities to accelerate their review of SOE operations and publish the aforementioned documents as steps toward greater transparency and adherence to its IMF program. However, military authorities have resisted these reform efforts. Sudan does not have an active privatization program in place for SOEs. 10. Political and Security Environment Sudan’s political and security environment is volatile. Neighborhood Resistance Committees, political parties, and other groups opposing the October 25, 2021, military takeover regularly stage large protests aimed at forcing the military leadership to relinquish control and return Sudan to its democratic transition. These protests have become violent, with 102 protesters killed as of June 2022 and over 2,000 injured by police and security forces since October 2021. On March 21, 2022, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Sudan’s Central Reserve Police for the use of excessive force against peaceful protestors. On May 23, 2022 the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the U.S. Department of Labor issued a business advisory to highlight growing risks to American businesses and individuals associated with conducting business with Sudanese State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) which includes all companies under military control (hereafter collectively referred to as “SOEs and military-controlled companies”). These risks arise from recent actions undertaken by Sudan’s Sovereign Council and security forces under the military’s control and could adversely impact U.S. businesses, individuals, other persons, and their operations in the country and the region. U.S. businesses, individuals, and other persons, including academic institutions, research service providers, and investors (hereafter “businesses and individuals”) that operate in Sudan should be aware of the role of SOEs and military-controlled companies in its economy. Though Sudan’s military has long controlled a network of entities, following its seizure of power on October 25, 2021, it is in effective control of all SOEs. Further, Sudan’s military is increasing its direct control of Sudan’s many SOEs and plans for civilian control over SOEs has been abandoned. Businesses and individuals operating in Sudan and the region should undertake increased due diligence related to human rights issues and be aware of the potential reputational risks of conducting business activities and/or transactions with SOEs and military-controlled companies. U.S. businesses and individuals should also take care to avoid interaction with any persons listed on the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Controls’(OFAC) list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List). The business advisory relates specifically to SOEs and military-controlled companies. The U.S. government does not seek to curtail or discourage responsible investment or business activities in Sudan with civilian-owned Sudanese counterparts. The full business advisory here: https://www.state.gov/risks-and-considerations-for-u-s-businesses-operating-in-sudan/. Suriname Executive Summary The government of Suriname (GOS) officially supports and encourages business development through local and foreign investment. The overall investment climate favors U.S. investors with experience working in developing countries. To attract foreign direct investment (FDI), authorities have planned to update institutional and legal frameworks to protect investors and eliminate restrictions regarding investment income transfers and control related FDI flows. However, the World Trade Organization’s 2019 Trade Policy Review concluded that Suriname’s investment regime has not changed since its last review in 2013. The report states that the overall regime, particularly the approval of FDI, may be discretionary rather than rules based. The extractives sector has historically attracted significant FDI, but numerous factors negatively impact the investment climate. These factors include an unclear process for awarding concessions and public tenders, corruption, institutional capacity constraints, and a lack of overall transparency. In January 2020, Apache and Total announced a “significant oil discovery” off the coast of Suriname, followed by similar discoveries in April 2020, July 2020, January 2021, and February 2022. In December 2020, Malaysian national oil company Petronas and ExxonMobil announced a discovery of hydrocarbons in Suriname’s Block 52. Experts estimate that it could take as much as 5-10 years to begin offshore oil production, assuming world oil prices support it. In 2020, the CEO of state-owned oil company Staatsolie estimated that the government of Suriname could earn $10-$15 billion over the course of 20 years if production reaches similar levels as in neighboring Guyana. Exploration activities are ongoing. U.S.-based Newmont Corporation and Canada-based IAMGOLD – the two major multinational gold companies in Suriname – continue to be the key players in Suriname’s gold mining sector, generating significant revenues for the government. Suriname’s economy has been in decline for the past seven years. To address this decline, the new government developed an economic and recovery plan to deal with these serious economic conditions. After taking office in July 2020, President Chandrikapersad Santokhi’s administration opened negotiations with the International Monetary Fund to arrange a financial assistance package and began talks with international bondholders to restructure Suriname’s repayment schedule. On December 22, 2021, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a 36-month, $688 million Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for Suriname. The EFF will support the government’s economic recovery plan to restore fiscal sustainability, bring public debt down to sustainable levels, upgrade the monetary and exchange rate policy framework, stabilize the financial system, and strengthen institutional capacity to tackle corruption and money laundering and improve governance. On February 14, 2021, the IMF announced that it has reached a staff level agreement with Suriname on policy measures for the completion of the first review under the EFF arrangement. Since taking office, the Santokhi administration allowed the Surinamese dollar to float on the open market, raised taxes on fuel and high income-earners, increased prices for utilities, passed a new law on foreign currency, amended the State Debt Act to allow the government to take loans to address COVID-19, and began reforms of Suriname’s large civil service sector. The government has said it would implement a value-added tax in the future. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 87 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 20xx x of XX N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator N/A U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 20xx USD Amount https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ N/A World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,620 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Government of Suriname (GOS) supports and encourages local and foreign investment to develop its economy. The overall investment climate favors U.S. investors with experience working in developing countries. Investment opportunities exist in the oil and gas sector, mining, agriculture, timber, fishing, financial technology, and tourism. Suriname has no sector-specific laws or practices that discriminate against foreign investors, including U.S. investors, by prohibiting, limiting, or conditioning foreign investment. The only exception is the petroleum sector. The state-owned oil company, Staatsolie, maintains sole ownership of all oil-related activities. Foreign investment is possible through exploration and production sharing contracts (PSCs) with Staatsolie. Five U.S. companies participate in PSCs as operators and/or contract partners. In May 2021, the National Assembly approved a law to establish a State-owned investment company, Suriname Investment Enterprise NV. The Government of Suriname announced plans to disband its two existing investment entities: the Institute for Promoting Investments in Suriname (InvestSur) and the Investment and Development Corporation of Suriname (IDCS). The MFA established an International Business Directorate to act as a first point of entry for foreign investors. Suriname does not have a formal business roundtable or ombudsman aimed at investment retention or maintaining an ongoing dialogue with investors. Foreign and domestic private entities can establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. There are no general limits on foreign ownership or control – statutory, de facto, or otherwise. No law requires that domestic nationals own a minimum percentage of domestic companies or that foreign nationals hold seats on the board. No law caps or reduces the percentage of foreign ownership of any private business enterprise. Except for the hydrocarbon sector, there are no sector-specific restrictions applied to foreign ownership and control. With hydrocarbons, the law limits ownership to Staatsolie, the state-owned oil company, which maintains sole ownership of all petroleum-related activities. Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) countries do enjoy favored status over other sources of foreign investment, but in practice international firms from beyond the CSME are not denied investment opportunities. An Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union aims to provide European companies better access to Suriname. Suriname has not yet ratified the EPA. Government ministries screen inbound foreign investments intended for the sector of the economy that they oversee. Special commissions screen all necessary legal and financial documents. Screening criteria vary but are intended to determine a proposed investment’s compliance with local law. The screening process is neither public nor transparent and can be considered a barrier to investment. The Department of International Business at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests that prospective investors fill out an intake form. The intake form will enable its appraisal committee to conduct a quick scan and conclude whether the FDI in question fits the development goals of the government. The World Trade Organization (WTO) last conducted an investment policy review of Suriname in 2019. The Inter-American Development Bank published a report called Framework for Private Development in Suriname in 2013. The World Bank Group published Suriname Sector Competitiveness Analysis, focusing on the agribusiness and extractive sectors in 2017. There are no civil society organizations in the country that have provided useful reviews of investment policy-related concerns in the past five years. The Santokhi administration has emphasized its desire to diversify Suriname’s economy and deepen business ties with the United States, Europe, and others. In 2020, Suriname’s new government began publishing public tenders on the Ministry of Public Works website. The government created a Presidential Commission on the Surinamese Diaspora to explore the possibilities of raising capital and increasing business ties with the Surinamese community in the Netherlands. In May 2021, the National Assembly approved a law to establish a State-owned investment company, Suriname Investment Enterprise NV. The MFA created an International Business Directorate to act as a first point of entry for foreign investors. There is no online registration system. Companies must register with the local Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which provides guidance on registration procedures. At the time of registration, the company needs a local notary’s assent to ratify the company bylaws. For non-residents, the notary also sends a request to the Foreign Exchange Commission for approval. Applicants must obtain a tax number at the registration office of the tax department. Applications then go to the Ministry of Justice and Police and finally to the President for approval. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Technological Innovation launched the Suriname Electronic Single Window (SESW) in September 2019. Online submission and processing of documents required for import, transit of goods, and export is now possible. The World Bank’s Doing Business report indicates starting a business requires 66 days. The local Chamber of Commerce and Industry states it can take as little as 30 days. The Government does not promote or incentivize outward investment. Suriname’s outward investment is minimal. Due to the small size of the local market, some domestic companies have expanded to CARICOM member states, such as Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago. 3. Legal Regime Suriname does not have transparent policies nor effective laws to foster competition. The previous National Assembly (2015-2020) indicated that it would vote on a draft competition law but did not do so. The Competitiveness Unit of Suriname coordinates and monitors national competitiveness and is working towards establishing policies and suggesting legislation to foster competition. Current legislation on topics such as taxes, the environment, health, safety, and other matters are not purposefully used to impede investment but may still form obstacles. Employment protection legislation is among the most stringent in the world. Labor laws, for instance, prohibit employers from firing an employee without the permission of the Ministry of Labor once the employee has fulfilled his or her probationary period, which by law is limited to two months. Tax laws are criticized for overburdening the formal business sector, while a large informal sector goes untaxed. Public sector contracts and concessions are not always awarded in a clear and transparent manner. The current administration has announced its commitment to greater transparency in the public tendering process, and the Ministry of Public Works is publishing procurement notices on its website on a regular basis. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. Rule-making and regulatory authority exist within relevant ministries at the national level. It is this level of regulation that is most relevant for foreign businesses. The government may consult with relevant stakeholders on regulations, but there is no required public process. The government presents draft laws and regulations to the Council of Minsters for discussion and approval. Once approved, the President’s advisory body, the State Council, considers the draft. If approved, the government presents a draft to the National Assembly for discussion, amendment, and approval, and then to the President for signature. Legislation only goes into effect with the signature of the President and after publication in the National Gazette. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are often outdated and therefore not transparent nor consistent with international norms. The National Assembly passed the Act on Annual Accounts in 2017 to create more fiscal transparency by requiring all companies, including state owned enterprises, to publish annual accounts based on the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The law went into effect in 2020 for large companies, while it went into effect for small and medium sized companies (SMEs) in 2021. Small companies can use the IFRS for SMEs. Suriname passed new legislation in October 2018 to professionalize and institute better standards in the accounting profession. The legislation created the Suriname Chartered Accountants Institute (SCAI) and makes membership mandatory for accountants in Suriname. The board of the SCAI has the responsibility to monitor the quality of the profession and apply disciplinary measures. The intake form used by the division of International Business at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation does mention that companies can submit an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) if available. Draft bills or regulations are discussed in view of the public, and relevant stakeholders may be consulted. The National Assembly has established the email address feedbackwetgeving@dna.sr as a place where individuals can give their opinion on draft legislation. There is no centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published. However, the National Assembly publishes the actual text of adopted laws on its website. It is unclear what the regulatory enforcement mechanisms that ensure the government follows administrative processes might be, as the processes have not been made public. There is no public administration law. The Auditor General’s office is an independent body in charge of supervising the financial management of government funds. The Supreme Audit Institution reports to the National Assembly. The Central Accountant Service exercises control on administrative processes at the ministries and reports to the Ministry of Finance. There are no centralized online locations where key regulatory actions, or their summaries, are published. The minimum wage law was revised by State Decree on July 18, 2019. In January 2021, the government announced its intent to implement a value-added tax (VAT) by January 01, 2022, but it has not yet been implemented. The VAT is now scheduled to be implemented July 1, 2022. No new business rules were announced in 2021. It is unclear what the regulatory enforcement mechanisms are, as the process has not been made public. Regulatory reform efforts announced in prior years have not been fully implemented. Regulations are developed by ministries that have jurisdiction over the relevant area, in consultation with stakeholders. The government’s executive budget proposal and enacted budget are easily accessible to the public. Actual revenues and expenditures regularly deviate from the budget as passed, and the origin and level of accuracy of some information in the budget is unreliable. A full end-of-year report is not publicly available. The Supreme Audit Institution publishes a limited audit based on self-reporting by the ministries. The State Debt Management Office (SDMO) is responsible for the operational management of the public debt of the government. Data regarding public debt is published every three months in the Government Gazette of Suriname and on the SDMO website. As a member of CARICOM, Suriname has committed to regionally coordinated regulatory systems. Suriname uses national and international standards. Standards developed by international and regional standardization bodies include ISO, Codex Alimentarius, International Electro Technical Commission, CROSQ, ASTM International, COPANT, SMIIC (Standards and Metrology Institute for Islamic Countries), NEN (Nederland Normalisatie Instituut), ETSI, GLOBAL GAP, etc. Suriname is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) lists only one notification from Suriname in 2015. Suriname’s legal system is based on the Dutch civil system. Judges uphold the sanctity of contracts and enforce them in accordance with their terms. When an individual or company disputes a signed contract, they have the right to take the case to court. The judiciary consistently upholds local law, applies it, and enforces it for local and international businesses. Laws are defined in criminal, civil, and commercial codes, and verdicts are based on the judge’s interpretation of those codes. There is no specialized commercial court. The commercial codes contain commercial legislation. Historically, the judicial system has been considered independent of the executive branch. Most observers consider the judicial system to be procedurally competent, fair, reliable, and free of overt government interference. Due to a shortage of judges and administrative staff, processing of civil cases can be delayed. Last year, the Court of Justice appointed seven new judges to ease the delay in court cases. There are now 30 judges. Draft regulations may be reviewed by interested stakeholders, and they may be given the opportunity to comment. Since October 2019, individuals have also had the option to comment on draft legislation via email at feedbackwetgeving@dna.sr. There is no formal, required public consultation process. Suriname has no general administrative law, so there are no special administrative tribunals. Judges of the regular courts also hear cases of administrative law. The overall legal regime, and more particularly the approval of foreign direct investment (FDI), may be discretionary rather than rules based. This can lead to heightened unpredictability and uncertainty and associated risks of favoritism and corruption. In July 2021 the National Assembly approved ratification of The Law of Accession to the Republic of Suriname to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) In April 2020, the previous National Assembly passed the COVID-19 State of Emergency Law, which granted the government broad powers to enforce COVID-19-related precautionary measures. It also created a $53 million fund to assist struggling businesses, and it allowed the government to take loans and advances from local institutions and consolidate them into a single mega-loan. The new National Assembly extended the law in August 2020 and extended it once again in February 2021. The National Assembly extended this law once again in August 2021, for the duration of twelve months. In August 2021, the National Assembly approved an amendment of the turnover tax law. Turnover tax on goods, and services was increased to twelve percent. In February 2021, the Foreign Exchange Commission announced three new measures regarding exchange rate policy. First, exporters are now required to repatriate earned export revenues to Suriname, which requires a buyer abroad to pay for purchased goods through a Surinamese commercial bank. Second, exporters and foreign exchange offices must exchange 30% of their foreign currency income into Surinamese Dollars (SRD). Third, importers are required to pay for imports via Surinamese commercial banks. Several criminal investigations of former government officials began in 2020. In February 2020, former Central Bank Governor Robert van Trikt was arrested on fraud charges. In August 2020, the new National Assembly officially indicted ex-Minister of Finance Gillmore Hoefdraad, which allowed the Attorney General to launch an investigation into alleged financial mismanagement by Hoefdraad in collaboration with the ex-Governor of the Central Bank of Suriname, Robert van Trikt. In December 2020, the National Assembly voted to indict former Vice President (and current National Assembly member) Ashwin Adhin, which allowed the Attorney General to pursue a criminal investigation for embezzlement, fraud, and destruction of government property. In Jan 2022, both Hoefdraad and van Trikt were sentenced to twelve and eight years in prison respectively. There is no primary one-stop-shop website for investments that provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. There are no domestic agencies currently reviewing transactions for competition-related concerns. The previous National Assembly (2015-2020) considered draft laws on competition and consumer protection but did not ultimately vote on them. According to the authorities, no date for enactment is foreseen. Both draft laws also cover state-owned enterprises. The CARICOM Competition Commission is based in Suriname, and it monitors potential anti-competitive practices for enterprises operating within the CARICOM Single Market and Economy. According to Article 34 of Suriname’s constitution, expropriation will take place “only for reasons of public utility” and with prior compensation. In practice, the government has no history of expropriations. However, Article 42 of Suriname’s constitution specifically refers to all natural resources as property of the nation, and states that the nation has inalienable rights to take possession of all natural resources to utilize them for the economic, social, and cultural development of Suriname. There is no history of government measures alleged to be, or that could be argued to be, indirect expropriation, such as confiscatory tax regimes or regulatory actions that deprive investors of substantial economic benefits from their investments. Suriname has bankruptcy legislation. Creditors, equity shareholders, and holders of other financial contracts, including foreign contract holders, have the right to file for liquidation of debts due to insolvency. In a case where there is a loan from a commercial bank, repayment of the bank loan takes precedence. Bankruptcy, in principle, is not criminalized. However, in cases where a board of directors encouraged a company to pursue bankruptcy to avoid creditors, courts have viewed this behavior as a criminal offense. In the World Bank’s Doing Business Report, Suriname stands at 139 in the ranking of 190 economies on the ease of resolving insolvency. 6. Financial Sector The government does not promote portfolio investment. There is a small self-regulating stock market with eleven companies registered. It meets twice a month but does not have an electronic exchange. There is no effective regulatory system to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. At present, Suriname is facing liquidity shortfalls. Sufficient policies do exist to facilitate the free flow of financial resources. As an IMF Article VIII member, Suriname has agreed to refrain from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms and at market rates. Foreign investors that establish businesses in Suriname are able to get credit on the local market, usually with a payment guarantee from the parent company. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. Larger companies can obtain customized credit products. There is, however, a Central Bank regulation that limits a commercial bank’s credit exposure to a single client. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. Larger companies can obtain customized credit products. According to the IMF Article IV Consultation in 2019, the banking system faces pressing vulnerabilities. Based on June 2020 data, the total non-performing loan ratio was 13.5 percent in June 2020, indicating an increase of 2.9 percent compared to 10.5 percent in December 2019, and is well above the internal guideline of five percent. (Source: Financial Nota 2021) The estimated total assets of the economy’s largest banks are: DSB Bank (annual report, 2018): $1,007 million. DSB annual report 2019 is delayed due to COVID-19 and time needed to implement. IFRS Hakrin Bank (semiannual report June 30, 2020): $731.8 million. Republic Bank Limited (2021 annual report, Suriname-based assets): $395.3 million. (The Republic Bank Limited of Trinidad and Tobago acquired Royal Bank of Canada’s Suriname holdings in 2015. Finabank (annual report, 2020): $477.4 million Suriname has a central bank system. Foreign banks or branches are allowed to establish operations in Suriname. They are subject to the same measures and regulations as local banks. According to an IMF assessment in 2016, banks in Suriname are among those in the region that have lost their correspondent relationships. The IMF notes that though the loss of correspondent banking relationships has not reached systemic proportions, a critical risk still exists. According to the IMF’s Article IV Consultation report in 2019, there is a possibility of losing corresponding banking relationships given recent overseas investigations of potential money laundering via Suriname’s financial sector. The reputational risk to both local and foreign banks acting as their correspondents is substantial. In November 2021, Suriname made its National Risk Assessment publicly available. There are no restrictions for foreigners to open a bank account. Banks require U.S. citizens to provide the information necessary to comply with the Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). The process is a lengthy one. On May 4, 2017, the National Assembly passed legislation establishing a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). In August 2020, President Santokhi announced that the government would operationalize Suriname’s SWF, as the previous government had not instituted the necessary state decrees to do so. In December 2020, the government held talks with experts from Norway to learn about the Norwegian SWF. Suriname does not participate in the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State owned enterprises (SOEs) operate in the oil, agribusiness, mining, communications, travel, energy, and financial sectors. The Ministry of Finance is currently working on developing a data base for SOEs. On the website of the Finance Ministry there is a list of 47 parastatals and 57 foundations that are state owned. According to available data from the Ministry of Finance, 22 parastatals are wholly owned. The ministry has also published some annual reports of SOEs from 2015 to 2018. There are SOEs that are governed by a director and some by a board. The Ministry is still in the process of information gathering from SOEs. According to data currently available, the number of employees is 13,789. Data regarding total assets and total net income of SOEs is not yet available. There is no public list of SOEs. SOEs receive advantages when competing in the domestic market. These include access to government guarantees and government loans otherwise unavailable to private enterprises. Additionally, SOEs have access to land and raw materials inaccessible to private entities. The government does not yet adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. However, the government’s 2021 restructuring plan mentions that there are plans to implement policies in cooperation with international institutions such as the IDB regarding corporate governance for SOEs. In 2012, the GoS announced a privatization program largely in the agricultural sector, but the only privatization was the state-owned banana company in 2014. The official governing accord of the ruling coalition states that privatization of SOEs will be considered where appropriate, and President Santokhi has indicated that some SOEs will need to be privatized. However, no privatizations have taken place since the new government installation in July 2020. Foreign investors can participate in privatization programs. In 2014, the Belgium multinational, UNIVEG, acquired a 90 percent stake in the state-owned banana company through a public, international bidding process; the European Commission assisted with the bidding. Later, UNIVEG pulled out, and the Government took over the remaining 90 percent of shares and UNIVEG’s $15 million debt and is now the only share holder. This is the only example of privatization in Suriname. No standard privatization or public bidding process has been established. 10. Political and Security Environment Since the conclusion of the interior war in 1992, Suriname has not experienced politically motivated violence or civil disturbance. In July 2019, illegal gold miners damaged property at the Rosebel goldmine after the company’s security personnel fatally shot an illegal goldminer. The mine was subsequently closed for one month, and then reopened. Political polarization has not become severe in Suriname. Elections are considered free and fair by international observers, including national elections on May 25, 2020, which brought the then-opposition parties to power. Sweden Executive Summary Sweden is generally considered a highly favorable investment destination. Sweden offers an extremely competitive, open economy with access to new products, technologies, skills, and innovations. Sweden also has a well-educated labor force, outstanding communication infrastructure, and a stable political environment, which makes it a choice destination for U.S. and foreign companies. Low levels of corporate tax, the absence of withholding tax on dividends, and a favorable holding company regime are additional incentives for doing business in Sweden. Sweden’s attractiveness as an investment destination is tempered by a few structural business challenges. These include high personal and VAT taxes. In addition, the high cost of labor, rigid labor legislation and regulations, a persistent housing shortage, and the general high cost of living in Sweden can present challenges to attracting, hiring, and maintaining talent for new firms entering Sweden. Historically, the telecommunications, information technology, healthcare, energy, and public transport sectors have attracted the most foreign investment. However, manufacturing, wholesale, and retail trade have also recently attracted increased foreign funds. Overall, investment conditions remain largely favorable. In the World Economic Forum’s 2019 Competitiveness Report, Sweden was ranked eight out of 138 countries in overall competitiveness and productivity. The report highlighted Sweden’s strengths: human capital (health, education level, and skills of the population), macroeconomic stability, and technical and physical infrastructure. Bloomberg’s 2021 Innovation Index ranked Sweden fifth among the most innovative nations on earth; a pattern reinforced by Sweden ranked second on the European Commission’s 2021 European Innovation Scoreboard and second on the World Intellectual Property Organization/INSEAD 2021 Global Innovation Index. Also in 2021, Transparency International ranked Sweden as one of the most corruption-free countries in the world – fourth out of 180. Sweden is perceived as a creative place with interesting research and technology. It is well equipped to embrace the Fourth Industrial Revolution with a superior IT infrastructure and is seen as a frontrunner in adopting new technologies and setting new consumer trends. U.S. and other exporters can take advantage of a test market full of demanding, highly sophisticated customers. The COVID-19 pandemic considerably impacted the Swedish economy, but following several fiscal stimulus packages, a successful vaccination rollout, and a relaxation of pandemic-related restrictions, Sweden’ economy has recovered fully to pre-pandemic levels with no notable impact on the investment climate. Climate and the environment are a central concern for the Swedish government, political parties across the political spectrum, businesses, and the public at large. Successive Swedish governments have actively lobbied for ambitious action to protect the environment and to curb greenhouse gases within a multilateral, internationally binding framework and by welcoming research, innovation, and investment within the fields of climate and the environment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 4 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 2 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $63,847 https://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $54,050 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment There are no laws or practices that discriminate or are alleged to discriminate against foreign investors, including and especially U.S. investors, by prohibiting, limiting, or conditioning foreign investment in a sector of the economy (either at the pre-establishment (market access) or post-establishment phase of investment). Until the mid-1980s, Sweden’s approach to direct investment from abroad was quite restrictive and governed by a complex system of laws and regulations. Sweden’s entry into the European Union (EU) in 1995 largely eliminated all restrictions. Restrictions to investment remain in the defense and other sensitive sectors, as addressed in the next section “Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment.” The Swedish Government recognizes the need to further improve the business climate for entrepreneurs, education, and the flow of research from lab to market. Swedish authorities have implemented a number of reforms to improve the business regulatory environment and to attract more foreign investment. In addition, Sweden introduced supplementary provisions to the EU Regulation on Foreign Direct Investments (adopted in March 2019), which entered into force November 1, 2020. Sweden is in the process of drafting its domestic Investment Screening Regime, and the government commission report has been circulated for comments. A final comprehensive regime is expected to enter into force in 2023. In the meantime, Sweden does however have the obligation and ability to review and prevent investments that pose national security threats. There are very few restrictions on where and how foreign enterprises can invest, and there are no equity caps, mandatory joint-venture requirements, or other measures designed to limit foreign ownership or market access. However, Sweden does maintain some limitations in a select number of situations: Accountancy: Investment in the accountancy sector by non-EU-residents cannot exceed 25 percent. Legal services: Investment in a corporation or partnership carrying out the activities of an “advokat,” a lawyer, cannot be done by non-EU residents. Air transport: Foreign enterprises may be restricted from access to international air routes unless bilateral intergovernmental agreements provide otherwise. Air transport: Cabotage is reserved to national airlines. Maritime transport: Cabotage is reserved to vessels flying the national flag. Defense: Restrictions apply to foreign ownership of companies involved in the defense industry and other sensitive areas. On January 1, 2020, Sweden enacted new regulations giving Swedish armed forces and security services authority to deny or revoke operating licenses to mobile radio providers that threaten national security. Swedish company law provides various ways a business can be organized. The main difference between these forms is whether the founder must own capital and to what extent the founder is personally liable for the company’s debt. The Swedish Act (1992:160) on Foreign Branches applies to foreign companies operating through a branch and also to people residing abroad who run a business in Sweden. A branch must have a president who resides within the European Economic Area (EEA). All business enterprises in Sweden (including branches) are required to register at the Swedish Companies Registration Office, Bolagsverket. An invention or trademark must be registered in Sweden in order to obtain legal protection. A bank from a non-EEA country needs special permission from the Financial Supervisory Authority, Finansinspektionen, to establish a branch in Sweden. Sweden also adheres to EU regulations on investment screening and approval mechanisms for inbound foreign investment. Sweden has in the past five years not undergone an investment policy review (IPRs) by the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Working Group on Business and Human Rights, or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In the past five years, Sweden has not undergone a review of investment policy-related concerns by civil society organizations, including those based in the host country or in third countries. Business Sweden’s Swedish Trade and Invest Council is the investment promotion agency tasked with facilitating business. The services of the agency are available to all investors. All forms of business enterprise, except for sole traders, have to be registered with the Swedish Companies Registration Office, Bolagsverket, before starting operations. Sole traders may apply for registration in order to be given exclusive rights to the name in the county where they will be operating. Online applications to register an enterprise can be made at https://www.bolagsverket.se/en and are open to foreign companies. The process of registering an enterprise is clear and can take a few days or up to a few weeks, depending on the complexity and form of the business enterprise. All business enterprises, including sole traders, need also to be registered with the Swedish Tax Agency, Skatteverket, before starting operations. Relevant information and guides can be found at http://www.skatteverket.se . Depending on the nature of business, companies may need to register with the Environmental Protection Agency, Naturvårdsverket, or, if real estate is involved, the county authorities. Non-EU/EEA citizens need a residence permit, obtained from the Swedish Board of Migration, Migrationsverket, in order to start up and/or run a business. A compilation of Swedish government agencies that work with registering, starting, running, expanding and/or closing a business can be found at http://www.verksamt.se . The Government of Sweden has commissioned the Swedish Exports Credit Guarantee Board (EKN) to promote Swedish exports and the internationalization of Swedish companies. EKN insures exporting companies and banks against non-payment in export transactions, thereby reducing risk and encouraging the expansion of operations. As part of its export strategy presented in 2015, the Swedish Government has also launched Team Sweden to promote Swedish exports and investment. Team Sweden is tasked with making export market entry clear and simple for Swedish companies and consists of a common network for all public initiatives to support exports and internationalization. The Government does not generally restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. The only exceptions are related to matters of national security and national defense; the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP) is tasked with control and compliance regarding the sale and export of defense equipment and dual-use products. ISP is also the National Authority for the Chemical Weapons Convention and handles cases concerning targeted sanctions. 3. Legal Regime As an EU member, Sweden has altered its legislation to comply with the EU’s stringent rules on competition. The country has made extensive changes in its laws and regulations to harmonize with EU practices, all to avoid distortions in, or impediments to the efficient mobilization and allocation of investment. The institutions of the European Union are publicly committed to transparent regulatory processes. The European Commission has the sole right of initiative for EU regulations and publishes extensive, descriptive information on many of its activities. More information can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/decision-making/index_en.htm ; http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/index_en.htm . There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. Nongovernmental organizations and private sector associations may submit comments to government draft bills. The submitted comments are made public in the public consultation process. Rule-making and regulatory authority on a national level exists formally in the legislative branch, the Riksdag. As a member of the EU, a growing proportion of legislation and regulation stem from the EU. These laws apply in some case directly as national law or are put before the Riksdag to be enacted as national law. The executive branch, the Government of Sweden, and its various agencies draft laws and regulations that are put before the Riksdag and are adopted on a national level when they enter into force. Municipalities may draft regulations that are within their spheres of competence. These regulations apply at the respective municipality only and may vary between municipalities. Sweden is in principle supportive of the creation of an EU-wide environmental, social, and governance (ESG) taxonomy for sustainable activities. The EU taxonomy is a classification system, establishing a list of environmentally sustainable economic activities to help the EU scale up sustainable investment and implement the European green deal. The ambition is that the EU taxonomy would provide companies, investors, and policymakers with appropriate definitions for which economic activities can be considered environmentally sustainable. In this way, the taxonomy is believed to create security for investors, protect private investors from greenwashing, help companies to become more climate-friendly, mitigate market fragmentation, and help shift investments where they are most needed. Draft bills and regulations, which include investment laws, are made available for public comment through a public consultation process, along the lines of U.S. federal notice and comment procedures. Current and newly adopted legislation can be found at the Swedish Parliament’s homepage and in the various government agencies dealing with the relevant regulation: http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/ . Key regulatory actions are published at Lagrummet: https://lagrummet.se/ . Lagrummet serves as the official site for information on Swedish legislation and provides information on legislation in the public domain, all statutes currently in force, and information on impending legislation. “Post och Inrikes Tidningar” serves in certain aspects a similar role as the Federal Register in the U.S., through which public notifications are published. The proclamations of “Post och Inrikes Tidningar” can be found at the Swedish Companies Registration Office (Bolagsverket): https://poit.bolagsverket.se/poit/PublikPoitIn.do . The judicial branch and various agencies are tasked with regulation oversight and/or regulation enforcement. The Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsmen, known as the Justitieombuds-männen (JO), are tasked to make sure that public authority complies with the law and follows administrative processes. They also investigate complaints from the general public. Regulations are reviewed on the basis of scientific and/or data-driven assessments. The principle of public access to official documents, offentlighetsprincipen, governs the availability of the results of studies that are conducted by government entities and furthermore to comments made by government entities. The principle provides the Swedish public with the right to study public documents as specified in the Freedom of the Press Act. The status of Sweden’s public finances is available at Statistics Sweden, Sweden official statistics agency: https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/public-finances/ . The status of Sweden’s national debt is available at the Swedish National Debt Office (Riksgälden): https://www.riksgalden.se/en/statistics/statistics-regarding-swedens-central-government-debt/ . As an EU-member, Sweden complies with EU-legislation in shaping its national regulations. If a national law, norm, or standard is found to be in conflict with EU-law, then the national law is altered to be in compliance with EU-law. Sweden adheres to the practices of WTO and coordinates its actions in regard to WTO with other EU-member countries as the EU-countries have a common trade policy. Sweden’s legal system is based on the civil law tradition, common to Europe, and founded on classical Roman law, but has been further influenced by the German interpretation of this tradition. Swedish legislation and Swedish agencies provide guidance on whether regulations or enforcement actions are appealable and adjudicated in the national court system. Swedish courts are independent and free of influence from other branches of government, including the executive. Sweden has a written commercial law and contractual law and there are specialized courts, such as commercial and civil courts. The Swedish courts are divided into: Courts of general jurisdiction (the District Courts, the Courts of Appeal, and the Supreme Court) which have jurisdiction with respect to civil and criminal cases; Administrative courts (County Administrative Courts, Administrative Courts of Appeal, and the Supreme Administrative Court) which have jurisdiction with respect to issues of public law, including taxation; Specialist courts for disputes within certain legal areas such as labor law, environmental law and market regulation. Sweden is a signatory to the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Law; foreign awards may be enforced in Sweden regardless of which foreign country the arbitral proceedings took place. The main source of arbitration law in Sweden is the Swedish Arbitration Act, which contains both procedural and substantive regulations. Sweden is a party to the Lugano and the Brussels Conventions, and, by its membership of the EU, Sweden is also bound by the Brussels Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. An arbitral award is considered final and is not subject to substantive review by Swedish courts. However, arbitral awards may be challenged for reasons set out in the Arbitration Act. An award may, for example, be set aside after a challenge because of procedural errors, which are likely to have influenced the outcome. During the 1990s, Sweden undertook significant deregulation of its markets. In a number of areas, including the electricity and telecommunication markets, Sweden has been on the leading edge of reform, resulting in more efficient sectors and lower prices. Nevertheless, a number of practical impediments to direct investments remain. These include a fairly extensive, though non-discriminatory, system of permits and authorizations needed to engage in many activities and the dominance of a few very large players in certain sectors, such as construction and food wholesaling. Foreign banks, insurance companies, brokerage firms, and cooperative mortgage institutions are permitted to establish branches in Sweden on equal terms with domestic firms, although a permit is required. Swedes and foreigners alike may acquire shares in any company listed on NASDAQ OMX. Sweden’s taxation structure is straightforward and corporate tax levels are low. In 2013, Sweden lowered its corporate tax from 26.3 percent to 22 percent in nominal terms and lowered it again to 21.4 percent in 2019. The effective rate can be even lower as companies have the option of making deductible annual appropriations to a tax allocation reserve of up to 25 percent of their pretax profit for the year. Companies can make pre-tax allocations to untaxed reserves, which are subject to tax only when utilized. Certain amounts of untaxed reserves may be used to cover losses. Due to tax exemptions on capital gains and dividends, as well as other competitive tax rules such as low effective corporate tax rates, deductible interest costs for tax purposes, no withholding tax on interest, no stamp duty or capital duties on share capital, and an extensive double tax treaty network, Sweden is among Europe’s most favorable jurisdictions for holding companies. Unlisted shares are always tax-exempt, meaning there is no qualification time or minimum holding of votes or capital. Listed shares are exempt if the holding represents at least 10 percent of the voting rights (or is contingent on the holder’s business) and the shares are held for at least one year. As part of a COVID-19 stimulus package, the government lowered the payroll tax for persons aged 19-23 from 31.42 percent to 19.73 percent. The lower rate is temporary and applies until March 31, 2023. Personal income taxes are among the highest in the world. Since public finances have improved due to extensive consolidation packages to reduce deficits, the government has been able to reduce tax pressure as a percentage of GDP. Though well below the national average in the EU area, public debt, as a share of GDP, rose to approximately 40 percent as a result of the enactment of several fiscal stimulus packages which aimed to boost the economy in the COVID-19 pandemic. Early 2022 figures indicate public debt will fall below 40 percent by the end of 2022. Significant tax increases in the near future remain unlikely. One particular focus of the Swedish government has been tax reductions to encourage employers to hire the long-term unemployed. Dividends paid by foreign subsidiaries in Sweden to their parent company are not subject to Swedish taxation. Dividends distributed to other foreign shareholders are subject to a 30 percent withholding tax under domestic law, unless dividends are exempt or taxed at a lower rate under a tax treaty. Tax liability may also be eliminated under the EU Parent Subsidiary Directive. Profits of a Swedish branch of a foreign company may be remitted abroad without being subject to any other tax than the regular corporate income tax. There is no exit taxation and no specific rules regarding taxation of stock options received before a move to Sweden. Instead, cases of double taxation are solved by applying tax treaties and cover not only moves within the EU but all countries, including the United States. For detailed tax guidance, see the Swedish Tax Administration’s website (in English): http://www.skatteverket.se/servicelankar/otherlanguages/inenglish.4.12815e4f14a62bc048f4edc.html There is no primary or “one-stop-shop” website that provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. Business Sweden, Sweden’s official trade and investment organization, is the investment promotion agency tasked with developing business in Sweden. The services of the agency are available to all investors. As an EU member, Sweden has altered its legislation to comply with the EU’s stringent rules on competition. The competition law rules are contained in the Swedish Competition Act (2008:579), which entered into force in November 2008. The fundamental antitrust provisions have been the same since 1993. The Swedish Competition Authority (SCA) is the main enforcement authority of the Swedish Competition Act. The agency adheres to transparent norms and procedures, which are made available on its homepage: Konkurrensverket | Välfärd genom väl fungerande marknaderSwedish Competition Authority | Welfare through well-functioning markets . SCA decisions can be appealed to the administrative courts. This can be done by submitting a written appeal to the Swedish Competition Authority within three weeks from the day the applicant received the SCA’s initial decision. Private property is only expropriated for public purposes, in a non-discriminatory manner, with fair compensation, and in accordance with established principles of international law. The Swedish legislation on bankruptcy is found in a number of laws that came into force in different periods of time and to serve different purposes. The main laws on insolvency are the Bankruptcy Act (1987:672) and the Company Reorganization Act (1996:764), but the Preferential Rights of Creditors Act (1970:979), the Salary Guarantee Act (1992:497), and the Companies Act (1975:1385) are equally important. In 2010, Sweden strengthened its secured transactions system through changes to the Rights of Priority Act that give secured creditors’ claims priority in cases of debtor default outside bankruptcy. According to data collected by the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, resolving insolvency takes two years on average and costs nine percent of the debtor’s estate, with the most likely outcome being that the company will be sold as a going concern. The average recovery rate is 78 cents on the dollar. Globally, Sweden ranked 17 of 190 economies on the ease of resolving insolvency in the Doing Business 2020 report. 6. Financial Sector Credit is allocated on market terms and is made available to foreign investors in a non-discriminatory fashion. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. NASDAQ-OMX is a modern, open, and active forum for domestic and foreign portfolio investment. It is Sweden’s official stock exchange and operates under specific legislation. Furthermore, the Swedish government is neutral toward portfolio investment and Sweden has a fully capable regulatory system that encourages and facilitates portfolio investments. Several foreign banks, including Citibank, have established branch offices in Sweden, and several niche banks have started to compete in the retail bank market. The three largest Swedish banks are Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB), Svenska Handelsbanken, and Swedbank. Nordea is the largest foreign bank and largest bank in Sweden, while Danske Bank is the second largest foreign bank and the fifth largest bank in Sweden. A deposit insurance system was introduced in 1996, whereby individuals received protection of up to SEK 250,000 (USD 29,250) of their deposits in case of bank insolvency. On December 31, 2010, the maximum compensation was raised to the SEK equivalent of 100,000 euro. The Swedish Central Bank, Riksbank, functions as Sweden’s central bank system. https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/ The banks’ activities are supervised by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, Finansinspektionen, http://www.fi.se , to ensure that standards are met. Swedish banks’ financial statements meet international standards and are audited by internationally recognized auditors only. The Swedish Bankers’ Association, http://www.bankforeningen.se , represents banks and financial institutions in Sweden. The association works closely with regulators and policy makers in Sweden and Europe. Sweden is not part of the Eurozone; however, Swedish commercial banks offer euro-denominated accounts and payment services. On July 1, 2014, Sweden signed the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) agreement with the U.S. Financial institutions in Sweden are now obligated to submit information in accordance with FATCA to the Swedish Tax Agency. In February 2015, the Swedish Parliament decided on new laws and regulations needed to implement FATCA. The Parliamentary decision means the government’s proposals in Bill 2014/15:41 were adopted, including for example, the introductions of: a new law on the identification of reportable accounts with respect to the agreement; changes to tax procedure act; new legislation on the exchange of information with respect to the agreement; and consequential amendments to the Income Tax Act and other laws. The provisions entered into force on April 1, 2015. For full text of Bill 2014/15:41, please see http://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/bd8cf7f897364944b35f5f30c099bc0c/genomforande-av-avtal-mellan-sveriges-regering-och-amerikas-forenta-staters-regering-for-att-forbattra-internationell-efterlevnad-av-skatteregler-och-for-att-genomfora-fatca-prop.-20141541 . Foreign banks or branches offering financial services must have an authorization from the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, Finansinspektionen, to conduct operations. As part of the authorization application process, FI reviews the firm’s capital situation, business plan, owners, and management. Parts of the firm’s daily operations may also require authorization from FI. The applicable regulatory code can be found at http://www.fi.se/en/our-registers/search-fffs/2009/20093/ . There are no reported losses of correspondent banking relationships in the past three years and there are no current correspondent banking relationships that are in jeopardy. Foreigners have the right to open an account in a bank in Sweden provided he/she can identify him/herself and the bank conducts an identity check. The bank cannot require the person to have a Swedish personal identity number or an address in Sweden. Sweden does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund or similar entity. 10. Political and Security Environment Sweden is politically stable, and no changes are expected. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $46,503 2020 $63,847 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 $81,935 2020 $55,404 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 $73.5% 2020 76.1% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ EconomicTrends/Fdi.html * Source for Host Country Data: Statistics Sweden (SCB). Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 413,512 100% Total Outward 464,891 100% Luxembourg 59,401 14.4% United States 85,939 18.5% The Netherlands 58,890 14.2% The Netherlands 46,019 9.9% United Kingdom 50,825 12.3% United Kingdom 33,311 7.2% United States 48,767 11.8% Norway 32,700 7.0% Germany 41,219 10.0% Finland 28,730 6.2% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Switzerland and Liechtenstein Executive Summary Switzerland is welcoming to international investors, with a positive overall investment climate. The Swiss federal government enacts laws and regulations governing corporate structure, the financial system, and immigration, and concludes international trade and investment treaties. However, Switzerland’s 26 cantons (analogous to U.S. states) and largest municipalities have significant independence to shape investment policies locally, including incentives to attract investment. This federal approach has helped the Swiss maintain long-term economic and political stability, a transparent legal system, extensive and reliable infrastructure, efficient capital markets, and an excellent quality of life for the country’s 8.6 million inhabitants. Many U.S. firms base their European or regional headquarters in Switzerland, drawn to the country’s modest corporate tax rates, productive and multilingual workforce, and well-maintained infrastructure and transportation networks. U.S. companies also choose Switzerland as a gateway to markets in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and beyond. Furthermore, U.S. companies select Switzerland because of favorable and less restrictive labor laws compared to other European locations as well as availability of a skilled workforce. In 2019, the World Economic Forum rated Switzerland the world’s fifth most competitive economy. This high ranking reflects the country’s sound institutional environment and high levels of technological and scientific research and development. With very few exceptions, Switzerland welcomes foreign investment, accords national treatment, and does not impose, facilitate, or allow barriers to trade. According to the OECD, Swiss public administration ranks high globally in output efficiency and enjoys the highest public confidence of any national government in the OECD. The country’s competitive economy and openness to investment brought Switzerland’s cumulative inward direct investment to USD 1.4 trillion in 2020 (latest available figures) according to the Swiss National Bank, although nearly half of this amount is invested in regional hubs or headquarters that further invest in other countries. In order to address international criticism of tax incentives provided by Swiss cantons, the Federal Act on Tax Reform and Swiss Pension System Financing (TRAF) entered into force on January 1, 2020. TRAF obliges cantons to offer the same corporate tax rates to both Swiss and foreign companies, while allowing cantons to continue to set their own cantonal tax rates and offer incentives for corporate investment. These can be deductions or preferential tax treatment for certain types of income (such as for patents), or expenses (such as for research and development). Switzerland joined the Statement of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Sharing (BEPS) in July 2021. It intends to implement the BEPS effective minimum corporate tax rate of 15 percent by January 2024, after a referendum to amend the Swiss constitution. Personal income and corporate tax rates vary widely across Switzerland’s cantons. Effective corporate tax rates ranged between 11.85 and 21.04 percent in 2021, according to KPMG. In Zurich, for example, the combined effective corporate tax rate (including municipal, cantonal, and federal taxes),was 19.7 percent in 2021. The United States and Switzerland have a bilateral tax treaty. Key sectors that have attracted significant investments in Switzerland include information technology, precision engineering, scientific instruments, pharmaceuticals, medical technology, and machine building. Switzerland hosts a significant number of startups. A new “blockchain act” came fully into force in August 2021, which is expected to benefit Switzerland’s already sizeable ecosystem for companies in blockchain and distributed ledger technologies. There are no “forced localization” laws designed to require foreign investors to use domestic content in goods or technology (e.g., data storage within Switzerland). Switzerland follows strict privacy laws and certain personal data may not be collected in Switzerland. Switzerland is a highly innovative economy with strong overall intellectual property protection. Switzerland enforces intellectual property rights linked to patents and trademarks effectively, and new amendments to the country’s Copyright Act to strengthen copyright enforcement on the internet came into force in April 2020. There are some investment restrictions in areas under state monopolies, including certain types of public transportation, telecommunications, postal services, alcohol and spirits, aerospace and defense, certain types of insurance and banking services, and the trade in salt. The Swiss agricultural sector remains protected and heavily subsidized. Liechtenstein Liechtenstein’s investment conditions are identical in most key aspects to those in Switzerland, due to its integration into the Swiss economy. The two countries form a customs union, and Swiss authorities are responsible for implementing import and export regulations. Both Liechtenstein and Switzerland are members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA, which also includes Iceland and Norway). EFTA is an intergovernmental trade organization and free trade area that operates in parallel with the European Union (EU). Liechtenstein participates in the EU single market through the European Economic Area (EEA), unlike Switzerland, which has opted for a set of bilateral agreements with the EU instead. Liechtenstein has a stable and open economy employing 40,328 people in 2020 (latest figures available), exceeding its domestic population of 39,055 and requiring a substantial number of foreign workers. In 2020, 70.6 percent of the Liechtenstein workforce were foreigners, mainly Swiss, Austrians and Germans, most of whom commute daily to Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein was granted an exception to the EU’s Free Movement of People Agreement, enabling the country not to grant residence permits to its workers. Liechtenstein is one of the world’s wealthiest countries. Liechtenstein’s gross domestic product per capita amounted to USD 162,558 in 2019 (latest data available). According to the Liechtenstein Statistical Yearbook , the services sector, particularly in finance, accounts for 63 percent of Liechtenstein’s jobs, followed by the manufacturing sector (particularly mechanical engineering, machine tools, precision instruments, and dental products), which employs 36 percent of the workforce. Agriculture accounts for less than one percent of the country’s employment. Liechtenstein’s corporate tax rate, at 12.5 percent, is one of the lowest in Europe. Capital gains, inheritance, and gift taxes have been abolished. The Embassy has no recorded complaints from U.S. investors stemming from market restrictions in Liechtenstein. The United States and Liechtenstein do not have a bilateral income tax treaty. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings – Switzerland Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 7 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 1 of 129 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 211,936 https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 82,620 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment With the exception of its agricultural sector, foreign investment into Switzerland is generally not hampered by significant barriers, with no reported discrimination against foreign investors or foreign-owned investments. Incidents of trade discrimination do exist, for example with regards to agricultural goods such as bovine genetics products. A Swiss government-affiliated non-profit organization, Switzerland Global Enterprise (S-GE), has a nationwide mandate to attract foreign business to Switzerland on behalf of the Swiss Confederation. S-GE promotes Switzerland as an economic hub and fosters exports, imports, and investments. Some city and cantonal governments offer access to an ombudsman, who may address a wide variety of issues involving individuals and the government, but does not focus exclusively on investment issues. Foreign and domestic enterprises may freely establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises in Switzerland. In August 2021, the Swiss government released a broad framework for a future foreign direct investment (FDI) screening regime. A draft bill is expected to be issued for public consultation in 2022. The bill is expected to focus on any mergers or acquisitions by foreign interests, but with a particular focus on foreign state-owned or state-related investors, regardless of the sector involved. For foreign private-sector investors, no list has been published indicating any specific sectors that would be subject to mandatory reporting and approval. There are some investment restrictions in areas under state monopolies, including certain types of public transportation, postal services, alcohol and spirits, aerospace and defense, certain types of insurance and banking services, and the trade in salt. Restrictions (in the form of domicile requirements) also exist in air and maritime transport, hydroelectric and nuclear power, operation of oil and gas pipelines, and the transportation of explosive materials. Additionally, the following legal restrictions apply within Switzerland: Corporate boards: A company registered in Switzerland must be represented by at least one person domiciled in Switzerland. This can be either a member of the board of directors or a member of the executive board (article 718 para. 4 of the Code of Obligations). Foreign-controlled companies often meet this requirement by nominating Swiss directors. However, the manager of a company need not be a Swiss citizen, and company shares may be controlled by foreigners. Further, since January 1, 2021, larger publicly listed companies headquartered in Switzerland must fill at least 30 percent of their board positions with women. Companies have five years to meet this requirement, otherwise they will be required to state the reasons and outline planned remediation measures in their compensation report to shareholders. The establishment of a commercial presence by persons or enterprises without legal status under Swiss law requires a cantonal establishment authorization. These requirements do not generally pose a major hardship or impediment for U.S. investors. Hostile takeovers: Swiss corporate equity can be issued in the form of either registered shares (in the name of the holder) or bearer shares. Provided the shares are not listed on a stock exchange, Swiss companies may, in their articles of incorporation, impose certain restrictions on the transfer of registered shares to prevent hostile takeovers by foreign or domestic companies (article 685a of the Code of Obligations). Hostile takeovers can also be annulled by public companies under certain circumstances. The company must cite in its statutes significant justification (relevant to the survival, conduct, and purpose of its business) to prevent or hinder a takeover by a foreign entity. Furthermore, public corporations may limit the number of registered shares that can be held by any shareholder to a percentage of the issued registered stock. Under the public takeover provisions of the 2015 Federal Act on Financial Market Infrastructures and Market Conduct in Securities and Derivatives Trading and its 2019 amendments, a formal notification is required when an investor purchases more than three percent of a Swiss company’s shares. An “opt-out” clause is available for firms that do not want to be taken over by a hostile bidder, but such opt-outs must be approved by a super-majority of shareholders and must take place well in advance of any takeover attempt. Banking: Those wishing to establish banking operations in Switzerland must obtain prior approval from the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA), a largely independent agency administered under the Swiss Federal Department of Finance. FINMA promotes confidence in financial markets and works to protect customers, creditors, and investors. FINMA approval of bank operations is generally granted if the following conditions are met: reciprocity on the part of the foreign state; the foreign bank’s name must not give the impression that the bank is Swiss; the bank must adhere to Swiss monetary and credit policy; and a majority of the bank’s management must have their permanent residence in Switzerland. Otherwise, foreign banks are subject to the same regulatory requirements as domestic banks. Banks organized under Swiss law must inform FINMA before they open a branch, subsidiary, or representation abroad. Foreign or domestic investors must inform FINMA before acquiring or disposing of a qualified majority of shares of a bank organized under Swiss law. If exceptional temporary capital outflows threaten monetary policy, the Swiss National Bank, the country’s independent central bank, may require other institutions to seek approval before selling foreign bonds or other financial instruments. Insurance: A federal ordinance requires the placement of all risks physically situated in Switzerland with companies located in the country. Therefore, it is necessary for foreign insurers wishing to provide liability coverage in Switzerland to establish a subsidiary or branch in-country. U.S. investors have not identified any specific restrictions that create market access challenges for foreign investors.Other Investment Policy Reviews The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) September 2017 Trade Policy Review of Switzerland and Liechtenstein includes investment information. Other reports containing elements referring to the investment climate in Switzerland include the OECD Economic Survey of January 2022. Link to the WTO report: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm#bycountry Link to the OECD reports / papers: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-switzerland-2019_7e6fd372-en The Swiss government-affiliated non-profit organization Switzerland Global Enterprise (SGE) has a mandate to attract foreign business to Switzerland on behalf of the Swiss Confederation. SGE promotes Switzerland as an economic hub and fosters exports, imports, and investments. Larger regional offices include the Greater Geneva-Berne Area (which covers large parts of Western Switzerland), the Greater Zurich Area, and the Basel Area. Cantonal and regional Chambers of Commerce provide similar support. Each canton has a business promotion office dedicated to helping facilitate real estate location, beneficial tax arrangements, and employee recruitment plans. These regional and cantonal investment promotion agencies do not require a minimum investment or job-creation threshold in order to provide assistance. However, these offices generally focus resources on attracting medium-sized or larger entities with the potential to create higher numbers of jobs in their region. References: The Swiss government’s online portal (“easygov”) is Switzerland’s online registration website and includes links to the main local interlocutors for business related questions: https://www.easygov.swiss/easygov/#/ Switzerland Global Enterprise connects companies with potential host regions: https://www.s-ge.com/en/investment-promotion Some of the larger promotion offices are: Greater Geneva-Bern Area: https://www.ggba-switzerland.ch/en/ Greater Zürich Area: https://www.greaterzuricharea.com/en Basel Area: https://www.baselarea.swiss/ Switzerland has a dual system for granting work permits and allowing foreigners to create their own companies in Switzerland. Employees who are citizens of the EU/EFTA area can benefit from the EU Free Movement of Persons Agreement. Permits for people from countries outside the EU/EFTA area, such as U.S. citizens, are restricted to highly qualified personnel. U.S. citizens who want to become self-employed in Switzerland must meet Swiss labor market requirements. The criteria for admittance, which usually do not create unusual hindrances for U.S. persons, are contained in: The Federal Act on Foreign Nationals and Integration (unofficial English translation): https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20020232/index.html Decree on Admittance, Residence and Employment (VZAE) (available in German, French, Italian): https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/20070993/index.html Setting up a company in Switzerland requires registration at the relevant cantonal Commercial Registry. The cost for registering a company can range considerably, from a few hundred Swiss francs in the case of sole proprietorships or joint partnerships, to higher registration costs for limited liability companies or corporations. A list of Swiss federal fees generally applied for small and medium-sized companies is available at https://www.kmu.admin.ch/kmu/en/home/concrete-know-how/setting-up-sme/starting-business/commercial-register%20/registration-costs.html. However, additional cantonal fees can add significantly to total registration costs, and Public Notary fees may also be necessary, which can also vary considerably by canton. Other steps/procedures for registration include: 1) placing paid-in capital in an escrow account with a bank; 2) drafting articles of association in the presence of a notary public; 3) filing a deed certifying the articles of association with the local commercial register to obtain a legal entity registration; 4) paying the stamp tax at a post office or bank after receiving an assessment by mail; 5) registering for VAT; and 6) enrolling employees in the social insurance system (federal and cantonal authorities). While Switzerland does not explicitly promote or incentivize outward investment, Switzerland’s export promotion agency Switzerland Global Enterprise facilitates overseas market entry for Swiss companies through its Swiss Business Hubs in several countries, including the United States. Switzerland does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The Swiss government uses transparent policies and effective laws to foster a competitive investment climate. Proposed laws and regulations are open for three-month public comment from interested parties, interest groups, cantons, and cities before being discussed within the bicameral parliament or promulgated by the appropriate regulatory authority. Authorities take comments into account carefully, particularly since proposals may be subject to optional or automatic referenda that allow Swiss voters to reject or accept the proposals. Only in rare instances – such as the case of the extension of a moratorium until 2025 on planting GMO crops – are regulations reviewed on the basis of political or customer preferences rather than solely on the basis of scientific analysis. Switzerland is not a member of the European Union. However, Switzerland adopts many EU standards in line with a series of agreements with the EU. The WTO concluded in 2017 that Switzerland has regularly notified its draft technical regulations, ordinances, and conformity assessment procedures to the WTO TBT Committee. Switzerland has been a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) since 2015. Swiss civil law is codified in the Swiss Civil Code (which governs the status of individuals, family law, inheritance law, and property law) and in the Swiss Code of Obligations (which governs contracts, torts, commercial law, company law, law of checks and other payment instruments). Switzerland’s civil legal system is divided into public and private law. Public law governs the organization of the state, as well as the relationships between the state and private individuals or other entities, such as companies. Constitutional law, administrative law, tax law, criminal law, criminal procedure, public international law, civil procedure, debt enforcement, and bankruptcy law are sub-divisions of public law. Private law governs relationships among individuals or entities. Intellectual property law (copyright, patents, trademarks, etc.) is an area of private law. Labor is governed by both private and public law. All cantons have a high court, which includes a specialized commercial court in four cantons (Zurich, Bern, St. Gallen and Aargau). The organization of the judiciary differs by canton; smaller cantons have only one court, while larger cantons have multiple courts. Cantonal high court decisions can be appealed to the Swiss Supreme Court. The court system is independent, competent, and fair. Switzerland is party to a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The Lugano Convention, a multilateral treaty tying Switzerland to European legal conventions, entered into force in 2011 (replacing an older legal framework by the same name). A set of bilateral treaties is also in place to handle judgments of specific foreign courts. While no such agreement is in place between the United States and Switzerland, Switzerland operates under the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Law, meaning local courts must enforce international arbitration awards under specific circumstances. The major laws governing foreign investment in Switzerland are the Swiss Code of Obligations, the Lex Friedrich/Koller, Switzerland’s Securities Law, the Cartel Law and the Financial Market Infrastructure Act. There is currently no specific screening of foreign investment beyond a normal anti-trust review. However, Parliament instructed the Federal Council to prepare a foreign investment screening mechanism in March 2020. The Federal Council decided on the basic tenets of Switzerland’s future investment screening mechanism in August 2021, and a draft law is expected to go to Parliament in 2022, with the earliest potential date for entry into force in 2023. There are few sectoral or geographic incentives or restrictions; exceptions are described below in the section on performance requirements and incentives. There is no pronounced interference in the court system that should affect foreign investors. Useful websites: The Swiss Code of Obligations, including an unofficial English translation: https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19110009/index.html Information on the acquisition of property in Switzerland by persons abroad: https://www.bj.admin.ch/dam/data/bj/wirtschaft/grundstueckerwerb/lex-e.pdf The Federal Act on Financial Market Infrastructures and Market Conduct in Securities and Derivatives Trading (Unofficial English translation): https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20141779/index.html The Federal Act on Cartels and other Restraints of Competition including an unofficial English translation: https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19950278/index.html Switzerland Global Enterprise provides a “handbook for investors” with the relevant laws: https://www.s-ge.com/en/publication/handbook-investors/handbook-investors The Swiss Competition Commission and the Swiss Takeover Board review competition-related concerns, and regularly decide on questions concerning mergers, market access, abuse of market position, and other matters affecting competitive advantage. In May and July 2021, the Competition Commission decided on cases involving collusive behavior in public and private tenders in the field of electrical installation and maintenance, and fined Ford Credit Switzerland for unlawful coordination of leasing conditions. The Competition Commission found an amicable conclusion with a German tobacco producer which colluded with several European partners distributors export pans to Switzerland. Decisions by the Swiss Competition Commission may be appealed to the Federal Administrative Court, those by the Swiss Takeover Board to the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA). A revision to the Swiss Cartel Act came into force in January 2022, regarding the conduct of companies with relative market power, the freedom of powerful companies to set prices, and geo-blocking practices applies. Under the revised law, all Swiss competition law rules against the abuse of a dominant position will apply not only to dominant companies, but also to companies with relative market power. A new category of abusive pricing by dominant companies and companies with relative market power was also introduced. Further, the geo-blocking of Swiss customers in distance selling and e-commerce is now prohibited. There are no known cases of expropriation within Switzerland. Switzerland’s bankruptcy law, the Federal Act on Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy of 11 April 1889 (in German, French and Italian), does not criminalize bankruptcy. Under the bankruptcy law, the same rights and obligations apply to foreign and Swiss contract holders. Swiss authorities provide information about Swiss residents and companies regarding debts registered with the debt collection register. The Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law (PILS, Art. 166-175, in force since January 1, 1989) governs Swiss recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings, including bankruptcies, foreign composition, and arrangements. Swiss law requires reciprocity for recognition of foreign insolvency. 6. Financial Sector The Swiss government’s attitude toward foreign portfolio investment and market structures is positive, resulting in high global rankings by many indices. The SIX Swiss stock exchange based in Zurich is a significant international stock market based on market capitalization. Switzerland is home to a sophisticated banking system that provides a high degree of service to both foreign and domestic entities. Switzerland also has an effective regulatory system that encourages and facilitates portfolio investment. The Swiss Bankers Association, which has nearly 300-member financial institutions, estimated that Switzerland’s banking sector managed assets amounting to approximately USD 8.4 trillion in 2020. Switzerland is the global market leader in cross-border private banking, accounting for a quarter of all cross-border assets under management worldwide. The largest banks, UBS and Credit Suisse, have total assets of approximately USD 1 trillion and USD 826 million, respectively, while Raiffeisen Switzerland holds about USD 260 billion and Zurich Cantonal Bank holds roughly USD 209 billion. Switzerland’s independent central bank is the Swiss National Bank (SNB). U.S. citizens who are resident in Switzerland may face difficulties in opening bank accounts at Swiss banks, as some banks seek to avoid the administrative costs of complying with additional regulatory and administrative procedures required for the accounts of U.S. persons under accepted disclosure rules. Many banks, especially smaller ones, assess that the additional compliance costs involved with U.S. citizens exceed the potential benefit they would receive from U.S. accountholder business. As a result, these banks offer limited or no services to U.S. citizens. U.S.-owned companies have also reported that Swiss banks treat them unequally as compared to companies owned by shareholders of other nationalities. One multinational corporation reported that its Swiss subsidiary has long held a corporate account in Switzerland, but the bank was unwilling to set up a business account for its U.S. parent company. In another case, a consortium of international citizens resident in Switzerland, including U.S. citizens, purchased a Swiss company, but reported that the Swiss company’s bank refused to maintain its corporate account as long as there were U.S. citizen shareholders. Several associations provide information about Swiss banks that offer services to U.S. clients. For more information, see the following page at the U.S. Embassy Bern website: https://ch.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/living-in-ch/banking-resources/. In 2018, the Swiss government created a blockchain task force and endorsed a report on the legal framework for blockchain and distributed ledger technology (DLT) in the financial sector, with the goal of creating favorable conditions for Switzerland to evolve as a leading location for fintech and DLT companies while maintaining anti-money laundering controls. The new “blockchain act,” consisting of company law reforms came into force in February 2021, while legislation on financial market infrastructure upgrades came into force in August 2021. This opens the doors to a fully regulated cryptocurrency and digital securities industry in Switzerland. There are now a wide range of companies in Switzerland that can create and list DLT-compatible digital securities. . In September 2021, for the first time a license was issued in Switzerland for infrastructure to facilitate the trading of digital securities in the form of tokens and their integrated settlement. SIX Digital Exchange AG was authorized to act as a central securities depository, and the associated company SDX Trading AG to act as a stock exchange. Switzerland does not have a sovereign wealth fund or an asset management bureau. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Swiss Confederation is the largest or sole shareholder in Switzerland’s five state-owned enterprises (SOEs), active in the areas of ground transportation (SBB), information and communication (Swiss Post, Swisscom), defense (RUAG, which was divided into two companies in January 2020 – see below), and aviation / air traffic control (Skyguide). These companies are typically responsible for “public function mandates,” but may also cover commercial activities (e.g., Swisscom in the area of telecommunications). These SOEs typically have commercial relationships with private industry. Private sector competitors can compete with the SOEs under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations. Additional publicly owned enterprises are controlled by the cantons in the areas of energy, water supply, and a number of subsectors. SOEs and canton-owned companies may benefit from exclusive rights and privileges (some of which are listed in Table A 3.2 of the most recent WTO Trade Policy Review – https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp455_e.htm ). Switzerland is a party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Some areas are partly or fully exempted from the GPA, such as the management of drinking water, energy, transportation, telecommunications, and defense. Private companies may encounter difficulties gaining business in these exempted sectors. In the aftermath of a 2016 cyberattack, the Federal Council reviewed Swiss defense and aerospace company RUAG’s structure in light of cybersecurity concerns for the Swiss military, and decided in June 2018 to split the company. RUAG was split into two holding companies as of January 1, 2020. A smaller company, MRO Switzerland, remains state-owned and provides essential technology and systems support to the Swiss military. A larger company, RUAG International, includes non-armaments aviation and aerospace businesses, and will be gradually fully privatized in the medium term, according to the Swiss government. 10. Political and Security Environment There is minimal risk from civil unrest in Switzerland. Protests do occur in Switzerland, but authorities carefully monitor protest activities. Urban areas regularly experience demonstrations, mostly on global trade and political issues, and some occasionally sparked by U.S. foreign policy. Protests held during the annual World Economic Forum (WEF) occasionally draw participants from several countries in Europe. Historically, demonstrations have been peaceful, with protestors registering for police permits. Protestors have blocked traffic; spray-painted areas with graffiti, and on rare occasions, clashed with police. Political extremist or anarchist groups sometimes instigate civil unrest. Right-wing activists have targeted refugees/asylum seekers/foreigners, and more recently have organized protests against COVID-19 restrictions. Meanwhile, left-wing activists (who historically have demonstrated a greater propensity toward violence) usually target organizations involved with globalization, alleged fascism, and alleged police repression. Swiss police have at their disposal tear gas and water cannons, which are rarely used. Taiwan Executive Summary Taiwan is an important market for regional and global trade and investment. Taiwan is one of the world’s top 25 economies in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) and serves as the United States’ 8th largest trading partner according to 2021 statistics. An export-dependent economy of 23.5 million people with a highly skilled workforce, Taiwan is at the center of regional high-technology supply chains due to advanced capabilities to develop products for industries such as semiconductors, 5G telecommunications, AI, and the Internet of Things (IoT). Taiwan is also a central shipping hub in East Asia. The Taiwan authorities continue to actively launch initiatives to partner with foreign investors to foster resilient, diverse supply chains in the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan welcomes and actively courts foreign direct investment (FDI) and partnerships with American and other foreign firms. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration seeks to promote economic growth by increasing domestic investment and FDI. Taiwan authorities offer investment incentives and aim to leverage Taiwan’s strengths in advanced technology, manufacturing, and R&D. Some Taiwan and foreign investors regard Taiwan as a strategic location to insulate themselves against potential supply chain disruptions caused by regional trade frictions and the COVID-19 pandemic. In January 2019, the Taiwan government launched three investment promotion programs, including a reshoring initiative to lure Taiwanese companies to shift production back to Taiwan from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Taiwan government extended these investment incentives to the end of 2024 to support its domestic economy and counter the adverse impact from COVID-19. Over the past few years, Taiwan has witnessed increases in greenfield investments by foreign firms, including from companies trying to reduce their over-reliance on PRC supply chains and from firms in the offshore wind sector. Taiwan’s finance, wholesale and retail, and electronics sectors remain top targets of inward FDI. Taiwan attracts a wide range of U.S. investors, including in advanced technology, digital, traditional manufacturing, and services sectors. The United States is Taiwan’s second-largest single source of FDI after the Netherlands, through which some U.S. firms also choose to invest. In 2020, according to U.S. Department of Commerce data, the total stock of U.S. FDI in Taiwan reached US $31.5 billion. U.S. services exports to Taiwan totaled US $10.2 billion in 2021. Leading services exports from the United States to Taiwan were intellectual property, transport, and financial services. Structural impediments in Taiwan’s investment environment include the following: excessive or inconsistent regulation; market influence exerted by domestic and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the utilities, energy, postal, transportation, financial, and real estate sectors; foreign ownership limits in sectors deemed sensitive; and regulatory scrutiny over the possible participation of PRC-sourced capital. Taiwan has among the lowest levels of private equity investment in Asia, although private equity firms are increasingly pursuing opportunities in Taiwan’s market. Foreign private equity firms have expressed concern over the lack of transparency and predictability in the investment approvals and exit processes and regulators’ reliance on administrative discretion when rejecting certain transactions. Private equity entry and exit challenges are especially apparent in sectors that are deemed sensitive for national security reasons, but still permit foreign ownership. Taiwan has strived to enact relevant regulation to fight climate change. Taiwan set a goal for renewable energy sources to provide 27 gigawatts (GW) of capacity by 2025. Taiwan aims to phase out nuclear power by 2025 and derive 20 percent of its power supply from renewable sources (mainly solar and offshore wind installation). Taiwan industry continues to question the feasibility for Taiwan to phase out nuclear power by 2025 and increase the use of liquified natural gas (LNG) and renewables. Labor relations in Taiwan are generally harmonious. The current Tsai administration made improving labor welfare one of its core priorities. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 25 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 31,544 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 N/A https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Promoting inward FDI has been an important policy goal for the Taiwan authorities because of Taiwan’s self-imposed public debt ceiling that limits public spending, and its low levels of private investment. Despite the global economic recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan’s domestic private investment registered 19 percent y-o-y growth in 2021 due to continuous reshoring of investment by overseas Taiwan companies since late 2018. Taiwan has pursued various measures to attract FDI from both foreign companies and Taiwan firms operating overseas. A network of science and industrial parks, technology industrial zones, and free trade zones aims to expand trade and investment opportunities by granting tax incentives, tariff exemptions, low-interest loans, and other favorable terms. Incentives tend to be more prevalent for investment in the manufacturing sector. In January 2019, Taiwan launched a reshoring incentive program to attract Taiwan firms operating in the PRC to return to Taiwan. Thus far, Taiwan has received favorable responses from Information Communication Technology (ICT) manufacturers. The Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) Department of Investment Services (DOIS) Invest in Taiwan Center serves as Taiwan’s investment promotion agency and provides streamlined procedures for foreign investors, including single-window and employee recruitment services. For investments over US $17.6 million (New Taiwan Dollar NTD 500 million), Taiwan authorities will assign a dedicated project manager for the investment process. DOIS services are available to all foreign investors. The Center’s website contains an online investment aid system (https://investtaiwan.nat.gov.tw/smartIndexPage?lang=eng ) to help investors retrieve all the required application forms based on various investment criteria and types. Taiwan also passed the Foreign Talent Retention Act to attract foreign professionals using relaxed visa and work permit issuance process and tax incentives. As of December 2021, 3,927 foreigners received the Taiwan Employment Gold Card, a government initiative to attract highly skilled foreign talent to Taiwan (https://goldcard.nat.gov.tw/en/ ). The Taiwan Employment Gold Card also includes a residency permit for the applicant and his/her immediate relatives (parents, spouse, children), a work permit for three years, an alien resident certificate, and a re-entry permit. The Employment Gold Card policy helped alleviate recruiting companies’ liability in work permit applications and associated administrative expenditures. The MOEA is also in the process of drafting a proposed amendment to the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals, which would replace the existing pre-approval investment review process with an ex-post reporting mechanism and strengthen investment screening in industries of national security concern. Taiwan maintains a negative list of industries closed to foreign investment in sectors related to national security and environmental protection, including public utilities, power distribution, natural gas, postal service, telecommunications, mass media, and air and sea transportation. These sectors constitute less than one percent of the production value of Taiwan’s manufacturing sector and less than five percent of the services sector. Railway transport, freight transport by small trucks, pesticide manufactures, real estate development, brokerage, leasing, and trading are open to foreign investment. The negative list of investment sectors, last updated in February 2018, is available at http://www.moeaic.gov.tw/download-file.jsp?do=BP&id=ZYi4SMROrBA=. The Taiwan authorities actively promote a “5+2 Innovative Industries” and six strategic industries development program to accelerate industrial transformation. Target industries under this campaign include smart machinery, biomedicine, IoT, green energy, national defense, advanced agriculture, circular economy, and semiconductors. The Taiwan authorities also offer subsidies for the research and development expenses for partnerships with foreign firms. Taiwan’s central authorities take a cautious approach to approving foreign investment in innovative industries that utilize new and potentially disruptive business models, such as the sharing economy. Taiwan’s authorities regularly meet with foreign business groups. For example, Taiwan’s National Development Council (NDC) meets with the American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan (AmCham Taiwan) to discuss AmCham Taiwan’s annual White Paper. Some U.S. investors have expressed concerns about a lack of transparency, consistency, and predictability in the investment review process, particularly regarding private equity investment transactions. U.S. investors claim to experience lengthy review periods for private equity transactions that involve redundant inquiries from the MOEA Investment Commission and its constituent agencies. Some U.S. investors report that public hearings convened by Taiwan regulatory agencies about specific private equity transactions appear to promote opposition to private equity rather than foster transparent dialogue. Private equity transactions and other previously approved investments have, in the past, attracted Legislative Yuan scrutiny, including committee-level resolutions that opposed specific transactions. Foreign entities are entitled to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity, similar with local firms, unless otherwise specified in relevant regulations. Taiwan sets foreign ownership limits in certain industries, such as a 60 percent limit on foreign ownership of wireless and fixed-line telecommunications firms, including a direct foreign investment limit of 49 percent in that sector. State-controlled Chunghwa Telecom, which controls 92 percent of the fixed-line telecom market, maintains a 49 percent limit on direct foreign investment and a 60 percent limit on overall foreign investment, including indirect ownership. There is a 20 percent limit on foreign direct investment in cable television broadcasting services, but foreign ownership of up to 60 percent is allowed through indirect investment via a Taiwan entity. However, in practice, this kind of investment is subject to heightened regulatory and political scrutiny. In addition, there is a foreign ownership limit of 49.99 percent for satellite television broadcasting services and piped distribution of natural gas and a 49 percent limit for high-speed rail services. These foreign ownership limits also apply to all public switched telecommunications resources (“PSTN”) that use telecommunications resources. The foreign ownership cap on airport ground services firms, air-catering companies, aviation transportation businesses (airlines), and general aviation businesses (commercial helicopters and business jet planes) is less than 50 percent, with a separate limit of 25 percent for any single foreign investor. Foreign investment in Taiwan-flagged merchant shipping services is limited to 50 percent for Taiwan shipping companies operating international routes. Taiwan has opened more than two-thirds of its aggregate industrial categories to PRC investors, with 97 percent of manufacturing sub-sectors and 51 percent of construction and services sub-sectors open to PRC capital. PRC nationals are prohibited from serving as chief executive officer in a Taiwan company, although a PRC board member may retain management control rights. The Taiwan authorities regard PRC investment in media or advanced technology sectors, such as semiconductors, as a national security concern. The Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services and the Cross-Strait Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation and Enhancement of Tax Cooperation were signed in 2013 and 2015, respectively, but have not taken effect. Negotiations on the Agreement on Trade in Goods with the PRC were halted in 2016. Taiwan’s Investment Commission screens applications for FDI, mergers, and acquisitions. Taiwan authorities claim that 95 percent of investments not subject to the negative list and, with capital less than US $17.6 million (NTD 500 million), obtain approval at the Investment Commission staff level within two to four days. Investments between US $17.6 million (NTD 500 million) and US $53 million (NTD 1.5 billion) in capital take three to five days to screen. The approval authority for these types of transactions rests with the Investment Commission’s executive secretary. For investment in restricted industries, in cases where the investment amount or capital increase exceeds NTD 1.5 billion, or for mergers, acquisitions, and spin-offs, screening takes 10 to 20 days and includes review by relevant supervisory ministries. Final approval rests with the Investment Commission’s executive secretary. Screening for foreign investments involving cross-border mergers and acquisitions or other special situations takes 20-30 days, as these transactions require interagency review and deliberation at the Investment Commission’s monthly meeting. The investment screening process provides Taiwan’s regulatory agencies opportunities to attach conditions to investments to mitigate concerns about ownership, structure, or other factors. Screening may also include an assessment of the impact of proposed investments on a sector’s competitive landscape and the rights of local shareholders and employees. Screening is also used to detect investments with unclear funding sources, especially PRC-sourced capital. To ensure monitoring of PRC-sourced investment in line with Taiwan law and public sentiment, Taiwan’s National Security Bureau participates in every investment review meeting regardless of the size of the investment. Blocked deals in recent years reflected the authorities’ increased focus on national security concerns beyond the negative-list industries. Taiwan authorities also review proposals to prevent illegal PRC investment via third-areas or through dummy accounts. Foreign investors must submit an application form containing their funding plan, business operation plan, entity registration, and documents certifying the inward remittance of investment funds. Applicants and their agents must provide a signed declaration certifying that any PRC investors in a proposed transaction do not hold more than a 30 percent ownership stake and do not retain managerial control of the company. When an investment fails review, an investor may re-apply when the reason for the denial no longer exists. Foreign investors may also petition the regulatory agency that denied approval or may appeal to the Administrative Court. Taiwan has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2002. In September 2018, the WTO conducted the fourth review of Taiwan’s trade policies and practices. Related reports and documents are available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp477_crc_e.htm MOEA took steps to improve the business registration process, including finalizing amendments to the Company Act to make business registration more efficient. Since 2014, Taiwan shortened the application review period for company registration to two days. Applications for a taxpayer identification number, labor insurance (for companies with five or more employees), national health insurance, and pension plans can be processed at the same time for approval within five to seven business days. Since January 2017, MOEA’s Central Region Office processes foreign investors’ company registration applications. In recent years, the Taiwan authorities revised rules to improve the business climate for startups. To develop Taiwan into a startup hub in Asia, Taiwan authorities launched an entrepreneur visa program to permit foreign entrepreneurs to remain in Taiwan if they meet one of the following requirements: raise at least US $70,400 (NTD 2 million) in funding, hold patent rights or a professional skills certificate; operate in an incubator or innovation park in Taiwan; win prominent startup or design competitions, or receive grants from the Taiwan authorities. Since in 2019, startup entrepreneurs – including foreign investors – can use intellectual property (IP) as collateral to obtain bank loans. In July 2021, the Taiwan authorities further introduced additional tax and social security measures to attract foreign professionals to Taiwan. Further details about Taiwan’s business registration process can be found in Invest Taiwan Center’s business one-stop service request website at https://onestop.nat.gov.tw/oss/web/Show/engWorkFlowEn.do . The Investment Commission website lists the rules, regulations, and required forms for seeking foreign investment approval: https://www.moeaic.gov.tw/businessPub.view?lang=en&op_id_one=1 Approval from the Investment Commission is required for foreign investors before proceeding with business registration. After receiving an approval letter from the Investment Commission, an investor can apply for capital verification and then file an application for a corporate name and proceed with business registration. The new company must register with the Bureau of Labor Insurance and the Bureau of National Health Insurance before recruiting employees. For the manufacturing, construction, and mining industries, the MOEA defines small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as companies with less than US $2.8 million (NTD 80 million) of paid-in capital and fewer than 200 employees. For all other industries, SMEs are defined as having less than US $3.5 million (NTD 100 million) of paid-in capital and fewer than 100 employees. Taiwan runs a Small and Medium Enterprise Credit Guarantee Fund to help SMEs obtain financing from local banks. Firms established by foreigners in Taiwan may receive a guarantee from the Fund. Taiwan’s National Development Fund has set aside NTD 10 billion (US $350 million) to invest in SMEs. The PRC used to be the top destination for Taiwan companies’ overseas investment given the low cost of factors of production there, such as wages and land. Since rising trade tensions between the United States and the PRC in 2018, the Taiwan authorities have intensified their efforts to assist Taiwan firms to diversify production by either relocating back to Taiwan or to other markets, including in Southeast Asia. The Tsai administration launched the New Southbound Policy to enhance Taiwan’s economic engagement with 18 countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific. In 2021, Taiwan companies’ investment in the 18 countries totaled US $5.8 billion. The Taiwan authorities seek investment agreements with these countries to incentivize Taiwan firms’ investment in those markets. Invest Taiwan Center provides consultation and loan guarantee services to Taiwan firms operating overseas. Taiwan’s financial regulators have urged Taiwan banks to expand their presence in Southeast Asian economies either by setting up branches or acquiring subsidiaries. According to the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, all Taiwan individuals, juridical persons, organizations, or other institutions must obtain approval from the Investment Commission to invest in or have any technology-oriented cooperation with the PRC. The Taiwan authorities maintain a negative list for Taiwan firms’ investment and have special rules governing technology cooperation in the PRC. The Taiwan authorities, Taiwan companies, and foreign investors in Taiwan are increasingly vigilant about the threat of IP theft and illegal talent poaching in key strategic industries, such as the semiconductor industry. 3. Legal Regime Taiwan generally maintains transparent regulatory and accounting systems that conform to international standards. Publicly listed Taiwan companies fully adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) IFRS 16 in 2019. Taiwan’s Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) has affirmed that Taiwan will begin implementing IFRS 17 in January 2026. Ministries generally originate business-related draft legislation and submit it to the Executive Yuan for review. Following approval by the Executive Yuan, draft legislation is forwarded to the Legislative Yuan for consideration. Legislators can also propose legislation. While the cabinet-level agencies are the primary contact windows for foreign investors before entry, foreign investors also need to abide by local government rules, including those related to transportation services and environmental protection, among others. Draft laws, rules, and orders are published on The Executive Yuan Gazette Online for public comment. Beginning December 29, 2016, the Taiwan authorities instituted a 60-day public comment period for new rules. All draft regulations and laws are required to be available for public comment and advanced notice unless they meet specific criteria allowing a shorter window. While welcomed by the U.S. business community, the 60-day comment period is not uniformly applied. Draft laws and regulations of interest to foreign investors are regularly shared with foreign chambers of commerce for their comments. These announcements are also available for public comment on the NDC’s public policy open discussion forum at https://join.gov.tw/index. Foreign chambers of commerce and Taiwan business groups’ comments on proposed laws and regulations, and Taiwan ministries’ replies, are posted publicly on the NDC website. In October 2017, the NDC launched a separate policy discussion forum specifically for startups, which can be found online at https://law.ndc.gov.tw/ProcessFlowNewLaw.aspx, serving as the central platform to harmonize regulatory requirements governing innovative businesses and startups operation. The Executive Yuan Legal Affairs Committee oversees the enforcement of regulations. Ministries are responsible for enforcement, impact analysis, draft amendments to existing laws, and petitions to laws pursuant to their respective authorities. Impact assessments may be completed by in-house or private researchers. To enhance Taiwan’s regulatory coherence in the wake of regional economic integration initiatives, the NDC in 2017 released a Regulatory Impact Analysis Operational Manual as a practical guideline for central government agencies. Taiwan authorities place a high priority on promoting socially responsible investment. Both the regulators and investors are gearing up to integrate environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) into investment processes. Taiwan authorities mandate that publicly listed companies with more than US $180 million (NTD 5 billion) in capital and firms in sectors with direct impact on consumers, such as food processing, restaurants, chemicals, and financial services, etc., prepare annual social responsibility reports. A total of 586 of Taiwan’s publicly listed companies issued annual social responsibility reports, and nearly half of the reports are prepared voluntarily. In April 2021, Taiwan’s Public Service Pension Fund announced that it will target to fund a total of US $400 million to two foreign asset managers for its “Global Quality ESG Indexed Equity” mandate. Taiwan regularly discloses government finance data to the public, including all debts incurred by all levels of government. Past information is also retrievable in a well-maintained fiscal database. Taiwan’s national statistics agency also publishes contingent debt information. Taiwan is not a member of any regional economic agreements but is a full member of international economic organizations such as the WTO, APEC, ADB, and Egmont Group. Although Taiwan is not a member of many international organizations, it voluntarily adheres to or adopts international norms, including with finance, such as IFRS. Taiwan is a signatory to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and met some of the customs facilitation requirements specified in the TFA, such as single-window customs services and preview of the origin. In 2018, citing tax parity for domestic retailers and the risk of fraud, Taiwan lowered the de minimis threshold from US $150 (NTD 3,000) to US $70 (NTD 2,000), an approach regarded as contrary to facilitating customs clearance and trade, especially for small- and medium-sized U.S. businesses. NDC is drafting a proposed amendment to the Personal Information Protection Act and related regulations to meet the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) standards and obtain adequacy status. Taiwan maintains a codified system of law. In addition to the specialized courts, Taiwan maintains a three-tiered court system composed of the District Courts, the High Courts, and the Supreme Court. The Compulsory Enforcement Act provides a legal basis for enforcing the ownership of property. Taiwan does not have discrete commercial or contract laws. Various laws regulate businesses and specific industries, such as the Company Law, the Commercial Registration Law, the Business Registration Law, and the Commercial Accounting Law. Taiwan’s Civil Code provides the basis for enforcing contracts. Taiwan’s court system is generally viewed as independent and free from overt interference by other branches of government. Taiwan established its Intellectual Property Court in July 2008 in response to the need for a more centralized and professional litigation system for IPR disputes. There are also specialized labor courts at every level of the court system to deal with labor disputes. Foreign court judgments are final and binding and enforced on a reciprocal basis. Companies can appeal regulatory decisions in the court system. Regulations governing FDI principally derive from the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals and the Statute for Investment by Overseas Chinese. These two laws permit foreign investors to transact either in foreign currency or the NTD. The laws specify that foreign-invested enterprises must receive the same regulatory treatment accorded to local firms. Foreign companies may invest in state-owned firms undergoing privatization and are eligible to participate in publicly financed R&D programs. Amendments the Legislative Yuan passed in 2015 to the Merger and Acquisition Act clarified investment review criteria for mergers and acquisition transactions. The Investment Commission is drafting amendments to the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals to simplify the investment review process. Included is an amendment that would replace a pre-investment approval requirement with a post-investment reporting system for investments under a certain threshold. Ex-ante approval would still be required for investments in restricted industries and those exceeding the threshold. The new proposal would also allow the authorities to impose various penalties for violations of the law. Guidance that previously required special consideration of the impact of a private equity fund’s investment has been folded into the set of general evaluation criteria for foreign investment in important industries. In 2016, the MOEA released a supplementary document to clarify required certification for different types of investment applications. This document, which was last revised in August 2021 and in Chinese only, can be found at https://www.moeaic.gov.tw/download-file.jsp?do=BP&id=k/wXjgwG3BM= In December 2020, Taiwan authorities amended the Regulations Governing the Approval of PRC Investment in Taiwan to ensure the complex structure of foreign investments by investors from the PRC do not circumvent the investment control through any indirect investment structure. The new PRC investment rules introduced stricter criteria for identifying PRC investment through third-area intermediary, expanded the scope of investment subject to the authorities’ approval, and forbid PRC investment with any political or military affiliation. All foreign investment-related regulations, application forms, and explanatory information can be found on the Investment Commission’s website, at http://run.moeaic.gov.tw/MOEAIC-WEB-SRC/OfimDownloadE.aspx . The Invest in Taiwan Portal also provides other relevant legal information of interest to foreign investors, such as labor, entry and exit regulations, at https://investtaiwan.nat.gov.tw/showPageeng1031003?lang=eng&search=1031003 Taiwan’s Fair Trade Act was enacted in 1992. Taiwan’s Fair Trade Commission (TFTC) examines business practices that might impede fair competition. Parties may appeal a TFTC decision directly to the High Administrative Court. After the High Administrative Court issues its opinion, either party may file an appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court, which will only review decisions to determine if the lower court failed to apply the law. According to Taiwan law, the authorities may expropriate property whenever it is deemed necessary for the public interest, such as for national defense, public works, and urban renewal projects. The U.S. government is not aware of any recent cases of nationalization or expropriation of foreign-invested assets in Taiwan. There are no reports of indirect expropriation or any official actions tantamount to expropriation. Under Taiwan law, no venture with 45 percent or more foreign investment may be nationalized, as long as the 45 percent capital contribution ratio remains unchanged for 20 years after establishing the foreign business. Taiwan law requires fair compensation must be paid within a reasonable period when the authorities expropriate constitutionally protected private property for public use. Taiwan’s bankruptcy law guarantees creditors the right to share a bankrupt debtor’s assets on a proportional basis. Secured interests in property are recognized and enforced through a registration system. Bankruptcy is not criminalized in Taiwan. Corporate bankruptcy is generally governed by the Company Act and the Bankruptcy Act, while the Consumer Debt Resolution Act governs personal bankruptcy. The quasi-public Joint Credit Information Center is the only credit-reporting agency in Taiwan. In 2020 (latest data available,) there were 200 rulings on bankruptcy petitions. 6. Financial Sector Taiwan authorities welcome foreign portfolio investment in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE), with foreign investment accounting for approximately 43.5 percent of TWSE capitalization in 2021. Taiwan allows the establishment of offshore banking, securities, and insurance units to attract a broader investor base. The FSC utilizes a negative list approach to regulating local banks’ overseas business not involving the conversion of the NTD. Taiwan’s capital market is mature and active. At the end of 2021, 959 companies were listed on the TWSE, with a total market value of US $2.2 trillion (including transactions of stocks, Taiwan Depository Receipts, exchange-traded funds, and warrants). Foreign portfolio investors are not subject to a foreign ownership ceiling, except in certain restricted companies, and are not subject to any ceiling on portfolio investment. The turnover ratio in the TWSE rose to 205.3 percent in 2021 as the TWSE Capitalization Weighted Stock Index (TAIEX) soared 23.7 percent in 2021. Payments and transfers resulting from international trade activities are fully liberalized in Taiwan. A wide range of credit instruments, all allocated on market terms, is available to domestic- and foreign-invested firms alike. Taiwan’s banking sector is healthy, tightly regulated, and competitive, with 39 banks including three online-only banks servicing the market. The sector’s non-performing loan ratio has remained below 1 percent since 2010, with a sector average of 0.17 in December 2021. Capital-adequacy ratios (CAR) are generally high, and several of Taiwan’s leading commercial lenders are government-controlled, enjoying implicit state guarantees. The sector had a CAR of 14.82 percent as of September 2021, far above the Basel III regulatory minimum of 10.5 percent required by 2019. Taiwan banks’ liquidity coverage ratio, which was required by Basel III to reach 100 percent by 2019, averaged 134.2 percent in September 2021. Taiwan’s banking system is primarily deposit-funded and has limited exposure to global financial, wholesale markets. Regulators have encouraged local banks to expand to overseas markets, especially in Southeast Asia, and minimize exposure in the PRC. Taiwan Central Bank statistics show that Taiwan banks’ PRC net exposure on an ultimate risk basis was USD 70.8 billion in the third quarter of 2021, trailing the United States’ USD 110.2 billion. Taiwan’s largest bank in terms of assets is the wholly state-owned Bank of Taiwan, which had USD 198.2 billion of assets as of December 2021. Taiwan’s eight state-controlled banks (excluding the Export and Import Bank) jointly held nearly US $1,015.6 billion, or 48 percent of the banking sector’s total assets. The Taiwan Central Bank operates as an independent agency and state-owned company under the Executive Yuan, free from political interference. The Central Bank’s mandates are to maintain financial stability, develop Taiwan’s banking business, guard the stability of the NTD’s external and internal value, and promote economic growth within the scope of the three aforementioned goals. Foreign banks are allowed to operate in Taiwan as branches and foreign-owned subsidiaries, but financial regulators require foreign bank branches to limit their customer base to large corporate clients. Foreigners holding a valid visa entering Taiwan are allowed to open an NTD account with local banks with passports and an ID number issued by the immigration office. Please refer to the Taiwan Bankers’ Association’s webpage: https://www.ba.org.tw/PublicInformation/BusinessDetail/10?returnurl=%2F for detailed information regarding various types of bank services for foreigners in Taiwan. Taiwan does not have a sovereign wealth fund, although the American business community continues to advocate for one. Taiwania Capital Management Company, a partially government-funded investment company, was established in October 2017 to promote investment in innovative and other target industries. As of August 2021, Taiwania raised US $490 million for four funds investing in IoT, biotech, digital health, and early startups in automation, 5G and networking, and advanced manufacturing. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Taiwan has 17 SOEs with stakes by the central authorities exceeding 50 percent, including official agencies such as the Taiwan Central Bank. Please refer to the list of all central government, majority-owned SOEs available online at https://ws.ndc.gov.tw/Download.ashx?u=LzAwMS9hZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yLzEwL3JlbGZpbGUvMC8xMjk1LzM3NGExNjVjLWM5MzAtNDYxZS1iYjViLTA3ODkzYjNlNWVhMi5kb2M%3d&n=M2ZjMzZmMDItZjVjOC00ZjU2LThiMTctZmM3Y2EzMTE1MDRhLmRvYw%3d%3d&icon=.doc Some of these SOEs are large in scale and exert significant influence in their industries, especially monopolies such as Taiwan Power (Taipower) and Taiwan Water. CPC Corporation (formerly China Petroleum Corporation) controls over 70 percent of Taiwan’s retail gasoline market. The most recent privatization took place in 2014, when the Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC) was successfully privatized through a public listing on the TWSE. Taiwan authorities retain control over some SOEs that were privatized, including managing appointments to boards of directors. These enterprises include Chunghwa Telecom, China Steel, China Airlines, Taiwan Fertilizer, Taiwan Salt, CSBC Corporation (shipbuilding), Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp., and eight public banks. In 2020 (latest data available), the 17 SOEs together had a net income of NTD 258 billion (US $9.2 billion), down 21 percent from the NTD 325 billion (US $11.6 billion) in 2019. The SOEs’ average return on equities continued to decline from a recent peak of 11.13 percent in 2015 to 6.67 percent in 2020. These 17 SOEs employed a total of 120,606 workers. Taiwan has not adopted the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. In Taiwan, SOEs are defined as public enterprises in which the government owns more than 50 percent of shares. Public enterprises with less than a 50 percent government stake are not subject to Legislative Yuan supervision. Still, authorities may retain managerial control through senior management appointments, which may change with each administration. Each SOE operates under the supervising ministry’s authority, and government-appointed directors should hold more than one-fifth of an SOE’s board seats. The Executive Yuan, the Ministry of Finance, and MOEA have criteria for selecting individuals for senior management positions. Each SOE has a board of directors, and some SOEs have independent directors and union representatives sitting on the board. Taiwan’s central and local government entities, and SOEs are all covered by the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA.) Except for state monopolies, SOEs compete directly with private companies. SOEs’ purchases of goods or services are regulated by the Government Procurement Act and are open to private and foreign companies via public tender. Private companies have the same access to financing as SOEs. Taiwan banks are generally willing to extend loans to enterprises meeting credit requirements. SOEs are subject to the same tax obligations as private enterprises and are regulated by the Fair Trade Act as private enterprises. The Legislative Yuan reviews SOEs’ budgets each year. There are no privatization programs in progress. Taiwan’s most recent privatization of AIDC in 2014 included the imposition of a foreign ownership ceiling of 10 percent due to the sensitive nature of the defense sector. In August 2017, Taiwan authorities identified CPC Corporation, Taipower Company, and Taiwan Sugar as their next privatization targets. Following the passage of the Electricity Industry Act amendments in January 2017, MOEA has stated that Taipower’s privatization will not occur in the near future, but plans to restructure it as a new holding company after separating Taipower’s distribution business from power generation. 10. Political and Security Environment Taiwan is a young and vibrant multi-party democracy. The transitions of power in both local and presidential elections have been peaceful and orderly. There are no recent examples of politically motivated damage to foreign investment. Tajikistan Executive Summary Tajikistan is a challenging place to do business but presents potential high-risk, high-reward opportunities for foreign investors who have experience in the region, a long-term investment horizon, and the patience and resources to conduct significant research and due diligence. At the most senior levels, the Tajik government continues to express interest in attracting more foreign investment. The government hosted an October 2021 investment forum to highlight its commitment to simplifying investment policies. Tajikistan’s ambassador to the United States – who formerly served as the head of the government’s Investment Committee – enlisted high-level government support for outreach to U.S. companies in 2021. Nevertheless, the poorest of the Central Asian countries harbors few U.S. investors and remains an uncompetitive investment destination. President Emomali Rahmon publicly emphasizes the need to foster private-sector-led growth, and attracting investment is prioritized in national development strategies. These strategy documents notwithstanding, authoritarian policies, bureaucratic and financial hurdles, widespread corruption, a flawed banking sector, and countless business and tax inspections greatly hinder investors. The government’s commitment to dedicate significant financial resources to the construction of the Roghun Dam hydropower plant creates pressure for the Tax Committee to enforce or creatively interpret arbitrary tax regulations on companies outside of the wide business interests of President Rahmon’s family in order to meet ever-increasing revenue targets. Politics also play a role. Remittances sent by Tajik labor migrants typically account for one-third of Tajikistan’s GDP, and the Russian Federation uses this leverage to ensure Tajik support for Russian foreign policy priorities, and/or to pressure Tajikistan into joining the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. Tajikistan is also saturated in opaque loans connected to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and Chinese investments account for more than 60 percent of the country’s total Foreign Direct Investment. Finally, despite Tajikistan’s 2013 accession to the World Trade Organization, the Tajik government has imposed trade policies to protect private domestic interests without notifying its partners, notably in the poultry, mining, and alcoholic beverage sectors. The COVID-19 pandemic laid bare endemic transport and infrastructure challenges in landlocked Tajikistan, imposed by geography but exacerbated by political isolation as borders with Afghanistan (following the Taliban’s return to power) and the Kyrgyz Republic (following deadly April 2021 border clashes) remain closed. Tajikistan’s rigid economy represents another systemic barrier as analyses show growth is consistently driven by remittance-fueled consumption and exports are concentrated in mining, metals, and agriculture, making Tajikistan especially vulnerable to commodity shocks in world markets. Despite these challenges and risks to potential investors, Tajikistan is pursuing greater trade and investment links and has made modest progress on trade facilitation and tax reform to improve its investment climate in past years. In 2021 authorities continued small steps towards compliance on intellectual property rights protections. Should the government pursue an economic reform path, opportunities in energy, agribusiness, food processing, tourism, textiles, and mining could prove promising. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 150 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/tajikistan Global Innovation Index 2021 103 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/Home U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 $38 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,060 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=TJ 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Tajik government consistently calls for greater U.S. investment. Despite this, Tajikistan has traditionally courted state-led investment and external loans from the People’s Republic of China and Russia. In 2021, overall Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Tajikistan roughly doubled to $342 million, and Chinese investments, which account for forty percent of all FDI, increased 175 percent to $211 million. Iran ($32.6 million) was the second largest source of FDI in 2021, followed by Turkey ($25.1 million) and Switzerland ($21.5 million). Tajikistan’s Investment Law (Article 7) guarantees equal rights for both local and foreign investors. According to this law, foreigners can invest by jointly owning shares in existing companies with other Tajik companies or Tajik citizens; by creating fully foreign-owned companies; or by concluding agreements with legal entities or citizens of Tajikistan that provide for other forms of foreign investment activity. Foreign firms may acquire assets, including shares and other securities, as well as land leasing and mineral usage rights. Foreign firms may also exercise all property rights to which they are entitled, either independently or shared with other Tajik companies and citizens of Tajikistan. Most of Tajikistan’s current international agreements provide most-favored-nation status. Tajikistan’s legislation does not discriminate against foreign investors by prohibiting, limiting, or conditioning foreign investment. To receive permission and licenses for operation, however, a foreign investor must navigate a complicated, cumbersome, and often corrupt bureaucratic system. In practice foreign companies may encounter different types of hurdles while exercising their rights. For example, registration of a company by a foreign entity or foreigner may be a more complicated process than for local founders. Several Tajik government agencies are responsible for investment promotion, but they frequently have competing interests. The State Committee on Investments and State Property Management ( https://investcom.tj ) facilitates FDI. In addition, state-owned enterprise Tajinvest under the State Committee on Investments and State Property Management is responsible for attracting investment into Tajikistan ( https://www.tajinvest.tj ). Although a donor-supported Consultative Council on the Improvement of the Investment Climate provides a formal venue for dialogue, investors continue to claim that complaints to the government go unheeded. Tajikistan’s legislation provides a right for all forms of foreign and domestic ownership to establish business enterprises and engage in remunerative activity. There are no limits on foreign ownership or control of firms and no sector-specific restrictions that discriminate against market access. Local law considers all land and subsoil resources to belong exclusively to the state, although initial efforts to establish a private land market are underway. Tajikistan’s legislation allows for 100 percent foreign ownership of local companies. In the context of jointly owned companies, local partners generally seek to possess a controlling share (51 percent or more) at the initial stage of business development and in some cases may seek to increase their stake over time. All sectors of Tajikistan’s economy are open to foreign participation except for aviation, defense, security, and law enforcement, which require special government permission for the operation of such types of businesses or services. Tajikistan does not restrict foreign investment; it does not mandate local stakeholder equity positions or local partnership. In some cases, the government requires specific licenses. There are no mandatory IP/technology transfer requirements. Tajikistan’s State Committee on Investments and State Property Management screens inbound foreign investments involving government interests, including investments into its five Free Economic Zones, and issues approval or rejection statements. The government takes particular interest in investments requiring government financial support or state guarantees as well as projects that may impact the country’s national security. Investors must submit their proposals to all relevant government agencies to solicit feedback or objection, and this process can be lengthy and cumbersome. Screening proposals often involve background checks on the company, the person(s) representing the company, and identification of a financial source to comply with anti-money laundering regulations. The review process could reject proposals that violate Tajik law or flag a proposal as “incomplete.” Applicants may appeal the government’s decision by submitting a claim to the Tajik Economic Court. In December 2021 the World Trade Organization conducted its first Trade Policy Review for Tajikistan. Additionally, in 2020 an OECD Peer Review of Investment Promotion in Tajikistan suggested enhancing communication with existing investors and establishing a clear investment strategy that articulates economic objectives and agency roles. Although the Tajik government simplified the business registration process by adopting a single-window registration system for investors in 2019, that process still requires significant legal and human resources, government connections, and time. The Tax Committee is the primary agency responsible for business registration ( www.andoz.tj ). In addition to obtaining state registration through a single-window, a company must also register with the Social Protection Agency ( www.nafaka.tj ); Statistics Agency under the President of Tajikistan ( www.stat.tj ); Ministry of Labor, Migration, and Employment ( www.mehnat.tj ); Sanitary-Epidemiological Service at the Ministry of Health ( www.moh.tj ); as well as with local authorities and municipal services. According to Tajik regulations, registering a business should take less than five business days; in reality, it may take several weeks or even months due to inappropriate or unlawful actions of the registering agencies. The international donor community, in coordination with the government, funds a number of projects that stimulate development of small and medium enterprises in Tajikistan. The Tajik government does not promote outward investments. Private companies from Tajikistan have invested in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkey, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the UAE, primarily in trade, food processing, real estate, and business development. The Tajik government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Tajikistan’s regulatory system lacks transparency, and the government does not encourage companies to disclose environmental, social, or governance transparency. Despite recent improvements to allow access to presidential decrees and laws online, governmental instructions, ministerial memos, and regulations are often inaccessible to the public or unpublished. Although Tajikistan archives laws, regulations, and policies at www.mmk.tj , investors must purchase access to Adliya, a commercial legal database, to obtain updated legal and regulatory information. The Tajik government rarely publishes proposed laws and regulations in draft form for public comment. Government agencies submit proposed draft regulations to government commissions, which receive a final review and approval from the Executive Office of President. TajikStandard, the government agency responsible for certifying goods and services and supervising compliance with state standards, lacks experts and appropriate equipment. TajikStandard does not publish its fees for licenses and certificates, or its regulatory requirements. Ongoing assistance from the World Bank helps the Ministry of Finance and some parastatals adopt International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in order to comply with the government’s 2011 Accounting Law. Publicly available budget documents fall short of internationally accepted standards, but the government has made progress towards greater fiscal transparency in recent years. Tajikistan is a member of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). Government officials are still studying the prospect of membership in the EAEU. The regulatory system that governs Tajikistan’s cotton sector incorporates CIS and U.S. technical norms. Tajikistan became a WTO member in 2013. According to a December 2021 WTO report, Tajikistan has outstanding or outdated notifications in a number of areas. Tajikistan has a civil legal system in which parties to a contract can seek enforcement by submitting claims or disputes to Tajikistan’s Economic Court. Nominally, the judicial system is independent. In practice, the executive branch interferes in judiciary matters. The current judicial process is neither fair nor reliable. Outcomes tend to favor the government’s executive branch. The Tajik government regulates investments through several laws, inter alia, the Law on Investment Agreement, Law on Concessions, Law on Resources, Law on Legal Status of Foreigners, Law on Free Economic Zones, Law on Investments, Concept of State Policy on Investments and Protection of Investments, Law on Natural Resources Tenders, and Law on Privatization of Housing. The Tajik government’s “one-stop-shop” Single Window website for investors launched in 2019: https://investcom.tj/en/investments/single-window/ . The Antimonopoly Service under the Government ( http://www.ams.tj ) is responsible for regulating prices for products of monopolistic enterprises and for preventing and eliminating monopolistic activity, abuse, and unfair competition. The agency’s decisions are subject to a legal appeals process, although there are few instances in which decisions have been overruled. The Tajik government can legally expropriate property under the terms of Tajikistan’s Law on Investments, Law on Privatization, civil code, and criminal code. The laws authorize expropriation if the Tajik government identifies procedural violations in privatizations of state-owned assets or determines a property has been used for anti-government or criminal activities, as defined in the criminal code. Tajikistan has a history of expropriating land that was illegally privatized following independence. After an investigation by government anti-corruption, anti-monopoly, and other law enforcement agencies, the State Committee for Investments and State Property Management can issue a finding that the asset was illegally privatized and request that the Tajik court system order its return to government control. Domestic law requires owners be reimbursed for expropriated property, but the amount of the compensation is usually well below the property’s fair market value. The Tajik government has not shown any pattern of discrimination against U.S. persons by way of illegal expropriation. Under Tajikistan’s 2003 Law on Bankruptcy, both creditors and debtors may file for an insolvent firm’s liquidation. The debtor may reject overly burdensome contracts and choose whether to continue contracts supplying essential goods or services, or avoid preferential or undervalued transactions. The law does not provide for the possibility of the debtor obtaining credit after the commencement of insolvency proceedings. Creditors have the right to demand the debtor return creditors’ property if that property was assigned to the debtor less than four months prior to the institution of bankruptcy proceedings. Tajik law does not criminalize bankruptcy. 6. Financial Sector Foreign portfolio investment is not a priority for the Tajik government, and the country lacks a securities market. According to government statistics, portfolio investment in Tajikistan totaled $502.5 million at the end of 2021. This includes the $500 million Eurobond the National Bank of Tajikistan (NBT) issued in 2017. The NBT has made efforts to develop a system to encourage and facilitate portfolio investments, including credit rating mechanisms implemented by Moody’s and S&P. Apart from these initial steps, however, Tajikistan has not established policies to facilitate the free flow of financial resources into product and factor markets. Tajikistan does not place any restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions, per IMF Article VIII. It regards transfers from all international sources as revenue, however, and taxes them accordingly. Politically-driven lending has historically saddled commercial banks with a high percentage of non-performing loans. Foreign investors can get credit on the local market, but those operating in Tajikistan avoid local credit because of comparatively high interest rates. According to the NBT report from December 2021, 62 credit institutions, including 13 banks, including one Islamic bank, 18 microcredit deposit organizations, four microcredit organizations, and 27 microcredit funds, function in Tajikistan. Tajikistan has 295 bank branches and 1,204 banking service centers. The National Bank has estimated roughly 25 percent of Tajiks have a bank account. Tajikistan’s banking system is on a recovery path following a 2015 financial crisis. AgroInvestBank and TojikSodirotbank, two of Tajikistan’s largest, entered the liquidation process in May 2021. Tajikistan’s banking sector has assets of $1.98 billion as of December 2021, while liabilities reached $1.53 billion. Although authorities report 13.4 percent of commercial loans are non-performing, other independent estimates are considerably higher. The NBT is Tajikistan’s central bank and, in recent years, has pursued policies to strengthen financial inclusion and cashless payments. Foreign banks can establish operations but are subject to NBT regulations. United States commercial banks discontinued correspondent banking relations with Tajik commercial banks in 2012. To establish a bank account, foreigners must submit a letter of application, a passport copy, and Tajik government-issued taxpayer identification number. Tajikistan does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises World Bank and IMF reports indicate there are 920 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which employ 24 percent of the labor force, use 50 percent of all available credit, and account for 17 percent of the country’s economic output. The State Committee for Investments and State Property Management maintains a private database of all SOEs in Tajikistan. SOEs are active in travel, transportation, energy, mining, metal manufacturing/products, food processing/packaging, agriculture, construction, heavy equipment, services, finance, and information and communication sectors. The government divested itself of smaller SOEs in successive waves of privatization but retained ownership of the largest Soviet-era enterprises and any sector deemed to be a natural monopoly. The government appoints directors and boards to SOEs, but the absence of clear governance and internal control procedures means the government retains full control. Tajik SOEs do not adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. When SOEs are involved in investment disputes, domestic courts typically rule in their favor. In sectors that are open to private sector and foreign competition, SOEs receive a larger percentage of government contracts/business than their private sector competitors. Tajikistan has undertaken a commitment, as part of its WTO accession protocol, to initiate accession to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), but the agreement does not cover SOEs. The Tajik government conducted privatization on an ad-hoc basis in the 1990s, and again in the early 2000s. Following a World Bank recommendation, in 2020 the government began splitting national energy parastatal Barqi Tojik, which is now legally three distinct public/private partnerships. Foreign investors are able to participate in Tajikistan’s privatization programs. There is a public bidding process, but the privatization process is not transparent. 10. Political and Security Environment Tajikistan’s civil war lasted from 1992 to 1997 and resulted in the deaths of 50,000 people. Apart from a minor uprising in September 2015, however, political violence following the end of the civil war has been rare. In 2020, President Rahmon won his fifth-consecutive term in office with 91 percent of the vote. Earlier in the year, the President’s political party won 47 of 63 seats in parliament. Tajikistan’s authoritarian ruler has consolidated power by silencing opposition voices and political parties. As part of its security efforts, the Tajik government has placed numerous restrictions on religious, media, and civil freedoms. The state, as an extension of the regime, furthers the interests of the ruling elite, often to the detriment of the business community. Democratic reform is viewed by many elites as a threat to important political and financial interests. Government institutions are often unwilling or unable to protect human rights, the judiciary is not independent, and the court system does not present Tajiks with a fair or effective forum in which to seek protection. Law enforcement institutions often overuse their authority to monitor, question, or detain a wide spectrum of individuals, and the State Committee on National Security (GKNB) exercises a wide degree of influence in all aspects of government. Tanzania Executive Summary The United Republic of Tanzania achieved lower-middle income country status in July 2020, following two decades of sustained economic growth. The country’s solid macroeconomic foundation, sound fiscal policies, rich natural endowments, and strategic geographic position have fostered a diverse economy resilient to external shocks. This proved critical as the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in an economic downturn, though Tanzania avoided a more severe pandemic-induced recession. The Government of Tanzania (GoT) welcomes foreign direct investment. In March 2021, President Samia Suluhu Hassan assumed the presidency following the death of President John Pombe Magufuli. In her first months in office, President Hassan promised reforms to improve the business climate and identified attracting foreign investment as a key priority. This commitment to increasing investment has continued throughout her tenure and economic issues remain at the forefront of the administration’s policies, strategies, and goals. President Hassan’s government has sought to engage stakeholders, including local private sector organizations and development partners, to improve the business climate and regain investor confidence. Consistent with this shift in rhetoric, significant changes to improving the business environment and investment climate have been made over the past year: improving the complex, and sometimes inconsistent, work permit issuance process for foreign workers and investors; streamlining Tanzania Investment Center (TIC) operations; disbandment of the special ‘Tax Task Force’ previously associated with heavy-handed and arbitrary tax enforcement; and strengthening regional trade cooperation. However, while several laws have been reviewed, business climate legislative reforms have not yet been sweeping. There remain significant legislative obstacles to foreign investment such as the Natural Resources and Wealth Act, Permanent Sovereignty Act, Public Private Partnership Act, and the Mining Laws and Regulations. Despite pledges by President Hassan and senior government officials, these have yet to be resolved; rather, the administration has selectively eased the application of these laws. The primary business and investment challenges lie in tax administration; opening and closing businesses; inconsistent institutions compounded by corruption and requests for “facilitation payments” at many levels of government; late payment issues; and cross-border trade obstacles. In recent years, aggressive and arbitrary tax collection policies targeted foreign and domestic companies and individuals alike, and tough labor regulations made it difficult to hire foreign employees, even when the required skills were not available within the local labor force. Corruption, especially in government procurement, taxation, and customs clearance remains a concern for foreign investors, though the government has prioritized efforts to combat the practice. The country’s drastic and improved shift in its acknowledgement of and approach to COVID-19 in 2021 led to the creation and implementation of a national COVID-19 response plan that addressed both health and socio-economic impacts of the pandemic. Tanzania has reengaged with the international community to support implementation of its robust national pandemic response plan with key pillars for improving data sharing, welcoming vaccines, and conducting vaccination outreach campaigns. Sectors traditionally attracting U.S. investment include infrastructure, transportation, energy, mining and extractive industries, tourism, agriculture, fishing, agro-processing, and manufacturing. Other opportunities exist in workforce development, microfinance solutions, technology, and consumer products and services. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 87 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 90 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country (historical stock positions) 2020 USD 1,510 Million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2019 USD 1,080 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The United Republic of Tanzania welcomes foreign direct investment (FDI) as it pursues its industrialization and development agenda. On her inauguration in March 2021, President Samia Suluhu Hassan identified removing obstacles to inward foreign investment as a key priority, along with other measures to improve the overall business climate and rebuild trust between the private sector and government. This follows declining FDI and investor confidence over the past six years, with UNCTAD’s 2021 World Investment Report indicating around $1.0 billion in FDI for 2020, stagnant growth in recent years and well below 2015 levels. The development of a $3.5 billion 1,400 km oil pipeline to transport crude oil extracted in Uganda to the Tanzanian port of Tanga could sustain investment in both countries in the future. Investors and potential investors note the biggest challenges to investment include difficulty in hiring foreign workers, unfriendly and opaque tax policies, increased local content requirements, regulatory and policy instability, lack of trust between the GoT and the private sector, and mandatory initial public offerings (IPOs) in key industries. In 2020 and 2021, the GoT recognized many of these concerns’ impacts on both foreign and domestic investment and created task forces and working groups to engage the private sector to identify solutions. These efforts were expanded by President Hassan’s government. The United Republic of Tanzania has framework agreements on investment and offers various incentives and the services of investment promotion agencies. Investment is mainly a non-Union matter (i.e., different laws, policies, and practices apply between mainland Tanzania and the semi-autonomous state of Zanzibar). Zanzibar updated its investment policy in 2019, while the mainland/Union policy dates from 1996. Efforts to update the Mainland Investment Policy and Investment Act are underway, but incomplete as of the date of this publication. International agreements on investment are covered as Union matters and therefore apply to both regions. The Tanzania Investment Center (TIC) is intended to be a one-stop center for investors, providing services such as permits, licenses, visas, and land ( view TIC’s portal ). The Zanzibar Investment Promotion Authority (ZIPA) provides the same function in Zanzibar ( view ZIPA ). The GoT has an ongoing dialogue with the private sector via the Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC). TNBC meetings are chaired by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania and co-chaired by the head of the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF). President Hassan reinvigorated this formal mechanism during her first months in office. There is also a Zanzibar Business Council (ZBC), as well as Regional Business Councils (RBCs), and District Business Councils (DBCs). Investors have found that technical expertise of their negotiating partners is a stumbling block to completing their investment plans. Investors should examine the level of sophistication of their negotiating partners at the onset of discussions to determine if outside expertise or training may be necessary. The U.S. government offers programs to develop expertise to facilitate investments and investors are encouraged to work with the Embassy’s economic and commercial sections to determine what, if any, programs may be available. Foreign investors generally receive treatment equivalent to domestic investors, though limits persist in a number of sectors. There are no geographical restrictions on private establishments with foreign participation or ownership, no limitations on number of foreign entities that can operate in any given sector, and no sectors in which approval is required for greenfield FDI but not for domestic investment. However, Tanzania discourages foreign investment in several sectors through limitations on foreign equity ownership or other activities, including aerospace; agribusiness (fishing); banking; insurance; construction and heavy equipment; travel and tourism; energy and environmental industries; information and communication; and publishing, media, and entertainment. In 2020, Tanzania relaxed but did not eliminate the foreign ownership limitations in the mining sector. Specific examples include the following: The Tourism Act of 2008 bars foreign companies from engaging in mountain guiding activities, and states that only Tanzanian citizens can operate travel agencies, car rental services, or engage in tour guide activities (with limited exceptions). Per the Merchant Shipping Act of 2003, only citizen-owned ships are authorized to engage in local trade, a requirement that can be waived at the minister’s discretion. Furthermore, the Tanzania Shipping Agencies Act of November 2017 gives exclusive monopoly power to the Tanzania Shipping Agency Corporation (TASAC) to conduct business as shipping agent, shipping regulator, and licensor of other private shipping agencies. The Act also gives TASAC an exclusive mandate to provide clearing and forwarding functions relating to imports and exports of minerals, mineral concentrates, machinery and equipment for the mining and petroleum sector, products and/or extracts related to minerals and petroleum. arms and ammunition, live animals, government trophies, and any other goods that the minister responsible for maritime transport may specify. A 2019 amendment extended this exclusive mandate to additional imports, including fertilizers, sugar (both industrial and domestic), cooking oil, wheat, oil products, liquefied gas, and chemicals related to the products. As of May 2021, the extended mandate has yet to go into effect, following extensive objections for private sector stakeholders. A 2009 amendment to the Fisheries Regulations imposes onerous conditions for foreign citizens to engage in commercial fishing and the export of fishery products, sets separate licensing costs for foreign citizens and Tanzanians, and limits the types of fishery products that foreign citizens may work with. Foreign construction contractors can only obtain temporary licenses, per the Contractors Registration Act of 1997, and contractors must commit in writing to leave Tanzania upon completion of the set project. 2004 amendments to the Contractors Registration By-Laws limit foreign contractor participation to specified, more complex classes of work. Foreign capital participation in the telecommunications sector is limited to a maximum of 75 percent. All insurers require one-third controlling interest by Tanzania citizens, per the Insurance Act. The Electronic and Postal Communications (Licensing) Regulations 2011 limits foreign ownership of Tanzanian TV stations to 49 percent and prohibits foreign capital participation in national newspapers. Mining projects must be at least partially owned by the GoT and “indigenous” companies, and hire – or at least favor – local suppliers, service providers, and employees. (See Chapter 4: Laws and Regulations on FDI for details.). Gemstone mining is limited to Tanzanian citizens with waivers of the limitation at ministerial discretion. In February 2019, responding to low growth and investment in the sector, the government revised the 2018 Mining Regulations to reduce local ownership requirements from 51 percent to 20 percent. Currently, foreigners can invest in stock traded on the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE), but only East African residents can invest in government bonds. East Africans, excluding Tanzanian residents, however, are not allowed to sell government bonds bought in the primary market for at least one year following purchase. There have not been any third-party investment policy reviews (IPRs) on Tanzania in the past several years, the most recent OECD report is for 2013. The World Trade Organization (WTO) published a Trade Policy Review in 2019 on all the East African Community states, including Tanzania. WTO – Trade Policy Review: East African Community (2019) UNCTAD– Tanzania Investment Policy Review (2002) WTO – Secretariat Report of Tanzania UNCTAD – Trade and Gender Implications (2018) The Business Registration and Licensing Agency (BRELA) issues certificates of compliance for foreign companies, certificates of incorporation for private and public companies, and business name registrations for sole proprietor and corporate bodies. After registering with BRELA, the company must: obtain a taxpayer identification number (TIN) certificate, apply for a business license, apply for a VAT certificate, register for workmen’s compensation insurance, register with the Occupational Safety and Health Authority (OSHA), receive inspection from OSHA, and obtain a Social Security registration number. The Tanzania Investment Center (TIC) now sits under the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), after being moved around several times in recent years. The TIC is a one-stop shop which provides simultaneous registration with BRELA, TRA, and social security for enterprises whose minimum capital investment is not less than USD 500,000 if foreign-owned or USD 100,000 if locally owned. Throughout 2021, TIC has streamlined its operations to facilitate the process of business registration. The government has been slow to implement its May 2018 Blueprint for Regulatory Reforms to improve the business environment and attract more investors. The reforms seek to improve the country’s ease of doing business through regulatory reforms and to increase efficiency in dealing with the government and its regulatory authorities. The official implementation of the Business Environment Improvement Blueprint started in July 2019, though there have been few tangible changes or advancements. President Hassan’s government identified implementation of the Blueprint as a priority for her first term. Tanzania does not promote or incentivize outward investment. There are restrictions on Tanzanian residents’ participation in foreign capital markets and ability to purchase foreign securities. Under the Foreign Exchange (Amendment) Regulations 2014 (FEAR), however, there are circumstances when Tanzanian residents may trade securities within the East African Community (EAC). In addition, FEAR provides some opportunities for residents to engage in foreign direct investment and acquire real assets outside of the EAC. 3. Legal Regime According to the World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance ( view the World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance ), Tanzania scores low in regulatory governance with 1.25 out of 5 totals in transparency of regulatory governance (neighboring Kenya and Uganda, by contrast, both score 3.25). Tanzania has formal processes for drafting and implementing rules and regulations. Generally, after an Act is passed by Parliament, the creation of regulations is delegated to a designated ministry. In theory, stakeholders are legally entitled to comment on regulations before they are implemented. However, ministries and regulatory agencies frequently fail to provide adequate opportunity for meaningful input as there is no minimum period of time for public comment set forth in law. Stakeholders often report that they are either not consulted or given too little time to provide meaningful input. Ministries or regulatory agencies do not have the legal obligation to publish the text of proposed regulations before their enactment. Sometimes, it is difficult to obtain the final, adopted version of a bill in a timely manner nor is it always public information if and when the President signed the bill. Moreover, the government over the past few years used presidential decree powers to bypass regulatory and legal structures. The 2016 Access to Information law in theory grants citizens more rights to information; however, some claim that the Act gives too much discretion to the GoT to withhold disclosure. Although information, including rules and regulations, is available on the GoT’s “Government Portal” ( view the Government Portal ), the website is generally not current and is incomplete. Alternatively, rules and regulations can be obtained on the relevant ministry’s website, but many offer insufficient information. Nominally, independent regulators are mandated with impartially following the regulations. The process, however, has been criticized as being subject to political influence, depriving the regulator of the independence it is granted under the law. Tanzania does not meet the minimum standards for transparency of public finances and debt obligations ( view the Department of State’s Fiscal Transparency Report). Tanzania is part of both the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and subject to their respective regulations. Notably in 2021, Tanzania ratified the EAC’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Protocol after a protracted period of deliberation. Tanzania is a member of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). The national standards body, the Tanzania Bureau of Standards, was established in 1975. It has been most active in promoting standards and quality in process technology, including agro-processing, chemicals and textiles, and engineering, including mining and construction. Tanzania is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its National Enquiry Point (NEP) is the Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS). As the WTO NEP, TBS handles information on adopted or proposed technical regulations, as well as on standards and conformity assessment procedures. Tanzania does not notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Tanzania’s legal system is based on the English Common Law system. The first source of law is the 1977 Constitution, followed by statutes or acts of Parliament; and case law, which are reported or unreported cases from the High Courts and Courts of Appeal and are used as precedents to guide lower courts. The Court of Appeal, which handles appeals from Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, is the highest court, followed by the High Court, which handles civil, criminal and commercial cases. There are four specialized divisions within the High Courts: Labor, Land, Commercial, and Corruption and Economic Crimes. The Labor, Land, and Corruption and Economic Crimes divisions have exclusive jurisdiction over their respective matters, while the Commercial division does not claim exclusive jurisdiction. The High Court and the District and Resident Magistrate Courts also have original jurisdiction in commercial cases subject to specified financial limitations. Apart from the formal court system, there are quasi-judicial bodies, including the Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal and the Fair Competition Tribunal, as well as alternate dispute resolution procedures in the form of arbitration proceedings. Judgments originating from countries whose courts are recognized under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (REFJA) are enforceable in Tanzania. To enforce such judgments, the judgment holder must make an application to the High Court of Tanzania to have the judgment registered. Countries currently listed in the REFJA include Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Zambia, Seychelles, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, the United Kingdom, and Sri Lanka. The Tanzanian constitution guarantees judicial independence. However, the degree of judicial independence has varied significantly in the past few years, and many perceive that political interference and corruption in the form of illicit payments to influence decisions in justice is a concern. Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable, and they are adjudicated in the national court system. Several laws and regulations enacted over the past six years affect the risk-return profile on foreign investments, especially those in the extractives and natural resources industries. The laws/regulations include the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act 2017, Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and Renegotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act 2017, Written Laws (Miscellaneous Act) 2017, and Mining (Local Content) Regulations 2019. These acts were introduced by the executive branch under a certificate of urgency, meaning that standard advance publication requirements were waived to expedite passage. As a result, there was minimal stakeholder engagement. Stakeholders continue to call for revision to these laws. Investors, especially those in natural resources and mining, express concern about the effects of these laws. Two laws apply to “natural wealth and resources,” which are broadly defined and not only include oil and gas, but in theory, could include wind, sun, and air space. Investors are encouraged to seek legal counsel to determine the effect these laws may have on existing or potential investments. For natural resources, the new laws subject the contracts, past and present, to Parliamentary review. More specifically, the law states “Where [Parliament] considers that certain terms …or the entire arrangement… are prejudicial to the interests of the People and the United Republic by reason of unconscionable terms it may, by resolution, direct the Government to initiate renegotiation with a view to rectifying the terms.” Further, if the GoT’s proposed renegotiation is not accepted, the offending terms are automatically expunged. “Unconscionable” is defined broadly, including catch-all definitions for clauses that are, for example, “inequitable or onerous to the state.” Under the law, the judicial branch does not play a role in determining whether a clause is “unconscionable.” The Mining (Local Content) Regulations 2019 require that ‘indigenous’ Tanzanian companies are given first preference for mining licenses. An ‘indigenous Tanzanian company’ is one incorporated under the Companies Act with at least 20 percent of its equity owned by and 100 percent of its non-managerial positions held by Tanzanians (this is an improvement from the 2018 regulations which required 51 percent Tanzanian ownership). Furthermore, foreign mining companies must have at least five percent equity participation from an indigenous Tanzanian company and must grant the GoT a 16 percent carried interest. Lastly, foreign companies that supply goods or services to the mining industry must incorporate a joint venture company in which an indigenous Tanzanian company must hold equity participation of at least 20 percent. The Tanzania Investment Center contains many relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors on its portal ( view the portal ), though it is not comprehensive. Note: TIC and the GoT are currently in the process of reviewing several investment- and business-related regulations. Investors are encouraged to contact the U.S. Embassy or to seek legal counsel with a firm operating in Tanzania. The Fair Competition Commission (FCC) is an independent government body mandated to intervene, as necessary, to prevent significant market dominance, price fixing, extortion of monopoly rent to the detriment of the consumer, and market instability. The FCC has the authority to restrict mergers and acquisitions if the outcome is likely to create market dominance or lead to uncompetitive behavior. The constitution and investment acts require government to refrain from nationalization. However, the GoT may expropriate property after due process for the purpose of national interest. The Tanzanian Investment Act guarantees payment of fair, adequate, and prompt compensation; access to the court or arbitration for the determination of adequate compensation; and prompt repatriation in convertible currency where applicable. For protection under the Tanzania Investment Act, foreign investors require $500,000 minimum capital and Tanzanian investors require $100,000. There are numerous examples of indirect expropriation, such as confiscatory tax regimes or regulatory actions that deprive investors of substantial economic benefits from their investments. This is another area that the GoT expected to address in 2021, though significant changes to tax-related laws and regulations have yet to be finalized. Tanzania has a bankruptcy law which allows for companies to declare insolvency. The insolvency process includes the appointment of receiver managers, administrative receivers, or liquidators. In practice the process is very long and expensive. Preferential debts such as government taxes and rents, outstanding wages and salaries, and other employee compensation take priority over other claims, including those from creditors. Insolvent or illiquid companies may also seek the protection of the courts by seeking a compromise or arrangement as proposed between a company and its creditors, a certain class of creditors, or its shareholders. Bankruptcy proceedings can take several years to conclude in Tanzania. The recovery rate for creditors on insolvent firms was reported at 20.4 U.S. cents on the dollar, with judgments typically made in local currency. 6. Financial Sector Tanzania’s Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE) is a self-listed publicly owned company. In 2013, the DSE launched a second-tier market, the Enterprise Growth Market (EGM) with lower listing requirements designed to attract small and medium sized companies with high growth potential. As March 2022, the total market capitalization was $7.076 billion, a 5.6 percent increase from March 2021 ($6.7 billion). The Capital Markets and Securities Authority (CMSA) Act facilitates the flow of capital and financial resources to support the capital market and securities industry. Tanzania, however, restricts the free flow of investment in and out of the country, and Tanzanians cannot sell or issue securities abroad unless approved by the CMSA. Under the Capital Markets and Securities (Foreign Investors) Regulation 2014, there is no aggregate value limitation on foreign ownership of listed non-government securities. Only companies or citizens from EAC nations are permitted to participate in the government securities market. Even with this recent development allowing EAC participation, foreign ownership of government securities is still limited to 40 percent of each security issued. Tanzania’s Electronic and Postal Communications Act 2010 amended in 2016 by the Finance Act 2016 requires telecom companies to list 25 percent of their shares via an initial public offering (IPO) on the DSE. Of the seven telecom companies that filed IPO applications with the CMSA, only Vodacom’s application received approval. As part of the Mining (Minimum Shareholding and Public Offering) Regulations 2016, large scale mining operators were required to float a 30 percent stake on the DSE by October 7, 2018. Currently, no mining companies are listed on the DSE. Tanzania’s financial inclusion rate increased significantly over the past decade thanks to mobile phones and mobile banking. However, participation in the formal banking sector remains low. Low private sector credit growth and high non-performing loan (NPL) rates are persistent problems. The NPL ratios further deteriorated with the COVID 19 pandemic. According to the IMF’s most recent Financial System Stability Assessment ( view assessment ), Tanzania’s bank-dominated financial sector is small, concentrated, and at a relatively nascent stage of development. Financial services provision is dominated by commercial banks, with the ten largest institutions being preeminent in terms of mobilizing savings and intermediating credit. The report found that nearly half of Tanzania’s 45 banks are vulnerable to adverse shocks and risk insolvency in the event of a global financial crisis. The two largest banks are CRDB Bank and National Microfinance Bank (NMB), which represent almost 30 percent of the market. The only U.S. bank operating in Tanzania is Citibank Tanzania Limited. Private sector companies have access to commercial credit instruments including documentary credits (letters of credit), overdrafts, term loans, and guarantees. Foreign investors may open accounts and earn tax-free interest in Tanzanian commercial banks, however a special exemption is required from the Bank of Tanzania to open an account as a “foreign entity.” A foreign entity account is an account owned by a company without a registered, legal business presence in Tanzania. The Banking and Financial Institution Act 2006 established a framework for credit reference bureaus, permits the release of information to licensed reference bureaus, and allows credit reference bureaus to provide to any person, upon a legitimate business request, a credit report. Currently, there are two private credit bureaus operating in Tanzania: Credit Info Tanzania Limited and Dun & Bradstreet Credit Bureau Tanzania Limited. Tanzania does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Public enterprises do not compete under the same terms and conditions as private enterprises because they have access to government subsidies and other benefits. SOEs are active in the power, communications, rail, telecommunications, insurance, aviation, and port sectors. SOEs generally report to ministries and are led by a board. Typically, a presidential appointee chairs the board, which usually includes private sector representatives. SOEs are not subjected to hard budget constraints. SOEs do not discriminate against or unfairly burden foreigners, though they do have access to sovereign credit guarantees. Specific details on SOE financials and employment figures are not publicly available. As of June 2019, the GoT’s Treasury Registrar reported shares and interests in 266 public parastatals, companies and statutory corporations ( view the most recent Treasury Registrar report ). The government retains a strong presence in energy, mining, telecommunication services, and transportation. The government is increasingly empowering the state-owned Tanzania Telecommunications Corporation Limited (TTCL) with the objective of safeguarding the national security, promoting socio-economic development, and managing strategic communications infrastructure. The government also acquired 51 percent of Airtel Telecommunication Company Limited and became the majority shareholder. In the past, the GoT has sought foreign investors to manage formerly state-run companies in public-private partnerships, but successful privatizations have been rare. Though there have been attempts to privatize certain companies, the process is not always clear and transparent. The GoT currently has 20 companies/assets awaiting privatization. 10. Political and Security Environment Since gaining independence, Tanzania has enjoyed a relatively high degree of peace and stability compared to its neighbors in the region. Tanzania has held six national multi-party elections since 1995, the most recent in October 2020 which saw the ruling party’s candidates win by vast majorities. There were serious doubts about the credibility of the October 2020 elections on the mainland and Zanzibar, as there were for byelections in 2018 and 2019. Zanzibar, particularly experienced political violence several times since 1995, including in 2020. Following the untimely death of President Magufuli (elected in October 2020) in March 2021, a peaceful transfer of power to Vice President Samia Suhulu Hassan took place in accordance with constitutionally mandated procedures. President Hassan continues to follow the CCM ruling party’s manifesto and has begun to lay out her own priorities, which include a reset on international relations and an effort to revive the private sector and attract foreign investment. Tanzania is generally free from violent conflict, however, there are ongoing concerns about insecurity spilling over from neighboring countries, particularly religious extremism from the Tanzania-Mozambique border. There are a significant number of refugees from crisis and conflicts in neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi, and the continuing violence in neighboring Mozambique has resulted in Mozambican citizens seeking refuge across the border in southern Tanzania. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (USD) 2019 $63 billion 2020 $62.41 billion www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country (USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $1.47 million BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States (USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2020 $ (-2) million BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 1.5% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/Economic Trends/Fdi.html * Source for Host Country Data: host country data not publicly available. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI There is no data for Tanzania in the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS). According to the Bank of Tanzania, the top sources for inward foreign investment into Tanzania are South Africa, Canada, Nigeria, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Mauritius, Kenya, United States, Vietnam, and France. Data on outward direct investment is not available. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment There is no data for Tanzania in the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS). Thailand Executive Summary Thailand is an upper middle-income country with a half-trillion-dollar economy, generally pro-investment policies, and well-developed infrastructure. General Prayut Chan-o-cha was elected by Parliament as Prime Minister on June 5, 2019. Thailand celebrated the coronation of King Maha Vajiralongkorn May 4-6, 2019, formally returning a King to the Head of State of Thailand’s constitutional monarchy. Despite some political uncertainty, Thailand continues to encourage foreign direct investment as a means of promoting economic development, employment, and technology transfer. In recent decades, Thailand has been a major destination for foreign direct investment, and hundreds of U.S. companies have invested in Thailand successfully. Thailand continues to encourage investment from all countries and seeks to avoid dependence on any one country as a source of investment. The Foreign Business Act (FBA) of 1999 governs most investment activity by non-Thai nationals. Many U.S. businesses also enjoy investment benefits through the U.S.-Thai Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, signed in 1833 and updated in 1966. The Treaty allows U.S. citizens and U.S. majority-owned businesses incorporated in the United States or Thailand to maintain a majority shareholding or to wholly own a company or branch office located in Thailand, and engage in business on the same basis as Thai companies (national treatment). The Treaty exempts such U.S.-owned businesses from most FBA restrictions on foreign investment, although the Treaty excludes some types of businesses. Notwithstanding their Treaty rights, many U.S. investors choose to form joint ventures with Thai partners who hold a majority stake in the company, leveraging their partner’s knowledge of the Thai economy and local regulations. The Thai government maintains a regulatory framework that broadly encourages investment. Some investors have nonetheless expressed views that the framework is overly restrictive, with a lack of consistency and transparency in rulemaking and interpretation of law and regulations. The Board of Investment (BOI), Thailand’s principal investment promotion authority, acts as a primary conduit for investors. BOI offers businesses assistance in navigating Thai regulations and provides investment incentives to qualified domestic and foreign investors through straightforward application procedures. Investment incentives include both tax and non-tax privileges. The Thai government is actively pursuing foreign investment related to clean energy, electric vehicles, and related industries. Thailand is currently developing a National Energy Plan that will supersede the current Alternative Energy Development Plan that sets a 20 percent target for renewable energy by 2037. Revised plans are expected to increase clean energy targets in line with the Prime Minister’s November 2021 announcement during COP26 that Thailand will increase its climate change targets, as well as domestic policies focused on sustainability, including the “Bio-Circular Green Economy” model. The government passed laws on cybersecurity and personal data protection in 2019; as of March 2022, the cybersecurity law has been enforced while the personal data protection law is still in the process of drafting implementing regulations. The government unveiled in January 2021 a Made in Thailand (MiT) initiative that will set aside 60 percent of state procurement budget for locally made products. As of March 2022, Federation of Thai Industry registered 31,131 products that should benefits from the MiT initiative. The government launched its Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) development plan in 2017. The EEC is a part of the “Thailand 4.0” economic development strategy introduced in 2016. Many planned infrastructure projects, including a high-speed train linking three airports, U-Tapao Airport commercialization, and Laem Chabang and Mab Ta Phut Port expansion, could provide opportunities for investments and sales of U.S. goods and services. In support of its “Thailand 4.0” strategy, the government offers incentives for investments in twelve targeted industries: next-generation automotive; intelligent electronics; advanced agriculture and biotechnology; food processing; tourism; advanced robotics and automation; digital technology; integrated aviation; medical hub and total healthcare services; biofuels/biochemical; defense manufacturing; and human resource development. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 110 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 43 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 17,450 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 7,040 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Thailand continues to generally welcome investment from all countries and seeks to avoid dependence on any one country as a source of investment. However, the Foreign Business Act (FBA) prescribes a wide range of business that may not be conducted by foreigners without additional licenses or exemptions. The term “foreigner” includes Thai-registered companies in which half or more of the capital is held by non-Thai individuals and foreign-registered companies. Although the FBA prohibits majority foreign ownership in many sectors, U.S. investors registered under the United States-Thailand Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations (AER) are exempt. Nevertheless, the AER’s privileges do not extend to U.S. investments in the following areas: communications; transportation; fiduciary functions; banking involving depository functions; the exploitation of land or other natural resources; domestic trade in indigenous agricultural products; and the practice of professions reserved for Thai nationals. The Board of Investment (BOI) assists Thai and foreign investors to establish and conduct businesses in targeted economic sectors by offering both tax and non-tax incentives. In recent years, Thailand has taken steps to reform its business regulations and has improved processes and reduced time required to start a business from 29 days to 6 days. Thailand has steadily improved its ranking in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report in the last several years and was 21 out of 190 countries in the 2020 ranking, trailing only Singapore (2) and Malaysia (12) in the ASEAN bloc. Thai officials routinely make themselves available to investors through discussions with foreign chambers of commerce. U.S. entities planning to invest in Thailand are advised to obtain qualified legal advice. Thai business regulations are governed predominantly by criminal, not civil, law. Foreigners are rarely jailed for improper business activities, yet violations of business regulations can carry heavy criminal penalties. Thailand has an independent judiciary and government authorities are generally not permitted to interfere in the court system once a case is in process. Various Thai laws set forth foreign-ownership restrictions in certain sectors. These restrictions primarily concern services such as banking, insurance, and telecommunications. The FBA details the types of business activities reserved for Thai nationals. Foreign investment in those businesses must comprise less than 50 percent of share capital, unless specially permitted or otherwise exempt. The following three lists detail FBA-restricted businesses for foreigners. List 1. This contains activities non-nationals are prohibited from engaging in, including newspaper and radio broadcasting stations and businesses; agricultural businesses; forestry and timber processing from a natural forest; fishery in Thai territorial waters and specific economic zones; extraction of Thai medicinal herbs; trading and auctioning of antique objects or objects of historical value from Thailand; making or casting of Buddha images and monk alms bowls; and land trading. List 2. This contains activities related to national safety or security, arts and culture, traditional industries, folk handicrafts, natural resources, and the environment. Restrictions apply to the production, distribution and maintenance of firearms and armaments; domestic transportation by land, water, and air; trading of Thai antiques or art objects; mining, including rock blasting and rock crushing; and timber processing for production of furniture and utensils. A foreign majority-owned company can engage in List 2 activities if Thai nationals or legal persons hold not less than 40 percent of the total shares and the number of Thai directors is not less than two-fifths of the total number of directors. Foreign companies also require prior approval and a license from the Council of Ministers (Cabinet). List 3. Restricted businesses in this list include accounting, legal, architectural, and engineering services; retail and wholesale; advertising businesses; hotels; guided touring; selling food and beverages; and other service-sector businesses. A foreign company can engage in List 3 activities if a majority of the limited company’s shares are held by Thai nationals. Any company with a majority of foreign shareholders (more than 50 percent) cannot engage in List 3 activities unless it receives an exception from the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) under its Foreign Business License (FBL) application. Aside from these general categories, Thailand does not maintain a national security screening mechanism for investment, and investors can receive additional incentives/privileges if they invest in priority areas, such as high-technology industries. Investors should contact the Board of Investment [ https://www.boi.go.th/index.php?page=index ] for the latest information on specific investment incentives. The U.S.-Thai Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations allows approved businesses to engage in some FBA restricted sectors; however, the Treaty does not exempt U.S. investments from restrictions applicable to: owning land; fiduciary functions; banking involving depository functions; inland communications & transportation; exploitation of land and other natural resources; and domestic trade in agricultural products. To operate restricted businesses as defined by the FBA’s List 2 and 3, non-Thai entities must obtain a foreign business license. These licenses are approved by the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) and/or Director-General of the MOC’s Department of Business Development, depending on the business category. Every year, the MOC reviews business categories restricted by the FBA. In 2022, the MOC announced it plans to remove four additional businesses – banking, bank branches, life insurance and non-life insurance – from List 3 by the end of the year. American investors who wish to take majority shares or wholly own businesses under the FBA may apply for benefits under the U.S.-Thai Treaty of Amity. https://2016.export.gov/thailand/treaty/index.asp#P5_233 The U.S. Commercial Service, U.S. Embassy Bangkok is responsible for issuing a certification letter to confirm that a U.S. company is qualified to apply for benefits under the Treaty of Amity. The applicant must first obtain documents verifying that the company has been registered in compliance with Thai law. Upon receipt of the required documents, the U.S. Commercial Service office will then certify to the Foreign Administration Division, Department of Business Development, Ministry of Commerce (MOC) that the applicant is seeking to register an American-owned and managed company or that the applicant is an American citizen and is therefore entitled to national treatment under the provisions of the Treaty. For more information on how to apply for benefits under the Treaty of Amity, please e-mail ktantisa@trade.gov . The World Trade Organization conducted a Trade Policy Review of Thailand in November 2020 ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp500_e.htm ). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) concluded its Investment Policy Review for Thailand in January 2021 ( https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/c4eeee1c-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/c4eeee1c-en ). The MOC’s Department of Business Development (DBD) is generally responsible for business registration. Registration can be performed online or manually. Registration documentation must be submitted in the Thai language. Many foreign entities hire a local law firm or consulting firm to handle their applications. Firms engaging in production activities also must register with the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Labor (MOL). A company is required to have registered capital of two million Thai baht per foreign employee in order to obtain work permits. Additionally, foreign companies may have no more than 20 percent foreign employees on staff. Companies that have obtained special BOI investment incentives may be exempted from this requirement. Foreign employees must enter Thailand on a non-immigrant visa and then submit work permit applications directly to the MOL’s Department of Employment. Work permit application processing takes approximately one week. For more information on Thailand visas, please refer to https://www.thaiembassy.com/thailand/work-permit-requirements In February 2018, the Thai government launched a Smart Visa program for investors in targeted industries and foreigners with expertise in specialized technologies. Under this program, foreigners can be granted a maximum four-year visa to work in Thailand without having to obtain a work permit or re-entry permit. Other relaxed immigration rules include having visa holders report to the Bureau of Immigration just once per year (instead of every 90 days) and providing the visa holder’s spouse and children many of the same privileges as the primary visa holder. More information is available online at https://smart-visa.boi.go.th/home_detail/general_information.php . Outward investment from Thailand has increased rapidly in recent years and Thailand has become one of the largest outward investors in ASEAN. During 2020 and 2021, Thai companies continued to expand and invest overseas despite the pandemic. These investments primarily target neighboring ASEAN countries, China, the United States, and Europe. A relatively stable domestic currency, rising cash holdings, and subdued domestic growth prospects are driving outward investment. Faced with the effects of the pandemic, the government may prioritize domestic investment to stimulate the economy. Previously, food, agro-industry, energy, and chemical sectors accounted for the main share of outward flows. Purchasing shares, developing partnerships, and making acquisitions help Thai investors acquire technologies for parent companies and expand supply chains in international markets. Thai corporate laws allow outbound investments to be made by an independent affiliate (foreign company), a branch of a Thai legal entity, or by any Thai company in the case of financial investments abroad. BOI and the MOC’s Department of International Trade Promotion (DITP) share responsibility for promoting outward investment. BOI focuses on outward investment in ASEAN (especially Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) and emerging economies. DITP covers smaller markets. 3. Legal Regime Generally, Thai regulations are readily available for public review. Foreign investors have, on occasion, expressed frustration that some draft sub-regulations are not made public until they are finalized. Comments stakeholders submit on draft regulations are not always taken into consideration. Non-governmental organizations report; however, the Thai government actively consults them on policy, especially in the health sector and on intellectual property issues. In other areas, such as digital and cybersecurity laws, the Thai government has taken stakeholders’ comments into account and amended draft laws accordingly. U.S. businesses have repeatedly expressed concerns about Thailand’s customs regime. Complaints center on lack of transparency, the significant discretionary authority exercised by Customs Department officials, and a system of giving rewards to officials and non-officials for seized goods based on a percentage of the value of the goods. Specifically, the U.S. government and private sector have expressed concern about inconsistent application of Thailand’s transaction valuation methodology and the Customs Department’s repeated use of arbitrary values. Thailand’s latest Customs Act, which entered into force on November 13, 2017, was a moderate step forward. The Act removed the Customs Department Director General’s discretion to increase the Customs value of imports. It also reduced the percentage of remuneration awarded to officials and non-officials from 55 percent to 40 percent of the sale price of seized goods (or of the fine amount) with an overall limit of five million baht ($160,000). The 2017 changes, however, have not fully satisfied those concerned that Customs officials problematic incentives to manufacture violations under the system. The Thai Constitution requires the government to assess the environmental impact of a wide range of undertakings, including by holding a public hearing of relevant stakeholders. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) is responsible for determining which projects, activities, or actions are required to have an environmental impact assessment report and for prescribing the regulations, methods, procedures, and guidelines in preparing an environmental impact assessment report. Additional information can be found here: http://www.onep.go.th/eia/. Inconsistent and unpredictable enforcement of government regulations remains problematic. In 2017, the Thai government launched a “regulatory guillotine” initiative to cut down on red tape, licenses, and permits. The initiative focused on reducing and amending outdated regulations in order to improve Thailand’s ranking on the World Bank “Ease of Doing Business” report. The regulatory guillotine project is still underway and making slow progress. Gratuity payments to civil servants responsible for regulatory oversight and enforcement remain a common practice despite stringent gift bans at some government agencies. Firms that refuse to make such payments can be placed at a competitive disadvantage to other firms that do engage in such practices. The Royal Thai Government Gazette ( www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th ) is Thailand’s public journal of the country’s centralized online location of laws, as well as regulation notifications. Thailand is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and notifies most draft technical regulations to the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Committee. However, Thailand does not always follow WTO and other international standard-setting norms or guidance (e.g., Codex Alimentarius maximum residue limits for pesticides on food) but prefers to set its own standards in some cases. Thailand’s legal system is primarily based on the civil law system with strong common law influence. Thailand has an independent judiciary that is generally effective in enforcing property and contractual rights. Most commercial and contractual disputes are generally governed by the Civil and Commercial Codes. The legal process is slow in practice and monetary compensation is based on actual damage that resulted directly from the wrongful act. Decisions of foreign courts are not accepted or enforceable in Thai courts. Most legal cases in Thailand will be under the jurisdiction of the Courts of Justice; however, there are also specialized courts that handle specific or technical problems: the Labor Court, the Intellectual Property and International Trade Court, the Bankruptcy Court, the Tax Court, and the Juvenile and Family Courts. Thailand also established the Criminal Court for Corruption and Misconduct Case to specifically handle corruption cases. The Foreign Business Act or FBA (described in detail above) governs most investment activity by non-Thai nationals. Other key laws governing foreign investment are the Alien Employment Act (1978) and the Investment Promotion Act (1977). However, as explained above, many U.S. businesses enjoy investment benefits through the U.S.-Thailand Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations (often referred to as the ‘Treaty of Amity’), which was established to promote friendly relations between the two nations. Pursuant to the Treaty, American nationals are entitled to certain exceptions to the FBA restrictions. Pertaining to the services sector, the 2008 Financial Institutions Business Act unified the legal framework and strengthened the Bank of Thailand’s (the country’s central bank) supervisory and enforcement powers. The Act allows the Bank of Thailand (BOT) to raise foreign ownership limits for existing local banks from 25 percent to 49 percent on a case-by-case basis. The Minister of Finance can authorize foreign ownership exceeding 49 percent if recommended by the central bank. Details are available at https://www.bot.or.th/English/AboutBOT/LawsAndRegulations/SiteAssets/Law_E24_Institution_Sep2011.pdf . In addition to acquiring shares of existing (traditional) local banks, foreign banks can enter the Thai banking system by obtaining new licenses. The Ministry of Finance issues such licenses, following consultations with the BOT. The BOT is currently preparing rules for establishing virtual banks or digital-only banks (no physical branches), a tool meant to enhance financial inclusion and keep pace with consumer needs in the digital age. Digital-only banks can operate at a lower cost and offer different services than traditional banks. The guidelines are expected to be released by mid-2022. The 2008 Life Insurance Act and the 2008 Non-Life Insurance Act apply a 25 percent cap on foreign ownership of insurance companies. Foreign membership on boards of directors is also limited to 25 percent. However, in January 2016 the Office of the Insurance Commission (OIC), the primary insurance industry regulator, announced that Thai life and non-life insurance companies wishing to exceed these limits could apply to the OIC for approval. Any foreign national wishing to hold more than 10 percent of the voting shares in an insurance company must seek OIC approval. With approval, a foreign national can acquire up to 49 percent of the voting shares. Finally, the Finance Minister, with OIC’s positive recommendation, has discretion to permit greater than 49 percent foreign ownership and/or a majority of foreign directors, if the operation of the insurance company may cause loss to insured parties or to the public. While OIC has not issued a new insurance license in the past 20 years, OIC is now contemplating issuing new virtual licenses for firms to sell insurance digitally without an intermediary. Full details have not yet been announced. The Board of Investment offers qualified investors several benefits and provides information to facilitate a smoother investment process in Thailand. Information on the BOI’s “One Start One Stop” investment center can be found at http://osos.boi.go.th . Thailand’s Trade Competition Act covers all business activities, except state-owned enterprises exempted by law or cabinet resolution; specific activities related to national security, public benefit, common interest and public utility; cooperatives, agricultural and cooperative groups; government agencies; and other enterprises exempted by the law. The Act’s definition of a business operator includes affiliates and group companies, and subjects directors and management to criminal and administrative sanctions if their actions (or omissions) resulted in violations. The Act also provides details about penalties in cases involving administrative court or criminal court actions. The Office of Trade Competition Commission (OTCC) is an independent agency and the main enforcer of the Trade Competition Act (2018). The Commission advises the government on issuance of relevant regulations; ensures fair and free trade practices; investigates cases and complaints of unfair trade; and pursues criminal and disciplinary actions against those found guilty of unfair trade practices stipulated in the law. The law focuses on the following areas: unlawful exercise of market dominance; mergers or collusion that could lead to monopoly; unfair competition and restricting competition; and unfair trade practices. The Thai government, through the Ministry of Commerce’s Central Commission on Price of Goods and Services, has the legal authority to control prices or set de facto price ceilings for selected goods and services, including staple agricultural products and feed ingredients (such as, pork, cooking oil, wheat flour, feed wheat, distiller’s dried grains with solubles (DDGs), and feed quality barley), liquefied petroleum gas, medicines, and sound recordings. In 2022, there are 56 goods and services under the price-controlled products list, which can be found here . The controlled list is reviewed at least annually, but the price-control review mechanisms are non-transparent. In practice, Thailand’s government influences prices in the local market through its control of state monopoly suppliers of products and services, such as in the petroleum, oil, and gas industry sectors. Thailand’s Constitution provides protection from expropriation without fair compensation and requires the government to pass a specific, tailored expropriation law if the expropriation is required for the purpose of public utilities, national defense, acquisition of national resources, or for other public interests. The Investment Promotion Act also guarantees the government shall not nationalize the operations and assets of BOI-promoted investors. The Expropriation of Immovable Property Act (EIP), most recently amended in 2019, applies to all property owners, whether foreign or domestic nationals. The Act provides a framework and clear procedures for expropriation; sets forth detailed provision and measures for compensation of landowners, lessees and other persons that may be affected by an expropriation; and recognizes the right to appeal decisions to Thai courts. However, the EIP and Investment Promotion Act do not protect against indirect expropriation and do not distinguish between compensable and non-compensable forms of indirect expropriation. Thailand has a well-established system for land rights that is generally upheld in practice, but the legislation governing land tenure still significantly restricts foreigners’ rights to acquire land. Thailand’s bankruptcy law is modeled after the United States. The Thai Bankruptcy Act (1940) authorizes restructuring proceedings that require trained judges who specialize in bankruptcy matters to preside. Thailand’s bankruptcy law allows for corporate restructuring similar to U.S. Chapter 11 and does not criminalize bankruptcy. The law also distinguishes between secured and unsecured claims, with the former prioritized. Within bankruptcy proceedings, it is also possible to undertake a “composition” in order to avoid a long and protracted process. A composition takes place when a debtor expresses in writing a desire to settle his/her debts, either partially or in any other manner, within seven days of submitting an explanation of matters related to the bankruptcy or during a time period prescribed by the receiver. Despite these laws, some U.S. businesses complain that Thailand’s bankruptcy courts in practice can slow processes to the detriment of outside firms seeking to acquire assets liquidated in bankruptcy processes. The National Credit Bureau of Thailand (NCB) provides the financial services industry with information on consumers and businesses. The NCB is required to provide the financial services sector with payment history information from utility companies, retailers and merchants, and trade creditors. 6. Financial Sector The Thai government maintains a regulatory framework that broadly encourages and facilitates portfolio investment. The Stock Exchange of Thailand, the country’s national stock market, was established under the Securities Exchange of Thailand Act in 1992. There is sufficient liquidity in the markets to allow investors to enter and exit sizeable positions. Government policies generally do not restrict the free flow of financial resources to support product and factor markets. The Bank of Thailand, the country’s central bank, has respected IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is generally allocated on market terms rather than by “direct lending.” Foreign investors are not restricted from borrowing on the local market. In theory, the private sector has access to a wide variety of credit instruments, ranging from fixed term lending to overdraft protection to bills of exchange and bonds. However, the private debt market is not well developed. Most corporate financing, whether for short-term working capital needs, trade financing, or project financing, requires borrowing from commercial banks or other financial institutions. Thailand’s banking sector, with 15 domestic commercial banks, is sound and well-capitalized. As of December 2021, the gross non-performing loan rate was low (around 2.97 percent industry wide), and banks were well prepared to handle a forecast rise in the NPL rate in 2021 due to the pandemic. The ratio of capital funds/risk-weighted assets (capital adequacy) was high (19.9 percent). Thailand’s largest commercial bank is Bangkok Bank, with assets totaling USD 112 billion as of December 2021. The combined assets of the five largest commercial banks totaled USD 494 billion, or 71.9 percent of the total assets of the Thai banking system, at the end of 2021. In general, Thai commercial banks provide the following services: accepting deposits from the public; granting credit; buying and selling foreign currencies; and buying and selling bills of exchange (including discounting or re-discounting, accepting, and guaranteeing bills of exchange). Commercial banks also provide credit guarantees, payments, remittances and financial instruments for risk management. Such instruments include interest-rate derivatives and foreign-exchange derivatives. Additional business activities to support capital market development, such as debt and equity instruments, are allowed. A commercial bank may also provide other services, such as bank assurance and e-banking. Thailand’s central bank is the Bank of Thailand (BOT), which is headed by a Governor appointed for a five-year term. The BOT serves the following functions: prints and issues banknotes and other security documents; promotes monetary stability and formulates monetary policies; manages the BOT’s assets; provides banking facilities to the government; acts as the registrar of government bonds; provides banking facilities for financial institutions; establishes or supports the payment system; supervises financial institutions; manages the country’s foreign exchange rate under the foreign exchange system; and determines the makeup of assets in the foreign exchange reserve. Apart from the 15 domestic commercial banks, there are currently 11 registered foreign bank branches, including three American banks (Citibank, Bank of America, and JP Morgan Chase), and four foreign bank subsidiaries operating in Thailand. To set up a bank branch or a subsidiary in Thailand, a foreign commercial bank must obtain approval from the Ministry of Finance and the BOT. Foreign commercial bank branches are limited to three service points (branches/ATMs) and foreign commercial bank subsidiaries are limited to 40 service points (branches and off-premises ATMs) per subsidiary. Newly established foreign bank branches are required to have minimum capital funds of 125 million baht (USD 3.8 million at 2021 average exchange rates) invested in government or state enterprise securities, or directly deposited with the Bank of Thailand. The number of expatriate management personnel is limited to six people at full branches, although Thai authorities frequently grant exceptions on a case-by-case basis. Non-residents can open and maintain foreign currency accounts without deposit and withdrawal ceilings. Non-residents can also open and maintain Thai baht accounts; however, in an effort to curb the strong baht, the Bank of Thailand capped non-resident Thai deposits at 200 million baht across all domestic bank accounts. However, in January 2021, the Bank of Thailand began allowing non-resident companies greater flexibility to conduct baht transactions with domestic financial institutions under the non-resident qualified company scheme. Participating non-financial firms that trade and invest directly in Thailand are allowed to manage currency risks related to the baht without having to provide proof of underlying baht holdings for each transaction. This will allow firms to manage baht liquidity more flexibly without being subject to the end-of-day outstanding limit of 200 million baht for non-resident accounts. Withdrawals are freely permitted. Since mid-2017, the BOT has allowed commercial banks and payment service providers to introduce new financial services technologies under its “Regulatory Sandbox” guidelines. Recently introduced technologies under this scheme include standardized QR codes for payments, blockchain funds transfers, electronic letters of guarantee, and biometrics. Thailand’s alternative financial services include cooperatives, micro-saving groups, the state village funds, and informal money lenders. The latter provide basic but expensive financial services to households, mostly in rural areas. These alternative financial services, with the exception of informal money lenders, are regulated by the government. Thailand does not have a sovereign wealth fund and the Bank of Thailand is not pursuing the creation of such a fund. However, the International Monetary Fund has urged Thailand to create a sovereign wealth fund due to its large accumulated foreign exchange reserves. As of December 2021, Thailand had the world’s 14th largest foreign exchange reserves at USD 246 billion. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Thailand’s 52 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have total assets of USD 448 billion and a combined gross income of USD 131 billion (end of 2021 figures, latest available). In 2021, they employed 255,397 people, or 0.65 percent of the Thai labor force. Thailand’s SOEs operate primarily in service delivery, in particular in the energy, telecommunications, transportation, and financial sectors. More information about SOEs is available at the website of the State Enterprise Policy Office (SEPO) under the Ministry of Finance at www.sepo.go.th . A 15-member State Enterprises Policy Commission, or “superboard,” oversees operations of the country’s 52 SOEs. In May 2019, the Development of Supervision and Management of State-Owned Enterprise Act (2019) went into effect with the goal to reform SOEs and ensure transparent management decisions. The Thai government generally defines SOEs as special agencies established by law for a particular purpose that are 100 percent owned by the government (through the Ministry of Finance as a primary shareholder). The government recognizes a second category of “limited liability companies/public companies” in which the government owns 50 percent or more of the shares. Of the 52 total SOEs, 42 are wholly-owned and 10 are majority-owned. Three SOEs are publicly listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand: Airports of Thailand Public Company Limited, PTT Public Company Limited, and MCOT Public Company Limited. By regulation, at least one-third of SOE boards must be comprised of independent directors. Private enterprises can compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, products/services, and incentives in most sectors, but there are some exceptions, such as fixed-line operations in the telecommunications sector. While SEPO officials aspire to adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs, there is not a level playing field between SOEs and private sector enterprises, which are often disadvantaged in competing with Thai SOEs for contracts. Generally, SOE senior management reports directly to a cabinet minister and to SEPO. Corporate board seats are typically allocated to senior government officials or politically affiliated individuals. The 1999 State Enterprise Corporatization Act provides a framework for conversion of SOEs into stock companies. Corporatization is viewed as an intermediate step toward eventual privatization. [Note: “Corporatization” describes the process by which an SOE adjusts its internal structure to resemble a publicly traded enterprise; “privatization” denotes that a majority of the SOE’s shares is sold to the public; and “partial privatization” is when less than half of a company’s shares are sold to the public.] Foreign investors are allowed to participate in privatizations, but restrictions are applied in certain sectors, as regulated by the FBA and the Act on Standards Qualifications for Directors and Employees of State Enterprises of 1975, as amended. However, privatization efforts have been on hold since 2006 largely due to strong opposition from labor unions. 10. Political and Security Environment Street clashes between anti-government protesters and police occurred regularly in a major Bangkok intersection in the early months of 2021. Several protesters were injured by rubber bullets, two of whom later died. Violence related to an ongoing ethno-nationalist insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces has claimed more than 7,000 lives since 2004. Although the number of deaths and violent incidents has decreased in recent years, efforts to end the insurgency have so far been unsuccessful. The government is currently engaged in preliminary talks with the leading insurgent group. Almost all attacks have occurred in the three southernmost provinces of the country. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $490,297 2020 $501,644 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $18,499 2020 $17,450 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $8,724 2020 $1,810 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 59.3% 2019 46.8% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/EconomicTrends/Fdi.html * Source for Host Country Data: Bank of Thailand (http://bot.or.th/) Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward $290,774 100% Total Outward $173,437 100% Japan $94,929 32.7% China, P.R.: Hong Kong $31,836 18.4% Singapore $53,612 18.4% Singapore $20,910 12.1% China, P.R.: Hong Kong $35,141 12.1% The Netherlands $12,711 7.3% United States $18,499 6.4% Indonesia $10,757 6.2% The Netherlands $13,849 4.8% Vietnam $9,545 5.5% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. The Bahamas Executive Summary Title The Commonwealth of The Bahamas is a nation of islands stretching 760 miles from the coast of Florida to the coast of Haiti. Despite historical and cultural similarities with many Caribbean countries, The Bahamas’ proximity to Florida reenforces its close ties to the United States. Only twenty-nine of its 700 islands are inhabited, and the population is clustered around the two largest cities of Nassau and Freeport. The country has a stable investment climate, democratic tradition, respect for the rule of law, and well-developed legal system. Bahamians’ use of English and frequent travel to the U.S. contribute to their preference for U.S. goods and services. The World Bank classifies The Bahamas as a developed country with a high per capita GDP of $25,194. The Bahamas relies primarily on imports from the United States to satisfy its fuel and food needs, and conducts more than 85 percent of its international trade with the United States. U.S. exports to The Bahamas were valued at $2.9 billion in 2021, giving the U.S. a trade surplus of $2.5 billion. The Progressive Liberty Party (PLP) returned to power in September 2021 elections. The landslide victory reflected public discontent over the slumping economy and the government’s handling of the pandemic. Both crises highlighted The Bahamas’ dependence on tourism, vulnerability to external shocks, and lack of economic diversification. The World Bank classifies The Bahamas as a high-income country, which belies the country’s extreme income inequality. Tourism and related services contribute to over 70 percent of the country’s GDP and employs just over half the workforce. However, Hurricane Dorian (2019) and the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2021) devastated the economy and forced tens of thousands out of jobs. A survey of the labor force has not been completed since December 2019, yet government and international agencies estimate unemployment at 20 to 25 percent. Although tourism is on the rebound, it has yet to reach the pre-pandemic level of more than seven million mostly American annual tourists. Financial services is the second most important sector of the economy, accounting for 15 percent of GDP. To diversify the economy, the government has targeted investment in light manufacturing, technology, agriculture, fisheries, extractive industries, and renewable energy. The government has also committed to digitizing business services and jumpstarting domestic productivity through small and medium enterprises (SMEs), especially those operating in non-traditional sectors. Grand Bahama, the most northern Bahamian island, depends less on tourism and has the most diversified economic activity of any island in the country. Its capital, Freeport, is a free trade zone featuring many U.S.-owned businesses. The Bahamas’ economic future depends on the government’s ability to revive the tourism industry, diversity the economy, attract foreign direct investment, manage debt obligations, and demonstrate fiscal responsibility. Following two years of pandemic-related government borrowing, spending, and tax concessions, the country has seen recent economic growth credited to rebounding tourism and the lifting of COVID restrictions. The government also reports a strong pipeline of investment proposals in tourism, renewable energy, airport and infrastructure development, mining, and agriculture. The government affirms its support for SMEs (representing 85 percent of registered businesses), with $250 million earmarked to fund entrepreneurial developments over five years. The Small Business Development Centre (SBDC), launched in 2018, has prioritized the economic empowerment of women entrepreneurs and the reduction of the income gap between men and women. The Bahamas has leaned on international financial institutions for loans and thus far rejected offers from foreign governments to prop up its economy. International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have voiced concern about The Bahamas’ reluctance to impose additional taxes to address its 96 percent debt-to-GDP ratio. The country does not have corporate, personal, inheritance or capital gains taxes. The government also faces international pressure to improve aspects of its anti-money laundering policies. The Bahamas is not a member of the WTO and does not offer export subsidies, engage in trade-distorting practices, or maintain a local content requirement. The country has a strict $500,000 dollar minimum on foreign capital investments. The country attracts FDI and over the past decade has benefitted from significant investments in the tourism sector by PRC-based and backed companies. Since taking office, the government has shown its willingness to engage investors from non-traditional markets such as the Middle East. Investments from the United States are primarily in the tourism sector and range from general services to billion-dollar resort developments. U.S. companies have also shown interest in emerging sectors, such as non-oil and renewable energy, niche tourism, extractive industries, and digital technology. Positive aspects of The Bahamas’ investment climate include political stability, a parliamentary democracy, an English-speaking labor force, a profitable financial services infrastructure, established rule of law, general respect for contracts, an independent judiciary, and strong consumer purchasing power. Negative aspects include a lack of transparency in government procurement, labor shortages in certain sectors, high labor costs, a bureaucratic and inefficient investment approvals process, a lengthy legal disputes resolution process, internet connectivity issues on smaller islands, and energy costs four times higher than in the United States. The high cost of electricity is driven by antiquated generation systems and inefficient diesel power plants. The current government has prioritized infrastructure projects focused on non-oil energy, including a liquid natural gas (LNG) plant and an onshore LNG regasification terminal. The government is also promoting solar energy, particularly on the smaller islands. Another barrier to investment in the country is the prohibition of foreign investment in 15 sectors of the economy without prior approval from the National Economic Council (NEC). These sectors include commercial fishing, public transport, advertising, retail operations, security services, real estate agencies, and others. Accession to the WTO, which would require opening at least some of these protected areas to foreign investment, is unlikely to take place before 2025. The absence of transparent investment procedures and legislation is also problematic. U.S. and Bahamian companies report business dispute resolution often takes years and debt collection can be difficult, even with a court judgment. Companies describe the approval process for FDI and work permits as cumbersome and time-consuming. The government passed a Public Procurement Act and launched an e-procurement and suppliers registry system in 2021. While the registry system is in place, the Public Procurement Act has yet to be fully implemented. Companies complain that the tender process for public contracts is inconsistent, and allege it is difficult to obtain information on the status of bids. The Bahamas scored 64 out of 100 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index in 2020 (where zero is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 is very transparent). This means The Bahamas is perceived as notably transparent when compared to the 180 ranked countries. However, the country’s score has dropped seven points since 2012. The new administration confirmed its intention to amend several good governance laws, including the Public Procurement Act, but has not provided a timeline. The Bahamas still lacks an Office of the Ombudsman and has not fully enacted its Freedom of Information Act (2017). Legislation to support an Integrity Commission and campaign reform have also been delayed. An independent Information Commissioner, supported by technical and administrative staff, was appointed in mid-2021. The country grapples with high crime, unemployment, and xenophobia directed towards irregular migrants, especially Haitians. Conservative and patriarchal norms sometimes lead to inequality of opportunity, including for women. Women have raised concerns regarding bureaucratic hurdles to register businesses and cited difficulty in securing financing. Table 1 Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 30 of 180 (rank) http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country (M USD, stock positions) 2020 46,061 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 26,070 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness to and Restrictions Upon Foreign Investment The government encourages FDI, particularly in the tourism and financial services sector. The National Investment Policy (NIP) and the Commercial Enterprises Act (CEA) encourage foreign investment in the following sectors of the economy: tourism; international business centers; aircraft and maritime services; marinas; information and data processing; information technology services; light industry manufacturing and assembly; agro-industries; aquaculture; food and beverage processing; banking and other financial services; offshore medical centers and services; e-commerce; arbitration; international arbitrage; computer programming; software design and writing; bioinformatics and analytics; and data storage and warehousing. After the September 2021 elections, the new administration established the Ministry of Tourism, Investments and Aviation headed by the Deputy Prime Minister. This new ministry is charged with promoting the tourism sector and driving economic development with investments in non-traditional sectors. The new administration stressed its commitment to an investment-friendly environment and touted plans to diversify the economy through targeted investments in non-traditional sectors such as light manufacturing, technology, agriculture and fisheries, extractive industries, and renewable energy. Since taking office, the government has also shown its willingness to engage investors from relatively untapped markets, such as the Middle East. Operating from the Office of the Prime Minister, the Bahamas Investment Authority (BIA) ( www.bahamas.gov.bs/bia ) administers investment policies, functions as the investment facilitation agency, and assists investors in navigating the sometimes-cumbersome approvals process. All foreign investors must apply for BIA approval. If operating in Grand Bahamas’ free port area, investors must seek approval from Invest Grand Bahama, the investment arm of the Grand Bahama Port Authority (GBPA) – a privately owned organization that oversees the city of Freeport. Newly elected administrations consistently support investment and generally honor agreements made by previous administrations. The Bahamas reserves the following 15 sectors of the economy for Bahamian investors: wholesale and retail operations (although international investors may engage in the wholesale distribution of any product they produce locally); agencies engaged in import or export; real estate agencies and domestic property management; domestic newspapers and magazine publications; domestic advertising and public relations firms; nightclubs and restaurants except specialty, gourmet, and ethnic restaurants, and those operating in a hotel, resort or tourist attraction; security services; domestic distribution of building supplies; construction companies except for special structures requiring foreign expertise; personal cosmetic or beauty establishments; commercial fishing including both deep water fishing and shallow water fishing of crustaceans, mollusks, fish, and sponges; auto and appliance services; public transportation including boat charters; and domestic gaming. The government does make exceptions, and the Embassy is aware of several cases in which it granted foreign investors full market access. The government does not give preferential treatment to investors based on nationality, and investors have equal access to incentives, including land grants, tax concessions, and direct marketing and budgetary support. The government provides guidelines for investment through the National Investment Policy (NIP), administered by the BIA, and through the Commercial Enterprises Act (CEA), administered by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The CEA provides incentives to domestic and foreign investors to establish specific projects, including approval of work permits for senior posts and the expedited issuance of work permits. The National Economic Council (NEC) must grant special approval for foreign investment projects valued at $10 million or more, those with national security implications, or those that require environmental and economic impact assessments. The NEC is comprised of government ministers, including the Prime Minister in his dual role as the Minister of Finance. The approval process generally requires review by multiple government agencies and a BIA recommendation prior to NEC consideration. Bureaucratic impediments are not limited to the NEC approvals process. The country continues to lag behind on international metrics related to starting a business, registering property, acquiring construction permits, accessing credit, and resolving property disputes. Significant delays in the approvals process have occurred, including cases where the government failed to respond to investment applications. To fast-track FDI and mobilize local investments the new administration is establishing the independent agency Bahamas Invest. Bureaucratic delays, functionality, and transparency are expected to improve under this new agency. Investment priorities are likely to include public-private partnerships, tourism, infrastructure, technological upgrades, renewable energy investments, and climate adaptability projects. Bahamas Invest will include a Domestic Investment Board to support Bahamian businesses and an Investment Compliance Unit to ensure international investors comply with government statutes. BIA will serve as the investment promotion arm of Bahamas Invest. Foreign investors have the right to establish private enterprises and most companies operate unencumbered once approved. Key considerations for approval include economic impact, job creation, infrastructure development, economic diversification, environmental protection, and corporate social responsibility. With the assistance of a local attorney, investors can create the following types of businesses: sole proprietorship, limited or general partnership, joint stock company, or subsidiary of a foreign company. The most popular all-purpose vehicles for foreign investors are the International Business Company (IBC) and the Limited Duration Company (LDC). Both benefit from income, capital gains, gift, estate, inheritance, and succession tax exemptions. Investors are required to establish a local company and register to operate in The Bahamas. A Beneficial Ownership Registry established in 2021 requires legal entities (defined as companies incorporated, continued, or registered in The Bahamas) to file beneficial ownership information with the Registrar General within 15 days of identifying any person as a beneficial owner of that legal entity. Investment screening mechanisms assess the creditworthiness of principals, capital investment, land and personnel requirements, financial arrangements, and economic and environmental impacts. It is not clear if national security risks are assessed. The Bahamas is the only Western Hemisphere country not in the WTO, and therefore has never benefitted from a WTO trade policy review. None of the OECD, UNCTAD, or the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights have conducted investment policy reviews. In April 2020, the government appointed an Economic Recovery Committee (ERC) to recommend policies to addresses the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The public-private coalition recommended significant changes to the investment landscape. The ERC’s full report can be accessed via https://opm.gov.bs/economic-recovery-committee-executive-summary-report-2020/ . In 2017, The Bahamas government streamlined the process to start a business with the launch of an e-business portal. The new process allows companies to apply for or renew their business licenses online from the Department of Inland Revenue ( http://inlandrevenue.finance.gov.bs/business-licence/copy-applying-b-l/ ). The government claims approvals are normally granted within seven working days, provided all required information and documentation has been submitted correctly. Foreign owned companies must provide evidence of BIA approval when applying for business licenses. Foreign companies and most larger businesses, regardless of national affiliation, are not eligible for provisional licenses, expedited renewals, or new business license fee exemptions. All companies with an annual turnover of $100,000 or more are required to register with the government to receive a Tax Identification Number and a Value Added Tax Certificate. The lengthy registration process is generally viewed as an impediment to the ease of doing business. The Bahamas government neither promotes nor prohibits its citizens from investing internationally, however, all outward direct investments by residents require the prior approval of the Exchange Control Department of the Central Bank of The Bahamas ( https://www.centralbankbahamas.com/exchange-control-notes-and-guidelines ). The Central Bank considers the probable impact an investment could have on The Bahamas’ balance of payments, specifically business activities that promote the receipt of foreign currency. In an effort to maintain adequate foreign reserves during the pandemic, the Central Bank suspended purchases of foreign currency on May 4, 2020 for transactions that could jeopardize the country’s ability to maintain a fixed, one-to-one exchange rate with the U.S. dollar. The Central Bank also suspended investments in U.S.-dollar denominated funds. The Central Bank began reauthorizing these investments on October 1, 2021 after the country’s foreign reserves stabilized. 3. Legal Regime The Bahamas’ accounting, legal, and regulatory systems are generally consistent with international norms. The Bahamas has no equivalent to the U.S. Federal Register, but the government regularly updates its website ( www.bahamas.gov.bs ) to list draft legislation, bills before parliament, and its legislative agenda. Proposed legislation is available at the Government Publications Office, and public and private sector engagement is usually encouraged. Public consultation on investment proposals is not required by law. The Embassy is unaware of any informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or private sector associations that restrict foreign participation in the economy. Throughout 2021, the government passed legislation to improve the country’s fiscal governance and enhance transparency and accountability. The Public Debt Management Act (2021) enshrines debt management policies into law and improves central government and state-owned enterprise (SOE) debt transparency. The Public Finance Management Act (2021) expands budgetary and fiscal reporting requirements for central government and SOEs. The Statistics Act (2021) transforms the current Department of Statistics into a quasi-independent National Statistics Institute. The Public Procurement Act (2021) brings transparency and accountability to government tenders and contracts. Only the Statistics Act has been fully implemented. In late 2021, the new administration confirmed its intention to amend these laws, as well as the Fiscal Responsibility Act passed in 2018. The Embassy is not aware of a timeline for the proposed amendments, which skeptics argue could stymie the original intent of enacting an ambitious transparency regime. Although efforts have been made to meet international best practices, The Bahamas’ supreme audit institution, the Office of the Auditor General, has not published a timely government budget audit report for several years. The last publicly available audit covers fiscal year 2018/2019. The U.S. Global Accountability Office is assisting the Office of the Auditor General to identify ways to fulfill its reporting obligations. The government made key budget documents publicly available, including the executive budget proposal, enacted budget, and end of fiscal year report. The government also submitted a Supplementary Budget following elections in September 2021. Budget documents include estimates of revenue and expenditure (including estimates from prior years), the budget communication (the budget speech), appropriation bills, tax bills, resolutions, and proposed legislative changes. The government also publicizes information on debt obligations, including that of SOEs, during the annual budget submissions to the Parliament. Budget documents are available at www.bahamas.gov.bs and www.bahamasbudget.gov.bs . The Bahamas is not a member of the WTO, so it does not notify the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of draft technical regulations. As part of WTO accession negotiations relaunched in 2018, The Bahamas announced it is reviewing investment policies with the aim of developing comprehensive, WTO-compliant investment legislation. However, the Embassy is not aware of significant progress in this area in 2021. The Bahamas is not a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures. The Bahamas Bureau of Standards and Quality (BBSQ), launched in 2016, governs standards for goods and services, particularly metrology (weights and balances). BBSQ also cooperates with other ministries on quality standards, such as sanitary and phytosanitary standards with the Ministry of Agriculture and Marine Resources and the Bahamas Health and Food Safety Agency (BAHFSA). BBSQ serves as the country’s focal point on trade barrier issues and has received technical support on the development of national standards from the EU and the Caribbean Regional Organization for Standards and Quality (CROSQ). Trade barriers are not a hindrance to trade with the United States, and U.S. products are widely accepted. The Bahamas legal system is based on English common law and foreign nationals are afforded full rights in legal proceedings. Contracts are legally enforced through the courts, however, there are some instances where civil disputes get tied up in the court system for years. Throughout 2020 and 2021, a U.S. investor and a government utility company were engaged in a civil dispute concerning the termination of a contract, non-payment for services provided, and ownership of equipment and materials. This case was settled in late 2021 with the local courts awarding the U.S. investor full payment and retention of its equipment. The judiciary is independent, and allegations of government interference in the judicial process are rare. With the recommendation of the Prime Minister, the Governor General appoints the highest-ranking officials in the judicial system, including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, the Director of Public Prosecutions, and the President of the Court of Appeals. The Bahamas is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations and uses the Privy Council Judicial Committee in London as the final court of appeal for civil and criminal matters. The Bahamas continues to advance efforts to develop its reputation as a center for international arbitration by drafting legislation, namely the International Commercial Arbitration Bill (2021) which updates the Arbitration Act (2009). The Bill governs domestic arbitration and incorporates key provisions of the Model Law of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The legislation has not yet passed. In 2020, The Bahamas also established an Alternative Dispute Resolution unit, and developed a two-year strategic plan to promote this method for settling commercial and other types of disputes. Judgments by British courts and select Commonwealth countries can be registered and enforced in The Bahamas under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act. Court judgments from other countries, including those of the United States, must be litigated in local courts and are subject to local legal requirements. The government is taking steps to modernize the justice system and increase judicial transparency and efficiency. Efforts throughout 2021 included implementation of an Integrated Case Management System, a Court Automated Payment System, Digital Court Reporting and Bail Management Systems, the launch of a Digitization Unit, and the expansion of the Bahamas Judicial Education Institute. The Court Services Bill (2020) has not yet been debated or enacted. This law would give the courts more autonomy and control over their administrative, financial, and operational affairs. There has been little movement on the construction of a new Supreme Court complex. While some public pronouncements have been made on FDI policies, no major laws, regulations, or judicial decisions have been passed since publication of the 2021 Investment Climate Statement. The government has drafted a Foreign Investment Bill purported to codify the existing National Investment Policy, align with international investment best practices, and bring additional transparency, accountability, and predictability to the country’s foreign investment process. The Embassy is not aware of efforts to advance this bill in 2021. The government committed to establishing Bahamas Invest – a new, autonomous agency to oversee a modern investment regime and fast-track investments. Bahamas Invest remains in the planning stages. All relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors can be found on the website of the Bahamas Investment Authority (BIA) ( www.bahamas.gov.bs/bia ). The Utilities Regulation and Competition Authority (URCA) regulates and imposes antitrust restrictions in the telecommunications and energy sectors. However, there is no legislation governing competition or anti-trust. A Competition (antitrust) Bill was drafted in 2018 in line with The Bahamas’ CARIFORUM-EU obligations and WTO accession requirements. Initial public consultations were held in August 2018. The Embassy is not aware of efforts to advance the Bill in 2021. Property rights are protected under Article 27 of the country’s constitution, which prohibits the deprivation of property without prompt and adequate compensation. There have been compulsory acquisitions of property for public use, but in all instances, there was satisfactory compensation at fair market value. The March 2020 Emergency Power (COVID-19) Regulations granted the government authorization to requisition any building, ship, aircraft, or article if it is reasonably required for any statutory purpose for the duration of the emergency. At the conclusion of the requisition, the government was to make prompt and adequate compensation to the owner. The Embassy is not aware of any instance in 2021 where the government invoked this law. The Emergency Power Regulations expired with the cancelation of the state of emergency in October 2021. Company liquidations, voluntary or involuntary, proceed according to the Companies Act. Liquidations are routinely published in newspapers in accordance with legislation. Creditors of bankrupt debtors and liquidated companies participate in the distribution of the bankrupt debtor’s or liquidated company’s assets according to the statute. U.S. investors should be aware that there is no equivalent to Chapter 11 bankruptcy law provisions to protect assets located in The Bahamas. The Credit Reporting Act was passed in February 2018 to improve credit reporting systems and better assess borrowers’ risk. The Central Bank confirmed Italian-based CRIF S.P.A. launched The Bahamas’ first credit bureau in April 2021, but it is not yet fully functional. Bahamian commercial banks and personal lenders will be required to share their clients’ credit history with CRIF. CRIF will provide lenders access to credit reports. The Central Bank identified 45 entities as credit information providers as of October 2021. 6. Financial Sector The government encourages free capital markets, and the Central Bank supports this through its regulatory functions. The Bahamas is an Article VIII member of the IMF and has agreed not to restrict currency transactions, such as payments for imports. The Bahamas Securities Commission regulates the activities of investment funds, securities, and capital markets ( www.scb.gov.bs ). The Bahamas International Stock Exchange (BISX), established in 1999, excludes foreign investors and is regulated by the Securities Commission of The Bahamas. There are no legal limitations on foreigners’ access to the domestic credit market, and commercial banks make credit available at market rates. The government encourages Bahamian-foreign joint ventures, which are eligible for financing through both commercial banks and the Bahamas Development Bank ( http://www.bahamasdevelopmentbank.com/ ). The government does not prohibit its citizens from investing internationally. However, all outward direct investments by residents, including foreign portfolio investments, require the prior approval of the Exchange Control Department of the Central Bank of The Bahamas ( https://www.centralbankbahamas.com/exchange-control-notes-and-guidelines ). Applications are assessed by their probable impact on The Bahamas’ balance of payments. In an effort to maintain adequate foreign reserves during the economic crisis brought on by the pandemic, the Central Bank suspended purchases of foreign currency on May 4, 2020 for specific transactions that could drain reserves and jeopardize the country’s ability to maintain a fixed, one-to-one exchange rate with the U.S. dollar. The Central Bank also suspended Bahamian investments in U.S.-dollar denominated investment. The Central Bank resumed access to these facilities on October 1, 2021 as the country’s foreign reserves stabilized. The financial sector of The Bahamas is highly developed and consists of savings banks, trust companies, offshore banks, insurance companies, private pension funds, cooperative societies, credit unions, commercial banks, a development bank, a publicly controlled pension fund, a housing corporation, and the state-owned Bank of The Bahamas. These institutions provide a wide array of services via several types of financial intermediaries. The financial sector is regulated by the Central Bank of The Bahamas, the Securities Commission, the Insurance Commission, the Inspector of Financial and Corporate Service Providers, the Gaming Board, and the Compliance Commission. In the domestic banking sector, four of the eight commercial banks are subsidiaries of Canadian banks, three are locally owned, and one is a branch of Citibank, a U.S.-based institution which has operated for more than fifty years providing corporate and investment banking services in the country. Continued reorganization by Canadian banks, including closure of several brick-and-mortar branches, has severely limited banking services on some of the less populated islands. All domestic commercial banks have correspondent banking relationships, and the Embassy is not aware of any of these relationships being in jeopardy. According to the Central Bank’s December 2021 Quarterly Economic Review, the private sector delinquency or non-performing rate on commercial bank loans increased to 9.6 percent at the end of 2021 from a pre-pandemic level of 8.0 percent. The Central Bank believes this rate will stabilize and begin to decline before the end of 2022. The Central Bank responded to the loss of brick-and-mortar banks by introducing the “Sand Dollar” in December 2019, the first central bank-backed digital currency in the world. The introduction of the new digital currency provides individuals with efficient access to financial services. Its launch has facilitated the financial inclusion of unbanked and underbanked residents. To date, nine firms (including clearing banks, money transfer services, credit unions and payment service providers) have successfully completed a cybersecurity assessment and been authorized to distribute Sand Dollars within their proprietary mobile wallets. In February 2021, the Central Bank collaborated with Mastercard and Island Pay (a local digital payment platform) to launch Sand Dollar prepaid cards allowing the option to instantly convert the digital currency to traditional Bahamian dollars and pay for goods and services anywhere Mastercard is accepted. As of December 2021, the Central Bank estimated 20,000 individuals utilized Sand Dollars and approximately $300,000 of the digital currency is in circulation. The bank has prioritized interoperability with the automated clearing house, so there can be direct linkages between Sand Dollar wallets and local deposit accounts. When this interoperability exercise is complete, additional businesses are expected to accept Sand Dollar as payments. Although Sand Dollar accounts and transactions are theoretically subject to the same stringent anti-money laundering and Know Your Customer (KYC) safeguards as traditional commercial banks, the Embassy continues to work with the Central Bank to ensure there is capacity to enforce safeguards and account audit capabilities. Additional information on the Sand Dollar can be accessed via www.sanddollar.bs/ . The Bahamian government passed omnibus legislation to manage the oil and gas sector in 2017 but has not yet promulgated supporting regulations. The legislation calls for the creation of a sovereign wealth fund which has yet to be completed. Discussions of a possible sovereign wealth fund were reignited when the Isle of Man-registered Bahamas Petroleum Company began exploratory oil drilling in Bahamas waters. The company confirmed in February 2021 that its exploratory drilling did not produce commercially viable quantities of oil and exited the market. Nonetheless, the recently elected administration committed to present legislation to support a Sovereign Wealth Fund in early 2022 to monetize the concessionary access to Crown Land and Seabed leases already provided to foreign investors. Future Crown Land investments and royalty payments from exports of the country’s natural resources (such as salt, sand, rock, and aragonite) are also likely to contribute to the fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises are active in the utilities and services sectors of the economy. A list of the 25 SOEs is available on www.bahamas.gov.bs . Key SOEs include Bahamasair Holdings Ltd. (the national airline), Public Hospitals Authority, Civil Aviation Authority, Nassau Airport Development Authority, University of The Bahamas, Health Insurance Authority, Bank of The Bahamas, Bahamas Power and Light (BPL), Water and Sewerage Corporation (WSC), Broadcasting Corporation of The Bahamas (ZNS), Nassau Flight Services, and the Hotel Corporation of The Bahamas. In April 2019, the government announced plans to introduce a State-Owned Enterprises Bill to impose proper corporate governance and address the risk inefficient SOEs pose to the government’s financial health. The Embassy is unaware of efforts to advance this Bill in 2021. However, a suite of legislation passed in March 2021 aimed at improving the country’s fiscal governance may also improve the performance and accountability of SOEs. Within the past decade, no SOE has returned profits or paid dividends, although SOEs account for significant government expenditure with approximately $419 million budgeted for fiscal year 2021-2022. The government has maintained SOE reforms are integral to its fiscal consolidation plans and confirmed commitments to reduce subsidies by $100 million annually over the next four years. The savings from SOE reform are expected to assist with meeting additional debt servicing obligations. The government has permitted foreign investment in sectors where SOEs operate and has approved licenses to private suppliers of electrical and water and sewerage services. These licenses have been issued for private real estate developments or where there is limited government capacity to provide services. The city of Freeport on the island of Grand Bahama has its own licensing authority and maintains monopolies for the provision of electricity, water, and sanitation services. The government has not taken definitive steps to privatize SOEs but has proposed public-private partnerships as the preferred model going forward. Foreign investors are allowed to participate in privatization programs. The government divested 49 percent of the Bahamas Telecommunication Company in 2011 to U.S.-based Cable & Wireless Communications. The government also issued a second license for cellular services and retained 51 percent equity in the new company, Cable Bahamas/Aliv. In February 2019, the government entered a 25-year, $250 million lease agreement with UK-based Global Ports Holdings to redevelop the Nassau Cruise Port. In May 2021, the company announced it successfully raised over $130 million through its private bond offering. 10. Political and Security Environment The Bahamas has no history of politically motivated violence and, barring a few incidents leading up to general elections in 2021, the political process is violence-free and transparent. The 2021 incidents were minor and included damage to political party installations and billboards, social media harassment, and altercations between political party supporters. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (M USD) 2019 13,164 2019 21,433,000 https://data.worldbank.org/country/bahamas Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country (M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2020 46,061 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.cfm Host country’s FDI in the United States (M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2020 1,944 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.cfm Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 N/A 2020 N/A UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/w orld-investment-report Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. The Gambia Executive Summary Located in West Africa, The Gambia is the smallest country in mainland Africa with a population of roughly 2.25 million people. The Gambia has an active private sector, and the government has announced its support for encouraging local investment and attracting foreign direct investment. The government’s Gambia Investment and Export Promotion Agency is dedicated to attracting foreign investment and promoting exports and it provides guidelines and incentives to all investors whose portfolios qualify for a Special Investment Certificate. The Gambia has a small economy that relies primarily on agriculture, tourism, and remittances for support. The Gambia remains heavily dependent on the agriculture sector, with 75 percent of the population dependent on crops and livestock for their livelihoods. However, recent economic growth has been mainly driven by the services sector, including financial services, telecommunication, and construction. The country also has a long trading history and is a party to several trade agreements, which have the potential to make it an attractive production platform for the region and beyond. The Gambia’s largest trade partner is Cote D’Ivoire, a fellow ECOWAS member, from which The Gambia imports the majority of its fuel products. Other major trade partners include China and Europe. The Gambia is a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional economic union of 15 countries located in West Africa. With its young and rapidly growing population, Gambia provides a market with numerous opportunities for the sale of international products and services. Many Gambians have strong personal or professional ties to the United States, as well as a strong affinity for American brands. With a continued interest in new American brands, many Gambians have opened shops strictly selling American products. The quality and durability of American products are highly regarded. English is the official language and the business language. Local languages are also spoken by Gambians, and many of them are multilingual. Registered property rights are crucial to support investment, productivity, and growth; however, the absence of a land policy means disputes over land are a major problem in The Gambia. Occasional disagreements occur in rural areas, mainly the West Coast Region, over land ownership or succession. Most conflicts result when community leaders sell a plot of land to multiple buyers. The Lands Office record-keeping system is manual and poor. Frequent power outages, high data tariffs, and interruptions in internet services hinder businesses’ operational efficiency. Telecommunication operating costs remain high, and service is slow and subject to blackouts due to constant maintenance. In addition, the road system is heavily trafficked and can become impassable during the rainy season due to lack of drainage. The Gambia lacks the energy infrastructure necessary to support advanced commercial activities. In December 2021, President Adama Barrow from the National People’s Party was re-elected for a second term five-year term. During his inaugural speech, Barrow pledged to jumpstart the economy and ensure broad-based development gains. In January 2021, the Ministry of Environment, Climate Change and Natural Resources launched the development process of Gambia’s Long-Term Climate Change Strategy (LTS), which aims to help in the full integration of climate into the country’s policies and strategies, better supporting the needs, priorities, and adaptive capacities of communities most affected by climate change. The plan, Vision 2050, has four strategic priorities and was intended to be released in late 2021, but is still in the works. Domestic Economy Developments The 2021 fiscal year was a challenging one for the Gambian economy, but it was an improvement from 2020. The economy was expected to grow by 3.2 percent in 2021 in comparison to the -0.2 percent growth rate recorded in 2020. The improved growth rate is attributed to a rebound in the economy, especially in the service sector. In 2021, the agricultural sector was expected to increase at a rate of 4.5 percent, a considerable decrease from the previous year’s 11.7 percent. Due to late rains resulting to an estimated decline in all agricultural sub-components except for livestock, which has an estimated growth rate of 4.2 percent in 2021. In essence, rain dependent agriculture continues to make the sector highly vulnerable to climate change. The industry sector was predicted to register the same growth rate of 9.9 percent in 2021 as it did in 2020. This is due to the lingering impact of the pandemic on construction especially the new road expansion project funded by Organization for Islamic Countries. Mining, quarrying, electricity, water, and construction sub-sectors are all projected to register a decline in 2021. Manufacturing is the only sub-sector projected to record an improved growth rate from -21.2 percent in 2020 to -1.7 percent in 2021. The Service sector, which remains the largest contributor to GDP, was estimated to register a growth from -7.2 percent in 2020 to 0.2 percent in 2021. The growth in the sector is mainly driven by modest performance in most of its sub-components such as wholesale and retail trade; information and communication; financial and insurance activities; professional and technical activities; and education, all of which are all projected to grow by less than 10 percent over the review period. Economy and Impact of COVID-19 Prior to outbreak of the pandemic, The Gambia had shown strong macroeconomic performance in the few years following the remarkable political transition in 2016-17. Economic growth accelerated, debt vulnerabilities decreased, external stability strengthened, structural and legislative reforms progressed, and key social indicators improved. However, the COVID-19 pandemic halted some of the hard-won progress, slowing economic activity and re-igniting extreme poverty. The Gambia experienced a third wave of the pandemic in mid-2021, which has receded. The COVID-19 vaccination rate currently stands at about 12 percent of the target population. The first quarter of 2021 looked promising, thanks to a huge vaccination campaign and a dramatic drop in the number of cases and fatalities by the virus. However, the recent emergence of new strains, especially the omicron variant, has dampened this prospect. The economy took a hit due to the closure of businesses and schools, and a slowdown in tourism activities in 2020. The Gambia had projected the start of economic recovery in 2021, as economic activity began showing early signs of recovery from the pandemic-induced contraction registered in 2020. The Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education reported COVID-19 related school closures affected about 674,300 students from Early Childhood Development to senior secondary schools in 2020. While most schools have since reopened, school closures resulted in many dropouts—highest among girls—and learning losses, which will likely have long-term detrimental economic and societal consequences. Limited digital infrastructure further hampered online learning. Micro-, Small-, and Medium-Size Enterprises (MSMEs), which form the backbone of the Gambian economy by employing 60 percent of the active labor force and contributing approximately 20 percent to GDP, were particularly hard hit during the COVID crisis. The survival of MSMEs is crucial for mitigating the negative impact of COVID-19 on the economy and to sustain employment and create the conditions needed for future growth once the pandemic is over. Recovery efforts may provide an opportunity to “rebuild better” by prioritizing sustainability, resilience, and inclusiveness. The World Bank indicated the key to The Gambia’s post-COVID economic strategy will require the creation of a skilled labor force that is more productive and better able to adopt and adapt to new technologies. This includes infrastructure improvements to increase productivity and create jobs. Inclusive and sustained economic growth remains one of the main objectives of the Government of The Gambia (GoTG), and the medium-term policy priorities will be anchored on achieving and sustaining a more diversified growth to improve the living standards of all citizens, in addition to creating a favorable environment for the private sector to thrive. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 102 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A http://www.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $750 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GoTG encourages foreign investment and has made increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) a priority. It also recognizes the importance of creating an environment that allows the private sector to be the engine of growth, transformation, and job creation. FDI is welcomed in almost every sector of the Gambian economy. There is no restriction on ownership of businesses by foreign investors in most sectors. Foreign companies can invest in Gambia without facing systemic discrimination in favor of local companies. Excessive and inconsistently applied bureaucratic procedures, decision-making process for public tenders, and contracts are all common complaints. The Gambia Investment & Export Promotion Agency (GIEPA) is the national agency established responsible for the promotion and facilitation of private sector investments into The Gambia. Through the GIEPA, eight areas are also identified as “priority sectors” which attract a Special Investment Certificate (SIC) that provides several incentives, including duty waivers and tax holidays. The Investment Section at Office of The President plans to start handling foreign direct investment matters. To maintain dialogue with investors, The Gambia Competitiveness Improvement Forum was created as part of the 2015 GIEPA Act, which hosts sector-based forums to maintain dialogue with investors. GIEPA normally hosts forums at which investors comment on the government’s policies and action. In 2021, GIEPA launched a new National Export Strategy for 2021-2025 which will focus on supporting The Gambia’s export-ready and export-potential firms to enter the regional and global value chains, particularly in value addition, horticulture and agro-processing, groundnuts, cashew, fisheries, light manufacturing, and hospitality or services – particularly tourism – to bring further benefits to the country. Foreign and domestic private entities have a right to own business enterprises and engage in in all forms of remunerative activities in The Gambia. There are no limits on foreign ownership or control of businesses except in the operations of defense industries, which are closed to all private sector participation, irrespective of nationality. Apart from Defense related activities, there are no sector-specific restrictions, limitations, or requirements were legally applied to foreign ownership and control. Foreign investors are not denied national treatment (i.e. the same treatment as domestic firms) or Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment (i.e. the same treatment as the most favored foreign investor) in any sector. There is no mandatory screening of foreign direct investment, but such screening may be conducted if there is suspicion of money laundering or terrorism financing. Investors subjected to such a screening may be asked for business registration documents and bank statements. As part of the country’s privatization program, foreign investors are treated equal to local investors. The World Trade Organization (WTO) last conducted a Trade Policy Review (TPR) in January 2018. The Gambia has maintained its generally open trade and investment regime since the last TPR in 2010. The main trade policy reform has been the adoption of the five-band ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET) from 1 January 2017. An executive summary of the findings can be found at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp465_e.htm . The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) conducted an Investment Policy Review (IPR) in 2017. The review shows The Gambia has adopted an open regime for investment and a range of modern business regulation tools. However, supply-side constraints, vulnerability to exogenous shocks and remaining regulatory and institutional bottlenecks have negatively affected the development of the private sector and the country’s performance in attracting FDI. The report can be downloaded at: https://unctad.org/webflyer/investment-policy-review-gambia . The Ministry of Justice, which offers a range of administrative services to foreign investors, is the point of entry for company registration. The government has drastically reduced the average number of days it takes to start a business in recent years. In the past it would usually take 25 days to start a business, but this has been decreased to a few days. According to the 2020 Doing Business report, it takes six procedures and, on average, a few days to start a business in the country. These procedures include registering a unique company name, notarizing company status, obtaining a tax identification number (TIN), registering employees with the Social Security and Housing Finance Corporation, registering with the Commercial Registry, and obtaining an operational license. While this can be done by anyone in theory, a local attorney who is familiar with the system can facilitate the process. In 2010, a Single Window Business Registration Desk was established at the Ministry of Justice. This initiative has reduced the number of days it takes to register a business in the country to one day. All projects that could have a negative impact on the environment require an Environmental Clearance issued by the National Environment Agency (NEA) using guidelines set out by the NEA as per the Environment Act 1994. Foreign investment in The Gambia is facilitated by the GIEPA and the Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GCCI). Their mandate includes export promotion and support for MSMEs’s development. Domestic investors have no limitations when it comes to investing abroad. Post has been working with the American Chamber of Commerce to expand its role in facilitating trade between The Gambia and the United States. 3. Legal Regime The GOTG uses transparent policies and effective laws to foster competition on a non-discriminatory basis to establish “clear rules of the game.” The Gambia’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. The Consumer Protection Act of 2007 mandates the Commission to advocate for competition in The Gambia; and to determine and impose penalties or appropriate remedies to ensure businesses comply with prohibited restrictive practices, and monitor compliance, among other things. The Gambia Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (GCCP) is a commercial watchdog that ensures the protection of consumers from unfair and misleading market practices and administers the prohibition of illegal business practices. Rule-making and regulatory authority exists with the President, his cabinet of Ministers, and the committee members under the National Assembly of The Gambia, and various government parastatals. The accounting, legal, and regulatory procedural systems of The Gambia are consistent with international norms. Draft bills or regulations are made available to the public for commenting through public meetings and targeted outreach to stakeholders, such as business associations or other groups. This practice is in line with the U.S. federal notice and comment procedures and applies to investment laws and regulations in The Gambia. There are no informal regulatory processes that are managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. There is no formal stock market such as a stock exchange for trading equity securities. The accounting, legal, and regulatory procedural systems of The Gambia are consistent with international norms. Draft bills or regulations are made available to the public for commenting through public meetings and targeted outreach to stakeholders, such as business associations or other groups. A contract was concluded with LexisNexis in 2009 for the publication of the entire country’s legislation; however, access is not free of charge. The National Assembly is also in the process of compiling all regulatory actions on its website. No centralized online location exists where key regulatory actions or their summaries are published. The Gambia also lacks a specialized government body tasked with reviewing and monitoring regulatory impact assessments conducted by other individual agencies or government bodies. There are no informal regulatory processes that are managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. There are two types of courts in The Gambia: the Superior Courts and the Magistrates Court. The Cadi Court and District Tribunals and such lower courts and tribunals may be established by an act of the National Assembly. The judicial power of The Gambia is vested in the courts, which exercise this power according to the respective jurisdictions conferred by an act of the National Assembly. No new regulatory system reforms have been announced since the previous Investment Climate Statement report, but regulatory reform efforts announced in prior years are being implemented. The Investment Policy Plan of The Gambia is still in draft stages. Proposed laws and regulations are made available to all the relevant stakeholders for their review and discussion at validation workshops. During the process of enactment in the National Assembly, deputies are free to suggest changes. Regulations are not reviewed based on scientific or data-driven assessments. There are no known scientific studies or quantitative analysis conducted on the impact of regulations made publicly available for comment, but there is a public agency, The Gambia Bureau of Statistics, that does develop data based on enacted legislation. Public comments received by regulators are not made public. Only limited information on debt obligation is made available. Documents lack complete information on natural resource revenues as well as financial earnings from state-owned enterprises. The Gambia is a member of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and as such, is signatory to the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty, which harmonizes investment rules. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) first introduced competition legislation in 2008, including a prohibition on anticompetitive mergers. The Gambia has its own regulatory system, designed from collaboration with stakeholders from the international community of NGOs, but international norms or standards referenced or incorporated into the country’s regulatory system are often based on the UK system of regulations. The international norms and standards of the United Kingdom are referenced and incorporated into The Gambia’s regulatory system. The Gambia is a member of the WTO. The government does not notify the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of all draft technical regulations. However, draft technical regulations are available to relevant stakeholders like the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), if requested. The country’s legal system is based on English common law and there are effective means for enforcing property and contractual rights. The Gambia has a written and consistently applied commercial law, which is found in the Companies Act. Monetary judgments can be made in both the investor’s currency and local currency. The Gambia does not have a written commercial and/or contractual law as its legal system is based on Common Law. The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and although the courts are not totally free from influence of the executive branch, they have demonstrated their independence on occasion. The Supreme Court, presided over by a chief justice, has both civil and criminal jurisdiction. Appeals against decisions of district tribunals (or the industrial tribunal in the case of labor disputes) may be lodged with the lower courts, the High Court and the Supreme Court, which is the highest court of appeal in the country. The investment laws and regulations of The Gambia apply equally to local and foreign investors. These include unclear provisions of some of the laws related to investment, such as competition, labor and corruption, and, in some instances, regulations do not exist to implement the laws effectively. For information on the laws, rules, procedures, and reporting required, foreign investors can visit the website of GIEPA (http://www.giepa.gm/). The Gambia Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (GCCPC) (https://gcc.gm/) is the body primarily responsible for the promotion of competition and the protection of consumers mandated by three acts, namely: The Competition Act 2007, The Consumer Protection Act 2014, and The Essential Commodities Act 2015. No major investment-related laws, regulations, or judicial decisions came out within the past year. The GCCPC’s 3rd Strategic Plan (2019 to 2021) covers enforcement and promotion of the Competition Act 2007, administration and promotion of the Consumer Protection Act 2014, advocacy and awareness creation and empowerment, mobilization and optimal utilization of resources, and infrastructure and human capital development. GCCPC is a commercial watchdog that reviews transactions for competition-related concerns and ensures the protection of consumers from unfair and misleading market practices and administers the prohibition of illegal business practices. The Constitution of The Gambia provides the legal framework for the protection of private ownership of property and only provides for compulsory acquisition by the state if this is found to be necessary for defense, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town, and country planning. During President Jammeh’s 22 years in office, state paramilitary officials were known to arrive unannounced on private property and tear down any standing structures on the property in question. Claimants alleged a lack of due process and compensation stemming from these incidents under President Jammeh. Bankruptcy is covered by the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act of 1992. Creditors, equity shareholders, and holders of other financial contracts may file for both liquidation and reorganization. 6. Financial Sector Banks and policymakers alike would like to see the exposure ratio return to the long-run average over time, if the emergence of lending opportunities, both large-scale investment projects and retail credit, can be supported by the banks without compromising their financial soundness and overall financial stability. Gambian banks are trying to return to a more balanced portfolio structure in the medium run following the secular decline in private sector lending relative to investment in government securities. The Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG) staff contends that the decline in the ratio was delayed by foreign banks entering the local market with an aggressive lending strategy to capture market share. The country does not have its own stock market. Sufficient liquidity does not exist in the markets to enter and exit sizeable positions. There is no effective regulatory system to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment, or policies to facilitate the free flow of financial resources into the products and factor markets. Credit is allocated on market terms. Foreign investors can get credit from the local market. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. The Government respects the IMF Article obligations for member countries, including refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Currently, the total number of customers in The Gambia stands at 772,101 and only 14 percent use E-Banking. The Gambia currently has 80 branches and 208 point-of-sale (POS) terminals. The banking system has been resilient to shocks and this includes challenges posed by COVID-19. The total assets of the banking industry as of the end of December 2021 increased to $1.4 billion from D58.82 billion ($1.2 million) in 2020 due to increases in balances due from other banks, investments and loans and advances. The country’s asset quality improved, mirroring improvement in the non-performing loan ratio. The ratio decreased by 1.2 percentage points to 5.2 percent at the end of December 2021. The industry’s capital and reserves exposure to foreign exchange activities declined to a long position of 0.37 percent in December 2021 from a long position of 4.6 percent in the corresponding period a year ago. The Gambia’s gross loans amounted to $175 million. The banking system had been adequately capitalized, liquid and profitable with a capital adequacy ratio of 32.6 percent in December 2020, the ratio of liquid assets to total assets at 63.8 percent and the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans at 6.82 percent. The two largest banks account for $513 million and 36.6 percent of the industry’s total assets. Most of the industry’s banks are foreign subsidiaries locally incorporated in The Gambia. However, no foreign branch operates in the country. Further to this, they are subject to prudential measures or regulations in line with the Central Bank’s Banking Act and guidelines. The country has a central bank system. Foreign banks or branches can establish operations in The Gambia. They are subject to the banking regulations of The Gambia. No correspondent banking relationships were lost in the past three years. There are no restrictions on foreigners opening a bank account. Finance companies dominate the non-bank financial sector with robust financial indicators for the period under review. Assets of FCs at end-December 2021 stood at D2.39 billion ($45 million) compared to D2.01 billion ($37 million) same period a year earlier. The increase in assets size was largely driven by gross loans, cash, and bank balances. Capital increased by 31.0 percent to D378.13 million ($7 million) in December 2021 surpassing the minimum requirement of D50.0 million ($932K). Mobile money financial services, similarly, grew in terms of customer base, but declined in terms of transactions. Year-on-year, the value of cash-in and cash-out transactions decreased by 20.8 and 20.7 while number of account holders surged by 93.8 percent. Neither the host government nor a government affiliate maintains a Sovereign Wealth Fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Gambia has a majority ownership in 14 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that operate in key economic sectors. Seven of the SOEs are commercial and operate more independently from the government, while the others are public corporations or institutions, some providing regulatory functions. While the President appoints the chief executive officer (CEO), or Director General, and the full boards of most of the SOEs, the enterprises remain under the supervision of line ministries. such as agriculture, power generation, energy, and gas. SOEs can also be found in the information and telecommunications, aviation, and finance industries. SOE revenues are not projected in budget documents. Audits of the public sector and SOEs are conducted by the Gambia’s Supreme Audit Institution. The following is a list of 14 SOEs. Assets Management & Recovery Corporation (AMRC) Gambia Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) Gambia Groundnut Corporation (GCC) Gambia International Airlines (GIA) Gambia National Petroleum Company (GNPC) Gambia Ports Authority (GPA) Gambia Postal Services (GAMPOSTS) Gambia Public Printing Cooperation (GPPC) Gambia Radio & Television Services (GRTS) Gambia Telecommunication Cellular Company (GAMCEL) Gambia Telecommunication Company (GAMTEL) National Water and Electricity Corporation (NAWEC) Public Utility and Regulatory Authority Social Security Housing & Finance Corporation (SSHFC) The Gambia’s government imposed an embargo on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) borrowing from each other in June 2020, according to the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs during a National Assembly session. Based on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in 2018 between SSHFC and SOEs, SOEs defaulted in their payments to Social Security. Other SOEs include Gambia International Airline (GIA), Gambia Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA), GAMCEL, and GAMTEL, with NAWEC being the largest defaulter. Private enterprises are allowed to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations, such as licenses and supplies. The Ministry of Finance website published the list of SOEs ( https://mofea.gm/soe ). The Public-Private Partnership Unit at the Ministry of Finance monitors the SOEs. By using the Public-Private Partnership Unit SOE Guidelines to form an integral part in organizing good practices among their state-owned enterprise sectors, promoting the implementation of the Guidelines in establishing their ownership practices, defining a framework for corporate governance of state-owned enterprises, and disseminating this Recommendation of the Guidelines among Ministries. Additionally, the GOTG is open to a review by the Working Party on State Ownership and Privatization Practices and for follow-up on the implementation of the OECD Council on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises’ Recommendations. The Government of The Gambia is currently not engaged in any forms of privatization programs. 10. Political and Security Environment The Gambia was ruled for over two decades by former president Yahya Jammeh, who consistently violated political rights and civil liberties. The 2016 election resulted in a surprise victory for opposition candidate Adama Barrow. Fundamental freedoms including the rights to free assembly, association, and expression initially improved thereafter, but the progress toward the consolidation of the rule of law is slow. The Barrow government has faced increasing criticism over corruption. LGBT+ individuals face severe discrimination and violence against women remains a serious problem. In January, authorities forcefully dispersed a Banjul demonstration against President Barrow’s decision to remain in office beyond a three-year timetable. Authorities arrested 137 people, including high-ranking members of the Three Years Jotna (ThreeYears Is Enough) pressure group; the group was banned that month and eight members received charges including rioting, which remained pending at year’s end. In September, legislators rejected a draft constitution that would have introduced term limits for presidents. President Barrow imposed a COVID-19-related state of emergency in March 2020, which expired in September. Public assemblies were restricted in March and a curfew was instituted in August, though most restrictions were rescinded or loosened by year’s end. The authorities reported nearly 3,800 cases and 124 deaths to the World Health Organization at year’s end. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (USD) N/A N/A 2020 $1.87 billion https://data.worldbank.org /indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=GM Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/Ax N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A N/A N/A BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A N/A N/A UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/ World%20Investment%20Report/ Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Data not available. The Netherlands Executive Summary The Netherlands consistently ranks among the world’s most competitive industrialized economies. It offers an attractive business and investment climate and remains a welcoming location for business investment from the United States and elsewhere. Strengths of the Dutch economy include the Netherlands’ stable political and macroeconomic climate, a highly developed financial sector, strategic location, well-educated and productive labor force, and high-quality physical and communications infrastructure. Investors in the Netherlands take advantage of its highly competitive logistics, anchored by the largest seaport and fourth-largest airport in Europe. In telecommunications, the Netherlands has one of the highest levels of internet penetration in the European Union (EU) at 96 percent and hosts one of the largest data transport hubs in the world, the Amsterdam Internet Exchange. The Netherlands is among the largest recipients and sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world and one of the largest historical recipients of direct investment from the United States. This can be attributed to the Netherlands’ competitive economy, historically business-friendly tax climate, and many investment treaties containing investor protections. The Dutch economy has significant foreign direct investment in a wide range of sectors including logistics, information technology, and manufacturing. Dutch tax policy continues to evolve in response to EU attempts to harmonize tax policy across member states. Until the COVID-19 crisis, economic growth had placed the Dutch economy in a very healthy position, with successive years of a budget surplus, public debt that was well under 50 percent of GDP, and record-low unemployment of 3.5 percent. This allowed the Dutch government significant fiscal space to implement coronavirus relief measures. In response to COVID, the Dutch government implemented wide-ranging support for businesses affected by the COVID crisis, including support to cover employee wages, benefits to self-employed professions to bridge a loss of income, and compensation for fixed costs other than wages. The financial support measures added up to about $70.5 billion (€60 billion) in the first year of the crisis. These programs prevented a wave of bankruptcies – bankruptcy filings in 2020 and 2021 were the lowest in two decades. The new coalition government announced in early 2022 plans to be climate neutral by 2050. The government said it would adjust domestic climate goals to at least 55 percent CO2 reduction by 2030 compared to 1990, with ambitions to aim higher for a 60 percent reduction. The government has named a Minister for Climate and Energy Policy to work on domestic issues in addition to a Climate Envoy focused on international efforts. The Netherlands joined the U.S.-EU Global Methane Pledge and promised to end all investment in new coal power generation domestically and internationally. In April 2022, the government joined the AIM for Climate initiative. The 2019 National Climate Agreement contains policy and measures to achieve climate goals through agreements with various economic sectors on specific actions. The participating sectors include electricity, industry, “built environment,” traffic and transport, and agriculture. The Netherlands business community suffered a two-pronged loss in the planned departure of two of its major national corporate champions. Energy leader Shell and food and household products conglomerate Unilever announced in 2021 a relocation of their corporate headquarters from The Hague and Rotterdam, respectively, to London. The companies cited concerns with Dutch tax law relative to dividend taxation and need for consolidated management structure. (Note: Both companies previously split their corporate governance between the Netherlands and the UK. End Note.) In March 2022, the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB) published its 2022 economic projections. Due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the outlook was marked by uncertainty and flagged “even higher” energy prices as the most important economic consequence. Because of increased energy prices and high inflation from the COVID pandemic, CPB estimates a 5.2% inflation rate for 2022 with a range of 6.0% and 3.0% depending on how long energy prices remain high. CPB estimated economic growth of 3.6% in 2022 and 1.7% in 2023. CPB predicted unemployment at 4 percent in 2022, down from 4.2% in 2021. The low unemployment rate reflects a similar challenge also faced by the United States – businesses are finding it difficult to recruit qualified staff. Government debt is expected to rise to 61 percent of GDP by 2025 due to increased spending under the new coalition government, including on defense, outlays to support an aging population, and support to low-income families to offset inflation in energy and food prices. According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), when measured by country of foreign parent, the Netherlands is the second largest destination for U.S. FDI abroad in 2020 after the UK, holding $844 billion out of a total of $6.1 trillion total outbound U.S. investment – about 14 percent. Investment from the Netherlands contributed $484 billion FDI to the United States, making it the fourth largest investor at the end of 2020 of about $4.6 trillion total inbound FDI to the United States– about 10.5 percent. Measured by ultimate beneficial owner (UBO), the Netherlands was the seventh largest investor at $236 billion. For the Netherlands, outbound FDI to the United States represented 14 percent of all direct investment abroad. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 8 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021 Global Innovation Index 2021 6 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysisindicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $844 million Bea: Netherlands – International Trade and Investment Country Facts World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $ 51,060 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment In 2020, the Netherlands was the 18th largest economy in the world and is the fifth largest economy in the European Union with a gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020 of over $913 billion according to the World Bank. The Netherlands consistently ranks among the world’s most competitive industrialized economies in global rankings that measure competitiveness, innovation, and access to infrastructure. According to the OECD and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 2020 the Netherlands was the second largest source and recipient for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world, although the Netherlands is not the ultimate destination for the majority of this investment. Similarly, in its 2020 investment report, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) identified the Netherlands as the world’s fourth largest destination of global FDI inflows and the third largest source of FDI outflows. The government of the Netherlands maintains liberal policies toward FDI, has established itself as a platform for third-country investment with some 145 investment agreements in force, and adheres to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Codes of Liberalization and Declaration on International Investment, including a National Treatment commitment and adherence to relevant guidelines. The Netherlands is the recipient of eight percent of all FDI inflow into the EU. The Netherlands has become a key export platform and pan-regional distribution hub for U.S. firms. Roughly 60 percent of total U.S. foreign-affiliate sales in the Netherlands are exports, with the bulk of them going to other EU members. The nearly 3,000 U.S. owned corporations represent more than 20% of all foreign owned firms in the Netherlands and they create more than 200,000 jobs. Foreign owned firms operate predominantly in business services, wholesale, and retail sectors. Although policy makers feared that Brexit would have an extremely negative impact on the Dutch economy, the Netherlands is benefitting from companies exiting the United Kingdom in search of an anchor location inside the EU Single Market. The European Medicines Agency (EMA) also relocated from London to Amsterdam. According to the Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency (NFIA), since the referendum in 2016, 316 companies have chosen to relocate to the Netherlands. The companies are mainly from the health, creative industry, financial services, and logistics sectors. The Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) expects Amsterdam to emerge as a main post-Brexit financial trading center in Europe for automated trading platforms and other ‘fintech’ firms, as more of these companies cross the Channel to keep their European trading within the confines of the EU regulatory oversight. Dutch tax authorities provide a high degree of customer service to foreign investors, seeking to provide transparent, precise tax guidance that makes long-term tax obligations more predictable. Advance Tax Rulings (ATR) and Advance Pricing Agreements (APA) are guarantees given by local tax inspectors regarding long-term tax commitments for a particular acquisition or greenfield investment. Dutch tax policy continues to evolve as the EU seeks to harmonize tax measures across member states. A more detailed description of Dutch tax policy for foreign investors can be found at https://investinholland.com/why-invest/incentives-taxes/ . Dutch corporations and branches of foreign corporations are currently subject to a corporate tax rate of 25 percent on taxable profits, which puts the Netherlands in the middle third among EU countries’ corporate tax rates and below the tax rates of its larger neighbors. Corporate income tax rates in the Netherlands are currently 15% for the first €395,000 of taxable profits and 25.8% for taxable profits exceeding €395,000 in 2022. Dutch corporate taxation generally allows for exemption of dividends and capital gains derived from a foreign subsidiary. Surveys of the corporate tax structure of EU member states note that both the corporate tax rate and the effective corporate tax rate in the Netherlands are around the EU average. Nevertheless, the Dutch corporate tax structure ranks among the most competitive in Europe considering other beneficial measures such as the possibility for the tax authorities to provide corporations with clarity on future treatment of taxes via “advance” rulings and agreements such as ATR and/or APA. The Netherlands also has no branch profit tax and does not levy a withholding tax on interest and royalties. Maintaining an investment-friendly reputation is a high priority for the Dutch government, which provides public information and institutional assistance to prospective investors through the Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency (NFIA) ( https://investinholland.com/ ). Historically, over a third of all “greenfield” FDI projects that NFIA attracts to the Netherlands originate from U.S. companies. Additionally, the Netherlands business gateway at https://business.gov.nl/ – maintained by the Dutch government – provides information on regulations, taxes, and investment incentives that apply to foreign investors in the Netherlands and clear guidance on establishing a business in the Netherlands. The NFIA maintains five regional offices in the United States (Washington, DC; Atlanta; Chicago; New York City; and San Francisco). The American Chamber of Commerce in the Netherlands ( https://www.amcham.nl/ ) also promotes U.S. and Dutch business interests in the Netherlands. With few exceptions, the Netherlands does not discriminate between national and foreign individuals in the establishment and operation of private companies. The government has divested its complete ownership of many public utilities, but in a number of strategic sectors, private investment – including foreign investment – may be subject to limitations or conditions. These include transportation, energy, defense and security, finance, postal services, public broadcasting, and the media. Air transport is governed by EU regulation and subject to the U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement. U.S. nationals can invest in Dutch/European carriers as long as the airline remains majority-owned by EU governments or nationals from EU member states. Additionally, the EU and its member states reserve the right to limit U.S. investment in the voting equity of an EU airline on a reciprocal basis that the United States allows for foreign nationals in U.S. carriers. The Netherlands has not recently undergone an investment policy review by the OECD, World Trade Organization (WTO), or UNCTAD. All companies must register with the Netherlands’ Chamber of Commerce and apply for a fiscal number with the tax administration, which allows expedited registration for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with fewer than 50 employees: https://www.kvk.nl/english/registration/foreign-company-registration/ The Netherlands business gateway at https://business.gov.nl/ – maintained by the Dutch government – provides a general checklist for starting a business in the Netherlands: https://business.gov.nl/starting-your-business/checklists-for-starting-a-business/how-to-start-a-business-in-the-netherlands-a-checklist/ . The Dutch American Friendship Treaty (DAFT) from 1956 gives U.S. citizens preferential treatment to operate a business in the Netherlands, providing ease of establishment that most other non-EU nationals do not enjoy. U.S. entrepreneurs applying under the DAFT do not need to satisfy a strict, points-based test and do not have to meet pre-conditions related to providing an innovative product. U.S. entrepreneurs setting up a sole proprietorship only have to register with the Chamber of Commerce and demonstrate a minimum investment of 4,500 euros. DAFT entrepreneurs receive a two-year residence permit, with the possibility of renewal for five subsequent years. In order to sustain the top ten ranking of the Netherlands among the world’s largest exporting nations, the Minister for International Trade and Development Cooperation within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs coordinates with the government and private sector trade promotion agencies in setting an annual ‘overseas trade mission’ agenda. The Netherlands Enterprise Agency (https://english.rvo.nl/) has the lead in organizing a custom-tailored and topical format of trade missions to accompany State visits and other official delegations abroad. Participation in these missions is open to any enterprise established in the Netherlands. 3. Legal Regime Dutch commercial laws and regulations accord with international legal practices and standards; they apply equally to foreign and Dutch companies. The rules on acquisition, mergers, takeovers, and reinvestment are nondiscriminatory. The Social Economic Council (SER)–an official advisory body consisting of employers’ representatives, labor representatives, and government appointed independent experts–administers Dutch mergers and acquisitions rules. The SER’s rules serve to protect the interests of stakeholders and employees. They include requirements for the timely announcement of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and for discussions with trade unions. As an EU member and Eurozone country, the Netherlands is firmly integrated in the European regulatory system, with national and European institutions exercising authority over specific markets, industries, consumer rights, and competition behavior of individual firms. Financial markets are regulated in an interconnected EU and national system of prudential and behavioral oversight. The domestic regulators are the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) and the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Market (AFM). Their EU counterparts are the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). The Dutch Civil Code requires boards’ statements of large companies to include non-financial performance indicators in their annual report. EU law is relevant in the Netherlands. Companies often voluntarily disclose ESG-related issues and refer to the GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines and the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures recommendations on its website. Some sectors such as the pension sector have committed to the 2018 Covenant on International Socially Responsible Investing (IMVB). In December 2021, the Netherlands became the latest European government to announce plans to introduce mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence (HREDD) legislation at a national level should the EU continue to delay an introduction of mandatory HREDD legislation. Traditionally, public consultation in drafting new laws is achieved by invitation of various civil society bodies, trade associations, and organizations of stakeholders. In addition, the SER has a formal mandate to provide the government with advice, both solicited and of its own accord. Recently, the SER has provided the government with advice on emissions reduction of greenhouse gases, energy transition, and pension reforms. New laws and regulations are subject to legal review by the Council of State and must be approved by the Second and First Chambers of Parliament. The World Bank scores the Netherlands at 4.75 out of 5 on its Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance which assesses transparency around proposed regulations and access to enacted laws. All proposed regulations are published publicly including on a unified website and on the website of the relevant ministry or regulator. The Netherlands is a member of the WTO and does not maintain any measures that are inconsistent with obligations under Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). Dutch contract law is based on the principle of party autonomy and full freedom of contract. Signing parties are free to draft an agreement in any form and any language, based on the legal system of their choice. Dutch corporate law provides for a legal and fiscal framework that is designed to be flexible. This element of the investment climate makes the Netherlands especially attractive to foreign investors. The Dutch civil court system has a chamber dedicated to business disputes, called the Enterprise Chamber. The Enterprise Chamber includes judges who are experts in various commercial fields. They resolve a wide range of corporate disputes, from corporate governance disputes to high-profile shareholder conflicts over mergers or hostile take-overs. Since 2019, the Enterprise Chamber houses an English-language commercial court. The Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC) and its appellate chamber (NCCA) offer parties the opportunity to litigate in English and will provide judgments in English. Both the NCC and NCCA will focus primarily on major international commercial cases. See also: https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx The Dutch government has demonstrated a growing concern with the protection of its open, market-based economy against foreign state malign activity. The Netherlands is in the process of establishing a formal domestic investment screening mechanism as per EU directive. In May 2020, the long-awaited investment screening law in the telecommunications sector came into force. In December 2020, the law on establishing a framework for investment screening for all critical sectors came into force, aimed at protecting Dutch national security. In concert with the European Union, the Dutch government is considering how to best protect its economic security and also continue as one of the world’s most open economies. The Netherlands has foreign investment and procurement screening mechanisms in place for certain vital sectors that could present national security vulnerabilities. The first such laws (one on investment screening per EU directive and one on unwanted outside influence in the telecommunications sector) passed in 2020. The government is in the process of expanding screening measures to cover sensitive technologies more broadly, and a new law, which will apply retroactively from September 2020, is expected to be passed by Parliament in 2022. Among policymakers, foreign investment and procurement screening is considered a non-partisan issue with support across the political spectrum. There is no requirement for Dutch nationals to have an equity stake in a Dutch registered company. Structural and regulatory reforms are an integral part of Dutch economic policy. Laws are routinely developed for stimulating market forces, liberalization, deregulation, and tightening competition policy. As an EU and Eurozone member, the Netherlands is firmly integrated in the European regulatory system with national and European institutions exercising authority over specific markets, industries, consumer rights, and competition behavior of individual firms. The Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) provides regulatory oversight in three key areas: consumer protection, post and telecommunications, and market competition. The Netherlands maintains strong protection on all types of property, including private and intellectual property rights, and the right of citizens to own and use property. Expropriation of corporate assets or the nationalization of industry requires a special act of Parliament, as demonstrated in the nationalization of ABN AMRO during the 2008 financial crisis (the government returned it to public shareholding through a 2016 IPO). In the event of expropriation, the Dutch government follows customary international law, providing prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, as well as ample process for legal recourse. The U.S. Mission to the Netherlands is unaware of any recent expropriation claims involving the Dutch government and a U.S. or other foreign-owned company. Dutch bankruptcy law is governed by the Dutch Bankruptcy Code, which applies both to individuals and to companies. The code covers three separate legal proceedings: 1) bankruptcy, which has a goal of liquidating the company’s assets; 2) receivership, aimed at reaching an agreement between the creditors and the company; and 3) debt restructuring, which is only available to individuals. 6. Financial Sector The Netherlands is home to the world’s oldest stock exchange – established four centuries ago – and Europe’s first options exchange, both located in Amsterdam. The Amsterdam financial exchanges are part of the Euronext group that operates stock exchanges and derivatives markets in Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, and Paris. Dutch financial markets are fully developed and operate at market rates, facilitating the free flow of financial resources. The Netherlands is an international financial center for the foreign exchange market, Eurobonds, and bullion trade. The flexibility that foreign companies enjoy in conducting business in the Netherlands extends into the area of currency and foreign exchange. There are no restrictions on foreign investors’ access to sources of local finance. The Dutch banking sector is firmly embedded in the European System of Central Banks, of which the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) is the national prudential banking supervisor. AFM, the Dutch securities and exchange supervisor, supervises financial institutions and the proper functioning of financial markets and falls under the EU-wide European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). The highly concentrated Dutch banking sector is over three times as large as the rest of the Dutch economy, making it one of Europe’s largest banking sectors in relation to GDP. Three banks, ING, ABN AMRO, and Rabobank, hold nearly 85 percent of the banking sector’s total assets. The largest bank, ING, has a balance sheet of just over $1 trillion (€937 billion). The DNB does not consider Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies to be legitimate currency, as they do not fulfill the traditional purpose of money as a stable means of exchange or saving, and their value is not supported via central bank guarantee mechanisms. DNB considers current cryptocurrencies to be risky investments that are especially vulnerable to criminal abuse and has begun requiring that providers of financial services related to exchange and deposit of cryptocurrencies register with the DNB, per anti-money laundering (AML) legislation. The DNB acknowledges that, in the future, cash transactions will likely be replaced with digital transactions that require central bank-issued and -guaranteed cryptocurrencies. Dutch society has already embraced cash-less commerce to a high degree – seventy percent of over-the-counter shopping is via PIN transactions and contactless payment – and DNB is participating with central banks from Canada, Japan, England, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Bank for International Settlements in research about a possible central bank-issued cryptocurrency. The Netherlands has no sovereign wealth funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Dutch government maintains an equity stake in a small number of enterprises and some ownership in companies that play an important role in strategic sectors. In particular, government-controlled entities retain dominant positions in gas and electricity distribution, rail transport, and the water management sector. The Netherlands has an extensive public broadcasting network, which generates its own income through advertising revenues but also receives government subsidies. For a complete list of government-owned entities, please see: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/staatsdeelnemingen/vraag-en-antwoord/in-welke-ondernemingen-heeft-de-overheid-aandelen Private enterprises are allowed to compete with public enterprises with respect to market access, credits, and other business operations such as licenses and supplies. Government-appointed supervisory boards oversee state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In some instances involving large investment decisions, SOEs must consult with the cabinet ministry that oversees them. As with any other firm in the Netherlands, SOEs must publish annual reports, and their financial accounts must be audited. The Netherlands fully adheres to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs. There are no ongoing privatization programs in the Netherlands. 10. Political and Security Environment Although political violence rarely occurs in the highly stable and consensus-oriented Dutch society, public debate on issues such as immigration and integration policy has been contentious. While rare, there have been some politically and religiously inspired acts of violence. The Dutch economy derives much of its strength from a stable business climate that fosters partnerships among unions, business organizations, and the government. Strikes are rarely used as a way to resolve labor disputes. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $859,001 2020 $914,000 GDP (current US$) – Netherlands | Data (worldbank.org) Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 $976,750 2020 $844,000 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $744,720 2020 $484,000 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 170% (excluding SFI) 2020 318% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/EconomicTrends/Fdi.html * Source for Host Country Data: Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB): GDP, Dutch Central Bank (DNB): FDI. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 4,512,447 100% Total Outward 5,876,798 100% United States 1,190,180 26% United Kingdom 801,255 14% Luxemburg 435,166 10% United States 792,311 13% United Kingdom 433,383 10% Switzerland 521,553 9% Germany 332,293 7% Germany 418,576 7% Switzerland 226,734 5% Luxembourg 330,020 6% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. The Philippines Executive Summary The Philippines remains committed to improving its overall investment climate and recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic. Sovereign credit ratings remain at investment grade based on the country’s historically sound macroeconomic fundamentals, but one credit rating agency has updated its ratings with a negative outlook indicating a possible downgrade within the next year due to increasing public debt and inflationary pressures on the economy. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows rebounded to USD 10.5 billion, up 54 percent from USD 6.8 billion in 2020 and surpassing the previous high of USD 10.3 billion in 2017, according to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (the Philippine Central Bank). While 2021 was a record year for inward FDI, since 2010 the Philippines has lagged behind regional peers in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in attracting foreign investment. The Philippines ranked sixth out of ten ASEAN economies for total FDI inflows in 2020, and last among ASEAN-5 economies (which include Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) in cumulative FDI inflows from 2010-2020, according to World Bank data. The majority of FDI equity investments in 2021 targeted the manufacturing, energy, financial services, and real estate sectors. (https://www.bsp.gov.ph/SitePages/MediaAndResearch/MediaDisp.aspx?ItemId=6189) Poor infrastructure, high power costs, slow broadband connections, regulatory inconsistencies, and corruption are major disincentives to investment. The Philippines’ complex, slow, and sometimes corrupt judicial system inhibits the timely and fair resolution of commercial disputes. Traffic in major cities and congestion in the ports remain barriers to doing business. The Philippines made progress in addressing foreign ownership limitations that has constrained investment in many sectors, through legislation such as the amendments to the Public Services Act, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, and Foreign Investment Act, that were signed into law in 2022. Amendments to the Public Services Act open previously closed sectors of the economy to 100 percent foreign investment. The amended law maintains foreign ownership restrictions in six “public utilities:” (1) distribution of electricity, (2) transmission of electricity, (3) petroleum and petroleum products pipeline transmission systems, (4) water pipeline distribution systems, (5) seaports, and (6) public utility vehicles. The newly approved Retail Trade Liberalization Act aims to boost foreign direct investment in the retail sector by reducing the minimum per-store investment requirement for foreign-owned retail trade businesses from USD 830,000 to USD 200,000. It will also reduce the quantity of locally manufactured products foreign-owned stores are required to carry. The Foreign Investment Act will ease restrictions on foreigners practicing their professions in the Philippines and grant them access to investment areas that were previously reserved for Philippine nationals, particularly in the education, technology, and retail sectors. In addition, the Corporate Recovery and Tax Incentives for Enterprises (CREATE) Act signed in March 2021 reduced the corporate income tax from ASEAN’s highest rate of 30 percent to 25 percent for large firms, and 20 percent for small firms. The rate for large firms will be gradually lowered to 20 percent by 2025. CREATE could attract new business investment, although some foreign investors have concerns about the phase-out of their incentive benefits, which are replaced by the performance-based and time-bound nature of the incentives scheme adopted in the measure. While the Philippine bureaucracy can be slow and opaque in its processes, the business environment is notably better within the special economic zones, particularly those available for export businesses operated by the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), known for its regulatory transparency, no red-tape policy, and one-stop shop services for investors. Finally, the Philippines’ infrastructure spending under the Duterte Administration’s “Build, Build, Build” infrastructure program is estimated to have exceeded USD100 billion over the 2017-2022 period. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 117 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 51 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 5,199 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD3,430 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Philippines seeks foreign investment to support economic recovery, generate employment, promote economic development, and contribute to inclusive and sustained growth in targeted areas. In 2021, the Corporate Recovery and Tax Incentives for Enterprises (CREATE) Act standardized the incentives regime across 14 investment promotion agencies (IPAs). With the reform, the Board of Investments (BOI) and Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) continue to be the country’s lead IPAs. The BOI approves incentives for projects with an investment capital of USD 20 million and below; the interagency Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB) approves incentives for projects beyond the USD 20 million investment capital threshold. Noteworthy advantages of the Philippine investment landscape include free trade zones, including economic zones, and a large, educated, English-speaking, and relatively low-cost Filipino workforce. Philippine law treats foreign investors the same as their domestic counterparts, except in sectors reserved for Filipinos by the Philippine Constitution and the Foreign Investment Act (see details under Limits on Foreign Control section). Additional information regarding investment policies and incentives are available on the BOI (http://boi.gov.ph) and PEZA (http://www.peza.gov.ph) websites. Restrictions on foreign ownership in some sectors, inadequate public investment in infrastructure, and lack of transparency in procurement tenders hinder foreign investment. The Philippines’ regulatory regime remains ambiguous in many sectors of the economy, and corruption is a significant problem. Large, family-owned conglomerates dominate the economic landscape, crowding out other smaller businesses. Foreigners are prohibited from fully owning land under the 1987 Constitution, although the 1993 Investors’ Lease Act allows foreign investors to lease a contiguous parcel of up to 1,000 hectares (2,471 acres) for a maximum of 75 years. Dual citizens are permitted to own land. The 2022 Foreign Investment Act (FIA) still requires the publishing every two years of the Foreign Investment Negative List (FINL), which outlines sectors in which foreign investment is restricted. The latest FINL was released in October 2018; an updated version of the FINL is currently under draft. The FINL bans foreign ownership/participation in the following investment activities: mass media (except recording and internet businesses); small-scale mining; private security agencies; utilization of marine resources; cockpits; manufacturing of firecrackers and pyrotechnic devices; manufacturing and distribution of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons; and manufacturing and distribution of anti-personnel mines. With the exception of the practices of law, radiologic and x-ray technology, and marine deck and marine engine officers, foreign professionals are allowed to practice in the Philippines if their country permits reciprocity for Philippine citizens. These professions include medicine, pharmacy, nursing, dentistry, accountancy, architecture, engineering, criminology, teaching, chemistry, environmental planning, geology, forestry, interior design, landscape architecture, and customs brokerage. In practice, however, language exams, onerous registration processes, and other barriers make it difficult for foreigners to practice in these fields. The Philippines limits foreign ownership to 40 percent in the manufacturing of explosives, firearms, and military hardware; private radio communication networks; natural resource exploration, development, and utilization (with exceptions); educational institutions (with some exceptions); operation and management of public utilities; operation of commercial deep sea fishing vessels; Philippine government procurement contracts (40 percent for supply of goods and commodities); contracts for the construction and repair of locally funded public works (with some exceptions); ownership of private land; and rice and corn production and processing (with some exceptions). Other areas that carry varying foreign ownership ceilings include the following: private employee recruitment firms (25 percent) and advertising agencies (30 percent). The amended FIA includes 100 percent foreign ownership for enterprises with a minimum paid-in capital of USD 100,000 involved in advanced technology (as determined by the Department of Science and Technology), endorsed as start-ups or start-up enablers (pursuant to the Innovative Startup Act), and where a majority of direct hires (but not less than 15 workers) are local talent. The FINL, however, is limited in scope since it cannot change prior laws related to foreign investments, such as Constitutional provisions which bar investment in mass media, utilities, and natural resource extraction. In the telecommunications sector, the Philippines’ existing regulations limit competition and create barriers to entry. Telecommunications services in the Philippines are classified as either “basic” or “enhanced” value added. Internet service providers as value-added service providers cannot build their own fiber network for commercial purpose and are required to connect to franchised telecommunication facilities for their service. Only companies with a legislative franchise and public telecommunication entities are allowed to build transmission and switching facilities, offer a local exchange service (landline), and operate inter-exchange service (backbone) and an international gateway facility. Amendments to the Retail Trade Liberalization Act lowered the minimum investment requirement for foreign retailers from USD 2.5 million to USD 500,000 and per-store investment requirement from USD 830,000 to USD 200,000. It also removed the USD 250,000 minimum investment for retailers of luxury goods. In effect, retail trade enterprises with capital of less than USD 500,000 are still reserved for Filipinos. The Philippines allows up to full foreign ownership of insurance adjustment, lending, financing, or investment companies; however, foreign investors are prohibited from owning stock in such enterprises, unless the investor’s home country affords the same reciprocal rights to Filipino investors. Foreign banks are allowed to establish branches or own up to 100 percent of the voting stock of locally incorporated subsidiaries if they can meet certain requirements. However, a foreign bank cannot open more than six branches in the Philippines. A minimum of 60 percent of the total assets of the Philippine banking system should, at all times, remain controlled by majority Philippine-owned banks. Ownership caps apply to foreign non-bank investors, whose aggregate share should not exceed 40 percent of the total voting stock in a domestic commercial bank and 60 percent of the voting stock in a thrift/rural bank. The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) conducted a Trade Policy Review of the Philippines in March 2018 and an Investment Policy Review of the Philippines in 2016, respectively. The reviews are available online at the WTO website (https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp468_e.htm) and OECD website (http://www.oecd.org/daf/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-philippines-2016-9789264254510-en.htm). Business registration in the Philippines is cumbersome due to multiple agencies involved in the process. It takes an average of 33 days to start a business in Quezon City in Metro Manila, according to the 2020 World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report. The Duterte Administration’s landmark law, Republic Act No. 11032 or the Ease of Doing Business and Efficient Government Service Delivery Act of 2018 (better known as the “Ease of Doing Business Act”), sought to address the issues through the amendment of the Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007 (https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2018/05/28/republic-act-no-11032/). The Ease of Doing Business Act legislates standardized deadlines for government transactions, a single business application form, a one-stop-shop to issue or renew permits and licenses, automation of business permits processing, a zero-contact policy, and a central business databank. Implementing rules and regulations for the Act were signed in 2019 (http://arta.gov.ph/pages/IRR.html). The law also created an Anti-Red Tape Authority (ARTA) under the Office of the President to oversee national policy on anti-red tape issues and implement reforms to improve competitiveness rankings. ARTA also monitors compliance of agencies and issues notices to erring and non-compliant government employees and officials. ARTA is governed by a council that includes the Secretaries of Trade and Industry, Finance, Interior and Local Governments, and Information and Communications Technology. The Department of Trade and Industry serves as interim Secretariat for ARTA. Since passage of the 2018 Ease of Doing Business Act, the Philippines jumped 29 notches in the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report ranking to 95th, with the ARTA pushing for the full adoption of an online application system as an efficient alternative to on-site application procedures, issue online permits, and use e-signatures in the processing of government transactions. In the past year, ARTA has launched integrated business registration portals, a database of government services and service standards, and the country’s first Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) manual, in line with the Ease of Doing Business Act’s mandate for government agencies to undergo an RIA process before proposing new regulations. The Revised Corporation Code, a business-friendly amendment that encourages entrepreneurship, improves the ease of business and promotes good corporate governance. This new law amends part of the four-decade-old Corporation Code and allows for existing and future companies to hold a perpetual status of incorporation, compared to the previous 50-year term limit which required renewal. More importantly, the amendments allow for the formation of one-person corporations, providing more flexibility to conduct business; the old code required all incorporation to have at least five stockholders and provided less protection from liabilities. There are no restrictions on outward portfolio investments for Philippine residents, defined to include non-Filipino citizens who have been residing in the country for at least one year; foreign-controlled entities organized under Philippine laws; and branches, subsidiaries, or affiliates of foreign enterprises organized under foreign laws operating in the country. However, outward investments funded by foreign exchange purchases above USD 60 million, or its equivalent per investor per year, require prior notification to the Central Bank. 3. Legal Regime Proposed Philippine laws must undergo public comment and review. Government agencies are required to craft implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) through public consultation meetings within the government and with private sector representatives after laws are passed. New regulations must be published in newspapers or in the government’s online official gazette before taking effect (https://www.gov.ph/). The 2016 Executive Order on Freedom of Information (FOI) mandates full public disclosure and transparency of government operations, with certain exceptions. The public may request copies of official records through the FOI website (https://www.foi.gov.ph/). Government offices in the Executive Branch are expected to develop their respective agencies’ implementation guidelines. The order is criticized for its long list of exceptions, which render the policy less effective. Stakeholders report regulatory enforcement in the Philippines is generally weak, inconsistent, and unpredictable. Many U.S. investors describe business registration, customs, immigration, and visa procedures as burdensome and frustrating. Regulatory agencies are generally not statutorily independent but are attached to cabinet departments or the Office of the President and, therefore, are subject to political pressure. Issues in the judicial system also affect regulatory enforcement. The Philippines is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and provides notice of draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). (http://tbtims.wto.org/en/Notifications/Search?ProductsCoveredHSCodes=&ProductsCoveredICSCodes=&DoSearch=True&ExpandSearchMoreFields=False&NotifyingMember=Philippines&DocumentSymbol=&DistributionDateFrom=&DistributionDateTo=&SearchTerm=&ProductsCovered=&DescriptionOfContent=&CommentPeriod=&FinalDateForCommentsFrom=&FinalDateForCommentsTo=&ProposedDateOfAdoptionFrom=&ProposedDateOfAdoptionTo=&ProposedDateOfEntryIntoForceFrom=&ProposedDateOfEntryIntoForceTo=). The Philippines continues to fulfill required regulatory reforms under the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). The Philippines officially joined live operations of the ASEAN Single Window (ASW) on December 30, 2019. The country’s National Single Window (NSW) now issues an electronic Certificate of Origin via the TRADENET.gov.ph platform, and the NSW is connected to the ASW, allowing for customs efficiencies and better transparency. The Philippines passed the Customs Modernization and Tariff Act in 2016, which enables the country to largely comply with the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation. The Philippines has a mixed legal system of civil, common, Islamic, and customary laws, along with commercial and contractual laws. The Philippine judicial system is a separate and largely independent branch of the government, made up of the Supreme Court and lower courts. The Supreme Court is the highest court and sole constitutional body. More information is available on the court’s website (http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/). The lower courts consist of: (a) trial courts with limited jurisdictions (i.e., Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, etc.); (b) Regional Trial Courts (RTCs); (c) Shari’ah District Courts (Muslim courts); and (d) Courts of Appeal (appellate courts). Special courts include the Sandiganbayan (anti-graft court for public officials) and the Court of Tax Appeals. A total of 147 RTCs have been designated as Special Commercial Courts (SCC) to hear intellectual property (IP) cases, with four SCCs authorized to issue writs of search and seizure on IP violations, enforceable nationwide. In addition, nearly any case can be appealed to appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, increasing caseloads and further clogging the judicial system. Foreign investors describe the inefficiency and uncertainty of the judicial system as a significant disincentive to investment. Many investors decline to file dispute cases in court because of slow and complex litigation processes and corruption among some personnel. The courts are not considered impartial or fair. Stakeholders also report an inexperienced judiciary when confronted with complex issues such as technology, science, and intellectual property cases. The Philippines ranked 152nd out of 190 economies, and 18th among 25 economies from East Asia and the Pacific, in the World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business report in terms of enforcing contracts. The interagency Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB) is the ultimate governing body that oversees the administration and grant of tax incentives by investments promotions agencies (IPAs). Chaired by the Philippine Secretary of Finance, the FIRB also determines the target performance metrics used as conditions to avail of tax incentives and reviews, approves, and cancels incentives for investments above USD 20 million as endorsed by IPAs. The BOI regulates and promotes investment into the Philippines that caters to the domestic market. The Strategic Investment Priorities Plan (SIPP), administered by the BOI, identifies preferred economic activities approved by the President. Government agencies are encouraged to adopt policies and implement programs consistent with the SIPP. The Foreign Investment Act (FIA) requires the publishing of the Foreign Investment Negative List (FINL) that outlines sectors in which foreign investment is restricted. The FINL consists of two parts: Part A details sectors in which foreign equity participation is restricted by the Philippine Constitution or laws; and Part B lists areas in which foreign ownership is limited for reasons of national security, defense, public health, morals, and/or the protection of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The 1995 Special Economic Zone Act allows the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) to regulate and promote investments in export-oriented manufacturing and service facilities inside special economic zones, including the granting of fiscal and non-fiscal incentives for investments worth USD 20 million and below. Further information about investing in the Philippines is available at the BOI website (http://boi.gov.ph/) and PEZA website (http://www.peza.gov.ph). The 2015 Philippine competition law established the Philippine Competition Commission (PCC), an independent body mandated to resolve complaints on issues such as price fixing and bid rigging, to stop mergers that would restrict competition. More information is available on PCC website (http://phcc.gov.ph/#content). The Department of Justice (https://www.doj.gov.ph/) prosecutes criminal offenses involving violations of competition laws. Philippine law allows expropriation of private property for public use or in the interest of national welfare or defense in return for fair market value compensation. In the event of expropriation, foreign investors have the right to receive compensation in the currency in which the investment was originally made and to remit it at the equivalent exchange rate. However, the process of agreeing on a mutually acceptable price can be protracted in Philippine courts. No recent cases of expropriation involve U.S. companies in the Philippines. The 2016 Right-of-Way Act facilitates acquisition of right-of-way sites for national government infrastructure projects and outlines procedures in providing “just compensation” to owners of expropriated real properties to expedite implementation of government infrastructure programs. The 2010 Philippine bankruptcy and insolvency law provides a predictable framework for rehabilitation and liquidation of distressed companies, although an examination of some reported cases suggests uneven implementation. Rehabilitation may be initiated by debtors or creditors under court-supervised, pre-negotiated, or out-of-court proceedings. The law sets conditions for voluntary (debtor-initiated) and involuntary (creditor-initiated) liquidation. It also recognizes cross-border insolvency proceedings in accordance with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, allowing courts to recognize proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction involving a foreign entity with assets in the Philippines. Regional trial courts designated by the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over insolvency and bankruptcy cases. 6. Financial Sector The Philippines welcomes the entry of foreign portfolio investments, including in local and foreign-issued equities listed on the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE). Investments in certain publicly listed companies are subject to foreign ownership restrictions specified in the Constitution and other laws, but the recent amendments to the Public Service Act opened several economic sectors like transportation and telecommunications that were previously closed to 100 percent foreign ownership. Non-residents are allowed to issue bonds/notes or similar instruments in the domestic market with prior approval from the Central Bank; in certain cases, they may also obtain financing in Philippine pesos from authorized agent banks without prior Central Bank approval. Although growing, the PSE (with 281 listed firms as of March 2022) lags many of its neighbors in size, product offerings, and trading activity. Efforts are underway to deepen the equity market, including introduction of new instruments (e.g., real investment trusts) and amend listing rules for small and medium enterprises (SME). In 2021, companies raised a record $4.5 billion in capital in PSE, including eight initial public offerings. The growth in market participation of local retail investors also supported robust PSE trading activity over the past year amid a retreat by foreign investors. The securities market is growing, and while it remains dominated by government bills and bonds, corporate issuances continue to expand due to the favorable interest rate environment, regulatory reforms, and digital transition. Hostile takeovers are uncommon because most companies’ shares are not publicly listed and controlling interest tends to remain with a small group of parties. Cross-ownership and interlocking directorates among listed companies also decrease the likelihood of hostile takeovers. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP/Central Bank) does not restrict payments and transfers for current international transactions in accordance with the country’s acceptance of International Monetary Fund Article VIII obligations of September 1995. Purchase of foreign currencies for trade and non-trade obligations and/or remittances requires submission of a foreign exchange purchase application form if the foreign exchange is sourced from banks and/or their subsidiary/affiliate foreign exchange corporations falls within specified thresholds (USD 500,000 for individuals and USD 1 million for corporates/other entities). Purchases above the thresholds are also subject to the submission of minimum documentary requirements but do not require prior Central Bank approval. Meanwhile, a person may freely bring in or carry out foreign currencies up to USD 10,000; more than this threshold requires submission of a foreign currency declaration form. Credit is generally granted on market terms and foreign investors are able to obtain credit from the liquid domestic market. Some laws require financial institutions to set aside loans for preferred sectors such as agriculture, agrarian reform, and MSMEs. Notwithstanding, bank loans to these sectors remain constrained; for example, MSMEs loans only had a 4.7 percent share of the total banking system loans as of end-June and had been declining since 2015, despite comprising 99 percent of domestic firms. The government has implemented measures to promote lending to preferred sectors at competitive rates, including the establishment of a centralized credit information system, enactment of the 2018 Personal Property Security Law allowing the use of non-traditional collaterals (e.g., movable assets like machinery and equipment and inventories), and the temporary use of MSME loans as commercial banks’ alternative compliance with the reserve requirements against deposit liabilities and substitutes. The government also established the Philippine Guarantee Corporation in 2018 to expand development financing by extending credit guarantees to priority sectors, including MSMEs. The BSP is a highly respected institution that oversees a stable banking system. It has pursued regulatory reforms promoting good governance and aligning risk management regulations with international standards. The Philippines’ banking system sustained its solid footing amid the pandemic, with capital adequacy ratios well above the Bank for International Settlements’ eight percent minimum threshold and the BSP’s 10 percent regulatory requirement. Loan quality remained manageable, with a non-performing loan ratio of 4.0 percent as of end-2021. High liquidity coverage ratio (197.6 percent) and net stable funding ratio (143.6 percent) suggest that banks can meet funding requirements during short and medium term liquidity shocks. Commercial banks constitute more than 93 percent of the total assets of the Philippine banking industry. As of September 2021, the five largest commercial banks represented 60 percent of the total resources of the commercial banking sector. The banking system was liberalized in 2014, allowing the full control of domestic lenders by non-residents and lifting the limits to the number of foreign banks that can operate in the country, subject to central bank prudential regulations. Twenty-six of the 45 universal and commercial banks operating in the country are foreign branches and subsidiaries, including three U.S. banks (Citibank, Bank of America, and JP Morgan Chase). Citibank sold its consumer banking unit to a local bank in 2021, with the transition expected to be completed in 2022. Despite the adequate number of operational banks, 15 percent of cities and municipalities in the Philippines were still without banking presence as of end-June 2021 and 4.4 percent were without any financial access point. The BSP nonetheless has made significant progress in expanding financial inclusion, with 53 percent of adults having bank accounts (from 34 percent in 2019) as of end-June 2021 – closer to its 70 percent target by 2023. Recent payment system reforms through the BSP’s National Retail Payment System have also increased individuals and enterprises’ access to e-wallet accounts, allowing them to do financial transactions without formal bank accounts, increasing the efficiency of financial transactions in the country. Foreign residents and non-residents may open foreign and local currency bank accounts. Although non-residents may open local currency deposit accounts, they are limited to the funding sources specified under Central Bank regulations. Should non-residents decide to convert to foreign currency their local deposits, sales of foreign currencies are limited up to the local currency balance. Non-residents’ foreign currency accounts cannot be funded from foreign exchange purchases from banks and banks’ subsidiary/affiliate foreign exchange corporations. The Philippines does not presently have sovereign wealth funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises, known in the Philippines as government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC), are predominantly in the finance, power, transport, infrastructure, communications, land and water resources, social services, housing, and support services sectors. The Governance Commission for GOCC (GCG) further reduced the number of GOCCs to 118 in 2020 (excluding water districts), from 133 the prior year; a list is available on their website (https://gcg.gov.ph). The government corporate sector has combined assets of USD 150 billion and liability of USD 103 billion (or net assets/equity worth about USD 46 billion) as of end-2020. Using adjusted comprehensive income (i.e., without subsidies, unrealized gains, etc.), the GOCC sector’s income declined by 55 percent to USD 1.1 billion in 2020, the lowest since 2015. GOCCs are required to remit at least 50 percent of their annual net earnings (e.g., cash, stock, or property dividends) to the national government. Competition-related concerns, arising from conflicting mandates for selected GOCCs, exist in the transportation sector. For example, both the Philippine Ports Authority and the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines have both commercial and regulatory mandates. Private and state-owned enterprises generally compete equally. The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) is the only agency, with limited exceptions, allowed to provide coverage for the government’s insurance risks and interests, including those in build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects and privatized government corporations. Since the national government acts as the main guarantor of loans, stakeholders report GOCCs often have an advantage in obtaining financing from government financial institutions and private banks. Most GOCCs are not statutorily independent, thus could potentially be subject to political interference. The Philippines is not an OECD member country. The 2011 GOCC Governance Act addresses problems experienced by GOCCs, including poor financial performance, weak governance structures, and unauthorized allowances. The law allows unrestricted access to GOCC account books and requires strict compliance with accounting and financial disclosure standards; establishes the power to privatize, abolish, or restructure GOCCs without legislative action; and sets performance standards and limits on compensation and allowances. The GCG formulates and implements GOCC policies. GOCC board members are limited to one-year terms and subject to reappointment based on a performance rating set by GCG, with final approval by the Philippine President. The Philippine Government’s privatization program is managed by the Privatization and Management Office (PMO) under the Department of Finance. The privatization of government assets undergoes a public bidding process. Apart from restrictions stipulated in FINL, no regulations discriminate against foreign buyers, and the bidding process appears to be transparent. The PMO is currently reviewing the privatization of government-owned mining assets as part of the Philippine government’s revenue-generating measures adopted during the pandemic. Additional information is available on the PMO website (http://www.pmo.gov.ph/ ). 10. Political and Security Environment Terrorist groups and criminal gangs operate around the country. The Department of State publishes a consular information sheet and advises all Americans living in or visiting the Philippines to review the information periodically. A travel advisory is in place for those U.S. citizens considering travel to the Philippines. Terrorist groups, including the Islamic State East Asia (IS-EA) and its affiliate Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Maute Group, Ansar al-Khalifa Philippines (AKP), the communist insurgent group the New People’s Army, and elements of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), periodically attack civilian targets, kidnap civilians – including foreigners – for ransom, and engage in armed attacks against government security forces. These groups have mostly carried out their activities in the western and central regions of Mindanao, including the Sulu Archipelago and Sulu Sea. Groups affiliated with IS-EA continued efforts to recover from battlefield losses, recruiting and training new members, and staging suicide bombings and attacks with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and small arms that targeted security forces and civilians. The Philippines’ most significant human rights problems are killings allegedly undertaken by vigilantes, security forces, and insurgents; cases of apparent governmental disregard for human rights and due process; official corruption; shrinking civic spaces; and a weak and overburdened criminal justice system notable for slow court procedures, weak prosecutions, and poor cooperation between police and investigators. In 2021, the Philippines continued to see red-tagging (the act of labelling, branding, naming, and accusing individuals or organizations of being left-leaning, subversives, communists, or terrorists that is used as a strategy by state agents against those perceived to be “threats” or “enemies of the State”), arrests, and killings of human rights defenders and members of the media. President Duterte’s administration continued its nationwide campaign against illegal drugs, led primarily by the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), which continues to receive worldwide attention for its harsh tactics. In 2021, the government retained its renewed focus on antiterrorism with a particular emphasis on communist insurgents. In addition to Philippine military and police actions against the insurgents, the Philippine government also pressured political groups and activists – accusing them of links to the NPA, often without evidence. The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020, signed into law on July 3, intends to prevent, prohibit, and penalize terrorism in the country, although critics question whether law enforcement and prosecutors might be able to use the law to punish political opponents and endanger human rights. Following the passage of the Antiterrorism Act of 2020, various human rights groups and private individuals filed petitions questioning the constitutionality of the act. On December 9, the Supreme Court announced its ruling that only two specific provisions of the bill were unconstitutional: first, making dissent or protest a crime if such act had an intent to cause harm; and second, allowing the Anti-terrorism Council to designate someone a terrorist based solely off UN Security Council designation. The petitioners and other human rights groups said, however, that the ruling against the two provisions still does not provide protection to the Filipino people. The upcoming May 2022 elections could impact the political and security environment in the country, given the Philippines’ history of election-related violence. The Philippine police and military keep a close watch on certain areas they classify as “election hotspots.” Timor-Leste Executive Summary The Government of Timor-Leste has welcomed foreign-investment and business-development opportunities since gaining independence in 2002. In practice the investment climate continues to be hampered by inadequate regulatory mechanisms, corruption, insufficient personnel capacity, and deficient infrastructure. The government is working to address these issues but limited human capacity and a time-consuming bureaucratic/legislative system has made progress on reform slow. Initially plagued by conflict and turmoil after independence, Timor-Leste has emerged as a peaceful and stable democracy. Peaceful changes of government and freely contested elections, including a 2022 presidential election that drew 16 candidates, demonstrated an active political climate with competing views for how to best develop an economy largely dependent on public-sector spending for growth. Timor-Leste’s desire to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) provides incentive to implement fiscal and economic reforms to meet regional and international norms. After an 8.6% economic contraction in 2020, Timor-Leste’s economy rebounded slightly in 2021, growing by 1.8%. Timor-Leste’s private sector is weak and primarily dependent on government contracts, and the government’s ability to regulate industry remains limited. The agriculture sector supplied less than 10% of the country’s total GDP. Oil and gas production represents the largest share of GDP and has attracted the most foreign investment, but the producing fields are depleting, and the Government of Timor-Leste (GOTL) continues to seek partners to develop onshore and offshore blocks. The GOTL is focused on development of the Greater Sunrise offshore natural gas reserves in which the GOTL controls a majority share of the joint venture. The GOTL also wants to develop its own domestic petroleum refinery capabilities on its south coast, which it seeks partners to develop, even as the international community moves towards decarbonization and a clean energy transition. The government has said it would like additional investment in the country’s southern coast, and it maintains Special Economic Zones in Oecusse and Atauro Island. Agriculture is the largest sector of the economy by employment but has been historically undeveloped and is dominated by subsistence farming. The United States was instrumental in fostering the coffee industry in Timor-Leste, and over the last decade coffee has been the third largest contributor to GDP. Focused efforts to develop other crops could potentially yield similar returns. Timor-Leste has not developed green development policies that impact the investment climate. The government supports responsible business conduct and protections for labor rights, although it lacks institutional capacity to ensure compliance. In practice, labor and human rights concerns do not pose significant risks to doing business responsibly. Beginning in March 2020, the government declared a State of Emergency implementing measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, including closing its borders, suspending commercial passenger flights, and sometimes enforcing internal travel restrictions. These measures, renewed for most of 2020-2021 every 30 days, hampered progress on development projects, including those involving foreign investments. In November 2021, the government passed amendments to public health laws that enabled the lifting of the SOE. U.S. assistance to Timor-Leste has contributed to improvements in the customs system and is helping to strengthen the legal regime for cybercrime. U.S. assistance also promotes diversification of Timor-Leste’s economy, support for private-sector, health and agricultural development, strengthening of democratic institutions, and reinforcing a commercial law framework. USAID support for public-private partnerships in the tourism sector and improving agriculture value chains contributes to strengthening the non-oil sector. The Commerce Department’s Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP) provides training opportunities for Timorese government officials in key legal and regulatory agencies to improve the business environment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 82 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $0 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.html#660 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 1,990 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Timor-Leste welcomes and strives to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The government has made considerable effort to establish effective legislative, executive, and judicial institutions, draft laws and regulations, and build personnel capacity. In 2011, parliament unanimously approved the government’s National Strategic Development Plan. The plan directs petroleum revenues to support non-petroleum economic development and help the country move to become a middle-income country by 2030. Despite its openness to FDI and efforts to improve the enabling environment, Timor-Leste’s legal, regulatory, and human capacity remain weak and continue to present challenges for investors. TradeInvest Timor-Leste, I.P. is Timor-Leste’s investment and export promotion agency. The organization’s goal is to facilitate and support potential investors in the country and assist foreign companies in identifying projects among the limited business opportunities emerging in Timor-Leste. TradeInvest is a one-stop-shop that provides services such as licensing, taxes, investment opportunities, permits, tariffs, and educating importers on correct procedures and policies. TradeInvest also provides post-investment aftercare services. The agency’s official website is www.tradeinvest.tl . There are no laws or practices in the country that U.S. investors allege discriminate against foreign investors by prohibiting, limiting, or conditioning foreign investment in a sector of the economy. However, under the constitution, only citizens may own land. Timor-Leste enacted laws in 2017 and 2018 to facilitate and protect foreign private investment by adhering to international agreements and reducing bureaucratic hurdles. Private Investment Law No. 15/2017 states that foreigners can be granted the right to private property for investment and reinvestment projects subject to the limits set out in the Constitution and in legislation on land and commercial companies. The government views building international ties as part of its effort to increase foreign direct investment opportunities. Timor-Leste is applying for full membership to ASEAN and served as President of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries from 2014-2016. (A Timorese citizen has served as Executive Secretary of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries since July 2021.) Timor-Leste is also pursuing WTO accession. It is also pursuing trilateral economic cooperation opportunities with Indonesia and Australia to boost cross-country investment. The government’s Strategic Development Plan highlights key investment areas to include oil and gas, forestry and livestock, fisheries, tourism, energy, infrastructure, civil construction, coffee, spices, and transportation. In an April 2021 speech, Timor-Leste’s Ambassador to the United States also highlighted many of these sectors. The government, through its autonomous agency, the National Petroleum and Minerals Authority (ANPM), contracts with foreign firms to explore and develop offshore oil and gas deposits. Pre-qualification for Timor-Leste’s second licensing round of 11 onshore and 7 offshore blocks closed on January 14, 2022. Thirteen companies submitted bid documents. Bid results were announced April 22, 2022 with five blocks awarded. ANPM has also hosted annual Oil, Gas, and Energy Summits for four years to attract international investors to the oil and gas industry in Timor-Leste, collectively drawing virtual and in-person attendance from over 350 participants from nearly 225 companies. The 2022 summit was held in Dili in June. The government deposits oil and gas revenues into a sovereign petroleum fund. Investment income represents the majority of fund income with revenues from oil and gas currently a relatively small share of income. Strong recovery of global oil prices in 2021, however, reaching historic highs in early 2022 has bolstered revenue from depleting production. The fund value has experienced considerable fluctuation as the COVID-19 pandemic impacted global financial markets. Government expenditures, including efforts to combat COVID-19, rely heavily on the fund. Business and individual tax collections comprise less than 10% of GOTL operating revenues. Government spending, coffee exports, subsistence agriculture, remittances from workers abroad, and small-scale retail activities are the other sources of employment and economic drivers. In August 2019, Australia and Timor-Leste ratified a Maritime Boundary Treaty under the UN Convention on Law of the Sea, which defined the exclusive economic zone borders between the two countries, removing development hurdles for both the Greater Sunrise and Buffalo offshore projects, and formalized the governance structure and tax sharing arrangement between the two countries. In 2018 the Timor-Leste government bought out the majority rights of several companies involved in a consortium to develop the Greater Sunrise oil and gas reserve. The government has stated its intention to build oil and gas refineries and significant associated infrastructure on its south coast to process the offshore reserves. Due to the cost of these infrastructure projects, the government may seek investment partners for all or some of them. Timorese authorities are intent on expanding private sector economic activities to provide employment for new labor market entrants. The country has one of the world’s most rapidly growing populations, with three-fourths of the population under 35 years of age and a birth rate around five per adult female. The population as of June 2021 was approximately 1.36 million. By law, foreign investors may invest in any sector other than postal services, public communications, transportation, protected natural areas, funeral services, and weapons production and distribution, as these are specifically reserved for the state. Investors are also prohibited from investing in sectors otherwise restricted by law. However, in practice, foreign companies have significant holdings in reserved sectors. For example, Brazilian, Indonesian, Vietnamese, and Chinese investors control large shares of the country’s three telecommunications providers. Section 54 of Timor-Leste’s constitution grants the right of land ownership exclusively to Timorese nationals, either individuals or corporate entities; however, foreigners may conclude long-term (up to 50-year) leases. Investors who wish to lease property must often sort through competing claims from the Portuguese colonial administration, the Indonesian occupation era, and the post-independence period. Resolution may be delayed for years. TradeInvest reviews foreign investment applications which are then presented to the Private Investment Commission for further study and evaluation. The Executive Director of TradeInvest chairs the Private Investment Commission, which is composed of directors general or equivalent from the relevant government ministries in the areas of taxation, customs, land and properties, economic activities of licensing, professional training, labor, immigration, building and housing, territorial planning, and the environment. Other ad-hoc members may also be called upon to be present during the meeting. Prospective investments are reviewed for their economic cost and benefits as well as for the capacity of the investor. The Private Investment Commission evaluates applications for foreign investment permits, verifying the following: Compliance of the application with requirements established in the National Development Plan, in the Procedural Regulation for Foreign Investment and other applicable legislation. Suitability, capacity, experience, and availability of financial resources necessary for implementation and operation of the proposed investment enterprise. Capacity, experience, and business or technical characteristics of the promoter or its managers in order to guarantee implementation and operation of the enterprise. Positive operational balance of the business, according to the project proposal. Environmental, infrastructural, and social implications which could condition the viability of the enterprise or that can result from its implementation. Guaranteeing availability of necessary land for installation and functioning of the investment enterprise. Ensuring consistency of the expected new jobs to be created in the short and medium term. Establishing interconnection with other economic sectors. The documents required for investments include: TradeInvest application form Descriptive project summary (project briefs, technical plans) Identification of promoters, professional CV/Firm Corporate Capability Bank credentials (bank statement, bank reference) Business plan Documents of Land Ownership Lot location Budget for construction/remodeling Environmental Impact Assessment (Environmental Licensing) Criminal Records (Original/Certified copy) TradeInvest can issue a certificate of investment for projects approved by the Private Investment Commission valued at less than $20 million. Investments of more than $20 million or that require more than 5 hectares of state land for tourism or 100 hectares of state land for agriculture, livestock, or forestry require approval from the Council of Ministers. Investors can also request a Special Investment Agreement, through TradeInvest, prior to submitting the project to the Council of Ministers for approval. The TradeInvest website reports that application fees are $500 for national investors and $2,000 for international investors. TradeInvest should issue investment decisions within 30 days. Regulatory actions needing approval from the Council of Ministers may require additional time to resolve. After nearly a decade, the government granted a foreign company the rights to invest an initial $100 million to develop 16 hectares into an upscale resort just west of the capital in March 2020. In January 2022, the Council of Ministers approved a Special Investment Agreement (SIA) for the development that had been pending since 2010. Other multi-million-dollar large-scale investments, including the Tibar Port and Baucau cement plant, might directly employ hundreds of Timorese but are yet to open and have been delayed by COVID-19 and opaque government processes. Timor-Leste has not yet conducted any investment policy reviews through OECD, WTO, or UNCTAD. Timor-Leste was accepted as an observer to the WTO in 2016, and its Working Party for accession to the WTO was established in December 2016 and held its first meeting in October 2020. In May of 2022, the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs and WTO Accession Chief Negotiator led a large government delegation in bilateral meetings with WTO members, the WTO Secretariat and development partners in Geneva. Timor-Leste’s overall political stability has allowed some businesses to grow; political impasses, however, during which the country operated without state budgets, reduced opportunities for government contracts in 2017, 2018, and 2020. The political impasses affected many areas of the economy, including commerce, public services, and larger public works projects. The government passed its 2021 and 2022 state budgets on time in December prior to the start of the respective fiscal year (January – December). In March 2020, the government enacted a State of Emergency (SOE) to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and restricted many “non-essential” commercial enterprises. In November 2021, the government passed amendments to the Health Law that allowed it to implement some of the public health measures previously only possible under an SOE. The last SOE expired on November 28, 2021. In August 2020, the government released an economic recovery plan to promote Timor-Leste’s post-COVID-19 economic recovery, including short-, medium-, and long-term interventions. The plan includes support to the private sector as well as to households and local producers. Although the government is committed to improving its services in critical sectors, challenges remain: bureaucratic inefficiency, infrastructure bottlenecks, the absence of real property and information communications technology (ICT) laws and other essential legislation, a lack of commercial courts, uncertain implementation of government procedures, significant deficiencies in human capacity, conflicts of interest, and corruption are some of the most notable challenges. Timor-Leste has not been the subject of investment policy reviews by domestic or third country civil society groups. Timor-Leste’s Business Verification and Registration Service office (SERVE) processes business registration and licensing in the country. SERVE was created in 2013 as one-stop-shop to make business registration faster and easier. The agency’s website is http://www.serve.gov.tl . Business registration and application processes require an in-person visit to SERVE’s office. Getting a business license takes between one and five days; however, actual timelines may be greater. For companies involved in civil construction, food processing, or pharmaceutical industries, the agency works closely with relevant ministries, particularly the Ministry of Tourism, Commerce, and Industry, to facilitate business licenses, although since 2017 all registration requirements have been centralized with SERVE. The government does not promote or incentivize outward investment, nor does it restrict it. 3. Legal Regime Timor-Leste’s regulatory system is still in formative stages. Existing tax, labor, environment, health and safety, and other laws and policies do not present obvious impediments to investment. Government policies and practices generally are transparent. The Ministry of Finance launched an online Procurement Portal in 2011, intended to increase transparency by providing equal access to information on government tenders and procurement contracts. However, updates are inconsistent and not all tenders appear to be included in the site. Reports say when tenders are posted, it is only for a few days and winners may be pre-selected. The Audit Chamber, under the Court of Appeals, is responsible for reviewing government procurements above $5 million. In 2018 and 2019, the Ministry of Finance launched the ASYCUDA system in APORTIL, the organization managing international port, and International Airport of Nicolao Lobato customs, as part of the fiscal reform process with the aim of improving efficiency, customer service, and transparency. The government hopes to facilitate trade by implementing a modern and reliable system to track and manage imports and exports. USAID’s Customs Reform Project helped Timor-Leste’s Customs Authority to streamline processes, improve government-wide integration, and align with laws and international standards. The project also established a National Customs Hotline for reporting illegal activities and an online Customs Trade portal providing the public with trade-related information, improving transparency for import/export procedures. In May 2021, Timor-Leste’s Customs Authority launched a Customs Hotline, allowing anyone to anonymously report by phone or online possible customs infractions. This and similar international programming help the GOTL reduce trade costs by adopting best-practice customs clearance and transit procedures. In addition, SERVE issues no-cost business licenses for what it determines to be low-risk undertakings. High- and medium-risk business licenses may incur application fees. Initial and renewal business license are generally valid for 12 months. SERVE also supports the private sector’s compliance with mandatory social security contribution laws. Parliament and parliamentary committees regularly hold hearings and debates on proposed laws. For certain major legislation, the government holds limited public consultations or solicits public comment. Since March 2020, the GOTL has reduced public consultations due to COVID-19 protocols. There is no legal requirement to publish draft regulations prior to enactment. Relevant functional agencies generally are responsible for formulating regulations, which is then presented by the parent Ministry for consideration and approval by the Council of Ministers. Regulations are adopted and implemented at the national level; there are no sub-national levels of regulation. Most oversight occurs in the capital by relevant ministries, although some agencies have staff at the district level that monitor compliance. Legislation and regulations are published in the national journal (Jornal da República de Timor-Leste, www.mj.gove.tl/jornal/ ), in full text, to signify entry into force, although applicable information may be tardily printed or difficult to find. Public finances and debt obligations are published and available to the public. Financial reports available through internet-based access are not consistently updated, but they are generally made available upon request. Government encourages businesses to engage in good corporate social responsibility practices, although this effort is only codified in the oil and gas sector. The Petroleum Act of 2005 includes a local content regulation that requires applicants for production sharing contracts to include proposals for environmental protection, health and safety, and training and preferential employment of Timor-Leste nationals. Reforms currently underway in Timor-Leste’s fiscal and economic systems aim to bring the country into compliance with ASEAN standards. The Timor-Leste ASEAN Mobilization Plan (TLAMP) aims to bring all the relevant line ministries into compliance with ASEAN economic best practices. Timor-Leste was accepted as an observer to the WTO in 2016, and its Working Party for accession was established in December 2016. The first meeting of the Working Party was held in October 2020. A Timor-Leste government delegation visited Geneva in May 2022 for bilateral meetings with WTO members and the WTO Secretariat and participated in roundtable discussions on the country’s WTO accession. The Portuguese legal system heavily influences Timor-Leste’s civil law system. Timor-Leste applies Indonesian law, which was in force until August 1999, as a subsidiary source of law for issues not yet addressed in Timorese legislation. The country does not have a written commercial code. The judicial system operates independently of the executive but is evolving and short staffed. Regulations and enforcement actions can be appealed to the court system. The Office of the Prosecutor General continues to accumulate experience and capacity to establish and implement case management and other essential systems. Timor-Leste has courts of first instance and a court of appeal. However, courts operate in only four of the country’s thirteen districts, and customary law governs most cases at the local level. Additional courts outlined in the Constitution and law, such as specialized tax courts, have not yet been established. Waiting times to bring a case before a judge remain long, and cases may be unresolved for years. Conciliation and arbitration judicial reforms to reduce pending caseloads are preliminary. In practice, the system generally prioritizes criminal cases. The Timorese legal system is based on a mix of Indonesian laws and regulations, acts passed by the United Nations Transitional Administration, and post-independence Timorese legislation modeled on Portuguese civil law. The country is reviewing its legislation to harmonize the system but has yet to undergo a comprehensive overhaul of the overlapping yet disparate systems. Timor-Leste has two official languages (Tetum and Portuguese) and two working languages (Indonesian and English); all new legislation is enacted in Portuguese and is based on the civil law tradition, though is supposed to be published in Tetum as well. The Private Investment Law (Law No. 15/2017) specifies the conditions and incentives for both domestic and foreign investment and guarantees full equality before the law for international investors. Other major laws affecting incoming foreign investment include the Companies Code of 2004, the Commercial Registration Code, and the Taxation Act of 2008. The Government of Timor-Leste announced the establishment of TradeInvest, a one-stop-shop for investment and export promotion in 2015 (https://www.tradeinvest.tl). The agency has the responsibility to promote Timorese exports and investment opportunities in the country and to encourage domestic entrepreneurship. There are ongoing fiscal reform efforts designed to align Timorese legislation and regulation with best practices in ASEAN (under the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement) and under the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Timor-Leste does not have a competition or anti-trust law. Both Article 54 of the Constitution and the Private Investment Law permit the expropriation or requisition of private property in the public interest only if just proper compensation is paid to the investor. The Private Investment Law calls for the equal treatment of foreign and national investors in expropriation cases and prohibits nationalization policies or land policies that deliberately target the property of investors. The government relocated significant numbers of residents for large development projects in Oecusse and Suai. Two known private investments in Dili have negotiated with the government to remove residents as part of the investment agreement. A large-scale hospitality development close to the capital is a cautionary example of unregistered tenets establishing domiciles on claimed property of a private investor and demanding compensation from the corporation or government before vacating, and all parties are outwardly refusing to relocate, compensate, or compromise. The government has not used methods that could be considered indirect expropriation. The government has at times been accused of not offering fair market value as compensation for expropriations, or for not following due process for evictions of squatters on government or disputed land. The Council of Ministers approved an insolvency law in March 2017, but parliament did not act on the law. In the most recent publication (2020), the World Bank ranked the country 168 of 190 in resolving insolvency with a score of zero reflecting no history of recovery. 6. Financial Sector Timor-Leste does not have a stock market. There is limited access to credit and liquidity to facilitate investment. There are no known restrictions on portfolio investment. As of 2019 only 54% of Timorese adults were depositors with commercial banks, and only 4% held bank loans. There are five commercial banks operating in Timor-Leste: ANZ of Australia, Mandiri of Indonesia, BRI of Indonesia, BNU of Portugal, and a subsidized National Commercial Bank of Timor-Leste. The banking system was estimated to hold $734 million in net assets in 2021. All banks in Timor-Leste are subject to prudential measures and regulation by the Central Bank. Since most of the country’s operating banks are branches of foreign banks, the system is relatively resistant to domestic economic shocks. Foreign citizens must have a tax identification number demonstrating residency in Timor-Leste to maintain an individual bank account. According to World Bank data, lending to the private sector totaled approximately $290 million in 2020. The overall non-performing loan rate was 5.1% in 2020. The Central Bank of Timor-Leste is the country’s monetary authority. It supervises the activities of commercial banks, money transfer operators, currency exchange offices, insurance companies, and other deposit-taking corporations, as well as serving as the operational manager of the country’s sovereign wealth Petroleum Fund. The bank also operates as the clearing house for interbank payments and undertakes bank operations for the government and Timor-Leste’s public administration. Established in 2005, the Petroleum Fund is Timor-Leste’s sovereign wealth fund. The Minister of Finance is responsible for its overall management and investment strategy. The Central Bank of Timor-Leste is responsible for its operational management, although the Minister of Finance has the authority to select a different operational manager. By law, all petroleum and related revenues must be paid into the Fund, with the balance of the Fund invested in international financial markets for the benefit of present and future generations of Timor-Leste’s citizens. The Fund’s receipts are invested in approximately 40 percent equities and 60 percent bonds, but 2021 changes to the Petroleum Fund Law permit the Fund to invest up to 50 percent in equities. The Petroleum Fund publishes monthly, quarterly, and annual reports online. Laws governing the Fund provide that it must maintain an independent auditor, which shall be an internationally recognized accounting firm. The Petroleum Fund meets the 24 generally accepted principles and practices for sovereign wealth funds, commonly referred to as the “Santiago Principles.” Timor-Leste is a full member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. The Petroleum Fund is the primary source of funding for the government budget, with a ceiling on annual withdrawals set by law at 3 percent of Timor-Leste’s total petroleum wealth (defined as the current Petroleum Fund balance plus the net present value of future petroleum receipts). Recent budgets and supplementals have exceeded the annual ceiling with parliamentary approval. However, budgets are rarely fully executed, regularly returning up to one-third of their value to government coffers. The Petroleum Activities Law no 13/2005, article 22, limits the government to investing 20 percent of the fund in petroleum activities. The government amended the law in 2019 to allow 5% of the Petroleum Fund to be invested in Timor Gas and Petroleum (Timor GAP), the national oil company, while reducing the percentage of the Fund held in stocks from 40% to 35%. Timor GAP must use the investment to exploit known oil and gas fields, which are commercially competitive and will contribute to development and diversification of the national economy. Timor GAP shall pay 4.5% interest on the investment and comply with reporting requirements. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Timorese government operates a small number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across various sectors, including broadcasting, aviation, oil and gas, pharmaceuticals, and telecommunications. There is no published list of SOEs. The Government of Timor-Leste owns 20.6 percent of Timor Telecom -a telecommunications provider- while privately-owned Telecommunicators Públicas de Timor (TPT) owns 54 percent. In 2013, two private foreign companies began telecommunications operations, ending Timor Telecom’s monopoly of the fixed and mobile network. In exchange for the end of the monopoly, Timor Telecom acquired certain equipment procured by the government and will retain no-cost usage rights of some government-owned infrastructure and equipment until 2062. In mid-2011, the government established Timor GAP, E.P., a 100-percent state-owned petroleum company intended to partner with international firms in exploration and development of Timor-Leste’s petroleum resources and to provide downstream petroleum services. Timor GAP is supervised by the Minister of Petroleum but is governed by an independent Board of Directors. Firms that partner with Timor GAP will receive preferential treatment in tenders for petroleum projects. In November 2008, the Timorese government transformed Timor-Leste’s Public Broadcasting Service, Radio Televisão de Timor-Leste (RTTL), into a state-owned enterprise known as RTTL. The government owns RTTL under the supervision of the State Secretary of Social Communication and governed by an independent Board of Directors. In 2016, the government established an official news agency, TATOLI. In November 2005 (Government Decree No.8/2005), the government established ANATL, E.P., a state-owned company to administer the domestic airports in all aspects, including air navigation. The government also created SAMES, E.P. in April 2004 (Government Decree No. 2/2004) – a public enterprise that imports, stores, and distributes medicines and medical products and equipment. In April 2015, the government converted SAMES, E.P. into SAMES, I.P., an autonomous institution, which operates under the tutelage and supervision of the Ministry of Health. In 2020, the government approved two decree laws to convert the public electricity utility known as the Department of National Electricity to Public Enterprise (EDTL, E.P) into a state-owned enterprise in the hope it will deliver better services to the customer and improve its cost recovery. Timor-Leste loses nearly half of its generated power by inefficient distribution infrastructure and consumer theft, costing the government millions annually. In 2020, the government through Decree Law no. 41/2020 established Bee Timor-Leste Empressa Publica (BTL, E.P.) as a state-owned public water utility company. Several autonomous government agencies are active in the economy: The Dili Port Authority (APORTIL), Timor-Leste’s Agency for Information and Communication Technology (TIC Timor), the National Electrical Authority (ANE), and the National Aviation Authority (AACTL) are four such agencies. Other autonomous and self-funded institution includes the National Petroleum and Mineral Authority (ANPM), which regulates the oil and gas sector. Line ministers or the prime minister’s office supervise SOEs, but independent boards of directors administer them. Senior management reports directly to government-appointed boards of directors. Line ministers are responsible for nominating or dismissing the president of the board of directors with approval from the Council of Ministers Timor-Leste does not have a formalized privatization program. 10. Political and Security Environment Timor-Leste emerged from a history of colonialism, occupation, and civil strife to the period of relative domestic calm that it has enjoyed for more than a decade. After twenty-four years of occupation by Indonesia, under an agreement between the United Nations, former colonial power Portugal, and Indonesia, a popular consultation was held on August 30, 1999, to allow the Timorese to vote on whether to remain part of Indonesia or to become independent. Seventy-nine percent of Timor-Leste voters rejected Indonesia’s governance proposal, effectively putting Timor-Leste on a path to independence. Timorese militias opposed to the decision organized and, supported by the Indonesian military, commenced a campaign of retribution. Approximately 1,300 Timorese were killed and as many as 300,000 people were forcibly relocated into West Timor as refugees. The majority of the country’s infrastructure, including homes, irrigation systems, water supply systems, and schools, and nearly 100 percent of the country’s electrical grid were destroyed. On September 20, 1999, at the request of the Timorese government, Australia led a deployment of peacekeeping troops (the International Force for East Timor, INTERFET), which ended the violence. After almost three years of UN administration, Timor-Leste became a fully independent republic with a parliamentary form of government on May 20, 2002. UN peacekeepers departed in 2005 leaving a special political mission in its stead. In 2006, however, civil order collapsed due to domestic political struggles, which led to armed conflict between the police and military. The government of Timor-Leste urgently requested police and military assistance from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Portugal. In August 2006, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1704, creating the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) to assist in restoring stability, rebuilding the security sector institutions, supporting the Government of Timor-Leste to conduct the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections, and achieving accountability for crimes against humanity and atrocities committed in 1999. An Australian-led International Stabilization Force (ISF) supported UNMIT’s mission. Timor-Leste held free, fair, and largely peaceful presidential and parliamentary elections in 2007. Nobel Peace Prize Laureate José Ramos-Horta assumed the presidency, and former guerilla leader and outgoing president Xanana Gusmão became prime minister. National elections for president and parliament in 2012 were peaceful, free, and fair. UNMIT and the ISF departed from Timor-Leste at the end of 2012. Following free, fair, and peaceful parliamentary elections in July 2017, Mari bin Amude Alkatiri became prime minister of a two-party coalition government. In a March 2017 presidential election, also judged as free and fair, voters elected Francisco Lu Olo Guterres. In contrast with previous years, elections proceeded without extensive support from the international community. Security forces maintained public order with no reported incidents of excessive use of force. Alkatiri’s government was not able to pass its program or budget. Early parliamentary elections in May 2018 were considered fair and transparent, with 81% voter turnout. In January 2020, the coalition government rejected its own budget in protest of ongoing ministerial vacancies, and the prime minister submitted his resignation to the president. The prime minister subsequently withdrew the request to resign and assumed leadership of the country’s COVID-19 response. The president maintains the authority to determine whether the country will hold early elections to resolve a political impasse or whether the political parties in parliament should form a new government. Following changes in the ruling coalition membership, the Eighth Constitutional Government continues. After political instability in the governing coalition delayed passage of the 2020 budget by ten months, the 2021 and 2022 budgets were successfully passed on time. In April 2021, the government passed a budget amendment responding to the continuing COVID-19 pandemic and natural disasters, including severe flooding in Dili. Two rounds of presidential elections in March and April 2022 were peaceful, free, and fair, with over 75% voter turnout. Occasional factional political violence can temporarily impact local retail businesses. There have been no instances in the past ten years of damage to projects or installations. Togo Executive Summary With a welcoming investment climate and modern transportation infrastructure, Togo’s steadily improving economic outlook offers opportunities for U.S. firms interested in doing business locally and in the sub-region. Even with a dip in growth due to the pandemic, Togo has sustained steady economic expansion since 2008 through reforms to encourage economic development and a better business environment, growing 5.5% in 2019, 1.8% in 2020 and 4.8% in 2021. It ranked 97th on the Work Bank’s 2020 Doing Business report, an improvement of 59 places from the previous two years and the highest ranking in West Africa. Current government policy is guided by the National Development Plan (PND) and an addendum policy roadmap for 2020-2025 that integrates business reforms and infrastructure projects designed to attract investment. Togo launched its five-year PND in 2018, focusing on three axes. The plan’s first goal is to leverage the country’s geographic position by transforming Lome into a regional trading center and transport hub. Togo has already completed hundreds of kilometers of refurbished roadways, expanded and modernized the Port of Lome, and inaugurated in 2016 the new Lome international airport that conforms to international standards. The second goal is to increase agricultural production through agricultural centers (Agropoles) and increase manufacturing. The third goal is improving social development, including furthering electrification of the country. The government seeks private sector investment to fulfill its PND goals and has had notable successes, including a new 2022 connection with the “Equiano” subsea cable owned by Google that will dramatically improve the quality of local broadband. In January 2021, Prime Minister Victoire Tomégah-Dogbe presented a detailed developmental roadmap to extend, supplement, and focus the goals of the PND for the remainder of the presidential term, which ends in 2025. The roadmap incorporates 42 specific projects, including universal access to identity documents and electricity; increased access to education, drinking water and sanitation; 20,000 new social housing units; a digital bank; construction of an industrial park around the port of Lome; and the extension of the road network. Nevertheless, Togo must tackle several challenges to maintain its momentum. Challenges include a weak and opaque legal system, lack of clear land titles, and government interference in various sectors. Corruption remains a common problem in Togo, especially for businesses. Often “donations” or “gratuities” result in expedited registrations, permits, and licenses, thus resulting in an unfair advantage for companies that engage in such practices. Although Togo has government bodies charged with combatting corruption, corruption-related charges are rarely brought or prosecuted. The government has made efforts to professionalize key institutions such as the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP), the Chamber of Commerce (CCIT), and the National Employment Agency (ANPE) including with new anti-corruption, ethics, and transparency measures. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 134 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 125 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2019 $690 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is a priority for Togo. The most recent data shows annual FDI flows to Togo almost doubling between 2019 and 2020 to $639 million, driven largely by increased investment from other West African countries, especially in the cement sector (UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2021). CimMetal Group (Burkina Faso) in 2021 established a $125 million construction materials plant) and Dangote (Nigeria) in 2020 invested in a $60 million cement plant. Reforms to increase the ease of doing business and new power plant should sustain continued FDI growth over the next several years, with opportunities available in infrastructure, information and communications technology, agribusiness, energy, banking, and mining. The Ministry of Investments serves as an interface for potential investors, allowing them to target investment sectors and present priority projects. Despite the pandemic, government officials made trips abroad in 2021 to promote Togo as a place to invest and show the government’s desire to diversify its economic partners. Togo does not have any laws or practices that discriminate against foreign investors. The Investment Code, adopted in June 2019, prescribes equal treatment for Togolese and foreign businesses and investors; free management and circulation of capital for foreign investors; respect of private property; protection of private investment against expropriation; and investment dispute resolution regulation. The code meets West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) standards. As an Investment Holding Company, Togo Invest Corporation focuses on investments involving the government through Public-Private-Partnerships. Although Togo prioritizes investment retention, the government does not maintain a formal dialogue channel with investors. There is a right for foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activities. The foreign investor can also create a wholly owned subsidiary. It has no obligation to associate itself with a local investor. This right is contained in the Investment Code “le Code des Investissements,” adopted June 17, 2019, and there are no general limits on foreign ownership or control. Section 3 of the Investment Code states that any company established in the Togolese Republic freely determines its production and marketing policy, in compliance with the laws and regulations in force in the Togolese Republic. Additionally, there are no formal investment approval mechanisms in place for inbound foreign investment nor rules, restrictions, limitations, or requirements applied to private investments. Togo conducted an investment policy review through the World Trade Organization (WTO) in October 2017. A link to the report can be found at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm There have been no major recent reviews of investment policy by civil society. Togo has dramatically improved its business climate in recent years through the implementation of bold reforms. It now takes only seven hours to register a new company online with the “Centre de Formalité des Entreprises” (https://www.cfetogo.org/eentreprise ), and Togo has continued to work simply procedures and reduce costs for businesses, including digitizing and automating tax payments. Togo has streamlined construction permits and eliminated a redundant requirement to receive a certificate of registration from the National Association of Architects. A new central office for property transactions (called the Guichet Unique Foncier) at the Togolese Revenue Office (OTR) also allows applicants to drop off their applications and retrieve their permits in one place, eliminating the need to visit multiple administrative offices to process paperwork. Togo has also improved the monitoring and regulation of power outages by recording data on the annual Average System Outage Duration Index (SAIDI) and Average System Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI). In August 2021, with support from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Togo launched two digital portals to provide information and assist investors in accessing finance and completing administrative procedures to facilitate market entry. The website investautogo.tg provides information on the business environment and investment in Togo, including the documentation required for administrative procedure. It also promotes business opportunities and tax incentives, with information on the investment code and the Export Processing Zone (EPZ). The website apizf.tg also presents useful documentation for investors to better understand the Togo business environment and investment procedures. Togo’s efforts have received international recognition, enabling it to achieve the rank of African Top Performer and third best in the world in terms of improving the business environment relative to its size (Greenfield FDI Performance Index Best Performers 2020). Togo’s ranking in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report has also spiked, moving from 137th globally in 2019 to 97th in 2020, the most recent report. Togo does not promote outward investment, nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime In June 2019, the National Assembly adopted a new investment code, which is in line with the objectives of the National Development Plan (PND) and embraces the government’s desire to make the private sector the driver of economic growth. The Investment Code seeks to make Togo an attractive place for international companies, supporting the development of logistics hubs by offering tax incentives. The incentives are proportional to the size of the investments made and the number of jobs created. At a time when Togo is committed to decentralization, the new investment code provides additional advantages to investments that create jobs outside of major urban centers. The code operationalizes the National Agency for the Promotion of Investments and the Free Zone (API-ZF) which simplifies formalities. The deadline for adjudicating files is now set at 30 days maximum. As a member of West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), Togo participates in zone-wide plans to harmonize and rationalize regulations governing economic activity within the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA – Organisation pour L’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires). OHADA includes sixteen African countries, including Togo, and one of the principal goals is a common charter on investment. Togo directly implements WAEMU and OHADA regulations without requiring an internal ratification process by the National Assembly. Togo’s Investment Code also specifies the provision of incentives to encourage investment. Incentives are to be proportional to the size of investment, with tax benefits conditional on job creation. Tax benefits include a lump sum tax reduction per job created and incentives to invest in rural areas, to consolidate social development and strengthen inclusion measures. Although the government does not make draft bills and proposed regulations available for public comment, ministries and regulatory agencies in Togo generally give notice of and distribute the text of proposed regulations to relevant stakeholders. Ministries and regulatory agencies also generally request and receive comments on proposed regulations through targeted outreach to business associations and other stakeholders. Togo is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures http://togo.eregulations.org . Foreign and national investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations including the number of steps, name and contact details of the entities, persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal bases justifying the procedures. The site is generally up-to-date and useful. The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP) ensures compliance and transparency with respect to government procurements. Each responsible ministry ensures compliance with its regulations which are developed in conformity with international standards and agreements such as WTO or WAEMU norms. Regulations are not reviewed based on scientific or data-driven assessments. The government has not announced any upcoming changes to the regulatory enforcement system. In December 2021, the government adopted Law 2021-033 on public procurement aimed at improving the legal framework and reducing the delays in procurement procedures, in particular through digitalization. Togo joined the Development Center of OECD in June 2019, an opportunity to share experiences and pool resources. Togo is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is not known if the government notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). For the most part, in economic terms, the Togolese legal and administrative framework is aligned with the community texts of UEMOA, ECOWAS or larger groups. On the financial side, Togo depends on sub-regional institutions, notably the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) whose head office is in Dakar. The Regional Council for Public Savings and Financial Markets (CREPMF), headquartered in Abidjan, regulates financial markets. The Togolese insurance market is subject to the rules of the CIMA zone (Inter African Conference of Insurance Markets). With regard to intellectual property, Togo relies on OAPI (African Intellectual Property Organization). The main laws and directives of these different legal and administrative areas are available, among others, on the website www.droit-afrique.com under the heading Togo. More broadly, Togo is a member of the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). At the African level, the country is also party to the Council of the Agreement, the Benin Electric Community (CEB), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the Alliance Zone and the Co-operation Zone for Prosperity (ZACOP), and the African Union. Togo practices a code-based legal system inherited from the French system. The judiciary is recognized as the third power after the executive and the legislative (the press being the 4th) and thus remains independent of the executive branch. Togo, as a member of the OHADA, has a judicial process that is procedurally competent, fair, and reliable. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable like any other civil actions and are adjudicated in the national court system. A Court of Arbitration and Mediation created in 2011 legally enforces contracts. The main law covering commercial issues is the Investment Code adopted in 2012. In 2013, Togo created three commercial Chambers within the Lomé tribunal with specialized magistrates who have exclusive trial court level jurisdiction over contract enforcement and business disputes. The Investment Code allows the resolution of investment disputes involving foreigners through: (a) bilateral agreements between Togo and the investor’s government; (b) arbitration procedures agreed to between the interested parties; or (c) through the offices of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. The OHADA also provides a forum and legal process for resolving legal disputes in 16 African countries. Investment disputes are managed by SEGUCE Togo (Societe d’Exploitation du Guichet Unique pour le Commerce Exterieur), and can be accessed at www.segucetogo.tg Togo is a member of UNCTAD’s international network of transparent investment procedures http://togo.eregulations.org . Foreign and national investors can find detailed information on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations including the number of steps, name and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal bases justifying the procedures. The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP) ensures compliance and transparency for competition-related concerns. The government regularly seeks to improve the framework for public procurement (including professionalizing the public procurement sector, moving procurement online, enacting legislative regulations, etc). The Public Procurement Bill of December 2021 aims to increase transparency and efficiency in the consumption of investment credits. These reforms directly benefit the private sector, which serves as the driver of the National Development Plan (PND) and related Government Roadmap. The government can legally expropriate property through a Presidential decree submitted by the cabinet of ministers and signed by the President. Only two major expropriations of property have taken place in Togo’s history. The first was the February 1974 nationalization of the then French-owned phosphate mines. The second was the November 2014 nationalization of the Hôtel du 2 Février after it had ceased operations for several years. Shortly after the nationalization of the hotel, Togo announced that it was establishing a commission to determine the fair market amount owed as compensation to the hotel’s Libyan owners/investors. Setting aside the case of the Hôtel du 2 Février as an isolated example, there is little evidence to suggest a trend towards expropriation or “creeping expropriation.” The government designed the 2012 Investment Code to protect against government expropriations. There are some claimants from lands expropriated for recent road construction, however, and the procedure to investigate and resolve those claims is slow. Another issue is that land titles are very unclear with traditional and modern systems overlapping. The government has occasionally earmarked land for development with unclear title that has raised complaints from local communities. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Togo is not a party to the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Togo is, however, a party to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention – also known as the Washington Convention), which it ratified in 1967. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Togo does not have Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) or Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with an investment chapter with the United States. Togo does not have a history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors, notwithstanding the two historical examples above. There do not appear to be any investment disputes involving U.S. persons from the past ten years. Local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards issued against the government. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts The dispute resolution alternative is the Court of Arbitration of Togo (CATO), which conforms to standards as established by the Investment Climate Facility for Africa (ICF). Local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards and there are no known State-Owned Enterprise investment disputes that have gone to the domestic court system. The World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) worked with the Government of Togo to improve commercial justice through the strengthening of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. The aim of the project was to increase the speed and efficiency of settlement of commercial disputes through the procedures used by the CATO. As a result of the project, 30 new arbitrators and 100 magistrates and professionals received training in mediation/arbitration techniques. Further, the new CATO procedure manual is explicit that the time between filing and judgment shall be a maximum of six months as per article 36 of the ruling procedures. Togo uses the standards set forth under the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA). That law states that if bankruptcy occurs, the competent jurisdiction designates an expert that concludes an agreement with creditors and stakeholders (preventive arrangement). The Manager (or managers) can be put under “patrimonial sanctions,” meaning they can be personally liable for the debts of the company. The manager is then forbidden to do business, to manage, administer, or control an enterprise, or hold political or administrative office, for three to ten years. Bankruptcy is criminalized, but generally as a last resort. According to data collected by the World Bank, insolvency proceedings take three years on average and cost approximately 15 percent of the debtor’s estate, with the most likely outcome being that the company will be sold off in pieces. The average recovery rate is 27.9 cents on the dollar. The World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 places Togo at 88 of 190 for the “Resolving Insolvency” indicator, well above the Sub-Saharan Africa regional average. 6. Financial Sector Togo and the other West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) member countries are working toward greater regional integration with unified external tariffs. Togo relies on the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) Regional Stock Exchange in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire to trade equities for Togolese public companies. WAEMU has established a common accounting system, periodic reviews of member countries’ macroeconomic policies based on convergence criteria, a regional stock exchange, and the legal and regulatory framework for a regional banking system. The government and central bank respect IMF Article VIII and refrain from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is generally allocated on market terms. With sufficient collateral, foreign investors are generally able to get credit on the local market. The private sector in general has access to a variety of credit instruments when and if collateral is available. The penetration of banking services in the country is low and generally only available in major cities. The government and the banking sector have worked to restore Togo’s reputation as a regional banking center, which was weakened by political upheavals from 1991 to 2005, and several regional and sub-regional banks now operate in Togo, including Orabank, Banque Atlantique, Bank of Africa, NSIA Group, International Bank of Africa in Togo (BIA Togo), and Coris Bank. Additionally, Togo is home to the headquarters of the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), the West African Development Bank (BOAD – the development bank of the West African Economic and Monetary Union), Oragroup, and Ecobank Transnational Inc. (ETI), the largest independent regional banking group in West Africa and Central Africa, with operations in 36 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The banking sector is generally healthy, and the total assets of Togo’s largest banks are approximately $25-30 billion, including Ecobank, a very large regional bank headquartered in Lomé. Togo’s monetary policy and banking regulations are managed by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). No known correspondent relationships were lost in the past four years. No known correspondent banking relationships are in jeopardy. Foreign Exchange There are no restrictions on the transfer of funds to other FCFA-zone countries or to France. The transfer of more than FCFA 500,000 (about $1,000) outside the FCFA-zone requires justification documents (e.g. pro forma invoice) to be presented to bank authorities. The exchange system is free of restrictions for payments and transfers for international transactions. Some American investors in Togo have reported long delays (30 – 40 days) in transferring funds from U.S. banks to banks located in Togo. This is reportedly because banks in Togo have limited contacts with U.S. banks to facilitate the transfer of funds. Togo uses the CFA franc (FCFA), which is the common currency of the eight West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries. The currency is fixed to the Euro at a rate of 656 FCFA to 1 Euro. As a result of this fixed exchange rate, Togo’s inflation rate is consistently below 2%. Remittance Policies The 2019 Investment Code provides for the free transfer of revenues derived from investments, including the liquidation of investments, by non-residents. Sovereign Wealth Funds Togo does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) or other similar entity. 10. Political and Security Environment After a period of political instability and economic stagnation from 1990 to 2007, the government started the country along a gradual path to political reconciliation and democratic reform. Togo has held multiple presidential, legislative, and local elections that were deemed generally free and fair by international observers, though the most recent legislative elections were boycotted by the majority of the opposition. Political reconciliation has moved slowly. A political crisis erupted in 2017 regarding the failure of the government to implement political measures, such as presidential term limits. After international facilitation between the government and opposition parties, in May 2019 the government implemented non-retroactive term limits and a two-round election system. The government held local elections in 2019, the first since 1986. President Faure Gnassingbe was elected for a fourth term on February 22, 2020 in a peaceful election. Political protests still occur on occasion and can often lead to tire burning, stone throwing, and government responses include the use of tear gas and other crowd control techniques. There are no known examples over the past ten years of damage to projects and/or installations pertaining to foreign investment due to political violence. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) N/A NA 2020 $7.575 billion www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 $350 2017 $0 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 $0 2017 $0 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2020 8.5% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ *Coordinated Direct Investment Survey – Data by Economy – IMF Data Note: U.S. based ContourGlobal built a 100 megawatt power plant in Togo in 2010. This FDI is not recorded in official U.S. government statistics. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (through 2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 2,302 100% Total Outward 5,312 100% South Africa 943 41% Niger 1,763 33% Qatar 546 24% Benin 561 11% Cyprus 138 6% Gambia 541 10% Côte d’Ivoire 112 5% Sao Tome & Principe 444 8% Gibraltar 83 4% Côte d’Ivoire 428 8% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment Data not available. Trinidad and Tobago Executive Summary Trinidad and Tobago (TT) is a high-income developing country with a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of $15,425 and an annual GDP of $21.6 billion (2020). It has the largest economy in the English-speaking Caribbean and is the third most populous country in the region with 1.4 million inhabitants. The International Monetary Fund predicts GDP for 2022 will increase by 5.4 percent as the economy rebounds following the economic impact of COVID-19 mitigation. TT’s investment climate is generally open and most investment barriers have been eliminated, but stifling bureaucracy and opaque procedures remain. Energy exploration and production drive TT’s economy. This sector has historically attracted the most foreign direct investment. The energy sector usually accounts for approximately half of GDP and 80 percent of export earnings. Petrochemicals and steel are other sectors accounting for significant foreign investment. Since the economy is tethered to the energy sector, it is particularly vulnerable to fluctuating prices for hydrocarbons and petrochemicals. Since the last ICS, TT has rolled back several pandemic-related measures that affected the investment climate including reopening borders to air travel; ending the state of emergency that only permitted essential services to operate; reopening the hospitality and entertainment sector to vaccinated individuals; and reopening schools. TT is working towards implementing its nationally determined contribution under the Paris Climate Agreement through 15 percent reduction is emissions from power generation (including by the ongoing construction of utility-scale renewable power generation plants), public transportation (through the conversion to compressed natural gas as a fuel, and development of an e-mobility policy) and industry by 2030. The TT government (GoTT) is developing policies on carbon capture and storage, but this technology has been predominantly used to inject carbon into hydrocarbon reservoirs for greater output. There are no significant risks to responsibly doing business in areas such as labor and human rights. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 82 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 97 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $ 4,974 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $ 15,420 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GoTT seeks foreign direct investment and has traditionally welcomed U.S. investors. The U.S. Mission is not aware of laws or practices that discriminate against foreign investors, but some have seen the decision-making process for tenders and the subsequent awarding of contracts turn opaque without warning, especially when their interests compete with those of well-connected local firms. InvesTT is the country’s investment promotion agency that assists investors through the process of setting up a non-energy business and provides aftercare services once established. Specifically, it provides market information, offers advice on accessing investment incentives, assists with regulatory and registry issues, and provides property and location services. It also assists with general problem solving and advocacy to the government. While TT prioritizes investment retention, the U.S. Mission is not aware of a formal, ongoing dialogue with investors, either through an Ombudsman or formal business roundtable. Foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity. There are no limits on foreign ownership. Under the Foreign Investment Act of 1990, a foreign investor is permitted to own 100 percent of the share capital in a private company. A license is required to own more than a 30 percent of a public company. The U.S. Mission is not aware of any sector-specific restrictions or limitations applied to U.S. investors. TT maintains an investment screening mechanism for foreign investment related to specific projects that have been submitted for the purpose of accessing sector-specific incentives, such as for those offered in the tourism industry. Information on criteria to access the development incentives are listed in various legislative acts such as the Tourism Development Act of 2001. The World Trade Organization conducted a trade policy review for TT in 2019: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp488_e.htm The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre noted concerns about the expansion of Chinese investment in TT in 2019. The GoTT’s business facilitation efforts focus primarily on investor services (helping deal with rules and procedures) through its investment promotion agency and is attempting to make the rules more transparent and predictable overall. However, more work needs to be done to achieve efficient administrative procedures and dispute resolution. TT ranks 158th of 190 countries for registering property, 174th for enforcing contracts, and 160th for payment of taxes in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report, representing a deterioration of indicators that reflect a difficulty of doing business. The business registration website is: www.ttbizlink.gov.tt . In 2022, the Global Enterprise Registration Network (GER) gives the TT business registration website an above-average score of 8.5 out of 10 for its single electronic window, and a below average score of 4 out of 10 for providing information on how to register a business ( http://www .TTconnect.gov.tt ). While the process is clear, the inability to make online payments and submit online certificate requests are the two primary reasons for the low score. A feedback mechanism allowing users to communicate with authorities is a strength of the TT business registration website. Foreign companies can use the website and business registration requires completion of seven procedures over a period of 10 days. The agencies with which a company must typically register include: Companies Registry, Ministry of Legal Affairs Board of Inland Revenue National Insurance Board; and Value Added Tax (VAT Office, Board of Inland Revenue) The GoTT does not promote or incentivize outward investment. The GoTT does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime Through the TT Fair Trading Commission, the GoTT develops transparent policies and effective laws to foster market-based competition on a non-discriminatory basis and establishes “clear rules of the game.” Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms There are no informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations. Rule-making and regulatory authority exist within the ministries and regulatory agencies at the national level. The government consults frequently, but not always, with international agencies and business associations in developing regulations. The GoTT submits draft regulations to parliament for approval. The process is the same for each ministry. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms. International financial reporting standards are required for domestic public companies. The GoTT promotes but does not require companies’ environmental, social and corporate governance disclosures to facilitate transparency to help investors and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. Proposed laws and regulations are often published in draft form electronically for public review at http://www.ttparliament.org/ , though there is no legal obligation to do so. The GoTT often solicits private sector and business community comments on proposed legislation, although there is no timeframe for the length of a consultation period when it happens, nor is reporting mandatory on the consultations. All draft bills and regulations are printed in the official gazette and other websites: www.news.gov.tt/content/e-gazette# www.ric.org.tt; www.ttparliament.org The U.S. Mission is not aware of an oversight or enforcement mechanism that ensures that the GoTT follows administrative processes. There has not been any announcement regarding reforms to the regulatory system, including enforcement, since the last ICS report. Regulatory reform efforts announced in prior years, such as the mechanism to calculate and collect property tax and the establishment of the revenue authority, have not been fully implemented. Establishment of the revenue authority is intended to increase collections and streamline the system for paying taxes. At present, regulatory enforcement mechanisms are usually a combination of moral suasion and the use of applicable administrative, civil, or criminal sanctions. The enforcement process is not legally reviewable. Regulation is usually reviewed based on scientific or data-driven assessments. Scientific studies or quantitative analyses are not made publicly available. Public comments received by regulators are generally not made public. Public finances and debt obligations are transparent and publicly available on the central bank website: https://www.central-bank.org.tt TT is not a part of a regional economic block, although it participates in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a regional trading bloc that gives duty-free access to member goods, free movement to some CARICOM nationals, and establishes common treatment of non-members on specific issues. The Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) is an initiative currently being explored by CARICOM that would eventually integrate its member-states into a single economic unit. When fully completed, the CSME would succeed CARICOM. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally consistent with United Kingdom standards. The GoTT has not consistently notified the World Trade Organization (WTO) Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of draft technical regulations. TT’s legal system is based on English common law. Contracts are legally enforced through the court system. The country has a written commercial law. There are few specialized courts and resolution of legal claims is time consuming. An industrial court exclusively handles cases relating to labor practices but also suffers from severe backlogs and is widely seen to favor claimants. Civil cases of less than $2,250 are heard by the Magistrate’s Court. Matters exceeding that amount are heard in the High Court of Justice, which can grant equitable relief. There is no court or division of a court dedicated solely to hearing commercial cases. TT’s judicial system is independent of the executive, and the judicial process is competent, procedurally and substantively fair, and reliable, although very slow. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report, TT ranks 174 of 190 in ease of enforcing contracts and its court system requires 1,340 days to resolve a contract claim, nearly double the Latin American and Caribbean regional average. Decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeal in the first instance. The United Kingdom Privy Council Judicial Committee is the final court of appeal. TT’s judicial system respects the sanctity of contracts and generally provides a level playing field for foreign investors involved in court matters. Due to the backlog of cases, however, there can be major delays in the process. It is imperative that foreign investors seek competent local legal counsel. Some U.S. companies are hesitant to pursue legal remedies, preferring to attempt good faith negotiations in order to avoid an acrimonious relationship that could harm their interests in the country’s small, tight-knit business community. There is no “one-stop-shop” website for investment providing relevant laws, rules, and procedures. Useful websites to help navigate foreign investment laws, rules, and procedures include: http://www.legalaffairs.gov.tt https://www.rgd.legalaffairs.gov.tt http://www.tradeind.gov.tt https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-laws/laws/46/trinidad-and-tobago-foreign-investment-act The TT Fair Trading Commission is an independent statutory agency responsible for promoting and maintaining fair competition in the domestic market. It is tasked with investigating the various forms of anti-competitive business conduct set out in the Fair-Trading Act. No cases that involve foreign investment have arisen in the past 12 months. The agency adheres to fair and transparent norms and procedures. The agency’s decisions can be appealed to the judicial system. The GoTT can legally expropriate property based on the needs of the country and only after due process including adequate compensation generally based on market value. Various pieces of legislation make provisions for compulsory licensing in the interest of public health or intellectual property rights. The U.S. Mission is not aware of any direct or indirect expropriation actions since the 1980s. All prior expropriations were compensated to the satisfaction of the parties involved. Energy sector contacts occasionally describe the tax regime as confiscatory, pointing to after-the-fact withdrawal or weakening of tax incentives offered to entice investment once investment occurs. Claimants did not allege a lack of due process in prior expropriation cases. Creditors have the right to be notified within 10 days of the appointment of a receiver and to receive a final report, a statement of accounts, and an assessment of claim. Claims of secured creditors are prioritized under the Bankruptcy Act. No distinction is made between foreign and domestic creditors or contract holders. Bankruptcy is not criminalized. The World Bank ranked TT 83rd out of 190 countries in resolving insolvency in its Doing Business 2020 report. This reflects TT’s recovery rate (cents on the dollar), which is worse than the regional average, and cost as a percentage of estate. 6. Financial Sector The GoTT welcomes foreign portfolio investment. TT has its own stock market and has an established regulatory framework to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. There is enough liquidity in the markets to enter and exit sizeable positions. Existing policies facilitate the free flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets. The GoTT and the Central Bank of TT respect IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payment and transfers for current international transactions. Shortages of foreign exchange, exacerbated by the government’s maintenance of the local currency at values higher than those which the market would bear, however, cause considerable delays in payments and transfers for international transactions. A full range of credit instruments is available to the private sector. There are no restrictions on borrowing by foreign investors who are able to access credit. Credit is allocated on market terms, but interest rates tend to be higher for foreign borrowers. Banking services are widespread throughout urban areas, but penetration is significantly lower in rural areas. Although the banking sector is healthy and well-capitalized, the IMF in its 2020 Financial Stability Assessment Program noted TT’s banks are exposed to sovereign risk and potential liquidity risks stemming from non-bank financial entities in the group. The financial system overall faces risks of increasing household debt, a lack of supervisory independence and out-of-date regulatory frameworks, the sovereign-bank nexus and the absence of a macro-prudential toolkit, and contagion risks between investment funds and banks. The report further states the financial sector legislation and regulation have not kept pace with international best practice. The supervisors operate with guidelines in key areas instead of binding powers, which limits their authority In December 2021, the estimated total assets of TT’s largest banks was $23.1 billion. TT has a central bank system. Foreign banks may establish operations in TT provided they obtain a license from the central bank. TT has lost correspondent banking relationships in the past three years. The U.S. Mission is not aware of any current correspondent banking relationships that are in jeopardy. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account. The value of TT’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF), the Heritage and Stabilization Fund, as of September 2021 is approximately $5.6 billion. The fund invests in U.S. short duration fixed income, U.S. core domestic fixed income, U.S. core domestic equities, and non-U.S. core international equities. The SWF follows the voluntary code of good practices known as the Santiago Principles. TT participates in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on SWFs. None of the SWF is invested domestically. There are no potentially negative ramifications for U.S. investors in the local market. 7. State-Owned Enterprises TT has 55 SOEs comprised of 43 wholly owned companies, eight majority-owned, and four in which the government has a minority share. SOEs are in the energy, manufacturing, agriculture, tourism, financial services, transportation, and communication sectors. Information on the total assets of SOEs, total net income of SOEs and number of people employed by SOEs is not available. The Investments Division of the Ministry of Finance appoints directors to the boards of state enterprises, reportedly at the direction of the Minister of Finance. SOEs are often informally or explicitly obligated to consult with government officials before making major business decisions. According to TT’s constitution, the government is entitled to: exercise control directly or indirectly over the affairs of the enterprise appoint a majority of directors of the board of directors of the enterprise; and hold at least 50 per cent of the ordinary share capital of the enterprise. A published list of SOEs for 2022 can be found here: https://www.finance.gov.tt/2021/10/04/https-www-finance-gov-tt-wp-content-uploads-2021-10-state-enterprises-investment-programme-seip-2022-pdf/ In sectors that are open to both the private sector and foreign competition, SOEs are sometimes favored for government contracts, which might negatively impact U.S. investors in the market. The country has not adhered to the OECD corporate governance guidelines for SOEs. TT does not have a privatization program in place, but the GoTT has issued initial public offerings of various state-owned companies to obtain revenue, primarily in the finance and energy sectors. Foreign investors can participate in the initial public offerings of SOEs. The purchase of initial public offering shares on past occasions was open to the public, easy to understand, non-discriminatory, and transparent. For example: https://ngc.co.tt/media/news/ngl-initial-public-offering-brokerage-details/ 10. Political and Security Environment While non-violent demonstrations occasionally occur, widespread civil disorder is not typical. There have been no serious incidents of political violence since a coup attempt in 1990. Subsequent to the closure of state oil firm Petrotrin in November 2018, which resulted in the lay-off of nearly 6,000 workers, there were reports of damage to installations. Certain areas of TT are increasingly insecure due to a critical level of violent crime. Tunisia Executive Summary In 2021, Tunisia’s economy continued to be heavily impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite a loosening of containment measures from those in place in 2020, Tunisia’s GDP grew by 3.1 percent in 2021 after a record contraction of 8.8 percent in 2020. The country still faces high unemployment, high inflation, and rising levels of public debt, in addition to a shortage of staple food products and low tourism revenues due to Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine. On July 25, citing widespread protests and political paralysis, President Saied took “exceptional measures” under Article 80 of the constitution to dismiss Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi, freeze parliament’s activities for 30 days, and lift the immunity of members of parliament. On August 23, Saied announced an indefinite extension of the “exceptional measures” period and on September 22, he issued a decree granting the president certain executive, legislative, and judiciary powers and authority to rule by decree, but allowed continued implementation of the preamble and chapters one and two, which guarantee rights and freedoms. Civil society organizations and multiple political parties raised concern that through these decrees President Saied granted himself unprecedented decision-making powers, without checks and balances and for an unlimited period. On September 29, Saied named Najla Bouden Romdhane as prime minister, and on October 11, she formed a government. On December 13, Saied announced a timeline for constitutional reforms including public consultations and the establishment of a committee to revise the constitution and electoral laws, leading to a national referendum in July 2022. Parliamentary elections would follow in December 2022. On March 30, 2022, the President issued a decree formally dissolving Parliament. Before the pandemic and President Saied’s decisions on July 25, successive governments had advanced some much-needed structural reforms to improve Tunisia’s business climate, including an improved bankruptcy law, investment code, an initial “negative list,” a law enabling public-private partnerships, and a supplemental law designed to improve the investment climate. The Government of Tunisia (GOT) encouraged entrepreneurship through the passage of the Start-Up Act in June 2018. The GOT passed a new budget law in January 2019 that ensures greater budgetary transparency and makes the public aware of government investment projects over a three-year period. These reforms are intended to help Tunisia attract both foreign and domestic investment. Nevertheless, substantial bureaucratic barriers to investment remain and additional economic reforms have yet to be achieved. State-owned enterprises play a large role in Tunisia’s economy, and some sectors are not open to foreign investment. The informal sector, estimated at 40 to 60 percent of the overall economy, remains problematic, as legitimate businesses are forced to compete with smuggled goods. Due to a growing budget deficit, the GOT sought international lending support in 2021. In February 2022, high-level discussions on economic reforms and government spending cuts were held between the GOT and the IMF, in the hopes of reaching an agreement on an IMF lending package. Such a program would likely include structural reforms. Tunisia’s strengths include its proximity to Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East; preferential or free-trade agreements with the EU and much of Africa; an educated workforce; and a strong interest in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Sectors such as agribusiness, aerospace, infrastructure, renewable energy (notably green hydrogen), telecommunication technologies, and services remain promising. The decline in the value of the dinar over recent years has strengthened investment and export activity in the electronic component manufacturing and textile sectors. Since 2011, the United States has provided more than $500 million in economic growth-related assistance, in addition to loan guarantees in 2012, 2014, and 2016 that enabled the GOT to borrow nearly $1.5 billion at low interest. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 70 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 71 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 258 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 3,300 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GOT has made efforts to improve the business climate and attract FDI. The GOT prioritizes attracting and retaining investment, particularly in the underdeveloped interior regions, and reducing unemployment by providing tax breaks, subsidizing social security fee contributions for new hires, and offering investment bonuses. However, government policies have not always yielded the anticipated flow of foreign investment in the country, and political developments have had a mitigating effect. More than 3,700 foreign companies currently operate in Tunisia, and the government has historically encouraged export-oriented FDI in key sectors such as call centers, electronics, aerospace and aeronautics, automotive parts, textile and apparel, leather and shoes, agro-food, and other light manufacturing. Through the first half of 2021, the sectors that attracted the most FDI were electrical and electronic (31.3 percent), energy (29 percent), services (10 percent), mechanical (8.2 percent), and agro-food (7.4 percent). Inadequate infrastructure in the interior regions results in the concentration of foreign investment in the capital city of Tunis and its suburbs (54.7 percent), the northern coastal region (20 percent), the eastern coastal region (18.8 percent), and the northwest region (5.7 percent). Internal western and southern regions attracted only 0.8 percent of foreign investment despite special tax incentives for those regions. The Tunisian Parliament passed an Investment Law (#2016-71) in September 2016 that went into effect April 1, 2017 to encourage the responsible regulation of investments. The law provided for the creation of three major institutions: The High Investment Council, whose mission is to implement legislative reforms set out in the investment law and decide on incentives for projects of national importance (defined as investment projects of more than 50 million dinars ($17.9 million) and 500 jobs). The Tunisian Investment Authority, whose mission is to manage investment projects of more than 15 million dinars ($5.4 million) and up to 50 million dinars ($17.9 million). Investment projects of less than 15 million dinars ($5.4 million) are managed by the Agency for Promotion of Industry and Innovation (APII). The Tunisian Investment Fund, which funds foreign investment incentive packages. These institutions were all launched in 2017. However, the Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA) continues to be Tunisia’s principal agency to promote foreign investment. FIPA is a one-stop shop for foreign investors. It provides information on investment opportunities, advice on the appropriate conditions for success, assistance and support during the creation and implementation of the project, and contact facilitation and advocacy with other government authorities. Under the 2016 Investment Law (article 7), foreign investors have the same rights and obligations as Tunisian investors. Tunisia encourages dialogue with investors through FIPA offices throughout the country. Foreign investment is classified into two categories: “Offshore” investment is defined as commercial entities in which foreign capital accounts for at least 66 percent of equity, and at least 70 percent of the production is destined for the export market. However, investments in some sectors can be classified as “offshore” with lower foreign equity shares. Foreign equity in the agricultural sector, for example, cannot exceed 66 percent and foreign investors cannot directly own agricultural land, but agricultural investments can still be classified as “offshore” if they meet the export threshold. “Onshore” investment caps foreign equity participation at a maximum of 49 percent in most non-industrial projects. “Onshore” industrial investment may have 100 percent foreign equity, subject to government approval. Pursuant to the 2016 Investment Law (article 4), a list of sectors outlining which investment categories are subject to government authorization (the “negative list”) was set by decree no. 417 of May 11, 2018. The sectors include natural resources; construction materials; land, sea and air transport; banking, finance, and insurance; hazardous and polluting industries; health; education; and telecommunications. The decree specified the deadline to respond to authorization requests for most government agencies and fixed a deadline of 60 days for all other government decision-making bodies not specifically mentioned in the decree. The decree went into effect on July 1, 2018. In June 2021, the government announced the elimination of government authorization requirements for 27 business activities in various sectors, about 10 percent of the total authorization categories. The change allows foreign and local investors to open businesses under conditions detailed in books of specifications without waiting for a government license. The action is meant to revive an economy heavily impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and boost investment in sectors such as tourism, transportation, finance, and renewable energy. For example, government authorizations are no longer required for business ventures such as the opening of shopping malls and supermarkets, operation of certain aircraft for tourism and leisure activities, management of financial portfolios by non-resident companies, organization of sporting events, cement manufacturing, self-production of electricity from renewable energies under 1 megawatt, import and marketing of films, sale and distribution of tobacco and alcohol, and import of used clothes. While the government decree has yet to be published, the elimination of authorization categories will likely improve Tunisia’s investment climate. The WTO completed a Trade Policy Review for Tunisia in July 2016. The report is available here: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp441_e.htm . The OECD completed an Investment Policy Review for Tunisia in November 2012. The report is available here: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/tunisia-investmentpolicyreview-oecd.htm . The list of Tunisia’s environmental conflicts on Environmental Justice Atlas is available at https://ejatlas.org/country/tunisia In May 2019, the Tunisian Parliament adopted law 2019-47, a cross-cutting law that impacts legislation across all sectors. The law is designed to improve the country’s business climate. The law simplified the process of creating a business, permitted new methods of finance, improved regulations for corporate governance, and provided the private sector the right to operate a project under the framework of a public-private partnership (PPP). This legislation and previous investment laws are all referenced on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/country-navigator/221/tunisia . The Agency for Promotion of Industry and Innovation (APII) and the Tunisia Investment Authority (TIA) are the focal point for business registration. Online project declaration for industry or service sector projects for both domestic and foreign investment is available at: www.tunisieindustrie.nat.tn/en/doc.asp?mcat=16&mrub=122 . The 2019 new online TIA platform allows potential investors to electronically declare the creation, extension, and renewal of all types of investment projects. The platform also allows investors to incorporate new businesses, request special permits, and apply for investment and tax incentives. https://www.tia.gov.tn/ . APII has attempted to simplify the business registration process by creating a one-stop shop that offers registration of legal papers with the tax office, court clerk, official Tunisian gazette, and customs. This one-stop shop also houses consultants from the Investment Promotion Agency, Ministry of Employment, National Social Security Authority (CNSS), postal service, Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Trade and Export Development. Registration may face delays as some agencies may have longer internal processes. Prior to registration, a business must first initiate an online declaration of intent, to which APII provides a notification of receipt within 24 hours. For agriculture and fisheries, business registration information can be found on the Agricultural Investment Promotion Agency’s (APIA) website: www.apia.com.tn . In February 2022, APIA announced the establishment of a 100% online investment declaration service for Tunisian and foreign investors in agricultural projects. The online service provides investors with an electronic investment declaration certificate (in PDF format) authenticated by a QR code. The service is accessible through “Espace Promoteur” (apia.com.tn) In the tourism industry, companies must register with the National Office for Tourism at: http://www.tourisme.gov.tn/en/investing/administrative-services.html . The central points of contact for established foreign investors and companies are the Tunisian Investment Authority (TIA): https://www.tia.gov.tn/en and the Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA): http://www.investintunisia.tn . The GOT does not incentivize outward investment, and capital transfer abroad is tightly controlled by the Central Bank. 3. Legal Regime The constitution provides citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage. On July 25, citing widespread protests and political paralysis, President Saied invoked Article 80 of the constitution and took “exceptional measures” to dismiss Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi, freeze parliament’s activities for 30 days, and lift immunity for members of parliament. On August 23, President Saied announced an indefinite extension of the “exceptional measures” period, and on September 22, issued a decree granting himself certain executive, legislative, and judicial powers, and the authority to rule by decree, subject to rights guaranteed in the constitution. Civil society organizations criticized the president for granting himself unprecedented decision-making powers, without institutional checks and balances and for an unlimited period. On September 29, President Saied named Najla Bouden Romdhane as prime minister, and on October 11 she formed a government composed of 24 ministers and one secretary of state. On December 13, President Saied announced a timeline including public consultations and the establishment of a committee to revise the constitution and electoral laws, leading to a national referendum in July 2022. Parliamentary elections would follow in December 2022. According to local polling, the measures were broadly popular, although some civil society groups and political parties expressed concern regarding the lack of transparency and inclusivity of Saied’s actions. On March 30, the President issued a decree formally dissolving Parliament. After adoption, all laws, decrees, and regulations are published on the website of the Official Gazette and enforced by the Government at the national level. The Government has historically taken few proactive steps to raise public awareness of the public consultation period for new draft laws and decrees. Civil society, NGOs, and political parties have pushed for increased transparency and inclusiveness in rulemaking. Many draft bills, such as the budget law, were reviewed before submission for a final vote under pressure from civil society. Business associations, chambers of commerce, unions, and political parties reviewed the 2016 Investment Law prior to final adoption. In January 2019, the Tunisian Parliament passed the Organic Budget Law, which is a foundational law defining the parameters for the government’s annual budgeting process. The law aims to bring the budget process in line with principles expressed in the 2014 constitution by enlarging Parliament’s role in the budgetary process and strengthening the financial autonomy of the legislative and judiciary branches. The law requires the government to organize its budget by policy objective, detail budget projections over a three-year timeframe, and revise its accounting system to ensure greater transparency. Due to the freezing of the Tunisian Parliament as of July 25, 2021, Tunisia’s 2022 budget law was passed directly through Presidential decree law #2021-21 on December 28, 2021. In May 2020, the government adopted decree #2020-316, establishing simplified conditions and procedures for granting project concessions and their monitoring based on a new public-private partnership (PPP) approach. The decree aims to further promote investment by young entrepreneurs (under the age of 35) and projects of all sizes, including those less than 15 million dinars ($5.5 million). Not all accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are in line with international standards. Publicly listed companies adhere to national accounting norms. Prior to July 25, the Parliament had oversight authority over the GOT but could not ensure that all administrative processes are followed. Following the exceptional measures implemented by President Saied on July 25 suspending Parliament, the Council of Ministers led by President Saied and at times, Prime Minister Bouden, have deliberated and approved decree laws. On March 30, President Saied issued a decree formally dissolving Parliament. Parliament will be established following legislative elections in December 2022. The World Bank Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance for Tunisia are available here: http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/tunisia . Tunisia is a member of the Open Government Partnership, a multilateral initiative that aims to secure concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen governance: http://www.opengovpartnership.org/country/tunisia . Prior to July 25, most of Tunisia’s public finances and debt obligations were debated and voted on by the Parliament. Since July 25, the Council of Ministers has discussed and approved Tunisia’s finances. In general, Tunisia promotes companies’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure to facilitate transparency but does not require it. As part of its negotiations toward a comprehensive free-trade agreement with the EU, the GOT is considering incorporating a number of EU standards in its domestic regulations. Tunisia became a member of the WTO in 1995 and is required to notify the WTO regarding draft technical regulations on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). However, in October 2018 the Ministry of Commerce released a circular that temporarily restricted the import of certain goods without going through the WTO notification process, which negatively impacted some business operations without forewarning. In February 2017, Tunisia domestically ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and presented its instrument of ratification to the WTO in July 2020 for all categories A, B, and C. However, Tunisia has yet to communicate indicative and definitive dates under category B and is overdue in submitting notifications related to technical assistance requirements and support and information on assistance and capacity building (Article 22.3). Tunisia has also yet to submit two transparency notifications related to: (1) import, export, and transit procedures, contact information of enquiry points, (Article 1.4) and (2) contact points for customs cooperation (Article 12.2.2). The Tunisian legal system is secular and based on the French Napoleonic code and meets EU standards. While the 2014 Tunisian constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary, constitutionally mandated reforms of courts and broader judiciary reforms are still ongoing. Citing corruption in the judiciary, on February 12, Saied dissolved the Supreme Judicial Council, the highest judicial authority responsible for judicial assignments and enforcing ethical standards and discipline and replaced it with a temporary council. Tunisia has a written commercial law but does not have specialized commercial courts. Regulations or enforcement actions can be appealed at the Court of Appeals. The 2016 Investment Law directs tax incentives towards regional development promotion, technology and high value-added products, research and development (R&D), innovation, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and the education, transport, health, culture, and environmental protection sectors. Foreign investors can apply for government incentives online through the Tunisian Investment Authority (TIA) website: https://www.tia.gov.tn/en . The primary one-stop-shop webpage for investors looking for relevant laws and regulations is hosted at the Investment and Innovation Promotion Agency website, http://www.tunisieindustrie.nat.tn/en/doc.asp?mcat=12&mrub=209 . The 2016 Investment Law (article 15) calls for the creation of an Investor’s Unique Point of Contact within the ministry in charge of investment to assist new and existing investors to launch and expand their projects. In addition, the Parliament adopted a number of economic reforms since 2015, including laws concerning renewable energy, competition, public-private partnerships (PPP), bankruptcy, and the independence of the Central Bank of Tunisia, as well as the Start-Up Act to promote the creation of new businesses and entrepreneurship. The 2015 Competition Law established a government appointed Competition Council to reduce government intervention in the economy and promote competition based on supply and demand. This law voided previous agreements that fixed prices, limited free competition, or restricted the entry of new companies as well as those that controlled production, distribution, investment, technical progress, or supply centers. While the law ensures free pricing of most products and services, there are a few protected items, such as bread, sugar, milk, water, and electricity, for which the GOT can still intervene in pricing. Moreover, in exceptional cases of large increases or collapses in prices, such as sharp price increases of surgical masks, sanitizer, and disinfection products during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry of Trade and Export Development reserved the right to regulate prices for a period of up to six months. The ministry can also intervene in some other sectors to ensure free and fair competition. However, the Competition Council can make exceptions to its anti-trust policies if it deems it necessary for overall technical or economic progress. The Competition Council also has the power to investigate competition-inhibiting cases and make recommendations to the Ministry of Trade and Export Development upon the Ministry’s request. Competition Council rulings can range from ordering temporary closures of a business to penalties and fines which could amount to a maximum of 10 percent of business revenue. There are no outstanding expropriation cases involving U.S. interests. The 2016 Investment Law (article 8) states that investors’ property may not be expropriated except in cases of public interest. Expropriation, if carried out, must comply with legal procedures, be executed without discrimination on the basis of nationality, and provide fair and equitable compensation. U.S. investments in Tunisia are protected by international law as stipulated in the U.S.-Tunisia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). According to Article III of the BIT, the GOT reserves the right to expropriate or nationalize investments for the public good, in a non-discriminatory manner, and upon advance compensation of the full value of the expropriated investment. The treaty grants the right to prompt review by the relevant Tunisian authorities of conformity with the principles of international law. When compensation is granted to Tunisian or foreign companies whose investments suffer losses owing to events such as war, armed conflict, revolution, state of national emergency, civil disturbance, etc., U.S. companies are accorded “the most favorable treatment in regard to any measures adopted in relation to such losses.” Parliament adopted in April 2016 a new bankruptcy law that replaced Chapter IV of the Commerce Law and the Recovery of Companies in Economic Difficulties Law. These two laws had duplicative and cumbersome processes for business rescue and exit and gave creditors a marginal role. The 2016 law increases incentives for failed companies to undergo liquidation by limiting state collection privileges. The improved bankruptcy procedures are intended to decrease the number of non-performing loans and facilitate access of new firms to bank lending. 6. Financial Sector Tunisia’s financial system is dominated by its banking sector, with banks accounting for roughly 85 percent of financing in Tunisia. The GOT’s overreliance on bank financing impedes economic growth and stronger job creation. Equity capitalization is relatively small; Tunisia’s stock market provided 9.1 percent of corporate financing in 2019 according to the Financial Market Council annual report. Other mechanisms, such as bonds and microfinance, contribute marginally to the overall economy. Created in 1969, the Bourse de Tunis (Tunis stock exchange) listed 85 companies as of December 2021. Market capitalization increased by 0.74 percent to $8.3 billion (19 percent of GDP), versus $7.9 billion in 2020 (19.7 percent of GDP). Financial institutions still dominate market capitalization with a share of 42.3 percent. Foreign transactions generated a net outflow of $99.2 million in 2021, and their share of market capitalization declined to 23.1 percent in 2021 versus 25.3 percent in 2020; only a small share of foreign capitalization is floating. During the last five years, the exchange’s regulatory and accounting systems have been brought more in line with international standards, including compliance and investor protections. The exchange is supervised and regulated by the state-run Capital Market Board. Most major global accounting firms are represented in Tunisia. Firms listed on the stock exchange must publish semiannual corporate reports audited by a certified public accountant. Accompanying accounting requirements exceed what many Tunisian firms can, or are willing to, undertake. GOT tax incentives attempt to encourage companies to list on the stock exchange. Newly listed companies that offer a 30 percent capital share to the public receive a five-year tax reduction on profits. In addition, individual investors receive tax deductions for equity investment in the market. Capital gains are tax-free when held by the investor for two years. Listing on the stock exchange helps ensure transparent financial statements, whereby the public sharing of certified financial statements has generally discouraged the introduction of more companies on the stock exchange. Foreign investors are permitted to purchase shares in resident (onshore) firms only through authorized Tunisian brokers or through established mutual funds. To trade, non-resident (offshore) brokers require a Tunisian intermediary and may only service non-Tunisian customers. Tunisian brokerage firms may have foreign participation, as long as that participation is less than 50 percent. Foreign investment of up to 50 percent of a listed firm’s capital does not require authorization. According to the Central Bank of Tunisia (CBT) annual report on banking supervision published in January 2022, Tunisia hosts 30 banks, of which 23 are onshore and seven are offshore. Onshore banks include three Islamic banks, two microcredit and SME financing banks, and 18 commercial universal banks. Domestic credit to the private sector provided by banks stood at 64 percent of GDP in 2019. According to the World Bank, this level is higher than the MENA region average of 56.7 percent. Eighty-seven percent of banks are located in the coastal regions, with about 41 percent in the greater Tunis area alone. The number of bank accounts has increased by 5 percent over the last five years to reach 10.3 million accounts at the end of 2020, of which 6 million are savings accounts. Tunisia’s banking system activity is mainly within the 23 onshore banks, which accounted for 92 percent of total assets, 94 percent of loans, and 96 percent of deposits in 2020. The onshore banks offer identical services targeting Tunisia’s larger corporations. Meanwhile, SMEs and individuals often have difficulty accessing bank capital due to high collateral requirements. The CBT report noted that in 2020, overall lending totaled $32.8 billion, an increase of 5 percent compared to a 3.1 percent increase in 2019. Loans to professionals were driven mainly by the increase in commitments of public enterprises, which rose by $586 million in 2020 (26.8 percent increase). Loans to the private sector increased by only 2.4 percent in 2020, the same rate as the previous year. These credits benefited mostly industry, trade, real estate development and tourism sectors. Tourism — alone made up nearly 80 percent of the lending. Foreign banks are permitted to open branches and establish operations in Tunisia under the offshore regime and are subject to the supervision of the Central Bank. Government regulations control lending rates. This prevents banks from pricing their loan portfolios appropriately and incentivizes bankers to restrict the provision of credit. Competition among Tunisia’s many banks has the effect of lowering observed interest rates; however, banks often place conditions on loans that impose far higher costs on borrowers than interest rates alone. These non-interest costs may include collateral requirements that come in the form of liens on real estate. Often, collateral must equal or exceed the value of the loan principal. Collateral requirements are high because banks face regulatory difficulties in collecting collateral, thereby adding to costs. According to the CBT banking supervision report, nonperforming loans (NPLs) were at 15.6 percent of all bank loans in 2020, mostly in the agriculture (28.4 percent) and tourism (41.3 percent) sectors. Beyond the banks and stock exchange, few effective financing mechanisms are available in the Tunisian economy. A true bond market does not exist, and government debt sold to financial institutions is not re-traded on a formal, transparent secondary market. Private equity remains a niche element in the Tunisian financial system. Firms experience challenges raising sufficient capital, sourcing their transactions, and selling their stakes in successful investments once they mature. The microfinance market remains underexploited, but profitable for microfinance institutions with non-governmental organization Enda Inter-Arabe the dominant lender in the field. The GOT recognizes two categories of financial service activity: banking (e.g., deposits, loans, payments and exchange operations, and acquisition of operating capital) and investment services (reception, transmission, order execution, and portfolio management). Non-resident financial service providers must present initial minimum capital (fully paid up at subscription) of 25 million Tunisian dinars ($8.9 million) for a bank, 10 million dinars ($3.5 million) for a non-bank financial institution, 7.5 million dinars ($2.6 million) for an investment company, and 250,000 dinars ($89,400) for a portfolio management company. By decree no. 85-2011, the GOT established a sovereign wealth fund, “Caisse des Depots et des Consignations” (CDC), to boost private sector investment and promote small and medium enterprise (SME) development. It is a state-owned investment entity responsible for independently managing a portion of the state’s financial assets. The CDC was set up with support from the French CDC and the Moroccan CDG (Caisse des Depots et de Gestion) and became operational in early 2012. The original impetus for the creation of the CDC was to manage assets confiscated from the former ruling family as independently as possible to serve the public interest. More information is available about the CDC at www.cdc.tn . As of June 2021, CDC had 9.7 billion dinars ($3.5 billion) in assets and 466 million dinars ($167 million) in capital. All CDC investments are made locally, with the objective of boosting investments in the interior regions and promoting SME development. The CDC is governed by a supervisory committee composed of representatives from different ministries and chaired by the Minister of Finance. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are 110 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and public institutions in Tunisia per the Ministry of Finance’s most recent (May 2020) report on public enterprises. SOEs are still prominent throughout the economy but are heavily indebted. Per the Tunisian Ministry of Finance report on transfers and guarantees to SOEs, total transfers reached $2.6 billion in 2021 with $392 million dedicated to payroll. Annual budgetary transfers amounted to 6.3 percent of GDP in 2021, with significant amounts directed to three SOEs in the form of subsidies for cereals, fuel, and electricity. Many SOEs compete with the private sector, in industries such as telecommunications, banking, and insurance, while others hold monopolies in sectors considered sensitive by the government, such as railroad, transportation, water and electricity distribution, and port logistics. Importation of basic food staples and strategic items such as cereals, rice, sugar, and edible oil also remains under SOE control. The GOT appoints senior management officials to SOEs, who report directly to the ministries responsible for the companies’ sector of operation. SOE boards of directors include representatives from various ministries and personnel from the company itself. Similar to private companies, the law requires SOEs to publish independently audited annual reports, regardless of whether corporate capital is publicly traded on the stock market. The GOT encourages SOEs to adhere to OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance, but adherence is not enforced. Investment banks and credit agencies tend to associate SOEs with the government and consider them as having the same risk profile for lending purposes. The GOT allows foreign participation in its privatization program. A significant share of Tunisia’s FDI in recent years has come from the privatization of state-owned or state-controlled enterprises. Privatization has occurred in many sectors, such as telecommunications, banking, insurance, manufacturing, and fuel distribution, among others. In 2011, the GOT confiscated the assets of the former regime. The list of assets involved every major economic sector. According to the Commission to Investigate Corruption and Malfeasance, a court order is required to determine the ultimate handling of frozen assets. Because court actions frequently take years – and with the government facing immediate budgetary needs – the GOT allowed privatization bids for shares in Ooredoo (a foreign telecommunications company of which 30 percent of shares were confiscated from the previous regime), Ennakl, Alpha Ford, and City Cars (car distribution), Goulette Shipping Cruise (cruise terminal management), Airport VIP Service (business lounge management), and Banque de Tunisie and Zitouna Bank (banking). The government is expected to sell some of its stakes in state-owned banks; however, no clear plan has been adopted or communicated so far due to fierce opposition by labor unions. 10. Political and Security Environment President Kais Saied was elected in the aftermath of presidential and parliamentary elections held in September and October 2019, the country’s first elections since its post-revolution constitution was ratified in 2014, which were widely regarded as well-executed and credible. The transition of power was smooth and without incident, following a clear procedure outlined by the 2014 constitution. In the 10 years since the revolution, Tunisia has made significant progress in the areas of civil society and rights-based reforms, but economic indicators continue to lag and have been a major driver of frequent protests. Public opinion polls indicated that corruption, poor economic conditions, and persistently high unemployment fuel public discontent with the political class. On July 25, citing widespread protests and political paralysis, President Saied took “exceptional measures” under Article 80 of the constitution to dismiss Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi, freeze parliament’s activities for 30 days, and lift the immunity of members of parliament. On August 23, Saied announced an indefinite extension of the “exceptional measures” period and on September 22, he issued a decree granting the president certain executive, legislative, and judiciary powers and authority to rule by decree, but allowed continued implementation of the preamble and chapters one and two, which guarantee rights and freedoms. Civil society organizations and multiple political parties raised concern that through these decrees President Saied granted himself unprecedented decision-making powers, without checks and balances and for an unlimited period. On September 29, Saied named Najla Bouden Romdhane as prime minister, and on October 11, she formed a government. On December 13, Saied announced a timeline for constitutional reforms including public consultations and the establishment of a committee to revise the constitution and electoral laws, leading to a national referendum in July 2022. Parliamentary elections would follow in December 2022. On March 30, President Saied issued a decree formally dissolving Parliament. Terrorist groups continue to operate in the mountains of Western Tunisia and developments in Libya continue to affect the security situation along the Tunisian-Libyan border. Extremist groups, including ISIS affiliates, operate and recruit in the country’s interior, particularly in disadvantaged regions. Tunisia has been under a State of Emergency since November 24, 2015, following two major terrorist attacks that targeted tourism destinations. Under the state of emergency, security forces have more authority to maintain civil order, enabling the government to focus on combating terrorism. Despite COVID-19 and economic challenges that affect national resources, Tunisia continues to demonstrate consistent security force readiness to combat security threats. There have been no terrorist attacks targeting tourists or other western interests since June 2015. Extremist elements continue to target police and military forces in suspected “lone wolf” attacks, including in front of the U.S. Embassy on March 6, 2020, and more recently in November 2021 at the Ministry of Interior in downtown Tunis. Travelers are urged to visit www.travel.state.gov for the latest travel alerts and warnings regarding Tunisia. Turkey Executive Summary Turkey experienced strong economic growth on the back of the many positive economic and banking reforms it implemented between 2002 and 2007, and it weathered the global economic crisis of 2008-2009 better than most countries, establishing itself as a relatively stable emerging market with a promising trajectory of reforms and a strong banking system. However, over the last several years, economic and democratic reforms have stalled and by some measures regressed. GDP growth was 2.6 percent in 2018 as the economy entered a recession in the second half of the year. Challenged by the continuing currency crisis, particularly in the first half of 2019, the Turkish economy grew by only 0.9 percent in 2019. Turkey’s expansionist monetary policy pushed Turkey’s economy to grow by 1.8 percent in 2020 despite the pandemic, though high inflation and persistently high unemployment have been exacerbated. In 2021, Turkey’s GDP grew 11 percent year-over-year (YOY), the highest growth rate in ten years. However, this year growth is expected to be around 3.3 percent, but with significant downside risks. The spending of over USD 100 billion in foreign reserves in a vain attempt to stop the lira’s devaluation, and unorthodox monetary policies that have fueled inflation have left Turkey vulnerable to external shocks. Despite recent growth, the government’s economic policymaking remains opaque, erratic, and politicized, contributing to long-term and sometimes acute depreciation of the Turkish lira. In September 2021, the Central Bank of Turkey embarked on a series of rate cuts that lowered the key interest rate by 500 basis points, leaving real rates deeply negative. Inflation in 2021 was 48.7 percent and unemployment 11.2 percent, with a slight recovery in labor force participation (52.9 percent). Macroeconomic instability and the government’s push to require manufacturing and data localization in many sectors have negatively impacted foreign investment into the country. Turkey has maintained its 2020 digital service taxes but agreed to a plan to rescind the tax once pillar one of the OECD Inclusive Framework on a global minimum tax is implemented. Other issues of importance include tax reform and the decreasing independence of the judiciary and the Central Bank. Laws targeting the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector have increased regulations on data, social media platforms, online marketing, online broadcasting, tax collection, and payment platforms. ICT and other companies report Government of Turkey (GOT) pressure to localize data, which the GOT views as a precursor to greater access to user information and source code. Law No. 6493 on Payment and Security Systems, Payment Services, and E-money Institutions also requires financial institutions to establish servers in Turkey to localize data. The Turkish Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK) is the authority that issues business licenses if companies localize their IT systems in Turkey and keep the original data (not copies) in Turkey. Regulations on data localization, internet content, and taxation/licensing have chilled investment by other possible entrants to the e-commerce and e-payments sectors. The laws affect all companies that collect private user data, such as payment information provided online for a consumer purchase. In 2020, a law requiring social network providers (SNPs) that serve more than one million users in Turkey to appoint a domestic representative entered into force. The SNPs in-country representatives are obliged to accept service of documents from the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (ICTA), which mainly requests removal of content on the grounds of articles 9 and 9/A of local Law No. 5651. The SNP’s country representative must be a Turkish citizen or a legal person registered in Turkey, and easily accessible to local users. The immediate impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy was sharp, but Turkey managed to contain the number of COVID-19 cases relatively effectively with targeted lockdowns and thanks to its strong health-services infrastructure. The tourism sector, which generates demand for products and various service sectors, was particularly affected. The GOT provided support to protect corporate liquidity, employment, and household incomes. Government investment incentives were refined during the pandemic to attract FDI and encourage green investments. The pandemic exacerbated structural challenges related to high unemployment and the country’s widespread informal economy, which hit the informal sector workers and the self-employed the hardest. While there has been progress in creating quality jobs over the past 15 years, the number of jobs decreased after both the 2018 financial turmoil and because of COVID-19. Turkey ratified the Paris Agreement in 2021 and continues to make progress on its green initiatives. Turkey’s FDI incentive packages are updated regularly, and in 2021 they were altered to include more incentives targeted at green projects as identified by the Ministry of Industry and Technology. The opacity and inconsistency of government economic decision making, and concerns about the government’s commitment to the rule of law, have led to historically low levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). While there are still an estimated 1,700 U.S. businesses active in Turkey, many with long-standing ties to the country, the share of American activity is relatively low given the size of the Turkish economy. Investment inflows in 2021 were USD 14.1 billion, an increase of 19 percent from 2019 and the highest rate in the last five years. However, real estate acquisition by foreign nationals accounted for 41 percent of the total inflows in 2021 with USD 5.8 billion, and equity capital inflows were the biggest slice of the FDI pie with USD 7.6 billion. Increased protectionist measures continue to add to the challenges of investing in Turkey. Progress in combatting corruption is also necessary for many of the GOT’s current and future policies to work effectively. Turkey’s investment climate is positively influenced by its favorable demographics and prime geographical position, providing access to multiple regional markets. Turkey is an island of relative stability in a turbulent region, making it a popular hub for regional operations. Turkey has a relatively educated work force, well-developed infrastructure, and a consumption-based economy. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 96 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 41 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $5,814 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $9,050 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Turkey acknowledges that it needs to attract significant new foreign direct investment (FDI) to meet its ambitious development goals. As a result, Turkey has one of the most liberal legal regimes for FDI among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members. According to the Central Bank of Turkey’s balance of payments data, Turkey attracted a total of USD 7.59 billion of FDI in 2021, almost USD 1.8 billion higher than 2020’s USD 5.79 billion. The figures demonstrate that Turkey needs to take steps to stabilize its macroeconomic fundamentals, in addition to improve enforcement of international trade rules, ensure the transparency and timely execution of judicial awards, increase engagement with foreign investors on policy issues, and to implement consistent monetary and fiscal economic policies to promote strong, sustainable, and balanced growth. Turkey also needs to take other political measures to increase stability and predictability for investors. A stable banking sector, tight fiscal controls, efforts to reduce the size of the informal economy, increased labor market flexibility, improved labor skills, and continued privatization of state-owned enterprises would, if pursued, have the potential to improve the investment environment in Turkey. Most sectors open to Turkish private investment are also opened to foreign participation and investment. All investors, regardless of nationality, face similar challenges: macroeconomic instability, excessive bureaucracy, a slow judicial system, relatively high and inconsistently applied taxes, and frequent changes in the legal and regulatory environment. Structural reforms that would create a more transparent, equal, fair, and modern investment and business environment remain stalled. Venture capital and angel investing are still relatively new in Turkey. Turkey does not screen, review, or approve FDI specifically. However, the government has established regulatory and supervisory authorities to regulate different types of markets. Important regulators in Turkey include the Competition Authority; the Excessive Pricing Evaluation Board; Energy Market Regulation Authority; Banking Regulation and Supervision Authority; Information and Communication Technologies Authority; Tobacco, Tobacco Products and Alcoholic Beverages Market Regulation Board; Privatization Administration; Public Procurement Authority; Radio and Television Supreme Council; and Public Oversight, Accounting, and Auditing Standards Authority. Screening mechanisms are executed to maintain fair competition and for other economic benefits. If an investment fails a review, possible outcomes can vary from a notice to remedy, which allows for a specific period to correct the problem, to penalty fees. The Turkish judicial system allows for appeals of any administrative decision, including tax courts that deal with tax disputes. There are no general limits on foreign ownership or control. However, there is increasing pressure in some sectors for foreign investors to partner with local companies and transfer technology, and some discriminatory barriers to foreign entrants, based on “anti-competitive practices,” especially in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector and the pharmaceuticals sector. In many areas, Turkey’s regulatory environment is business friendly. Investors can establish a business in Turkey irrespective of nationality or place of residence. There are no sector-specific restrictions that discriminate against foreign investor access, which are prohibited by World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations. The OECD published an Environmental Performance Review for Turkey in February 2019, noting the country was the fastest growing among OECD members, and an Economic Survey of Turkey in 2021, which noted that investor confidence in policy predictability could not be consolidated, and risk premium and exchange rate volatility remained very high. The OECD survey which includes details on policy recommendations can be found at: https://www.oecd.org/turkey/oecd-environmental-performance-reviews-turkey-2019-9789264309753-en.htm Turkey’s most recent investment policy review through the World Trade Organization (WTO) was conducted in March 2016. Turkey has cooperated with the World Bank to produce several reports on the general investment climate that can be found at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp431_e.htm The International Investors Association (YASED)’s members represent 85 percent of all FDI in Turkey. YASED has a working group structure to support the demands of investors and targets common themes to express investors’ perspectives and concerns to the government to shape the policymaking processes. YASED’s publications can be found at: https://www.yased.org.tr/reports The Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Investment Office is the official organization for promoting Turkey’s sectoral investment opportunities to the global business community and assisting investors before, during, and after their entry into Turkey. Its website is clear and easy to use, with information about legislation and company establishment. https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/pages/home-page.aspx The conditions for foreign investors setting up a business and transferring shares are the same as those applied to local investors. International investors may establish any form of company set out in the Turkish Commercial Code (TCC), which offers a corporate governance approach that meets international standards, fosters private equity and public offering activities, creates transparency in managing operations, and aligns the Turkish business environment with EU legislation as well as with the EU accession process. Turkey defines micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises according to Decision No. 2022/5315 of the Official Gazette dated March 17, 2022: Micro-sized enterprises: fewer than 10 employees and less than or equal to 5 million Turkish lira in net annual sales or financial statement. Small-sized enterprises: fewer than 50 employees and less than or equal to 50 million Turkish lira in net annual sales or financial statement. Medium-sized enterprises: fewer than 250 employees and less than or equal to 250 million Turkish lira in net annual sales or financial statement. The government promotes outward investment via investment promotion agencies and other platforms. It does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime The GOT has adopted policies and laws that, in principle, should foster competition and transparency. The GOT makes its budgetary spending reports available online. Copies of draft bills are generally made available to the public by posting them to the websites of the relevant ministry, Parliament, or Official Gazette. Foreign companies in several sectors; however, claim that regulations are applied in a nontransparent manner. Public tender decisions and regulatory updates can be opaque and politically driven. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures appear to be consistent with international norms, including standards set forth by the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the EU, and the OECD. Publicly traded companies adhere to international accounting standards and are audited by well-respected international firms. Turkey is a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) and is party to the Inclusive Framework’s October 2021 deal on the two-pillar solution to global tax challenges, including a global minimum corporate tax. In 2021, Turkey’s Office of the Presidency partnered with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to assess the Impact Investing Ecosystem in Turkey and the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Investor Map Turkey. These efforts provided preliminary steps towards environmental, social, and governance (ESG) regulations. Turkey’s Capital Markets Board (CMB) amended its Corporate Governance Communique on Turkey’s Sustainability Principles Compliance Framework for publicly traded companies in 2020. The Framework offers publicly traded companies an opportunity to take their social, environmental, and governance impact seriously, beyond shareholders’ demands. There is no standard ESG legal framework but the GOT recommends that all companies operating in Turkey proactively adopt EGT standards. Turkey is a candidate for EU membership; however, the accession process has stalled, with the opening of new chapters put on hold. Some, though not all, Turkish regulations have been harmonized with the EU, and the country has adopted many European regulatory norms and standards. Turkey is a member of the WTO, though it does not notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Turkey’s legal system is based on civil law, provides means for enforcing property and contractual rights, and has written commercial and bankruptcy laws. Turkey’s court system is overburdened, which sometimes results in slow decisions and judges lacking sufficient time to consider complex issues. Judgments of foreign courts, under certain circumstances, need to be upheld by local courts before they are accepted and enforced. Recent developments reinforce the Turkish judicial system’s need to undertake significant reforms to adopt fair, democratic, and unbiased standards. The government is currently implementing a series of judicial reform packages introduced since 2019, but Amnesty International noted the reforms “fail to bring Turkey’s laws in line with human rights law and standards, and rather tinker at the edges of a system marked by the deepening erosion of independence of the judiciary.” The judiciary remains subject to influence, particularly from the executive branch, and faces significant challenges that limit judicial independence. The judicial reform strategy’s nine priorities are: protecting and improving rights and freedoms, improving judicial independence, objectivity and transparency, improving both the quality and quantity of human resources, increasing performance and productivity, enabling the right of defense to be used effectively, making justice more approachable, increasing the effectiveness of the penal justice system, simplifying civil justice and administrative procedures, and popularizing alternative mediation methods. Turkey’s investment legislation is simple and complies with international standards, offering equal treatment for all investors. The New Turkish Commercial Code No. 6102 (“New TCC”) was published in February , 2011. The backbone of the investment legislation is made up of the Encouragement of Investments and Employment Law No. 5084, Foreign Direct Investments Law No. 4875, international treaties, and various laws and related sub-regulations on the promotion of sectorial investments. Regulations related to mergers and acquisitions include: the Turkish Code of Obligations: Article 202 and Article 203; the Turkish Commercial Code: Articles 134-158; the Execution and Bankruptcy Law: Article 280; the Law on the Procedures for the Collection of Public Receivables: Article 30; and the Law on Competition: Article 7. https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/ The Competition Authority is the sole authority on competition issues in Turkey and handles private sector transactions. Public institutions are exempt from its authority. The Constitutional Court can overrule the Competition Authority’s finding of innocence in a competition case. There have been some cases of Turkish courts blocking foreign company operations based on competition concerns, with a few investigations into foreign companies initiated. Such cases can take over a year to resolve, during which time the companies can be prohibited from doing business in Turkey, which benefits their (local) competitors. The Government of Turkey established a related board, called the Excessive Pricing Evaluation Board, in 2019 and under the authority of the Ministry of Trade. As inflation has increased, exacerbated by the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, some private sector contacts note a marked increase in the frequency and aggressiveness of audits by the board. The board reportedly uses a “secret comparable,” whereby a product’s price is compared against that of another company whose name is not revealed. In 2021, an increasingly active Competition Authority of Turkey (RK) has stepped up its investigations with the purported intent of protecting consumers from anticompetitive behavior and price gouging. On October 29, 2022, RK fined five supermarkets and one supplier a combined USD 283 million for violating antitrust regulations. Under the U.S.-Turkey Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), expropriation can only occur in accordance with due process of law, can only be for a public purpose, and must be non-discriminatory. Compensation must be prompt, adequate, and effective. The GOT occasionally expropriates private real property for public works or for state industrial projects. The GOT agency expropriating the property negotiates the purchase price. If the owners of the property do not agree with the proposed price, they are able to challenge the expropriation in court and ask for additional compensation. There are no known outstanding expropriation or nationalization cases for U.S. firms. Although there is not a pattern of discrimination against U.S. firms, the GOT has aggressively targeted businesses, banks, media outlets, and mining and energy companies with alleged ties to the so-called “Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETO)” and/or the July 2016 attempted coup, including the expropriation of over 1,100 private companies worth more than USD 11 billion. ICSID Convention and New York Convention Turkey is a member of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and is a signatory to the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Foreign arbitral awards will be enforced if the country of origin of the award is a New York Convention state, if the dispute is commercial under Turkish law, and if none of the grounds under Article V of the New York Convention are proved by the opposing party. Investor-State Dispute Settlement U.S. investors generally have full access to Turkey’s local courts and the ability to take the government directly to international binding arbitration if a breach of the U.S.-Turkey Bilateral Investment Treaty has occurred. International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts Turkey adopted the International Arbitration Law, based on the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model law, in 2001. Local courts accept binding international arbitration of investment disputes between foreign investors and the state. In practice, however, Turkish courts have sometimes failed to uphold international arbitration awards involving private companies and have favored Turkish firms. There are two main arbitration bodies in Turkey: the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (www.tobb.org.tr ) and the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce Arbitration and Mediation Center (www.itotam.com/en ). Most commercial disputes can be settled through arbitration, including disputes regarding public services. Parties decide the arbitration procedure, set the arbitration rules, and select the language of the proceedings. The Istanbul Arbitration Center was established in October 2015 as an independent, neutral, and impartial institution to mediate both domestic and international disputes through fast-track arbitration, emergency arbitrator, and appointments for ad hoc procedures. Its decisions are binding and subject to international enforcement (www.istac.org.tr/en ). As of January 2019, some commercial disputes may be subject to mandatory mediation; if the parties are unable to resolve the dispute through mediation, the case moves to a trial. Turkey criminalizes bankruptcy and has a bankruptcy law based on the Execution and Bankruptcy Code No. 2004 (the “EBL”), published in t 1932, and numbered 2128. 6. Financial Sector The Turkish Government encourages and offers an effective regulatory system to facilitate portfolio investment. Since the start of 2020, a currency crisis that has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, and high levels of dollarization have raised liquidity concerns among some commentators. Existing policies facilitate the free flow of financial resources into product and factor markets. The government respects IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is generally allocated on market terms, though the GOT has increased low- and no-interest loans for certain parties, and pressured state-owned banks to increase their lending, especially for stimulating economic growth and public projects. Foreign investors can get credit on the local market. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. The Turkish Government adopted a framework Capital Markets Law in 2012, aimed at bringing greater corporate accountability, protection of minority-shareholders, and financial statement transparency. Turkish capital markets in 2020 drew growing interest from domestic investors, according to data from the Central Registry Agency (MKK). In 2021, the number of local real investors reached 2.3 million, up an average of 65,200 per month, with the total portfolio value reaching USD 22.2 billion. The Turkish banking sector remains relatively healthy. The estimated total assets of the country’s largest banks were as follows at the end of 2021: Ziraat Bankasi A.S. – USD 102.69 billion, Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi – USD 77.08 billion, Halk Bankasi – USD 67.49 billion, Is Bankasi – USD 69.44 billion, Garanti Bankasi– USD 56.78 billion, Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi – USD 58.51 billion, Akbank – USD 57.15 billion. According to the Turkish Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK), the share of non-performing loans in the sector was approximately 3.15 percent at the end of 2021, though there appears to have been some regulatory forbearance during the COVID pandemic. The only requirements for a foreigner to open a bank account in Turkey are a passport copy and either an identification number from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or a Turkish tax identification number. The BDDK monitors and supervises Turkey’s banks. The BDDK is headed by a board whose seven members are appointed for six-year terms. Bank deposits are protected by an independent deposit insurance agency, the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF). Because of historically high local borrowing costs and short repayment periods, foreign and local firms frequently seek credit from international markets to finance their activities. Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in the country. Foreign Exchange Turkish law guarantees the free transfer of profits, fees, and royalties, and repatriation of capital. This guarantee is reflected in Turkey’s 1990 Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States, which mandates unrestricted and prompt transfer in a freely usable currency at a legal market-clearing rate for all investment-related funds. There is little difficulty in obtaining foreign exchange in Turkey, and there are no foreign-exchange restrictions. Throughout 2021, the GOT continued to encourage businesses to conduct trade in lira. An amendment to the Decision on the Protection of the Value of the Turkish Currency was made with Presidential Decree No. 85 in September 2018 wherein the GOT tightened restrictions on Turkey-based businesses conducting numerous types of transactions using foreign currencies or indexed to foreign currencies. The Turkish Ministry of Treasury and Finance may grant exceptions, however. Funds associated with any form of investment can be freely converted into any world currency. A limit on banks’ currency swap, forward and option transactions with non-resident partners at 10 percent of their capital since September 2020. In November 2020, the limit for swaps, forward and option transactions where banks pay Turkish lira at maturity was raised to up to 30 percent, depending on their remaining maturities. Turkey took a variety of such measures to prop up the Turkish lira, including the mandatory surrender and repatriation requirements on FX export proceeds; generally, within 180 days and at least 80 percent had to be surrendered to a local bank in exchange for Turkish liras. In January 2020, the surrender requirement was dropped, but the repatriation requirement remained. However, in January 2022 the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) announced it would buy 25 percent of all euro, dollar, or British Pound-denominated export income from exporters. There is no limit on the amount of foreign currency that may be brought into Turkey, but not more than 25,000 Turkish lira or 10,000 euros worth of foreign currency may be taken out without declaration. Although the Turkish lira is fully convertible, most international transactions are denominated in U.S. dollars or euros due to their universal acceptance. Banks deal in foreign exchange and do borrow and lend in foreign currencies. While for the most part foreign exchange is freely traded and widely available, a May 2019 government decree imposed a settlement delay for FX purchases by individuals of more than USD 100,000; there is also a 0.2 percent tax on FX purchases. The settlement delay provision was repealed in December of 2020. Foreign investors are free to convert and repatriate their Turkish lira profits. The exchange rate was heavily managed by the CBRT with a “dirty float” regime until November 2020, when a new central bank governor assumed responsibility. After several months of increased policy rates, tight monetary policy, and a more stable Turkish lira, the governor was fired, because of which the lira quickly depreciated by 10 percent. Macroeconomic policy has remained largely unpredictable since then. Remittance Policies In Turkey, there have been no recent changes or plans to change investment remittance policies. Waiting periods for dividends, return on investment, interest and principal on private foreign debt, lease payments, royalties, and management fees do not exceed 60 days. There are no limitations on the inflow or outflow of funds for remittances of profits or revenue. The GOT announced the creation of a sovereign wealth fund (called the Turkey Wealth Fund, or TVF) in August 2016. Unlike traditional sovereign wealth funds, the controversial fund consists of shares of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and is designed to serve as collateral for raising foreign financing. However, the TVF has not launched any major projects since its inception. Several leading SOEs, such as natural gas distributor BOTAS, Turkish Airlines, and Ziraat Bank have been transferred to the TVF, which in 2020 became the largest shareholder in domestic telecommunications firm Turkcell. Critics worry management of the fund is opaque and politicized. The fund’s consolidated financial statements are available on its website (https://www.tvf.com.tr/en/investor-relations/reports ), although independent audits are not made publicly available. Firms within the fund’s portfolio appear to have increased their debt loads substantially since 2016. International ratings agencies consider the fund a quasi-sovereign. The fund was already exempt from many provisions of domestic commercial law and new legislation adopted April 16, 2020, granted it further exemptions from the Capital Markets Law and Turkish Commercial Code, while also allowing it to take ownership of distressed firms in strategic sectors. Turkey issued government debt securities worth USD 4.16 billion in April 2019 to support its state banks and TVF injected 21 billion Turkish Lira of additional capital in May 2020 into three public banks engaged in COVID-19 measures (Ziraat, Halkbank and Vakifbank). 10. Political and Security Environment The period between 2015 and 2016 was one of the more violent times in Turkey since the 1970s. However, since January 2017, Turkey has experienced historically low levels of violence even when compared to past periods of calm, and the country has greatly ramped up internal security measures. Turkey can experience politically motivated violence, generally at the level of aggression against opposition politicians and political parties. A July 2016 attempted coup resulted in the death of more than 240 people and injured over 2,100 others. Since the July 2015 collapse of the cessation of hostilities between the government and the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), along with sister organizations like the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK), have regularly targeted security forces, with civilians often getting injured or killed by PKK and TAK attacks. (Both the PKK and TAK have been designated as terrorist organizations by the United States.) Other U.S.-designated terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) and the leftist Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) are present in Turkey and have conducted attacks in 2013, 2015, 2016, and early 2017. The indigenous Marxist-Leninist insurgent group, DHKP/C, for example, which was established in the 1970s and designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. in 1997, is responsible for several attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Ankara and the U.S. Consulate General Istanbul in recent years, including a suicide bombing at the embassy in 2013 that killed one local employee. The DHKP/C has stated its intention to commit further attacks against the United States, NATO, and Turkey. Still, widespread internal security measures, especially following the failed July 2016 coup attempt, seem to have hobbled its success. In addition, violent extremists associated with ISIS and other groups transited Turkey enroute to Syria in the past, though increased scrutiny by government officials and a general emphasis on increased security – including a newly constructed 911 km wall along Turkey’s border with Syria – has significantly curtailed this access route, especially when compared to the earlier years of the conflict. There have been past instances of violence against religious missionaries and others perceived as proselytizing for a non-Islamic religion in Turkey, though none in recent years. On past occasions, perpetrators have threatened and assaulted Christian and Jewish individuals, groups, and places of worship, many of which receive specially assigned police protection, both for institutions and leadership. Anti-Semitic discourse periodically features in both popular rhetoric and public media, and evangelizing activities by foreigners tend to be viewed suspiciously by the country’s security apparatus. However, government officials support religious freedom as policy and points to Turkey’s religious minorities as a sign of the country’s diversity. Religious minority figures periodically meet with the country’s president and other senior members of national political leadership. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $795,950 2020 $719,920 * www.turkstat.gov.tr Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 $1,430 2020 $5,814 BEA data available athttps://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data *https://evds2.tcmb.gov.tr/index.php?/evds/dashboard/4944 Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $1,557 2020 $2,578 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 19.9% 2019 21.9% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World percent20Investment percent20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx * www.tcmb.gov.tr The IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) data is not consistent with Turkey’s data as reported by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, which can be found at: https://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/TR/TCMB+TR/Main+Menu/Istatistikler/Odemeler+Dengesi+ve+Ilgili+Istatistikler/Uluslararasi+Yatirim+Pozisyonu/ Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (through 2020) From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 124923 100% Total Outward 50,726 100% Qatar 32,445 26% North Macedonia 19,668 39% North Macedonia 17,994 4% United Kingdom 5,211 10% United Kingdom 13,083 10% Germany 2,561 5% Germany 9,360 7% Austria 2,286 .5% Luxembourg 5,291 4% Jersey 2,285 4.5% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) data available at: http://data.imf.org/?sk=40313609-F037-48C1-84B1-E1F1CE54D6D5&sId=1482331048410 Turkmenistan Executive Summary Turkmenistan is currently considered high risk for U.S. foreign direct investment due to endemic corruption, a weak commercial law and regulatory regime, opaque and onerous bureaucratic processes, and strict foreign currency controls. The government has not taken measures to incentivize foreign direct investment outside the petroleum industry and there is no significant U.S. FDI in the country. Turkmenistan has the fourth largest natural gas reserves in the world, though just outside the top ten largest natural gas producers. Almost all government revenue comes from the sale of natural gas, mostly to China, with a lesser dependence on export of petrochemicals, cotton, and textiles. Strict foreign currency controls have resulted in a black-market exchange rate for dollars that averaged over five times the official rate in 2020-2021. This results in an inability to repatriate profits or to convert local currency to dollars to import supplies or equipment. It also distorts data, especially GDP, contributing to the widely held view that most economic indicators released by the government are unreliable. The government often fails to implement or consistently enforce investment-related legislation. There are no meaningful legal protections against government expropriation of assets and there is no independent judiciary. Foreign companies typically pay significantly higher prices for services. Weak education and healthcare systems, as well as underdeveloped physical and telecommunications infrastructure are also challenges. Turkmenistan’s status as one of the most restrictive and isolated countries in the world only grew during the pandemic; the country’s borders were closed for average Turkmen citizens, internal movement between provinces restricted, and regularly scheduled commercial air traffic completely stopped in March 2020 and continuing through publication in April 2022. International travelers, to include foreign workers in the construction, oil and gas industries, travel in and out of the country on charter flights. The government often counts foreign loans as FDI, but there is little genuine FDI in the country. The government has promoted efforts to expand downstream petrochemical production, reduce greenhouse gasses, especially methane, improve energy and water efficiency, increase digitalization, and begin production of hydrogen. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 169 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/country/TKM Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.wipo.int/global_innovation_index/en/2021/ U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.cfm?Area=343&UUID=912a1109-0ce4-466a-8e93-3c0adb2c4b89 World Bank GNI per capita 2019 7,220 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=TM 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Turkmenistan regularly announces its desire to attract more foreign investment, but tight state control of the economy, a lack of transparency, underdeveloped commercial law field, healthcare and infrastructure, and a restrictive visa regime have created a difficult foreign investment climate. There is extremely limited genuine foreign investment in the country outside the oil and gas sector. The government often incorrectly touts foreign loans as investment, which it repays fastidiously. Turkmenistan does not have a functional investment promotion agency. The government selectively chooses its investment partners and establishing a strong relationship with a government official is often essential to achieving commercial success. Decisions to allow foreign participation in projects often appear politically driven. Officials reportedly may “seek rents” for permitting or assisting foreign investors to enter the local market. Some foreign investors have found success working through foreign business representatives who are able to leverage their personal relationships with senior leaders to advance their business interests. A number of foreign companies though have been forced out of the market in recent years due to non-payment of invoices by the government or government connected suppliers and currency controls limiting their ability to repatriate profits. There are no legal limits on foreign ownership or control of companies. In practice, however, the government has only allowed significant foreign ownership and foreign direct investment in the energy sector. The law permits foreigners to establish and own businesses and generally engage in business activities, but profit repatriation remains a major hurdle due to a near ban on official currency conversion. All contractors operating in Turkmenistan for a period of at least 183 days a year must register with the Tax Department of the Ministry of Finance and Economy (formerly the Main State Tax Service). National accounting and international financial reporting standards apply to foreign investors. In the energy sector, Turkmenistan precludes foreign investors from investing in the exploration and production of its onshore gas resources. All land in Turkmenistan is government owned. Turkmenistan generally requires that citizens of Turkmenistan make up 90 percent of the workforce of foreign-owned companies (i.e., for every foreign worker, nine Turkmen citizen must be hired). This policy does not apply to foreign-owned oil and gas companies, which are subject to a more lenient policy requiring only 30 percent of the workforce to be Turkmen citizens, with the expectation that expats will also gradually be replaced by local workers through training programs. Other governmental barriers that have reportedly been used to discriminate against investors include excessive and arbitrary tax examinations, arbitrary license extension denials, and customs clearance and visa issuance obstacles. In most cases, the government has insisted on maintaining a majority interest in any joint venture (JV). Foreign investors have been reluctant to enter JVs controlled by the government, mainly because of differing business cultures and conflicting management styles. Although there is no specific legislation requiring foreign investors to receive government approval to divest, in practice they are expected to coordinate such actions with the government. Private entities in Turkmenistan have the right to establish and own business enterprises. The 2000 Law on Enterprises defines the legal forms of state and private businesses (state enterprises, sole proprietorships, cooperatives, partnerships, corporations, and enterprises of non-government organizations). The law allows foreign companies to establish subsidiaries, though the government does not currently register subsidiaries. The Civil Code of Turkmenistan and the Law on Enterprises govern the operation of representative and branch offices. Enterprises must be registered with the Registration Department of the Ministry of Finance and Economy. The 2008 Law on the Licensing of Certain Types of Activities (last amended in November 2015) lists 44 activities that require government licenses. The Law on Enterprises and the Law on Joint Stock Societies allow acquisitions and mergers. Turkmenistan’s legislation is not clear, however, about acquisitions and mergers involving foreign parties, nor does it have specific provisions for the disposition of interests in business enterprises, both solely domestic and those with foreign participation. Governmental approval is necessary for acquisitions and mergers of enterprises with state shares. Foreign companies with approved government contracts and wishing to operate in Turkmenistan generally receive government support and do not face problems or significant delays when registering their operations in Turkmenistan. Under Turkmen law, all local and foreign entities operating in Turkmenistan are required to register with the Registration Department under the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Before the registration is granted, however, an inter-ministerial commission that includes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Agency for Protection from Economic Risks, law enforcement agencies, and industry-specific ministries must approve it. Foreign companies without approved government contracts that seek to establish a legal entity in Turkmenistan must go through a lengthy and cumbersome registration process involving the inter-ministerial commission mentioned above. The commission evaluates foreign companies based on their financial standing, work experience, reputation, and perceived political and legal risks. The inter-ministerial commission does not give a reason when denying the registration of a legal entity. In order to participate in a government tender, companies are not required to be registered in Turkmenistan. However, a company interested in participating in the tender process must submit all the tender documents to the respective ministry or agency in person. Many foreign companies with no presence in Turkmenistan provide a limited power of attorney to local representatives who then submit tender documents on the company’s behalf. A list of required documents for screening is usually provided by the state agency announcing the tender. The tender process is opaque and difficult to navigate, particularly for companies outside Turkmenistan, and not all tenders are publicly announced. Many tenders are not fully available online and require a local agent to pay a fee to obtain the information on paper. Before most contracts can be signed, the agreement must be approved by the State Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange, the Central Bank, the Supreme Control Chamber, and the Cabinet of Ministers. The approval process is not transparent and often appears politically driven. There is no legal guarantee that the information provided by companies to the government will be kept confidential. After becoming an observer to the WTO in 2020, Turkmenistan submitted its formal application to join the WTO in 2021. However, the government has not yet undergone an investment policy review by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review. Post is not aware of a civil society organization that has provided review of investment policy related concerns. Turkmenistan does not have a business registration website for use by domestic or foreign companies. Depending on the type of business activity a foreign company seeks in Turkmenistan, registration with the local statistics office, the Agency for Protection from Economic Risks, the Registration and Tax Departments under the Ministry of Finance and Economy, and the State Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange could all be required. Business registration usually takes about six months and often depends on personal connections in various government offices. Development and implementation of public policies to attract foreign investment, investment coordination, and assistance to foreign investors are carried out by the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan. The Agency for Protection from Economic Risks under the Ministry of Finance and Economy makes decisions on providing any investment-related services to potential foreign investors based on criteria such as the financial status of the investor. Turkmenistan’s Law on State Support to Small and Medium Enterprises (adopted in August 2009) defines small- and medium-sized enterprises as follows: in industry, power generation, construction, and gas and water supply sectors, small enterprises are defined as those with up to 50 employees and medium enterprises are those with up to 200 employees; in all other sectors small enterprises are those with up to 25 employees and medium enterprises are those with up to 100 people. However, the benefits of the Law on State Support to Small and Medium Enterprises do not apply to: 1) state-owned enterprises; 2) enterprises with foreign investment carrying out banking or insurance activities; and 3) activities related to gambling and gaming for money. As in many countries, business-related activities, particularly any large-scale contracts for goods or services, benefits from face-to-face contact. Foreigners wishing to visit Turkmenistan for business must request a letter of invitation issued by State Migration Service from the inviting Ministry/State Agency to travel to the country; permission also must be received from the government to meet with state ministries, agencies, and enterprises. It is possible to conduct business with the government by hiring a local agent. The U.S. Embassy in Ashgabat can assist U.S. companies interested in identifying potential local partners and requesting a letter of invitation, which allows a traveler to board a plane for Turkmenistan and to request a visa on arrival at the airport. Turkmenistan closed its borders to regularly scheduled international commercial air travel in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic (domestic flights are still available). It is unclear when scheduled international commercial flights will resume. Foreign embassies and some foreign companies arrange charter flights into and out of the country (Istanbul is the most common point of departure and arrival for charter flights). However, these flights are not typically permitted to land at Ashgabat International Airport and instead must land and take off from Turkmenabat or Turkmenbashi Airports. Private citizens are currently subject to 21-days quarantine upon entry. All travelers should refer to travel.state.gov for the most up-to-date information on travel restrictions and quarantine measures. The government of Turkmenistan does not promote or incentivize outward investment and there is no investment promotion agency. The existing policies are aimed at reducing imports and promoting exports. According to unofficial reports, individual entrepreneurs have been known to invest in real estate abroad, namely in Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Those entrepreneurs who invest abroad tend not to disclose such information, fearing possible retribution from the government. 3. Legal Regime The government does not use transparent policies to foster competition and foreign investment. Laws have frequent references to bylaws that are not publicly available. Most bylaws are passed in the form of presidential decrees. Such decrees are not categorized by subject, which makes it difficult to find relevant cross references. Personal relations with government officials can play a decisive role in determining how and when government regulations are applied. There is no information available on whether the government conducts any market studies or quantitative analysis of the impact of regulations. Regulations often appear to follow the government’s “try-and-see approach” to addressing issues. Arbitrary audits and investigations by government bodies are common in relation to both foreign and local companies. Bureaucratic procedures are opaque, confusing, and onerous. The government does not generally provide informational support to investors. As a result, foreign companies may spend months conducting due diligence in Turkmenistan. A serious impediment to foreign investment is the lack of knowledge of internationally recognized business practices, as well as the limited number of fluent English speakers in Turkmenistan, especially outside Ashgabat. English-language material on legislation is scarce, and there are very few business consultants to assist investors. Proposed laws and regulations are not generally published in draft form for public comment. There are no standards-setting consortia or organizations besides the Main State Standards Service. There is no independent body for filing complaints. Financial disclosure requirements are neither transparent nor consistent with international norms. Government enterprises are not required to publicize financial statements, even to foreign partners. Financial audits are often conducted by local auditors, not internationally recognized firms. The legal framework contained in the Law on Petroleum (2008) was a partial step toward creating a more transparent policy in the energy sector. Turkmenistan’s banks completed the transition to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). State-owned agencies began the transition to IFRS in 2012 and fully transitioned to National Financing Reporting Standards (NFRS) in January 2014, which is reportedly in accordance with IFRS. While IFRS may improve accounting standards by bringing them into compliance with international standards, they have no discernible impact on Turkmenistan’s fiscal transparency since fiscal data remains inaccessible to the public. There is no publicly available information regarding the budget’s conformity with IFRS. There is no public consultation process on draft bills and there are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. Public finances and debt obligations are not transparent. Turkmenistan pursues a policy of neutrality (acknowledged by the United Nations in 1995) and generally does not join regional blocs. In drafting laws and regulations, the government usually includes a clause that states international agreements and laws will prevail in the case of a conflict between local and international legislation. Turkmenistan is not a member of Eurasian Economic Union. In July 2020, Turkmenistan became an observer to the WTO and in 2021 applied for full membership. Turkmenistan is a civil law country, and the parliament adopts around 50 laws per year without involving the public, though Presidential decrees often supersede legislation. Most contracts negotiated with the government have an arbitration clause. The Embassy strongly advises U.S. companies to include an arbitration clause identifying a dispute resolution venue outside Turkmenistan. Investment and commercial disputes involving Turkmenistan have three common themes: nonpayment of debts, non-delivery of goods or services, and contract renegotiations. The government may claim the provider did not meet the terms of a contract as justification for nonpayment. Several disputes have centered on the government’s unwillingness to pay in freely convertible currency as contractually required. In cases where government entities have not delivered goods or services, the government has often ignored demands for delivery. Finally, a change in leadership in the government agency that signed the original contract routinely triggers the government’s desire to re-evaluate the entire contract, including profit distribution, management responsibilities, and payment schedules. The judicial branch is independent of the executive on paper only, but in practice is heavily influenced by the executive branch. In February 2015, an updated law, “On the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Turkmenistan” (first adopted in 1993) was signed. The new law redefined the legal and economic framework for the activities of the Chamber, defined the state support measures, and created a new body for international commercial arbitration under the Chamber’s purview. This body can consider disputes arising from contractual and other civil-legal relations in foreign trade and other forms of international economic relations, if at least one of the parties to the dispute is located outside of Turkmenistan. The enforcement of the decisions of commercial arbitration outside of Turkmenistan may be denied in Turkmenistan under certain conditions listed under Article 47 of the Law of Turkmenistan “On Commercial Arbitration” adopted in 2014 and in force as of 2016. According to the law, the parties in dispute can appeal the arbitration decision only to the Supreme Court of Turkmenistan and nowhere abroad. The government of Turkmenistan recognizes foreign court judgements on a case-by-case basis. According to the 2008 Law on Foreign Investment, all foreign and domestic companies and foreign investments must be registered at the Ministry of Finance and Economy. The Petroleum Law of 2008 (last amended in 2012) regulates offshore and onshore petroleum operations in Turkmenistan, including petroleum licensing, taxation, accounting, and other rights and obligations of state agencies and foreign partners. The Petroleum Law supersedes all other legislation pertaining to petroleum activities, including the Tax Code. According to the Land Code (last amended February 2017), foreign companies or individuals are permitted to lease land for non-agricultural purposes, but only the Cabinet of Ministers has the authority to grant the lease. Foreign companies may own structures and buildings. Turkmenistan adopted a Bankruptcy Law in 1993. Other laws affecting foreign investors include the Law on Investments (last amended in 1993), the Law on Joint Stock Societies (1999), the Law on Enterprises (2000), the Law on Business Activities (last amended in 1993), the Civil Code enforced since 2000, and the 1993 Law on Property. Turkmenistan requires that import/export transactions and investment projects be registered at the State Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange (SCRME) and the Ministry of Finance and Economy. The procedure applies not only to contracts and agreements signed at SCRME, but also to contracts signed between third parties. SCRME is state-owned and is the only exchange in the country. The contract registration procedure includes an assessment of “price justification,” and while SCRME does not directly dictate pricing, it does generally set a ceiling for imports and a minimum price for exports. Import transactions must be registered before goods are delivered to Turkmenistan. The government generally favors long-term investment projects that do not require regular hard currency purchases of raw materials from foreign markets. The Law on Foreign Investment, as amended in 2008, is the primary legal instrument defining the principles of investment. A foreign investor is defined in the law as an entity owning a minimum of 20 percent of a company’s assets. Under Turkmenistan’s law, all local and foreign entities operating in Turkmenistan are required to register with the Registration Department under the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Before the registration is granted, however, an inter-ministerial commission that includes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Agency for Protection from Economic Risks, law enforcement agencies, and industry-specific ministries must approve it. There is no “one-stop-shop” website for investment that provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. Foreign companies without approved government contracts that seek to establish a legal entity in Turkmenistan must go through a lengthy and cumbersome registration process involving the inter-ministerial commission mentioned above. The commission evaluates foreign companies based on their financial standing, work experience, reputation, and perceived political and legal risks. There is no publicly available information on which agencies review transactions for competition-related concerns. The government does not publish information on any competition cases. While Turkmenistan does not have a specific law that governs competition, Article 17 (Development of Competition and Antimonopoly Activities) of the Law on State Support to Small and Medium Enterprises seeks to promote fair competition in the country. The government has a history of arbitrarily expropriating the property of local businesses and individuals. Three known cases raise expropriation concerns for foreign businesses investing in Turkmenistan. In December 2016, the government expropriated the largest (and only foreign owned) grocery store in Ashgabat, Yimpaş (Yimpash) shopping and business center, without compensation or other legal remedy. In April 2017, the Turkish Hospital in Ashgabat was expropriated without compensation. In September 2017, Russian cell phone service provider MTS suspended its operations after the state-owned Turkmen Telecom cut the company off from the network over an alleged expired license. In each case the companies involved had valid licenses or leases. Turkmenistan’s legislation does not provide for private ownership of land. Turkmenistan adopted a Bankruptcy Law in 1993 (last amended March 2016), which protects certain rights of creditors, such as the satisfaction of creditors’ claims in case of the debtor’s inability or unwillingness to make payments. The law allows for criminal liability for intentional actions resulting in bankruptcy. The law does not specify the currency in which the monetary judgments are made. 6. Financial Sector The only stock market in the country is the Ashgabat Stock Exchange. The website, https://agb.com.tm/, is currently available only in Turkmen. According to the website, the only shares listed are in three state-controlled banks, and the five members of the exchange are all state controlled banks. Over the past decade, the Government of Turkmenistan has adopted several laws, including the Law On Securities and Stock Exchanges of Turkmenistan (2014), the Law of Turkmenistan On Foreign Investments (2019), the State Program for the Development of the Banking System of Turkmenistan for 2011-2030. And the launch of the Ashgabat Stock Exchange in 2016. In 2021, USAID sponsored training and expert consultations for the development of the Ashgabat Stock Exchange in conjunction with the Rysgal Joint-Stock Bank. Turkmenistan’s underdeveloped financial system and severe hard currency shortage significantly hinder the free flow of financial resources. There is no publicly available information to confirm whether the government or Central Bank respect IMF Article VIII. There were no reported cases where foreign investors received credit on the local market. According to unofficial reports, credit is not allocated on market terms. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) provides some loans to private small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Turkmenistan. The banking system is underdeveloped. The largest state banks include: The State Bank for Foreign Economic Relations (Vnesheconombank), Dayhanbank, Turkmenbashy Bank, Turkmenistan Bank, Halk Bank, Senagat Bank, and Rysgal bank. These banks generally operate within narrow specializations, such as foreign trade, agriculture, industry, social infrastructure, and savings and mortgages. There are also four foreign commercial banks in the country: a joint Turkmen-Turkish bank (joint venture of Dayhanbank and Ziraat Bank), a branch of Saderat Bank of Iran, as well as Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank offices, which provide European bank guarantees for companies and for the Turkmen government; they do not provide general banking services. The National Bank of Pakistan permanently closed its Ashgabat branch. State banks primarily service state enterprises and allocate credit on subsidized terms to state entities. Foreign investors are only able to secure credit on the local market through equity loans from EBRD and Turkmen-Turkish Bank. There are no capital markets in Turkmenistan, although the 1993 Law on Securities and Stock Exchanges outlines the main principles for issuing, selling, and circulating securities. The 1999 Law on Joint Stock Societies further provides for the issuance of common and preferred stock and bonds and convertible securities in Turkmenistan, but in the absence of a stock exchange or investment company, there is no market for securities. The Embassy is not aware of any official restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account based on residency status, though in practice foreigners may only open foreign currency accounts, and not manat accounts. The country’s largest bank, Turkmenistan Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs, also known as Vnesheconombank, handles most transactions with foreign companies, especially in transactions involving the Government of Turkmenistan. Vnesheconombank’s list of correspondent banks is available at: http://www.tfeb.gov.tm/index.php/en/about-bank-en/correspondent-relations . All banks, including commercial banks, are tightly regulated by the state. The government maintains a sovereign wealth fund known as the Stabilization Fund, which mainly holds state budget surpluses. The government also keeps a separate fund known as the Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund (FERF) for oil and gas revenues. There is no publicly available information about the size of these funds or how they are managed. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate Turkmenistan’s economy and control the lion’s share of the country’s industrial production, especially in onshore hydrocarbon production, transportation, refining, electricity generation and distribution, chemicals, transportation, and construction material production. Education, healthcare, and media enterprises are, with some rare exceptions, also state owned and tightly controlled. SOEs are also to varying degrees involved in agriculture, food processing, textiles, communications, construction, trade, and services. Although SOEs are often inefficient, the government considers them strategically important. While there are some small-scale private enterprises in Turkmenistan, the government continues to exert significant influence on most economic sectors. There are no mechanisms to ensure transparency or accountability in the business decisions or operations of SOEs. There is no publicly available information on the total assets of SOEs, total net income of SOEs, the number of people employed by SOEs and the expenses these SOEs allocate to research and development (R&D). There is no published list of SOEs. Turkmenistan is not a party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the WTO. SOEs are not uniformly subject to the same tax burden as their private sector competitors Efforts to privatize former state enterprises have attracted little foreign or domestic investment. Outdated technology, poor infrastructure, and bureaucratic obstacles can make privatized enterprises unattractive for foreign and local investors. Strategic facilities, as identified by the government, are not subject to privatization, including those related to natural resources. Other property not subject to privatization includes objects of cultural importance, the property of the armed and security forces, government institutions, research institutes, the facilities of the Academy of Sciences, the integrated energy system, and the public transportation system. The rules and procedures governing privatization in Turkmenistan lack transparency. Foreign investors are allowed to participate in the bidding process only after they have been approved by the State Agency for Protection from Economic Risks under the Ministry of Finance and Economy. In December 2013, the parliament passed the Law on the Denationalization and Privatization of State Property, which took effect in July 2014. Despite official comments emphasizing the importance of private sector growth, supporting privatization has been low on the government’s agenda. All land is government owned. Private citizens have some land usage rights, but these rights exclude the sale or mortgage of land. Land rights can be transferred only through inheritance. Foreign companies or individuals are permitted to lease land for non-agricultural purposes, but only the Cabinet of Ministers has the authority to grant leases. Since 2018, the government has offered some agricultural land for 99-year leases to farmers. As of 2019, 40 such leases existed. There was no information publicly available on the number of such leases in 2021. 10. Political and Security Environment Turkmenistan’s political system has remained stable since Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov became president in February 2007 and had a peaceful transfer of power to his son, Serdar Berdimuhamedov in 2022. With the exception of a reported coup attempt in 2002, there is no history of politically motivated violence. There have been no recorded examples of damage to projects or installations. The government does not permit political opposition and maintains a tight grip on all politically sensitive issues, in part by requiring all organizations to register their activities. The Ministry of National Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs actively monitor locals and foreigners. The country’s parliament passed a Law on Political Parties in January 2012 that defines the legal grounds for the establishment of political parties, including their rights and obligations. In August 2012, under the directive of President Berdimuhamedov, Turkmenistan created a second political party, the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. This pro-government party, created from the membership of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, has a platform nearly identical to the President’s Democratic Party. The same is true for the Agrarian Party, which was created in September 2014 in an effort to move Turkmenistan towards a multi-party system. Organized crime is rare, and authorities have effectively rooted out organized crime groups and syndicates. Turkmenistan does not publish crime statistics or information about crime. Uganda Executive Summary Uganda’s investment climate presents both important opportunities and major challenges for U.S. investors. With a market economy, ideal climate, ample arable land, a young and largely English-speaking population, and development underway of fields containing at least 1.4 billion barrels of recoverable oil, Uganda offers numerous opportunities for investors. Despite the negative effects of COVID-19 related countermeasures on the economy, including a 40-day July-August 2021 national lockdown, according to the Bank of Uganda (BOU), the economy grew by 6.5% in 2021, recovering from 1.5% contraction in 2020. On a fiscal year basis, the economy grew by 3.3% in FY 2020/21 (July 1, 2020-June 30, 2021) compared to 3% in FY 2019/20. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is still yet to recover from pre-pandemic levels, with receipts dropping by 35% to $847 million in FY 2020/21 compared to $1.3 billion in FY 2019/20. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects FDI to rebound due to oil-related investments projected at $10 billion over the next five years and the IMF also projects Uganda’s economy to return to pre-pandemic growth that averaged 5.3% from 2014 to 2019. Oil-related investments were spurred by the February 1, 2022 announcement by Uganda and its partners – Tanzania, TotalEnergies, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and the state-owned Uganda National Oil Company (UNOC) – of final investment decision (FID) on upstream oil production, with first oil expected in 2025. Uganda maintains a liberal trade and foreign exchange regime. In 2021, the IMF approved a $1 billion Extended Credit Facility (ECF) to the government to enable the country to deal with the COVID-19 crisis and spur economic recovery. Uganda received the first tranche of $258 million in June 2021 and the second tranche of $125 million in March 2022. As the economy begins to recover, Uganda’s power, agricultural, construction, infrastructure, technology, and healthcare sectors present attractive potential opportunities for U.S. business and investment. President Yoweri Museveni and government officials vocally welcome foreign investment in Uganda. However, the government’s actions sometimes do not support its rhetoric. The closing of political and democratic space, poor economic management, endemic corruption, growing sovereign debt, weak rule of law, growing calls for protectionism from some senior policymakers, and the government’s failure to invest adequately in the health and education sectors all create risks for investors. U.S. firms often find themselves competing with third-country firms that cut costs and win contracts by disregarding environmental regulations and labor rights, dodging taxes, and bribing officials. Shortages of skilled labor, a complicated land tenure system, and increased local content requirements, also impede the growth of businesses and serve as disincentives to investment. An uncertain mid-to-long-range political environment also increases risk to foreign businesses and investors. President Museveni was declared the winner in the widely disputed and discredited January 2021 general elections and started a five-year term in May 2021 after 35 years already in power. Domestic political tensions increased following election-related violence and threats to democratic institutions. Many of Uganda’s youth, a demographic that comprises 77% of the population, openly clamor for change. However, the 77-year-old President has not provided any indication that he or his government are planning reforms to promote more inclusive, transparent, and representative governance. On the legislative front, Uganda’s parliament passed a Mining and Minerals Bill on February 17, 2022, aimed at reforming the mining sector and attracting larger mining companies to exploit Uganda’s cobalt, copper, nickel, rare earth, and other mineral deposits. However, the private sector has noted that the bill could limit potential international investment since it contains high tax and free carried interest provisions and insufficient legal protections for mining firms. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 144 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/uga Global Innovation Index 2021 119 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $50 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.html#446 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $800 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=UG 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Ugandan government and authorities vocally welcome FDI and celebrate its job creation benefits. Furthermore, the country’s free market economy, liberal financial system, and close to 45-million-person consumer market together attract investors. However, rampant corruption, weak rule of law, threats to open and free internet access – including a five-day complete internet shutdown surrounding January 2021 elections and an ongoing, year-long ban on Facebook – and an increasingly aggressive tax collection regime by the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) create a challenging business environment. In June 2021, the government scrapped the $0.056 Over the Top (OTT) daily tax for consumers to access social media channels. The tax was replaced by a 12% excise duty levy on each internet package purchased. The 2019 Investment Code Act (ICA) abolished restrictions on technology transfer and repatriation of funds by foreign investors, and established new incentives (e.g., tax waivers) for investment. However, the ICA also set a minimum value of $250,000 for FDI and a yet-to-be-specified minimum value for portfolio investment. Additionally, the ICA authorized the Ugandan government to alter these thresholds at any time, thereby creating potential uncertainty for investors. Under the ICA, investment licenses carry specific performance conditions varying by sector, such as requiring investors to allow the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) to monitor operations, or to employ or train Ugandan citizens, or to use Ugandan goods and services to the greatest extent possible. Further, the ICA empowers the Ugandan government to revoke investment licenses of entities that “tarnish the good repute of Uganda as an attractive base for investment.” The government has yet to revoke any investor license on this ground. In December 2021, MTN Uganda – the largest telecom company in Uganda – sold 13% of its shares to the public when it listed on the Uganda Securities Exchange (USE). MTN listed the shares in order to move toward compliance with the 2020 Communications Licensing Framework (CLF). The CLF requires telecommunication (telecom) companies to list 20% of their equity on the USE with the aim of increasing local ownership and reducing the repatriation of profits. Airtel, the second largest telecom, is expected to float shares by mid-2022. In 2020, MTN and Airtel paid $100 million and $75 million, respectively, to renew their licenses for 12 years and 20 years, respectively. The Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) facilitates investment by granting licenses to foreign investors, and is tasked with promoting, facilitating, and supervising foreign investments. UIA provides a “one-stop shop” online where investors can apply for a license, pay fees, register businesses, apply for land titles, and apply for tax identification numbers. In practice, however, investors may also need to liaise with other authorities to complete legal requirements. The UIA also triages complaints from foreign investors. The UIA’s website ( www.ugandainvest.go.ug ) and the International Trade Administration’s website ( https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/uganda-market-overview ) provide information on the laws and reporting requirements for foreign investors. Investors often bypass the UIA, citing bureaucratic delays and corruption. For larger investments, companies have reported that political support from and relationship-building with high-ranking Ugandan officials is a prerequisite. President Museveni hosts an annual investors’ roundtable to consult a select group of foreign and local investors on increasing investment, occasionally including U.S. investors. However, the last meeting was held in March 2020, a few days before the first national lockdown was announced to control the spread of COVID-19. Every Ugandan embassy has a trade and investment desk charged with advertising investment opportunities in the country. Except for land, foreigners have the right to own property, establish businesses, and make investments. Ugandan law permits foreign investors to acquire domestic enterprises and to establish greenfield investments. The Companies Act of 2010 permits the registration of companies incorporated outside of Uganda. Foreigners seeking to invest in the oil and gas sector must register with the Petroleum Authority of Uganda (PAU) to be added to its National Supplier Database. More information on this process is available on the Embassy’s website (select – Registering a U.S. Firm on the National Supplier Database): ( HYPERLINK “https://ug.usembassy.gov/business/commercial-opportunities/” h https://ug.usembassy.gov/business/commercial-opportunities/). The Petroleum Exploration and Development Act and the Petroleum Refining, Conversion, Transmission, and Midstream Storage Act require companies in the oil sector to prioritize using local goods and labor when possible and give the Minister of Energy and Mineral Development (MEMD) the authority to determine the extent of local content requirements in the sector. All investors must obtain an investment license from the UIA. The UIA evaluates investment proposals based on several criteria, including potential for generation of new earnings; savings of foreign exchange; the utilization of local materials, supplies, and services; the creation of employment opportunities in Uganda; the introduction of advanced technology or upgrading of indigenous technology; and the contribution to locally or regionally balanced socioeconomic development. The United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) issued its World Investment Report, 2020, available at: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2021_en.pdf The IMF issued an Article IV Consultation and Review of the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Requests for Modifications of Performance Criteria in 2022, and its concluding statement is available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2022/03/15/Uganda-2021-Article-IV-Consultation-and-First-Review-under-the-Extended-Credit-Facility-515168 The World Trade Organization (WTO) issued its most recent Trade Policy Review in 2019; the report is available at: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=254764,251521,117054,95202,80262,80232,82036,106989&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True Global Witness reviewed the state of the mining sector in 2017 and proposed reforms to the mining code: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/oil-gas-and-mining/uganda-undermined/ The UIA “one-stop shop” website assists in registering businesses and investments. In practice, investors and businesses may need to liaise with multiple authorities to set up shop, and the UIA lacks the capacity to play a robust business facilitation role. Prospective investors can also register online and apply for an investment license at https://www.ebiz.go.ug/ . The UIA also assists with the establishment of local subsidiaries of foreign firms by assisting in registration with the Uganda Registration Services Bureau ( http://ursb.go.ug/ ). New businesses are required to obtain a Tax Identification Number (TIN) from the URA, by clicking the “My TIN” link at https://www.ura.go.ug/ or through the UIA. Businesses must also secure a trade license from the municipality or local government in the area in which they intend to operate. Investors in specialized sectors such as finance, telecoms, and petroleum often need an additional permit from the relevant ministry in coordination with the UIA. Under the Uganda Free Zones Act of 2014, the government continues to establish free trade zones for foreign investors seeking to produce goods for export and domestic use. Such investors receive a range of benefits including tax rebates on imported inputs and exported products. An investor seeking a free zone license may apply to the Uganda Free Zones Authority ( https://freezones.go.ug/ ). The Ugandan government does not promote or incentivize outward investment nor does it restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. 3. Legal Regime On paper, Uganda’s legal and regulatory systems are generally transparent and non-discriminatory, and they comply with international norms. In practice, bureaucratic hurdles and corruption significantly impact all investors, but with disproportionate effect on foreigners learning to navigate a parallel informal system. While Ugandan law requires open and transparent competition on government project tenders, U.S. investors have alleged that endemic corruption means that competitors not subject to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or similar legislation, often pay bribes to win awards. Ugandan law allows the banking, insurance, and media sectors to establish self-regulatory processes through private associations. The government continues to regulate these sectors, however, and the self-regulatory practices generally do not discriminate against foreign investors. Potential investors must be aware of local, national, and supranational regulatory requirements in Uganda. For example, EAC rules on free movement of goods and services would affect an investor planning to export to the regional market. Similarly, regulations issued by local governments regarding operational hours, or the location of factories would only affect an investor’s decision at the local level. Foreign investors should liaise with relevant ministries to understand regulations in the proposed sector for investment. Uganda’s accounting procedures are broadly transparent and consistent with international norms, though full implementation remains a challenge. Publicly listed companies must comply with accounting procedures consistent with the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board. Governmental agencies making regulations typically engage in only limited public consultation. Draft bills similarly are subject to limited public consultation and review. Local media typically cover public comment only on more controversial bills. Although the government publishes laws and regulations in full in the Uganda Gazette, the gazette is not available online and can only be accessed through purchase of hard copies at the Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation offices. The Uganda Legal Information Institute also publishes all enacted laws on its website ( https://ulii.org/ ). Uganda’s court system and Inspector General of Government are responsible for ensuring the government adheres to its administrative processes; however, anecdotal reports suggest that corruption significantly undermines the judiciary’s oversight role. In July 2020, the URA started the implementation of the amended Income Tax Act, which imposes presumptive taxes on rental income based on location using a blockchain compliance system meant to improve transparency and reduce corruption. Generally, there is legal redress to review regulatory mechanisms through the courts, and the process is made public. Uganda’s legislative process includes public consultations and, as needed, subject matter expert presentations before parliament; however, not all comments received by regulators are made publicly available and parliament’s decisions tend to be primarily politically driven. Formal scientific or economic analyses of the potential impact of a pending regulation are seldom conducted. Public finances are generally transparent and budget documents are available online. The government annually publishes the Annual Debt Statistical Bulletin, which contains the country’s debt obligations including status of public debt, cost of debt servicing, and liabilities. However, the government’s significant use of supplementary and classified budget accounts – which accounted for 9% of the FY2020/21 budget – undermines parliamentary and public oversight of public finances. The government does not require companies to disclose environmental, social, and governance (ESG) profiles. Per treaty, Uganda’s regulatory systems must conform to the below supranational regulatory systems (though in practice, domestication of supranational legislation remains imperfect): African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP) African Union (AU) Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Commonwealth of Nations East African Community (EAC) Uganda, through the Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS), is a member of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Codex Alimentarius, and International Organization of Legal Metrology (OIML). Uganda applies European Union directives and standards, but with modifications. Uganda is a member of the WTO and notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of all draft technical regulations through the Ugandan Ministry of Trade’s National TBT Coordination Committee. Uganda’s legal system is based on English Common Law. The courts are responsible for enforcing contracts. Litigants must first submit commercial disputes for mediation either within the court system or to the government-run Center for Arbitration and Dispute Resolution (CADER). Uganda does not have a singular commercial law; multiple statutes touch on commercial and contractual law. A specialized commercial court decides commercial disputes. Approximately 80% of commercial disputes are resolved through mediation. Litigants may appeal commercial court decisions and regulatory and enforcement actions through the regular national court system. While in theory the court system is independent, in practice there are credible reports that the executive has attempted to influence the courts in certain high-profile cases. More importantly for most investors, endemic corruption and significant backlogs hamper the judiciary’s impartiality and efficacy. The Constitution and ICA regulate FDI. The UIA provides an online “one-stop shop” for investors ( https://www.ugandainvest.go.ug/ ). Uganda does not have any specialized laws or institutions dedicated to competition-related concerns, although commercial courts occasionally handle disputes with competition elements. There was no significant competition-related dispute handled by the courts in 2021. The constitution guarantees the right to property for all persons, domestic and foreign. It also prohibits the expropriation of property, except when in the “national interest” such as eminent domain and preceded by compensation to the owner at fair market value. In 2020, the two National Telecom Operators – MTN Uganda and Airtel Uganda – renewed their licenses to operate in Uganda for 12 and 20 years respectively. One requirement of those license renewals is for the telecom companies to list 20% stakes on the Ugandan stock market within two years of being granted the license. MTN Uganda listed on the stock exchange in 2021. In 1972, then-President Idi Amin expropriated assets owned by ethnic South Asians. The expropriation was extrajudicial and was ordered by presidential decree. The government did not allow judicial challenge to the expropriations or offer any compensation to the owners. The Ugandan government has since returned most of the properties to the original owners or their descendants or representatives. There have not been any expropriations since, and government projects are often significantly delayed by judicial disputes over compensation for property the Ugandan government seeks to expropriate under eminent domain. The Bankruptcy Act of 1931, the Insolvency Act of 2011, and the Insolvency Regulations of 2013 generally align Uganda’s legal framework on insolvency with international standards. On average, Uganda recovers $ 0.39 per dollar, well above the sub-Saharan average of $0.20. Bankruptcy is not criminalized. 6. Financial Sector The government generally welcomes foreign portfolio investment and has put in place a legal and institutional framework to manage such investments. The Capital Markets Authority (CMA) licenses brokers and dealers and oversees the USE, which is now trading the stock of 18 companies. USE liquidity remains low, constraining entry and exit from sizeable positions. Capital markets are open to foreign investors and there are no restrictions for foreign investors to open a bank account in Uganda. However, the government imposes a 15% withholding tax on interest and dividends. Foreign-owned companies may trade on the stock exchange, subject to some share issuance requirements. The government respects IMF Article VIII and refrains from restricting payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is available from commercial banks on market terms, and foreign investors can access credit. However, persistently high yields on Ugandan government-issued securities push up lending rates more broadly, including interest rates on commercial loans, undermining the private sector’s access to affordable credit. For instance, commercial lending rates averaged 19.4% and government 10-year bonds averaged 14% at the end of February 2022. Formal banking participation remains low, with only 35.5% of Ugandans having access to bank accounts, many via their membership in formal savings groups. However, there are 19 million total bank accounts and more than 32 million mobile money accounts used to conduct basic financial transactions as some Ugandans hold multiple accounts. Uganda’s banking and financial sector is generally healthy, though non-performing loans remain a problem. According to the Bank of Uganda’s Financial Soundness Indicators, Uganda’s non-performing loan rate stood at 4.25% at the end of June 2021, down from 6% in June 2020. Uganda has 26 commercial banks, with the top six controlling at least 62% of the banking sector’s total assets, valued at $10 billion. The Bank of Uganda regulates the banking sector, and foreign banks may establish branches in the country. In June 2021, the BOU started the direct regulation of mobile money service providers under the National Payment Systems Act, 2020. In February 2020, the Financial Action Taskforce added Uganda to its “Grey List” due to the country’s insufficient implementation of its anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) policies. As of the end of February 2021, Uganda was still on this watch list due to seven strategic deficiencies in the implementation of AML/CFT policies. As a result, Uganda’s correspondent banking relationships face increased oversight. Uganda has made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and (Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group) ESAAMLG to strengthen its AML/CFT regime and plans to implement FATF’s recommendations by May 2022. Uganda does not restrict foreigners’ ability to establish a bank account. In 2015, the government established the Uganda Petroleum Fund (PF) to receive and manage all government revenues from the oil and gas sector. By law, the government must spend a portion of proceeds from the fund on oil-related infrastructure, with parliament appropriating the remainder of revenues through the normal budget procedure. As of June 2021, the PF had a balance of $65 million. Uganda does not have a sovereign wealth fund but established a fund called the Petroleum Revenue Investment Reserve (PRIR) to ensure responsible and long-term management of revenue from Uganda’s oil resources when oil production begins. As of the end of 2021, the government had not passed the Petroleum Revenue Investment policy to determine where petroleum revenue would be invested. In the 2021 – 2026 Charter of Fiscal Responsibility, the government has committed to spending oil revenue worth 0.8% of non-oil GDP from the previous fiscal year as part of the national budget. The balance would be sent to the PRIR for Investment. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Uganda has thirty State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). However, the Ugandan government does not publish a list of its SOEs, and the public is unable to access detailed information on SOE ownership, total assets, total net income, or number of people employed. The government has not established any new SOEs in 2021 but has ramped up expenditure for car manufacturer Kiira Motors Corporation. While there is insufficient information to assess the SOEs’ adherence to the OECD Guidelines of Corporate Governance, the Ugandan government’s 2021 Office of Auditor General report noted corporate governance issues in seven SOEs. In February 2021, the Ugandan government embarked on a plan to merge some of the SOEs to reduce duplication of roles and costs of administration. This process is still ongoing. SOEs do not get special financing terms and are subject to hard budget constraints. According to the Ugandan Revenue Authority Act, they have the same tax burden as the private sector. According to the Land Act, private enterprises have the same access to land as SOEs. One notable exception is the Uganda National Oil Company (UNOC), which receives proprietary exploration data on new oil discoveries in Uganda. UNOC can then sell this information to the highest bidder in the private sector to generate income for its operations. The government privatized many SOEs in the 1990s. Uganda does not currently have a privatization program. 10. Political and Security Environment There has been an uptick in crime over the past several years – particularly after the start of the pandemic – and Uganda has also experienced periodic political violence associated with elections and other political activities. Security services routinely use excessive force to stop peaceful protests and demonstrations. In 2021, Uganda experienced twin suicide bombings in the capital, Kampala, and another bomb explosion in the city outskirts. In the twin suicide explosions, one targeted the main central police station and the other took place a few dozen meters away from parliament gate. Four victims and the bombers were killed in the twin suicide bombings; ISIS-DRC claimed responsibility for both, as well as the earlier bombing on the outskirts, which killed one. Also in 2021, Minister of Works and Transport Gen. Katumba Wamala was targeted by armed assailants who fired bullets at his car, killing his daughter and driver. He survived with minor injuries. Political tensions increased dramatically prior to, during, and after the January 2021 general elections. Security forces in unmarked cars picked up dozens of opposition supporters and held them in detention long past the constitutionally mandated limit. Cases of torture allegedly perpetrated by elements within the security forces persist. United Arab Emirates Executive Summary The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is urgently pursuing economic diversification and regulatory reforms to promote private sector development; reduce dependence on hydrocarbon revenues; and build a knowledge economy buttressed by advanced technology and clean energy. The UAE serves as a major trade and investment hub for the Middle East and North Africa, as well as increasingly for South Asia, Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Multinational companies cite the UAE’s political and economic stability, excellent infrastructure, developed capital markets, and a perceived absence of systemic corruption as factors contributing to the UAE’s attractiveness to foreign investors. The UAE seeks to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by i) not charging taxes or making restrictions on the repatriation of capital; ii) allowing relatively free movement into the country of labor and low barriers to entry (effective tariffs are five percent for most goods); and iii) offering FDI incentives. The UAE in 2021 launched broad economic and social reforms to strengthen pandemic recovery, respond to growing regional economic competition, and commemorate its 50-year founding anniversary with a series of reforms. The UAE and the country’s seven constituent emirates have passed numerous initiatives, laws, and regulations to attract more foreign investment. Recent measures include visa reforms to attract and retain expatriate professionals, a drive to create new international economic partnerships, major investments in critical industries, and policies to encourage Emirati entrepreneurship and labor force participation. These economic development projects offer both challenges and opportunities for foreign investors in the coming years. In 2022, UAE changed its work week for government bodies from Sunday to Thursday to Monday to Thursday with a half day on Friday in order to more closely align with world markets. Additionally, the UAE approved a comprehensive reform of the national legal system, which, among other aims, developed the legal frameworks around data privacy, investment, regulation and legal protection of industrial property, copyrights, trademarks, and residency. The first-ever federal data protection law regulates how personal data are processed across the UAE, with separate laws on government, financial, and healthcare data to follow. The new Commercial Companies law removes restrictions to facilitate further mergers and acquisition activity. The federal trademark law further expands the scope of legal protection for companies’ trademarks, products, innovations, and trade names by protecting non-traditional patterns of trademarks. These legal reforms are broadly considered to be positive by U.S. companies, but investors will need to carefully consider how these broad changes affect their operations. The Ministry of Finance announced in January 2022 that the UAE will introduce a federal corporate tax on business profits starting in 2023 as part of its membership in the OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. Companies await further guidance on how the new tax policy will be implemented, but it is expected to have a broad and significant impact on companies operating both inside in the UAE and “offshore” in the country’s many economic free zones. The UAE announced in October 2021 that it would pursue net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, to include an investment of $163 billion in renewable energy. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 24 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 33 out of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $19.5 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $39,410 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The UAE actively seeks FDI, citing it as a key part of long-term economic development plans. In 2021, as part of the series of reforms to commemorate the UAE’s 50th anniversary, the government announced a series of programs to with the goal of attracting $150 billion worth foreign investment in the coming decade. The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated government efforts to attract foreign investment to promote economic growth. Under Federal Decree-Law No (26) of 2020, the “Commercial Companies Law,” onshore UAE companies are no longer required to have a UAE national or a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) national as a majority shareholder. UAE joint stock companies no longer must be chaired by an Emirati citizen or have Emirati citizens comprise the majority of its board. Local branches of foreign companies no longer must have a UAE national or a UAE-owned company act as an agent. In March 2021, an intra-emirate committee recommended a list of strategically important sectors requiring additional licensing restrictions. The Abu Dhabi Department of Economic Development (ADDED) published in May 2021 a list of 1,105 commercial and industrial business activities that are eligible for 100 percent foreign ownership, effective June 2021. In August 2021, ADDED introduced the “Reduction Program” to facilitate investment and ease of doing business in Abu Dhabi emirate by reducing requirements and cutting fees. As part of the program, Abu Dhabi cut business startup fees by 94 percent in 2021. In June 2021, the Dubai government published guidelines for full ownership procedures for more than 1,000 commercial and industrial activities. Federal Law No (32) of 2021 introduced two new types of companies: the special purpose acquisition company, or “SPAC,” and the special purpose vehicle, or “SPV.” The law also amended certain provisions related to Limited Liability Companies and public joint stock companies and introduced a regime to allow for the division of Joint Stock Companies. Non-tariff barriers to investment persist in the form of visa sponsorship and distributorship requirements. Several constituent emirates have introduced new long-term residency visas and land ownership rights to attract and retain expatriates with sought-after skills in the UAE. The Federal Decree-Law No (26) of 2020, outlined above, reduced limits on foreign control and right to private ownership of companies. Neither Embassy Abu Dhabi nor Consulate General Dubai (collectively referred to as Mission UAE) has received any complaints from U.S. investors that they have been disadvantaged relative to other non-GCC investors. UAE officials emphasize the importance of facilitating business investment and tout the broad network of free trade zones as attractive to foreign investors. The UAE’s business registration process varies by emirate, but generally happens through an emirate’s Department of Economic Development. The UAE issued Federal Law No (37) of 2021 on commercial registry law to make the Economic Register a comprehensive reference for economic activities in the country and enable use of the unified economic register number as a digital identity for establishments. Links to information portals from each of the emirates are available at https://ger.co/economy/197 . Dubai waived and reduced fees for a total of 88 services provided by various Dubai Government entities in July 2021. In September 2021, the UAE introduced the “Green Visa,” which allows self-employed individuals meeting certain professional requirements to achieve residency for themselves and family members without obtaining a work permit, a shift from previous immigration policies. The UAE also created a “Freelancers Visa” and expanded “Golden Visa” eligibility to include certain managers, CEOs, specialists in science, engineering, health, education, business management, and technology. The Golden Visa, first announced in 2019, allows foreigners who make major investments or focus on in-demand professions to live and work in the UAE without Emirati sponsors and offers extended visa validity compared to the UAE’s traditional work-related visa program. The UAE introduced in September 2021 a single online platform to present all foreign investment opportunities in the UAE: invest.ae . Dubai launched the Invest in Dubai platform, a “single-window” service in February 2021 to enable investors to obtain trade licenses and launch their business quickly. In August 2020, the Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) introduced a new license for startups, entrepreneurs, and technology firms, starting at $1,500 per year. In January 2022, ADDED announced it had removed more than 20,000 requirements to set up businesses in the emirate as part of an ongoing overhaul of procedures. Twenty-six local and federal partner entities participated in the reductions program. As part of Dubai Multi Commodities Center’s (DMCC) broader environment, social, and governance strategy, the DMCC announced in February 2022 that it will bring 20 social and environmental impact-driven businesses into its community through an Impact Scale-Up Program. Accordingly, the DMCC will provide qualifying companies with substantial discounts on business setup costs for five years. Five-year residence visas are available for investors who purchase property worth $1.4 million or more, and 10-year residence visas are available for individuals who invest $2.8 million in a business. The government also provides visas for entrepreneurs and specialized talent in science, medicine, and specialized technical fields. The Abu Dhabi Department of Culture and Tourism launched in February 2021, the Creative Visa for individuals working in cultural and creative industries, including heritage, performing arts, visual arts, design and crafts, gaming and e-sports, media, and publishing. The UAE is an important participant in global capital markets, including through several sizeable sovereign wealth funds, as well as through several emirate-level, government-related investment corporations. 3. Legal Regime The onshore regulatory and legal framework in the UAE continues to generally favor local Emirati investors over foreign investors. The Trade Companies Law requires all companies to apply international accounting standards and practices, generally the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) Board Decision issued a decision in 2020 that public joint stock companies listed on the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) or the Dubai Financial Market (DFM) must publish a sustainability report. In March 2021, the SCA made it mandatory for listed companies to have at least one female representative on their board. Generally, legislation is only published after it has been enacted into law and is not formally available for public comment beforehand. Government-friendly press occasionally reports details of high-profile legislation. The government may consult with large private sector stakeholders on draft legislation on an ad hoc basis. Final versions of federal laws are published in Arabic in an official register “The Official Gazette,” though there are private companies that translate laws into English. The UAE Ministry of Justice (MoJ) maintains a partial library of translated laws on its website. Other ministries and departments inconsistently offer official English translations via their websites. The emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah publish official gazettes online in Arabic. Regulators are not required to publish proposed regulations before enactment. As a GCC member, the UAE maintains regulatory autonomy, but coordinates efforts with other GCC members through the GCC Standardization Organization (GSO). In 2021, the UAE submitted 109 notifications to the WTO committee, including notifications of emergency measures and issues relating to Intellectual Property Rights. Islam is identified as the state religion in the UAE constitution and serves as the principal source of domestic law. Common law principles, such as following legal precedents, are generally not recognized in the UAE, although lower courts commonly follow higher court judgments. Judgments of foreign civil courts are typically recognized and enforceable under local courts. Domestic law is a dual legal system of civil and Sharia laws – the majority of which has been codified. Most codified legislation in the UAE is a mixture of Islamic law and other civil laws. The legal system of the country is generally divided between a British-based system of common law used in offshore free trade zones (FTZs) and onshore domestic law. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York signed a memorandum with the DIFC courts providing companies operating in Dubai and New York with procedures for the mutual enforcement of financial judgments. The Abu Dhabi-based financial free zone hub Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Abu Dhabi Judicial Department in February 2018 allowing reciprocal enforcement of judgments, decisions, orders, and arbitral awards between ADGM and Abu Dhabi courts. The UAE constitution stipulates each emirate can set up a local emirate-level judicial system (local courts) or rely exclusively on federal courts. The Federal Judicial Authority has jurisdiction over all cases involving a “federal entity.” The Federal Supreme Court in Abu Dhabi is the highest federal court. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in seven categories of cases: disputes between emirates; disputes between an emirate and the federal government; cases involving national security; interpretation of the constitution; questions over the constitutionality of a law; and cases involving the actions of appointed ministers and senior officials while performing their official duties. The federal government administers the courts in Ajman, Fujairah, Umm al Quwain, and Sharjah, including vetting, appointing, and paying judges. Judges in these courts apply both local and federal law, as appropriate. Dubai, Ras Al Khaimah, and Abu Dhabi administer their own local courts, hiring, vetting, and paying local judges and attorneys. Abu Dhabi operates both local (the Abu Dhabi Judicial Department) and federal courts in parallel. Employment Law: In December 2021, the UAE issued Federal Law No (33) of 2021, which took effect on February 2, 2022, and repealed UAE Federal Law No (8) of 1980. The new labor law defines contracts, working hours, leave entitlements, safety, and healthcare regulations. The new labor law also sets a minimum wage for employees in the private sector to be determined by the UAE Cabinet. Trade unions, strikes, and collective bargaining is prohibited. Expatriates’ legal residence in the UAE is tied to their employer (kafala system), but skilled labor usually has more flexibility in transferring their residency visa. In 2009, the UAE Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization (MOHRE) introduced a Wages Protection System (WPS) to ensure unbanked workers were paid according to the terms of their employment agreement. Most domestic workers remain uncovered by the WPS. The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religion, race, and national origin. The new labor law protects UAE government efforts to enhance the participation of Emirati citizens and notes that such efforts do not constitute discrimination. Federal Law No (06) of 2020 stipulates equal wages for women and men in the private sector. The DIFC issued amendments in September 2021 to The DIFC Employment Law No (2) of 2019, addressing issues such as paternity leave, sick pay, and end-of-service settlements. ADGM also issued new employment regulations with effect in January 2020, which allowed employers and employees more flexibility in negotiating notice periods and introduced protective provisions for employees ages 15-18. The UAE signaled throughout 2021 its intention to develop a more commercially friendly legislative environment to strengthen foreign investment. In March 2021, the UAE government announced it would allow full foreign investments in the industrial investments as part of its ten-years comprehensive industrial strategy the so called “Operation 300 Billion,” by updating the industrial law to support local entrepreneurs and attract foreign direct investment. It said the new industrial law would include flexible conditions to provide opportunities to small and medium-sized companies and allow 100 percent foreign ownership. The Commercial Companies Law removes the restriction that the nominal value of a share in a joint stock company must be no less than $272,000. The new law also makes certain changes to the provisions regulating limited liability companies and public joint stock companies. It abolishes the maximum and minimum percentage of the founders’ contribution to the company’s capital, and cancels the legal limitation of the subscription period. The law eliminates the requirement for the nationality of the members of the board of directors, and allows companies to transform into a public joint stock company and offer new shares without being restricted to a certain percentage. It allows companies to divide and create legal rules governing division operations. Branches of foreign companies licensed in the UAE would be also allowed to transform into a commercial company with UAE citizenship. To register with the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange, go to: https://www.adx.ae/English/Pages/Members/BecomeAMember/default.aspx To obtain an investor number for trading on Dubai Exchanges, go to: http://www.nasdaqdubai.com/assets/docs/NIN-Form.pdf The Ministry of Economy’s Competition Regulation Committee reviews transactions for competition-related concerns. Mission UAE is not aware of foreign investors subjected to any expropriation in the UAE in the recent past. There are no federal rules governing compensation if expropriations were to occur. Individual emirates would likely treat expropriations differently. In practice, authorities would be unlikely to expropriate unless there were a compelling development or public interest need to do so. The bankruptcy law for companies, Federal Decree Law No (9) of 2016, came into effect in February 2019. The law covers companies governed by the Commercial Companies Law, FTZ companies (with a few exceptions for free zones with their own bankruptcy and insolvency regime, such as the DIFC and ADGM), sole proprietorships, and companies conducting professional business. It allows creditors owed $27,225 or more to file insolvency proceedings against a debtor 30 business days after written notification to the debtor. The law decriminalized “bankruptcy by default,” ending a system in which out-of-cash businesspeople faced potential criminal liability, including fines and potential imprisonment, if they did not initiate insolvency procedures within 30 days. In October 2020, the UAE Cabinet approved amendments to the law and added provisions regarding “Emergency Situations” that impinge on trade or investment, to enable individuals and business to overcome credit challenges during extraordinary circumstances such as pandemics, natural and environmental disasters, and wars. Under the amendments, a debtor may request a grace period from creditors, or negotiate a debt settlement for a period up to 12 months. The bankruptcy law for individuals, Insolvency Law No (19) of 2019, came into effect in November 2019. It applies only to natural persons and estates of the deceased. The law allows a debtor to seek court assistance for debt settlement or to enter liquidation proceedings as a result of the inability to pay for an extended period of time. Under this law, a debtor facing financial difficulties may apply to the court for assistance and guidance in the settlement of his financial commitments through one or more court-appointed experts, or through a court-supervised binding settlement plan. 6. Financial Sector The UAE issued investment fund regulations in September 2012 known as the “twin peak” regulatory framework designed to govern the marketing of investment funds established outside the UAE to domestic investors and the establishment of local funds domiciled inside the UAE. These regulations gave the Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA), rather than the Central Bank, authority over the licensing, regulation, and marketing of investment funds. The marketing of foreign funds, including offshore UAE-based funds, such as those domiciled in the DIFC, require the appointment of a locally licensed placement agent. The UAE government has also encouraged certain high-profile projects to be undertaken via a public joint stock company to allow the issuance of shares to the public. The UAE government requires any company carrying out banking, insurance, or investment services for a third party to be a public joint stock company. The UAE has three stock markets: Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange, Dubai Financial Market, and NASDAQ Dubai. SCA, the onshore regulatory body, classifies brokerages into two groups: those that engage in trading only while the clearance and settlement operations are conducted through clearance members, and those that engage in trading clearance and settlement operations for their clients. Under the regulations, trading brokerages require paid-up capital of $820,000, whereas trading and clearance brokerages need $2.7 million. Bank guarantees of $367,000 are required for brokerages to trade on the bourses. In March 2021, the SCA issued new corporate governance rules under the Chairman of SCA Board Decision No (03 R.M) of 2020 concerning adopting the Corporate Governance Guide for Public Joint Stock Companies. The new Rules describe the principles and objectives of corporate governance which are centered around the key pillars of accountability, fairness, disclosure, transparency, and responsibility. In January 2022, the SCA approved the Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) regulatory framework, paving the way for the listing of the first SPAC on ADX during 2022. Credit is generally allocated on market terms, and foreign investors can access local credit markets. Interest rates usually closely track those in the United States since the local currency is pegged to the dollar. The UAE has a robust banking sector with 48 banks, 21 of which are foreign institutions, and six which are GCC-based banks. The number of national bank branches declined to 521 in September 2021, compared to 559 in September 2020, due to bank mergers and the transition to online banking. Non-performing loans (NPL) comprised 8.2 percent of outstanding loans in Q2 2021, compared with 7.4 percent in Q2 2020, according to figures from the Central Bank of the UAE (CBUAE). The CBUAE recorded total sector assets of $897 billion as of November 2021. The banking sector remains well-capitalized but has experienced a decline in lending and a rise in NPL as a result of the pandemic. These factors have significantly reduced reported profits as banks have made greater provisions for non-performing loans. On March 15, 2020, the CBUAE announced the USD $ 27.2 billion Targeted Economic Support Scheme (TESS) stimulus package, which included USD $13.6 billion in zero-interest, collateralized loans for UAE-based banks, and USD $13.6 billion in funds freed up from banks’ capital buffers. In November 2020, the CBUAE extended TESS to June 2021. In April 2021, the CBUAE extended parts of the TESS until mid-2022, accordingly financial institutions will continue to be eligible to access the collateralized USD $13.6 billion zero-cost liquidity facility. CBUAE’s financing for loan deferrals under the TESS was terminated at end of 2021, marking the first stage of the gradual exit strategy from the measures implemented during the pandemic. In December 2021, the CBUAE extended relief measures regarding banks’ capital buffers and liquidity and stable funding requirements until 30 June 2022. This includes temporary lowering of the capital conservation buffer, and the capital buffer for systemically important domestic banks. Abu Dhabi maintains several major sovereign wealth funds. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) is chaired by UAE President Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan and holds assets of approximately $829 billion. Mubadala Investment Company is chaired by Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan with estimated total assets of approximately $250 billion. Board members of each fund are appointed by the ruler of Abu Dhabi and is the chair of Mubadala. Abu Dhabi Holding (ADQ) includes both investment portfolios and state-owned firms with interests in agriculture, aviation, financial services, healthcare, industries, logistics, media, real estate, tourism and hospitality, transport and utilities with estimated total assets of approximately $ 110 billion. Emirates Investment Authority, the UAE’s federal sovereign wealth fund has estimated assets of $86 billion. The Investment Corporation of Dubai (ICD) is Dubai’s primary sovereign wealth fund, with an estimated $301.6 billion in assets according to ICD’s June 2021 financial report. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are a key component of the UAE economic model. There is no published list of SOEs or GREs at the national or individual emirate level. The influential Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) is strategically important and provides a major source of revenue for the government. Emirates Airlines and Etisalat, the largest local telecommunications firm, are also internationally recognized brands. In some cases, these firms compete against other state-owned firms (Emirates and Etihad airlines, for example, or telecommunications company Etisalat against du). While they are not granted full autonomy, these firms leverage ties between entities they control to foster national economic development. In Dubai, SOEs have been used as drivers of diversification in sectors including construction, hospitality, transport, banking, logistics, and telecommunications. Sectoral regulations in some cases address governance structures and practices of state-owned companies. The UAE is not party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement. There is no privatization program in the UAE. There have been several listings of portions of SOEs, on local UAE stock exchanges, as well as some “greenfield” IPOs focused on priority projects. However, several SOEs have allowed partial foreign ownership in their shares. For example, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company for Distribution, many national banks, some utility operators and the telecom operators, Etisalat and du, now allow minority foreign ownership. In November 2021, Dubai announced plans to list ten SOEs on the Dubai Financial Market as part of a broader strategy to double the financial market’s size to $817 billion. 10. Political and Security Environment Violent crimes and crimes against property are rare. U.S. citizens should take the same security precautions in the UAE that one would practice in the United States or any large city abroad. In March 2022, the United States published a travel advisory for UAE noting pandemic concerns and the potential for missile or drone strikes. The latest information can be found at https://travel.state.gov/. Visitors should enroll in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) to receive security messages. United Kingdom Executive Summary The United Kingdom (UK) is a popular destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) and imposes few impediments to foreign ownership. In the past decade, the UK has been Europe’s top recipient of FDI. The UK government provides comprehensive statistics on FDI in its annual inward investment report: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/department-for-international-trade-inward-investment-results-2020-to-2021. The COVID pandemic triggered a massive expansion of government support for households and businesses. The government focused on supporting business cashflow and underwriting over £200 billion ($261 billion) in loans from banks to firms. Although aggregate investment grew by 5.3 percent in 2021, levels remain below their pre-pandemic peak. Most analysts expect a rebound in investment growth in 2022, however, driven in part by the government’s investment tax super-deduction, which allows business to claim back 130 percent of the cost of an eligible capital investment on their taxable profits up until March 2023, a more stable post-Brexit regulatory framework, and the reduction of economic and mobility restrictions imposed to cope with the pandemic. Most of these measures were phased out by October 2021. Their fiscal impact has been large, however, and the budget deficit reached 8.5 percent of GDP. The government has committed to fiscal consolidation, and in September 2021 announced that it planned to increase the corporation tax rate from 19 percent to 25 percent by 2023 and national insurance contributions by 2.5 percent to fund additional health and social care spending. In response to declining inward foreign investment each year since 2016, and amidst the sharp but temporary recession related to the pandemic, the UK government established the Office for Investment in November 2020. The Office is focused on attracting high-value investment opportunities into the UK which “align with key government priorities, such as reaching net zero, investing in infrastructure, and advancing research and development.” It also aims to drive inward investment into “all corners of the UK through a ‘single front door.’” The UK formally withdrew from the EU’s political institutions on January 31, 2020, and from the bloc’s economic and trading institutions on December 31, 2020. The UK and the EU concluded a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) on December 24, 2020, setting out the terms of their future economic relationship. The TCA generally maintains tariff-free trade between the UK and the EU but introduced several new non-tariff, administrative barriers. Market entry for U.S. firms is facilitated by a common language, legal heritage, and similar business institutions and practices. The UK is well supported by sophisticated financial and professional services industries and has a transparent tax system in which local and foreign-owned companies are taxed alike. The pound sterling is a free-floating currency with no restrictions on its transfer or conversion. There are no exchange controls restricting the transfer of funds associated with an investment into or out of the UK. UK legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international standards. The UK legal system provides a high level of protection. Private ownership is protected by law and monitored for competition-restricting behavior. U.S. exporters and investors generally will find little difference between the United States and the UK in the conduct of business, and common law prevails as the basis for commercial transactions in the UK. The United States and UK have enjoyed a “Commerce and Navigation” Treaty since 1815 which guarantees national treatment of U.S. investors. A Bilateral Tax Treaty specifically protects U.S. and UK investors from double taxation. The UK has, however, taken some steps that particularly affect U.S. companies in the technology sector. A unilateral digital services tax came into force in April 2020, taxing digital firms—such as social media platforms, search engines, and marketplaces—two percent on revenue generated in the UK. The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), the UK’s competition regulator, has indicated that it intends to scrutinize and police the sector more thoroughly. From 2020-2021, the CMA investigated the acquisition of Giphy by Meta Platforms (formerly Facebook). The CMA found that the acquisition may impede competition in both the supply of display advertising in the UK, and in the supply of social media services worldwide (including in the UK) and ordered Meta to sell Giphy. The United States is the largest source of direct investment into the UK on an ultimate parent basis. Thousands of U.S. companies have operations in the UK. The UK also hosts more than half of the European, Middle Eastern, and African corporate headquarters of American-owned multinational firms. In October 2021, the UK government introduced its Net Zero Strategy, which comprehensively sets out UK government plans to cut emissions, seize green economic opportunities, and use private investment to achieve a net zero economy by 2050. The Net Zero Strategy allocates £7.8 billion ($10.5 billion) in new spending and aims to leverage up to £90 billion ($118 billion) of private investment by 2030. In its latest spending review, Her Majesty’s Treasury’s (HMT) estimated that net-zero spending between 2021-22 and 2024-25 would total £25.5 billion ($34.5 billion). The UK government is endeavoring to position the UK as the first net-zero financial center and a global hub for sustainable financial activity. The UK Infrastructure Bank, established in 2021, is providing £22 billion ($29 billion) of infrastructure finance to tackle climate change. In 2021 HMT sold £16 billion ($20.8 billion) worth of the UK’s Green Gilt to help fund green projects across the UK. Through the Greening Finance Roadmap, HMT outlines the UK government’s intent to implement a detailed sovereign green taxonomy, which is expected to be published by the end of 2022, along with sustainable disclosure requirements that would serve as an integrated framework for sustainability throughout the UK economy. Currency conversions have been done using XE and Bank of England data. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 11 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 4 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $890,086 https://www.bea.gov/data/intl-trade-investment/direct-investment-country-and-industry World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $45,870 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The UK actively encourages inward FDI. With a few exceptions, the government does not discriminate between nationals and foreign individuals in the formation and operation of private companies. The Department for International Trade, including through its newly created Office for Investment, actively promotes inward investment and prepares market information for a variety of industries. U.S. companies establishing British subsidiaries generally encounter no special nationality requirements on directors or shareholders. Once established in the UK, foreign-owned companies are treated no differently from UK firms. The UK government is a strong defender of the rights of any UK-registered company, irrespective of its nationality of ownership. Foreign ownership is limited in only a few strategic private sector companies, such as Rolls Royce (aerospace) and BAE Systems (aircraft and defense). No individual foreign shareholder may own more than 15 percent of these companies. Theoretically, the government can block the acquisition of manufacturing assets from abroad by invoking the Industry Act of 1975, but it has never done so. Investments in energy and power generation require environmental approvals. Certain service activities (like radio and land-based television broadcasting) are subject to licensing. The National Security and Investment Act (NSIA) 2021 came into force on January 4, 2022. The NSIA created a new screening regime for transactions which might raise national security concerns in the UK called the Investment Security Unit (ISU). The ISU sits within the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). It is responsible for identifying, addressing and mitigating national security risks to the UK arising when a person gains control of a qualifying asset or qualifying entity. The UK requires that at least one director of any company registered in the UK be ordinarily resident in the country. The UK, as a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), subscribes to the OECD Codes of Liberalization and is committed to minimizing limits on foreign investment. The Economist Intelligence Unit and the OECD’s Economic Forecast Summary have current investment policy reports for the United Kingdom: http://country.eiu.com/united-kingdom https://www.oecd.org/economy/united-kingdom-economic-snapshot/ The UK government has promoted administrative efficiency successfully to facilitate business creation and operation. The online business registration process is clearly defined, though some types of companies cannot register as an overseas firm in the UK, including partnerships and unincorporated bodies. Registration as an overseas company is only required when the company has some degree of physical presence in the UK. After registering their business with the UK governmental body Companies House, overseas firms must separately register to pay corporation tax within three months. Since 2016, companies have had to declare all “persons of significant control.” This policy recognizes that individuals other than named directors can have significant influence on a company’s activity and that this information should be transparent. More information is available at this link: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guidance-to-the-people-with-significant-control-requirements-for-companies-and-limited-liability-partnerships . Companies House maintains a free, publicly searchable directory, available at https://www.gov.uk/get-information-about-a-company. The UK offers a welcoming environment to foreign investors, with foreign equity ownership restrictions in only a limited number of sectors covered by the World Bank’s Investing Across Sectors indicators. https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-international-trade https://www.gov.uk/set-up-business https://www.gov.uk/topic/company-registration-filing/starting-company http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/united-kingdom/starting-a-business The British Overseas Territories (BOTs) comprise Anguilla, British Antarctic Territory, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), Gibraltar, Montserrat, Pitcairn Islands, St. Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, Turks and Caicos Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, and Sovereign Base Areas on Cyprus. The BOTs retain a substantial measure of responsibility for their own affairs. Local self-government is usually provided by an Executive Council and elected legislature. Governors or Commissioners are appointed by the Crown on the advice of the British Foreign Secretary, and retain responsibility for external affairs, defense, and internal security. Many of the territories are now broadly self-sufficient. The UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), however, maintains development assistance programs in St. Helena, Montserrat, and Pitcairn. This includes budgetary aid to meet the islands’ essential needs and development assistance to help encourage economic growth and social development to promote economic self-sustainability. In addition, all other BOTs receive small levels of assistance through “cross-territory” programs for issues such as environmental protection, disaster prevention, HIV/AIDS, and child protection. Seven of the BOTs have financial centers: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. These territories have committed to the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for the automatic exchange of taxpayer financial account information. They are already exchanging information with the UK, and began exchanging information with other jurisdictions under the CRS from September 2017. Of the BOTs, Anguilla is the only one to receive a “non-compliant” rating by the Global Forum for Exchange of Information on Request. The Global Forum has rated the other six territories as “largely compliant.” Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, and the Turks and Caicos Islands have committed in reciprocal bilateral arrangements with the UK to hold beneficial ownership information in central registers or similarly effective systems, and to provide UK law enforcement authorities with near real-time access to this information. These arrangements came into effect in June 2017. Anguilla: Anguilla is a neutral tax jurisdiction. There are no income, capital gains, estate, profit or other forms of direct taxation on either individuals or corporations, for residents or non-residents of the jurisdiction. The territory has no exchange rate controls. Non-Anguillan nationals may purchase property, but the transfer of land to an alien includes a 12.5 percent tax on the assessed value of the property or the sales proceeds, whichever is greater. British Virgin Islands: The government of the British Virgin Islands offers a series of incentive packages aimed at reducing the cost of doing business on the islands. This includes relief from corporation tax payments over specific periods, but companies must pay an initial registration fee and an annual license fee to the BVI Financial Services Commission. Crown land grants are not available to non-British Virgin Islanders, but private land can be leased or purchased following the approval of an Alien Land Holding License. Stamp duty is imposed on transfers of real estate and the transfer of shares in a BVI company owning real estate in the BVI at a rate of four percent for belongers (i.e., residents who have proven they meet a legal standard of close ties to the territory) and 12 percent for non-belongers. There is no corporate income tax, capital gains tax, branch tax, or withholding tax for companies incorporated under the BVI Business Companies Act. Payroll tax is imposed on every employer and self-employed person who conducts business in BVI. The tax is paid at a graduated rate depending upon the size of the employer. The current rates are 10 percent for small employers (those that have a payroll of less than $150,000, a turnover of less than $300,000 and fewer than seven employees) and 14 percent for larger employers. Eight percent of the total remuneration is deducted from the employee, while the remainder of the liability is met by the employer. The first $10,000 of remuneration is free from payroll tax. Cayman Islands: There are no direct taxes in the Cayman Islands. In most districts, the government charges stamp duty of 7.5 percent on the value of real estate at sale, but certain districts, including Seven Mile Beach, are subject to a rate of nine percent. There is a one percent fee payable on mortgages of less than KYD 300,000 ($360,237), and one and a half percent on mortgages of KYD 300,000 ($360,237) or higher. There are no controls on the foreign ownership of property and land. Investors can receive import duty waivers on equipment, building materials, machinery, manufacturing materials, and other tools. Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas): Companies located in the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) are charged corporation tax at 21 percent on the first £1 million ($1.4 million) and 26 percent for all amounts more than £1 million ($1.4 million). The individual income tax rate is 21 percent for earnings below £12,000 ($16,800) and 26 percent above this level. Gibraltar: The government of Gibraltar encourages foreign investment. Gibraltar has a buoyant economy with a stable currency and few restrictions on moving capital or repatriating dividends. The corporate income tax rate is 20 percent for utility, energy, and fuel supply companies, and 12.5 percent for all other companies. There are no capital or sales taxes. Gibraltar is not currently a part of the EU, and its post-Brexit relationship with the bloc is the subject of ongoing negotiations between London and Brussels. Under the terms of an agreement in principle reached between the UK and Spain on December 31, 2020, free movement of workers and goods across the land border between Gibraltar and Spain is temporarily continuing. Montserrat: The government of Montserrat welcomes new private foreign investment. Foreign investors are permitted to acquire real estate, subject to the acquisition of an Alien Land Holding license, which carries a fee of five percent of the purchase price. The government also imposes stamp and transfer fees of 2.6 percent of the property value on all real estate transactions. Foreign investment in Montserrat is subject to the same taxation rules as local investment and is eligible for tax holidays and other incentives. Montserrat has preferential trade agreements with the United States, Canada, and Australia. The government allows 100 percent foreign ownership of businesses, but the administration of public utilities remains wholly in the public sector. St. Helena: The island of St. Helena is open to foreign investment and welcomes expressions of interest from companies wanting to invest. Its government is able to offer tax-based incentives, which will be considered on the merits of each project – particularly tourism projects. All applications are processed by Enterprise St. Helena, the business development agency. Pitcairn Islands: The Pitcairn Islands have approximately 50 residents, with a workforce of approximately 29 employed in 10 full-time equivalent roles. The territory does not have an airstrip or safe harbor. Residents exist on fishing, subsistence farming, and handcrafts. Turks and Caicos Islands: The islands operate an “open arms” investment policy. Through the policy, the government commits to a streamlined business licensing system, a responsive immigration policy to give investment security, access to government-owned land under long-term leases, and a variety of duty concessions to qualified investors. The islands have a “no tax” status, but property purchasers must pay a stamp duty on purchases over $25,000. Depending on the island, the stamp duty rate may be up to 6.5 percent for purchases up to $250,000, eight percent for purchases $250,001 to $500,000, and 10 percent for purchases over $500,000. The Crown Dependencies: The Crown Dependencies are the Bailiwick of Jersey, the Bailiwick of Guernsey, and the Isle of Man. The Crown Dependencies are not part of the UK but are self-governing dependencies of the Crown. This means they have their own directly elected legislative assemblies, administrative, fiscal, and legal systems, and their own courts of law. The Crown Dependencies are not represented in the UK Parliament. Jersey’s standard rate of corporate tax is zero percent. The exceptions to this standard rate are financial service companies, which are taxed at 10 percent; utility companies, which are taxed at 20 percent; and income specifically derived from Jersey property rentals or Jersey property development, taxed at 20 percent. A five percent VAT is applicable in Jersey. Guernsey has a zero percent rate of corporate tax. Exceptions include some specific banking activities, taxed at 10 percent; utility companies, which are taxed at 20 percent; Guernsey residents’ assessable income is taxed at 20 percent; and income derived from land and buildings is taxed at 20 percent. The Isle of Man’s corporate standard tax is zero percent. The exceptions to this standard rate are income received from banking business, which is taxed at 10 percent, and income received from land and property in the Isle of Man, which is taxed at 20 percent. In addition, a 10 percent tax rate also applies to companies that carry on a retail business in the Isle of Man and have taxable income in excess of £500,000 ($695,000) from that business. A 20 percent rate of VAT is applicable in the Isle of Man. The tax data above are current as of March 2022. The UK is one of the largest outward investors in the world, often through bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which are used to promote and protect investment abroad and have been adopted by many countries. The UK’s international investment position abroad (outward investment) in 2020 was $2.1 trillion. The main destination for UK outward FDI is the United States, which accounted for approximately 25 percent of UK outward FDI stocks at the end of 2020. Other key destinations include the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and Spain which, together with the United States, account for a little over half of the UK’s outward FDI stock. Europe and the Americas remain the dominant areas for UK international investment positions abroad. 3. Legal Regime U.S. exporters and investors generally will find little difference between the United States and UK in the conduct of business. The regulatory system provides clear and transparent guidelines for commercial engagement. Common law prevails in the UK as the basis for commercial transactions, and the International Commercial Terms (INCOTERMS) of the International Chambers of Commerce are accepted definitions of trading terms. In terms of accounting standards and audit provisions, firms in the UK must use the UK-adopted international accounting standards (IAS) instead of the EU-adopted IAS for financial years beginning on or after January 1, 2021. The UK’s Accounting Standards Board provides guidance to firms on accounting standards and works with the IASB on international standards. Statutory authority over prices and competition in various industries is given to independent regulators, for example the Office of Communications (Ofcom), the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat), the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), the Rail Regulator, the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The PRA was created out of the dissolution of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in 2013. The PRA reports to the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) in the Bank of England. The PRA is responsible for supervising the safety and soundness of individual financial firms, while the FPC takes a systemic view of the financial system and provides macro-prudential regulation and policy actions. The FCA is a regulatory enforcement mechanism designed to address financial and market misconduct through legally reviewable processes. These regulators work to protect the interests of consumers while ensuring that the markets they regulate are functioning efficiently. Most laws and regulations are published in draft for public comment prior to implementation. The FCA maintains a free, publicly searchable register of their filings on regulated corporations and individuals here: https://register.fca.org.uk/. The UK government publishes regulatory actions, including draft text and executive summaries, on the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy webpage listed below. The current policy requires the repeal of two regulations for any new one in order to make the business environment more competitive. https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/business-regulation https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/regulatory-delivery The UK’s withdrawal from the EU has not yet caused dramatic shifts in the UK’s regulatory regimes but has opened the door to regulatory divergence. The future regulatory direction of the UK remains uncertain as the UK determines whether to maintain the current regulatory regime inherited from the EU or to deviate towards new regulations. The UK is an independent member of the WTO and actively seeks to comply with all WTO obligations. The UK is a common-law country. UK business contracts are legally enforceable in the UK, but not in the United States or other foreign jurisdictions. International disputes are resolved through litigation in the UK Courts or by arbitration, mediation, or some other alternative dispute resolution (ADR) method. The UK has a long history of applying the rule of law to business disputes. The current judicial process remains procedurally competent, fair, and reliable, which helps position London as an international hub for dispute resolution with over 10,000 cases filed per annum. The Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022, which took effect March 15, 2022, established a registry of foreign beneficial owners of real property (freeholds or leases of seven years or more) expected to go into place in September 2022. The Act requires registry of ultimate beneficial owners, including those controlling at least 25 percent of overseas entities that own such property. The requirement applies retroactively to properties purchased in England and Wales since 1999 and in Scotland since December 2014. Entities or their officers who refuse to register or keep their information up to date face tough restrictions on selling the property, and those who break the rules could face a fine of up to £2,500 ($3,270) per day or up to five years in prison. The procedure for establishing a company in the UK is identical for British and foreign investors. No approval mechanisms exist for foreign investment, apart from the process outlined in Section 1. Foreigners may freely establish or purchase enterprises in the UK, with a few limited exceptions, and acquire land or buildings. As noted above, the UK is currently reviewing its procedures and has proposed new rules for restricting foreign investment in those sectors of the economy with higher risk for affecting national security. The National Security and Investment (NSI) Act 2021 – which applies equally to foreign or domestic investment – requires mandatory reporting of significant investments (generally over 25 percent) in 17 sensitive sectors; the reporting requirement extends to investments in intellectual property and in higher education and research. The UK government aims to review cases expeditiously, with most reviews of notifications completed within 30 days. Alleged tax avoidance by multinational companies, including by several major U.S. firms, has been a controversial political issue and subject of investigations by the UK Parliament and EU authorities. Foreign and UK firms are subject to the same tax laws, however, and several UK firms have also been criticized for tax avoidance. Foreign investors may have access to certain EU and UK regional grants and incentives designed to attract industry to areas of high unemployment, but these do not include tax concessions. Access to EU grants ended on December 31, 2020. In 2015, the UK flattened its structure of corporate tax rates. The UK currently taxes corporations at a flat rate of 19 percent for non-ring-fenced companies, with marginal tax relief granted for companies with profits falling between £300,000 ($420,000) and £1.5 million ($2.1 million). On March 3, 2021, Chancellor of the Exchequer Rishi Sunak announced that, starting in 2023, UK corporate tax would increase to 25 percent for companies with profits over £250,000 ($346,000). A small profits rate (SPR) will also be introduced so that companies with profits of £50,000 ($69,000) or less will continue to pay Corporation Tax at 19 percent. Companies with profits between £50,000 ($69,000) and £250,000 ($346,000) will pay tax at the main rate reduced by a marginal relief providing a gradual increase in the effective Corporation Tax rate. Tax deductions are allowed for expenditure and depreciation of assets used for trade purposes. These include machinery, plant, industrial buildings, and assets used for research and development, such as cloud computing. A special rate of 20 percent is given to unit trusts and open-ended investment companies. There are different Corporation Tax rates for companies that make profits from oil extraction or oil rights in the UK or UK continental shelf, known as “ring-fenced” companies. Small “ring-fenced” companies are taxed at a rate of 19 percent for profits up to £300,000 ($420,000), and 30 percent for profits over £300,000 ($420,000). A supplementary tax known as the bank Corporation Tax Surcharge, is applied to companies in the banking sector at eight percent of profits in excess of £25 million ($33 million). To maintain equitable tax rates for banks with the upcoming tax rise, the government has changed the surcharge rate to three percent applied to profits above £100 million ($132 million), starting in April 2023. The UK has a simple system of personal income tax. The marginal tax rates for 2020-2021 are as follows: up to £12,570 ($16,500), 0 percent; £12,501 ($17,370) to £57,700 ($75,740), 20 percent; £57,701 ($75,740) to £150,000 ($196,900), 40 percent; and over £150,000 ($196,900), 45 percent. UK citizens also make mandatory payments of about 13.25 percent of income into the National Insurance system, which funds healthcare, social security, and retirement benefits. The UK requires non-domiciled residents of the UK to either pay tax on their worldwide income or the tax on the relevant part of their remitted foreign income being brought into the UK. If they have been resident in the UK for seven tax years of the previous nine, and they choose to pay tax only on their remitted earnings, they may be subject to an additional charge of £30,000 ($42,000). If they have been resident in the UK for 12 of the last 14 tax years, they may be subject to an additional charge of £60,000 ($84,000). The Scottish Parliament has the legal power to increase or decrease the basic income tax rate in Scotland, currently 20 percent, by a maximum of three percentage points. For guidance on laws and procedures relevant to foreign investment in the UK, follow the link below: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/investment-in-the-uk-guidance-for-overseas-businesses The UK competition regime is established by the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002, as amended by the Enterprise and Regulator Reform Act 2013. This legislative framework created the UK’s independent competition authority, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), which is responsible for enforcing UK competition law. The government has limited powers to intervene in either the assessment of mergers or the investigation of markets. Before Brexit, the prohibitions in UK law on abusing dominant market positions and anti-competitive agreements were based on and underpinned by equivalent provisions in EU law. Since Brexit, under the terms of the UK-EU trade agreements, EU competition law is no longer enforced in the UK, and the UK and EU now operate separate competition regimes. The CMA is responsible for: investigating phase 1 and phase 2 mergers, conducting market studies and market investigations, investigating possible breaches of prohibitions against anti-competitive agreements under the Competition Act 1998, bringing criminal proceedings against individuals who commit cartel offenses, enforcing consumer protection legislation, particularly the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Directive and Regulations, encouraging sectoral regulators to use their powers to protect competition, considering regulatory references and appeals, and, regulation of public sector subsidies to business. While merger notification in the UK is voluntary, the CMA may impose substantial fines or suspense orders on potentially non-compliant transactions. The CMA has no prosecutorial authority, but it may refer entities for prosecution in extreme cases, such as those involving cartel activity, which carries a penalty of up to five years imprisonment. In 2021, the UK established the Digital Markets Unit on a non-statutory basis within the CMA to oversee and operationalize a forthcoming pro-competition regime for digital markets. Powers for the DMU and the new regulatory regime will require new legislation. In the interim, the DMU is supporting and advising the government on establishing the statutory regime, including by gathering evidence on digital markets. In addition to the CMA, the Takeover Panel, the Financial Conduct Authority, and the Pensions Regulator have principal regulatory authority: The Takeover Panel is an independent body, operating per the (the “Code”), which regulates takeovers of public companies, and some private companies, centrally managed or controlled in the UK, the Isle of Man, Jersey, and Guernsey. The Code provides a binding set of rules for takeovers aimed at ensuring fair treatment for all shareholders in takeover bids, including requiring bidders to provide information about their intentions after a takeover. The Financial Conduct Authority administers Listing Rules, Prospectus Regulation Rules, and Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules, which can apply to takeovers of publicly listed companies. The Pensions Regulator has powers to intervene in investments in pension schemes. The UK is a member of the OECD and adheres to the OECD principle that when a government expropriates property, compensation should be timely, adequate, and effective. In the UK, the right to fair compensation and due process is uncontested and is reflected in all international investment agreements. Expropriation of corporate assets or the nationalization of industry requires a special act of Parliament. In response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the UK government nationalized Northern Rock bank (sold to Virgin Money in 2012) and took major stakes in the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds Banking Group. As a member of the World Bank-based International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the UK accepts binding international arbitration between foreign investors and the State. As a signatory to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the UK provides local enforcement on arbitration judgments decided in other signatory countries. London is a thriving center for the resolution of international disputes through arbitration under a variety of procedural rules such as those of the London Court of International Arbitration, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, the American Arbitration Association International Centre for Dispute Resolution, and others. Many of these arbitrations involve parties with no connection to the jurisdiction, but who are drawn to the jurisdiction because they perceive it to be a fair, neutral venue with an arbitration law and courts that support efficient resolution of disputes. They also choose London-based arbitration because of the general prevalence of the English language and law in international commerce. A wide range of contractual and non-contractual claims can be referred to arbitration in this jurisdiction including disputes involving intellectual property rights, competition, and statutory claims. There are no restrictions on foreign nationals acting as arbitration counsel or arbitrators in this jurisdiction. There are few restrictions on foreign lawyers practicing in the jurisdiction as evidenced by the fact that over 200 foreign law firms have offices in London. ICSID Convention and New York Convention In addition to its membership in ICSID, the UK is a signatory to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The latter convention has territorial application to Gibraltar (September 24, 1975), Hong Kong (January 21, 1977), Isle of Man (February 22, 1979), Bermuda (November 14, 1979), Belize and Cayman Islands (November 26, 1980), Guernsey (April 19, 1985), Bailiwick of Jersey (May 28, 2002), and British Virgin Islands (February 24, 2014). The United Kingdom has consciously elected not to follow the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. Enforcement of an arbitral award in the UK is dependent upon where the award was granted. The process for enforcement in any particular case is dependent upon the seat of arbitration and the arbitration rules that apply. Arbitral awards in the UK can be enforced under a number of different regimes, namely: The Arbitration Act 1996, The New York Convention, The Geneva Convention 1927, The Administration of Justice Act 1920 and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, and Common Law. The Arbitration Act 1996 governs all arbitrations seated in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, both domestic and international. The full text of the Arbitration Act can be found here: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/data.pdf. The Arbitration Act is heavily influenced by the UNCITRAL Model Law, but it has some important differences. For example, the Arbitration Act covers both domestic and international arbitration; the document containing the parties’ arbitration agreement need not be signed; an English court is only able to stay its own proceedings and cannot refer a matter to arbitration; the default provisions in the Arbitration Act require the appointment of a sole arbitrator as opposed to three arbitrators; a party retains the power to treat its party-nominated arbitrator as the sole arbitrator in the event that the other party fails to make an appointment (where the parties’ agreement provides that each party is required to appoint an arbitrator); there is no time limit on a party’s opposition to the appointment of an arbitrator; parties must expressly opt out of most of the provisions of the Arbitration Act which confer default procedural powers on the arbitrators; and there are no strict rules governing the exchange of pleadings. Section 66 of the Arbitration Act applies to all domestic and foreign arbitral awards. Sections 100 to 103 of the Arbitration Act provide for enforcement of arbitral awards under the New York Convention 1958. Section 99 of the Arbitration Act provides for the enforcement of arbitral awards made in certain countries under the Geneva Convention 1927. Under Section 66 of the Arbitration Act, the court’s permission is required for an international arbitral award to be enforced in the UK. Once the court has given permission, judgment may be entered in terms of the arbitral award and enforced in the same manner as a court judgment or order. Permission will not be granted by the court if the party against whom enforcement is sought can show that (a) the tribunal lacked substantive jurisdiction and (b) the right to raise such an objection has not been lost. The length of arbitral proceedings can vary greatly. If the parties have a relatively straightforward dispute, cooperate, and adopt a fast-track procedure, arbitration can be concluded within months or even weeks. In a substantial international arbitration involving complex facts, many witnesses and experts and post-hearing briefs, the arbitration could take many years. A reasonably substantial international arbitration will likely take between one and two years. There are two alternative procedures that can be followed in order to enforce an award. The first is to seek leave of the court for permission to enforce. The second is to begin an action on the award, seeking the same relief from the court as set out in the tribunal’s award. Enforcement of an award made in the jurisdiction may be opposed by challenging the award. The court may also, however, refuse to enforce an award that is unclear, does not specify an amount, or offends public policy. Enforcement of a foreign award may be opposed on any of the limited grounds set out in the New York Convention. A stay may be granted for a limited time pending a challenge to the order for enforcement. The court will consider the likelihood of success and whether enforcement of the award will be made more or less difficult as a result of the stay. Conditions that might be imposed on granting the stay include such matters as paying a sum into court. Where multiple awards are to be rendered, the court may give permission for the tribunal to continue hearing other matters, especially where there may be a long delay between awards. UK courts have a good record of enforcing arbitral awards. The courts will enforce an arbitral award in the same way that they will enforce an order or judgment of a court. At the time of writing, there are no examples of the English courts enforcing awards which were set aside by the courts at the place of arbitration. Most awards are complied with voluntarily. If the party against whom the award was made fails to comply, the party seeking enforcement can apply to the court. The length of time it takes to enforce an award which complies with the requirements of the New York Convention will depend on whether there are complex objections to enforcement which require the court to investigate the facts of the case. If a case raises complex issues of public importance the case could be appealed to the Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court. This process could take around two years. If no complex objections are raised, the party seeking enforcement can apply to the court using a summary procedure that is fast and efficient. There are time limits relating to the enforcement of the award. Failure to comply with an award is treated as a breach of the arbitration agreement. An action on the award must be brought within six years of the failure to comply with the award or 12 years if the arbitration agreement was made under seal. If the award does not specify a time for compliance, a court will imply a term of reasonableness. The UK has strong bankruptcy protections going back to the Bankruptcy Act of 1542. Today, both individual bankruptcy and corporate insolvency are regulated in the UK primarily by the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Insolvency Rules 1986, regulated through determinations in UK courts. The World Bank’s Doing Business Report Ranks the UK 14 out of 190 for ease of resolving insolvency. Regarding individual bankruptcy law, the court will oblige a bankrupt individual to sell assets to pay dividends to creditors. A bankrupt person must inform future creditors about the bankrupt status and may not act as the director of a company during the period of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is not criminalized in the UK, and the Enterprise Act of 2002 dictates that for England and Wales bankruptcy will not normally last longer than 12 months. At the end of the bankrupt period, the individual is normally no longer held liable for bankruptcy debts unless the individual is determined to be culpable for his or her own insolvency, in which case the bankruptcy period can last up to 15 years. For corporations declaring insolvency, UK insolvency law seeks to distribute losses equitably between creditors, employees, the community, and other stakeholders in an effort to rescue the company. Liability is limited to the amount of the investment. If a company cannot be rescued, it is liquidated and assets are sold to pay debts to creditors, including foreign investors. In March 2020, the UK government announced it would introduce legislation to change existing insolvency laws in response to COVID-19. The new measures enabled companies undergoing a rescue or restructuring process to continue trading and help them avoid insolvency. These measures expired in March 2022. HMG does not currently require environmental, social, and governance disclosure to help investor and consumers distinguish between high- and low-quality investments. The majority of ESG reporting is not currently mandatory in the UK. However, some specific metrics that come under the ESG regulation reporting umbrella are mandatory, including: Greenhouse gas reporting: Mandatory for quoted companies since 2013 under the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013. Energy use: Quoted companies must report on their global energy use, and large businesses must disclose their UK annual energy use and greenhouse gas emissions. This is required by the Companies (Directors’ Report) and Limited Liability Partnerships (Energy and Carbon Report) Regulations 2018. Gender pay gap: Any employer with a headcount of 250 or more must comply with gender pay gap reporting regulations. Modern Slavery: UK organizations with an annual turnover of £36 million ($47 million) or more must publish an annual statement setting out the steps to prevent modern slavery. Uruguay Executive Summary Title The Government of Uruguay recognizes the important role foreign investment plays in economic development and offers a stable investment climate that does not discriminate against foreign investors. Uruguay’s legal system treats foreign and national investments equally, and most investments are allowed without prior authorization. Investors can freely transfer capital and profits from their investments abroad. International investors can choose between arbitration and the judicial system to settle disputes. Local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards. U.S. firms have not identified corruption as an obstacle to investment. In 2021, Transparency International ranked Uruguay as the most transparent country in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the second most transparent in the Western Hemisphere after Canada. Uruguay is a stable democracy, one of only three full democracies in the Western Hemisphere and ranked 13th in the world, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit. As of March 2022, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s rated Uruguay one step above the investment grade threshold with a stable outlook. Fitch Ratings rated it at the investment grade threshold with a stable outlook. Investment rose substantially from 2004-2014 as a result of an historic commodities boom but dropped significantly 2015-2019 as the boom flagged. However, investment picked up again in 2021 as a result of: tax incentives for investors; a successful COVID vaccination program; government COVID spending; a dynamic tech industry; and a $2 billion foreign investment in a pulp-mill. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development reports FDI inflows increased 43 percent to $2.6 billion in 2021, the highest level since 2012. About 150 U.S. firms operate locally in a wide array of sectors, including forestry, tourism and hotels, services, and telecommunications. The IT services sector is a significant recent growth area, with several Uruguayan companies listing on U.S. stock markets, or being bought by U.S. companies. In 2020, the United States had the fourth largest stock of foreign investment, reflecting its longstanding presence in the country. Uruguay has bilateral investment treaties with over 30 countries, including the United States. The United States does not have a double-taxation treaty with Uruguay, but does have a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in place, in addition to agreements on open skies, trade facilitation, customs mutual assistance, promotion of small and medium enterprises, and social security totalization. Uruguay is a founding member of Mercosur, the Southern Cone Common Market, created in 1991 and headquartered in Montevideo, along with Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. (Note: Venezuela joined the bloc in June 2012 but was suspended in December 2016.) Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are associate members of Mercosur. The current administration is lobbying Mercosur to relax its requirement for members to negotiate as a bloc and allow Uruguay to embark on independent trade negotiations. Uruguay and Mexico have had a comprehensive trade agreement in place since 2004, and in 2018, Uruguay extended its existing free trade agreement with Chile to increase trade in goods and services. Over the past decade, Uruguay strengthened bilateral trade, investment, and political ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), its principal trading partner since 2013. In 2018, Uruguay was the first country in the Southern Cone to join the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative. Uruguay formally joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2020. In September 2021, the government announced that it would start negotiating a free trade agreement with the PRC, independently from its Mercosur partners. A pre-feasibility study was planned to be completed by the end of 2021. A 2018 survey by Uruguay’s Ministry of Economy and Finance showed that about half of foreign investors were satisfied or very satisfied with Uruguay´s investment climate, principally due to its rule of law, low political risk, macroeconomic stability, strategic location, and investment incentives. Almost all investors were satisfied or highly satisfied with Uruguay’s twelve free trade zones (FTZs) and its free ports. However, roughly one-fourth of investors were dissatisfied with at least one aspect of doing business locally, expressing concerns about high labor costs, taxes, union/labor conflicts and high energy costs. The World Bank’s 2020 “Doing Business” Index placed Uruguay fourth out of twelve countries in South America. Uruguay’s strategic location (in the center of Mercosur’s wealthiest and most populated area), and its special import regimes (such as free zones and free ports) make it a well-situated distribution center for U.S. goods into the region. Several U.S. firms warehouse their products in Uruguay’s tax-free areas and service their regional clients effectively. With a small market of middle-class consumers, Uruguay can also be a good test market for U.S. products. There are no significant risks to doing business responsibly in areas such as labor and human rights. Additionally, the government’s long-term climate strategy, announced in December 2021, focuses on mitigation and adaptation to climate change and seeks to reach carbon neutrality, with stable emissions of methane and nitrous oxide in its agricultural sector, by 2050. The government is gradually including environmental variables in designing public economic and capital market policies. Uruguay is proposing in international fora, including the World Bank and the IMF, tying the cost of sovereign funding to advanced environmental indicators. Table 1: International Rankings and Statistics Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 18 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 65 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ dex U.S. FDI in Partner Country ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 999 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 15,790 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=UY 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment Uruguay recognizes the important role foreign investment plays in economic development and offers a stable investment climate that does not discriminate against foreign investors. Uruguay’s legal system treats foreign and national investments equally. Most investments are allowed without prior authorization. Investors can freely transfer capital and profits from their investments abroad, and choose between arbitration and the judicial system to settle disputes. The judiciary is independent and professional. Foreign investors are not required to meet any specific performance requirements. Moreover, foreign investors are not subject to discriminatory or excessively onerous visa, residence, or work permit requirements. The government does not require nationals to own shares or that the share of foreign equity be reduced over time, or impose conditions on investment permits. Uruguay normally treats foreign investors as nationals in public sector tenders. Uruguay’s law permits investors to participate in any stage of the tender process. Uruguay’s export and investment promotion agency, Uruguay XXI ( http://www.uruguayxxi.gub.uy ), provides information on Uruguay’s business climate and investment incentives, at both a national and sectoral level. The agency also has several programs to promote the internationalization of local firms and regularly participates in trade missions. There is no formal business roundtable or ombudsman responsible for regular dialogue between government officials and investors. Uruguay levies value-added and non-resident income taxes on foreign-based digital services, while locally-based digital services are generally tax exempt. Tax rates vary depending on whether the company provides audiovisual transmissions or intermediation services, and on the geographical locations of the company and consumers of the service. Aside from the few limited sectors involving national security and limited legal government monopolies in which foreign investment is not permitted, Uruguay practices neither de jure nor de facto discrimination toward investment by source or origin, with national and foreign investors treated equally. In general, Uruguay does not require specific authorization for firms to set up operations, import and export, make deposits and banking transactions in any particular currency, or obtain credit. Screening mechanisms do not apply to foreign or national investments, and investors do not need special government authorization for access to capital markets or to foreign exchange. The World Trade Organization published its Trade Policy Review of Uruguay, which included a detailed description of the country’s trade and investment regimes in 2018 and is available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp474_e.htm . While Uruguay is not a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), it has gradually endorsed several of its principles and joined some of its institutions. In March 2021, it became the 50th adherent to OECD´s Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprise, and in July 2021 the OECD published its first Investment Policy Review on the country (available at https://www.oecd.org/publications/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-uruguay-1135f88e-en.htm ). Uruguay is a member of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), but the organization has not yet conducted an Investment Policy Review on the country. The civil society organization, Un Solo Uruguay, was founded in 2018 and frequently raises investment policy-related concerns and suggestions to the government. In 2020, Uruguay was ranked 66th in the World Bank’s “Starting a Business” sub-indicator (against its overall aggregate ranking of 101st for the ease of doing business). Domestic and foreign businesses can register operations in approximately seven days without a notary at http://empresas.gub.uy . Uruguay receives high marks in electronic government. The UN’s 2020 Electronic Government Development Index ranked Uruguay second in the Western Hemisphere (after the United States). Uruguay is a member of the D9, the group that gathers the leading digital governments globally. In recent years, some U.S. industrial small- to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), in chemical production for example, have described Uruguay’s market as difficult for new foreign entrants. Those SMEs pointed to legacy business relationships and loyalties, along with a cultural resistance by distributors and clients to trusting new producers. The government does not promote nor restrict domestic investment abroad. 3. Legal Regime Transparent and streamlined procedures regulate local and foreign investment in Uruguay at the state and national level. The Constitution does not provide for supra-national regulations. Most draft laws, except those having an impact on public finances, can start either in the executive branch or in the parliament. Uruguay’s president needs the agreement of all ministries with competency on the regulated matter to issue decrees. Ministers may also issue resolutions. All regulatory actions —including bills, laws, decrees, and resolutions — are publicly available at https://www.presidencia.gub.uy/normativa . The U.S. government’s Fiscal Transparency Report labels Uruguay as a “fiscally transparent” country. Public finances and debt obligations, including explicit and contingent liabilities, are transparent. Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms. The government only occasionally proposes laws and regulations in draft form for public comment. Parliamentary commissions typically engage stakeholders while discussing a bill. Non-governmental organizations or private sector associations do not manage any informal regulatory processes. The government does not promote or require environmental, social, and governance disclosures. Article 10 of the U.S.–Uruguay BIT mandates that both countries publish promptly or make public any law, regulation, procedure, or adjudicatory decision related to investments. Article 11 sets transparency procedures that govern the accord. Uruguay is a member of several regional economic blocs, including Mercosur and the Latin American Integration Association (known by its Spanish acronym, ALADI), neither of which have supranational legislation. To create local law, Uruguay’s parliament must ratify these blocs’ decisions. Uruguay is also a member of the WTO and notifies all draft technical regulations to its committee on technical barriers to trade. The legal system in Uruguay follows civil law based on the Spanish civil code. The highest court in the country is the Supreme Court. The executive branch nominates judges and Parliament’s General Assembly appoints them. Supreme Court judges serve a ten-year term and can be reelected after a lapse of five years following the previous term. Other subordinate courts include the court of appeal, district courts, peace courts, and rural courts. Uruguay has a written commercial law and specialized civil courts. The judiciary remains independent of the executive branch. Critics of the court system complain that its civil sector can be slow. The executive branch rarely interferes directly in judicial matters, but at times has voiced its dissatisfaction with court rulings. Investors can appeal to local or international courts for commercial disputes. International investors may choose between arbitration and the judicial system to settle disputes. Uruguayan law treats foreign and domestic investment alike. Law No. 16,906 (passed in 1998) declares that the promotion and protection of investments made by both national and foreign investors is in the nation’s interest and allows investments without prior authorization or registration. The law also provides that investors can freely transfer their capital and profits abroad and that the government may not prevent the establishment of investments in the country. U.S. and other foreign firms can participate in local or national government-financed or subsidized research and development programs. Uruguay’s Accountancy and Administration Document (known by its Spanish acronym, TOCAF) contains the norms and regulations that govern public purchases, including the laws, decrees, resolutions, and international agreements that apply to the contracting process. Uruguay uses government procurement as a tool for promoting local industry, especially micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), and enterprises that innovate in technological and scientific areas. Most government contracts (except for those in areas in which the public and private sectors compete) prioritize goods, services, and civil engineering works produced or supplied by domestic MSMEs. The most used preferential regime grants an eight percent price preference to goods and services produced domestically, regardless of the firm’s size. MSME programs grant price preferences ranging from 12 to 16 percent for MSMEs competing against foreign firms. Uruguay’s export and investment promotion agency, Uruguay XXI , helps potential investors navigate Uruguayan laws and rules. When awarding bids, the government often prioritizes price over quality. This has led to several projects needing a price adjustment post award. Uruguay has transparent legislation established by the Commission for the Promotion and Defense of Competition at the Ministry of Economy to foster competition. The main legal pillars (Law No. 18,159 and decree 404, both passed in 2007) are available at the commission’s site: https://www.mef.gub.uy/578/5/areas/defensa-de-la- percent20competencia—uruguay.html . A 2017 peer review of Uruguay´s competition law and policy is available at https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1640 . In 2001, Uruguay created regulatory and controlling agencies for telecommunications (URSEC), water, and energy. In 2020, the new government enhanced URSEC’s autonomy through article 256 of an omnibus reform law (No. 19,889), making it a decentralized and independent service directed by a three-member board appointed by the Presidency. Uruguay passed an Audiovisual Communications Law (Law No. 19,307) in December 2014. Also known as the media law, it includes provisions on market caps for cable TV providers that could limit competition. In April 2016, Uruguay’s Supreme Court ruled that these market caps and some local content requirements were unconstitutional. The government proposed new legislation in April 2020 to change the media law, which as of March 2022 remains under review by Parliament. U.S. companies have expressed concerns about some of the proposed articles. Uruguay’s Constitution declares property rights an “inviolable right” subject to legal determinations that may be taken for general interest purposes and states that no individuals can be deprived of this right — except in case of public need and with fair compensation. Article 6 of the U.S.–Uruguay BIT rules out direct and indirect expropriation or nationalization of private property except under specific circumstances. The article also contains detailed provisions on how to compensate investors, should expropriation take place. There are no known cases of expropriation of investment from the United States or other countries within the past five years. The Bankruptcy Law passed in 2008 (Law No. 18,387) expedites bankruptcy procedures, encourages arrangements with creditors before a firm may go bankrupt, and provides the possibility of selling the firm as a single unit. Bankruptcy has criminal and civil implications with intentional or deliberate bankruptcy deemed a crime. The law protects the rights of creditors according to the nature of the credit, and workers have privileges over other creditors. The World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report ranks Uruguay second out of twelve countries in South America for its ease of “resolving insolvency.” Uruguay ranks 70th globally in this sub-index (vs. its overall aggregate global ranking of 101st for ease of doing business). 6. Financial Sector Over time Uruguay has added regulations and legislation to develop its capital markets, including law No. 18,627 in 2009. However, the local capital market remains underdeveloped and highly concentrated in sovereign debt, making it difficult to finance business ventures through the local equity market. Due to such underdevelopment and lack of sufficient liquidity, Uruguay typically receives only “active” investments oriented to establishing new firms or gaining control over existing ones and lacks “passive investments” from major investment funds. The government maintains an open attitude towards foreign portfolio investment, though there is no effective regulatory system to encourage or facilitate it. Uruguay does not impose any restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Uruguay allocates credit on market terms, but long-term banking credit has traditionally been difficult to obtain. Foreign investors can access credit on the same market terms as nationals. As part of the process of complying with OECD requirements (see Bilateral Investment Agreements section), Uruguay banned “bearer shares” in 2012, which had been widely used. Private firms do not use “cross shareholding” or “stable shareholder” arrangements to restrict foreign investment, nor do they restrict participation in or control of domestic enterprises. Uruguay established its Central Bank (BCU) in 1967 as an autonomous state entity. The government-owned Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay (BROU) is the nation’s largest commercial bank and has the largest market share. The rest of the banking system comprises a government-owned mortgage bank and nine international commercial banks. The BCU’s Superintendency of Financial Services regulates and supervises foreign and domestic banks or branches alike. The Superintendency reports that as of March 2022, the banking sector has good capital and liquidity ratios. Since Uruguay’s establishment of a financial inclusion program in 2011, and especially after the passage of a financial inclusion law in 2014 (No. 19,210), the use of debit cards, credit cards, and bank accounts has increased significantly. Several private sector firms issue electronic currency. Articles 215 and 216 of Law No. 19,889 reinstated the possibility of paying workers’ salaries in cash instead of electronically. Regarding technological innovation in the financial sector, Montevideo hosted the first regional Fintech Forum in 2017, which led to the creation of the Fintech Ibero-American Alliance. Some local firms have developed domestic and international electronic payment systems, but emerging technologies like blockchain and crypto currencies remain underdeveloped. There have been some cases of U.S. citizens having difficulties establishing a first-time bank account, mostly related to the United States’ Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act provisions. There are no sovereign wealth funds in Uruguay. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The State still plays a significant role in the economy and Uruguay maintains government monopolies or oligopolies in certain areas, including the importing and refining of oil, workers compensation insurance, and landline telecommunications. Uruguay’s largest state-owned enterprises (SOEs) include: the petroleum, cement, and alcohol company ANCAP; telecommunications company ANTEL; the electric utility UTE; the water utility OSE; and Uruguay’s largest bank BROU. While deemed autonomous, in practice these enterprises coordinate in several areas with various ministries and the executive branch. The boards of these entities are appointed by the executive branch, require parliamentary approval, and remain in office for the same term as the executive branch. Uruguayan law requires SOEs to publish an annual report, and independent firms audit their balances. Some traditionally government-run monopolies have opened to private-sector competition. Cellular phone service, international long-distance services, insurance, and media services are open to local and foreign competitors. Uruguay permits private-sector generation of power and private interests dominate renewable energy production, but the state-owned power company UTE holds a monopoly on the transfer of electrical power through transmission and distribution lines from one utility’s service area to another’s, otherwise known as wheeling rights. State-owned companies tend to have the largest market share even in sectors open to competition. Potential cross-subsidies likely give SOEs an advantage over their private sector competitors. Uruguay does not adhere to the OECD’s Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises. The current government plans to reform and increase the efficiency of its SOEs. Uruguay has not undertaken any major privatization program in recent decades. While Uruguay opened some previously government-run monopolies to private-sector competition, the government continues to maintain a monopoly in the import and refinement of petroleum, landline telecommunications and water treatment and distribution. Parliament passed a public-private partnership (PPP) law in 2011 and created regulations with Decree 007/12. The law allows private sector companies to design, build, finance, operate, and maintain certain infrastructure, including brownfield projects. With some exceptions (such as medical services in hospitals or educational services in schools), PPPs can also be applied to social infrastructure. The return for the private sector company may come in the form of user payments, government payments, or a combination of both. In 2015, Uruguay passed regulations (Decree 251/15) to simplify the procedures and expedite the PPP process. The only fully operational project to date is a $93 million prison. In May 2021 (latest data available), there were three PPP projects in the implementation phase, the largest of which is a 170-mile railroad for approximately $1 billion. There are ten other projects worth $873 million in different stages of development, related to roads, education, and health. The current government aims to improve PPP approval times. U.S. companies have tended to be suppliers of equipment and services to local companies that compete for PPPs rather than direct bidders, with some exceptions. In the 2020 omnibus reform law, the government determined that –with a transition period of up to three years– local fuel prices should closely track import parity prices (i.e., international price plus import cost). The legislation was aimed at increasing the efficiency of the state-owned oil company in order to reduce the local price of fuels. 10. Political and Security Environment Uruguay is a stable democracy in which respect for the rule of law and transparent national debates to resolve political differences are the norm. The majority of the population is committed to non-violence. In 2021, the Economist magazine ranked Uruguay the only “full democracy” in South America, and one of three in the Western Hemisphere. There have been no cases of political violence or damage to foreign investment projects or installations over the past decade. While violent crime rose to historic levels in 2019, it has decreased over the last two years. The issue of deteriorating citizen security was a central issue in the 2019 presidential election and is a top priority of the current government. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $51,734 2020 $53,629 www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 2,248 2019 $3,578 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/ international/factsheet/ Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2018 $391 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/ direct-investment-and-multinational- enterprises-comprehensive-data Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 94% N/A N/A UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/ world-investment-report *Host country source: https://www.bcu.gub.uy/Estadisticas-e-Indicadores/Paginas/Default.aspx The vast majority of U.S. investment consisted of intra-company loans, and not greenfield, brownfield, or reinvestment projects. U.S. investment is distributed among a wide array of sectors, including forestry, tourism and hotels, services (e.g., call centers or back office), and telecommunications. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data, 2020 From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment Total Inward 29,642 100% Total Outward N/A Spain – 5,911 20% N/A N/A Argentina – 4,533 15% N/A N/A Switzerland – 3,483 12% N/A N/A United States – 2,248 8% N/A N/A The Netherlands– 2,044 7% N/A N/A “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- $500,000. Source: IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey Uzbekistan Executive Summary Uzbekistan is a populous double land-locked country in the middle of Central Asia with an emerging lower-middle income economy. State-owned enterprises still dominate its industrial and financial sectors, and foreign trade centers on commodities. The declared goal of its current economic policy is to achieve sustainable growth and overcome underemployment and poverty as soon as possible. Fast growing external public debt limits the availability of public funds and loans to support economic growth, so attraction of private and foreign investment (FDI) has become a vital priority. Five years ago, the Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) launched a program of radical market reforms, with a focus on improving the business environment. Notable progress has been made so far in addressing a rage of systemic business regulation problems and overcoming the dominance of state monopolies, but more is yet to be done to completely unlock all benefits of FDI for the economy. Uzbekistan has the potential to become a strong regional economy: a dynamic and entrepreneurial population, the largest in Central Asia; relatively good infrastructure; and a large potential consumer market. In the past, most FDI was directed into the oil, gas, and mining sectors. In recent years, however, there has been a trend towards increasing FDI in manufacturing, production and distribution of electricity, tourism, and banking. Such diversification was facilitated by positive changes in state regulation and the beginning of a privatization program. Further advancing privatization, as well as implementation of a long-expected capital market development policy, may create unique investment opportunities. Over the past five years, the GOU has made efforts to improve the investment attractiveness of the country. The GOU has modernized its legislation through the adoption of the Law on Investments and Investment Activities and other acts that streamlined interactions of investors with the state, reduced the tax load, liberalized access to certain commodities, and started the privatization of major state-owned enterprises. As a result, the inflow of FDI has grown from about $2 billion in 2017 to over $8 billion in 2021. The government’s efforts to attract funding for various development and social support programs contributed to sustained economic growth despite severe quarantine restrictions in 2020. With the removal of major pandemic restrictions in 2021, GDP grew 7.4 percent. Notable progress has been made in development of renewable energy capacity. Uzbekistan already attracted FDI to develop nearly 4,000 MW of solar and wind capacity and plans to build another 4,000 MW in generation capacity by 2026, which will increase the share of renewables to 25 percent and displace 3 billion cubic meters of natural gas usage annually. The GOU’s current environmental policy goal is to achieve a 35 percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP from 2010 levels by 2030. At the same time, the GOU still attempts to channel foreign investments into predetermined import-substituting or export-oriented projects. In some cases, transparency is sacrificed for the urgency of investment. Pandemic-related challenges and the subsequent disruption of global of supply chains have slowed the progress of liberalization reforms because the GOU expanded the use of direct administrative control methods. Another restraining factor is the lack of experience among middle and lower-level government officials in working transparently and properly enforcing legislation that protects the rights of entrepreneurs. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 140 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 86 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $90 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.html#345 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,740 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The GOU has maintained economic growth by directing more investments into accelerated industrialization programs – a policy chosen to address social issues caused by disturbingly high unemployment and poverty rates. The goal is to create more jobs by building new competitive production capacity, modernizing infrastructure, and expanding the service sector. The GOU declared that increasing the share of private investment is a top policy priority, acknowledging that strong inflow of private capital could ensure economic stability in the medium and long-term. The Law on Investments and Investment Activities, which entered into force on January 27, 2020, guaranteed unrestricted transfer of funds out of Uzbekistan and the protection of investments from nationalization. For the effective implementation of this law, in 2021 the GOU created a multi-level mechanism of interaction between public authorities and investors. These include the Ministry of Investments and Foreign Trade (MIFT), designated deputy heads of regional governments, diplomatic missions abroad, and commercial banks. In 2021, the GOU demonstrated its continued willingness to improve the business environment by focusing on implementing previously adopted programs and strengthening law enforcement practices. Several measures were taken to facilitate the legalization of business practices and incentivize entrepreneurs to transition out of the non-transparent cash-based grey economy. The fight against corruption has intensified. To prevent pandemic-related business losses, despite repeated outbreaks, the government refrained from imposing new lockdowns. Several large state-owned enterprises were privatized, including the Coca-Cola Bottlers of Uzbekistan and Asia Alliance Bank. Special incentives were offered to attract investments into the provinces and critical industries. Over $1.5 billion in FDI was attracted to renewable energy projects. In general, according to official reports, a total of $8.1 billion of FDI was raised in 2021 for 318 large and about 15 thousand smaller regional projects, which created over 273 thousand new jobs. Realizing that there are still major problems hindering investor confidence, the MIFT has asked international financial institutions and experts help in creating a stronger reform roadmap, the National Strategy and Roadmap for Attracting FDI. Meanwhile, the GOU has yet to address several fundamental problems reported by U.S. businesses and investors, such as the lack of transparency in public procurements, its poor record of enforcing public-private contracts, poor protection of private property rights, and insufficient enforcement of intellectual property rights. Local entrepreneurs also complain about losses due to non-compliance with the law on the inviolability of private property, the lack of real business protection tools, and excessive pressure from government agencies that still have disproportionately and inappropriately high regulatory authority. Uzbekistan is ranked 140th (of 180) in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. By law, foreign investors are welcome in all sectors of Uzbekistan’s economy and the government cannot discriminate against foreign investors based on nationality, place of residence, or country of origin. However, the government has demonstrated a continued desire to control capital flows in major industries, encouraging investments in a preapproved list of import-substituting and export-oriented projects, while investments in import-consuming projects can generally expect very little support. The Ministry of Investments and Foreign Trade ( https://mft.uz/en/ , http://www.invest.gov.uz/en/ ) provides foreign investors with consulting services, information and analysis, business registration, and other legal assistance, as does the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Uzbekistan ( http://www.chamber.uz/en/index ), on a contractual basis. The GOU organizes and attends media events and joint government-business forums on a regular basis and at these events officials stress their interest in seeing new companies establish operations in Uzbekistan. The Law on Investments and Investment Activities, which entered into force on January 27, 2020, obliges Uzbekistan’s state bodies, diplomatic missions, and consular institutions abroad to provide advisory and informational assistance to investors. On August 20, 2021, President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev chaired the first direct dialogue session with investors and local businesses, an event attended by about 10 thousand entrepreneurs. During the meeting, the president discussed issues raised by businesses, such as expensive loans and cumbersome tax administration, and announced that such dialogues would become regular. Earlier, in 2019, the President’s office established the Council of Foreign Investors, which operates as an institutional advisory body ( https://fics.uz/en/ ). The GOU established the Institute of the Business Ombudsperson (IBO) in 2017 to protect the rights and legitimate interests of businesses and provide legal support. The Law on Investments and Investment Activities obliged the IBO to assist foreign businesses in resolving emerging disputes through extrajudicial and pre-trial procedures. In 2021, the number of cases reviewed by the IBO has doubled and exceeded six thousand. At the beginning of 2022, the IBO received the right to apply fines to violators of investor rights. During the reporting period, various GOU officials attended several of in-person and virtual meetings with representatives of U.S. companies. U.S. business facilitation agencies and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) met with Uzbekistan’s government officials under the framework of the Strategic Partnership Dialogue in December 2021. By law, Uzbekistan guarantees the right of foreign and domestic private entities to establish and own business enterprises, and to engage in most forms of remunerative activity. However, due to the prevalence in state-owned or state-supported monopolies in several sectors, in reality, the right to establish business enterprises is still limited in some sectors. In 2020, the GOU started the process of reducing the role of large state-owned enterprises (SOE), especially in the transportation, banking, energy, and cotton sectors. It introduced measures to reduce government involvement in the economy, enforcement of an antimonopoly compliance system in SOE operations, reorganization of some large SOEs for optimized corporate governance, and privatization of certain formerly off-the-table state-owned assets. This privatization program includes state-owned monopolies in the mining, energy, ITC, chemical, transportation, construction, banking, and insurance sectors. In November 2021, the GOU set a target to privatize two thirds of SOE assets. The state still reserves the exclusive right to export some commodities, such as nonferrous metals and minerals. In theory, private enterprises may freely establish, acquire, and dispose of equity interests in private businesses, but, in practice, this is difficult to do because Uzbekistan’s securities markets are still underdeveloped. Private capital is not allowed in some industries and enterprises. The Law on Denationalization and Privatization (adopted in 1991, last amended in 2020) lists state assets that cannot be sold off or otherwise privatized, including land with mineral and water resources, the air basin (atmospheric resources in the airspace over Uzbekistan), flora and fauna, cultural heritage sites and assets, state budget funds, foreign capital and gold reserves, state trust funds, the Central Bank, enterprises that facilitate monetary circulation, military and security-related assets and enterprises, firearm and ammunition producers, nuclear research and development enterprises, some specialized producers of drugs and toxic chemicals, emergency response entities, civil protection and mobilization facilities, public roads, and cemeteries. Foreign ownership and control for airlines, railways, long-distance telecommunication networks, and other sectors deemed related to national security requires special GOU permission, but so far foreigners have not been welcomed in these sectors. By law, foreign nationals cannot obtain a license or tax permit for individual entrepreneurship in Uzbekistan. In practice, therefore, they cannot be self-employed, and must be employed by a legally recognized entity. According to Uzbekistan’s law, local companies with at least 15% foreign ownership can qualify as having foreign investment. The minimum fixed charter-funding requirement for a company with foreign investment is 400 million s’om (USD 1 equals about 10,850 s’om as of March 2022). The same requirement for companies registered in the Republic of Karakalpakstan and the Khorezm region is 200 million s’om. Minimum charter funding requirements can be different for business activities subject to licensing. For example, the requirement for banking activities is 100 billion s’om; for activities of microcredit organizations – 2 billion s’om; for pawnshops – 500 million s’om; for production of ethyl alcohol and alcoholic beverages – 10,000 Base Calculation Rates (BCR) (one BCR equals 270,000 s’om or about $25, as of March 2022); lotteries – 200 million s’om; and for tourism operators – 400 BCRs. Foreign investment in media enterprises is limited to 30%. The government may scrutinize foreign investment, with special emphasis on sectors of the economy that it considers strategic, such as mining, energy, transportation, banking, and telecommunications. There is no standard, transparent screening mechanism, and some elements of Uzbekistan’s legal framework are expressly designed to protect domestic industries and limit competition from abroad, such as a list created in January 2021 of 529 imported items banned from the public procurement process. The basis for inclusion of items to the list was the presence of two or more domestic suppliers of similar goods and services. There are no legislative restrictions that specifically disadvantage U.S. investors. On December 2021, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) published its Uzbekistan Investment Policy Review ( https://unctad.org/webflyer/investment-policy-review-uzbekistan ). The report contains findings on Uzbekistan´s investment environment and policies and 10 recommendations for improving the climate for FDI, which address policy and administration with regard to entry of foreign investment; regulatory and tax policy; measures to improve the competitive provision of business services; and investment promotion issues. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and have not conducted investment policy reviews of Uzbekistan in the past four years. Since 2019, several international and Uzbekistan-based civil society organizations and NGOs have published reports on issues related to forced labor monitoring in the cotton harvest ( https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/?&content_types=reports&language=en&countries=UZ ). The GOU has declared that business facilitation and improvement of the business environment are among its top policy priorities. Uzbekistan’s working-age population has been growing by over 200,000 people per year over the past decade. Therefore, the GOU prioritizes private businesses and joint ventures with the potential to create additional jobs and help the government address unemployment concerns. The introduction of one-window and on-line registration practices and electronic reporting systems simplified and streamlined business registration procedures. The GOU has created 23 Special Economic Zones (SEZ), as well nearly 350 special small industrial zones (SIZ) in all regions of the country to attract more FDI. New legislation has created additional tax incentives for private businesses and promised firms protection against unlawful actions by government authorities. By legislation (effective from January 2018), foreign and domestic private investors can register their business in Uzbekistan using any Center of Government Services (CGS) facility, which operate as “Single Window” (SW) registration offices, or the Electronic Government (EG) website – https://my.gov.uz/en . The registration procedure requires electronic submission of an application, company name or trademark, and foundation documents. The SW/EG service will register the company with the Ministry of Justice, Tax Committee, local administration, and other relevant government agencies. The registration fee is equivalent to 20% of a BCR for local investors and 10 BCRs for foreign investors (one BCR equals 270,000 s’om, or about $25, as of March 2022). Applicants receive a 50% discount for using the EG website. The new system has reduced the length of the registration process from several weeks to 30 minutes. Depending on the extent of foreign participation, a business can be defined as an “enterprise with foreign capital” (EFC) if less than 15% foreign-owned, or as an “enterprise with foreign investment” (EFI) if more than 15% foreign-owned and holding a minimum charter capital of 400 million s’om (about $37,000 as of March 2022). Foreign companies may also maintain a physical presence in Uzbekistan as “permanent establishments” without registering as separate legal entities, other than with the tax authorities. A permanent establishment may have its own bank account. In general, the GOU does not promote or incentivize outward investments. The Ministry of Investments and Foreign Trade coordinates outward investments mainly in the form of bilateral economic cooperation engagements. Some state-owned enterprises invest in development of their marketing networks abroad as part of efforts to boost export sales. Private companies that operate primarily in the retail, manufacturing, transportation, construction, and textile sectors use outward investments for market outreach, to access foreign financial resources, for trade facilitation, and, in some cases, for expatriation of capital. The most popular destinations for outward investments are Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Singapore, UAE, Scotland, Turkey, and Germany. There are no formal restrictions on outward investments. However, financial transactions with some foreign jurisdictions (such as Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Libya, and Yemen) and offshore tax havens can be subject to additional screening by the authorities. 3. Legal Regime Uzbekistan has a substantial body of laws and regulations aimed at protecting the business and investment community. Primary legislation regulating competition includes the 2012 Law on Competition (last updated in 2019), the Law on Guarantees of the Freedoms of Entrepreneurial Activity, the 2003 Law on Private Enterprise (last updated in 2020), the 2019 Law on Investments and Investment Activities and a body of decrees, resolutions, and instructions. In late 2016, the GOU publicly recognized the need to improve and streamline business and investment legislation, which is still perceived as complicated, often contradictory, and not fully consistent with international norms. In some cases, the government may require businesses to comply with decrees or instructions that are not publicly available. To simplify and streamline legislation, Parliament and the Cabinet of Ministers have initiated a “regulatory guillotine” policy, under which nearly eight thousand laws and regulations were abolished in 2020-2021. For example, the GOU Resolution N87 of February 22, 2021, invalidated 1,887 government decisions, and the Ministry of Justice invalidated 4,343 resolutions of regional governments. To avoid problems with tax and regulatory measures, foreign investors often secure government benefits through Presidential Decrees and GOU resolutions. These, however, have proven to be easily revocable. For additional information, please review the World Bank’s Regulatory Governance assessment on Uzbekistan: https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/uzbekistan . Practices that appear as informal regulatory processes are not associated with nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations, but rather with influential local politicians or well-connected local elites. Most rule-making and regulatory authority exists on the national level. Businesses in some regions and special economic zones can be regulated differently, but relevant legislation must be adopted by the central government and then regulated by national-level authorities. Only a few local legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and fully consistent with international norms. Although the GOU has started to unify local accounting rules with international standards, local practices are still document- and tax-driven, with an underdeveloped concept of accruals. Uzbekistan is just beginning to develop its Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) regulations. In 2021, the country presented its first ever ESG report, which described the progress of ongoing reforms in various areas, such as Infrastructure for Growth, Active Governance & Strong Civil Society, and Sustainable Livelihoods. Key findings of the report include that GOU efforts to work with international NGOs on the issue of forced labor in the agricultural sector are re-positioning the country as an attractive partner for reliable textiles sourcing, and that the GOU is making efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. (Uzbekistan’s ESG report can be reviewed here: https://changeinuzbekistan.com/report/ ). Parliament and GOU agencies publish some draft legislation for public comment, including draft laws, decrees and resolutions on the government’s development strategies, tax and customs regulation, resolutions of regional governments, and other legislation. Public review of the legislation is available through the website https://regulation.gov.uz . Uzbekistan’s laws, presidential decrees, and government decisions are available online. Uzbekistan’s legislation digest ( http://www.lex.uz/ ) serves as a centralized online location for current legislation in effect. As of now, there is no centralized nor comprehensive online location for Uzbekistan’s legislation, similar to the Federal Register in the United States, where all key regulatory actions or their summaries are published. There are other online legislative resources with executive summaries, interpretations, and comments that could be useful for businesses and investors, including http://www.norma.uz/ and http://www.minjust.uz/ru/law/newlaw/ . Formally, the Ministry of Justice and the Prosecutor’s Office of Uzbekistan are responsible for oversight to ensure that government agencies follow administrative processes. In some cases, however, local officials have inconsistently interpreted laws, often in a manner detrimental to private investors and the business community at large. GOU officials have publicly suggested that improvement of the regulatory system is critical for the overall business climate. In 2021, Uzbekistan adopted laws and regulations to streamline business related legislation. In particular, the Ministry of Justice abolished 878 presidential decrees, 1,887 government resolutions, and 336 ministerial level acts, which shrank the national legal framework by almost 10%. In addition, 4,343 decrees of regional governments were invalidated, downsizing their total number by 70%. Several new laws adopted in the reviewing period introduced amendments related with the enforcement of business-related legislation. Regulatory reform efforts implemented in previous years, which include Presidential Decree UP-5690 “On Measures for the Comprehensive Improvement of the System of Support and Protection of Entrepreneurial Activity,” adopted in March 2019, set enforcement mechanisms for effective protection of private businesses, including foreign investors. The Law on Investments and Investment Activities, adopted in December 2019, guarantees free transfer of funds to and from the country without any restrictions. This law also guarantees protection of investments from nationalization. The GOU has implemented several additional reforms in recent years, including the currency exchange liberalization, tax reform, simplification of business registration and foreign trade procedures, and establishment of the business Ombudsperson. The government’s development strategies include a range of targets for upcoming reforms, such as ensuring reliable protection of private property rights; further removal of barriers and limitations for private entrepreneurship and small business; creation of a favorable business environment; suppression of unlawful interference of government bodies in the activities of businesses; improvement of the investment climate; decentralization and democratization of the public administration system; and expansion of public-private partnerships. Previously implemented regulatory system reforms often left room for interpretation and were, accordingly, enforced subjectively. New and updated legislation continues to leave room for interpretation and contains unclear definitions. In many cases, private businesses still face difficulties associated with enforcement and interpretation of the legislation. More information on Uzbekistan’s regulatory system can be reviewed at the World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance ( http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/data/explorecountries/uzbekistan ). The Ministry of Justice and the system of Economic Courts are formally responsible for regulatory enforcement, while the Institute of Business Ombudsperson was established in May 2017 to protect the rights and legitimate interests of businesses and render legal support. The state body responsible for enforcement proceedings is the Bureau of Mandatory Enforcement under the General Prosecutor’s Office. Several GOU policy papers call for expanding the role of civil society, non-governmental organizations, and local communities in regulatory oversight and enforcement. The government also publishes drafts of business-related legislation for public comments, which are publicly available. However, the development of a new regulatory system, including enforcement mechanisms outlined in various GOU reform and development roadmaps, has yet to be completed. Uzbekistan’s fiscal transparency still does not meet generally accepted international standards. In 2021, the GOU demonstrated some progress in its efforts to ensure compliance with the requirements of fiscal transparency, continuing the reform of the budgeting system launched in 2019. The process of awarding natural resource extraction contracts became more statutory and transparent. The web portal of the Finance Ministry https://openbudget.uz , created to be the main source of budget-related information, provides comprehensive information on the enacted budget, its implementation (with a breakdown by categories and territories), as well as the report of the Accounts Chamber (the supreme audit). However, the portal is still not fully operational. It does not provide detailed information on budget amendments to the budget adopted during the fiscal year, regional budgets, or specialized funds. The GOU did not publish its FY2022 budget proposal for public review. Most of GOU agencies do not publish reports on their off-budget funds and other socially significant information, although the law of 2020 introduced amendments to the Administrative Code establishing fines for senior GOU officials for non-disclosure of reports on the execution of budgets, off-budget funds and state trust funds, or other violations that undermine the transparency of the budget process. Uzbekistan is not currently a member of the WTO or any existing economic blocs although it is pursuing WTO accession. In 2020, Uzbekistan assumed observer status in the Eurasian Economic Union. No regional or other international regulatory systems, norms, or standards have been directly incorporated or cited in Uzbekistan’s regulatory system – although GOU officials often claim the government’s regulatory system incorporates international best practices. Uzbekistan joined the CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement in 2014, but that does not constitute an economic bloc with supranational trade tariff regulation requirements. Uzbekistan’s contemporary legal system belongs to the civil law family. The hierarchy of Uzbekistan’s laws descends from the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, constitutional laws, codes, ordinary laws, decrees of the president, resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers, and normative acts, in that order. Contracts are enforced under the Civil Code, the Law “About the Contractual Legal Base of Activities of Business Entities” (No. 670-I issued August 29, 1998, and last revised in 2020), and several other regulations. Uzbekistan’s contractual law is established by the Law “About the Contractual Legal Base of Activities of Business Entities.” It establishes the legal basis for the conclusion, execution, change, and termination of economic agreements, the rights, and obligations of business entities, and also the competence of relevant public authorities and state bodies in the field of contractual relations. Economic disputes, including intellectual property claims, can be heard in the lower-level Economic Court and appealed to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Economic court judges are appointed for five-year terms. This judicial branch also includes regional, district, town, city, Tashkent city (a special administrative territory) courts, and arbitration courts. On paper, the judicial system in Uzbekistan is independent, but government interference and corruption are common. Government officials, attorneys, and judges often interpret legislation inconsistently and in conflict with each other’s interpretations. In recent years, for example, many lower-level court rulings have been in favor of local governments and companies which failed to compensate plaintiffs for the full market value of expropriated and demolished private property, as required under the law. In July 2021, President Mirziyoyev approved a new Law on Courts (ZRU-703), which tightens the requirements for judicial candidates, describes the disciplinary liability of judges, and expands their socially protected status. Uzbekistan also adopted a law (ZRU-717) on reforming the Supreme Judicial Council of Uzbekistan by strengthening its independence and authority, as well as several new laws to simplify court proceedings and to improve the institutions for judicial reviews. The Law on International Commercial Arbitration (ZRU-647 adopted February 16, 2021) established the procedures for setting arbitration agreements, appointing arbitrators, and conducting arbitration proceedings. In 2020, the President ordered for additional measures to eliminate corruption in the courts and ensure the independence of judges (Decree UP-6127). Court decisions or enforcement actions are appealable though a process that can be initiated in accordance with the Economic Procedural Code and other applicable laws of Uzbekistan, and can be adjudicated in the national court system. Several laws, presidential decrees, and government resolutions relate to foreign investors. The main laws are: Law on Investments and Investment Activities (ZRU-598, December 25, 2019) Law on Guarantees of the Freedoms of Entrepreneurial Activity (ZRU-328, 2012) Law on Special Economic Zones (ZRU-604, February 17, 2020) Law on Production Sharing Agreements (№ 312-II, 2001) Law on Concessions (№ 110-I, 1995) Law on Investment and Share Funds (ZRU-392, 2015) Law on Public-Private Partnership (ZRU 537, 2019) In 2021, the GOU adopted 85 laws, over a hundred decrees, nearly six hundred resolutions, and thousands of judicial decisions. New legislation that could affect foreign investors includes: The Law on the State Budget for 2022, (ZRU-742, adopted December 30, 2021). Subsequent laws made amendments in the Tax Code and other regulations. Law on Insurance Activities (ZRU-730, adopted November 23,2021). Law on Privatization of Non-Agricultural Lands (ZRU-728, adopted November 15, 2021). Transport Law (ZRU-706, adopted August 9, 2021). Law on Licensing, Permitting and Notification Procedures (ZRU-701, adopted July 14, 2021). Law on the Ratification of International Labor Organization Convention No.187 on Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health (Geneva, 15 June 2006) (ZRU-693, adopted June 4, 2021). Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Republic of Uzbekistan (No. ZRU-692, adopted June 4, 2021). Public Procurement Law (ZRU-684, adopted April 22, 2021). Environmental Audit Law (ZRU-678, adopted March 15, 2021). Audit Law (ZRU-677, adopted February 25, 2021). International Commercial Arbitration Law (ZRU-674, adopted February 16, 2021). Presidential Decree on Measures to Regulate the Cotton and Textile Clusters (UP-14, adopted November 16, 2021). Presidential Decree on Measures to Stimulate Geological Exploration and on the Taxation of Subsoil Users (UP-6319, adopted October 6, 2021). Presidential Decree on Measures to Reduce the Administrative and Tax Burden for Businesses and Improve the Protecting of their Legitimate Interests (UP-6314, adopted September 15, 2021). Presidential Decree on Measures to Improve Contractual Relations (UP-6313, adopted September 14, 2021). Presidential Decree on the Simplification of Customs Procedures (UP-6310, adopted September 10, 2021). Presidential Decree on Improving the Tax Administration for Businesses (UP-6307, adopted September 07, 2021). Presidential Decree on Measures to Stimulate Exporting Enterprises (UP-6306, adopted September 7, 2021). Presidential Decree on Measures to Ensure Transparency in Land Relations, Reliable Protection of Land Rights and Their Transformation Into a Market Asset (UP-6243, adopted June 8, 2021). Presidential Decree on Measures for Capital Market Development (UP-6207, adopted April 13. 2021). Presidential Decree on Measures to Improve Public Services for Businesses (UP-6191, adopted March 23, 2021). Presidential Decree on Measures to Accelerate the Privatization of State Assets (UP-6167, adopted February 11, 2021). As of now, there is no real “one-stop-shop” website for investors that provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements in Uzbekistan. In December 2018, the GOU created a specialized web portal for investors called Invest Uz ( http://invest.gov.uz/en/ ), which provides some useful information. The website of the Ministry of Investments and Foreign Trade ( http://mift.uz/ ) offers some general information on laws and procedures, but mainly in the Uzbek and Russian languages. Competition and anti-trust legislation in Uzbekistan is governed by the Law on Competition (ZRU-319, issued January 6, 2012, and last revised in 2019). The main entity that reviews transactions for competition-related concerns is the State Antimonopoly Committee (established in January 2019). This government agency is responsible for advancing competition, controlling the activities of natural monopolies, protecting consumer rights, and regulating the advertisement market. There were no significant competition-related cases involving foreign investors in 2021. Private property is protected against baseless expropriation by legislation, including the Law on Investments and Investment Activities and the Law on Guarantees of the Freedoms of Entrepreneurial Activity. Despite these protections, however, the government potentially may seize foreign investors’ assets due to violations of the law or for arbitrary reasons, such as a unilateral revision of an investment agreement, a reapportionment of the equity shares in an existing joint venture with an SOE, or in support of a public works or social improvement project (similar to an eminent domain taking). By law, the government is obligated to provide fair market compensation for seized property, but many who have lost property allege the compensation has been significantly below fair market value. Uzbekistan has a history of expropriations. Profitable, high-profile foreign businesses have been at greater risk for expropriation, but smaller companies are also vulnerable. Under the previous administration, large companies with foreign capital in the food processing, mining, retail, and telecommunications sectors faced expropriation. In cases where the property of foreign investors is expropriated for arbitrary reasons, the law obligates the government to provide fair compensation in a transferable currency. However, in most cases the private property was expropriated based upon court decisions after the owners were convicted for breach of contract, failure to complete investment commitments, or other violations, making them ineligible to claim compensation. Decisions of Uzbekistan’s Economic Court on expropriation of private property can be appealed to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan in accordance with the Economic Procedural Code or other applicable local law. Reviews usually are quite slow. Some foreign investors have characterized the process as unpredictable, non-transparent, and lacking due process. There were several cases in recent years when the government imposed excessive import controls for the supplies of enterprises with foreign investment, which were alleged to be measures applied for indirect expropriation. The Law on Bankruptcy regulates bankruptcy procedures. Creditors can participate in liquidation or reorganization of a debtor only in the form of a creditor’s committee. According to the Law on Bankruptcy and the Labor Code, an enterprise may claim exemption from paying property and land taxes, as well as fines and penalties for back taxes and other mandatory payments, for the entire period of the liquidation proceedings. Monetary judgments are usually made in local currency. Bankruptcy itself is not criminalized, but in August 2013, the GOU introduced new legislation on false bankruptcy, non-disclosure of bankruptcy, and premeditated bankruptcy cases. In 2021, the GOU and Parliament conducted a legislative review of the procedures for bringing economically bankrupt enterprises out of the financial crisis and decided that they were not effective. Therefore, a new draft Law on Insolvency was prepared to replace the Law on Bankruptcy. The new act should address all controversial issues of current bankruptcy legislation. The draft law is in the process of public review. In its 2020 Doing Business report, the World Bank ranked Uzbekistan 100 out of 190 for the “Resolving Insolvency” indicator (https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/uzbekistan ). 6. Financial Sector Prior to 2017, the government focused on investors capable of providing technology transfers and employment in local industries and had not prioritized attraction of portfolio investments. The first plans to improve the capital market and use stock market instruments to meet its economic development goals were announced in 2017. In April 2021, the government created a Department for Capital Market Development under the Ministry of Finance. Currently the Department is drafting the Law on Capital Market. The U.S. Government is supporting the Ministry of Finance through a technical assistance program led by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Uzbekistan has its own stock market, which supports trades through the Republican Stock Exchange “Tashkent,” Uzbekistan’s main securities trading platform and only corporate securities exchange ( https://www.uzse.uz ). The stock exchange mainly hosts equity and secondary market transactions with shares of state-owned enterprises. In most cases, government agencies determine who can buy and sell shares and at what prices, and it is often impossible to locate accurate financial reports for traded companies. Uzbekistan formally accepted IMF Article VIII in October 2003, but due to excessive protectionist measures of the government, businesses had limited access to foreign currency, which stimulated the grey economy and the creation of multiple exchange rate systems. Effective September 5, 2017, the GOU eliminated the difference between the artificially low official rate and the black-market exchange rate and allowed unlimited non-cash foreign exchange transactions for businesses. The Law on Currency Regulation (ZRU-573 of October 22, 2019) fully liberalized currency operations, current cross-border, and capital movement transactions. In 2019, the GOU considerably simplified repatriation of capital invested in Uzbekistan’s industrial assets, securities, and stock market profits. According to the law (ZRU-531), foreign investors that have resident entities in Uzbekistan can convert their dividends and other incomes to foreign currencies and transfer them to their accounts in foreign banks. Non-resident entities that buy and sell shares of local companies can open bank accounts in Uzbekistan to accumulate their revenues. Under the law, foreign investors and private sector businesses can have access to various credit instruments on the local market, but the still-overregulated financial system yields unreliable credit terms. Access to foreign banks is limited and is usually only granted through their joint ventures with local banks. Commercial banks, to a limited degree, can use credit lines from international financial institutions to finance small and medium sized businesses. As of January 2022, 33 commercial banks operate in Uzbekistan. 10 commercial banks are state-owned, 22 banks are registered as joint-stock financial organizations (eight of which are partly state-owned), seven banks have foreign capital, and five banks are private. Commercial banks have 887 branches and a network of exchange offices and ATMs throughout the country. State-owned banks hold 81.5% of banking sector capital and 84% of banking sector assets, leaving privately owned banks as relatively small niche players. The nonbanking sector is represented by 72 microcredit organizations and 73 pawn shops. In May 2020, President Mirziyoyev approved a five-year strategy for reformation of the banking sector to address existing weaknesses of the banking sector, such as excessive share of state assets, insufficient competition, poor quality of corporate governance and banking services in comparison with best international standards, as well as a relatively low penetration of modern global technologies. The goal of the strategy is to reduce the state share in the sector from the current 84% to 40% and to increase the market share of the non-banking sector from current 0.35% to 4%. By 2025 the government plans to privatize its shares in six banks and facilitate modernization of banking services in remaining state-owned banks. According to assessments of international rating agencies, including Fitch and Moody’s, the banking sector of Uzbekistan is stable and poses limited near-term risks, primarily due to high concentration and domination of the public sector, which controls over 80% of assets in the banking system. The average rate of capital adequacy within the system is 17%, and the current liquidity rate is 98%. The growing volume of state-led investments in the economy supports the stability of larger commercial banks, which often operate as agents of the government in implementing its development strategy. Fitch Ratings notes, however, that the banking sector faces increasing asset-quality risks due to rapid lending growth, high balance-sheet dollarization, and an increased reliance on external funding. Privately owned commercial banks are relatively small niche players. The government and the Central Bank of Uzbekistan (CBU) still closely monitor commercial banks. According to the Central Bank of Uzbekistan, the share of nonperforming loans out of total gross loans is 5.2% (as of January 1, 2022). The average share of nonperforming loans in state-owned banks is 5.4% and 4.1% in private banks. A majority of Uzbekistan’s commercial banks have earned “stable” ratings from international rating agencies. In July 2021, Moody’s Investors Service took rating actions on 14 banks following the change of outlook on the GOU’s B1 long-term issuer rating to positive from stable and upward revision of the banking system’s Macro Profile to “Weak-” from “Very Weak+” given the improving operating conditions in the country. As of January 1, 2022, the banking sector’s capitalization was about $6.6 billion, and the value of total bank assets in the whole country was equivalent to about $41 billion. The three largest state-owned banks – the National Bank of Uzbekistan, Asaka Bank, and Uzpromstroybank – hold 41% of the banking sector’s capital ($2.7 billion) and 44.3% of the assets ($18.3 billion). Uzbekistan maintains a central bank system. The Central Bank of Uzbekistan (CBU) is the state issuing and reserve bank and central monetary authority. The bank is accountable to the Supreme Council of Uzbekistan and is independent of the executive bodies (the bank’s organization chart is available here: http://www.cbu.uz/en/ ). In general, any banking activity in Uzbekistan is subject to licensing and regulation by the Central Bank of Uzbekistan. Foreign banks often feel pressured to establish joint ventures with local financial institutions. Currently there are seven banks with foreign capital operating in the market, and seven foreign banks have accredited representative offices in Uzbekistan, but do not provide direct services to local businesses and individuals. Information about the status of Uzbekistan’s correspondent banking relationships is not publicly available. Foreigners and foreign investors can establish bank accounts in local banks without restrictions. They also have access to local credit, although the terms and interest rates do not represent a competitive or realistic source of financing. The Fund for Reconstruction and Development of Uzbekistan (UFRD) serves as a sovereign wealth fund. Uzbekistan’s Cabinet of Ministers, Ministry of Finance, and the five largest state-owned banks were instrumental in establishing the UFRD, and all those institutions have membership on its Board of Directors. The fund does not follow the voluntary code of good practices known as the Santiago Principles, and Uzbekistan does not participate in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on sovereign wealth funds. The GOU established the UFRD in 2006, using it to sterilize and accumulate foreign exchange revenues, but officially the goal of the UFRD is to provide government-guaranteed loans and equity investments to strategic sectors of the domestic economy. The UFRD does not invest, but instead provides debt financing to SOEs for modernization and technical upgrade projects in sectors that are strategically important for Uzbekistan’s economy. All UFRD loans require government approval. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate those sectors of the economy recognized by the government as being of national strategic interest. These include energy (power generation and transmission, and oil and gas refining, transportation, and distribution), metallurgy, mining (ferrous and non-ferrous metals and uranium), telecommunications (fixed telephony and data transmission), machinery (the automotive industry, locomotive and aircraft production and repair), and transportation (airlines and railways). Most SOEs register as joint-stock companies, and a minority share in these companies usually belongs to employees or private enterprises. Although SOEs have independent boards of directors, they must consult with the government before making significant business decisions. The government owns majority or blocking minority shares in numerous non-state entities, ensuring substantial control over their operations, as it retains the authority to regulate and control the activities and transactions of any company in which it owns shares. The Agency for Management of State-owned Assets is responsible for management of Uzbekistan’s state-owned assets, both those located in the country and abroad. There are no publicly available statistics with the exact number of wholly and majority state-owned enterprises, the number of people employed, or their contribution to the GDP. According to some official reports and fragmented statistics, there are over 3,500 SOEs in Uzbekistan, including 27 large enterprises and holding companies, about 2,900 unitary enterprises, and 486 joint stock companies, which employ about 1.5-1.7 million people, or about 13% of all domestically employed population. In 2021, the share of SOEs in the GDP was about 55%, and taxes paid by the ten largest SOEs contributed about 40% of total state budget revenues. The published list of major Uzbekistani SOEs is available on the official GOU website (listing large companies and banks only): http://www.gov.uz/en/pages/government_sites . By law, SOEs are obligated to operate under the same tax and regulatory environment as private businesses. In practice, however, private enterprises do not enjoy the same terms and conditions. In certain sectors, private businesses have limited access to commodities, infrastructure, and utilities due to legislation or licensing restrictions. They also face more than the usual number of bureaucratic hurdles if they compete with the government or government-controlled firms. Most SOEs have a range of advantages, including various tax holidays, as well as better access to commodities, energy and utility supplies, local and external markets, and financing. There are cases when gaps in the legislation are used to ignore the rights of private shareholders (including minority shareholders and holders of privileged shares) in joint stock companies with a state share. An April 2021 IMF Staff Report concluded that SOEs absorbed disproportionate shares of skilled labor, energy, and financial resources, while facing weak competition enforcement and enjoying a wealth of investment preferences. The GOU has officially recognized the problem. President Mirziyoyev said strong involvement of the state in the fuel and energy, petrochemical, chemical, transport, and banking sectors was hampering their development. In 2020, he issued several decrees and resolutions to improve the competition environment and reduce the dominance of SOEs in the economy. New legislation has strengthened the role of the Anti-Monopoly Committee, overturned over 600 obstructing laws and regulations, abolished 70 (out of 266) types of licenses and 35 (out of 140) permits for various types of businesses. The Presidential decree on SOE reformation and privatization (adopted October 27, 2020) orders 32 large SOEs to optimize and transform their corporate structure, 39 SOEs to introduce advanced corporate governance and financial audit systems, the privatization of state-owned shares in 541 enterprises through public auctions, and the sale of 15 public facilities to the private sector. The reform covers large SOEs in the energy, mining, telecommunications, transportation, construction, chemical, manufacturing, and other key industries. Another decree orders large-scale privatization in the banking sector. In 2020, the government started projects to privatize six state-owned banks in cooperation with international financial institutions. In addition to privatization efforts, the GOU intends to attract private investments to the public sector through promotion of public-private partnerships (PPP). The new law on PPP, adopted in 2019, and a number of follow-up regulations introduced in 2020, create a more favorable environment for such partnerships. Implementation of this SOE optimization and reform program will likely take some time, as the GOU seeks to avoid high social costs, such as mass unemployment. The COVID-19 pandemic and global economic slowdown have almost stopped SOE reform. In September 2020, the IMF staff noted, “The crisis should not delay the reform of the state-owned banks and state-owned enterprises—including by improving their governance—and the agricultural sector. As the crisis abates, the authorities should also continue with reducing the role of the state in the economy, opening markets, and enhancing competition, and improving the business environment.” The IMF’s 2021 statement said: “After years of little progress, it is important to make a start [to reform the SOE sector]”. GOU policy papers indicate it is prioritizing further privatization of state-owned assets. The GOU’s goal is to reduce the public share of capital in the banking sector and business entities through greater attraction of foreign direct investments, local private investments, and promotion of public-private partnerships. The new public sector optimization policy was first announced in 2018. A special working group headed by the Prime Minister performed careful due diligence on about 3,000 enterprises with state shares and developed proposals for their reorganization and privatization. Based on the results, the GOU approved a program that covers over 620 SOEs in the energy, mining, telecommunications, transportation, construction, chemical, manufacturing, and other key industries. The program foresees privatization of 541 state-owned enterprises, six state-owned banks, and the sale of 15 public facilities to the private sector. In a longer-term perspective, the government plans to privatize over 1,115 SOEs and offer about 50 SOEs for public-private partnership projects. Companies that operate critical infrastructure and enterprises that qualify as companies of strategic importance will remain in full state ownership. Senior government officials see privatization and public-private partnerships as a solution to improve the economic performance of inefficient large SOEs and as an instrument to attract private investments. They view such investments as critical for the creation of new jobs and mitigation of state budget deficits. The GOU believes it needs to prepare SOEs for privatization by introducing advanced corporate governance methods and restructuring the organization and finances of underperforming SOEs. By law, privatization of non-strategic assets does not require government approval and can be cleared by local officials. Foreign investors are allowed to participate in privatization programs. For investors that privatize assets at preferential terms, the payment period is three years, and the investment commitment fulfillment term is five years. Large privatization deals with the involvement of foreign investment require GOU approval. Privatization programs officially have a public bidding process. The legislation and regulations adopted in 2020 for acceleration of the privatization program are intended to ensure the transparency and fairness of the process, as well as facilitating greater involvement of international financial institutions and foreign experts as consultants. In the past, however, privatization procedures have been confusing, discriminatory, and non-transparent. Many investors note a lack of transparency at the final stage of the bidding process when the government negotiates directly with bidders before announcing the results. In some cases, the bidders have been foreign-registered front companies associated with influential Uzbekistani families. The State Assets Management Agency of Uzbekistan coordinates the privatization program ( https://davaktiv.uz/en/privatization ). 10. Political and Security Environment Uzbekistan does not have a history of politically motivated violence or civil disturbance. There have not been any examples of damage to projects or installations over the past ten years. Uzbekistani authorities maintain a high level of alert and aggressive security measures to thwart terrorist attacks. The environment in Uzbekistan is not growing increasingly politicized or insecure. Vietnam Executive Summary Foreign direct investment (FDI) continues to be of vital importance to Vietnam, as a means to support post-COVID economic recovery and drive the government’s aspirations to achieve middle-income status by 2045. As a result, the government has policies in place that are broadly conducive to U.S. investment. Factors that attract foreign investment include government commitments to fight climate change issues, free trade agreements, political stability, ongoing economic reforms, a young and increasingly urbanized and educated population, and competitive labor costs. According to the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), which oversees investment activities, at the end of December 2021 Vietnam had cumulatively received $241.6 billion in FDI. In 2021, Vietnam’s once successful “Zero COVID” approach was overwhelmed by an April outbreak that led to lengthy shutdowns, especially in manufacturing, and steep economic costs. However, the government reacted quickly to launch a successful national vaccination campaign, which enabled the country to switch from strict lockdowns to a “living with COVID” policy by the end of the year. The Government of Vietnam’s fiscal stimulus, combined with global supply chain shifts, resulted in Vietnam receiving $19.74 billion in FDI in 2021 – a 1.2 percent decrease over the same period in 2020. Of the 2021 investments, 59 percent went into manufacturing – especially in electronics, textiles, footwear, and automobile parts industries; 8 percent in utilities and energy; 15 percent in real estate; and smaller percentages in other industries. The government approved the following major FDI projects in 2021: Long An I and II LNG Power Plant Project ($3.1 billion); LG Display Project in Hai Phong ($2.15 billion); O Mon II Thermal Power Plant Factory in Can Tho ($1.31 billion); Kraft Vina Paper Factory in Vinh Phuc ($611.4 million); Polytex Far Eastern Vietnam Co., Ltd Factory Project ($610 million). At the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh made an ambitious pledge to reach net zero emissions by 2050, by increasing use of clean energy and phasing out coal-fueled power generation. In January 2022 Vietnam introduced new regulations that place responsibility on producers and importers to manage waste associated with the full life cycle of their products. The Government also issued a decree on greenhouse gas mitigation, ozone layer protection, and carbon market development in Vietnam. Vietnam’s recent moves forward on free trade agreements make it easier to attract FDI by providing better market access for Vietnamese exports and encouraging investor-friendly reforms. The EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) entered into force August 1, 2020. Vietnam signed the UK-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement entered into force May 1, 2021. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) entered into force January 1, 2022 for ten countries, including Vietnam. These agreements may benefit U.S. companies operating in Vietnam by reducing barriers to inputs from and exports to participating countries, but also make it more challenging for U.S. exports to Vietnam to compete against competitors benefiting from preferential treatment. In February 2021, the 13th Party Congress of the Communist Party approved a ten-year economic strategy that calls for shifting foreign investments to high-tech industries and ensuring those investments include provisions relating to environmental protection. On January 1, 2021, Vietnam’s Securities Law and new Labor Code Law, which the National Assembly originally approved in 2019, came into force. The Securities Law formally states the government’s intention to remove foreign ownership limits for investments in most industries. The new Labor Code includes several updated provisions including greater contract flexibility, formal recognition of a greater part of the workforce, and allowing workers to join independent workers’ rights organizations, though key implementing decrees remain pending. On June 17, 2020, Vietnam passed a revised Law of Investment and a new Public Private Partnership Law, both designed to encourage foreign investment into large infrastructure projects, reduce the burden on the government to finance such projects, and increase linkages between foreign investors and the Vietnamese private sector. Despite a comparatively high level of FDI inflow as a percentage of GDP – 7.3 percent in 2020 – significant challenges remain in Vietnam’s investment climate. These include widespread corruption, entrenched State Owned Enterprises (SOE), regulatory uncertainty in key sectors like digital economy and energy, weak legal infrastructure, poor enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR), a shortage of skilled labor, restrictive labor practices, and the government’s slow decision-making process. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 87 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 44 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 2,820 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 2,650 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment FDI continues to play a key role in upholding the country’s economy. Vietnam Customs reported that FDI companies exported $247 billion worth of goods in 2021, representing 73.6 percent of total exports, a 21.1 percent increase over 2020. The government, at both central and municipal levels, actively seeks to welcome FDI. The Politburo issued Resolution 55 in 2019 to increase Vietnam’s attractiveness to foreign investment. This Resolution aims to attract $50 billion in new foreign investment by 2030. In 2020, the government revised laws on investment and enterprise, in addition to passing the Public Private Partnership Law, to further the goals of this Resolution. The revisions encourage high-quality investments, use and development of advanced technologies, and environmental protection mechanisms. While Vietnam’s revised Law of Investment says the government must treat foreign and domestic investors equally, foreign investors have complained about having to cross extra hurdles to get ordinary government approvals. The government continues to have foreign ownership limits (FOLs) in industries Vietnam considers important to national security. In January 2020, the government removed FOLs on companies in the electronic payment sector and reformed electronic payments procedures for foreign firms. Some U.S. investors report that these changes have provided more regulatory certainty, which has, in turn, instilled greater confidence as they consider long-term investments in Vietnam. U.S. investors continue to cite concerns about confusing tax regulations and retroactive changes to laws – including tax rates, tax policies, and preferential treatment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). U.S. companies also reported facing difficulties in extending/renewing investment certificates – citing prolonged periods of non-responsiveness from government agencies. In 2021, a survey by the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in Hanoi listed the need for “administrative reforms that streamline regulations and promote transparency” as the top key element of a roadmap for a sustainable growth in Vietnam. The Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) is the country’s national agency charged with promoting and facilitating foreign investment; most provinces and cities also have local equivalents. MPI and local investment promotion offices provide information and explain regulations and policies to foreign investors. They also inform the Prime Minister and National Assembly on trends in foreign investment. However, U.S. investors should still consult legal counsel and/or other experts regarding issues on regulations that are unclear. Vietnam’s senior leaders often meet with foreign governments and private-sector representatives to emphasize Vietnam’s attractiveness as an FDI destination. The semiannual Vietnam Business Forum includes meetings between foreign investors and Vietnamese government officials. The U.S.-ASEAN Business Council (USABC), AmCham, and other U.S. associations also host multiple yearly missions for their U.S. company members, which allow direct engagement with senior government officials. Foreign investors in Vietnam have reported that these meetings and dialogues have helped address obstacles. Both foreign and domestic private entities have the right to establish and own business enterprises in Vietnam and engage in most forms of legal remunerative activity in non-regulated sectors. Vietnam has some statutory restrictions on foreign investment, including FOLs or requirements for joint partnerships, projects in banking, network infrastructure services, non-infrastructure telecommunication services, transportation, energy, and defense. The new Decree 31/2021/ND-CP dated 26 March 2021 provides a list of 25 business lines in which foreigners are prohibited to invest and 59 other business lines subjected to market access requirements. By law, the Prime Minister can waive these FOLs on a case-by-case basis. In practice, however, when the government has removed or eased FOLs, it has done so for the whole industry sector rather than for a specific investment. MPI plays a key role with respect to investment screening. All FDI projects required approval by the People’s Committee in the province in which the project would be located. By law, large-scale FDI projects must also obtained the approval of the National Assembly before investment can proceed. MPI’s approval process includes an assessment of the investor’s legal status and financial strength; the project’s compatibility with the government’s long- and short-term goals for economic development and government revenue; the investor’s technological expertise; environmental protection; and plans for land use and land clearance compensation, if applicable. The government can, and sometimes does, stop certain foreign investments if it deems the investment harmful to Vietnam’s national security. The following FDI projects also require the Prime Minister’s approval: airports; grade 1 seaports (seaports the government classifies as strategic); casinos; oil and gas exploration, production, and refining; telecommunications/network infrastructure; forestry projects; publishing; and projects that need approval from more than one province. In 2021, the government removed the requirement that the Prime Minister needs to approve investments over $271 million or investments in the tobacco industry. Recent third-party investment policy reviews include: WTO’s 2021 Trade Policy Review World Bank’s Review from 2020 OECD’s 2018 Review UNCTAD Investment Policy Review The Government of Vietnam has several initiatives in progress to implement administrative reforms, such as building e-Government platforms and single window services. In May 2021, USAID and the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) released the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) 2020 Report, which examined trends in economic governance. This annual report provides an independent, unbiased view on the provincial business environment by surveying over 8,500 domestic private firms on a variety of business issues. Overall, Vietnam’s median PCI score improved, reflecting the government’s efforts to improve economic governance and the quality of infrastructure, as well as a decline in the prevalence of corruption. Vietnam’s nationwide business registration site is here. In addition, as a member of the UNCTAD international network of transparent investment procedures, information on Vietnam’s investment regulations can be found online (Vietnam Investment Regulations Website). The website provides information for foreign and national investors on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations, including the number of steps, name, and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal and regulatory citations for seven major provinces. The government does not have a clear mechanism to promote or incentivize outward investment, nor does it have regulations restricting domestic investors from investing abroad. According to a preliminary report from the General Statistics Office, Vietnam invested $819 million in 134 projects abroad in 2020. By the end of 2020, total outward FDI investment from Vietnam was $21 billion in more than 1,400 projects in 78 countries. Laos received the most outward FDI, with $5 billion, followed by Russia and Cambodia with $2.8 billion and $2.7 billion, respectively. The main sectors of outward investment for Vietnam are mining, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, telecommunication, and energy. 3. Legal Regime U.S. companies continue to report that they face frequent and significant challenges with inconsistent regulatory interpretation, irregular enforcement, and an unclear legal framework. AmCham members have consistently voiced concerns that Vietnam lacks a fair legal system for investments, which affects U.S. companies’ ability to do business in Vietnam. The 2020 PCI report documented companies’ difficulties dealing with land, taxes, and social insurance issues, but also found improvements in procedures related to business administration and anti-corruption. Accounting systems are inconsistent with international norms, and this increases transaction costs for investors. The government had previously said it intended to have most companies transition to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by 2020. Unable to meet this target, the Ministry of Finance in March 2020 extended the deadline to 2025. In Vietnam, the National Assembly passes laws, which serve as the highest form of legal direction, but often lack specifics. Ministries provide draft laws to the National Assembly. The Prime Minister issues decrees, which provide guidance on implementation. Individual ministries issue circulars, which provide guidance on how a ministry will administer a law or decree. After implementing ministries have cleared a particular law to send the law to the National Assembly, the government posts the law for a 60-day comment period. However, in practice, the public comment period is sometimes truncated. Foreign governments, NGOs, and private-sector companies can, and do, comment during this period, after which the ministry may redraft the law. Upon completion of the revisions, the ministry submits the legislation to the Office of the Government (OOG) for approval, including the Prime Minister’s signature, and the legislation moves to the National Assembly for committee review. During this process, the National Assembly can send the legislation back to the originating ministry for further changes. The Communist Party of Vietnam’s Politburo reserves the right to review special or controversial laws. In practice, drafting ministries often lack the resources needed to conduct adequate data-driven assessments. Ministries are supposed to conduct policy impact assessments that holistically consider all factors before drafting a law, but the quality of these assessments varies. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) oversees administrative procedures for government ministries and agencies. The MOJ has a Regulatory Management Department, which oversees and reviews legal documents after they are issued to ensure compliance with the legal system. The Law on the Promulgation of Legal Normative Documents requires all legal documents and agreements to be published online and open for comments for 60 days, and to be published in the Official Gazette before implementation. Business associations and various chambers of commerce regularly comment on draft laws and regulations. However, when issuing more detailed implementing guidelines, government entities sometimes issue circulars with little advance warning and without public notification, resulting in little opportunity for comment by affected parties. In several cases, authorities allowed comments for the first draft only and did not provide subsequent draft versions to the public. The centralized location where key regulatory actions are published can be found here . The Ministry of Finance has provisions laws instructing public companies to produce an annual report disclosing their environmental, social and corporate governance policies. In 2016, the State Securities Commission of Vietnam, in cooperation with the International Finance Corporation, published an Environmental and Social Disclosure Guide which encourages independent external assurance. While almost all public companies in Vietnam now perform an environmental and social impact assessment when investing in a new project, many see this exercise as merely procedural. While general information is publicly available, Vietnam’s public finances and debt obligations (including explicit and contingent liabilities) are not transparent. The National Assembly set a statutory limit for public debt at 65 percent of nominal GDP, and, according to official figures, Vietnam’s public debt to GDP ratio at the end of 2021 was 43.7 percent – down from 53.3 percent the previous year. However, the official public-debt figures exclude the debt of certain large SOEs. This poses a risk to Vietnam’s public finances, as the government is liable for the debts of these companies. Vietnam could improve its fiscal transparency by making its executive budget proposal, including budgetary and debt expenses, widely and easily accessible to the general public long before the National Assembly enacts the budget, ensuring greater transparency of off-budget accounts, and by publicizing the criteria by which the government awards contracts and licenses for natural resource extraction. Vietnam’s legal system mixes indigenous, French, and Soviet-inspired civil legal traditions. Vietnam generally follows an operational understanding of the rule of law that is consistent with its top-down, one-party political structure and traditionally inquisitorial judicial system, though in recent years the country has begun gradually introducing elements of an adversarial system. The hierarchy of the country’s courts is: 1) the Supreme People’s Court; 2) the High People’s Court; 3) Provincial People’s Courts; 4) District People’s Courts, and 5) Military Courts. The People’s Courts operate in five divisions: criminal, civil, administrative, economic, and labor. The Supreme People’s Procuracy is responsible for prosecuting criminal activities as well as supervising judicial activities. Vietnam lacks an independent judiciary and separation of powers among Vietnam’s branches of government. For example, Vietnam’s Chief Justice is also a member of the Communist Party’s Central Committee. According to Transparency International, there is significant risk of corruption in judicial rulings. Low judicial salaries engender corruption; nearly one-fifth of surveyed Vietnamese households that have been to court declared that they had paid bribes at least once. Many businesses therefore avoid Vietnamese courts as much as possible. The judicial system continues to face additional problems: for example, many judges and arbitrators lack adequate legal training and are appointed through personal or political contacts with party leaders or based on their political views. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable, and appeals are adjudicated in the national court system. Through a separate legal mechanism, individuals and companies can file complaints against enforcement actions under the Law on Complaints. The 2005 Commercial Law regulates commercial contracts between businesses. Specific regulations prescribe specific forms of contracts, depending on the nature of the deals. If a contract does not contain a dispute-resolution clause, courts will have jurisdiction over a dispute. Vietnamese law allows dispute-resolution clauses in commercial contracts explicitly through the Law on Commercial Arbitration. The law follows the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model law as an international standard for procedural rules. Vietnamese courts will only consider recognition of civil judgments issued by courts in countries that have entered into agreements on recognition of judgments with Vietnam or on a reciprocal basis. However, with the exception of France, these treaties only cover non-commercial judgments. The legal system includes provisions to promote foreign investment. Vietnam uses a “negative list” approach to approve foreign investment, meaning foreign businesses are allowed to operate in all areas except for six prohibited sectors – from which domestic businesses are also prohibited. These include illicit drugs, wildlife trade, prostitution, human trafficking, human cloning, and debt collection services. The law also requires that foreign and domestic investors be treated equally in cases of nationalization and confiscation. However, foreign investors are subject to different business-licensing processes and restrictions, and companies registered in Vietnam that have majority foreign ownership are subject to foreign-investor business-license procedures. The Ministry of Planning and Investment enacted Circular No. 02/2022/TT-BKHĐT, which came into effect on April 1, 2022, guiding the supervision and investment assessments of foreign investment activities in Vietnam, providing a common template. It also examines the implementation of financial obligations towards the State; the execution of legal provisions on labor, foreign exchange control, environment, land, construction, fire prevention and fighting and other specialized legal regulations; the financial situation of the foreign-invested economic organization; and other provisions related to the implementation of investment projects. The 2019 Labor Code, which came into effect January 1, 2021, provides greater flexibility in contract termination, allows employees to work more overtime hours, increases the retirement age, and adds flexibility in labor contracts. The Law on Investment, revised in June 2020, stipulated that Vietnam would encourage FDI through financial incentives in the areas of university education, pollution mitigation, and certain medical research. The Public Private Partnership Law, passed in June 2020, lists transportation, electricity grid and power plants, irrigation, water supply and treatment, waste treatment, health care, education, and IT infrastructure as prioritized sectors for FDI and public-private partnerships. Vietnam has a “one-stop-shop” website for investment that provides relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors. The Vietnam Competition and Consumer Authority (“VCCA”) of MOIT reviews transactions subject to complaints for competition-related concerns. In 2021, VCCA reported that 125 merger control notifications, most of which related to real estate, have been submitted since 2019. Thirty percent of cases notified involved offshore transactions. The VCCA clarified that the Vietnam merger control regime seeks to regulate only relevant transactions that may have an anticompetitive impact on Vietnamese markets, especially those that enable enterprises to hold a dominant or monopoly position and heighten the risk of an abuse of dominance. Under the law, the government of Vietnam can only expropriate investors’ property in cases of emergency, disaster, defense, or national interest, and the government is required to compensate investors if it expropriates property. Under the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, Vietnam must apply international standards of treatment in any case of expropriation or nationalization of U.S. investor assets, which includes acting in a non-discriminatory manner with due process of law and with prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. The U.S. Mission in Vietnam is unaware of any current expropriation cases involving U.S. firms. Under the 2014 Bankruptcy Law, bankruptcy is not criminalized unless it relates to another crime. The law defines insolvency as a condition in which an enterprise is more than three months overdue in meeting its payment obligations. The law also provides provisions allowing creditors to commence bankruptcy proceedings against an enterprise and procedures for credit institutions to file for bankruptcy. According to the World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business Report, Vietnam ranked 122 out of 190 for resolving insolvency. The report noted that it still takes five years on average to conclude a bankruptcy case in Vietnam. The Credit Information Center of the State Bank of Vietnam provides credit information services for foreign investors concerned about the potential for bankruptcy with a Vietnamese partner. 6. Financial Sector The government generally encourages foreign portfolio investment. The country has two stock markets: the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange (HOSE), which lists publicly traded companies, and the Hanoi Stock Exchange, which lists bonds and derivatives. The Law on Securities, which came into effect January 1, 2021, states that Vietnam Exchange, a parent company to both exchanges, with board members appointed by the government, will manage trading operations. Vietnam also has a market for unlisted public companies (UPCOM) at the Hanoi Securities Center. Although Vietnam welcomes portfolio investment, the country sometimes has difficulty in attracting such investment. Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) classifies Vietnam as a Frontier Market, which precludes some of the world’s biggest asset managers from investing in its stock markets. Vietnam did not meet its goal to be considered an “emerging market” in 2020 and pushed back the timeline to 2025. Foreign investors often face difficulties in making portfolio investments because of cumbersome bureaucratic procedures. Furthermore, in the first three months of 2021, surges in trading frequently crashed the HOSE’s decades-old technology platform, resulting in investor frustration. Vietnam put into place the HOSE’s interim trading platform in July 2021, provided by FPT Corporation – Vietnam’s largest information technology service company – that has addressed HOSE’s overload issues while awaiting the new trading system purchased from the South Korean Exchange (KRX). The new system is expected to begin official operations in late 2022 and meet the requirements for Vietnam’s stock trading, including market information, market surveillance, clearing, settlement and depository and registration. There is enough liquidity in the markets to enter and maintain sizable positions. Combined market capitalization at the end of 2021 was approximately $334 billion, equal to 92 percent of Vietnam’s GDP, with the HOSE accounting for $250 billion, the Hanoi Exchange $21 billion, and the UPCOM $60 billion. Bond market capitalization reached over $64 billion in 2021, the majority of which were government bonds held by domestic commercial banks. Vietnam complies with International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII. The government notified the IMF that it accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4, effective November 8, 2005. Local banks generally allocate credit on market terms, but the banking sector is not as sophisticated or capitalized as those in advanced economies. Foreign investors can acquire credit in the local market, but both foreign and domestic firms often seek foreign financing since domestic banks do not have sufficient capital at appropriate interest rate levels for a significant number of FDI projects. Vietnam’s banking sector has been stable since recovering from the 2008 global recession. Nevertheless, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), Vietnam’s central bank, estimated in 2020 that 30 percent of Vietnam’s population is underbanked or lacks bank accounts due to a preference for cash, distrust in commercial banking, limited geographical distribution of banks, and a lack of financial acumen. The World Bank’s Global Findex Database 2017 (the most recent available) estimated that only 31 percent of Vietnamese over the age of 15 had an account at a financial institution or through a mobile money provider. The COVID-19 pandemic increased strains on the financial system as an increasing number of debtors were unable to make loan payments. However, low capital cost, together with credit growth rally, increased bank profits in 2021 by 25 percent compared to 2020. At the end of 2021, the SBV reported that the percentage of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the banking sector was 1.9 percent, up from 1.7 percent at the end of 2020. By the end of 2021, per SBV, the banking sector’s estimated total assets stood at $651 billion, of which $268 billion belonged to seven state-owned and majority state-owned commercial banks – accounting for 41 percent of total assets in the sector. Though classified as joint-stock (private) commercial banks, the Bank of Investment and Development Bank (BIDV), Vietnam Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Industry and Trade (VietinBank), and Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam (Vietcombank) all are majority-owned by SBV. In addition, the SBV holds 100 percent of Agribank, Global Petro Commercial Bank (GPBank), Construction Bank (CBBank), and Oceanbank. Currently, the total foreign ownership limit (FOL) in a Vietnamese bank is 30 percent, with a 5 percent limit for non-strategic individual investors, a 15 percent limit for non-strategic institutional investors, and a 20 percent limit for strategic institutional partners. The U.S. Mission in Vietnam did not find any evidence that a Vietnamese bank had lost a correspondent banking relationship in the past three years; there is also no evidence that a correspondent banking relationship is currently in jeopardy. Vietnam does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The 2020 Enterprises Law, which came into effect January 1, 2021, defines an SOE as an enterprise that is more than 50 percent owned by the government. Vietnam does not officially publish a list of SOEs. In 2018, the government created the Commission for State Capital Management at Enterprises (CMSC) to manage SOEs with increased transparency and accountability. The CMSC’s goals include accelerating privatization in a transparent manner, promoting public listings of SOEs, and transparency in overall financial management of SOEs. SOEs do not operate on a level playing field with domestic or foreign enterprises and continue to benefit from preferential access to resources such as land, capital, and political largesse. Third-party market analysts note that a significant number of SOEs have extensive liabilities, including pensions owed, real estate holdings in areas not related to the SOE’s ostensible remit, and a lack of transparency with respect to operations and financing. Vietnam officially started privatizing SOEs in 1998. The process has been slow because privatization typically transfers only a small share of an SOE (two to three percent) to the private sector, and investors have had concerns about the financial health of many companies. Additionally, the government has inadequate regulations with respect to privatization procedures. 10. Political and Security Environment Vietnam is a unitary single-party state, and its political and security environment is largely stable. Protests and civil unrest are rare, though there are occasional demonstrations against perceived or real social, environmental, labor, and political injustices. In August 2019, online commentators expressed outrage over the slow government response to an industrial fire in Hanoi that released unknown amounts of mercury. Other localized protests in 2019 and early 2020 broke out over alleged illegal dumping in waterways and on public land, and the perceived government attempts to cover up potential risks to local communities. Citizens sometimes protest actions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), usually online. For example, in June 2019, when PRC Coast Guard vessels harassed the operations of Russian oil company Rosneft in Block 06-01, Vietnam’s highest-producing natural gas field, Vietnamese citizens protested via Facebook and, in a few instances, in public. In April 2016, after the Formosa Steel plant discharged toxic pollutants into the ocean and killed a large number of fish, affected fishermen and residents in central Vietnam began a series of regular protests against the company and the government’s lack of response to the disaster. Protests continued into 2017 in multiple cities until security forces largely suppressed the unrest. Many activists who helped organize or document these protests were subsequently arrested and imprisoned. West Bank and Gaza Executive Summary Title The Palestinian economy is small, and while the internal economy in the West Bank is relatively open, there are significant constraints on movement and access of goods and people both within the West Bank and Gaza. Due to the small size of the local market (about 5 million consumers with relatively low purchasing power), access to foreign markets through trade is essential for private sector growth. Enterprises are highly dependent on Israel for either inputs or as a market, and 90 percent of Palestinian exports are sold to Israel. Preliminary 2021 export statistics obtained from the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) show total exports increased from $1.1 billion in 2020 to $1.4 in 2022. However, the trade deficit remained high at -$4.96 billion because of high levels of imports ($6.42 billion in 2021). Palestinian businesses have a reputation for professionalism and quality products. Ninety-nine percent of firms in the West Bank and Gaza are family owned small and medium-sized enterprises employing fewer than 20 people. Most private sector firms have moderate productivity, low investment, and limited competition, with the majority operating in retail and wholesale trading activities. Large Palestinian enterprises — only 1 percent of Palestinian companies — dominate certain sectors and are connected internationally, with partnerships extending to Asia, Europe, the Gulf, and the Americas. However, Israeli government restrictions on the movement and access of goods and people between the West Bank, Gaza, and external markets – which Israel states are necessary to address its security concerns — continue to limit Palestinian private sector growth. Roughly 40 percent of the West Bank falls under the civil control of the Palestinian Authority (PA), referred to as Area A and Area B following the 1993 Oslo Accords and the 1994 economic agreement commonly known as the Paris Protocol. Under those agreements, pending a final negotiated peace agreement defining borders and control of territory, the Israeli government maintains full administrative and security control of Area C, which comprises roughly 60 percent of the West Bank. A 2017 USAID study found that high transaction costs stemming from limitations on movement, access, and trade are the most immediate impediment to Palestinian economic growth, followed by energy and water insecurity. The Palestinian labor force is well educated, boasting a 98 percent literacy rate, and the West Bank and Gaza enjoy high technology penetration, despite poor internet service and limited access to modern, high-speed mobile networks. Nevertheless, already high unemployment persisted and worsened in 2021. According to the latest figures available from the PCBS, the combined West Bank and Gaza unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of 2021 was 24.2 percent. While the unemployment rates in both the West Bank and Gaza have remained the same in the last few years, the West Bank’s rate of 13.2 percent pales by comparison with the Gaza’s 44.7 percent, according to the PCBS. The rates were high for youth aged 20-24 years old (37.4percent), and for the educated (28 percent). The unemployment rate among women is 39.2 percent in the West Bank and Gaza compared to 20.4 percent among men. The average daily wage in the West Bank is $32, and $13 in Gaza compared to $82 in Israel. The public sector continues to be the largest Palestinian employer, providing 21.3 percent of all jobs. In 2021, the economy grew by 6 percent, according to World Bank preliminary estimates, due to the removal of the PA’s severe pandemic measures that affected all economic sectors during the prior year. With population growth at roughly 3 percent per year, real per capita GDP is projected to decline as unemployment and poverty rates rise. Ongoing political, economic, and fiscal uncertainty has generally deterred large-scale internal and foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment, representing 1 percent of GDP, is also very low in comparison with other economies. According to the World Bank, in 2021 investment rates remained low, with the majority channeled into non-traded activities that generate low productivity employment and returns that are less affected by political risk, such as internal trade and real estate development. Private investment levels, averaging about 15-16 percent of GDP in recent years, have been low compared with rates of over 25 percent in middle-income economies. The manufacturing and agricultural sectors’ contribution to GDP is also in decline. Manufacturing fell from 19 percent of GDP in 1994 to 11 percent in 2020 and agriculture fell from 12 percent of GDP in 1994 to seven percent in 2020. To reverse these trends, the Palestinian Investment Promotion and Industrial Estates Agency (IPIEA) included both sectors in its National Export Strategy. Target sectors include: Stone and marble Tourism Agriculture, including olive oil, fresh fruits, vegetables, and herbs Food and beverage, including agro-processed meat Textiles and garments Manufacturing, including furniture and pharmaceuticals Information and communication technology (ICT) Renewable energy To improve its foreign direct investment policies, the PA enacted a new Companies Law in December 2021, which updates the 1964 Jordanian law, to facilitate business incorporation online, and eliminate costly bureaucratic practices. The new law removes restrictions to foreign investors, such as foreign equity limits and local partner requirements. It improves rules for larger businesses with multiple shareholders. The new law also introduces new business types, including sole proprietorships and limited liability companies, and creates a legal framework for mergers, divisions, and transformations that will allow businesses to adapt their business model as they grow. In December 2021, the PA’s Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology (MTIT) facilitated the soft launch of a $3.5 million e-government initiative to ensure government services are more efficient and accessible to PA residents and the business community. The new e-services include online renewal of driver licenses, applications for government-provided health insurance, and registration for new companies. In 2021, the PA ran a total fiscal deficit of nearly $ 1.257 billion, of which around $317million ($186 million in recurrent budget support and $131 million in development financing) was covered by foreign donors, leaving the PA with $940 million financing gap. The PA covered its financing gap by taking additional bank loans (reaching unprecedented levels of $2.5 billion) and accumulating further arrears to the private sector suppliers of goods and services (with the stock of arrears exceeding $1 billion), and the PA civil servants’ pension fund (arrears estimated at $2 billion). The Palestinian Monetary Authority and the banking sector have stated that banks can no longer provide further loans, as the PA has already exceeded established lending limits; further, lending to the PA and public sector employees now comprises roughly 40 percent of all banking loans. The PA remains heavily dependent on clearance revenues (customs duties collected on imports by Israel on the PA’s behalf) which comprised 68 percent of all PA revenues in 2021. The PA’s continued practice of making prisoner and “martyr” payments – paying families of Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli jails and the families of Palestinians killed or seriously injured due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including terrorists – jeopardized these transfers. Israel imposes penalties to deter such payments, a position shared by the United States and applied to U.S. assistance through the Taylor Force Act and the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA). Substantial economic growth in the West Bank and Gaza depends on a number of factors: further easing of Israeli movement and access restrictions balanced with Israeli security concerns; expanded external trade and private sector growth; continued PA approval and implementation of long-pending commercial legislative reforms; political stability; increased water and energy supply to the productive sectors at lower cost; and PA fiscal stability. Economic sectors that are not dependent on traditional infrastructure and freedom of movement, such as information and communications technologies, are able to grow somewhat independently of these factors and therefore have enjoyed greater success in the Palestinian economy during the past decade. However, communications technology lags behind and is an impediment to further growth. The West Bank implemented Third Generation (3G) communications technology in 2018, while Gaza is still limited to outdated 2G communications technology. Israel and the PA, with international pressure, are negotiating allowing 4G technology in the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinian economy is expected to recover slowly (6 percent growth in 2021 and a projected 3 percent for 2022) after a sharp 11 percent decline in 2020. West Bank investment opportunities continue to exist in information technology, stone and marble, real estate development, light manufacturing, agriculture, and agro-industry. COVID-19 pandemic response measures have led to setbacks in both the stone and marble industry and the tourism sector, previously considered growth areas; the loss of inbound tourism throughout 2022, negatively affecting 37,800 tourism industry workers. It is anticipated that the waning pandemic will allow for eased restrictions and these sectors will flourish again. The increased cost of shipping and global disruptions in supply chains remain challenges despite the lifting of COVID-19 restrictions. The Gaza Strip effectively has been closed to traditional tourism since the 2007 Hamas takeover. This report focuses on investment issues related to areas under the administrative jurisdiction of the PA, except where explicitly stated. Where applicable, this report addresses issues related to investment in Gaza, although the de facto Hamas-led government’s implementation of PA legislation and regulations may differ significantly from PA’s. For issues where PA law is not applicable, Gazan courts typically refer to Israeli and Egyptian law; however, Hamas does not consistently apply PA, Egyptian, or Israeli law, and businesses in Gaza have reported instances where Hamas courts and officials have employed coercion or have otherwise acted outside the legal system when engaging with private businesses. These inconsistencies in the legal environment, among a number of other, more challenging factors, are strong deterrents to private investment in Gaza. Due to evolving circumstances, potential investors are encouraged to contact the PA Ministry of National Economy (MONE) ( www.mne.gov.ps ),IPIEA ( www.PIPA.ps ), the Palestine Trade Center ( www.paltrade.org ), and the Palestinian-American Chamber of Commerce ( www.pal-am.com ), as well as the Palestinian Affairs Unit of the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem ( https://il.usembassy.gov/palestinian-affairs-unit/) and the U.S. Commercial Service ( http://export.gov/westbank ) for the latest information. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index N/A N/A http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global -Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita (USD) 2018 $3,882 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.KN?locations=PS 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The West Bank and Gaza received an overall ranking of 117 out of 190 in the World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business report (the latest available), a slight decrease from 116 out of 190 in 2019. (World Bank rankings range from 1 to 190, with a lower rank representing greater ease of doing business. In the 2020 Doing Business Report, the Getting Credit component achieved a score of 25. However, the West Bank continues to rank poorly and needs significant regulatory improvement in the critical business-enabling categories of Resolving Insolvency (168 of 190), Starting a Business (173 of 190), Protecting Minority Investors (114 of 190), and Dealing with Construction Permits (148 of 190). The ease of registering real property score fell from 84 to 91 out of 190. The 2017-2022 National Policy Agenda is both a national development policy and a political document outlining the PA’s aspirations in three pillars: the path to independence; government reform; and sustainable development. The last section highlights the need for economic independence, including domestic reform to promote economic growth with fewer regulatory restrictions, supporting business start-ups and micro, small, and medium enterprises, as well as looking ahead to economic opportunities following the resolution of the political conflict with Israel. PA-Israeli government trade relations are governed by the 1994 Paris Protocol, which was intended to endure for five years until a final peace agreement was signed. Many of the stipulations are outdated or not fully implemented. Since 1995, the PA has taken steps to facilitate and increase foreign trade by signing free trade agreements independently with Russia, Jordan, Egypt, the Gulf States, Morocco, Tunisia, Mercosur, Vietnam, and Germany, and it is a member of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area. Israel does not recognize the PA’s signed trade agreements with the European Union, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Canada, and Turkey which therefore cannot be implemented; however, the West Bank and Gaza remain eligible for the benefits of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement The PA participates roughly every other year in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial meetings as an ad hoc observer, most recently in 2017 as more recent WTO Ministerial meetings have been delayed since 2020 due to COVID-19 but are currently scheduled to take place on June 13, 2022. The PA’s 2014 amendments to the Promotion of Investment in Palestine Law No. 1 of 1998 shifted promotional incentives from a focus on those that benefit from providing large capital investments to industrial projects to a focus on employment growth, development of human capital, increased exports, and local sourcing of machinery and raw materials (see Investment Incentives section below). The updated Companies Law enacted on December 30, 2021, removes restrictions to foreign investors, such as foreign equity limits and local partner requirements, making it easier for multinational corporations to open a branch or subsidiary in the West Bank. The updated law provides improved regulations for larger businesses with multiple shareholders. It introduces legal frameworks for mergers, divisions, and transformation, that will allow businesses to adapt their business models as they grow. In addition, the new law allows sole proprietorship, and individual entrepreneurs can take advantage of limited liability and can build their businesses in a way that responds to their needs. The law also introduces stronger protections for minority shareholders, including clear rules to mitigate conflicts of interest and priority rights to existing shareholders when new shares are issued. Certain investment categories require pre-approval by the Council of Ministers (PA Cabinet). These include investments involving (1) weapons and ammunition, (2) aviation products and airport construction, (3) electrical power generation/distribution, (4) reprocessing of petroleum and its derivatives, (5) waste and solid waste reprocessing, (6) wired and wireless telecommunication, and (7) radio and television. Purchase of land by foreigners also requires approval by the Council of Ministers. U.S. investors are not specifically disadvantaged or singled out by any of the ownership or control mechanisms, sector restrictions, or investment screening mechanisms, relative to other foreign investors. The Office of the Quartet (OQ), an organization under the UN working to support Palestinian economic development, rule of law, and improved movement and access for goods and people, has continued to work on advancing economic initiatives and the application of the rule of law. The OQ gives priority to areas where accomplishments are most viable under current conditions. Its current priorities are: (1) energy; (2) water; (3) rule of law; (4) movement and trade; and (5) telecommunications. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the WTO, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) do not provide investment policy reviews for the West Bank and Gaza. Foreign companies may register businesses in the West Bank and Gaza according to the new Companies Law enacted in December 2021 (in practice, Hamas-controlled Gaza continues to apply a separate 2012 Companies Law). The IPIEA provides information online about the business registration process, at http://www.pipa.ps/page.php?id=1c1ba7y1842087Y1c1ba7 but the PA does not offer a business registration website. The West Bank and Gaza rank low in Starting a Business on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Report, with a score in 2020 of 173 out of 190. The PA simplified the process of starting a business, which now can be done online according to the new Companies Law. Foreign investors must obtain a required business license from the Municipality and approval from the MONE and the relevant ministries. Foreign companies may work with IPIEA to obtain the investment registration certificate and investment confirmation certificate. See http://pipa.ps/page.php?id=1c395fy1849695Y1c395f and http://pipa.ps/page.php?id=1c1ba7y1842087Y1c1ba7 . In addition, foreign companies seeking to open branches in the West Bank or Gaza must submit registration documents certified by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) representative in their home country. Due to the closure of the PLO office in New York in 2018, U.S. investors can use the PLO office in Canada. According to IPIEAA, the majority of Palestinian companies are small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); consequently, the PA has sought to support SME development and financing. The PA categorizes SMEs according to staff size: small enterprises employ up to nine people, while medium enterprises employ 10-19 people. The PA does not have any mechanism for tracking outward private investment. 3. Legal Regime The PA Ministry of Justice, in cooperation with Birzeit University, publishes online the Official Gazette of all PA legislation since 1994 at http://muqtafi.birzeit.edu/en/index.aspx . The PA established a legislative framework for business and other economic activity in the areas under its jurisdiction in 1994; however, implementation and monitoring of implementation needs to be strengthened, according to many observers. The PA Ministry of National Economy is in the process of drafting key pieces of economic legislation to improve business and commercial regulation, including new intellectual property rights protections, a Competition Law, and procedures for resolving bankruptcy. The PA Ministry of National Economy holds stakeholder meetings for draft commercial legislation to gather input from the private sector and publishes drafts of the proposed laws. Because the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) has not met since 2007, each law must be approved by the Cabinet and adopted as a Presidential decree, an effort that often delays reform efforts. The laws will likely need to be approved by the PLC also, should it reconvene in the future. The PA budget execution reports are publicly available, including on the Ministry of Finance website ( http://www.pmof.ps/pmof/index.php ). A regulatory body governs the insurance sector, and the PA has adopted a telecommunications law that calls for establishment of an independent regulator. Establishment of the telecommunications regulator remains stalled, however. The Palestinian Standards Institution (PSI) also has a website with information on standards for the business community ( http://www.psi.pna.ps/en ). The PA is not a member of the WTO but has consistently expressed an interest in Permanent Observer status, having participated in the 2005, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017 WTO Ministerial meetings as an ad hoc observer. Commercial disputes can be resolved by way of conciliation, mediation, or domestic arbitration. Arbitration in the Palestinian territories is governed by PA Law No. 3 of 2000. International arbitration is accepted. The law sets out the basis for court recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. Generally, every dispute may be referred to arbitration by agreement of the parties, unless prohibited by the law’s Article 4, including disputes involving marital status, public order issues, and cases where no conciliation is permitted. If the parties do not agree on the formation of the arbitration tribunal, each party may choose one arbitrator and those arbitrators shall then choose a presiding arbitrator, unless the parties agree to do otherwise. Judgments made in other countries that need to be enforced in the West Bank and Gaza are honored, according to the prevailing law in the West Bank, primarily Jordanian Law No. 8 of 1952 as amended by the PA in 2005. Gazan courts refer back to Israeli and Egyptian laws, which were in force prior to 1993, for matters not covered by PA law; however, the de facto Hamas-led government in Gaza does not consistently apply PA, Egyptian, or Israeli laws, and has previously acted outside of existing legal frameworks, including to coerce private businesses. Laws that govern foreign direct investment are overseen by the PA Ministry of National Economy. There is no current Competition Law for the West Bank and Gaza. The PA drafted a law in 2003 that was not enacted. An effort to develop, draft, and implement a new Competition Law began in 2017 with the assistance of the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP). The PA’s resulting revised draft law has not yet been issued and is currently undergoing review by the President’s Office and must be approved and published in the official gazette to be enacted. Because of the geographic divisions between and within the West Bank and Gaza anwd strict Israeli controls on the movement of people as well as goods between the West Bank and Gaza, many firms have little to no competition, causing variations in both pricing and firm productivity between regions and sometimes between cities within a region. The Investment Law, as amended in 2014, prohibits expropriation and nationalization of approved foreign investments, other than in exceptional cases for a public purpose with a court decision and in return for fair compensation based on market prices and for losses suffered because of such expropriation. PA sources and independent lawyers say that any Palestinian citizen can file a petition or a lawsuit against the PA. In 2011, the PA established specialized courts for labor, chambers, customs, and anti-corruption. These courts are composed of judges and representatives from the Ministries of National Economy and Finance. There is a lack of confidence in the judicial system, though businesses sometimes rely on the courts and police to enforce contracts and seek redress. Alternative means of arbitration, including through familial or tribal mechanisms, are still used to resolve many disputes. The World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report (latest available) did not cite any cases involving foreclosure, liquidation, or reorganization proceedings filed during that year. According to that report, no priority is assigned to post-commencement creditors, and debtors may only file for liquidation. The PA Ministry of National Economy, with the assistance of international donors, is in the process of drafting several proposed laws related to bankruptcy, but no bankruptcy reform has been enacted. The newly enacted Companies Law includes a chapter on insolvency. 6. Financial Sector In 2004, the PA enacted the Capital Markets Authority Law and the Securities Commission Law and created the Capital Market Authority to regulate the stock exchange, insurance, leasing, and mortgage industries. In 2010, a Banking Law was adopted to bring the Palestinian Monetary Authority’s (PMA) regulatory capabilities in line with the Basel Accords, a set of recommendations for regulating the banking industry. The 2010 law provides a legal framework for the establishment of deposit insurance, management of the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system, and treatment of weak banks in areas such as merger, liquidation, and guardianship. It also gives the PMA regulatory authority over the microfinance sector. In 2013, the PA passed a Commercial Leasing Law and in 2015 the MONE finalized a registry for moveable assets, intended to facilitate secured transactions, especially for small and medium-sized businesses. In April 2016, the PA passed the Secured Transactions Law, which established the legal grounds and modern systems to regulate the use of movable assets as collateral. Notwithstanding this regulatory environment, the World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business report assigned the West Bank and Gaza a particularly low score for Protecting Minority Investors (114 out of 190) and Resolving Insolvency (168 out of 190). Founders of recently established SMEs complain that loan terms from Palestinian creditors fail to allow the borrower sufficient time to establish a sustainable business, although the new Moveable Assets Registry, coupled with the Secured Transactions Law and Commercial Leasing Law, led to a substantial improvement in the Getting Credit ranking (25 out of 190) from 2018. The Palestine Exchange (PEX) was established in 1995 to promote investment in the West Bank and Gaza. Launched as a private shareholding company, it was transformed into a public shareholding company in February 2010. The PEX was fully automated upon establishment – the first fully automated stock exchange in the Arab world, and the only Arab exchange that is publicly traded and fully owned by the private sector. The PEX is registered with the Companies Controller at the Ministry of National Economy and it operates under the supervision of the Palestinian Capital Market Authority. PEX’s 49 listed companies are divided into five sectors: banking and financial services, insurance, investment, industry, and services, with a USD 3.5 billion market capitalization. Shares trade in Jordanian dinars and U.S. dollars. PEX member securities companies (brokerage firms) operations are found across the West Bank and Gaza and authorized custodians are available to work on behalf of foreign investors. The Palestinian banking sector continues to perform well under the supervision of the PMA. World Bank reports to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) have consistently noted that the PMA is supervising the banking sector effectively. The PMA continues to enhance its institutional capacity and provides rigorous supervision and regulation of the banking sector, consistent with international practice. The PMA regulates and supervises 13 banks (6 Palestinian, 6 Jordanian, and 1 Egyptian) with 379 branches and offices in the West Bank and Gaza, with $ 20.9 billion net assets. No Palestinian currency exists and, as a result, the PA places no restrictions on foreign currency accounts. The PMA is responsible for bank regulation in both the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian banks are some of the most liquid in the region, with customers deposits of USD 11.5billion and gross credit of USD 10.7 billion as of the end of 2021. An Anti-Money Laundering Law that was prepared in line with international standards with technical assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and USAID came into force in October 2007. In December 2015, the PA President signed the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (AML/CFT) Decree Law Number 20 for the PA to join the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA/FATF), a voluntary organization of regional governments focused on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation. Improvements contained in the 2015 law make terrorist financing a criminal offense and defines terrorists, terrorist acts, terrorist organizations, foreign terrorist fighters, and terrorist financing. The PMA completed a National Risk Assessment (NRA) — an AML/CTF self-assessment — in 2018. The PMA is implementing the recommendations from the self-assessment to strengthen the AML/CTF regime in preparation for a MENA/FATF member review of the Palestinian economy’s AML/CFT safeguards, initially scheduled for August 2020 but postponed at the PA’s request to August 2022 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Swedish Riks Bank completed its assessment of the financial sector in preparation for the upcoming MENA/FATF mutual evaluation. Credit is affected by uncertain political and economic conditions and by the limited availability of real estate collateral due to non-registration of most West Bank land. Despite these challenges, the sector’s loan-to-deposit ratio continues to increase towards parity, moving from 58 percent at the end of 2015 to 68 percent at the end of 2019. However, in 2020 and 2021, the loan to deposit ratio slightly declined to 66.6 percent and 65.1 percent respectively due to reduced lending to businesses because of COVID-19. The increase in the loan to deposit ratio in the past was in part because of the PMA’s encouragement to banks to participate in loan guarantee programs sponsored by the United States and international financial institutions, by supporting a national strategy on microfinance, and by imposing restrictions on foreign placements. The PA Ministry of National Economy’s enactment of the Secured Transactions Law in April 2016 allows for use of moveable assets, such as equipment, as collateral for loans. Non-performing loans in 2021 were 4.15 percent of total loans, due to credit bureau assessments of borrowers’ credit worthiness and a heavy collateral system. In addition, in 2021 banks continued to avoided default by restructuring and rescheduling loans to help customers cope with the impact of COVID-19. Palestinian banks have remained stable in general but have suffered from a deterioration in relations with Israeli correspondent banks since the 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza when Israeli banks cut ties with Gazan branches and gradually restricted cash services provided to West Bank branches. In 2008, all Palestinian banks were required to move their headquarters to Ramallah. Israeli restrictions on the movement of cash between West Bank and Gaza branches of Palestinian banks have caused intermittent liquidity crises in Gaza and for all commonly used major currencies, including U.S. dollars, Jordanian dinars, and Israeli shekels. An Israeli government decision in the first quarter of 2021 increased the cash deposit transfer amount from Palestinian banks to the Bank of Israel to NIS 1.2 billion monthly. However, banks still say that this increase is not enough to mitigate the problem of a surplus of shekel bank notes stranded in the West Bank, and the PMA requested the BOI increase the quota to NIS 2.75 billion per month. Despite Hamas’s control of the Gaza Strip, Palestinian banks operating in Gaza follow strict PMA measures in order to maintain their operations and avoid running afoul of AML/CFT regulations. The privately-run Palestine Investment Fund (PIF) acts as a sovereign wealth fund, owned by the Palestinian people. According to PIF’s 2020 annual report (the most recent available), its assets reached $ 934 million and a net income of $ 8.6 million. These investments covered strategic economic sectors, and focused on high added-value productive sectors, such as the energy sector, both traditional and renewable, health, telecommunication and infrastructure, technology and education, agriculture, industry, commerce, construction, and small enterprises. 90 percent of PIF investments are domestic, but excess liquidity is invested in international and regional fixed income and equity markets. In 2014, the fund established the Palestine for Development Foundation, a separate not-for-profit foundation managing PIF’s corporate social responsibility initiatives, which are primarily focused on support to Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem, and abroad. Since 2003, PIF has transferred over $ 850 million to the PA in annual dividends, but PIF leadership does not report to the PA per PIF bylaws. International auditing firms conduct both internal and external annual audits of the PIF. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Although there are no state-owned enterprises (SOEs), some observers have noted that the PIF essentially acts as a sovereign wealth fund for the PA, and enjoys a competitive advantage in some sectors, including housing and telecommunications, due to its close ties with the PA. The import of petroleum products falls solely under the mandate of the Ministry of Finance’s General Petroleum Corporation, which then re-sells the products to private distributors at fixed prices. There is no PA privatization program for industries within the West Bank and Gaza. 10. Political and Security Environment Israeli government restrictions on the movement and access of goods and people between the West Bank, Gaza, and external markets – which Israel states are necessary to address its security concerns – continue to limit Palestinian private sector growth. Israeli Defense Forces under the Israeli Ministry of Defense are responsible for the West Bank, but PA Security Forces were granted security control of 17.5 percent (called Area A) under the 1993 Oslo Accords. Area A and Area B together make up the 36 percent of the West Bank and fall under PA civil control. Pending a final negotiated peace agreement defining borders and control of territory, Israel maintains all administrative and security control of Area C, which comprises 61 percent of the West Bank. A 2017 USAID study found that high transaction costs stemming from limitations on movement, access, and trade are the most immediate impediment to Palestinian economic growth, followed by energy and water insecurity. The security situation can change rapidly. Potential investors should regularly consult the State Department’s latest travel warnings, available at https://travel.state.gov. Clashes between security forces and Palestinians in the West Bank as well as between Israeli settlers and Palestinians have resulted in deaths and injuries. The Israeli government may restrict access to and within the West Bank and may place some areas under curfew. In June 2007, Hamas, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), seized control of the Gaza. The security environment within Gaza and on its borders is volatile. Violent demonstrations and shootings occur sporadically and with little warning, and the collateral risks are high. While the situation remains calm following a large escalation in May 2021, periodic mortar and rocket fire and Israeli military responses continue to occur. Following the 2007 Hamas takeover, the Israeli government implemented a closure policy that restricted imports to limited humanitarian and commercial shipments, effectively blocking exports from Gaza until 2015, when exports rebounded to an average of 115 truckloads per month. The economic situation and investment outlook in Gaza have deteriorated since the 2007 takeover, with especially challenging periods following Israeli combat operations there: December 2008-January 2009; November 2012; and July-August 2014; and May 2021. The Israeli government has at times eased its closure policy by lifting some restrictions on goods imported into and exported out of Gaza, most recently following the May 2021 escalation. However, businesses continue to face opaque restrictions on delays in importing and exporting goods, spare parts, and through Israeli-controlled Kerem Shalom crossing, the sole entry and exit point for goods traveling between Israel and Gaza. The Israeli government allows limited exports (transshipments) to overseas markets and to Israel, and some sales to the West Bank. Zambia Executive Summary Zambia is a landlocked country in southern Africa that shares a border with eight countries: Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Namibia. It has an estimated population of 17.86 million, GDP of $19.3 billion and GDP per capita of USD $1,086. Zambia has been in a financial and economic crisis since at least 2020, when the country became the world’s first COVID-era default after Zambia missed a payment on $3 billion of outstanding Eurobonds. The Zambian economy contracted in 2020 by 3.0 percent and grew by a meager 1.0 percent in 2021. The IMF forecasts 2022 real GDP growth of only 1.1 percent. Zambia’s debt overhang remains a severe inhibitor of economic growth, effectively eliminating the government’s access to international capital markets and forcing it to finance a persistent budget deficit through domestic borrowing, which crowds out private sector access to capital and limits growth. Despite broad economic reforms and debt relief under the World Bank’s Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in the early 2000s, Zambia has generally struggled to meet its full economic potential. A decade of democratic and economic backsliding under former President Edgar Lungu and the Patriotic Front resulted in widespread use of corruption and economic rent-seeking that has further damaged Zambia’s reputation as an investment destination. Cumbersome administrative procedures and unpredictable legal and regulatory changes continue to inhibit Zambia’s immense potential for private sector investment, compounded by insufficient transparency in government contracting, ongoing lack of reliable electricity, and a high cost of doing business due to poor infrastructure, high cost of capital, and the lack of skilled labor. President Hakainde Hichilema achieved a resounding victory at the polls in August 2021 on a platform of democratic and economic reform and renewal. By December 2021, Zambia achieved staff-level agreement with the IMF on a $1.4 billion Extended Credit Facility that is expected to anchor macroeconomic and fiscal reforms and restore investor confidence. With the appointment of respected economists and technocrats to lead the Ministry of Finance and the central bank, the Hichilema administration has made significant strides reducing inflation, which has dropped from nearly 25.0 percent in July 2021 to 13.1 by the end of March 2022. The Hichilema administration is currently seeking debt restructuring under the auspices of the G-20 Common Framework, which would provide the basis for IMF board approval of Zambia’s Extended Credit Facility. A successful businessman and investor in his own right, President Hichilema has pledged to tackle fiscal and regulatory reforms aimed at strengthening Zambia’s investment climate. Zambia remains highly dependent on its mining and extractives industry. It is Africa’s second-largest producer of copper and is an important source of several other critical minerals, including nickel and cobalt. According to the Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative, mining products accounted for 77 percent of Zambia’s total export earnings and 28 percent of government revenues in 2019. Investment in the mining sector fell substantially during the Lungu era due to multiple changes to Zambia’s minerals tax regime and an unstable regulatory environment. The Hichilema administration in its maiden budget introduced a key reform to Zambia’s minerals tax policy that is expected to attract new investment in the sector. The agriculture, healthcare, energy, financial services, and ICT sectors all offer potentially attractive opportunities for expanded U.S. trade and investment. The U.S. Embassy works closely with the American Chamber of Commerce of Zambia (AmCham) to support its American and Zambian members seeking to increase two-way trade. Agriculture and mining remain headlining sectors for the Zambian economy. U.S. firms are present and are exploring new projects in tourism, power generation, agriculture, and services. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 117 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 121 of 190 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $21 https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/factsheet.cfm World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,160 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 1. Openness To and Restrictions Upon Foreign Investment In general, Zambian law does not restrict foreign investors in any sector of the economy, although there are a few regulations and practices limiting foreign control laid out below. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) continues to play an important role in Zambia’s economy. The Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) is charged with attracting more FDI to Zambia, in addition to promoting trade and investment and coordinating the country’s private sector-led economic development strategy. Zambia has undertaken certain institutional reforms aimed at improving its attractiveness to investors; these reforms include the Private Sector Development Reform Program (PSDRP), which addresses the cost of doing business through legislation and institutional reforms, and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which addresses issues relating to transparency and good governance. However, frequent government policy changes have created uncertainty for foreign investors. The ZDA does not discriminate against foreign investors, and all sectors are open to both local and foreign investors. Foreign and domestic private entities have a right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activities, and no business ventures are reserved solely for the government. Although private entities may freely establish and dispose of interests in business enterprises, investment board approval is required to transfer an investment license for a given enterprise to a new owner. Currently, all land in Zambia is considered state land and ownership is vested in the president. Land titles held are for renewable 99-year leases; ownership is not conferred. According to the government, the current land administration system leaves little room for the empowerment of citizens, especially the poor and vulnerable rural communities. The government began reviewing the current land policy in earnest in March 2017; though shorter terms continue to be suggested, no changes have been adopted to date. Foreign investors in the telecom sector are required to disclose certain proprietary information to the ZDA as part of the regulatory approval process. Further information regarding information and communication regulation can be found at the website of the Zambia Information and Communication Technology Authority at http://www.zicta.zm The ZDA board screens all investment proposals and usually makes its decision within 30 days. The reviews appear to be routine and non-discriminatory, and applicants have the right to appeal investment board decisions. Investment applications are screened, with effective due diligence to determine the extent to which the proposed investment will help to create employment; the development of human resources; the degree to which the project is export-oriented; the likely impact on the environment; the amount of technology transfer; and any other considerations the Board considers appropriate. The following are the requirements for registering a foreign company in Zambia: At least one and not more than nine local directors must be appointed as directors of a majority foreign-owned company. At least one local director of the company must be resident in Zambia, and if the company has more than two local directors, more than half of them shall be residents of Zambia. There must be at least one documentary agent (a firm, corporate body registered in Zambia, or an individual who is a resident in Zambia). A certified copy of the Certificate of Incorporation from the country of origin must be attached to Form 46. The charter, statutes, regulations, memorandum and articles, or other instrument relating to a foreign company must be submitted. The Registration Fee of K5,448.50 (~ USD 320.00) must be paid. The issuance and sealing of the Certificate of Registration marks the end of the process for registration. This and further information can be found through the following Government of Zambia’s regulatory websites: Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA), https://www.pacra.org.zm/ ; Zambia Development Agency http://www.zda.org.zm/ ; Business Regulatory Review Agency, http://www.brra.org.zm/ ; and Business License Portal, http://www.businesslicenses.gov.zm/ . Zambia has not undergone any third-party investment policy reviews since 2012 through a multilateral organization such as the OECD, WTO, UNCTAD. However, domestic investment policies and legislation have been revised periodically, whenever impediments to investment laws are identified. The Zambian government, often with support from cooperating partners, has undertaken economic reforms to improve its business facilitation process and attract foreign investors, including steps to support more transparent policymaking and to encourage competition. The impact of these progressive policies, however, has been undermined by persistent fiscal deficits, struggling economy, high cost of doing business and widespread corruption. Business surveys, including TRACE International, generally indicate that corruption in Zambia is a major obstacle for conducting business in the country. The Zambian Business Regulatory Review Agency (BRRA) manages Regulatory Services Centers (RSCs) that serve as a one-stop shop for investors. RSCs provide an efficient regulatory clearance system by streamlining business registration processes; providing a single licensing system; reducing the procedures and time it takes to complete the registration process; and increasing accessibility of business registration institutions by placing them under one roof. The government established RSCs in Lusaka, Livingstone, Kitwe, and Chipata, and has plans to establish additional RSCs so that there is at least one in each of the country’s 10 provinces. Information about the RSCs can be found at the following links: The Companies Act No. 10 of 2017 was operationalized through a statutory instrument (June 2018) and implementing regulations (February 2019) aimed at fostering accountability and transparency in the management of companies. Companies are required to maintain a register of beneficial owners, and persons holding shares on behalf of other persons or entities must now disclose those beneficial owners. In order to facilitate improved access to credit, the Patents and Company Registration Office (PACRA) established the collateral registry system, a central database that records all registrations of charges or collaterals created by borrowers to secure credits provided by lenders. This service allows lenders to search for collateral offered by loan applicants to see if that collateral already an existing claim has registered against it. Creditors can also register security interests against the proposed collateral to protect their priority status in accordance with the Movable Property (Security Interest) Act No. 3 of 2016. Generally, the first registered security interest in the collateral has first priority over any subsequent registrations. Parliament passed the Border Management and Trade Facilitation Act in December 2018. The Act, among other things, calls for coordinated border management and control to facilitate the efficient movement and clearance of goods; puts into effect provisions for one-stop border posts; and simplifies clearance of goods with neighboring countries. While one-stop border posts have existed for several years and agencies are co-located at some border crossings, the new law seeks to harmonize conflicting regulations and processes within the interagency. There are no incentives for outward investment. 3. Legal Regime Proposed laws and other statutory instruments are often insufficiently vetted with interest groups or are not released in draft form for public comment. Proposed bills are published on the National Assembly of Zambia website ( http://www.parliament.gov.zm/ ) for public viewing and to facilitate public submissions to parliamentary committees reviewing the legislation; however, these are frequently issued with little advanced notice. Hard copies of the documents are delivered by courier to the stakeholders’ premises/mailboxes. Opportunities for comment on proposed laws and regulations sometimes exist through trade associations and policy thinktanks such as the Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research, Centre for Trade Policy and Development, Zambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Zambia Association of Manufacturers, Zambia Chamber of Mines, and the American Chamber of Commerce in Zambia. The government established the Business Regulatory Review Agency (BRRA) in 2014 with the mandate to administer the Business Regulatory Act. The Act requires public entities to submit for Cabinet approval a policy or proposed law that regulates business activity, after the policy or proposed law has BRRA approval. A public entity that intends to introduce any policy or law for regulating business activities should give notice, in writing, to the BRRA at least two months prior to submitting it to Cabinet; hold public consultations for at least 30 days with relevant stakeholders; and perform a Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). The BRRA works in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, which does not approve any proposed law to regulate business activity without the approval of BRRA. While this framework exists on paper, the BRRA and the consultative process is still relatively new and unknown even by other government officials, and in some cases, it appears that the BRRA was informed after the Ministry of Justice had already approved a law. While there are clear public procurement guidelines, transparency remains a concern for potential investors and bidders. To enhance the transparency, integrity, and efficiency of Zambia’s procurement system, the GRZ launched the Electronic Government Procurement (e-GP) in July 2016. President Hichilema has made public procurement reform a key priority for his administration, introducing a new financial crimes fast track court and strengthening the mandate of key investigative institutions. Zambia is a member of several regional and international economic groupings, including the COMESA and SADC Free Trade Areas. Zambia was also an active participant in the establishment of the Tripartite Free Trade Area between COMESA, SADC, and the East African Community (EAC). The top five intra-COMESA exports from Zambia include tobacco, sugar, wire, refined copper, and cement. Trade among SADC member states is conducted on reciprocal preferential terms. Rules of Origin define the conditions for products to qualify for preferential trade in the SADC region. Products have to be “wholly produced” or “sufficiently processed” often warranting change in tariff heading in the SADC region to be considered compliant with the SADC Rules of Origin, which are product-specific and not generic. COMESA, EAC, and SADC member states agreed in October 2008 to negotiate a Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) covering half of Africa. The TFTA was launched in June 2015 in Egypt; to date, Zambia is one of the 22 out of the 26 member states which have signed the agreement. The Agreement will enter into force once it has been ratified by 14 Member States-with 10 Members (Botswana, Burundi, Egypt, Eswatini, Kenya, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, South Africa and Zambia) ratified. According to OECD trade facilitation indicators, Zambia performs better than the average sub-Saharan African and lower middle-income countries in the areas of information availability, involvement of the trade community, appeal procedures, and automation. Zambia’s performance for internal border agency co-operation and governance and impartiality is below average for sub-Saharan African and lower middle-income countries. In February 2019, Zambia signed the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) and in February 2021 it deposited the instruments of ratification with the African Union, making Zambia the 36th member to fully accede to the agreement. The trade agreement among 54 African Union member states creates in theory a continent-wide single market, with plans for free movement of people and a single-currency union. At the multilateral level, Zambia has been a WTO member since 1995. Zambia’s investment incentives program is transparent and has been included in the WTO’s trade policy reviews. The incentive packages are also subject to reviews by the Board of the ZDA and to periodic reviews by the Parliamentary Accounts Committee. Zambia is a signatory to the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), but still faces major challenges in expediting the movement, release, and clearance of goods, including goods in transit, which is a major requisite of the TFA. The new administration has committed to implement a robust infrastructure development for roads and bridges which form a backbone of Zambia’s transport network and regional connectivity. Zambia has benefited from duty-free and quota-free market access to the EU through its Everything but Arms FTA, and to the United States via the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and AGOA agreements. Zambia has a dual legal system that consists of statutory and customary law enforced through a formal court system. Statutory law is derived from the English legal system with some English Acts of Parliament still deemed to be in full force and effect within Zambia. Traditional and customary laws, which remain in a state of flux, are generally not written or codified, although some of them have been unified under Acts of Parliament. No clear definition of customary law has been developed by the courts, and there has not been systematic development of this subject. Zambia has a written commercial law. The Commercial Court, a division of the High Court, deals with disputes arising out of commercial transactions. All commercial matters are registered in the commercial registry and judges of the Commercial Court are experienced in commercial law. Appeals from the Commercial Court, based on the amended January 2016 constitution, now fall under the recently established Court of Appeals, comprised of eight judges. The Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, Chapter 76, makes provision for the enforcement in Zambia of judgments given in foreign countries that accord reciprocal treatment. The registration of a foreign judgment is not automatic. Although Zambia is a state party to international human rights and regional instruments, its dualist system of jurisprudence considers international treaty law as a separate system of law from domestic law. Domestication of international instruments by Acts of Parliament is necessary for these to be applicable in the country. Systematic efforts to domesticate international instruments have been slow but continue to see progress. The courts support Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and there has been an increase in the use of arbitration, mediation, and tribunals by litigants in Zambia. Arbitration is common in commercial matters and the proceedings are governed by the Arbitration Act No. 19 of 2000. The Act incorporates United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Zambian courts have no jurisdiction if parties have agreed to an arbitration clause in their contract. The establishment of the fee-based judicial commercial division in 2014 to adjudicate high-value claims has helped accelerate resolution of such cases. The courts in Zambia are generally independent, but contractual and property rights enforcement is weak and final court decisions can take a prohibitively long time. At times, politicians have exerted pressure on the judiciary in politically controversial cases. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable, and adjudication depends on the matter at hand and the principal law or act governing the regulations. The major laws affecting foreign investment in Zambia include: The Zambia Development Agency Act of 2006, which offers a wide range of incentives in the form of allowances, exemptions, and concessions to companies. The Companies Act of 1994, which governs the registration of companies in Zambia. The Zambia Revenue Authority’s Customs and Excise Act, Income Tax Act of 1966, and the Value Added Tax of 1995 provide for general incentives to investors in various sectors. The Employment Code Act of 2019, Zambia’s basic employment law that provides for required minimum employment contractual terms. The Immigration and Deportation Act, Chapter 123, regulates the entry into and residency in Zambia of visitors, expatriates, and immigrants. The Zambian economy operates under free market norms with a fairly developed competition and regulatory framework. There is freedom of pricing, currency convertibility for a small currency basket, freedom of trade, and free use of profits. A fairly strong institutional framework is provided for strategic sectors, such as mining and mining supply industries, and large-scale commercial farming. The Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) is a statutory body established with a unique dual mandate to promote competition in the economy, curtail restrictive business practices and protect consumer rights. The CCPC’s mandate implemented through the CCPC ACT cuts across all economic sectors in an effort to eliminate abuse of dominant position of market power, anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions, and cartels, and to enhance consumer protection and safeguard competition. In 2016 the CCPC published a series of guidelines and policies that included adoption of a formal Leniency Policy intended to encourage persons to report information that may help to uncover prohibited agreements. In certain circumstances the person receives immunity from prosecution, imposition of fines, or the guarantee of a reduction in fines. The policy also calculates administrative penalties. In addition, the CCPC in 2016 published draft Settlement Guidelines, which provide a formal framework for parties seeking to engage the CCPC to reach a settlement. The CCPC Act, Chapter 417, prevents firms from distorting the competitive process through conduct or agreements designed to exclude actual or potential competitors, and applies to all entities, regardless of whether private, public, or foreign. Although the CCPC largely opens investigations when a complaint is filed, it can also open investigations on its own initiative. Zambian competition law can also be enforced by civil lawsuits in court brought by private parties, while criminal prosecution by the CCPC is possible in cartel cases without the involvement of the Director of Public Prosecution under the Competition and Consumer Protection Act (CCPA) No. 24 of 2010. However, the general perception is that the Commission may be restricted in applying the competition law against government agencies and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), especially those protected by other laws. Zambia is a signatory to the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of the World Bank and other international agreements. This guarantees foreign investment protection in cases of war, strife, disasters, and other disturbances, or in cases of expropriation. Zambia has signed bilateral reciprocal promotional and protection of investment protocols with a number of countries. The ZDA also offers further security for investments in the country through the signing of the Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (IPPAs). Investments may only be legally expropriated by an act of Parliament relating to the specific property expropriated. Although the ZDA Act states that compensation must be at a fair market value, the method for determining fair market value is ill-defined. Compensation is convertible at the current exchange rate. The ZDA Act also protects investors from being adversely affected by any subsequent changes to the Investment Act of 1993 for seven years from their initial investment. Leasehold land, which is granted under 99-year leases, may revert to the government if it is determined to be undeveloped after a certain amount of time, generally five years. Land title is sometimes questioned in court, and land is re-titled to other owners. There is no pattern of discrimination against U.S. persons by way of an illegal expropriation by the government or authority in the country. There are no high-risk sectors prone to expropriation. The Bankruptcy Act, Chapter 82, provides for the administration of bankruptcy of the estates of debtors and makes provision for punishment of offenses committed by debtors. It also provides for reciprocity in bankruptcy proceedings between Zambia and other countries and for matters incidental to and consequential upon the foregoing. This applies to individuals, local, and foreign investors. Bankruptcy judgments are made in local currency but can be paid out in any internationally convertible currency. Under the Bankruptcy Act, a person can be charged as a criminal. A person guilty of an offense declared to be a felony or misdemeanor under the Bankruptcy Act in respect of which no special penalty is imposed by the Act shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. Zambia has made strides in improving its credit information system. Since 2008, the credit bureau, TransUnion, requires banks and some non-banks to provide loan requirement information and consult it when making loans. The credit bureau eventually captures data from other institutions, such as utilities. However, the bureau’s coverage is still less than ten percent of the population, the quality of its information is suspect, and there it lacks clarity on data sources and the inclusion of positive information. 6. Financial Sector Government policies generally facilitate the free flow of financial resources to support the entry of resources in the product and factor market. Banking supervision and regulation by the Bank of Zambia (BoZ) has improved slightly over the past few years. Improvements include revoking licenses of some insolvent banks, denying bailouts, limiting deposit protection, strengthening loan recovery efforts, and upgrading the training of and incentives for bank supervisors. High domestic lending rates, a lack of dollar and foreign exchange liquidity, and the limited accessibility of domestic financing have constrained business for several years. High returns on government securities encourage commercial banks to invest heavily in government debt to the exclusion of financing productive private sector investments, particularly for SMEs. The Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE), established in 1993, is structured to meet international recommendations for clearing and settlement system design and operations. There are no restrictions on foreign participation in the LuSE, and foreigners may invest in stocks on the same terms as Zambians. The LuSE has offered trading in equity securities since its inception and, in March 1998, the LuSE became the official market for selling Zambian government bonds. Investors intending to trade a listed security or government bond are now mandated to trade via the LuSE. The market is regulated by the Securities Act of 1993 and enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of Zambia. Secondary trading of financial instruments in the market is very low or non-existent in some areas. The financial sector is comprised of three sub-sectors according to financial sector supervisory authorities. The banking and financial institutions sub-sector is supervised by the BoZ, the securities sub-sector by the SEC, and the pensions and insurance sub-sector by the Pensions and Insurance Authority. The Banking and Financial Services Act, Chapter 387, and the Bank of Zambia Act, Chapter 360, govern the banking industry. Zambia’s banking sector is considered relatively well-developed in the African context, but the sector remains highly concentrated. There are currently 19 banks in Zambia with the largest four banks holding nearly two-thirds of total banking assets. The dominance of the four largest banks in deposits and total assets has been diluted by increased market capture of smaller banks and new industry entrants, an indication of growing competitive intensity in this segment of the banking market. Government policies generally facilitate the free flow of financial resources to support the entry of resources in the product and factor market. There continued to be a steady increase in electronic banking and related services over the last few years. The BoZ’s current policy rate as of March 2022 is 9.0 percent. Commercial lending rates averaged 25.65 percent in 2021, among the highest in the region, making the cost of capital for investment unattractive. One factor inhibiting more affordable lending is a culture of tolerating loan default, which many borrowers view as a minor transgression. Non-performing loans (NPLs) have continued to decline, closing the 2021 financial year at 5.82 percent compared to 11.63 percent in 2020. The government contributes to this problem, with arrears to government contractors estimated at $1.3 billion. Banking officials acknowledge the need to upgrade the risk assessment and credit management skills of their institutions to better serve borrowers but note widespread financial illiteracy limits borrowers’ ability to access credit. Banks provide credit denominated in foreign currencies only for investments aimed at producing goods for export. Banks provide services on a fee-based model and banking charges are generally high. Home mortgages are available from several leading Zambian banks, although interest rates are still very high. To operate a bank in Zambia, the bank must be licensed by the Registrar of Banks, Financial Institutions, and Financial Businesses (“the Registrar”) whose office is based at the BoZ. The decision to license banks lies with the Registrar. Foreign banks or branches are allowed to operate in country as long as they fulfill BoZ requirements and meet the minimum capital requirement of $100 million for foreign banks and $20 million for local banks. According to the BoZ, many banks in the country have correspondent banking relationships. Generally, all regulatory agencies that issue operating licenses have statutory reporting requirements that businesses operating under their laws and regulations must meet. For example, the Banking and Financial Services Act has stringent reporting provisions that require all commercial banks to submit weekly returns indicating their liquidity position. Late submission of the weekly returns or failure to meet the minimum core liquidity and statutory reserves incur punitive penalty interest and may lead to the placement of non-compliant commercial banks under direct supervision of BoZ, closure of the undertaking, or the prosecution of directors. All companies listed under the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE) are obliged to publish interim and annual financial statements within three months after the close of the financial year. Listed companies are also required to disclose in national print media any information that can affect the value of the price of their securities. According to the Companies Act, Chapter 388, company directors need to generate annual account reports after the end of each financial year. The annual account, auditor’s report or reports on the accounts, and directors’ report should be sent to each person entitled to receive notice of the annual general meeting and to each registered debenture holder of the company. A foreign company is required to submit annual accounts and an auditor’s report to the Registrar. The Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs) are licensed and regulated in accordance with the provisions of the Banking and Financial Services Act of 1994 (BFSA) and related Regulations and Prudential Guidelines. As key players in the financial sector, NBFIs are subject to regulatory requirements governing their prudential position, consumer protection, and market conduct in order to safeguard the overall soundness and stability of the financial system. The NBFIs comprise eight leasing and finance companies, three building societies, one credit reference bureau, one savings and credit institution, one development finance institution, 80 bureaux de change, one credit reference bureau, and 34 micro-finance institutions. Private firms are open to foreign investment through mergers and acquisitions. The CCPC reviews and handles big mergers and acquisitions. The High Court of Zambia may reverse decisions made by the Commission. Under the CCPA, foreign companies without a presence in Zambia and taking over local firms do not have to notify their transactions to the Commission, as it has not established disclosure requirements for foreign companies acquiring existing businesses in Zambia. Zambia does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are currently 34 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating in different sectors in Zambia including agriculture, education, energy, financial services, infrastructure, manufacturing, medical, mining, real estate, technology, media and communication, tourism, and transportation and logistics. Most SOEs are wholly owned, or majority owned by the government under the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) established in 2015. Zambia has two categories of SOEs: those incorporated under the Companies Act and those established by particular statutes, referred to as statutory corporations. There is a published list of SOEs in the Auditor General’s annual reports; SOE expenditure on research and development is not detailed. There is no exhaustive list or online location of SOEs’ data for assets, net income, or number of employees. Consequently, inaccurate information is scattered throughout different government agencies/ministries. The majority of SOEs have serious operational and management challenges. In theory, SOEs do not enjoy preferential treatment by virtue of government ownership, however, they may obtain protection when they are not able to compete or face adverse market conditions. The Zambia Information Communications Authority Act has a provision restricting the private sector from undertaking postal services that would directly compete with the Zambia Postal Services Corporation. Zambia is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the WTO, however private enterprises are allowed to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations such as licenses and supplies. SOEs in Zambia are governed by Boards of Directors appointed by government in consultation with and including members from the private sector. The chief executive of the SOE reports to the board chairperson. In the event that the SOE declares dividends, these are paid to the Ministry of Finance. The board chair is informally obliged to consult with government officials before making decisions. The line minister appoints members of the Board of Directors from within public service, the private sector, and civil society. The independence of the board, however, is limited since most boards are comprised of a majority of government officials, while board members from the private sector or civil society that are appointed by the line minister can be removed. SOEs can and do purchase goods or services from the private sector, including foreign firms. SOEs are not bound by the GPA and can procure their own goods, works, and services. SOEs are subject to the same tax policies as their private sector competitors and are generally not afforded material advantages such as preferential access to land and raw materials. SOEs are audited by the Auditor General’s Office, using international reporting standards. Audits are carried out annually, but delays in finalizing and publishing results are common. Controlling officers appear before a Parliamentary Committee for Public Accounts to answer audit queries. Audited reports are submitted to the president for tabling with the National Assembly, in accordance with Article 121 of the Constitution and the Public Audit Act, Chapter 378. In 2015, the government transferred most SOEs from the Ministry of Finance to the revived Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). The move, according to the government, was to allow line ministries to focus on policy making thereby giving the IDC direct mandate and authorization to oversee SOE performance and accountability on behalf of the government. The IDC’s oversight responsibilities include all aspects of governance, commercial, financing, operational, and all matters incidental to the interests of the state as shareholder. There were no sectors or companies targeted for privatization in 2021. The privatization of parastatals began in 1991, with the last one occurring in 2007. The divestiture of state enterprises mostly rests with the IDC, as the mandated SOE holding company. The Privatization Act includes the provision for the privatization and commercialization of SOEs; most of the privatization bidding process is advertised via printed media and the IDC’s website ( www.idc.co.zm ). There is no known policy that forbids foreign investors from participating in the country’s privatization programs. 10. Political and Security Environment Zambia has benefited from almost 30 years of largely peaceful multi-party politics, with 3 peaceful transfers of executive power. Zambia does not have a history of large-scale political violence. National elections in 2021 were largely peaceful and former President Edgar Lungu conceded defeat to Hakainde Hichilema. The rise in street crime remains a significant concern as the Zambian economy struggles to create meaningful employment opportunities for young people. 13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($BM USD) 2020 N/A 2020 $18.11 https://data.worldbank.org/ country/zambia Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2020 $21 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/factsheet.cfm Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 N/A 2020 -$1 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/ factsheet/factsheet.cfm Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 N/A 2020 1.3% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/ World%20Investment%20Report/ Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx * Host country statistical data released is almost non-existent. If it exists, there is not a central source for retrieving the data, and at most times it does not match international sources. Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data** From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions) Inward Direct Investment Stock Outward Direct Investment Stock Total Inward $12,383.6 100% Total Outward $725.8 100% Canada $3,387 27.4% Switzerland $165.8 22.8% China $2,439 19.7% United States $22.3 3% Switzerland $2,382 19.2% South Africa $6.5 0.9% Netherlands $1,775 14.3% Mauritius $3 0.4% Australia $890 7.2% Rest of the World $2.6 0.4% “0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000. **Bank of Zambia Private Capital Flow 2021 Report Zimbabwe Executive Summary Zimbabwe suffered serious economic contractions in 2019 and 2020 due to the economic mismanagement, the extended effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and climate shocks that crippled agriculture and electricity generation. According to the government of Zimbabwe, the economy recovered strongly, growing by 7.8 percent, in 2021 although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates the economy grew by 6.1 percent, thanks to increased agricultural production, high commodity prices, and improved capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector. The government expects the economy to grow by 5.5 percent in 2022 as the negative impacts of COVID-19 subside. International financial institutions also project positive but more modest growth, with the IMF forecasting a real GDP growth of 3.1 percent in 2022. Inflation remained high in 2021, but steadily declined to end the year at 60.6 percent. Authorities attributed the decline to the introduction of a weekly foreign exchange auction system in June 2020 and fiscal consolidation that resulted in near balanced budgets in 2020 and 2021. However, the inflation rate has continued to rise to 72.7 percent by March 2022 due to the negative effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on commodity prices as well as the depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar. Zimbabwe’s local currency has lost 79 percent of its value relative to the U.S. dollar since the government adopted an auction system on June 23, 2020. A gap between the auction and parallel-market exchange rates has persisted, with U.S. dollars more than twice as expensive on the parallel market. To improve the ease of doing business, the government formed the Zimbabwe Investment and Development Agency (ZIDA) in 2020, intended as a one-stop-shop to promote and facilitate both domestic and foreign investment in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s incentives to attract FDI include tax breaks for new investment by foreign and domestic companies, and making capital expenditures on new factories, machinery, and improvements fully tax deductible. The government waives import taxes and surtaxes on capital equipment. It has made gradual progress in improving the business environment by reducing regulatory costs, but policy inconsistency and weak institutions have continued to frustrate businesses. Corruption remains rife and there is little protection of property rights, particularly with respect to agricultural land. Historically, the government has committed to protect property rights but has also expropriated land without compensation. The Finance Act (No 2) at the end of 2020 amended the Indigenization Act by removing language designating diamonds and platinum as the only minerals subject to indigenization (requiring majority ownership by indigenous Zimbabweans), finally ending indigenization requirements in all sectors. However, the new legislation also granted broad discretion to the government to designate minerals as subject to indigenization in the future. The government subsequently issued statements to reassure investors that no minerals will be subject to indigenization, including diamonds and platinum. The government ended its 2019 ban on using foreign currencies for domestic transactions in March 2020. However, the authorities decreed businesses selling in foreign exchange must surrender 20 percent of the receipts to the central bank in exchange for local currency at the overvalued auction rate. Exporters must surrender 40 percent of foreign currency earnings at the unfavorable auction rate. Zimbabwe owes approximately US$10.7 billion (US$6.5 billion of which is in arrears) to international financial institutions accounting for 71 percent of the country’s GDP. The country’s high external debt (public and private) limits its ability to access official development assistance at concessional rates. Additionally, domestic banks do not offer financing for periods longer than two years, with most financing limited to 180 days or less. The sectors that attract the most investor interest include agriculture (tobacco, in particular), mining, energy, and tourism. Zimbabwe has a well-earned reputation for the high education levels of its workers. Although the United States has a targeted sanctions program against Zimbabwe, it currently applies to only 83 individuals and 37 entities. The U.S. Government imposed sanctions against specifically identified individuals and entities in Zimbabwe, as a result of the actions and policies of certain members of the Government of Zimbabwe and other persons that undermine democratic institutions or processes in Zimbabwe, violate human rights, or facilitate corruption. U.S. companies can do business with Zimbabwean individuals and companies that are not on the specially designated nationals (SDN) list. After reaching US$745 million in 2018, Zimbabwe witnessed significant declines in foreign direct investment (FDI). According to data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), FDI inflows into Zimbabwe fell from US$280 million in 2019 to US$194 million in 2020. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 157 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 113 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 (D) https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 1,140 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD (D) – Information suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies. 1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment To attract FDI and improve the country’s competitiveness, the government has encouraged public-private partnerships and emphasized the need to improve the investment climate by lowering the cost of doing business as well as restoring the rule of law and sanctity of contracts. Implementation, however, has been limited. The government amended the Indigenization Act by removing diamonds and platinum from minerals subject to indigenization (requiring majority ownership by indigenous Zimbabweans), although the new legislation appeared to grant broad discretion to the GOZ to designate minerals as subject to indigenization in the future. Subsequently, the GOZ reassured investors that no minerals will be subject to indigenization, including diamonds and platinum. However, there are smaller sectors “reserved” for Zimbabweans (see below). To improve the ease of doing business, the government enacted legislation that led to the formation of the Zimbabwe Investment and Development Agency (ZIDA) in 2020. ZIDA replaced the Zimbabwe Investment Authority and serves as a one-stop-shop center in promoting and facilitating both domestic and foreign investment in Zimbabwe. While the government has committed to prioritizing investment retention, there are still no mechanisms or formal structures to maintain ongoing dialogue with investors. Foreign and domestic private entities have a right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in all forms of remunerative activity, but foreign ownership of businesses in certain reserved sectors is limited. Foreign investors are free to invest in most sectors without any restrictions as the government aims to bring in new technologies, value-add manufacturing, and generate employment. According to the ZIDA Act, “foreign investors may invest in, and reinvest profits of such investments into, any and all sectors of the economy of Zimbabwe, and in the same form and under the same conditions as defined for Zimbabweans under the applicable laws and regulations of Zimbabwe.” However, the government reserves certain sectors for Zimbabweans such as passenger buses, taxis and car hire services, employment agencies, grain milling, bakeries, advertising, dairy processing, and estate agencies. The country screens FDI through the ZIDA in liaison with relevant line ministries to confirm compliance with the country’s laws. According to the country’s laws, U.S. investors are not especially disadvantaged or singled out by any of the ownership or control mechanisms relative to other foreign investors. In its investment guidelines, the government states its commitment to non-discrimination between foreign and domestic investors and among foreign investors. In a 2019 review, Global Witness recommended reform of Zimbabwe’s shadowy diamond sector through publication of all diamond mining contracts, shareholdings, and their ultimate beneficial owners; production of timely annual reports, including audited accounts detailing revenues raised and all payments to the Treasury and all transfers to private shareholders. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/blog/time-zimbabwes-opaque-diamond-sector/ The Zimbabwe Environmental Lawyers Association (ZELA) published in October 2021 and March 2022 reports focused on the investment climate around the extractive sector. Though the reports view the extractive sector through the lens of PRC engagement, the information on laws, regulations, and gaps in legislation and enforcement remain relevant for all interested investors. The Handbook of Zimbabwe-China Economic Relations: Zimbabwe Open for Business: Progress Check on Implementation: Policy inconsistency, administrative delays and costs, and corruption hinder business facilitation. Zimbabwe does not have a fully online business registration process, though one can begin the process and conduct a name search online via the ZimConnect web portal. The government created the Zimbabwe Investment Development Agency (ZIDA, https://www.zidainvest.com/ ) which replaced the Zimbabwe Investment Authority (ZIA), the Special Economic Zones Authority, and the Joint Venture Unit to oversee the licensing and implementation of investment projects in the country. The Agency has established a one-stop investment services center (OSISC) which houses several agencies that play a role in the licensing, establishment, and implementation of investment projects including the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), Environmental Management Agency (EMA), Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), National Social Security Authority (NSSA), Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority (ZERA), Zimbabwe Tourism Authority, the State Enterprises Restructuring Agency, and specialized investment units within relevant line ministries. The business registration process currently takes 27 days. Zimbabwe does not promote or incentivize outward investment due to the country’s tight foreign exchange reserves. Although the government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad, any outward investment requires approval by exchange control authorities. Firms interested in outward investment would face difficulty accessing the limited foreign currency at the more favorable official exchange rate. 3. Legal Regime The government officially encourages competition within the private sector and seeks to improve the ease of doing business, but the bureaucracy within regulatory agencies lacks transparency, and corruption is prevalent. Investors complain of policy inconsistency and unpredictability. Moreover, Zimbabwe does not have a centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published, and investors must contact ZIDA. The government at times uses statutory instruments and temporary presidential powers to alter legislation impacting economic policy. These powers have limited duration – the government must pass legislation within six months for the presidential powers to become permanent. These measures, which can appear without warning, often surprise businesses and lack implementation details, leading firms to delay major business decisions until gaining clarity. For example, the government unexpectedly prohibited the use of foreign currencies for domestic transactions in June 2019 but lifted the ban in March 2020, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and growing economic pressure. The government has made changes to the share of foreign currency earnings exporters must surrender to the central bank without warning or stakeholder consultations. The standard legislative process, on the other hand, does provide ample opportunity for public review and comment before the final passage of new laws. The development of regulations follows a standard process and includes a period for public review and comment. According to the Department of State’s 2021 Fiscal Transparency Report, public budget documents do not provide a full picture of government expenditures, and there is a notable lack of transparency regarding state-owned enterprises and the extraction of natural resources. Information on public finances is generally unreliable, as actual revenues and expenditures have deviated significantly from the enacted budgets. Information on some debt obligations is publicly available, but not information on contingent debt. Zimbabwe is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and it is a signatory to the SADC and COMESA trade protocols establishing free trade areas (FTA) with the aim of growing into a customs union. Zimbabwe is also a member of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) which came into force on January 1, 2021, with the aim of creating a single continental market and paving the way for the establishment of a customs union. Although the country is also a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), it normally notifies only SADC and COMESA of measures it intends to implement. According to the country’s law and constitution, Zimbabwe has an independent judicial system whose decisions are binding on the other branches of government. The country has written commercial law and, in 2019, established four commercial courts at the magistrate level. The government also trained 55 magistrates in the same year. Administration of justice in commercial cases that do not touch on political interests is still generally impartial, but for politicized cases government interference in the court system has hindered the delivery of impartial justice. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable and are adjudicated in the national court system. Foreign investors are free to invest in most sectors including mining without any restrictions. In 2020, the government amended the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act which required majority ownership by indigenous Zimbabweans to attain its goal to bring in new technologies, generate employment, and value-added manufacturing. In certain sectors, such as primary agriculture, transport services, and retail and wholesale trade including distribution, foreign investors may not own more than 35 percent equity. The ZIDA ( https://www.zidainvest.com/ ), which now acts a one-stop shop for investors, promotes and facilitates both local and foreign direct investment. The government officially encourages competition within the private sector according to the Zimbabwe Competition Act. The Act provided for the formation of the Tariff and Competition Commission charged with investigating restrictive practices, mergers, and monopolies in the country. The Competition and Tariff Commission (CTC) is an autonomous statutory body established in 2001 with the dual mandate of implementing and enforcing Zimbabwe’s competition policy and law and executing the country’s trade tariffs policy. The Act provides for transparent norms and procedures. Although the decision of the Commission is final, any aggrieved party can appeal the decision to the Administrative Court. In 2000, the government began to seize privately-owned agricultural land and transfer ownership to government officials and other regime supporters. In April 2000, the government amended the constitution to grant the state’s right to assert eminent domain, with compensation limited to the improvements made on the land. In September 2005, the government amended the constitution again to transfer ownership of all expropriated land to the government. Since the passage of this amendment, top government officials, supporters of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party, and members of the security forces have continued to disrupt production on commercial farms, including those owned by foreign investors, those owned by black indigenous farmers, and those covered by bilateral investment agreements. Similarly, government officials have sought to impose politically connected individuals as indigenous partners on privately and foreign-owned wildlife conservancies. In 2006, the government began to issue 99-year leases for land seized from commercial farmers, retaining the right to withdraw the lease at any time for any reason. These leases, however, are not readily transferable, and banks do not accept them as collateral for borrowing and investment purposes. The government continues to seize commercial farms without compensating titleholders, who have no recourse to the courts. The seizures continue to raise serious questions about respect for property rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe. In 2017, the government announced its intention to compensate farmers who lost their land and made small partial payments to the most vulnerable claimants. In July 2020, the government and white commercial farmers who lost land to the land reform program signed a US$3.5 billion Global Compensation Deed Agreement for improvements made by commercial farmers on the farms. The government promised to pay a 50 percent deposit within 12 months of signing the agreement and 25 percent of the remainder in each subsequent year so that it makes full payment over five years. Given fiscal constraints, it remains unclear how the government will finance this sum. As of July 2021, the GOZ paid a token US$1 million towards compensating former commercial farmers, but it still lacks a credible plan to pay the remaining US$3.499 billion and has pushed back its deadline for doing so. In the event of insolvency or bankruptcy, Zimbabwe applies the Insolvency Act. All creditors have equal rights against an insolvent estate. Zimbabwe does not criminalize bankruptcy unless it is the result of fraud, but the government blacklists a person declared bankrupt from undertaking any new business. 6. Financial Sector Zimbabwe has two stock exchanges in Harare and Victoria Falls. The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) in Harare currently has 51 publicly listed companies with a total market capitalization of US$13 billion as of March 16, 2022. Stock and money markets are open to foreign portfolio investment. Foreign investors can take up to a maximum of 49 percent of any locally listed company with any single investor limited to a maximum of 15 percent of the outstanding shares. Regarding the money market, foreign investors may buy up to 100 percent of the primary issues of bonds and stocks and there is no limit on the level of individual participation. There is a 1.48 percent withholding tax on the sale of marketable securities, while the tax on purchasing stands at 1.73 percent. Totaling 3.21 percent, the rates are comparable with the average of 3.5 percent for the region. As a way of raising funds for the state, the government mandated insurance companies and pension funds invest between 25 and 35 percent of their portfolios in prescribed government bonds. Zimbabwe’s high inflation has greatly eroded the value of domestic debt instruments and resulted in negative real interest rates on government bonds. Zimbabwe launched the Victoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX) in September 2020. Four companies have listed on the VFEX with a market capitalization of US$256 million as of March 16, 2022. The country respects the IMF’s Article VIII and refrains from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions provided there is sufficient foreign exchange to finance the transactions. Depending on foreign currency availability, foreign companies with investments in Zimbabwe can borrow locally on market terms. Although credit is allocated on market terms and foreigners are allowed to borrow on the local market, lack of foreign exchange constrains the financial sector from extending credit to the private sector. Three major international commercial banks and several regional and domestic banks operate in Zimbabwe, but they have reduced their branch network substantially in line with declining business opportunities. The central bank (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ)) maintains the banking sector is generally stable despite a harsh operating environment characterized by high credit risk, high inflation, and foreign exchange constraints. Most Zimbabwean correspondent banking relationships are in jeopardy or have already been severed due to international bank efforts to reduce risk (de-risking) connected to the high penalties for non-compliance with prudential anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism finance (AML/CFT) guidelines in developed countries. However, in March 2022, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) removed Zimbabwe from the “gray list” in response to “significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime” and Zimbabwe is no longer subject to the FATF’s increased monitoring process. As of December 31, 2021, the sector had 19 operating institutions, comprising 13 commercial banks, five building societies, and one savings bank. According to the RBZ, as of December 2021, 11out of 13 operating commercial banking institutions and two out of five building societies complied with the prescribed minimum core capital requirements. The level of non-performing loans rose slightly from 0.31 percent in December 2020 to 0.94 percent by December 2021. The RBZ attributed the increase to the disruptive effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The RBZ reports the total loans-to-deposits ratio rose from 40.4 percent in December 2020 to 48.3 percent in December 2021. According to the central bank, total deposits (including interbank deposits), rose from ZWL$204.13 billion in December 2020 to ZWL$476.35 billion in December 2021, an increase of 76 percent in U.S. dollar terms. The total assets of the banking sector stood at ZWL$763 billion or US$7 billion at the end of December 2021 up from ZWL$349.6 billion or US$4.3 billion on December 31, 2020. The government set aside US$1 million toward administrative costs related to the setting up of a SWF in its 2016 budget. Although the government proposed to capitalize the SWF through a charge of up to 25 percent on royalty collections on mineral sales, as well as through a special dividend on the sale of diamond, gas, granite and other minerals, it has not done so. In 2021, state media listed the SWF as a shareholder of a new major mining company in Zimbabwe. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Zimbabwe has 107 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), defined as companies wholly owned by the state. A list of the SOEs appears here . Many SOEs support vital infrastructure including energy, mining, and agribusiness. Competition within the sectors where SOEs operate tends to be limited. However, the government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) invites private investors to participate in infrastructure projects through public-private partnerships (PPPs). Most SOEs have public function mandates, although in more recent years, they perform hybrid activities of satisfying their public functions while seeking profits. SOEs should have independent boards, but in some instances such as the recent case of the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), the government allows the entities to function without boards. Zimbabwe does not appear to subscribe to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs. SOEs are subject to the same taxes and same value-added tax rebate policies as private sector companies. SOEs face several challenges that include persistent power outages, mismanagement, lack of maintenance, inadequate investment, a lack of liquidity and access to credit, and debt overhangs. As a result, SOEs have performed poorly. Few SOEs produce publicly available financial data and even fewer provide audited financial data. SOE poor management and lack of profitability has imposed significant costs on the rest of the economy. Although the government committed itself to privatize most SOEs in the 1990s, it only successfully privatized two parastatals. In 2018, the government announced it would privatize 48 SOEs. So far, it has only targeted five in the telecommunications, postal services, and financial sectors for immediate reform, but the privatizations have not yet concluded. The government encourages foreign investors to take advantage of the privatization program to invest in the country, but inter-SOE debts of nearly USD 1 billion pose challenges for privatization plans. According to the government’s investment guidelines, it is still working out the process under which it will dispose its shareholding to the private sector. 10. Political and Security Environment Political parties, labor organizations, and civil society groups sometimes encounter state-sponsored intimidation and repression from government security forces and Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) – linked activists. Disagreements between and within political parties occasionally result in violence targeting political party members. Political tensions and civil unrest persist since the end of Robert Mugabe’s rule in November 2017. On August 1, 2018, the army fired upon people demonstrating against the delay in announcing official presidential election results, killing six civilians. In response to January 2019 demonstrations against rising fuel prices, security forces killed 17, raped 16, injured hundreds, and arrested more than 800 people over the course of several weeks. The crackdown targeted members of the main opposition party, civil society groups, and labor leaders. In 2020 and 2021, the government arrested and detained journalists, several leaders of opposition parties, and trade union activists for organizing demonstrations against corruption and allegedly violating bail conditions. Police also arrested three women members of the opposition party, MDC Alliance (now Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC)), including a member of parliament for violating lockdown measures when they demonstrated against corruption and food shortages during the first of several lockdowns imposed on the country to fight COVID-19. They were subsequently abducted from police custody and tortured by alleged security agents. Since then, the government routinely arrests and detains the three leaders whenever they speak out against the government. Political tensions also prevailed during campaigns for the March 26, 2022 by-elections. On February 26, 2022, ZANU-PF-affiliated youths allegedly killed CCC rally attendee Mboneli Ncube and injured 22 others after they stormed a CCC rally in Kwekwe. The CCC also reported attacks targeted at its activists and supporters across the country. Political uncertainty remains high. Violent crime, such as assault, smash and grabs, and home invasion, is common. Armed robberies perpetrated by serving members of the army and police have increased. Local police lack the resources to respond effectively to serious criminal incidents. Incidents of violence have typically not targeted investment projects.