The U.S. government estimates the total population at 34.1 million (July 2017 estimate). There are no reliable statistics available concerning the percentages of Shia and Sunni Muslims in the country; the government’s Central Statistics Office does not track disaggregated population data. Shia leaders estimate Shia make up approximately 20-25 percent of the population, while Sunni leaders state the Shia constitute 10 percent.

According to religious community leaders, the Shia population, approximately 90 percent of whom are ethnic Hazaras, is predominantly Jaafari, but it also includes Ismailis. Other religious groups, mainly Hindus, Sikhs, Bahais, and Christians, constitute less than 0.3 percent of the population. Sikh and Hindu leaders estimate there are 245 Sikh and Hindu families totaling 1,300 individuals in the country. The Ahmadi Muslim community estimates it has 600 adherents nationwide. Reliable estimates of the Bahai and Christian communities are not available. There are small numbers of practitioners of other religions, including one Jew.

Hazaras live predominantly in the central and western provinces as well as in Kabul; Ismaili Muslims live mainly in Kabul and in the central and northern provinces. Followers of the Bahai Faith live predominantly in Kabul, with a small community in Kandahar. Ahmadi Muslims largely live in Kabul.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares Islam the official state religion and says no law may contravene the beliefs and provisions of the “sacred religion of Islam.” It further states there shall be no amendment to the constitution’s provisions with respect to adherence to the fundamentals of Islam. According to the constitution, followers of religions other than Islam are “free to exercise their faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of the law.”

There is no definition of apostasy in the criminal code. Apostasy falls under the seven offenses making up the hudood as defined by sharia. According to Sunni Hanafi jurisprudence, which the constitution states shall apply “if there is no provision in the constitution or other laws about a case,” beheading is appropriate for male apostates, while life imprisonment is appropriate for female apostates unless they repent. A judge may also impose a lesser penalty, such as short-term imprisonment or lashes, if doubt about the apostasy exists. Under Hanafi jurisprudence, the government may also confiscate the property of apostates or prevent apostates from inheriting property. This guidance applies to individuals who are of sound mind and have reached the age of maturity. Civil law states the age of majority for citizens is 18, except it is 16 for females with regard to marriage. Islamic law defines it as the point at which one shows signs of puberty.

Conversion from Islam to another religion is apostasy according to the Hanafi school of jurisprudence applicable in the courts. If someone converts to another religion from Islam, he or she shall have three days to recant the conversion. If the person does not recant, then he or she shall be subject to the punishment for apostasy. Proselytizing to try to convert individuals from Islam to another religion is also illegal according to the Hanafi school of jurisprudence applicable in the courts and subject to the same punishment.

Blasphemy, which may include anti-Islamic writings or speech, is a capital crime according to the Hanafi school. Accused blasphemers, like apostates, have three days to recant or face death, although there is no clear process for recanting under sharia. Some hadiths (sayings or traditions that serve as a source of religious law or guidance) suggest discussion and negotiation with an apostate to encourage the apostate to recant.

According to a 2007 ruling from the General Directorate of Fatwas and Accounts under the Supreme Court, the Bahai Faith is distinct from Islam and is a form of blasphemy. All Muslims who convert to it are considered apostates; Bahai practitioners are labeled infidels.

Licensing and registration of religious groups are not required. Registration as a group (which gives the group the status of a shura or council) or an association conveys official recognition and the benefit of government provision of facilities for seminars and conferences. By law anyone who is 18 years of age or older may establish a social or political organization. Such an entity must have a charter consistent with domestic laws as well as a central office. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) may dissolve such organizations through a judicial order. Groups recognized as shuras or councils may cooperate with one another on religious issues. Associations may conduct business with the government or the society as a whole. Both groups and associations may register with the MOJ. According to the MOJ database, 2,215 Sunni and Shia organizations performing religious, charitable, and social functions are registered, while the Sikh and Hindu National Shura has one council registered with the MOJ and another with the Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs because of the council’s location.

The law prohibits the production, reproduction, printing, and publishing of works and materials contrary to the principles of Islam or offensive to other religions and denominations. It also prohibits publicizing and promoting religions other than Islam and bans articles on any topic the government deems might harm the physical, spiritual, and moral wellbeing of persons, especially children and adolescents. The law instructs National Radio and Television Afghanistan (RTA), a government agency, to provide broadcasting content reflecting the religious beliefs of all ethnic groups in the country. The law also obligates RTA to adjust its programs in light of Islamic principles as well as national and spiritual values.

The criminal code states persons who forcibly stop the conduct of rituals of any religion, those who destroy or damage “permitted places of worship” (a term not defined by the code) where religious rituals are conducted, or those who destroy or damage any sign or symbol of any religion are subject to imprisonment of six months to one year or a fine ranging from 30,000 afghanis (AFN) to 60,000 AFN ($430 to $870).

According to the constitution, the “state shall devise and implement a unified educational curriculum based on the provisions of the sacred religion of Islam” and develop courses on religion based on the “Islamic sects” in the country. The national curriculum includes materials designed separately for Sunni-majority schools and Shia-majority schools, as well as textbooks that emphasize nonviolent Islamic terms and principles. The curriculum includes courses on Islam, but not on other religions. Non-Muslims are not required to study Islam in public schools.

According to the law, all funds contributed to madrassahs by private or international sources must be channeled through the Ministry of Education (MOE).

The civil and penal codes derive their authority from the constitution. The constitution stipulates the courts shall apply constitutional provisions as well as the law in ruling on cases. For instances in which neither the constitution nor the penal or civil code address a specific case, the constitution declares the courts may apply Hanafi Sunni jurisprudence within the limits set by the constitution to attain justice. The constitution also allows courts to apply Shia law in cases involving Shia followers. Non-Muslims may not provide testimony in matters requiring sharia jurisprudence. The constitution makes no mention of separate laws applying to non-Muslims.

A Muslim man may marry a non-Muslim woman, but the woman must first convert if she is not an adherent of one of the other two Abrahamic faiths – Christianity or Judaism. It is illegal for a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim man.

The criminal code punishes “crimes against religions,” which include verbal and physical assaults on a follower of any religion. It specifies a person who attacks a follower of any religion shall be sentenced to a prison term of six months to one year. The issue of blasphemy is covered under sharia, under which the authorities consider it a capital crime.

The government’s national identity cards indicate an individual’s religion. Individuals are not required to declare belief in Islam to receive citizenship.

The constitution requires the president and vice presidents to be Muslim. Other senior officials (ministers, members of parliament, judges) must swear allegiance and obedience to the principles of Islam as part of their oath of office.

The constitution allows the formation of political parties, provided the program and charter of a party are “not contrary to the principles of the sacred religion of Islam.” The constitution states political parties may not be based on sectarianism.

The law, pursuant to a 2016 presidential decree, mandates an added seat in parliament’s lower house be reserved for a member of the Hindu and Sikh community. Four seats in the parliament are also reserved for Ismailis.

According to the MOJ’s database, the country is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights based on a 1983 presidential decree, but the parliament has not yet ratified the country’s signature.

Government Practices

Summary Paragraph: Converts from Islam to other religions reported they continued to fear punishment from the government as well as reprisals from family and society; however, there were no reported prosecutions for apostasy or blasphemy. According to the Hindu and Sikh communities, their members continued to avoid settling disputes in the courts due to fear of retaliation and instead settled disputes through community councils or mediation. Representatives of minority religious groups reported a continued failure by the courts to grant non-Muslims the same rights as Muslims. A small number of Sikhs and Hindus continued to serve in government positions. On June 25, the president invited Sikh and Hindu leaders to the presidential palace for a dialogue on the importance of these minority religious communities and their long-standing presence and valuable contributions to the country. Although some Shia continued to hold senior positions in the government, Shia leaders continued to assert the proportion of official positions held by Shia did not reflect their estimate of the country’s demographics. Sunni members of the Ulema Council continued to assert, however, that Shia remained overrepresented in government based on Sunni estimates of the percentage of Shia in the population. Observers stated that these debates were often about ethnicity as much as religion.

As in the previous three years, there were no reports of government prosecutions for blasphemy or apostasy during the year; however, individuals converting from Islam reported they continued to risk annulment of their marriages, rejection by their families and communities, loss of employment, and possibly the death penalty. Bahais continued to be labeled as “infidels,” although they were not considered to be converts; as such, they were not charged with either crime. There was no new information available about an individual who had been given a 20-year prison sentence for blasphemy in 2013.

MOHRA remained responsible for managing Hajj and Umrah pilgrimages, revenue collection for religious activities, acquisition of property for religious purposes, issuance of fatwas, educational testing of imams, sermon preparation and distribution for government-supported mosques, and raising public awareness of religious issues. The government again allowed both Sunnis and Shia to go on pilgrimages, with no quota on either group. It charged fees for Hajj participants to cover transportation, food, accommodation, and other expenses. MOHRA also continued to facilitate pilgrimages for Hindus and Sikhs to India, but it did not collect any revenue for or from non-Muslims. Ahmadi Muslims reported they chose not to interact with MOHRA because they feared MOHRA would deem them non-Muslims and forbid them from participating in the Hajj.

MOHRA reported 4,589 mullahs were registered at year’s end who worked directly for MOHRA, of approximately 160,000 mullahs in the country. These mullahs continued to receive an average monthly salary of 10,000 AFN ($140) from the government. Mullahs applying to be prayer leaders in MOHRA-registered mosques continued to have to hold at least a high school diploma, although a bachelor’s degree or equivalent verified by the Ministry of Higher Education was preferred. MOHRA reported approximately 5,000 of the estimated 160,000 mosques in the country were registered, including the registration of an additional 700 mosques during the year. According to MOHRA, the ministry lacked the financial resources to create a comprehensive registry of mullahs and mosques in the country.

MOHRA reported it continued to allocate a portion of its budget for the construction of new mosques, although local groups remained the source of most of the funds for the new mosques. Unless the local groups requested financial or other assistance from the ministry, they were not required to inform the ministry about the new construction.

Hindu and Sikh groups reported they remained free to build places of worship and to train other Hindus and Sikhs to become clergy, but per the law punishing conversion, the government continued not to allow them to proselytize. They said their community members continued to avoid pursuing land disputes through the courts due to fear of retaliation, especially if powerful local leaders occupied their property. On June 25, the President Ashraf Ghani convened a meeting with Sikh and Hindu leaders for a dialogue about their situation and to recognize their long-standing presence in and contributions to the country.

Although the government had provided land to use as cremation sites, Sikh leaders stated the distance from any major urban area and the lack of security in the region continued to make the land unusable. Hindus and Sikhs reported continued interference in their efforts to cremate the remains of their dead from individuals who lived near the cremation sites. In response, the government continued to provide police support to protect the Sikh and Hindu communities while they performed their cremation rituals. The government promised to construct modern crematories for the Sikh and Hindu populations.

MOHRA reported there were 4,093 registered madrassahs and “Quran learning centers” throughout the country. There were 152 registered madrassahs in Kabul, with the remaining 3,941 spread throughout the provinces and other cities. While the government registered some madrassahs during the year, it did not report how many. More than 370,000 students were enrolled in the madrassahs during the year, mostly in Kabul, Balkh, Nangarhar, and Herat Provinces, according to the latest available estimate.

The registration process for madrassahs continued to require a school to demonstrate it had suitable buildings, classrooms, accredited teachers, and dorms if students lived on campus. MOHRA continued to register madrassahs co-located with mosques, while the MOE continued to register madrassahs not associated with mosques. In MOHRA-run madrassahs, students received individual instruction, with one imam teaching approximately 50 to 70 children studying at various levels. Only certificates issued by registered madrassahs allowed students to pursue higher education at government universities.

MOHRA could not estimate the number of unregistered madrassahs but stated it estimated registered madrassahs “far outnumbered” unregistered madrassahs. The MOE was authorized to close unregistered madrassahs, but ministry officials again said it remained nearly impossible to close any due to local sensitivities. According to ministry officials, no madrassahs were closed during the year due to the potential for negative societal repercussions. Ministry officials said the government continued its efforts to raise awareness of the benefits of registering madrassahs, including recognition of graduation certificates and financial and material assistance, such as furniture or stationery.

Mosques continued to handle primary-level religious studies. Eighty MOE-registered madrassahs offered two-year degree programs at the secondary level. A total of 1,200 public and 200 private madrassahs were registered with the MOE.

According to government authorities, the government continued to monitor financial assistance to madrassahs by requiring registered madrassahs to route private or international donations through the MOE. The authorities said the MOE seldom imposed a ban on a madrassah for failing to comply with this requirement. They also said the continuing tendency of donors to make cash donations directly to the madrassahs made it difficult for the government to track funds coming from private sources or abroad. Despite this, the government’s efforts to solicit donations from other Muslim countries and from private individuals continued. The MOE reportedly continued to require the accreditation of independent madrassahs and disclosure of their funding sources.

The MOE’s Department of Islamic Education continued to provide a standardized curriculum for registered madrassahs. This curriculum required 60 percent of the subjects taught in madrassahs to be religious in nature, while the other 40 percent consisted of mathematics, history, geography, and Dari literature.

A government-sponsored school for Sikh children continued to operate in Kabul. It received proportionate funding from the government to cover staff salaries, books, and maintenance. The MOE also provided the curriculum for the Sikh school, except for religious studies. The community appointed a teacher for religious studies, while the MOE paid the teacher’s salary.

A privately funded Sikh school continued to operate in Jalalabad with funding from the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan. Sikh children continued to attend private international schools; Hindu children often attended Sikh schools.

Ahmadi Muslims reported they sent their children to public schools but kept their children’s religious affiliation secret. There were no Christian schools in the country.

Legal sources said the courts continued to rely on statutory law in both civil and criminal cases. Members of minority religious groups continued to report instances, however, when the courts used Hanafi jurisprudence, even when such law conflicted with the country’s international human rights commitments.

The president continued to take advice on Islamic legal matters from the Ulema Council, a group of senior Sunni and Shia scholars, imams, and Muslim jurists. The council met with the president every two months, discussing topics such as support for the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces and peace negotiations with insurgent groups. The Ulema Council also continued to provide advice on the formulation of new legislation and the implementation of existing law to the parliament and ministries.

Ulema Council members continued to receive financial support from the state, although it officially remained independent from the government. The council also provided advice to some provincial governments, although, according to scholars and NGOs, most legal decision making in villages and rural areas continued to be based on local interpretations of Islamic law and tradition. President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah made numerous speeches during the year supporting religious tolerance.

Minority religious groups reported the courts still did not apply the protections provided to those groups by the law and the courts denied non-Muslims the access to the courts or other legal redress as Muslims, even when the non-Muslims were legally entitled to those same rights. According to media reports and representatives from non-Muslim religious minorities, some members of these communities were told they did not have equal rights because they were “Indians,” not Afghans, even when they were citizens of the country. Members of minority religious communities reported the state, including the courts, treated all citizens as if they were Muslims, and some basic citizenship rights of non-Muslims remained uncodified. They said the result was non-Muslims continued to risk being tried according to Hanafi jurisprudence.

Sikhs and Hindus continued to report their community members avoided taking civil cases to court because they believed they were unprotected by dispute resolution mechanisms such as the Special Land and Property Court. Instead, their members continued to settle disputes within their communities.

Leaders of both Hindu and Sikh communities continued to report discrimination, including long delays to resolve cases in the judicial system. The illegal appropriation of Sikh properties remained the most common judicial problem.

There continued to be a small number of Sikhs and Hindus serving in government positions, including one at the municipal level, one at the Chamber of Commerce and Industries, and one as a presidentially appointed member of the upper house of parliament.

Although Shia Muslims held senior positions in government, they continued to state the number of their appointments to government administrative bodies was not proportionate to the percentage of Shia they estimated to compose the country’s population. Sunni members of the Ulema Council continued to assert, however, that Shia remained overrepresented in government based on Sunni estimates of the percentage of Shia in the population. Other non-Shia observers said the issue of employment of Shia was more related to their largely Hazara ethnicity than religion.

Although four Ismaili Muslims remained members of parliament, Ismaili community leaders continued to report concerns about what they called the exclusion of Ismailis from other positions of political authority.

The government continued to support the efforts of judicial, constitutional, and human rights commissions composed of members of different Islamic religious groups (Sunni and Shia) to promote Muslim intrafaith reconciliation. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs and MOHRA continued working toward their stated goal of gaining nationwide acceptance of the practice of allowing women to attend mosques. The Moderation Center of Afghanistan, a government-funded NGO, continued to promote what the government viewed as a moderate interpretation of Islam. Educational exchanges organized by the center continued to send Shia and Sunni clerics to Kuwait for training, and then appoint them to positions as teachers in various provinces to train other clerics. The center distributed 5,000 books addressing Islamic subjects, extremism, and the current conflict in the country. The Ulema Council, the Islamic Brotherhood Council, and MOHRA also continued their work on intrafaith reconciliation.

The ONSC’s work on addressing religiously motivated violent extremism continued. The ONSC continued to sponsor provincial-level conferences on religiously motivated violent extremism to collect data for use in its effort to develop a strategy to counter violent extremism. The ONSC also continued to coordinate the efforts of relevant government institutions and NGOs to formulate the strategy through an interministerial working group.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

According to journalists, local observers, and UNAMA, attacks by the ISKP, the Taliban, and other insurgent groups targeted specific religious and ethnoreligious groups, including the Hazara Shia. Media reported the ISKP said its attacks on the country’s Shia population were justified because Shia fighters had joined militias fighting the ISKP in Syria and Iraq. According to media reports, the ISKP also accused the country’s Shia of being progovernment and targeted security and military personnel worshipping in mosques. According to UNAMA’s Annual Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, the combined use of suicide improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and non-suicide IEDs by “Anti-Government Elements” accounted for 4,151 civilian casualties (1,229 deaths and 2,922 injured), constituting 40 percent of all civilian casualties during the year.

UNAMA documented 499 civilian casualties (202 deaths and 297 injured) from 37 attacks, overwhelmingly committed by “Anti-Government Elements” against places of worship, religious leaders, and worshippers during the year. These included targeted killings, abductions, and intimidation and represented a 32-percent increase in civilian casualties from such attacks, double the number of deaths and three times as many attacks as in 2016. According to UNAMA, the ISKP claimed responsibility for 18 of the incidents and 412 of the 499 casualties; the Taliban claimed 20 attacks, up from seven attacks in 2016.

UNAMA’s annual report found attacks against Shia places of worship and/or worshippers constituted 83 percent of all civilian casualties from attacks against places of worship, religious leaders, and worshippers. Nearly one-third of the ISKP attacks targeted Shia Muslims, including six attacks directed at Shia places of worship.

Attacks on Shia mosques for which the ISKP claimed responsibility included: a June 15 suicide bomb attack on a Shia mosque in western Kabul that killed five persons; an August 1 attack by two suicide bombers on a Shia mosque in Herat that killed 29 worshippers and injured 64; an August 25 attack by gunmen and a suicide bomber on a Shia mosque in western Kabul that killed 40 and wounded 100; and an October 20 ISKP suicide bombing in which the attacker lobbed a grenade into the women’s section and detonated his suicide vest in the second row of worshippers at a Shia mosque in Kabul that killed 57 persons and injured another 55.

Attacks on Shia mosques for which no group claimed responsibility included a January 1 bomb attack on a Shia mosque in Herat that wounded six worshippers, and a June 6 blast outside the Great Mosque of Herat, a Shia mosque opened in 1446, which killed eight individuals and wounded 10.

On September 29, a suicide bomber killed seven persons and wounded 37 in a Kabul Shia mosque two days before Ashura.

The media reported complaints by members of the Shia community concerning a continued lack of protection from the government. In response to these attacks, the Ministry of Interior announced increased security around Shia mosques and authorized the arming of Shia civilians, under the authority of the police, to provide extra security for Ashura. During the Ashura processions, however, there were no violent incidents reported – a sharp contrast from recent years.

According to media reports, antigovernment forces also targeted Sunni mosques. On June 10, Taliban gunmen entered a Sunni mosque in the Gardez district of Paktiya Province and killed three worshippers. On August 11, gunmen killed three worshippers in a Takhar Province Sunni mosque. Rival factions, not linked to the Taliban or the ISKP, were reportedly vying to lead prayers, which led to the shootings.

ISKP attacks targeting Shia continued to extend outside of mosques. On September 28, three individuals were killed, including two policemen, and 16 were injured in a blast at a cinema in the Chendawol area of Kabul with a significant Shia population, according to a local media report. A Ministry of Interior spokesman said the blast was triggered by a magnetic bomb attached to a police vehicle. ISIS media said the attack was directed against a Shia assembly hall in the area. On December 21, ISKP detonated a remote controlled IED outside a library in a predominantly Shia neighborhood, killing four and injuring 10. On December 28, a suspected ISKP suicide bomber attacked the Afghan Voice news agency and a Shia cultural center in Kabul, killing more than 40 persons and injuring at least 80.

Attacks continued against Shia villages and civilian properties. On January 6, unidentified gunmen stopped a bus carrying Shia coal miners in Baghlan Province and killed at least nine passengers. On August 6, gunmen linked to the Taliban and the ISKP killed at least 50 civilians, including women and children, in a Shia village in Sar-e Pul Province.

The Taliban continued to assassinate and threaten religious leaders with death for preaching messages contrary to the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam or its political agenda. On March 22, suspected Taliban gunmen assassinated an imam and former provincial council member in Laghman Province. On May 7, a cleric and media adviser to the Kandahar government was shot and killed, reportedly for calling the Taliban jihad “illegitimate.” On May 9, the Parwan Provincial Ulema chief, who had been publicly critical of the Taliban, was killed by an IED, along with six children studying at his school; the Taliban claimed responsibility. On May 22, suspected Taliban gunmen shot and killed the deputy head of the Logar Ulema council while he was walking to his mosque, and on May 28, suspected Taliban gunmen shot and killed a provincial Ulema council member in Paktika Province. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the assassinations of the deputy director of Islamic education in Kapisa Province on July 1 and of a progovernment cleric in Nangarhar Province on July 15. During the year, UNAMA documented 26 incidents of killings targeting religious scholars and leaders, compared with eight in 2016.

In addition to the targeting of religious worshippers and leaders, from January 1, 2016, to November 7, 2017, UNAMA documented 25 terrorist attacks targeting individuals deemed to be military targets while they were inside places of worship. Most of those targeted in places of worship were civilians suspected of supporting the government, including tribal elders, judicial officials, civilian government workers, and teachers worshipping inside a mosque. According to UNAMA, on November 27, the Taliban shot and killed the imam of a mosque in Nangarhar Province, accusing him of supporting the government. On July 23, the ISKP killed a local imam in Sar-e Pul Province for committing “sorcery.” The imam had been offering traditional Afghan talismans to worshippers.

In several cases, it was not certain who was responsible for the attacks on religious officials. For example, on March 17, the chief of Hajj and Religious Affairs in Nangarhar Province survived a suicide bombing in which his brother was killed. In September unknown assailants riding motorcycles killed the head of the provincial ulema in the Hesa Awal Kohistan District area of Kapisa Province. On October 12, unidentified gunmen on motorcycles killed an imam outside his mosque in Nangarhar Province.

There were reports of continued Taliban warnings to mullahs not to perform funeral prayers for government security officials. As a result, according to the director of madrassahs at MOHRA, imams continued to state they feared performing funeral rites for Afghan National Security Forces and other government employees. MOHRA also reported difficulty in staffing registered mosques in insecure areas because of Taliban threats.

There continued to be reports of the Taliban and the ISKP monitoring the social habits of local populations in areas under their control and imposing punishments on residents according to their respective interpretations of Islamic law. There were continued reports of the Taliban and the ISKP taking over schools in areas under their control and imposing their own curricula.

Sikhs, Hindus, Christians, and other non-Muslim minorities reported continued harassment from Muslims, although Hindus and Sikhs stated they continued to be able to publicly practice their religions. Members of the Hindu community continued to report they faced fewer incidents of harassment than Sikhs, which they ascribed to their lack of a distinctive male headdress. Since religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was often difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

There were several media reports of local religious leaders forcing young men to fast during Ramadan. In one instance, a mullah who worked for Balkh Province’s Prevention of Vice Commission shaved the head of a young man to shame him for not fasting.

Women of several different faiths, including Islam, reported harassment from local Muslim religious leaders over their attire. As a result, the women said, they continued to wear burqas in public in rural areas and in some urban areas, including Kabul. Almost all women reported wearing some form of head covering. Some women said they did so by personal choice, but many said they did so due to societal pressure and a desire to avoid harassment and increase their security in public. MOHRA and the National Ulema Council both continued to state there was no official pressure on women regarding their attire.

Ahmadi Muslims reported harassment when neighbors or coworkers learned of their faith. They said they also faced accusations of being “spies” for communicating with other Ahmadi Muslim community congregations abroad. They said they did not proselytize due to fear of being persecuted. Ahmadis maintained a place of worship but kept it unmarked, without minarets or other adornments identifying it as an Ahmadi Muslim community mosque.

Christian representatives reported public opinion remained hostile toward converts to Christianity and to the idea of Christian proselytization. The representatives said Christians continued to worship alone or in small congregations in private homes due to fear of societal discrimination and persecution. There continued to be no public Christian churches.

According to minority religious leaders, the decreasing numbers of Sikhs, Hindus, and other religious minorities had only a few places of worship. According to the Sikh and Hindu Council, which advocates with the government on behalf of the Sikh and Hindu communities, there were 12 gurdwaras (Sikh temples) and 2 mandus (Hindu temples) remaining in the country, compared with a combined total of 64 in the past. Buddhist foreigners remained free to worship in Hindu temples. Following past seizures of their places of worship by residents of Kandahar, Ghazni, Paktya, and other provinces, the Hindu community had presented the list of its places of worship to MOHRA in an effort to stop further seizures and to reclaim the land and buildings previously lost. Members of the Hindu and Sikh communities said these problems remained unresolved at year’s end.

According to the leader of the Sikh community, a new mosque next to a Sikh temple deliberately aimed its loudspeakers at the temple to harass non-Muslim worshippers.

According to members of the Sikh and Hindu communities, they continued to refuse to send their children to public schools due to harassment from other students, although there were only a few private school options available to them due to the decreasing sizes of the two communities and their members’ declining economic circumstances. The Sikh and Hindu Council reported one school in Nangarhar and two schools in Kabul remained operational.

Sikh leaders reported the main cause of Hindu and Sikh emigration remained a lack of employment opportunities; they said one factor impeding their access to employment was illiteracy. Both communities stated emigration would continue to increase as economic conditions worsened and security concerns increased.

Observers reported societal discrimination against the Shia minority by the Sunni majority continued to decline, although there were reports of discrimination in some localities, especially in regard to employment opportunities. There were also instances, however, where Sunnis and Shia came together for prayer or to donate blood in the aftermath of terrorist attacks.

Both Shia and Sunni leaders condemned particular secular events as contrary to Islam. In July Shia religious leaders in Bamyan declared a local two-day festival celebrating traditional Afghan music as being against Islamic values, forbidding participation or attendance. Both Sunni and Shia religious scholars in mid-August condemned the planned performance of a female Afghan pop singer to celebrate Independence Day as being against Islamic values. The concert’s venue was changed to a lower-profile location.

Kabul’s lone synagogue remained inactive, and a nearby Jewish cemetery was utilized as an unofficial dump.

Worship facilities for noncitizens of various faiths continued to be located at coalition military facilities and at embassies in Kabul.

The media continued to report efforts by local Muslim religious leaders to limit social activities they considered inconsistent with Islamic doctrine, such as education for females or female participation in sports.

There were reports many mullahs, especially those in unregistered mosques, continued to support the Taliban or ISKP in their sermons.

NGOs reported Muslim residents remained suspicious of development assistance projects, which they often viewed as surreptitious efforts to advance Christianity or engage in proselytization.

In meetings with members of the president’s staff, the ONSC, MOHRA and the Ulema Council, U.S. embassy officials continued to promote religious tolerance and the need to enhance the government’s capacity to counter violent religious extremism. Senior embassy officials met with government officials to emphasize the need to protect religious minorities.

Embassy officials met with both government and religious officials to discuss the issue of ensuring madrassahs did not offer a curriculum encouraging religiously motivated violent extremism. The embassy continued to coordinate with the ONSC, as well as other governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders, to assist the ONSC in creating a national strategy to combat violent extremism.

Embassy officials held regular meetings with leaders of major religious groups, imams, scholars, and NGOs to discuss ways to enhance religious tolerance and interreligious dialogue.

Embassy officials hosted iftars with government, civil society, and religious leaders during Ramadan to promote religious dialogue and tolerance. The embassy also posted social media content during Ramadan by members of the Muslim community in the United States underscoring respect for religious diversity. The embassy sponsored visits by religious leaders to the United States and other countries to broaden religious dialogue.

The embassy hosted roundtables with researchers and religious scholars, including from the Moderation Center and MOHRA, to discuss the sources and means to counter violent religious extremism. The embassy also facilitated and funded the coordination of research efforts on violent religious extremism.

The Ambassador recorded a video statement for International Religious Freedom Day on October 27, which the embassy highlighted on social media and shared with local news outlets. On social media, the embassy also highlighted remarks from senior U.S. and Afghan government officials urging religious tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 3 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the most recent census conducted in 2011, Sunni Muslims constitute nearly 57 percent of the population, Roman Catholics 10 percent, members of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Albania nearly 7 percent, and members of the Bektashi Order (a form of Shia Sufism) 2 percent. Other groups include Protestant denominations, Bahais, Jehovah’s Witnesses, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and a small Jewish community. Nearly 20 percent of respondents declined to answer the optional question about religious affiliation, creating the potential for an undercount. No other official estimate is expected until the next census in 2021.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates there is no official religion, all religions are equal, and the state has the duty to respect and protect religious coexistence. It declares the state is neutral in questions of belief and recognizes the independence of religious groups. According to the constitution, relations between the state and religious groups are regulated by agreements between these groups and the Council of Ministers and ratified by the parliament.

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and guarantees freedom of conscience, religion, and free expression. It states everyone is free to choose or change their religion or beliefs and to express them individually, collectively, in public, or in private. The constitution also states individuals may not be compelled to participate or excluded from participating in a religious community or its practices, nor may they be compelled to make their beliefs or faith public or be prohibited from doing so. It prohibits political parties or other organizations whose programs incite or support religious hatred. The criminal code prohibits interference in an individual’s ability to practice a religion and prescribes punishments of up to three years in prison for obstructing the activities of religious organizations or for willfully destroying objects or buildings of religious value.

By law, the Office of the Commissioner for Protection from Discrimination receives and processes discrimination complaints, including those concerning religious practice. The law specifies the State Committee on Cults, under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Prime Minister, regulates relations between the government and religious groups, protects freedom of religion, and promotes interfaith cooperation and understanding. The law also directs the committee to maintain records and statistics on foreign religious groups that solicit assistance and to support foreign employees of religious groups in obtaining residence permits.

The government does not require registration or licensing of religious groups, but a religious group must register with the district court as a nonprofit association to qualify for certain benefits, including opening a bank account, owning property, and obtaining some degree of tax-exempt status. The registration process entails submission of information on the form and scope of the organization, its activities, the identities of its founders and legal representatives, the nature of its interactions with other stakeholders (e.g., government ministries and civil society organizations) in a particular field, the address of the organization, and payment of a 1,000 lek ($9) fee to the district court. A judge is randomly assigned within three to four days of the submission of an application, and the process usually concludes within one session.

The government has agreements with the Sunni Muslim and Bektashi communities, the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, and the VUSH. The bilateral agreements serve to codify arrangements pertaining to official recognition, property restitution, tax exemptions on income, donations and religious property, and exemption from submitting accounting records for religious activities. A provision of law enacted in 2009 specifies the government will provide financial support to the four religious communities with which it has agreements dating from the same time. This provision of the law does not include the VUSH, whose agreement with the government dates from 2011. There is no provision of the law stipulating the VUSH should receive financial support from the government.

The law requires the ATP to address claims by religious groups for properties confiscated during the communist era.

The law allows religious communities to run educational institutions as well as build and manage religious cemeteries on land the communities own.

Public schools are secular, and the law prohibits religious instruction in them. Private schools may offer religious instruction. According to official 2016 figures, religious groups, organizations, and foundations have 125 affiliated associations and foundations managing 116 educational institutions, including universities, primary and secondary schools, preschools, kindergartens, vocational schools, and orphanages. By law, the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport must license these institutions, and nonreligious curricula must comply with national education standards. Catholic, Muslim, and Orthodox groups operate numerous state-licensed kindergartens, schools, and universities. Most of these do not have mandatory religion classes but offer them as an elective. The Muslim community runs six madrassahs that teach religion in addition to the state-sponsored curriculum.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Catholic, Sunni Muslim, Orthodox, and Bektashi communities reported the total government financial support for these four groups remained at 109 million lek ($986,000), the same as in 2016. The Muslim community continued to receive 28 percent, while the remaining three each continued to receive 24 percent. The communities continued to use the funds to cover part of the salaries for administrative and educational staff. The Bektashi community, which had fewer staff members than the others, continued to use part of the funds it received for new places of worship.

The government issued a decision in April to reduce the price of electricity as a type of indirect financial support for religious communities. The VUSH reported that several of its properties continued to be charged at the higher rates set for businesses.

The VUSH also reported a continued lack of financial support from the government, despite repeated requests for the government to amend the law and add the provision of financial support.

The government continued the process of legalizing unofficial mosques built during the 1990s, and issued 41 property certificates during the year, compared with 137 in the previous year, six in 2015, and reportedly none in 2014. The government continued to require the endorsement of the AIC for legalization.

The government did not return any properties confiscated under the communist regime during the year; it approved compensation for one property, which had belonged to the Bektashi community. The government stated it was prepared to provide compensation for 112 additional properties, but the relevant religious communities had not yet gone through the required step of requesting the funds. The resolution of the single claim during the year still left unresolved hundreds of claims submitted by the religious communities to the ATP since the fall of the communist regime in 1990. The ATP acknowledged the restitution process was slow but stated 423 claims by religious communities had been resolved recently. These were pending amendment of the 2015 property law, part of which had been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. The ATP also stated it continued to budget funds for the settlement of older claims decided in previous years but not yet implemented, pending a change in the property law provisions.

On a visit in May, the UN special rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Ahmed Shaheed, while offering general praise for the government’s efforts to protect religious freedoms, urged the government to return to religious communities their properties nationalized under the previous communist regime.

Bektashi leaders reported construction continued on places of worship in Gjirokaster, Diber, Permet, and Elbasan. The government reportedly legalized nine tekkes (places of worship) in Gjirokaster, Permet, and Elbasan during the year. The Bektashi said they continued to have problems with the local registration offices in Tirana, Elbasan, and Gjirokaster, noting that the registration process was slow, bureaucratic, and occasionally vulnerable to corruption.

VUSH members continued to report difficulties in acquiring land on which to construct places of worship, due to local government tax assessments and regulations. They said they therefore continued to rent existing buildings.

VUSH leaders reported continued problems with regard to property taxes on their churches. They reported authorities levied fines on them for not submitting tax documents normally required only from for-profit companies. In May the VUSH met with tax authorities who reportedly gave assurances such fines would cease, but the VUSH reported the fines continued to be assessed.

On December 22, President Ilir Meta signed a decree to give citizenship to Archbishop Anastasios of the Orthodox Autocephalous Church, which he issued on December 24. The president said Anastasios fulfilled the requirements for citizenship, reinvigorated the Church after communism, and made it one of the most honored churches in the world. While the Greek president and foreign minister welcomed the action, there was some societal condemnation and mixed local political reaction.

The Institute for Education Development trained 29 civics education and sociology teachers in 15 pilot schools between January and May, pursuant to the 2016 announcement by Prime Minister Edi Rama of a new program of religious education in schools, designed to help prevent radicalization and promote religious tolerance. Both the prime minister and the minister of education continued to assert the program would not affect the secular nature of the country’s education system. Religious groups did not contradict this assertion. A pilot cross-thematic curriculum was developed for sixth and 10th grade students; however, implementation of the full program stalled in May, and its future appeared uncertain.

In October the parliament passed a new law on minorities that would provide additional protection for minority rights, including the freedom of religion.

Representatives of the Catholic, Orthodox, and Bektashi communities continued to state the 2011 census presented an inaccurate picture of the religious demographics of the country because their numbers were undercounted. Bektashi leaders expressed concern the census had classified many of their followers as Muslim but not Bektashi.

In May UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief Ahmed Shaheed completed his assessment of the state of religious freedom in the country and stated, “Albania is a model for interfaith harmony.” He called on the country “not to take for granted,” but to “uphold the unique societal harmony and co-existence.” He mentioned concern about “unknown foreign funding” but noted, “radical religious groups were under control.” He also urged the government to return properties that were nationalized under the previous communist regime.

The Interreligious Council, established as a forum for leaders of the Catholic, Sunni Muslim, Orthodox, and Bektashi communities to discuss shared concerns, met three times during the year, in contrast with 2016, when it did not meet. In the absence of a permanent secretary general, the four communities making up the council elected the Orthodox Church as the first six-month chair of a rotating chairmanship.

The country’s general election was held on June 25, the same day as the Eid al-Fitr holiday. The AIC issued a statement indicating that even though the date was not ideal, peaceful elections were important for the country and all Muslims should exercise their democratic right to vote.

The AIC received criticism on social media for a perceived insult to the country’s medieval hero Skanderbeg. The AIC had set up two large screens on the grounds where its public September 1 Eid al-Adha celebration took place in order to accommodate the large crowd, according to the Tirana mufti. From certain viewing angles, however, the screens partially obstructed the view of a statue of Skanderbeg, although observers from most other angles reported this was not the case. Social media sites were nonetheless full of posts criticizing the Muslim community’s perceived insult to the nation.

In meetings with the state commissioner on cults and the ATP, embassy officers continued to urge the government to accelerate its handling of religious property claims and to restore to religious groups their property confiscated during the communist era. In June the embassy sponsored the participation of two individuals, including a diversity specialist in the state police, in an exchange program designed to raise awareness and acceptance of human and civil rights for groups, including religious minority communities. The embassy also sponsored the rector of Beder University to attend a Study of the United States Institutes visit to the United States, with a focus on religious tolerance.

The Ambassador and other embassy officers continued to promote religious tolerance in meetings with the Sunni Muslim, Bektashi, Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant communities, and in visits to churches, mosques, and other religious sites. The Ambassador hosted an iftar for Muslim youth from different communities where he stressed the value of religious dialogue and tolerance.

The embassy continued its youth education programs and its work with religious communities to decrease the potential appeal of violent religious extremism. As part of these programs, students at Islamic, Catholic, and Orthodox religious schools planned and carried out projects celebrating religious diversity and tolerance. Other embassy-sponsored programs focused on promoting women’s empowerment in the religious communities in Elbasan and celebrating religious diversity through sports clinics with students from madrassahs and Catholic and Muslim universities. Additional seminars sponsored by the embassy with key religious figures and leaders in government and academia focused on the compatibility of religious faith and democracy.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 41 million (July 2017 estimate), more than 99 percent of whom are Muslims following the Maliki school of Sunni Islam. Religious groups together constituting less than 1 percent of the population include Christians, Jews, Ahmadi Muslims, Shia Muslims, and a community of Ibadi Muslims residing principally in the province of Ghardaia. Some religious leaders estimate there are fewer than 200 Jews.

The Christian community includes Roman Catholics, Seventh-day Adventists, Methodists, members of the Protestant Church of Algeria, Lutherans, members of the Reformed Church, Anglicans, and an estimated 1,000 to 1,500 Egyptian Coptic Christians. Religious leaders’ unofficial estimates of the number of Christians range from 20,000 to 200,000. According to government officials, foreign residents make up the majority of the Christian population. The proportion of students and immigrants without legal status from sub-Saharan Africa among the Christian population has also increased in recent years. Christian leaders say citizens who are Christians predominantly belong to Protestant groups. Christians reside mostly in the cities of Algiers, Annaba, and Oran, and the Kabylie region east of the capital.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares Islam to be the state religion and prohibits state institutions from engaging in behavior incompatible with Islamic values. The constitution provides for freedom of worship in accordance with the law and states that freedom of conscience and freedom of opinion are inviolable.

The law does not prohibit conversion from Islam, but proselytizing of Muslims by non-Muslims is a criminal offense. The law prescribes a maximum punishment of one million dinars ($8,700) and five years’ imprisonment for anyone who “incites, constrains, or utilizes means of seduction tending to convert a Muslim to another religion; or by using to this end establishments of teaching, education, health, social, culture, training … or any financial means.” Making, storing, or distributing printed documents or audiovisual materials with the intent of “shaking the faith” of a Muslim is also illegal and subject to the same penalties.

The law criminalizes “offending the Prophet Muhammad” or any other prophets. The penal code provides a punishment of three to five years in prison and/or a fine of 50,000 to 100,000 dinars ($440 to $870) for denigrating the creed or prophets of Islam through writing, drawing, declaration, or any other means. The law also criminalizes insults to any other religion, with the same penalties.

The law grants all individuals the right to practice their religion as long as they respect public order and regulations.

The constitution establishes a High Islamic Council and states it shall encourage and promote ijtihad (the use of independent reasoning as a source of Islamic law for issues not precisely addressed in the Quran) and express opinions on religious questions presented for its review. The president appoints the members of the council and oversees its work. The constitution requires the council to submit regular reports to the president on its activities. A presidential decree further defines the council’s mission as taking responsibility for all questions related to Islam, for correcting mistaken perceptions, and for promoting the true fundamentals of the religion and a correct understanding of it. The council may issue fatwas at the request of the president.

The law requires any group, religious or otherwise, to register with the government as an association prior to conducting any activities. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) grants association status to religious groups; only registered associations are officially recognized. The MOI’s registration requirements for national-level associations stipulate the founding members must furnish documents proving their identities, addresses, and other biographic details; furnish police and judicial records to prove their good standing in society; show they have founding members residing in at least one quarter of the country’s provinces to prove the association merits national standing; submit the association’s constitution signed by its president; and submit documents indicating the location of its headquarters. The law requires the ministry to provide a receipt for the application once it has received all the required documentation and to give a response within 60 days of submission of the completed application. The law states applicants are de facto approved if the ministry fails to make a decision within the 60-day limit. The law grants the government full discretion in making registration decisions, but provides applicants an opportunity to appeal a denial to an administrative tribunal.

Registration applications of religious associations must be approved by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA). The law, however, does not specify additional requirements for religious associations or further specify the MRA’s role in the process. Religious groups may appeal an MRA denial to an administrative tribunal. For associations seeking to register at the local or provincial level, application requirements are similar, but the association’s membership and sphere of activity is strictly limited to the area in which it registers. An association registered at the wilaya (provincial) level is confined to that specific wilaya.

The National Commission for Non-Muslim Religious Groups, a government entity, is responsible by law for facilitating the registration process for all non-Muslim groups. The MRA presides over the commission, composed of senior representatives of the Ministries of National Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, the presidency, the national police, the national gendarmerie, and the governmental National Human Rights Committee (CNDH).

The CNDH monitors and evaluates human rights issues, including matters related to religious freedom. The law authorizes the agency to conduct investigations of alleged abuses, issue opinions and recommendations, conduct awareness campaigns, and work with other government authorities to address human rights issues. The agency may address concerns of individuals and groups that believe they are not being treated fairly by the MRA. The CNDH does not have the authority to enforce its decisions but may refer matters to the relevant administrative or criminal court. It submits an annual report to the president, who appoints the agency’s members.

The law specifies the manner and conditions under which religious services, Muslim or otherwise, may take place. The law states religious demonstrations are subject to regulation, and the government may shut down any religious service taking place in private homes or in outdoor settings without official approval. With the exception of daily prayers, which are permissible anywhere, Islamic services may take place only in state-sanctioned mosques. Friday prayers are further limited to certain specified mosques. Non-Muslim religious services must take place only in buildings registered with the state for the exclusive purpose of religious practice, run by a registered religious association, open to the public, and marked as such on the exterior. A request for permission to observe special non-Muslim religious events must be submitted to the relevant wali (governor) at least five days before the event, and the event must occur in buildings accessible to the public. Requests must include information on three principal organizers of the event, its purpose, the number of attendees anticipated, a schedule of events, and its planned location. The organizers also must obtain a permit from the wali. The wali may request the organizers move the location of an event or deny permission for it to take place if he deems it would be a danger to public order or harm “national constants,” “good mores,” or symbols of the revolution. If unauthorized meetings go forward without approval, participants are subject to dispersal by the police. Failure to disperse at the behest of the police may result in arrest and a prison term of two to 12 months under the penal code.

The penal code states only government-authorized imams, whom the state hires and trains, may lead prayer in mosques and penalizes anyone else who preaches in a mosque with a fine of up to 100,000 dinars ($870) and a prison sentence of one to three years. Fines as high as 200,000 dinars ($1,740) and prison sentences of three to five years are stipulated for any person, including government-authorized imams, who acts “against the noble nature of the mosque” or in a manner “likely to offend public cohesion.” The law states such acts include exploiting the mosque to achieve purely material or personal objectives or with a view to harming persons or groups.

By law, the MRA provides financial support to mosques and pays the salaries of imams and other religious personnel, as well as for health care and retirement benefits. The law also provides for the payment of salaries and benefits to non-Muslim religious leaders who are citizens. The Ministry of Labor regulates the amount of an individual imam’s or mosque employee’s pay, and likewise sets the salaries of citizen non-Muslim religious leaders based on their position within their individual churches.

The Ministries of Religious Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Commerce must approve the importation of non-Islamic religious writings, except those intended for personal use.

A January 4 decree established a commission within the MRA to review importation of the Quran. This decree requires all applications to include a full copy of the text and other detailed information. The ministry is given three to six months to review the text, with the absence of a response after that time constituting a rejection of the importation application. A separate January 4 decree covering religious texts other than the Quran states, “The content of religious books for import, regardless of format, must not undermine the religious unity of society, the national religious reference, public order, good morals, fundamental rights and liberties, or the law.” The importer must submit the text and other information, and the ministry must respond within 30 days. A nonresponse after this period of time is considered a rejection. Religious texts distributed without authorization may be seized and destroyed.

The law states the government must approve any modification of structures intended for non-Muslim collective worship.

Under the law, children born to a Muslim father are considered Muslim regardless of the mother’s religion.

The Ministries of National Education and Religious Affairs require, regulate, and fund the study of Islam in public schools. Religious education focuses on Islamic studies but includes information on Christianity and Judaism and is mandatory at the primary and secondary school levels. The Ministry of National Education requires private schools to adhere to curricula in line with national standards, particularly regarding the teaching of Islam and the use of Arabic as the primary language of instruction, or risk being closed.

The law states discrimination on the basis of religion is prohibited and guarantees state protection for non-Muslims and for the “toleration and respect of different religions.” It does not prescribe penalties for religious discrimination.

The constitution prohibits non-Muslims from running for the presidency. Non-Muslims may hold other public offices and work within the government.

The family code prohibits Muslim women from marrying non-Muslim men unless the man converts to Islam. The code does not prohibit Muslim men from marrying non-Muslim women.

By law, individuals who have converted from Islam to another religion are ineligible to receive an inheritance via succession.

The law prohibits religious associations from receiving funding from political parties or foreign entities. The constitution prohibits the establishment of political parties based on religion.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary Paragraph: Police investigated hundreds and arrested dozens of Ahmadi Muslims in several cities and towns in connection with the practice of their religion, according to leaders of the Ahmadi community. MRA representatives, including the minister, continued to make public statements warning against the spread of “foreign” religious influences such as Salafism, Wahhabism, Shia Islam, and Ahmadi Islam. In April the then chief of staff to the president called on citizens to “protect the country from the Shia and Ahmadi sects.” An Islamic religious council declared that Ahmadi beliefs are outside of Islam. In February the minister of religious affairs stated that Ahmadis were “damaging the very basis of Islam.” While in April the minister said he did not intend to combat members of the Ahmadi community and that the government’s actions were solely intended to enforce laws on associations and the collection of donations, he stated in July Ahmadis were manipulated by a “foreign hand” aimed at destabilizing the country, according to Human Rights Watch. The president commuted the sentence of a Christian convert arrested in 2016 for insulting the Prophet Muhammad on Facebook, but as of October the convert remained imprisoned. Another individual, sentenced to five years’ imprisonment in 2016 for Facebook posts deemed insulting to Islam, was released on June 14 as part of a general amnesty. Authorities closed a church in Oran, and sought to close another in Kabylie, according to Protestant church leaders. Some Christian groups continued to report facing a range of administrative difficulties in the absence of a written government response to their requests for recognition as associations. MRA officials, including the minister, continued to state publicly the government’s willingness to accommodate minority faiths that wished to practice in the country by opening places of worship. Christian leaders stated the lack of government responsiveness to visa applications continued to pose complications for religious workers.

MRA representatives continued to make public statements warning against the spread of “foreign” religious influences such as Salafism, Wahhabism, Shia Islam, and Ahmadi Islam. In April the president’s then-chief of staff called on citizens to “protect the country from Shia and Ahmadi sects.”

Throughout the year, the government conducted investigations of at least 205 Ahmadi Muslims, arresting dozens, according to leaders of the Ahmadi community. Charges included operating an unregistered religious association, collecting funds without authorization, and holding prayers in unauthorized locations. As of December, five Ahmadi Muslims remained imprisoned, according to members of the Ahmadi community. Approximately 30 others were found guilty but, as of October, remained free while they appealed the charges. In February an Algerian Islamic religious council, whose membership is determined by government-appointed officials, declared that Ahmadi beliefs are outside of Islam. That same month, the minister of religious affairs stated that Ahmadis were “damaging the very basis of Islam.” Although in April he said he did not intend to combat members of the Ahmadi community and that the government’s actions were solely intended to enforce laws on associations and the collection of donations, in July, according to Human Rights Watch, he stated that Ahmadis were manipulated by a “foreign hand” aimed at destabilizing the country. A lawyer for the Ahmadi community said judges and prosecutors on several occasions questioned Ahmadi defendants in court about their religious beliefs and theological differences with Sunni Islam. Members of the Ahmadi community said government officials tried to persuade them to recant their beliefs while they were in custody.

In July, as part of a presidential amnesty, authorities commuted the sentence of Slimane Bouhafs, a Christian convert who in 2016 had been sentenced to five years in prison plus a 100,000 dinars ($870) fine for posting statements on his Facebook page deemed insulting to the Prophet Muhammad. A court had previously reduced his sentence to three years, and he was scheduled for release in March 2018 as a result of the commutation; he remained imprisoned as of year’s end. Rachid Fodil, who was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment in 2016 for Facebook posts deemed insulting to Islam, was released on June 14 as part of a general amnesty for prisoners who obtained a diploma.

Christian leaders said courts were sometimes biased against non-Muslims in family law cases, such as divorce or custody proceedings.

MRA officials said the government did not regularly prescreen and approve sermons before imams delivered them during Friday prayers, but also stated it sometimes provided preapproved sermon topics for Friday prayers to address the public’s concerns following major events or to encourage civic participation through activities such as donating blood and voting in legislative elections. The MRA said it did not punish imams who failed to discuss the suggested sermon topics.

The government monitored the sermons delivered in mosques. According to MRA officials, if a ministry inspector suspected an imam’s sermon was inappropriate, particularly if it supported violent extremism, the inspector had the authority to summon the imam to a “scientific council” composed of Islamic law scholars and other imams who assessed the sermon’s correctness. The government could decide to relieve an imam of duty if he was summoned multiple times. The government also monitored activities in mosques for possible security-related offenses, such as recruitment by extremist groups, and prohibited the use of mosques as public meeting places outside of regular prayer hours.

The government continued to enforce the ban on proselytizing by non-Muslim groups. Several Christian representatives stated continued government observance of the ordinance against proselytizing by non-Muslims prompted churches to restrict some activities not related to proselytizing, such as the distribution of religious literature and holding of events in the local community that Muslims might attend.

Authorities closed a church in Oran and sought to close another in Tizi Ouzou Province, according to Protestant church leaders. A November 9 letter from the MOI ordered the closure of the House of Hope Church in Ain Turk, Oran, stating the church was not legally registered to operate and was printing materials for proselytizing. Church leaders said the House of Hope Church was a branch of the nationally registered Protestant Church of Algeria and the premises were not used for the printing of any materials for proselytization. Municipal officials in Tizi Ouzou Province ordered the closure of a church in the area, saying the church building was not authorized to be used for prayer services. The church contested the closure in court, and it remained in operation in December as legal proceedings continued.

Some Christian citizens said they continued to use homes or businesses as “house churches” due to government delays in issuing the necessary legal authorizations. Authorities generally permitted such churches to operate. Other Christian groups, particularly in the Kabylie region, reportedly held worship services more discreetly. No houses were shut down during the year, but litigation seeking to shut down one house church was ongoing at year’s end.

Christian leaders reported being able to visit Christians in prison.

According to the MOI, although religious associations were de facto registered if the ministry did not reject their applications within 60 days of submission, the 60-day clock did not begin until the ministry considered the application complete and had issued a receipt to that effect. NGOs and religious leaders said the MOI routinely failed to provide them with a receipt proving they had submitted a completed registration application.

Several religious groups that had been registered under the previous associations law prior to 2012 continued to try to reregister with the government. The Protestant Church of Algeria submitted paperwork to renew its registration in 2014 but as of year’s end had still not received a response from the MOI; this was also the case with the Seventh-day Adventist Church.

Some religious groups stated they viewed themselves as registered 60 days after having submitted their application, even though they had not received an MOI confirmation. Such groups stated, however, that service providers, such as utilities and banks, refused to provide services, insisting on proof of registration. As a result, these groups faced the same administrative obstacles as unregistered associations and also had limited standing to pursue legal complaints and could not engage in charitable activities, which required bank accounts.

Most Christian leaders stated they had had no contact with the National Commission for Non-Muslim Religious Groups, despite its legal mandate to work with them on registration, since its establishment in 2006. Other MRA officials, however, met regularly with Christian leaders to hear their views, including complaints about the registration process. Christian leaders stated some Protestant groups continued to avoid applying for recognition and instead operated discreetly because they lacked confidence in the registration process.

According to the MRA, the government continued to allow government employees to wear religious clothing including the hijab, crosses, and the niqab. Authorities continued to instruct some female government employees, such as security force members, not to wear head and face coverings that could complicate the performance of their official duties.

The government did not grant any permits for the importation of Christian religious texts during the year. Christian organizations stated they had been waiting more than a year for a new import authorization; the last such authorization was in October 2016. Non-Islamic religious texts, music, and video media continued to be available on the informal market, and stores and vendors in the capital sold Bibles in several languages, including Arabic, French, and Tamazight. The government enforced its prohibition on dissemination of any literature portraying violence as a legitimate precept of Islam.

The government, along with local Muslims making private contributions, continued to fund mosque construction. The government and public and private companies also funded the preservation of some churches, particularly those of historical importance. The province of Oran, for example, continued to work in partnership with local donors on an extensive renovation of Notre Dame de Santa Cruz as part of its cultural patrimony.

The government did not always enforce the family code prohibition against Muslim women marrying non-Muslim men.

Government-owned radio stations continued to broadcast Christmas and Easter services in French, although many Christians said they would prefer services to be broadcast in Arabic or Tamazight.

Government officials continued to invite leading Christian and Jewish citizens to events celebrating national occasions; for example, the president invited Christian and Jewish community representatives to the November 1 parade to commemorate the beginning of the revolution, according them the same status as Muslim, cultural, and national figures.

Senior government officials publicly condemned acts of violence committed in the name of Islam by nonstate actors and urged all members of society to reject extremist behavior. In response to terrorist attacks in other countries during the year, including in the United Kingdom, Russia, and Spain, the government issued statements calling the attacks “criminal acts” for taking innocent human lives in contradiction to the tenets of Islam.

Government officials regularly made statements about the need for tolerance of non-Islamic religious groups. In April imams, representatives from the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and municipal officials participated in an interfaith event at a Catholic church in Algiers featuring Christian and Muslim prayers and a panel discussion on Quranic and Biblical teachings on the environment.

Church groups reported the government did not respond to their requests for visas for religious workers and visiting scholars and speakers, resulting in an increase in de facto visa refusals. One Christian leader said, of 21 visa requests, only two were approved. Catholic and Protestant groups continued to identify the delays as a significant hindrance to religious practice. One religious leader identified lack of visa issuances as a major impediment to maintaining contact with the church’s international organization. Higher-level intervention with officials responsible for visa issuance by senior MRA and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials at the request of religious groups sometimes resulted in the issuance of long-term visas, according to those groups.

Several Christian leaders reported instances in which citizens who converted, or who expressed interest in learning more about Christianity, were assaulted by family members, or otherwise pressured to recant their conversions.

Some Muslim citizens who converted to Christianity reported they and others in their communities continued to keep a low profile due to concern for their personal safety and the potential for legal, familial, career, and social problems. Other Muslim citizens who converted to Christianity practiced their new religion openly, however, according to members of the Christian community.

Media outlets reported in August that as many as 600 imams had lodged complaints in recent years after suffering violent attacks. MRA officials said some of the attacks were perpetrated by extremists who opposed the imams’ moderate teachings, while others were related to interpersonal disputes. The government said it would take additional steps to protect imams.

The media criticized religious communities it portrayed as “sects” or “deviations” from Islam or as “foreign,” such as Ahmadi Muslims and Shia Muslims. Some who openly engaged in any religious practice other than Sunni Islam reported that family, neighbors, or others criticized their religious practice, harassed them to convert, and occasionally insinuated they could be in danger because of their choice. The head of an independent imams union described Ahmadiyya as an “infidel” sect.

Both private and state-run media produced reports throughout the year examining the supposed foreign ties and dangers of religious groups such as Shia Muslims, Ahmadi Muslims, and Salafists. For example, in August the newspaper L’Expression published an article claiming groups such as the Karkariya Sufi order and Ahmadi Muslims were part of a “plot” against Algeria by “Western-Zionist” powers.

Jewish citizens said they continued to try to keep their religious identity private, while otherwise engaging with society. In August the newspaper Echourouk El Youmi published a cartoon depicting a Jewish man sitting in front of an Arab man who had stripped off his clothes. The Jewish man was holding a sign saying “more,” appearing to imply that he was not satisfied despite what the Arab man had given up. Another Echourouk El Youmi cartoon published in August depicted a Jewish man with a Star of David on his sleeve clenching the surface of a globe, implying world domination by Jews. On August 10, the same newspaper published an article stating that Jews had been plotting against Muslims since the days of the Prophet Muhammad, that Jews were responsible for most of the disasters that have befallen Muslims, and that Jews controlled the media, cinema, art, and fashion.

Christian leaders said they had good relations with Muslims in their communities, with only isolated incidents of vandalism or harassment.

Christian leaders said when Christian converts died family members sometimes buried them according to Islamic rites, and the church had no standing to intervene on their behalf. Christian groups reported some villages continued not to permit Christians to be buried alongside Muslims. A ministry official stated that where burial grounds were private, such cases were outside the government’s domain.

The U.S. Ambassador and other embassy officers met with government officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, and Religious Affairs to discuss the difficulties Christian and other minority religious groups faced in registering as associations, importing religious materials, and obtaining visas. Embassy officers also regularly addressed the government’s stance toward minority Muslim communities.

The Ambassador and other embassy officers met throughout the year with government-affiliated and independent religious leaders and with representatives of Muslim and Christian communities to discuss interreligious dialogue and tolerance, and in the case of religious minorities, their rights and status.

The embassy discussed the practice of religion, its intersection with politics, religious tolerance, and the religious and political roles of women with religious and political leaders, as well as with the Muslim Scholars Association and High Islamic Council. Visiting officials from the U.S. Department of State regularly raised religious freedom issues in meetings with civil society and government officials.

The Ambassador and other embassy staff hosted several dinners and receptions featuring discussions emphasizing the theme of religious tolerance. The embassy regularly posted social media content promoting religious freedom, including examples of religious pluralism in the United States. Embassy staff and embassy-sponsored U.S. speakers addressed the themes of pluralism and religious tolerance in discussions with civil society, youth, and organizations representing a cross-section of citizens.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 77,000 (July 2017). The population is predominantly Roman Catholic. Muslim leaders estimate the community has 800-2,000 members. The Muslim community, of which the large majority is comprised of recent immigrants, has grown in recent years. The Jewish community reports it has approximately 100 members. Other small religious groups include Hindus, Anglicans, Seventh-day Adventists, Bahais, the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), the New Apostolic Church, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Legal Framework

The constitution “guarantees freedom of ideas, religion, and cult.” It prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion and stipulates no one shall be required to disclose his or her religion or beliefs. The constitution states such freedoms may be limited only to protect public safety, order, health, or morals as prescribed by law or to protect the rights of others. The constitution acknowledges a special relationship with the Catholic Church “in accordance with Andorran tradition” and recognizes the “full legal capacity” of the bodies of the Catholic Church, granting them legal status “in accordance with their own rules.” One of two constitutionally designated princes of the country (who serves equally as joint head of state with the other prince, the president of France) is the Catholic Bishop of Urgell, Joan Enric Vives i Sicilia, whose diocese in Spain includes Andorra.

Faiths other than Catholicism do not have legal status as religious groups. The government registers religious communities as cultural organizations under the law of associations, which does not specifically mention religious groups. To build a place of worship or seek government financial support for community activities, a religious group must register as a nonprofit cultural organization and acquire legal status. To register, a group must provide its statutes and foundational agreement, a statement certifying the names of persons appointed to the board or other official positions in the organization, and a patrimony declaration that identifies the inheritance or endowment of the organization. A consolidated register of associations records all types of associations, including religious groups. The law governing the issuance of official documents such as residence permits, passports, and driver’s licenses, requires individuals to appear and be photographed with their heads uncovered.

According to the law, municipalities are responsible for the construction, preservation, and administration of cemeteries and funerary services.

Government regulation permits ritual slaughter as required by the Islamic or Jewish faith, so long as it takes place under the supervision of the veterinary services of the country’s slaughterhouse.

Instruction in the Catholic faith is optional in public schools. The Catholic Church provides teachers for religion classes, and the government pays their salaries. The Ministry of Education also provides space in the public schools where religion classes are taught.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Catholic Church continued to receive special privileges not available to other religious groups. The government paid the salaries of the eight Catholic priests serving in local churches and granted all foreign Catholic priests citizenship for as long as they exercised their functions in the country.

Authorities at the local and national level did not resume meetings with the Jewish and Muslim communities to further discuss construction of a cemetery where they could bury their dead according to their customs, and Jewish and Muslim representatives said no municipality had identified a space for such use. Government officials stated they were still exploring the possibility of building cemeteries for those communities but that there was no precedent for providing land for such a purpose. Although Jews and Muslims could bury their dead in existing cemeteries, municipalities did not allocate separate burial areas in those cemeteries for use by those communities. As a result, these communities generally buried their dead outside the country. The Jewish community, for example, continued to use cemeteries in Toulouse, France, and Barcelona, Spain. The Muslim community continued to use cemeteries in Toulouse or bury their dead in their countries of origin.

Based on a court hearing that took place on October 10, the prosecutor’s office concluded the 2014 assault by two individuals of a Jewish man outside of a discotheque in the city of La Massana did not constitute an anti-Semitic hate crime.

The government continued to fund three Catholic schools at the primary and secondary level.

In February the Council of Europe’s ECRI published its quinquennial report on the country and recommended establishing a national body to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and intolerance; more comprehensive antidiscrimination legislation; and introduction into law of the principle of sharing of the burden of proof in civil cases alleging discrimination, including religious discrimination. As a follow-up to the recommendations in the ECRI report, on November 23, the parliament extended the mandate of the national ombudsman to process complaints, including those involving incidents with a religious motivation.

In July a study on equality, including religious equality, that the government carried out with civil society recommended enactment of a law on nondiscrimination, which would also address cases of discrimination on the basis of religious belief. By year’s end parliament had not enacted such a law.

Members of the Muslim community again raised concerns that individuals wearing head coverings for religious reasons were required to remove them in photographs for official documents.

According to members of the Muslim community, a Muslim halal butcher regularly performed ritual slaughter at the country’s slaughterhouse.

Foreigners performing religious functions for religious groups other than the Catholic Church remained unable to obtain religious working permits because the law did not define what constituted a “religious worker.” These workers had to enter the country under a different status. Foreign religious workers could enter the country with permits for other positions such as schoolteachers or business workers and were able to carry out religious work without hindrance.

There continued to be no mosque in the country, but there were two Muslim prayer rooms in Andorra la Vella and in Esclades Engordany.

The Catholic Church of Santa Maria del Fener in Andorra la Vella continued to lend its sanctuary twice a month to the Anglican community so that visiting Anglican clergy could conduct services for the English-speaking community.

Officials from the U.S. Consulate General in Barcelona discussed continued concerns about the lack of cemeteries for the Jewish and Muslim communities with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior and Justice officials.

Consulate general officials met with representatives of the Jewish and Muslim communities to discuss issues such as the lack of legal status as religious groups for faiths other than Catholicism, the implications of regulations requiring individuals to remove head coverings for official identity documents, and the lack of cemeteries for the Jewish and Muslim communities.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 29.3 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2014 national census, approximately 41 percent of the population is Roman Catholic and 38 percent Protestant. Individuals not associated with any religious group constitute 12 percent of the population. The remaining 10 percent is composed of animists, Muslims, Jews, and other religious groups. While the 2014 census reported there were an estimated 103,000 Muslims in the country, one leader of a Muslim organization stated there could be as many as 800,000. His figure includes an unknown number of Muslim migrants mainly from North and West African countries. There are approximately 350 Jews in country, primarily foreign residents.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the state as secular and prohibits religious discrimination. The constitution requires the state to protect churches and religious groups as long as they comply with the law. The constitution provides for freedom of conscience, religious belief, and worship, and it recognizes the right of religious groups to organize and carry out their activities as long as they adhere to the law. The constitution permits conscientious objection for religious reasons, prohibits questioning individuals about their religious beliefs for reasons other than anonymous statistical purposes, and specifies that religious rights may not be suspended even if the state declares a state of war, siege, or emergency. It recognizes the right of prisoners to receive visits from, and correspond with, religious counselors. The law establishes that conscientious objectors can perform civilian service as an alternative to military service.

The religious freedom law requires religious groups to register for legal recognition from the state. Legal recognition gives religious groups the ability to purchase property collectively and use their property to hold religious events, exempts them from paying certain property taxes, and authorizes a group to be treated as an incorporated entity in the court system. To apply for government recognition, a religious group must collect 100,000 member signatures from legal residents from 12 of the 18 provinces and submit them to the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (MJHR). The law also requires religious groups to submit documents defining their organizational structure, methods of worship, leadership, and the amount of time the group has operated in the country, and that their doctrine be in accordance with principles and rights the constitution. In 2015 the MJHR issued a circular that provides for the establishment of ecumenical associations and the requirements for an unrecognized religious group to incorporate with the ecumenical association. While the MJHR is responsible for registration and recognition of religious groups, oversight of religious organizations is the responsibility of the Ministry of Culture through its National Institute for Religious Affairs (INAR).

Religious instruction is not a component of the public educational system. Private schools are allowed to teach religion.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On November 24, a court in Luanda sentenced four Muslims to three years’ imprisonment and fined them 70,000 kwanzas ($410) for allegedly forming a radical Islamic group and pledging allegiance to the Islamic State. Two other defendants were acquitted. The defendants maintained their innocence and said they were discriminated against because of their Muslim faith. They acknowledged they discussed religion over the internet through a Facebook page and stated they had discussed writings by a Brazilian Muslim who was detained in Brazil related to charges of participating in a terrorist cell. Lawyers for the defendants asserted their clients’ innocence and said that discussing religion on social media and sharing religious beliefs with others was not a crime and was a common practice among other religious communities. In a private meeting, a leader in the Muslim community said that he did not believe the individuals were persecuted for their religious beliefs, and he agreed that they should be tried and held accountable for any crimes they might have committed so as not to cast a negative light on the Muslim community in Angola.

Government officials at the highest levels continued to state concern about the proliferation of religious “sects,” some of which were alleged to have exploited vulnerable populations with limited financial means by requiring them to provide recurring payments or dues to worship or belong to these organizations. In President Lourenco’s first address to parliament on October 16, he expressed the desire to change the law on religious freedom in order to reinforce the lines separating religion from business. A few days after the president’s speech, the minister of culture started a dialogue with officially recognized churches to elicit input that would be taken into account as the government drafted a new religious freedom law. On November 11, the vice-governor of Luanda Province stated her wish to curtail the proliferation of religious sects that she said operated churches solely as profitable businesses rather than simply places of worship, or were detrimental to social order.

The government again recognized no new religious groups, and the number officially recognized remained at 81. The government has not recognized a new religious group since 2004 when it created the current application system. A large number of groups continued to await recognition despite having submitted several applications for registration. In 2015, the government estimated that approximately 1,300 religious groups were operating without government recognition, some of which were providing education and medical care to members despite having no legal authority to do so.

The government continued not to recognize any Muslim groups officially or issue any licenses to Muslim groups to practice their religion legally. The Muslim community requested official recognition of its groups but was unable to meet the requirements of the 2004 law, including having 100,000 citizen members and a religious doctrine aligned with the country’s constitution. In the past government officials had stated that some practices allowed by Islam, such as polygamy, contradicted the constitution.

The Muslim community was organized under the Islamic Foundation of Angola (FIA), which interacts with the government and organizes the mosques and adherents in the country. The FIA applied for recognition but did not receive an official response from the government as of year’s end. The Islamic Community of Angola (COIA) is a civil rights organization that applied for recognition in 2005 and also had not received a response from the government. According to the COIA leadership, the high threshold for obtaining legal status, combined with the fact that the majority of recognized religious organizations were Christian, indicated the government opposed recognizing non-Christian religious groups. The Bahai Faith and the Global Messianic Church remained the only two non-Christian organizations legally registered.

During the year the government continued to lead an effort to bring unrecognized Christian groups together in associations that would then receive de facto government recognition, requesting those groups to support actively government requests, such as calls to register for elections, and not to engage in illegal practices. The government approved the operation of four coalitions of Christian churches: the evangelical Christian Union of Churches of the Holy Spirit in Angola, the Protestant Christian Church Coalition of Angola, the National Convention of Angolan Christian Churches, and the Angolan Reviving Churches Council. The INAR stated that since 2016 dozens of groups had joined these associations to avoid closure.

Some religious leaders, civil society members, and media outlets continued to accuse the government of trying to coerce religious groups to align themselves with the ruling party in exchange for authorization to operate freely. In June and July the media reported several instances of national- and local-level politicians presenting the ruling party’s platform to religious leaders and requesting their support in getting congregation members to polling places and ensure an atmosphere of peace during the election period.

While religious groups were free to run radio stations and written press, the government did not approve a 2009 request from the Catholic radio station Ecclesia to extend its signal beyond Luanda.

On August 26, seven alleged assailants released a toxic gas among the 7,000 persons gathered at the Viana Assembly Hall of Jehovah’s Witnesses for their annual congress. More than 400 individuals were affected, mainly by causing victims, including young children, to faint. Police and firefighters were called to assist the victims, and two persons died. The National Police detained three of the alleged perpetrators, while four remained at large. In one media report, two of the alleged perpetrators declared they were members of an opposition political party that wanted to punish the Jehovah’s Witnesses for not voting in the recently concluded national elections. Some leaders of legally recognized religious organizations – Bishop Jose Manuel Imbamba of the Episcopal Conference of Angola and Sao Tome, Deolinda Teca of the Angolan Council of Christian Churches, Luis Nguimbi of the Angolan Christian Forum, and others – continued to criticize the proliferation of smaller, unrecognized religious groups. Teca also acknowledged the need for greater religious understanding and interfaith dialogue.

Throughout the year, the embassy raised religious freedom issues with government officials, including long-pending registration applications and the drafting of the new religious freedom law. In February embassy officials and a representative from the Department of State Office of International Religious Freedom met with government officials from the Ministries of Culture, Justice and Human Rights, External Relations, and the INAR and discussed religious registration and possible areas of cooperation to promote religious tolerance.

Embassy officials met with religious leaders and civil society representatives to discuss religious freedom issues and expanded outreach to religious communities, including the Jewish community. During the Department of State officer’s February visit, he and embassy officials met with representatives of the Christian, Muslim, and Jewish communities and civil society and discussed their reaction to the government’s stated concerns about the proliferation of churches. They also discussed the status of pending recognitions, the proposed law on religion freedom, and efforts to promote increased interfaith dialogue.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 95,000 (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2011 census, 17.6 percent of the population is Anglican, 12.4 percent Seventh-day Adventist, 12.2 percent Pentecostal, 8.3 percent Moravian, 8.2 percent Roman Catholic, and 5.6 percent Methodist. Those with unspecified or no religious beliefs account for 5.5 percent and 5.9 percent of the population, respectively. Members of the Baptist Church, the Church of God, and the Wesleyan Holiness Consortium each account for less than 5 percent. The census categorizes an additional 12.2 percent of the population as belonging to other religious groups, including Rastafarians, Muslims, Hindus, and Bahais, without providing percentages for each group. According to anecdotal information, these four religious groups are listed from largest to smallest.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of worship as well as the right to change and practice the religion of one’s choosing. The constitution protects individuals from taking oaths contradictory to their beliefs or participating in events and activities of religions not their own, including participating in or receiving unwanted religious education. These freedoms may be limited in the interests of defense or public safety, order, morality or health, or to protect the rights of others, unless actions under such limitations can be shown “not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.” The constitution prohibits members of the clergy from running for elected office. No law may be adopted that contradicts these constitutional provisions. The government does not enforce a law outlawing blasphemous language in a public place or any other place that would “cause annoyance to the public.”

The government does not require religious groups to register; however, in order to receive tax and duty-free concessions and to own, build, or renovate property, religious groups must register with the government. To register, religious groups must fill out an online tax form that determines the group’s activities and the corresponding taxes. The completed form is submitted to the Inland Revenue Department for review and approval. Registration and tax statuses are routinely granted.

Public schools do not allow religious instruction. Private religious schools may provide religious instruction. The government does not provide subsidies to private schools. Public schools require parents to immunize their children to attend school; however, some schools waive the requirement based on the religious beliefs of the family. Some private schools do not require immunizations for their students. The law also permits home schooling.

Occupational health regulations require individuals with dreadlocks to cover their hair when they work with food, hazardous equipment, or in the health sector. These regulations apply to both public- and private-sector workplaces.

The law prohibits the use of marijuana, including for religious purposes.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

A representative of the Rastafarian community continued to state that the government’s prohibition of marijuana restricted the right to practice their religion because marijuana was integral to their religious rituals. The representative stated the government engaged with the community on this issue.

A Rastafarian representative said Rastafarians disagreed with the public school requirement that children be vaccinated, which he stated was against the religious beliefs of Rastafarians. He said some Rastafarian children received exemptions requiring immunizations to enter school or attended private schools not requiring immunizations. He stated that some other Rastafarians chose to home school their children.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

U.S. embassy officials engaged officials from the Department of Gender Affairs in the Ministry of Social Services and Community Development as well as the police to emphasize the importance of respect for religious diversity and equal treatment under the law.

Embassy officials also met with representatives from the Christian Council, the Muslim community, and the Rastafarian community to discuss religious freedom issues, including the importance of freedom of religious expression and discrimination on the basis of religion. The embassy also used Facebook to promote messages about the importance of religious freedom and respect for religious diversity across the Eastern Caribbean.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 44.3 million (July 2017 estimate). Religious demographic and statistical data from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), research centers, and religious leaders vary. According to a 2014 Pew Research Center study, Roman Catholics constitute 71 percent of the population, with Protestants at 15 percent, and atheists, agnostics, and those with no religious affiliation at 11 percent. Seventh-day Adventists, Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Lutherans, Methodists, and members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) together total 3 percent of the population. The Jewish population is approximately 250,000-300,000, and the Muslim population is estimated to be between 450,000 and one million. Evangelical Protestant communities, particularly Pentecostals, are growing in size, but no reliable statistics are available. There are also a small numbers of Bahais and adherents to indigenous religions in the country; however, no data is available on the size of these groups.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the right to profess, teach, and practice freely one’s faith. It attests the support of the federal government for “the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith,” but the Supreme Court has ruled that it is not an official or state religion.

The government provides the Catholic Church with tax-exempt subsidies, institutional privileges such as school subsidies, significant autonomy for parochial schools, and licensing preferences for radio frequencies. The law does not require the Catholic Church to register with the Secretariat of Worship in the MFA. Registration is not compulsory for other religious groups, but registered groups receive the same status and fiscal benefits as the Catholic Church, including tax-exempt status, visas for religious officials, and the ability to hold public activities. To register religious groups must have a place of worship, an organizational charter, and an ordained clergy, among other requirements.

Registration is not required for private religious services, such as those held in homes, but is sometimes required to conduct activities in public spaces pursuant to local regulations. City authorities may require groups to obtain permits to use public parks for public activities, and they may require religious groups to be registered with the secretariat to receive the permit. Once registered, an organization must report to the secretariat any significant changes or decisions made regarding its leadership, governing structure, size of membership, and the address of its headquarters.

The mandatory curriculum in public schools is secular by law. Students may request elective courses of instruction in the religion of their choice in some public schools, which may be conducted in the school or at a religious institution. Many Christian, Jewish, and Muslim religious groups operate private schools, which receive financial support contingent on registration with the government.

Foreign religious officials of registered religious groups may apply for a specific visa category to enter the country. The length of the visa varies depending on the purpose of the travel. Foreign missionaries of registered religious groups must apply to the Secretariat of Worship, which in turn notifies immigration authorities to request the issuance of the appropriate documents.

The board of the National Institute against Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Racism (INADI), a government agency under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, includes representatives of the major religious groups. INADI investigates suspected and reported incidents of discrimination based on religion. INADI is not authorized to enforce recommendations or findings, but its reports may be used as evidence in civil court. The agency also supports victims of religious discrimination and promotes proactive measures to prevent discrimination. INADI produces and distributes publications to promote religious tolerance.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In December a federal judge indicted former President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner on “aggravated concealment” charges, seeking her arrest on allegations she had covered up possible Iranian involvement in the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires. The court also requested the lifting of her immunity from prosecution as a sitting senator. Authorities also conducted raids linked to the case and arrested three of Fernandez de Kirchner’s former associates, including her former foreign minister, Hector Timerman. Fernandez de Kirchner and 14 others had been called to testify in October.

In September the gendarmerie (national police) completed a forensic report supporting the hypothesis that Nisman, the lead federal prosecutor responsible for the investigation of the 1994 AMIA bombing, was murdered in 2015. Nisman was discovered dead in his apartment from a gunshot to the head. Previous analyses had maintained that there was insufficient evidence to prove foul play. On December 26, a federal judge ruled Nisman was murdered that Nisman, the lead federal prosecutor responsible for the investigation of the 1994 AMIA bombing, was murdered and charged Nisman’s former assistant, Diego Lagomarsino, as an accessory to his death.

The administration of President Mauricio Macri administration also publicly expressed its commitment to transparency and pursuing justice in the investigation of the 1992 terrorist bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires.

In July the secretary of worship submitted a draft religious freedom bill to the lower house of congress that would eliminate the requirement that non-Catholic religious groups register with the government to receive the same benefits accorded to the Catholic Church, allow for conscientious objection on the basis of religion, and protect religious dress, religious holidays, and days of worship. While President Macri, the Permanent Commission of the Argentine Catholic Bishops, and some other religious groups supported the draft bill, others opposed it. Catholic Archbishop of La Plata Reuben Aguer said the draft bill challenged the Catholic Church’s “elevated status” in the country. The country’s branch of Amnesty International also opposed the draft bill, stating it could allow doctors to refuse to provide contraception, judges to refuse to officiate at same-sex marriages, and teachers to refuse to teach evolutionary theory because of their religious beliefs. There was no action on the draft legislation by year’s end.

According to Christian Solidarity Worldwide, on October 22, approximately 20 individuals appearing to be local police officers harassed attendees of the Pueblo Grande Baptist Church and threatened them with arrest. The officers left after local Gendarmerie officers protecting the church intervened and demanded the individuals show identification.

Jewish groups said relations with the government continued to improve under the Macri administration. The groups said the relationship had transformed from one of distrust to one of close collaboration, particularly in light of what they stated was the administration’s strong commitment to resolve the Nisman murder and to pursue justice in its investigations of the 1994 AMIA attack and the 1992 terrorist bombing of the Israeli embassy.

Secretary of Worship Ambassador Santiago de Estado, Undersecretary for Worship Ambassador Alfredo Abriani, the Buenos Aires director general for religious affairs, and other government representatives continued to host and attend religious freedom conferences, interreligious dialogues, rabbinical ordinations, and Rosh Hashanah, Eid al-Adha, and Eid al-Fitr celebrations, as well as other religious activities, including those held by Protestant and Orthodox churches. In November the city of Ushuaia hosted the Second World Congress on Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue, aimed at promoting interreligious dialogue and understanding.

INADI continued to spearhead education campaigns directed at public and private schools to facilitate a better understanding among youth of religious tolerance and respect for diversity. In March INADI announced a new partnership with UNICEF to counter cyberbullying, including religious discrimination.

In June police in Buenos Aires seized a large cache of Nazi-era objects, including instruments used in Nazi medical experiments, in a private house. The minister of security stated it was the largest seizure of Nazi objects in the country’s history. Police identified several suspects; however, there were no arrests by year’s end.

In July the MFA delivered approximately 40,000 World War II-era documents to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington DC, including diplomatic correspondence from Argentina’s embassies in Europe, visa applications from Jewish refugees and applicants, and newspaper articles. In September the government presented approximately 140,000 World War II-era documents to Israel during a visit by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

On March 8, individuals protesting the Catholic Church’s stance on abortion set fire to the Catholic Cathedral of Buenos Aires, causing property damage. On October 15, a group protesting the Catholic Church’s policies on abortion and prostitution set fire and damaged property at a church in the town of Resistencia, Province of Chaco. Two bystanders received minor injuries when attempting to intervene.

In May several human rights organizations, including the Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, an organization of mothers whose children disappeared during military rule in the 1970s and 1980s), criticized the Catholic Church for organizing an event calling for reconciliation between relatives of victims killed by the former military governments and 1970s-1980s military regime officers. The human rights organizations said the event, organized by the Argentine Bishops’ Conference, was an attempt to deflect the Catholic Church’s perceived complacency with the military government’s repressive actions against its opponents.

On September 11, anti-Semitic graffiti appeared around Buenos Aires, including on the walls of the Israeli Embassy, protesting the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.

In November a host of the national television show “Us in the Morning” was fired after she posted anti-Semitic comments on her Twitter account. INADI published a statement repudiating the host’s “racist” declarations.

The Delegation of Argentine Jewish Associations (DAIA) documented 351 reported complaints of anti-Semitism in 2016, compared with 478 reported complaints of anti-Semitism recorded in 2015. DAIA continued to track complaints of verbal, physical, and online harassment or anti-Semitic remarks, as well as anti-Semitic language in public spaces, including social and traditional media and during demonstrations and protests.

Interreligious organizations groups such as Religions for Peace, whose members included Catholic, Protestant, evangelical Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, Bahai, and indigenous religious groups, continued to exemplify the value of religious diversity. These groups worked to increase opportunities for multireligious action on common societal challenges.

Jewish and Muslim community representatives conducted various cultural events to foster closer community ties, including a “hummus festival” held in Buenos Aires in September.

Embassy officials met with government representatives, including with the Secretary of Worship, the MFA’s human rights office, and the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, to discuss ways to promote religious diversity and interfaith cooperation. In meetings with government officials at the national and Buenos Aires city levels, the Charge d’Affaires and other embassy officials discussed tolerance, the country’s interfaith movement, and measures to counteract religious discrimination. In meetings with the Secretary of Worship, embassy officials emphasized the importance of religious freedom and interfaith dialogue, as well as discussing the status of the AMIA case and ways to counter anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment.

Embassy outreach included regular meetings with religious and community leaders, including members of interreligious organizations. In these meetings, embassy officials discussed the status of religious freedom and interfaith dialogue, as well as the conditions and integration of refugees, the status of the AMIA case, and ways to counter anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment and promote religious tolerance. Embassy officials regularly attended conferences, observances, and commemorations organized by religious groups and NGOs, including DAIA, AMIA, the Islamic Center of Argentina, the Islamic Center for Peace, the Evangelical Church of Argentina, and the United Religious Initiative. Embassy officials continued to encourage the increased participation of religious communities in embassy-sponsored scholarship and educational programs. Embassy officials supported interfaith cooperation and universal respect for freedom of religion through both public statements and social media campaigns.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 3.1 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2011 census, approximately 92 percent of the population identifies with the AAC. Other religious groups, none representing more than 1 percent of the population, include Roman Catholics, Armenian Uniate (Mekhitarist) Catholics, Orthodox Christians, evangelical Christians, Pentecostals, Seventh-day Adventists, Baptists, charismatic Christians, Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), members of the Holy Apostolic Catholic Assyrian Church of the East, pagans, Molokan Christians, Yezidis, Jews, Bahais, Shia Muslims, and Sunni Muslims. According to members of the Jewish community, there are between 500 and 1,000 Jews.

Yezidis are concentrated primarily in agricultural areas northwest of Yerevan around Mount Aragats, and Armenian Uniate Catholics live primarily in the north. Most Jews, Mormons, and Orthodox Christians reside in Yerevan, along with a small community of Muslims. Most Muslims are Shia, including Iranians and temporary residents from the Middle East.

Legal Framework

The constitution states everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right includes the freedom to change one’s religion or beliefs and the freedom to manifest religion or belief in rituals of worship, such as preaching or church ceremonies, either alone or in community with others, in public or in private. The constitution allows restrictions on this right to protect state security, public order, health and morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. The constitution establishes separation of “religious organizations” and the state. It recognizes “the exclusive mission of the Armenian Apostolic Church as a national church in the spiritual life, development of the national culture, and preservation of the national identity of the people of Armenia.” The constitution prohibits the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms for the purpose of inciting religious hatred. It allows conscientious objectors to military service to perform alternative civilian service.

The law prohibits, but does not define, “soul hunting,” a term describing both proselytism and forced conversion; however, no prosecutions have occurred under this law.

According to the law, a registered religious group has the right to minister to the religious and spiritual needs of its faithful; perform religious liturgies, rites, and ceremonies; establish groups for religious instruction; engage in theological, religious, and historical and cultural studies; train members for the clergy or for scientific and pedagogical purposes; obtain and utilize objects and materials of religious significance; use communications media; establish ties with religious organizations in other countries; and engage in charity. The law does not require religious groups to register, but in order to conduct business in its own name (e.g., to own property, rent property, establish bank accounts), it must register. The law does not stipulate rights accorded to unregistered groups.

To register as a legal entity, a religious community must present to the Office of the State Registrar an assessment from the Division of Religious Affairs and National Minorities stating its expert opinion whether the community complies with the requirements of the law that it be based on “historically recognized holy scripture;” be “free from materialism and is of a spiritual nature;” have at least 200 adult members; and its doctrine be espoused by a member of the “international modern system” of religious communities. The law does not define “free from materialism” or state which religious communities are considered part of the “international modern system.” The law specifies that this list of registration requirements, to which the Division of Religious Affairs and National Minorities must attest, does not apply to a religious organization based on the faith of one of the groups recognized as national minorities. A decision by the Office of the State Registrar may be appealed through the courts.

The criminal code prohibits “obstruction of the right to exercise freedom of religion” and prescribes punishment ranging from fines of up to 200,000 drams ($410) or detention of up to two months.

The Human Rights Defender’s office (Ombudsman’s office) has a mandate to address human rights violations and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of religion, committed by officials of the state and local governments.

The law prohibits an employee of the police, National Security Service, service for mandatory enforcement of court rulings, penitentiary service, or rescue service from being a member of a religious organization, but the law does not define the meaning of “membership” in a religious organization. The law prohibits members of the police, military, and National Security Service, as well as prosecutors, diplomats, and other national, community, and civil servants from using their official position for the benefit of “religious associations” or from preaching in support of them. The law also prohibits police, prosecutors, and other state and civil servants from conducting other religious activities while performing official duties. While the law defines a “religious organization” as an association of citizens established for professing a common faith as well as for fulfilling other religious needs, it provides no definition for “religious associations.” According to a new law regarding military service adopted on November 15, a military service member is not permitted to establish a religious association. If a member of the military is a member of a religious association, the member does not have the right to preach to other service personnel during the military service.

The law allows the AAC free access to, and the right to station representatives in, hospitals, orphanages, boarding schools, military units, and places of detention, while other religious groups may have representatives in these locations only with permission from the head of the institution. The law also stipulates the state will not interfere with the AAC’s exclusive right to preach freely and spread its beliefs throughout the entire territory of the country.

The law mandates public education be secular, and states “religious activity and preaching in public educational institutions is prohibited, with the exception of cases provided by law.” Courses called the History of the Armenian Church (HAC) are a mandatory part of the national curriculum in public and private schools in grades five through 11.

The AAC has the right to participate in the development of the syllabi and textbooks for these courses and to define the qualifications of their teachers. The Church may nominate candidates to teach the courses, although the teachers are state employees. All students are required to enroll in these classes; there is no opt-out provision. The law grants the AAC the right to organize voluntary extracurricular religious instruction classes in state educational institutions. Other religious groups may provide religious instruction to their members in their own facilities, but not within the premises of state educational institutions.

The labor code prohibits employers from collecting and analyzing data on religious views of employees.

The law provides for two types of service for conscientious objectors as an alternative to compulsory, two-year military service: alternative (noncombat) military service for 30 months, or alternative labor service for 36 months. Evasion of alternative service remains a criminal offense. Penalties range from two months’ detention to eight years’ imprisonment depending on the circumstances of the case.

The law does not recognize groups organized on the basis of religion as political parties.

The criminal code prohibits incitement of religious hatred through violence, public statements, or the mass media and prescribes punishments ranging from fines of 200,000 to 500,000 drams ($410 to $1,000) or prison terms of between two and six years.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: Religious minority groups said they were concerned about the potential erosion of their rights through a legislative initiative on religious freedom proposed by the government and sent to the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) for review in November. Representatives of religious minorities said if the law passed as drafted, it would adversely impact freedom of religion for minority religious groups in the country. Human rights activists continued to express concern about the government’s concurrence with the AAC’s dissemination of teaching in schools that often equated AAC affiliation with national identity. According to minority religious groups and NGOs, government speech equating national identity to affiliation with the AAC continued to fuel discrimination against minority religious groups. NGOs and some religious groups also said the focus in school textbooks on the Bible and AAC traditions and language, such as “we the Armenians are Christian people,” and “thanks to the AAC, Christianity has become the inseparable part of the national identity of the Armenian people” showed government preference for the AAC. They also said other religious groups were sometimes characterized in disparaging or inaccurate ways. During the year religious minority groups did not report abuses during the military service of their religious community members, unlike in previous years. One group reported a “positive attitude” toward members of the evangelical Christian faith in the army, including from AAC chaplains. Minority Christian groups reported they had the freedom to worship provided they did so privately and discreetly on their own premises and in their community – keeping their activities low-profile and exercising self-censorship.

On June 1, the Ministry of Justice proposed a package of laws, called the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, to amend legislation on religious freedom. The ministry did not conduct prior consultations with religious organizations or the governmental Division of Religious Affairs and National Minorities before proposing the legislation. Numerous members of religious minority groups and civil society organizations stated there were positive developments in the proposed legislation, including the removal of unclear registration requirements and the mention of “soul-hunting.” They expressed particular concern, however, about the apparent intention of the government to remove the AAC from being covered by the draft law. They also expressed concerns the draft law stipulated religious unions may receive funding from abroad and may not finance their spiritual centers and political parties located outside of the territory of the Republic of Armenia. Proposed government monitoring of religious groups and unclear articles in the draft pertaining to NGOs were other concerns.

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) reviewed the draft package of laws following an official request from human rights advocate Arman Tatoyan. The ODIHR opinion issued on September 29 noted the draft legislation contained some major improvements in terms of compliance with international human rights standards, including adoption of some of the key recommendations made in previous ODIHR-Venice Commission joint opinions on Armenian legislation pertaining to freedom of religion or belief. ODIHR stated, however, that further amendments were needed to ensure the draft’s full compliance with international standards and OSCE “human dimension” commitments. Key ODHIR recommendations included an explicit statement that the AAC must fall under the jurisdiction of the draft law; the replacement of “state security” with the term “public safety” to remove potential limitations on the freedom to manifest thought, conscience, and religion or belief; removal of the obligation for religious organizations to maintain records of their members; and the removal of the prohibition on foreign funding for religious organizations.

On November 30, following the ODIHR review, the Ministry of Justice presented to the religious community an updated draft of the legislative package. According to religious freedom experts and many members of the religious community, even though the updated package specifically included AAC as a subject of the law, in some respects the revised version was more problematic than the previous draft because it was clearly aimed at controlling religious organizations and limiting freedom of religion. According to the preliminary assessment by the Center for Religion and Law, a local NGO, the revised draft included many provisions stricken from previous drafts by the Venice Commission and ODIHR. The updated draft Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations included more than a dozen grounds (many of them vague and open for interpretation) for banning expression of freedom of religion, including if such expression undermined state security, weakened the country’s defense capacity, preached religious fanaticism, engaged in other illegal or immoral acts, was carried out for mercenary purposes, or occurred in the vicinity of educational facilities. The draft also banned foreign funding, included mandatory public reporting requirements and increased government supervision, with the possibility of suspending the organization for failure to comply with such reporting requirements, and numerous other provisions that critics said were excessive and restrictive. According to representatives of evangelical churches, such provisions could be selectively applied to target “unwanted” minority religious groups. The government sent the draft to the Venice Commission for an assessment in November.

Some human rights activists, religious minorities, and atheists continued to express concern over the government’s inclusion of the AAC in many areas of public life, and the public education system in particular, as well as its granting permission to the AAC to disseminate materials in schools with material equating AAC affiliation with the national identity.

Yezidi community representatives continued to report their dissatisfaction with the mandatory HAC course, terming it “religious indoctrination.” In December 2016, the Sinjar Yezidi National Union NGO addressed an open letter to Prime Minister Karen Karapetyan voicing concern that the state violated the freedom of religion of Yezidi children by carrying out Christian indoctrination and conversion of the non-Christian population through the HAC course as a mandatory school subject. The Ministry of Education and Science stated, however, it did not receive any complaints against the teaching of the HAC course.

Several non-AAC religious groups said they did not object to the inclusion of the HAC course in public schools. For instance, representatives from the Word of Life Church said, “The 1,700-year activity of the Armenian Church is an integral part of the history of the Armenian people, so we have no objection to the teaching of the Armenian Church history in schools. At the same time, it is important that neutral and respectful attitudes toward other denominations be maintained, and pupils of different church affiliations not be subjected to preaching.” Others, however, including NGOs, other religious organizations, atheists, and nonpracticing members of the AAC publicly voiced concerns. There were reports of AAC clergy teaching the course in some schools and requiring visits to AAC churches as part of the course, without providing opportunities for discussion of other faiths or for students to visit non-AAC religious sites. According to the government, there were no AAC clergy members teaching the course during the 2016-17 academic year, only lay teachers; however, media reports stated that some AAC clergy continued to teach the HAC course. Reportedly teachers of Armenian language, literature, and history courses also organized visits to AAC religious sites. According to media reports, AAC clergy also visited state-funded kindergartens, including during celebrations of religious holidays, and organized visits of kindergarten classes to AAC churches.

Critics of the HAC course said it “constituted church indoctrination disguised as history.” NGOs and other religious groups cited the focus on the Bible and AAC traditions and language such as “we the Armenians are Christian people,” and “thanks to the AAC, Christianity has become the inseparable part of the national identity of the Armenian people” in fifth and sixth grade textbooks. They also said the HAC course sometimes characterized other religious groups in disparaging or inaccurate ways. For example, while describing Islam, the textbook includes the following, “Getting acquainted with the Bible, as well as the Jewish and Christian religions, Muhammad declared himself a prophet and beginning in 610, started to preach in the manner he understood and established a new religion.” NGOs also noted the eighth grade textbook presented the activities of Catholic missionaries in a negative light, including quotes such as “Catholic propaganda created especially horrible devastation in the Armenian communities in Europe.” NGO critics said the ninth grade book presented evangelical movements as a threat to the AAC, accusing other religious groups of “soul-hunting,” while the eleventh grade textbook states, “Armenians are Christian by faith and Apostolic by belief.”

On January 24, in a Facebook press conference with Radio Free Europe, Minister of Education Levon Mkrtchyan was asked about AAC preaching in schools and the requirement in the HAC course that graduates of high schools, including Yezidis and other non-Christians, participate in AAC national religious holidays and understand their meaning. In response, the minister quoted the article of the law stating the AAC had an exclusive right to preach on the territory of the country and minorities could preach within their own communities. The minister also said, “We are people living under the auspices of the AAC.” In a different video aired on May 29, the minister said those Yezidi community representatives whom he had met did not voice concerns about the HAC course, but rather, about the preservation of their language. The minister added he was prepared to incorporate information on Yezidis and Kurds in the schools where there are minorities “but for the entire Armenia, naturally not.”

On November 1, Epress.am, an independent online outlet focused on human rights reporting, published a story stating a professor of Armenian Language and Literature at the Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) State University had told her students she would conduct an exam at an AAC church and therefore all female students must cover their hair during the exam. Another student was removed from her class for saying he was an atheist.

Based on a Ministry of Education pilot program launched in 2012, school administrations had the option to include an additional course, entitled History of the AAC/Christian Education, in their curriculum for grades two through four. Once a school chose this option, the course became mandatory for students in those grades. During the year, 76 schools followed this option.

Human rights activists expressed concern about the impact of government statements and policies, including changes to the constitution in 2016, further linking the AAC with the state and potentially marginalizing religious minorities. For instance, Eduard Sharmazanov, the vice speaker of parliament from the ruling Republican Party of Armenia, said in response to criticism of the AAC by a former official, “the only right investment in Armenia is to build a church … it’s a good thing, what should the investors do? Should we let the cults build churches instead? Yes, the Apostolic Church is our only holy church, and, in fact, we need to increase the hours of Armenian Church History taught at schools, in addition, it should be taught both at the university level and in our own lives.” Responding to a journalist’s question about soldiers being forced to pray in the army, Sharmazanov responded, “They are not forced. That’s the right thing to do, and it should be done, that’s not a violation of rights. This is not prostitution or erotica. It is true that soldiers pray in the army, we ought to start doing the same in the parliament, and we must have our spiritual awakening everywhere.” In his remarks Sharmazanov also said, “Nation and church are united, as Armenian and Christian are synonymous,” and in reference to the AAC, he said, “This is our state Church.” On December 8, at the celebrations of the 20th anniversary of the army’s chaplaincy program, Minister of Defense Vigen Sargsyan said, “The Church cannot be separate either from the state or the army. This is prescribed in our constitution, legislation, and most importantly, in the heart of every Armenian.”

Several minority religious groups reported their members preferred not to publicize their religious affiliation while in military service, although conscripts continued to be encouraged to declare their religion when beginning their service. There were no reports by religious minority groups of abuses during the military service of their community members connected to their faith; one group reported a positive attitude towards evangelical Christians in the army, including from AAC chaplains. According to the government, no religious groups other than the AAC presented requests to visit a military unit. The chaplaincy program, a joint Ministry of Defense-AAC initiative, continued to allow only AAC clergy to serve in the program.

On October 12, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses had been unjustly convicted for refusing to perform alternative service under military supervision and determined the government must provide conscientious objectors with “an alternative military service of a genuinely civilian nature.” The Jehovah’s Witnesses were in 2011 to two and half years in prison and released in 2013. The government implemented an alternative civilian service not controlled by the military later that year.

Jehovah’s Witnesses reported 161 of their members completed alternative civilian service for conscientious objection by the end of the year, up from 17 members in 2016. As of December, 105 Jehovah’s Witnesses were working in the alternative civilian service program. Members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses said the state committee responsible for coordinating and reviewing the applications for alternative service continued to be cooperative, and the program worked well. According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the directors of alternative civilian service locations had expressed their satisfaction with the program.

On October 11, during public hearings at the National Assembly, Avetik Ishkhanyan of the NGO Helsinki Committee asked Minister of Defense Sargsyan about atheists and non-AAC followers who were “forced to pray in the army.” The minister replied he was unaware of any case in which a soldier was forced to pray or be baptized. The minister said he would punish those who violated the law, while stating, “I consider an absolute the value that the Armenian Apostolic Church creates in our general system of values.”

Jehovah’s Witnesses said they continued to face difficulties in building places of worship because of interference of local officials throughout the country. According to Witnesses, representatives from mayors’ offices openly stated on numerous occasions they would not permit Jehovah’s Witnesses to build a place of worship in their town or city. In particular, Jehovah’s Witnesses encountered difficulty obtaining approval of the required architectural planning studies and in obtaining building and occupancy permits. At year’s end, Witnesses had three pending cases before the ECHR disputing the prohibition by the Yerevan City Municipality on building places of worship on land owned by the Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Jehovah’s Witnesses representatives said they continued to pursue legal avenues for the protection of their rights and tried to maintain a dialogue with the government. They reported they continued to receive police protection while engaging in their public ministry both in Yerevan and in the regions and discerned a continued improved attitude on the part of government authorities toward their members.

According to various religious groups and NGOs advocating for religious tolerance, government rhetoric equating national identity to affiliation with the AAC continued to fuel discrimination against religious organizations other than the AAC. In a June 8 interview published in the Religions.am portal of religious news maintained by the NGO Collaboration for Democracy, the pastor of the Rhema Pentecostal Church, Karen Khachatryan, discussed the reasons behind what he said was the marginalization of religious organizations other than the AAC and their absence from public discourse. According to Khachatryan, the churches of the evangelical family remained outside the public eye due to a number of factors, including the role of the AAC, the biased attitude of the state, and unprofessional media. Other minority Christian groups reported they had the freedom to worship provided they did so discreetly and limited their activities to their own premises and community. They said attempting to expand beyond those premises or attempting to expand their existing membership through proselytizing could potentially lead to harassment or discrimination in school or the workplace. For this reason, the groups said, they kept their activities low-profile and exercised self-censorship.

The minister of foreign affairs initiated a conference on November 22 in Yerevan entitled, “Preventing and Countering Hate Crimes against Christians and Members of other Religious Groups – Perspectives from the OSCE and Beyond,” hosted by OSCE/ODIHR with the purpose of addressing persecution of Christians in the OSCE and elsewhere. The minister noted that Armenia was the “first country to adopt Christianity as a national state religion.”

Jehovah’s Witnesses did not report instances of physical harassment toward their members, unlike the previous year; however, they reported 10 cases of verbal harassment while engaging in their public ministry. In some cases, individuals overturned literature carts, causing minor damage. Following what the Jehovah’s Witnesses said were prompt responses from police officers on duty in the area, the unidentified offenders did not interfere with the group’s activity again.

A 2017 Pew Research Center survey released in May found 82 percent of respondents agreed with the statement, “It is important to be part of the Armenian Apostolic Church in order to truly share the national identity of the country” and 84 percent expressed the view that “their culture is superior to others.” Most respondents said they belonged to the AAC.

Many minority Christian groups and NGOs reported a trend over the past several years toward positive or neutral coverage of minority religious groups in many online and print media outlets, mostly private. According to a minority Christian group, however, most broadcast media outlets, including public television, avoided coverage of minority religious groups and their activities, while some media outlets and blogs continued to label minority religious groups as “sects” that threatened national security. According to media sources, many of the self-defined “experts” and authors of such materials were pro-Russia, and they increased their negative rhetoric following the forced closure of the Jehovah’s Witnesses organization in Russia in July. These “experts” said the West funded various “sects” that pursued political goals and aimed to destabilize the country. According to local NGOs, the rhetoric was consistent with general hatemongering against the West by these individuals and was aimed at discrediting universal values and human rights, including freedom of conscience and belief. One of the main “experts” was Alexander Amaryan, who was listed as an expert of the Institute of Public Diplomacy, an educational facility funded by the Russian government and affiliated with the Collective Security Treaty Organization Academy in Armenia.

There were instances of negative media coverage on the Jehovah’s Witnesses throughout the year. An article in Zhoghovurd, titled “Jehovah’s Witnesses have increased” said many Jehovah’s Witnesses were living in Tavush Province bordering Azerbaijan, which is “a threat to our national security given the fighting with Azerbaijan because Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse to take arms.” The paper stated Jehovah’s Witnesses are legally banned in Azerbaijan and Russia, while in Armenia the number of Jehovah’s Witnesses is growing.

On November 16, the official website of the Ararat Diocese of the AAC republished an editorial from its official print biweekly Shoghakn Araratyan entitled “When it’s demanded to tolerate everything,” in which the author compared religious and sexual minorities with viruses. “Absolute truth becomes irrelevant; under the names of ‘divine texts’ Buddhist, Krishna cult ideas are spread, and our society, illiterate in the sphere of religion, devours with pleasure those beautifully packed formulations. European standards require from us not to notice that the suggested path leads to the spiritual ruination of suicide attempts, human sacrifices, participation in sermons with shouting and screaming… professing treacherous ideas.”

The AAC also received negative media coverage in some opposition and independent print and online media outlets, as well as in social media.

On October 16, Epress.am published an interview with two women who said that during job interviews with a prominent private candy company, they were questioned about their religious views, including when they had last visited a church and whether they were atheists or members of “cults.”

On October 27, International Religious Freedom Day, the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF), a local NGO, held the closing ceremony of its three-year program aimed at promoting religious tolerance and nondiscrimination. As part of the event, EPF held an awards ceremony for the best coverage of issues related to the freedom of religion or belief. The EPF received 32 written articles, 14 videos, and 12 caricatures as submissions for the awards. Throughout the program, the EPF trained hundreds of journalists on religious tolerance with its partner NGO. According to human rights NGOs and religious minority representatives, the program positively impacted media coverage of religious issues.

Construction continued on Quba Mere Diwane Temple, which the media called the world’s largest Yezidi temple. Located in the small village of Aknalich, the Yezidi community said it would become the spiritual center for the country’s Yezidis. In an international meeting in November, Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian said, “Historically being situated on the crossroads of different civilizations, Armenia has cultivated deeply rooted traditions of coexistence and respect towards other cultures and religions. That is why Armenia preserves a rich cultural heritage that includes, among others, a Hellenistic era temple, some of the oldest churches in the world, a medieval Jewish cemetery, and an 18th century mosque and soon will host the world’s largest Yezidi temple.”

During a September 8 meeting among Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia, Sheikh ul-Islam Allahshukur Pashazade, Chairman of the Caucasian Muslims Board, and Karekin II, Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians, the three religious leaders signed a joint statement urging peace in the region.

The Ambassador and other embassy officials continued to promote religious tolerance and interfaith dialogue during meetings with government officials. Embassy officials met with a representative of the Ministry of Defense to discuss religious tolerance in the army and the legal restrictions on members of religious groups joining the military. The Ambassador regularly met with representatives of the government, political parties, social groups, and religious minorities to discuss problems of discrimination faced by religious minorities; to foster a dialogue between the government and the religious groups; and to explore cooperative solutions to those problems. The Ambassador raised with the Ombudsman’s Office and other government officials concerns of the religious community with the proposed legislation on religious freedom. In October the Ambassador made two speeches at the schools for the Republican Party of Armenia and the opposition bloc Bright Armenia where, among other human rights issues, he brought up the importance of nondiscrimination in regard to religion and belief.

The Ambassador held frank and productive meetings with leaders of the AAC and engaged them in supporting the rights of religious minorities to practice their faiths without restrictions. Embassy officials attended conferences on the issue of religious tolerance; visited a Holy Apostolic Catholic Assyrian village; attended a religious celebration of the Jewish community and the celebration of the bicentennial anniversary of the birth of Bahaullah, the founder of the Bahai Faith; and held regular meetings with representatives of religious and ethnic/religious minorities, including evangelical Christians and other Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Yezidis, Apostolic Assyrians, and Bahais. In these meetings, embassy officials and religious group representatives discussed the state of religious freedom in the country, including minority religious group concerns. Embassy officials attended the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-hosted OSCE workshop on discrimination against Christians. They also met with civil society groups to discuss concerns about the HAC courses taught in public schools.

Embassy officials participated in the EPF Annual Media Award jury and the ceremony to support religious tolerance in the media. The embassy used social media, including Twitter and Facebook, to send messages supporting religious diversity and tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 23.2 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2016 census, 52.1 percent of residents are Christian, including 22.6 percent of residents who are Roman Catholic and 13.3 percent Anglican. Buddhists constitute 2.4 percent of the population, Muslims 2.6 percent, Hindus 1.9 percent, and Jews 0.4 percent. An additional 9.6 percent either did not state a religious affiliation or stated other religious affiliations such as “new age,” “not defined,” or “theism,” while 30.1 percent reported no religious affiliation.

The 2016 census indicated indigenous persons constitute 2.8 percent of the population. The most recent breakdown for indigenous population remained the 2011 census, which estimated that 1 percent of indigenous respondents practice traditional indigenous religions. Among this group, affiliation with a traditional indigenous religion is higher in very remote areas (6 percent) than in all other areas (less than 1 percent). Approximately 60 percent of indigenous respondents identify as Christian, and an estimated 20 percent report having no religious affiliation. The remainder either did not state a religious affiliation or stated other religious affiliations.

Legal Framework

The constitution bars the federal government from making any law that imposes a state religion or religious observance, prohibits the free exercise of religion, or establishes a religious test for a federal public office.

The right to religious freedom may be limited only when deemed necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Individuals who suffer religious discrimination have recourse under federal discrimination laws or through the court system and bodies such as the Australian Human Rights Commission.

The state of Tasmania is the only state or territory whose constitution specifically provides citizens with the right to profess and practice their religion; however, seven of the eight states and territories have laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of a person’s religion or ethnoreligious background. South Australia is the only state or territory that does not explicitly prohibit discrimination on the grounds of religion. All other states and territories have independent agencies to mediate allegations of religious discrimination.

Religious groups are not required to register. To receive tax-exempt status for income or other benefits and an exemption from the goods and services tax (sales tax), however, nonprofit religious groups must apply to the Australia Tax Office (ATO). Registration with the ATO has no effect on how religious groups are treated, apart from standard ATO checks. To receive tax-exempt status, an organization must be a nonprofit entity. An organization’s activities, size, and permanence are some of the factors taken into account when determining its tax-exempt status.

The government permits religious education in public schools, generally taught by volunteers using approved curricula; parents may decide whether their children will attend or not. There is no national standard for approving religious curricula, which happens at the state and local levels.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In September a Melbourne court ruled that a Christian school that accepted half of its pupils from non-Christian families could not reasonably exclude a five-year-old Sikh boy from attending classes on account of his parents’ belief that he should wear a turban. The court said the parents and school were free to negotiate appropriate new agreements to the school’s uniform code, possibly including and not limited to colors of all clothing worn, but that the boy’s turban worn for religious reasons could not be excluded.

The One Nation Party had four senators in the federal parliament and maintained a platform calling for ceasing Muslim immigration and admission of Muslim refugees, banning the burqa and niqab in public places, installing surveillance cameras in all mosques, and prohibiting members of parliament from being sworn in under the Quran. In August One Nation Party leader and federal Senator Pauline Hanson wore a burqa in the senate chamber and called on the government “to ban the burqa.” Attorney General George Brandis immediately rejected the call and called Hanson’s action a “stunt.”

The government continued to begin each session of parliament with a recitation of a short prayer and then the Lord’s Prayer, as has been the practice since 1901. Participation in the prayers remained optional. The Australian Greens and other groups continued to call for the practice to end.

In September three men from the United Patriots group were convicted of inciting contempt and ridicule of Muslims following a 2015 event protesting the construction of a mosque in Bendigo, located 90 miles from Melbourne. They were each fined $2,000 Australian dollars ($1,600). Construction on the mosque began in August.

The Victorian State Government Multicultural Commission published a report in December 2016 on the debate over construction of the mosque in Bendigo. The study concluded that the Bendigo Muslim community faced abuse. Muslim children reported being bullied at school, and women wearing the hijab said they were shouted at by people passing by in their cars. The commission said it hoped the findings of the report could help other regional cities better engage their Muslim communities.

In New South Wales (NSW), a Muslim organization called the Women of Hizb ut-Tahrir said Muslim men were permitted to strike a disobedient wife as long as it was soft and “symbolic.” The women faced backlash for their video post from the NSW police commissioner and Deputy Prime Minister Barnaby Joyce, who said, “If you want to beat up your wife, you can’t become a citizen of this nation.”

The government continued to provide funding for security installations –lighting, fencing, closed-circuit television cameras, and others – and for the cost of employing security guards, in order to protect schools and preschools facing a risk of attack, harassment, or violence stemming from racial or religious intolerance. This funding was available at both government and nongovernment schools, including religious schools.

The Australian Multicultural Council continued to provide guidance to the government on multicultural affairs policy and programs. The government’s national multicultural policy, The People of Australia, was based on a government-wide approach to maintaining social cohesion and included religious tolerance as a component. The government provided a range of youth-focused early intervention, outreach, and education programs to promote religious tolerance as well as “deradicalization” programs for prison inmates convicted of terrorism-related offenses.

Former Prime Ministers John Howard and Tony Abbott expressed concern that the proposed legislation to legalize same-sex marriage provided inadequate protection of religious freedom. The attorney general said current law provided adequate protections for religious freedom. Parliament passed legislation legalizing same-sex marriage on December 7.

A multiparty group of legislators in Victoria did not allow a vote on legislation introduced in 2016 that would protect LGBTI students, employees, and job seekers at faith-based schools.

In April a 30-year-old Greek Orthodox Christian wearing a large cross outside his clothing reportedly was beaten on a train in Western Sydney by a group of young men of “Middle Eastern appearance.” The attackers reportedly ripped the crucifix off his neck and stomped on it while uttering a religious profanity.

In May the president of the Australian Human Rights Commission, an independent statutory organization, said “there is consistent evidence that Muslims are subject to higher rates of racism than pertains for all other racial and religious groups within the Australian community … the headscarf has become a lightning rod for attacking Muslim women. The Muslim community is disproportionately subject to ‘hate speech’ and discrimination in employment and the delivery of goods and services.”

The Australian Christian Lobby organization said its April conference in Sydney was disrupted and it was forced to cancel an earlier conference in Sydney due to threats of violence during the period preceding a national postal survey on same-sex marriage. The national headquarters of the Australian Christian Lobby organization in Canberra was severely damaged by a car explosion and fire attack in December 2016. The attacker told police that he opposed religion and the organization’s views on sexuality.

In September an employee in Canberra who opposed same-sex marriage due to her Christian beliefs was fired by her employer for posting on her personal social media page that she intended to vote against the measure to legalize same-sex marriage in the national postal survey.

In June a group of female Muslim students attending a career expo at the Perth Convention and Exhibition Centre were reportedly made to leave the event because other participants felt threatened by their wearing of hijabs in the aftermath of the May 22 Manchester bombing.

According to media reports, an academic study published in February using data gathered in 2015 and 2016 found Australians less anti-Muslim than most commentators had previously stated. According to the study’s interpretation of a survey, 9 percent of respondents showed “high or very high Islamophobia,” while nearly 70 percent of respondents showed low or very low levels.

The Q Society – a self-proclaimed “Islam-critical” organization – held fundraising dinners in February headlined by two members of the federal parliament. The group’s leaders said that “there is more support than ever across Australia and the world for the Islam-critical Movement.” The Q Society opposed halal certification programs and construction of mosques and advocated for a moratorium on immigration from Afghanistan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. The group said it had more than 1,000 members in the country and held monthly meetings in each Australian state.

In August a group called the Antipodean Resistance posted fliers at three Melbourne universities and the Australian National University in Canberra. The fliers featured anti-immigrant and anti-Semitic messages, including, “Stop the Hordes” and “Reject Jewish Poison.” Political leaders and educators denounced the fliers. The group also said it placed swastika stickers at the University of Sydney.

In August swastikas and racist graffiti were found inside the University of Sydney Business School and the International Student Lounge. The graffiti was removed the same day, and the university said it was working with police to identify the perpetrators.

In August three men were charged with a December 2016 firebomb attack on an Islamic community center in Melbourne in which the words “Islamic State” were scrawled on the building. The blaze destroyed the building, which was a center of worship for the Shia community. Police stated that these anti-Shia acts were “inspired” by the Islamic State. All three were charged with engaging in a terrorist attack, an offense that can carry a sentence of life in prison.

The Executive Council of Australian Jewry reported 230 anti-Semitic incidents of threats or abuse during the year, up from 210 in the previous year. In May paper slips and leaflets containing content that denied the occurrence of the Holocaust were distributed on cars and noticeboards across the University of Western Australia campus.

The U.S. Embassy in Canberra and Consulates General in Melbourne, Perth, and Sydney met with government officials from the federal and state-level departments of social services and multicultural affairs to promote interfaith understanding and tolerance programs.

U.S. officials, including the Charge d’Affaires, engaged a wide range of religious leaders, faith communities, and groups, including the Islamic Council of Victoria and the Australia Arab Association of Perth. The embassy and consulates general used social media platforms to increase awareness of U.S. policy and activities supportive of religious freedom through posting and sharing of articles and events.

The Consulate General in Melbourne hosted its eighth annual Youth Iftar and welcomed Muslim and non-Muslim guests from political, legal, sports, government, entertainment, educational, and faith backgrounds. The dinner facilitated young leaders in meeting a diverse group of people for discussions including religious diversity.

A representative from the Consulate General in Perth gave an address at the Australia Arab Association’s Multicultural Eid al-Adha events to celebrate diversity.

Members of the Consulate General in Sydney attended interfaith dinners hosted by leaders of Sydney’s Lebanese Muslim community to discuss tolerance and inclusion.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 8.8 million (July 2017 estimate). According to religious groups and the government Austrian Integration Fund, Roman Catholics constitute 59 percent of the population and Muslims 8 percent, while approximately 25 percent is unaffiliated with any religion. Religious groups constituting less than 5 percent each include the Lutheran Church; Swiss Reformed Church (Evangelical Church-Augsburg and Helvetic confessions); Eastern Orthodox Churches (Russian, Greek, Serbian, Romanian, and Bulgarian); Jehovah’s Witnesses; other Christian churches; and Jews and other non-Christian religious groups.

Legal Framework

A combination of historical and modern constitutional documents guarantees freedom of “conscience and creed.” The law provides for freedom of religious belief and the rights of all residents to join, participate in, leave, or abstain from association with any religious community. It stipulates, “Duties incumbent on nationals may not be impeded by religious affiliation.”

Several constitutional provisions protect religious freedom. The main pillars are historical laws on fundamental rights and freedoms, including religious freedom, and treaties and conventions such as the European Convention on Human Rights, which form part of the constitution. Antidiscrimination legislation prohibits discrimination on religious grounds. Citizens have the right to sue the government for constitutional violations of religious freedom.

The law prohibits public incitement to hostile acts against a church group, religious society, or other religious group if the incitement is perceivable by “many people,” which an official government commentary on the law and the courts interpret as 30 or more individuals. The prohibition also applies specifically in the case of incitement in print, electronic, or other media available to a broad public. The law also prohibits incitement, insult, or contempt against religious groups if such action violates human dignity.

The law divides registered religious groups into three officially recognized legal categories (listed in descending order of rights and privileges): religious societies, religious confessional communities, and associations. Each category possesses specific rights, privileges, and legal responsibilities. Members of religious groups not legally recognized may practice their religion at home “insofar as this practice is neither unlawful nor offends common decency.”

There are 16 recognized religious societies: the Catholic Church, Protestant churches – specifically Lutheran and Presbyterian, called “Augsburg” and “Helvetic” confessions – the IGGIO, the Old Catholic Church, the IKG, the Eastern Orthodox Church (Russian, Greek, Serbian, Romanian, and Bulgarian), The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), the New Apostolic Church, the Syrian Orthodox Church, the Coptic Orthodox Church, the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Methodist Church of Austria, the Buddhist Community, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Alevi Community in Austria, and the Free Christian Churches.

The law grants registered religious societies the right to public practice and independent administration of their internal affairs, to participate in the program requiring mandatory church contributions by church members, and to bring religious workers into the country to act as ministers, missionaries, or teachers. Under the law, religious societies have “public corporation” status, permitting them to engage in a number of public or quasi-public activities, such as government-funded religious instruction in both public and private schools, which the government denies to confessional communities and associations. The government grants all recognized religious societies tax relief in two main ways: donations are not taxable, and they receive exemption from property tax for all buildings dedicated to the active practice of religion or administration of such. Additionally, religious societies are exempt from the surveillance charge, payable for instances where state security is required, and the administrative fee levied at the municipal level. Responsibilities of religious societies include a commitment to sponsor social and cultural activities that serve the common wellbeing and to ensure their teachings do not violate the law or ethical standards.

Religious groups seeking to achieve religious society status for the first time must apply for recognition with the Office for Religious Affairs in the Federal Chancellery. Religious groups recognized as societies prior to 1998 retained their status. The government grandfathered in 14 of the 16 recognized religious societies under this provision of the law. In order to gain recognition as a religious society, religious groups not recognized prior to 1998 must have membership equaling 0.2 percent of the country’s population (approximately 17,400 persons) and have been in existence for 20 years, at least 10 of which must have been as an association and five as a confessional community. The government recognizes Jehovah’s Witnesses and Alevi Muslims as religious societies under these post-1998 criteria. Groups that do not meet these criteria may still apply for religious society status under an exception for groups that have been active internationally for at least 100 years and active as an association in the country for 10 years. Groups sharing a broad faith with an existing society or confessional community, for example Christianity, may register separately as long as they can demonstrate that their group has a different theology.

The law allows religious groups not recognized as societies to seek official status as confessional communities with the Office for Religious Affairs in the Federal Chancellery. The government recognizes eight groups as confessional communities: the Bahai Faith, the Movement for Religious Renewal-Community of Christians, the Pentecostal Community of God, Seventh-day Adventists, the Hindu Community, the Islamic-Shia Community, the Old-Alevi Community in Austria, and the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church).

A recognized confessional community has the juridical standing needed to engage in such activities as purchasing real estate in its own name and contracting for goods and services, but it is not eligible for the financial and educational benefits available to recognized religious societies. Contributions to their charitable activities are tax deductible for those who make them, but confessional communities are not exempt from property taxes.

In order to gain government recognition as a confessional community, a group must have at least 300 members and submit to the Office for Religious Affairs its statutes describing the goals, rights, and obligations of members, as well as membership regulations, a list of officials, and financing information. A group must also submit a written description of its religious doctrine, which must differ from that of any previously recognized religious society or religious confessional community. The Office for Religious Affairs determines whether the group’s basic beliefs are consistent with public security, order, health, and morals, and with the rights and freedoms of citizens. A religious group seeking to obtain confessional community status is subject to a six-month waiting period from the time of application to the chancellery. After this period, groups that have applied automatically receive the status unless the government issues a decree rejecting the application.

Religious groups not qualifying for either religious society or confessional community status may apply to become legal associations, a status applicable to a broad range of civil groups. Some groups organize as associations while waiting for the government to recognize them as confessional communities.

The Church of Scientology and a number of smaller religious groups, such as Sahaja Yoga and the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, have status as associations.

Religious groups registered as associations have the right to function in public, but they may not provide religious instruction in schools or pastoral care in hospitals or prisons.

According to the law, any group of more than two persons pursuing a nonprofit goal qualifies to organize as an association. Groups may apply to the Ministry of Interior to gain such status. In order to become an association, groups have to submit a written statement citing their common, nonprofit goal and commitment to function as a nonprofit organization. Associations have juridical standing and many of the same rights as confessional communities, such as the right to own real estate and to contract for goods and services.

The law governing relations between the government and the IGGIO and Alevi groups stipulates that funding for the day-to-day operations of mosques must be derived from domestic sources, Islamic teachings and practices must not violate federal law, and Islamic institutions should “take a positive stance” toward the state and society. The law provides an explicit legal definition of, and legal protection for, Islamic practices, such as circumcision and preparation of food in conformity with religious rules, and states Muslims may raise children and youth in accordance with Islamic traditions. Muslim groups with at least 300 members and a theology that is not distinct from a pre-existing Islamic religious society or confessional community are considered cultural communities and fall under the umbrella of the pre-existing, legally recognized Islamic religious society or confessional community: the IGGIO and the Alevi Community in Austria, which are both religious societies, or the Islamic-Shiite Community or the Old-Alevi Faith Community in Austria, which have confessional community status. The law allows for Islamic theological university studies, which began for the first time at the University of Vienna in the fall.

Separate laws govern relations between the government and each of the other 14 state-recognized religious societies. The laws have similar intent but vary in specifics, given that they were enacted at different times over a span of approximately 140 years.

In May parliament adopted a law banning full-face covers in public places as a “violation of Austrian values,” with exceptions made only for artistic, cultural, or traditional events; in sports; or for health or professional reasons. The law went into effect on October 1. Failure to comply with the law is an administrative violation. The law prescribes a 150 euro ($180) fine but does not entitle police to remove the face covering.

The government funds religious instruction for children on a proportional basis in public schools, government-accredited private schools, and places of worship for any of the 16 officially recognized religious societies. The government does not offer such funding to other religious groups. A minimum of three children is required to form a class. Attendance in religious classes is mandatory for all students unless they formally withdraw at the beginning of the school year; students under the age of 14 require parental permission to withdraw from religious classes. The government funds the instruction, and religious groups provide the instructors. Religious instruction takes place either in the school or at sites organized by religious groups. Some schools offer ethics classes for students not attending religious instruction. Religious education and ethics classes include the tenets of different religious groups as comparative religious education.

The curriculum for both public and private schools includes compulsory anti-bias and tolerance education, including religious tolerance, as part of civics education across various subjects, including history and German-language instruction.

Holocaust education is part of history instruction and appears in other subjects such as civics.

The Equal Rights Agency, an independent agency falling under the jurisdiction of the women’s ministry, oversees discrimination cases on various grounds, including religion. The agency provides legal counseling and mediation services, and it assists with bringing cases before the Equal Treatment Commission, another independent government agency. In cases where it finds discrimination, the commission makes a recommendation for corrective action. In case of noncompliance with the recommendation, the case goes to court. Only a court may order corrective action and compensation.

The law bans neo-Nazi activity and prohibits public denial, belittlement, approval, or justification of the Nazi genocide or other Nazi crimes against humanity in print, broadcast, or other media.

Foreign religious workers for groups recognized as confessional communities or associations must apply for a general immigrant visa that is not employment or family based, and is subject to a quota. The government requires a visa for visitors from non-visa waiver countries or individuals who would stay beyond 90 days, including religious workers of confessional communities or associations. Foreign religious workers belonging to religious societies do not require visas for either shorter visits or stays beyond 90 days.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: Police continued to protect Jewish sites. Muslims said the ban on face veils in public violated basic rights. The city government in Vienna increased inspections of city-subsidized Islamic kindergartens after a study found “Islamic political influence” in several of them. A federally funded office continued to offer the public negative views about religious groups, such as Scientology, which it described as “cults.” A government-funded study stated one third of mosques nurtured extremist views. The foreign ministry worked with the IGGIO on a campaign against extremism. The education ministry worked with the international NGO Anti-Defamation League (ADL) to provide Holocaust training for teachers. Jewish and Muslim groups and NGOs expressed concerns about what they regarded as anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim sentiment in the FPOe, which joined a coalition government with the People’s Party in December. In April the government adopted the IHRA’s definition of anti-Semitism, which the IKG called a milestone in fighting anti-Semitism.

Some religious minority groups, such as the Unification Church, continued to complain the three-tier system of categorizing legally recognized religious groups only granted them second- or third-class status.

The police continued to provide extra protection to the Vienna Jewish community’s offices and other Jewish community institutions such as schools and museums. Law enforcement authorities stated the government provided the protection due to general concerns over the potential for anti-Semitic acts against Jewish institutions.

On various occasions, the IGGIO called on the Ministry of Justice to fund pastoral care for Muslims in prisons, where 46 IGGIO imams provided such care. According to the IGGIO, government funding would allow it to expand prison pastoral care. The ministry replied that it already funded social workers and representatives from the NGO De-radicalization Network to work with Muslim prisoners it considered extremists.

Muslim representatives expressed concern that the new ban on full-face coverings would push women wearing face veils into further isolation and, together with the Bar Association and Amnesty International, argued the law violated such basic rights as freedom of religion and expression. While characterizing the wearing of face veils in public as “socially undesirable,” the Catholic Church also criticized the ban as an “exaggerated legal prohibition.” A Viennese psychology student who was fined in October for covering her face while cycling announced she would challenge the ban before the Administrative Court.

On January 6, then-Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz of the People’s Party advocated for a ban on headscarves for public servants, including teachers, reigniting public debate over displays of religious symbols in public. Kurz stated Christian crucifixes in classrooms should be allowed, as they symbolized the country’s “historic culture.” A representative of the IGGIO and a representative of the IKG both publicly opposed the headscarf ban proposal as discriminatory.

Approximately 2,000 persons participated in a February 4 demonstration against the stipulation in the government’s agenda, announced January 30, that women working as uniformed police, judges, or prosecutors were to be prohibited from wearing headscarves. Several Muslim groups, some of them affiliated with the IGGIO, staged the protests. The President of the Islamic Faith Community, Ibrahim Olgun, said the proposed ban for police, judges, and prosecutors would “pull the rug” out from under efforts to create a good working relationship between the government and the Muslim community.

In remarks made to schoolchildren in March and broadcast on television in April, President Alexander Van der Bellen expressed opposition to restrictions on clothing, telling the students women had the right to dress how they wanted and that “if this rampant Islamophobia continues … we must ask all women to wear a headscarf – all – out of solidarity with those who do it for religious reasons.” The president’s office said he believed restrictions were justified when applied to all religious symbols in certain circumstances, such as for female judges, where religious dress could raise questions about neutrality.

The government continued to apply a policy of banning headwear in official identification documents with an exception for religious purposes as long as the face was sufficiently visible to allow for identification of the wearer.

In June the Vienna city government increased its inspections of the 150 Islamic kindergartens subsidized by the city after University of Vienna professor Ednan Aslan stated in a study of Islamic kindergartens he conducted in 2016 that there was political Islamic influence in several of them, and they were helping to create “parallel societies.”

The federal Office of Sect Issues continued to offer advice to persons with questions about groups that it considered “sects” and “cults.” The office was nominally independent but government funded, and the minister for family and youth appointed and supervised its head. Some Scientologists and representatives of the Unification Church continued to state the Office of Sect Issues and other government-associated entities fostered societal discrimination against religious groups not registered as religious societies or confessional communities.

A counseling center in Vienna managed by the Society against Sect and Cult Dangers, an NGO working against some religious groups, such as Scientology, continued to distribute information to schools and the general public, and it provided counseling for former members of such groups. According to the website of the society’s founder, Friedrich Griess, the society received funding from the government of Lower Austria. Several other provinces funded family and youth counseling offices that provided information on “sects and cults,” which members of some minority religious groups, such as Scientologists or the Unification Church, stated they considered to be negatively biased.

An amendment of transportation regulations in June stipulated the use of public roads and sidewalks for non-traffic purposes must not violate public safety and security. Based on the amendment, government representatives stated police could ban proselytizing by religious groups. There were no reports that police blocked such activity.

According to a study by the Austrian Integration Fund, financed by the Ministry for Europe, Integration, and Foreign Affairs and based on 16 mosques examined by the authors, one-third of the mosques examined were actively countering efforts to integrate Muslims by nurturing extremist views.

According to a George Washington University study, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Austria,” the Muslim Brotherhood had “substantial connections and influence” in the country, including over key functions affecting Muslim immigrants, such as in the IGGIO’s training institute for Islamic religion teachers. The study, which the Austrian Security Services commissioned, was done in cooperation with the University of Vienna and the Austrian Integration Fund and released in September. An official involved with the study stated the Muslim Brotherhood represented values that stood in contrast to the rule of law and promoted a political Islam that divided society. In reaction, FPOe Chair Heinz Christian Strache called for stricter action against radical Islamist activities. A Muslim youth leader privately rejected the report’s conclusions and methodology and complained about what he described as the “continuous drip” of biased studies against Muslims in the country. The organization Muslim Youth of Austria also rejected the study’s findings, which stated the organization received financial support from the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with the IGGIO, undertook an information campaign in mosques, Islamic organizations, and community centers, distributing written materials to convey the message that jihadism violated the principles of Islam.

The Ministry for Education and Women conducted teacher-training projects with the ADL. Seminars were available on Holocaust education, and Holocaust survivors talked to school classes about National Socialism and the Holocaust.

Chancellor Christian Kern as well as Catholic and Jewish representatives attended an IGGIO-hosted iftar in June to express support for the Muslim Community.

In July FPOe Member of Parliament Johannes Huebner announced he would not seek reelection in the October parliamentary election, following widespread protests over a 2016 statement he made that critics said contained anti-Semitic undertones. In a speech on “mass migration to Austria,” Huebner had referred to “so-called Holocaust victims” who were criticizing the FPOe.

On September 13, Norbert Hofer, FPOe Deputy Chair, presented an election platform for the October 15 parliamentary elections with rhetoric including a statement that “Islam is not part of Austria.” At the presentation, FPOe Chair Strache stated, “We must not become strangers in our own home country.” The party campaigned against immigration and “Islamization,” and FPOe billboards carried the slogan “Islamization must be stopped.”

Speaking to the press in September, Vienna City Councilor, and previous integration representative for the Islamic Community Omar al-Rawi stated, “When parties address the issue of Islam, it’s always in a negative context.”

Some local Jewish groups expressed concern about anti-Semitism in the FPOe.

In November FPOe Chair Strache suspended a local FPOe councilor in Styria for giving a “Heil Hitler” salute.

NGOs and Jewish and Muslim community members called on the People’s Party, which came in first place in the parliamentary elections, not to form a coalition government with the FPOe, which came in third. In October the Mauthausen Komitee, a group commemorating Nazi camp victims, published a list of what it said were at least 60 anti-Semitic and racist incidents involving FPOe figures since 2013. Ramazan Demir, a Vienna-based imam and a leading representative of the IGGIO, stated, “This election result is something we feared … There’s never been this much Islamophobia in Austria.” The NGO SOS Mitmensch (SOS Fellow Human Being) released a letter it wrote to People’s Party leader Kurz, citing allegations of FPOe officials’ involvement in right-wing extremist, and neo-Nazi activities.

The People’s Party formed a coalition with the FPOe, and the new government assumed office on December 18, with Kurz as Chancellor and FPOe leader Strache as Vice Chancellor. The new government’s coalition agreement included acknowledgement of the country’s role in the Holocaust and a pledge to fight anti-Semitism. As party chair, Strache had repeatedly called for zero tolerance for anti-Semitism or glorification of Nazism, most recently in the context of the presentation of the coalition government’s program.

IKG Vienna President Oskar Deutsch continued to express concerns about the FPOe, which he said was an anti-Semitic party, and its attempts to appeal to Jewish voters by rebranding itself as an anti-Muslim party.

Then-Justice Minister Wolfgang Brandstetter established the special prosecutor’s office for right-wing extremism in April. The office focused on enforcing the law banning neo-Nazi activity.

The government made the Mauthausen Memorial Agency an independent government agency on January 1, providing it with a legal base to implement tasks mandated in a 2016 law, which set the goal of Holocaust commemoration and education as the agency’s prime task. Mauthausen was the country’s largest concentration camp during the Nazi era and became a national monument.

Chancellor Kern, during an April visit to Israel, met with Holocaust survivors of Austrian background. In a speech he emphasized his country’s responsibility for the “darkest chapters in Austria’s history” and its commitment to learn from its Nazi past and to combat anti-Semitism.

On April 25, the cabinet adopted the IHRA’s definition of anti-Semitism. Then-Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz termed the decision an important signal to identify and combat anti-Semitism more easily with a commonly acknowledged definition. IKG Vienna President Deutsch welcomed the decision as a “milestone in combating anti-Semitism.”

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

Summary paragraph: The IKG reported a record 503 anti-Semitic incidents during the year, slightly more than in 2016 and 97 percent more than in 2014. Incidents included five assaults, as well as threats, insults, harassment, hate speech, and vandalism. According to the IKG, right-wing persons were responsible for almost a quarter of incidents and Muslims for another 10 percent. The IKG Vienna president expressed concern that it had become more socially acceptable to make anti-Semitic statements. The IGGIO reported 253 anti-Muslim incidents in 2016, 62 percent more than in 2015. Most incidents involved discrimination, hate speech, verbal attacks, and vandalism. The Ministry of Interior reported 41 anti-Semitic and 38 anti-Muslim incidents in 2016. In April an Afghan refugee allegedly stabbed a Christian woman reading from a Bible at a migrant center. An NGO reported 61 percent of cases of discrimination in the country were due to “Islamophobia,” and female Muslim students were the targets in 73 percent of discrimination cases in schools. In January the Supreme Court upheld an injunction in a slander case against a publication, Aula, which had published an article calling survivors of the former Mauthausen concentration camp “criminals.” In June more than 300 imams condemned terrorism carried out in the name of Islam. Catholic and Muslim groups engaged in activities promoting interfaith understanding.

In April the interior ministry released statistics according to which there were 41 anti-Semitic and 28 anti-Muslim incidents reported to police in 2016, compared with 41 and 31 incidents, respectively, in 2015. The majority of cases involved hate speech on the internet. There were several cases of neo-Nazi-related hate speech, including on the internet, as well as cases of persons giving the Hitler salute or shouting Nazi slogans.

IKG Vienna President Deutsch expressed concerns that anti-Semitism remained at a “high but stable” level. The IKG’s Forum against Anti-Semitism said it received an all-time high of 503 reports of anti-Semitic incidents during the year, up from 477 in 2016 and 97 percent more than the 255 incidents reported in 2014. The 503 incidents included five physical assaults (down from seven in 2016), in addition to insults, verbal, written, and telephoned threats and harassment, complaints about the internet and social media, and vandalism. Insults and threats increased by 17 percent to 28, incidents involving the internet rose by 12 percent to 171, and those involving letters and telephone calls rose 3 percent to 203. Cases involving vandalism or damage to property declined by 25 percent to 51. The other 45 incidents fell under the category of “other.” .

According to the Forum Against Anti-Semitism, increased awareness and reporting was one of several factors that explained the eight-fold increase in anti-Semitic incidents recorded since 2006, but there was also a declining stigma associated with anti-Semitic views. The IKG noted rising fears of a “new Islamic anti-Semitism” from Muslim refugees, although it still attributed the majority of anti-Semitic incidents to right-wing groups. The forum said that of the 503 incidents reported during the year, right-wing persons accounted for 24 percent, Muslims for 10 percent, left-wing persons 3 percent, and unspecified perpetrators for the other 62 percent. IKG President Deutsch expressed concern that there were fewer inhibitions among the anti-Semitic perpetrators in voicing anti-Semitism, and that it had generally become more socially acceptable to make such statements.

The IGGIO’s documentation center reported the number of reports of anti-Muslim incidents it received had been increasing since it began collecting such statistics in mid-2014. In 2016, the center received 253 reports of anti-Muslim incidents, compared with 156 cases in 2015. According to the center, 98 percent of all incidents were directed against women. Two-thirds of cases involved verbal attacks and hate speech, the rest graffiti, discrimination, and other acts. The center stated it believed a large number of cases were related to the 2016 presidential election campaign.

In April according to the NGO Human Rights Without Frontiers, an asylum seeker from Afghanistan stabbed and injured a Christian woman in a migrant center after he heard her reading from the Bible. Her alleged attacker was a man who the NGO said was offended that Christian residents of the center had invited the woman to discuss the Bible.

According to the Equal Rights Agency, 173 cases of religious discrimination came before the equal rights commissioner in 2016, compared with 131 cases in 2015. The agency did not provide additional information on the nature of the cases, the groups targeted, or how it addressed these cases.

Female Muslim students made up more than 73 percent of the total number of individuals subjected to discrimination at schools in 2016, according to a report by the NGO Initiative for Discrimination-Free Education. The report listed a total of 47 cases of discrimination in schools and attributed 61 percent of these cases to “Islamophobia.”

A report by the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency on the situation of Muslims in Europe released in September found Austria was among those EU member states to which Muslims felt least attached. The report, for which only Muslims of Turkish background in the country were interviewed, said that, on a scale of 1-5, where five was the highest, Muslims’ sense of attachment to the country was 3.5, while the EU average was 4.1. On the other hand, according to the report, only 15 percent of Muslims interviewed in the country complained about ethnic profiling by police – substantially below the EU average of 32 percent.

Bishop Manfred Scheuer resigned as president of the Catholic organization Pax Christi because of expressions of anti-Semitism within the organization and at a Pax Christi event, according to media reports. Pax Christi stated it had issued statements critical of Israel but denied they had contained anti-Semitic undertones.

In January the Supreme Court upheld a preliminary injunction against a publication alleged to be slandering Holocaust survivors, forbidding German author Manfred Duswald from calling Mauthausen concentration camp survivors “criminals and a widespread nuisance.” Duswald made the statements in a 2015 article that appeared in the monthly Aula, a publication the Vienna-based anti-Semitism NGO Documentation Center of Austrian Resistance called an extreme right-wing pamphlet and “FPOe-leaning.” Holocaust survivors and Green Party Member of Parliament Harald Walser filed a collective lawsuit on civil law claims and media law charges in 2016 after a Graz court in early 2016 dismissed an investigation against the paper under the anti-neo-Nazi law, sparking a protest among the Mauthausen survivors.

In January a court in Upper Austria State convicted a man who had sold pro-Nazi songs on an internet forum, which authorities had shut down in 2012, of engaging in neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic activity and sentenced him to 33 months in prison.

In January a court in Vienna convicted a man of incitement for calling women wearing burkas “garbage bags” on his website and sentenced him to a five-month suspended prison sentence.

In March a court in Salzburg convicted a man of neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic activity for flying a kite with Nazi symbols and sentenced him to two years in prison. The court sentenced his accomplice to a three-month suspended prison sentence in June.

In July a court in Lower Austria State convicted a man of neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic activity for performing a Nazi salute and sentenced him to two years in prison.

In July a court in Innsbruck convicted and fined a local FPOe official on charges of denouncing religious teachings for calling Islam an “insane ideology” on the internet.

In August a Vienna court convicted a soccer fan of engaging in neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic activity for performing a Nazi salute during a soccer game and sentenced him to 18 months in prison.

In September a court in Vorarlberg convicted a German citizen to a 10-month suspended prison sentence and a fine after convicting him of neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic activity. He had sent a picture on a messaging service of headwear adorned with the swastika and skulls, with the message: “Dear refugees, you will recognize your caseworker by these hats.”

In September a court in Carinthia State convicted a man who had posted a call on Facebook for the reopening of a Hitler-era concentration camp and the gassing of migrants there, of neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic activity and sentenced him to a 14-month suspended prison sentence and a fine.

In September the public prosecutor’s office in Innsbruck launched an investigation of charges of neo-Nazi activity against a local FPOe official accused of possessing Nazi memorabilia. The Tyrolean chapter of the FPOe expelled the official from the party.

On June 14, more than 300 imams signed a joint declaration condemning international terrorism carried out in the name of Islam and appealing to all Muslims to contribute to living together peacefully in the country.

In July the Catholic Church established the Commission on World Religions, consisting of 21 experts tasked with promoting interreligious dialogue, in particular with Islam. The commission focused on issues of joint concern for Christians and Muslims, including human rights and the rule of law.

In September the IGGIO staged a human chain in Vienna, from an Islamic center to a Catholic church, as a symbol of religious tolerance and mutual respect. Muslim, Catholic, and Buddhist representatives participated.

On November 9, to commemorate victims of anti-Jewish pogroms, leaders of Christian churches and the IKG sent an open letter entitled “Never Again” to the newly elected parliament, expressing concern about “flared-up thinking” indicating anti-Semitic tendencies and other prejudices and appealing to members to reject it. Other commemoration events included a vigil and “light of hope” march through Vienna and prayers in churches.

Fourteen Christian churches, among them the Catholic Church, various Protestant denominations, and eight Orthodox and Old Oriental Churches, continued to meet within the Ecumenical Council of Churches in Austria. Baptists and the Salvation Army had observer status on the council. The Council met twice a year. There were two permanent working groups, on “Religion and Society” and “Media.”

The U.S. Ambassador, Charge d’Affaires, and other embassy representatives met regularly with government officials, including with the Department for Integration and Division of Dialogue of Cultures at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the Ministry of Interior, to discuss religious freedom. Topics discussed included the concerns of religious groups, the integration of Muslim refugees, cooperation with religious groups in combating terrorism, and measures to combat anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment.

Embassy representatives continued to meet frequently with religious leaders and community members throughout the country, including with the leadership and membership of the IGGIO, IKG, Catholic Church, Syrian Orthodox Church, and other Christian organizations, as well as the Church of Scientology, to discuss the relationship between these groups and the government, discriminatory or inflammatory incidents, and the role of religious education in encouraging interfaith tolerance.

The embassy continued to engage with and support the Jewish community to promote religious tolerance and combat anti-Semitism. Embassy representatives participated in the International Advisory Board of the Mauthausen Memorial Agency to promote remembrance of the Holocaust and Holocaust education and advocated continued efforts of the agency to pursue increased youth outreach to combat anti-Semitism among youth.

The Charge d’Affaires hosted a Thanksgiving dinner for the Muslim community, where he spoke on the importance of religious freedom and religious tolerance.

In an interview at a May ceremony marking the end of the Second World War and the liberation from National Socialism, a senior embassy official emphasized the principal lesson was the importance of guaranteeing religious tolerance. The Charge d’Affaires and the Charge d’Affaires of the U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, headquartered in Vienna, attended the commemoration of the liberation of the Mauthausen concentration camp in May, and the embassy Charge d’Affaires made remarks noting the importance of upholding religious freedom.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at10 million (July 2017 estimate). According to 2011 data from the SCWRA, 96 percent of the population is Muslim, of which approximately 65 percent is Shia and 35 percent Sunni. Groups that together constitute the remaining 4 percent of the population include the Russian Orthodox Church, Georgian Orthodox Church, Armenian Apostolic Church, Seventh-day Adventists, Molokans, Roman Catholic Church, other Christians, including evangelical Christians and Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, and Bahais. Other groups include the International Society of Krishna Consciousness (ISKON) and those professing no religion.

Christians live mainly in Baku and other urban areas. Approximately 15,000 to 20,000 Jews live in Baku, with smaller communities throughout the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates the separation of state and religion and equality of all religions and all individuals regardless of belief. It protects freedom of religion, including the right of individuals to profess, individually or together with others, any religion, or to profess no religion, and to express and spread religious beliefs. It also provides for the freedom to carry out religious rituals, provided they do not violate public order or public morality. The constitution states no one may be required to profess his or her religious beliefs or be persecuted for them; the law prohibits forced expressions or demonstrations of religious faith.

The law requires religious organizations – termed “associations” in the country’s legal code and encompass religious groups, communities, and individual congregations of a denomination – to register with the government through the SCWRA. The SCWRA manages the registration process and may appeal to the courts to suspend a religious group’s activities. Registration of a religious community is tied to the physical site where the community is located, as stated in its application. A subsequent move or expansion to other locations requires reregistration. Registration allows a religious organization to hold meetings, maintain a bank account, rent property, act as a legal entity, and receive funds from the government.

To register, a religious organization must submit to the SCWRA a notarized application signed by at least 50 of its members, a charter and founding documents, the names of the organization’s founders, and the organization’s legal address and bank information.

By law, the government must rule on a registration application within 30 days, but it does not specify any consequences if the government fails to act by the deadline. Authorities may deny registration of a religious organization if its actions, goals, or religious doctrine contradicts the constitution or other laws. Authorities may also deny registration if an organization’s charter and other establishment documents contradict the law or if the information provided is false. Religious groups may appeal registration denials to the courts.

The Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB) oversees the activities of registered Islamic organizations, including training and appointing clerics to lead Islamic worship, periodically monitoring sermons, and organizing pilgrimages to Mecca. Muslim communities must receive an approval letter from the CMB before submitting a registration application to the SCWRA.

The law bans activities by unregistered religious groups, which are punishable by fines or imprisonment.

While the law prohibits the government from interfering in the religious activities of any individual or group, there are exceptions for suspected extremist or other illegal activity. The law states government entities and citizens have rights and responsibilities to combat “religious extremism” and “radicalism,” referring to other criminal, administrative, and civil provisions of the law in prescribing punishments. The law defines religious extremism as behavior motivated by religious hatred, religious radicalism (described as believing in the exceptionalism of one’s religious beliefs) or religious fanaticism (described as excluding any criticism of one’s religious beliefs). According to the law, this behavior includes forcing a person to belong to any specific religion or to participate in specific religious rituals. It also includes activities seeking to change by force the constitutional structure of the country’s government, including its secular nature, or setting up or participating in illegal armed groups or unions, and engaging in terrorist activities. The law penalizes actions intending to t change the constitutional order or violating the territorial integrity of the country on the grounds of religious hatred, radicalism, or fanaticism, with prison terms from 15 years to life.

The law also specifies cases in which religious organizations may be dissolved, including if they act contrary to their founding objectives; cause racial, national, religious, or social animosity; or proselytize in a way that degrades human dignity or contradicts recognized principles of humanity, such as “love for mankind, philanthropy, and kindness.” Other grounds for dissolution include hindering secular education or inducing members or other individuals to cede their property to the organization.

On June 22, President Ilham Aliyev approved amendments to the religious freedom law that allow foreigners invited by registered religious groups to conduct religious services. Passed by parliament on May 20, the amendments also allow the CMB to grant special permission to citizens who have received Islamic education abroad to perform Namaz (ritual prayers) and other Islamic rituals.

The law stipulates punishments for individuals who lead Islamic religious ceremonies in violation of the restrictions against citizens receiving unauthorized religious education abroad. The penalties include up to one year’s imprisonment or fines from 1,000 AZN ($580) up to 5,000 AZN ($2,900). A longstanding agreement between the government and the Holy See allows foreigners to lead Catholic rituals.

The law also restricts the use of religious symbols and slogans to inside places of worship.

According to the law, the SCWRA reviews and approves all religious literature for legal importation, sale, and distribution. Punishment for the illegal production, distribution, or importation of religious literature can include fines ranging from 5,000 to 7,000 AZN ($2,900 to $4,100) or up to two years’ imprisonment for first offenses, and fines of 7,000 to 9,000 AZN ($4,100 to $5,300) or imprisonment of between two and five years for subsequent offenses.

There is no separate religious component in the curriculum of public or private elementary or high schools; however, students may obtain after-school religious instruction at registered institutions. Students may take courses in religion at higher educational institutions, and the CMB sponsors some religious training abroad. Individuals wishing to participate in state-supported religious education outside the country, whether supported by the national or foreign governments, must obtain permission from, or register with, the SCWRA or the Ministry of Education. If religious education abroad is not supported by the national or foreign governments, individuals are not required to obtain advance permission from authorities. Individuals who pursue foreign government-supported or privately funded religious education abroad without permission from the government are not allowed to hold official religious positions, preach, or lead sermons after returning to the country.

Although the constitution allows alternative service “in some cases” when military service conflicts with personal beliefs, there is no legislation permitting alternative service, including on religious grounds, and refusal to perform military service is punishable under the criminal code with imprisonment of up to two years or forced conscription.

The law stipulates the government may revoke the citizenship of individuals who participate in terrorist actions; engage in religious extremist actions; undergo military training abroad under the guise of receiving religious education; propagate religious doctrines in a “hostile” manner, which the law does not further define; or participate in religious conflicts in a foreign country under the guise of performing religious rituals.

According to the constitution, the law may restrict participation of “religious officials” in elections and bars them from election to the legislature. By law, political parties may not engage in religious activity. The law does not define “religious officials.” The law prohibits religious leaders from simultaneously serving in any public office and in positions of religious leadership. It proscribes the use of religious facilities for political purposes.

The constitution prohibits “spreading and propaganda of religions humiliating people’s dignity and contradicting the principles of humanism,” as well as “propaganda” inciting religious animosity. The law also prohibits threats or expressions of contempt for persons based on religious belief.

The law prohibits proselytizing by foreigners but does not prohibit citizens from doing so. In cases of proselytization by foreigners and stateless persons, the law sets a punishment of one to two years in prison.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: The government continued to physically abuse, arrest and imprison religious activists who local human rights groups deemed to be political prisoners according to local human rights groups and others. There were an estimated 80 individuals incarcerated as of the end of the year. In January and December the Baku Grave Crimes Court sentenced leaders of the Muslim Unity Movement and others arrested in a 2015 police operation in Nardaran to long prison terms. In July the Masalli District Court sentenced a theologian to three years in prison for performing a religious ceremony after studying Islam outside the country. Authorities detained, fined and warned numerous individuals for holding unauthorized religious meetings. According to religious groups, the government continued to deny or delay registration to minority religious groups it considered “nontraditional,” disrupting their religious services and fining participants. Groups previously registered but which the authorities required to reregister continued to face difficulties doing so. Local religious experts stated the government continued to close mosques on the pretext of repairing them but said the actions were actually due to government concerns the individuals in mosques promulgated extremist views. The government continued to restrict the importation, distribution, and sale of religious materials. The courts fined numerous individuals for the unauthorized sale or distribution of religious materials, although some individuals had their fines revoked on appeal. The government organized conferences and took other steps to combat what it considered to be religious extremism and to promote religious tolerance.

On September 30, authorities detained 30 men who, in violation of local edict, were marching towards the Imamzadeh Mosque in Ganja to commemorate Ashura. Police charged four individuals with hooliganism and for resisting the police and placed them in pretrial detention. Human rights lawyers reported the police severely beat many of the detainees in custody.

Government authorities continued to arrest and incarcerate individuals for their religious activities. Local human rights groups considered many of these individuals political prisoners. There were no reliable figures on the number of religious activists detained or released during the year, although the estimated total incarcerated as of the end of the year was 80, compared with 86 in 2016, according to data collected by the Working Group for the Unified List of Political Prisoners and other NGOs.

On January 25, the Baku Grave Crimes Court sentenced Muslim Unity Movement leader Taleh Bagirzada and his deputy Abbas Huseynov to 20 years in prison following the December 2016 police raid in the village of Nardaran. The court sentenced 16 others associated with the case to prison terms ranging from 10 to 19 years. In July a court denied appeals to overturn the sentences. On December 28, the Baku Court sentenced another group of individuals arrested in connection to the special police operation in Nardaran to prison terms of 12 to 15 years. Lawyers for the convicted men publicly called the verdicts and sentences illegal and said they would appeal them. Authorities charged the group with terrorism, murder, calling for the overthrow of the government, and inciting religious hatred. Human rights defenders stated the government fabricated the charges to halt the spread of an Islamic political opposition in the country. In September the government granted the early release of 18 individuals convicted of minor crimes related to a 2015 police operation in Nardaran.

On July 3, the Masalli District Court sentenced theologian Sardar Babayev to three years in prison for performing Namaz (ritual prayers) after having studied Islam outside the country. He was the only individual ever prosecuted under this law. Following Babayev’s arrest, parliament passed legislation allowing the CMB, the same body that had originally appointed him as imam in Masalli, to waive selectively the same legal requirements for other individuals. According to NGOs Human Rights Without Frontiers (HRWF) and Forum 18, Babayev’s lawyer was unable to attend the first hearing on February 22 due to the short notice, and while in pre-trial detention from February to July prison authorities reportedly denied Babayev access to the Quran and to a prayer mat.

On July 25, the Baku Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court’s conviction of Inqilab Ehadli for treason (reportedly wanting to overthrow the constitutional order). On May 11, 2016, the Baku Grave Crimes Court had sentenced him to five years in prison. Lawyers stated the real reason for his conviction was his support of the politically active Muslim Unity Movement.

According to the media reports, police in the town of Quba raided a religious meeting at the home of local resident Tehran Amiraslanov on March 4 and detained 22 participants on charges of holding a religious meeting without state permission. Police seized 54 religious books and 16 audio tapes and sent them to the SCWRA for analysis. At least 21 of the accused reportedly were found guilty and each was fined 1,500 AZN ($880) at hearings on March 5.

On April 9, according to NGO reports, police raided meetings of Jehovah’s Witnesses in the Qaradag district of Baku, detaining 39 individuals, including 10 children. Police seized a large quantity of religious literature during the raids. At year’s end, the investigation of the case continued. Jehovah’s Witnesses also reported police raided and interfered with religious services, seized religious literature, physically attacked individuals, and detained them for hours in three incidents in Barda and Lokbatan. Between October 2016 and July 2017, Jehovah’s Witnesses representatives’ reported 10 cases of police interference with their public proselytizing.

Media reported authorities removed an imam in the Goychay district, Ruslan Mammadov, from his position as the CMB-approved imam, charging him with illegal activity for setting up a mosque in a village near his home. Media also reported the SCWRA issued a warning to Imam Ilgar Ibrahimoglu for holding an “illegal” meeting in Baku during Ramadan for the Juma Mosque religious community from which authorities officially removed him in 2004.

Unregistered Muslim and non-Muslim religious groups considered nontraditional by the government reported authorities continued to impede their functioning and subject them to fines. Some Protestant leaders reported that their continued inability to obtain legal registration prevented them from openly conducting worship services or advertising their locations to bring in new members. Leaders of unregistered home-based churches continued to report they kept their activities discreet after past unsuccessful registration attempts brought them unwanted attention from authorities.

Numerous religious communities continued to report experiencing problems with the government’s registration application process, leaving them unable to register.

Communities applying for registration for the first time stated the government continued to return applications because of what it said were technical or administrative problems with the information provided. In 2009, the government amended the law governing religious communities to require all registered groups to resubmit registration applications. The SCWRA did not reregister some groups, including several minority Muslim groups, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and some evangelical Christians, despite their submission of their applications before the January 2010 deadline, and continued to require the groups to dissolve legally before accepting new applications for registration.

Some religious community leaders also reported the SCWRA continued its policy of applying pre-2009 registration status for such communities only to the physical structures mentioned in their pre-2009 registration forms. The SCWRA continued to state the religious activities of these communities in additional facilities or new locations acquired since 2009 were not covered under their pre-2009 registration status.

The SCWRA reported it continued to provide letters authorizing previously registered communities to operate while their new registration applications remained pending. Although the SCWRA stated those communities were able to operate under their previous registration, some of the religious communities unable to reregister reported police continued to reject the SCWRA letters as inadequate and stated only communities listed on the SCWRA website as currently registered were allowed to operate.

According to the SCWRA, the number of registered communities during the year reached 793, of which 28 were non-Muslim – 17 Christian, eight Jewish, two Bahai, and one ISKON. The SCWRA also reported 2250 mosques, 14 churches, and seven synagogues were registered at the end of the year. The SCWRA stated it had registered ten religious education schools during the year.

The SCWRA said in a press release it terminated the activities of seven religious communities for noncompliance with the law and reported registering 34 religious communities.

Observers reported the government and the majority of school administrators throughout the country continued to permit girls to wear the hijab in primary and secondary schools despite directives in 2007 and 2009 that mandated school uniforms and implied girls should not wear the hijab.

According to religious experts, the government continued to exercise control over the activities of Muslim groups, including through regulating the content of religious television broadcasts and the sale of religious literature. The government also reportedly continued confiscations of unapproved books.

According to NGO reports, on May 5, police in the southern town of Astara, on the border with Iran, seized 365 banned religious books and 13 CDs from five homes. The police investigation reportedly continued at year’s end.

Although some religious groups reported the process for obtaining permission to import religious literature remained burdensome, Jehovah’s Witnesses stated their previous problems with the importation of religious materials and literature had ended following meetings on the subject with the SCWRA.

On May 31, the Sheki Court of Appeals upheld a fine of 1,500 AZN ($880) imposed on Sunni Muslim Shahin Ahmadov for holding an “illegal” religious meeting. Police had detained him for reading aloud from the works of theologian Said Nursi to three friends while picnicking on April 18.

On June 21, the Sheki Court of Appeals upheld a fine of 1,500 AZN ($880) given to Baptist Pastor Hamid Shabanov for an illegal religious gathering after police raided a 2016 meeting with fellow church members in the village of Aliabad in the northern Zakatala district. Media reported police also fined Mehman Agamammadov for his participation in the same gathering, but he was unable to join Shabanov’s appeal, having never received a written decision from the court, despite repeated attempts to obtain it. Human rights defenders stated there were multiple violations of law and process in this case, such as the court’s failure to provide a translator and asking Shabanov to sign documents he could not read.

In early January a higher court rejected the appeal by three Jehovah’s Witnesses from the Goranboy district of fines imposed on them for discussing their faith with others and offering to give them religious literature.

Local media reported authorities fined Kifayat Maharramova, a bookseller in Ganja, 2,000 AZN ($1,200) in early May for selling religious books and discs without the necessary state permission. Two booksellers in Baku, Shahmerdan Imamaliyev and Islam Mammadov, lost their appeals in January to overturn similar fines imposed in 2016.

In March a court in Baku acquitted the owners of a store selling Christian books after they showed evidence to the court they had previously applied for the needed license to sell religious items, and the books being sold had received state approval or were sample copies to be submitted for such approval. Following the court decision in their favor, they received the necessary license from authorities with the assistance of the SCWRA.

On February 8, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of Jehovah’s Witnesses Valida Jabrayilova and Irina Zakharchenko on charges of illegal distribution of religious literature. The court found the brochure in question had been approved for import and was not harmful to society. On August 4, the Nasimi District Court awarded them compensation for “material and moral damage” incurred during their 11-month imprisonment.

Local religious experts stated the government continued to close mosques under the pretext of repairing or renovating them; they said the government’s real motivation was countering perceived religious extremism. Once closed, they said, the mosques remained closed. For example, after the Ashurbey Mosque in the Old City of Baku became popular with Salafis as a place of worship, authorities announced it needed renovation and closed it in July 2016. It remained closed at year’s end.

On July 1, local authorities demolished the Haji Javad mosque in Baku. According to media reports, on April 12, a group of Muslims surrounded the mosque to prevent its demolition to construct a new road. Authorities had suspended the demolition while they studied the issue and held consultations on relocating the mosque to a nearby location. Media reported the government had not authorized the demolition, and officials fired the head of the city district. The government ordered the construction of a new Haji Javad Mosque that was near completion at the end of the year.

Domestic human rights NGOs and Jehovah’s Witnesses reported the government continued not to offer any form of alternative service to conscientious objectors. Government officials continued to state the basis for their stance was the continuing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

On March 17, in conjunction with the declaration of 2017 as a year of Islamic solidarity, the president announced the allocation of three million AZN ($1,750,000) to the CMB for educational activities throughout the country, to be conducted in coordination with state officials and religious figures.

On June 20, President Aliyev signed a decree allocating one million AZN ($585,000) to the CMB for the needs of Muslim communities, and 250,000 AZN ($147,000) each to the Baku Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church and the religious community of Mountain Jews. The decree also allocated 100,000 AZN ($58,500) each to the European Jewish community, the Albanian-Udi community, and the Catholic Church of Baku.

During the first six months of the year, the SCWRA held 13 domestic conferences in varying locations on Islamic solidarity, modern challenges, and “religious enlightenment,” 12 roundtables on activities of religious communities in promoting Islamic solidarity, and nine training sessions on the fight against “religious radicalism.”

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

The government did not exercise control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Some religious groups and NGOs reported continued restrictions on religious activities by the de facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh, but information on specific abuses remained unavailable.

On September 8, Grand Mufti Sheikh ul-Islam Allahshukur Pashazade, Armenian Supreme Patriarch Karekin II, and Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill I met in Moscow to discuss a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict . The three religious leaders called on the authorities in the region to protect churches and mosques and to respect and preserve religious monuments. They also urged political authorities not to allow the conflict to turn into a religious conflict.

Local religious experts and civil society representatives stated the country’s historical societal tolerance continued with regard to traditional minority religious groups such as Jews, Russian Orthodox, and Catholics, but many persons viewed groups considered nontraditional, such as Baptists and Jehovah’s Witnesses, with suspicion and mistrust. Social media comments reflected such mistrust; some users maligned Jehovah’s Witnesses for refusing to serve in the army while the country remained at war.

According to a media report in March, there was limited public debate on social media over the proper place of religion in public life after a draft of an alleged “creationist” textbook was posted online for public comment. Secular leaning academics spoke out against the draft textbooks, and in response, the Ministry of Education modified the offending passages.

The Ambassador and embassy officers met with senior SCWRA officials and with CMB and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials and urged the government to address longstanding issues with the registration process for religious groups and the government’s treatment of the religious communities continuing to face difficulties in fulfilling registration requirements, including the Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptist communities, and other religious minorities. They also discussed fines and detentions of religious practitioners.

The Ambassador and embassy officers met regularly with leaders of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish groups and civil society representatives for continuing discussions on religious freedom and obstacles to registration.

The Ambassador and embassy spokespersons made several public statements encouraging the government and individuals to live up to country’s history of religious tolerance. In June the Ambassador again hosted an iftar for government officials, Muslim and non-Muslim religious leaders, and NGO representatives at which he emphasized the need for promoting mutual tolerance and respect among the country’s religious communities.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 1.4 million (July 2017 estimate). Of the total population, citizens number 677,000, according to the local government’s 2017, most recently available estimate. According to U.S. estimates, Muslims make up 70 percent of the total population; Christians 14.5 percent; Hindus 9.8 percent; Buddhists 2.5 percent; and Jews 0.6 percent. Local sources estimate 99 percent of citizens are Muslim, while Christians, Hindus, Bahais, and Jews together constitute the remaining 1 percent.

The government does not publish statistics regarding the sectarian breakdown between Shia and Sunni Muslims; most estimates state Shia constitute a majority (55 to 60 percent) of the citizen population. According to Jewish community members, there are approximately 36 Jewish citizens, from six families, in the country.

Most of the foreign residents, who, according to the government, make up approximately 55 percent of the total population, are migrant workers from South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Arab countries. Local government estimates report approximately 51 percent of foreign residents are Muslim, 17 percent Christians (primarily Roman Catholic, Protestant, Syrian Orthodox, and Mar Thoma from South India), fewer than 1 percent Jewish ,and 31 percent followers of other religions (Hindus, Buddhists, Bahais, and Sikhs).

Legal Framework

According to the constitution, Islam is the official religion and the state safeguards the country’s Islamic heritage. The constitution provides for freedom of conscience, the inviolability of places of worship, the freedom to perform religious rites, and the freedom to hold religious parades and religious gatherings, “in accordance with the customs observed in the country.” The constitution provides for the freedom to form associations as long as these do not infringe on the official religion or public order, and it prohibits discrimination based on religion or creed. Shia and Sunni citizens have equal rights by law. According to the constitution, all people are equal without discrimination on the grounds of gender, origin, language, or faith. The labor law prohibits discrimination in the public sector on grounds of religion or faith. The law also stipulates victims of dismissal or discrimination in the work place on the basis of religion are entitled to legal recourse, but the government had not defined or identified an effective means of recourse by year’s end.

The constitution guarantees the right to express and publish opinions provided these do not infringe on the “fundamental beliefs of Islamic doctrine,” do not prejudice the unity of the people, or arouse discord or sectarianism.

The law prohibits anti-Islamic publications and broadcast media programs and mandates imprisonment for no less than six months for “exposing the state’s official religion to offense and criticism.”

Muslim groups must register with the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs (MOJIA) to operate. Sunni religious groups register with the ministry through the Sunni Waqf, while Shia religious groups register through the Jaafari (Shia) Waqf. The waqfs are endowment boards, which supervise, fund the work of, and perform a variety of activities related to mosques and prayer halls. Non-Muslim congregations and groups must register with the Ministry of Labor and Social Development (MOLSD) to operate. In order to register, a group must submit an official letter requesting registration; copies of minutes from the founders’ committee meeting; a detailed list of founders, including names, ages, nationalities, occupations, and addresses; and other information such as the group’s bylaws and bank account information. Religious groups also may need approval from the Ministry of Education (MOE), the Ministry of Information Affairs, or the Ministry of Interior (MOI), depending on the nature of the group’s intended activities. If any religious group organizes functions outside of its designated physical space without approval, it may be subject to government prosecution and a fine. The law prohibits activities falling outside of an organization’s charter. The penal code does not specifically address the activities of unregistered religious groups, but provides for the closing of any unlicensed branch of an international organization plus imprisonment of up to six months and fines of up to 50 Bahraini dinars (BD) ($130) for the individuals responsible for setting up the branch.

According to the MOLSD’s official website, 19 non-Muslim religious groups are registered with the MOLSD: the National Evangelical Church, Bahrain Malaylee Church of South India Parish, Word of Life International Church, St. Christopher’s Cathedral and Awali Anglican Church, Full Gospel Church of Philadelphia, St. Mary and Anba Rewis Church (St. Mary’s Indian Orthodox Cathedral), Jacobite Syrian Christian Association and St. Peter’s Prayer Group (St. Peter’s Jacobite Syrian Orthodox Church), St. Mary’s Orthodox Syrian Church, Sacred Heart Catholic Church, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Church of Christ, Greek Orthodox Church, Pentecostal Church, Baps Shri Swaminarayan Mandir Bahrain (Hindu Temple), Indian Religious and Social Group (Hindu Temple), Spiritual Sikh Cultural and Social Group, St. Thomas Church Evangelical Church of Bahrain, Marthoma Parish, and the Anglican and Episcopal Church in Bahrain. Additionally, three non-Muslim, nonregistered groups include Bahai, Buddhist, and Jewish communities.

The penal code calls for punishment of not more than one year’s imprisonment or a fine of no more than BD100 ($265) for offending one of the recognized religious groups or their practices, or for openly defaming a religious figure considered sacred to members of a particular group.

The law stipulates fines or imprisonment for insulting an institution, announcing false or malicious news, spreading rumors, attending conferences abroad without authorization, encouraging others to show contempt for a different religious denomination or sect, illegally gathering, and advocating for a change of government, among other offenses. The Office of the Ombudsman addresses the rights of prisoners, including the right to practice their religion.

The MOJIA oversees the activities of both the Sunni Waqf and the Jaafari Waqf. The respective endowment boards, Sunni and Jaafari, supervise the activities of mosques and prayer halls, review and approve clerical appointments for religious sites under their purview, and fund expenses for religious sites. The endowment boards’ operations are largely funded by monetary donations or property donated to the boards by citizens. In addition, the respective Sunni and Shia endowment boards are funded by the state as well as tithes, income from property rentals, and other private sources. The income is used to fund the maintenance of religious sites. The boards also pay for salaries, supplies, and building expenses for the religious sites. The endowment boards may pay flat commissions and bonuses for preachers and other religious figures. Board members’ salaries are funded by the MOJIA.

The Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (SCIA) oversees general religious activities taking place within the country, and reviews the parliament’s draft legislation as well as the publication of Islamic studies school curricula and official religious texts. The council comprised a chairman, a deputy chairman, and 16 prominent religious scholars, eight Sunni and eight Shia, most of them prominent preachers or sharia judges. The king appoints council members for a four-year term. Independent from other government scholarship programs, the council offers university scholarships for advanced Islamic studies for low income students. All legislation proposed by the parliament is reviewed by the SCIA to ensure the draft law’s compliance with sharia, as applicable. The council also consults with other government entities before issuing permits to new Islamic societies or centers. The council is responsible for reviewing the content of Islamic programs aired or broadcast on official government media, such as the official television station and official radio programs. The council also has a peacebuilding role and organizes interfaith conferences and workshops.

The king has sole legal authority to allocate public land, including for religious purposes, although he may delegate this authority to government officials, including the prime minister. By law, construction of places of worship requires approvals from appropriate national and municipal authorities. The law permits non-Muslim houses of worship to display crosses or other religious symbols on the outside of their premises. Government entities involved in allocating building permits include the MOJIA for non-Islamic religious sites, either the Sunni Waqf or the Shia Waqf under the MOJIA for Islamic sites, the Survey and Restoration Directorate, and the Survey Department. The construction of a new mosque, whether Shia or Sunni, is based on a government determination of the need for a new mosque in the area.

The law regulates Islamic religious instruction at all levels of the educational system. The government funds public schools for grades 1-12; Islamic studies are mandatory for all Muslim students, and are optional for non-Muslims. Many students attend private schools, which must be registered with the government and, with a few exceptions (for example, a foreign-funded and -operated school), are also required to provide Islamic religious education for Muslim students. Private schools wishing to provide non-Islamic religious education to non-Muslims, in addition to the required Islamic religious education for Muslim students, must receive permission from the Ministry of Education (MOE). Outside of school hours, both Muslim and non-Muslim students engage in religious studies as their parents decide.

The MOE reports that no particular school of jurisprudence forms the basis of the Islamic studies portion of the public school curriculum. According to the MOE, it utilizes a team of experts to routinely review and develop the Islamic studies public school curriculum to emphasize shared Islamic values between different Sunni and Shia schools of thought, reject extremism, and promote tolerance and coexistence. There are two public schools that provide more in-depth religious instruction for students from elementary school through high school; the remainder of their curricula is consistent with the nonreligious curriculum in other public schools. The Jaafari Institute provides religious instruction in Shia Islam. The Religious Institute provides education in Sunni Islam.

The University of Bahrain offers degree programs in religious studies and Islamic jurisprudence for Shia and Sunni students. There are five registered institutes, publicly funded and overseen by the Sunni Waqf, offering religious education for Sunnis. There are several dozen hawzas (Shia seminaries), some registered and some not registered. According to the government, the SCIA provides financial assistance to six of the registered hawzas; other hawzas choose to be privately funded. Foreign donors are not permitted to contribute to privately funded hawzas. Non-Muslim groups are also permitted to offer religious instruction to their adherents.

According to the constitution, sharia forms a principal basis for legislation, although civil and criminal matters are governed by a civil code. With regard to family and personal status matters, the constitution states inheritance is a guaranteed right governed by sharia. It also guarantees the duties and status of women according to sharia. In July the government passed a unified family law, which codifies personal status law for both the Sunni interpretation and Jaafari interpretation of sharia with regard to family matters, including inheritance, child custody, marriage, and divorce. Mixed Sunni-Shia families may choose which court system will hear their case. The provisions of the law on personal status apply to both Shia and Sunni women, requiring a woman’s consent for marriage and permitting women to include conditions in the marriage contract. Prior to July there was no personal status law for Shia. Previously, Shia would use a court system in which personal status matters are decided by judges who used their own discretion to interpret Islamic tradition. Non-Muslims may marry in civil or religious ceremonies, and civil courts make decisions for them on matters such as divorce and child custody.

The government does not designate religious affiliation on national identity documents, including birth certificates. Applications for birth certificates, however, record a child’s religion, but not denomination. Hospital admission forms and school registration forms may also request information on an individual’s religion.

The constitution says the state shall strive to strengthen ties with Islamic countries. It specifies the succession to the position of king is hereditary, passing from eldest son to eldest son. The royal family is Sunni.

The law prohibits individuals from being members of political societies or becoming involved in political activities while serving in a clerical role at a religious institution, including on a voluntary basis.

By law, the government regulates and monitors the collection of money by organizations, including religious ones. Organizations wishing to collect money must first obtain authorization from the MOJIA to do so.

In May the parliament approved an amendment to a 2014 law on correctional facilities that would guarantee inmates the right to attend burials and receive condolences outside of prison. Parliament also approved a proposal to provide religious lectures and sermons for prisoners, who previously relied on books, brochures and leaflets for spiritual guidance.

The country is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with reservations stating it interprets the covenant’s provisions relating to freedom of religion, family rights, and equality between men and women before the law as “not affecting in any way ” the prescriptions of sharia.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: The government continued to question, detain, and arrest clerics, community members, and opposition politicians associated with the Shia community. On May 21, Sheikh Isa Qassim, identified by the media as the leading Shia cleric in the country (who had been confined under de facto house arrest), and two of his employees received a one-year suspended sentence in absentia for money laundering and collecting funds without a government license. Since June 2016, the police have restricted access to Qassim’s home village following a sit-in around his house by his supporters who protested the revocation of his citizenship. On May 23, security forces conducted an operation to remove the protestors who had been blocking roads surrounding Qassim’s residence, located in the predominately Shia neighborhood of Diraz. The operation resulted in 286 arrests, five deaths, and 31 injured police officers. On December 4, the government permitted Qassim to leave his home for the first time since June 2016, in order to receive medical treatment for several days at a private hospital. On April 3, the Court of Cassation overturned the Appeals Court’s nine-year prison sentence given to Ali Salman, secretary general of the Shia-aligned opposition political society Wifaq, and restored his four-year sentence. On November 12, the Bahrain News Agency reported new criminal charges were being filed against Salman and two other individuals for conspiring with Qatar to undermine the government in 2011. In February the Court of Cassation upheld a September 2016 appeals court denial of Wifaq’s appeal and upheld the lower court’s order to shut down Wifaq and liquidate its assets. International human rights organizations published reports stating Shia prisoners were vulnerable to intimidation, harassment, and mistreatment by prison guards because of their religious affiliation. Shia community representatives complained about what they said was discrimination in government employment, education, and the justice system. Government officials continued to state some Shia opposition members were supporters of terrorism and engaged in treasonous behavior. The government permitted Shia groups to hold processions to commemorate Ashura and Arbaeen throughout the country. According to non-Muslim religious groups, the government did not interfere with their religious observances and encouraged tolerance for minority religious beliefs and traditions. Because religion and political affiliation were often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

On May 21, the High Criminal Court sentenced Shia cleric Sheikh Isa Qassim, who had been confined under a de facto house arrest, to a one-year suspended sentence in absentia on charges of money laundering and collecting funds without a government license. Two of Qassim’s employees, Hussain Al Qassab and Mirza Al Durazi, also received suspended sentences for the same crimes. The court fined the three individuals BD 100,000 ($265,000) each and reportedly confiscated more than BD 3 million ($7.96 million) from Qassim’s bank account and reported the funds would be delivered to local charities. In October Qassab withdrew his appeal of the suspended sentence and fine. Qassim’s supporters reported his office had collected the money and spent the funds in accordance with Shia customs and obligations, known as khums, and said the government had targeted Qassim due to his prominent status in the Shia community. On December 4, the government permitted Qassim to leave his home for the first time since June 2016, in order to receive medical treatment for several days at a private hospital.

Supporters of Qassim continued a sit-in demonstration until May 23 around his house in the village of Diraz which began after the government revoked Qassim’s citizenship in June 2016. In response, the government established checkpoints to control access to Diraz. Local residents complained of long lines and difficulties accessing their community. Authorities prevented nonresidents, including Shia clerics, from entering to attend or lead prayers at mosques in Diraz.

On May 23, the MOI conducted a security operation targeting alleged members of a terrorist cell involved in the sit-in around Qassim’s residence. The MOI stated its actions were to “apprehend terrorists operating in the area and clear illegal roadblocks and obstructions.” Protesters and human rights groups, including the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR), stated police opened fire with shotgun pellets and teargas on peaceful demonstrators. Police stated protesters attacked them with iron rods, axes, knives, rocks, firebombs, and grenades. According to local press, police arrested 286 persons, reportedly including fugitives who had escaped from Jaw Prison in January. The media reported five civilians were killed and 31 police officers injured in clashes with protesters during the operation. While police stated use of force was justified, opposition groups and activists said the killings were politically motivated and were evidence of excessive use of force. Local and international human rights groups criticized the government’s actions. BCHR expressed concern over the “total impunity” of security forces, while Amnesty International called for an independent investigation into police use of “excessive force” against the protesters.

On November 8, the MOI authorities entered and searched the Islamic Awareness Society headquarters in Diraz, which the government had closed in 2016. The authorities said they were responding to a suspicious package near the building. The society was registered as a charity with the MOLSD, but it was reportedly headed by Qassim, and its members were largely Shia clerics and religious workers such as teachers and chanters. Shia activists said the government had likely used the report of a suspicious package as an excuse to raid the society’s headquarters.

In October residents of Diraz reported the MOI prohibited guest speakers from entering the village to teach at prayer halls during Ashura celebrations. International NGOs reported the police had summoned more than 70 individuals, including 30 clerics, prior to and during the Ashura celebrations. Police held many individuals overnight; some were detained and released soon after.

Courts sentenced several Shia clerics to prison terms for participating in the demonstrations in support of Qassim. In October a court sentenced Hamza Al Deiri, scholar and former Member of Parliament (MP) of Wifaq, to one year in prison for taking part in the sit-in outside of Qassim’s residence. Authorities released seven other Shia clerics in August after they completed a one-year prison term following a demonstration in support of Qassim. Between August 3-9, authorities released an additional six Shia clerics – Sheikh Mounir Al-Maatouk, Sayed Yassine Al-Mosawi, Sheikh Imad Al-Shagla, Sheikh Aziz Al-Khadran, Sheikh Ali Naji, and Sayed Ali Ahmad – one year after their arrest over the Diraz protest that began in June 2016.

On April 3, the Court of Cassation overturned the Appeals Court’s nine-year prison sentence of Sheikh Ali Salman, secretary general of the Shia opposition political society Wifaq, restored his four-year sentence, and cleared him of the charge of calling for regime change. On November 12, the Bahrain News Agency reported authorities filed new criminal charges against Salman and two other individuals, Hasan Ali Juma Sultan and Ali Mahdi Ali Al Aswad, for conspiring with Qatar to undermine the government in 2011. Salman’s two codefendants were abroad and would be tried in absentia. Salman appeared in the High Criminal Court on November 29 and December 28; however, no verdict had been announced in this case at year’s end.

Several Shia clerics arrested in 2011 remained in prison at year’s end. They had been associated with the political opposition and given sentences ranging from 15-years to life imprisonment on charges related to terrorist activity or inciting hatred. Human rights NGOs considered them to be political prisoners.

Authorities arrested Shia scholar Sheikh Abdul Zahra Al Karbabadi along with his wife and sister on April 28. No update on their cases was available at year’s end.

Former Wifaq MP Hasan Isa remained in prison while his trial on charges of helping to finance a terrorist bomb attack continued. Authorities had arrested Isa in August 2015, following a July 2015 bombing in Sitra that killed two police officers. Isa denied involvement in the bombing, saying he had not given money to terrorists, but had distributed funds to poor families in his role as a religious leader of his neighborhood. The Court of Appeals postponed Isa’s case until November 7, but no further information was reported publicly.

The government continued to monitor and provide general guidance for the content of sermons and to bring charges against clerics who repeatedly spoke on unapproved topics. On April 11, the High Criminal Court of Appeal upheld a six-month jail sentence for a Shia religious chanter, Mahdi Sahwan, who had participated in what the government called “an illegal gathering” outside of Qassim’s residence. On April 12, authorities summoned four Shia clerics for questioning after the clerics commemorated the death of an Iraqi clergyman who was executed by the Iraqi government in the 1980s. On May 25, the government arrested Shia cleric Isa Al Moamen for a sermon he delivered in August 2016. He was released after serving a three-month prison sentence. On June 28, authorities charged Sheikh Hasanain Al-Mhanna with “inciting hatred against the regime and inciting contempt against a sect” based on the background of a sermon he delivered. No additional details were reported on his case.

Authorities generally permitted prisoners to practice their religion, but there were reports authorities sometimes denied prisoners access to religious services and prayer time. The government continued not to provide regular statistics on detainees. International NGOs reported Shia prisoners were vulnerable to intimidation, harassment, and ill treatment by prison guards because of their religion, which at times led to coerced confessions. Some Shia prisoners at Jaw Prison and at the pretrial Dry Dock facility reported they were not allowed to practice their faith freely. Government officials stated the MOI, which supervised detention facilities, only prohibited practices when they violated prison safety rules, such as waving religious banners or organizing large-scale gatherings for religious ceremonies. In November the National Institute for Human Rights, (NIHR), a quasi-official government human rights organization, stated inmates had the right to perform their religious rites as long as it did not impact the security of the prison or detention center. Inmates at Jaw Prison staged several hunger strikes throughout the year to protest detention conditions that included lack of religious freedom.

The NIHR reported 15 cases of complaints by Muslim inmates and five Christian inmates at Jaw Prison saying prison guards prevented them from performing prayers in a designated prayer area for all faiths.

On April 12, Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, one of 13 Shia leaders sentenced to life in prison in 2011, started a hunger strike which lasted 24 days to protest what he said was degrading treatment and poor conditions in Jaw Prison. On September 9, the press reported inmates at Jaw Prison staged a hunger strike to protest prison conditions and lack of religious freedom, in particular the right to pray. Shia activists reported inmates from at least four cellblocks joined the strike and the prison administration isolated the group and cut off outside communication. Most prisoners reportedly ended the hunger strike on September 24, after prison officials agreed to improve conditions and allow Shia inmates greater ability to worship.

At year’s end, no additional information was reported by the local press on implementation of the amendment allowing inmates to attend burials and receive condolences outside of prison. In response to the parliament proposal to provide religious lectures and sermons for prisoners, the government reported the law already permitted inmates to receive special programs for seminars and educational lectures. The government also stated inmates possess the right to maintain their own library containing a variety of religious books and publications.

The government during the year reported 452 licensed Sunni mosques and 91 Sunni community centers, while the number of licensed Shia places of worship remained at 608 mosques and 618 ma’atams (Shia prayer houses, sometimes called husseiniyas in other countries). In 2016, the government reported there were 440 licensed Sunni mosques and 80 Sunni community centers, while the number of licensed Shia places of worship had been 609 mosques and 618 ma’atams. It reported it granted nine permits during the year to build Sunni mosques and 17 permits to build Shia mosques and ma’atams. According to local press reports, the predominantly Shia neighborhoods in the Northern Governorate have 344 Shia mosques, more than half of the country’s total, and 211 ma’atams, nearly one-third of the country’s registered ma’atams. Observers reported that, in new housing developments, there continued to be a disproportionately large number of Sunni mosques, which they said showed continued government favoritism toward Sunni Muslims. The government stated that determining whether the mosque was Sunni or Shia in new housing developments depended on the needs and demographics of the new residents.

The MOJIA continued to monitor clerics’ adherence to a pledge of ethics it had created for individuals engaged in religious discourse. Preachers who diverged from the pledge were subject to censure or removal by authorities. The MOJIA reported reviewing sermons submitted to the government on a weekly basis by preachers. The MOJIA reported regularly visiting mosques to ensure preacher’s sermons were “moderate,” avoided discussing controversial topics, did not incite violence, and did not use religious discourse to serve political purposes. The MOJIA also continued to announce how much money an adult should give on a voluntary basis to the poor on religious feast days. According to Shia community representatives, during Ashura, police summoned some Shia chanters and preachers and had them sign pledges to avoid discussing politics from the pulpit.

The government continued to permit Shia groups to hold processions to commemorate Ashura and Arbaeen throughout the country, with the largest procession organized by a Shia community-led organization, the Manama Public Processions Commission. Local press estimated the largest procession attracted 150,000-200,000 attendees in downtown Manama. As in previous years, the MOI provided security for the processions, but again removed some Ashura flags, banners, and decorations from streets and private property in Shia villages but not at the large procession in Manama, according to Shia leaders. The government stated MOI personnel had removed the banners because they violated zoning restrictions or because they contained political messages.

The government continued to permit both registered and unregistered non-Muslim communities to maintain identifiable places of worship, hold religious gatherings, and display religious symbols. The MOI continued to provide security for large events held by religious communities, including non-Muslim ones. Security forces stated they continued to monitor religious gatherings and funerals to maintain peace and security.

Adherents of minority religious groups reported they were able to produce religious media and publications and distribute them in bookstores and churches, although the government did not permit publications that were perceived to criticize Islam. According to non-Muslim religious groups, the government did not interfere with religious observances and encouraged tolerance for minority religious beliefs and traditions.

In 2009, the government adopted a codified family law for Sunnis; however, following criticism from Shia religious leaders, the legislature did not pass a corresponding Shia personal status law at that time. Prior to passing the codified family law in July, the king appointed a sharia committee comprised of Sunni and Shia religious scholars to review the draft law for compliance with sharia provisions for both the Sunni and Shia branches of Islam.

In 2016, the king announced he would permit a Coptic Orthodox church to be built in Manama; there were no updates available at year’s end.

The government again reported no significant reconstruction work had been done on the three remaining Shia mosques from the 30 it had damaged or destroyed in 2011. The government pledged to do the reconstruction in compliance with the recommendations of an independent fact-finding commission established by the king in 2011. The government reported that one mosque in Salmabad was reconstructed by local residents without a permit on an “illegal” site, despite the government’s offer for an alternative site in the same neighborhood. According to the government, the second remaining mosque, in Hawrat Sanad, was under evaluation because nine other Shia mosques already existed within close proximity. The government also stated the third mosque, in Madinat Zayed, was under review pending determination of the need for a new mosque in the area. Some Shia stated they remained dissatisfied with three of the 27 reconstructed mosques because they had been rebuilt in different locations. Shia leaders stated the mosque grounds should have been preserved as they were. The government reported many of the mosques were previously built using primitive materials, without licenses, or in areas not in compliance with zoning regulations.

In June the local press reported officials from the Jaafari Waqf Directorate and local municipal authorities blamed each other for the lack of attention to maintaining, remodeling, or cleaning existing Shia mosques and ma’atams in the Northern Governorate.

NGOs reported the government showed disparate treatment of Shia versus Sunni individuals and stated this different treatment fueled perceptions among the Shia community of a justice system stacked against them. For example, several times during the year the government reported it had investigated a number of officials from the mostly-Sunni police and military services for breaking the law or violating official procedures, but the government did not name any of the individuals, including those who had been convicted of crimes, were in jail, or had been removed from their positions. On the other hand, the Public Prosecution Office, the MOI, and the state-run Bahrain News Agency sometimes published names and pictures of Shia who were convicted of crimes, although not explicitly stating their religious affiliation, and at times published their names before the persons were indicted.

The government-run television station continued to air Friday sermons from large Sunni mosques, but not sermons from Shia mosques.

According to the law, Arab applicants with 15 years’ residence and non-Arab applicants with 25 years’ residence are eligible to apply for citizenship. Shia politicians and community activists, however, continued to say the government’s naturalization and citizenship process favored Sunni applicants over Shia applicants. They said the government continued to recruit Sunnis from other countries to join the security forces, granted them expedited naturalization, and provided them with public housing while excluding Shia citizens from those forces. According to Shia community activists, this continued recruitment and expedited naturalization of Sunnis represented an ongoing attempt to alter the demographic balance among the country’s citizens.

According to Shia leaders and community activists, the government continued to provide Sunni citizens preference for government positions, including as teachers, and especially in the managerial ranks of the civil service and military. They reported Sunnis received preference for employment, especially in the managerial ranks of state-owned businesses. They continued to report few Shia citizens served in significant posts in the defense and internal security forces. According to Shia leaders, senior civil service recruitment and promotion processes continued to favor Sunni candidates. They said educational, social, and municipal services in most Shia neighborhoods remained inferior to those in Sunni communities. The government stated it made efforts to support public schools in Shia and Sunni neighborhoods equally; however, many parents with the financial means preferred to send their children to private schools. The government repeated its statements affirming a policy of nondiscrimination in employment, promotions, and the provision of social and educational services. The MOLSD reported it organized expositions, job fairs, professional guidance, and assistance to needy families in predominately Shia neighborhoods. The MOLSD, which has a supervisory role in implementing labor law in the civil sector, said there were no reported cases of religious or sectarian discrimination during the year. Shia community activists said that they lacked confidence in the effectiveness of government institutions to address discrimination, so they did not utilize them. The king continued to appoint Shia citizens to senior leadership positions, including cabinet positions and seats on the Shura Council, the upper house of parliament appointed by the king.

Human rights activists reported discrimination against Shia in education continued. Activists said interview panels for university scholarships continued to ask about students’ political views and family background. The government said their scholarships remained competitive, but some applicants not selected said their being passed over was due to discrimination. Rights activists said many top scoring Shia applicants continued to receive scholarship offers in less lucrative or less prestigious fields. The government reported that the flagship Crown Prince Scholarship Program continued to have representation from members of both Shia and Sunni groups, but it did not provide statistics of such a breakdown. There were continued reports of the MOE refusing to recognize the foreign degrees of some students. Some activists said these refusals disproportionately affected Shia students.

The 40-member Shura Council included 18 Shia members, one Jewish member, and one Christian member, while 20 of its members were Sunni. Five of the 23 cabinet members, including one of the five deputy prime ministers, were Shia.

In February the Court of Cassation rejected the appeal of Wifaq to halt the group’s dissolution and liquidation of its assets, upholding a September 2016 appeals court denial of Wifaq’s appeal and a lower court’s order to shut down the organization.

Throughout the year government officials made statements accusing Shia individuals or segments of the Shia community of specific crimes, alleging they were supporters of terrorism, linking individuals with what they said were Iranian-backed militants’ efforts to subvert the government, or threatening community members and institutions with future legal action.

NGOs reported the government closely monitored the collection of funds by religious organizations, including charity donations. The NGOs said religious leaders and organizations not authorized to collect money, or whom the government believed handled the money in improper ways, were potentially subject to legal action.

In September under the king’s patronage, an interfaith NGO, This is Bahrain, launched the Kingdom of Bahrain Declaration in Los Angeles in cosponsorship with the Simon Wiesenthal Center. The Bahrain Declaration calls on all “people of faith” to “disown practices such as the sowing of terror, the encouragement of extremism and radicalization, suicide bombing, promotion of sexual slavery, and the abuse of women and children.” Local and international press reported that Arab diplomats, other foreign representatives, and 300 interfaith leaders from around the world attended the event.

News editorials and statements from government and religious leaders emphasized the importance of religious tolerance. For example, in October the king wrote an editorial in international media that was reprinted in local press, highlighting what he said was the country’s tradition of churches, synagogues, a Sikh temple, and a 200-year old Hindu temple being built in close proximity to mosques. He wrote, “religious freedom should not be viewed as a problem but rather a very real solution to many of our world’s biggest challenges and especially terrorism, which knows no religion and threatens all peace-loving people.” Local press featured photos of the crown prince visiting the Diwali festivities of several prominent Hindu families.

During the year, local press reported individuals allegedly associated with militant groups committed attacks on police, and some groups claiming responsibility used Shia religious terminology to justify their attacks. In response, the government launched investigations, prosecuted members of violent groups, and said Iran was providing material support to these groups. The government reported four police officers were killed, dozens sustained minor injuries, and 13 sustained life-threatening or serious injuries during the year. Perpetrators of these attacks often filmed themselves attacking police and posted such videos on social media. They sometimes wore religious garb such as burial shrouds.

The government reported IED attacks killed two police officers during the year, including a June 18 blast that killed an officer near the home of prominent cleric Isa Qassim, and an October 27 blast targeting a police bus that killed one officer and injured eight others.

On December 31, local press reported authorities tried a group of 60 individuals involved with a local militant group, Al Ashtar Brigades, for their reported role in the January 29 killing of an off-duty police officer and the January 1 Jaw Prison break, in which assailants freed 10 Shia inmates and killed a guard.

On October 1, according to press reports, Shia militant group Wa’ad Allah (God’s Promise Brigades), believed by the government to be associated with Al-Ashtar Brigades, detonated an IED targeting an MOI checkpoint in Daih during Ashura processions. Five police officers were injured.

Non-Muslim religious community leaders reported there continued to be some Muslims who changed their religious affiliation, despite ongoing societal pressure not to do so, but those who did remained unwilling to speak publicly or privately to family or associates about their conversions out of fear of harassment or discrimination.

NGOs working on civil discourse and interfaith dialogue reported regional Sunni-Shia tensions and historical political divisions continued to have an effect domestically. Shia representatives stated the persistent higher unemployment rate among their community, limited prospects for upward social mobility, and the lower socioeconomic status of Shia exacerbated by ongoing private sector discrimination against them, added to the tensions between the two communities. Because religion and political affiliation were often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

Construction on a cathedral to serve as headquarters for the Catholic Apostolic Vicariate of Northern Arabia, on land donated by the king, was scheduled to begin in early 2018. Christian community leaders stated that they had made some progress in finding a location for a new non-Muslim cemetery. There were cremation facilities for the Hindu community.

Several Hindu temples and Sikh temples operated throughout the country. The Shri Krishna Hindu Temple is reportedly over 200-years old and was often visited by high-level government officials, including the crown prince. The country was also home to a Jewish synagogue and more than a dozen Christian churches. There was no registered Buddhist temple; however, some Buddhist groups met in private facilities.

Holiday foods, decorations, posters, and books continued to be widely available during major Christian and Hindu holidays, and Christmas trees and elaborate decorations remained prominent features in malls, restaurants, coffee shops, and hotels. The news media continued to print reports of non-Muslim religious holiday celebrations, including Christmas celebrations and Hindu festivals such as Diwali and Holi.

According to minority religious groups, there was a high degree of tolerance within society for minority religious beliefs and traditions, although societal attitudes and behavior discouraged conversion from Islam. Local news reports during the year featured activities of minority religious communities, including announcements of changes in leadership, Muslim bands performing at Christmas festivities, and sports events organized by the Sikh community.

Some social media accounts repeated allegations that prominent Shia leaders supported terrorism or had engaged in what was termed “treasonous behavior.” Comments continued to refer to the Shia political opposition as “Iranian subordinates” and “coup plotters.” Other social media posts accused prominent Sunnis of being “ISIL affiliates,” “dogs,” and “takfiri” (Muslims who kill other Muslims who do not follow the same belief structure).

The Ambassador, other embassy officers, and Department of State representatives met with government officials to urge them to respect freedom of expression for all, including clerics; ensure members of the Shia community had equal access to employment and services; pursue reconciliation between the government and Shia communities; and allow prisoners to practice their religions. In August the Secretary of State called on the government to “stop discriminating against the Shia communities.” U.S. officials both publicly and in private meetings continued to advocate for the government to pursue political reforms, which would take into consideration the needs of all citizens regardless of religious affiliation.

The Ambassador and other embassy officers continued to meet regularly with religious leaders of all faiths, representatives of NGOs, and political groups to discuss their freedom of religion, the welfare of detainees, and freedom of expression as it relates to religious practices.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 157.8 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2013 census, Sunni Muslims constitute 89 percent of the population and Hindus 10 percent. The remainder of the population is predominantly Christian (mostly Roman Catholic) and Theravada-Hinayana Buddhist. The country also has small numbers of Shia Muslims, Bahais, animists, Ahmadi Muslims, agnostics, and atheists. Many of these communities estimate their respective numbers to be between a few thousand and 100,000 adherents. Many ethnic minorities practice minority religions and are concentrated in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and northern districts. For example, the Garo in Mymensingh are predominantly Christian as are some of the Santal in Gaibandha. Most Buddhists are members of the indigenous (non-Bengali) populations of the CHT. Bengali and ethnic minority Christians live in communities across the country, with relatively high concentrations in Barisal, Gournadi, Baniarchar, Monipuripara, Christianpara, Gazipur, and Khulna.

The largest noncitizen population is Rohingya, nearly all Muslim. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), approximately 33,000 Rohingya refugees from Burma are officially registered in the country and are residing in the two official refugee camps within Cox’s Bazar district. The government and UNHCR estimate another 900,000 to 1,000,000 Rohingya from Burma are in Cox’s Bazar district, including an estimated 500 Hindu Rohingya. Approximately 700,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh following the start of violence in Burma’s Rakhine State in August.

Legal Framework

According to the constitution, “the state religion of the Republic is Islam, but the State shall ensure equal status and equal rights in the practice of the Hindu, Buddhist, Christian and other religions.” The constitution also stipulates the state should not grant political status in favor of any religion. It also provides for the right to profess, practice, or propagate all religions “subject to law, public order, and morality” and states religious communities or denominations have the right to establish, maintain, and manage their religious institutions. The constitution stipulates no one attending any educational institution shall be required to receive instruction in, or participate in ceremonies or worship pertaining to, a religion to which he or she does not belong.

Under the penal code, statements or acts made with a “deliberate and malicious” intent to insult religious sentiments are subject to fines or up to two years in prison. Although the code does not further define this prohibited intent, the courts have interpreted it to include insulting the Prophet Muhammad. The criminal code allows the government to confiscate all copies of any newspaper, magazine, or other publication containing language that “creates enmity and hatred among the citizens or denigrates religious beliefs.” The law applies similar restrictions to online publications. While not a stated blasphemy law, authorities use the penal code as well as Section 57 of the Information and Communication Technology Act to charge offenders.

The constitution prohibits freedom of association if an association is formed for the purpose of destroying religious harmony or creating discrimination on religious grounds.

Individual houses of worship are not required to register. Religious groups seeking to form associations with multiple houses of worship, however, must register with either the NGO Affairs Bureau (NGOAB) if they receive foreign assistance for development projects or the Ministry of Social Welfare if they do not. The law requires the NGOAB to approve and monitor all foreign-funded projects. The NGOAB director general has the authority to impose sanctions on NGOs for violating the law, including fines of up to three times the amount of the foreign donation or closure of the NGO. NGOs also are subject to penalties for “derogatory” comments about the constitution or constitutional institutions (i.e., the government). Expatriate staff must receive a security clearance from the National Security Intelligence Agency, the Special Branch of the police, and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence.

The registration requirement and procedures for religious groups are the same as for secular associations. Registration requirements with the Ministry of Social Welfare include submission of certification that the name being registered is not taken; provision of the bylaws/constitution of the organization; a security clearance for leaders of the organization from the national intelligence agency; minutes of the meeting appointing the executive committee; a list of all executive committee and general members and photographs of principal officers; a work plan; a copy of the deed or lease of the organization’s office and a list of property owned; a budget; and a recommendation by a local government representative. Requirements to register with the NGOAB are similar.

Family law concerning marriage, divorce, and adoption has separate provisions for Muslims, Hindus, and Christians. These laws are enforced in the same secular courts. A separate civil family law applies to mixed faith families or those of other faiths or no faith. The family law of the religion of the two parties concerned governs their marriage rituals and proceedings. A Muslim man may have as many as four wives, although he must obtain the written consent of his existing wife or wives before marrying again. A Christian man may marry only one woman. Hindu men may have multiple wives. Officially Hindus have no options for divorce, although informal divorces do occur. Women may not inherit property under Hindu law. Buddhists are subject to Hindu law. Divorced Hindus and Buddhists may not legally remarry. Divorced men and women of other religions and widowed individuals of any religion may remarry. Marriage between members of different religious groups is allowed and occurs under civil law. To be legally recognized, Muslim marriages must be registered with the state by either the couple or the cleric performing the marriage; however, some marriages are not. Registration of a marriage for Hindus and Christians is optional, and other faiths may determine their own guidelines.

Under the Muslim family ordinance, a widow receives one eighth of her husband’s estate if she is his only wife, and the remainder is divided among the children; each female child receives half the share of each male child. Wives have fewer divorce rights than husbands. Courts must approve divorces. The law requires a Muslim man to pay a former wife three months of alimony, but these protections generally apply only to registered marriages; unregistered marriages are by definition undocumented and difficult to substantiate. Authorities do not always enforce the alimony requirement even in cases involving registered marriages.

Alternative dispute resolution is available to all citizens, including Muslims, for settling family arguments and other civil matters not related to land ownership. With the consent of both parties, lawyers may be identified to facilitate the arbitration, the results of which may be used in court.

Fatwas may be issued only by Muslim religious scholars, and not by local religious leaders, to settle matters of religious practice. Fatwas may not be invoked to justify meting out punishment, nor may they supersede existing secular law.

Religious studies are compulsory and part of the curriculum for grades three through 10 in all public government-accredited schools. Private schools do not have this requirement. Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian students receive instruction in their own religious beliefs, although the teachers are not always adherents of the students’ faith.

The code regulating prisons allows for observance of religious commemorations by prisoners, including access to extra food on feast days or permission to fast for religious reasons. The law does not guarantee prisoners regular access to clergy or regular religious services, but prison authorities may arrange special religious programs for them. Prison authorities are required to provide prisoners facing the death penalty access to a religious figure from a religion of their choice before execution.

The 2001 Vested Property (Return) Act allows the government to confiscate property of anyone whom it declares to be an enemy of the state. Authorities often used it to seize property abandoned by minority religious groups, especially Hindus, when they fled the country, particularly after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: Police arrested two suspects with ties to an al-Qa’ida-inspired group in connection with the 2015 killing of a U.S.-born blogger critical of religious extremism. According to the press, one of the suspects confessed to involvement in the killing of four other secular activists. Despite government orders to the contrary, village community leaders, often working together with local religious leaders, used extrajudicial fatwas to punish individuals, mostly women, for perceived “moral transgressions.” Religious minority communities such as Hindus and Christians, who also are sometimes ethnic minorities, reported the government failed to effectively prevent forced evictions and land seizures. In these instances, the minorities said law enforcement was sometimes slow to respond. The MOE made significant changes to Bengali language textbooks, which were traditionally secular, such as removing non-Muslim authors’ content and adding Islamic content to nonreligious subject matter. Supreme Court authorities moved a sculpture depicting a blindfolded woman holding a scale from the court’s entrance to a less prominent space. Sources said the court took this action in response to statements that the “idol” stood against Islamic values. The government continued to provide law enforcement personnel at religious sites, festivals, and events considered to be possible targets for violence.

The investigation into the 2016 killings of six secular bloggers, online activists, writers, and publishers remained inconclusive, according to press reports. Police had not charged any individuals by year’s end.

Outlawed militant group Ansar Al Islam, which according to press reports is likely loosely affiliated with al Qa’ida-inspired Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), claimed responsibility for killing nine individuals for “offending Islam” from February 2013 to April 2016. In April the High Court confirmed the death penalty for two individuals found involved in the nine deaths. Police charged suspects in two other killings, leaving six open investigations pending. According to a Daily Prothom Alo newspaper report published on September 9, police detained only seven of the 43 suspects in those six pending cases.

On November 6, police announced they had detained Abu Siddiq Sohel, whom they said had admitted to involvement in the 2015 killing of atheist blogger Avijit Roy, a critic of religious extremism. On November 23, police said they had arrested another individual, Arafat Rahman, also wanted in connection with Roy’s killing. Machete-wielding assailants hacked to death Roy, a U.S. citizen of Bangladeshi origin, while he accompanied his wife home from a Dhaka book fair. The assailants also seriously injured Roy’s widow in the attack. The press reported that police suspected ABT of involvement in Roy’s killing, and a police official identified Rahman as a member. The press also reported Rahman had confessed to involvement in the killing of four other secular activists.

In line with its stated intent to facilitate an impartial inquiry into the November 2016 killing of three Santal Christians in law enforcement engagements and arson attacks, the government withdrew the Superintendent of Police of Gabandha District as well as the entire police force from the Govidaganj Sub-District in February to comply with a High Court order. On October 7, personnel from the Police Bureau of Investigation (PBI) detained Shah Alam, a Union Council member and one of the 33 accused in the case. Several others detained earlier were released on bail. According to media reports, at year’s end the PBI had not filed charges against a parliamentarian from the ruling party and a local civil servant reportedly involved in the incident.

Human rights organizations reported that, despite government orders to the contrary, village community leaders, often together with local religious leaders, used fatwas to punish individuals, mostly women, for perceived “moral transgressions,” such as adultery and other illicit sexual relations. From January to December, the human rights organization Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK) documented 10 incidents of punishments under fatwas, including societal shunning, whipping, and forced interim marriages between individuals of different religions. In February the High Court ordered a local government entity to report on action it had taken against the perpetrators of the extrajudicial punishment meted out to a man and a woman in December 2016 in Komolganj Upazila of Maulvibazar District for reported moral transgressions. At year’s end, no new developments were reported.

The government did not approve registrations for a number of religiously affiliated organizations. The government disallowed some religiously affiliated organizations to engage in relief operations for the Rohingya in Cox’s Bazar, such as Muslim Aid.

Hindus, Christians, and members of other religious minority communities, who are also sometimes members of ethnic minority groups, reported several property and land ownership disputes and forced evictions, including by the government, remained unresolved. According to religious minority associations, such disputes occurred in areas near new roads or industrial development zones, where land prices had recently increased. They also stated local police, civil authorities, and political leaders sometimes enabled property appropriation for financial gain or shielded politically influential property appropriators from prosecution. Some human rights groups, including Odhikar, attributed the lack of resolution of some of these disputes to ineffective judicial and land registry systems and the targeted communities’ insufficient political and financial clout rather than government policy disfavoring religious or ethnic minorities.

Religious minorities continued to state minority students sometimes were unable to enroll in religion classes of their faith because of a lack of minority teachers for mandatory religious education classes. In these cases, school officials generally allowed local religious institutions, parents, or others to hold religious studies classes for such students outside of school hours and sometimes exempted students from the religious education requirement.

According to local organizations and media reports, the MOE made changes to Bengali language textbooks, including removing poems and stories penned by non-Muslim writers and replacing pictures of secular items in alphabet references, such as ol (a type of yam), with orna (hijab). The textbook revisions also introduced religious content in educational disciplines outside of religious studies. Local media reported Hefazat-e-Islam’s political advocacy influenced the government’s decision to make the changes to the school books. The media report also stated Hefazat-e-Islam was seeking more significant changes to the education system in coming years. Rasheda K. Choudhury, a human rights activist and educator, said “the government is trying to appease Islamists to get their votes”

In an April 11 meeting with approximately 350 Islamic clerics led by Hefazat-e-Islam Chief Allama Ahmad Shafi, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina announced the government’s recognition of degrees granted by thousands of unregistered Qawmi madrassahs. The government issued a notification permitting master’s degree equivalent status to the Dawra-e-Hadith, the highest degree offered to graduates by these exclusively religious educational institutes, thus making graduates eligible for government jobs. Some news reports suggested the government recognized the Qawmi madrassah system to win support in advance of the general election due to be held by January 2019.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs had a budget of 6.59 billion taka ($80.4 million) for the 2017-18 fiscal year, including 3.33 billion taka ($40.6 million) allocated for development through various autonomous religious bodies. The government provided the Islamic Foundation, administered by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 3.27 billion taka ($39.9 million), which was 98.10 per cent of the total development fund. The Hindu Welfare Trust received 54.8 million taka ($668,000) or 1.64 percent and The Buddhist Welfare Trust received 2.6 million taka ($31,700) or 0.26 percent of the total development allocation. The government did not release any of the two billion taka ($24.4 million) allocation the finance minister announced in his budget speech for the development of Hindu temples throughout the country. While The Christian Welfare Trust did not receive any development funding from the 2017-18 budget, it received 2.1 million taka ($25,600) to run its office.

On October 29, law enforcement detained six persons for vandalizing and looting a Hindu Durga temple in Shivalaya Upazila (sub-district) of Manikganj District. According to an October 31 Daily Ittefaq newspaper report, the temple committee chair accused a local Awami League leader and his nephew of inciting their constituency to vandalize the temple with the intention of seizing the land where the temple is situated.

On May 26, Supreme Court authorities removed a sculpture at the Supreme Court’s entrance depicting a blindfolded woman with scales in one hand and a sword in the other, dubbed “lady justice.” The court’s decision apparently came in response to demands from some Muslim clerics who stated the “idol” contradicted Islamic values and heritage and would interfere with Eid prayers. Supreme Court authorities removed the statute approximately two weeks after Prime Minister Hasina expressed her support for the clerics’ demand to remove the sculpture from the court premises. The move sparked counterprotests demanding the statue be reinstalled. On May 28, authorities reinstalled the statue in a less prominent space in the Supreme Court compound.

The government continued to provide law enforcement personnel at religious sites, festivals, and events considered potential targets for violence, including the Hindu festival of Durga Puja, Christmas, Easter, and the Buddhist festival of Buddha Purnima.

According to news reports, the government provided extra security to protect Buddhist monasteries in Chittagong and Dhaka in anticipation of possible retaliation for the actions against Rohingya, the vast majority Muslim, by the military and civilians in Burma’s Rakhine State. No attacks materialized.

Although most mosques were independent of the state, the government maintained significant influence to appoint and remove imams and continued to provide guidance to imams throughout the country on some aspects of the content of their sermons. Religious community leaders said imams in all mosques usually avoided sermons that contradicted government policy.

The government continued to prohibit transmission of India-based Islamic televangelist Zakir Naik’s Peace TV Bangla, which it stated spread extremist ideologies, and closed “peace schools” the government said reflected his teachings. According to civil society organizations, the government overreached in its efforts to ban Peace TV Bangla and could have allowed the locally produced programs featured on the channel to air, even if officials believed censorship of Zakir Naik was necessary.

A media monitoring cell established in 2016 to track media and blogs that write negatively about Hindu, Muslim, and other religious beliefs remained in place.

According to the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council (BHBCUC), as of October, authorities had adjudicated approximately 3 percent of 200,000 property restitution cases filed under the Vested Property Return Act and returned a small portion of the land seized mainly from Hindus before the nation’s independence. The BHBCUC said deputy commissioners of the various districts and the Ministry of Law were responsible for the slow return of land seized under relevant legislation from Hindus who had left for India. The government did not amend the Vested Property Return Act to accelerate the process of return of land.

President Abdul Hamid continued to host receptions to commemorate each of the principal Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian holidays.

On November 30, Prime Minister Hasina and other officials met Pope Francis, who, during a meeting at the presidential palace referred to the plight of refugees from Rakhine State and called for “decisive measures to address this grave crisis.” He was the first pope to visit the country in 31 years. Religious leaders across various faiths said they were encouraged by the pope’s visit and what it meant for religious tolerance and interfaith cooperation.

Communal violence impacting minority religious groups continued to result in deaths, injuries, and damage to property. At times, land disputes disproportionately affected religious minorities, particularly the Hindu community. Members of religious minorities also stated they experienced continued discrimination in employment and housing. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

On June 2, ethnic Bengalis in Longdu Sub-District of the Rangamati Hill District set fire to the houses of nearly 300 Chakma ethnic tribal people, most of whom were Buddhist. It was reportedly in retaliation for the killing of Nurul Islam, a local leader of the ruling Awami League’s youth front. Ethnic Bengalis stated they blamed local ethnic Chakmas for Islam’s death. A 70-year-old Chakma woman was killed in the fires. Both police and affected ethnic Chakmas filed charges against some of the Bengalis for the arson, and police detained 28 suspects who were later released on bail by the court. Ethnic Chakma community leaders said the government did not arrest the mastermind of the arson attack because of his link to the ruling party.

Unlike in 2016, there were no major incidents specifically targeting religious minorities by extremist groups claiming to be affiliated with ISIS or al-Qa’ida in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS).

The Bangladesh Christian Association reported physical injury to a security guard at a church in Pabna on March 10 after aggressors reportedly attacked the guard with sharp weapons. Law enforcement detained three suspects, and the case remained pending at year’s end.

The Bangladesh Christian Association also reported, on October 2, assailants abducted Shishir Natale Gregory, a priest at Saint Mary Cathedral in Dhaka, and demanded a ransom for his release. Gregory was able to escape, and local residents in Tongi detained one of his abductors and turned him over to police. It was unclear if the abduction was religiously motivated.

According to human rights organization ASK, attacks during the year targeting Hindus or their property resulted in the death of one person and injuries to 67, compared with seven killed and 67 injured in 2016. Attackers destroyed 166 statues, monasteries, or temples, compared with 197 in 2016, and destroyed 26 homes and three businesses, compared with 192 homes and two businesses in 2016. The motivation for these incidents was often unclear.

The BHBCUC compiled 959 reports of violations of minority rights from newspaper reports from January to October. The incidents included killings, attempted killings, death threats, assaults, and attacks on homes, businesses, and places of worship, rape, and kidnappings. According to the BHBCUC, the primary motivation for most of the incidents was a desire to seize real property, steal, or extort money.

According to media reports, police still had not filed charges in the case involving the July 2016 killing of 22 persons, most of them non-Muslims, at the Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka. The attackers singled out non-Muslims and killed the victims with machetes and firearms. At year’s end, police had not finalized the investigation, and some attackers remained at large.

On September 21, in Dinajpur Hindu worshippers found statues of deities in a temple destroyed. This was the third incident in the district since August 26.

According to The Bangladesh Buddhist Federation, on September 6, Muslim inhabitants attacked the abbot of East Khadacha Ideal Buddhist Monastery in Matiragana Upazila. The abbot was admitted to a local hospital with critical injuries.

On September 12, Muslims in Jessore assaulted a Buddhist monk, Gyanamitra Bhikkhu, from Chittagong, as he was returning home from India. Taifiq Ahmed Sujan, a leader of the ruling Awami League’s student wing, the Bangladesh Chhatra League, reportedly led the attackers.

On September 23, a Muslim attacked Buddhist monk Agralankar at Cunati Gautam Bihara in Chittagong district. The Bangladesh Buddhist Federation said police took appropriate action as soon as they were informed of the incident.

In November a mob of approximately 20,000 in Rangpur set fire to and vandalized approximately 30 private homes belonging to the local Hindu minority community. The violence followed a Facebook posting demeaning the Prophet Muhammad. A press report stated one person was killed during the incident and five suffered critical injuries.

The mass exodus of Rohingya, the vast majority Muslim, from Burma raised concerns among the Buddhist population about their safety as they feared acts of vengeance from local Muslims. Buddhist organizations formed the Bangladesh United Buddhist Forum in September in the face of perceived threats. The forum organized a human chain in Dhaka on September 8, held a news conference on September 10, and submitted a memorandum to the Embassy of Burma in Dhaka urging the Burmese government to stop atrocities against the Rohingya and resolve its issues through “holistic Buddhist peaceful means.” The forum announced local Buddhist community leaders would curtail spending in observance of two approaching religious festivals and instead allocate the funding for the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. Similarly, Hindu leaders urged community members to reduce expenses related to the October Hindu festival Durga Puja and divert the money to Rohingya welfare. According to media reports, a group of Islamic clerics reached out to Rohingya Hindus, who also fled from Rakhine to Cox’s Bazar.

At year’s end, law enforcement had yet to conclude its investigation into the October 2016 attack on Hindu homes and temples in Brahmanbaria District. Attackers injured more than 100 individuals and vandalized 52 Hindu homes and 15 temples in response to a Hindu resident’s Facebook post showing a Hindu deity pasted over the Kaaba in Mecca. The National Human Rights Commission stated the attack was orchestrated to drive Hindus from the area to obtain their land. Of the 104 persons detained for suspected involvement in the attacks, all but one was released on bail.

NGOs continued to report tensions in the CHT between the predominantly Muslim Bengali settlers and members of indigenous groups, primarily Buddhist, Hindu, and Christian, largely over land ownership. The government continued to work to resolve land ownership disputes with an amendment to the existing law that provides for more inclusive decision making and a harmonization of the law with the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord.

According to the Bangladesh Christian Association, Muslim real estate investors, in collusion with local government officials, tried to seize land belonging to a Christian family in Miton Village near Dhaka on May 24. The investors launched repeated attacks on the Christian family and physically injured some family members.

The Ambassador and other embassy staff met with officials from the Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, and local government representatives to underscore the importance of religious freedom and tolerance. They discussed the interface between religion, religious freedom, and violent extremism and the importance of integrating religious freedom and other human rights in security policy. Embassy officials stressed the importance of respecting religious minorities’ viewpoints and protecting such minorities from extremist attacks.

Embassy officials also met with government officials to discuss protection and humanitarian assistance for the approximately 700,000 Rohingya who crossed into the country from Burma during the year. The Ambassador and other embassy officials visited refugee camps and makeshift settlements in Cox’s Bazar to hear directly from Rohingya refugees about their experiences.

As part of community policing training, the embassy encouraged law enforcement officials to protect the rights of religious minorities.

Embassy officials attended public religious events demonstrating religious tolerance among religious groups. The Buddhist community invited the Ambassador to be a special guest at the occasion of Holy Kathin Cibor Danustan. Embassy officials attended a Puja festival and Diwali festival in honor of the country’s Hindu community. The Ambassador also attended a government-sponsored interreligious and ecumenical gathering for peace during Pope Francis’ November 30-December 2 visit to the country. In all these events, the Ambassador and other embassy officials emphasized the importance of religious tolerance and respect for diversity.

Embassy and other U.S. government officials expressed support for religious minorities. Embassy officials met regularly with a wide range of religious organizations and representatives, including the Islamic Foundation Bangladesh, Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council, Bangladesh Christian Association, Buddhist Religious Welfare Trust, Christian Religious Welfare Trust, apostolic nuncio, Bangladesh Buddhist Federation, Chittagong Hill Tracts Land Commission, Bangladesh Purja Celebration Committee, Baitur Rouf Jame Mosque, Imamat Day of Aga Khan, Cox’s Bazar Model Women’s Kamil Madrassa, and Sheema Bihar Temple. In these meetings, embassy and other U.S. government officials and representatives from the various groups discussed the state of religious freedom in the country, identified challenges religious minorities encountered, and discussed the importance of religious tolerance.

Embassy officials met regularly with a working group of 11 foreign missions to discuss a broad range of human rights concerns, including religious freedom.

To encourage civil society’s respect for religious pluralism in the country, the embassy facilitated the participation of representatives of several madrassahs and a professor from the Islamic University in Kushtia in an exchange program on religious education in the U.S. The overarching objective of the program was to explore the role of religion and religious freedom in a multicultural society.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 292,000 (July 2017 estimate). According to the most recent census in 2010, approximately 76 percent of the population is Christian. The two largest groups are Anglicans (23.9 percent) and Pentecostals (19.5 percent), followed by Seventh-day Adventists (5.9 percent), Methodists (4.2 percent), Roman Catholics (3.8 percent), Wesleyans (3.4 percent), Nazarenes (3.2 percent), and the Church of God (2.4 percent). Religious groups with 2 percent or less of the population each include Baptists, Moravians, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, and other Christian groups. Other religious groups, together constituting less than 3 percent of the population, include Muslims, Jews, Rastafarians, Hindus, Buddhists, and Bahais. Approximately 20.6 percent of respondents did not identify a religious affiliation. The Barbados Muslim Association states there are 3,000 Muslims.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion, including the freedom of individuals to change their religion, and prohibition of discrimination based on creed. A law criminalizing “blasphemous libel” is unenforced.

The government does not require religious groups to register. To obtain duty-free import privileges and tax benefits, however, they are required to register with the Corporate Affairs and Intellectual Property Office. A religious group must file the relevant customs and tax forms, along with a resolution passed by the majority of its board of trustees expressly authorizing the application, plus the group’s related statutory declaration.

The constitution grants religious groups the right to establish and maintain private schools and provide religious instruction. The government provides subsidies or financial assistance to some of these schools to help cover the cost of students who could not find space in a public school. The public school curriculum includes religious “values education” as part of the historic association of schools with Christian missionaries who founded many of the schools. At the primary school level, the focus is on Christianity from several denominations. At the secondary school level, all major religions are included. The constitution protects students from mandatory religious instruction, ceremony, or observance without personal consent or, if under the age of 21, consent of the guardian.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Rastafarians continued to state their objection to the government’s enforcement of the prohibition on marijuana for any use, which they said made it impossible to fully perform their religious rituals. Rastafarian activists continued to say that police and immigration officials required Rastafarians to remove head coverings and gave extra scrutiny to Rastafarian women at checkpoints, which they said was a pretext for searching for marijuana. Authorities continued to state that the removal of head coverings was part of the government’s security measures, which were applied to all individuals regardless of religious affiliation.

Rastafarian activists continued to state that the requirements for vaccinations for all children to enroll in public schools violated Rastafarian religious beliefs. They also continued to object to the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology requirement that all Rastafarian children cover their hair when attending school.

Representatives from the Barbados Muslim Association said they objected to a government policy requiring women to remove all head coverings for identification and passport photographs. The association continued to ask the government to change its practices to permit head coverings in identification photographs, including passports. The government continued to state that it was a security measure applied to all individuals regardless of religion.

Some Rastafarians stated they continued to face societal discrimination, but that they did not face hostile actions and were not refused private or public services. They said some members of society viewed Rastafarians as troublemakers due to their wearing of dreadlocks and their use of marijuana for religious purposes. Some Rastafarians said they believed public opinion of the Rastafarian community was gradually improving; one source said the increase in positive societal attitudes towards Rastafarians was evidenced by the fact that some Rastafarians were now white-collar workers.

Unknown individuals vandalized a synagogue in St. Michael, Bridgetown, in March, spraying red anti-Semitic epithets on the synagogue walls. A synagogue employee said this was the first time an incident such as this occurred. Synagogue employees said they were of the opinion the incident was a “one-off” occurrence and did not reflect the general population’s positive interactions and views of the Jewish faith.

U.S. embassy officials continued to raise the importance of freedom of religious expression, respect for religious diversity, tolerance, and equal treatment under the law with government officials, including those from the Ministries of Labor, Industry, and Social Care, as well as the Corporate Affairs and Intellectual Property Office.

Embassy officials engaged leaders of civil society and religious groups, including the Muslim and Rastafarian communities, on the importance of religious expression and to ask about any concerns regarding societal or governmental discrimination. The Ambassador met with representatives from the Anglican, Catholic, and Jewish communities to discuss their views on the status of their respective religious communities in the country and to emphasize the importance of respect for religious diversity. The embassy also used Facebook to promote messages about the importance of religious freedom and respect for religious diversity across the Eastern Caribbean.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 9.6 million (July 2017 estimate). According to a January 2016 survey by the state Information and Analytical Center of the Presidential Administration, approximately 53 percent of the adult population belongs to the BOC and 6 percent to the Roman Catholic Church. Eight percent of the adult population is atheist, and 22 percent is uncertain. Smaller religious groups together constituting approximately 2 percent of the population include Jews; Muslims; Greek Catholics (“Uniates”); Old Believers (both those who practice their faith with priests, usually termed “priestist,” and those who practice their faith without priests, usually termed “priestless”); and other Orthodox groups in addition to the BOC. This 2 percent also includes Lutherans, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Apostolic Christians, Presbyterians and other Protestant groups, Armenian Apostolics, Latin Catholics, ISKON, Bahais, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and Buddhists. Jewish groups state there are between 30,000 and 40,000 Jews. Ethnic Poles, who constitute approximately 3 percent of the population, tend to be Roman Catholic.

Legal Framework

The constitution grants individuals the freedom to profess any religious beliefs and to participate in the performance of acts of worship not prohibited by law. It stipulates all faiths are equal before the law. The constitution states relations between the state and religious organizations shall be regulated by the law “with regard to their influence on the formation of the spiritual, cultural, and state traditions of the Belarusian people.” It prohibits activities by religious groups that are directed against the country’s sovereignty, its constitutional system, and civic harmony; involve a violation of civil rights and liberties; “impede the execution of state, public, and family duties” by its citizens; or are detrimental to public health and morality. The constitution states the law shall determine the conditions for exemption from military service and the performance of alternative service as a substitute.

The Office of the Plenipotentiary Representative for Religious and Nationality Affairs (OPRRNA) regulates all religious matters.

The law recognizes the “determining role” of the BOC in the development of the traditions of the people as well as the historical importance of religious groups commonly referred to as “traditional” faiths”: Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, and evangelical Lutheranism. The law does not consider as “traditional faiths” the newer religious groups or older groups such as the priestless Old Believers, Greek Catholics (Uniates), and the Calvinist churches, which have roots in the country dating to the 17th century.

A concordat between the government and the BOC provides the BOC with autonomy in its internal affairs, freedom to perform religious rites and other activities, and a special relationship with the state. The concordat recognizes the BOC’s “influence on the formation of spiritual, cultural, and national traditions of the Belarusian people.” Although it states the agreement does not limit the religious freedom of other religious groups, the concordat calls for the government and the BOC to combat unnamed “pseudo-religious structures that present a danger to individuals and society.” The BOC, unlike other religious communities, receives state subsidies. In addition, the BOC possesses the exclusive right to use the word “orthodox” in its title and to use as its symbol the double-barred image of the Cross of Saint Euphrosyne, the country’s patron saint.

The concordat also serves as the framework for agreements between the BOC and individual state agencies. There are at least a dozen such agreements, including an agreement with the Ministry of Education covering cooperation on education through 2020 and providing for joint projects for the “spiritual and moral education” of students based on BOC traditions and history.

The law establishes three tiers of registered religious groups: religious communities, religious associations, and national religious associations. Religious communities must include at least 20 persons over the age of 18 who live in one or several adjoining areas. Religious associations must include at least 10 religious communities, one of which must have been active in the country for at least 20 years, and may be constituted only by a national-level religious association. National religious associations may be formed only when they comprise active religious communities in at least four of the country’s six regions.

According to government data as of January 1, there are 25 religious faiths and denominations registered in the country, encompassing 3,350 religious communities and 174 religious associations, monasteries, missions, brotherhoods, sisterhoods, and schools. The BOC has 1,681 religious communities, 15 dioceses, seven schools, 35 monasteries, 15 brotherhoods, and 10 sisterhoods. The Roman Catholic Church has four dioceses, five schools, 11 missions, nine monasteries, and 496 communities. Protestant religious organizations of 14 denominations have 1,033 religious communities, 21 associations, 22 missions, and five schools. There are 33 registered religious communities of Old Believers. There are three Jewish religious associations – Orthodox, Chabad-Lubavitch, and Reform Judaism – comprising 52 communities, including 10 autonomous communities. In addition, 24 Muslim religious communities – 23 Sunni and one Shia – are registered.

National religious associations include the BOC, Roman Catholic Church, Old Believers Church, Union of Evangelical Christian Baptists, Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith, Confederation of Christian Seventh-day Adventists, Association of New Apostolic Churches, Union of Full Gospel Christian Churches, Association of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Union of Evangelical-Lutheran Churches. National-level Jewish associations include the Jewish Religious Union, Association of Jewish Religious Communities, and Union of Reform Judaism Communities. National Muslim associations include the Muslim Religious Association and Spiritual Board of Muslims. The Religious Association of Bahais is also a national religious association.

To register, a religious community must submit an official application with the following information: a list of its founders’ names, places of residence, citizenship, and signatures; copies of its founding statutes; the minutes of its founding meeting; and permission from the regional authorities confirming the community’s right to occupy or use any property referenced in its founding statutes. A religious group not previously registered by the government must also submit information about its beliefs. The law stipulates authorities may take up to six months to review a new registration application due to an additional evaluation of the religion by a state-appointed religious commission of experts. The commission evaluates the fundamental teachings of the religion; rituals, practices, history, and forms and methods of activities; welfare and charitable services; proselytizing and missionary activities; approaches towards marriage and family; educational activities; attitudes toward health care; and compliance with legal requirements. In addition, the community must submit any texts written by its founder or considered sacred by the followers of the religion, information about prohibitions on clergy or adherents, a list of countries where the religion is widely practiced, and a list of countries officially recognizing the religion. It also must submit information about countries that have refused to recognize the religion and information about court cases against followers of the religion in other countries.

Regional government authorities as well as Minsk city authorities or local municipal authorities (for groups outside of Minsk) review all registration applications. Permissible grounds for denial of registration are broad and include failure to comply with requirements for establishing a community, an inconsistent or fraudulent charter or other required document, violations of the procedures to establish religious organizations, or a negative evaluation by the state-appointed religious commission of experts. Communities may appeal refusals in court.

In order to register as a religious association or national religious association, a group must provide an official application with a copy of the founding statutes, a list of members of the managing body with biographical information, proof of permission for the association to be at its designated location, and the minutes from its founding congress. Religious associations have the exclusive right to establish religious educational institutions and organize cloistered and monastic communities. All applications to establish associations and national associations must be submitted to OPRRNA, which has 30 days to respond. Grounds for refusal are the same as for religious communities except they also include failure to comply with requirements for establishing an association rather than a community. Refusals or a failure by OPRRNA to respond within the 30-day period may be appealed in court.

The law confines the activities of religious communities and associations to the jurisdictional area where they are registered. The law permits state agencies in charge of registration to issue written warnings to a registered religious group for violating any law or undertaking activities outside the scope of responsibilities in the group’s charter. The government may apply to a relevant court, depending upon jurisdiction, to shut down the group if it has not ceased the illegal activity outlined in the written warning within six months or if the activity is repeated within one year of the warning. The government may suspend activities of the religious group pending the court’s decision. The law contains no provision for appeal of the warning or suspension.

The law bans all religious activity by unregistered groups and subjects group members to penalties ranging from unspecified fines to two years in prison.

The housing code permits religious groups to hold services at residential premises if local authorities grant permission. The local authorities must certify the premises comply with a number of regulations, including fire safety, sanitary, and health code requirements. Such permission is not granted automatically, and the law does not permit religious groups to hold services in private residences without prior permission from local authorities.

By law, all religious groups must obtain permits to hold events outside of their premises, including proselytizing.

The law requires all religious groups to receive prior governmental approval to import and distribute religious literature. The approval process includes official examination of the documents by state-appointed religious studies experts.

Although there is no law providing for a systematic restitution process for property, including religious property, seized during the Soviet and Nazi periods, groups may apply for the restitution of property to local authorities. The law on religion specifically bans the restitution of seized property currently used for cultural or sports purposes.

The law permits associations and national associations to establish schools to train clergy; however, it does not permit religious communities to do so.

The law permits only registered religious groups that are members of national religious associations to organize extracurricular religious activities at educational institutions. The law states the national religious association must first conclude an agreement on cooperation with the Ministry of Education. Students who wish to participate in voluntary “moral, civic, and patriotic education” in collaboration with religious groups must either provide a written statement expressing their desire to participate or secure their legal guardians’ approval. According to the law, “such education shall raise awareness among the youth against any religious groups whose activities are aimed at undermining Belarus’ sovereignty, civic accord, and constitutional system or at violating human rights and freedoms.”

The law prohibits religious groups from conducting activities in any school without identifying themselves. It also prohibits visits from representatives of foreign religious groups; missionary activities; collections of donations or fees from students for religious groups or any charity; distribution of religious literature, audio, video, and other religious materials; holding prayer services, religious rituals, rites, or ceremonies; and placing religious symbols or paraphernalia at educational institutions.

The law does not allow private religious elementary, junior, and senior high schools or homeschooling for religious reasons.

The law establishes penalties ranging from fines to five years in prison for failure to fulfill mandatory military service, with an exemption for conscientious objectors for religious reasons. A 2016 provision allows alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors. By law, individuals who evade alternative civilian service may face up to five years in prison.

Only registered religious associations may apply to OPRRNA for permission to invite foreign clergy to the country. OPRRNA must grant permission before foreign religious workers may serve in local congregations, teach or study at local institutions, or participate in charitable work. Such permission is generally granted for a period of one year, which may be reduced or extended. OPRRNA has 30 days to respond to requests for foreign clergy permits (religious visas) and may deny requests without explanation. There is no provision for appeals.

By law, the government permits foreign missionaries to engage in religious activity only in the territorial area where their religious association is registered. Transfers of foreign clergy within a religious association, including from one parish to another, require prior government permission. By law, foreigners may not lead religious groups. The authorities may reprimand or expel foreign citizens who officially are present in the country for nonreligious work if they lead any religious activities. Law enforcement agencies on their own initiative or in response to recommendations from other government entities, such as the security service, may require foreign clergy to depart the country.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: The government continued to detain or fine individuals for proselytizing, including Jehovah’s Witnesses and Baptists. Minority religious groups continued to have difficulty registering; some groups remained reluctant to apply for registration, reportedly due to fear of harassment and punishment. The government also continued its surveillance of minority and unregistered religious groups, especially those it labeled as “foreign” or “cults.” According to human rights groups, prison authorities denied Muslim and Protestant clergy, as well as clergy from nontraditional faiths, access to prisoners of their faiths, while they granted such access to BOC and Roman Catholic clergy. Protestant and other minority religious groups said they continued to have difficulties obtaining buildings to use as houses of worship. They said the government continued to arbitrarily grant or deny permission for holding religious gatherings and denied visas and requests to extend the stay of some foreign missionaries but also rescinded denials previously given to other clergy.

According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, there were incidents in which authorities briefly detained Jehovah’s Witnesses for proselytizing in Hrodna, Dziarzhynsk, Loeu, and Smarhon. In Smarhon, authorities detained Volha Fiadulava for disseminating Jehovah’s Witnesses printouts in March; however, a local court dismissed her case on April 14. In a similar case, a local court in Hrodna fined two Jehovah’s Witnesses on charges of holding an unauthorized gathering on June 10. A court of appeals reportedly dropped their case in July.

The news service of the international religious freedom nongovernmental organization (NGO) Forum 18 reported police in Lepel detained Council of Baptist Churches members in mid-October and November. According to Forum 18, police detained church members for singing and offering Christian books and magazines to passersby near the town market. Authorities fined church member Andrei Fokin 460 rubles ($230) for reportedly organizing an illegal picket on October 21. They fined him and his wife 460 rubles ($230) and 575 rubles ($290), respectively, for a similar repeated offense on October 30. On November 4, police briefly detained at least nine church members and reportedly questioned them at a precinct. Fokin said police officers injured his face and put handcuffs on another church member so tightly that his hands became numb. On November 10, Fokin’s brother received a fine of 460 rubles ($230) for organizing a demonstration without permission from local authorities. Fokin told the press that he filed a complaint about the mistreatment with the prosecutor’s office; however, there was no response from the prosecutor’s office by the end of the year.

The government continued surveillance on minority religious groups of various Protestant denominations, especially those it labeled “foreign” or “cults.” According to various observers, government ideology officers continued to monitor the activities of members of unregistered religious groups in their workplaces, although there were no reports of prosecutions. Government officials reportedly had occasional informal talks with members of religious groups to learn about their activities. According to religious leaders, state security officers also continued to attend religious services of registered Protestant communities to conduct surveillance, which group members described as intimidation and harassment. The Roman Catholic Church expressed concerns that in some regions of the country local ideology officers requested the Church provide them Sunday school programs and lists of children attending them.

Christian groups continued to state the registration requirements for religious groups remained complex and difficult to fulfill, which they said restricted their activities, suppressed freedom of religion, and legalized criminal prosecution of individuals for their religious beliefs. The government’s guidelines for evaluating registration applications remained sufficiently broad, they said, to continue to give authorities a pretext for denying applications from groups they considered unacceptable. Authorities in Barysau refused registration to a Jehovah’s Witnesses community on April 14. Local authorities in Slonim and Vileika continued to deny multiple registration applications from Jehovah’s Witnesses. Authorities also continued to deny registration to several Protestant religious communities, including a Baptist community in Slonim.

Independent religious experts continued to report minority religious groups remained reluctant to apply for registration because members continued to be unwilling to provide their names as part of the application process due to fear of harassment and punishment by the authorities. Additionally, a number of them said they did not report registration denials because they believed that if they did not publicize the denials, they might still be able to negotiate their communities’ registration with local authorities.

Many unregistered religious groups stated they continued to maintain a low profile because of what they believed to be government hostility and due to fear of criminal prosecution. According to independent religious experts, many registered religious communities also remained reluctant to report abuses and restrictions because of fear of punishment.

Nontraditional religious groups continued to state the procedure for registering and using residential premises for religious gatherings remained cumbersome and arbitrary. Authorities continued to deny permission granted in 2014 for a registered Jehovah’s Witness community in Homyel to hold religious services at a private home, but allowed it to hold services at rented premises.

Human rights groups reported prison administrators continued to deny Muslim and Protestant clergy, as well as clergy from nontraditional faiths (any faiths not among the four recognized as “traditional”), permission to visit inmates in prison. At the same time, they said, authorities continued to grant BOC and Roman Catholic clergy permission to visit believers in prison on a regular basis, and many prisons had designated Orthodox religious facilities.

On May 5, authorities in Brest refused to permit a local Full Gospel Church to organize a bicycle ride celebrating the 500th anniversary of the publication of the Bible in the Belarusian language in 1517 and to promote Christian values. The community planned to start the ride in Brest and finish in Baranavichy, stopping and meeting with supporters in the towns of Kobryn, Drahichyn, and Pinsk. Authorities banned the ride and the meetings, citing lack of the church group’s coordination with traffic police and claiming, “Mass events in the proposed formats in towns en route are not considered possible.”

The Jehovah’s Witnesses reported Minsk city officials approved a request for a convention to take place in the city on July 7. Approximately 7,300 members attended the convention without hindrance. In Vitebsk, authorities denied a similar request to hold a local convention.

Religious groups, especially Protestants and Jehovah’s Witnesses, continued to report they remained cautious about proselytizing and distributing religious materials due to what they said was the general atmosphere of intimidation and fear of punishment. Orthodox literature, they said, remained available countrywide. They also said the BOC remained able to proselytize freely and, unlike other religious groups, continued to participate in government-sponsored public events such as rallies without the need to seek prior approval from authorities.

Religious groups continued to report problems purchasing properties as places of worship. They said converting residential property to religious use also remained difficult. Renting a public facility to hold religious services remained difficult as well, especially for unregistered groups. For example, some Protestant communities continued to report they were able to conclude only short-term lease agreements with the owners of the facilities the communities rented, which allowed authorities to pressure owners to terminate or not renew lease agreements as a means of preventing religious activities. Protestant groups stated they continued to be more severely affected than other groups in this regard because they were less likely to own religious facilities and their private homes were too small to accommodate their numbers.

The government continued the requirement for students to use textbooks that representatives of nontraditional religious groups said promoted intolerance towards them, citing chapters in the books that labeled such groups as “sects.” The government did not make changes to these textbooks despite continued requests from religious groups to do so.

School administrators continued to cooperate only with the BOC among registered religious groups based on the BOC’s concordat with the government. School administrators continued to invite BOC priests to lecture to students, organize tours of BOC facilities, and participate in BOC festivities, programs, and humanitarian projects.

Religious groups said the government continued to apply visa regulations in ways restricting the ability of foreign missionaries to live and work in the country. According to the Roman Catholic Church, in April OPRRNA denied Polish citizen Reverend Robert Maciejewski permission to serve at a parish in Mstislaul. Forum 18 said he returned to Poland after serving as a priest in the region for almost 10 years. On May 23, a representative of OPRRNA, Andrei Aryayev, told Forum 18 the office had the right not to give a reason for denial. On October 9, the NGO Aid to the Church in Need published an interview with Archbishop of Minsk Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz. In the interview, he described the problems experienced by foreign priests: newly arrived priests had to undergo a lengthy approval process before obtaining permission to celebrate Mass; they were often issued a visa for only three to six months; and they often encountered administrative difficulties when trying to renew visas.

In July OPPRNA revoked a previous decision not to renew religious work permits for at least two Polish priests, allowing them to continue their service in the country. The Roman Catholic Church had argued that while OPPRNA alleged the priests received multiple speeding tickets, at least one of them did not drive and did not have a driver’s license, and the traffic police confirmed that they had never held the two liable for speeding. OPPRNA reportedly extended their permits until “the situation was further examined.”

In April local residents in Homyel reported the construction of two luxury apartment buildings began on the grounds of a former Jewish cemetery. According to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), a Jewish activist filed a motion for an injunction, but the Tsentralny District Court denied his motion on August 21. The JTA said the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress, World Jewish Congress, and Union of Public Associations criticized the court’s ruling. Foreign ministry official told the JTA in a statement, however, that sampling for human remains conducted in March in the presence of Rabbi David Kantarovich demonstrated the “absence of human remains in the land,” and the rabbi’s community determined there was “no reason to fear the construction would disturb human remains.” The contractor and the local Jewish community reportedly signed an agreement to cooperate and take appropriate action in the case anything was unearthed at the site. The construction resumed, and local rabbis reportedly did not express any further concerns because there were no claims of unearthed remains since the court hearing. The Israeli ambassador visited Homyel and met with local authorities in September, and the local Jewish community continued to monitor the continuing construction.

There still were no developments regarding the freeze placed on the assets of New Life Church. Minsk authorities renewed their attempts to evict the church from its premises, a process that began in 2007 and continued through 2012 after the authorities refused to register the church at its location. While the church continued to use the space for religious purposes, it remained unable to obtain proof of ownership from the authorities and had no access to electricity. District court bailiffs attempted to enter the premises to issue eviction orders on April 26, but church members refused to allow them in. Church leadership continued to meet with Minsk city authorities to negotiate the status and operations of the church, but without result at the end of the year.

On October 20, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleh Krauchanka met with two high-level Mormon officials to discuss religious operations of their local communities. The government also allowed the two to address their community in Minsk without a special permit for a religious activity.

The authorities continued to permit the BOC to collect charitable donations in public as well as on its religious property. While the law does not restrict other religious groups from raising donations in public, representatives of these groups said authorities continued to limit their fundraising activities to their own places of worship or other properties based on the harassment from authorities when they tried to raise donations at other locations. The Krishna community reported local authorities harassed and warned them against fundraising in public.

In July media reported many Holocaust memorials built in Soviet times and some others more recently did not acknowledge Jewish victims. During the year, the Jewish community worked with local authorities to erect new monuments that specifically commemorate Jewish victims.

According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, on June 14, doctors in Kamyanets forced an elderly Jehovah’s Witness woman to have a blood transfusion despite her explicit written refusal of blood transfusions.

The BOC, in particular the Minsk-based parish of the Feast of the Presentation of Blessed Virgin, continued its annual commemoration honoring Hauryil Belastoksky, a child allegedly killed by Jews near Hrodna in 1690, as one of its saints and martyrs. Jewish community leaders again expressed concern over the memorial prayer recited on the anniversary of Belastoksky’s death on May 3, the text of which included a passage stating the “martyred and courageous Hauryil exposed Jewish dishonesty.”

Jewish community and civil society activists expressed concern regarding pan-Slavic nationalism professed by some extremist groups. Neo-Nazis such as the Russian National Unity group and supporters of similar groups were widely believed to be behind anti-Semitic incidents across the country. Anti-Semitic and xenophobic newspapers, literature, digital video discs, and videotapes, frequently imported from Russia, were widely available.

There were new reports of vandalism at Jewish memorials in Mahilyou. On February 20, a Mahilyou district court convicted three young men for spraying black paint on a monument in November 2016 that commemorated thousands of Jews killed by Nazis in the local ghetto during the Holocaust. The court sentenced two men to up to two and one-half years in prison and gave the third individual a two-year suspended sentence due to his minor age. All three pleaded guilty and admitted to expressing ultraright Nazi ideas and to belonging to a local skinhead group. On May 16, a higher court dismissed their appeal challenging their convictions.

On November 16, the Mahilyou police detained two local residents and charged them with stealing parts of metal fencing from graves at a local Jewish cemetery. The investigation continued at the end of the year.

On November 20, a Mahilyou court sentenced local resident Andrei Kuzmin to six months in prison on charges of inciting ethnic hatred against Russians and Jews and urging killings of Jews in his social media posts, reportedly related to activities of ultraright Ukrainian groups. Authorities arrested him for posting Nazi symbols online on August 9, and he pleaded guilty.

The Bible Society, an interconfessional Christian fellowship center, continued to print and distribute copies of the Bible and other religious literature, including donating Bibles to a children’s home and a hospital in January. Founded by the Belarusian Orthodox, Roman and Greek Catholic Churches, Union of Evangelical Christian Baptists, Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith, and Confederation of Christian Seventh-day Adventists, the Bible Society also engaged in educational and charitable projects targeting vulnerable populations.

The BOC, Union of Evangelical Christian Baptists, and Union of Evangelical-Lutheran Churches established an interreligious working group under the Minsk-based Belarusian-German International Educational Center when the latter opened in 1994. Jewish religious communities joined the group in 2015. The group worked to maintain an interfaith dialogue among Christian and Jewish denominations by organizing quarterly meetings, seminars on theological themes, trips around the country, and a trip to Siegen, Germany, during the year that focused on interfaith dialogue and social services. The group visited their German counterparts, a local museum, a children’s hospital, and a family center; participated in commemorations at the site of a synagogue burned down in 1938; and met with local authorities.

In September embassy officials and a visiting U.S. delegation met with officials from the Ministries of Culture and Foreign Affairs as well as prosecutors to discuss concerns related to the preservation of Jewish heritage sites. Embassy officials followed up with government officials on reports of vandalism and of construction on sites of former Jewish cemeteries.

The Charge d’Affaires and other embassy officials continued to meet regularly with representatives of the BOC, Roman Catholic Church, and minority religious groups. They discussed anti-Semitism and the preservation of Jewish religious heritage with Jewish religious groups, and government restrictions on registration and operations with the Jehovah’s Witnesses, ISKON, and Protestant groups. Embassy officials also continued to hold regular discussions about restrictions on religious freedom with religious freedom activists, religious leaders, lawyers for religious groups, and representatives of the For Freedom of Religion initiative, a group of civil society activists promoting religious tolerance. On social media, embassy officials posted the Secretary of State’s speeches and other materials related to religious freedom during the year.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 11.5 million (July 2017 estimate). A 2011 report (based on 2009 data) by the King Baudouin Foundation estimates the religious affiliation of the population to be 50 percent Roman Catholic, 33 percent without affiliation, 9 percent atheist, 5 percent Muslim, 2.5 percent non-Catholic Christian, and 0.4 percent Jewish. The Muslim population is highest in Antwerp and Brussels, where some studies estimate it at more than 25 percent of the respective metropolitan areas. According to the report, other religious groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs, the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Scientologists, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). A 2015 study by the Catholic University of Louvain updates the estimate of the Muslim portion of the population to approximately 7 percent with no significant changes for other affiliations.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees freedom of worship (including its public practice) and freedom of expression, provided no crime is committed in the exercise of these freedoms. It states no individual may be barred from religious ceremonies or from observing religious days of rest, and bars the state from interfering in the appointment of religious clergy or blocking the publication of religious documents. It obligates the state to pay the salaries and pensions of religious clergy certified by the official organizations of recognized religions and are officially employed in recognized houses of worship.

The law prohibits discrimination based on religious or philosophical (e.g., nonconfessional) orientation. Federal law prohibits public statements inciting religious hatred, including Holocaust denial. The maximum sentence for Holocaust denial is one year in prison.

The government officially recognizes Catholicism, Protestantism (including evangelicals and Pentecostals), Judaism, Anglicanism (separately from other Protestant groups), Islam, Orthodox (Greek and Russian) Christianity, and secular humanism.

The requirements to obtain official recognition are not legally defined. The legal basis for official recognition is composed of the constitution and other laws and interpretations, some of which predate the constitution itself. A religious group seeking official recognition applies to the Ministry of Justice, which then recommends approval or rejection. The government evaluates whether the group meets organizational and reporting requirements and applies criteria based on administrative and legislative precedents in deciding whether to recommend that parliament grant recognition to a religious group. The religious group must have a structure or hierarchy, a “sufficient number” of members, and a “long period” of existence in the country. It must offer “social value” to the public, abide by the laws of the state, and respect public order. The government does not formally define “sufficient number,” “long period of time,” or “social value.” Final approval is the sole responsibility of the federal parliament; however, parliament generally accepts the ministry’s recommendation.

The law requires each officially recognized religion to have an official interlocutor, such as an office composed of one or more representatives of the religion plus administrative staff, to support the government in its constitutional duty of providing the material conditions for the free exercise of religion. The functions performed by the interlocutor include certification of clergy and teachers of the religion, assistance in the development of religious curriculum, and oversight of the management of houses of worship.

The federal government provides financial support for officially recognized religious groups. The subsidies for recognized groups include payment of clergy salaries, maintenance, and equipment for facilities and places of worship, and tax exemptions. Denominations or divisions within the recognized religious groups (Shia Islam, Reform Judaism, or Lutheranism, for example) do not receive support or recognition separate from their parent religious group. Unrecognized groups outside of these recognized religions do not receive government subsidies but may worship freely and openly.

There are procedures for individual houses of worship of recognized religious groups to obtain recognition and state subsidies. To do so, a house of worship must meet requirements set by the region in which it is located and by the federal Ministry of Justice. These requirements include transparency and legality of accounting practices, renunciation of foreign sources of income for ministers of religion working in the facility, compliance with building and fire safety codes, certification of the minister of religion by the relevant interlocutor body, and a security check. Recognized houses of worship also receive subsidies from the linguistic communities and municipalities for the upkeep of religious buildings. Houses of worship or other religious groups that are unable or choose not to meet these requirements may organize as nonprofit associations and benefit from certain tax advantages (but not government subsidies). Houses of worship in this situation (i.e., not completing the recognition process) may still be affiliated with an officially recognized religious group.

There is a federal ban on covering one’s face in public. Women who wear the full-face veil in public face a maximum fine of 137.50 euros ($170).

The constitution requires teaching in public schools to be neutral with respect to religious belief. All public schools offer mandatory religious instruction or, alternatively, “moral” instruction (which is oriented towards citizenship and moral values), although parents in schools in Flanders may have their children opt out of such courses. A constitutional court ruling in 2015 allows francophone community parents to opt out of primary school religion and ethics classes for their children, pursuant to the court’s finding those classes not to be “objective, critical, and pluralistic.”

Schools provide teachers for each of the recognized religious groups, as well as for secular humanism, according to the student’s preference. The public education system requires neutrality in the presentation of religious views outside of religion classes. Teachers of religion are permitted to express their religious beliefs and wear religious attire, even if school policy otherwise forbids such attire. Public school religion teachers are nominated by a committee from their religious group and appointed by the linguistic community government’s education minister. Private, authorized religious schools following the same curriculum as public schools are known as “free” schools. They receive government subsidies for operating expenses, including building maintenance and utilities. Teachers in these schools, like other civil servants, are paid by their respective linguistic community governments.

UNIA, formerly the Inter-federal Center for Equal Opportunities, is a publicly funded but independent agency responsible for litigating discrimination cases, including those of a religious nature.

The justice minister appoints a magistrate in each judicial district to monitor discrimination cases and facilitate prosecution of discrimination as a criminal act.

The Walloon and Flanders regional governments, which have jurisdiction over animal welfare, passed laws in May and July, respectively, banning the ritual slaughter of animals without prior stunning. In accordance with kosher and halal practices, ritual slaughter should take place only with unstunned animals. The bans are scheduled to take effect in 2019, ending the permission granted to certified permanent slaughterhouses in those regions to slaughter animals without prior stunning. Both regions ban animal slaughter without prior stunning in temporary slaughtering facilities in use during Islamic holidays.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In the continuing aftermath of 2016 terrorist attacks, the government maintained its efforts to curb what it termed radical Islam in the country’s mosques. In January the Ministry of Justice released a report that labeled Salafism a “societal problem” that can lead to jihadism in the country. In February a report by the government’s Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA) was leaked to the media in which CUTA was cited as stating an increasing number of mosques and Islamic centers were “controlled by Wahhabism,” which was the “Salafist missionary apparatus,” and constituted a threat to the practice of moderate Islam in the country.

In its final report issued in October, the parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on Terrorist Attacks recommended oversight of the Great Mosque in Brussels be removed from the government of Saudi Arabia, which had been granted a concession to oversee the mosque in 1967, and be transferred to the Muslim Executive, the official interlocutor between the government and the country’s Muslim community. The commission further recommended a broader cross-section of Islamic schools of thought should inform management of the mosque, beyond the Salafi/Wahhabi schools, which had been the previous dominant orientation at the mosque, but which the commission determined represented a possible source of radicalism.

The federal and regional governments stated they remained committed to their previously announced plans to encourage mosques to seek official recognition as a means of increasing government oversight. Although the federal government recommended several mosques for recognition by the regional governments, the number of recognized mosques initially declined during the year from 81 to 80 as the result of the withdrawal of official recognition from one mosque by the Flemish minister of home affairs following media reports that the Turkish government sought to determine the content of religious sermons and politically involve itself in the mosque’s operation. The minister also requested the investigation of another mosque. In the wake of these actions, which prompted a negative reaction from the federal minister of justice who was responsible for recognition at the federal level, the recognition of new mosques in Flanders reportedly remained gridlocked. The Walloon regional government later recognized several mosques, increasing the total of recognized mosques to 83 – two higher than the previous year.

Members of the Jewish community stated the public authorities were more aware and concerned about physical threats to the Jewish community following terrorist attacks in 2016. They stated that authorities had failed, however, to address what they termed “day-to-day” anti-Semitism in the country, including expressions of online hatred and the doubling of documented anti-Semitic acts and threats.

The Buddhist community’s previously filed application for recognition remained pending with the Ministry of Justice as of the end of the year. The government nonetheless continued to provide subsidies to the community in preparation for its recognition as a “nonconfessional philosophical community.”

The Hindu community’s previously filed request for recognition also remained pending with the Ministry of Justice at the end of the year.

The government maintained its ban on wearing religious symbols in public sector jobs requiring interaction with the public.

In July in a case brought by two Muslim women challenging the law banning wearing the niqab in public, the ECHR upheld the government’s ban, ruling the ban was not discriminatory. The court agreed that the government had the right to consider the ban necessary in a democratic society in order to guarantee the concept of “living together” and the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

Most public schools continued to ban headscarves, in accordance with the policy allowing individual schools to decide whether to impose such bans. At least 90 percent of public schools sponsored by the francophone community and virtually all Flemish public schools maintained such bans. Of the 98 Brussels public schools, three continued to allow headscarves.

A new institute for the education of Muslim clergy and scholars opened in Wallonia, following 2016 action by the regional government and the government of the francophone community to establish it.

According to Muslim groups, city and town administrations continued to withhold approval or continued to delay approval for the construction of new mosques and Islamic cultural centers. In Court-Saint-Etienne, city authorities denied an application for the construction of a new mosque for the fourth time in the past five years.

The Jewish community issued public statements criticizing the decisions by the Flanders and Walloon governments to ban slaughter without prior stunning as attacks on Jewish religious practices. The Coordinating Committee of Belgian Jewish Organizations stated the two regions had sent a negative political message because these laws did not respect the principle of equality. The Brussels regional government did not authorize any temporary slaughterhouse specifically for slaughter without prior stunning during Islamic holidays as it had done in previous years.

In September the government’s Committee for Bio-Ethics, after a three-year study, issued a report expressing opposition to circumcision for reasons other than medical necessity, which precluded circumcision based on religious custom. Its ruling stated the physical integrity of the child takes precedence over the belief system of the parents. The recommendation was not legally binding, and some members of the committee stated they recognized the practice of circumcision was also an issue of religious freedom. The report issued a unanimous recommendation to stop social security reimbursements for nonmedical circumcisions, valued at approximately 2.6 million euros ($3.1 million) per year.

The Ministry of Justice increased its annual allocation for clergy salaries and other financial support for recognized religious groups by four million euros to 104 million euros ($124.9 million). Catholic groups once again received approximately 85 percent of the total available funding for religious groups, followed by secular humanists (8 percent) and Protestant groups (2.5 percent). Muslims again received approximately 2 percent of the funding, which was not commensurate with their share of the population, and which observers said did not account for the actual level of services required for imams and mosques.

The ECHR upheld in July the 2013 conviction of Fouad Belkacem by the country’s highest court for hate speech in videos he made in 2011 inciting other persons to discriminate on the basis of faith and to commit violence against non-Muslims. Belkacem had argued his videos were protected under free speech. Belkacem made the appeal to the ECHR while in prison serving a separate 12-year sentence from 2015 for leading a terrorist group.

The Liege appeals court in January upheld the two-month prison sentence previously issued to French comedian Dieudonne for incitement to hatred, anti-Semitism, and Holocaust denial in a 2012 nightclub show. In June the country’s highest court upheld the appellate court decision, although media commentary suggested Dieudonne ultimately would not spend time in prison due to overcrowding but would have to pay the 9,000 euro ($10,800) fine levied by the court.

In November the mayors of Brussels and Molenbeek banned a so-called Islam safari that aimed to showcase the Brussels neighborhood of Molenbeek’s alleged connections to violent extremism. The event was organized by the leader of Belgium’s Vlaams Belang party, Filip Dewinter, jointly with Dutch Freedom Party Leader Geert Wilders. Wilders held a press conference at the Belgian Parliament in response to the event’s banning, saying “Enough is enough. Parliamentarians should be able to travel freely in their own country. But mayors are telling us that this is forbidden, and they are saying Molenbeek no longer belongs to Belgium.”

In April the Forum of Jewish Organizations of the Flemish Region released a statement denouncing the city of Antwerp’s plan to move a 20-year-old Holocaust monument to a quieter neighborhood so the annual Holocaust commemoration and its required security would “have less of an impact on traffic.” The statement noted that the Jewish community was not consulted and that the proposed location had no historic connection to the Holocaust, during which German and Belgian officers concentrated thousands of Antwerp Jews at the Belgielei location ahead of their shipment to death camps. The statement said the move “would result in the loss of a historical, emotional, and educational dimension.” The mayor of Antwerp acknowledged the failure to consult the Jewish community and apologized.

In November the Jewish Museum of Belgium together with the Belgian State Archive, with support from the Jewish-Moroccan Cultural Center, mounted its first new exhibition since a terrorist attack killed four persons there in 2014. The exhibit “Belgium, Welcoming Land?” explores the history of immigration to the country, and its curator stated the aim was to emphasize cultural commonalities among immigrants as a means to counter intolerance.

UNIA reported it recorded 365 complaints of online hate speech in 2016 compared with 333 in 2015 (10 percent increase), with anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim hate speech representing the vast majority of cases. UNIA reported an increase in anti-Semitic acts and threats from 57 in 2015 to 109 in 2016, the most recent year for which data were available.

In September a Belgian convert to Islam verbally and then physically attacked a Hasidic Jew on his way home from religious services in Antwerp. Police apprehended the assailant, and the case remained under investigation.

NGOs reported private employers continued to ban religious attire such as headscarves if they believed such attire would interfere with the performance of an employee’s duties. On March 14, in a ruling addressing the terminations of a Belgian citizen and a French citizen from their workplaces for wearing headscarves, the ECJ stated employers could ban religious symbols, such as headscarves, in the workplace if the ban were part of a general, internal policy of projecting neutrality among employees. The ECJ ruling stipulated customers could not demand that workers remove their headscarves if the company had no preexisting policy on neutrality in the workplace.

Observers and NGOs continued to report incidents of discrimination against Muslims in the workplace. Muslim women wearing headscarves continued to report they were targets of discrimination.

UNIA reported there were 88 complaints of workplace discrimination based on religion in 2016, the latest year for which data were available, compared with 46 in 2015.

UNIA recorded 390 complaints of religious discrimination and harassment in 2016, the most recent year for which comprehensive data was available, not including the 109 anti-Semitic incidents, which UNIA tracks separately. This total compared with 330 complaints recorded in 2015. UNIA reported 89 percent of the 390 complaints concerned Muslims, with the majority involving hate speech on the internet, although there were also cases involving labor or education issues. UNIA reported 40 percent of the 2016 incidents were media-related, 23 percent labor-related, and 12 percent related to the distribution of goods and services.

Although UNIA reported separately on anti-Semitism, including on incidents of discrimination, harassment, online hate speech, threats and acts of violence, Jewish groups complained that UNIA did not take anti-Semitism as seriously as other forms of discrimination. They cited one case in which a UNIA legal expert’s internal email leaked. The email concerned a 2014 court case in which an individual received a six-month suspended sentence for shouting anti-Semitic statements at a rally in Antwerp. The expert had described the conviction as “distorted” and not “true justice,” triggering admonishment from the Jewish community and some politicians concerning the expert’s lack of impartiality.

Jewish groups reported continued anti-Semitic statements and attitudes in the media, particularly related to the government of Israel and the Holocaust. For example, some Jewish leaders said there was a proliferation of online comments posted ostensibly as criticisms of the Israeli government but contained anti-Semitic elements such as rhetoric conflating Jews with Israeli government policy or blaming Jews for Israel’s actions.

A 2016 case of anti-Semitic bullying at a school in Brussels, including jokes referencing the Holocaust, concluded with the expulsion of the perpetrator from school and the relocation of the victim to another school.

In December the Belgian Federation of Jewish Organizations, at the urging of human rights organizations, requested that the management of the Bruges soccer team strongly penalize the fans who engaged in anti-Semitic slurs in soccer stadiums, including deducting points from the team whose fans stoked religious hatred.

At least 100 young Muslim and Jewish leaders from around Europe came together in Brussels for a “Joint Day of Action against Anti-Semitism and Anti-Muslim Hatred and Discrimination,” organized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and EU bodies on May 30. European Muslim and Jewish participants raised concerns about what they characterized as the stark rise of anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment in European societies, primarily fueled by political campaign rhetoric.

Jewish and Muslim leaders convened for a “Muslims March Against Terrorism” stop in Brussels, with 60 imams on a peace tour across multiple European cities. During the event, a member of the public disturbed a speech on religious unity by Rabbi Avi Tawil, the director of the European Jewish Community Center. The police removed the individual. Interior Minister Jan Jambon said security measures alone were not enough and stressed the need to strengthen the social fabric.

U.S. embassy officials discussed continued anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic incidents and sentiment, as well as Turkish influence on the country’s mosques, in meetings with representatives from the Prime Minister’s Office; the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Justice; and the regional governments. Embassy officials also discussed with government officials the continued efforts of Buddhist and Hindu groups to obtain recognition and the status of the government’s plans to encourage more mosques to apply for official recognition as places of worship.

Embassy officials regularly met with religious leaders to discuss religious discrimination incidents and ways to counter public manifestations of anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic sentiment. They continued engagement with activists from the Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish communities to promote interreligious understanding. The embassy sponsored a six-month youth program that promotes interfaith dialogue between Jewish and Muslim youth. A separate embassy program funded the production and translation of a documentary that amplifies training for Belgian youth interfaith ambassadors in schools. A Fulbright scholar researched efforts to build resilience in Antwerp’s Hasidic Jewish community through vocational programs independent of the declining diamond industry.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 360,000 (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2010 census, the Roman Catholic Church is the largest religious group, accounting for 40 percent of the population. Protestants make up 34 percent, including Pentecostals (9 percent), Seventh-day Adventists (6 percent), Anglicans (5 percent), Mennonites (4 percent), Baptists (4 percent), Methodists (3 percent), and the Church of the Nazarene (3 percent). Jehovah’s Witnesses make up 2 percent of the population, while other religious groups, including The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, Rastafarians, The Salvation Army, and Bahais, together constitute 11 percent. Approximately 15 percent of the population does not belong to any listed religious affiliation.

No religious group is a majority in any of the country’s six districts. Catholics reside throughout the country. Mennonites and Pentecostals reside mostly in the rural areas of the Cayo and Orange Walk Districts.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion, freedom to change religion or belief, and freedom – either alone or in community with others – to manifest and propagate one’s religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice, and observance. It states that no one may be compelled to take an oath contrary to one’s religion or belief. The constitution stipulates that religious groups may establish places of education and states that “no such community shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for persons of that community.” Discrimination on religious grounds is illegal.

The preamble to the constitution acknowledges “the supremacy of God.” The Council of Churches, a board including representatives from several major Christian denominations, along with the BAEC, together appoint one senator to the senate with the governor general’s concurrence. The two groups together include the Anglican, Catholic, Methodist, and Presbyterian Churches, The Salvation Army, the Chinese Christian Mission, the Church of Christ, Assembly of God Church, the Seventh-day Adventists, and other evangelical Protestant groups. They do not, however, include the NEAB, which split from the BAEC in 2015 over political differences, or any non-Christian denominations. The current “Church” senator was appointed in November 2015. Senate transitions typically occur with a change in administration.

An unenforced law limits speech that is “blasphemous or indecent.”

The law requires all religious groups to register with the official Companies Registry within the Ministry of the Attorney General in a process similar to that of a business. Registration permits the religious organization to operate legally in the country; be recognized by the state; negotiate, sue, and be sued; own property; hire employees; and lend or borrow money. There is a one-time registration fee of 295 Belize dollars ($148) and a yearly fee of five Belize dollars ($2.50). Requirements for registration include a memorandum of association with the government delineating the group’s objective and mission, an article of association, and a letter from the central bank if the organization has foreign financial contributors. The government may shut down the facilities of groups that fail to register.

The government does not levy property taxes on churches and other places of worship. Other church-owned buildings occupied on a regular basis, such as clergy residences, are not tax-exempt. Religious organizations may also partner with the state to operate schools, run hospitals and other charity organizations, and, depending on funding availability, receive financial assistance from the government. Local religious groups commonly affiliate with international NGOs and international religious partners from the United States and Canada to carry out mission work in the country. They hold joint conferences and outreach activities to address health, poverty, and education issues. Government assistance is rare, but the government occasionally works with religious groups in specific fields, such as health services and education.

The public school curriculum includes weekly nondenominational “spirituality” classes incorporating morals, values, and world religions for students in both public and church-run schools from kindergarten through sixth grade. While there is no official rule governing students’ ability to opt out of these sessions, parents may decide their children will not attend. The constitution prohibits any educational institution from obligating a child to attend any religious ceremonies or observances. Christian churches manage most public elementary schools, high schools, and some colleges. Catholic and other Christian holidays are routinely observed at the schools’ discretion. A few schools are run by non-Christian religious groups, such as the Muslim Community Primary School in Belize City.

The law grants respect for inmates’ religious beliefs, and as such, inmates may participate in religious activities within prison facilities. Religious leaders may request use of the chaplain inside the facility and offer religious service to inmates. Prison authorities avoid unnecessary work by prisoners on Sunday and other major Christian religious holidays (Christmas and Good Friday) and by prisoners recorded as belonging to other religions on their recognized day of religious observance. The law allows religious scriptures and other books of religious observance be made available to the prisoners.

To enter the country and proselytize, foreign religious workers need a multi-entry visa, which costs 100 Belize dollars ($50) and is valid for one year. Applicants must also purchase a religious worker’s permit, costing 50 Belize dollars ($25). The visas are renewable on an annual basis. Visa requirements include information on length of stay, location, funding for activity, and specific purpose. Members of all religious groups are eligible to obtain visas. While the group does not need to be locally registered, recommendation by a locally registered religious group lends more credibility to the visa request according to local authorities.

The Belize Defense Force retains a nondenominational chaplain and space for religious observance. With the prior consent of the authorities, any religious group may use the space for worship.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In January a court ruled in favor of a Rastafarian schoolboy who was not allowed to attend class at a public school in August 2016 because of his dreadlocks. Following the ruling, the school allowed the boy to attend class and agreed to pay the family’s legal fees.

The government owned the Belize Central Prison, the only prison in the country. Catholic NGO, the Kolbe Foundation, continued to run the prison by providing general administration, policing, and security. Religious leaders from varying denominations visited the prison to hold services at a nondenominational chapel within the prison. Kolbe reported the prison continued to respect dietary restrictions for prisoners from various religious backgrounds. Several religious groups, including Anglicans, Methodists, Catholics, evangelical Protestants, Seventh-day Adventists, Nazarenes, Mennonites, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslims, Baptists, and Mormons, continued to make frequent use of the access to clergy granted by prison administration.

The government continued to allow religious organizations to own and operate radio and television stations. There were 15 registered religious-based radio stations operating in the country; the government did not provide specific information on which religious groups owned or operated radio and television stations. Some sources estimated the majority of the stations were owned and run by evangelical Protestant groups. The other stations included one Catholic, two Mennonite, and one Pentecostal radio station.

In September the Council of Churches said it was displeased with the government’s decision to hold National Day (September 10) festivities with a citizens’ parade on a Sunday. The government held the planned activities on that day but stated “relevant steps would be taken” to avoid a similar situation in the future.

Some church leaders said certain evangelical pastors acted irresponsibly in their radio and television broadcasts on religion-associated stations, including attacking religious leaders supporting the August 2016 Supreme Court ruling that found the section of the criminal code that outlawed “carnal intercourse against the order of nature” to be unconstitutional.

The rift continued between the NEAB and the BAEC. The NEAB stated it believed the government had interfered to ensure the Council of Churches’ senate representative remained sympathetic to the political party in power. The NEAB was not a member of the Council while the BAEC was.

Embassy representatives met with government officials to emphasize the importance of the government’s continued engagement with a wide spectrum of religious groups in the country, including religious minorities.

The embassy invited the religious community to participate in embassy programming and outreach and to reinforce the role of religious groups in promoting respect for religious diversity and tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 11 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2013 census, 48.5 percent of the population is Christian, 27.7 percent is Muslim (mostly Sunni), 11.6 percent practice Voodoo, 2.6 percent are members of indigenous religious groups, 2.6 percent members of other religious groups, and 5.8 percent declare no religious affiliation. The largest Christian denominations are Roman Catholicism with 25.5 percent of the population and Celestial Christian with 6.7 percent. Other smaller religious groups include Methodists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Bahais, Baptists, Pentecostals, the Family Federation of World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), and Eckankar followers.

Many individuals who identify themselves as Christian or Muslim also practice Voodoo or other traditional religions.

Most Muslims are concentrated in northern areas. The few Shia Muslims are primarily foreign residents. Southern areas are predominantly Christian.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes a secular state, prohibits religious discrimination, and provides for freedom of religious thought, expression, and practice, consistent with public order as established by law and regulations.

The Ministry of Defense through the gendarmes, generally in rural areas, and the Ministry of Interior through the police, generally in cities, have the authority to intervene in conflicts between religious groups to ensure public order and social peace, provided the intervention complies with the principle of state neutrality in religious affairs. On July 18, the government announced the police force and the gendarmerie would merge into a single entity under the Ministry of Interior effective January 1, 2018.

Persons who wish to form a religious group or establish a religious affiliation must register with the Ministry of Interior. Registration requirements include submission of administrative materials (including the applicant’s birth certificate, police record, request letter, copy of identification, and the group’s internal rules) and payment of a registration fee of 50,000 CFA francs ($89). If a group is not registered, the Ministry of Interior orders the closing of the religious facilities until the group registers.

By law, public schools may not provide religious instruction. Religious groups may establish private schools given the authorization of the state and may benefit from state subsidies.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On the night of January 28, five followers of the Baname Church died from asphyxiation in the department of Oueme and several more were hospitalized after church leaders told followers to shut themselves in their prayer rooms and burn incense and charcoal sold to them by the church. Following the incident, the prosecutor at the Court of Porto-Novo ordered the detention of four priests of the church and in February entered manslaughter charges against them. The church leader, who, according to media reports, is known for opposing other religions, especially voodoo, and who has stated that she was a “living god” was not arrested or charged; she later told a radio reporter that the five who died were not really church members, but “people who came to test us.”

Government officials attended inductions, funerals, and other religious ceremonies organized by various groups. State-owned television often broadcast these events. Police provided security for any religious event upon request.

There were reports of interreligious conflict that involved intervention by government security forces. On January 8, two persons died and several were injured during a violent clash between followers of the Baname Church and local residents of the Djime neighborhood in Abomey due to church followers’ statements that local residents deemed offensive to the historic King of Abomey, Bahanzin. Church members also threatened to destroy voodoo shrines in Abomey. On January 9, police intercepted a car transporting 26 armed followers of the Church of Baname who authorities said were on a revenge mission to Djime. After the clashes, the leadership of the Church of Baname stated that the police and gendarmes failed to take action despite prior knowledge of the planned attack on followers of the Church of Baname. In response to the complaint, on January 11, the government placed the heads of the police and gendarmes in Abomey on a six-month administrative leave before assigning them to other posts; the case closed.

On August 20, members of the Zangbeto brotherhood blockaded the Church of the Assemblies of God in the village of Doukonta in the commune of Lokossa, in the southwestern part of the country, preventing Sunday services from taking place. The incident occurred in response to accusations by the pastor and his family members on August 17 that some members of the Zangbeto brotherhood had stolen a chicken from the pastor’s chicken coop for a ritual purpose. Local authorities and the police met with the leaders of the two religious groups to quell the tension between the two religious communities.

Interfaith dialogue occurred regularly. On September 23, the Community of Sant’Egidio in Benin held an interreligious conference in Cotonou, gathering Christian, Muslim, and traditional religious leaders along with government officials and members of the diplomatic community. The conference hosted a number of panels, with discussion sessions, on issues such as peace, human rights, and interfaith dialogue. Participants signed a communique calling for peace and religious harmony.

To commemorate the 50th anniversary of its establishment in the country, the Ahmadi Muslim community organized a series of interreligious conferences in Allada, Bohicon, Lokossa, Parakou, Kandi, Bassila, and Porto-Novo. Religious leaders, local authorities, and government officials attended the conferences, which focused on religious freedom, interfaith dialogue, social cohesion, and peace. The government sent representatives to deliver keynote remarks at the conferences, which, according to observers, highlighted government interest in advancing interreligious dialogue.

Embassy officials met periodically with imams and other religious leaders to encourage religious tolerance. On June 12-14, embassy officials visited the predominantly Muslim north, including Parakou, the country’s second largest city; Djougou, fourth largest city; and Copargo. The embassy delegation met with imams, members of mosque congregations, Muslim women’s associations, and Quranic teachers. The Ambassador underscored the rejection of religious intolerance and violence.

At the September 23 interreligious conference hosted by the Community of Sant’Egidio in Benin, the Ambassador delivered remarks highlighting the promotion of peace through interfaith dialogue and religious freedom.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 758,000 (July 2017 estimate). According to a 2010 report by the Pew Research Center, approximately 75 percent of the population follows the Drukpa Kagyu or Nyingma schools of Buddhism. Hindus are approximately 22 percent of the total population and reside mostly in southern areas of the country.

According to the Pew Research Center and the Open Doors World Watch List, estimates of the size of the Christian community range from the low thousands to 20,000. Estimates by local and international Christian groups range from 3,000 to 15,000. Most Christians are concentrated in towns in the south of the country. Although traditional Bon practices are often combined with Buddhist practices, very few citizens adhere exclusively to this religious tradition, according to scholars. The Sharchop ethnic group, which forms the majority of the population in the east, practices elements of Tibetan Buddhism combined with elements of the Bon tradition and Hinduism, according to the advocacy group Alliance Defending Freedom.

In May Bhutan’s Home Minister stated there were 53,042 foreign workers in the country, most of whom are likely Hindu or Muslim, based on previous government information.

Legal Framework

The constitution recognizes Buddhism as the state’s “spiritual heritage” and stipulates it is “the responsibility of all religious institutions and personalities to promote the spiritual heritage of the country.” The constitution states every citizen has “the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion” and bans discrimination based on faith. The constitution says the king must be Buddhist and requires the king to be the “protector of all religions.”

The constitution states, “No person shall be compelled to belong to another faith by means of coercion or inducement.” The penal code criminalizes coercion or inducement to convert as a misdemeanor, punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment.

The law prohibits oral or written communication “promoting enmity between religious groups” and provides for sentences of up to three years’ imprisonment for violations. There were no reports of prosecutions.

The penal code states individuals found guilty of promoting civil unrest by advocating “religious abhorrence,” disturbing public tranquility, or committing an act “prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony” between religious groups shall be subject to punishment of five to nine years’ imprisonment. There were no reports of prosecutions during the year.

The law requires religious groups to register with the CRO. To register, a religious group must submit an application demonstrating its leaders are citizens and disclose their educational background and financial assets. The law also specifies the organizational structure, bylaws, and procedural rules registered religious organizations must follow. The law prohibits religious organizations from “violating the spiritual heritage” of the country and requires them to protect and promote it. The law also states no religious organization shall do anything to impair the sovereignty, security, unity, or territorial integrity of the country. The law mandates the CRO certify that religious groups applying for registration meet the requirements specified in the law.

Registered religious groups may raise funds for religious activities; they are exempt from taxes. Registered groups require permission from local government authorities to hold public meetings outside of their registered facilities and must seek permission from the Ministry of Home and Cultural Affairs to invite foreign speakers or receive foreign funds.

Unregistered religious groups may not organize publicly, own property, raise funds, conduct outreach activities, or import literature. According to the law, these activities are subject to penalties ranging from fines to prison terms, depending on the offense. Unregistered religious groups may hold private worship services in homes. The law states it is an offense for a religious group to provide false or misleading information in its religious teachings, to misuse investments, or to raise funds illegally. The CRO has authority to determine whether the content of a group’s religious teachings is false or misleading and whether it has raised funds illegally. Sanctions include fines and potential revocation of registration.

The law states the CRO shall consist of an eight-member board responsible for overseeing the structure of religious institutions, enforcing the constitutional separation between the government and religious organizations, and monitoring religious fundraising activities. The chairperson of the board is a cabinet minister appointed by the prime minister. A senior official from the Ministry of Finance and one of the king’s appointees to the National Council also sit on the board. The director of culture in the Ministry of Home Affairs serves as an ex-officio secretary. Heads of Buddhist religious bodies and the Hindu Dharma Samurai occupy the remaining seats. The law requires the CRO “ensure that religious institutions and personalities promote the spiritual heritage of the country” by developing a society “rooted in Buddhist ethos.”

The constitution states the king shall appoint the chief abbot of the central monastic body on the advice of the five masters of the monastic body. Those individuals and a civil servant administrative secretary make up the Commission for Monastic Affairs, which manages issues related to Buddhist doctrine. The constitution says the state will provide funds and “facilities” to the central monastic body.

The law permits the government to “avoid breaches of the peace” by requiring licenses for public assembly, prohibiting assembly in designated areas, and imposing curfews. The government may apply these measures to groups and organizations of all kinds, including religious groups.

Government approval is required to construct religious buildings. By law, all buildings, including religious structures must adhere to traditional Bhutanese architectural standards. The CRO determines conformity with these standards.

The constitution states religious institutions have the responsibility to ensure religion remains separate from the state. It also says, “Religious institutions and personalities shall remain above politics.” The law prohibits religious organizations from involvement in political activity. Ordained members of the clergy of any religion may not engage in political activities, including running for office and voting.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

NGO representatives continued to express concern over the lack of a clear definition in the constitution and legal code for terms such as “inducement to religious conversion.” They stated this lack of clarity continued to put the religious activities of minority religious groups at risk, citing religious teaching, charitable services, and public education as examples of activities the government could penalize. Civil society representatives continued to say the potential existed for arbitrary government action, however, there were no reports during the year that the government used the law to penalize any one and surreptitious religious conversions from Buddhism to other religions continued.

According to Open Doors and a local pastor, churches that previously applied for registration continued to await a response from the CRO. Hindu Dharma Samurai was the only registered non-Buddhist religious group, out of 96 registered groups. As in previous years, the CRO reported no Christian groups had applied for registration. Members of Christian associations reported that Christian groups attempting to register on multiple occasions in the past also received no official response. Christian groups said the lack of registration meant they continued not to be able to raise funds. They added that villagers disrupted their gatherings and local authorities questioned their legal status. Christian groups and media sources reported the government continued to provide preferential treatment for Buddhist groups for registration and financial support.

NGOs reported unregistered religious groups continued to be able to worship in private but remained unable to exercise certain rights such as property ownership. Members of the Christian community continued to report holding religious meetings discreetly in private facilities. They also continued to report that some Christians living close to the country’s border traveled to India for worship. An NGO reported one house church closed and those in another district ceased meetings after receiving threats and warnings from the government.

An NGO reported that Christians said they often faced difficulty or fail to obtain a “non-objection certificate” from local authorities, required for loan and employment applications, property registration, , and the renewal of identification cards.

The government continued its financial assistance for the construction of Buddhist temples and shrines, as well as funding for Buddhist monks and monasteries. Government construction, which began in 2012 and scheduled for completion in 2018, continued on a large Hindu temple in Thimphu.

Local NGOs reported compulsory Buddhist daily prayer sessions in schools continued. Some Christian leaders said children of Christian families faced discrimination from teachers and sometimes were denied access to schools. The government reportedly continued to provide scholarships for Hindus to study Sanskrit in India.

Courts and some other government institutions remained housed within Buddhist monasteries. Some religious groups stated government ceremonies continued to involve mandatory Buddhist prayer rituals. An NGO reported government pressure on non-Buddhists in civil service positions to participate in Buddhist rites and contribute to festivals. According to the NGO, government employees who refused to comply were pressured to resign.

NGOs reported continuing societal pressure on individuals to participate in Buddhist traditions and practices. The NGO Open Doors reported Christians faced discrimination in their personal and professional lives and rated persecution of Christians as “very high.” According to Open Doors, Christians experienced tremendous pressure to conform and were persecuted accordingly, since Buddhism and traditional religions were considered part of the country’s heritage. For Christian converts, surveillance by local religious leaders, families, and entire communities prevented the free expression and practice of the Christian faith.

The United States does not have a diplomatic presence in the country and does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with the government. The U.S. Embassy in New Delhi continued to conduct informal discussions during periodic visits.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 11.1 million (July 2017 estimate). According to U.S. government figures, 77 percent of the population identifies as Roman Catholic and 16 percent as Protestant, including evangelical and Pentecostal groups. Approximately 5 percent identify with smaller religious groups and 5 percent self-identify as nonbelievers. There are approximately 250 Muslims and approximately 450 Jews, according to leaders of the respective faiths. Many indigenous communities, concentrated in rural areas, practice a mix of Catholic and indigenous “spiritual” traditions.

Legal Framework

According to the constitution, the state respects and provides for “freedom of thought, spirituality, religion and cult,” expressed individually or collectively, in public and in private. The constitution stipulates the state is independent of all religion.

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination, including in access to educational institutions, health services, and employment and protects the right of access to public sport and recreational activities without regard to religion.

The law requires religious groups to register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) Office of Religion and Nongovernmental Organizations as NGOs in order to operate legally. Pursuant to an accord with the Holy See, the Catholic Church is exempt from the registration law.

According to the MFA’s Religion and Nongovernmental Organizations Office, religious organizations must fulfill 14 requirements to register their organization with the government. Organizations must submit their notarized legal documents, including statutes, internal regulations, and procedures; rental agreement documents, utility bill invoices for the place(s) of worship, and a site map; detailed information on board members and legal representatives, including criminal background checks; an INTERPOL certificate for foreigners; and proof of fiscal solvency. They must also provide the organization chart, with names, addresses, identification card numbers, and photographs; a full list of members and identifying information; details on activities and services provided by the organization, including the location of the services; and information on their financing source(s), domestic and/or foreign.

The requirements for spiritual organizations vary from the religious organization requirements but require essentially the same type of information. The constitution defines a spiritual organization as a group of natural, national, and/or foreign persons who organize themselves to carry out practices that develop their spirituality according to their ancestral worldview. Most spiritual organizations are indigenous in their origins. The constitution defines a religious organization as a group of natural, national, and/or foreign persons who organize themselves with the purpose of carrying out practices of worship and/or belief around a Supreme Being, in order to develop their spirituality and religiosity, and whose purpose does not pursue profit.

The government may revoke an organization’s operating license if the organization does not produce an annual report of activities for more than two consecutive years; does not comply with its stated objectives; carries out activities different from those established in its statute; or carries out activities contrary to the country’s constitution, laws, morality, or “good customs.” A religious or spiritual organization may also lose its operating license if it does not comply with the deadline for renewing the license.

During the year, the government enacted a new regulation requiring religious and spiritual groups to reregister their operating licenses to ensure that all documents list the official name of the country as “Estado Plurinacional.” Prior to this new requirement, organizations could carry an older version of licenses that listed the name of the state as “Republica de Bolivia.” Reregistration also requires any amendments to organizations’ bylaws to conform to all new national laws. Organizations must comply with the new registration requirements by 2019. Registered religious groups receive tax, customs, and other legal benefits.

The fees to obtain an operating license differ between “Religious Organizations” and “Spiritual Organizations” with costs of 6,780 bolivianos ($990) and 4,068 bolivianos ($590), respectively.

The government reserves the right to revoke an organization’s operating permit for noncompliance with the registration requirements. The government may not deny legal recognition to any organization based on its articles of faith.

The constitution and other laws give educational institutions the option to teach religion classes, including indigenous spiritual belief classes, with the stated aim of encouraging mutual respect among religious communities. While religion classes are optional, schools must teach ethics with curriculum materials that promote religious tolerance. The government does not restrict religious teaching in public or private schools, and it does not restrict a student from attending private, religiously affiliated schools. The law also requires all schools to accept students regardless of their religious affiliation.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights.

Government Practices

According to members of the evangelical Christian community, several smaller religious communities that formed “house churches,” also known as unofficial worship locations, continued to refuse to register their organizations, stating they preferred not to provide the government with access to internal personal information. Sources stated that these unregistered groups could neither own property nor have bank accounts in their name; however, the sources said the government did not interfere with these organizations for their refusal to comply with the law.

On September 23, the foreign minister inaugurated the Single Window of Worship, an office designed to help expedite the process for religious and spiritual organizations to register their legal status, amendment of statutes, internal regulations, and structure of their respective administrative bodies with the government. The objective of the new office, according to government officials, was to ensure that the registration requirements were in line with the constitution. Religious entities affected by this new regulation could review the final wording and legal technical framework of the Single Window. The Single Window office began operating through the MFA on September 25.

As of the end of the year, the registry of the MFA’s Office of Religion and Nongovernmental Organizations continued to list 434 registered religious groups and approximately nine religious groups in the process of registering – the same numbers for 2016. The complexity of the registration procedure, including registering the legal name of the organization, reportedly caused many organizations to seek legal assistance in order to comply.

Church leaders continued to work with the government on a legislative proposal exempting churches from the registration requirements for the next five years. In July the constitutional court denied a 2015 petition submitted by evangelical Protestant leaders challenging the religious registration law; no interested parties appealed the court’s decision.

The Bolivian National Association of Evangelicals sent a letter to the foreign minister on September 27, raising what it said was governmental preferential treatment of indigenous groups and citing the fee structure difference to obtain operating licenses for spiritual and religious groups as an example. The government did not respond to the request during the year.

Government leaders continued to criticize religious leaders who publicly commented on political issues. In October Bishop Ricardo Centellas Guzman, the president of the Bolivian Episcopal Conference of Catholic Bishops (CEB), said the country could not afford to re-elect President Morales for a currently unconstitutional fourth term in office, lest the democratic country turn into “a dictatorship.” The president responded directly to the Bishop’s comments, stating, “Some priests do not tolerate Indians being president.” On December 10, Secretary General of the CEB Aurelio Pesoa responded to the November 28 constitutional court decision allowing President Morales to seek re-election indefinitely, stating that these decisions highlighted a “regression” of democratic rights and freedoms in the country during the year. Several religious leaders also said that access to the government and their ability to disagree with the government on political issues was limited.

A representative from the Jewish community stated that the Jewish community had no contact with the president and had not cultivated any kind of relationship with the Morales administration.

On April 12, the CEB rejected the government’s legislative proposal that would decriminalize abortion under certain circumstances and stated that the government excluded the Catholic Church in the official debate regarding such changes to current legislation. The CEB also charged the government with discriminating against the religious beliefs of the “majority of the Bolivian population,” which it stated was against abortion. President Morales stated that high officials in the government were not responsible for the draft legislation and that the Legislative Assembly, operating as an entity independent of the executive branch, was in full control of the legislative process. The Chamber of Deputies approved the measure on September 28 and sent it to the Senate for approval. On December 6, the Senate approved by two-thirds vote and without amendments Article 157 of the penal code, detailing the legality of abortion under certain circumstances.

In February the Chamber of Deputies ratified OAS conventions against discrimination and intolerance and against racism and racial discrimination. Religious organizations, including the Catholic and Protestant Churches, and civil society institutions objected to the government’s ratification on the basis that the ambiguity and breadth of the definitions of “intolerance” in the conventions could violate freedom of expression and religion.

Christian groups continued to challenge the government concerning the legality of a May 2016 gender identity law allowing transgender individuals to change officially their name gender to reflect their chosen sex on all official documents. In June the CEB and the United Evangelical Churches presented a formal request to the Constitutional Tribunal (TCP) to review the constitutionality of the law. Representatives of the Catholic Church stated they sought to defend the “nuclear family, marriage between a man and a woman, and the values and principles that the family brings to society,” through the constitutional challenge. On November 9, the TCP ruled that a portion of the gender identity law was unconstitutional, specifically the article allowing transgender individuals to “exercise all fundamental, political, labor, civil, economic, and social rights.” Most observers said the ruling meant transgender individuals no longer had the right to marry or adopt a child.

Several evangelical Protestant leaders stated that government officials continued to host and participate in interfaith meetings, but the government would often begin with a ritual from an indigenous group faith rather than from another group attending the event. Some Protestant leaders said government officials attended the religious ceremonies of some denominations more than of others; they also said the government gave preference to certain groups to participate in official ceremonies. Other observers, however, said senior government officials, including the vice president and regional governors, also attended Catholic masses in their official capacity.

Catholic and evangelical Protestant leaders said the government continued to favor an Andean spiritual philosophy, especially the philosophy of the ethnic Aymara community, over other religious beliefs, for government use in public statements and ceremonies. They stated this was a violation of the constitution’s separation of religion and state.

Evangelical Protestant leaders continued to state there were cases of indigenous leaders’ hitting pastors in remote rural areas. They also said members of indigenous communities continued to expel missionaries and pastors from rural communities for practicing a religion that did not defer to traditional Andean spiritual beliefs.

U.S. government access to government officials continued to be limited, despite embassy requests for meetings.

Embassy representatives routinely engaged religious leaders to underscore the importance of tolerance and religious freedom. In October the Charge d’Affaires hosted an interfaith meeting for religious leaders from the evangelical Protestant, Catholic, Methodist, Jewish, and Muslim communities to discuss religious freedom issues, such as registration challenges and perceived discrimination, and to engage religious leaders in interfaith dialogue. Religious representatives discussed what they said was government preference for Andean religious ceremonies and rituals and the longstanding and public tensions between the Catholic community and the government.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 3.9 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the first post-conflict census, conducted in 2013, Sunni Muslims constitute approximately 51 percent of the population; Serbian Orthodox Christians 31 percent; Roman Catholics 15 percent; and others, including Protestants and Jews, 3 percent.

There is a strong correlation between ethnicity and religion: Bosnian Serbs affiliate primarily with the SOC, and Bosnian Croats with the Roman Catholic Church. Bosniaks are predominantly Muslim. The Jewish community estimates it has 1,000 members, the majority living in Sarajevo. The majority of Serbian Orthodox live in the RS, and most Muslims and Catholics in the Federation. Protestant and most other small religious communities have their largest membership in Sarajevo and Banja Luka.

Legal Framework

Annex IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which serves as the country’s constitution, provides for freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. It stipulates no one shall be deprived of citizenship on grounds of religion and all persons shall enjoy the same rights and freedoms without discrimination as to religion. The entity constitution of the Federation states all individuals shall have freedom of religion, including of public and private worship, and freedom from discrimination based on religion or creed. It defines religion as a vital national interest of constituent peoples.

The entity constitution of the RS establishes the SOC as “the Church of the Serb people and other people of Orthodox religion.” It guarantees equal freedoms, rights, and duties for all citizens irrespective of religion. It specifies religious communities shall be equal before the law and free to manage their religious affairs and hold religious services; open religious schools and conduct religious education in all schools; engage in commercial activities; receive gifts; and establish and manage legacies in accordance with the law.

A state law on religion guarantees freedom of conscience, grants legal status to churches and religious communities, and grants to registered religious communities numerous rights, including the right to assemble, to conduct collaborative actions such as charity work, to raise funds, and to construct and occupy places of worship. The law states churches and religious communities serve as representative institutions and organizations of believers, founded in accordance with their own regulations, teachings, beliefs, traditions, and practices. The law recognizes the legal status of four “traditional” religious communities: the IC, SOC, Catholic Church, and Jewish community. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) maintains a unified register of all religious communities, and the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees is responsible for documenting violations of religious freedom.

According to the law, any group of 300 or more adult citizens may apply to register a new religious community or church through a written application to the MOJ. Other requirements for registration include the development of a statute defining the method of religious practice and a petition for establishment with the signatures of at least 30 founders. The ministry must issue a decision within 30 days of receipt of the application, and a group may appeal a negative decision to the state-level Council of Ministers. The law allows registered religious organizations to operate without restriction. The law also stipulates the ministry may deny the application for registration if it concludes the content and manner of worship may be “contrary to legal order, public morale, or is damaging to the life and health or other rights and freedoms of believers and citizens.”

The law states no new church or religious community may be founded bearing the same or similar name as an existing church or religious community. The law also states no one may use the symbols, insignia, or attributes of a church or a religious community without its consent.

A concordat with the Holy See recognizes the public juridical personality of the Catholic Church and grants a number of rights, including to establish educational and charitable institutions, carry out religious education, and officially recognize Catholic holidays. The commission for implementation of the concordat comprises five members from the government and five from the Holy See. A similar agreement exists with the SOC, but a commission for implementation does not yet exist.

The state recognizes the IC as the sole supreme institutional religious authority for all Muslims, including immigrants and refugees, as well as for Bosniaks and other Muslim nationals living outside the country who accept the IC’s authority. According to the law, no Islamic group may register with the MOJ or open a mosque without the permission of the IC.

The law affirms the right of every citizen to religious education. The law calls for a representative of each of the officially registered religious communities to be responsible for teaching religious studies in all public and private pre-, primary, and secondary schools and universities. Children from minority religious groups are entitled to religious education only when there are 18 or more students from that religious group in one class. Religious communities select and train their respective religious education teachers. These individuals are employees of the schools where they teach, but they receive accreditation from the religious body governing the curriculum.

The IC, SOC, and Catholic Church develop and approve religious curricula across the country. Public schools offer religious education in a school’s majority religion, with some exceptions. Secondary students who do not wish to attend the religion class have the right to opt out if their school offers a class in ethics as an alternative, which many schools do. Parents of primary school students may request their child be exempted from religion class.

In the Federation’s five Bosniak-majority cantons, primary and secondary schools offer Islamic religious instruction as a twice-weekly course. In cantons with Croat majorities, Croat students in primary and secondary schools attend an elective Catholic religion course twice a week. In the five primary and 10 secondary Catholic schools located in both the Federation and the Republika Srpska, parents may choose either an elective Catholic religion course or a course in ethics. In Sarajevo and Tuzla Cantons, primary and secondary students may either opt out or take ethics courses in lieu of religious education classes. The Sarajevo Canton Ministry of Education offers Orthodox and Protestant religious education in addition to classes offered to the Muslim and Catholic communities.

A law against discrimination prohibits exclusion, limitation, or preferential treatment of individuals based on religion in employment and the provision of social services in both the government and private sectors.

The state constitution provides for representation of the three major ethnic groups – Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks – in the government and armed forces. The constitution makes no explicit mention of representation for religious groups, although each ethnicity mentioned by the constitution is associated with a particular religion. Parliamentary seats and government positions are apportioned among the three constituent major ethnicities – Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks – according to quotas set by constitutional provisions.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Observers reported government authorities were not enforcing the 2015 decision by the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council prohibiting employees of judicial institutions from wearing any form of “religious insignia” at work, including headscarves. On January 30, the Border Police amended regulations regarding personal appearance to prohibit explicitly border officials from having beards.

According to IC officials, the Presidency did not approve an agreement, reached in 2015 between the state and the IC that addressed dietary restrictions in public institutions, employer accommodations for daily prayer, and time off to attend Friday prayers as well as to take a one-time trip to Mecca for the Hajj, as had been anticipated. IC officials reported there were unspecified objections from the Croat and Serb members of the Presidency to the text of the agreement.

According to representatives of the Catholic Church, there had been no meeting of the joint commission for implementation of the concordat with the Holy See since June 2016 due to a perceived lack of government interest. Earlier agreements reached by the commission, including legislation on observing religious holidays, remained unimplemented by the government and parliament.

According to SOC representatives, a continued lack of government initiative and the SOC’s lack of internal consensus contributed to the failure to reach agreement on establishing a commission to implement the government’s agreement with the SOC.

According to officials of minority religious groups, local authorities continued to discriminate against them with regard to the use of religious property and issuance of permits for new religious properties. Drvar municipal authorities continued to refuse construction permits for a new Catholic church, despite repeated requests from the local Catholic priest, the Banja Luka Catholic Diocese, and representatives from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which became directly engaged on the issue. Municipal authorities also continued to refuse to return any of the Catholic Church’s nationalized properties, according to Church officials in Banja Luka.

Representatives of the Mostar Evangelical Church reported they had decided to sell their property in the city center rather than try to rebuild the church there because of protracted delays and municipal authorities preventing the church from obtaining the necessary reconstruction permits. Church officials said they would search for a less contentious location.

According to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), provisions of the law regarding the religious education of returnee children remained unimplemented, particularly in segregated school systems, often at the behest of senior government authorities seeking to obstruct the process. Parents of more than 500 Bosniak children, who returned to their prewar homes in several RS communities, continued to boycott public schools for a fifth year, choosing instead to send their children to alternative schools organized on the premises of the IC’s administrative building and supported by the Federation Ministry of Education. Academic and NGO representatives reported continued social pressure on students from both majority and minority religious communities to attend instruction in their respective religions.

According to Catholic, Orthodox, and Jewish minorities, as well as Bosniak Muslims returning to a predominantly ethnic Serbian town, government authorities continued to enforce selectively their rights, especially for refugees returning to their original communities pursuant to the Dayton Peace Agreement. Leaders of religious minority communities, particularly in Canton 10 in the western part of the Federation and several municipalities in eastern RS, reported the continued failure of authorities to provide government services and protections to minorities, including access to health care, pensions, other social benefits, and the transfer of student records between districts. The leaders also said discrimination by local authorities continued when it came to providing police protection and investigating threats of violence, harassment, and vandalism. Because religion and ethnicity often are closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many actions as solely based on religious identity.

Observers reported continued failure by government authorities to implement a 2009 decision by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) stating the country should amend its constitution to allow members of religious and other minorities, including Jews, to run for president and the parliament’s upper house. According to the ECHR ruling, observers said, by apportioning government positions and seats in the parliament only among Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, the constitution discriminated against minority groups. Individuals who were not members of the three major ethnic/religious groups reported they could not hold any of the proportionally guaranteed government positions, including president.

NGOs, academics, and government agencies reported the continued association of each of the country’s major political parties with the religion practiced by the dominant ethnic group among its membership. The biggest ethnic Bosniak parties continued to align with the IC, the biggest ethnic Croat parties with the Catholic Church, and the two largest ethnic Serb parties with the SOC.

In October 2016 the Bosniak-dominated Sarajevo Canton Assembly renamed a street and an elementary school after Mustafa Busuladzic, a World War II-era anti-Semite who glorified Hitler. The president of the Jewish Community strongly condemned the act. At year’s end, the school had not officially changed back its name to its previous title. Proponents of the Canton Assembly decision in Sarajevo to rename the school after Busuladzic defended it following criticism from the Jewish community, politicians from opposition parties, and Israeli and other foreign governments. Proponents claimed Busuladzic was not an anti-Semite despite his public support for the fascist Ustasha Movement.

One defendant on trial for the 2015 attack on a mosque in Omerovici village of Tomislavgrad pled guilty and was sentenced to one year in prison, which was suspended on condition of good behavior for a probationary period of two years. Legal proceedings in Livno Municipal Court continued against the remaining seven individuals who had pled not guilty.

The trial of an individual on charges of arson for a fire set at a shed attached to the SOC Holy Transfiguration Church in 2016 ended in June due to the defendant’s mental health. The Sarajevo Municipal Court released the defendant, after which the Cantonal Prosecutor’s Office filed an appeal with the Cantonal Court, which the court rejected.

In May the IRC, which records and tracks cases of intolerance and hatred when members of affected religious communities report them, released data it had collected between November 2015 and October 2016. The data showed 12 attacks on religious sites, religious officials, or believers. One attack was against a Catholic site, nine against the IC, one against the SOC, and one against the Jewish Community. In total, the IRC registered 198 attacks on religious officials and sites since 2010. Police had identified perpetrators in only 55 of the attacks, and the courts prosecuted only 23 of these cases. The IRC maintained the failure of the authorities to pursue many cases reflected ignorance about hate crimes and a desire to deflect criticism of religious intolerance. On July 11, a Croat defendant who pled guilty to a 2015 attack on a mosque in Tomislavgrad received a one-year prison sentence; however, the sentence stipulated the defendant would not face prison time as long as he did not commit any new crimes for a two-year period.

The Council of Muftis of the IC continued efforts to persuade unregistered Islamic congregations (or para-jamaats), which gathered predominantly Salafist followers and operated outside the purview of the IC, to cease their “unsanctioned” religious practices and officially unite with the IC. While the IC initially reported 64 unregistered congregations, it reported only 21 active congregations had still not officially joined the IC by year’s end. Some members of the IC continued to refer to adherents of minority Salafist groups as intolerant or extremist or as “Wahhabis.”

On January 18, unidentified individuals broke the windows of the Careva Mosque in Foca and wrote nationalistic graffiti on its walls. Both the mayor and deputy mayor condemned the incident and called on police to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice. Unidentified attackers vandalized the same mosque in 2016.

On August 8, unidentified individuals broke windows and lights at the Orthodox Church of Elijah the Prophet in Sarajevo’s Ilijas municipality, causing significant damage. The incident was reported to the Sarajevo Canton police; the investigation continued at year’s end.

The IRC continued to sponsor projects to increase interfaith dialogue involving women and youth. On April 24, IRC leaders visited four sites where atrocities had been committed against different ethnic groups during earlier wars. The event was the first-ever visit by a high-level delegation including members of all the major religious groups; it included Serbian Orthodox Bishop Grigorije, Catholic Cardinal Vinko Puljic, Deputy Reis of the Islamic Community Husejin Effendi Smajic, and President of the Sarajevo Jewish Community Boris Kozemjakin. The event was widely covered by the media, which characterized it as the most significant interreligious event of the year.

Religious leaders from throughout the country delivered speeches emphasizing religious tolerance and reconciliation at the June 29 ceremony in Sarajevo marking the 20th anniversary of the IRC’s founding. Orthodox Bishop Grigorije stated the country needed dialogue between religious groups to eliminate “discomfort and fear” and promote peace among them, which would also promote peace in the country.

Orthodox Christian adherents and other religious leaders welcomed the inauguration of Orthodox Bishop Hrizostom as the new Metropolitan of Dabar-Bosna on September 3 at the Orthodox cathedral in Sarajevo. Patriarch Irinej of the Serbian Orthodox Church presided over the service. Hrizostom’s appointment filled a vacancy in SOC leadership created by the death of former Metropolitan Nikolaj in 2015. According to Orthodox Christian and other religious minority community leaders, his presence helped foster interreligious dialogue and improve relations among religious communities in Sarajevo and the entire country.

Embassy officials engaged with the Presidency and a range of government ministries to discuss the government’s efforts to combat violent extremism related to religion and religious freedom. They also underscored the need to promote respect for religious diversity and to enforce equal treatment under the law, including for religious minorities, emphasizing that restrictions on minority religious groups can lead to their marginalization and possible radicalization.

The embassy continued to promote interreligious dialogue in regular meetings with leaders and representatives of the four traditional religious communities and other religious groups, including discussing ways they could contribute to the further development of a peaceful and stable society. As part of a U.S. government program with the IRC to promote peace, reconciliation, tolerance, and coexistence among the country’s diverse religious and ethnic communities, embassy officials attended significant events in the different religious communities – Eid al-Fitr celebrations with the IC, Christmas and Easter celebrations with the Orthodox and Catholic communities, and a Passover seder with the Jewish community. In these events, embassy officials emphasized the importance of interreligious dialogue and respect for religious diversity.

The embassy continued to maintain regular contact with the IRC and support its activities, including further development of its institutional capacity. The IRC continued to participate in U.S. government-funded programs designed to help overcome ethnic and religious divisions through dialogue and restore trust among the country’s religious groups. Embassy representatives joined IRC leaders in April in their visit to historic sites of war crimes committed against each of the four main religious groups. The embassy facilitated and joined meetings between the World Jewish Restitution Organization delegation and government officials in May to seek the country’s commitment to form a working group to discuss and find common ground on Holocaust-era private, communal, and heirless property restitution.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 2.2 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2011 Population and Housing Census reporting on the population 12 years and over, 79 percent of citizens are members of Christian groups, 15 percent espouse no religion, 4 percent are adherents of the Badimo traditional indigenous religious group, and all other religious groups comprise less than 1 percent of the population.

Anglicans, Methodists, and members of the United Congregational Church of Southern Africa make up the majority of Christians. There are also Lutherans, Roman Catholics, Mormons, Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists, Mennonites, and members of the Dutch Reformed Church and other Christian denominations. According to the 2011 census, there are approximately 11,000 Muslims, many of whom are of South Asian origin. There are small numbers of Hindus, Bahais, Buddhists and Sikhs, as well as a small Jewish community. Immigrants and foreign workers are more likely to be members of non-Christian religious groups than are native-born citizens.

Legal Framework

Under its broader protections of freedom of conscience, the constitution provides for freedom of thought and religion, the right to change religion or belief, and the right to manifest and propagate religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice, and observance. The constitution permits the government to restrict these rights in the interest of protecting the rights of other persons, national defense, public safety, public order, public morality, or public health when the restrictions are deemed “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.” The government has never exercised this provision. The constitution’s provision of rights also prohibits discrimination based on creed.

The constitution permits every religious group to establish places for religious instruction at the group’s expense. The constitution prohibits requiring religious instruction, as well as requiring participation in religious ceremonies in a religion other than one’s own. The constitution also prohibits compelling an individual to take an oath that is contrary to that individual’s religious beliefs. The penal code criminalizes “hate speech” towards any person or group based on “race, tribe, place of origin, color or creed” with a maximum fine of 500 pula (BWP) ($51).

All organizations, including religious groups, must register with the government. To register, a group must submit its constitution to the registrar of societies section of the Ministry of Nationality, Immigration, and Gender Affairs. A group must register to conduct business, sign contracts, or open an account at a local bank. Any person who manages, assists in the management of, or holds an official position in an unregistered group is subject to a fine of up to 1,000 BWP ($100) and up to seven years in prison. Any member of an unregistered group is subject to penalties including fines up to 500 BWP ($51) and up to three years in prison.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

An amendment passed in March 2015 raising the minimum membership threshold for registration for new religious groups from 10 to 150 members received presidential assent and became law in August 2016. The amendment did not affect previously registered groups.

Optional religious education remained part of the curriculum in public schools; this curriculum continued to emphasize Christianity but also addressed other religious groups in the country. Government regulation of private schools did not distinguish among Christian, Muslim, or secular schools.

As a matter of policy, the government no longer granted residence permits for religious workers. While the government did permit 90-day visits for Mormon missionaries, it inconsistently granted or denied missionaries’ applications for extensions of a further 90 days, as the law allows. The government reportedly remained concerned about unregulated churches (sometimes called “fire churches”) coming into the country to take advantage of local citizens by demanding tithes and donations for routine services or special prayers. There were reports some pastors from countries normally allowed visa-free travel were required to apply for visas to enter the country, while the government deported others without explanation. For example, the government reportedly put Shepherd Bushiri, the Malawian founder of the Enlightened Christian Gathering, on a visa-required list in April.

The Dalai Lama was scheduled to attend a conference at Gaborone’s Botho University on August 17-19. President Ian Khama criticized China’s attempts to prevent the Dalai Lama’s visit, saying Botswana “is not a colony of China.” The Dalai Lama’s office released a statement praising President Khama and the government for “their unwavering principled stand to welcome him to their country, despite overwhelming pressure not to do so.” The Dalai Lama eventually canceled his visit, citing health concerns.

Although it was common for government meetings to begin with a Christian prayer, members of non-Christian groups occasionally led prayers as well.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

The Ambassador and other senior embassy officials continued to engage the government on the issue of visas for Mormon missionaries. Embassy officials engaged with Muslim, Buddhist, Mormon, and other religious representatives to discuss religious freedom, interreligious relations, and community engagement. The Ambassador hosted an iftar dinner for members of the local Muslim community where he and a local imam highlighted the importance of tolerance and peace between and among different religious groups. In observance of the UN International Day for Tolerance, the Ambassador hosted a breakfast roundtable with women religious leaders to discuss religious freedom and other human rights issues.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 207.4 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2010 census, 64.6 percent of the population is Roman Catholic and 22 percent is Protestant. Approximately 60 percent of Protestants belong to Pentecostal churches, 18 percent to “mainstream” Protestant churches, and 22 percent to other Protestant groups. Other Christian groups, each constituting less than 1 percent of the population, include Jehovah’s Witnesses and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). Atheists, agnostics, those claiming no religion, and those whose religion is unknown comprise approximately 8 percent of the population.

Other religious groups, each constituting less than 1 percent of the population, include Buddhists, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and African and syncretic religious groups such as Candomble and Umbanda. There are a small number of adherents of indigenous religious beliefs. Some Christians also practice Candomble and Umbanda.

According to the 2010 census, there are approximately 35,200 Muslims, while the Federation of Muslim Associations of Brazil states the number at approximately 1.5 million. Other observers estimate the number of Muslims to be between 400,000 and 500,000. Some observers say the discrepancy in numbers may be because the estimate of 1.5 million may include the Brazilian-Arab population, whom the federation may be assuming are all Muslim, but many of whom are Christian or adhere to other faiths. There are significant numbers of Muslims in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Curitiba, and Foz do Iguazu, as well as in smaller cities in the states of Parana and Rio Grande do Sul.

According to the Jewish Confederation of Brazil, there are approximately 125,000 Jews, 65,000 of whom reside in Sao Paulo State and 25,000 in Rio de Janeiro State. Many other cities have smaller Jewish communities.

Legal Framework

The constitution states that freedom of conscience and belief is inviolable and that the free exercise of religious beliefs is guaranteed. The constitution prohibits the federal, state, and local governments from either supporting or hindering any specific religion. The law provides penalties of up to five years in prison for crimes of religious intolerance. Courts may fine or imprison for two to five years any individual who displays, distributes, or broadcasts religiously intolerant material; the government did not apply the law during the year. It is illegal to write, edit, publish, or sell literature that promotes religious intolerance.

Religious groups are not required to register to establish places of worship, train clergy, or proselytize, but groups seeking tax-exempt status must register with the Department of Federal Revenue and the local municipality. States and municipalities have different requirements and regulations for obtaining tax-exempt status. Most jurisdictions require groups to document the purpose of their congregation, provide an accounting of finances, and have a fire inspection of any house of worship. Local zoning laws and noise ordinances may limit where a religious group may build houses of worship or hold ceremonies.

Government regulations require public schools to offer religious instruction, but neither the constitution nor legislation defines the parameters. By law, the instruction should be nondenominational, conducted without proselytizing, and with alternative instruction for students who do not want to participate. The law prohibits public subsidies to schools operated by religious organizations.

A constitutional provision provides the right of access to religious services and counsel individuals of all religions in all civil and military establishments. The law states that public and private hospitals as well as civil or military prisons must comply with this provision.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In September a Supreme Court ruling officially authorized public schools to allow religious leaders to teach a particular religion, in addition to offering general religious education classes already taught in schools. A religious diversity specialist at the Ministry of Human Rights characterized the country’s system of religious education in public schools as asymmetrical, with some schools offering no religious education course and other schools inviting Catholic priests to teach the class. Although religious instruction was optional, some public schools considered it mandatory but did not offer alternatives or opt-out options for students. The ruling remained nonbinding until the court issued a formal written statement of the decision. It did not mandate confessional religious education in all public schools but rather only authorized it in schools that chose to provide it.

In May practitioners and defenders of Afro-Brazilian religions delivered a doctrinal opinion and technical note to Supreme Court President Carmen Lucia defending the right to practice animal sacrifice as an element of their religious rituals. The case, brought before the court by the Public Ministry in Rio Grande do Sul State, challenged a ruling by the state court permitting practitioners of Afro-Brazilian religions to sacrifice animals for the purpose of food. The adherents of Afro-Brazilian religions stated that the criticism of and challenges to the practice of animal sacrifice were motivated more by racism than concern for the welfare of the animals. They stated that the practice of animal sacrifice was in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Animal Rights. The case remained pending with the Supreme Court at the end of the year.

In response to the growing number of attacks against practitioners and terreiros, the Rio de Janeiro state SDH created a hotline called “Dial to Combat Discrimination” in August. According to the Rio de Janeiro State SDH, the hotline will handle complaints only related to religious intolerance and racism. Between August and November, the hotline received 52 calls. Brasilia, in the Federal District, and Curitiba, in Parana State, maintained police stations to investigate crimes motivated by racial and religious issues. In May Minister of Human Rights Luislinda Valois publicly stated that one of the goals of the ministry was to establish these special police stations in each of the country’s 26 states.

A religious diversity specialist at the Ministry of Human Rights cited the creation of committees for the respect of religious diversity in every state as one of the ministry’s short-term goals. This was also one of the goals outlined in the country’s Program for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights, included in the country’s Multi-Annual Plan (2016-2019). As of the end of the year, four of the 26 states – Amazonas, Minas Gerais, Sao Paulo, and Tocantins – as well as the Federal District established such committees. The ministry stated that the committees would work together to draft at the state level a national plan on respect for religious diversity, after which the central government would create a national plan.

Following the attacks on terreiros in Nova Iguacu, in November the Rio de Janeiro state government established the Joint Commission of the Baixada Fluminense against Religious Intolerance. The commission composed of religious leaders in the Baixada Fluminense on the outskirts of the city of Rio de Janeiro, representatives of the Rio de Janeiro state government, members of the Rio de Janeiro state Public Defender’s Office, and civil police officers.

The municipal Office for the Respect of Religious Diversity in Rio de Janeiro helped organize the Religious Expo, which took place on October 6-8, and brought together the followers of 15 diverse religious groups for workshops and roundtable discussions on religious diversity and featured religious musical and dance performances. The office also assisted in the organization of the Buddhist Vesak Festival, which took place at a Buddhist temple in Grajau in northern Rio de Janeiro State, with approximately 200 persons in attendance.

To commemorate the National Day to Combat Religious Intolerance on January 21, the Palmares Foundation of the Ministry of Culture organized three days of events in the Federal District. The events included a panel discussion on threats to religious diversity and secularism in the country, an interfaith celebration at Brasilia’s Shin Buddhist Temple, and the launch of the Ministry of Human Rights’ report on religious intolerance in the country covering 2011 to 2015. This report, published in January, included press coverage of religious violence and intolerance reported to national ombudsmen and the analysis of current jurisprudence. Of the 409 articles published on religious violence and intolerance from 2011 to 2015, 53 percent involved victims who practiced African-originated religions.

On October 25, the Federal District commemorated its second annual Day to Combat Religious Intolerance. The District Committee for Religious Diversity, established in 2016, organized the ceremony. Rodrigo Dias, the undersecretary for human rights of the Federal District government, delivered remarks on the importance of the theme of religious diversity and the fight against intolerance due to religious motivation.

On October 20, the Rio de Janeiro state SDH hosted a Forum on Religious Intolerance in Nova Iguacu, a suburb of Rio de Janeiro. The state secretariat stated it held the forum in this city because the state’s largest number of registered terreiros (253) is located there and there was a spate of vandalism incidents involving seven temples in August and September.

In October Rio de Janeiro Mayor Marcelo Crivella took part in the Festa Rio Judaico, a daylong outdoor festival involving 9,000 participants of diverse religious affiliations and featuring Jewish music, dance, cinema, literature, and food. In July Mayor Crivella laid the cornerstone of the city’s Holocaust memorial in Yitzhak Rabin Park. The Israeli ambassador attended the event.

According to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), a Jewish congressman was accused by one of his party’s colleagues of “Nazi behavior” in July because the lawmaker had recommended criminal charges against the country’s president. There were no updates or fallouts from this incident by the end of the year.

On September 25, unidentified arsonists burned down a Candomble terreiro in Jundiai, Sao Paulo, destroying the roof, walls, musical instruments, and art hanging inside. This incident was one of eight attacks against Afro-Brazilian temples occurring in September in the state of Sao Paulo. In another case, an individual entered a terreiro during a meeting of practitioners and stabbed four persons, including one minor. Following the attacks, the organization Collective of Negro Entities (CEN) declared it would begin compiling data on attacks against Afro-Brazilian religion practitioners and terreiros in the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Pernambuco, and Sao Paulo to present to the United Nations and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights at the Organization of American States (OAS). In filing complaints with the United Nations and OAS, CEN stated it sought accountability from the government for failing to investigate acts of religious intolerance and prosecute perpetrators.

On July 28, unidentified assailants attacked 33-year-old Syrian refugee Ali Abdelmoatty Ilenavvy in Copacabana, Rio de Janeiro. Video footage of the incident showed one of the assailants armed with a piece of wood and yelling at the victim to get out of the country, stating that the country was “being invaded by suicide bombers who killed children and teenagers.” The press reported and some civil society leaders said the attack stemmed in part from preconceived notions about the refugee’s religion. Several days later, members of a local evangelical Christian church organized an anti-Muslim demonstration in Rio de Janeiro. They held signs and sang songs referring to Muslims as “assassins, pedophiles, and terrorists.” There were no reports of arrests related to the incident. In August a Jewish Rio de Janeiro city councilman led an initiative to honor the victim at Rio de Janeiro’s city hall.

Between January and June, SDH’s Dial 100 human rights hotline registered 169 complaints related to cases of religious intolerance. Of these complaints, 39 percent (the largest proportion) was in relation to practitioners of Candomble, Umbanda, and other Afro-Brazilian religions. The number of complaints during the comparable period of 2016 was 377.

In Bahia State, the Nelson Mandela Reference Center to Combat Racism and Religious Tolerance reported 13 cases of religious intolerance in the state throughout the year. The center cited as an example the vandalizing of a terreiro in Lauro de Freitas in August with graffiti stating, “The blood of Jesus has power.”

The Rio de Janeiro state SDH reported that seven terreiros in Nova Iguacu experienced incidents of arson, vandalism, and destruction of sacred objects inside the terreiros in August and September. According to Rio de Janeiro state Secretary of Human Rights Atila Nunes, drug lords identifying themselves as evangelical Christians broke into terreiros to destroy religious images. The police continued to investigate the attacks and indicted one person for religious discrimination.

In August a group of individuals vandalized the Centro Espirita Casa do Mago terreiro in Rio de Janeiro three times within a two-week period. According to news reports, the assailants set fire to the gate, threw an improvised explosive device at the terreiro, and fired gunshots at the terreiro. The investigation was in progress at the end of the year. Although the civil police did not identify any suspects, the state secretary of human rights said the incidents were carefully planned and likely the work of an unidentified “religious militia.”

In April a third grade teacher at a private school in Recife decorated his classroom with Nazi flags and wore a swastika armband during a lesson about totalitarian regimes. The school removed a Facebook post praising the teacher after the school received numerous complaints. School representatives said the tone of its Facebook post was inappropriate, but they did not apologize. The school agreed to work with the Jewish Federation of Brazil to educate students and teachers on Judaism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust.

In June individuals spray-painted a swastika inside a Star of David at the entrance of Jewish sports club in Rio de Janeiro. Local police investigated the incident, which the police considered a hate crime.

On November 14, the JTA reported that students at the Milecimo de Silva High School in Rio de Janeiro conducted a role play of Nazi-era medical experiments; the simulations included students playing the roles of patients as well as doctors wearing swastika armbands. Photographs posted on Facebook also showed swastikas and a sign saying “Nazi Laboratory” hanging on the walls. The Rio de Janeiro state Department of Education reportedly opened an investigation into the incident.

Civil society organizations continued training on religious tolerance. Between December 2016 and September, the Rio de Janeiro-based CEPLIR trained 1,500 police officers, public school teachers and students, and members of the Brazilian Bar Association on religious freedom.

In September the Brazilian Bar Association created a religious freedom commission. The commission’s stated purpose was to allow lawyers and others to discuss legal matters related to religious freedom.

Citizens throughout the country organized peaceful demonstrations to promote religious diversity. Two such demonstrations occurred on October 22 in Belo Horizonte and Curitiba, the state capitals of Minas Gerais and Parana, respectively.

On September 17, the NGO Commission to Combat Religious Intolerance organized the 10th Annual Walk in Defense of Religious Freedom at Copacabana Beach in Rio de Janeiro. According to the organizers, the event drew approximately 50,000 participants from diverse religious backgrounds, including Muslims, Jews, Christians, Buddhists, spiritualists, and atheists.

Embassy officials met with a representative of the Ministry of Human Rights to discuss the ministry’s goals to increase the number of state-level religious diversity committees. U.S. officials also met with representatives from the Rio state SDH to discuss their efforts to combat religious intolerance.

Embassy officials met with a representative from the OLIR to learn about pending national legislation on excused absences from school and the rescheduling of test dates for observance of religious holidays. Embassy officials also met with the president of the Palmares Foundation to discuss its long-term strategy of using education to increase understanding of Afro-Brazilian history, culture, and religion. The Consul General in Sao Paulo met with the president of the Superior Council of Theologians and Islamic Matters to discuss the views of and challenges for the Muslim community. The Consul General in Rio de Janeiro visited Casa de Oxumare, one of the oldest Candomble terreiros in Salvador, Bahia State, to reinforce U.S. support for religious diversity. Embassy officials also met with the NGO CEPLIR to discuss its efforts to combat religious intolerance. U.S. officials met with the imam and president of the Beneficent Islamic Cultural Center in Foz de Iguacu to discuss the role and integration of the local Islamic community over the past century.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 444,000 (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2011 census, approximately 78.8 percent of the population is Muslim, 8.7 percent Christian, and 7.8 percent Buddhist, while the remaining 4.7 percent consists of other religions including indigenous beliefs.

There is significant variation in religious identification among ethnic groups. According to 2015 official statistics, ethnically Malay Bruneians comprise 66 percent of the population, and are presumed to be Muslim as an inherited status. The Chinese population, which is approximately 10 percent of the total population and includes both citizens and permanent residents, is 65 percent Buddhist and 20 percent Christian. Indigenous tribes such as Dusun, Bisaya, and Murut make up approximately 4 percent of the population and are estimated to be 50 percent Muslim, 15 percent Christian, and the remainder followers of other religious groups, including adherents of traditional practices. The remaining fifth of the population includes foreign-born workers, primarily from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and South Asia, or are stateless residents. According to official statistics, approximately half of these temporary and permanent residents are Muslim, more than one quarter Christian, and 15 percent Buddhist.

Legal Framework

The constitution states the religion of the country shall be the Shafi’i school of Sunni Islam but allows all other religions to be practiced “in peace and harmony” by the persons professing them.

The legal system is divided between civil law and sharia, which run parallel systems of both criminal and civil/family law and operate separate courts under a single judiciary department. The civil courts are based on common law. The sharia courts follow Islamic jurisprudence, in which there is no law of precedence and judges are not bound by the decisions of a higher court. Sharia courts have jurisdiction over both criminal law and civil/family matters involving Muslims and hear cases brought under long-standing sharia legislation as well as under the SPC. In some cases non-Muslims are subject to sharia courts, such as khalwat (close proximity between the sexes) if the other accused party is Muslim.

Phase one of the SPC, which came into force in 2014, runs in parallel with the existing common law-based criminal law system and primarily involves offenses punishable by fines or imprisonment. It expands restrictions in long-standing domestic sharia law on drinking alcohol, eating in public during the fasting hours of Ramadan, cross-dressing, close proximity between unmarried people of different genders, and propagating religions other than Islam. It includes a prohibition of “indecent behavior,” including pregnancies out of wedlock, and criminalizes any act that “tends to tarnish the image of Islam, deprave a person, bring bad influence, or cause anger to the person who is likely to have seen the act.” The SPC applies to both Muslims and non-Muslims, including foreigners, as well as to offenses committed outside the country by citizens or permanent residents. Non-Muslims are exempted from certain sections, such as requirements for men to join Friday prayers or payments of zakat (obligatory annual alms giving). It states that Muslims will be identified for purposes of the law by “general reputation.”

The second phase of the SPC, which would include amputating the hands of thieves, is not scheduled to come into effect until one year after the publication of a Sharia Courts Criminal Procedure Code (CPC). To date, the government has not published the CPC. Phase three of the SPC, which includes punishments – stoning to death for rape, adultery, or sodomy, and execution for apostasy, contempt of the Prophet Muhammad, or insult of the Quran – is scheduled to be implemented two years after the publication of the CPC. The punishments included in phases two and three include different standards of proof than the common law-based penal code, such as requiring four pious men to witness personally an act of fornication to support a sentence of stoning. Stoning sentences, however, could be supported by a confession in lieu of evidence at the discretion of a sharia judge.

The government describes its official national philosophy as Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB), or Malay Islamic Monarchy, which the government defines as “a system that encompasses strong Malay cultural influences, stressing the importance of Islam in daily life and governance, and respect for the monarchy as represented by His Majesty the Sultan.” The government has said this system is essential to the country’s way of life and its main defense against extremism. A government body, the MIB Supreme Council, seeks to spread and strengthen the MIB philosophy and ensure MIB is enshrined in the nation’s laws and policies. MIB is a compulsory subject for students in both public and private schools, including at the university level.

The Religious Enforcement Division under the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) is the lead agency in many investigations related to religious practices, but other agencies also play a role. The Religious Enforcement Division leads investigations on crimes that exist only in the SPC and other sharia legislation, such as male Muslims failing to pray on Fridays. Cases involving crimes that are not covered by sharia legislation such as human trafficking are investigated by the Royal Brunei Police Force (RBPF). Cases involving crimes covered by both sharia and the civil code are also investigated by the RBPF and referred to the Attorney General’s Chamber (AGC). In these cases, the AGC determines in each case if a specific crime should be prosecuted and whether it should be filed in the sharia or civil court. No official guidelines for the AGC’s determination process have been published.

The government bans religious groups it considers deviant, including the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, Al-Arqam, Abdul Razak Mohammad, Al-Ma’unah, Saihoni Tasipan, Tariqat Mufarridiyyah, Silat Lintau, Qadiyaniah, the Bahai Faith, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. The list is based on fatwas proclaimed by the state mufti or the Islamic Religious Council – a government body and the sultan’s highest authority on matters on Islam – and is publicly available on the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ website. The SPC also bans any practice or display of “black magic.”

The SPC includes a list of words and expressions, including the word “Allah,” reserved for use by only Muslims or in relation to Islam. In 2016 the government clarified that the use of certain words, such as “Allah” by non-Muslims, did not constitute an SPC offense when used in a nonreligious context or social activity.

The law forbids the teaching or promotion of any religion other than Islam to Muslims or to persons of no faith. Under the first phase of the SPC, the penalty for propagating religions other than Islam is up to five years in prison, a fine of up to 20,000 Brunei dollars (BND) ($14,900), or both. The SPC includes a provision that makes it illegal to criticize Islam, including the SPC itself, although no cases, arrests, or charges under this provision have been reported.

Muslims are legally permitted to renounce their religion until phase three of the SPC is implemented but must inform the Islamic Religious Council in writing. A person must be at least 14 years and seven months old to convert to a different religion. If parents convert to Islam, their children automatically become Muslim.

The law requires all organizations, including religious groups, to register and provide the names of their members. Applicants are subject to background checks for leaders and board members, and proposed organizations are subject to naming requirements. Registered organizations must furnish information on leadership, election of officers, members, assets, activities, and any other information requested by the registrar. Benefits of registration include the ability to operate, reserve space in public buildings, and apply for permission to raise funds. The registrar of societies oversees the application process, exercises discretion over applications, and is authorized to refuse approval for any reason. Organizations are prohibited from affiliation with any organization outside the country without written approval by the registrar. Unregistered organizations may face charges of unlawful assembly and may be subject to fines. Individuals who participate in or influence others to join unregistered organizations may be fined, arrested, and imprisoned. The general penalty for violating laws on the registration and activity of organizations is a fine of up to 10,000 BND ($7,500), imprisonment for up to three years, or both.

The law states that any public assembly of five or more persons requires official approval in advance. Under long-standing emergency powers, this applies to all forms of public assembly, including religious assembly. In practice, however, places of worship are viewed as private.

Laws and regulations limit access to religious literature. The law states it is an offense for a person to import any publication deemed objectionable, which is defined in part as describing, depicting, or expressing matters of race or religion in a manner likely to cause “feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will, or hostility between different racial or religious groups.” The law also bans distributing materials relating to religions other than Islam to Muslims or persons of no faith.

The law establishes two sets of schools: those offering the national or international curriculum and administered by the Ministry of Education (MOE), and those offering supplemental religious education (ugama) that are administered by MORA. Ugama instruction in MORA schools is a seven-to-eight-year course that teaches the day-to-day practice of Sunni Islam according to the Shafi’i school and is mandatory for Muslim students ages seven to 14 who hold citizenship or permanent residency. Alternatively, MORA also administers a set of schools taught in Arabic that offer the national curriculum combined with ugama religious education. The law states that Muslim parents who fail to enroll their children in an ugama school face a 5,000 BND ($3,700) fine, imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or both. The law promulgates the officially recognized Shafi’i school and does not make accommodations for Muslims who have non-Shafi’i beliefs. MOE schools are also required to teach a course on Islamic religious knowledge, which is required for all Muslim children ages seven to 15 who reside in the country and who have at least one parent who is a citizen or permanent resident.

Public and private schools, including private schools run by churches, are prohibited from providing religious instruction in beliefs other than the Shafi’i school of Islam during school hours. Schools may be fined or school officials imprisoned for teaching non-Islamic religious subjects. The SPC criminalizes exposing Muslim children or the children of parents who have no religious affiliation to the beliefs and practices of any religion other than Islam. The law also requires practitioners to obtain official permission before teaching any matter relating to Islam. Churches and religious schools are permitted to offer non-Shafi’i Islamic education in private settings.

All parental rights are awarded to the Muslim parent if a child is born to mixed-faith parents. The non-Muslim parent is not recognized in any official document, including the child’s birth certificate, unless that parent has converted to Islam. The law bans any Muslim from surrendering custody of a minor or dependent in his or her guardianship to a non-Muslim.

Under the SPC, non-Muslims may be arrested for zina (fornication or adultery) or khalwat, provided that the other accused party is Muslim. Foreigners are also subject to these laws.

In July the government introduced a regulation requiring businesses that produce, supply, and serve food and beverages to obtain a halal certificate or apply for exemption if serving non-Muslims.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs has declared circumcision for Muslim girls (sunat) a religious rite obligatory under Islam and described it as the removal of the hood of the clitoris (Type I per World Health Organization classification). The government has stated it does not consider this practice to be female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) and has expressed support for the World Health Organization’s call for the elimination of FGM.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary Paragraph: The government continued to enforce sharia restrictions and prosecute offenses under the SPC. It continued to apply sharia to Muslims and, for certain offenses, non-Muslims, resulting in arrests, fines, and confiscations. The government continued to impose traditional Islamic social norms more broadly, including placing limitations on businesses suspected of encouraging mingling of men and women, proselytizing, and religious education. In November the sultan called for the rejection of Islamic teachings that repudiate local practices. A fatwa barring church and temple expansion or renovation remained in force; however, the government granted a school associated with the Christian community permission to build a parking lot.

The authorities continued to arrest and prosecute persons for offenses under both the SPC and long-standing sharia.

The chief sharia court judge announced that the number of sharia court cases dropped to 148 cases from 259 cases in 2016. Of the 148 cases, 98 were for khalwat. The judge said khalwat cases were “mainly committed by Muslim and non-Muslim youth and civil servants.” He noted that a review of the penalties imposed by sharia judges for khalwat had so far been unsuccessful in deterring people from committing the offense. He added that khalwat could lead to other sharia criminal offenses such as “adultery, pregnancy out of wedlock, and the abandonment of babies.”

Not all of those investigated or accused of sharia crimes were formally arrested. There were some reports of administrative penalties, such as travel bans or suspension from government jobs, for individuals accused but not yet convicted of khalwat, but application of such practices reportedly was not consistent. The government had not issued implementing regulations governing sharia proceedings by year’s end.

Following the introduction of the regulation requiring businesses in the food service industry to provide a halal certificate, authorities charged a government health official under the sedition law for criticizing MORA’s halal policy on Facebook. In the post, the individual criticized the halal certification requirements’ negative impact on small businesses and called for MORA to instead investigate “why all sexual offenders are religious teachers.” His post quickly went viral on social media but was removed. Local attorneys noted this was the first case of an individual being charged with sedition in 30 years. If found guilty of sedition, the individual could face a fine of 5,000 BND ($3,700), up to three years in prison, or both. At year’s end, the defendant Shahiransheriffuddin bin Shahrani Muhammad, was free on bail and ordered not to post such comments against government policy on social media. His next hearing was scheduled for August 2018.

MORA continued to provide texts for Friday sermons to all mosques, which were required to deliver the approved texts, and the government required the sermons to be preached by registered imams.

There was no legal requirement for women to wear head coverings in public; however, religious authorities continued to reinforce social customs to encourage Muslim women to wear the tudong (a traditional Islamic head covering), and many women did so. When applying for passports, drivers’ licenses and national identity cards, Muslim females were made to wear a tudong, and all females were given a black jacket to ensure their shoulders were covered in their identity photographs. Muslim women employed by the government were expected to wear a tudong to work, although some chose not to with no reports of official repercussions. In government schools and institutions of higher learning, Muslim female students were required to wear a uniform that includes a head covering. Male students were expected to wear the songkok (a traditional hat), although this was not required in all schools. Women who were incarcerated, including non-Muslims, were required to wear a uniform that included a tudong.

Unlike in previous years, religious leaders and government officials did not officially warn citizens against publicly displaying symbols of religions other than Islam during Christmas and Chinese New Year, although many businesses still chose not to display decorations. As with past years, the government limited traditional Lunar New Year lion dance performances to a three-day period and restricted them to the Chinese temple, Chinese school halls, and private residencies of Chinese Association members. The government also introduced a new online application for event permits, making it easier for Chinese Dragon dances to take place during Chinese New Year. Members of the royal family and the minister of religious affairs again publicly attended Lunar New Year celebrations and lion dance performances during the allowed period, with coverage in state-influenced media.

The government continued to enforce restrictions on non-Muslims proselytizing to Muslims or people with no religious affiliation. The government periodically warned the population about “outsiders” preaching non-Shafi’i versions of Islam, including both “liberal” practices and those associated with jihadism, Wahhabism, or Salafism. In November during a titah (royal proclamation), the sultan said the country “could not afford to let anyone carry out or import any teachings that could disintegrate Muslims in the country” and called for the rejection of Islamic teachings that repudiate local practices, which include offering prayers for the dead, celebrating the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, and Quran readings prior to work and public events.

The government continued to enforce strict customs controls on importing non-Islamic religious texts such as Bibles, as well as on Islamic religious teaching materials or scriptures intended for sale or distribution. Authorities continued to generally ban non-Islamic texts from import, and the censorship board continued to review Islamic texts to ensure they did not contain text that deviates from the Shafi’i school of Islam. Personal packages entering the country continued to be checked by customs to ensure they did not contain anything of a non-Shafi’i Islamic or sexual nature, such as magazines showing women in swimsuits.

Churches confirmed that a long-standing fatwa discouraging Muslims from assisting in perpetuating non-Muslim faiths continued to inhibit expansion, renovation, or construction of new facilities. Christian churches and associated schools, however, were generally allowed to repair and renovate buildings on their sites if required for safety. This approval process remained lengthy and difficult, and there were reports of the government stalling new construction projects for not meeting the complicated permit process requirements. The government, however, granted a school associated with the Christian community, with students from various religious backgrounds, permission to build a parking lot to reduce traffic congestion. With only six approved churches in the country, facilities were often too small to accommodate their congregations without significant overflow seating outdoors. Chinese temples were also subjected to the same fatwa, with only one official Chinese temple preserved as a cultural heritage. Data from 2015 indicated there were 99 registered mosques. Christian worshippers reported difficulty accessing churches on many Sundays because of road closures by the government for official events, with some services being rescheduled to other times.

The MOE required courses on Islam and MIB in all schools, with non-Muslims exempted from some religious requirements. The government reported many non-Muslim children elected to take courses on Islam. Reportedly, those applying for government-funded scholarships believed having such courses could be advantageous. MORA posted religious teachers in some embassies abroad to teach Brunei citizens in those locations. Most school textbooks were illustrated to portray Islam as the norm, and women and girls were shown wearing the tudong. There were no depictions of the practices of other religious groups in textbooks.

Authorities continued to prohibit non-Muslims and non-Shafi’i Muslims from receiving non-Shafi’i religious education in schools. The government tolerated non-Islamic religious education in private settings, such as at home or in approved churches. All church-associated schools were recognized by the MOE and remained open to students of any religion, although they were not permitted to teach religions other than Shafi’i Islam.

Throughout the year, the government enforced business hour restrictions for all businesses, requiring they close for the two hours of Friday prayers. Religious enforcement officers reportedly continued to enforce a ban on restaurants serving dine-in food during the fasting hours of Ramadan, although take-out food to be consumed in private was permitted, and officers issued verbal warnings to restaurants and customers found in breach of the ban. Several Chinese restaurants, however, said that, in contrast with previous years, they did not experience government inspections on this issue. The government continued to enforce a ban on eating, drinking, or smoking in public during the fasting hours of Ramadan, which was applied to both Muslims and non-Muslims.

The government maintained a long-standing ban on the sale of alcoholic beverages and cigarettes, and a restriction against the import or consumption of alcoholic beverages by Muslims. Religious authorities partnered with the RBPF in conducting “antivice raids” in which they confiscated alcoholic beverages and nonhalal meats brought into the country without proper customs clearance. In September the state mufti warned worshippers not to deviate from the path of Allah, as alcohol was still being smuggled and sold in the country, and blamed the increasing numbers of tourists and foreign workers for its illicit sale. Authorities also monitored restaurants and supermarkets to ensure conformity with halal practices. Religious authorities allowed nonhalal restaurants and nonhalal sections in supermarkets to operate without interference but continued to hold public outreach sessions to encourage restaurants to become halal.

The government continued to favor the propagation of Shafi’i beliefs and practices, particularly through public events and the education system, which remained solely based on the Al-Shafi’i school. In October the crown prince opened an event at Universiti Islam Sultan Sharif Ali to launch 25 books on the topic of the Al-Shafi’i school.

The government offered incentives to prospective converts to Islam and the Shafi’i school, especially those from indigenous communities in rural areas, including help with housing, welfare assistance, or help to perform the Hajj. During the year, Hajj participants received designer luggage from the government. The government gave presentations on the benefits of converting to Islam that received extensive press coverage in state-influenced media. For example, media reported Ramadan guidance classes for new converts headed by the Tutong District’s religious authorities. Government statistics again showed that each year an average of 500 people converted to Islam. Converts included citizens and permanent residents, as well as foreigners. Official government policy supported Islam through the national MIB philosophy as well as through government pledges to make the country a zikir nation (a nation that remembers and obeys Allah). While in London in December, the sultan met with Bruneian expatriates and reminded them that the “mold for our identity and character is MIB” and cautioning them from being derailed from the MIB track or from trying anything apart from MIB.

Despite the absence of a legal prohibition of Muslims marrying non-Muslims, all Muslim weddings required approval from the sharia courts, and officiants, who were required to be imams approved by the government, required the non-Muslim party to convert prior to the marriage.

Most government meetings and ceremonies commenced with an Islamic prayer, which the government continued to state was not a legal requirement but a matter of custom.

The government required residents to carry identity cards that stated the bearer’s ethnicity, which were used in part to determine whether he or she was Muslim; for example, all Malays were assumed to be Muslim. Female Muslim citizens were required to wear a tudong in photographs on national identity cards as well as passports, and non-Muslim women were required to dress conservatively. Ethnic Malays traveling in the country were generally assumed to be Muslim and required to follow certain Islamic religious practices or potentially face fines, arrest, and imprisonment. Religious authorities reportedly checked identity cards for ethnicity when conducting raids against suspected violators of sharia. Visitors to the country were asked to identify their religion on their visa applications.

Non-Muslims and Muslims faced social pressure to conform to Islamic guidelines regarding behavior.

Religious freedom continued to be debated on social media platforms with some commentators calling for increased “Islamification” and the removal of non-Malays from the country. Residents who questioned the SPC or Islamic values on social media sometimes reported receiving online abuse and threats, and official monitoring. Some vocal activists who challenged established norms reported family and friends would pressure them to keep quiet due to fear they would attract the attention of authorities or damage the family’s reputation.

Some Muslims who wished to convert to another religion reportedly continued to fear social retribution, such as ostracism by friends, family, and their community. If parents converted to Islam, there was often family and official pressure for the children to do the same. Some non-Muslims said they felt pressured in the workplace or in social groups to convert to Islam.

The new halal certificate order was widely criticized on social media by commentators as being detrimental to the government’s efforts to promote entrepreneurship.

There were more reports of Muslims being open to allowing other religious groups to celebrate their holidays than in the years since the SPC launched. For example, Christian leaders continued to report more Muslims wished Christians a “Merry Christmas” and attended holiday parties.

The Ambassador and other embassy officials continued to raise concerns and recommendations about religious freedom throughout the year to government officials at all levels. U.S. officials continued to coordinate with other governments, including Australia and the United Kingdom, regarding shared concerns about implementation of the SPC and continued to encourage the government to postpone implementation. U.S. embassy officials emphasized the seriousness with which the United States takes assurances from the government that the evidentiary and witness standards in the SPC would as a matter of procedure and policy be so exacting as to effectively guarantee that torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment will not be carried out in practice. The Ambassador and other embassy officials also continued to raise concerns that a confession could be used in lieu of evidence, and that those accused could be coerced by social pressure to confess. They urged officials to defer the publication of the procedural code that is a necessary precursor to the remaining phases of the SPC. Embassy officials urged that religious enforcement officers and officials involved in drafting, implementing, and enforcing the SPC comply with international human rights norms.

Embassy officials met with religious enforcement officers as well as lawyers defending individuals charged with violations of sharia.

Embassy officials visited places of worship, spoke with leaders of all principal religious groups, and facilitated discussions on the SPC and laws and policies affecting religious freedom in the country, including obstacles to practicing religions and beliefs other than Shafi’i Islam in addition to provisions of sharia.

The embassy hosted a holiday reception that convened representatives from the various religious communities in the country. The Ambassador emphasized religious tolerance by participating in numerous Lunar New Year celebrations and attending Christian events that many locals also attended.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 7.1 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2011 census, 76 percent of the population identifies as Eastern Orthodox Christian, mostly affiliated with the BOC. The census reports Muslims, the second-largest religious group, are approximately 10 percent of the population, followed by Protestants at 1.1 percent and Roman Catholics at 0.8 percent. Orthodox Christians from the Armenian Apostolic Orthodox Church (AAOC), Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Bahais, and members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, the Sri Chinmoy Center, the White Brotherhood, and other groups together make up 0.2 percent of the population; 4.8 percent of respondents said they had no religion, and 7.1 percent did not indicate a religion, according to the census.

Some religious minorities are concentrated geographically. Many Muslims, including ethnic Turks, Roma, and Pomaks (descendants of Slavic Bulgarians who converted to Islam under Ottoman rule) live in the Rhodope Mountains along the southern border with Greece and Turkey. Ethnic Turkish and Romani Muslims also live in large numbers in the northeast and along the Black Sea coast. Some recent Romani converts to Islam live in towns in the central part of the country, such as Plovdiv and Pazardjik. According to the census, nearly 40 percent of Catholics live in and around Plovdiv. The majority of the small Jewish community lives in Sofia, Plovdiv, and along the Black Sea coast. Protestants are widely dispersed, but many Roma are Protestant converts, and Protestants are more numerous in areas with large Romani populations. Approximately 80 percent of the urban population and 62 percent of the rural population identifies as Orthodox Christian. Approximately 25 percent of the rural population identifies as Muslim, compared with 4 percent of the urban population.

Legal Framework

The constitution states freedom of conscience and choice of religion or no religion are inviolable, prohibits religious discrimination, and stipulates the state shall assist in maintaining tolerance and respect among believers of different denominations, as well as between believers and nonbelievers. It states the practice of any religion shall be unrestricted and religious beliefs, institutions, and communities shall not be used for political ends. It restricts freedom of religion to the extent that its practice would be detrimental to national security, public order, health, and morals, or the rights and freedoms of others. It states no one shall be exempt from obligations established by the constitution or the law on grounds of religious or other convictions. The constitution also stipulates the separation of religious institutions from the state and the formation of political parties along religious lines, as well as organizations that incite religious animosity. The law does not allow any privilege based on religious identity.

The constitution names Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the country’s traditional religion. The law establishes the BOC as a legal entity, exempting it from the court registration that is mandatory for all other religious groups wishing to acquire legal recognition.

The penal code prescribes up to three years’ imprisonment for participants in attacks on individuals or groups based on their religious affiliation. Instigators and leaders of an attack may receive prison sentences of up to six years. Those who obstruct the ability of individuals to profess their faith or carry out their rituals and services or compel another to participate in religious rituals and services may be sentenced to up to one year in prison. Violating a person’s or group’s freedom of acquiring or practicing a religious belief is subject to a fine of between 100 and 300 levs ($60 to $180). If the infraction is committed by any legal entity, the fine can range from 500 to 5,000 levs ($305 to $3,050).

To receive national legal recognition, the law requires groups other than the BOC to register with the Sofia City Court. Applications must include: the group’s name and official address; a description of the group’s religious beliefs and service practices, organizational structure and bodies, management procedures, bodies, and mandates; a list of official representatives and the processes for their election; procedures for convening meetings and making decisions; and information on finances and property and processes for termination and liquidation. The Directorate for Religious Affairs under the Council of Ministers provides expert opinions on registration matters upon request of the court. Applicants may appeal negative registration decisions to the Sofia Appellate Court and, subsequently, the Supreme Cassation Court. The law does not require the formal registration of local branches of registered groups, only that branches notify local authorities of the national registration of their group. The law prohibits registration of different groups with the same name in the same location. There are 168 registered religious groups, in addition to the BOC.

The law requires the government to provide funding for all registered religious groups, although there is no legal requirement on how to allocate the funds among the groups. Registered groups have the right to perform religious services, own assets such as houses of worship and cemeteries, provide medical, social, and educational services, receive property tax exemptions, and participate in commercial ventures.

Unregistered religious groups may engage in religious practice, but they lack privileges granted to registered groups, such as access to government funding and the right to own property, establish financial accounts in their name, operate schools and hospitals, receive property tax exemptions, or sell religious merchandise.

The law restricts the wearing of face-covering garments in public places, imposing a fine of 200 levs ($120) for a first offense and 1,500 levs ($900) for repeat offenders.

The law allows registered, but not unregistered, groups to publish, import, and distribute religious media. The law does not restrict proselytizing by registered or unregistered groups. Some municipal ordinances, however, require local permits for distribution of religious literature in public places, and some municipalities have adopted local regulations that restrict proselytizing.

By law, public schools at all levels may, but are not required to, teach the historical, philosophical, and cultural aspects of religion and introduce students to the moral values of different religious groups as part of the core curriculum. A school may teach any registered religion in a special course as part of the elective curriculum upon request of at least eight students, subject to the availability of books and teachers. The Ministry of Education and Science approves and provides books for these special religion courses. If a public school is unable to pay for a religion teacher, it may accept financial sponsorship from a private donor or a teacher from a registered denomination. The law also allows registered religious groups to operate schools and universities, provided they meet government standards for secular education.

The Commission for Protection against Discrimination is an independent government body charged with preventing and protecting against discrimination, including religious discrimination, and ensuring equal opportunity. It functions as a civil litigation court adjudicating discrimination complaints; its decisions may be appealed to administrative courts. If the commission accepts a case, it assigns it to a panel and then reviews it in open session. If it makes a finding of discrimination, the commission may impose a fine of 250-2,000 levs ($150-$1,200). The commission may double fines for repeat violations. Regional courts may also try civil cases involving religious discrimination.

The law establishes an independent ombudsman to serve as an advocate for citizens who believe that public or municipal administrations or public service providers have violated their rights and freedoms, including those pertaining to religion, through their actions or inaction. The ombudsman may request information from authorities, act as an intermediary in resolving disputes, make proposals for terminating existing practices, refer information to the prosecution service, and request the Constitutional Court to abolish legal provisions as unconstitutional.

The penal code provides up to three years’ imprisonment for forming “a political organization on religious grounds” or using a church or religion to spread propaganda against the authority of the state or its activities. It prohibits the propagation or incitement of religious or other discrimination, violence, or hatred “by speech, press or other media, by electronic information systems or in another manner,” as well as religiously motivated assault or property damage. Either offense is punishable by imprisonment for one to four years and a fine of 5,000-10,000 levs ($3,050-$6,100), as well as “public censure.” Desecration of religious symbols or sites, including places of worship or graves, is punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment and a fine of 3,000-10,000 levs ($1,850-$6,100).

The law allows foreign members of religious denominations to obtain long-term residency permits.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: The retrial of 13 Muslim leaders charged with spreading an antidemocratic ideology (Salafi Islam, per the prosecution) continued at the Plovdiv Appellate court. The trial of 14 Romani Muslims on charges of propagating antidemocratic ideology and incitement to war and aiding ISIS continued in Pazardjik District Court. Jehovah’s Witnesses reported continued assaults and harassment, including an ongoing media campaign against them, by members of the United Patriots coalition in the national assembly. Schools continued to ban the wearing of religious symbols, including the hijab and cross. Jehovah’s Witnesses and other minority religious groups reported an increase in the number of municipalities with ordinances restricting their activities, especially proselytizing and the distribution of religious literature. The Muslim community reported difficulty in obtaining construction permits for new places of worship; its property restitution claims remained suspended, pending court review of whether the Office of the Grand Mufti was the rightful successor to confiscated properties. The ECHR ruled the government’s denial of registration of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community constituted a violation of the religious freedom clause of the European Convention on Human Rights. Jewish organizations expressed concern over the government’s failure to prosecute growing anti-Semitism on social media. NGOs and minority religious groups expressed concern over proposals for legislation restricting religious activities, including one that would criminalize “radical Islam.” The government established the position of national coordinator for combating anti-Semitism, and adopted the internationally accepted working definition of anti-Semitism.

At year’s end, the retrial of Ahmed Mussa and 12 other Muslims charged with spreading Salafi Islam (which the prosecution characterized as an antidemocratic ideology), remained ongoing at the Plovdiv Appellate Court. In July 2016 the Supreme Cassation Court had vacated the guilty verdict against Mussa for preaching Salafi Islam and rescinded the administrative punishment against the 12 other Muslims, ordering the Plovdiv Appellate Court to retry the case.

In a separate case, the trial of 14 Romani Muslims, including Ahmed Mussa, on charges of supporting ISIS, assisting foreign fighters, and propagating antidemocratic ideology and incitement to war, remained ongoing at year’s end at the Pazardjik District Court. Mussa, who had been in custody during the trial, was released on bail in November, while 12 other defendants continued to be under house arrest; the 14th defendant remained free, released on her own recognizance.

On June 15, the ECHR delivered a unanimous ruling that the Bulgarian government had violated Article 9 (freedom of religion) in light of Article 11 (freedom of association) of the European Convention on Human Rights by denying a registration application by the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community. Rumen Metodiev, later joined by others, had first applied to register the group in 2007 and been denied by the Sofia City Court, following a negative report on the group by the government’s Department of Religious Affairs. According to the ECHR, the government’s report stated the Ahmadis were “known for their religious intolerance, refusal of modernity, and polygamy, and were regarded as a sect by Muslims.” Metodiev appealed to the ECHR in 2008 after the Sofia Appellate Court and the Supreme Cassation Court upheld the denial. The ECHR decreed the government should pay Metodiev 4,000 euros ($2,450) in damages. The ECHR ruled its finding of a violation constituted sufficient compensation for damages sustained by the other plaintiffs. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community remained unregistered at year’s end.

Members of minority religious groups, such as Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses, continued to report cases where the government failed to prosecute individuals, particularly members of the National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB) and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) political parties, for the assault and harassment of their members.

On July 19, according to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, IMRO party member and Vratsa Municipal Councilor Marin Tsvetkov approached two Jehovah’s Witnesses on the street and tried to push over their cart containing literature. According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, this was the ninth incident of harassment by Tsvetkov. The Jehovah’s Witnesses said police spoke with Tsvetkov but took no other action after the incident.

In August the Supreme Cassation Court vacated the Sofia Appellate Court’s 2015 decision upholding the challenge of former Grand Mufti Nedim Gendjev to the legitimacy of the 2011 extraordinary conference, which had elected Mustafa Alish Hadji as Grand Mufti. At year’s end Gendjev continued to pursue a court challenge of Hadji’s election, which a regular Muslim conference confirmed in 2016.

The Commission for Protection against Discrimination and most schools continued to interpret the law denying privileges based on religious identity as banning the display of all religious symbols in public schools, including wearing hijabs or displaying crosses.

The government stated it would continue to work closely with groups representing Orthodox Christianity, Hanafi Sunni Islam, Judaism, and Roman Catholicism, each of which it recognized as holding a historic place in the country’s culture.

The national budget allocated a total of 5 million levs ($3.1 million) for the construction and maintenance of religious facilities and related expenses, including: 3.76 million levs ($2.3 million) for the BOC; 360,000 levs ($221,000) for the Muslim community; and 50,000 levs ($30,700) each for the Roman Catholic Church, AAOC, and the Jewish community. The budget distributed 80,000 levs ($49,000) among 15 other registered denominations that had applied for funds to the Directorate for Religious Affairs. The directorate stated its goal was to make sure denominations that had not received funds previously received funding if they applied. The government’s budget also allocated 450,000 levs ($276,000) for the maintenance of religious facilities of national importance, 50,000 levs ($30,700) for the publication of religious books and research, and 15,000 levs ($9,200) to the National Council of Religious Communities. The budget kept 135,000 levs ($82,800) in reserve, including 15,000 levs ($9,200) for updating the electronic register and digital database of religious facilities in the country.

Minority religious groups reported at least 40 municipalities, a nearly 70 percent increase compared with 2016, had ordinances prohibiting door-to-door proselytizing and the distribution of religious literature. Among these municipalities were the regional cities of Haskovo, Kurdjali, Kyustendil, Pazardjik, Pleven, Ruse, Shumen, Silistra, Sliven, Stara Zagora, Turgovishte, Varna, Vratsa, and Yambol.

Jehovah’s Witnesses, for example, reported many municipalities had ordinances restricting their religious activities, including ones preventing them from expressing their religious convictions in public and carrying out what the ordinances termed “religious agitation on city streets” by distributing free printed materials, and from visiting individuals at their homes, which was often characterized as “religious propaganda.” They cited multiple instances in which police fined, threatened, warned, or issued citations to individual Jehovah’s Witnesses for violating these ordinances. For example, on July 19, two police patrol officers stopped two Jehovah’s Witnesses who were talking with people on the street in Obzor and told them their activity was illegal, threatening to arrest them if they continued.

Sometimes municipalities imposed fines on individual Jehovah’s Witnesses even though the city ordinances did not include restrictions on religious activities. Municipalities levied 10 fines on Jehovah’s Witnesses, who appealed nine of them, of which the courts annulled eight. For example, on June 23 and July 7, Sofia municipal officials issued citations for unauthorized commercial activity to Jehovah’s Witnesses distributing religious literature, imposing a 100 lev ($61) fine for violating the regulations for public sports, culture, and other mass events. On November 24, Sofia Administrative Court annulled the June fine; an appeal of the July fine was pending at year’s end.

Representatives of Jehovah’s Witnesses reported recommendations by the Directorate for Religious Affairs or by the ombudsman against municipal restrictions on religious activities had no effect. Jehovah’s Witnesses challenged eight of the ordinances in administrative courts and won all eight cases. The courts ruled the ordinances had violated the country’s constitution, declaring the ordinances null and void. Municipalities appealed three of the eight cases; the appeals were pending at year’s end. According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Asenovgrad municipality revoked its restrictions on door-to-door proselytizing and the distribution of religious literature after learning about court decisions revoking ordinances in other localities.

Muslim representatives continued to report a lack of cooperation from authorities on the restoration and maintenance of historic mosques, such as the Makbul Ibrahim Pasa in Razgrad, that the Ministry of Culture managed as national cultural monuments.

Muslim community leaders reported the municipality of Gotse Delchev continued to withhold issuance of a construction permit to build a mosque, maintaining the plot remained zoned for a shopping center. They also said the Sofia municipal government continued to withhold permission to build a second mosque in Sofia on the grounds that the application for a building permit remained incomplete. In August IMRO declared it would oppose any attempts to build a new mosque in Sofia, which it said would “alter the skyline of the city as a capital which stands up for its history and values.” There were no reports of further developments in either case by year’s end.

Catholic community leaders complained about the Sofia municipality’s refusal to recognize the religious status of a monastery there, treating it instead as a residential building and imposing taxes that otherwise would be waived.

The Office of the Grand Mufti reported there had been no progress by year’s end with regard to its claim, lodged with the Sofia City Court, for succession to the properties of pre-1940s Muslim religious communities seized by the communist government. Pending court review of who the rightful successor to the confiscated properties was, the government continued to hold all restitution claims by the Office of the Grand Mufti in suspension.

The government did not restitute any properties to the Catholic Church during the year. The Church reported authorities had returned approximately 50 percent of the properties for which it was seeking restitution since the restitution law entered into force in 1992.

According to the United Evangelical Churches (UEC) – a group representing nine individual Protestant churches and three unions of Pentecostal, Baptist, and Congregational churches – the Chitalishte Union, a government-supported association of educational and cultural community centers throughout the country, prohibited its member cultural centers from renting their premises to Protestants for their religious activities because the union regarded them as “sects.”

In April the Kurdjali Administrative Court overruled the denial by the Commission for Protection against Discrimination of a complaint filed by Muslims about the failure of public kindergartens, schools, and hospitals to offer menu choices without pork in their eating facilities. The Ministry of Health and the Kurdjali Municipality had supported the commission’s position that health considerations should guide the dietary choices offered in those institutions. The court stated the commission had failed to document any negative health-related consequences of replacing pork with other meat and ordered the commission to review the case again.

The government continued to permit religious headdresses in official photos for national identity documents as long as both ears and one centimeter (2/5 of an inch) of hair were visible.

The local lodge of Jewish service organization B’nai B’rith made multiple statements to the media that leading politicians in the three political parties comprising the United Patriots coalition had carried out anti-Semitic acts and appointed to public service individuals professing neo-Nazi views. On May 17, Deputy Regional Development Minister Pavel Tenev resigned after a picture of him saluting a wax statue of a Nazi officer in a Paris museum nine years earlier was circulated on social media. Deputy Prime Minister Valeri Simeonov defended Tenev, commenting that, as a student in the 1970s, he himself had visited the Buchenwald concentration camp and might have taken “fun-poking pictures” there. Similar pictures of Ivo Antonov, head of a directorate at the Ministry of Defense, giving a Nazi salute in front of a German tank surfaced on May 18, but they did not result in his resignation. Antonov issued a public apology, and the defense minister refused to fire him despite the prime minister’s request to do so.

Jewish organizations reported the government declined to prosecute individuals or organizations for propagating anti-Semitism online, despite evidence collected by the police. For example, in December the group National Resistance, led by Blagovest Asenov, posted on its Facebook page a statement reading in part, “The Jews have done much evil to mankind, but the beginning … was the murder of Christ! … they have … been the greatest supporters of debauchery and evil … they have served as Satan’s edge against man and the Christian people.”

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, the campaign mounted against them by the NFSB and the IMRO, two members of the United Patriots coalition, continued throughout the year. For example, in January in Elhovo, in February in Mezdra, and in July in Vratsa, IMRO members questioned the right of Jehovah’s Witnesses missionaries to distribute literature and threatened them, in one case telling the missionaries no one would “be able to save you.”

Deputy Prime Minister Krassimir Karakachanov, who also served as the minister of defense and as the leader of IMRO, stated in several public interviews there should be a law prohibiting foreign financing of religious denominations and restricting the ability of foreigners to engage in religious activities in the country. He also proposed that the High Islamic Institute train imams according to a government-approved curriculum. The leaders of many religious groups, including Muslims, Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Armenian Orthodox, Mormons, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, all expressed concern over Karakachanov’s proposed restrictions.

On December 6, the national assembly passed on first reading a bill submitted by the United Patriots coalition amending the penal code to criminalize “radical Islam.” The draft amendments defined radical Islam as an ideology calling for establishing a caliphate, enforcing the rule of sharia, or forcing Islamic religious principles and norms on others. Muslim leaders and NGOs criticized the proposal, saying it stigmatized and discriminated against Muslims as well as religious faith in general. At year’s end, the proposal was pending a second reading in the national assembly, required before becoming law.

In May President Rumen Radev, continuing his predecessor’s tradition, hosted an iftar attended by religious leaders, politicians, academics, diplomats, and refugees. At the iftar, Radev told the participants different ethnic and religious backgrounds did not divide the country but enriched and further developed its identity.

In May the country advanced its status in the IHRA from observer to liaison. Pursuant to its application for full membership, on October 18, the government designated Deputy Foreign Minister Georg Georgiev as National Coordinator for Combating Anti-Semitism, and adopted the IHRA’s working definition of anti-Semitism. Meeting with the Israeli Ambassador in November, Georgiev said authorities would continue to sanction manifestations of anti-Semitism “with all necessary severity,” adding that “such actions are not inherent to the Bulgarian people.” Also in November the foreign ministry issued a statement denouncing anti-Semitic acts and intolerance after vandals posted anti-Semitic graffiti on two Soviet Army monuments.

A Holocaust education program trained 20-25 history teachers annually, based on a 2016 memorandum between the Ministry of Education and Israel’s Yad Vashem. In the fall an interagency committee began working with textbook publishers on updating content related to the Holocaust and the history of Jews in the country.

Summary paragraph: Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Mormons reported multiple cases of physical assaults, harassment, and threats. Two teenage girls attacked the wife and daughters of the deputy grand mufti. Protestant pastors reported harassment from Orthodox priests, who said the pastors represented “sects.” The Office of the Grand Mufti blamed the government for financial difficulties resulting in its inability to pay imams. Despite protests resulting in denial of official permission to stage the annual march honoring Hristo Lukov, the march took place. Jewish NGOs expressed concern manifestations of anti-Semitism had become accepted as routine. According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, some media outlets continued to misrepresent their activities and encouraged their harassment. Acts of vandalism against Muslim, Jewish and Jehovah’s Witnesses places of worship continued. Christian and Muslim groups held commemorative events to promote religious tolerance.

Mormons reported 22 instances of physical assault and harassment of missionaries in Blagoevgrad, Burgas, Pleven, Sliven, Ruse, Stara Zagora, Haskovo, Plovdiv, and Sofia. For example, on January 26, in Plovdiv, a man physically assaulted two Mormon missionaries and yelled at them, swearing at them as they ran away. Mormon representatives said police did not identify the attackers in any of these incidents and in some cases may have decided the incidents were not worth pursuing.

On June 27, in a supermarket parking area, two teenage girls attacked Deputy Grand Mufti Biralli Mumun Biralli’s wife and two daughters, hitting, kicking, spitting, and shouting abuse at them. The Mufti’s wife was wearing an Islamic headscarf. The regional prosecutor’s office charged the perpetrators with hooliganism and placed them under the monitored supervision of an inspector of juveniles. The High Muslim Council condemned the attack, stating it was a consequence of negative, anti-Muslim rhetoric by the media and politicians, including in the national assembly. IMRO deputy chairman Angel Djambazki defended the teenagers, stating they were the victims and the Muslims had attacked them first. The prosecution was still preparing the case at year’s end.

Jehovah’s Witnesses reported six cases of physical assault and threats in Pernik, Vratsa, Popovo, Elhovo, Mezdra, and Lom. Although police responded to their complaints, Jehovah’s Witnesses stated prosecutors closed all six cases due to lack of evidence.

The UEC reported some Orthodox Christian chaplains pressured prison directors to restrict the access of “sectarian” Protestant chaplains to the prison population.

Protestants reported some Orthodox Christian priests called on police to take action against Protestant pastors because, they said, the pastors represented “sects.”

In July the Sri Chinmoy Center won the court case it had initiated against Desislava Panayotova, Director of the Center for Religious Research and Consultations and Chief Editor of the webpage of the BOC’s Holy Synod, for discrimination. The Sofia Regional court ordered Panayotova to pay a 700 lev ($430) indemnity for persuading concert hall managers in Sofia not to stage the center’s concerts on the grounds it was a “sect” and instructed her to refrain from such actions.

On June 20, the regional prosecution in Shumen indicted a man for a 2016 assault on a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. After initially placing the suspect under house arrest and then releasing him pending further investigation, authorities charged him with hooliganism and assault for inflicting multiple bruises and a concussion on the Jehovah’s Witness after the latter had invited the suspect to one of the group’s conventions. At year’s end, the trial was continuing.

In June the Office of the Grand Mufti reported it had stopped paying imams for their services because it needed to divert the funds to support three Muslim secondary schools in Momchilgrad, Shumen, and Ruse after the Turkish Diyanet had withdrawn financial support for the schools due to actions taken by the Bulgarian caretaker government in power from January to May. The country’s caretaker government had alleged Turkish interference in the election campaign and expelled several Diyanet representatives from the country. Due to the diversion of its funds to the schools, the effects of accumulated taxes and other debts to the treasury, and a government freeze on some of the denomination’s assets due to unpaid taxes, the Office of the Grand Mufti did not have the funds to pay the imams, many of whom had begun to look for work abroad. In August Grand Mufti Mustafa Alish Hadji asked the national assembly to pass legislation providing sufficient government funding for all religious denominations in the country in order to ensure their normal and independent operation.

In February the NGOs Organization of Jews in Bulgaria Shalom and B’nai B’rith called for a ban of the annual march by nationalists, scheduled for February 18, to honor Hristo Lukov, who headed the pro-Nazi Union of Bulgarian National Legions prior to and during WWII. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms party, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, and other NGOs also issued statements against the march, and opponents of the march staged a small protest on February 12. Sofia Mayor Yordanka Fandakova again canceled the permit for the march on the grounds it would pose a risk to public order, but she granted permission for supporters to gather at Lukov’s memorial plaque. Despite the prohibition, the Bulgarian National Union, a political party, organized a march in downtown Sofia, in which more than 1,000 people participated under police scrutiny. Prior to the march, police detained eight would-be marchers for inebriation and carrying dangerous objects but later released them without pressing charges.

Shalom stated there were no incidents of anti-Semitic violence during the year but that it remained concerned about an increase in the number of nonviolent anti-Semitic acts. B’nai B’rith reported it found anti-Semitic rhetoric was increasingly accepted as normal. Both NGOs stated authorities had stopped paying attention to fan groups displaying Nazi symbols during soccer games or treated these incidents as sports hooliganism instead of hate crimes. They stated souvenirs with Nazi insignias were widely available in tourist areas around the country. In September Shalom, with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote to the Mayor of Nesebur, Nikolay Dimitrov, asking him to take measures against the sale of such souvenirs and informing him of possible sanctions. The mayor initiated an inspection of all souvenir stalls in the municipality, but the inspections did not identify any legal violations. Authorities, however, warned the vendors against selling such articles. In January following B’nai B’rith’s intervention, the country’s largest chain bookstore, Helikon, publicly apologized and stopped selling copies of Mein Kampf.

Other Christian denominations cited what they believed was continued BOC disparagement. They referred to a 2016 BOC declaration stating there were “no other churches, but only heresies and schisms,” that, by claiming to be churches, were committing theological, dogmatic, and canonical mistakes.

Jehovah’s Witnesses reported libel in the media had declined, but certain media outlets continued to regularly misrepresent their activities and beliefs. They stated reporters from the SKAT TV cable television company continued to harass them, accusing Jehovah’s Witnesses of criminal acts and encouraging their viewers to report the Jehovah’s Witnesses to police each time they came across any members of the group. On January 5, the Supreme Administrative Court confirmed the Burgas Administrative Court’s October 2016 decision to reject SKAT TV’s appeal against a ruling of the Commission for Protection against Discrimination. The commission had levied a 2,000 lev ($1,200) fine on SKAT and a 1,200 lev ($735) fine on two of its journalists for spreading false information and making comments constituting discrimination against Jehovah’s Witnesses.

A study released in April by the Alpha Research polling agency, conducted with the support of the New Bulgarian University and funded by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, reported on the results of a survey of 1,200 individuals in 2016 who had self-identified as Muslims in the 2011 census. According to the survey, 57.3 percent of respondents supported use of the secular legal system, while 0.7 percent favored use of sharia law to settle disputes. Another 16.6 percent said disputes should be settled by God or Allah, and 12 percent said by the imam or mufti. The survey found 53.5 percent of respondents opposed wearing a niqab or burqa in public, while 1.6 percent said a woman should always wear one. Fifty-one percent of respondents considered religion an important part of their lives; 20 percent said they were devout, while 70 percent reported they were “more religious than not.”

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jewish community leaders, and the Office of the Grand Mufti, there were incidents of vandalism, such as painted swastikas, graffiti, and broken windows, in their respective places of worship. For example, on May 28, suspected soccer hooligans threw beer bottles and waste containers at the mosque in Sofia while shouting offensive words about Muslims and Islam. On July 11, Jehovah’s Witnesses reported unidentified individuals threw eggs and stones at their meeting place in Popovo. Also in July residents in Sofia’s Orlandovtsi neighborhood hung pigs’ heads on the fence of the construction site of a residential building owned by the Office of the Grand Mufti, protesting it would become a “sanctuary for radical Islamists.” In September unknown individuals toppled and broke tombstones in the Jewish cemetery in Sofia. At year’s end, police had not made arrests in any of the incidents of vandalism.

In February Taner Veli, the Regional Mufti of Plovdiv, hosted the third annual Tolerance Coffee event, commemorating a 2014 attack on the local Cumaya Mosque. Representatives of the Christian and Jewish communities, local government officials, foreign diplomats, and civil society members attended the event.

On October 30, the UEC organized a commemoration of the 500th anniversary of the Reformation. The event was cosponsored by Sofia municipality and funded by the National Council of Religious Communities, a government-supported nonprofit group with the goal of promoting religious tolerance and comprised of representatives of the Bulgarian Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Muslim, evangelical Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish communities. The council originally received the funds from the government for its annual Festival of Religions but transferred them to the UEC. More than 3,000 people participated in the commemoration, which presented the history of the Reformation, as well as the development of Protestantism in the country.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy officials continued discussions with representatives of the Directorate for Religious Affairs, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Commission for Protection against Discrimination, local government administrations, and law enforcement agencies about cases of religious discrimination, harassment of religious minorities, the denial of construction permits for new places of worship, and legislative initiatives restricting religious freedom. A senior embassy representative discussed religious tolerance during the iftar hosted by President Radev in May.

In January the Ambassador joined with other concerned foreign ambassadors to write to Sofia Mayor Fandakova to protest the planned march in honor of Hristo Lukov. In February the embassy released a statement in response to the march, condemning hate speech, xenophobia, and incitements to violence.

Embassy officials continued to meet with representatives of the National Council of Religious Communities and the Office of the Grand Mufti, as well as leaders of the Mormon, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Catholic, Protestant, Armenian Orthodox, Muslim, and Jewish communities, human rights groups, such as the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, Marginalia, Inforoma Center, and Sofia Security Forum, and academics to discuss problems religious communities faced, including proposed legislative changes potentially restricting the freedom to practice their respective religions.

The Ambassador continued to meet with Shalom and B’nai B’rith to discuss the need to counter anti-Semitism and hate speech. In speeches at the commemoration of the 74th anniversary of the saving of the country’s Jewish population in March, at a Tolerance and Mutual Understanding Day event in Kurdjali on March 31, and at a Shabbat dinner in June, the Ambassador spoke about the lessons of the Holocaust and the need for tolerance of different religious communities.

On November 20, the Ambassador met with Grand Mufti Mustafa Alish Hadji to discuss tolerance and the Muslim denomination’s financial challenges, as well as proposed legislative restrictions on religious practices.

On March 14-16, the embassy co-hosted a religious tolerance workshop with the Commission for Protection against Discrimination to promote dialogue between civil society and government representatives and to discuss the situation of minority religious communities. Approximately 80 representatives from all major religious groups, NGOs, government, media, and other groups participated. Workshop sessions included an overview of the legal framework and history of religious freedom, safeguarding religious freedom in the context of national security, protecting against religious discrimination, promoting models for good governance, engaging religious communities, advocating religious freedom, and measuring religious discrimination and hate crimes. Officials from the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security in Sofia for the workshop also met with government officials and NGOs to discuss government practices on religious freedom, tolerance education, enforcement against hate crimes and training for law enforcement, and the desire for increased engagement on Holocaust issues.

On March 30-31, the Ambassador visited Kurdjali to participate in the Kurdjali Tolerance and Mutual Understanding Day, organized by the Olga Lengyel Institute. The event gathered approximately 600 students and their teachers from 15 high schools, who had participated in a national essay contest on saving Bulgaria’s Jews during World War II. During his remarks, the Ambassador cited the country’s history of religious tolerance and the importance of preserving and strengthening that heritage.

On March 31, the Ambassador met with Kurdjali Regional Mufti Beyhan Mehmedov to discuss the restitution of historical property, the provision of appropriate menu choices in schools for Muslim schoolchildren, and other challenges facing the local Muslim community.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 20.1 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2006 census, 61 percent of the population is Muslim, predominantly Sunni, 19 percent is Roman Catholic, 4 percent belong to various Protestant groups, and 15 percent maintain exclusively indigenous beliefs. Less than 1 percent is atheist or belongs to other religious groups. Statistics on religious affiliation are approximate because Muslims and Christians often adhere simultaneously to some aspects of indigenous religious beliefs.

Muslims reside largely in the northern, eastern, and western border regions, and Christians are concentrated in the center of the country. Indigenous religious beliefs are practiced throughout the country, especially in rural communities. The capital has a mixed Muslim and Christian population. There is no significant correlation between religious affiliation, ethnicity, or political or socioeconomic status.

Legal Framework

The constitution states the country is secular, and both it and other laws provide for the right of individuals to choose and change their religion and to practice the religion of their choice. The constitution states freedom of belief is subject to respect for law, public order, good morals, and “the human person.” Political parties based on religion, ethnicity, or regional affiliation are forbidden.

The law allows all organizations, religious or otherwise, to register with the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Internal Security, which is in charge of religious affairs. The ministry, through the Directorate for Customary Affairs and Worship, monitors the implementation of standards for burial, exhumation, and transfer of the remains; helps organize religious pilgrimages; promotes and fosters interreligious dialogue and peace; and develops and implements measures for the erection of places of worship and the registration of religious organizations and religious congregations. The registration process usually takes approximately three to four weeks and costs less than 50,000 CFA francs ($89). Registration confers legal status but no specific obligations or benefits. Religious organizations are not required to register, but when they do so, failure to comply with applicable regulations required by all registered organizations may result in a fine of 50,000 to 150,000 CFA francs ($89 to $270).

Religious groups operate under the same regulatory framework for publishing and broadcasting as other entities. The Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization may request copies of proposed publications and broadcasts to verify they are in accordance with the nature of the religious group as stated in their registration.

Religious teaching is not allowed in public schools. Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant groups operate private primary and secondary schools and some schools of higher education. By law, schools (religious or not) must submit the names of their directors to the government and register their schools with the Ministry of National Education and Literacy, but the government does not appoint or approve these officials.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In March military forces killed one individual and arrested 18 associated with the militant Islamist group Ansarul Islam near the Mali border. The security minister stated that the country was determined to defeat what he termed extremists trying to enforce sharia.

The National Observatory of Religious Facts (ONAFAR), an organization created by the government in 2015 to “monitor regulations on cultural practices” and promote tolerance and interfaith dialogue, continued to monitor religious communities and cultural practices. Along with monitoring, the ONAFAR played a mediator role within the religious community to mitigate tensions between communities through dialogue. For example, the ONAFAR intervened in the Hauts-Bassins region to conduct mediation within a community in which a dispute over funeral rites to be performed on a deceased individual who had converted to Islam had resulted in violence. The ONAFAR, along with national and local government officials, met with the community leaders and members to find a peaceful resolution.

On January 9, the government announced the withdrawal of a draft bill designed to regulate religious organizations and practices, after the Federation of Burkina Islamic Associations (FAIB) publicly expressed concerns that the proposed bill would “reduce their freedom of conscience and worship.” The FAIB specifically objected to provisions stating that collective worship shall take place exclusively in buildings intended for public worship that have received prior authorization from authorities. It also objected to a provision that would prevent public officials from “conspicuously” and visibly exhibiting their religious beliefs in the performance of their duties. The FAIB additionally opposed provisions that required leaders of religious organizations and associations to “demonstrate solid knowledge of religious matters attested by at least one recognized structure or institution.”

The government continued to give all religious groups equal access to registration and routinely approved their applications, according to religious group leaders.

The government generally did not fund religious schools or require them to pay taxes unless they conducted for-profit activities. The government provided subsidies to a number of Catholic schools as part of an agreement allowing students from public schools to enroll in Catholic schools when public schools are at full capacity. The government taxed religious groups only if they engaged in commercial activities, such as farming or dairy production. The government reviewed the curricula of religious schools to ensure they offered the full standard academic curriculum; however, the majority of Quranic schools were not registered, and thus their curricula were not reviewed.

The government allocated 75 million CFA francs ($133,000) each to the Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, and traditional animistic communities. According to the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, the government could provide an additional subsidy under the following circumstances: when the religious community or organization pursued a mission of general interest, such as education, health, or vocational training; when the religious community conducted an activity of national interest, such as promoting peace or social stability; or when the success or failure of an activity could have affected a significant part of the population, as in the case of religious pilgrimages. The government also provided funding to registered Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim (commonly referred to as “Franco-Arabic”) schools through subsidies for teacher salaries, which were typically less than those of public school teachers.

In August the government allocated approximately one billion CFA francs ($1.78 million) to subsidize the costs of the 8,100 Muslims going on the Hajj.

On September 8, the ethics commission of the CSC, the governmental body in charge of regulating media, summoned and questioned officials of the Al Houda radio station for content it stated was “undermining the principle of religious tolerance” and violating the terms of agreements signed between the CSC and media organizations. During a program, a preacher stated that individuals adhering to Ahmadiyya beliefs should not be considered Muslims, prompting a complaint from a listener. Al Houda radio officials had been summoned in a similar incident in 2016. A CSC commission reviewed the case and sent a warning letter to Al Houda radio. The CSC could adopt sanctions against the radio if another incident occurs.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

In March armed men killed a teacher and a resident in the northern city of Kourfayel. Several media reports indicated that armed men entered classrooms in Wonrongoma, Pelem Pelem, and Lassa and threatened teachers, telling them they would be killed if they did not start teaching the Quran instead of the regular curricula. This attack caused the temporary closure of dozens of schools and the departure of teachers from the region. Governmental delegations including the minister of security and the minister of education traveled several times to the region and met with representatives of teachers and local authorities to discuss ways to ensure the safety of teachers working in the northern part of the country.

Members of the Burkinabe Muslim Community Organization, the Catholic Archdiocese of Ouagadougou, and the (Protestant) Federation of Evangelical Churches stated religious tolerance was widespread and numerous examples existed of families of mixed faiths and religious leaders attending each other’s holidays and celebrations. Members of the main religious communities promoted interfaith dialogue and tolerance through public institutions, such as the ONAFAR, which conducted awareness campaigns and mediations throughout the country, but also through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Dori-based Fraternal Union of Believers, which since 1969 involved various religious communities to conduct socioeconomic activities with the goal of fostering religious tolerance. In 2010 the Catholic Church established a commission on Islamic-Christian dialogue, which held periodic meetings to promote interfaith dialogue. Catholic and Muslim leaders in the country’s second largest city, Bobo Dioulasso, worked together to organize a united peace march to condemn the August 13 attacks on a Turkish-owned café by suspected Islamists and also to resolve together issues such as the unauthorized construction of a mosque on Catholic Church-owned land. The Catholic and Muslim leadership agreed to provide a new plot of land for the Catholic Church instead of demolishing the mosque.

New Muslim and Protestant congregations opened without approval and oversight from existing Muslim and Protestant federations. Religious leaders stated that the Muslim and Protestant federations were often undermined by small new minority religious groups not falling under their oversight that took positions counter to the federation’s messages of tolerance. For example, some religious leaders reportedly discouraged traditional interfaith courtesy calls during a religious holiday.

Embassy staff regularly discussed events and policies affecting religious freedom with the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, including the dispute over funeral rites in Haut-Bassins Region and the draft bill to regulate religious organizations and practices.

The Ambassador and embassy officials met separately with Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant religious leaders throughout the country, at the local and national levels, to encourage their efforts to promote interfaith dialogue and advocate for religious tolerance and freedom.

On November 16, the Ambassador and embassy officials invited representatives and journalists for a roundtable to emphasize the importance of religious freedom and tolerance, and provide a framework to discuss and strengthen the state of religious tolerance in the country. Representatives from the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization; the Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, and Traditional communities; the ONAFAR; and the Dori-based NGO Union Fraternelle des Croyants (Fraternal Union of Believers) were invited.

On July 22, the Ambassador hosted an iftar with young leaders from religious communities and civil society to promote interfaith tolerance and dialogue and discussed how youth could play a positive role.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 55.1 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the most recently available estimates, approximately 88 percent are Theravada Buddhists. Approximately 6 percent are Christians (primarily Baptists, Roman Catholics, and Anglicans, along with several small Protestant denominations). Muslims (mostly Sunni) comprise approximately 4 percent of the population. NGOs and the government estimate the overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim Rohingya population at 1.1 million. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, this includes more than 800,000 stateless individuals in northern Rakhine State, prior to the outbreak of violence in October 2016. As of December, international organizations estimated 300,000 Rohingya remain in Rakhine State. There are small communities of Hindus and practitioners of traditional Chinese and indigenous religions. There is a very small Jewish community in Rangoon.

There is significant demographic correlation between ethnicity and religion. Theravada Buddhism is the dominant religion among the majority Bamar ethnic group and among the Shan, Rakhine, Mon, and numerous other ethnic groups. Christianity is dominant among the Kachin, Chin, and Naga ethnic groups. Christianity also is practiced widely among the Karen and Karenni ethnic groups, although many Karen and Karenni are Buddhist and some Karen are Muslim. People of South Asian ancestry, who are concentrated in major cities and in the south central region, are predominantly Hindu or Muslim, although some are Christian. Islam is practiced in Rakhine State and in Rangoon, Irrawaddy, Magwe, and Mandalay Divisions by some Bamar and ethnic Indians as well as ethnic Kaman and Rohingya. Chinese ethnic minorities generally practice traditional Chinese religions and to a lesser extent Islam and Christianity. Traditional indigenous beliefs are practiced among smaller ethnic groups in the highland regions.

Legal Framework

The constitution states that every citizen is equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess and practice his or her religious beliefs. The constitution limits those rights if they threaten public order, health, morality, or other provisions of the constitution. It further provides that every citizen has the right to profess and practice his or her religion if not contrary to laws on security, law and order, community peace, or public order and morality.

The law prohibits deliberate and malicious speech or acts intended to outrage or wound the religious feelings of any class by insulting or defaming its religion or religious beliefs. The law also prohibits injuring, defiling, or trespassing on any place of worship or burial grounds with the intent to insult religion.

All organizations, whether secular or religious, are required to register to obtain official status. This official status is required for organizations to gain title to land, obtain construction permits, and conduct religious activities.

The law bars members of “religious orders” (such as priests, monks, and nuns of any religious group) from running for public office, and the constitution bars members of religious orders from voting. The government restricts by law the political activities and expression of the Buddhist clergy (sangha). The constitution forbids “the abuse of religion for political purposes.”

Although there is no official state religion, the constitution notes that the government “recognizes the special position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union.” The constitution “also recognizes Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Animism as the religions existing in the Union at the day of the coming into operation of this Constitution.”

The government bans any organization of Buddhist monks other than nine state-recognized monastic orders. Violations of this ban are punishable by immediate public defrocking and criminal penalties. The nine recognized orders submit to the authority of the SSMNC, the members of which are elected by monks.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs’ Department for the Perpetuation and Propagation of the Sasana (Buddhist teaching) oversees the government’s relations with Buddhist monks and schools.

Four laws passed in 2015 for the “protection of race and religion” remain in effect. The Buddhist Women Special Marriage law stipulates notification and registration requirements for marriages between non-Buddhist men and Buddhist women and stipulates obligations to be observed by non-Buddhist husbands and penalties for noncompliance. The Religious Conversion law regulates conversion through an extensive application and approval process. The Population Control Law allows for the designation of special zones for which population control measures could be applied, including authorizing local authorities to implement three-year birth spacing. The Monogamy Law bans polygamous practices, which were already criminalized under the country’s penal code.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary Paragraph: There were reports of large-scale abuses by the military and others against ethnic Rohingya, who are nearly all Muslim, and other minority populations – including extrajudicial killings, rapes, torture, beatings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, mass displacement, burning of structures, restrictions on religious practice and freedom of movement, and discrimination in employment, granting of building permits, and access to citizenship. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity. Elsewhere in the country, non-Buddhist minorities, including Christians, Hindus, and Muslims, reported incidents in which authorities unduly restricted religious practice and travel, destroyed religious property and texts, denied or failed to approve permits for religious buildings and renovations, and discriminated in employment.

According to the government, ongoing attacks on and threats against civilians by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) prompted the government to deploy security forces to northern Rakhine State in early August. According to NGO and media reports, security forces, in their search for ARSA members, committed enforced disappearances and arbitrary arrests of various persons, the majority of whom were Muslim Rohingya. According to the government, security forces later acted in response to coordinated ARSA attacks on August 25 against 30 border guard police and military outposts in northern Rakhine State that resulted in the deaths of 12 soldiers. Media sources and NGOs said some Rohingya villagers joined ARSA to attack security units. The military and Border Guard Police subsequently launched so-called “clearance operations,” which they said were to search for the perpetrators of the ARSA attacks.

From August through November, there were numerous reports by media, the UN, NGOs, and others of mass atrocities in northern Rakhine State, including killings, rapes, beatings, arrests, and the burning of 354 villages by security forces and local vigilante groups. NGOs and UN observers assessed that the security forces’ operations were preplanned, pointing to the movement of units, the spike in arrests of Rohingya before the ARSA attacks, and the common tactics used by many different units in many different villages. Other NGOs, think tanks, and UN observers said the security forces’ response appeared opportunistic and disproportionate, but not pre-planned, given the ongoing security threats in northern Rakhine State against Rohingya, Rakhine, and other civilians between January and August.

The government said its “clearance operations” ended September 5, but satellite imagery corroborated claims by witnesses that security forces or local vigilante groups continued to raze villages for weeks afterward. According to the government, as of September, there were reports of approximately 400 “insurgent” deaths, 30 civilian deaths, as well as 6,842 homes burned in 59 villages during security forces’ operations. The government restricted UN, NGO, and media access to Rakhine State through the end of the year.

As of December, international organizations reported that approximately 688,000 civilians, overwhelmingly Rohingya, arrived in Bangladesh after being displaced from Rakhine State. An additional unknown number were internally displaced. The Government of Bangladesh estimated 500 of the Rohingya refugees from Burma in Bangladesh are Hindu and the remainder Muslim. Human rights organizations and media reported security forces and vigilante groups carried out mass killings and rapes of Rohingya civilians,, as well as arson, in multiple locations in northern Rakhine State, citing far higher numbers of burned homes and villages than the government. International NGOs documented through satellite imagery many instances where homes belonging to villagers from other ethnic groups were not burned in areas that were otherwise destroyed. For example, over 90 percent of the Rohingya homes in Maungdaw District, one of three districts in northern Rakhine, were reportedly burned. Reports indicated children, elderly, or infirm persons were burned alive in houses. Places of worship and religious texts were destroyed. In September the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR) released a report that included an interview with a Rohingya Muslim refugee from Burma in Cox’s Bazar, who reported that Burmese security forces attacked a mosque and burned a Quran in Buthidaung Township a few days before the ARSA attacks on August 25. Based on victim and witness interviews, NGOs and media reported that security forces employed similar tactics in different villages. According to eyewitness accounts collected by The New York Times, Human Rights Watch, and others in Cox’s Bazar, villagers who fled to Bangladesh described the military’s use of small arms, mortars, and armed helicopters in the attacks. Rohingya refugees also said they witnessed children and elderly family members being thrown into burning homes and experienced or witnessed gang rapes of women by uniformed security forces. Some media reports and some NGOs stated that some of the serious allegations from Rohingya victims were not completely accurate and the result of collective trauma due to forced displacement. NGOs and media also reported on allegations of several mass casualty massacres in Tula Toli (aka Min Gyi), Inn Din, and other Rohingya villages across northern Rakhine State, with total deaths among them reported in the thousands. According to a report by NGOs Fortify Rights and the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, on August 27, in Chut Pyin Village, Rathedaung Township, soldiers shot rocket-propelled grenades to burn houses and opened fire on Rohingya individuals, while armed civilians slashed and stabbed Rohingya with knives and long swords.

According to NGO and media reports, victims reported that soldiers told some Rohingya Muslim villagers they needed to leave because they were Bengali or because Burma was not a place for Muslims. After some instances of abuse, including killings and physical abuse, soldiers reportedly mocked or denigrated villagers’ religious beliefs.

UN experts and other observers expressed serious concern regarding the role of religious intolerance in abuses against the Rohingya Muslim community and other minorities throughout Rakhine State. The military denied any discrimination on its part. Some Rakhine State leaders said they feared Rohingya would demographically overtake the Rakhine community in Rakhine State and would consequently take over the land of ethnic Rakhine. On September 1 in Nay Pyi Taw, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing said insurgents used religion as a tool for violent attacks, and said the “Bengali problem” was a holdover from previous governments that the current government had to solve. Denying allegations of widespread rape, Colonel Phone Tint, the Rakhine State border security minister, stated, “look at those women who are making these claims – would anyone want to rape them?” In November the military replaced the army general responsible for Rakhine State, Major General Maung Maung Soe, for undisclosed reasons.

The UN, media, human rights groups, and Bangladesh border authorities reported security forces planted landmines along the border of Bangladesh in northern Rakhine State in September, with some saying the security forces planted the mines to prevent Rohingya refugees from returning. Sources said at least nine internally displaced persons (IDPs) died from wounds characteristic of landmine injuries while fleeing northern Rakhine State to Bangladesh.

On September 11, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights said the situation in northern Rakhine State “appears to be a textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” On December 5, the High Commissioner noted security forces had committed “acts of appalling barbarity … against the Rohingya, including deliberately burning people to death inside their homes, murders of children and adults; indiscriminate shooting of fleeing civilians; widespread rapes of women and girls, and the burning and destruction of houses, schools, markets and mosques;” and that “elements of genocide may be present.”

At the end of September a commissioner from the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission visited northern Rakhine State and declared security forces had not used disproportionate force or committed any human rights abuses.

According to news reports, some of the small number of Rohingya Hindus who fled to Bangladesh described witnessing killings and arson in their communities, like their Muslim neighbors.

Multiple government-led investigations into earlier reported abuses by security forces did not result in prosecutions or accountability. Following widespread disturbances in northern Rakhine State in October 2016 and reports of abuses by security forces, on February 16, the military declared an end to security operations there, stating that 106 individuals had died, including 76 “attackers,” and that security forces had detained over 600 individuals. On January 3, the government-led Investigation Commission on Maungdaw, headed by military-appointed Vice President Myint Swe, released an interim report stating there was “insufficient evidence to take legal action” regarding allegations of rape, and that the unrest was due to foreign-funded “extremists.” In February the UNOHCHR mission in Bangladesh released a report based on interviews with Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh detailing widespread allegations of extrajudicial killings, rape, and other abuses occurring in 2016. In August the Investigation Commission on Maungdaw released its final report, informed by separate military and police investigations into 2016 abuses in northern Rakhine State. In the report, the government-led commission stated there was no credible basis for allegations of human rights abuses by security forces in northern Rakhine State during operations in October and November 2016. International experts pointed to serious flaws in the commission’s methodology, including interrupting alleged victims of abuses to assert that their testimony was false and then broadcasting the exchange on national television. At the end of September, a commissioner from the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission visited northern Rakhine State and declared security forces had not used disproportionate force or committed any other human rights abuses during their August 2017 clearance operations.

On August 25, the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, established by State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi in 2016 and led by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, released its final report with recommendations. The report noted, “protracted statelessness and profound discrimination have made the Muslim community particularly vulnerable to human rights violations.” The commission’s recommendations included: accelerating the citizenship verification process for stateless individuals; ending restrictions on freedom of movement; ensuring minority representation in local governance; closing IDP camps; and ensuring the safe and voluntary return of IDPs to their homes. The government committed to implementing these recommendations but had not taken steps to do so by year’s end.

On December 24, 2016, the military detained two affiliates of the Kachin Baptist Convention, Dumdaw Nawng Latt and his nephew, Langjaw Gam Seng, in Mong Ko, in northern Shan State. Civil society groups said the military did not disclose until the end of January that they were holding the men. The two were detained after speaking to journalists about a church in Mong Ko allegedly damaged by the military. In January the military charged both men under the Unlawful Association Act for supporting the Kachin Independence Army and for having unlicensed motorbikes. In March the military announced an additional charge of defamation based on an interview the men gave to Voice of America saying the Burmese military bombed civilians during the 2016 conflict. A court convicted the two men on October 27. It sentenced Nawng Latt to four years and three months for criminal defamation and violating the Unlawful Association Act and the Export Import Act, and sentenced Gam Seng to two years, three months under the same latter two charges. The two had been in detention for 10 months at the time of convictions, which were deducted from their sentences.

International observers reported abuses by authorities during late 2016 operations and against alleged participants in those attacks in the year following. Police and security forces reportedly arrested and detained hundreds of Rohingya males at random following the October 2016 violence. Some of these individuals reportedly stood trial with hundreds of codefendants after being held in prison for over a year.

On May 24, President Htin Kyaw pardoned and the government released 259 prisoners, including Muslim interfaith activists Zaw Zaw Latt and Pwint Phyu Latt. The released also included seven of the 12 alleged Muslim Myanmar Army prisoners whom authorities had arrested in 2014 under the subsequently repealed Emergency Provisions Act; they had been accused of receiving training from an armed group, among other charges.

According to various religious organizations and NGOs, the process to register an NGO, including a religiously affiliated NGO, remained lengthy and, due largely to what they say is bureaucratic inefficiency in local governments, was often not completed. Organizations noted that lack of registration did not generally hinder the ability of groups and individuals to conduct religious activities, except in a few cases.

Fighting between the government and rebels that restarted in Kachin State in 2011 continued; and fighting in Shan State reportedly increased as new groupings of rebels confronted the army. According to UN figures, almost 100,000 civilians remained displaced by conflict in Kachin and northern Shan States, where there are many Christians and Buddhists as well as other religious groups.

There were reports of local authorities preventing Muslims from conducting prayer services at religious facilities in some villages. Rohingya in northern Rakhine were reportedly prohibited from gathering publicly in groups of more than five persons.

On December 9, local government authorities in Kan Thar Village Tract in Magwe Division, which has an ethnic Chin Christian population, issued a letter barring a planned pre-Christmas prayer in a private home from proceeding. The letter said Buddhist neighbors had suggested to the local government officials that the celebration could cause religious conflict.

The government relaxed its requirements to receive prior written authorization for public events, including religious ceremonies outside of houses of worship and festivals, although in practice religious organizations still operated under the former regulations. While the law, as amended in 2016, only requires written notification to the local government for public events, in practice many religious and civil society organizations stated they preferred to receive written authorization from ward, township, and other local authorities before holding events. There were reports that some religious and nonreligious events received written authorization with restrictive security regulations or other controls.

Several Christian theological seminaries and Bible schools continued to operate, along with several madrassahs.

The government continued to support financially Buddhist seminaries and Buddhist missionary activities. The government continued to fund two state sangha universities in Rangoon and Mandalay, respectively, which trained Buddhist monks under the purview of the SSMNC, as well as the International Theravada Buddhist Missionary University in Rangoon.

Religious organizations said Buddhist groups generally did not experience difficulty obtaining permission to build new pagodas, monasteries, or community religious halls, in contrast with minority religious groups. According to religious organizations, the Ministry of Religious Affairs financially supported the SSMNC and religious ceremonies.

Some teachers at government schools reportedly continued to require students to recite Buddhist prayers, although such practices were no longer a mandated part of the curriculum. Many classrooms displayed Buddhist altars or other Buddhist iconography.

Due to movement restrictions, many Rohingya reportedly could not access education in state-run schools. Authorities did not permit Rohingya high school graduates from Rakhine State and others living in IDP camps to travel outside the state to attend college or university. Authorities continued to bar any university students who did not possess citizenship scrutiny cards from graduating, which disproportionately impacted students from religious minorities, particularly Muslim students. These students were permitted to attend classes and take examinations, but they could not receive diplomas unless they had a national identification card, the application for which required some religious minorities to identify as a “foreign” ethnic minority.

Faith communities throughout the country, including Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, and Muslims, all reported difficulties and delays that could last for years in getting permits to allow construction of new and rehabilitation of existing religious buildings. Buddhists, however, said getting such permission was harder for other groups. Religious groups said the multiple permissions required, unclear authority among government agencies, and interminable delays in responses to requests for permits led them to construct places of worship without the required permissions, leaving them vulnerable to future government action or to pressure by members of other religious groups. Others said it was necessary to bribe authorities to obtain permits.

In Mandalay, Christians said the local General Administrative Department (GAD), which has a significant role in issuing permits, required them to attest prayer activities would not take place in a requested new house of worship. Christians also said the local GAD office in July told them the permit process for new religious buildings was suspended due to May incidents in Rangoon related to “illegal mosques and prayer activities leading to social unrest.” A Hindu group seeking similar authorization in Mandalay said the GAD had not granted it by year’s end. In Meiktila in Mandalay Division, Muslims said authorities strictly prohibited cleaning, renovating, or entering eight mosques shut down after interreligious conflict in 2014; five others remained authorized. In Rangoon and Mandalay, Buddhist leaders said local GAD authorities denied some requests to build or renovate some monasteries, while other monasteries were shut down due to insufficient information provided to the GAD.

Christian communities in Chin and Kachin States reported that while applications to local authorities for property registration, construction, and renovation were not formally denied, the applications encountered delays spanning several years or were lost altogether. These included continued reports that local government officials delayed permits to restore crosses previously destroyed, or to renovate and build Christian churches in Chin State. Local authorities in Chin State also continued to delay applications from Christian groups and churches to buy land in the name of their religious organizations. Religious groups said individual members circumvented this requirement by purchasing land on behalf of the group, a practice the government tolerated.

Christian and Muslim groups seeking to build small places of worship on side streets or other inconspicuous locations continued to be able to do so only with informal approval from local authorities, according to religious groups.

Muslim groups reported official building requests encountered significant delays, and even when approved could subsequently be reversed. They also reported it remained extremely difficult to acquire permission to repair existing mosques, although authorities permitted internal maintenance in some cases. Historic mosques in Meiktila in Mandalay Division, Mawlamyine in Mon State, and Sittwe in Rakhine State, as well as in Rangoon and other areas continued to deteriorate because authorities did not allow routine maintenance.

Rohingya remained unable to obtain employment in any civil service positions. A 2005 local order in Maungdaw Township in northern Rakhine State requires residents, predominately Rohingya, to obtain local authorization to marry. In addition, some Rohingya sources expressed concern about the two-child policy for Rohingya families, referring to a 2005 local order promulgated in northern Rakhine State and sporadically enforced.

On September 18, local government authorities in Hpa-An Township in Karen State issued a letter requiring Muslims from Hpa-An to inform and receive authorization from local administrators to travel. Enforcement of the order reportedly was haphazard, however, and the chief minister of Karen State later rescinded it. In September airport officials at Thandwe Airport in southern Rakhine State requested some organizations traveling to Ngapali Beach to identify Muslim travelers and note where they would be staying.

In November Amnesty International released a two-year study on conditions in Rohingya IDP camps in place since intercommunal violence in 2012. The report noted that the camps segregate Rohingya men and women in what some called an “open air prison,” with little access to food and basic services and increasing restrictions on their freedom of movement.

In Rakhine State, the government and security forces imposed restrictions on the movement of various ethnic groups, particularly members of the nearly all Muslim Rohingya community and including IDPs, both before and after the violence beginning in August. According to NGOs and the Annan report, such restrictions seriously impeded the ability of Rohingya to pursue livelihoods, gain access to markets and other basic services, and engage other communities. According to civil society groups, government officials denied the Rohingya normal access to basic services, including hospitals, which Rohingya could only access through an arduous and unclear approval process. Additionally, as the vast majority of the restricted groups in the area were Muslim, individuals stereotyped by security forces as appearing to be Muslim received additional scrutiny on movements in the region, regardless of their actual religion.

Restrictions governing the travel of persons whom the government considers as foreigners, including both Muslim and Hindu Rohingya, and others between townships in northern Rakhine State, varied depending on the township, usually requiring submission of an immigration form. The traveler could obtain this form only from the township Immigration and National Registration Department and only if that person provided an original copy of a family list, temporary registration card, and two guarantors. The form authorized travel for 14 days. Authorities granted Muslims located outside of Rakhine State more freedom to travel, but they still faced restrictions on travel into and out of Rakhine State.

Muslim community representatives reported that in some cases Muslim-owned businesses encountered significant delays to procure government contracts without a Buddhist “front” person. Media and religious sources said local authorities in some villages restricted the licensing and butchering of cattle by slaughterhouses, the vast majority owned by Muslims, which negatively affected business operations and the ability of Muslim communities to celebrate Islamic holidays.

Nearly all senior officials within the military and civil service remained Buddhist, in spite of military and civil service outreach to various ethnic groups, including by inviting various ethnic groups to attend the Defense Services Academy. Applications for civil service and military positions required the applicant to list his or her religion.

Authorities required citizens and permanent residents to carry government-issued identification cards that permitted holders to access services and prove citizenship. These identification cards often indicated religious affiliation and ethnicity, but there appeared to be no consistent criteria governing whether a person’s religion was indicated on the card. The government also required citizens to indicate their religion on certain official applications for documents such as passports, although passports themselves do not indicate the bearer’s religion. Members of religious minorities, particularly Muslims, faced problems obtaining identification and citizenship cards. Some Muslims reported that they were required to indicate a “foreign” ethnicity if they self-identified as Muslim on applications for citizenship cards.

According to the Annan commission, “Muslims in Rakhine constitute the single biggest stateless community in the world. …Efforts by the government to verify citizenship claims have failed to win the confidence of either Muslim or Rakhine communities.” The government continued to call for Rohingya to participate in the government’s citizenship verification process and to apply for National Verification Cards (NVCs), but Rohingya communities objected to the exercise, citing a lack of requisite change in their rights after obtaining the NVCs and a general distrust towards the government. In September and October, the government reported issuing more than 2,600 NVCs (the first step in the citizenship verification process) to Rohingya in Maungdaw Township, and, as of the end of the year, a small number of Rohingya had gained either full or naturalized citizenship. Recipients of naturalized citizenship were ineligible to participate in some political activities and professions, although all citizens had the right to vote. The national government no longer required participants to identify as “Bengali” to receive NVCs and did not include race or religion on the document, but local implementers reportedly made applicants identify as “Bengali,” and all were required to identify as “Bengali” on their ensuing citizenship card. In October the government reportedly attempted to force Rohingya in Sittwe to apply for NVCs by making renewal of fishing licenses contingent on applying and by refusing to release Rohingya prisoners from Sittwe prison until they applied. According to a news report, Rohingya Hindus had accepted documents that recognized them as naturalized citizens.

According to a Refugees International report published in December, “decreased international aid, decreased accessibility due to government policies, and waning global attention are creating a desperate and unsustainable situation for the displaced people” in northern Burma – in particular, an estimated 100,000 displaced persons still living in camps in Kachin State, mostly Christian with some Buddhists also impacted, and northern Shan State, mostly Buddhist. According to the report, nearly half of this displaced population lived in areas controlled by ethnic armed groups to which the government blocked nearly all access by the UN and other international groups.

On April 28, authorities sealed off two madrassahs in Thaketa Township near downtown Rangoon in response to protests by a group of 50 to 100 Buddhist nationalists, who believed that the schools were unlawfully operating as mosques. According to local residents and media, Buddhist nationalists and police locked the buildings and barricaded the entrances. Several weeks later, when Muslim leaders arranged a large community prayer on a nearby street, authorities reportedly banned the event and threatened participants with jail. Police charged the Muslim community member who led the prayers, Moe Zaw, and two other community members with failure to obtain a permit to organize prayers, punishable by a fine or up to six months in prison. The two madrassahs remained closed as of year’s end. Several hundred students had attended the madrasahs’ primary schools prior to their closure.

On June 1, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture ordered the closure of Mya Taung Saung Monastic Education School in the town of Mrauk-U in Rakhine State after the military charged the head Buddhist monk at the school with having connections to the Arakan Army, an ethnic armed group deemed an illegal association by the government. The monk reportedly held a soccer match on school grounds on April 8 to celebrate the eighth anniversary of the Arakan Army. The Burmese military based in Mrauk-U found out about the match and filed charges against the monk and Khine Min Ni, another organizer of the match. The school reportedly later received a letter from the ministry removing authorization for the school to operate. According to officials, the monastic school had approximately 180 students, of which 50 lived on the school grounds.

Second Vice President Henry Van Thio, a Chin Christian, continued to serve in his position. There were no Muslim members of parliament. While some political parties fielded religious minority candidates in the 2015 elections and 2017 by-elections, including Muslims, the vast majority of parliamentarians were Buddhist. High-profile Buddhist monks remained informally involved in controversial political issues.

State-controlled media frequently depicted government officials and family members paying respect to Buddhist monks; offering donations at pagodas; officiating at ceremonies to open, improve, restore, or maintain pagodas; and organizing “people’s donations” of money, food, and uncompensated labor to build or refurbish Buddhist shrines nationwide. The government published and distributed books on Buddhist religious instruction.

The government officially recognized a number of interfaith groups, including the Interfaith Dialogue Group of Myanmar, which organized monthly meetings and sponsored several religious activities promoting peace and religious tolerance around the country throughout the year. The group’s leadership included Buddhist, Muslim, Christian, and Hindu leaders as well as from other religious groups. The government also organized interfaith prayer meetings across the country in October.

The government generally permitted foreign religious groups to operate. Local religious organizations were also able to send official invitations for visa purposes to clergy from faith-based groups overseas, and foreign religious visitors acquired either a tourist or business visa for entry. Authorities generally permitted Rangoon-based groups to host international students and experts.

The government facilitated the visit of Pope Francis to Rangoon and Nay Pyi Taw November 28 to 30. The pope’s visit, the first by any pope, included meetings with government leaders, religious leaders, and a public Mass attended by approximately 150,000 participants from various religious faiths.

Local and international experts said deeply woven prejudices led to instances of abuse or discrimination against members of religious minorities by societal actors. Many prominent military, civilian and religious leaders spoke about the challenge of the “Western Gate” – the idea that only Burmese society and Buddhism stood in the way of “hordes” of Muslims who would come through the mountains of western Burma (i.e., northern Rakhine State where the Rohingya lived) and overwhelm Buddhist areas of Burma and Thailand.

In September the government organized a trip for journalists to see the alleged mass graves of 45 Hindus whom the government said ARSA had killed in northern Maungdaw Township on August 25. Civil society organizations and some local villagers, however, suggested that security forces or vigilante groups not associated with Rohingya had killed the individuals. ARSA denied responsibility for the killings.

Despite the May 23 order by the SSMNC that no group or individual could operate under the banner of Ma Ba Tha, some of the group’s leaders and members continued to issue pejorative and hateful statements against Muslims in sermons and through social media through its new Buddha Dhamma Parahita Foundation. The group continued to operate, but its influence reportedly waned following the SSMNC order.

On March 9, the SSMNC banned the self-defined ultranationalist Wirathu, a monk and the chairperson of the Ma Ba Tha branch in Mandalay, from delivering sermons across the country for one year due to what the SSMNC called religious hate speeches against Muslims, which inflamed communal tensions. For example, in January he publicly thanked the suspected killers of Ko Ni, a prominent Muslim constitutional lawyer, and stated that it would be better for women to marry dogs than Muslims. On March 11, in response to the banning order, Wirathu livestreamed a video to his Facebook page of him with tape over his mouth, while a recording of one of his older sermons played for a crowd of some 500 persons. On August 30, Wirathu headlined a rally at which he spoke about the attacks in northern Rakhine State and stated international NGOs were “supporting the terrorists in Rakhine.” The SSMNC did not take action against him following the public speeches.

On May 10, nationalist monks stated that Rohingya were hiding illegally in Mingala Taungnyunt Township in Rangoon and, according to media reports, the monks informed local police about their suspicions. The reports stated that when local police investigated and found no one to be living illegally in the neighborhood, monks and Buddhist laypeople instigated acts of violence against the Muslim community there, injuring at least two individuals. Police arrested eight individuals for their involvement in the violence.

On May 20, more than 700 individuals who identified themselves as nationalists protested against Minister of Religious Affairs and Culture Aung Ko and demanded his resignation, a week after the SSMNC ordered that no group or individual would be allowed to operate under the banner of Ma Ba Tha. After the protest, the Nay Pyi Taw Council Administrative Department instructed regional police to file a case against the protesters on charges that they broke an agreement to use only approved slogans during the protest.

According to media reports, on July 6, 150 Buddhists and monks attacked newly converted Christians in This Taw village in the Sagaing Region in the northwest area of the country, injuring seven and destroying their homes and property. According to the media, the neighbors grew frustrated at the Christian household’s loud celebration lasting through the night for three days; on the third day, the neighbors attacked. The report also noted that local police and some other monks and neighborhood laypeople tried to stop the mob.

On September 10, in Taungdwingyi near Magwe, approximately 50 young men wearing masks threw stones at a house reportedly belonging to a Muslim man. The attackers then proceeded to a mosque in Shwe Kyar Inn, Ward 1, loudly singing the national anthem and throwing stones. The crowd grew in size to approximately 400 individuals before police intervened. Police detained at least four persons. According to police, the four suspects and the Muslim homeowner had an existing personal dispute, and the riot leaders had attempted to build support for the four suspects’ cause by inflaming existing religious tensions in the community.

In March police arrested Swe Win after Ma Ba Tha supporter Kyaw Myo Shwe claimed that Swe Win shared a Facebook post suggesting Wirathu violated the monastic code of conduct by making statements commending the January 28 assassination of Muslim constitutional lawyer Ko Ni. Authorities subsequently released Swe Win on bail, but the charges remained pending at year’s end.

There were reports of some local villages in Rakhine State deterring individuals from assisting the Rohingya community. In September in central Rakhine State, a local Rakhine woman who offered food to Rohingya in a neighboring village was forced to shave her head and march around the village with a sign around her neck that said “traitor.”

On October 30, Buddhist leader Sitagu Sayadaw gave a sermon to soldiers at a military training school in Kayin State, live-streamed on Facebook to more than 250,000 persons, that was widely interpreted to suggest that in the course of battle, it is less of a sin for soldiers to kill non-Buddhists then to kill Buddhists. He quoted a parable from Sri Lanka in which a king who killed millions of the Hindu Tamil community is told by his council of advisors, including monks, that it was only a minor sin because those millions of deaths only added up to one and a half real human beings since the Hindus did not obey the five precepts of Buddhism. In his sermon, Sitagu Sayadaw noted the need for Buddhist leaders and the Burmese military to work together for national unity. Commentators generally interpreted these remarks as condoning the military’s abuses against members of religious minority groups.

During the year, there were multiple reports of possible ARSA members killing civilians in northern Rakhine State for collaborating with the government; however, others said these reports were not credible. On August 1, the government reported “extremists” killed six ethnic Mro Buddhists villagers in northern Rakhine State.

Some Buddhist and Muslim community leaders continued to collaborate to quell rumors and prevent violence through formal and informal community-centered mechanisms. For example, during the violence in Magway in September, local religious and community groups worked to calm community tensions and dispel rumors, preventing the mob from growing larger and more violent. Similarly, during the incident in Mingala Taungnyunt in Rangoon, interfaith networks cautioned Muslims to stay indoors to avoid encountering the violent mob.

Religious and community leaders and civil society activists organized intrafaith and interfaith events, and some worked jointly to develop mechanisms to monitor and counter hate speech and to promote religious tolerance and diversity. A coalition of interfaith civil society groups continued developing draft legislation, which they said they planned to bring to parliament in 2018, to counter hate speech and promote interfaith harmony. In Mandalay Division, various NGOs and interfaith leaders continued to hold meetings and public events to promote peace and religious tolerance for community leaders and youth. A number of interfaith groups continued mobilizing civil society around the country to promote religious tolerance.

Senior U.S. officials – including the Secretary of State, the Ambassador, the Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific Affairs, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor – consistently raised with senior leaders ongoing U.S. concerns about religious freedom in the country. They specifically raised the plight of the mostly Muslim Rohingya in Rakhine State, hardships facing religious minority communities in Kachin and northern Shan States in the midst of ongoing military conflicts, and advocacy on social media of violence against religious minorities. On November 22, the Secretary of State announced that the situation in northern Rakhine State constituted ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya. After August 25, the U.S. government severely curtailed bilateral military-to-military relations, prevented current and former military leaders from obtaining visas to the U.S., imposed financial sanctions against a general who commanded forces in northern Rakhine, and took other steps towards accountability for perpetrators of human rights violations. U.S. government officials consistently called for long-term and durable solutions to the root causes of longstanding issues in Rakhine State and the lack of citizenship status for most Rohingya, including a voluntary and transparent path to restoration and provision of citizenship, and full access to humanitarian aid for Rohingya and other affected communities in the region. Embassy officials also urged government and interfaith leaders to improve efforts to mitigate religiously motivated violence such as in Rangoon and Magwe.

Embassy officials at all levels discussed the importance of addressing the effects of ethnoreligious violence and hate speech, including anti-Muslim rhetoric. Embassy officials promoted religious freedom and tolerance in meetings with high-level government officials, including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, the commander in chief, the national security advisor, and the ministers of foreign affairs; religious affairs; home affairs; ethnic affairs; immigration, population, and labor affairs; and social welfare, relief, and resettlement affairs. Embassy officials also met with officials in the president’s office, the speaker of the lower house of parliament, parliamentarians, members of civil society, scholars, and representatives of other governments.

The Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration led a delegation to Burma and Bangladesh in October. In central Rakhine State, the delegation met with Rohingya confined to IDP camps since 2012, and in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, the delegation met with Rohingya refugees who had recently fled the ethnic cleansing in northern Rakhine State. The delegation also engaged government officials, civil society groups, and international organizations.

Embassy officials traveled to ethnic minority-predominant areas to discuss religious freedom and tolerance with state and local government officials, NGOs, and members of community-based organizations and religious communities. The Ambassador visited Rakhine, Kachin, and Chin States, areas where religious minorities were affected by conflict or violence, as well as other areas that had suffered from and were identified as at risk of ethnoreligious conflict. Embassy officials visited northern Rakhine State in January to assess the impact the October 2016 violence had on humanitarian assistance and the various communities living there. The Ambassador’s multiple visits to Rakhine State to assess the situation helped inform the embassy’s efforts and strategies in engaging the government and advocating for the rights of all communities in the state.

The embassy continued to call for respect for religious freedom, tolerance, and unity in its interactions with all sectors of society, and on its Facebook page. At high-profile events, embassy representatives spoke out for religious freedom and against intercommunal conflict and hate speech. Embassy representatives, including the Ambassador, repeatedly met with Buddhist, Christian, Jewish, Hindu, and Muslim leaders, including ethnic minority religious leaders, members of faculties of theology, and other religiously affiliated organizations – such as Ma Ba Tha and its successor organization – and NGOs to advocate for religious freedom and tolerance. The embassy also shared multiple posts on Facebook about religious pluralism, tolerance, and shared identity in the U.S.

The embassy regularly published statements highlighting concerns about religiously based tension and anti-Muslim discrimination, as well as calling for respect for religious diversity, unity, and tolerance. For example, on August 25, the embassy released a statement welcoming the release of the Annan Commission Report and the Burmese government’s declared commitment to implement the recommendations. The same day the embassy released a statement condemning the ARSA attacks on August 25 in northern Rakhine State – recognizing government and security force responsibility to apprehend perpetrators and urging them to do so in a way that protects all civilians. On November 22, the Secretary of State stated, “No provocation can justify the horrendous atrocities that have ensued. These abuses by some among the Burmese military, security forces, and local vigilantes have caused tremendous suffering and forced hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children to flee their homes in Burma to seek refuge in Bangladesh. After a careful and thorough analysis of available facts, it is clear that the situation in northern Rakhine state constitutes ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya.”

Embassy facilities in Rangoon and Mandalay hosted numerous discussions for youth and civil society on religious tolerance. A U.S. government-sponsored program on supporting political and civic engagement provided several courses to civil society representatives on pluralism and social respect as the basis of a free and democratic civil society that is more robust than authoritarian societies, economies, and militaries. As in prior years, the embassy partnered with and supported numerous faith-based and civil society organizations working on programs promoting religious freedom and tolerance.

Since 1999, Burma has been designated as a CPC under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. On December 22, 2017, the Secretary of State redesignated Burma as a CPC and identified the following sanction that accompanied the designation: the existing ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(a) pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 11.5 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2008 national census, 62 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 21.6 Protestant, 2.5 Muslim, and 2.3 Seventh-day Adventist. Another 6.1 percent have no religious affiliation, and 3.7 percent belong to indigenous religious groups. The Muslim population lives mainly in urban areas, and the head of the Islamic Community of Burundi estimates Muslims constitute closer to 10-12 percent of the population. Most Muslims are Sunni. There are some Shia Muslims and a small Ismaili community. Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Jehovah’s Witnesses, Orthodox Christians, The Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Hindus, and Jains.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes a secular state; prohibits religious discrimination; recognizes freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; and provides for equal protection under the law regardless of religion. These rights may be limited by law in the general interest or to protect the rights of others, and may not be abused to compromise national unity, independence, peace, democracy, or the secular nature of the state, or to violate the constitution. The constitution prohibits political parties from preaching religious violence, exclusion, or hate.

The government recognizes and registers religious groups through the law covering nonprofit organizations, which states these organizations must register with the Ministry of Interior. There is a 20,000 Burundian franc ($12) fee for registration. Each religious group must provide the denomination or affiliation of the institution, a copy of its bylaws, the address of its headquarters in the country, an address abroad if the local institution is part of a larger group, and the names and addresses of the association’s governing body and legal representative. Registration also entails identifying any property and bank accounts owned by the religious group. The ministry usually processes registration requests within two to four weeks. Leaders of religious groups who fail to comply or who practice in spite of denial of their registration are subject to six months’ to five years’ imprisonment.

The law does not generally grant tax exemptions or other benefits to religious groups, with certain exceptions. Some religious and nonreligious schools have signed agreements with the government entitling them to tax exemptions when investing in infrastructure or purchasing school equipment and educational materials.

The official curriculum includes religion and morality classes for all secondary and primary schools. The program offers religious instruction for Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam, although all classes may not be available if the number of students interested is insufficient in a particular school. Students are free to choose from one of these three religion classes or attend morality classes instead.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In August during a civil marriage ceremony in Karuzi Province, a Jehovah’s Witness couple refused to pronounce their marriage vows while holding the national flag – a practice common in civil marriages but not required by law. The couple was arrested and detained in a jail in Karuzi. They were released two weeks later without any charges and were subsequently allowed to marry, pronouncing their vows with their hands on the Bible.

The government sometimes prevented religious groups without official recognition from holding meetings. In December police and members of the National Intelligence Service (SNR) detained members of an unrecognized Christian congregation in Mwaro Province during a late-night prayer session. Members of the security services reportedly believed that the group was engaged in political activities rather than, or in addition to, prayer, reflecting widespread restrictions on the freedom of assembly in the country. The detained individuals were subsequently released without charges.

On December 27, SNR agents detained 13 Ahmadi Muslims between 12 and 24 years of age who were visiting the Ahmadiyya mosque in Bujumbura, reportedly on suspicion that they were members of the al-Shabaab terrorist group. They were subsequently released, allegedly for a bribe.

The Ministry of the Interior sometimes denied requests for registration from religious groups but did not make information available on the applicants who were refused or the reasons for refusal.

Following tense rhetorical exchanges between the government and the Catholic Church over political issues exacerbated by the 2015 presidential election, observers stated that both government officials and members of the Catholic hierarchy made efforts to improve relations. In August Archbishop of Gitega Simon Ntamwana inaugurated a government-organized prayer retreat in Gitega, which was attended by President Nkurunziza and other senior officials.

President Nkurunziza routinely employed religious rhetoric in the context of political speeches and invoked divine guidance for political decisions. In a November speech, he lauded the members of the Imbonerakure, the youth wing of the ruling CNDD-FDD party, by using a play on words in which he called God “the first Imbonerakure,” literally “one who sees far” or “a visionary.”

In May the president issued a decree launching a campaign requiring unmarried couples to legalize their relationships by the end of the year. The Ministry of the Interior subsequently announced that couples who did not marry before the end of the year could face fines of 50,000 francs ($29), based on the provisions of the criminal code against unmarried cohabitation, and that children born out of wedlock would not be eligible for waivers on primary school fees and other social services. The media described this as a campaign to “moralize society.” The president stated that church- and state-sanctioned weddings were an effort to reinforce positive moral values. Civil society activists said that compelling cohabitating couples to marry was part of a “religious crusade” led by the president and his wife.

In January the Ministry of the Interior announced the establishment of a new religious monitoring body to “monitor, regulate, and settle” inter and intradenominational disputes and to ensure that religious organizations operate according to law. The committee was also charge with tracking subversive or inflammatory teachings. Eight of the 11 members named were religious leaders, with no representative from the Catholic Church. There were no reports of the body taking action during the year.

Some of the followers of Eusebie Ngendakumana who had earlier been released from prison were subject to continued legal proceedings under consideration by the Supreme Court, according to their lawyer. Ngendakumana, who remained in exile in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was accused of leading an unrecognized cult that formed after she reported seeing visions of the Virgin Mary in 2013.

Government benefits, such as tax waivers, continued to be granted to religious groups for the acquisition of materials to manage development projects. According to the Burundi Revenue Authority, tax waivers were granted to religious denominations for the import of religious materials such as printed materials, wines for the observation of Mass, and equipment to produce communion wafers. The authority granted to a Catholic congregation a tax waiver for the purchase of building material for a new convent, and to a diocese for the import of two vehicles for its development projects.

President Nkurunziza led the country’s 14th annual National Prayer Breakfast on November 14, with the theme “Be the change you wish to see.” The president’s speech focused on the need “to root out evil and to plant good,” alternating his message between a call for citizens to work for change and offering that “some things only God can do.”

Religious leaders from different denominations sought to promote improved interfaith relations, which at times were strained by political differences. In October religious leaders representing the Catholic Church, Protestant denominations, and the Islamic community met in Arusha, Tanzania, under the auspices of the World Council of Churches and the UN Office on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect. The leaders issued a joint communique promising to undertake interfaith efforts for national peace and reconciliation. They called on the Burundian government to establish conditions for peaceful, free, and fair elections in 2020, and on political leaders to renounce violence. The Catholic Church subsequently issued a separate communique sharing the joint message’s determination to promote peace through interfaith efforts.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy representatives discussed religious freedom with the government and urged the government to respect the rights of individuals and organizations, including religious groups.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy officials continued to encourage and support broad-based religious acceptance and dialogue in meetings with religious leaders from different faiths and denominations and through engagement with civil society organizations supporting interfaith dialogue. The embassy encouraged societal leaders, including political leaders and representatives of major faith groups, to support religious acceptance and promote interfaith discussion of the collaborative role religious groups could play in disseminating a message of peace and tolerance to the population.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 561,000 (July 2017 estimate). The national government’s statistics indicate 77 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 10 percent Protestant, 2 percent Muslim, and 1 percent does not identify with any religion. The second-largest Christian denomination is the Church of the Nazarene. Other Christian denominations include Seventh-day Adventists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Assemblies of God, Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, and other Pentecostal and evangelical groups. There are small Bahai and Jewish communities.

Legal Framework

The constitution states freedom of conscience, religion, and worship are inviolable and protects the right of individuals to choose, practice, profess, and change their religion and to interpret their religious beliefs for themselves. It provides for the separation of religion and state and prohibits the state from imposing religious beliefs and practices on individuals. It prohibits political parties from adopting names associated with particular religious groups. The constitution prohibits ridiculing religious symbols or practices. Under the constitution, rights may be suspended only in a state of emergency or siege.

Violations of religious freedom are crimes subject to penalties of between three months and three years in prison.

The law codifies the constitution’s religious freedom provisions by providing for equal rights and guarantees for all religions in accordance with the constitution and international law. The law separates religion and state but allows the government to sign agreements with religious entities on matters of public interest. Specific sections of the law guarantee the protection of religious heritage, the right to religious education, freedom of organization of religious groups, and the free exercise of religious functions and worship.

A 2014 concordat between the government and the Holy See recognizes the legal status of the Catholic Church and its right to carry out its apostolic mission freely. The concordat further recognizes Catholic marriages under civil law and the right of Catholics to carry out religious observances on Sundays, and it specifies a number of Catholic holidays as public holidays. It protects places of worship and other Catholic properties and provides for religious educational institutions, charitable activities, and pastoral work in the military, hospitals, and penal institutions. The concordat exempts Church revenues and properties used in religious and nonprofit activities from taxes and makes contributions to the Church tax deductible.

The law requires all associations, whether religious or secular, to register with the Ministry of Justice. The constitution states an association may not be armed; be in violation of penal law; or promote violence, racism, xenophobia, or dictatorship. To register, a religious group must submit a copy of its charter and statutes signed by its members. Failure to register does not result in any restriction of religious practice, but registration provides additional benefits such as exemptions from national, regional, and local taxes and fees. Registered religious groups may receive exemptions from taxes and fees in connection with places of worship or other buildings intended for religious purposes, activities with exclusively religious purposes, institutions and seminaries intended for religious education or training of religious leaders, goods purchased for religious purposes, and distribution of publications with information on places of worship. Legally registered churches and religious groups may use broadcast time on public radio and television at their own expense.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Under the 2014 concordat, the government continued to grant privileges to the Catholic Church that other groups did not receive, including in educational institutions, in government facilities, and in access to media. Some minority religious groups said this practice strengthened the perception that the government favored the Catholic Church as the “official religion” over other religious groups. The government continued to use Catholic Church representatives to inaugurate public buildings throughout the country. Public television transmitted religious programming paid for by the Catholic Church, most of which was of Catholic services. A Brazilian-owned television network TV Record covered the religious activities of the Universal Church. Other religious groups received minimal television broadcast time, reportedly because they did not request it or had no means to pay for it.

Muslim leaders stated the registration process was straightforward and that they were hopeful the new government, elected in 2016, would be easier to work with than the previous one. Muslim community leaders noted, Muslims requesting to visit for community strengthening and to conduct minor infrastructure projects such as refurbishment of mosques were denied entry in the past, but the change in government appeared to have reversed that tendency, although the volume of such requests was small. The director of the Central Prison of Praia stated that he had not scheduled a time for regular clergy visits for Muslim prisoners, although other religious groups had such visits. He added that Ramadan was observed in the prison. The prison director in Mindelo, the country’s second-largest prison, noted that requests for Muslim religious services access often would involve after-hours support from the prison. A Muslim leader confirmed that the community had not approached the prison for permission since the change of government. Ministry of External Relations and Communities officials stated that the country was an institution-based democracy that respected freedom of religion, including in prison.

The country officially recognized its Jewish heritage as part of the national patrimony and national culture in a resolution issued by the Council of Ministers and signed by the prime minister in July.

Members of minority religious groups, including Mormons, stated that they received no media coverage for their events. According to some observers, only Catholic and large Nazarene events received media coverage.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

Embassy representatives met with officials from the Ministry of External Relations and Communities to discuss inmates’ ability and freedom to practice the religion of their choosing in prisons around the country. U.S. embassy representatives met with Catholic and other religious communities on various trips around the archipelago to discuss social conditions and interfaith and religious community relations. The embassy also spoke with civil society representatives regarding religious freedom. The embassy used social media channels to raise awareness about the need to protect religious freedom.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 16.2 million (July 2017 estimate). The 2013 Intercensal Population Survey conducted by the National Institute of Statistics said Buddhists make up 97.9 percent of the population, almost all of them Theravada Buddhist, according to the Ministry of Cults and Religions (MCR). The vast majority of ethnic Khmer Cambodians are Buddhist. Ethnic Vietnamese in the country traditionally practice Mahayana Buddhism, although there are many who have adopted Theravada Buddhism. Other ethnic Vietnamese practice Roman Catholicism, and they make up the vast majority of Catholics in the country. Ethnic Vietnamese make up approximately 5 percent of the population. According to government estimates, approximately 2.1 percent of the population is Muslim, although some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) estimate the Muslim population to be 4-5 percent. The Muslim population is predominantly ethnic Cham, although not all Cham are Muslim. The Cham typically live in towns and rural fishing villages on the banks of the Tonle Sap Lake and the Mekong River, as well as in Kampot Province. There are four branches of Islam represented in the country: the Shafi’i branch, practiced by as many as 90 percent of Muslims in the country; the Salafi (Wahhabi) branch; the indigenous Iman-San branch; and the Kadiani branch. The remainder of the population includes Bahais, Jews, ethnic Vietnamese Cao Dai, and members of various Christian denominations.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of belief and religious worship, provided such freedom neither interferes with others’ beliefs and religions nor violates public order and security. The constitution establishes Buddhism as the state religion and provides for state support of Buddhist education; it also prohibits discrimination based on religion. The law requires that religious groups refrain from openly criticizing other religious groups, although this provision is rarely tested. The law also forbids religious organizations from organizing events, rallies, meetings, and training sessions that are politically focused.

The law requires all religious groups, including Buddhist groups, to register with the MCR to conduct religious activities. The law mandates that groups must inform the government of the goals of their religious organization, describe its activities, provide biographical information for all religious leaders, describe funding sources, commit to submitting annual reports detailing all activities, and refrain from insulting other religious groups, fomenting disputes, or undermining national security. Registration requires approvals from numerous local, provincial, and national government offices, a process which can take up to 90 days. The MCR, however, has no authority to punish religious groups for failing to register, and there are no associated penalties for failing to register. Registered religious groups receive an income tax exemption from the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

The law formally bans non-Buddhist groups from door-to-door proselytizing and stipulates that non-Buddhist literature may be distributed only inside religious institutions. The law also prohibits offers of money or materials in order to convince people to convert.

The law requires separate registration of all places of worship and religious schools. Unregistered places of worship and religious schools may be shut down temporarily until they are registered, although the MCR says it has not taken such action. The law also makes a legal distinction between “places of worship” and “offices of prayer.” The establishment of a place of worship requires that the founders own the structure and the land on which it is located. The facility must have a minimum capacity of 200 persons, and the permit application requires the support of at least 100 congregants. An office of prayer may be located in a rented property and has no minimum capacity requirement. The permit application for an office of prayer requires the support of at least 25 congregants. Places of worship must be located at least two kilometers (1.2 miles) from each other and may not be used for political purposes or to house criminals or fugitives. The distance requirement applies only to the construction of new places of worship and not to offices of religious organizations or offices of prayer.

Religious schools must be registered with the MCR and the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport (MOEYS). Religious schools are advised to follow the MOEYS core curriculum, which does not include a religious component; however, schools may supplement lessons with a religious curriculum in addition to the ministry’s core curriculum. The government promotes Buddhist religious instruction in public schools in coordination with MOEYS. Non-Buddhist students are allowed to opt out of this instruction. The law does not mandate non-Buddhist religious instruction, and no other religions are taught in public schools. Non-Buddhist religious instruction may be provided by private institutions.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In August UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia Rhona Smith released a statement following her two-week mission to the country affirming UNHCR had determined 36 Vietnamese Christian Montagnards who had fled to Cambodia had legitimate asylum claims. The Cambodian government, however, had not agreed to settle them within the country or facilitate their transit to a third country for resettlement. In October the government determined that seven of the Montagnards had legitimate refugee claims and cooperated in sending them to a third country. It said the remaining 29 had weak asylum cases and announced plans to forcibly repatriate them back to Vietnam, even though UNHCR was ready to assist in resettling them. The government dismissed the special rapporteur’s statement and condemned her for what it described as interference in its domestic affairs.

In September during a speech to garment workers in Kampong Cham Province, Prime Minister Hun Sen urged all private-sector employers to allow Muslims to wear headscarves and conservative clothing at the workplace. During Ramadan, the prime minister reaffirmed Muslim rights to wear religious head coverings at school and in photographs used for official identification. He also pledged support to Muslim teachers across the country and praised the government for facilitating their integration into the public education system.

The government continued to promote Buddhist holidays by declaring some of them as official holidays off from work, provide Buddhist training and education to monks and others in pagodas, and provide financial support to an institute that performed research and published materials on Khmer culture and Buddhist traditions. The government did not grant similar treatment to other religions or religious holidays.

The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, also known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, continued to hear testimony related to charges of ethnic- and religious-based genocide against the Cham population during the Khmer Rouge era from 1975 to 1979.

During Ramadan Prime Minister Hun Sen hosted an iftar for more than 4,700 members of the Muslim community. In his speech he told his guests there was no basis for political discrimination in the country and called on Buddhists to be tolerant and accepting of the Muslim and Christian communities.

Villagers killed several ethnic Phnong people suspected of practicing sorcery due to their animist beliefs. In July a 29-year-old man was shot in the head in Mondulkiri, and in November a 62-year-old man was beheaded by villagers in Kampot; both were accused of sorcery.

There were reports from members of the Cham Muslim community of barriers to their integration into society. Local media reported some members of the majority Buddhist community continued to view the Cham and other minority ethnic groups with suspicion as purported practitioners of sorcery or “black magic.” In some cases, those who were suspected of practicing black magic were threatened or, in past years, killed by villagers or by their own family members.

U.S. embassy officials raised religious freedom and tolerance with MCR representatives and other government officials. MCR officials spoke about their initial plans of drafting a new law on religious freedom. The embassy offered to review the draft law when appropriate. Embassy officials also discussed the issue of forced repatriation and residency of Montagnard Christians with government officials and members of international and local NGOs.

The embassy underscored the importance of acceptance of religious diversity with leaders of Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim groups, emphasizing the importance of interfaith tolerance in a democratic society. Embassy programs focused on faith-based communities and promoted pluralism through exchanges and youth programs.

Several embassy programs specifically focused on the preservation of Cham heritage, including religious heritage, through reading and writing instruction in the Cham language, and included the preservation and study of religious artifacts from the ancient Kingdom of Champa. The embassy continued a series of speaking engagements and focus groups in which Islamic leaders from around the world engaged with the Cham community to provide them with a deeper understanding of the constructive role that various Muslim populations play throughout the world in their workforces and communities.

Other embassy programs focused on interfaith cooperation, community leadership, and conflict resolution. Embassy officials toured the country on several occasions to meet members of the community, in the process promoting religious tolerance, showing respect for Cham culture, lessening the isolation of the Cham, and supporting Cham integration into the wider culture. The Ambassador also hosted an iftar for members of the Cham and Muslim community during Ramadan. The iftar included members of the ruling and opposition parties, youth groups, and civil society and allowed for open discussions about the importance of religious tolerance and acceptance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 25 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2005 census, the most recent available, 69.2 percent of the population is Christian, 20.9 percent Muslim, 5.6 percent animist, 1.0 percent other religions, and 3.2 percent report no religious affiliation. Of Christians, approximately 55.5 percent are Roman Catholic, 38 percent Protestant, and 6.5 percent other Christian denominations, including Jehovah’s Witnesses and Orthodox churches. There is a growing number of Christian revivalist churches.

Christians are concentrated primarily in the southern and western parts of the country. The two Anglophone regions are largely Protestant, and the five southern Francophone regions are mostly Catholic. The Fulani (Peuhl) ethnic group is mostly Muslim and lives primarily in the northern Francophone regions; the Bamoun ethnic group is also predominantly Muslim and lives in the West Region. Many Muslims, Christians, and members of other faiths also adhere to some aspects of animist beliefs.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes the state as secular, prohibits harassment or discrimination on grounds of religion, and provides for freedom of religion and worship.

The law on freedom of association governs relations between the government and religious groups. The government must approve religious groups or institutions as a prerequisite for lawful operation. Although the law prescribes no specific penalties for operating without official recognition, the government may suspend the activities of unauthorized groups. The government does not require indigenous religious groups to register, characterizing the practice of traditional religion as a private concern observed by members of a particular ethnic or kinship group or the residents of a particular locality.

To become an authorized entity, a religious group must legally qualify as a religious congregation, defined as “any group of natural persons or corporate bodies whose vocation is divine worship” or “any group of persons living in community in accordance with a religious doctrine.” The religious group must submit a request for authorization as a religious group, and include with it the group’s charter describing planned activities, names and functions of the group’s officials, and a declaration of commitment to comply with the law on freedom of association, to the relevant divisional (local-level) office. That office forwards the documents to the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MINATD). The MINATD reviews the file and sends it to the presidency with a recommendation to approve or deny. Authorization may be granted by presidential decree. Official authorization confers no general tax benefits but allows religious groups to receive real estate as a tax-free gift for the conduct of their activities and to gather publicly and worship. It also permits missionaries to receive visas with longer validity. Unauthorized religious groups may gather publicly and worship under a policy of “administrative tolerance” as long as public security and peace are not disturbed.

The MINATD may issue an order to suspend any religious group for “disturbing public order,” which is not defined in the law. The president may dissolve any previously authorized religious organization that “deviates from its initial focus.”

The Ministry of Basic Education and the Ministry of Secondary Education require private religious schools to comply with the same curriculum, infrastructure, and teacher training standards as state-operated schools. Unlike public schools, private schools may offer religious education.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government and leaders of the Catholic Church disagreed about the circumstances surrounding the death of Bishop Jean Marie Benoit Bala of the Diocese of Bafia. On June 2, his body was recovered from the Sanaga River after his car was found on the bridge with a note inside stating, “I am in the water.” On June 13, the National Episcopal Council of Cameroon (NECC) declared the Bishop had been brutally murdered. The NECC challenged the results of an official autopsy, which stated that the Bishop probably drowned, given that there were no signs of violence on his body. On July 4, the attorney general also released a statement at the Central Appeal Court stating, “Drowning is the most probable cause of death of the Bishop.” On July 10, the NECC stated in a public statement, based on what it said was moral certitude, “the corpse which was recovered from the river and identified as his, bore marks of violence.” Bala’s death followed a series of killings of Roman Catholic clergymen since the 1980s. Bishop Abraham Kome, appointed as administrator of the Diocese of Bafia following Bala’s death, said during a homily that people in positions of power killed Bala because he stood against homosexual activity. On August 4, NECC President Archbishop Samuel Kleda said the controversy surrounding the Bishop’s death had significantly strained relations between the Church and the government. The NECC filed a private lawsuit against government officials for “mishandling the case.”

On September 17, security officers in Douala arrested the pastor of the Salvation for All Nations revivalist church following the death of Henriette Fagna, a parishioner who sought treatment from her pastor after falling ill. The pastor initiated a healing service on her behalf, but her condition deteriorated, and she was eventually taken to a health facility where she later died. Authorities charged the pastor with her death, stating the pastor’s actions delayed medical intervention until it was too late.

On August 8, the newly appointed governor of the Center Region, Paul Naseri Bea, announced the closure of unauthorized revivalist churches, citing public order and health concerns, especially nighttime noise that disturbed residents. The authorities, however, did not implement his order or close any churches.

The government intervened on several occasions in protracted leadership crises within Christian groups, such as the Cameroon Evangelical Church (CEC) and the Cameroonian Presbyterian Church (EPC). In July the courts suspended the president and other executives of the CEC, who had been elected in April. In February the Divisional Officer of Mvila, South Region, placed five parishes of the CPC under the temporary administration of its General Assembly. In both cases, the government stated it took this measure to preserve order and encourage a solution and reconciliation among those involved. Various factions of the two denominations accused the government of administrative bias and judicial discrimination.

On June 25, security officers dispersed a group of persons attempting to disrupt Islamic prayers marking the end of Ramadan in Ngaoundere, Adamawa Region. The group that attempted the disruption stated that the traditional Muslim ruler (Lamido) and the governor had wrongfully expelled 48 families from the prayer site in May after public authorities granted the land to them. The governor said the state owned the land in question and granted the Muslim community access after an official request. Gendarmes arrested six protesters.

The government again took no action to adjudicate applications for legal status by a number of religious groups whose applications had been pending for years. The government approved only one new religious group in the last 18 years and none since 2010. According to the MINATD, incomplete application submissions and lengthy background investigations contributed to delays. Although, by law, groups must register, the government continued to allow hundreds of unauthorized small religious groups to operate freely under its policy of “administrative tolerance.” Forty-seven religious groups continued to be legally authorized at year’s end.

The government continued to grant broad legal authority to traditional leaders to manage their districts. As part of this authority, traditional leaders continued to exercise control over local mosques with the right to appoint or dismiss imams.

The state-sponsored television station and radio stations regularly broadcast Christian and Islamic religious services and ceremonies on national holidays and during national events. Government ministers and other officials often attended these ceremonies.

The government provided an annual subsidy to all private primary and secondary education institutions, including those operated by religious denominations. The size of each subsidy was proportional to the size of the student body.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

Boko Haram continued committing acts of mass violence in its quest to impose its religious and political beliefs. Boko Haram perpetrated numerous attacks, sometimes directly targeting places of worship. For example, on September 13, a young girl walked into the Sanda-Wadjiri mosque in Kolofata and set off an explosive that killed five worshippers during morning prayers. Boko Haram perpetrated multiple and indiscriminate killings of civilians – Muslim and Christian alike – and of government officials and military personnel. In addition, insurgents kidnapped civilians and set residences on fire. On September 5, Amnesty International released a report stating that Boko Haram suicide bombers had killed 158 civilians in the country between April and September.

The government worked in conjunction with the Nigerian government in a joint forces campaign to free citizens under the control of Boko Haram and arrest Boko Haram fighters. In March troops from the country’s Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR), alongside Nigerian forces, freed several localities, including Siyara, Kote, Sigawa Tchatike, and Lamukura, in the border region under Boko Haram control.

Mfombam Memouna said her father Mfomban Aboubakar, who opposed her conversion from Islam to Christianity, forcibly transported her from her residence in Yaounde to a mosque in Douala following her conversion, where she was beaten, forced to recite Quranic verses and inhale certain fumes. She said Aboubakar demanded her to renounce her conversion. Although she escaped back to Yaounde, her father continued to threaten her in an attempt to compel her to renounce Christianity. On October 12, Memouna submitted a complaint against her father to the attorney general of the Court of First Instance in Yaounde. At year’s end, she had yet to receive a response.

In March a “Consortium of Parents” filed lawsuits against Catholic, Presbyterian, and Baptist clergy who presided over denominational schools in the Northwest and Southwest Regions. Authorities subsequently charged the clerics with embezzlement, refusing to teach students, and jeopardizing national unity. Observers stated the charges were perceived as a disguised government attack, since the accusations were made following a communique on February 9 in which the clergymen jointly called on the government to “pursue frank dialogue with agitating Anglophone leaders” and pointed out that the crisis in the Northwest and Southwest Regions “resulted from an underlying and unsolved political problem.” Church leaders in these regions made clear their conviction that the government was behind the charges filed against them, which they said stemmed from a school boycott conducted by Anglophone strikers that began in November 2016. The consortium filed the lawsuit after strikers closed most schools in these regions due to perceived marginalization of the Anglophone community. On September 25, the attorneys general of the respective regional courts of appeal dropped all charges against the clerics.

In April members of the CEC elected as president Reverend Jean Samuel Hendje Toya, but a faction of the CEC protested and filed a lawsuit on May 23, saying the election was rigged. In 2009 members had agreed their next president would be of Sawa ethnicity, and some rejected Toya for not meeting this criterion or because they had pledged their allegiance to Toya’s rival, Reverend Priso Moungole. Demonstrations and interruptions of church services ensued, and on July 21, the Court of First Instance in Wouri, Littoral Region, suspended the installation of those elected in April. Toya’s supporters denounced this decision, which was upheld on appeal, and rejected the authority of the state to adjudicate in internal disputes of the CEC.

On April 2, a faction of the CPC in Abong-Mbang, East Region, attempted to prevent the reopening of the Nkol-Mvolan Chapel by removing the cross, palms, altar cloth, and other religious objects and setting up barricades. Security forces intervened, the chapel reopened, and worship took place. The Nkol-Mvolan and Mbama chapels had been closed since 2014 following a dispute among those who created the Nkol-Mvolan Jerusalem parish to replace the Nkol-Mvolan parish, an initiative the CPC leadership opposed.

On February 21, the senior divisional officer for Mvila, South Region, Victor Marcel Mendel Ngangue, endorsed the decision reached by the opposing factions of the EPC. During a meeting over which he presided, they arrived at a consensus, and he placed five disputed parishes of the EPC in Ebolowa, the capital of South Region, under the provisional administration of the General Assembly of the church.

On June 7, Bishop Dibo Thomas Babyngton Elango of the Anglican Church of Cameroon addressed accusations made in 2016 that he gave preferential treatment to Nigerian clergymen. Elango stated that most parishes in the country were fledgling and consequently required outside help, including from Nigerians.

Many prominent religious leaders as well as various organizations spoke out against Boko Haram and violent extremism. On June 25, during prayers marking the end of Ramadan, the president of the Council of Imams and Religious Dignitaries of Cameroon (CIDIMUC) called on Muslims to reject terrorism and denounce Boko Haram’s radical extremism. Once a month, one imam in the Southwest Region publicly denounced Boko Haram and religious extremists.

In July, during the 11th assembly of the Association of Episcopal Conferences of the Central Africa Region in Yaounde, Catholic priests and clergy from other religious groups condemned religious fundamentalism and promoted dialogue and mutual acceptance when discussing differences of belief. On October 3 and 4, the UN Development Program organized a workshop in Maroua, Far North Region, which sensitized students and teachers of Quranic schools on the prevention of violent extremism, citizenship, and mutual acceptance. On September 10, the Diocese of Ebolowa held an interreligious service to promote peaceful coexistence between the Catholic Church and practitioners of traditional African beliefs and customs. This involved discussions between the bishop and local traditional leaders, which addressed myths and stereotypes, as well as “suspicions, prejudices, and ambiguities” that had characterized relations between their communities.

The U.S. embassy discussed religious freedom and the importance of interfaith dialogue with government officials, including regional delegations from the Ministry of Social Affairs and the National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms.

Embassy officers met with leaders from the Christian and Muslim communities, including the Archbishop of Douala, who is president of the NECC and president of the Association of Episcopal Conferences of the Central Africa Region; the national coordinator of CIDIMUC; the president of the Islamic Union of Cameroon; and the Archbishop of the Anglican Church in Cameroon. The conversations focused on preventing violent extremism related to religion and promoting freedom of worship. They also focused on promoting religious tolerance and peacebuilding. The embassy underscored the commitment of the U.S. to interfaith dialogue and cooperation in the face of threats by Boko Haram.

The U.S. government funded several projects in the Far North Region concerning religious freedom. In December local NGO Cameroon Association for Interreligious Dialogue (ACADIR) convened 169 female religious leaders for three days to share experiences and jointly elaborate an action plan to counter violent extremism and address interreligious conflicts. Fifty-one male leaders joined them on the final day. In July the NGO Public Concern, implemented two workshops related to countering violent extremism connected to religion, bringing together 60 community leaders from four divisions. In March ACADIR held a program entitled “Sensitizing Youth of Different Religious Backgrounds on Violent Extremism in the Far North,” involving 256 youth, including 64 girls, from four villages.

Additionally, the U.S. government funded a two-year project in the North and Far North Regions that concentrated on improving cohesion in communities at risk of violent extremist attack or recruitment. The project supported and trained staff of community radio stations to produce radio programs in local languages about religious tolerance, interreligious dialogue, and interreligious conflict. Project partner ACADIR assisted with organizing community events that bolstered social cohesion and provided the project with a network of moderate religious leaders who were featured on the radio programs.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 35.6 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2011 census (the most recent data available), approximately 67 percent of the population self-identify as Christian. Roman Catholics constitute the largest group (38 percent of the total population), followed by the United Church of Canada (6 percent), Anglican (5 percent), Baptist (1.9 percent), and Christian Orthodox (1.7 percent). Presbyterian, Lutheran, and Pentecostal groups each constitute less than 2 percent of the population. Approximately 3 percent of the population is Muslim and 1 percent is Jewish. Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs, Scientologists, Bahais, and adherents of Shintoism, Taoism, and aboriginal spirituality together constitute less than 4 percent of the population. Approximately 24 percent of the population claims no religious affiliation.

According to the 2011 census, 56 percent of immigrants who arrived in the country from 2006 to 2011 were of Asian origin and 12 percent were of African origin; these groups generally adhere to religious beliefs that differ from the majority of native-born citizens. According to the 2011 census, non-Caucasian, nonindigenous ethnic minorities constitute 19.1 percent of the overall population and adhere to a diverse range of religious practices.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion, and expression. Every individual is equal under the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination based on religion. The law imposes “reasonable limits” on the exercise of these religious rights only where such restrictions can be “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” The law permits individuals to sue the government for violations of religious freedom. Federal and provincial human rights laws prohibit discrimination on the grounds of religion. Civil remedies include compensation and/or changes to the policy or practice responsible for the discrimination.

The law does not require religious groups to register, but the government grants tax-exempt status to religious groups that register as nonprofit organizations with the Charities Directorate of the Canada Revenue Agency. Nonprofit status provides federal and provincial sales tax reductions, rebates, and exemptions. To gain and retain tax-exempt status, a group must be nonpolitical and undergo periodic audits. Charitable status also grants clergy various federal benefits, including a housing deduction under the tax code and expedited processing through the immigration system. The term “clergy” includes persons whose communities have licensed, ordained, or otherwise formally recognized them for their religious leadership and authority to perform spiritual duties and services within their religious organization. Individual citizens who donate to tax-exempt religious groups receive a federal tax receipt entitling them to federal income tax deductions.

The criminal code prohibits the practice of polygamy, which is an indictable offense subject to imprisonment of up to five years.

Government policy and practices with respect to education, including religious schools, fall under the purview of the provincial, rather than federal, governments. Six of the 10 provinces provide full or partial funding to some religious schools.

Catholic schools in Ontario, Alberta, and Saskatchewan retain the constitutionally protected provincial funding they had when those provinces joined the federation. Federal statutory protection for Catholic and Protestant publicly funded minority education exists in the Yukon, Nunavut, and Northwest Territories, which do not have provincial status. Constitutional or federal statutory protection for public funding of religious education does not extend to schools of other religious groups, although British Columbia (B.C.), Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Quebec offer partial funding to religious schools of any faith that meet provincial scholastic criteria. The law permits parents to homeschool their children and to enroll them in private schools for religious reasons.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In January the prime minister publicly condemned the January 29 attack against the Islamic Cultural Centre of Quebec, in which a gunman killed six worshippers and injured several others, as a “terrorist attack on Muslims.” The premier of Quebec and the mayor of Quebec City also publicly denounced the attack and expressed solidarity with the Muslim community. The premier pledged to increase security at Quebec mosques. The federal government extended a deadline for communities at risk of hate-motivated crime to apply for public funds to upgrade security at their facilities.

In July a court found two elders of a fundamentalist Mormon sect in Bountiful, B.C., guilty of practicing polygamy. The elders filed an appeal, stating the ruling violated their constitutional right to freedom of religion and other rights. The province originally dropped polygamy charges against the men in 2009 after a provincial court ruled the method for choosing a prosecutor was inappropriate. The provincial government asked the B.C. Supreme Court to issue an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of the polygamy ban. In 2011, the court found that the harm polygamy represented outweighed the right to religious freedom. Authorities reinstated the charges in 2014, which led to the conviction.

In November the federal Supreme Court declined to extend constitutional protection for religious freedom to objects of worship or territory of spiritual significance. In 2012, the indigenous Ktunaxa Nation sought judicial review of a B.C. government decision to approve the construction of a ski resort in an area the Ktunaxa said was the habitat of Grizzly Bear Spirit, which is central to their faith. The Ktunaxa claimed the development would drive away the spirit, irrevocably impair their religious beliefs and practices, and violate their religious freedom. The court ruled the constitution protects the right to hold and to practice religious beliefs, but such protection does not extend to “the object of beliefs or the spiritual focal point of worship.”

In October the Quebec assembly enacted a law banning individuals from wearing religious face coverings when providing or receiving government services. The government stated the law fostered adherence to state religious neutrality and boosted social cohesion while providing a framework for religious accommodation requests in certain governmental bodies; however, critics said it would discriminate against Muslim women. The law went into effect on October 18 and allows for exemptions, although the law did not specify how these would be applied and how the law would be enforced pending the publication of explanatory regulations in 2018. The National Council of Canadian Muslims and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association filed a legal challenge to the legislation, stating the law infringed on the religious and equality rights of Muslim women. On November 12, NGOs in Quebec held a peaceful street march in Montreal to protest the law and to speak out against racism and extremism. Approximately 160 organizations cosigned a declaration in support of tolerance and inclusivity. On December 2, a Quebec Superior Court justice issued a temporary stay against implementation of the law until the government issued guidelines for religious accommodations.

In May Saskatchewan Premier Brad Wall invoked a Canadian legal procedure to temporarily defer application of a ruling by a Saskatchewan judge ordering the province to cease public funding of non-Catholic students who attend Catholic schools. The judge ruled that providing funding for non-Catholic students discriminated against secular schools and those of other religious groups in favor of Catholic education. Critics of the ruling said some Catholic schools could close if enrollment of non-Catholic students fell.

In June the Ontario Catholic School Trustees’ Association (OCSTA) reached an out-of-court settlement with a former non-Catholic student. She alleged her high school administrators had punished her after she sought an exemption from religious studies classes at her Catholic high school and filed a complaint at the provincial human rights tribunal. OCSTA agreed to review its procedures to ensure that schools did not impose barriers to granting exemptions.

In June the Ontario government amended provincial law to add a child’s gender identity and gender expression as factors provincial child welfare authorities should consider in matters of child protection, adoption, and foster care. The law also eliminated consideration of the religious faith in which the parents were raising a child when deciding where and whether to place a child in care. Some NGOs stated the change could discriminate against parents, adoptive couples, or foster parents with religious beliefs that only recognize marriage between individuals of opposite sexes. They also stated the change could allow child protection services to remove LGBTI-identifying children from the custody of biological parents whose religious beliefs do not support LGBTI persons. Government officials said this was not the intent of the law.

In November the Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms filed an application on behalf of an evangelical Christian couple for judicial review of an Alberta Child and Family Services decision to deny them the ability to adopt a child because of their religious beliefs. Child welfare authorities allegedly told the couple their religious beliefs regarding heterosexual marriage and sexuality appeared to “reject” children who identify as LGBTI, which made them ineligible as adoptive parents under provincial government policy. The application for judicial review argued the decision was unreasonable and arbitrary, and violated the couple’s right to religious freedom under the constitution and the Alberta Human Rights Act. The case remained pending at the end of the year.

In December the Supreme Court heard concurrent appeals of provincial court decisions on accreditation for future graduates of Trinity Western University (TWU) Law School, a Christian university in B.C. The court reserved its decision in the case, which remained pending at the end of the year. In June 2016 an Ontario appeals court found the Ontario law society’s decision to bar future TWU graduates from receiving provincial legal accreditation was reasonable. The law society argued that TWU’s requirement that students sign a “Christian covenant” pledging to abstain from sexual relations outside heterosexual marriage discriminated against homosexuals and violated same-sex equality laws. In contrast, the B.C. Court of Appeal found unlawful the B.C. law society’s decision to deny accreditation on the same grounds. In 2016 a Nova Scotia appeals court ruled that province’s law society exceeded its jurisdiction in denying accreditation to future TWU graduates because TWU was located in B.C. and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Nova Scotia Human Rights Act.

In June the Ontario Superior Court heard arguments from a coalition of Christian medical organizations and several individual physicians on their application for judicial review of the province’s requirement that physicians who oppose assisted death on moral grounds make an “effective [active] referral” to another medical provider for patients who seek the service. The group of plaintiffs included the Christian Medical and Dental Society of Canada, the Canadian Federation of Catholic Physicians’ Societies, and Canadian Physicians for Life in Ontario. Under Ontario’s regulations, physicians who fail to make such referrals could face sanctions up to and including the loss of their medical license. Federal law permits assisted death but specifies that doctors have the right to freedom of conscience and the right not to perform or assist in providing the procedure. Ontario is the only province requiring referral to another physician rather than to a registry of licensed physicians that perform such procedures or some other mechanism. The plaintiffs argued that the referral to another practitioner, rather than to a registry, constituted facilitation and violated constitutional guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion. The court’s decision remained pending at the end of the year.

The same court heard arguments in June from Ontario-based physician faith groups in a suit filed in 2015 against the province’s medical regulator. The suit challenged a provincial policy requiring doctors who decline to provide access to contraception or decline to perform abortions on religious or moral grounds to refer the patient to another physician. The court’s decision remained pending at the end of the year.

In November the federal Supreme Court heard the appeal of an Alberta congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses of an Alberta Court of Appeal ruling that courts could exercise jurisdiction in matters of religious edicts. The Supreme Court reserved its decision, which remained pending at the end of the year. In 2016, the Alberta court allowed a Calgary man’s appeal of his “shunning” by a community of Jehovah’s Witnesses to proceed in a lower provincial court. The plaintiff successfully argued his “disfellowship” was procedurally unfair and adversely affected his civil and property rights as a real estate agent whose clientele was largely composed of members of his former religious community.

In March the House of Commons passed a motion condemning Islamophobia and all forms of systemic racism and religious discrimination. The nonbinding measure also called for a parliamentary committee to study and report by year’s end on how the government could reduce or eliminate racism and religious discrimination, and collect data to inform the reporting of hate crime. The measure’s passage prompted online criticism and a brief period of protests. Opponents stated the motion singled out Islamophobia and violated freedom of speech. Media outlets reported Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) Iqra Khalid, who introduced the motion, received more than 50,000 mostly hostile emails on the topic, including some with death threats. Police offered the MP extra protection and investigated the threatening messages.

In July a Quebec judge issued an arrest warrant for a Jordanian imam for the willful promotion of hatred – a criminal offense. In a December 2016 sermon at a Montreal mosque, circulated online, the imam allegedly called for the killing of Jews. The imam was not a Canadian resident, but the warrant would apply if he tried to reenter the country.

In July police in Montreal apologized to a Jewish couple for initially refusing to investigate anti-Semitic graffiti daubed on their car and suggested the couple remove the graffiti themselves. Police investigated the incident but had no suspects at year’s end.

In November Toronto police arrested and charged the editor and publisher of the Toronto-based newspaper Your Ward News on two counts of “promoting willful hatred against women and Jews.” The charges stemmed from the newspaper’s summer 2017 issue, in which one of the accused allegedly incited readers to “bludgeon to death” a couple who had filed a civil suit against the newspaper. Your Ward News faced numerous civil complaints in recent years for its depictions of women, Jews, Muslims, and LGBTI persons. In 2016, the federal government banned it from using Canada Post for distribution, although it appealed that ruling.

On May 8, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau served as keynote speaker at the national Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremony and reiterated the government’s commitment to fighting anti-Semitism, racism, and all forms of discrimination. Leaders of major federal political parties also attended. In January Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland issued a statement on International Holocaust Remembrance Day in which she stated the importance of the country’s standing against anti-Semitism and increasing Holocaust awareness and knowledge.

In September Prime Minister Trudeau and other officials participated in the unveiling of the National Holocaust Monument in Ottawa. After Jewish groups, opposition politicians, and rights advocates criticized the government for omitting the mention of Jews and anti-Semitism on a plaque at the monument’s entrance, the government removed it and pledged to correct and replace it.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). The government supported, both domestically and abroad, Holocaust education, remembrance, and research, and it recommended continued participation in the IHRA.

There were reports of various incidents directed against religious groups, in particular anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim incidents including physical violence, destruction of places of places of worship, vandalism, hate speech, violence, and harassment. On January 29, a gunman entered the Islamic Cultural Centre of Quebec and opened fire on worshippers, killing six men, critically injuring five, and wounding approximately 12 others. On January 30, police charged the gunman with six counts of first-degree murder and five counts of attempted murder. On August 6, individuals set fire to a car owned by the head of the same Islamic Cultural Centre targeted in January. In September police arrested and charged two men with arson. In a separate incident, unidentified individuals flung excrement at the front door of the building. Unknown attackers also targeted the mosque several times in 2016, including an incident in which an unidentified vandal left a pig’s head on the building’s doorstep and distributed racist tracts in the mosque’s neighborhood. Police did not identify any suspects.

In November the national statistical agency released police data identifying Jews as the religious group most frequently targeted for hate crimes in 2016, followed by Catholics and Muslims. Jews were targets of 221 incidents, up from 178 in 2015. The number of hate crimes recorded by police against Catholics fell from 55 in 2015 to 27 in 2016 and from 159 incidents against Muslims in 2015 to 139 incidents in 2016.

According to an October poll conducted by the Angus Reid Institute, a public opinion research foundation, in partnership with faith-based think tank Cardus, 55 percent of respondents stated religious freedom made Canada a better country, while 44 percent said religious diversity had both positive and negative impacts on the country. Forty-six percent of respondents said Islam was damaging to the country, the highest negative score of all the faiths included in the survey, followed by Sikhism at 22 percent. Catholicism, evangelical Christianity, and Judaism had overall positive ratings. Quebec respondents were the most likely to identify increasing religious diversity as an adverse impact on the country, listed at 31 percent compared with 23 percent nationally.

In June Husky Energy agreed to investigate allegations by three Muslim women in Edmonton, Alberta, who stated that their employer, a contracting company affiliated with Husky Energy, dismissed them after they complained a non-Muslim coworker had told them to remove their hijabs. The three women filed a complaint with the Alberta Human Rights Commission, which remained pending at the end of the year. Husky Energy announced in December it had completed a review of the incident and found the women’s employer, a subcontractor, was not related to the women’s complaint and occurred as part of a scheduled downsizing as the contractor’s maintenance contract with Husky Energy expired. Husky Energy dismissed the allegations as part of its internal investigation. Both Husky Energy and the contractor underscored their commitment to a diverse workforce and pledged to cooperate fully with the Human Rights Commission investigation.

In February a B.C. carpentry school rejected an application from a prospective Israeli student on the stated grounds of his nationality and “non-inclusive” policies pursued by the Israeli government. According to a press report, the school’s executive director subsequently issued a written apology to the student, reversed the school’s decision, and rescinded restrictions on admission of students from Israel.

On August 4, the mayor of Quebec City announced the municipality had conditionally accepted an offer from the Quebec Islamic Cultural Centre to purchase city-owned land for an Islamic cemetery. The agreement followed a July 16 referendum in Saint-Apollinaire, a town near Quebec City, in which voters rejected the center’s bid to build an Islamic cemetery in the town. Although the Saint-Apollinaire city council had unanimously approved the center’s application, the cemetery required a zoning change, necessitating a referendum under Quebec law. Only residents living adjacent to the proposed site were eligible to vote, and of 49 eligible voters, 36 cast ballots. Debate spread beyond the community and engendered messages directed against the mosque. In July the mosque received a mailed package containing a defaced copy of the Quran and a note expressing hatred toward Muslims. Police opened a hate crime investigation but did not identify suspects. Prime Minister Trudeau condemned the incident as inconsistent with Quebec or Canadian values; he later praised the municipal government’s decision to sell the land for the cemetery.

The B’nai Brith Canada League for Human Rights said it received 1,728 reports of anti-Semitic incidents in 2016, a 26 percent increase from 2015. The greatest number of reports (490) came from Ontario. Reported incidents in 2016 included violence against persons (11 incidents); harassment (1,559 incidents); vandalism, including graffiti; and attacks on synagogues, private homes, community centers, and desecration of cemeteries (158 incidents).

Independent Arabic language newspaper Al Saraha, based in London, Ontario, agreed to publish a front-page apology for reprinting an article in its June-July 2016 edition. The article alleged Jews had inflated the number of Holocaust victims from 100,000-600,000 to six million and blamed them for Germany’s economic collapse in the 1920s. Al Saraha had reprinted the article from an Egyptian newspaper. The publication is distributed online and through Middle Eastern restaurants and grocery stores throughout the greater London, Ontario area.

In February Ryerson University in Toronto fired teaching assistant Imam Ayman Elkasrawy for reportedly calling for purification of the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem from the “filth of the Jews” in a 2016 off-campus sermon.

In December, eight synagogues in Toronto, Montreal, Hamilton, and Edmonton received identical letters depicting a swastika inside a bleeding Star of David with the phrase “Jewry Must Perish,” in what appeared to be a coordinated mailing that coincided with Hanukkah. Police in all four cities opened hate crime investigations. Police in north Toronto, where one of the targeted synagogues was located, said his detachment would pay additional attention to synagogues and Jewish facilities in the area.

In February unknown individuals posted notes with the words “No Jews” placed above a swastika on the doors of a condominium building in North York, Ontario. Authorities did not identify any suspects.

In September a woman interrupted an event in support of then federal New Democratic Party leadership candidate Jagmeet Singh, a Sikh, by heckling and accusing him of supporting sharia and the Muslim Brotherhood organization. Singh won his party’s leadership, and some observers credited, in part, what they said was his deft handling of the interaction with the heckler for boosting his popularity.

In August police in Markham, Ontario, investigated incidents of anti-Semitic and race-related graffiti at three schools. Police treated the cases as related hate crimes; however, they did not identify any suspects.

On August 31, an Ontario judge sentenced an 18-year-old male to a year in custody, including time served, plus two years’ probation for vandalizing six religious buildings in Ottawa in 2016. The vandalism included anti-Semitic graffiti on a Jewish school, synagogue, and rabbi’s home.

Authorities did not identify any suspects following an April 2016 incident in which vandals wrote the words “Muslim terrorists” over a picture of a Muslim woman wearing a niqab at a library exhibit on the lives of Muslims in Quebec.

Numerous interfaith and ecumenical organizations at the national, provincial, and local levels continued to operate, with the stated purposed of fostering respect for religious diversity, tolerance, and equal treatment for all religious groups. The groups included participation by the Canadian Council of Churches, the United Church of Canada, the Roman Catholic Church, The Salvation Army, other Protestant communities, as well as Jewish and Muslim associations.

Embassy and other U.S. government officials met with representatives from Global Affairs Canada’s Office of Diversity and Inclusion to discuss issues of religious freedom in the country and internationally.

The Charge d’Affaires and embassy officials also conducted regular outreach to religious leaders, NGOs, and religious groups to discuss strategies for combating religious intolerance. In February the Charge visited Quebec City and met with the leadership of the mosque where six worshippers were shot and killed on January 29. In October the U.S. Consulate in Quebec City donated a tree and plaque to the mosque to commemorate the shooting victims. The embassy amplified these efforts to support the mosque and the shooting victims on social media. In December a senior embassy official hosted a lunch at her residence for clergy, faith leaders, and NGOs that support religious freedom and diversity to raise awareness of International Religious Freedom Day and the United Nations International Day for Tolerance, and to promote interfaith dialogue. In September the Charge attended a public ceremony to remember the victims and honor the survivors of the Holocaust at the inauguration of the National Holocaust Monument. The embassy amplified the Charge’s attendance at the event through social media. In July the embassy hosted a gathering of religious and civil groups to view a moderated discussion via video conference on violence and discrimination targeting vulnerable groups, including Muslims. The audience identified ways to adapt best practices to their own vulnerable groups and agreed to form a working group through Ottawa City Hall to address hate crimes. In July the Consul General and consulate staff in Quebec City hosted an iftar with leaders and young representatives of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian religious communities. In her remarks, the Consul General highlighted the values of sharing, compassion, and mutual understanding. Embassy officials also met on several occasions with local faith leaders to discuss issues of religious freedom. On two occasions embassy officials met with imams in Ottawa to hear about the challenges facing their communities and about their success in building interfaith alliances.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5.6 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the Pew Research Foundation, the population is 61 percent Protestant, 28 percent Roman Catholic, and 9 percent Muslim. Other religious groups, including traditional religious groups and those having no religious beliefs, make up an estimated 2 percent of the population. The nongovernmental organization (NGO) Oxfam estimates the percentage of Muslims at up to 15 percent. Some Christians and Muslims incorporate aspects of indigenous beliefs into their religious practices.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion under conditions set by law and equal protection under the law regardless of religion. It prohibits all forms of religious intolerance and “religious fundamentalism,” which is not defined in law. It specifies an oath of office for the head of state made “before God” that includes a promise to fulfill the duties of the office without any consideration of religion.

Religious groups, except for indigenous religious groups, are required to register with the Ministry of the Interior, Public Security, and Territorial Administration. To register, religious groups must prove they have a minimum of 1,000 members and their leaders have adequate religious education, as judged by the ministry.

The law permits the ministry to deny registration to any religious group it deems offensive to public morals or likely to disturb social peace, and to suspend the operation of registered religious groups if it finds their activities subversive. Registration is free and confers official recognition and certain benefits, such as customs duty exemptions for vehicles or equipment. There are no penalties prescribed for groups that fail to register.

The law does not prohibit religious instruction in public or private schools, but it is not part of the public school curriculum.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to media reports and religious and civil society leaders, civilian authorities failed to maintain effective control over the security forces, a situation that has persisted for a number of years. Human rights organizations stated the government again failed to take steps to investigate and prosecute officials who committed abuses that targeted members of various religious groups. These individuals were in the security forces and elsewhere in the government, and the human rights organizations stated this was a long-standing problem and one that fostered a climate of impunity.

During a government and UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) military operation to question and arrest local Muslim militia leader Yossouf Malinga, security forces killed Malinga in a February 7 shootout in Bangui’s predominantly Muslim PK5 neighborhood. According to the Christian Broadcasting Network, his death was followed by several violent incidents, including the fatal stabbing of a Protestant minister at his church by supporters of Malinga’s militia group, the burning of two other churches, and the killing of a Muslim civilian, reportedly by anti-Balaka elements in retaliation. In addition, 300 residents of the Fondo neighborhood, also in the same district, fled their homes and took shelter at the recently closed IDP site at nearby M’Poko International Airport.

Muslims continued to report harassment outside of the PK5 enclave and exclusion from national decision making. Muslim leaders cited situations where Muslims were treated as outsiders or as a different class of citizens, especially when requesting government services.

Some government officials stated they intended to focus efforts on reconciliation among religious groups, although observers stated they made limited progress for a second year. The national Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Reconciliation Commission was created in December 2016, but its members had not been named by the end of 2017. Following the announcement of its creation in 2016, local peace committees began meeting in several areas. On August 23, President Faustin-Archange Touadera appointed new administrators for all of the country’s 16 prefectures; none of the appointees were Muslim. Critics stated the appointments lacked religious diversity. On September 12, Touadera named a new cabinet that included seven Muslims among the 34 ministers. The previous cabinet included four Muslims among 23 ministers. The percentage of Muslims in the cabinet increased from 17 to 21.

In February the government completed the closure of the IDP camp located at M’Poko International Airport. More than 28,000 residents, predominantly Christian, were unsure of where to go after the camp’s closure, according to UNICEF. Many of the IDPs previously lived in the PK5 neighborhood.

In July the Ministry of Social Affairs provided Muslim IDPs living on the grounds of Bangui’s Central Mosque with 50,000 CFA francs ($88) each to assist them with finding housing, mostly in the PK5 neighborhood.

The government continued to observe Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha as official but unpaid holidays. Unlike in the previous year, the government did not host an iftar.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

Armed groups, which generally operated freely in certain areas of the country, continued to commit many of the actions affecting religious freedom. The government remained incapable of imposing its authority throughout the territory, preventing abuses, or ensuring the rule of law and the administration of justice, according to many observers.

Armed groups, particularly the anti-Balaka and ex-Seleka, continued to control significant swaths of territory throughout the country and acted as de facto governing institutions, according to media and UN reports.

Police and the gendarmerie failed to stop or punish abuses committed by the ex-Seleka and anti-Balaka militias, including killings, abductions, physical mistreatment, extortion, and gender-based violence.

MINUSCA was deployed to multiple areas within the country in response to violence between anti-Balaka and ex-Seleka elements during the year.

According to UN Independent Expert Marie-Therese Keita Bocoum, in mid-February anti-Balaka fighters reportedly killed at least 16 civilians from the predominantly Muslim and nomadic Peulh community near Ippy, Ouaka Prefecture, during an ambush on a truck carrying persons trying to reach safety in Bambari. Between March 7 and 15, attacks carried out by anti-Balaka elements on the village of Site Chinois, to the south of Bria, reportedly resulted in the deaths of an estimated nine Peulh civilians and massive population displacement.

On May 11, the local branch of the Red Cross in Alindao, Basse-Kotto, reported that 37 bodies had been recovered and 110 persons injured in the locality following attacks carried out against the population between May 8 and May 10, reportedly by predominantly Muslim Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique – Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) militias. According to MINUSCA, a group of assailants believed to be associated with anti-Balaka forces attacked a UN convoy near the town of Bangassou in the southeast on May 8, killing five peacekeepers. This was part of a series of attacks that included attacks on the Muslim population in Bangassou.

According to the July report from the UN Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic, on May 13, anti-Balaka fighters attacked the Tokoyo neighborhood of Bangassou and the MINUSCA base, resulting in 72 persons killed, 76 injured, and 4,400 displaced. During the attacks 1,000 persons took refuge in a mosque in Bangassou, and 500 took refuge in a hospital. According to the UN Panel, attackers specifically targeted members of the Muslim community sheltering inside a Catholic church after peacekeepers left the church and returned to the MINUSCA base to protect it, leaving the Muslims at the church unprotected. One UN peacekeeper was killed. On May 14, UN forces were able to regain control of the area and those who sought refuge were freed. The Red Cross reported that it found the bodies of 115 individuals, the majority of whom were likely Muslim, in Bangassou on May 17, following the several days long anti-Balaka attacks. Approximately 2,000 Muslims remained in the Catholic mission after the attacks. Their Muslim neighborhood was destroyed by the anti-Balaka, and many homes were burned down. Additional anti-Balaka attacks targeting Muslims took place in June, leading to the displacement of additional civilians, approximately 21,000 altogether.

According to MINUSCA, on July 21, anti-Balaka militias targeted a Roman Catholic seminary in Bangassou which was providing refuge to an estimated 2,000 internally displaced Muslims. During the attack, two children were seriously hurt. A Muslim woman was also kidnapped, presumably by anti-Balaka militia; in response Muslim groups detained six Christians. Two of the Christians were reportedly released on July 22, and the whereabouts of the others remained unknown at year’s end.

According to international media reports, in mid-May the predominantly Muslim armed group Popular Front for the Renaissance of Central African Republic (FPRC) entered the town of Bria and faced off with anti-Balaka militants, displacing tens of thousands of persons, mostly Christians. A month after the FPRC forces entered, approximately 41,000 persons, mostly Christians, continued to live in IDP camps. The PK3 camp, close to the UN base in Bria, had more than 26,000 inhabitants.

On August 8, 50 Christians were killed by the ex-Seleka in Gambo after anti-Balaka forces were cleared from the area by the MINUSCA.

According to the July UN Report of the Independent Expert, the Human Rights Division of MINUSCA documented 45 cases of violence committed against persons accused of witchcraft, involving 77 victims – 38 men, 32 women, and seven children. According to the report, most individuals accused of witchcraft and charlatanism were women and children, and a large number went to prison. The report said false allegations were made by members of armed groups to terrorize and extort money from the population. The report recommended the prosecution and punishment of all perpetrators of violence against persons accused of witchcraft.

In October a Bangui newspaper reported that a “network of sorcerers” had been dismantled in the village of Ndangala, outside Bangui. Villagers reportedly handed over to authorities in the town of Bimbo for investigation 12 individuals whom they accused of attempting to kill a woman through witchcraft.

While most observers stated violent conflict and instability in the country had multiple sources, they also said religion continued to be used as a tool to divide the population. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

According to international news reports, on November 11, attackers launched a grenade attack on a nightclub concert intended to foster reconciliation and social cohesion and attended by both Muslims and Christians, killing four and injuring more than 20 persons. Christian and Muslim victims were taken to separate hospitals to diffuse tensions. On November 12, reportedly in retaliation three motorcycle taxi drivers were killed and their bodies delivered to a local mosque.

According to the July 7 report of the Panel of Experts, rhetoric against the Peulh community was widespread in the country, and the situation was reminiscent of 2014, when the negative discourse against one specific Muslim community – the Chadians – led to the targeting of the Muslim community as a whole.

Negative comments about or directed toward Muslims, particularly members of the Peulh community, were still common in most media outlets. Private media outlets reportedly continued to be heavily influenced by their financers, generally representing a Christian perspective, and led by Christian editors. There had been no Muslim-operated radio station or Muslim-oriented program on the national radio station since September 2015.

Muslims continued to report facing consistent social discrimination and marginalization, including an inability to move freely or to access schools, hospitals, and basic necessities, such as services provided by the government, as well as those provided by private donors and organizations.

Muslims reported facing several challenges within their community, including differences among Muslims of Arab, Peulh, and Bantu ethnicity regarding identity, discrimination, and internal division over leadership.

According to international reports, Christians felt that MINUSCA was biased towards the Muslim population because many peacekeepers were Muslim.

In January prayers resumed at the site of the Petevo Mosque in Bangui. The mosque was destroyed during the intercommunal violence in 2014. In May prayers resumed at the Al Faroukou de Yapele Mosque in Bangui. The mosque was heavily damaged during the intercommunal violence in 2014.

In June the Religious Platform held an interreligious service for peace at the National Assembly, attended by the country’s president and members of the government and parliament. Religious Platform leaders called for an end to violence, a return to peace, and reconciliation. They emphasized their belief that the crisis the country was experiencing was not an interconfessional crisis, but began because of economic and social conditions and had become associated with religion due to manipulation by bad actors.

On September 30, several imams, including the Muslim representative of the Religious Platform, held a reconciliation prayer service and ceremony near the site of the representative’s destroyed mosque and home in the predominantly Christian Eighth District. The mosque was destroyed in 2014. During the ceremony a local anti-Balaka leader called for peace and reconciliation and invited Muslims to return to the community.

Prayers resumed at the site of the Miskine Mosque in Bangui’s predominantly Christian Fifth District in September. The mosque was one of the first mosques destroyed during the intercommunal violence in 2014.

On February 10, Muslim and Christian communities from districts affected by intercommunal violence celebrated the one-year anniversary of a nonaggression pact signed between groups that were engaged in armed conflict. The celebration was held at an intersection that, prior to the pact, served as a barrier between communities and obstructed the movement of both Christians and Muslims to certain parts of the city.

The Religious Platform continued to spread messages of peace and reconciliation throughout the country. For example, in November, following a grenade attack on a nightclub in Bangui, the Platform issued a statement saying, “Christians and Muslims must remain united and speak one language in order to bring peace to the Central African Republic. During this time of disturbance, all peace-loving Central Africans must be vigilant and act for the cause of peace.”

The U.S. Ambassador raised issues related to religion, including violence against Muslims and Christians, freedom of movement, the return of refugees and IDPs, representation in government, and access to the justice system and other government services. He encouraged governmental outreach to all religious communities in high-level meetings, including with President Touadera, the presidential advisor for national reconciliation, and the minister of social affairs and reconciliation.

The Ambassador and embassy officials engaged regularly with religious leaders, including the leaders of the Religious Platform, the Imam of the Central Mosque, and the Coordinating Committee for Central African Muslim Organizations, on issues related to religious freedom and reconciliation, and they discussed ways to broaden access and dialogue to elected officials.

The U.S. government continued to fund a consortium formed to build up the capacity of the Religious Platform to bolster its high-profile role in promoting social cohesion, including reconciliation between religious communities.

In February the Ambassador, the Senior USAID Advisor for the Great Lakes Region, and the USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance Coordinator visited a Muslim and a Christian IDP site and the Muslim enclave in Boda in the southwestern part of the country. In all three locations, they discussed with local residents concerns such as religious tolerance, freedom of movement, and assistance for returnees.

In March U.S. government officials visited the Central Mosque and met with the imam and several displaced persons. They discussed topics including equal representation and access to government services for Muslims, obstacles to the return of refugees and IDPs, and freedom of movement.

In May the Ambassador returned to Boda, where he met with religious leaders from the Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant communities to discuss progress on intercommunal reconciliation and challenges faced by their respective communities.

Also in May a local NGO launched an embassy-funded program that brought together Muslim and Christian women from three Bangui districts for training on promoting intercommunal reconciliation and social cohesion among their communities, along with technical and financial support for starting small businesses.

In August the Ambassador inaugurated an embassy-funded program to provide free motorcycle taxi rides between the primarily Muslim PK5 neighborhood and other communities in Bangui. The objective was to reduce the isolation of Muslim residents and to encourage non-Muslims to travel to PK5, the site of Bangui’s largest public market.

In October the Charge d’Affaires delivered remarks at the finale of an embassy-sponsored basketball tournament that included mixed faith teams from all eight Bangui districts. The tournament promoted reconciliation among residents of the districts, which had experienced significant intercommunal violence since 2013. The imam from the Religious Platform attended the game and afterwards met with community members from a predominantly Christian district of Bangui, where the tournament was held.

On August 31, embassy officers visited the Central Mosque and discussed with the deputy imam the social and security conditions for Muslims in Bangui and U.S. engagement on religious freedom and reconciliation.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 12.1 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the most recent census, in 2009, approximately 58 percent of the population is Muslim, 18 percent Roman Catholic, 16 percent Protestant, and the remaining 8 percent practices indigenous religious beliefs. Most Muslims adhere to the Sufi Tijaniyah tradition. A small minority hold beliefs associated with Wahhabism or Salafism. The majority of Protestants are evangelical Christians. There are also small numbers of Bahais and Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Most northerners practice Islam, and most southerners practice Christianity or indigenous religions; religious distribution is mixed in urban areas.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes the state as secular and affirms the separation of religion and state. The constitution provides for freedom of religion and equality before the law without distinction as to religion. These rights may be regulated by law and may only be limited by law to ensure mutual respect for the rights of others and for the “imperative” of safeguarding public order and good morals. It prohibits “denominational propaganda” that infringes on national unity or the secular nature of the state.

Under the law, all associations, religious or otherwise, must register with the Ministry of Territorial Planning, Urban Development, and Housing. The associations must provide a list of all the founding members and their positions in the organization, the founders’ resumes, copies of the founders’ identification cards, minutes of the establishment meetings, a letter to the minister requesting registration, the principal source of the organization’s revenue, the address of the organization, a copy of the rules and procedures, and the statutory documents of the organization. The Ministry of Public Security and Immigration conducts background checks on every founding member and establishes a six-month temporary, but renewable, authorization to operate, pending final authorization and approval. Failure to register with the ministry means that organizations are not considered legal entities and may not open a bank account or enter into contracts; it may also lead to the banning of a group, one month to a year in prison, and a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 CFA francs ($88 to $880). Registration does not confer tax preferences or other benefits.

Burqas, defined by ministerial notice as any garment where one sees only the eyes, are forbidden in the entire national territory by ministerial decree. This also applies to niqabs.

The constitution states public education shall be secular. The government prohibits religious instruction in public schools but permits religious groups to operate private schools.

The government-created High Council for Islamic Affairs (HCIA) oversees Islamic religious activities, including some Arabic language schools and institutions of higher learning, and represents the country at international Islamic forums. Wahabbists are not officially represented on the council and are banned by the government. The Grand Imam of N’Djamena, who is selected by a committee of Muslim elders and approved by the government, is the de facto president of the HCIA and oversees the grand imams from each of the country’s 23 regions. He has the authority to restrict Muslim groups from proselytizing, regulate the content of mosque sermons, and control activities of Islamic charities.

The constitution states military service is obligatory and prohibits invoking religious belief to “avoid an obligation dictated by the national interest.” The government does not enforce conscription, however.

The Office of the Director of Religious and Traditional Affairs under the Ministry of Territorial Planning, Urban Development, and Housing oversees religious matters. The office is responsible for mediating intercommunal conflict, reporting on religious practices, coordinating religious pilgrimages, and ensuring religious freedom.

According to regulations of the government board that oversees the distribution of oil revenues, Muslim and Christian leaders share a rotational position on the board. The position is held for three years and may be renewed only once.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government maintained its ban on the leading Wahabbist group; however, those practicing continued to meet and worship in their own mosques.

The government continued its long running public education campaign in the national media to inform individuals of the burqa ban. During the year, there were no known prosecutions for violating the ban.

In June during the celebration of the end of Ramadan, President Deby stated that all mosques should affiliate with the HCIA and that the HCIA would have oversight over all Muslim activities. Institutions that did not comply could face closure.

The government continued to deploy security forces around both Muslim and Christian places of worship, notably on Fridays around mosques and Sundays around churches, as well as other occasions for religious events.

In a June speech, President Deby warned that intra-Muslim tensions in the country were not good for peaceful cohabitation and could lead to violent extremism. The statement further referenced a 2016 government-endorsed fact-finding mission that concluded that intra-Muslim tensions in the country were high, pointing to the absence of a Salafi representative on the HCIA as a particular concern.

In September Moussa Nguedmbaye was stabbed to death in the Al Rahman mosque in N’Djamena. Media reported that the victim, who was a Sufi, had a conflict with the Wahabbi members of the mosque before he was killed. One media outlet stated that the imam of the mosque ordered the killing. There were no arrests at year’s end.

During the National Day of Prayer and Peaceful Interreligious Coexistence, held on November 28, religious leaders, including the Secretary of the Chadian Churches and Evangelical Mission for Harmony, the Archbishop of the N’Djamena, and the HCIA publicly stated they supported the president’s statements advocating religious tolerance.

Religious leaders continued to raise awareness of the risks of terrorist attacks and to advocate for continued additional security in places of worship.

The Regional Forum on Interfaith Dialogue, comprising representatives of evangelical Protestant churches, the Catholic Church, and the Islamic community, met in February in N’Djamena to promote religious tolerance and combat prejudice. They publicly reiterated their commitment to educate their respective groups on the necessity of peaceful cohabitation.

On June 6, during Ramadan, members of the HCIA discussed the country’s socioeconomic challenges, peaceful interreligious coexistence, and global terrorism. They pledged to support the government in the fight against religious extremism, and made speeches explaining the purpose of the burqa ban. The HCIA and Radio Al Koran al-Karim used positive messaging to strengthen communities and counter religious extremism. The HCIA continued to use the same messages throughout the year to raise awareness to counter religious extremism.

Catholic Archbishop of N’Djamena Edmond Jitangar began seeking funds from nongovernment sources for reconstruction of the Catholic cathedral in N’Djamena, which was damaged in 1980 during the country’s civil war. In August he noted, “it is not the role of the state to construct a cathedral, because we are in a secular state,” and expressed his belief that reconstruction would symbolize the peaceful coexistence of religion in the country, as the cathedral is located just a few yards from the Malik Faycal Mosque.

Muslims and Christians commonly attended each other’s ceremonies and celebrations.

The U.S. Ambassador hosted an iftar attended by more than 60 religious leaders, including Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, and Bahai representatives, and government officials. At the iftar, attendees discussed religious freedom and tolerance in the country. Embassy officials met regularly with imams in training sessions and workshops to promote tolerance and human rights. The Ambassador and other embassy representatives met with the grand imam, and with Catholic and Protestant leaders to monitor and promote religious freedom and tolerance, as well as to discuss efforts to counter extremist messages.

In September the U.S. government provided additional funding and continued support to the nongovernmental organization Equal Access, which worked with religious leaders of all faiths to promote moderate messaging on community radio stations. Additionally, in July the U.S. Ambassador gave a speech at the inauguration of a U.S. government-funded community radio station in Karal established to amplify moderate voices.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 17.8 million (July 2017 estimate). According to ONAR, approximately 60 percent of the population self-identifies as Roman Catholic and approximately 18 percent identifies as “evangelical,” a term used in the country to refer to all non-Catholic Christian groups except The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Orthodox churches (including the Armenian, Greek, Persian, Serbian, and Ukrainian communities), and Seventh-day Adventists. In the most recent census, conducted in 2002, Bahais, Buddhists, Jews, Muslims, members of the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of the Orthodox churches, Seventh-day Adventists, and unspecified members of religious groups together constituted less than 5 percent of the population. An estimated 4 percent of the population identifies as atheist or agnostic, while 17 percent of the population identifies as nonreligious.

According to ONAR, 9 percent of the population self-identifies as indigenous, of whom 55 percent identify as Catholic, 37 percent as evangelical, and 6 percent identify as other, which includes adherents of traditional indigenous faith practices. Over the last decade, the country has experienced a decline in numbers of individuals affiliated with the Catholic faith. According to the 2002 census, 70 percent of the country’s population identified as Roman Catholic in 2002 compared to the 60 percent ONAR specified in 2017. Evangelical Christian affiliation increased from 15.1 to 18 percent between 2002 and 2017.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of conscience and the free exercise of worship. It states that these practices must not be “opposed to morals, to good customs or to the public order.” Religious groups may establish and maintain places of worship, as long as the locations are in compliance with public hygiene (health standards) and security regulations established by laws and municipal orders.

According to the constitution, religion and state are officially separate. The law prohibits religious discrimination and provides civil legal remedies to victims of discrimination based on religion or belief and increases criminal penalties for acts of discriminatory violence.

The law does not require religious groups to register with the government; however, there are tax benefits for those that do. Once registered, a religious group is recognized as a religious nonprofit organization; religious organizations have the option of adopting a charter and bylaws suited to a religious entity rather than a private corporation or a secular nonprofit. Under the law, religious nonprofit organizations may create affiliates, such as charitable foundations, schools, or additional houses of worship, which retain the tax benefits of the religious parent organization. According to ONAR, public law recognizes more than 3,200 religious entities as legal entities. By law, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) may not refuse the registration petition of a religious entity, although it may object to petitions within 90 days if legal prerequisites for registration are not satisfied.

Applicants for religious nonprofit status must present the MOJ with an authorized copy of their charter, corresponding bylaws with signatures, and the national identification numbers of charter signatories. The bylaws must include the organization’s mission, creed, and structure. The charter must specify the signatories, the name of the organization, its physical address, and must include confirmation that bylaws have been approved by the religious institutions’ charter signatories. In the event the MOJ raises objections to the group, the group may petition; the petitioning group has 60 days to address the MOJ’s objections or can challenge them in court. Once registered, the state may not dissolve a religious entity by decree. If concerns are raised about a religious group’s activities after registration, the semi-autonomous Council for the Defense of the State may initiate a judicial review of the matter. The government has never deregistered a legally registered group. One registration per religious group is sufficient to extend nonprofit status to affiliates, such as additional places of worship or schools, clubs, and sports organizations, without registering them as separate entities. According to ONAR, the MOJ receives approximately 30 petitions monthly; the MOJ has not objected to any petition and has registered every group that completed the required paperwork.

By law, all schools must offer religious education for two teaching hours per week through pre-elementary, elementary, middle, and high school. Local school administrators decide how religious education classes are structured. The majority of religious instruction in public schools is Catholic, although the Ministry of Education has approved instruction curricula designed by 14 other religious groups, such as orthodox and reformed Jews, evangelicals, Seventh-day Adventists, and other groups. Schools must provide religious instruction for students according to students’ religious affiliations. Parents may have their children excused from religious education. Parents also have the right to homeschool their children for religious reasons or enroll them in private, religiously oriented schools.

The law grants religious groups the right to appoint chaplains to offer religious services in public hospitals and prisons. Prisoners may request religious accommodations. Regulations for the armed forces and law enforcement agencies allow officially registered religious groups to appoint chaplains to serve in each branch of the armed forces, in the national uniformed police, and the national investigative police.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Catholic and Episcopalian leaders condemned the Constitutional Court’s August decision to partially lift the country’s total ban on abortions, stating that permitting abortions was unconstitutional and violated their religious beliefs.

Both central and regional authorities continued to support the provision of non-Catholic religious education in public schools when parents requested it. Authorities supported schools through municipal offices of religious affairs, encouraged the development of community-supported religious curricula, and provided religious diversity training to public servants.

While prison and military chaplains remained predominately Catholic, the numbers of evangelical Protestant chaplains and other non-Catholic chaplains increased, due in part to the diverse religious affiliations of the prison population and the increase in evangelical Protestant followers in the country. ONAR continued to work to counter perceptions of bias and support diversity in the chaplaincy by encouraging other faith communities to prepare and present candidates for those positions. The National Institute of Human Rights, an independent government agency, continued to report that Protestant faith communities operated without impediments in the prison system.

According to CSW, from January to October, arsonists set fire to four Catholic and four Baptist churches in the primarily indigenous Mapuche communities in the rural Araucania Region. No one was hurt in the attacks. In October the National Prosecutors’ Office found the alleged arsonists did not meet the threshold for trial under the anti-terrorism law. The alleged perpetrators were charged with arson; the trial was still pending at the end of the year. CORMA pledged to develop a work plan to help provide peaceful solutions to the region’s societal conflict by bringing together churches, parishioners, community organizations, neighbors, workers, investors, and business owners. CORMA also donated in-kind goods to rebuild the churches. The regional government announced in April it would help to reconstruct the destroyed churches and initiated programs to train Catholic and evangelical Protestant churches in preventative security measures.

ONAR representatives regularly met with religious leaders with the stated aim of ensuring state institutions respected minority religious practices. In June ONAR published the first edition of an ethics code to facilitate a dialogue of mutual understanding among the country’s religious communities, public and private entities, labor leaders, and civil society. The ethics code asserts Chile’s identity as a secular state and outlines best practices through which civil society, the private sector, and religious institutions might demonstrate religious diversity and tolerance. The ethics code discusses suggestions for education, media outlets, and the environment, among other topics.

ONAR continued to work through the Interfaith Advisory Council, a roundtable organization comprising religious leaders representing the country’s religious communities, including Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims, and Bahais, among others. Their efforts were designed to facilitate and enhance interreligious dialogue within the country by establishing standing meetings among religious leaders and offering government space to host those conversations.

In June President Michelle Bachelet and ONAR hosted an interfaith iftar at the La Moneda presidential palace to support dialogue and promote interfaith understanding.

While the Assemblies of God and the Interdenominational Regional Council of Pastors of Araucania publicly called on the authorities to improve their investigation into the eight church burnings, other churches and organizations did not make public statements. According to political sources, the church attacks appeared to fit into the pattern of protest and sabotage directed against a wide range of institutions and business interests in the Araucania Region, which also included trucks, farm equipment, and farm structures.

A soccer match in Santiago on June 8 between Club Israeliti, a Chilean-Jewish team, and Club Palestino, a Chilean-Palestinian team, ended in physical violence as xenophobic chants erupted and fans of the Chilean-Palestinian club rushed the field. Jewish community leaders filed a complaint with the public prosecutor, accusing the Club Palestino fans of anti-Semitic chants. Chilean-Palestinian leaders complained to authorities that the entrance to their community’s soccer field was marked with graffiti of the Star of David and the words “Palestine doesn’t exist, Arabs are terrorists.” Club Palestino denounced the graffiti, describing it as “cowardly aggression.” The president of the Jewish Community of Chile filed a complaint with the police against Club Palestino’s fans, condemned the vandalizing of Club Palestino’s stadium, and expressed the Jewish community’s solidarity with Chile’s Palestinian community.

Jewish community leaders expressed concern about other incidents of graffiti, including some marking Jewish homes as businesses, which they perceived as anti-Semitic, and graffiti that pledged support for Hitler. They also expressed concern about anti-Semitic flyers found in June at Universidad Concepcion and Universidad Catolica promoting white racial purity and denouncing immigration, interreligious marriage, and “racial degeneration.”

U.S. embassy officials met regularly with ONAR officials, regional government leaders, and law enforcement to express concern about the impact of the church burnings on religious minorities in Araucania and neighboring regions.

The Ambassador and embassy officials met with religious leaders to discuss the status of religious minorities in the country, expressions of anti-Semitism, the impact of immigration on religious institutions, the impact of elections on religious institutions, security, and institutional cooperation among government and religious organizations. In August a senior embassy official participated in an interreligious dialogue between government officials and faith leaders, including members of the Jewish, Bahai, evangelical, and Catholic faiths, among others; ONAR; and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In June a senior embassy official hosted leaders of Muslim, Protestant, Jewish, Catholic, Bahai, and indigenous Mapuche communities at an interfaith iftar. The event celebrated religious diversity, interfaith dialogue, and religious tolerance, and sought to increase cooperation among religious organizations in light of the arson attacks in the Araucania Region. In December the Ambassador participated in a Hanukkah celebration hosted by President Bachelet and the Jewish Community of Chile. The event highlighted interreligious dialogue, democracy, solidarity, freedom of expression, equality, and education, among other topics. As part of the ceremony, the Ambassador, the presidential rabbi, and the minister of labor and social security lit a menorah candle in celebration of equality. The embassy celebrated International Religious Freedom Day and UN International Day for Tolerance with social media campaigns.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.4 billion (July 2017 estimate). According to the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), there are more than 200 million religious believers in the country. Many experts, however, believe that official estimates understate the total number of religious adherents. The U.S. government estimates there are 658 million religious believers in the country, including 251 million Buddhists, 70 million Christians, 25 million Muslims, 302 million observers of folk religions, and 10 million observers of other faiths, including Taoism. According to a February estimate by the U.S.-based NGO Freedom House, there are more than 350 million religious believers in the country, including 185-250 million Chinese Buddhists, 60-80 million Protestants, 21-23 million Muslims, 7-20 million Falun Gong practitioners, 12 million Catholics, 6-8 million Tibetan Buddhists, and hundreds of millions who follow various folk traditions. According to 2016 data from the Jewish Virtual Library, the country’s Jewish population is 2,600.

The 2014 Blue Book of Religions, produced by the Institute of World Religions at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a research institution directly under the State Council, reported the number of Protestants to be between 23 and 40 million. Among these, there are 20 million Protestant Christians affiliated with the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM), the state-sanctioned umbrella organization for all officially recognized Protestant churches, according to information on TSPM’s website in March. According to a 2014 SARA statistic, more than 5.7 million Catholics worship in sites registered by the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA), the state-sanctioned organization for all officially recognized Catholic churches. Accurate estimates on the numbers of Catholics and Protestants as well as other faiths are difficult to calculate, however, because many adherents practice exclusively at home.

According to SARA, there are more than 21 million Muslims, with 10 ethnic minorities practicing Islam. Other sources indicate almost all of the Muslims are Sunni. The two largest Muslim ethnic minorities are Hui and Uighur, with Hui Muslims concentrated primarily in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and Qinghai, Gansu, and Yunnan Provinces. SARA estimates the Muslim Hui population at 10.6 million. Uighur Muslims live primarily in the XUAR. The State Council’s 2015 White Paper on Xinjiang reports Hui, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uighur, and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities constitute 14.63 million residents in Xinjiang, 63 percent of the total population.

While there is no reliable government breakdown of the Buddhist population by branch, the vast majority of Buddhists in China are adherents of Mahayana Buddhism, according to the Pew Research Center.

Prior to the government’s 1999 ban on Falun Gong, the government estimated there were 70 million adherents. Falun Gong sources estimate that tens of millions continue to practice privately, and Freedom House estimates 7-20 million practitioners.

Some ethnic minorities retain traditional religions, such as Dongba among the Naxi people in Yunnan Province and Buluotuo among the Zhuang in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. Media sources report Tibetan Buddhism is growing in popularity among the Han Chinese population.

Legal Framework

The constitution states citizens have “freedom of religious belief,” but limits protections for religious practice to “normal religious activities.” The constitution does not define “normal.” It says religion may not be used to disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens, or interfere with the educational system. The constitution provides for the right to hold or not to hold a religious belief, and states that state organs, public organizations, and individuals may not discriminate against citizens “who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion.” The law does not allow legal action to be taken against the government on the basis of the religious freedom protections afforded by the constitution. Criminal law allows the state to sentence government officials to up to two years in prison if they violate a citizen’s religious freedom.

CCP members and members of the armed forces are required to be atheists and are forbidden from engaging in religious practice. Members found to belong to religious organizations are subject to expulsion, although these rules are not universally enforced. The vast majority of public office holders are CCP members, and membership is widely considered a prerequisite for success in a government career. These restrictions also apply to retired CCP cadres and party members.

Certain religious or spiritual groups are banned by law. The criminal law defines banned groups as “cult organizations,” and those belonging to them can receive sentences of up to life in prison. There are no published criteria for determining, or procedures for challenging, such a designation. A national security law explicitly bans “cult organizations.” The CCP maintains an extralegal, party-run security apparatus to eliminate the Falun Gong movement and other such organizations. The government continues to ban Falun Gong, the Guanyin Method religious group (Guanyin Famen or the Way of the Goddess of Mercy), and Zhong Gong (a qigong exercise discipline). The government also considers several Christian groups to be “evil cults,” including the Shouters, The Church of Almighty God (also known as Eastern Lightning), Society of Disciples (Mentu Hui), Full Scope Church (Quan Fanwei Jiaohui), Spirit Sect, New Testament Church, Three Grades of Servants (San Ban Puren), Association of Disciples, Lord God religious group, Established King Church, the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), Family of Love, and South China Church.

The Counterterrorism Law describes “religious extremism” as the ideological basis of terrorism that uses “distorted religious teachings or other means to incite hatred, or discrimination, or advocate violence.” Xinjiang has its own counterterrorism law containing similar provisions regarding “religious extremism” as the national law. Xinjiang also enacted a separate counterextremism law, which took effect April 1. The law bans the wearing of long beards, full-face coverings, giving “abnormal” names to children, expanding halal practice beyond food, and “interfering” with family planning, weddings, funerals, or inheritance, among other provisions.

Regulations require religious groups to register with the government. Only religious groups belonging to one of the five state-sanctioned “patriotic religious associations” are permitted to register with the government and legally hold worship services. These five associations operate under the direction of the CCP United Front Work Department. Other religious groups, such as Protestant groups unaffiliated with the official patriotic religious association or Catholics professing loyalty to the Vatican, are not permitted to register as legal entities. The government does not recognize Judaism. The country’s laws and policies do not provide a mechanism for religious groups independent of the five official patriotic religious associations to obtain legal status.

All religious organizations are required to register with SARA or its provincial and local offices. Registered religious organizations are allowed to possess property, publish approved materials, train staff, and collect donations. According to regulations, religious organizations must submit information about the organization’s historical background, members, doctrines, key publications, minimum funding requirements, and government sponsor, often a “patriotic religious association.” According to SARA, there are more than 360,000 clergy, 140,000 places of worship, and 5,500 registered religious groups in the country.

Religious regulations also vary by province; many provinces updated their regulations during the year following the National Work Conference on Religion in April.

In September the State Council issued revisions to the 2005 Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA), scheduled to take effect on February 1, 2018. These revised regulations will allow members of unregistered religious groups to seek approval from authorities to participate in religious activities. Individuals who do not participate in religious activities through a registered organization or those that have not been approved by authorities will be considered to have engaged in “illegal religious activities,” and doing so carries potential criminal or administrative penalties. The revisions will require religious groups to register with the government, increase penalties for conducting or “providing facilities” for unauthorized religious activities, and restrict contact with overseas religious institutions, including a new requirement for members of religious groups to seek approval to travel abroad and a prohibition on “accepting domination by external forces.” The revisions include new registration requirements for religious schools. They also place new restrictions on religious groups conducting business or making investments. Additionally, the revisions require that religious activity “must not harm national security.” While the current regulations stipulate the obligations of religious groups to abide by the law and safeguard national unity, the new revisions specify steps to take strong measures on “religious extremism.” The new regulations also place limits on the online activities of religious groups, requiring activities to be approved by the provincial Religious Affairs Bureau.

In addition to the five nationally recognized religions, local governments permit certain religious communities and practices, such as Orthodox Christianity in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and Heilongjiang, Zhejiang, and Guangdong provinces. The government classifies worship of Mazu, a folk deity with Taoist roots, as “cultural heritage” rather than religious practice.

The government and the Holy See do not have diplomatic relations, and the Vatican has no representative in the country. The CPA does not recognize the authority of the Holy See to appoint Catholic bishops. The Regulation on the Election and Consecration of Bishops requires candidate bishops to pledge publicly support for the CCP.

SARA states through a policy posted on its website that family and friends have the right to meet at home for worship, including prayer and Bible study, without registering with the government.

According to the law, inmates have the right to believe in a religion and maintain their religious beliefs while in custody.

Tibetan Buddhists in the country, including outside the TAR, are not free to venerate the Dalai Lama openly. While there is no public law expressly forbidding it, authorities view as suspect any display of the Dalai Lama’s photo by businesses or individuals and treat those seen as loyal to him as a separatist threat.

Proselytizing in public or meeting in unregistered places of worship is not permitted.

Religious and social regulations permit official patriotic religious associations to engage in activities, such as building places of worship, training religious leaders, publishing literature, and providing social services to local communities. The CCP’s United Front Work Department, SARA, and the Ministry of Civil Affairs provide policy guidance and supervision on the implementation of these regulations.

An amendment to the criminal law and a judicial interpretation by the national Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Supreme People’s Court published in November 2016 criminalize the act of forcing others to wear “extremist” garments. Neither the amendment nor the judicial interpretation defines what garments or symbols are considered “extremist.” Regulations in Urumqi, Xinjiang, prohibit residents from wearing veils that cover the face, forbid residents from homeschooling children, and forbid men from growing “abnormal beards.” A separate regulation approved by the Xinjiang People’s Congress Standing Committee in 2016 bans the practice of religion in government buildings and the wearing of clothes associated with “religious extremism.”

In February authorities in Xinjiang defined 26 religious activities, including some practices of Islam, Christianity, and Tibetan Buddhism, as illegal without government authorization. These regulations, which came into force April 1, stipulate that no classes, scripture study groups, or religious studies courses may be offered by any group or institution without prior government approval. No religious group is permitted to carry out any religious activities, including preaching, missionary work, proselytizing, and ordaining clergy, without government approval. The pronouncement forbids the designation of reincarnations of Tibetan Buddhist teachers without government approval. It also bans editing, translation, publication, printing, reproduction, production, distribution, sale, and dissemination of religious publications and audiovisual products without authorization.

National printing regulations restrict the publication and distribution of literature with religious content. Religious texts published without authorization, including Bibles and Qurans, may be confiscated, and unauthorized publishing houses closed. The government allows some foreign educational institutions to provide religious materials in Chinese, which are used by both registered and unregistered religious groups.

The government offers some subsidies for the construction of state-sanctioned places of worship and religious schools.

By regulation, if a religious structure is to be demolished or relocated because of city planning or construction of key projects, the party responsible for demolishing the structure must consult with its local Bureau of Religious Affairs (administered by SARA) and the religious group using the structure. If all parties agree to the demolition, the party conducting the demolition must agree to rebuild the structure or provide compensation equal to its appraised market value.

National regulations permit parents to instruct children under the age of 18 in the beliefs of officially recognized religious groups, and children may participate in religious activities. Xinjiang officials, however, require minors to complete nine years of compulsory education before they may receive religious education outside of school. Also in Xinjiang, regulations forbid minors from participating in religious activities and impose penalties on organizations and individuals who “organize, entice, or force” minors to participate in religious activities. According to press reports, a regulation in effect since November 2016 further bans any form of religious activity in Xinjiang schools and stipulates parents or guardians who “organize, lure, or force minors into religious activities” may be stopped by anyone and reported to police. The new Xinjiang law also amends its regional version of the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency Law to require children taking part in religious activities go to “specialized schools for correction.” In April Xinjiang authorities banned naming children with any name having an Islamic connotation, and in June stated all children under the age of 16 with such names must change their names.

The teaching of atheism in schools is mandated, and a CCP directive provides guidance to universities on how to prevent foreign proselytizing of university students.

The law states job applicants shall not face discrimination in hiring based on factors including religious belief.

Birth limitation policies stating all married couples may have no more than two children, with no exceptions for ethnic or religious minorities, remain in force.

The law currently permits domestic NGOs, including religious organizations, to receive donations in foreign currency. The law requires documented approval by SARA of donations from foreign sources to domestic religious groups of more than one million renminbi (RMB) ($154,000). This amount is expected to change in February 2018 with the implementation of the new religious regulations that will require government approval for donations of more than 100,000 RMB ($15,400).

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). With respect to Macau, the national government notified the UN Secretary General, in part, that residents of Macau shall not be restricted in the rights and freedoms they are entitled to, unless otherwise provided for by law, and in case of restrictions, the restrictions shall not contravene the ICCPR. With respect to Hong Kong, the national government notified the secretary general, in part, that the ICCPR would also apply to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: Throughout the country, there continued to be reports of deaths in detention of religious adherents as well as reports the government physically abused, detained, arrested, tortured, sentenced to prison, or harassed adherents of both registered and unregistered religious groups for activities related to their religious beliefs and practices. Religious affairs officials and security organs scrutinized and restricted the religious activities of registered and unregistered religious groups, including assembling for religious worship, expressing religious beliefs in public and in private, teaching youth, and publishing religious texts. Falun Gong reported that dozens of its members died in detention. Reportedly, a Buddhist monk self-immolated in January in Haikou City, due to a land requisition dispute involving a Buddhist temple. International media reported an increase in control over religious activities in advance of the 19th Party Congress in October. Religious leaders and groups stated the 2018 regulations would increase restrictions on their ability to practice their religions, including a new requirement for religious groups to seek approval to travel abroad and a prohibition on “accepting domination by external forces.” The government continued to cite concerns over the “three evils” of “ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism” as grounds to enact and enforce restrictions on religious practices of Muslims in Xinjiang, including Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui, and Tajiks. The government’s repression of religious freedom remained most severe in Xinjiang and in Tibetan areas, according to media and NGO sources. According to reports, the government continued to extract unpaid labor, conduct indoctrination sessions, and closely monitor and restrict the movements of Uighurs to counteract what it considered “religious extremism” in Xinjiang.

According to Minghui, a Falun Gong-affiliated organization, during the year 42 practitioners died in custody or following release from prison due to injuries sustained while in custody. Minghui reported Han Hongxia died in March while in police custody. Officials of the Da’an City Domestic Security Office in Jilin Province arrested her in October 2016. Guards at the Baicheng City Detention Center reportedly tortured her for refusing to renounce her beliefs in Falun Gong. Minghui also reported that Falun Gong practitioner Yang Yuyong died in July in police custody. Authorities in Tianjin arrested him in December 2016. He reportedly suffered severe abuse while in custody, including sexual abuse involving 13 inmates who pinched his genitals and bit his nipples. By the time authorities took him to receive medical care, he was already suffering complete organ failure. His family reported his body as being black and blue and having traces of bamboo sticks under his toenails. Yang’s wife, Meng Xianzhen, was arrested with him and remained in custody at year’s end.

On January 10 in Haikou City, Hainan Province, Buddhist monk Shi-Wu Zong self-immolated and died in front of witnesses from the local ethnic and religious affairs bureau as well as officials from the social stability office. Bowen Press said his action was due to a land requisition dispute. Since the end of 2016, Shi-Wu Zong had protested an alleged illegal land transaction between government authorities and a local real estate developer. The real estate contractor hired workers to demolish a Buddhist temple to make way for new construction. Authorities accused Shi-Wu Zong of criminal disturbance of social order before he self-immolated.

On June 15, Radio Free Asia reported ethnic Kazakh Imam Akmet (one name only) died on June 4 in police custody in Xinjiang. According to sources in the region, authorities had detained him a week before for unknown reasons and said he had hanged himself. Sources reported authorities detained more than 100 of his supporters who spoke out about his death online. Earlier in the year, Radio Free Asia also reported that a Kaba (Habahe) County court sentenced an ethnic Kazakh Imam Okan (one name only) to 10 years in prison for performing traditional funeral prayers in accordance with Islamic customs.

According to July articles by ChinaAid and in Express, TSPM Nanle County Church Pastor Zhang Shaojie’s daughter said authorities beat him nearly to death after he appealed his 12-year sentence following four years of imprisonment. Zhang’s relatives said prison guards had tortured him, using methods including sleep deprivation as well as slowly starving him by giving him very little to eat. Zhang is a pastor in Xinxiang, Henan Province, in prison for “swindling” and “assembling a crowd to disrupt public order” for leading a group of Christians to Beijing to file a petition concerning his church’s land dispute with local officials.

In January The South China Morning Post and Radio Free Asia reported Christian Pastor Yang Hua (also known as Li Guozhi) of the unofficial Livingstone Church in Guizhou Province was sentenced to two and a half years in prison for divulging state secrets. The documents in question reportedly concerned a “crackdown” on his church. Authorities detained the pastor in 2015, and he spent more than a year in jail prior to his sentencing. Yang’s lawyers said authorities tortured him, did not treat his serious medical conditions, and threatened to kill him and his family. In late August authorities fined the Livingstone Church seven million RMB ($1.1 million) for illegally establishing a religious space. Pastor Su Tianfu and lawyer Huang Sha filed an application with the Guiyang Municipal Ethnic and Religious Committee requesting reconsideration of the decision. In 2016, authorities arrested Su and released him pending trial, but security services continued to follow him and pressured him to plead guilty to disclosing state secrets and to relinquish to the government the space the church purchased. Authorities released church deacon Zhang Xiuhong in August on a five-year suspended sentence. Reportedly, authorities targeted church leaders because they were unwilling to register the church under the TSPM. Authorities had previously shut down the church in 2015.

In a May court hearing, a judge ordered prosecutors to gather further evidence in the case of Chen Huixia, a Falun Gong practitioner in Hebei Province charged with “using an evil cult to undermine law enforcement.” Amnesty International said detention center officials tortured her and held her without access to family or lawyers since 2016.

According to Christian NGO ChinaAid and religious groups, as part of the government’s ongoing campaign of “Sinicization,” religious organizations reported a continued increase in detentions and arrests, especially of those not affiliated with a government-backed patriotic association. The most common charges included “illegal religious activities” and “disrupting social stability.”

Multiple media outlets reported an increase in authorities’ control over religious activities in advance of the 19th Party Congress in October. These controls included detaining persons for participating in religious rituals outside of officially sanctioned religious sites, arresting persons for disturbing public order, and increasing surveillance of religious sites and communities.

Human rights groups said the vague definition of “terrorism” and “religious extremism” in the Counterterrorism Law that took effect in 2016 and in the revised religious regulations that are scheduled to come into force in 2018 could be used to criminalize peaceful expressions of religious belief. Authorities often failed to distinguish between peaceful religious practice and criminal or terrorist activities, according to human rights organizations. It remained difficult to determine whether particular raids, detentions, arrests, or judicial punishments targeted those pursuing political goals, the right to worship, or criminal acts.

The Political Prisoner Database maintained by human rights NGO Dui Hua Foundation contained the following number of religious prisoners at year’s end: 308 Protestants, 277 Almighty God Church members, 107 Muslims, 30 Buddhists, and nine Catholics, compared with 207 Protestants, 366 Almighty God Church members, 66 Muslims, 21 Buddhists, and 23 Catholics at the end of 2016. The Political Prisoner Database listed 3,516 Falun Gong practitioners imprisoned at year’s end, compared with 3,322 at the end of 2016. Dui Hua defined religious prisoners as “people persecuted for holding religious beliefs that are not officially sanctioned.”

Falun Gong reported significantly higher numbers of its members being arrested and sentenced, stating on Minghui authorities sentenced almost 1,000 practitioners to imprisonment during the year for practicing Falun Dafa. During the year, authorities arrested and charged at least 50 persons with “using an evil cult to undermine law enforcement.” International Falun Gong-affiliated NGOs and international media reported detentions of Falun Gong practitioners continued to increase around “sensitive” dates. Authorities instructed neighborhood communities to report Falun Gong members to officials and offered monetary rewards to citizens who informed on Falun Gong practitioners.

Radio Free Asia reported authorities in Burultokay (Fuhai) County, Xinjiang, sentenced ethnic Kazakh Manat Hamit to 16 years in prison on an ethnic hatred charge at a May secret trial after authorities found audio files of Quranic recitations on his computer. Authorities reportedly refused to provide his family information regarding his trial and did not accept the lawyer hired for his appeal, which a court rejected in July.

According to ChinaAid as reported by The Christian Post in January, individuals reportedly connected to the government beat a group of Christians from Fuxing Church in Hebei Province after the church refused local officials’ pressure to sign a land transfer that would remove the congregation from the space. Several of the Christians were subsequently hospitalized.

In January authorities detained more than 80 Christians affiliated with the Protestant house church network Fangcheng Fellowship across Xinjiang Province for worshipping in house churches, according to The Christian Post. Some of those arrested were charged with “engaging in religious activities at nonreligious sites.”

According to The Christian Post, local authorities in Xinjiang arrested Ma Huichao in January for holding a Bible study in her home. They charged her with “gathering a crowd to disturb public order” and sentenced her to three years in prison. In October Radio Free Asia reported that Xinjiang authorities had detained three grandchildren of Qurban Barat, a deceased ethnic Uighur imam in Hotan (Hetian) Prefecture. Authorities charged them with “religious violations” and possession of illegal religious material, sentencing two to six years in prison and the third to five and a half years. They had given a fourth grandson an eight-year prison sentence in 2015 for the same charges.

In January authorities formally arrested Pastor Gu “Joseph” Yuese, the former pastor of Chongyi Church in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, one of the country’s largest TSPM churches, on embezzlement charges his supporters said authorities fabricated to punish him for publicly opposing Zhejiang’s cross demolition campaign. On December 24, prosecutors withdrew the charges and released Gu. Authorities barred him from returning to his pastoral duties after his release. This was the second time authorities detained Gu on embezzlement charges in as many years. In January 2016 authorities had removed Gu from his pastoral duties and placed him under criminal detention for suspected embezzlement of church funds, but released him on bail in March 2016.

According to ChinaAid, authorities jailed five Christians in March in Liaoning Province and subsequently sentenced them to three to seven years in prison for buying and selling “officially forbidden Christian devotional books.” Although their church, Chaoguang Village Christian Gathering Place, is officially registered with the TSPM, authorities said they were conducting illegal business because they intended to make a profit from their activities. Authorities closed the church.

ChinaAid said police detained two Christians, Zhou Jinxia from Dalian, Liaoning Province, and Shi Xinhong from Bengbu, Anhui Province, after they attempted to pray at the Great Hall of the People at the beginning of the National People’s Congress on March 5. Authorities detained Zhou for 10 days in 2016 for holding religious signs outside CCP headquarters.

In March authorities detained at least 14 members of a 90-member house church in Langzhong City, Sichuan Province, for 15 days. According to ChinaAid, authorities also confiscated items belonging to the house church. Police charged the members with the crime of “illegal congregation.”

In April authorities in Zhengzhou, Henan Province, briefly detained a group of Christian worshippers and Taiwan Pastor Xu Rongzhang for singing a Christian song – an activity authorities said was illegal. According to ChinaAid, police released Xu the same day, but kept his identification for a two more days. Police forced the local Christians to write letters of confession and told Xu not to hold gatherings of more than 10 persons.

According to a Voice of America report, after ISIS in Pakistan killed two Chinese missionaries sometime in May or June, Chinese authorities reportedly detained four church leaders from Zhejiang Province who had assigned the two to travel overseas. The families of the missionaries said after the arrest the government used their killings to suppress underground churches and Christians in the area. Civil society reported authorities told the families of the missionaries they should feel shame for how the negative publicity from the killings affected the country’s international image.

According to ChinaAid, police arrested Pastor Chen Shixin of Caili Church in Anhui Province in May and detained him for one month before formally charging him with “intentionally sabotaging public and private property.” On November 29, Chen pleaded innocent at his trial. During the trial, the prosecution said Chen damaged trees on a plot of land belonging to persons from the neighboring village. Chen said the land belonged to his church.

The Telegraph and BBC reported that in June authorities detained 18 suspected members of The Church of Almighty God (also known as Eastern Lightning), regarded by the government as an illegal demonic cult. In August 2016 authorities in Anhui Province detained 36 members of the group, accusing them of creating and distributing video content for the group.

According to ChinaAid, in July Guangdong police detained Pastor Tang Lili of Renyi, a five-year-old Protestant house church mainly serving migrant workers in a village in Jiangmen’s Xinhui District, and shut down the church. Police later searched Tang’s apartment and confiscated all religious items.

According to press reports, nearly every week government-backed groups in Ezhou, Hubei Province, harassed Christian house church members who met outdoors after local authorities confiscated the chairs and desks of their former indoor space on January 10. Also in January, according to ChinaAid, authorities detained six women from the church, including Hao Zhiwei, one of the church’s pastors, and a court sentenced each to 10 to 15 days of detention on charges of organizing unauthorized religious activities. Hao told Radio Free Asia reporters on August 14 authorities detained four Christians and beat them for five to seven days. On August 22, the government-backed groups beat five or six of the church members. Attackers dumped buckets of mud on the Christians, shot firecrackers at them, and beat one woman unconscious. One of the attackers reportedly told the church members, “Beating people up is my job.” Local police reportedly refused to intervene to stop the attackers or to press charges. In December 2016 local authorities warned the house church members their group violated the Regulation on Religious Affairs because it organized religious activities without the government’s approval, and said they should cease their religious activities.

In Shanxi Province, dozens of Catholics reportedly sustained injuries in August when trying to block bulldozers from destroying their church building, which belonged to the local diocese, part of the officially recognized CCPA. Local officials announced the church and surrounding plaza would be demolished “to enrich the life of the people,” despite the issuance of formal appeals by parishioners, according to news reports.

In September authorities in Sichuan Province prevented “unofficial” Protestant house Pastor Wang Yi from traveling to Hong Kong. Wang said border guards had told him that he was detained because he represented a “threat to national security,” according to Radio Free Asia.

In September authorities in Zhejiang Province arrested Pastor Xu Shizhen, along with her daughter and three-year-old grandson, after the women performed religious services in public parks and squares, according to Christianity Today. Reports from October indicated that Xu and her daughter were transferred to other facilities while the grandson was held at the police station. Christian advocates reported Xu and her daughter’s whereabouts remained unknown. Authorities seized Xu’s former church in 2012 and handed it over to the government-sanctioned church.

The Union of Catholic Asian News (UCAN) reported Father Lu Danhua of Lishui Diocese of eastern Zhejiang Province went missing on December 29. UCAN said officials of SARA took him from a priests’ dormitory and, according to a witness, the officials said they were going for a brief chat. On December 30, the witness went to SARA’s office where officials said they already released Lu, but he remained missing and his mobile phone unanswered at the end of the year. A source told UCAN that authorities had said Lu needed to go to Wenzhou for “re-education” on new religious regulations scheduled to come into effect in February 2018.

On August 9, Radio Free Asia reported there was no sign of ethnic Kazakh Imam Nurjan Mehmet whose expected release from prison was July 31. According to sources in the region, authorities had arrested him in August 2016 when a Muslim couple registering their marriage said he led a traditional Muslim nikah wedding ceremony for them. A source said, “This may be a local policy unique to Xinjiang. You have to first apply for a marriage certificate and then carry out the Islamic practice of nikah. The imams aren’t allowed to perform nikah if there is no marriage certificate, or they will be sent to prison.” Reports said Mehmet was serving a four-year jail term instead of the original one-year sentence.

According to Radio Free Asia, sources estimated authorities in Xinjiang detained hundreds of ethnic minority Kazakhs in the months leading up to December for “extremist” behavior that included normal Islamic practices. In December Radio Free Asia reported authorities in Xinjiang detained five Kazakhs for disseminating “terrorist audio and video” online. A regional official of the Cyberspace Administration said they detained 37-year-old Wu (full names not provided) on November 1 for possessing “terrorist video” materials on a cellular phone, 31-year-old Zhu for “making comments that promote ethnic divisions,” and 26-year-old “A,” 36-year-old Ye, and 26-year-old Tuo for “incitement to ethnic hatred.” Radio Free Asia said regional officials had recently investigated 10 similar cases in which they detained suspects for “promoting, storing, and disseminating text, images, audio, and video related to terrorist violence, religious extremism, ethnic separatism, and false rumors.” Radio Free Asia said authorities detained six Uighurs on similar charges in November.

Authorities reportedly continued to harass and detain human rights lawyers defending religious adherents, often forbidding client meetings and threatening revocation of their professional licenses. During the year, authorities tried and convicted several prominent Christian legal rights activists and lawyers on charges of subversion of state power. Authorities also harassed or detained the family members, including children, of religious leaders and religious freedom activists. Authorities placed some of the family members under travel bans, restricting their movement.

Police in Jiangmen, Guangzhou Province, arrested human rights activist and Catholic Church member He Lin after he participated in a seaside memorial for human rights activist Liu Xiaobo on July 19. According to He Lin, authorities offered to release him if he were willing to sign a “repentance statement.” Lin refused the offer and told his lawyer he would rather sit in jail than violate his faith by signing a false statement.

In September police detained human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, who had defended members of religious groups, including Christians and Falun Gong members. Gao had previously released a memoir published in Taiwan detailing reported abuses he had suffered during six years of harassment from authorities, including abductions, followed by five years of detention and physical abuse in prison, such as beatings to his face with an electric baton. Gao and his family said that after his release in 2014, government agents continued to subject him to intrusive visits at home and deny him permission to travel for medical treatment.

Relations between the Vatican and the government reportedly improved early in the year before stagnating, while media and observers reported many cases of authorities surveilling, harassing, and detaining unregistered bishops and priests.

In January overseas media reported the Shanghai chapter of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) announced Shanghai Auxiliary Bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin as a “supplemental member” of its executive committee, but listed him as “Father Ma Daqin” – not as a bishop. Ma reportedly remained under house arrest in Sheshan Seminary after resigning from the CCPA during his episcopal ordination in 2012. In 2016, there were reports that Ma had written a blog post saying it was a mistake to leave the CCPA.

According to several news sources, in April, before Catholics marked Holy Week, security officials took Bishop Peter Shao Zhumin away from his Wenzhou Diocese, marking the fourth time authorities detained him since September 2016. Authorities in Wenzhou City, Zhejiang Province, originally detained Shao, whom the Vatican recognized but who was not a member of the CCPA, in 2016 to prevent him from assuming control of Wenzhou Diocese following the death of Bishop Vincent Zhu Weifang. In September a photo of Shao in a Beijing hospital began circulating on social media. According to overseas media, the photo was taken at Beijing Tongren Hospital where the bishop was to have ear surgery. In October prior to the start of the Communist Party’s 19th Party Congress in Beijing, authorities moved Shao to Xining in Qinghai Province in the west of the country. Media reports said authorities pressured Shao to sign an agreement stating that he would support SARA and the state’s authority to appoint bishops, but Shao reportedly did not agree with the terms. According to reports, authorities continued to detain him at year’s end.

In Fujian Province, AsiaNews reported “underground” Catholic Bishop Guo Xijin was missing for a few days after meeting with authorities from the Religious Affairs Office on April 6. According to AsiaNews, the head of public security in Ningde said the Bishop “needs to study and learn” and would remain in custody for 20 days. Guo’s followers said he might have been pressured into joining the government-affiliated CCPA.

The Catholic Herald reported authorities raided an “underground” Catholic Mass at a community hall in Heilongjiang Province on April 20 to prevent an “illegal religious activity.” Videos taken at the scene showed police attempting to arrest the parish priest and the community’s lay preacher, as well as arguing with parishioners.

According to the UCAN, on September 17, a court in Gaizhou City, Liaoning Province, sentenced Catholic priest Fei Jisheng to 18 months’ imprisonment for stealing funds from a charity money box at a home for the elderly. The trial was not public, and court records were unavailable. Authorities had arrested or detained Fei multiple times in 2016 for conducting religious work outside his own diocese. In October 2016 authorities detained Fei on charges of stealing charity funds. Catholic community members said the real reason for his arrest was due to his work with the Apostolic Class, an illegal evangelical Christian organization. Authorities released Fei after five weeks of detention and a week of ideological retraining. Fei hired a local lawyer after his arrest, but the lawyer reportedly quit due to pressure from local authorities. Local sources stated Liaoning police authorities planned to punish Fei severely to regain the trust of the central government, which was lost when local authorities failed to stop a large underground gathering of Catholics in 2015.

While authorities officially abolished “re-education through labor camps” in 2013, advocacy groups and international media continued to report some camps had been relabeled and continued to house members of religious and spiritual groups.

In Xinjiang human rights groups and others reported hundreds of thousands of Uighur Muslims were forcibly sent to re-education camps, and extensive and invasive security and surveillance practices were instituted. According to Human Rights Watch, restrictions on religious dress and expression came into effect in April along with restrictions on giving children names with religious connotations. Authorities increasingly restricted travel for religious purposes, and continued to bar Uighur children from participating in religious activities. Radio Free Asia reported that officials stayed with some families for up to 15 days during Ramadan to ensure they did not fast or pray.

Authorities in Xinjiang implemented a campaign to force Uighur Muslims returning from abroad into re-education camps. According to Radio Free Asia, the director of public security in Korla’s Qara Yulghun village said those in the camps had to express appropriate remorse for traveling abroad before authorities allowed them to return to “general re-education” studies, and eventually allowed them to leave. Other reports said officials in Hotan (Hetian), largely populated by Uighurs, confirmed that higher authorities gave them a target of sending nearly half the area’s residents to re-education camps throughout Xinjiang. Many of these camps have been registered as “career development centers” to circumvent legal problems. Reports indicated authorities sent Muslims and some Christians from ethnic minority groups to re-education.

The government continued to seek the forcible return of thousands of Uighur Muslims living outside the country, many of whom had sought asylum from religious persecution, according to human rights organizations. The government continued to claim that Uighurs were criminals and not refugees, and some countries, including Egypt, complied with the government’s requests for the forcible return of Uighur asylum seekers.

Government authorities focused forced repatriation efforts on Uighur religious students studying at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt. The Financial Times reported Chinese government officials sent these students messages in May telling them to return home. Authorities arrested some of the students’ families in China in an attempt to compel them to return. Since July the Egyptian police reportedly arrested more than 200 Uighur students in Cairo, and the Egyptian government repatriated at least 22 to China.

Uighur Islamic scholar and professor Dr. Hebibulla Tohti received a 10-year prison sentence in May. According to Radio Free Asia, authorities compelled him to return from study in Egypt in 2016 to register with authorities in Xinjiang. Authorities said he conducted illegal activities by teaching religion to Uighur students in Egypt without approval, participating in a religious conference in Saudi Arabia without approval, and emphasizing the distinctive nature of Uighur culture in his doctoral dissertation. The government-sanctioned China Islamic Association provided financial support for his graduate studies and previously lauded his work publicly.

Radio Free Asia reported in November that authorities in some parts of Xinjiang had recently issued orders for ethnic Kazakh Chinese nationals to hand in their passports and Kazakh residence permits. Reportedly, authorities detained hundreds of ethnic Kazakhs returning from overseas study or family visits to Kazakhstan and sent them for indefinite terms to “re-education” facilities. One ethnic Kazakh in Tekes County said authorities placed him on a “wanted” list, along with some 60 other ethnic Kazakhs, for “returning to China after a long absence.”

According to Minghui, authorities continued to successfully force some prisoners and detainees to recant their beliefs, particularly Falun Gong practitioners, whom the government reportedly subjected to “transformation through re-education.” Authorities also failed to provide prisoners with adequate access to religious materials, facilities, or clergy. Prison authorities reportedly subjected detained Falun Gong practitioners to various methods of physical and psychological coercion, such as sleep deprivation, in attempts to force them to renounce their beliefs.

Religious groups continued to report the CCP interfered in matters of doctrine, theology, and religious practice in “patriotic religious associations.” Local authorities pressured religious believers to affiliate with patriotic associations and used administrative detention, including confinement and abuse in administrative detention centers, to punish members of unregistered religious or spiritual groups. Patriotic religious associations regularly reviewed sermons and sometimes required church leaders to attend education sessions with religious bureau officials. They also closely monitored and sometimes blocked the ability of religious leaders to meet freely with foreigners.

Due to the difficulty of fulfilling registration requirements, many religious organizations remained either unregistered or registered as commercial enterprises. Unregistered groups reported they were vulnerable to coercive and punitive action by SARA, the Ministry of Public Security, and other party or government security organs. In some areas local authorities allowed or at least did not interfere with the activities of some unregistered groups, while in other areas, local officials restricted events and meetings, confiscated and destroyed property, physically assaulted and injured participants, or imprisoned leaders and worshippers, according to reports.

SARA continued to maintain statistics on registered religious groups. According to statistics released in February, there were 21 officially recognized Protestant seminaries, 48,000 pastors, and 56,000 churches and other meeting places. According to civil society, there were 12 CPA seminaries; however, the government was reportedly in the process of closing the ones in Shanghai and Chengdu, Sichuan Province. Although there were two CPA seminaries in Beijing, civil society regarded one of them to be primarily used as the CPA’s propaganda for international visitors. There were 72 CPA-affiliated Catholic bishops, eight of whom the Vatican did not recognize, and three of those eight were excommunicated. An outside source estimated approximately 37 Catholic bishops remained independent of the CPA and continued to operate unofficially. In some locations, however, local authorities reportedly pressured unregistered Catholic priests and believers to renounce all ordinations approved by the Holy See. SARA also estimated there were 40,000 mosques, 50,000 imams, and 10 Quran Institutes.

It remained unclear how strictly authorities would enforce the revised RRA. Some experts noted while the text of the revisions appeared to indicate a harsher line towards religious activity, the last revision of the RRA was in 2005, and thus the revisions could serve to formalize policies and practices already in place, in addition to adding new regulations.

The government did not recognize house or unregistered churches, and continued to closely monitor their activities. Some officials reportedly still denied the existence of house churches or unregistered churches. Although SARA declared family and friends had the right to worship together at home – including prayer and Bible study, without registering with the government – authorities still regularly harassed and detained small groups that did so.

Officials across Zhejiang Province forcibly entered churches to install “antiterrorism” surveillance cameras, according to Radio Free Asia and The South China Morning Post. In some cases where church followers resisted, officials cut off water and electricity to the churches. Authorities beat some of those who resisted to the extent that they required hospitalization. The churches targeted for installation of cameras were often the same ones previously targeted for removal of unapproved crosses.

More than 10 government officials broke up a group of Christians praying at Olive Church in Guangdong Province on March 19 and accused the congregation of conducting religious activities without legal authorization. ChinaAid reported the police detained approximately 20 church members, releasing them later that day. ChinaAid also reported public security and religious affairs bureaus combined forces to target Huaqiangbei Bible Guizheng Church in Shenzhen during the year, confiscating church property. In response, the congregation dispersed to several satellite locations.

On April 20, police raided the Buji Church in Shenzhen, stating the church was operating illegally, detained Zhang Rongxian – the wife of Pastor Zhang Fei – and interrogated her for 15 hours. The police also conducted frequent fire inspections of church facilities and pressured the property owner to evict the pastor and his wife, according to ChinaAid.

ChinaAid reported on several actions in May. On May 3, Dongguan local police raided the Zhong Fu Wan Min “underground” Catholic Church during its worship service, which two U.S. citizens attended. Police took 30 congregants in for questioning. Authorities released them the next day. Police officers beat Pastor Li Peng at the church and kept him in custody at the local police station. ChinaAid reported this was the second time in a year local police raided the Zhong Fu Wan Min Church.

On May 4, the “underground” Guang Fu Church’s landlord requested the church to move out of one of its locations in Baiyun District, Guangzhou. Local police also denied Pastor Ma Ke and some of his church members’ applications for residency permits.

On May 12, in Xiamen, local authorities banned the River of Life Berean Church and the Berean Research Institute of Theology, accusing them of having Korean connections and setting up illegal religious meeting places. The local Huli District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau also confiscated 1,345 yuan ($210) donated to the church, claiming it was illegal income.

On July 26, officials from the Guangzhou Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau summoned Ma Ke, Pastor of Guangfu Church, to the police station and told him the church could either become a member of the TSPM church or consent to “special personnel” monitoring the congregation. The pastor refused the first option, citing a belief that house churches and TSPM churches followed a different theology. The pastor said Guangfu Church had been a constant target of government harassment and surveillance over the past few years.

Security officials frequently interrupted the outdoor services of the unregistered Shouwang Church in Beijing and detained individuals attending services for several days without charge. Security services continued to closely monitor and harass church Pastor Jin Tianming, according to reports from advocacy groups.

Despite an overall tightening in spaces for unregistered churches to operate, in some areas, members of unregistered churches said they had more freedom than in the past to conduct religious services, as long as they gathered only in private and kept congregation numbers low. In some areas, however, authorities shut down churches that tried to maintain a low profile. Some unregistered churches reported authorities harassed and pressured their landlords to break property leases with the churches. Civil society reported authorities in one city forbade vacation Bible sessions for children during school breaks – a change from the previous year, while authorities refused to allow weekend religious education programs in numerous other cities across the country.

Churches nationwide continued to report stricter requirements on sermon content, design of buildings, and management of finances. Some local governments continued to restrict the growth of unregistered Protestant church networks and cross-congregational affiliations.

In Xinjiang, the government continued to cite concerns over the “three evils” as a reason to enact and enforce repressive measures against the religious practices of Uighur Muslims. Authorities typically characterized these operations as targeting “separatists” or “terrorists.” Police raids and restrictions on Islamic practices were part of “strike hard” campaigns, which began in 2014 and continued throughout the year. Local observers said, however, many incidents related to pressure on Uighurs went unreported to international media or NGOs.

Radio Free Asia reported in February that an official at the Xinjiang Religious and Ethnic Minority Affairs Bureau confirmed the government banned all Christian activities not linked to state-approved churches.

In January and February local authorities conducted a series of raids and arrests targeting Christian house churches in Xinjiang. Media reports indicated authorities used short-term administrative sentences in an attempt to pressure house church members to join government-sanctioned congregations.

On November 16, Radio Free Asia reported authorities in Tekes County, Xinjiang, searched the homes of 30,000 members of the mostly Muslim Kazakh ethnic group over several weeks, confiscating religious items they had ordered families to hand over in September.

During Ramadan in May and June, local authorities throughout Xinjiang imposed policies intended to disrupt Muslims’ observance of the fast. According to The Independent, these included mandatory 24-hour shifts for local government employees, the requirement that restaurants remain open during the day, and mandatory sports activities and patriotic film sessions for students on Fridays throughout the month. There were reports of authorities prohibiting university students from fasting during Ramadan.

Throughout Ramadan, authorities in Hotan (Hetian) Prefecture, Xinjiang implemented the “Together in Five Things” campaign during which authorities assigned local party cadres to stay in local residences. They observed families throughout the day and ensured they did not pray or fast. According to Radio Free Asia, an official said “During this period, [officials] will get to know the lives of the people, assist in their daily activities – such as farming – and propagate laws and regulations, party and government ethnic and religious policies, and so on.” Authorities required all Uighur cadres, civil servants, and pensioners to sign a pledge stating they would not fast and would seek to dissuade their families and friends from doing so.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to deny international media reports stating authorities banned Uighur Muslims from Ramadan fasting, and said that religious freedom for Uighurs was guaranteed by the country’s constitution. Reports published on the official websites of local governments in Xinjiang, however, indicated authorities restricted or banned certain groups of Uighurs from observing Ramadan, including CCP members, their relatives, students, and the employees of state-owned enterprises and state-run organizations, and instead hosted education events about the dangers of “religious extremism.” Authorities also hosted morning sessions in order to ensure students and workers ate breakfast. Authorities ordered restaurants and grocery stores to remain open and serve alcohol during Ramadan, according to the website of the Qapqal County, Yili (Ili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture government.

Restrictions across Xinjiang that required worshippers to apply for mosque entry permits remained in place. Beginning in October 2016, authorities in several prefectures in Xinjiang further restricted movement by requiring residents turn their passports in to their local police station for an annual review. Ethnoreligious minorities also reported increased screening at airport, train station, and roadside security checkpoints.

The government facilitated participation in the Hajj, and Muslims applied online or through local official Islamic associations. Media reported authorities punished pilgrims attempting to perform the Hajj through routes other than government-arranged ones. Approximately 12,800 Chinese Muslims participated in the Hajj during the year, according to SARA, almost 2,000 fewer than in 2016. The China Islamic Association reported in 2016 Saudi Arabia imposed an annual quota on the number of pilgrims from China that was lower than those for other countries such as India, which was granted 175,025 during the year. Chinese state media said Xinjiang provided nearly a quarter of pilgrims, although independent sources say only 1,400 Uighur Muslims were able to participate. These figures included China Islamic Association members and security officials sent to monitor Muslim citizens and prevent unauthorized activities. Uighur Muslims reported difficulties taking part in state-sanctioned Hajj travel due to the China Islamic Association’s criteria for participation in the official Hajj program. The government confiscated the passports of Uighurs in Xinjiang, and Uighurs reported near universal failure in efforts to regain possession of travel documents. Age restrictions limiting Hajj travel to Uighurs over 60 years old also reduced the number traveling to Mecca, according to media reports. Those selected to perform state-sanctioned Hajj travel were required to undergo political and religious “education,” according to SARA and media reports. Uighurs allowed to attend the Hajj were also reportedly forced to participate in political education every day during the Hajj. Organizations reported the government favored Hui Muslims over Uighur Muslims in the Hajj application process. Muslims that chose to travel outside of legal government channels reportedly often risked deportation when they tried to travel through third countries.

Radio Free Asia reported the CCP on March 23 demoted a CCP official from Chira (Cele) County, Hotan (Hetian) for her having a Muslim wedding ceremony (nikah) in her home. A local Han Chinese official reportedly said the majority Muslim region’s regulations clearly stated weddings should not be at one’s own house, and that the village party branch secretary and a specially appointed religious leader must attend, because not doing so “might promote deviant views that contradict ethnic unity and the sovereignty of the country.”

Authorities continued to prevent any “illegal” religious activities in Xinjiang and prioritize Chinese language and culture over Uighur language and culture under the rubric of ethnic unity. Authorities promoted loyalty to the Communist Party as the most important value. Reportedly, authorities encouraged thousands of Uighurs to participate in ceremonies wearing traditional Han Chinese clothing, performing tai chi, and singing the national anthem.

According to media reports, in August authorities in Xinjiang arrested more than 20 ethnic Kazakh Muslim university students because they were wearing religious clothing and reciting daily prayers. Security forces closely monitored university students and forbade religious activity.

The government pressured students in northwestern Xinjiang to report information on their family’s religious practices to teachers, including identifying those in the family who prayed, attended religious ceremonies, or wore a hijab or beard. Teachers conducted these surveys annually and passed them to security authorities as a means to stop religious ideology from entering schools, according to media reports.

Hui Muslims in Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, and Yunnan Provinces continued to engage in religious practice with less government interference than did Uighurs, according to local sources. Hui Muslims reported they were free to practice as they wished with regard to family customs such as fasting during Ramadan, clothing, prayer, and performing the Hajj. They reported, however, they did not receive special accommodations for time to pray during their workday and were not given time off for Islamic holidays. They said they were treated the same as others in their community.

SARA conducted training for Muslim leaders at the local and national levels on religious regulations and their rights under the constitution. SARA officials stated they acknowledged the importance of cultivating the talents of religious leaders to promote the country’s social development.

Authorities continued to restrict the printing and distribution of religious materials. The government limited distribution of Bibles to CPA and TSPM/Chinese Christian Council entities such as churches, church bookshops, and seminaries. Individuals could not order Bibles directly from publishing houses. Members of unregistered churches reported the supply and distribution of Bibles was inadequate, particularly in rural locations. There were approximately 11 provincial TSPM Christian publishers. Authorities only allowed the national TSPM to publish the Bible legally. According to reports, while there were no independent domestic Christian booksellers, publishers not religiously-affiliated could publish Christian books. Approximately 20 distribution centers and bookstores were linked to the national TSPM. In addition, authorities reportedly allowed churches with more than 2,000 members to sell books at their church facilities. Approximately 700 churches had such bookstores. During the year, authorities continued to limit the number of Christian titles that could be published annually, with draft manuscripts closely reviewed. Authorities also restricted the ability of some bookstores to sell Christian books. Christian organizations seeking to use social media and smartphone applications to distribute Christian materials, however, reported the government did not generally censor such materials.

As part of the ongoing “Three Illegals and One Item” campaign, international media reported authorities in Xinjiang continued to confiscate Qurans and prayer rugs as illegal religious items. The campaign also included confiscating items containing religious symbols.

On March 2, Radio Free Asia reported local police intimidated Xu Lei, the spouse of detained Guangfu Protestant Family Church member Li Hongmin, after she petitioned the government in Beijing regarding her husband’s case. Xu had appealed on behalf of her husband, whom authorities charged with conducting illegal business operations for printing Bibles. Xu’s landlord evicted her at the end of March.

On September 14, officials in Shangqiu County, Henan Province, shut down a Christian-run academy for youth, saying it was “brainwashing” young persons. Officials also confiscated books and seized a computer and other materials from the academy, according to ChinaAid.

In October Radio Free Asia reported Beijing authorities closed an Islamic bookstore and publishing house. They also arrested the owner, a member of the Dongxiang minority group, on terrorism charges. The publishing house specialized in the production of materials related to Hui Muslims.

The People’s High Court, Public Security Bureau, Bureau of Culture, and Bureau of Industry and Commerce in Xinjiang continued to implement restrictions on video and audio recordings the government defined as promoting terrorism, religious extremism, and separatism. Authorities prohibited dissemination of such materials on the internet, social media, and in online marketplaces. As part of these measures, police randomly stopped individuals to check their mobile phones for any sensitive content.

There were reports authorities restricted the acquisition or use of buildings for religious ceremonies and purposes. Authorities continued to arrest and harass church leaders in Zhejiang Province where the government continued to conduct its “Three Rectifications and One Demolition” campaign, according to news reports. The campaign, which the Zhejiang provincial government announced in 2013, involved the demolition of church buildings authorities said were “illegal” structures. Christian communities reported many targeted churches had building permits and other official documents showing that the proper authorities had approved their building.

Numerous church officials, journalists, and commentators said the “Three Rectifications and One Demolition” campaign focused on demolishing buildings used by Christians. Church pastors and members of their congregations openly continued to resist official cross removals, including by forming human chains and replacing or reattaching crosses, resulting in repeated clashes and standoffs with police. Some observers estimated the government demolished as many as 2,000 crosses and buildings in Zhejiang Province since 2014 when the campaign began. LaCroix International reported that on September 20, local officials in Tanghe County, Henan Province, forcibly demolished the cross on top of the Holy Grace Protestant Church, an officially registered church. The cross caught on fire during the demolition. On August 3, officials in Jiangxi Province’s Shangrao City forcibly dismantled a cross from a church that was still under construction. This was the most recent of 10 cross removals in Jiangxi, according to reports.

In January individuals in Henan Province reportedly hired by the government raided the state-recognized Dali Christian Church, locked several church officials in an office, confiscated their mobile phones and threw away their phone cards, smashed and looted church property, and demolished part of the church with a front-end loader, according to ChinaAid.

In April the Guizhou Provincial Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau reported in 2016 it shut down 79 Buddhist and Taoist congregation sites and 254 Christian congregation sites in Guizhou Province, referring to these sites as illegal establishments and operations.

According to the Catholic News Agency, on May 5, 300 police officers in Shangqiu City, Henan Province, demolished a church, beat and shoved to the ground worshippers who tried to stop the demolition, and detained 40 worshippers. Local officials referred to the church as an “illegal structure” and ordered its demolition. They also said the church had not paid a “road usage fee” demanded by other villagers. Authorities detained the church’s pastor when he tried to discuss the issue with officials.

In June the Bazhong municipal government in Sichuan Province announced it shut down 10 religious congregation sites for failure to register properly with the government in accordance with the law.

In December authorities demolished a Catholic church in Xi’an’s Huyi District, Shaanxi Province, according to Radio Free Asia. Three hundred parishioners protested the action.

The government continued to restrict religious education in institutions across the country. Muslims and Christians also reported restrictions on their ability to speak about their faith among university students; the government strictly banned meetings of student religious organizations. Local public security bureau officials regularly warned religious student groups against meeting.

Individuals seeking to enroll at an official seminary or other institution of religious learning had to obtain the support of the official patriotic religious association. The government continued to require students to demonstrate “political reliability,” and political issues were included in examinations of graduates of religious schools. Protestant representatives reported that in TSPM-controlled seminaries, officials directed faculty to engage in “theological reconstruction” to make the Protestant doctrine conform to socialism. Both registered and unregistered religious groups reported a shortage of trained clergy due in part to government controls on admission to seminaries.

Baptist Press reported authorities in Zhejiang and Henan provinces notified churches they forbade religious education of minors, including Sunday school and church summer camps. Henan authorities reportedly said they prohibited church summer camps due to the potential health risk of excessive heat. In August authorities notified more than 100 churches in Zhejiang Province they banned minors from entering churches or participating in religious activities.

Officials continued to hold “anticult” education sessions and propaganda campaigns affecting schoolchildren and their families. Some officials required families to sign statements guaranteeing they would not take part in unregistered churches and “cult organization” activities related to Falun Gong as a prerequisite for registering their children for school. The media reported authorities forced government employees in Xinjiang to sign guarantees they would refrain from religious or political expression. The penalty for not signing could be a ban on their children entering university or an administrative investigation of the employees.

Authorities continued to allow some patriotic religious association-approved Catholic and Protestant seminarians, Muslim clerics, and Buddhist monks to travel abroad for additional religious study. Religious workers not affiliated with a patriotic religious association stated they faced difficulties in obtaining passports or official approval to study abroad.

Official media outlets often linked the ongoing anticorruption campaign to the religious or superstitious beliefs of fallen officials. These beliefs ranged from mainstream religious beliefs to fortune telling or soothsaying.

In May officials in a rural part of Zhumadian, Henan Province, banned gatherings of a house church and accused it of being part of a cult and practicing “heresy,” according to ChinaAid.

According to human rights groups, on June 12, police officers followed Ruan Haonan, who hosted Jiangmen Fengle Church Christian gatherings in his home, and detained him and fellow church members at the local police station. Officials interrogated them and ordered them to confess they had participated in an “evil cult” – a charge reportedly often levied against Christians for their church activities. Later that day, police forcibly entered Ruan’s apartment and arrested his pregnant wife Luo Caiyan. Police did not show her family any documents authorizing the arrest. Despite not mentioning any “cult” activities, police forced church members to sign a document as a condition of their release, asserting they participated in a cult. On July 13, police released Jiangmen Fengle Family Church Pastors Li Wanhua and Ruan Haonan on bail. On June 15, police arrested the church’s other pastor, Li Wanhua, on the charge of “sabotaging implementation of the law by organizing and using cults.”

Government policy continued to allow religious groups to engage in charitable work. Regulations specifically prohibited faith-based organizations from proselytizing while conducting charitable activities. Authorities required faith-based charities, like all other charitable groups, to register with the government. Once registered as an official charity, authorities allowed them to raise funds publicly and to receive tax benefits. The government did not permit unregistered charitable groups to raise funds openly, hire employees, open bank accounts, or own property. According to several unregistered religious groups, the government required faith-based charities to obtain official cosponsorship of the registration application by the local official religious affairs bureau. Authorities often required these groups to affiliate with one of the five patriotic religious associations.

Authorities allowed certain overseas faith-based aid groups to deliver services in coordination with local authorities and domestic groups. Some unregistered religious groups reported local authorities placed limits on their ability to provide social services.

Foreign residents belonging to religious groups not officially recognized by the government reported authorities permitted them to worship. According to policy, however, foreigners could not proselytize, conduct religious activities at unregistered venues, or conduct religious activities with local citizens at religious venues. In many cases, authorities prohibited citizens from attending the services of religious organizations permitted to operate for foreign residents. In some cases, authorities reportedly expelled foreign residents who attempted to conduct religious activities with Chinese citizens without government approval. Some foreign residents whose appeals for registration the government denied still met without government approval. On several occasions, police raided those meetings, with increased pressure reported during sensitive holidays.

In February international media reported authorities arrested and detained two South Korean pastors in Liaoning Province for assisting North Korean defectors in China. According to media reports, authorities also stepped up a campaign to arrest and deport Christian missionaries. Previously, authorities often issued missionaries a warning and allowed them one month to leave the country. Security services in the northeastern provinces more often arrested and detained missionaries, seizing their electronic devices as they did so, according to international media sources.

The government continued its efforts to restrict the movement of the Dalai Lama. In June the Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested the Dalai Lama’s series of lectures and his commencement speech at the University of California San Diego. After the Dalai Lama’s commencement speech, the China Scholarship Council announced it would no longer fund programs for visiting Chinese scholars intending to study or do research at the University of California San Diego.

Because religion, culture, and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents of societal discrimination as being solely based on religious identity. Religious and ethnic minority groups such as Tibetan Buddhists and Uighur Muslims experienced institutionalized discrimination throughout the country because of both their religious beliefs and their status as ethnic minorities with distinct languages and cultures.

Anti-Muslim speech in social media remained widespread, although in September the government announced it would censor some anti-Islamic expression on the internet. According to the South China Morning Post, many social media articles criticized Hui Muslims in Shadian, Yunnan Province, and said the local government was too tolerant of them. Some individuals boycotted a food delivery service that offered halal meals, according to media reports. Individuals criticized what some perceived as too favorable treatment toward Muslim populations and associated all Muslims with terrorism. National Public Radio reported a Han Chinese resident of Urumqi’s suburbs as saying, without the new security measures, “each time I see a face that doesn’t look like mine, I might wonder if they’re terrorists from outside the country.” In Xinjiang, policies discriminating against Uighurs, as well as greater access to economic opportunities for Han Chinese, exacerbated tensions between Uighur Muslims and both the Han Chinese and the government.

Despite labor law provisions against discrimination in hiring based on religious belief, some employers openly discriminated against religious believers. Some Protestant Christians reported employers terminated their employment due to their religious activities. Muslims in Xinjiang faced discrimination in hiring, lost their positions, and were detained by authorities for praying in their workplaces. There were also reports from Falun Gong practitioners that employers dismissed them for practicing Falun Gong. In some instances, landlords discriminated against potential tenants based on their religious beliefs.

The Secretary of State, Ambassador, and other embassy and consulates general representatives repeatedly and publicly expressed concerns about abuses of religious freedom. On August 15, the Secretary said, “In China, the government tortures, detains, and imprisons thousands for practicing their religious beliefs.” He said dozens of Falun Gong members died in detention in 2016 and police policies that restrict Uighur Muslims’ and Tibetan Buddhists’ religious expression increased.

Embassy officials met regularly with a range of government officials managing religious affairs, both to advocate for greater religious freedom and tolerance and to obtain more information on government policy on the management of religious affairs, including regarding the treatment of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang.

Embassy officials, including the Ambassador, urged government officials at the central and local levels, including those at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Council, to implement stronger protections for religious freedom and to release prisoners of conscience. The Ambassador highlighted religious freedom in private diplomacy with senior officials. The Department of State, the embassy, and the consulates general regularly called upon the government to release prisoners of conscience, including individuals imprisoned for religious reasons.

The Ambassador, the Consuls General, and other embassy and consulate general officials met with religious groups as well as academics, NGOs, members of registered and unregistered religious groups, and family members of religious prisoners to reinforce U.S. support for religious freedom. Embassy and consulate general officials hosted events around religious holidays and conducted roundtable discussions with religious leaders to convey the importance of religious pluralism in society and learn about issues facing religious communities. The embassy supported a number of religious leaders and scholars to participate in exchange programs related to the role of religion and religious tolerance. The embassy arranged for the introduction of religious officials to members of U.S. religious communities and U.S. government agencies that engaged with those communities. The embassy and consulates general regularly hosted events for the public to promote understanding and tolerance, such as an academic discussion about the relationship between religion and the state, as well as events highlighting ethnoreligious minority communities.

Authorities continually harassed and intimidated religious leaders to dissuade them from speaking with U.S. officials. Authorities regularly prevented members of religious communities from attending events at the embassy and consulates general, and security services questioned individuals that did attend.

Since 1999, China has been designated as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. On December 22, the Secretary of State redesignated China as a CPC and identified the following sanction that accompanied the designation: the existing ongoing restriction on exports to China of crime control and detection instruments and equipment, under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246), pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act.

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The U.S. government estimates the total population at 7.2 million (July 2017 estimate). According to SAR government statistics, there are approximately two million Buddhists and Taoists; 480,000 Protestants; 379,000 Roman Catholics; 100,000 Hindus; 20,000 members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons); 12,000 Sikhs, and 5,000-6,000 Jews. Local Muslim groups estimate the SAR has approximately 300,000 Muslims. Small communities of Bahais and Zoroastrians also reside in the SAR. Confucianism is widespread, and in some cases, elements of Confucianism are practiced in conjunction with other belief systems. The Falun Gong estimates there are approximately 500 Falun Gong practitioners in Hong Kong.

There are approximately 50 Protestant denominations, including Anglican, Baptist, Christian and Missionary Alliance, the Church of Christ in China, Lutheran, Methodist, Pentecostal, and Seventh-day Adventists. The Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong recognizes the pope and maintains links to the Vatican.

Legal Framework

Under the Basic Law, the Hong Kong SAR has autonomy in the management of religious affairs. The Basic Law calls for ties between the region’s religious groups and their mainland counterparts based on “nonsubordination, noninterference, and mutual respect.” The Basic Law states residents have freedom of conscience; freedom of religious belief; and freedom to preach, conduct, and participate in religious activities in public. The Basic Law also states the government cannot interfere in the internal affairs of religious organizations or restrict religious activities that do not contravene other laws.

The Bill of Rights Ordinance incorporates the religious freedom protections of the ICCPR, which include the right to manifest religious belief individually or in community with others, in public or private, and through worship, observance, practice, and teaching. The Bill of Rights Ordinance states persons belonging to ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities have the right to enjoy their own culture, profess and practice their own religion, and use their own language. The ordinance also protects the right of parents or legal guardians to “ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.” These rights may be limited when an emergency is proclaimed and “manifestation” of religious beliefs may be limited by law when necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the rights of others. Such limitations may not discriminate solely on the basis of religion.

Religious groups are not legally required to register with the government; however, they must register to receive government benefits, such as tax-exempt status, rent subsidies, government or other professional development training, the use of government facilities, or a grant to provide social services. To qualify for such benefits, the group must prove to the satisfaction of the government that it is established solely for religious, charitable, social, or recreational reasons. The government determines whether a religious group’s application for tax-exempt status is accepted. Registrants must provide the name and purpose of the organization, identify its office holders, and confirm the address of the principal place of business and any other premises owned or occupied by the organization. If a religious group registers with the government, it enters the registry of all NGOs, but the government makes no adjudication on the validity of any registered groups. Religious groups may register as a society and/or tax-exempt organization as long as they have at least three members who hold valid SAR identity documents; the registration process normally takes approximately 12 working days. Falun Gong is not classified as a religious group under the law, as it is registered as a society, under which its Hong Kong-based branches are able to establish offices, collect dues from members, and have legal status.

The Basic Law allows private schools to provide religious education. The government offers subsidies to schools built and run by religious groups, should they seek such support. Government subsidized schools must adhere to government curriculum standards and may not bar students based on religion, but they may provide nonmandatory religious instruction as part of their curriculum. Teachers may not discriminate against students because of their religious beliefs. The public school curriculum mandates coursework on ethics and religious studies, with a focus on religious tolerance; the government curriculum also includes elective modules on different world religions.

Religious groups may apply to the government to lease land at concessional terms through Home Affairs Bureau sponsorship. Religious groups may apply to develop or use facilities in accordance with local legislation.

The only direct government role in managing religious affairs is the Chinese Temples Committee, led by the secretary for home affairs. The SAR chief executive appoints its members. The committee oversees the management and logistical operations of 24 of the region’s 600 temples and provides grants to other charitable organizations. The committee provides grants to the Home Affairs Bureau for disbursement, in the form of financial assistance to needy ethnic Chinese citizens. The colonial-era law does not require new temples to register to be eligible for Temples Committee assistance.

An approximately 1,200-member Election Committee elects Hong Kong’s chief executive. The Basic Law stipulates that the Election Committee’s members shall be “broadly representative.” Committee members come from four sectors, divided into 38 subsectors, representing various trades, professions, and social services groups. The religious subsector is comprised of the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong, the Chinese Muslim Cultural and Fraternal Association, the Hong Kong Christian Council, the Hong Kong Taoist Association, the Confucian Academy, and the Hong Kong Buddhist Association. These six bodies are each entitled to 10 of the 60 seats for the religious subsector on the Election Committee. The religious subsector is not required to hold elections under the Chief Executive Election Ordinance. Instead, each religious organization selects its electors in its own fashion. Each of the six designated religious groups is also a member of the Hong Kong Colloquium of Religious Leaders.

Government Practices

During the year, Falun Gong practitioners reported generally being able to operate openly and engage in behavior that remained prohibited elsewhere in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), such as distributing literature and conducting public exhibitions. The group had an ongoing lawsuit against the Hong Kong government in 2012 to contest a requirement to obtain government approval for the display of posters; the retrial was scheduled for March 2018. In April Falun Gong practitioners conducted public protests against the treatment of fellow practitioners in Mainland China. In June Falun Gong practitioners displayed banners and posters calling on visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping to stop the persecution of Falun Gong and to bring Jiang Zemin, former head of the Chinese Communist Party, to justice. The Hong Kong Falun Gong Association said that it suspected that the Communist Party of China funded private groups that harassed its members at public events by surrounding them and yelling at them. The association also reported continuing difficulties renting venues for meetings and cultural events from both government and private facilities. The association suspected the cause of this difficulty was the central government’s pressure on venue owners.

According to the Falun Gong-affiliated Epoch Times, immigration authorities barred 43 Falun Gong practitioners from Taiwan from entering at the Hong Kong International Airport in July. The immigration authorities ordered the practitioners to return to Taiwan without explanation. The practitioners had intended to join an annual parade in Hong Kong peacefully protesting the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners in Mainland China.

Some religious groups expressed concern that new PRC religious affairs regulations entering into force in February 2018 could have a negative impact on exchanges and interactions with counterparts in the Mainland.

A variety of government and media sources reported that faith leaders continued to be able to meet with detainees and prisoners of all nationalities. The Home Affairs Bureau functioned as a liaison between religious groups and the government.

Senior government leaders often participated in large-scale events held by religious organizations. The SAR government and legislative council representatives participated in Confucian and Buddhist commemorative activities, Taoist festivals, and other religious events throughout the year.

Religious groups, some of which received government funding, provided a wide range of social services open to those of all religious affiliations including welfare, elder care, hospitals, publishing services, media and employment services, rehabilitation centers, youth and community service functions, and other charitable activities.

Religious leaders reported hosting and participating in interfaith activities. For example, a local mosque hosted a visitor exchange with a local Jewish synagogue, and Jewish leaders hosted Holocaust awareness public events.

Clergy from Hong Kong accepted invitations from state-sanctioned patriotic religious associations on the Mainland to teach at religious institutions. There were also student exchanges between state-sanctioned religious groups on the Mainland and Hong Kong-based religious groups.

Consulate general officials, including the Consul General, stressed the importance of religious freedom and interfaith dialogue in meetings with Hong Kong government officials, including representatives of the Home Affairs Bureau.

Consulate general representatives also met with religious leaders, NGOs, and community representatives. The Consul General and other consulate officials met with Buddhist, Catholic, Taoist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Protestant, and Sikh religious leaders to emphasize the importance of religious freedom and tolerance and to receive reports about the status of religious freedom both in Hong Kong and in the Mainland.

Throughout the year, consulate general officials showed respect for religious traditions by marking traditional religious holidays and visiting local Taoist, Confucian, and Buddhist temples. The Consul General hosted an annual iftar at his residence, and consulate officers participated in other festival celebrations with the Buddhist and Muslim communities. Consulate general officials also participated in Holocaust commemorations. At all these events, consulate general officials stressed in public and private remarks the importance of religious freedom, tolerance, and diversity.

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The U.S. government estimates the total population at 602,000 (July 2017 estimate). The SAR Government Information Bureau reports nearly 80 percent of the population practices Buddhism. There are approximately 30,000 Roman Catholics, of whom more than half are foreign domestic workers and other expatriates, and more than 8,000 Protestants. Protestant denominations include the Anglican, Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist, Pentecostal, and Presbyterian Churches. Evangelical Christian and independent local nondenominational churches, some of which are affiliated with Mainland churches, are also present. Muslim groups estimate there are approximately 12,000 Muslims. Smaller religious groups include Bahais, who estimate their membership at above 2,000, and Falun Gong practitioners, who estimate their membership at 50 persons.

Legal Framework

The Macau Basic Law states residents have freedom of religious belief and the freedom to publicly preach as well as conduct and participate in religious activities. These rights may be limited in extreme situations for national security reasons. The Basic Law further stipulates that the government shall not interfere in the internal affairs of religious groups or in their relations with their counterparts outside Macau. It bars the government from restricting religious activities that do not contravene the laws of the Macau SAR.

Under the Basic Law, the government of the Macau SAR, rather than the central government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), is charged with safeguarding religious freedom in the SAR.

The law states the Macau SAR government does not recognize a state religion and stipulates all religious denominations are equal before the law. The law further provides for freedom of religion, including privacy of religious belief, freedom of religious assembly, freedom to hold religious processions, and freedom of religious education.

Religious groups are not required to register in order to conduct religious activities, but registration enables them to benefit from legal status. Religious groups register with the Identification Bureau, providing their names, identification card numbers, and contact information, as well as the group’s name and a copy of the group’s charter to register. To receive tax-exempt status or other advantages, religious groups register as charities with the Identification Bureau by submitting the same information and documents as are required to register.

The law guarantees religious organizations may run seminaries and schools, hospitals, and welfare institutions and provide other social services.

Schools run by religious organizations may provide religious education under the law. No religious education is required in public schools.

By law, religious groups may develop and maintain relations with religious groups abroad. The Catholic Church in Macau, in communion with the Holy See, recognizes the pope as its head. The Vatican appoints the bishop for the diocese.

Government Practices

Falun Gong members continued to hold rallies and set up informational sites at public venues without incident. For example, a Falun Gong-related civil society organization reported that in May, Falun Gong members participated in a public rally during a visit from Zhang Dejiang; one of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee members, for what they said was his role in persecuting Falun Gong members on the Mainland. Falun Gong practitioners, however, reported difficulty renting venues for large events, a situation they suspected was a result of Communist Party pressure.

Some religious groups reported the Central Government Liaison Office supported their activities and exchanges with coreligionists on the Mainland. Others said the government acknowledged and did not obstruct charity work conducted on the Mainland. Religious groups said they retained their ability to conduct activities on the Mainland by working through official channels and officially recognized churches.

The Catholic Diocese of Macau continued to run most educational institutions, only 10 of 77 schools were public, according to government statistics from the 2016-17 school year.

The government provided financial support, regardless of religious affiliation, for the establishment of schools, child-care centers, clinics, homes for the elderly, rehabilitation centers, and vocational training centers run by religious groups. The government also continued to refer victims of human trafficking to religious organizations for the provision of support services.

Many religious groups, including Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, and Bahais, provided social services to individuals of all faiths.

There were reports Mainland students were no longer able to attend local seminaries.

U.S. consulate general officials, including the Consul General, stressed the importance of religious diversity and discussed religious communities’ relations with their coreligionists on the Mainland in meetings with Macau SAR officials and civil society interlocutors, including the Catholic Bishop of Macau, a Catholic nongovernmental organization, Muslim organizations, and Protestant clergy.

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According to official data from China’s most recent census in November 2010, 2,716,400 Tibetans make up 90 percent of the TAR’s total population. Han Chinese make up approximately 8 percent. Other ethnicities make up the remainder. Some experts, however, believe the number of Han Chinese and other non-Tibetans living there is significantly underreported. Outside of the TAR, official census data show Tibetans constitute 24.4 percent of the total population in Qinghai Province, 2.1 percent in Sichuan Province, 1.8 percent in Gansu Province, and 0.3 percent in Yunnan Province, although the percentage of Tibetans is much higher within jurisdictions of these provinces designated as autonomous for Tibetans.

Most Tibetans practice Tibetan Buddhism, although a sizeable minority practices Bon, a pre-Buddhist indigenous religion, and small minorities practice Islam, Catholicism, or Protestantism. Some scholars estimate there are as many as 400,000 Bon followers across the Tibetan Plateau who follow the Dalai Lama, and some of whom consider themselves Tibetan Buddhist. Scholars also estimate there are up to 5,000 Tibetan Muslims and 700 Tibetan Catholics in the TAR. Other residents of traditionally Tibetan areas include Han Chinese, many of whom practice Buddhism (including Tibetan Buddhism), Taoism, Confucianism, traditional folk religions, or profess atheism; Hui Muslims; and non-Tibetan Catholics or Protestants.

Legal Framework

The constitution of the People’s Republic of China states citizens enjoy “freedom of religious belief,” but limits protections for religious practice to “normal religious activities” without defining “normal.” The constitution bans the state, public organizations, and individuals from compelling citizens to believe in, or not believe in, any religion. It says religion may not be used to disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens, or interfere with the educational system. The constitution states religious bodies and affairs are not to be “subject to any foreign control.” The constitution also stipulates the right of citizens to believe in or not believe in any religion. Only religious groups belonging to one of five state-sanctioned “patriotic religious associations” (Buddhist, Taoist, Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant), however, are permitted to register with the government and legally hold worship services or other religious ceremonies and activities.

Regulations issued by the central government’s State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA) codify its control over the selection of Tibetan religious leaders, including reincarnate lamas. These regulations stipulate that, depending on the perceived geographic area of influence of the lama, relevant administrative entities may deny permission for a lama to be recognized as reincarnated and the entities must approve reincarnations. The State Council has the right to deny the recognition of reincarnations of high lamas of “especially great influence.” The regulations also state that no foreign organization or individual may interfere in the selection of reincarnate lamas, and all reincarnate lamas must be reborn within China. The government maintains a registry of officially recognized reincarnate lamas.

Within the TAR, regulations issued by SARA assert state control over all aspects of Tibetan Buddhism, including religious venues, groups, and personnel. Through local regulations issued under the framework of the national-level Management Regulation of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries, governments of the TAR and other Tibetan areas control the registration of monasteries, nunneries, and other Tibetan Buddhist religious centers. The regulations also give the government formal control over the building and management of religious structures and require monasteries to obtain official permission to hold large-scale religious events or gatherings.

In September the central government’s State Council issued revisions to the Regulations on Religious Affairs, slated to take effect on February 1, 2018. The revisions require religious groups to register with the government, increase penalties for “providing facilities” for unauthorized religious activities, and restrict contact with overseas religious institutions, including a new requirement for religious groups to seek approval to travel abroad and a prohibition on “accepting domination by external forces.” The revisions increase regulations for religious schools and place new restrictions on religious groups conducting business or investments. Additionally, the revisions require that religious activity “must not harm national security.” While the existing regulations stipulate the obligations of religious groups to abide by the law and safeguard national unity, the new revisions specify steps to respond to “religious extremism.” The new regulations also place limits on the online activities of religious groups, requiring activities be approved by the provincial Religious Affairs Bureau.

To establish places of worship, religious organizations must receive approval from the religious affairs department of the relevant local government both when the facility is proposed and again before any services are held at that location. Religious organizations must submit dozens of documents in order to register during one or both approval processes, including detailed management plans of their religious activities, exhaustive financial records, and personal information on all staff members. Religious communities not going through the formal registration process may not legally have a set facility or worship meeting space. Therefore, each time they want to reserve a space for worship, such as by renting a hotel or an apartment, they need to seek a separate approval from government authorities for each service. Worshipping in a space without pre-approval, either through the formal registration process or by seeking an approval for each service, is considered an illegal religious activity, which may be criminally or administratively punished.

The TAR government has the right to deny any individual’s application to take up religious orders. The regulations also require monks and nuns to obtain permission from officials in both the originating and receiving counties before traveling to other prefectures or “county-level cities” within the TAR to “practice their religion,” engage in religious activities, study, or teach. Tibetan autonomous prefectures outside of the TAR have similar regulations.

At the central government level, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee’s Central Tibet Work Coordination Group, the CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD), and SARA are responsible for developing religious management policies, which are carried out with support from the five “patriotic religious associations” (Buddhist, Protestant, Catholic, Islamic, and Taoist). At local levels, party leaders and branches of the UFWD, SARA, and the state-controlled Buddhist Association of China (BAC) are required to coordinate implementation of religious policies in monasteries, and many have stationed party cadres and government officials, including public security agents, in monasteries in Tibetan areas.

CCP members, including Tibetans and retired officials, are required to be atheists and are forbidden from engaging in religious practices. CCP members who belong to religious organizations are subject to expulsion, although these rules are not universally enforced.

Government Practices

Summary Paragraph: Across the Tibetan Plateau there were reports of forced disappearance, physical abuse, prolonged detention, and arbitrary arrest of persons due to their religious practice, as well as forced expulsions from monasteries, restrictions on religious gatherings, and destruction of monastery- related dwellings, according to media reporting and human rights organizations. There were six cases of self-immolation and one reported suicide by other means in protest of government policies. Human rights advocates stated authorities continued to use intimidation, including collective punishment of family or community members for acts of dissent, to compel acquiescence with government regulations and to attempt to reduce the likelihood of antigovernment demonstrations, thereby projecting an image of stability and the appearance of popular support. Security forces maintained a permanent presence at some monasteries, sometimes dressing in monastic clothing. As part of an ongoing multi-year project, according to local sources, during the year authorities continued to evict at least 11,500 monks and nuns from Buddhist institutes at Larung Gar and Yachen Gar, destroying as many as 6,000 homes where they resided and subjecting many of them to “patriotic re-education.” In many Tibetan areas police detained monks and laypersons who called for freedom, human rights, and religious liberty, or who expressed support for the Dalai Lama or solidarity with individuals who had self-immolated. Several monks were detained without formal criminal charges. For example, in February authorities detained Lobsang Tsultrim, a monk from Kirti Monastery, for shouting slogans supportive of Tibetan freedom and the Dalai Lama. Restrictions on religious activities were particularly severe around politically and religiously sensitive anniversaries and events. Tibet scholars stated the Chinese government’s ban on minors entering monasteries and nunneries and restrictions on travel of monks and nuns threatened the traditional transmission and practice of Tibetan Buddhism. According to human rights organizations, authorities scrutinized and sought to control monastic operations and restricted travel for religious purposes, including to neighboring countries such as India and Nepal. According to reports, Bon members were subject to many of the same restrictions as Tibetan Buddhists.

As in previous years there were cases of self-immolation as a means of protest against government policies. During the year, six Tibetans reportedly self-immolated, as compared to three individuals in 2016, seven in 2015, 11 in 2014, and 26 in 2013. Some experts attributed reports of the continued relatively low number of self-immolations to tighter controls by authorities. Local authorities prosecuted and imprisoned an unknown number of Tibetans whom authorities said had aided or instigated self-immolations, including family members and friends of self-immolators, according to press reports. Authorities also reportedly took measures, including threatening anyone who shared this information with foreigners with up to 15-year prison sentences, to limit news of self-immolations and other protests from spreading within Tibetan communities and beyond. There were also numerous reports of officials shutting down or restricting local access to the internet and cellular phone services for this purpose.

The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) and other groups reported 16-year-old Chagdor Kyab set fire to himself in Bora (Bola) Township of Xiahe (Sangchu) County, Gansu Province, in May while calling for Tibetan freedom and the return of the Dalai Lama. According to a number of local sources, following the self-immolation, prefecture police detained Chagdor’s parents and other family members for interrogation and threatened them with “severe consequences” should they fail to cooperate with security officials. As of December, local sources reported authorities had released Chagdor’s parents, but instructed them not to discuss the incident.

Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that on March 18, a 24-year-old Tibetan farmer named Pema Gyaltsen, from Nyagrong, set himself ablaze in Kardze in protest of government policies. His fate remained unclear.

RFA also reported that on April 15, another Nyagrong resident, Wangchuk Tseten, a 39-year-old father of four, set himself ablaze in Kardze. As he burned, RFA’s sources said he called for a long life for the Dalai Lama. The source added there seemed to be little chance that Tseten survived.

Jamyang Losel, a 22-year-old monk at Gyerteng monastery, self-immolated on May 19, close to a hospital in Kangsta (Gangcha) county in Qinghai’s Tsojang (Haibei) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. A source cited in an RFA article said, “He did not survive his protest,” but that police who took away Losel’s body refused to give his remains to family members who requested it.

A 63-year-old Tibetan monk named Tenga, from a monastery in Kardze (Ganzi) county, reportedly died of his injuries after he set himself on fire November 26. While burning, Tenga called out for freedom for Tibet. Afterwards, there reportedly was a heavy security lockdown in the area, and Tenga’s family members in Dando village were placed under watch by Chinese police.

RFA reported that a former Kirti monastery monk named Konpe set himself ablaze on December 23. Konpe self-immolated on the main road in Ngaba, a site of numerous other self-immolations and protests calling for Tibetan freedom. Detailed information on Konpe’s identity and condition were delayed, reportedly due to a clampdown imposed by Chinese authorities in the area. Konpe was approximately 30 years old and joined the monastery as a young child but later disrobed. Konpe’s father was reportedly detained by authorities who talked to him about his son’s medical costs.

In June FreeTibet.org reported that a Tibetan man died after slitting his own throat near the Jokhang Temple in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa. The man shouted “We don’t have freedom and rights” before he took his own life. Authorities referred to the event as a suicide and did not mention any form of protest.

In February Nyima Lhamo, the niece of prominent reincarnate lama political prisoner Tenzin Delek Rinpoche, testified at the 9th Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy that Chinese authorities denied her uncle a fair trial and medical parole even as his health deteriorated. Nyima Lhamo recounted what she said were mysterious circumstances leading to the Rinpoche’s death in prison in 2015 and the government’s denial of permission for his family to perform post-death Buddhist rites and for his religious order to seek his reincarnation. According to Nyima Lhamo, her family remained in Tibet until 2016, and Chinese authorities continued to harass and threaten them with prosecution for Nyima Lhamo’s continued advocacy for her late uncle. She reported other local Tibetans seeking justice for the Rinpoche were arrested and “sustained injuries from gunshots” from authorities.

The government continued to insist that Gyaltsen Norbu, whom it selected in 1995, was the Panchen Lama’s true reincarnation, and not Gedhun Choekyi Nyima. According to numerous Tibetan Buddhist monks and scholars, UFWD and Religious Affairs Bureau officials frequently pressured monks and laypersons, including government officials, to attend religious study sessions presided over by Gyaltsen Norbu, including ordering every Tibetan family in Chamdo (Changdu) city to send family members to a September teaching session in order to ensure hundreds of thousands of people paid him respect. Authorities have installed Gyaltsen Norbu in Tashi Lhunpo Monastery in Shigatse (Xigaze), a prefecture-level city in the TAR, the traditional seat of the Panchen Lama. Chinese authorities detained Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the 11th Panchen Lama, who is recognized by the Dalai Lama and most Tibetans, and his parents in 1995 when he was six years old and have not responded to requests by international observers to visit him. Members of the Tibetan community inside the country and in exile consider him to be forcibly disappeared by the Chinese government, and have been unsuccessful in their attempts to visit him for more than two decades. His and his parents’ whereabouts remain unknown. The Panchen Lama is the Gelugpa school of Tibetan Buddhism’s second-most prominent teacher after the Dalai Lama.

The government continued to exercise its authority over the approval of reincarnations of Tibetan Buddhist lamas and the supervision of their religious education. In addition, authorities closely supervised the education of many key young reincarnate lamas. In a deviation from traditional custom, government officials, rather than religious leaders, continued to manage the selection of the reincarnate lamas’ religious and lay tutors in the TAR and some other Tibetan areas. Religious leaders reported as part of the interference by authorities in reincarnate lamas and monks’ religious education, authorities were incentivizing these young men to voluntarily disrobe by emphasizing the attributes of secular life as compared to the more disciplined and austere religious life. These and other interferences continued to cause concern to religious leaders about the ability of religious traditions to survive for successive generations. According to media reports, as of December, the government added seven additional “living buddhas” below the age of 16 to last year’s list of more than 1,300 approved “living buddhas.” The new additions continued to undergo training on patriotism and the Chinese Communist Party’s socialist political system. The BAC announced its database of 1,311 “living buddhas” that it deemed “authentic” was nearly complete. Neither the Dalai Lama nor Tenzin Delek Rinpoche was on the list.

The government placed restrictions on the size of Buddhist monasteries and other institutions. According to local sources, at Larung Gar, Kardze (Ganzi), Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, site of the world’s largest Tibetan Buddhist institute, during the year the government evicted approximately 9,000 monks and nuns from a population that was at least 20,000 in 2016, and demolished an estimated 4,000 residences. According to Chinese press reports, the government stated the demolition was to prevent fires and promote crowd control. Rights groups said that if safety were the primary motivator for this government action, then other provisions, such as building additional housing that met fire safety codes, could be a way to resolve the issue instead of large scale demolitions and expulsions. Local sources stated the destruction was to clear the way for tourist infrastructure and to prevent nuns, monks, and laypersons from outside the area, particularly ethnic Han, from studying at the institute. Reportedly in hopes of saving the institute, Larung Gar’s monastic leadership continued to advise residents not to protest the demolitions.

According to local sources, during the year authorities destroyed at least 2,000 residences and evicted approximately 2,500 monks and nuns from an estimated population of 10,000 religious practitioners in Yachen Gar, also in Kardze (Ganzi) Prefecture. Local sources reported monks and nuns from Yachen Gar who returned to their hometowns in the TAR were told they were prohibited from joining any other monastery or nunnery there or participating in any public religious practices.

In a 2016 letter to Chinese authorities that was made public in March before the UN Human Rights Council, six UN special rapporteurs, including the special rapporteur for religious freedom and belief wrote: “While we do not wish to prejudge the accuracy of these allegations, grave concern is expressed over the serious repression of the Buddhist Tibetans’ cultural and religious practices and learning in Larung Gar and Yachen Gar.”

Chinese authorities targeted centrally or conveniently located monasteries or temples to make it more difficult for Tibetan Buddhists to worship. For example, local sources reported Chinese authorities recently demolished Bagar (Baiyanshan) Monastery in Linzhi, TAR – the main worship place for Buddhists in Linzhi city and a popular tourist destination – citing transportation safety concerns.

There were reports of the arbitrary arrest and physical abuse of religious prisoners and prolonged detention of religious figures without criminal charges. In February authorities detained Lobsang Tsultrim, a monk from Kirti Monastery, for shouting slogans supportive of Tibetan freedom and the Dalai Lama and holding his photo in public. Local sources reported police severely beat Tsultrim. His condition and whereabouts remained unknown following his detention in Aba (Ngaba) Prefecture.

In March authorities reportedly arrested Lobsang Dhargyal, a young monk from Kirti Monastery, for staging a solo protest against the Chinese government in Aba (Ngaba) Prefecture. Police detained Dhargyal shortly after his protest, and his whereabouts remained unknown.

In May authorities reportedly detained Gonpo (only name given), a monk from the Oephung Monastery in Nyagrong (Xinlong) County, Kardze (Ganzi) Prefecture, Sichuan Province, after local authorities suspected he had disseminated information regarding local protests to outside contacts. The protests reportedly involved Wangchuk Tseten and Pema Gyaltsen, who self-immolated earlier in the year. Gonpo’s whereabouts remained unknown.

In May Chinese police in Machu County of Gansu Province detained Khedup, a 50-year-old Tibetan doctor and monk from the Mura Monastery, for the second time. According to the Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy, authorities accused Khedup of posting the Dalai Lama’s teachings on social media, writing and reposting blog posts that expressed support for the monks and nuns displaced from Larung Gar, and advocating for religious freedom and cultural rights for Tibetans. Khedup’s condition and whereabouts remained unknown.

According to the Tibet Post, on July 29 Chinese authorities released Lobsang Kelsang from Deyang Prison. Police originally detained Kelsang, a Kirti Monastery monk, in 2011 following his self-immolation in protest against Chinese repressive rule. Following his release, the Tibet Post’s source stated Kelsang was under strict surveillance at his home in northeastern Tibet. There was no additional information regarding his condition. On March 28, authorities released another Kirti monk named Lobsang Kunchok from Deyang Prison in Sichuan Province after he had served more than six years in prison for staging a self-immolation protest. His leg was amputated in prison. After his release Kunchok remained under strict surveillance in his Meruma home.

The condition and whereabouts of Lobsang Tsering, a monk from Kirti Monastery whom authorities reportedly detained in 2016 in Aba (Ngaba) County following a solo protest against Beijing’s rule in Tibet, remained unknown. During the protest he wore a ceremonial scarf and carried a photo of the Dalai Lama, calling for his long life. Prison officials reportedly beat him in custody.

In addition, the condition and whereabouts of Ven Pagah and Geshe Orgyen, the abbot and a monk from the Chongri Monastery in Kardze (Ganzi) Prefecture, Sichuan Province, remained unknown. Authorities detained them in 2016 after the monastery helped organize a mass prayer for the recovery of the Dalai Lama, who was then undergoing medical treatment in the United States.

Limited access to information about prisoners made it difficult to ascertain the exact number of Tibetan prisoners of religious conscience, determine the charges brought against them, or assess the extent and severity of abuses they suffered. The U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China’s Political Prisoner Database included records of 1,414 political or religious prisoners known or thought to be in custody as of November 5. A later accounting specific to Tibet included 512 Tibetan political prisoners who had been detained by December 29, and who were presumed to remain detained or imprisoned. Of the 512 political prisoners, 506 were detained on or after March 2008, the start of a wave of political protests that spread across the Tibetan areas of China. Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, and teachers made up 212 cases of the 506 persons serving known sentences.

According to reports, authorities continued “patriotic re-education” campaigns at many monasteries and nunneries across the Tibetan Plateau, forcing monks and nuns to participate in “legal education,” denounce the Dalai Lama, express allegiance to the government-recognized Panchen Lama, and study Mandarin as well as materials praising the leadership of the CCP and the socialist system. Human Rights Watch reported a video circulated on social media that showed what appeared to be 25 young Tibetan nuns with shaven heads, dressed in military jackets and standing at attention, in rows inside a police or government office. Authorities had reportedly expelled the group from the Larung Gar Tibetan Buddhist Institute. The women chanted in unison, “The Tibetans and the Chinese are daughters of the same mother, the name of the mother is China.” Another video reportedly showed Tibetan nuns singing and dancing to a Communist Party song. Since Buddhist nuns vow to refrain from singing, dancing, and viewing entertainment, the report suggests these performances were coerced as part of political re-education.

According to many observers, primary sources of grievances among Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns included the requirement that all monks under the age of 18, who are legally unable to join monasteries and Buddhist religious institutions, undergo “patriotic education”; strict controls over religious practice; and intrusive surveillance of many monasteries and nunneries, including the permanent installation of CCP and public security officials and overt camera surveillance systems at religious sites and monasteries. Senior monks at some monasteries continued to report informal agreements with local officials whereby resident monks would not stage protests or commit self-immolation as long as the government adopted a hands-off approach to the management of their monasteries.

The CCP continued to forbid its members from participating in religious activities of any kind, despite reports that many Tibetan government officials and CCP members held religious beliefs.

Government officials regularly denigrated the Dalai Lama publicly and accused the “Dalai Clique” and other outside forces of instigating Tibetan protests, stating such acts were attempts to “split” China. In February new TAR Party Secretary Wu Yingjie called for monks and nuns in the region to “resolutely fight against the ‘Dalai Clique’ and defend the unity of the motherland.” In September Wu instructed various party and government organs to reduce “negative religious influence” and ensure religious figures in the region were aware they needed to draw a clear line between themselves and the “14th Dalai Lama clique.” Authorities in the TAR continued to prohibit registration of children’s names that included parts of the Dalai Lama’s name or names included on a list blessed by the Dalai Lama.

Although authorities permitted some traditional religious ceremonies and practices, they continued to maintain tight control over the activities of religious leaders and religious gatherings of laypersons, confining many religious activities to officially designated places of worship, restricting or canceling religious festivals, and preventing monks from traveling to villages for politically sensitive events and religious ceremonies. The government suppressed religious activities it viewed as vehicles for political dissent. For example, local authorities again ordered many monasteries and laypersons not to celebrate or organize any public gatherings for celebrations of the Dalai Lama’s 82nd birthday in July, the anniversary of the March 10, 1959, Tibetan uprising, or the March 14, 2008, outbreak of unrest across the Tibetan Plateau. TAR authorities banned monks and nuns from leaving their monasteries and nunneries during such celebrations. According to local sources, Sichuan provincial authorities patrolled major monasteries in Tibetan areas and warned that those holding special events or celebrations would face severe consequences.

During Lunar New Year celebrations in January and February, ICT reported the authorities, among other measures, imposed “intimidating” military force at a prayer ceremony at Kumbum Monastery; hosted a series of meetings in Lhasa telling monks and nuns to comply with party policy; and inspected “armed forces” and cadres at Tibetan Buddhist monasteries. They deployed troops to monitor prayer festivals elsewhere in the TAR and other Tibetan areas. In early November the government banned the annual Dechen Shedrub prayer festival from occurring in Larung Gar, citing overcrowding and unfinished reconstruction. The ban marked the second consecutive year the government did not allow the 21-year-old festival to take place.

Multiple sources reported open veneration of the Dalai Lama, including the display of his photograph, remained prohibited in almost all areas. Local officials, many of whom considered the images to be symbols of opposition to the CCP, removed pictures of the Dalai Lama from monasteries and private homes during visits by senior officials. The government also banned pictures of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, whom the Dalai Lama and the overwhelming majority of Tibetan Buddhists recognize as the 11th Panchen Lama. Punishments in certain counties inside the TAR for displaying images of the Dalai Lama included closing of venues, expulsion from monasteries, and criminal prosecution.

The TAR government maintained tight control over the use of Tibetan Buddhist religious relics and declared them, religious buildings, and religious institutions to be state property.

Sources continued to report security personnel targeted individuals in religious attire, particularly those from Nagchu (Naqu) and Chamdo (Changdu) Prefectures in the TAR and Tibetan areas outside the TAR, for arbitrary questioning on the streets of Lhasa and other cities and towns. Many Tibetan monks and nuns reportedly chose to wear nonreligious garb to avoid such harassment when traveling outside of their monasteries and around the country.

In many areas, monks and nuns under the age of 18 were forced to leave their monasteries. In July in Draggo (Luhuo) County in Kardze (Ganzi) Prefecture, sources reported the government had removed minors from local monasteries following a January 2015 provincial mandate to remove all monks and nuns under the age of 18 from monasteries and Buddhist schools to receive “patriotic education.”

According to a December 18 report from the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, authorities told parents of an eight-year-old girl in Manchu County, Gansu Province, she would not be allowed to attend school because her father, who was reportedly tortured and denied medical assistance in prison, had participated in protests for Tibetan freedom.

The traditional monastic system reportedly continued to decline as many top Buddhist teachers remained in exile or died in India or elsewhere, and some of those who returned from India were not allowed to teach or lead their institutions. The heads of most major schools of Tibetan Buddhism – including the Dalai Lama, Karmapa, Sakya Trizin, and Taklung Tsetrul Rinpoche (who died in 2015), as well as Bon leader Gyalwa Menri Trizin (who died in September) – all resided in exile.

Multiple sources also reported that during the past three years the Chinese government increasingly restricted Tibetan Buddhist monks from visiting Chinese cities to teach. For example, prominent Larung Gar Buddhist Institute religious leaders Khenpo Tsultrim Lode and Khenpo So Dargey, who both previously taught in Chinese cities, were no longer allowed to do so. Authorities also restricted Tibetans’ travel inside China, particularly for Tibetans residing outside the TAR who wished to visit the TAR, during sensitive periods. During the year, many religious figures reported it was very difficult for them to enter the TAR to teach or study. The government also restricted the number of monks who could accompany those who received permission to travel to the TAR. Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns stated these restrictions have negatively impacted the quality of monastic education. Many monks expelled from their TAR monasteries after the 2008 Lhasa riots and from Kirti Monastery after a series of self-immolations from 2009 to 2015 had not returned, some because of government prohibitions.

Many Tibetans, including monks, nuns, and laypersons, continued to encounter difficulties traveling to India for religious purposes. In many cases, Public Security Bureau officials refused to approve their passport applications. In other cases, prospective travelers were able to obtain passports only after paying bribes to local officials, or after promising not to travel to India or to criticize Chinese policies in Tibetan areas while overseas. Numerous Tibetans in Gansu, Qinghai, and Sichuan Provinces waited for up to five years before receiving a passport, often without any explanation for the delay, according to local sources. There were also instances of authorities confiscating and canceling previously issued passports as a way of preventing Tibetans from participating in religious events involving the Dalai Lama in India. Restrictions also remained in place for monks and nuns living in exile, particularly those in India, that made it difficult or impossible for them to travel into Tibetan areas.

Authorities reportedly often hindered Tibetan Buddhist monasteries from delivering religious, educational, and medical services.

According to government policy, newly constructed government-subsidized housing units in many Tibetan areas were located near township and county government seats or along major roads. These new housing units had no nearby monasteries where resettled villagers could worship, and the construction of new temples was prohibited. Traditionally, Tibetan villages were clustered around monasteries, which provided religious and other services to members of the community. Many Tibetans continued to view such measures as CCP and government efforts to dilute religious belief and weaken the ties between monasteries and communities.

Authorities continued to justify interference with Tibetan Buddhist monasteries by associating the monasteries with “separatism” and pro-independence activities, as reported in state media. General administrative affairs in TAR monasteries, which traditionally were managed by monks, were instead overseen by Monastery Management Committees and Monastic Government Working Groups, both of which were composed primarily of government officials and CCP members, together with a few government-approved monks. Since 2011 China has established such groups in all monasteries in the TAR and in many major monasteries in other Tibetan areas, such as Sichuan Province’s Kirti Monastic Management Committee.

In August Deputy Chief of the Public Security Bureau of Kardze (Ganzi), Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Sichuan Province, Zha Ba was appointed to serve concurrently as party secretary general and president of Larung Gar Buddhist Academy, the largest Tibetan Buddhist monastery in the world. In addition to Zha Ba, six other party cadres were appointed to various positions in the monastery, including deputy party secretaries, vice presidents, and deputy managing directors.

In accordance with official guidelines for monastery management, the leadership of and membership in the various committees and working groups remained restricted to “politically reliable, patriotic, and devoted monks, nuns, and party and government officials.” The TAR CCP committee and government required all monasteries to display prominently the PRC flag and the portraits of five CCP chairmen from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping.

Provincial, prefectural, county, and local governments continued to station CCP cadres in, and established police stations or security offices adjacent to or on the premises of, many monasteries. For example, the TAR had more than 8,000 government employees working in 1,787 monasteries, according to local sources and Chinese government reporting in September. Security forces continued to block access to and from important monasteries during politically sensitive events and political religious anniversaries.

Authorities hindered Tibetan Buddhist monasteries from carrying out environmental protection activities, an important part of traditional Tibetan Buddhist practices, out of fear such activities could create a sense of pride among Tibetans, particularly children, and an awareness of their distinctness from Chinese culture, according to local sources.

In some cases, authorities enforced special restrictions on Tibetans staying at hotels inside and outside the TAR. Police regulations forbade some hotels and guesthouses in the TAR from accepting Tibetan guests, particularly monks and nuns, and required other hotels to notify police departments when Tibetan guests checked in, according to an RFA report confirmed by several hotels.

Because expressions of identity and religion are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religion. Tibetans, particularly those who wore traditional and religious attire, regularly reported incidents in which they were denied hotel rooms, avoided by taxis, and discriminated against in employment opportunities or business transactions.

In July some Tibetan scholars and monks reportedly tried to organize an informal event to discuss current trends of Tibetan language education in a hotel in Chengdu, but the hotel refused to rent the conference room and told the organizers that “religious and ethnic minority gatherings” required advance approval from relevant government departments. As a result, the event was held in a tea shop.

Many Han Buddhists were interested in Tibetan Buddhism and donated money to Tibetan monasteries and nunneries. Tibetan Buddhist monks frequently visited Chinese cities to provide religious instruction to Han Buddhists. In addition, a growing number of Han Buddhists visited Tibetan monasteries, although officials sometimes imposed restrictions that made it difficult for Han Buddhists to conduct long-term study at many monasteries in Tibetan areas.

U.S. government officials, including the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, the U.S. Consul General and other officers in Chengdu, and officers at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing continued sustained and concerted efforts to encourage greater religious freedom in Tibetan areas.

The Office of the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues continued to coordinate U.S. government programs to preserve Tibet’s distinct religious, linguistic, and cultural identity as well as efforts to promote dialogue between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama. U.S. officials repeatedly raised Tibetan religious freedom issues with Chinese government counterparts at multiple levels, such as the Chinese government’s refusal to engage in dialogue with the Dalai Lama and the ongoing demolition campaign at the Larung Gar Tibetan Buddhist Institute and Yachen Gar Tibetan Buddhist Institute. In addition to raising systemic issues, such as passport issuance to Tibetans, U.S. officials expressed concern and sought further information about individual cases and incidents of religious persecution and discrimination.

In April officials from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the U.S. Consulate General in Chengdu met with Chairman of the TAR People’s Congress Lobsang Gyaltsen and TAR Governor Qi Zhala. U.S. officials emphasized the importance of upholding cultural and religious rights in Tibet, and expressed concern about the TAR government’s failure to protect the rights of local Tibetans to worship freely and assemble in public places.

U.S. officials regularly expressed concerns to the Chinese government at the highest levels regarding severe restrictions imposed on Tibetans’ ability to exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms, including religious freedom and cultural rights.

In July the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor met with the Gyalwang Karmapa, who along with the Dalai Lama leads two of the four major religious schools in Tibetan Buddhism, to highlight continued U.S. support for religious freedom. Also in July, U.S. officials met with Arjia Thubten Lobsang Rinpoche, one of the highest-ranking reincarnate lamas to flee into exile, following his opposition to becoming the tutor of the Chinese government-appointed Panchen Lama Gyaltsen Norbu. In November the Consul General in Chengdu met with various TAR government officials, including TAR Executive Vice Chairman and TAR Standing Committee Member Norbu Dhundrup (Luobu Dunzhu), TAR National People’s Congress Standing Committee Vice Chairman Ju Jianhua, and Nyingchi (Linzhi) Party Secretary Ma Shengchang. The Consul General called for the TAR government to respect the Tibetan people’s right to practice their religion freely.

U.S. officials maintained contact with a wide range of religious leaders and practitioners as well as NGOs in Tibetan areas to monitor the status of religious freedom, although travel and other restrictions made it difficult to visit and communicate with these individuals. Although diplomatic access to the TAR remained tightly controlled, U.S. officials did receive access during the year, with authorities granting one U.S. consular visit in July, and two Consul General visits in April and November.

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The U.S. government estimates the total population at 47.6 million (July 2017 estimate). The Catholic Church estimates 75 percent of the population is Catholic but notes the government has never taken a precise census. According to a 2014 study by the Pew Research Center (the most recent), 79 percent of the population is Catholic, 13 percent Protestant, and 6 percent atheist or agnostic. Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include nondenominational worshipers or members of other religious groups, including Jews, Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and Mennonites. The Colombian Confederation of Jewish Communities (CJCC) estimates there are approximately 4,200 Jews. There is also a small population of adherents to animism and various syncretistic beliefs.

Some religious groups are concentrated in certain geographical regions. Most of those who blend Catholicism with elements of African animism are African-Colombians and reside on the Pacific coast. Most Jews reside in major cities, most Muslims on the Caribbean coast, and most adherents of indigenous animistic religions in remote rural areas. A small Taoist community is located in a mountainous region of Santander Department.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion and the right to profess one’s religious beliefs. It prohibits discrimination based on religion. There is no official state church or religion, but the law says the state “is not atheist or agnostic, nor indifferent to Colombians’ religious sentiment.” The constitution states all religions and churches are equal before the law. A 1998 Constitutional Court ruling upheld the right of traditional authorities to enforce the observation of and participation in traditional religious beliefs and practices on indigenous reserves. Recent rulings referred to the 1998 decision to reaffirm the right of indigenous governors to prohibit the practice of certain religions on indigenous reserves. A concordat between the Holy See and the government, made into law, recognizes marriages performed by the Catholic Church, allows the Church to provide chaplaincy services, and prohibits members of the Catholic clergy from compulsory public service, including military service. A court ruling determined these provisions were constitutional so long as they apply to all religious groups.

The law prohibits any official government reference to a religious affiliation for the country.

The MOI is responsible for formally recognizing churches, religious denominations, religious federations and confederations, and associations of religious ministers, as well as keeping a public registry of religious entities. Entities formally recognized by the MOI can then confer this recognition, called “extended public recognition,” to affiliated groups sharing the same beliefs. The application process requires submission of a formal request and basic organizational information, including copies of an act of constitution and an estimation of the number of members, to obtain formal recognition. The government considers a religious group’s total membership, its degree of acceptance within society, and other factors, such as the organization’s statutes and its required behavioral norms, when deciding whether to grant the religious group formal recognition. The MOI is authorized to reject requests that are incomplete or do not fully comply with established requirements. The MOI provides a free, web-based registration process for religious and faith-based organizations seeking recognition. Formally recognized entities may collect funds and receive donations, establish religious education institutions, and perform religious services not including marriages. Unregistered entities may still perform religious activities without penalty but may not collect funds or receive donations.

The state recognizes as legally binding religious marriages performed by the Catholic Church, the Jewish community, and 13 additional non-Catholic Christian denominations that are signatories to the 1997 public law agreement. This agreement enables non-Catholic religious groups to engage in a number of activities previously restricted to the Catholic Church, such as marriages, funeral services, and spiritual assistance in prisons, hospitals, military facilities, and educational institutions. Under this agreement, members of religious groups that are neither signatories to the agreement nor affiliates must marry in a civil ceremony for the state to recognize the marriage. Non-Catholic religious groups seeking to provide chaplaincy services and conduct state-recognized marriages must also solicit formal state recognition from the MOI.

The constitution recognizes the right of parents to choose the education their child receives, including religious instruction. The law states religious education shall be offered in accordance with laws protecting religious freedom, and it identifies the Ministry of Education as responsible for establishing guidelines for teaching religion within the public school curriculum. Religious groups, including those that have not acceded to the public law agreement, may establish their own schools, provided they comply with ministry requirements. A Constitutional Court ruling obligates schools to implement alternative accommodations for students based on their religion, which could include students at religious institutions opting out of prayers or religious lessons. The government does not provide subsidies for private schools run by religious organizations.

The law imposes a penalty of one to three years in prison and a fine of 7.4 million to 11 million Colombian pesos ($2,500 to $3,700) for violations of religious freedoms, including discrimination based on religion. The penal code also prohibits discrimination based on religious beliefs, including physical or moral harm.

A Constitutional Court ruling states citizens, including members of indigenous communities, may be exempt from compulsory military service if they can demonstrate a serious and permanent commitment to religious principles that prohibit the use of force. Conscientious objectors who are exempt from military service are required to complete alternative, government-selected public service. A law passed in August reinforces protections for conscientious objectors and expands options for compulsory military service exemptions by removing the prior distinction between times of war and peace. It also requires that regional interagency commissions (Interdisciplinary Commissions on Conscientious Objection, or ICCOs), under the Ministry of Defense, evaluate requests for conscientious objector status; commission members include representatives from the armed forces, the Inspector General’s Office, and medical, psychological, and legal experts. According to the new law, the National Commission of Conscientious Objection reviews any cases not resolved at the regional level.

Foreign missionaries must possess a special visa, valid for up to two years. The MFA issues visas to foreign missionaries and religious group administrators who are members of religious organizations officially recognized and registered with the MOI. When they apply for a visa, foreign missionaries must have a certificate from either the MOI or church authorities confirming registration of their religious group with the MFA. Alternatively, they may produce a certificate issued by a registered religious group confirming the applicant’s membership and mission in the country. The visa application also requires a letter issued by a legal representative of the religious group stating the organization accepts full financial responsibility for the expenses of the applicant and family, including funds for return to their country of origin or last country of residence. Applicants must explain the purpose of the proposed sojourn and provide proof of economic means. A Constitutional Court ruling stipulates that no group may force religious conversion on members of indigenous communities.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Justapaz said there were two cases of arbitrary arrest related to military service targeting members of evangelical Christian churches. The army detained a high school student and member of the Foursquare Church on January 26 for what the army said was the student’s failure to complete compulsory military service in Tolima Department’s municipality of Honda. The student, who said he objected to military service because of his religious beliefs, was in detention for eight days and then released. On May 4, the army detained a displaced victim and member of the United Pentecostal Church of Colombia in Bogota and informed him he would be required to complete compulsory military service. The Inspector General’s Office interceded on the man’s behalf, securing his release after six hours in detention.

The ECC objected to the Ministry of Education’s mention of sexual orientation and gender identity in an antidiscrimination campaign in public schools, as well as the government’s decision to omit the Te Deum liturgical service from the July 20 independence celebration. The ECC perceived these actions as “ignoring the religious dimension of the individual” and infringing upon one’s right to express in public one’s religious beliefs.

The MOI reported it received 1,243 applications for formal recognition of religious entities, approved 581, and archived 95 due to failure to complete the required documentation during the year. The MOI continued to review the remaining applications, some of which awaited additional information from applicants. The MOI said the majority of applications were from evangelical Christian churches. The MOI gave applicants who submitted incomplete applications or incorrect supporting documents 30 days to bring their applications into compliance. If the MOI deemed an application incomplete, it could deny the application; however, the applying organization was able to resubmit an application at any time. There was no waiting period to reapply. The MOI reported it rejected applications only if they were determined to be incomplete.

The Traditional Episcopal Church and International Ministerial Church of Jesus Christ filed petitions to accede to the 1997 public law agreement enabling religious groups to provide chaplaincy services and perform marriages. The petitions remained pending at year’s end; however, the government proposed interim agreements to allow the two groups to perform marriages and provide chaplaincy services.

According to religious groups, individuals continued to have difficulty obtaining exemptions from military service on religious grounds. Justapaz reported an increase in requests for conscientious objector status, likely due to increased outreach and the August law’s inclusion of conscientious objector status as a valid exemption from compulsory military service. The National Army Reserve Recruitment and Control Command stated it had received 140 requests for recognition of conscientious objector status. Of those, it approved 86 by the end of the year. Justapaz stated that the ICCOs interagency commissions established by the August law to evaluate requests for conscientious objector status were staffed disproportionally by members of the armed forces, which it said ran counter to a 1998 UN resolution requiring that independent and impartial bodies evaluate objection requests to protect the rights to freedom of worship and of consciousness.

The Association of Conscientious Objectors of Colombia (ACOOC) said indigenous peoples were often unaware of their rights to object on religious grounds because of language differences.

An article added to the 2014-18 National Development Plan required the MOI to develop new guidelines on freedom of religion. Specifically, the new article mandated the MOI work with religious groups to develop policies to guarantee freedom of religion and equal treatment among religious groups. The MOI issued a resolution in June guaranteeing religious groups’ participation in the formulation and implementation of this policy through the creation of the National Table of the Religious Sector and corresponding entities at the regional level. The final version, which entered into force on December 12, focused on the promotion of religious rights and the social and institutional inclusion of the country’s religious plurality. It also emphasized the importance of reducing social, cultural, and institutional factors that fuel intolerance, exclusion, and persecution; guaranteed conditions of equality among the various religions and denominations; and proposed implementing strategies to create and strengthen peace initiatives and social projects with religious entities.

The Colombian National Police, through the Protection and Special Services Directorate, continued to provide security for religious sites under threat. Some religious groups filed reports of threats with the police; however, they said they had not received updates related to follow-up investigations or charges.

In accordance with a declaration signed by President Juan Manuel Santos in 2016, the country again observed July 4 as the National Day of Religious Freedom. In connection with the observance, the MOI and regional governments held various forums and presentational events to educate the public on the significance of the holiday and build bridges with religious organizations.

On July 27, the ECC reported the killing of 31-year-old Father Diomer Eliver Chavarria Perez, “in the exercise of his mission” in the Santa Rosa de Osos diocese in Antioquia Department. According to the ECC, unknown assailants killed Father Chavarria during the night in his home. In a separate incident, unknown attackers robbed and killed Father Abelardo Antonio Munoz Sanchez, 41, in Rionegro on October 3.

As in past years, there were media and NGO reports that guerrillas, illegal armed groups, and organized crime groups threatened leaders and members of religious groups and targeted them for extortion. A recent study by the Bogota mayor’s office and National University of Colombia, which investigated cases of intolerance, discrimination, and religious persecution against religious leaders in the capital, showed that 13 percent of respondents had received threats of violence, kidnapping, or extortion due to their religious beliefs.

Protestant leaders continued to state that isolation and fear of retribution in rural communities led to underreporting of clergy assault, harassment, and killings. Some religious leaders said they chose not to report cases formally to law enforcement or seek government security assistance because of fear of retribution by illegal armed groups. Justapaz continued to report threats from criminal groups and forced displacements of clergy and parishioners of the Anglican Church, Mennonite Church, and House on the Rock Church.

Global Ministries reported threats, forced displacement, and arbitrary detentions by illegal armed groups against members of evangelical Christian churches in Santander and Antioquia. According to Global Ministries, suspected National Liberation Army guerrillas forced a pastor of an independent Christian church along with his family out of their community in El Bagre, Antioquia, following threats of violence on February 28. The motive behind this displacement was unknown.

The NGO Witness for Peace continued to report guerrillas and illegal armed groups threatened, displaced, or attacked religious leaders for promoting human rights, assisting internally displaced persons, assisting with land restitution claims, and discouraging coca cultivation. Religious groups, including Justapaz and Global Ministries, reported armed groups continued to restrict religious freedom by limiting freedom of movement and preventing individuals from attending religious services.

The Bogota mayor’s office and National University of Colombia’s study showed that, among those surveyed, 13 percent had received threats of violence, kidnapping, or extortion due to their religious beliefs.

The CJCC continued to report instances of anti-Israel rhetoric connected to events in the Middle East, accompanied by anti-Semitic graffiti near synagogues, as well as demonstrations in front of the Israeli Embassy that were sometimes accompanied by anti-Semitic comments on social media. In particular, the CJCC expressed concern over the presence of BDS Colombia, which it said aggressively promotes the boycott of Israeli products, culture, and travel, and does not actively counter the conflation of anti-Israel policies with anti-Semitic rhetoric.

A number of faith-based and interfaith NGOs continued to promote religious freedom and tolerance through their programs and community engagement. On October 30, the Episcopal Conference of Latin America, Latin American Jewish Congress, Latin American Council of Churches, and the Islamic Organization for Latin America and the Caribbean signed the Cordoba Declaration, which promotes religious coexistence and pluralism in the region. ACOOC, Justapaz, Pastoral Social, and the CJCC advocated for new cases of conscientious objectors, regardless of their religious affiliation.

U.S. embassy officials discussed conscientious objection to military service and the effect of guerrilla and illegal armed groups on religious freedom with the MFA, the Attorney General’s Office, and the MOI.

Embassy representatives continued to meet with representatives from the Catholic Church, Justapaz, Witness for Peace, the CJCC, the Muslim Charity Association, faith-based NGO Pastoral Social, and others to discuss religious freedoms in the post-accord period. Given the presence of illegal armed actors in many parts of the country, religious leaders and faith-based NGOs reported in meetings with embassy officials that they continued to focus their efforts on ensuring the safety of their communities and assisting community members – many of them displaced persons or victims of the conflict – with victim registration and restitution. Embassy representatives discussed religious freedom issues during an annual embassy-hosted working group session attended by government representatives, civil society, and religious leaders that emphasized the importance of continued interfaith dialogue and coordination with government partners. Among the results of the working group were the establishment of a direct line of communication between NGOs and religious organizations and the Attorney General’s Office to report religiously motivated crimes, and discussions between the MOI and Attorney General’s Office to convene a technical working group to monitor religious freedom issues.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 808,000 (July 2017 estimate), of which 98 percent is Sunni Muslim. Roman Catholics, Shia, Sufi, and Ahmadi Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Protestants together make up less than 2 percent of the population. Non-Muslims are mainly foreign residents and are concentrated in the country’s capital, Moroni, and the capital of Anjouan, Mutsamudu. Shia and Ahmadi Muslims mostly live in Anjouan.

Legal Framework

The constitution states Islam is the state religion and citizens shall draw the state’s governing principles and rules from Islamic tenets. It proclaims equality of rights and obligations for all individuals regardless of religion or belief. A law establishes the Sunni Shafi’i doctrine as the “official religious reference” and provides sanctions of five months to one year imprisonment and/or a fine of 100,000 to 500,000 Comorian francs ($240 to $1,200) for campaigns, propaganda, or religious practices or customs in public places that could cause social unrest or undermine national cohesion.

Proselytizing for any religion except Sunni Islam is illegal, and the law provides for deportation of foreigners who do so. The penal code states “whoever discloses, spreads, and teaches Muslims a religion other than Islam will be punished with imprisonment of three months to one year and a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 Comorian francs” ($120 to $1,200).

There is no official registration for religious groups. The law allows Sunni religious groups to establish places of worship, train clergy, and assemble for peaceful religious activities. It does not allow non-Sunni religious groups to assemble for peaceful religious activities in public places.

The law prohibits proselytizing or performance of non-Sunni religious rituals in public places, based on “affronting society’s cohesion and endangering national unity.” Without specifying religion, the penal code provides penalties for the profaning of any spaces designated for worship, interfering with the delivery of religious leaders in the performance of their duties, or in cases where the practice of sorcery, magic, or charlatanism interferes with public order.

By law, the president nominates the grand mufti, the senior Muslim cleric who is part of the government and manages issues concerning religion and religious administration. The grand mufti heads an independent government institution called the Supreme National Institution in Charge of Religious Practices in the Union of the Comoros. The grand mufti counsels the government on matters concerning the practice of Islam and Islamic law. The grand mufti chairs and periodically consults with the Council of Ulema, a group of religious elders cited in the constitution, to assess whether citizens are respecting the principles of Islam.

The law provides that before the month of Ramadan, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and the Council of Ulema publish a ministerial decree providing instructions to the population for that month.

The government uses the Quran in public primary schools for Arabic reading instruction. There are more than 200 government-supported, fee-based schools with Quranic instruction. The tenets of Islam are sometimes taught in conjunction with Arabic in public and private schools at the middle school and high school levels.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government issued decrees restricting the practice of Islam and jailed people for violating these decrees or other Islamic guidelines. The government prevented non-Shafi’i Sunni Muslim groups from attending or establishing their own mosques, and seized, damaged or destroyed mosques of minority Muslim groups. The president and other national leaders condoned the harassment of non-Shafi’i Sunnis, particularly Shia, in public statements.

On September 1, gendarmes arrested 28 persons, including several imams and their followers, on Grande Comore for violating the grand mufti’s guidance declaring Eid al-Adha to be on September 2 rather than the day prior as it was celebrated elsewhere. According to observers, the decree had been issued for political reasons, including to discredit a presidential contender who, in a previous term, had decreed the holiday should be observed on the same day as in Mecca. A court found 26 of the 28 individuals guilty and sentenced them to varying terms of imprisonment and also imposed fines. The imams received 12-month prison terms, two without parole and a 250,000 Comorian francs ($610) fine. Those who followed their imams’ guidance received a six-month sentence, one without parole, and a 100,000 Comorian francs fine ($240). A week later, President Azali pardoned them all.

In late January gendarmes on Anjouan prevented so-called “Djawulas” (a cleric from the group rejected the label and said they call themselves Sunni Muslims), a Muslim group that holds a more literal view of Islam than the majority, from worshipping at their local mosque. A cleric from the group said they were forbidden from establishing their own mosques and that three other “Djawulas” had been arrested days earlier for violating a presidential ban against their religious observance and were serving a one-year prison sentence. Multiple sources reported the arrests, but the specific charges could not be independently verified.

The government banned alcohol consumption and daytime swimming during Ramadan, which the police enforced. Authorities arrested Muslims in Fomboni, on Moheli, and in Mutsamudu, on Anjouan, for eating, and eating and smoking, respectively. According to press reporting, they received sentences of between one and five years in prison.

On October 30, the Council of Ulema on Anjouan sent a letter to the Prefect of Nyumakele prohibiting a local group of Muslims calling themselves the “Ahl As-Sounna wal Jamaa” from conducting Friday prayers in their own mosque, apart from the community’s existing, state-approved “Friday mosques.”

Christians reported they were pressured to fast during Ramadan, including by police officials, and forbidden from openly wearing religious symbols such as crucifixes. Local Christians said they practiced their faith secretly to avoid harassment by government officials or members of their communities.

On January 30, the Prefect of Mutsamudu, as well as a representative of the presidency in Anjouan and a representative of the Council of Ulema, signed a decree stating that the increasing number of religious groups was creating conflict and discord and noting that religion was a “prerogative” of the president. The decree stipulated that the opening of mosques without prior approval by the Muftiate and the Council of Ulema would be punishable by law, and it suspended all Friday prayers in conflict with majority religious practices.

During a July 6 national day speech, President Azali equated the “recent rise of Shiism” with “fringe extremist sects.” While acknowledging the constitution’s guarantee of freedom of worship, he said “any practice other than [Shafi’i Sunni Islam] which undermines national cohesion will not be tolerated and will be severely sanctioned.”

In a press interview published on September 25, Moustoidrane Abdou, one of the country’s three vice presidents, responded to a question about increasing pressure on religious minorities by equating Shia Islam with outside influence, and said, “We will completely eradicate Shiism from the country.”

On January 8, the minister of the interior ordered the seizure and partial demolition of the country’s first Ahmadi mosque, in Mutsamudu, on Anjouan, because it was deemed to undermine public order. He prevented its inauguration in October 2016, closed the mosque in November 2016, and in January ordered its expropriation, the destruction of its minarets, and its conversion into a police station.

On August 23, government forces destroyed a Shia mosque in Koni-Djodjo on Anjouan with the help of the local population.

The grand mufti continued to regularly address the country on the radio, applying Islamic principles to social issues such as delinquency, alcohol abuse, marriage, divorce, and education.

As in previous years, there were reports that communities unofficially shunned individuals suspected of converting from Islam to Christianity. Societal abuse and discrimination against non-Muslim citizens persisted, particularly against Christians or those who were converts from Islam. Non-Muslim foreigners reported little to no discrimination.

In August a Shia Muslim in Koni-Djodjo told a journalist that his family received death threats from other local inhabitants, and that gendarmes had made several threatening phone calls.

According to the Comorian Press Agency, on June 21 an event was held at the National Documentation and Scientific Research Center under the theme “Sunnism and Shiism: Convergences to Divergences.” The report said the event was designed as a debate with Sunni and Shia participation, but only Sunni Muslims were speakers.

Observers stated that all citizens faced pressure from fellow citizens to practice elements of Islam, and this pressure was extended to noncitizens during Ramadan. Most societal pressure and discrimination reportedly occurred behind closed doors at the village level. The extent of de facto discrimination typically depended on the level of involvement of local Islamic teachers. Most non-Muslim citizens reportedly did not openly practice their faith for fear of societal rejection. Persons who raised their children with non-Muslim religious teachings said they faced societal discrimination. Societal pressure and intimidation continued to restrict the use of the country’s three churches to noncitizens.

There is no permanent U.S. diplomatic presence in the country. Representatives from the U.S. embassy in Antananarivo, Madagascar visited the country and engaged with government officials on issues of religious freedom. The U.S. Ambassador discussed religious freedom and the seizure of an Ahmadi mosque with President Azali. An article published the day after the meeting quoted the president’s office saying, “the only form of Islamic practice President Azali will allow is the Sunni of ‘Ahli Sunna waldjamaa,’” referring to the practices of the majority. Other embassy officials met with the minister of justice, the minister of interior, the commander of the gendarmerie, the Governors of Anjouan and Moheli, and the mayors of the major cities to discuss the situation of religious minorities and to express their concern and alarm regarding the increasing harassment of religious minorities.

In August the embassy hosted an imam for a week to discuss countering extremism through economic empowerment. The visiting imam met with religious, political, and civil society leaders to address religious tolerance through economic development in the country.

Embassy officers met with a wide variety of Muslim and Christian religious and civil society leaders on issues of religious freedom.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 4.9 million (July 2017 estimate). According to a March survey by the Center for Investigations and Political Studies of the University of Costa Rica, an estimated 69.7 percent of the population is Catholic (compared with 72.8 percent in a 2013 survey), 15.2 percent Protestant, including evangelical Protestants (compared with 14.8 percent in the 2013 survey), 3.0 percent other religious groups (compared with 3.6 percent in 2013), and 12.0 percent without religious affiliation (compared with 8.4 percent in 2013). The majority of Protestants are Pentecostal, with smaller numbers of Lutherans and Baptists. There are an estimated 60,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses, predominantly on the Caribbean coast. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) estimates its membership at 35,000. The Jewish Zionist Center estimates there are between 3,000 and 3,500 Jews in the country. Approximately 1,000 Quakers live near the cloud forest reserve of Monteverde, Puntarenas. Smaller groups include followers of Islam, Taoism, the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Scientology, Tenrikyo, and the Bahai Faith. Some members of indigenous groups practice animism.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes Roman Catholicism as the state religion and requires the state to contribute to its maintenance. The constitution prohibits the state from impeding the free exercise of other religions that does not undermine “universal morality or proper behavior.” Unlike other religious groups, the Catholic Church is not registered as an association and receives special legal recognition. Its assets and holdings are governed consistent with Catholic canon law.

The constitution recognizes the right to practice the religion of one’s choice. By law, a person claiming a violation of religious freedom may file suit with the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, and may also file a motion before the Constitutional Chamber to have a statute or regulation declared unconstitutional. Additionally, a person claiming a violation of religious freedom may appeal to the Administrative Court to sue the government for alleged discriminatory acts. Legal protections cover discrimination by private persons and entities.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Religion is responsible for managing the government’s relationship with the Catholic Church and other religious groups. According to the law, a group with a minimum of 10 persons may incorporate as an association with judicial status by registering with the public registry of the Ministry of Justice. The government does not require religious groups to register; however, religious groups must register if they choose to engage in any type of fundraising. Registration also entitles them to obtain legal representation and standing to own property.

The constitution forbids Catholic clergy from serving in the capacity of president, vice president, cabinet member, or Supreme Court justice. This prohibition does not apply to non-Catholic clergy.

An executive order provides the legal framework for religious organizations to establish places of worship. Religious organizations must submit applications to the local municipality to establish a place of worship and to comply with safety and noise regulations established by law.

The law establishes that public schools must provide ecumenical religious instruction by a person who is able to promote moral values and tolerance and be respectful of human rights. If a parent on behalf of a child chooses to opt out of religious courses, the parent must make a written request. The Ministry of Public Education provides assistance for religious education to private schools, both Catholic and non-Catholic, including directly hiring teachers and providing teacher salaries and other funds.

The law allows the government to provide land free of charge to the Catholic Church only. Government-to-church land transfers are typically granted through periodic legislation.

Only Catholic priests and public notaries may perform state-recognized marriages. Wedding ceremonies performed by other religious groups must be legalized through a civil union.

Immigration law requires foreign religious workers to belong to a religious group accredited for migration control purposes by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Religion and stipulates religious workers may receive permission to stay at least 90 days but not more than two years. The permission is renewable. In order to obtain accreditation, a religious group must present documentation about its organization, including its complete name, the number of followers, bank information, the number of houses of worship, and the names of and information on the group’s board of directors. Immigration regulations require religious workers to apply for temporary residency before arrival.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Constitutional Chamber received four claims against the free exercise of religious freedom at educational institutions. The court dismissed two claims due to lack of evidence proving discrimination. In the other two claims, the chamber ruled in favor of the claimants. In one case, the chamber ordered that a student’s exam planned for a Saturday be rescheduled for his observation of the Sabbath. In the other case, the chamber ruled that a Jewish student had the constitutional right to wear the kippah skullcap during classes.

The government included support for the Catholic Church in its annual budget. It earmarked approximately 8.4 million colones ($14,900) for various projects requested by the Catholic Church during the year, including funds needed to make improvements at churches and cemeteries in different parts of the country. This was the only funding for religious groups included in the national budget for 2017. A semi-autonomous government institution sold lottery tickets and used the proceeds to support social programs, including some run by non-Catholic groups.

Some non-Catholic leaders continued to state the constitution did not sufficiently address the specific concerns of non-Catholic religious groups. Members of Protestant groups registered as secular associations continued to state they preferred a separate registration that would specifically cover church construction and operation, permits to organize events, and pastoral access to hospitals and jails for members of non-Catholic religious groups. In the case of the Catholic Church, the government continued to address such concerns through the special legal recognition afforded the Church under canon law.

According to the director of the Evangelical Alliance, a movement to remove Catholicism as the state religion and define the country as an explicitly secular state lost momentum.

The director of the Evangelical Alliance and the president of the Catholic Conference of Bishops criticized proposed legislation that would revise the law permitting abortion only when the mother’s life or health is at risk. Similarly, the Evangelical Alliance director and the president of the Catholic Conference of Bishops criticized the government for supporting draft legislation allowing same-sex civil unions.

The Jewish community reported instances of anti-Semitic comments on social media, in particular posts that questioned Israel’s right to exist.

Arguments over same-sex marriage and abortion on social media networks were occasionally accompanied by insults and remarks disparaging the beliefs of Catholics and other Christians. For example, an article reporting on the Catholic Church’s opposition to a change in the law governing access to abortion received several insulting comments with disparaging language toward Catholic leaders. Similarly, an article sharing the views of a leader of a Christian political party garnered comments with slurs and derogatory language.

On December 3, thousands of citizens participated in the “March for Life and Family,” sponsored by an association made up of members of the Catholic Church and other Christian groups. Participants carried signs and banners expressing support for prolife measures and traditional gender and family roles. Seven of the country’s presidential candidates also attended the event.

Embassy officials met with Christian legislators and discussed issues of free expression of religious beliefs as well as same-sex marriage and abortion issues of concern to religious groups. Embassy representatives met throughout the year with a wide range of religious leaders from the Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant and other Christian communities to discuss their views on religious freedom in the country, including the free expression of religious beliefs. At the embassy’s July 4th event, its largest representational event of the year, the Ambassador delivered remarks emphasizing the importance of valuing diversity, including religious diversity. The embassy used social media to send congratulatory messages to religious groups on special religious occasions. A senior U.S. embassy official spoke at the concert of an embassy-sponsored Klezmer band from the U.S., emphasizing the importance of religious diversity and tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 24.1 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the most recent census (in 2014), 42 percent is Muslim, 34 percent Christian, and 4 percent adherents of indigenous religious beliefs. Approximately 20 percent did not respond to the census. Many Christians and Muslims also practice some aspects of indigenous religious beliefs.

Christian groups include Roman Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, Lutherans, Methodists, Presbyterians, Harrists, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Southern Baptists, Copts, adherents of the Celestial Church of Christ, and members of the Assemblies of God. Muslim groups include Sunnis, Shia, Sufis, and Ahmadis. Other religious groups include Buddhists, Bahais, Rastafarians, followers of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, and Bossonists, who follow traditions of the Akan ethnic group.

Traditionally, the northern part of the country is associated with Islam and the south with Christianity, although adherents of both religious groups live throughout the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates a secular state that respects all beliefs and treats all individuals equally under the law, regardless of religion. It prohibits religious discrimination in public and private employment and provides for freedom of conscience and religious belief and worship consistent with the law, the rights of others, national security, and public order. It prohibits “propaganda” that encourages religious hatred. It recognizes the right of political asylum in the country for individuals persecuted for religious reasons.

The Department of Faith-Based Organizations (Direction Générale des Cultes), within the Ministry of Interior, is charged with promoting dialogue among religious groups and between the government and religious groups, providing administrative support to groups trying to become established, monitoring religious activities, and managing state-sponsored religious pilgrimages and registration of new religious groups.

The law requires all religious groups to register with the government. Groups must submit an application to the Department of Faith-Based Organizations. The application must include the group’s bylaws, names of the founding members and board members, date of founding, and general assembly minutes. The department investigates the organization to ensure the religious group has no members or purpose deemed politically subversive and that no members are deprived of their civil and political rights. There are no penalties prescribed for groups that do not register, but those that register benefit from government support. For example, the government provides free access to state-run television and radio for religious programming to registered religious groups that request it. Registered religious groups are not charged import duties on devotional items such as religious books and religious items such as rosaries.

Religious education is not included in the public school curriculum but is often included in private schools affiliated with a particular faith.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On June 6, women and children from the Guinean faction of one of the largest mosques in Man staged a sit-in to protest its closing in 2016. Local authorities closed the mosque following violent incidents to resolve a question of leadership between the Guinean and Ivorian factions. The women ended their sit-in on June 25, on the condition that the local authorities would look into reopening the mosque. The mosque was still closed at the end of the year.

The government continued to supervise and organize Hajj pilgrimages for Muslims and fund pilgrimages to Israel and France for Christians, as well as fund local pilgrimages for members of independent African Christian churches. The government organized and transported 4,200 pilgrims to the Hajj and funded pilgrimages for 3,500 Christians of all denominations.

The government included prominent Muslim and Catholic religious leaders in talks with disgruntled soldiers who staged a mutiny in January over the back payment of promised bonuses. Religious leaders also met with the soldiers before the second mutiny in May, and shared their assessment with government officials that the soldiers were likely to stage a second mutiny.

The national government declared the one-year anniversary of the March 2016 terrorist attack in Grand Bassam a “Day of Remembrance.” On this occasion, the mayor organized a public ceremony to unveil a headstone in memory of the victims. A Catholic priest and an imam said prayers for the victims.

Ivoirians regularly celebrated each other’s religious holidays by attending household or neighborhood gatherings, regardless of their own faith.

While religious leaders said they shunned working too closely with political parties, an imam used his influence to condemn what he termed widespread corruption and impunity on June 21 during a sermon on the Night of Destiny, the holiest night during Ramadan, at which several high-level government officials were present.

U.S. embassy representatives frequently discussed the importance of religious tolerance with figures in the government, the political opposition, and the national media. In March an embassy official attended the anniversary ceremony of the 2016 terrorist attack in Grand Bassam and emphasized the need for religious tolerance. In November an embassy official met with the director general of religious affairs. In the meeting, officials discussed how the directorate manages interreligious dialogue. This includes regular outreach with leaders of faith communities, with the aim of preventing radicalization and preserving the peaceful relations between religious groups. The Charge d’Affaires and other embassy officials took multiple trips to Man, in the west, where they met with government, civil society, and religious leaders to discuss the 2016 closure of a prominent mosque, whose members had resorted to violence to resolve a question of leadership. The embassy urged government officials to work to reduce tensions. Embassy officials also met with representatives of both sides of the conflict to allow them to air their grievances and continued efforts to resolve the conflict.

In June the Charge d’Affaires led an embassy delegation on a visit to the Abobo Rail mosque in one of the most impoverished neighborhoods of Abidjan to participate in an iftar meal celebrating Ramadan. He made a donation of food and other items and spoke on national television and radio on the importance of tolerance in a diverse society. In September an embassy official attended Eid al-Adha ceremonies in Grand Bassam. During this visit he spoke on national television and gave an interview to Fraternite Matin, the state-owned newspaper, on the importance of religious tolerance. The embassy conducted a social cohesion program for youth using soccer as a vehicle to teach youth themes of tolerance, respect for diversity, and conflict resolution. The program specifically included mention of the need for tolerance in a religiously diverse country.

Foundation Djigui, a human rights organization founded by a prominent imam, participated in an embassy-hosted panel discussion on the need to reform cultural and traditional practices that discriminate against women, particularly female genital mutilation, which is common in Muslim communities.

Under an agreement between Voice of America (VOA) and Al-Bayane Radio, VOA’s Dialogue des Religions (Dialogue of Religions) in French continued to reach millions of listeners across the country with its weekly broadcast on the Islamic radio station. Dialogue des Religions featured a host and guests – often religious scholars or journalists – who discussed religious issues in the news and answered listeners’ questions on various facets of religion. The embassy also continued its Hello, America! Broadcast – a monthly radio program in partnership with the Al-Bayane Islamic radio station which had the largest audience in the country. The program featured Americans from the embassy who represented different ethnic and religious backgrounds and spoke about the value of American diversity, as well as religious tolerance and diversity.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 4.3 million (July 2017 estimate.) According to the 2011 census, 86.3 percent of residents are Catholic, 4.4 percent Serbian Orthodox, and 1.5 percent Muslim. Nearly 4 percent self-identify as nonreligious or atheist. Other religious groups include Jews, Protestants, and other Christians. According to the Coordination of Jewish Communities in Croatia, there are between 2,000 and 2,500 Jews.

Religious affiliation correlates closely with ethnicity. Ethnic Serbs are predominantly members of the SOC and live primarily in cities and areas bordering Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most members of other minority religious groups reside in urban areas.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for equality of rights regardless of religion, and freedom of conscience and religious expression. It prohibits incitement of religious hatred. According to the constitution, religious communities shall be equal under the law and separate from the state; they are free to publicly conduct religious services and open and manage schools and charitable organizations under the protection and assistance of the state.

The Catholic Church receives state financial support and other benefits established in four concordats between the government and the Holy See. These agreements allow state financing for salaries and pensions of some religious officials associated with religious education through government-managed pension and health funds. These agreements also stipulate state funding for religious education in public schools. The law stipulates the same rights and benefits as those specified for the Catholic Church in the concordats with other registered religious communities that have concluded agreements with the state.

The law defines the legal position of religious communities and determines eligibility for government funding and tax benefits; registered religious communities are exempt from taxes on the purchase of real estate, the profit/capital gains tax, and taxes on donations. According to the law, a religious community which was previously active as a legal entity before enactment of the current law need only submit its name, the location of its headquarters, information about the office of the person authorized to represent it, and the seal and stamp it uses to register. To register as a religious community, a religious group without prior legal status must have at least 500 members and have been registered as an association for at least five years. To register as an organization, a group submits a list of its members and documentation outlining the group’s activities and bylaws and describing its mission to the Ministry of Administration. Nonregistered religious groups may operate freely but without tax or other benefits. A contractual agreement with the state, which grants a registered religious community eligibility for further funding and benefits, defines the community’s role and activities and provides for collaboration with the government in areas of joint interest, such as education, health, and culture.

The state recognizes marriages conducted by registered religious communities that have concluded agreements with the state, eliminating the need for civil registration. Marriages conducted by registered communities that have not concluded agreements with the state, or by nonregistered religious groups, require civil registration. Registered religious communities that have not concluded agreements with the state and nonregistered religious groups may not conduct religious education in schools or access state funds in support of religious activities, including charitable work, counseling, building costs, and clergy salaries; however, they may engage in worship, proselytize, own property, and import religious literature. Only registered religious communities, with or without agreements with the state, may provide spiritual counsel in prisons, hospitals, and the military.

There are 54 registered religious communities, including the Catholic Church, SOC, Bulgarian Orthodox Church, Christian Adventist Church, Church of Christ, Church of God, Croatian Old Catholic Church, Evangelical Church, Macedonian Orthodox Church, Pentecostal Church, Reformed Christian Church, Union of Baptist Churches, Seventh-day Adventist Reform Movement, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Union of Pentecostal Churches of Christ, Coordination of Jewish Communities in Croatia (an umbrella group of nine distinct Jewish communities), Jewish Community of Virovitica, Bet Israel (a Jewish group), and the Islamic Community of Croatia. Besides the Catholic Church, 19 religious communities have agreements with the state.

Public schools must offer religious education, although students may opt out without providing specific grounds. The Catholic catechism is the predominant religious text used. Other religious communities that have agreements with the state may also offer religious education classes in schools if there are seven or more students of that faith. Eligible religious communities provide the instructors and the state pays their salaries. Private religious schools are eligible for state assistance.

The law does not allow citizens whose property was confiscated during the Holocaust era to seek compensation or restitution, as it excludes the period of 1941-45 from claims. The law also does not allow noncitizens to file new property claims, since a legal deadline for such claims expired in 2003 and has not been renewed.

The ombudsman is a commissioner of the parliament responsible for the promotion and protection of human rights and freedoms, including religious freedom. The ombudsman examines citizens’ complaints pertaining to the work of state bodies, local and regional self-government, and legal persons vested with public authority. The ombudsman can issue recommendations to government agencies regarding human rights and religious freedom practices, but does not have authority itself to enforce compliance with recommendations.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The ombudsman reported continued obstacles encountered by Jehovah’s Witnesses regarding their right to health care in accordance with their religious beliefs. The ombudsman stated that in 2016, the latest year for which figures were available, there were 22 cases in which 14 state healthcare institutions denied surgery to Jehovah’s Witnesses who refused blood transfusions because of their religious beliefs. The Jehovah’s Witness community reported having to use its own finances to send patients to different hospitals for procedures, including hospitals outside of the country. The ombudsman’s 2016 report made recommendations for the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labor to improve hospital procedures and policies in order to provide adequate health care to patients in accordance with their religious beliefs.

Representatives of the SOC reported the government did not resolve any of its outstanding property restitution cases during the year, including claims for land in Osijek County and properties in Vukovar, Vinkovci, and Epharchy Osijecko-Poljska.

On August 17, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs issued a statement noting the government was engaged in dialogue with representatives of minorities and was committed to promoting tolerance, solidarity, and cooperation among minority and religious groups.

According to the Office of the Commission for Relations with Religious Communities, the Catholic Church received 299.5 million kuna ($48.1 million) in government funding during the year for salaries, pensions, and other purposes, compared to 285.7 million kuna ($45.9 million) in 2016. The government offered funding to other religious communities that had concluded agreements with the state, a portion of which was based on their size, in addition to funds provided to support religious education in public schools (all offered on an opt-in basis), as well as the operation of private religious schools. The government provided 20.6 million kuna ($3.31 million) to these groups, the same amount as the previous year.

On April 23, Prime Minister (PM) Andrej Plenkovic and other government ministers attended the annual official commemoration for victims of the WWII-era Jasenovac death camp. For the second year in a row, Jewish and Serb (largely Orthodox) leaders announced they would not participate in the official ceremony, but would hold separate commemorations. The leaders cited dissatisfaction with the government’s lack of response to a veterans group’s placement of a plaque, in November 2016, bearing the Ustasha-era salute “Za dom Spremni” (“For the Homeland, Ready,” ZDS) near the site of the camp. Following the boycott, PM Plenkovic said he regretted the placement of the plaque and that it was the lasting task of the government to develop a tolerant and democratic society. In September President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic and PM Plenkovic both condemned the plaque, and the government relocated it to a veterans’ cemetery in the nearby town of Novska; the government did not make a determination on the legality of the use of the controversial Ustasha salute.

In March PM Plenkovic announced the creation of a special council, the Council for Dealing with Consequences of the Rule of Non-Democratic Regimes. According to the PM, the council would provide the government with legal and institutional recommendations regarding the use of symbols of totalitarian regimes during and after WWII, to include ZDS, that would be used for eventual legislation on the issue. The government directed the council, which consisted of legal experts, academics, and historians, to issue its recommendations by March 2018.

In January PM Plenkovic attended a traditional Orthodox Christmas reception organized by the Serb National Council (SNV) in Zagreb. He stated his government’s policy was one of stability, tolerance, dialogue, settlement of outstanding issues, and good relations with all minorities in the country. When he visited the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial in January, he committed to fight “any form of hatred, racism, and Holocaust denial” and said the country would continue to promote “values of mutual respect, understanding, and tolerance.”

On August 24, President Grabar-Kitarovic bestowed the Order of Ante Starcevic, a national decoration, upon the leader of the Islamic Community of Croatia, Mufti Aziz Efendi Hasanovic. Hasanovic was recognized for his contribution to the building of the contemporary state and promotion of religious liberties, tolerance, and human rights, as well as for his engagement in interreligious and intercultural cooperation. During the ceremony, the president stated Muslim citizens were included in all spheres of social life on an equal footing. The president emphasized the successful interreligious dialogue between the Christian majority and Muslim minority, commending the role of the Islamic Community of Croatia.

Members of the Islamic community reported they cooperated with the government to provide religious and cultural instruction to soldiers before they deployed to Muslim countries, particularly Afghanistan. The Mufti of Croatia, Aziz Hasanovic, accompanied President Grabar-Kitarovic on state visits to majority-Muslim countries.

The Office of the President continued to maintain a special advisor for Holocaust issues.

The country is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

Some Jewish community leaders said there were incidents of significant historical revisionism and downplaying or denial of the country’s role in the Holocaust. They expressed dissatisfaction with how the government responded to cases of anti-Semitism, such as the placement of the controversial plaque at Jasenovac and use by some of Ustasha symbols and slogans.

The Jewish community organized its own commemoration of the victims of the Jasenovac death camp after boycotting the government’s ceremony. Serb and other organizations, such as the Association of Anti-Fascist Fighters and the Anti-Fascists of Croatia, also held separate commemorations.

In February the extra-parliamentary Autonomous Croatian Party of Rights (A-HSP), described widely in both media reports and academic analyses as far right, staged a march in Zagreb during which party members waved flags bearing an unofficial coat of arms associated with the fascist Ustasha movement. The procession of approximately 30 participants also flew an A-HSP party flag emblazoned with the ZDS Ustasha salute. According to PM Plenkovic, the actions were intended to “incite fear and intolerance in society.” Police arrested A-HSP leader Drazen Kleminec during the rally for disturbing the peace.

In August singer Marko “Thompson” Perkovic led pro-Ustasha chants during a concert in Slunj commemorating the country’s Victory and Homeland Day. Police filed misdemeanor charges against him for violating public peace and order.

On January 23, during an interview with daily newspaper Jutarnji list, SOC Patriarch Irinej of Serbia called upon government officials and Catholic clergy to respond to continuing crimes against the Croatian Serb population and to address desecration of SOC churches reported during previous years. He also stated that when visiting the Jasenovac camp in 2016, he had noticed pro-Ustasha graffiti on the memorial walls.

SOC representatives reported to authorities approximately 10 burglaries during the year at religious properties in Knin and Drnis.

The country continued to host a center for Halal Quality Certification. The center provided halal certifications to businesses producing halal products for domestic consumption and export, as well as education, scientific, research, and marketing services related to halal products. Since its opening in 2010, the center certified 66 food producers, 18 hotels, seven travel agencies, a catering company, and a public school.

In July the Constitutional Court ruled that inclusion of the phrase “So help me God” in the oath taken by newly elected presidents of the country did not violate the secularity of the republic and that the oath was in accordance with the constitution. The court found that taking the oath was “essentially just a ceremonial act,” and the phrase “So help me God” was not “linked to any religious position,” and did not “represent a theistic and religious conviction,” or “impose a particular religious commitment upon the president.” Three individuals had separately challenged the constitutionality of including the phrase in the oath in motions they filed in 2009, 2013, and 2014. Two judges dissented from the majority opinion, opining the phrase violated the principles of equality of religious communities and of separation of religion from the state.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy staff regularly discussed religious freedom issues, including concerns related to the status and treatment of religious minorities, with representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice, Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, ombudsman, and other officials. In March and September the Ambassador, embassy staff, and the U.S. Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues met with Justice Minister Drazen Bosnjakovic, then-Justice Minister Ante Sprlje, Culture Minister Nina Obuljen Korzinek, officials from the foreign ministry and the PM’s office, and members of parliament. They encouraged them to adopt amendments to existing legislation to provide for restitution of private and communal or religious property seized during and after WWII, including provisions that would unequivocally allow for foreign claims and that would also reopen the deadline for potential new claims. Embassy engagement also focused on the restitution of Jewish communal properties such as cultural centers, synagogues, and cemeteries, as well as private property, and creation of a claims process for victims.

The embassy discussed religious freedom issues, including concerns related to freedom of expression and efforts to counter discrimination, with the NGO Society for Promotion of Religious Freedom and other civil society organizations, such as Human Rights House, Documenta, and Freedom House, as well as representatives from Catholic, Serbian Orthodox, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, and other religious groups.

In cooperation with the Ministry of Science, Education, and Sports, the embassy funded Holocaust education training in the U.S. for two high school and two primary school teachers, who later applied the training in the classroom. The annual program was organized by the Department of State, the Association of Holocaust Organizations in New York, and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. The program imparted new teaching methods and techniques, facilitated an exchange of ideas and experiences, and provided resources and materials for classroom instruction.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 11.2 million (July 2017 estimate). There is no independent, authoritative source on the overall size or composition of religious groups. The Roman Catholic Church estimates 60 to 70 percent of the population identifies as Catholic. Membership in Protestant churches is estimated at 5 percent of the population. Pentecostals and Baptists are likely the largest Protestant denominations. The Assemblies of God reports approximately 120,000 members and the four Baptist conventions estimate their combined membership at more than 100,000. Jehovah’s Witnesses estimate their members at 96,000; Methodists at 40,000; Seventh-day Adventists at 35,000; Anglicans, 22,500; Presbyterians, 15,500; Episcopalians, 6,000; Quakers, 300; and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), 150. Some Christian leaders say they have observed a marked growth of evangelical Protestant groups in the country. The Jewish community estimates it has 1,500 members, of whom 1,200 reside in Havana. According to the local Islamic League, there are 2,000 to 3,000 Muslims, of whom an estimated 1,500 are native born. Other religious groups with small numbers of adherents include Greek Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, Buddhists, and Bahais.

Many individuals, particularly those of African descent, practice religions with roots in West Africa and the Congo River Basin, known collectively as Santeria. These religious practices are commonly intermingled with Catholicism, and some require Catholic baptism for full initiation, making it difficult to estimate accurately their total membership.

Legal Framework

According to the constitution, “the state recognizes, respects, and guarantees freedom of religion” and “different beliefs and religions enjoy the same considerations under the law.” The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religion. It declares the country to be secular and provides for the separation of church and state, but says the Communist Party of Cuba is “the superior leading force of the society and the State.” It also states no freedom can be exercised contrary to the “objectives of the socialist state.”

The ORA, an organ of the Communist Party, regulates religious institutions and the practice of religion. The law of associations requires all religious groups to apply to the MOJ for official recognition. The MOJ recognizes religious denominations as associations similar to officially recognized civil society organizations. The application process requires religious groups to identify the location of their activities, their proposed leadership, and their funding sources, among other requirements. Ineligibilities for registration include determination by the MOJ that another group has identical or similar objectives, or that the group’s activities could harm the common good. Once the ministry grants official recognition, the religious group must request permission from the ORA to conduct activities, such as holding meetings in approved locations, publishing major decisions from meetings, receiving foreign visitors, importing religious literature, purchasing and operating motor vehicles, and constructing, repairing, or purchasing places of worship. Groups failing to register may face penalties ranging from fines to closure of their organizations.

The constitution states “the rights of assembly, demonstration and association are exercised by workers, both manual and intellectual; peasants; women; students; and other sectors of the working people,” but it does not explicitly address religious association. The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religion.

Military service is mandatory for all men. For religious groups that actively oppose military participation, there are no legal provisions exempting their members as conscientious objectors; in practice, the authorities allow conscientious objectors to perform alternative service.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The country notes, “With respect to the scope and implementation of some of the provisions of this international instrument, Cuba will make such reservations or interpretative declarations as it may deem appropriate.”

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: Religious organizations and human rights groups stated the government continued to threaten, detain, and use violence against outspoken religious figures, especially those advocating for human rights and religious freedom or collaborating with independent human rights groups. Security forces took measures, including detentions sometimes accompanied by violence, which inhibited the ability of members of the protest group Ladies in White to attend Catholic Mass. Some members of independent evangelical Christian churches said government authorities closely monitored and detained, for unspecified periods of time, their leadership and family members. Representatives of the Patmos Institute, a religious freedom advocacy organization, said authorities also targeted Christians affiliated with the institute, including through threats, detentions, and expulsions from school and work. One leader, who stated the situation had improved from the previous year, cited the approved permit to build the first new church built in the country since 1959.

Some high level Catholic, Protestant, and minority religious leaders stated the religious freedom environment had improved compared with the previous year; however, some evangelical Christian groups said religious freedom had not improved for their groups. CSW’s annual report stated church leaders from all denominations reported consistent harassment and surveillance from state security and officials responsible for religious affairs. It also stated the government continued to severely restrict public religious events. The CSW report counted 325 violations during the year, compared with 2,380 violations in 2016 and over 2,300 violations in 2015. In its report CSW stated the “significant drop” in the reported cases of violations of religious freedom or belief in the year, compared with previous years, was due to the government’s verbal rescinding in May of a decree that had outlawed 2,000 AG churches. One leader, who stated the situation had improved from the previous year, cited the approved permit to build a new Catholic church in Pinar del Rio Province – the first new church built in the country since 1959.

According to CSW, human rights activist Jorge Luis Garcia Perez reported state security agents raided the home of Misael Diaz Paseiro on October 22 and confiscated two Bibles, a number of crucifixes and five rosaries. On November 4, police reportedly beat Diaz, tore his rosaries from his neck, and said “in addition to being a counterrevolutionary, you are also a Christian. You should look at us – we are revolutionaries and we don’t believe in your god. Our god is Fidel Castro.” Diaz was imprisoned on November 22 and reportedly denied visits from a priest and access to a Bible. The Christian Post reported the government charged Diaz with “pre-criminal dangerousness” and sentenced him to 3.5 years in prison.

Reverend Juan Carlos Nunez Velazquez, an Apostolic Movement leader, lost an appeal on February 1 to overturn his sentence of one year under house arrest. Police arrested Nunez in 2016 for disturbing the peace because he failed to comply with police orders to reduce the size and volume of the speakers he used during Sunday sermons at his open-air church.

According to CSW, in February authorities twice interrogated an Eastern Baptist Convention pastor about his work, members of his congregation, and the activities of his church. The authorities also threatened to confiscate the property; however, at year’s end, the government had taken no action against the church.

According to CSW and news sources, on April 27, airport authorities detained and interrogated Felix Yuniel Llerena Lopez, a 20-year-old student and evangelical Christian and religious freedom activist, upon his return to the country. The authorities informed Llerena Lopez he was being investigated for planning terrorist acts, possessing pornographic materials, and meeting with “terrorist” Cuban exiles opposed to the government. The authorities briefly detained Lopez’s mother, expelled Llerena Lopez from the university where he was a part-time student, and banned him from international travel. On October 2, authorities informed Llerena Lopez he would not be charged with any crimes and rescinded his travel ban; however, the university had not reinstated him at year’s end. CSW quoted Llerena Lopez as saying, “After five months of opposition, arrests, being expelled from university, intimidation, threats, and a false accusation, today I can say that solidarity and the dignity of not giving up on principles … triumphed.”

According to CSW, on November 6, police arrested and briefly detained Leonardo Rodriguez Alonso, a local Patmos coordinator in Santa Clara, without charges. CSW sources said on April 11, Rodriguez’s daughter, Dalila Rodriguez Gonzalez, was fired from her position as a university professor for not being “a good influence on students” and because she “could damage their formation.” According to Rodriguez Alonso, his daughter’s dismissal was revenge for his religious freedom advocacy.

According to CSW, police physically assaulted members of the Ladies in White, a rights advocacy organization, while they were en route to attend religious ceremonies. On February 19, CSW reported that a police officer punched in the face Ladies in White member Magda Onelvis Mendoza Diaz as she was going to church. On August 13, a police officer in Havana reportedly choked Berta Soler Fernandez, and officers detained her for 24 hours; they subsequently released her without charge.

According to representatives of several religious organizations that had unsuccessfully sought legal recognition, the government continued to interpret the law on associations as a means for the MOJ to deny the registration of certain religious groups. If the MOJ decided a group was duplicating the activities of another, it denied recognition. In some cases, the MOJ delayed the request for registration or cited changing laws as a reason why a request had not been approved.

According to the members of Protestant denominations, some groups were still able to register only a small percentage of “house churches” in private homes; however, most unregistered house churches continued to operate with little or no government interference. A number of religious groups, including the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Mormons, continued to await a decision from the MOJ on pending applications for official recognition, some dating as far back as 1994. These groups said the authorities permitted them to conduct religious activities, hold meetings, receive foreign visitors, make substantial renovations to their facilities, and send representatives abroad. They also said state security continued to monitor their movements, telephone calls, visitors, and religious meetings.

According to CSW sources, on September 14, police disrupted an interdenominational Christian service in Santiago; local authorities had previously approved the service. Local authorities said the service was “counterrevolutionary” and threatened to imprison event organizer Pastor Ernesto Lora if he organized a similar event in the future.

According to CSW, on April 3, authorities in Las Tunas fined Reverend Mario Travieso of the Apostolic Church 1,500 pesos ($1,500) for building a wall next to his church that the authorities considered too high even though he had received written approval from his neighbors. Prior to imposing the fine, authorities had inspected his house in response to a noise complaint; they told him not to pray or sing with neighboring families.

Many religious leaders continued to state they refrained from speaking about overtly political topics. Some said they feared criticizing the government could lead to denials of permits from the ORA, dismantling of religious buildings, or other measures that could limit the growth of their religious groups. The nongovernmental organization Outreach Aid to the Americas (OAA) reported some instances in which evangelical Christians not supporting Communist Party political activities experienced harassment and threats from government employers and educators.

According to the OAA, the Central University in Santa Clara expelled an 18-year-old student after he began attending Christian group meetings at the university. The OAA said university officials told the student he was expelled because his beliefs “were not compatible with the philosophy taught at the university.”

The OAA said from October 2016 to April 2017, the supervisors of an employee in a government-run company in Taguasco reportedly threatened the employee with termination after learning he had joined a Christian church in 2016. The man reported his harassment and threats to his pastor in April.

The OAA stated in April school administrators had threatened to expel a 17-year-old student enrolled in a pre-university course at the Ernesto Che Guevara Institute of Santa Clara if he continued to participate in Christian group meetings.

In May the government informed the Assemblies of God (AG) it would not proceed with confiscation orders against 2,000 AG churches or demolish a church in Santiago under zoning laws passed in 2015; however, it did not provide written guarantees to this effect.

Many religious groups continued to use private homes as house churches to work around restrictions on constructing new buildings. Protestant leaders’ estimates of the total number of house churches for Protestant groups varied significantly, from fewer than 2,000 to as many as 10,000. Religious groups said authorities approved many applications within two to three years from the date of the application, but either did not respond to or denied other applications arbitrarily.

Representatives from both the Catholic Church and the CCC said they continued to conduct religious services in prisons and detention centers in some provinces. The Protestant seminary in Matanzas and churches in Pinar del Rio continued to train chaplains and laypersons to provide religious counseling for prison inmates and to provide support for their families. The CCC continued to operate a training facility it opened in 2016, at which it offered courses on chaplain work as well as courses on caring for sacred religious objects, gender and women’s issues, and seminars for international students.

Representatives of religious groups reported their leaders continued to travel abroad generally unimpeded to participate in exchanges between local and international faith-based communities. The majority of religious groups continued to report improvement in their ability to attract new members without government interference, and a reduction in interference from the government in conducting their services. According to local observers, in September authorities prohibited a Baptist journalist from traveling with an interfaith group of religious and civil society activists and journalists to a human rights training seminar in Brazil. The journalist’s employer reportedly accused the journalist of selling secret information and of committing treason. Several independent journalists and bloggers reported an increase in government harassment and prohibitions of travel of individuals who questioned government policies.

Some religious leaders reported obstacles preventing them from importing religious materials and donated goods, including bureaucratic challenges and arbitrary restrictions such as inconsistent rules on computers and electronic devices. Several groups said they could import large quantities of Bibles, books, clothing, and other donated goods. The Catholic Church and several Protestant religious group representatives said they continued to maintain small libraries, print periodicals and other information, and operate their own websites with little or no formal censorship. The Catholic Church continued to publish periodicals and hold regular forums at the Varela Center that sometimes criticized official social and economic policies.

By year’s end, the government had not granted the Archbishop of Havana’s 2016 public request to allow the Catholic Church to reopen religious schools and have open access to broadcast on television and radio. The ORA authorized the CCC to host a monthly radio broadcast, which allowed the council’s messages to be heard throughout the country. No other churches had access to media, which are all state-owned. Several religious leaders continued to protest the government’s restriction on broadcasting religious services over the radio or on television.

The ORA stated in August the law on associations was being revised, although it did not provide a timeline for when the revisions would be finalized, nor what the changes would be. Members of the AG continued to request the government pass reforms to the law that would validate and legalize the property the church owned, as well as allow the church to build new temples.

Several religious leaders said the ORA continued to grant new permits to repair or restore existing buildings, allowing the expansion of some structures and in some cases the construction of essentially new buildings on the foundations of the old. In August the an ORA source stated the ORA had granted permission in 2015 for the Catholic Church to build an entirely new church on newly acquired ground in Pinar del Rio Province. The media reported in 2017 the construction was almost complete. Some religious leaders stated the government regularly granted permits to buy properties to be used as house churches, including in some cases when the titleholder to the property did not plan to live there. Other religious groups stated securing permission for the purchase or construction of new buildings remained difficult, if not impossible.

The government continued to prevent religious groups from establishing accredited schools but did not interfere with the efforts of some religious groups to operate seminaries, interfaith training centers, before- and after-school programs, eldercare programs, weekend retreats, workshops for primary and secondary students, and higher education programs. The Catholic Church continued to offer coursework leading to a bachelor’s and master’s degree through foreign partners. Several Protestant communities continued to offer bachelor’s or master’s degrees in theology, the humanities, and related subjects via distance learning; however the government did not recognize any of these degrees.

Jehovah’s Witnesses leaders continued to state they found the requirements for university admission and the course of study incompatible with the group’s beliefs since their religion prohibited them from political involvement. As a result, Jehovah’s Witnesses remained ineligible for professional careers in the fields of law, medicine, among others.

Church leaders reported the government continued an unofficial practice of allowing civilian public service to substitute for mandatory military service for those who objected on religious grounds. Church leaders submitted official letters to a military committee, which decided whether to grant these exemptions. Jehovah’s Witnesses and Seventh-day Adventist leaders stated their members generally were permitted to perform social service in lieu of military service.

Some religious leaders said the government continued to restrict their ability to receive donations from overseas. They cited a measure that prohibited churches and religious groups from using individuals’ bank accounts for their organizations, and required existing individual accounts used in this way to be consolidated into one per denomination or organization. Larger, better organized churches reported more success in receiving large donations, while smaller, less formal churches reported difficulties with banking procedures. According to these religious leaders, the regulations allowed the government to curb the scope and number of activities of individual churches and to single out groups that could be held accountable for withdrawing money intended for purposes not approved by the government.

Religious groups continued to report the government allowed them to engage in community service programs, including assisting the elderly, providing potable water to small towns, growing and selling fruits and vegetables at below-market prices, and establishing health clinics. International faith-based charitable operations such as Caritas, Sant’Egidio, and the Salvation Army maintained local offices in Havana. Caritas in particular was very involved in gathering and distributing hurricane relief items.

According to the Western Baptist Convention (WBC), on July 6, members of a family that occupied a Havana property owned by the WBC more than 30 years ago broke into the WBC’s new office adjacent to where the family lived. The family reportedly stole the WBC’s documents, computers, furniture, and other property and refused to return it to the WBC. The ORA took no action, despite WBC’s requests for ORA’s intervention. In 1992, a court ruled the family’s residency in the property was illegal but did not require the family to leave.

The Community of Sant’Egidio, recognized by the Catholic Church as a “Church public lay association,” held an interfaith meeting – “Paths of Peace” – in Havana on October 4 and 5 to promote interreligious engagement, tolerance, and joint efforts towards peace. Leaders of different religious groups in the country and more than 500 participants attended the meeting, which focused on the importance of welcoming and integrating migrants regardless of their religious affiliation or lack of affiliation.

U.S. embassy officials continued to meet with ORA officials and raise concerns about the ability of unregistered churches to gain official status and practice their religion. The ORA officials continued to state their interest in increased engagement with U.S. religious groups and U.S. government counterparts. The U.S. government continued to call upon the government to respect its citizens’ fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of religion and expression. For example, the Department of State Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor posted on social media about “fundamental freedoms” on January 6 and about Ladies in White on April 13. The latter post stated “great meeting with Damas de Blanco on human rights in Cuba – we stand with defenders of free expression and assembly.”

Embassy officials met with the head of the CCC and discussed concerns some unregistered churches faced to gain official status.

Embassy officers continued to meet frequently with a wide range of religious groups, including Protestants, Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslims, and Catholics, to discuss the principal issues of religious freedom and tolerance affecting each group, including freedom of assembly, church expansion, access to state-owned media, and their ability to open private religious schools. Embassy engagement with smaller religious groups under pressure from the government included a continuing assessment of how the change in diplomatic relations between the two governments affected these communities.

Embassy engagement focused on facilitating exchanges between visiting religious delegations and religious groups, including between visiting representatives of U.S. religious organizations and local institutions. The groups often discussed the challenges of daily life in the country, such as obtaining government permission for certain activities, and successes, such as closer bonds between Cuban and American churches and an increase in two-way travel between Cuban and American congregations.

The U.S. government estimates the total population of the island at 1.2 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2011 census, the population of the government-controlled area was 840,000. Of that total, 89.1 percent is Greek Orthodox Christian and 1.8 percent Muslim. Other religious groups include Roman Catholics (2.9 percent), Protestants (2 percent), Buddhists (1 percent), Maronite Catholics (0.5 percent), Armenian Orthodox (0.3 percent), with small populations of Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Bahais. Recent immigrants and migrant workers are predominantly Roman Catholic, Muslim, and Buddhist. The country’s chief rabbi estimates the number of Jews at approximately 3,000, most of whom are foreign born.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and protects the right of individuals to profess their faith and to worship, teach, and practice or observe their religion, individually or collectively, in private or in public, subject to limitations due to considerations of national security or public health, safety, order, and morals, or the protection of civil liberties. The constitution specifies all religions whose doctrines or rites are not secret are free and equal before the law. It protects the right to change one’s religion and prohibits the use of physical or moral compulsion to make a person change, or prevent a person from changing, his or her religion. The ombudsman is an independent state institution responsible for protecting citizens’ rights and human rights in general. The ombudsman has the power to investigate complaints made against any public service or official for actions that violate human rights, including freedom of religion, or actions exercised in contravention of the laws or the rules of proper administration. The ombudsman makes recommendations to correct wrongdoings but does not issue remedial steps.

The constitution states the Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus (Church of Cyprus) has the exclusive right to regulate and administer the Church’s internal affairs and property in accordance with its canons and charter. By law, the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus pays taxes only on commercial activities.

The constitution sets guidelines for the Vakf, which is tax exempt and has the exclusive right to regulate and administer its internal affairs and property in accordance with its laws and principles. According to the constitution, no legislative, executive, or other act may contravene or interfere with the Church of Cyprus or the Vakf. The Vakf operates only in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots and does not administer mosques located in the government-controlled area. The Vakf acts as caretaker of religious properties in the Turkish Cypriot community. The government serves as caretaker and provides financial support to mosques in government-controlled areas.

Besides the Church of Cyprus and Islam, the constitution recognizes three other religious groups: Maronite Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, and “Latins” (Cypriot Roman Catholics). Their institutions are exempt from taxes and eligible for government subsidies for cultural and educational matters, depending on the needs of each group, for example, to cover costs to operate their own schools, for school fees for members of the groups attending private schools, or for activities to preserve their cultural identity.

Religious groups not recognized in the constitution must register with the government as nonprofit organizations in order to engage in financial transactions and maintain bank accounts. To register, a religious group must submit through an attorney an application to the Ministry of Commerce stating its purpose and provide the names of its directors. Religious groups registered as nonprofit organizations are treated the same as any other nonprofit organization; they are tax-exempt, must provide annual reports to the government, and are not eligible for government subsidies.

The government requires Greek Orthodox religious instruction and attendance at religious services before major holidays in public primary and secondary schools. The MOE may excuse primary school students of other religious groups from attending religious services and instruction at the request of their guardians, but Greek Orthodox children in primary school may not opt out. The MOE may excuse any secondary school student from religious instruction on grounds of religion or conscience, and may excuse them from attending religious services on any grounds at the request of their guardians, or at their own request if over the age of 16.

Conscientious objectors on religious grounds are exempt from active military duty and from reservist service in the National Guard but must complete alternative service. There are two options available for conscientious objectors: unarmed military service, which is a maximum of four months longer than the normal 14-month service; or social service, which is a maximum of eight months longer than normal service but requires fewer hours of work per day. The penalty for refusing military or alternate service is up to three years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to 6,000 euros ($7,200), or both. Those who refuse both military and alternate service, even if objecting on religious grounds, are considered to have committed an offense involving dishonesty or moral turpitude and are disqualified from holding elected public office and ineligible for permits to provide private security services.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Ministry of Interior (MOI), which has oversight of Turkish Cypriot properties in the government-controlled area, granted Turkish Cypriots access to religious sites in the area it controlled; however, Muslim community leaders stated the government continued to withhold full access to 19 mosques located on cultural heritage sites and deny them any administrative authority over the sites. The ministry made available six of those 19 mosques, as well as two other mosques not located on cultural heritage sites, for religious services. Of the eight functioning mosques, seven were available for all five daily prayers, and six had the necessary facilities for ablutions. Bayraktar and Dhali Mosques had no ablution facilities and no bathrooms, and the government removed temporary bathrooms installed during Ramadan at Dhali Mosque. The Ministry of Communications and Works’ Department of Antiquities reported it provided bathroom facilities at a distance of approximately 330 feet from Bayraktar Mosque, because the mosque was part of the medieval Venetian wall of the city, making it impossible to install sewage pipes. According to the MOI, in 2016, the government approved architectural plans for ablution and bathroom facilities at the Dhali Mosque; construction had not begun by year’s end. The government again failed to respond to a long-standing request by the Muslim community for permission to make improvements at the functioning mosques, and there was no change from previous years in either the number of open mosques or the number of ablution and bathroom facilities available at those mosques.

The only one of the eight functioning mosques not open for all five daily prayers was the Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque, the most important Islamic religious site in the country. The Department of Antiquities continued to keep it open during standard museum hours only, limiting access to the mosque to two of the five daily prayer times. The mosque’s imam had to ask permission of the MOI and Department of Antiquities to keep the mosque open after 5 p.m. in the autumn/winter months and after 7:30 p.m. in the spring/summer months. To cross the “green line” without identification checks to visit religious sites, Turkish Cypriots were required to submit their requests to UNFICYP, which then facilitated the approval process with the government.

The government continued to waive visa requirements for the movement of non-Turkish Cypriot pilgrims south across the “green line” to visit Hala Sultan Tekke to conduct prayers and services on special occasions. On June 27, approximately 1,000 pilgrims crossed into the government-controlled areas for a pilgrimage to Hala Sultan Tekke on Eid al-Fitr. On September 5, police escorted approximately 700 Turkish Cypriots, Turks, and other foreign nationals to Hala Sultan Tekke for prayers on Eid al-Adha. On November 29, 950 more crossed the “green line” for a pilgrimage at Hala Sultan Tekke on the occasion of the Mawlid-al Nabi.

A representative of the Buddhist community reported it continued to encounter difficulties operating a temple due to the rigorous enforcement of laws not typically observed for majority religious and other groups. Authorities prevented the community from operating a temple in Pera, a village outside of Nicosia where the community owned a house, arguing the community should have applied first for permission to change the building’s use from a residence to a temple. Local authorities instructed the Buddhist monks to remove the temple sign and move statues inside. The Buddhist community did not apply for the permit to change the use of the house to a temple and abandoned the effort in that village. The community instead rented an apartment in Nicosia to use as a temple. A representative of the Buddhist community reported the Municipality of Nicosia sent a letter to the owner of the newly rented apartment warning that it could not be used for large gatherings because of insufficient parking. To prevent further action by the municipality, members of the community avoided parking outside the building. A 2015 government criminal case against the Buddhist priest for unlicensed alterations and additions to the building in Pera remained open, and the priest had to appear in court on several occasions. The Buddhist community also reported delays in the renewal of the same religious leader’s temporary residence permit.

In response to a 2016 recommendation by the ombudsman, in July the government removed the requirement to designate a person’s religion on civil marriage certificates and on applications for civil marriage.

The ombudsman’s office reported it received new complaints regarding MOE regulations for exempting students from religious instruction and from participation in school-organized Greek Orthodox religious ceremonies. Most of the complaints concerned rejection of exemption applications because the applicants, who objected to the requirement to state their religion on their application, did not do so and the schools therefore denied the exemption. Another parent complained the school indiscreetly handled the student’s exemption from a religious ceremony and traumatized the child. The ombudsman was examining the complaints at year’s end.

The military continued to require recruits to take part in a common prayer led by Church of Cyprus clergy during swearing-in ceremonies. Recruits of other faiths, atheists, and those who did not wish to take the oath for reasons of conscience could refrain from raising their hand during the ceremony. They instead gave a pledge of allegiance at a separate gathering.

Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity. Representatives of the Jewish community continued to report incidents of assault and verbal harassment directed against individuals with yarmulkes and payot (hair side curls) but did not provide additional details. By year’s end, the police had not arrested any suspects for any of the incidents.

Members of minority religious groups continued to report societal pressures to participate in public religious ceremonies. For example, children of various religious minorities faced pressure to attend religious ceremonies at school, even though parents had the option to request they be exempted from participation. A representative of a religious group reported younger non-Greek Orthodox students did not wish to be excluded from school-organized Greek Orthodox Church ceremonies but said there were cases of Greek Orthodox clergy denying communion to those students in front of their classmates. Some Greek Orthodox adherents, who converted to other faiths, including Islam, reportedly hid their conversion from family and friends due to fear of social ostracism.

An NGO reported an employer at a hotel refused to hire migrant Muslim women for a cleaning job, stating their hijab would get in the way of doing their work.

In June the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage (TCCH), one of the bicommunal working groups set up as part of the UN-facilitated settlement talks, completed the restoration of Koprulu Mosque in Limassol and Mathiatis Mosque in Nicosia district. The TCCH was restoring the mosques of Ayios Nicolaos (Aynikola) and Ayios Yiannis (Ayianni) in Paphos district. The Department of Antiquities assumed responsibility for restoring Arnavut Mosque in Limassol as an ancient monument and completed the work in October.

The leaders of the main religious groups on the island continued to meet regularly and visit places of worship on both sides of the buffer zone. On September 28, the RTCYPP, an initiative of the embassy of Sweden that served as a platform for all religious leaders to discuss and promote religious freedom and contribute to efforts for reunification of the island, convened its third Round Table for Human Rights with religious leaders and civil society organizations. At that meeting, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights introduced its “Faith for Rights” initiative, which aimed to provide space for a cross-disciplinary dialogue between religious groups concerning human rights, on the assumption that individual and communal expression of religion or belief could thrive and flourish in environments where human rights were protected. Attendees discussed ways to engage women, men, and children from across the island in implementing the initiative. On October 5, the RTCYPP launched a joint project of religious leaders to offer Greek and Turkish classes for members of the Greek Orthodox, Muslim, Armenian Orthodox, Maronite, and Latin Catholic faith communities. The pilot course, the first of its kind, included a group of 20 persons, including priests, imams, nuns, and laypersons who worked for faith-based organizations.

On November 16, in commemoration of the International Day of Tolerance, the religious leaders from the five principal religious groups – Archbishop Chrysostomos II of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus; Talip Atalay, Mufti of Cyprus; Archbishop Doghramadjian of the Armenian Orthodox Church; Father Ibrahim Khita, representing the Maronite Catholic Church; and Father Jerzy Kraj, representing the Latin Catholic Church – jointly visited churches in the buffer zone and discussed the importance of religious freedom and the restoration of religious monuments. The leaders reaffirmed their commitment to dialogue and cooperation and reiterated their request to the political leadership to respect religious heritage and the right to worship.

U.S. embassy representatives continued to meet frequently with government officials – from the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice, as well as the Department of Antiquities and the Office of the Ombudsman – to discuss religious freedom issues, such as access to religious sites on either side of the “green line” dividing the country.

Embassy staff continued to discuss religious freedom issues with the NGOs Movement for Equality, Support, Anti-Racism and Future Worlds Center. They met with representatives of the Armenian Orthodox, Bahai, Buddhist, Greek Orthodox, Jewish, Latin, Maronite, and Muslim communities to hear their concerns about access to and the condition of religious sites, and to inquire about incidents of discrimination or violence based on religion, societal attitudes toward minority religions, and obstacles to full enjoyment of religious freedom. For example, embassy officials frequently discussed with Greek Orthodox leaders their community’s concerns over the restrictions Turkish Cypriot authorities placed on the number and the duration of church ceremonies conducted in the area under Turkish Cypriot administration, as well as the heavy “police” monitoring of services, including occasional videotaping of the congregation. Embassy officials were supportive of religious leaders’ ongoing dialogue and encouraged the continuing reciprocal visits of Christian and Muslim leaders to places of worship on both sides of the “green line.”

READ A SECTION: REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS (ABOVE) | THE AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS

According to 2011 census information from the Turkish Cypriot authorities, the population of the area administered by Turkish Cypriots is 286,000. The census contains no data on religious affiliation. Sociologists estimate as much as 97 percent of the population is Sunni Muslim, of which 500 are members of the Naqshbandi Sufi order. Religious groups report an estimated 10,000 migrant workers of Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab origin are Alevi Muslims. According to sociologists, other small groups include approximately 330 members of the Church of Cyprus, 200 members of the Russian Orthodox Church, 150 Bahais, 150 Maronite Catholics, 180 Anglicans, 150 Jews, 300 Turkish-speaking Protestants, and 40 Jehovah’s Witnesses. According to “MOE” statistics for the 2016-17 academic year, there were 79,686 foreign students enrolled at universities in the area administered by the Turkish Cypriots. Of these, 50,650 were predominantly Muslim Turks and 29,036 were foreign students, many of them Christian and Muslim, from more than 100 different countries.

Legal Framework

The Turkish Cypriot “constitution” states the territory is a “secular republic” and provides for freedom of conscience and religious faith and unrestricted worship and religious ceremonies, provided they do not contravene public order or morals. It prohibits forced prayer, forced attendance at religious services, condemnation based on religious beliefs, and compelling of individuals to disclose their religious beliefs. It stipulates religious education may only be conducted under “state” supervision. The “law” does not recognize any specific religion, and individuals cannot “exploit or abuse” religion to establish, even partially, a state based on religious precepts or for political or personal gain. The Vakf has the exclusive right to regulate and administer its internal affairs and property in accordance with Vakf laws and principles. Although the “constitution” states the Vakf shall be exempt from all taxation, its commercial operations are subject to applicable taxes. It also receives income from properties it manages. According to the “constitution,” the Turkish Cypriot authorities shall help the Vakf in the execution of Islamic religious services and in meeting the expenses of such services. No other religious organization is tax exempt or receives subsidies from Turkish Cypriot authorities.

The 1975 Vienna III Agreement covers the treatment of Greek Cypriots and Maronite Catholics living in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots and the treatment of Turkish Cypriots living in the government-controlled area. Among other provisions, the agreement provides for facilities for religious worship for Greek Cypriots, stating they are free to stay and “will be given every help to lead a normal life, including facilities for education and for the practice of their religion.”

Turkish Cypriot “regulations” stipulate Greek Orthodox residents may conduct liturgies or masses led by three priests designated by the Orthodox Church at three designated functional churches in the Karpas Peninsula without seeking permission. Maronite residents may hold liturgies or masses at four designated functional Maronite churches by Maronite-designated clergy without seeking permission. These religious groups must submit applications to the authorities for permission to hold religious services at churches or monasteries other than these seven designated churches. For the application to be considered, the date should be of significance to that religious group; the church or monastery must be structurally sound; it must not be located in a military zone; and it must not have a dual use, for example, as a museum. Permission is also necessary for priests other than those officially predesignated to conduct services. Specific permission is required for services in which Cypriots who are not residents in the Turkish Cypriot-administered area, such as members of the Greek Orthodox, Maronite Catholic, and Armenian Orthodox Churches, participate. UNFICYP coordinates some applications, which must be submitted 10 days before the date of the requested service.

The “Religious Affairs Department” represents Islam in the area administered by the Turkish Cypriots. Whereas the Vakf manages land that has been donated as an endowment by Muslims for charitable purposes, the “Religious Affairs Department” oversees how imams conduct prayers and deliver sermons in mosques.

Religious groups are not required to register with authorities as associations in order to assemble or worship, but only associations registered with the “Ministry of Interior” (“MOI”) have the right to engage in commercial activity and maintain bank accounts. Religious groups and nonreligious groups have the same registration process and are required to submit the founders’ names and photocopies of their identification cards to the “MOI,” along with a copy of the association’s rules and regulations. Associations do not receive tax-exempt status or any “government” benefits or subsidies. Religious groups are not permitted to register as associations if the stated purpose of the association is to provide religious education to their members.

There is compulsory instruction covering religion in grades four through eight in all schools. These classes focus primarily on Islam but also include sessions on comparative religion. The “MOE” chooses the curriculum, which is based on a textbook commissioned by the Ministry of Education in Turkey. Schools or teachers may excuse non-Muslim students from attending the course or taking the mandatory exam at the end of the semester on an individual basis at the request of their guardians, but there is no formal process to request such an exemption. At the high school level, religion classes are optional.

There are no provisions or “laws” allowing conscientious objection to mandatory military service, which includes a 12-15-month initial service requirement and a one-day annual reserve duty.

“Government” Practices

Authorities continued to restrict access to Greek Orthodox, Maronite Catholic, and Armenian Orthodox places of worship, and the “MFA” continued to state Greek Cypriots were abusing the right to religious freedom and politicizing the situation. Apostolos Andreas, St. Barnabas, and St. Mamas Churches remained open for religious services throughout the year. Apostolos Andreas Monastery was open for prayer but still required special permission to celebrate liturgy.

Authorities continued restrictions on regular religious services in certain other churches. UNFICYP reported, of 112 requests it received to facilitate religious services at churches in the northern part of the island during the year, the “MFA” approved approximately 67, compared with 139 requests and 84 approvals in 2016. The “MFA” reported that, of 133 requests (including both UNFICYP-facilitated and non-UNFICYP-facilitated requests) to hold religious services during the year, it approved 83, compared with 163 requests and 109 approvals in 2016.

In April the “MFA” again did not allow Good Friday church services to take place at the St. George Exorinos Church in Famagusta.

Turkish Cypriot civil society organizations criticized authorities for not allowing Greek Cypriots to perform church services and urged greater access to religious sites.

In response to a complaint from an Alevi Muslim association that religion courses ignored their needs, the “ombudsman” published a report in May stating the “MOE” only offered Sunni Islam-based academic religion courses in schools and that the policy ran contrary to basic rights of equality, faith, and freedom of religion, as stated in the “TRNC constitution.” It advised the “MOE” to make religion courses optional and more inclusive. In a joint press conference, the Pir Sultan Abdal Association, an Alevi Muslim association, the Primary Education Teachers’ Union, and the Secondary Education Teachers’ Union also stated they were against mandatory religion courses in schools.

Some Christians, as well as Alevis, stated the mandatory religion classes in schools were overly focused on Sunni Islam, and they expressed concerns that their children had no formal recourse to opt out of the classes. Alevis reported the education system discriminated against them. For example, one Alevi representative reported all students at the Hala Sultan Religious High School, which offered additional classes in Sunni Islam, received scholarships, but students at other schools were not all eligible for scholarships.

According to a representative of the Maronite community, the Turkish military continued to grant Maronites limited access to their churches and villages located within Turkish military zones. The Turkish military allowed Maronites to celebrate Mass once a year in the Church of Ayia Marina. It denied Maronites access to the Church of Marki near Kormakitis/Kormacit. The Maronite Church of Archangelos Michael in the village of Asamatos/Ozhan was also located within a Turkish military zone but did not require permission to function regularly on Sundays.

A representative of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus stated 50-55 religious sites remained inaccessible due to being located within Turkish military zones.

On July 11, police in Turkey released “Director of the Religious Affairs Department” and Mufti Talip Atalay after four days of interrogation. “Acting Director of Religious Affairs” Fahrettin Ogdu told the press Atalay was not detained due to “Fethullah Gulen Terrorist Organization”-related affiliations, but rather because of unfounded accusations made by the “MFA” in an attempt to punish Atalay for his participation in the Religious Track dialogue with other religious leaders.

In August local newspapers reported the “MFA” did not grant permission for Greek Cypriots to conduct a religious ceremony on September 1-3 at St. Mamas Church to celebrate the saint’s name day. The “MFA” stated that due to security concerns and the overlap with Muslim holiday Kurban Bayram in the area administered by the Turkish Cypriots, it suggested postponing the religious ceremony one week. Main opposition Republican Turkish Party issued a written statement criticizing the “MFA” for preventing Greek Cypriots from holding Mass at St. Mamas, citing annual celebrations there since 2003. The Greek Cypriots declined to hold the religious ceremony a week later.

Some minority religious groups, including evangelical Christians, continued to report Turkish Cypriot authorities, including the police, monitored their activities. A Greek Orthodox priest reported heavy police presence during church services, including police inside the church videotaping services held by the enclaved Greek Cypriot community.

The TSPA again reported some of its members were frightened to attend religious services due to police pressure; TSPA representatives visited homes instead.

According to a Greek Orthodox official, police were instructing Greek Orthodox priests to limit the length of services, and there were instances when police intervened during the service to tell the priest to expedite it.

Heavy police escorts continued to accompany visiting Greek Orthodox worshippers. Turkish Cypriot authorities said the escorts were to provide security; Greek Orthodox officials said they were for surveillance.

The “Religious Affairs Department” staffed 192 mosques, all Sunni, with 225 imams. Members of the majority Sunni religious community continued to voice concerns the “government” was interfering with religious affairs by selecting imams.

Some non-Sunni Muslims continued to state they lacked places of worship and funding to construct such facilities. Alevi Muslims said the authorities treated them and other minority religious groups unequally. The Alevi Culture Association continued to report that due to the lack of a house of worship, Alevis were required to conduct funerals inside mosques, contrary to their traditions. They also said they perceived favoritism in “state” funding toward the Sunni Muslim population through financing of mosque construction and support for administration of mosques. One Alevi representative reported there were 196 [sic] “state”-funded mosques for Sunnis, but only one cemevi (place of worship) for Alevis, which had been under construction for several years and still not been completed. Consequently, Alevis had to worship at the unfinished cemevi or at some other location. Turkish Cypriot authorities earmarked three million Turkish liras ($792,000) in the “state” budget in 2016 for the completion of the cemevi but had not yet disbursed the funds. The tender process to complete construction of the cemevi was expected to begin the first half of 2018.

A representative of the Greek Orthodox Church again stated that some religious sites, to which Church officials had little or no access, were damaged or close to collapse due to decades of neglect. The representative did not cite specific examples.

Greek Orthodox religious groups continued to complain that authorities placed religious items, including icons, in storage rooms or displayed them in museums, against the wishes of the communities to whom they were sacred.

In August Turkish Cypriot local authorities cancelled a TSPA-organized theatrical performance, even though the authorities had previously issued all necessary permits. The TSPA stated it believed local authorities, who reportedly did not provide a justification, cancelled the event because they deemed the performance Christian propaganda.

The TSPA also reported Turkish Cypriot authorities had prevented it from opening an office in Famagusta for the previous two years.

The TSPA said the police paid monthly visits to the association to check on the group and monitor its activities.

The TSPA reported it sent a letter to “President” Mustafa Akinci in September requesting the abolishment of mandatory religion courses in schools, a place to worship, and an opportunity to broadcast Christmas or Easter programming on a “state” television channel. By year’s end, the president had not responded, according to the TSPA.

The TSPA continued to report societal discrimination within the Turkish Cypriot community toward Protestants. The TSPA reported that, after previously agreeing to rent the group an assembly room for a Christmas party and play planned for December 24, a local school principal canceled the event on December 19. According to the TSPA, the school principal succumbed to pressure from nationalists who disapproved of the religious celebration. Despite appeals, the “MOE” did not intervene on the association’s behalf.

The TCCH reported it had completed restoration of eight religious sites and was restoring another seven. The TCCH also reported completing five small cultural heritage activities, including religious sites, and completing project designs for another two sites. The TCCH and the UN Development Program Partnership for the Future continued restoration work at the Greek Orthodox Apostolos Andreas Monastery in the Karpas Peninsula, a popular destination for pilgrims. The second phase of the project, including the restoration of the small chapel, surrounding buildings, and environmental landscaping, was expected to begin during the first half of 2018.

A pastor of a church, whose members were African students studying in universities in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, reported difficulties in securing a place of worship. The pastor said local companies rejected their requests to rent halls for religious ceremonies and required payment of an entire year’s rent up front. They reported Near East University in the north had a mosque on campus for Muslims but did not have a chapel or church for Christians.

Muslim and Orthodox religious leaders continued to promote religious tolerance by meeting and arranging pilgrimages for their congregations to places of worship across the “green line,” such as Hala Sultan in the Republic of Cyprus and St. Barnabas in the “TRNC.”

U.S. embassy representatives continued to meet with Turkish Cypriot authorities at the “Presidency” and the “MFA” to discuss access to religious sites and the ability to hold religious services at sites without restrictions.

Embassy officials also discussed issues pertaining to religious freedom, including access to sites of worship and instances of societal discrimination within the Turkish Cypriot community, with representatives of the Armenian Orthodox, Alevi Muslim, Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Protestant, and Sunni Muslim communities.

All references to place names within this report are for reference purposes only and are meant to convey meaning. They should not be interpreted as implying or indicating any political recognition or change in long-standing U.S. policy.

READ A SECTION: REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS | THE AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS (ABOVE)

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 10.7 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2011 census, of the 56 percent of citizens who responded to the question about their religious beliefs, approximately 62 percent held no religious beliefs, 18 percent were Catholic, 12 percent listed no specific religion, and 7 percent belonged to a variety of religious groups, including the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren, the Czechoslovak Hussite Church, other Protestant churches, other Christian groups, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism. Academics estimate there are 10,000 Jews; the FJC estimates there are 15,000 to 20,000. Leaders of the Muslim community estimate there are 10,000 Muslims, most of whom are immigrants.

Legal Framework

The constitution does not explicitly address religious freedom, but the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, a supplementary constitutional document, guarantees freedom of religious conviction and the fundamental rights of all regardless of their faith or religion. It states every individual has the right to change religion or faith; to abstain from religious belief; and to freely practice religion, alone or in community, in private or public, “through worship, teaching, practice, or observance.” The charter defines religious societies, recognizing their freedom to profess their faith publicly or privately and to govern their own affairs, independent of the state. It stipulates conscientious objectors may not be compelled to perform military service and that conditions for religious instruction at state schools shall be set by law. The charter states religious freedom may be limited by law in the event of threats to “public safety and order, health and morals, or the rights and freedoms of others.”

The law states the MOC Department of Churches is responsible for religious affairs. While religious groups are not required by law to register with the government and are free to perform religious activities without registering, they have the option to register with the MOC. The law establishes a two-tiered system of registration for religious groups. The MOC reviews applications for first- and second-tier registration with input from other government bodies, such as the Office for Protection of Private Data, and outside experts on religious affairs. The law does not establish a deadline for the MOC to decide on a registration application. Applicants denied registration can appeal to the MOC to reconsider its decision and, if again denied, to the courts.

To qualify for the first (lower) tier, a religious group must present the signatures of at least 300 adult members permanently residing in the country, a founding document listing the basic tenets of the faith, and a clearly defined structure of fiduciary responsibilities. First-tier registration confers limited tax benefits, including exemptions from a tax on the interest earned on current account deposits and taxes on donations and members’ contributions, and establishes annual reporting requirements on activities, balance sheets, and use of funds.

For second-tier registration, a group must have been registered with the Department of Churches for 10 years, have published annual reports throughout the time of its registration, and have membership equal to at least 0.1 percent of the population, or approximately 10,700 persons. The group must provide this number of signatures as proof. Second-tier registration entitles religious groups to government subsidies. In addition, only clergy of registered second-tier religious groups may perform officially recognized marriage ceremonies and serve as chaplains in the military and at prisons. Prisoners who belong to unregistered religious groups or groups with first-tier status may receive visits from their own clergy, outside of the prison chaplaincy system.

Religious groups registered prior to 2002 have automatic second-tier status without having to fulfill the requirements for second-tier registration.

There are 38 state-registered religious groups; 16 groups are first tier and 22 are second tier.

Unregistered religious groups are free to assemble and worship but may not legally own property. The law provides unregistered groups the option of forming civic associations to manage their property.

The law authorizes the government to return to 17 religious groups (including the FJC) land and other property confiscated during the communist era and still in the government’s possession, the total value of which is estimated to be approximately 75 billion koruna ($3.59 billion). It also sets aside 59 billion koruna ($2.83 billion) for financial compensation for lands that cannot be returned, to be paid over 30 years to 17 second-tier religious groups, including the Roman Catholic Church, FJC, Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren, and Hussite Church, that received state subsidies prior to the enactment of the restitution law. Using a mechanism prescribed by law based on an agreement among the religious groups concerned, the government allocates slightly more than 79 percent of the financial compensation to the Catholic Church. Religious groups had a one-year window, which ended in 2013, to make restitution claims for confiscated land and other property, which the government is processing. If the government rejects a property claim, the claimant may appeal the decision in the courts. The law also contains provisions for phasing out direct state subsidies to second-tier religious groups over a 17-year period, ending in 2029.

The law permits second-tier registered religious groups to apply through the MOC to teach religion in state schools; 11 of the 22 second-tier groups have applied and received permission. The teachers are supplied by the religious groups and paid by the state. If a state school does not have enough funds to pay for its religious education teachers, teachers are paid by parishes or dioceses. Although the law makes religious instruction in public schools optional, school directors must provide instruction in the beliefs of one of the 11 approved religious groups if seven or more students of that religious group request it, in which case the school provides the religious instruction only to the students who requested it.

The government does not regulate instruction in private schools.

The penal code outlaws denial of Nazi, communist, or other genocide, providing for prison sentences of six months to three years for public denial, questioning, approval of, or attempts to justify the genocide committed by the Nazis. The law also prohibits the incitement of hatred based on religion and provides for penalties of up to three years’ imprisonment.

Foreign religious workers must obtain long-term residence and work permits to remain in the country more than 90 days. There is no special visa category for religious workers; foreign missionaries and clergy are required to meet the conditions for a standard work permit.

The law designates January 27 as Holocaust Remembrance Day.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The MOC did not register any religious groups during the year. Registration applications by Theravada Buddhists in May and the Priestly Fraternity of St. Pius X in 2016 remained pending at year’s end. In January the ministry rejected PGJ’s registration application on grounds of what it characterized as abuse of personal information, incitement of hate, and the primarily for-profit character of the group’s activities. In February the group appealed the decision to the MOC. In September Minister of Culture Daniel Herman upheld the rejection. Following that decision, PGJ appealed to the municipal court in Prague. PGJ said it expected the court to begin hearing the case in early 2018.

In February the Lions of the Round Table – Order of the Lands of the Czech Crown – appealed in court against the MOC’s rejection of its first-tier registration application in May 2016. The case was pending at year’s end. In June the Community of Buddhism in the Czech Republic appealed to the MOC, asking it to reconsider its decision in May to halt the group’s 2016 registration application. The MOC rejected the appeal in December. In December 2016, the Cannabis Church appealed in court the MOC’s halting of its registration procedure. The case remained pending at year’s end. The MOC said it had halted the applications of both these groups because they had not provided sufficient information in their registration applications as required by law.

The government provided 17 second-tier religious groups with approximately 3.4 billion koruna ($162.8 million), with approximately 1.3 billion koruna ($62.25 million) given as a subsidy and 2.1 billion koruna ($100.6 million) as compensation for communal property in private and state hands that would not be returned to churches. Five of the 22 second-tier groups declined all state funding. While accepting the state subsidy, the Baptist Union opted not to accept the compensation for unreturned property. The MOC provided 4.0 million koruna ($192,000) in grants for religiously oriented cultural activities in response to applications from a variety of religious groups.

PGJ leader Jaroslav Dobes and PGJ member Barbora Plaskova remained in immigration detention in the Philippines, where they had been seeking asylum since 2015. International arrest warrants issued by Czech authorities for Dobes and Plaskova remained outstanding, as criminal proceeding against Dobes and Plaskova for alleged sexual abuse remained pending in the Zlin Regional Court.

In January the Prague 10 District Court ruled in favor of a state nursing school which a former Muslim student had sued in 2013 for discrimination because the school barred her from wearing a hijab during classes. The court ruled there was no evidence of discrimination. In September the appellate senate of the Prague Municipal Court upheld the ruling. The appellate court found the school’s prohibition did not constitute discrimination because it applied to all head coverings and not just to hijabs.

The government addressed hundreds of religious communal property restitution cases, restituting property to 17 religious groups during the year. These included claims of the Roman Catholic authorities and other religious groups concerning property seized during the communist era. Although the government returned most Catholic churches, parishes, and monasteries in the 1990s, much of the land and forests the Church had previously owned remained in state possession and were being returned in the framework of 2012 restitution legislation. Between January and March the government settled 735 claims with religious groups for agricultural property and 106 claims for nonagricultural property. As of March 31, there were 65 agricultural and 120 nonagricultural property claims that had not been adjudicated. At that time, there were also 1,203 pending lawsuits religious groups had filed in the courts to appeal government restitution decisions.

In August the South Moravian Regional Court in Brno overturned a decision by the municipal court that had ruled in February in favor of the Brno Jewish Community (BJC), holding that it had legal title to a property in possession of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. The ministry had appealed the municipal court’s decision to the regional court. In reaction to the revocation by the regional court, the BJC appealed to the Supreme Court. The appeal was pending at year’s end. The BJC filed its claim in 2013 based on church restitution legislation, and the ministry rejected the claim in 2014.

The MOI continued to cooperate with the Jewish community on protection of Jewish sites in Prague and across the country.

In January the MOC designated as items of cultural heritage 12 tombstones and tombstone fragments originally from a former Jewish cemetery in Prostejov that the MOC designated as a cultural monument in 2016. The Prostejov local mayor supported a local petition against privately funded efforts to restore the Prostejov cemetery, which the Nazis had destroyed, and which the city later converted into a public park. In November 2016, 10 percent of the city’s voters signed the petition. According to the petition and the mayor, the park provided needed access to a nearby school and residential parking; according to the national media, planners said the reconstruction would not restrict access or impede parking. Soon thereafter, anti-Semitic statements appeared in social media, and a local tabloid, Prostejovsky vecernik, characterized the dispute as an Orthodox Jewish attack on the city. In February Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka appointed his chief advisor, Vladimir Spidla, to mediate the dispute, which was continuing at year’s end.

President Milos Zeman and Prime Minister Sobotka continued to make public statements against Muslim immigration. For example, in September President Zeman stated at a press conference after meeting with his German counterpart that Muslim culture was not compatible with European culture. He stated integration of Muslims into national society was “practically impossible.” In August Prime Minister Sobotka told the Austrian newspaper Die Presse, “We do not want any more Muslims in the Czech Republic.” In June citing “the aggravated security situation and the dysfunctionality of the whole [relocation] system,” Interior Minister Milan Chovanec announced the government had approved a decision to halt acceptance of refugees under the EU’s refugee relocation program. At the time, the country had accepted 12 of approximately 2,700 refugees, whom the EU had allotted to the country and many of whom came from Muslim-majority countries.

In September Tomio Okamura, the leader of the opposition FDD, and other members of the party leadership issued a public statement calling for a ban on Islam as “an ideology incompatible with freedom and democracy.” The party ran on an anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant platform, posting billboards reading, “No to Islam” before October parliamentary elections. The party won more than 10 percent of the vote.

In May the government approved the annual Strategy to Combat Extremism, which outlined tasks for various ministries, such as the MOI, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education, and MOC, in fighting extremism, including religiously motivated extremism. The document outlined primary strategic goals, including better communication with the public regarding extremist activities and MOI countermeasures, education programs at schools, crime prevention, specialized training for law enforcement to counter extremism, and assistance to victims of crimes, especially victims from minority groups. The MOI continued to monitor the activities of groups and political parties espousing anti-Semitic views, including National Democracy, National Revival, and the Workers’ Party of Social Justice.

In April Deputy Chairman of the Senate Jaroslav Kubera and Minister of Culture Herman sponsored and participated in an annual march and concert against anti-Semitism, which opened the 14th Culture against Anti-Semitism Festival. Approximately 750 people attended the event.

At year’s end the government was continuing to review the 2016 applications of 92 Chinese Christians on grounds of religious persecution in China.

The government funded religiously oriented cultural activities, including the 2017 Night of Churches in several cities, the annual National Pilgrimage of St. Wenceslaus, the Culture against Anti-Semitism Festival, the 2017 Hussite Festival, and the 13th International Festival of Sacral Music, as well as a series of ecumenical services that included Romani religious music.

The country is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

According to estimates from NGO In Iustitia, there were reports of 34 religiously motivated hate incidents during the year, 22 against Muslims, 10 against Jews, and two against Christians, compared with 24 cases in 2016. In Iustitia did not provide details of the incidents.

In 2016, the most recent year for which data were available, the MOI recorded 28 criminal offenses with anti-Semitic motives, compared with 47 cases in the previous year. The MOI reported seven criminal offenses with anti-Muslim motives in 2016 compared with five in 2015. The MOI did not provide details of the incidents.

In July a woman assaulted two Muslim women accompanying a group of children to a water park in Prague. The attacker photographed the group and then insulted the two women, kicking and punching one of them, after the women asked her to stop taking pictures of the group. Police said they were investigating the alleged attacker on suspicion of committing a misdemeanor.

PGJ said its members faced societal discrimination stemming from negative media reporting about the group. PGJ compiled 14 statements from members describing instances of discrimination. Members said they faced difficulty leasing space for PGJ events, encountered difficulties selling PGJ books, lost clients when their affiliation with the group became known, been dismissed or threatened with dismissal from their jobs, and felt they must conceal their membership in the group from family, friends, and associates. PGJ stated nine media reports on the group during the year contained false or defamatory information or violated the group’s presumption of innocence. Other reports, according to PGJ, called its leader, Jaroslav Dobes, “a notorious fraudster, a fake guru, and sexual abuser of women,” and PGJ “a dangerous cult or sect.” The umbrella organization Czech Women’s Lobby (CWL), representing 32 women’s organizations, stated that several former members of the PGJ turned to CWL member organization ProFem (Center for Victims of Domestic and Sexual Violence) after they experienced sexual abuse by PGJ leader Jaroslav Dobes during spiritual practices. ProFem provided them with social and legal counseling.

According to press reports, groups that included the Worker’s Party of Social Justice and the Block Against Islamization (BPI) – political parties which did not hold office at any level – organized a number of demonstrations in Prague and elsewhere against accepting migrants and refugees, many of whom were Muslim, and against the EU for imposing refugee quotas. One such demonstration was held in Wenceslas Square in Prague in May. The number of participants at the demonstrations generally varied between dozens and 100.

In October the national television service filed a criminal complaint, asking law enforcement to investigate the BPI for what the station said was an anti-Muslim election campaign video it was required by law to broadcast.

In March the police concluded an investigation of Martin Konvicka, leader of the Block Against Islam group that dissolved itself in 2016. In 2016, Block Against Islam staged a mock attack by ISIS in the center of Prague. Police stated the investigation did not prove the group committed a crime and did not file charges. By year’s end, authorities had not yet concluded a pre-trial phase of the prosecution of Konvicka, whom they charged in 2016 with incitement of hatred and suppression of rights and freedoms for statements they said he made on the internet against Islam and Muslims.

In February online news platform Coda Story cited Lukas Houdek, project coordinator of HateFree, a government antidiscrimination program, as stating that anti-Muslim sentiment had found fertile ground in the country. Many people, he said, had no personal experience with Islam, and anti-Muslim attitudes appeared to stem from fear of the unknown. According to Houdek, “most of the [television] news you see about Muslims is negative.” Coda Story also cited a report by internet research project Netmonitor.cz stating that what it described as the most popular anti-Muslim web outlet, Parlamentni listy, averaged 123,000 readers per day in January, compared with 1.6 million readers for novinky.cz, the most popular news website in the country.

In May the Ethical Commission of the Syndicate of Journalists stated some of the articles on efforts to restore the Prostejov Jewish cemetery published in Prostejovsky vecernik weekly exhibited features of anti-Semitism. The Kolel Damesek Eliezer Foundation, a U.S. charity involved with the restoration effort, had filed a complaint with the commission about Prostejovsky vecernik’s coverage.

Adam Bartos, Chairman of the National Democracy Party, which did not hold political office at any level, continued to post anti-Semitic writings on social media. In March a regional court in Brno upheld a one-year suspended prison sentence with two years of probation for incitement to hatred and defamation over a note Bartos wrote in 2015 supporting an 1899 Jewish blood libel trial. Bartos appealed to the Supreme Court. In July the Prague 1 District Court heard a case in which authorities charged Bartos with incitement to hatred and Holocaust denial on the internet, in public speeches, and books. The case remained pending at year’s end.

From January to September the MOI reported seven private “white power” music concerts took place in the country, where participants expressed anti-Semitic and neo-Nazi views. The MOI did not provide additional details.

In April youths vandalized a symbolic tombstone of Rabbi Zvi Horowitz, designated as a cultural monument at the site of the former Jewish cemetery in Prostejov. Police declined to pursue the case because the perpetrators were minors. In a previous vandalism case in 2016, in which a group damaged 30 tombstones at the Jewish cemetery in Korycany, authorities also declined to file charges because the alleged vandals were minors.

In August the European Shoah Legacy Institute ceased operations, reportedly for lack of funding. The NGO had sought systematic international solutions for restitution of Jewish cultural assets stolen by the Nazis and promoted provision of adequate social welfare to Holocaust survivors and Holocaust education.

The government-funded Endowment Fund for Holocaust Victims, established by the FJC, again contributed 4.5 million koruna ($215,000) to 13 institutions providing health and social care to approximately 500 Holocaust survivors.

The U.S. embassy continued to engage government officials from the MOC, especially the Department of Churches, on issues such as church restitution and religious tolerance. In March embassy officials and representatives from SEHI met with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to reiterate continued support for the goals of 2009 Terezin Declaration, especially property restitution and the welfare of Holocaust survivors, after the closure of the European Shoah Legacy Institute in August.

In a series of meetings in June, Department of State representatives and embassy officials discussed religious tolerance with representatives of the MOC and with religious groups and NGOs, including the Ecumenical Council of Churches, the FJC, the Czech Council of Jewish Women, In Iustitia, and the NGO People in Need.

The embassy monitored the process of restitution of church property. Embassy officials responded to requests for assistance from two U.S. citizen Holocaust victims seeking compensation for property seized in the past. The government informed the claimants it could not return the property under the existing restitution law.

In June the Charge d’Affaires hosted an iftar during which representatives of the local Muslim community, NGOs, Deputy Minister of Human Rights Martina Stepankova, and Senator Hassan Mezian discussed religious tolerance and the need for interfaith dialogue to overcome perceived differences.

The Charge d’Affaires and other embassy officials continued to meet with representatives of Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim groups to reaffirm commitment for religious tolerance and to hear the groups’ views on interfaith relations.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 25.2 million (July 2017 estimate). In a 2002 report to the UN Human Rights Committee, the government reported there were 12,000 Protestants, 10,000 Buddhists, and 800 Roman Catholics. The report noted Cheondoism, a modern religious movement based on a 19th century Korean neo-Confucian movement, had approximately 15,000 practitioners. Consulting shamans and engaging in shamanistic rituals is reportedly widespread but difficult to quantify. The South Korea-based Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB) reported that five priests from the Russian Orthodox Church are in Pyongyang. South Korean and other foreign religious groups estimate the number of religious practitioners in the country is considerably higher than reported by the authorities. UN estimates place the Christian population at between 200,000 and 400,000. In a 2012 report, Cornerstone Ministries International (CMI) stated that it was in contact with 37,000 churchgoers in the country. CMI estimated 10-45 percent of those imprisoned in detention camps were Christians. The COI report stated, based on the government’s own figures, the proportion of religious adherents among the population dropped from close to 24 percent in 1950 to 0.016 percent in 2002.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides “Citizens shall have the right of faith. This right guarantees them chances to build religious facilities or perform religious rituals.” It further provides, however, “Religion must not be used as a pretext for drawing in foreign forces or for harming the state and social order.”

According to a 2014 official government document, “Freedom of religion is allowed and provided by the State law within the limit necessary for securing social order, health, social security, morality and other human rights.”

The country’s criminal code punishes a “person who, without authorization, imports, makes, distributes or illegally keeps drawings, photos, books, video recordings or electronic media that reflect decadent, carnal or foul contents.” The criminal code also bans engagement in “superstitious activities in exchange for money or goods.” The NGO Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) reported that under these two provisions, ownership of religious materials brought in from abroad is illegal and punishable by imprisonment and other forms of severe punishment, including execution. Also according to HRNK, the law banning “superstitious activities” is specifically intended to prohibit fortune telling and enable the imprisonment of fortune tellers.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government continued to deal harshly with those who engaged in almost any religious practices through executions, torture, beatings, and arrests. An estimated 80,000 to 120,000 political prisoners, some imprisoned for religious reasons, were believed to be held in the political prison camp system in remote areas under horrific conditions. Christian Solidarity Worldwide said a policy of guilt by association was often applied in cases of detentions of Christians, meaning that the relatives of Christians were also detained regardless of their beliefs.

Religious and human rights groups outside the country continued to provide numerous reports that members of underground churches were arrested, beaten, tortured, and killed because of their religious beliefs. According to the NKDB, there was a report in 2016 of disappearances of persons who were found to be practicing religion within detention facilities. International NGOs and North Korean defectors reported any religious activities conducted outside of those that were state-sanctioned, including praying, singing hymns, and reading the Bible, could lead to severe punishment, including imprisonment in political prison camps.

The country has in the past detained foreigners allegedly engaging in religious work within its borders. Reports indicated that authorities released one foreign Christian in August.

The NKDB aggregated 1,304 cases of violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief by authorities within the country during the year. Charges included propagation of religion, possession of religious materials, religious activity, and contact with religious practitioners. Of the 1,304 cases, DPRK authorities reportedly detained 770 (59 percent), restricted movement of 133 (10.2 percent), killed 119 (9.1 percent), disappeared 87 (6.7 percent), deported or forcibly moved 48 (3.7 percent), and physically injured 44 (3.4 percent). The NKDB had recorded 1,247 such cases in 2016. According to a survey of 11,805 defectors from North Korea referenced in the NKDB white paper, 99.6 percent said there was no religious freedom in the country. Only 4.2 percent of 12,032 defectors said they had seen a Bible when they lived there, although survey data reflected a slight increase in recent years.

According to a South Korea-based NGO, evidence was discovered in 2016 that the organization said confirmed DPRK security entities actively targeted religious practitioners, including Christians and Buddhists and their networks. The NGO stated that the evidence also suggested security officials imprisoned and executed citizens suspected of religious involvement.

According to media reports, activists said DPRK agents killed Korean-Chinese Christian Pastor Han Choong Yeol in April 2016. The pastor operated a church in Changbai, Jilin Province in northeast China, and had provided aid to defectors from North Korea. DPRK authorities said South Korea was responsible for the killing. Radio Free Asia reported that on June 3, authorities in Hyesan City beat and arrested a 61-year-old man after he returned from visiting relatives in China. The man had reportedly attended Christian church services and was subsequently charged with espionage.

According to Washington, DC-based NGO North Korean Refugees in the USA, a North Korean defected in May after spending eight years in prison for attending church in China for four months. Reportedly, she was charged with practicing Christianity and learning of its “disgraceful nature.” During her imprisonment, authorities told her up to a dozen times a day to repent of her past and try to “wash” her mind. She reported six other women who were in prison for attending church were either beaten to death or died from diarrhea because they did not have access to medicine.

The Christian Post reported in April that Hye Jin Lim of the Seoul-based New Korea Women’s Union said Chinese police detained 17 North Korean orphan defectors, all minors, and repatriated them to North Korea. She said the North Korean security agents found out three of the 17 were Christians because they had “calluses on their knees, as they had been praying for a long time for God to help them.” Authorities reportedly sent them to a political prison camp – an illegal action, according to Lim, because children under the age of 18 should not have been sent to a political prison camp – while they sent the remaining 14 to a reeducation camp.

In August the UN secretary-general and in October the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK released reports reiterating concerns about the country’s use of arbitrary executions, political prison camps, and torture amounting to crimes against humanity. In March and December, the UN Human Rights Council and UN General Assembly plenary session, respectively, adopted resolutions by consensus that “condemned in the strongest terms long-standing and ongoing systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations,” including denial of the right to religious freedom, and urged the government to acknowledge such violations of human rights and take immediate steps to end all such violations and abuses through the implementation of relevant recommendations by the United Nations. The annual resolutions again welcomed the Security Council’s continued consideration of the relevant conclusions and recommendations of the COI. The February 2014 COI final report concluded there was an almost complete denial by the government of the rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, as well as the rights to freedom of opinion, expression, information, and association. It further concluded that, in many instances, the violations of human rights committed by the government constituted crimes against humanity, and it recommended that the United Nations ensure those most responsible for the crimes against humanity were held accountable.

The COI report found the government considered Christianity a serious threat, as it challenged the official cult of personality and provided a platform for social and political organization and interaction outside the government. The report concluded Christians faced persecution, violence, and heavy punishment if they practiced their religion outside the state-controlled churches. The report further recommended the country allow Christians and other religious believers to exercise their religion independently and publicly without fear of punishment, reprisal, or surveillance.

Defectors reported the government increased its investigation, repression, and persecution of unauthorized religious groups in recent years, but access to information on current conditions was limited.

According to the South Korean government-affiliated Korea Institute for National Unification’s (KINU) 2017 report, “It is practically impossible for North Korean people to have a religion in their daily lives.” According to the NKDB, the constitution represents only a nominal freedom granted to political supporters, and only when the regime deems it necessary to use it as a policy tool. A survey of 11,730 refugees between 2007 and April 2016 by the NKDB found 99.6 percent said there was no religious freedom in the country.

Defectors reported that the ruling party prohibited members from practicing religion.

Juche, or “self reliance,” and Suryong, or “supreme leader,” remained important ideological underpinnings of the government and the cult of personalities of previous leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and current leader Kim Jong Un. Refusal on religious or other grounds to accept the leader as the supreme authority was regarded as opposition to the national interest and reportedly resulted in severe punishment.

Some scholars stated the Juche philosophy and reverence for the Kim family resembled a form of state-sponsored theology. Approximately 100,000 Juche research centers reportedly existed throughout the country.

While shamanism has always been practiced to some degree in the country, NGOs noted an apparent continued increase in shamanistic practices, including in Pyongyang. These NGOs reported that government authorities continued to react by taking measures against the practice of shamanism. In October HRNK reported that at least one individual had recently been imprisoned for fortune telling and other “crimes.” Defector reports cited an increase in party members consulting fortune tellers in order to gauge the best time to defect.

According to the NKDB, the South Korean government estimated as of 2016 there were 121 religious facilities in North Korea, including 60 Buddhist temples, 52 Cheondoist temples, three state-controlled Protestant churches, and one Russian Orthodox Church. A 2014 government report also cited the existence of 64 Buddhist temples but said the temples had lost religious significance in the country and remained only as cultural heritage sites or tourist destinations. The 2015 KINU white paper counted 60 Buddhist temples and noted that most citizens did not realize Buddhist temples were religious facilities nor saw Buddhist monks as religious figures.

The five state-controlled Christian churches in Pyongyang included three Protestant churches (Bongsu, Chilgol, and Jeil churches), a Catholic church (Changchung Cathedral), and Life-Giving Trinity Russian Orthodox Church. Chilgol church was dedicated to the memory of former leader Kim Il Sung’s mother, Kang Pan Sok, who was a Presbyterian deaconess. The number of congregants regularly worshiping at these five churches was unknown, and there was no information on whether scheduled services were available at these locations. Reports from visitors taken to these churches to attend services when visiting Pyongyang reported local citizens in attendance appeared to have been brought in for the occasion, and they seemed to be observers rather than participants. Some defectors who previously lived in or near Pyongyang reported knowing about these churches. One defector said when he lived in Pyongyang, authorities arrested individuals who they believed lingered too long outside these churches to listen to the music or consistently drove past them around each week when services were being held on suspicion of being secret Christians. This defector also said authorities quickly realized one unintended consequence of allowing music at the services and allowing persons to attend church was that many of the attendees converted to Christianity, so authorities took steps to mitigate that outcome. Numerous other defectors from outside Pyongyang reported no knowledge of these churches, and according to the 2017 KINU white paper, no Protestant or Catholic churches existed in the country except in Pyongyang.

KINU also reported in 2015 the existence of state-sanctioned religious organizations in the country such as the Korean Christian Federation (KCF), Korea Buddhist Federation, Korean Catholic Association (KCA), Korea Chondoist Central Guidance Committee, and Korean Council of Religionists. The NKDB white paper also noted the existence of the Korea Orthodox Committee. There was minimal information available on the activities of such organizations, except for some information on inter-Korean religious exchanges in 2015.

The government-established KCA provided basic services at the Changchung Roman Catholic Cathedral but had no ties to the Vatican. There also were no Vatican-recognized Catholic priests, monks, or nuns residing anywhere in the country.

According to religious leaders who have traveled to the country, there were Protestant pastors at the Bongsu and Chilgol churches, although it was not known if they were resident or visiting pastors.

Five Russian Orthodox priests served at the Life-Giving Trinity Russian Orthodox Church, purportedly to provide pastoral care to Russians in the country. Several of them reportedly studied at the Russian Orthodox seminary in Moscow.

In its 2002 report to the UN Human Rights Committee, the government reported the existence of 500 “family worship centers.” According to the 2017 KINU report, however, while some Pyongyang residents had heard of them, most persons living outside Pyongyang were not aware of the existence of such family churches. Those who were aware of their existence were not able to identify them as places of worship. According to a survey of 11,967 defectors cited in the 2017 NKDB report, none had ever seen any of these purported home churches, and only 1.3 percent of respondents believed they existed. Observers stated that “family worship centers” may be part of the state-controlled KCF.

The COI report concluded that authorities systematically sought to hide from the international community the persecution of Christians who practiced their religion outside state-controlled churches by pointing to the small number of state-controlled churches as exemplifying religious freedom and pluralism.

According to KINU’s 2017 report, the government continued to use authorized religious organizations for external propaganda and political purposes and reported citizens were strictly barred from entering places of worship. Ordinary citizens considered such places primarily as “sightseeing spots for foreigners.” Foreigners who met with representatives of government-sponsored religious organizations stated they believed some members were genuinely religious, but they noted others appeared to know little about religious doctrine. KINU concluded the lack of churches or religious facilities in the provinces indicated ordinary citizens did not have religious freedom.

In August NK News, an independent news provider based outside the country, reported the government recently attempted to appear less hostile to Christianity by sending local clergy to international Christian seminars and publishing its own official translation of the King James Bible. In May NK News interviewed an official of the privately funded Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, who said he occasionally attended the local Protestant church in Pyongyang where the pastor’s sermon was “normally good” but often focused on progovernment politics. The official added he and his colleagues confined their worship to 6 a.m. prayers in a small university office.

The NKDB stated that officials conducted thorough searches of incoming packages and belongings at ports and airports to search for religious items as well as other items deemed objectionable by the government.

Little was known about the day-to-day life of individuals practicing a religion. There were no reports that members of government-controlled religious groups suffered discrimination, but the government reportedly regarded members of underground churches or those connected to missionary activities as subversive elements. Scholars said authorities meted out strict punishment to forcibly returned defectors, including those who had contact with Christian missionaries or other foreigners while in China.

The government reportedly allowed certain forms of religious education, including programs at three-year colleges for training Protestant and Buddhist clergy, a religious studies program at Kim Il-sung University, a graduate institution that trained pastors, and other seminaries related to Christian or Buddhist groups.

Christians were restricted to the lowest class rungs of the songbun system, which classifies individuals on the basis of social class, family background, and presumed support of the regime based on political opinion and religious views. The songbun classification system results in discrimination in education, health care, employment opportunities, and residence. According to KINU, the government continued to view Christianity in particular as a means of foreign, Western encroachment. KINU again reported that citizens continued to receive education from authorities at least twice a year emphasizing ways to detect and identity individuals who engage in spreading Christianity.

The government reportedly was concerned that faith-based South Korean relief and refugee assistance efforts along the northeast border of China had both humanitarian and political goals, including the overthrow of the government, and alleged these groups were involved in intelligence gathering. The government reportedly tightened border controls in an effort to crack down on any such activities.

The government continued to allow some overseas faith-based aid organizations to operate inside the country to provide humanitarian assistance. Such organizations reported they were not allowed to proselytize; their contact with local citizens was limited and strictly monitored, and government escorts accompanied them at all times. Some workers of such organizations reported being permitted to take their personal Bibles into the country.

Defector accounts indicated religious practitioners often concealed their activities from neighbors, coworkers, and other members of society due to the fear that their activities would be reported to the authorities.

The COI report concluded government messaging regarding the purported evils of Christianity led to negative views of Christianity among ordinary citizens.

During the year, KINU reported accounts of private Christian religious activity in the country, although the existence of underground churches and the scope of underground religious activity remained difficult to quantify. While some NGOs and academics estimated up to several hundred thousand Christians practicing their faith underground, others questioned the existence of a large-scale underground church or concluded it was impossible to estimate accurately the number of underground religious believers. Individual underground congregations were reportedly very small and typically confined to private homes. Some defector reports confirmed unapproved religious materials were available and secret religious meetings occurred, spurred by cross-border contact with individuals and groups in China. Some NGOs reported individual underground churches were connected to each other through well-established networks. The government did not allow outsiders access to confirm such claims.

Foreign legislators who attended services in Pyongyang in previous years reported congregations arrived and departed services as groups on tour buses, and some observed the worshippers did not include any children. Some foreigners noted they were not permitted to have contact with worshippers, and others stated they had limited interaction with them. Foreign observers had limited ability to ascertain the level of government control over these groups but generally assumed the government monitored them closely. According KINU, some foreign Christians who visited the country said church activities seemed staged, and added they witnessed the door of the church was closed when they attempted to visit without prior consultation.

According to KINU, defectors reported being unaware of any recognized religious organizations that maintained branches outside Pyongyang. Religious ceremonies such as for weddings and funerals were almost unknown.

The U.S. government does not have diplomatic relations with the DPRK and has no official presence in the country. It used other mechanisms to address religious freedom concerns.

The United States cosponsored resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council in March and December that condemned the country’s “systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations.” The resolutions further expressed grave concern over the country’s denial of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, as well as of the rights to freedom of opinion, expression, and association, and urged the government to take immediate steps to ensure these rights.

On October 26, the Department of State submitted the third biannual Report on Human Rights Abuses and Censorship in North Korea to Congress. The report identified two entities and seven government officials as responsible for or associated with serious human rights abuses or censorship. The report stated, “The government also maintains an extensive system of forced labor through its rigid controls over workers, and restricts the exercise of freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, association, religion or belief, and movement.”

The U.S. government raised concerns about religious freedom in the country in other multilateral forums and in bilateral discussions with other governments, particularly those with diplomatic relations with the country. The United States has made clear that addressing human rights, including religious freedom, would significantly improve prospects for closer ties between the two countries. Senior U.S. government officials, including the Deputy Secretary of State and the Special Representative for North Korea Policy, met with defectors and NGOs that focused on the country, including some Christian humanitarian organizations.

Since 2001, the country has been designated as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. On December 22, 2017, the Secretary of State redesignated the country as a CPC and identified the following sanction that accompanied the designation: the existing ongoing restrictions to which North Korea is subject, pursuant to sections 402 and 409 of the Trade Act of 1974 (the Jackson-Vanik Amendment) pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 83.3 million (July 2017 estimate). The last national census was performed in 1981, and many existing demographic statistics vary in estimates and reliability. The Pew Research Center estimates 95.8 percent of the population is Christian, 1.5 percent is Muslim, and 1.8 percent report no religious affiliation (2010 estimate). Of the Christian groups, 48.1 percent are Protestant, including evangelical Christians and the Church of Jesus Christ on Earth through the Prophet Simon Kimbangu (Kimbanguist), and 47.3 percent are Catholic. Other Christian groups include the Jehovah’s Witnesses, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and the Greek Orthodox Church. There are small communities of Hindus, Jews, Buddhists, Bahais, and followers of indigenous religious beliefs. Muslim leaders estimate their community to be approximately 5 percent of the population, rather than the 1.5 percent reported by Pew.

A significant portion of the population combines traditional beliefs and practices with Christianity or other religious beliefs.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and provides for freedom of religion and the right to worship subject to “compliance with the law, public order, public morality, and the rights of others.” It stipulates the right to religious freedom cannot be abrogated even when the government declares a state of emergency or siege.

The law regulates the establishment and operation of religious groups. According to the law, the government may legally recognize, suspend recognition of, or dissolve religious groups. The government grants tax-exempt status to recognized religious groups. Nonprofit organizations, including foreign and domestic religious groups, must register with the government to obtain official recognition by submitting a copy of their bylaws and constitution. Religious groups must register only once for the group as a whole, but nonprofit organizations affiliated with a religious group must register separately. Upon submission, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (MOJ) issues a provisional approval and, within six months, a permanent approval or rejection. Unless the ministry specifically rejects the application, the group is considered approved and registered after six months even if the ministry has not issued a final determination. Applications from international headquarters of religious organizations must be approved by the Presidency after submission through the MOJ. The law requires officially recognized religious groups to operate as nonprofits and respect the general public order. It also permits religious groups to establish places of worship and train clergy. The law prescribes penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment and/or a fine of 200,000 Congolese francs ($130) for groups which are not properly registered but receive gifts and donations on behalf of a church or religious organization.

The constitution allows public schools to work with religious authorities to provide religious education to students in accordance with students’ religious beliefs if parents request it. Public schools with religious institution guardianship may provide religious instruction, but government-owned schools may not mandate religious instruction.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Because religious and political issues overlap, it was difficult to categorize some incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

On September 15, government security forces shot and killed 36 Burundian refugees and asylum seekers in Kamanyola outside of Bukavu in the eastern part of the country. The Burundians were Christian followers of Eusebie Ngendakumana, who said she had visions of the Virgin Mary in Burundi. The followers were critical of the Burundi president and were killed while protesting the forcible deportation of some of their members back to Burundi. The motive for the killings was unclear. Since 2015, over 2,000 Burundian members of this movement have sought refuge in the country.

In March authorities arrested Ne Muanda Nsemi, the leader of the BDK separatist political-religious group, which calls for the secession of Kongo Central, after a series of clashes between Nsemi and government forces. Nsemi, who is believed by his followers to have religious or mystical powers, used women and children as human shields during the standoff to keep government security forces from raiding his compound. In May Nsemi escaped from jail, along with as many as 4,000 other prisoners, when unknown assailants attacked Kinshasa’s Makala Prison. On August 7, BDK members attacked police and civilians in Kinshasa, killing several. According to the UN Joint Office of Human Rights, government security forces killed an unspecified number of civilians during the ensuing security force response.

On December 31, government security forces used teargas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition to disrupt peaceful protests in Kinshasa organized by Catholic Church leaders calling for credible elections and implementation of the CENCO-mediated December 2016 Agreement between the government and opposition parties. Church leaders and civil society organizations reported that state security forces arrested priests and churchgoers, encircled at least 134 parishes in Kinshasa, interrupted Mass in five churches, blocked access to two churches, forcibly entered at least 18 churches, and deployed tear gas in 10 others. At least five people were killed and as many as 92 were injured. More than 100 people were arrested, some of whom were held incommunicado. Some of those who were severely injured were shot by live ammunition or rubber bullets while inside church compounds. Security forces shot at least one person in the head at point blank range and then shot with rubber bullets a priest who was carrying the injured parishioner.

Catholic Church leaders reported acts of violence and intimidation against Church officials in response to Church support for elections and implementation of the December 2016 Agreement, which called for elections by December, prevented President Joseph Kabila from seeking a third presidential term or changing the constitution, and called for the release of political prisoners and an end to politically motivated prosecutions. For instance, Catholic seminaries were targets of vandalism in February and March in what CENCO said was retaliation for its mediation of the December 2016 Agreement and support for its implementation. On February 12, unknown assailants vandalized Saint Dominique’s Church in Kinshasa. On February 18, assailants ransacked and burned part of a seminary in Malole in the town of Kananga in Kasai Central Province. On February 19, assailants vandalized a Catholic church in Kinshasa’s Limete neighborhood. According to Church leaders, assailants “overturned the tabernacle, ransacked the altar, smashed some of the benches, and attempted to set fire to the church.” On February 21, unidentified individuals broke into the parish of St. Mary in Lukalaba of Kasai Oriental, breaking windows and stealing liturgical books and other objects. That same day in Lubumbashi, unidentified individuals vandalized the St. Jean parish building and attempted to break into the parish of St. Kizito. Following these incidents, Cardinal Laurent Monsengwo, the Archbishop of Kinshasa, said in a public statement that the Catholic Church was “being targeted deliberately in order to sabotage her mission of peace and reconciliation.” Catholic clergy were also threatened after CENCO released a statement on April 21 expressing concern about the government’s failure to implement the December Agreement as written.

Catholic leaders and institutions were also threatened after Church leaders expressed concern over violence they attributed to government security forces and the Kamuina Nsapu militia in Kasai. According to the UN Joint Office of Human Rights, on February 4-5 in Luiza territory, government security forces killed 49 civilians including 39 children who had taken refuge at a Catholic mission. In June the Catholic Church reported that as many as 3,383 people had been killed in Kasai since August 2016. The Apostolic Nunciature also reported that from October 2016 to June 2017, 232 Catholic Church buildings and schools in Kasai were attacked amid fighting between government security forces and the Nsapu militia. Church leaders also stated that some Catholic officials in Kasai who publicly denounced the behavior of government security forces were subjected to government harassment and attacks against their congregations. Catholic Bishops in Luiza and Luebo sought refuge in Kinshasa after receiving death threats from both Nsapu militia and members of government security forces.

The MOJ again did not issue any final registration permits for religious groups and has not done so since 2014, reportedly due to an internal investigation into registration practices resulting in fraud. The government, however, continued its practice that groups have been presumed to have been approved and have been permitted to organize. Unregistered domestic religious groups reported they continued to operate unhindered. The MOJ previously estimated that more than 2,000 registration applications for both religious and nonreligious NGOs remained pending and 3,569 associations with no legal authorization continued to operate. Foreign-based religious groups reported they operated without restriction after applying for legal status. Under existing law, which was under review, nonprofit organizations could operate as legal entities by default if a government ministry gave a favorable opinion of their application and the government did not object to their application for status. According to 2015 registration statistics, the latest year for which the MOJ had statistics, there were a total of 14,568 legally registered nonprofit organizations, 11,119 legal religious nonprofit organizations, and 1,073 foreign nonprofit organizations. Religious nonprofits that were legally operating and registered included 404 Catholic, 93 Protestant, 54 Muslim, and 1,322 evangelical nonprofits, the latter including those belonging to the Kimbangu Church.

The government continued to rely on religious organizations to provide public services such as education and healthcare throughout the country. According to the Ministry of Education, approximately 72 percent of primary school students and 65 percent of secondary school students attended government-funded schools administered by religious organizations. The government paid teacher salaries at some schools run by religious groups depending on sectors, areas, and needs.

Muslim community leaders said the government did not afford them some of the same privileges as larger religious groups. The government continued to deny Muslims the opportunity to provide chaplains for Muslims in the military, police force, and hospitals, despite a complaint filed in 2015 with the president and his cabinet.

Nsapu militia members attacked and targeted Catholic Church property, schools, and clergy, according to Church sources. In Kasai, Kasai Central and Kasai Oriental Provinces, the Catholic Church reported that threats and attacks against the Church by Nsapu, other armed groups, and government forces prevented several churches from freely administering services. On February 18, Nsapu ransacked and set the Malole Catholic Seminary on fire, and then prevented the evacuation of 25 seminarians, forcing them to be airlifted to safety by UN peacekeepers. Nsapu members also robbed parishes along the road from Tshimbulu to Luiza in Kasai Central Province, making the area insecure for travel and forcing schools to close. Clergy in these areas reported receiving threats from Nsapu members and said members kidnapped four priests. Numerous Catholic schools were burned, attacked, or closed due to lack of security. In many instances, observers stated it was not clear whether government forces or Nsapu members perpetrated the attacks.

Some religious leaders reported continued tensions between Christian and Muslim communities in the eastern part of the country linked to the government’s ongoing fight against the Allied Democratic Forces and other armed groups in North Kivu Province. On April 2, armed men reportedly assaulted three priests in Paida after attacking their parish. According to news reports and a statement by the local Catholic diocese, two Catholic priests in North Kivu were kidnapped by unidentified individuals in July. As of the end of the year, neither priest had been released.

In South Kivu Province, Muslims in the Katana area said they had not received funds to rebuild their mosque after it was burned down in October 2016, despite a promise in November 2016 from the former governor of South Kivu to provide funds to rebuild the mosque.

The U.S. Charge d’Affaires and embassy officials met regularly with government officials, religious leaders, and civil society organizations to discuss religious freedom issues, such as government relations with religious organizations, violence in the Kasais and in the east, and the country’s ongoing political crisis. The discussions included numerous meetings with CENCO on the electoral process and implementation of the December 2016 St. Sylvester Agreement. The Charge d’Affaires and embassy representatives regularly urged the government and other community and political leaders to refrain from violence and respect the rights of civil society, including religious groups, to assemble and express themselves freely.

The embassy also discussed these issues with religious leaders and human rights organizations, particularly in the eastern part of the country and Kasai, and used social media to highlight religious freedom issues and promote tolerance. Embassy officials, for instance, met with members of religious communities in Kasai, Kinshasa, and in the eastern region of the country, among other places, to discuss their respective groups’ ability to practice their faith freely.

In addition, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations met with CENCO in October in Kinshasa, and in November a representative of the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor met with director the Episcopal Justice and Peace Commission.

The U.S. government estimates the total population is 5.6 million (July 2017 estimate). According to Statistics Denmark, the government statistical office, as of July 1, 76 percent of all citizens are members of the ELC.

According to the Aarhus University’s Center for Contemporary Religion, Muslims constitute 5.1 percent of the population. Muslim groups are concentrated in the largest cities, particularly Copenhagen, Odense, and Aarhus. There has been an increase in Muslim immigrants in recent years. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimates that other religious groups, each constituting less than 1 percent of the population, include, in descending order of size, Roman Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Serbian Orthodox Christians, Jews, Baptists, Buddhists, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Pentecostals, and nondenominational Christians. Academics and polling institutions estimate that up to 12-20 percent of the population, some of whom are classified as members of the ELC, identify as atheist. Although estimates vary, the Jewish Society, also known as Mosaiske, estimates the Jewish population at approximately 5,500 to 7,000, most of whom live in the Copenhagen metropolitan area.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares the ELC as the established Church, which shall receive state support and to which the reigning monarch must belong. The constitution also states individuals shall be free to form congregations to worship according to their beliefs, providing nothing “at variance with good morals or public order shall be taught or done.” It specifies that “rules for religious bodies dissenting from the Established Church shall be laid down by statute.” It stipulates that no person may be deprived of access to the full enjoyment of civil and political rights because of religious beliefs, and that these beliefs shall not be used to evade compliance with civic duty. It prohibits requiring individuals to make personal financial contributions to religious denominations to which they do not adhere.

The law prohibits hate speech, including religious hate speech that is directed at individuals or groups; the maximum penalty for hate speech is a fine or two years’ imprisonment. On June 2, parliament repealed, effective June 9, a blasphemy law, which had prescribed a maximum of four months in prison and a fine for those who mocked or insulted a legally recognized religion.

The law permits the government to prevent religious figures who are foreign nationals and do not already have a residence permit from entering the country if the Ministry of Immigration determines their presence poses a threat to the public order. In such cases the ministry places the individuals on a national sanctions list and bars them from entry into the country for a two-year period, which may be renewed.

The ELC is the only religious group that receives funding through state grants and voluntary taxes paid via payroll deduction of its members. Members receive a tax credit for their donations to the ELC. The voluntary taxes account for an estimated 86 percent of the ELC’s operating budget; the remaining 14 percent is provided through a combination of voluntary donations by congregants and grants from the government. Members of other recognized religious communities may donate to their own community voluntarily and receive a credit towards their personal income tax liability. The ELC and other state-sanctioned religious communities carry out registration of civil unions, births, and deaths for their members.

The Ministry of Culture and Ecclesiastic Affairs has responsibility for granting official status to other religious groups in addition to the ELC through recognition by historic royal decree or through official registration. According to the Ministry of Culture and Ecclesiastic Affairs, there are a total of 314 religious groups and congregations: 205 Christian groups, 66 Muslim groups, 15 Buddhist groups, nine Hindu groups, three Jewish groups, and 16 miscellaneous groups and congregations including the Bahai Faith, the Alevi Muslim community, and followers of the indigenous Norse belief system, Forn Sidr. Of this number, some groups are officially recognized while others are affiliated with recognized groups.

Recognized religious groups have the right to perform legal marriage ceremonies, name and baptize children with legal effect, issue legal death certificates, obtain residence permits for foreign clergy, establish cemeteries, and receive tax-deductible financial donations and various valued-added tax exemptions. For religious communities that do not perform baptisms, paper forms provided on the citizen services website are filled out and delivered to the clergy member or office of the religious community, who in turn registers the child in the population register. Individuals unaffiliated with a registered religious group may opt to have birth and death certificates issued by the health authority.

Groups not recognized by either royal decree or a government registration process, such as the Church of Scientology, are entitled to engage in religious practices without any kind of public registration, but members of those groups must marry in a civil ceremony in addition to any religious ceremony. Unrecognized religious groups are not granted fully tax-exempt status, but they have some tax benefits; for example, contributions by members are tax-deductible.

In order for a religious community to be registered, it must have at least 150 members, while a congregation, which the Ministry of Culture and Ecclesiastic Affairs considers as a group within one of the major world religions (Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam), must consist of at least 50 adult members to be approved. For congregations located in sparsely populated regions, such as Greenland, a lower population threshold is used. The threshold number varies, depending on the total population of a given area. The guidelines for approval of religious organizations require religious groups seeking registration to submit a document on the group’s central traditions; descriptions of its most important rituals; a copy of its rules, regulations, and organizational structure; an audited financial statement; information about the group’s leadership; and a statement on the number of adult members permanently residing in the country. Groups must also have formal procedures for membership and make its teachings available to all members. The Ministry of Justice makes the final decision on registration applications after receiving recommendations from a group consisting of a lawyer, a religious historian, a sociologist of religion, and a nonordained theologian.

The law bans judges from wearing religious symbols such as headscarves, turbans, skullcaps, and large crucifixes while in court.

All public and private schools, including religious schools, receive government financial support. Public schools must teach Evangelical Lutheran theology; the instructors are public school teachers rather than provided by the ELC. The religion classes are compulsory in grades 1-9, although students may be exempted if a parent presents a request in writing. No alternative classes are offered. The curriculum in grades 1-6 focuses on life philosophies and ethics, biblical stories, and the history of Christianity. In grades 7-9, the curriculum adds a module on world religions. The course is optional in grade 10. If the student is 15 years old or older, the student and parent must jointly request the student’s exemption. Private schools are also required to teach religion classes in grades 1-9, including world religion in grades 7-9. The religion classes taught in grades 1-9 need not be about ELC theology. Noncompulsory collective prayer in schools is allowed if it does not include proselytizing. Prayers are optional at the discretion of each school. They may consist of ELC, other Christian, Muslim, or Jewish prayers, and students may opt out of participating.

Military service is compulsory, but there is an exemption for conscientious objectors, including for religious reasons. Those who do not want to serve in the military may apply for either alternative civilian service or not to serve at all. The period of alternative service for a conscientious objector is the same as the period required for military service. An individual must apply to perform service as a conscientious objector within eight weeks of receiving notice of military service. The application must go to the Conscientious Objector Administration and must show that military service of any kind is incompatible with the individual’s conscience. The alternative service may take place in various social and cultural institutions, peace movements, organizations related to the United Nations, churches and ecumenical organizations, and environmental organizations throughout the country.

The law prohibits ritual slaughter of animals without prior stunning, including kosher and halal slaughter. The law allows for slaughter according to religious rites with prior stunning and limits such slaughter to cattle, sheep, goats, and chickens. All slaughter must take place at a slaughterhouse. Slaughterhouses practicing ritual slaughter are obliged to register with the Veterinary and Food Administration. Violations of this law are punishable by fines or up to four months in prison. Halal and kosher meat may be imported.

A law that came into force on May 1 requires clergy members with legal authorization to officiate at marriages to complete a two-day course on family law and civil rights, administered by the Ministry of Culture and Ecclesiastic Affairs. The law also includes a requirement that religious workers “must not behave or act in a way that makes them unworthy to exercise public authority.” Religious workers perceived as not complying with the new provisions may be stripped of their right to conduct marriage ceremonies.

According to European Union legislation, companies are allowed to fire employees for wearing religious symbols if their conditions of employment preclude employees from wearing such symbols.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Prosecutors invoked the country’s blasphemy law on February 22 for the first time in 46 years over a 2015 incident in which a man burned a Quran and posted a video to a Facebook group called “Yes to Freedom – No to Islam.” The individual’s lawyer stated the burning was in “self-defense” of potential Muslim aggression and cited the precedent of individuals who were not prosecuted for burning Bibles. He was charged on the grounds of inciting “public scorn or mockery of religion.” Prosecutors dropped the case as a result of the repeal of the blasphemy law in June.

The government continued to provide armed security for Jewish sites it considered to be at high risk of terrorist attack, including Copenhagen’s synagogue, community center, and schools as it had since terrorist attacks in 2015. During the summer, the military began assisting the police in protecting Jewish sites in Copenhagen.

In October the Danish People’s Party (DPP) proposed a resolution that parliament instruct the government to draft legislation making it illegal to wear masks or total body-covering clothing, for example, burqas and niqabs, in public. The resolution cited as possible penalties for wearing these items fines, jail, and/or an obligatory course on national values, drawing on similar legislation in Belgium and France. By year’s end, the resolution had not passed, and no draft legislation had been produced, although parliamentarians from the governing coalition and the Social Democratic Party voiced support for the DPP resolution. Members of smaller political parties expressed concerns that if the ban were adopted, it would appear to target specific religious groups and make it harder to integrate immigrants belonging to those groups.

A Social Democratic Party councilman on the Ishoj Town Council, Seyit Ahmet Ozkan, resigned in August after he stated on Facebook that Zionists, and not radical Muslims, were behind ISIS. In a later interview, Ozkan said he did not equate Zionists with Jews. Local Social Democratic Party representatives insisted on having his name removed from the ballot for the November 21 local election. Another councilman in Ishoj, Niels Roskov from the Unity List Party, stated it was commonly known Zionists were heavily involved in ISIS. According to radio and television news reports, the Unity List Party leadership said there was nothing to substantiate Roskov’s claim, but the Unity List Party declined to take any further action.

In May the government barred six religious figures, including a pastor and an imam who were U.S. citizens, from entry into the country for a two-year period. The Ministry of Immigration and Integration deemed these individuals threats to the nation’s values and public security.

In February Aarhus Municipality ended gender-segregated swimming at its pools, despite the popularity of the segregation policy within the Muslim community.

In March a group of five or six men attacked a man and a woman outside a pizzeria. The couple said that the assailants had shouted, “You’re not supposed to eat pork on your pizza” and physically assaulted them. Police were investigating the incident but had not identified any suspects by year’s end.

In May a 17-year-old was sentenced to six years in prison by Holbaek District Court for her role in planning a terrorist attack in 2016 against two schools, including a Jewish private school in Copenhagen. After the defendant and prosecutor appealed, in November the Eastern Division of the High Court upheld a guilty verdict and raised the sentence to eight years in prison. Authorities dropped charges against her alleged accomplice, a 24-year-old who had recently returned from Syria.

In January the Jewish and Muslim communities worked together to engage society on the topic of ritual circumcision and counter public comments by the Danish Medical Board that the practice should be outlawed. Leaders from the two communities stated they believed the proposed ban was specifically targeted at their respective communities. Although opinion polls indicated public support for a ban on circumcision, no major party in parliament publicly expressed support for prohibiting the practice.

In May the Jewish community called on police to investigate a possible case of incitement to hatred after an imam at the Al-Faruq Mosque in a Copenhagen suburb appeared to call for the killing of Jews during a sermon in March that was posted on social media. According to a translation of the Arabic transcript of the sermon, the imam said, “Judgment Day will not come until the Muslims fight the Jews and kill them.” Minister of Immigration and Integration Inger Stojberg described the imam’s address as “horrible, antidemocratic, and abominable.” Police investigated the incident but filed no charges.

In January a court in Glostrup ordered a woman to pay 20 fines of 250 Danish kroner ($40) each for writing insulting content about Muslims on a closed Facebook group for “like-minded” persons. The woman posted the content in 2014 and 2015. The group had a few hundred members but reportedly had earlier had more than 6,000.

In February unknown individuals vandalized eight Muslim graves in Vestre Kirkegard (Western Cemetery) in Copenhagen, breaking the tombstones on all eight graves. Police investigated the incident but identified no suspects.

After meeting with Jewish and Muslim religious leaders, embassy officials, including the Ambassador, met several times with government officials, including cabinet members as well as foreign ministry officials, to raise Jewish and Muslim concerns over proposals to ban male circumcision and other issues of concern to those communities.

Embassy officials met with various religious leaders from the Muslim, Jewish, and Christian communities throughout the year. In January embassy officials met with Jewish community leaders from Mosaiske to discuss the community’s sense of safety after the government and the community implemented changes in security. Embassy officials also met with the Muslim Council to discuss circumcision, access to halal meat, and its general views regarding religious freedom and tolerance in the country.

In May embassy officials met with international representatives from the Jewish and Muslim communities in Aarhus to discuss tolerance and mutual cooperation there.

In September embassy officials met with the chief rabbi of Mosaiske to discuss religious freedom and collaboration between the Muslim and Jewish communities.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 865,000 (July 2017 estimate), of which 94 percent is Sunni Muslim. Shia Muslims, Roman Catholics, Protestants, Ethiopian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Hindus, Jews, Bahais, and atheists constitute the remaining 6 percent. Non-Muslims are generally foreign-born citizens and expatriates, highly concentrated in Djibouti City.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates the registered refugee population at approximately 27,700, of whom 48 percent are from Somalia, 16 percent from Yemen, 32 percent from Ethiopia, and 4 percent from Eritrea. No data exists on the religious affiliations of refugees, but they engage in both Muslim and non-Muslim worship.

Legal Framework

Islam is the religion of the state, according to the constitution. The constitution mandates the government respect all faiths and guarantees equality before the law, regardless of one’s religion. The law does not impose sanctions on those who do not observe Islamic teachings or who practice other religious beliefs. The constitution prohibits religiously based political parties.

The Ministry of Islamic and Cultural Affairs has authority over all Islamic matters and institutions, including mosques, religious events, and private Islamic schools. The Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs and the Ministry of Education jointly oversee the school curricula and teacher certification of approximately 40 Islamic schools. The public school system is secular.

The president swears an Islamic religious oath.

Muslims may bring matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance either to family courts, whose code includes elements of civil and Islamic law, or to civil courts. Civil courts address the same matters for non-Muslims. In legal matters, citizens are officially considered Muslims if they do not specifically identify with another religious group.

The government requires all foreign and domestic non-Muslim religious groups to register by submitting an application to the Ministry of Interior, which conducts a lengthy background investigation of the group. Domestic and foreign Muslim religious groups must inform the Ministry of Islamic and Cultural Affairs of their existence and intent to operate and are subject to neither registration nor investigation by the Ministry of Interior. Muslim and non-Muslim foreign religious groups must also gain approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to operate in the country. Once approved, every foreign religious group signs a one-year agreement detailing the scope of its activities. Foreign religious groups must submit quarterly reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and renew their agreements every year. The quarterly report details activities, origin of funding for activities, and scope of work completed, and it identifies beneficiaries. Non-Muslim religious groups may not operate in the interim while awaiting registration.

The government is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The government has declared a reservation regarding proselytizing in open public spaces.

Government Practices

The Ministry of Islamic and Cultural Affairs continued its efforts to implement a 2014 decree executing a law on state control of mosques, which converted the status of imams, including refugee imams, to civil service employees under the ministry and transferred ownership of mosque properties and other assets to the government. The ministry’s High Islamic Council sent instructions on and closely vetted all Friday prayer service sermons, reportedly dismissing imams for sermons deemed extremist. Government officials stated the decree aimed to eliminate political activity from mosques, provide greater government oversight of mosque assets and activities, and counter foreign influence. Virtually all mosques in the country had an imam who was a civil service employee.

In November the Ministry of Islamic and Cultural Affairs organized its fifth annual forum of ulemas (Muslim scholars) from East Africa, including ulemas from Djibouti, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Comoros, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. President Ismail Omar Guelleh opened the forum, noting the main theme was a review of “religious conceptions and cultural perceptions” to change “mentalities and behaviors.” Participants in the three-day forum discussed strategies of leveraging social media in East Africa to engage youth, promote tolerance, and mitigate violent extremism.

The government continued to permit registered non-Islamic groups, including Catholic, Protestant, Greek Orthodox, and Ethiopian Orthodox churches, to operate freely, according to Christian leaders. For registered non-Islamic groups, the government subsidized the cost of utilities at church properties, since it considered some church properties to be part of the national patrimony. Religious groups not independently registered with the government, such as Ethiopian Protestant and non-Sunni Muslim congregations, operated under the auspices of registered groups. Smaller groups, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and Bahais, were not registered with the government but operated privately without incident, according to Christian leaders.

The government continued to recognize legal Islamic marriages conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and civil marriages conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior for non-Muslims and interfaith couples. The government also recognized non-Islamic religious marriages, when documentation from the religious organization performing the ceremony was provided.

The Ministry of Islamic and Cultural Affairs continued to sponsor a program in which religious leaders visited public schools for one-hour sessions to answer students’ questions about religion. Participation in these weekly sessions, designed to broaden students’ knowledge of world religions, was not mandatory.

The government continued to allow non-Islamic religious groups to host events and proselytize on the groups’ private property; in practice, groups refrained from proselytizing in public spaces, such as hotels or street corners, due to cultural sensitivities. The government continued to permit a limited number of Christian missionaries to sell religious books and pamphlets at a local bookstore.

The government continued to issue visas to foreign Islamic and non-Islamic clergy and missionaries, but required they belong to registered religious groups before they could work in the country or operate nongovernmental organizations.

Local public schools continued to observe only Islamic holidays, but schools permitted refugee students to miss class for their respective religious holidays.

In response to a violent ISIS attack on Christians in Egypt on April 9 (Palm Sunday), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent messages of condolence condemning the attack and expressing its solidarity with the victims’ families. The government-run newspaper, La Nation,published the ministry’s message.

Societal norms and customs discouraged conversion from Islam, but conversions reportedly still occurred, particularly for marriages with non-Islamic partners. Christian groups reported continued discrimination in employment and education against converts to Christianity who changed their names.

With the government integrating refugee youth into the national education system for the first time during the year, embassy officials requested that the Ministry of Education permit students in the refugee camps to observe their respective religious holidays, given the religious diversity of the refugee population.

Embassy personnel shared the Secretary of State’s Ramadan message on the importance of religious freedom with government, religious, and civil society leaders, including at an embassy-hosted iftar.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 74,000 (July 2017). According to data from the 2011 census, approximately 53 percent of the population is Roman Catholic. Evangelical Protestants comprise approximately 20 percent of the population. The largest evangelical Protestant groups are Pentecostals with 6 percent, Baptists with 5 percent, and the Christian Union Mission with 4 percent. Seventh-day Adventists comprise 7 percent of the population. Other smaller religious groups include Anglicans, Methodists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslims, and Rastafarians. Nine percent of the population professes no religious affiliation.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion, including freedom of thought, freedom to practice one’s religion, and freedom from taking oaths contrary to one’s beliefs. By law, the government may make exceptions to constitutionally required provisions in the interests of public order and morality if the exceptions are for activities “shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.”

Religious groups seeking nonprofit status must register with the Attorney General’s Office. They must submit a letter signed by five executives of the religious group and provide the official name of the religious group with an address identifying the place of worship. The registration fee is 25 Eastern Caribbean dollars ($9). The Attorney General’s Registry Office reviews and approves applications. Any organization denied permission to register has the right to apply for judicial review. By law, religious groups must also register buildings used to publish banns of marriage (announcements of marriage) or used as places of worship.

The constitution grants religious groups the right to establish and maintain private schools and to provide religious instruction. Public schools may hold nondenominational prayers. Parents may homeschool their children.

The government imposes no legal regulations on foreign missionaries beyond the standard immigration laws for entering and remaining in the country.

The government prohibits the use of marijuana for any purpose, including for religious purposes.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government continued to enforce its ban on any type of marijuana use. Government officials and members of civil society, including Rastafarian associations, stated that Rastafarians continued to disagree with the government’s prohibition of marijuana use because Rastafarians believe marijuana is integral to their religious rituals. Members of the Rastafarian community said police and immigration officials continued to subject them to scrutiny because of the use of marijuana in the Rastafarian community. According to reports by both the police and members of the Rastafarian community, persons of other religious groups were not subject to such scrutiny. Some Rastafarian leaders said their children were not eligible to attend public schools because the schools required immunizations for all students and the Rastafarians did not vaccinate their children because of their religious beliefs. Members of the Rastafarian community stated, however, that their relationship with the government had improved and the number of police stops and searches of Rastafarians had declined. There were no reports of police arrests of Rastafarians during the year in connection with marijuana for religious use.

The government subsidized teacher salaries at all private schools run by religious organizations, including those affiliated with the Catholic, Methodist, and Seventh-day Adventist Churches.

At public schools, teachers, principals, and students continued to lead nondenominational prayers during morning assemblies, but students were not required to participate.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

Embassy officials raised religious freedom subjects with the government, including with the chief welfare officer of the Ministry of Social Services, Family, and Gender Affairs. They discussed issues of police and immigration harassment of Rastafarians, the inability for unvaccinated Rastafarian children to enter school, and the importance of media messaging to encourage religious diversity and tolerance.

Embassy officials engaged religious groups and civil society leaders, including the Rastafarians, Catholic Church, Christian Council, and Evangelical Association, in a series of discussions on the issues of religious freedom and discrimination as a means to encourage tolerance and respect for religious diversity. The embassy also used Facebook to promote messages about the importance of religious freedom and respect for religious diversity across the Eastern Caribbean.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 10.7 million (July 2017 estimate). According to a 2015 Latinobarometer survey, the population is 57 percent Catholic and 25 percent evangelical Protestant, while 13 percent have no declared religion. Groups together composing 5 percent of the population include Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), nonevangelical Protestants, atheists, and others.

There are approximately 2,500 to 3,000 Muslims, located across the country. Most of the approximately 350 members of the Jewish community live in Santo Domingo, with a small community in Sosua. There are small numbers of Buddhists, Hindus, and Bahais.

Most Haitian immigrants are Catholic. The Dominican National Statistics Office estimated in 2012 there were 458,000 Haitian immigrants in the country; however, government officials estimate the number could be as high as 1.2 million. An unknown number practice Voodoo or other African Caribbean beliefs such as Santeria.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of “conscience and worship, subject to public order and respect for social norms.” A 1954 concordat with the Holy See designates Catholicism as the official state religion and extends special privileges to the Catholic Church not granted to other religious groups. These include the special protection of the state in the exercise of the Catholic ministry, exemption of Catholic clergy from military service, permission to provide Catholic instruction in public orphanages, public funding to underwrite some Catholic Church expenses, and exemption from customs duties.

To request exemption from customs duties, non-Catholic religious groups must first register as NGOs with the Attorney General’s Office and the Ministry of Finance. Registration with the Attorney General’s Office, which applies to nonprofit organizations generally and is not specifically for religious groups, is a two-step process. First, the organization must provide documentation of a fixed address and the names of seven elected officers, have a minimum of 25 members, and pay a nominal fee. Second, the organization must draft and submit statutes and provide copies of government-issued identification documents for the board of directors. After registering, religious groups may request customs duty exemption status from the Ministry of Finance.

The law provides for government recognition of marriages performed by religious groups registered with the Central Electoral Board. The law requires churches to have legal status and presence in the country for at least five years, to provide a membership list, and to train pastors on how to perform marriages. Churches are responsible for determining the legal qualification of couples, and they must record all marriages performed and make those lists available for government inspection. Failure to comply with the regulations governing marriage can result in misdemeanor sanctions or fines.

The concordat grants the Catholic Church free access to prisons. The government states it allows access to all faiths in prisons. All faiths have the right to perform religious acts, in community or alone, in prisons.

As part of the concordat with the Vatican, the law requires religious studies based on Catholic Church teachings in all public schools. The concordat accords the Catholic Church the right to revise and approve textbooks used in public schools throughout the country. The concordat also provides parents with the option of exempting their children from religious studies in public schools at both the elementary and secondary levels. Private schools are exempt from the religious studies requirement; however, private schools run by religious groups may teach religious studies according to their beliefs.

The government imposes no immigration restrictions or quotas on religious workers. Foreign missionaries may obtain a one-year multi-entry business visa through the Ministry of Foreign Relations after submitting a completed application form, original passport, two passport-sized photographs, and a document offering proof as to the business activity from the institution or person in the country with whom the missionary is affiliated. Foreign missionaries may renew the visa before the original one-year visa has expired.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Non-Catholic religious groups continued to state that the government provided the Catholic Church significant financial support that was unavailable to them, including properties transferred to the Catholic Church, as well as subsidies to the salaries of Catholic Church officials.

In June the Catholic Church transferred 127 parochial schools to the Ministry of Education. The government agreed to finance the schools while allowing the schools to continue to provide Catholic instruction. In October the Ministry of Education also agreed to assume responsibility for 134 private evangelical Protestant schools, while also allowing those schools to continue to offer the same religious instruction in accordance with evangelical Protestant teachings. The transfer of the schools, which was voluntary, resulted from a 2014 presidential promise to spend 4 percent of the country’s gross domestic product on education.

A non-Catholic organization said the government required them to pay customs duties on imported food and other items and then apply for a refund instead of receiving an exemption as allowed by the law. Religious groups reported difficulties when applying for and receiving customs duty refunds from the Ministry of Finance.

At the opening of the Caribbean Symposium on Religious Liberty in November, Vice President Cedeno stressed the centrality of legal systems to recognize and guarantee religious freedom. She also emphasized the need for societies to develop cultures of mutual respect and to foster interfaith collaboration between the public and private sectors, so that the shared value of religious freedom can confront the looming challenge of social inequality.

The Pontifical University in Santo Domingo cohosted with the Religious Freedom and Business Foundation, Religions for Peace, and Brigham Young University the Caribbean Symposium on Religious Liberty. Delegates from 14 Caribbean countries participated in the event, which emphasized the connection between religious freedom and sustainable development and the positive role business leaders play in advancing interfaith understanding and peace.

Embassy officials maintained ties with religious representatives and faith groups, meeting with leaders from the Catholic Church; the United Dominican Council for Evangelicals, representing the Protestant community; officials from the Jewish community; and leaders from the Muslim community. In these meetings, embassy officials and religious leaders discussed the concordat, government financial support of churches, customs duties, and the freedom to proselytize.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 16.3 million (July 2017 estimate). According to a 2012 survey by the National Institute of Statistics and Census, the most recent government survey available, approximately 92 percent of the population professes a religious affiliation or belief. Of those, 80.4 percent is Roman Catholic; 11.3 percent evangelical Christians, including Pentecostals; and 1.3 percent Jehovah’s Witnesses. Seven percent belongs to other religious groups, including Muslims, Buddhists, Jews, Hindus, Mormons, Anglicans, Episcopalians, Lutherans, Eastern Orthodox, Presbyterians, the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification, Bahais, spiritualists, followers of Inti (the traditional Inca sun god), and indigenous and African faiths. There are also practitioners of Santeria, primarily resident Cubans.

According to Mormon and Muslim leaders, their communities are growing due to conversions, especially in coastal areas. A Muslim leader said there were concentrations of Muslim communities in Cuenca, Guayaquil, and Quito.

Some groups, particularly those in the Amazon jungle and Choco regions, combine indigenous beliefs with Catholicism. Pentecostals draw much of their membership from indigenous people in the highland provinces. There are Jehovah’s Witnesses throughout the country, with the highest concentrations in coastal areas. Many evangelical Christian churches are not affiliated with a particular denomination.

Legal Framework

The constitution grants all individuals the right to practice and profess publicly and freely the religion of their choice, and prohibits discrimination based on religion. It states the government has a responsibility to “protect voluntary religious practice, as well as the expression of those who do not profess any religion, and will favor an atmosphere of plurality and tolerance.” Individuals have the right to change their religion. The constitution also grants the right of self-determination to indigenous communities, including provisions granting freedom to “develop and strengthen their identity, feeling of belonging, ancestral traditions and form of social organization.”

On October 23, President Moreno repealed past executive decrees regarding civil society, issued by former President Correa, and issued a new decree explaining how civil society organizations, including religious organizations, must register to obtain and maintain legal status. The new decree relaxes or eliminates some aspects of the registration process, including certain requirements for religious organizations to collect, organize, and retain information. Additionally, the new decree removes some subjective justifications for dissolving organizations and eliminates the authority of public officials, at their sole discretion, to impose changes to the bylaws of civil society organizations. Under the new decree, civil society organizations are no longer required to extend membership to any person, even against the will of the other members.

Under the new registration decree, the government requires individual religious congregations and organizations to conduct this registration process through the MOJ. The NSPM’s Office of Planning maintains a national database of legally recognized civil society organizations. Registration provides religious groups with legal and nonprofit status. An officially registered organization is eligible to receive government funding and exemptions from certain taxes. To register, a religious group must present to the government a charter signed by all of its founding members and provide information on its leadership and physical location. Three experts in religious matters appointed by the ministry evaluate the application, in consultation with religious organizations already legally established within the country; the evaluation process may be revised under the new registration decree. The decree does not specify the criteria for selection of religious experts. The registration process is free. Failure to obtain legal status through registration can result in the dissolution of the group and liquidation of its physical property by the government.

The law prohibits public schools from providing religious instruction, but private schools may provide religious instruction. There are no legal restrictions specifying which religious groups may establish schools.

Foreign religious missionaries and volunteers must apply for a temporary residence visa to work in the country and present a letter of invitation from the sponsoring organization to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The letter must include a commitment to cover the applicant’s living expenses and details the activities to be conducted by the applicant. Applicants also must provide a certified copy of the bylaws of the sponsoring organization and the name of its legal representative as approved by the government.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

While Mormon and Muslim groups said they did not have difficulties with the registration process before President Moreno issued the new registration decree on October 23, some other religious groups stated the registration process had been onerous and disruptive to their activities at times. Evangelical Christian leaders noted their legal representatives often had to travel to Quito to complete processing because satellite registration offices could not handle the final processing of the registration forms, resulting in significant administrative costs and delays. For example, Guayaquil’s registration office had to send documents to Quito for processing, which frequently resulted in a lengthy back and forth to correct simple administrative errors. An evangelical Christian leader said the delays led many groups not to apply for registration. Without a legal representative, groups were unable to open bank accounts or engage in formal land transactions. According to evangelical Christian representatives, unregistered groups often met in private homes or ad hoc structures on the private land of a group member.

Some religious leaders said the government’s enforcement of its decrees under former President Correa was unequal and arbitrary. A Catholic representative said the government requested a complete membership list for his congregation, even though the governing presidential decree required groups to provide only a list of the organization’s founding members. The representative stated it was difficult to comply with the request given the size of the congregation and the fact that its members did not necessarily participate in regular gatherings.

Evangelical Christian leaders said that the Correa government disqualified many of their pastors from serving as the recognized legal representative for their congregations, citing a requirement that legal representatives be citizens with permanent residence in the country and extensive legal knowledge. They said dividing a community’s moral and legal authority complicated decision making and weakened their pastors’ standing within their communities. They stated the MOJ’s Office of Policies for the Regulation and Promotion of the Freedom of Religion prohibited them from naming religious leaders to serve as legal representatives in the city of Ambato.

The NSPM provided training on the old registration process to civil society organizations, including religious groups, throughout the country. The MOJ also provided training to religious groups to help them navigate the registration process. According to the ministry, roughly 4,000 religious groups operated in the country, but only half actually registered with the government. The MOJ provided no public information on specific groups that were denied registration. No religious organizations were dissolved during the year for failure to register.

In January the Constitutional Court found a Jehovah’s Witnesses case filed in June 2016 requesting “special action of protection” to be inadmissible. Jehovah’s Witness representatives stated they were analyzing the case to determine if they could present it to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Jehovah’s Witnesses had filed their initial complaint before a lower court after a gated community near Guayaquil banned proselytization by Jehovah’s Witnesses following complaints from community residents. The court ruled against the Jehovah’s Witnesses, citing the community’s right to prevent trespassing on private property. In May 2016 the judicial court of Guayas Province rejected the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ appeal of the decision.

As of the end of the year, another case filed by the Jehovah’s Witnesses and accepted for review in September 2014 remained pending before the Constitutional Court. The case involved a conflict in the northern town of Iluman between Jehovah’s Witnesses who wanted to build a new assembly hall and indigenous residents who opposed it. Two lower courts had previously ruled in favor of the residents, concluding that their right to self-determination was a valid rationale for preventing the practice of religion. Representatives of the Jehovah’s Witnesses said they hoped to set a legal precedent with the case, which they said would establish that an indigenous community’s constitutional right to self-determination could not violate individuals’ right to practice freely the religion they chose. The Jehovah’s Witnesses said they regularly requested information from the MOJ but did not receive an explanation for why the case remained pending more than three years after the Constitutional Court had accepted it for review.

Jewish, Muslim, and Mormon representatives reported they engaged with other religious groups through social work projects and occasional discussions through interfaith groups to enhance understanding and respect among different faiths. A local representative from the interfaith group Religions for Peace said that religious groups did not face societal discrimination or persecution in the country. Many religious leaders said that society exhibited a general lack of knowledge about religious traditions and practices outside of Catholicism. For example, Muslim leaders said members of society asked them about traditional Muslim dress and names. Some religious leaders expressed concerns about what they considered an erosion of traditional religious values and a rise in secularism.

Prior to the release of the new registration decree in October, Embassy officials discussed with the MOJ and NSPM the inability of numerous religious groups to register because of difficulties with the process. Government officials provided information to embassy officials about the registration process and about their plans to improve religious groups’ understanding of the governing decrees. Following President Moreno’s issuance of the new registration decree, embassy officials engaged the government on its plans to implement the new registration procedures.

The Ambassador hosted roundtables with religious leaders on February 9 in Guayaquil and March 29 in Quito to discuss challenges facing their communities. Leaders from the Bahai, Catholic, evangelical Christian, Jewish, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormon, and Muslim communities attended the events. Embassy officials also spoke with a representative from the interfaith group Religions for Peace to encourage the continuation of interfaith and ecumenical dialogue.

The embassy and consulate used social media platforms in Quito and Guayaquil to highlight their efforts to promote social inclusion and religious diversity. Separately, embassy and consulate officials met with leaders of the Buddhist, Catholic, evangelical Christian, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jewish, Mormon, and Muslim communities to discuss challenges associated with the government’s registration process for civil society organizations and societal respect for religious diversity.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 97 million (July 2017 estimate). Most media reports state that approximately 90 percent of the population is officially designated as Sunni Muslims and approximately 10 percent is recognized as Christian (estimates range from 5 to 15 percent). Approximately 90 percent of Christians belong to the Coptic Orthodox Church, according to Christian leaders.

Other Christian communities together constitute less than 2 percent of the population and include Anglican/Episcopalian and Protestant denominations, Armenian Apostolic, Catholic (Armenian, Chaldean, Melkite, Maronite, Greek, Latin, and Syrian), and Orthodox (Greek and Syrian) Churches. The Protestant community includes Apostolic Grace, Apostolic, Assemblies of God, Baptists, Brethren, Christian Model Church (Al-Mithaal Al-Masihi), Church of Christ, Faith (Al-Eyman), Gospel Missionary (Al-Kiraaza bil Ingil), Grace (An-Ni’ma), Independent Apostolic, Message Church of Holland (Ar-Risaala), Open Brethren, Pentecostal, Presbyterians, Revival of Holiness (Nahdat al-Qadaasa), and Seventh-day Adventists. Jehovah’s Witnesses account for 1,000-1,500 people, according to media estimates, and there are also members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). Christians reside throughout the country, although the percentage of Christians is higher in Upper Egypt and in some sections of Cairo and Alexandria, according to religious and civil society groups.

Anecdotal estimates of the number of atheists range from one million to ten million. Absent official figures, sources consistently report that the number is increasing steadily. Estimates of the number of former Muslims who have quietly converted to other faiths – most often Christianity – range from 50,000 to four million.

Estimates regarding the number of Shia Muslims range from 800,000 to 2 million, according to media reports. There are also small groups of Quranist Muslims and Ahmadi Muslims.

The Jewish community is believed to number fewer than 25 persons, according to members of the community. According to a local Jewish nongovernmental organization (NGO), there are six Jews in Cairo (all female). There are between 2,000 and 3,000 adherents of the Bahai Faith, according to media estimates.

There are many foreign resident adherents of various religious groups, including Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Mormons. There is also a small Dawoodi Bohra Community, numbering approximately 550, mostly comprising Indian nationals, according to a member of the community.

Legal Framework

The constitution specifies Islam as the state religion and the principles of sharia as the primary source of legislation. The constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion and makes “incitement to hate” a crime. It describes freedom of belief as absolute. The constitution limits the freedom to practice religious rituals and establish places of worship to adherents of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. The constitution prohibits the exercise of political activity or the formation of political parties on the basis of religion.

The constitution states that Al-Azhar is “the main authority in theology and Islamic affairs” and is responsible for spreading Islam, Islamic doctrine, and the Arabic language in the country and throughout the world. The president appoints the grand imam for life, choosing from among the institution’s Council of Senior Scholars, but lacks the authority to dismiss him. While the constitution declares Al-Azhar an independent institution, its core funding comes from the government which is required by the constitution to provide “sufficient funding for it to achieve its purposes.” Sources report that Al-Azhar’s donor funding – particularly from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – dwarfs the funding it receives from the government.

The constitution also stipulates that the canonical laws of Jews and Christians form the basis of legislation governing their personal status, religious affairs, and selection of spiritual leaders. Individuals are subject to different sets of personal status laws (regarding marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc.), depending upon their official religious designation. The Ministry of Interior issues national identity cards that include official religious designations. Designations are limited to Muslim, Christian, or Jewish or a dash for citizens whose parents and grandparents were not members of those religions. Since the first use of the dash subsequent to a 2009 court order, Bahais are identified by a dash. The minister of interior has the authority to issue executive regulations determining what data should be provided on the card.

Neither the constitution nor the civil or penal codes prohibit apostasy from Islam or efforts to proselytize Muslims. The law states individuals may change their religion. The government does recognize conversion from Islam for individuals who were not born Muslim but later converted to Islam, according to a Ministry of Interior decree pursuant to a court order. Reverting to Christianity requires presentation of a document from the receiving church, an identity card, and fingerprints. After a determination is made that the intent of the change – which often also entails a name change – is not to evade prosecution for a crime committed under the Muslim name, a new identity document will be issued with the Christian name and religious designation. In those cases in which Muslims not born Muslim convert from Islam, their minor children, and in some cases adult children who were minors when their parents converted, remain classified as Muslims.

Consistent with sharia, the law requires non-Muslim men to convert to Islam to marry Muslim women, although Christian and Jewish women need not convert to marry Muslim men. Muslim women are not permitted to marry non-Muslim men, and children from any unrecognized marriage are considered illegitimate. A married non-Muslim woman who converts to Islam must divorce her husband if he is not Muslim and is unwilling to convert. If a married man is discovered to have left Islam, his marriage to a woman whose official religious designation is Muslim is dissolved.

A divorced mother is entitled to custody of her son until the age of 10 and her daughter until age 12, unless one parent is Muslim and the other is not, in which case the Muslim parent is awarded custody.

The law generally follows sharia in matters of inheritance; a Muslim female heir generally receives half the amount of a male heir’s inheritance, and Christian widows of Muslim husbands have no inheritance rights. On January 3, however, an appellate court ruled that applying sharia to non-Muslims violated the section of the constitution stating that the rules of the Christians and Jewish communities govern in personal status matters.

According to the penal code, using religion to promote extremist thought with the aim of inciting strife, demeaning or denigrating Judaism, Christianity, or Islam, and harming national unity carries penalties ranging from six months’ to five years’ imprisonment.

Christian, Muslim, and Jewish denominations may request official recognition from the government, which gives a denomination the right to be governed by its canonical laws, practice religious rituals, establish houses of worship, and import religious literature. To obtain official recognition, a religious group must submit a request to the Ministry of Interior Religious Affairs Department. The department then determines whether the group poses a threat to national unity or social peace. As part of this determination, the department consults leading religious institutions, including the Coptic Orthodox Church and Al-Azhar. The president then reviews and decides on the registration application.

The law does not recognize the Bahai Faith or its religious laws and bans Bahai institutions and community activities. Although the government lists “Christian” on the identity cards of Jehovah’s Witnesses, a presidential decree bans all Jehovah’s Witnesses’ activities. The law does not stipulate any penalties for banned religious groups or their members who engage in religious practices, but these groups are barred from rights granted to recognized groups, such as having their own houses of worship or other property, holding bank accounts, or importing religious literature.

The government appoints and monitors imams who lead prayers in licensed mosques and pays their salaries. According to the law, penalties for preaching or giving religious lessons without a license from the Ministry of Awqaf or Al-Azhar include a prison term of up to one year and/or a fine of up to 50,000 Egyptian pounds (EGP) ($2,800). The penalty doubles for repeat offenders. Ministry of Awqaf inspectors also have judicial authority to arrest imams violating this law. A ministry decree prevents unlicensed imams from preaching in any mosque, prohibits holding Friday prayers in mosques smaller than 80 square meters (861 square feet), bans unlicensed mosques from holding Friday prayer services (other prayer services are permitted), and pays bonuses to imams who deliver Friday sermons consistent with Ministry of Awqaf guidelines. Any imam who fails to follow the guidelines loses the bonus and can be subject to disciplinary measures, including potentially losing his preaching license. The ministry also issues prewritten sermons, but use of them by imams is voluntary.

The prime minister has authority to stop the circulation of books that “denigrate religions.” Ministries may obtain court orders to ban or confiscate books and works of art. The cabinet may ban works it deems offensive to public morals, detrimental to religion, or likely to cause a breach of the peace. The Islamic Research Center of Al-Azhar has the legal authority to censor and confiscate any publications dealing with the Quran and the authoritative Islamic traditions (hadith), and to confiscate publications, tapes, speeches, and artistic materials deemed inconsistent with Islamic law.

The law delegates authority to approve requests for church building and renovation permits to governors, rather than the president. The governor is to respond within four months; any refusal must include a written justification. The law does not provide for review or appeal of a refusal; nor does it specify recourse if a governor fails to respond within the required timeframe. The law also includes provisions to legalize existing unlicensed churches and rescinds preconditions established in the 1930s. It stipulates that, while a request to license an existing building for use as a church is pending, the use of the building to conduct church services and rites may not be prevented. Under the law, the size of new churches depends on a government determination of the “number and need” of Christians in the area. New churches must also meet stringent land registration and building codes not required for mosques or for commercial or residential property.

Under a separate law governing the construction of mosques, the Ministry of Awqaf approves permits to build mosques. The law does not stipulate any government role in reviewing the number or size of mosques based on its assessment of the number of Muslims in the area, but a 2001 cabinet decree includes a provision requiring that new mosques built after that date must be a minimum distance of 500 meters (1600 feet) from the nearest other mosque. The law does not require Ministry of Awqaf approval for mosque renovations.

In public schools, Muslim students are required to take courses on “principles of Islam,” and Christian students are required to take courses on “principles of Christianity” in all grades. Determinations of religious identity are based on official designations, not personal or parental decisions. Students who are neither Muslim nor Christian must choose one or the other course; they may not opt out or change from one to the other. A common set of textbooks for these two courses is mandated for both public and private schools, including Christian-owned schools. Al-Azhar maintains a separate school system which serves some two million students from elementary through secondary school using its own separate curriculum.

The penal code criminalizes discrimination based on religion and defines it as including “any action, or lack of action, that leads to discrimination between people or against a sect due to … religion or belief.” The law stipulates imprisonment and/or a fine of no less than 30,000 EGP ($1,700) and no more than 50,000 EGP ($2,800) as penalties for discrimination. If the perpetrator is a public servant, the law states that the imprisonment should be no less than three months, and the fine no less than 50,000 EGP ($2,800) and no more than 100,000 EGP ($5,600).

The government recognizes only the marriages of Christians, Jews, and Muslims with documentation from a cleric. Since the state does not recognize Bahai marriage, married Bahais are denied the legal rights of married couples of other religious beliefs, including those pertaining to inheritance, divorce, and sponsoring a foreign spouse’s permanent residence.

In matters of family law, when spouses are members of the same religious denomination, courts apply that denomination’s canonical laws. In cases where one spouse is Muslim and the other a member of a different religion, both are Christians but members of different denominations, or the individuals are not clearly a part of a religious group, the courts apply sharia.

Sharia provisions forbidding adoption apply to all citizens. The Ministry of Social Solidarity, however, manages a program entitled “Alternative Family” which recognizes permanent legal guardianship if certain requirements are met.

The National Council for Human Rights, whose members are appointed by parliament, is charged with strengthening protections, raising awareness, and ensuring the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including religious freedom. It also is charged with monitoring enforcement and application of international agreements pertaining to human rights. The council’s mandate includes investigating reports of alleged violations of religious freedom.

According to the constitution, “no political activity may be exercised or political parties formed on the basis of religion, or discrimination based on sex, origin, sect, or geographic location, nor may any activity be practiced that is hostile to democracy, secretive, or which possesses a military or quasi-military nature.”

The constitution mandates the state to eliminate all forms of discrimination through an independent commission to be established by parliament. By year’s end, the government had not yet established such a commission.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights but declared in a reservation that it became a party considering that the provisions of sharia do not conflict with the covenant.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: Local officials sometimes did not apply equal protection to all citizens. Judges often cited sharia when ruling to restrict religious freedom, particularly for persons born to at least one Muslim parent. Authorities continued to deny individuals the right to change their official religious designation from Muslim to another religion and sometimes arrested those who had left Islam, according to multiple sources. Local authorities closed some churches because of threats of which church leaders said they were unaware, and others in response to attacks by Muslim neighbors. Local authorities also closed churches on the grounds that they were unlicensed, despite provisions in the law guaranteeing Christians the right to use the buildings for worship pending licensure. Two such churches were subsequently reopened. Government officials sometimes failed to protect minority victims of sectarian violence from intimidation by perpetrators demanding that the victims drop charges in a spirit of “reconciliation” rather than pursue justice through the court system. The government continued to prosecute individuals, including religious leaders, on charges of denigration of religions. The government also restricted the ability of citizens to carry out worship, marriage, educational, and other life activities of their choice. Dar al-Ifta and Al-Azhar undertook efforts to re-examine centuries-old Islamic jurisprudence mandating the death penalty for those who leave Islam. The Ministry of Education removed some language from school textbooks that was perceived as promoting hate and the superiority of Islam above all other religious beliefs and developed an all-new curriculum for a 12-year rollout beginning in fall 2018. Al-Azhar University admitted its first non-Muslim student. For the first time, the government issued a civil marriage license to a Bahai couple. A court ruling permitted a Christian family to divide an inheritance according to Christian practices.

On August 21, National Security Service (NSS) officials arrested two atheists after their manager at La Poire, a pastry shop in New Cairo, notified authorities of a private message passed between the two that was critical of religion. The officials beat the two arrestees, according to sources familiar with the case, and then told inmates to beat them further.

On December 23, NSS officers arrested a 29-year-old man on charges of denigration of religions for allegedly administering a Facebook page entitled “Al Mulhedeen” (“The Atheists”) with more than 34,000 followers, according to press reports. The page, which allegedly questioned some Quranic verses and promoted the “Big Bang” theory of the origin of the universe, was no longer available after the arrest. North Giza Court subsequently ordered the man detained for 15 days pending investigation. Discussions about the rise of atheism in society continued through year’s end, both in parliament and in Islamic institutions, according to press reports.

In July a man who allegedly had converted from Islam to Christianity was brought to police by family members who said that he was an apostate from Islam and thereby guilty of denigration of religions, according to sources familiar with the case. Police reportedly interrogated him for four hours, then released him and told him to “disappear.” The man immediately relocated to a different residence. Some months later, a representative of the NSS summoned him to NSS headquarters where they detained and interrogated him for several nights before releasing him, according to sources.

In August police arrested and interrogated a man whom they alleged had converted from Islam to Christianity. Police released him, reportedly telling him he was too old to withstand the treatment they ordinarily would give to apostates from Islam, according to sources.

In December NSS officers informed family members of two former Muslims’ conversions to other faiths but did not make arrests. According to a source familiar with the case, this put at least one of the converts at risk; upon learning from the NSS about the conversion, a member of the convert’s family reportedly threatened to kill him if news of his conversion negatively affected the family member’s government job.

Courts continued to apply the penal code to prosecute those charged with denigrating Islam. On February 27, a court sentenced Muslim preacher Mohamed Abdullah Al Nasr, popularly known as Sheikh Mizo, to five years in prison and a fine of 10,000 EGP ($560) for denigration of religions based on comments he made on social media questioning literal interpretations of Islamic texts and expressing doubt about the authenticity of others. An appeals court reduced the sentence to two years in prison and a fine of 1,000 EGP ($56); subsequently the government waived the remainder of his sentence after he was included in a routine annual pardon. At year’s end, he was due for imminent release.

There were reports of government actions targeting the Muslim Brotherhood, which the government had designated as a terrorist organization, and individuals associated with the group.

Authorities arrested and charged Bassem Abdel Malak Fahem with denigration of religions when, after terrorists attacked a bus and killed 28 Coptic Christian pilgrims in May, he posted pictures of well-known Islamic clerics on Facebook and accused them of inciting violence against Christians. Authorities arrested Abdel Malak in September, and they acquitted and released him in early November.

Also in May authorities charged former Under Secretary of the Ministry of Awqaf Sheikh Salem Abdul Galeel with denigration of religions and undermining national unity after he appeared on his television program explaining verses from the Quran which described Jews and Christians as “kuffar” (infidels). Galeel told his audience that it was a disservice to Jews and Christians to assure them that they would go to paradise because the Quran was clear that they were kuffar and therefore would go to hell. Abdul Galeel also said Jewish and Christian scriptures had been corrupted. The television station canceled Galeel’s show and the Ministry of Awqaf banned him from preaching in mosques. Subsequently, the ministry demoted and banned from preaching Sheikh Abdullah Roshdy, an Al-Azhar scholar employed with the ministry, after he defended Abdul Galeel’s position. Other Muslim clerics called for respectful debate of intellectual and doctrinal issues, rather than criminal charges. A court released Galeel on bail; subsequently the complainant dropped the case, according to press reports.

On June 16, authorities charged Coptic Orthodox priest Makary Younan with denigration of religions, discrimination against a specific group, disturbing peace and order in the country, exploiting religion to spread thoughts that aim to stir strife and insult divine religions, and harming national unity and social coherence after he stated in a sermon that, according to both Islamic and non-Islamic historical sources, the country had a Christian majority until it was defeated by a Muslim army. A court released Makary on bail; subsequently the complainant dropped the case, according to press reports. On May 16, authorities arrested three Christians in El-Zawya El-Hamra for trying to stop local authorities from carrying out a demolition order against a Coptic Church-owned building based on an anonymous complaint that it was being used as a church, according to press reports. Authorities halted demolition when Church leaders, who had been using the building for a charity clinic and other social services for local residents, presented ownership papers and stated that they intended to include the site on the list to be presented to the government for licensure in accordance with the Church Construction Law. Authorities subsequently released the three Christians.

Religious freedom and human rights activists said that government officials, courts, and prosecutors sometimes did not extend procedural safeguards and rights of due process to members of minority faiths, including by closing churches in violation of the law on church construction. According to a report by one human rights organization, there were at least 19 cases of assault or sectarian tensions relating to church buildings and the holding of church services during the year, most of which were led by security officials on the grounds the buildings being used were unlicensed. These actions led to the closure of at least eight active churches during the year, the report said. According to press reports, more than 60 churches remained closed at year’s end.

On March 5, security forces closed a church in Ezbet El-Nakhl village in Minya, telling members of the community that closing the church was a security precaution against an attack by Islamic extremists, according to news outlets. Subsequently, Minya Province Security Chief Faisal Dweidar denied that there was a threat to the church and stated that it was closed for lack of proper licensing, the same news outlet reported.

In July security forces closed a church in the town of Kidwan, Minya Province, citing alleged complaints by local residents that the church was not licensed, according to press reports. A local bishop told the press that the 1,300 Christians of Kidwan had no other place to pray and denied that Muslim neighbors had complained about the church. He further stated that at least 15 churches in the surrounding towns remained closed and some 70 towns remained without a church despite having applied for building licenses. After Christians in Kidwan appealed to President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the church reopened on September 10.

On August 20, security forces closed Virgin Mary Church, located in what was once a private home in the town of Ezbat al-Forn, also in Minya Province. A senior police officer told the press that security forces had intervened to disperse a clash between the town’s Muslim and Christian residents regarding some Muslims’ objections to Christians conducting worship services in the building. Christians denied that there had been clashes and conducted worship services in the street the same day and during the next two days without incident. Christians of Ezbat al-Forn appealed to President Sisi; subsequently their church also reopened on September 10.

Authorities in Minya Province closed four churches in October and assailants attacked three others there, according to media reports. Local residents reportedly pressured Christians to agree that the churches would remain closed until permits could be obtained and that no one would be held accountable for the attacks.

On October 15, Christians reopened the Church of the Virgin in the town of Sheikh Alaa in Minya Province, which had been closed by officials after it was attacked by local Muslim residents in 2015; however, security officials closed the church again on the same day due to security concerns for worshippers after local residents harassed some of them, according to a statement by the local bishop. In his statement, the bishop explained that officials did not take action to reopen the church after the first attack and routinely responded to harassment of worshippers by closing down churches.

On October 22, security officials closed a church in the town of al-Qushairy in Minya Province after four Christians were injured by people throwing stones, according to the local bishop’s statement. The authorities issued arrest warrants for 11 suspects in connection with the attacks, according to the local governor. The bishop, however, reported that since agreement had been reached between the parties, no charges were filed against the perpetrators, but the church remained closed.

Also on October 22, security officials closed Abu Sayfen Church in the town of al-Karm in Minya Province over reports of a planned attack against the church; however, the local bishop stated that there had been no complaints about the church. The governor of Minya Province subsequently affirmed that there had been no attack and no arrest warrants had been issued. On October 27, security officials closed Mar Gerges Church (Saint George) in Ezbet Zakaria, also in Minya Province, after a Christian woman was injured in an attack on the church. The attack occurred the same day that local residents were pressuring Christians to agree, in the name of “reconciliation,” that the churches would remain closed, media reported. According to the local governor, 15 suspects were arrested for the attack.

The governor of Minya affirmed in an October 29 statement to the press that security officials were closing churches because they were “unlicensed houses” which lacked authorization required to perform religious rites, in spite of a provision in the law guaranteeing Christians the right to continue using unlicensed churches pending regularization of their status. He also announced on or about November 29 that he had granted permits for 21 churches to be restored, expanded, or rebuilt. World Watch Monitor, an organization that reports on Christians under pressure for their faith, said some of the applications for those permits were reportedly submitted more than 20 years ago.

On September 26, pursuant to the law, church leaders submitted to government authorities lists of more than 3,700 unlicensed churches and other church-affiliated properties for which they desired legal recognition. According to sources, a government administrator connected with the committee to review applications for licenses rejected at least 27 of these churches on the grounds that they had been inactive for more than five years, in compliance with the law. The sources stated, however, that the reason for their inactivity was that authorities had closed them.

In September the Supreme Council for Media Regulation (SCMR) banned Dr. Sabri Abdel Raouf, Al-Azhar professor of comparative Islamic jurisprudence, from television and radio after he responded to a request for a fatwa on necrophilia by stating that, although any normal human being would find the practice repugnant, nothing in Islamic doctrine specifically prohibited “farewell intercourse” with the corpse of one’s recently-deceased wife. Al-Azhar University president Dr. Mohammed Al Mahrasawi referred Raouf for investigation and possible disciplinary actions, stating, “speaking of these types of fatwas should be limited in order to protect Al-Azhar and Islam.”

Al Mahrasawi also referred Dr. Suad Saleh, Al-Azhar professor of Islamic studies and former dean of the Women’s College, for investigation and possible disciplinary action after she appeared on television and responded to Raouf’s fatwa. Subsequently on October 17, the outcome document of a conference on fatwas hosted by Dar al-Ifta recommended adopting legislation to regulate the issuance of fatwas.

On November 15, Chairman of the SCMR Makram Mohammed Ahmed announced in a press conference at SCMR headquarters that all media outlets would be prohibited from featuring any mufti (a Muslim scholar specifically qualified to issue a fatwa) except 50 named individuals approved by Al-Azhar and Dar al-Ifta. Observers said that there were hundreds of muftis in the country authorized to issue fatwas. “Freedom of expression in religious issues is not included in religious advisory activity,” Ahmed stated.

In December the Administrative Control Authority referred Samir Hashish, a Muslim scholar affiliated with Al-Azhar’s Islamic Research Complex, to court on charges of inciting sectarianism after videos circulated online of the preacher presenting what he said was longstanding doctrinal evidence that, while Islam sanctioned the death penalty for murder, it did not sanction the death penalty for a Muslim who had killed a non-Muslim because the blood of a non-Muslim was not equal to that of a Muslim.

Television host Islam El-Beheiry, who received a presidential pardon in 2016 after he was jailed for “defaming religious symbols” by criticizing traditional Islamic teachings and texts, including some which called for violence, produced and broadcast 25 television episodes during the year and continued to host a radio program entitled Free Islam. On October 29, an administrative court banned Beheiry’s previous show, Ma’a Islam, from all satellite channels, pursuant to a 2015 lawsuit filed by Sheikh Ahmed El-Tayeb, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, which accused the show of violating the law on denigration of religions. The order did not ban Beheiry’s other ongoing programming.

The government did not prevent Bahais, Mormons, and Jehovah’s Witnesses from worshiping privately in small numbers. According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, the government engaged in surveillance and frequent home visits during which members were interrogated and sometimes threatened. The NSS also summoned members to their offices for interrogations. The government continued to ban the importation and sale of Bahai and Jehovah’s Witnesses literature and to authorize customs officials to confiscate their personally owned religious materials. In July NSS officers stopped two Jehovah’s Witnesses in Beni Suef, confiscating religious materials from the two individuals as well as from two other Jehovah’s Witnesses who arrived later.

On July 27, authorities issued a civil marriage license to a Bahai couple with no religious designation listed who had sued for that right, thus enabling them to change their marital status on national identity cards and other documentation. With the exception of that couple, national identity cards continued to list married Bahais as “single,” which some Bahai women with children said invoked a sense of embarrassment and public shame, in addition to creating difficulties obtaining proper documentation and services for their children. At year’s end, standardized procedures for issuing civil marriage licenses to couples with no religious affiliation designated had not been developed.

The government closed the tomb of Imam Al-Hussein, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, located inside Al-Hussein Mosque in Old Cairo, during the three-day commemoration of Ashura, which was described in multiple news reports as an attempt to discourage Shia Muslim gatherings. The main area of the mosque remained open; only the room containing the shrine was closed.

On January 24, President Sisi, addressing the country’s high divorce rate and its impact on families, called for an amendment of divorce laws. He called for an end to verbal divorce and suggested that divorce should come into effect only after being documented by authorized marriage officiants. Two weeks later, Al-Azhar rejected the proposed amendment as “contradicting sharia” and suggested, “those who deal lightly with divorce fatwas … had better divert their efforts to serve the people and solve their problems in real life.” Subsequently, the government dropped the proposed change.

After an ISIS-affiliated suicide bomber killed 29 people in a December 2016 attack against Saints Peter and Paul Church in Cairo, the army repaired the damage in time for Coptic Orthodox Christmas on January 7, as ordered by President Sisi.

In response to this and other terrorist attacks, the government stationed security officers outside of churches. Some officers lost their lives defending churches, including seven who were killed in April when a terrorist detonated his suicide vest outside a metal detector after being refused entry into the church where, had he been granted entry, reports said he would have killed many more. Another security officer was killed defending Mar Mina Church in Helwan in a December terrorist attack which killed at least nine people. At the same time, according to sources, in some cases officers only checked national identity cards and denied entry to churches to anyone officially designated as Muslim, allegedly on the order of the Ministry of Interior. Sources said this diminished the opportunity for converts from Islam to attend church services, both by barring them entry and by requiring them to take the added risk of revealing themselves to security officers as likely converts.

In September the government announced the completion of the rebuilding, primarily at government expense, of 78 church properties throughout the country that had been damaged or destroyed by Muslim Brotherhood supporters in 2013. Construction progressed on a state-funded church in al-Our village in Minya Province in honor of 20 Copts beheaded by an ISIS affiliate in Libya.

The Ministry of Awqaf launched a program training female Muslim preachers (250 according to the most recent information), some of whom were deployed alongside Christian nuns to different communities as part of an interfaith dialogue campaign, according to ministry officials.

In response to President al-Sisi’s continuing calls for Islamic scholars to renew religious discourse and challenge the ideology of extremists, the Ministry of Education issued new textbooks for use in public and private schools. While most passages perceived as promoting hate and the superiority of one religion over all others had been removed, some passages continued to draw complaints from religious leaders, educators, and families. For example, some textbooks mandated for Arabic language class, a secular subject required for students of all religious backgrounds, contained multiple Quranic verses, generally preceded by “God the Most High says … ” Some lessons in these textbooks teach Islam; for example, a fifth-grade Arabic language textbook read, “peace will not be achieved on earth except by following God’s regime as contained in the Quran and Sunna (example) of Muhammad,” and “not following the rules of God will lead to great punishment.” Parents and educators also expressed concerns about history textbooks; however, Ministry of Education representatives stated that history curricula were being updated as well. Sources reported difficulties obtaining Al-Azhar approval for proposed updates to the curriculum used in public and private schools. Al-Azhar approval is required for all curriculum changes in all the country’s schools.

Al-Azhar also announced that it was updating classroom textbooks for use in its own K-12 school system; however, sources said that teachers continued to rely primarily on historical doctrinal texts for religious studies rather than prepared textbooks. In addition, the committee overseeing curriculum development continued to reject much of the proposed new content, according to a member of the committee who was quoted in press reports. In some cases, the content being rejected was identical to statements Al-Azhar itself had published on its website, according to press reports.

The Ministry of Education also developed a new curriculum for a rollout beginning with incoming kindergarten and first grade students in the fall of 2018 with the next year’s curriculum to be added each year. According to ministry sources, respect for human rights and religious tolerance was woven into the new curriculum. The ministry also continued to update the existing curriculum, which it expected would take 12 years to phase out completely.

All 27 of the country’s governors, appointed by the president, were Muslim. As of the end of the year, the cabinet contained one Christian, the minister of immigration and expatriate affairs. Christians remained underrepresented in the military and security services. Christians admitted at the entry level seldom were promoted into the upper ranks of government entities, according to sources.

Children of families who self-identified as Christians but legally identified as Muslims were required to attend religion classes for Muslim students, as a matter of policy. In addition, such children could not be admitted to a Christian orphanage or live with Christian foster parents. In March authorities forcibly removed a three-year-old orphan from the home of a Christian family who had taken him in from the street, according to an individual familiar with the case. Authorities placed him in an orphanage for Muslim children, stating that under sharia any child in a Muslim-majority land whose religion is unknown is presumed Muslim, even if non-Muslims live in the land, and that Muslim children were not permitted to be raised by non-Muslims. Children designated as Muslim also had no recourse to choose their religion when they reached legal age. This restricted their ability to marry; for example, young women legally designated as Muslim but self-identifying as Christian were not permitted to marry Christian men.

According to the academic community, no Christians served as presidents of the country’s 25 public universities. On December 25, Cairo University announced the appointment of a Christian dean. In September Al-Azhar University, a publicly funded institution with both religious and nonreligious programs of study, accepted its first non-Muslim student into its Department of Dentistry. The government barred non-Muslims from employment in public university training programs for Arabic language teachers, stating as its reason that the curriculum involved study of the Quran.

Reports of anti-Semitism continued, including in public statements by government-supported Al-Azhar. In a May 5 interview with television station Channel 1, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar said it was the Jews who had started the animosity with the Muslims “by rejecting the message of the Prophet Muhammad.” He stated the Jews of Medina and other towns in the Arabian Peninsula “took actual measures to thwart, kill, and bury the Islamic call in its infancy,” and, after 1,400 years, Muslims “still suffer from Zionist-Jewish interference in the affairs of the Muslims.”

A member of parliament, in arguing against requiring Muslim women to wear the niqab, told press that it was of Jewish origin, and chairman of the parliament’s Human Rights Committee Alaa Abed said that a Human Rights Watch report on torture in the country’s jails was funded by “the Zionist Lobby.”

The government generally permitted foreign religious workers in the country on condition they not proselytize to Muslims; however, some religious workers were denied visas or refused entry upon arrival without explanation, according to sources. According to community representatives, non-Muslim minorities and foreign religious workers generally refrained from proselytizing to Muslims to avoid risking legal penalties and extralegal repercussions from authorities and members of the local community.

The government continued its efforts to digitize historical records of births, marriages, deaths, and other community records of the greatly diminished Jewish community whose membership in the 1950s exceeded 75,000 people. The Ministry of Antiquities, charged with preserving the country’s heritage, continued to assess Jewish heritage sites and to catalogue their contents and to fund and oversee restoration of the large Nebi Daniel Synagogue in Alexandria. Most of the country’s other synagogues, as well as a millennium-old Jewish cemetery in Cairo, continued to deteriorate from decades of disuse and neglect.

In February the Council of Protestant Churches submitted a request to the government to permit both adoption and equal inheritance as part of the package of personal status laws applied to its members.

Summary paragraph: Lethal violence connected with religion continued. A gang of armed terrorists carrying an ISIS flag attacked a Sufi mosque in Northern Sinai during Friday prayers, killing 311 persons, including 27 children. ISIS claimed responsibility for multiple other attacks, including suicide bombings against two churches during Palm Sunday services, attacks against passengers on a bus carrying Christian pilgrims, and a spate of attacks on individual Christians in northern Sinai and elsewhere. An assailant killed a Coptic Orthodox priest in Cairo and injured another; a court sentenced the assailant to death for murder. According to press reports, three noncommissioned officers and a security guard allegedly tortured and killed a Christian police conscript. His family reported in a videotaped interview that he was “tortured and killed for his faith.” Families, employers, neighbors, local police, and national security officials subjected former Muslims, including those who became atheists as well as those who converted to other faiths, to violence, threats, and abuse. The construction of churches continued to meet societal resistance, including acts of violence and destruction of property in some cases. Reports of abductions targeting Christians, religious discrimination, and defamatory speech against Jews, Christians, and Shia Muslims continued.

On November 24, at least 25 armed assailants attacked the Sufi mosque of Al-Rawda village in North Sinai during Friday prayers, killing 311 persons, including 27 children, and injuring at least 122, according to press reports. According to a statement by government officials, the assailants opened fire at the worshippers from the mosque’s windows using automatic machine guns. The assailants then took up ambush positions and opened fire at ambulances arriving at the scene. The attackers raised the ISIS flag, according to government officials and eyewitnesses quoted in press accounts, although by year’s end no group had claimed responsibility. ISIS previously had denounced Sufis as apostates from Islam and threatened to kill them, mentioning Sufis in the town of Rawda specifically. The military launched air strikes against the gunmen’s vehicles during the attack, according to a statement by the military spokesman, and subsequently destroyed a number of terrorist hideouts.

On April 9, twin suicide bombings at Coptic Orthodox churches killed 45 people during Palm Sunday services. One struck St. Mark’s Cathedral, the seat of the Coptic Orthodox Bishop of Alexandria, where Coptic Orthodox Pope Tawadros II was leading the service. The attacker detonated a bomb at the gate of the church compound after being refused entry by security. The other attack occurred in the city of Tanta in the Nile delta, where a suicide bomber detonated himself among the front pews of the church. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attacks and warned Muslims to avoid Christian gatherings in Egypt. The government referred 48 persons to a military court for suspected involvement in these and the December 2016 attack against a Coptic Orthodox church in Cairo, as well as on suspicion of membership in ISIS terrorist cells. President al-Sisi also declared a state of emergency on April 9 after the Palm Sunday attacks and instructed all churches to cancel all activities other than regular church services for a period of three months.

On May 26, gunmen dressed in military fatigues and posing as security officers waved down a bus carrying Christian pilgrims on a highway in Minya Province and ordered the passengers to exit the bus, according to survivors of the attack. After separating the men from the women and children, they ordered the men to recite the shahada (the Islamic creed: “There is no god but God and Mohammad is the messenger of God”) and thus become Muslims. When the men refused, the gunmen opened fire, killing 28. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack.

On December 29, an ISIS gunman opened fire as congregants exited after services at Mar Mina Church in Helwan killing seven, including a Muslim police officer who was stationed outside the church, and injuring five, according to press reports. He also attacked a nearby shop, killing two other Christians. According to a statement by the Ministry of Interior, the attacker was wearing a suicide vest and attempted to enter the church, but was prevented by police.

Terrorists affiliated with ISIS carried out a series of attacks against Christians in northern Sinai after having issued videos and other public statements calling on pious Muslims to kill them. On January 30, masked assailants shot Coptic Christian Wael Milad in his shop, according to press reports. Eyewitnesses told media outlets that on February 11 an attacker shot Christian veterinarian Bahgat William in the head, neck, and stomach as he was leaving his clinic. Attackers killed Adel Showky on the same day in al-Arish’s Samaran neighborhood, according to press reports. On February 16, two assailants on a motorbike gunned down Coptic Christian schoolteacher Gamal Tawfiq as he was walking through a crowded marketplace between his home and school, according to press reports. On February 22, the corpses of two local Christians, Saad Hanna and his son Medhat, were found on the roadside in al-Arish. Saad’s body showed gunshot wounds; Medhat’s showed signs of having been burned alive, according to press reports. Following these attacks and additional threats, hundreds of Christians fled Sinai during the first several months of the year for other parts of Egypt, according to press and church sources. According to an international NGO, several families told human rights activists they wanted to return to their homes, but were skeptical that this would be possible. Subsequently on May 6, gunmen shot and killed Nabeel Saber Ayoub, a Copt who had fled al-Arish with his family but returned briefly to complete school paperwork for his son and to check on his house and barber shop, according to press reports.

Violent attacks against individual Christians were not limited to northern Sinai; however, it was uncertain in some cases if there was a religious motivation. In Cairo on January 16, Ishak Younan was discovered in his apartment with his throat slit. According to press, there was no sign of struggle and his wallet still contained cash. Police arrested two suspects. On January 14, an attacker stabbed Christian physician Bassam Zaki in the neck, chest, and back in his apartment in Dayrout City. On January 6, Eastern Orthodox Christmas Eve, a killer slit the throats and killed a Christian couple, Gamal Fadlallah, and his wife Nadia Amin, in their beds in the village of Tokh-Dalka in Menoufia Province. On January 3, an assailant slit the throat of Christian shop owner Youssef Lamei while the victim was sitting outside of his store in Alexandria. The assailant confessed that he had killed the shopkeeper for selling alcohol after having previously warned him that this was against Islam. On March 9, a court ordered the death sentence for the attacker; an appeal remained pending at year’s end.

On December 22, Muslim residents in Atfih, a suburb of Cairo, gathered after Friday prayer and attacked Al-Amir Tadros Church, destroying its contents, calling for the church to be demolished, and wounding three Christians after a rumor circulated that Christians intended to install a bell, according to press reports and other sources. Police dispersed the mob and arrested 15 of the attackers on charges of illegal assembly, thuggery, vandalism, assault, and using religion to stir sectarian strife. Police also arrested the 62-year-old former owner of the church building on charges of construction without a permit, according to press reports. A local rights activist reported that the church had been operating for 15 years and that church authorities had requested it be licensed in keeping with the 2016 Church Construction Law. At year’s end, all suspects remained in custody.

On July 19, Christian police conscript Josef Reda Helmy was tortured and killed at Mubarak Training Camp in Cairo, according to press reports. His family said that Helmy was killed because of Christian symbols tattooed on his arm. A military prosecutor held three noncommissioned officers and one security guard for 15 days in connection with the case. The four defendants said they had acted under the order of Officer Mohammed Tork who, as of year’s end, had not been charged.

On October 12, Semaan Shehata, a Coptic Orthodox priest from Beni Suef, was stabbed to death in the Cairo suburb El-Salaam City, and a cross was carved on his forehead. Authorities arrested Ahmed El-Sonbaty; on November 15, a court sentenced him to death for murder, according to media reports. At year’s end, the case was scheduled to be appealed. Sheikh Samir Hashish, a Muslim cleric, stated that according to longstanding Islamic jurisprudence, the blood of the kuffar was not equal to that of Muslims; therefore, the death penalty should not be imposed on the Muslim who killed the priest. Coptic Orthodox religious leaders appealed to the government to change “the culture of a nation poisoned by extremism,” media reported. During a television interview, Father Saleeb Abdel Shahid, Shehata’s father-in-law, said that these conditions for Christians could not continue, adding that priests needed to feel safe in their own country. The assailant reportedly also injured a second priest, Benjamin Moftah, during the same attack.

Societal abuses against former Muslims continued. In May a young man in Cairo committed suicide after his family locked him inside the house for more than two years for being an atheist, according to sources. In July a 20-year-old Cairo resident was forced to flee when his brother threatened to kill him after learning that he had converted from Islam to Christianity, according to sources familiar with the case. In March a young woman living in Cairo was threatened by her brother and uncle who said they would kill her for her conversion from Islam to Christianity, according to sources familiar with the case. Another young woman from northern Egypt reportedly spent three months in jail under false charges filed by her family when they discovered she had converted to Christianity, according to sources familiar with the case. Another reportedly fled and lived in hiding after her family sent her to a psychiatric ward for being “confused about religion.” Christian couples from Muslim backgrounds reported that if their children revealed to teachers, classmates, or relatives that a religion other than Islam was being practiced in the home, this could put the entire family at risk. One such couple reported that, because of this risk, they did not plan to have children.

In April Muslims in Kom al-Loufi village in Minya Province attacked the Christian community after services celebrating Holy Thursday which had been held in a Christian-owned home with the verbal approval of police, according to press reports, since the church remained closed by authorities. The assailants set fire to three Christian-owned homes and injured four persons. Police arrested 15 individuals. Subsequently Muslim residents gathered a second time and threw rocks at Christian-owned homes, in spite of the presence of security forces, according to press reports, leading to another 15 arrests. On April 21, Christian residents issued a statement that police had failed to keep a promise to allow them to use their church or, alternatively, to build a new church on land they had purchased on the outskirts of town; that pressure from extremists was impeding their access to churches in neighboring villages; and in spite of the recent arrests and presence of security, Muslim residents continued to prevent them from gathering for prayer. They demanded that the legal and constitutional rights of Christians be protected and that the perpetrators of the attacks be brought to justice, and called on President al-Sisi to intervene. In December Christian families withdrew charges against 23 suspects in a 2016 case in which assailants had attacked Christians and Christian-owned properties in the same village. Some human rights activists stated that the Christian families withdrew their complaints in fear of a backlash if the suspects were sentenced; others reported that they did so after the local Muslim community and security agencies entered into a verbal agreement to allow them to build a church on the outskirts of town.

Police responded swiftly to reports of sectarian violence on March 24 in the village of al-Mohayadet, near Luxor, when Muslims from four villages converged on a gated compound containing five Christian-owned homes, according to press reports. The crowd demanded the release of an 18-year-old woman, saying she had converted to Islam and married a 19-year-old Muslim who was unable to provide documentation of the marriage. The woman’s family had fled with their daughter ten days earlier, according to a source familiar with the case, saying the man had tried to attack their daughter. Police used tear gas to disburse the crowd; four police and seven protesters were injured in the clashes.

In contrast to preceding years, the Coptic Orthodox Church refused to participate in government-sponsored “customary reconciliation” as a substitute to the rule of law to address attacks on Christians and their churches. Human rights groups and Christians said that practice constituted an encroachment on the principles of nondiscrimination and citizenship, and effectively precluded recourse to the judicial system in most cases, as victims were regularly pressured to retract their statements and deny facts, leading to the dropping of charges. “Reconciliation” sessions had been held under the auspices of the Egyptian Family House, a body consisting of Muslim and Christian clerics.

In some cases intimidation in the name of “reconciliation” continued, however. For example, Souad Thabet, an elderly Coptic woman, and other Coptic witnesses to an attack she and other Copts suffered, retracted their testimonies under pressure and threats by local residents, sources reported. In 2016, 300 Muslim residents of the village of El-Karm in Minya Province set fire to several Christian owned homes and stripped Thabet naked after a rumor spread that her son was having an affair with a married Muslim woman. The case remained pending at the end of the year; however, government officials report a lack of evidence after the woman and witnesses retracted their testimony. Thabet’s son and the woman with whom he allegedly had an affair were each sentenced to two years in prison for adultery.

While kidnappers targeted both Muslims and Christians during the year, sources reported cases of police failing to assist Christian parents in recovering their minor daughters who had been kidnapped by or eloped with Muslim men. In one case, a girl’s parents identified the perpetrator and provided police with his address but police still took no action, according to an individual familiar with the case. One father agreed to prosecutors’ request to drop charges against a Muslim man in order to recover his 14-year-old daughter, according to a source familiar with the case. One activist stated that Christian parents often dropped charges because the court had the authority to place an underage girl in an orphanage pending investigation, which could last until the daughter’s 18th birthday. World Watch Monitor published an interview with a man who said he was a former Muslim who had convinced a series of Christian girls to elope with him. According to the article, he said he had received money for each girl from “Salafist networks” whose aim was “to strengthen Islam and weaken Christianity.” An activist who tracks abduction and elopement cases reported several cases of minor Christian girls eloping with Muslim men during the year.

On May 3, Director of Ibn Taymiyyah Academy for Theological and Epistemological Research Mohamed Soliman filed a lawsuit against the country’s theater troupe, accusing them of denigrating Islam in a play about a man from seventh century Mecca who rejected Islam. The sketch ended with the lead actor saying, “Today, wine and women. And tomorrow, we kill Muhammad, peace be upon him.” A group of actors answered, “Peace be upon him.”

On December 25, the president of Cairo University announced the appointment of a Christian as dean. Regular discrimination in private hiring continued, however, including in professional sports, according to human rights groups and religious communities. Discrimination also occurred against Muslims. In late November a Christian landlord told his tenants that their roommate had to vacate the premises by the end of the month after seeing his national identity card listing him as Muslim, according to sources. Sources also reported widespread religious discrimination in the workplace against persons officially designated as Muslim who declined invitations to participate in communal Islamic prayers or who broke the Ramadan fast.

Islamic groups continued to use discriminatory speech against Christians, and terrorists called for Christians to be killed. For example, on February 20, terrorists affiliated with ISIS released a 20-minute video claiming responsibility for the December 2016 attack on Saints Peter and Paul Church in Cairo, calling for the killing of Christians, saying they were the “favorite prey” of the mujahideen, and adding that Copts were “warriors of the Crusaders.”

In response to ISIS’ statement listing names of Muslim clerics whom they accused of apostasy from Islam and calling on pious Muslims to kill them, Al-Azhar’s Observatory, established in 2015 to monitor extremist rhetoric, issued a statement on February 21 criticizing the group for equating the blood of Muslim clerics with the blood of non-Muslims.

After the Palm Sunday church bombings in Alexandria and Tanta, Muslim preacher Wagdi Ghoneim, a Salafi imam living in exile in Qatar, broadcast a video stating that Coptic Christians “deserved” what they got, saying the bombing was punishment for Christians’ support for President al-Sisi, one of a series of videos he produced calling for the killing of Coptic Christians, condemning al-Sisi as an apostate from Islam, and calling for the overthrow of the government. A court sentenced Ghoneim to death in absentia on April 30 for “creating a terrorist cell.”

Reports of societal anti-Semitism and incitement to commit violence against Jews continued, particularly by Muslim clerics.

On March 27, Sheikh Abd Al-Wahhab Al-Maligi, a Muslim cleric, appeared on Al-Seha wa Al-Jamal TV defending female genital mutilation and said that Jews had been the first to criticize the practice because they did “not want Islam or the Muslims to be pure, developed, and civilized.” He pointed to the debunked Protocols of the Elders of Zion as support for his argument.

On July 20, Al-Azhar University professor of Islamic law Ahmed Karima appeared on Palestinian television calling for armed jihad against the “Zionist gang” who were “raised on aggression, theft, and plundering,” and encouraged armed jihad against Jews.

In videotaped sermons on August 4 and August 11, Muslim cleric Sayed Ahmed Ali cited a hadith (tradition) quoting the Prophet Muhammad saying, “Judgment Day will not come until the Muslims fight the Jews. The Muslims will kill them, and the Jews will hide behind trees and rocks, but the trees and rocks will call: ‘Oh, Muslim, oh servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him!’” Sayed subsequently cried out, “Oh, Allah, bring us that day of battle with the Jews! Bring us that day of battle with the Jews!”

Following the President’s announcement recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, some newspapers published anti-Semitic editorial cartoons suggesting Jewish and Israeli domination of U.S. policies and politics. Copies of anti-Semitic literature, including translations of Mein Kampf, were widely available for purchase.

Anti-Shia rhetoric continued as well. On February 11, cleric Muhammad Al-Zoghbi called Shia Muslims “criminal rafidites,” (a slur for Shia, meaning “rejectionists”) for killing Sunnis in Iraq and Syria in an interview televised on Al-Rahma TV. “I tell you, these are filthy people! They are nothing like the Sunnis,” he said after recounting a story he said he had heard about Ayatollah Khomeini allegedly having sex with a five-year-old girl and later justifying the act as permitted in Islam.

Sunni cleric Sameh Abdel Hameed Hamouda called on the government to demolish the Al-Hussein mosque in Cairo, the shrine believed by many to contain the head of Prophet Muhammad’s grandson Imam Al-Hussein, a revered figure for Shia Muslims. Sameh accused Shia of lying about the presence of the relic in an effort to “exploit this mosque to spread Shiism and invade Egypt with their heresies and deviations,” adding, “ignorant people come to this shrine to practice all types of polytheism and heresies.”

In December lawyer and frequent talk show guest Nabih al-Wahsh called for women to be raped if they did not comply with traditional Islamic standards of modesty. ‎The National Security Emergency Misdemeanor Court subsequently sentenced him to three years in jail on charges of threatening public order and security, as well as incitement to harm citizens.

During a televised talk show, the president of a Coptic human rights organization, Naguib Gabriel, called in and described Jehovah’s Witnesses as Zionists and called on all of the country’s Christians not to invite Jehovah’s Witnesses into their homes.

U.S. government officials at multiple levels, including the Ambassador, the Charge d’Affaires, and other Department of State, embassy, and consulate general officials, raised religious freedom concerns with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education as well as with members of parliament, governors, and representatives of Islamic institutions, church communities, and religious minority groups. President Trump condemned the lethal attacks on the Rawda mosque in North Sinai and on the Mar Mina Coptic Orthodox Church in Helwan and phoned President al-Sisi on both occasions, offering condolences and reiterating, “The United States will continue to stand with Egypt in the face of terrorism.”

In January embassy officers and visiting U.S. officials met with the Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Awqaf, and Education as well as with the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Coptic Orthodox Pope Tawadros II, and a number of human rights activists and religious and community leaders. Washington, D.C.-based U.S. government officials visited the country to promote religious freedom in October. Issues raised included cases in which the government failed to hold the perpetrators of sectarian violence accountable; failed to protect victims of sectarian attacks from intimidation; prosecuted individuals for religious defamation; enabled religious discrimination by means of official religious designations including on national identity cards; and failed to recognize conversion of Muslim-born citizens. Embassy representatives also met with leading religious figures, including the Grand Mufti of Dar Al-Iftaa, the Coptic Orthodox Pope, other leading Christian clergy, and representatives of the Jewish, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Bahai communities as well as atheists and former Muslims who had converted to Christianity. In December the embassy hosted a digital video conference with the State Department Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Middle East, North Africa, and South and Central Asia for a discussion about religious freedom in the country. The embassy also promoted religious freedom on social media throughout the year. The U.S. government closely monitored foreign organizations for possible terrorist activity; during the reporting period, the Muslim Brotherhood did not meet U.S. statutory criteria to be designated as a foreign terrorist organization.

U.S. officials emphasized to the country’s officials the U.S. commitment to religious freedom and raised a number of cases, including attacks on Christians, recognition of Bahais and Jehovah’s Witnesses, the rights of Shia to publicly perform religious rituals, and problems resulting from government-designated religious identities listed on official documents which in some cases facilitated religious discrimination and, particularly in cases of converts from Islam, led to abuses including violence. Embassy officials maintained an active dialogue with human rights advocates, religious leaders, and community members on questions of religious freedom, for example, on combating anti-Semitism and supporting the rights of all citizens to choose their religion, build houses of worship, and practice their religious rituals as well as the government’s responsibility to prosecute perpetrators of sectarian attacks.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 6.2 million (July 2017 estimate). According to a May survey by the University of Central America’s Institute of Public Opinion, 47.5 percent of the population identifies as Roman Catholic, 35.1 percent as evangelical Protestant, and 14.5 percent have no religious affiliation. Approximately 3 percent state “other,” which includes Jehovah’s Witnesses, the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Muslims, Jews, Bahais, Buddhists, and members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). A small segment of the population adheres to indigenous religious beliefs, with some mixing of these beliefs with other religions such as Catholicism.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the free exercise of religion. It states all persons are equal before the law and prohibits discrimination based on religion. The ombudsman for human rights monitors the state of religious freedom in the country, including issuing special reports and accepting petitions from the public for violation of the free exercise of religion.

The penal code imposes criminal sentences of one to three years on individuals who publicly offend or insult the religious beliefs of others, or damage or destroy religious objects. The law defines an offense as an action that prevents or disrupts the free exercise of religion, publicly disavows religious traditions, or publicly insults an individual’s beliefs or religious dogma. Sentences increase to four to eight years when individuals commit such acts to gain media attention. Repeat offenders may face prison sentences of three to five years. There were no prosecutions under this law during the year.

The constitution states members of the clergy may not occupy the positions of president, cabinet ministers, vice ministers, Supreme Court justices, judges, governors, attorney general, public defender, and other senior government positions. The clergy may not belong to political parties. The electoral code requires judges of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and members of municipal councils to be laypersons.

The constitution allows religious groups to apply for official recognition by registering with the government. The constitution gives legal status to the Catholic Church and exempts it from registration requirements. Religious groups may operate without registering, but registration provides tax-exempt status and facilitates activities requiring official permits, such as building places of worship. To register, a religious group must apply through the Office of the Director General for Nonprofit Associations and Foundations (DGFASFL) within the Ministry of Governance. The group must present its constitution and bylaws describing the type of organization, location of its offices, its goals and principles, requirements for membership, function of its ruling bodies, and assessments or dues. DGFASFL analyzes the group’s constitution and bylaws to ensure both comply with the law. Upon approval, the government publishes the group’s constitution and bylaws in the official gazette. DGFASFL does not maintain records on religious groups once it approves their status, and there are no requirements for renewal of registration.

By law, the Ministry of Governance has authority to register, regulate, and oversee the finances of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and all religious groups except the Catholic Church, due to its special legal recognition under the constitution. Foreign religious groups must obtain special residence visas for religious activities, including proselytizing, and may not proselytize while on visitor or tourist visas. Religious groups must be registered in the country in order to be eligible for this special residence visa for religious activities.

Public education is secular. The constitution grants the right to establish private schools, including schools run by religious groups, which operate without government support. Parents choose whether their children receive religious education in private schools. Public schools may not deny admittance to any student based on religion. All private schools, religiously affiliated or not, must meet the same academic standards to obtain Ministry of Education approval.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On April 6, the First Appellate Court upheld the original 30-year sentence of Colonel Guillermo Alfredo Benavides, handed down in 1992 for his role in the 1989 killings of six Jesuit priests. The court also upheld the 1992 acquittals of four ex-soldiers accused of participating in the killings, whom authorities had arrested in February 2016. The court stated it upheld the four acquittals because the courts could not retry the accused for the same crime. On August 18, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court ruled against enforcing the INTERPOL arrest warrant issued for the 13 remaining former members of the military accused in a Spanish court of the Jesuit priests’ killing, citing previous decisions in this case that Spanish courts did not have primary jurisdiction in this matter. On November 28, former Vice Minister for Public Security (1989-92) Inocente Orlando Montano was extradited to Spain from the United States for his alleged involvement in the 1989 killings. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the UN-backed Truth Commission Report characterized the killing of the Jesuit priests as a politically motivated crime carried out in the context of the civil war by military agents who believed the priests supported, or worked on behalf of, guerilla elements.

The Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights again reported it had not received notice of any cases of alleged violations of religious freedom. The ombudsman stated she was receptive to the importance of protecting the rights of all individuals regardless of the person’s religious or other identity and was committed to acting accordingly.

According to the Ministry of Governance, there were 139 new requests for registration of religious groups from January through November 3. Of these, the Ministry of Governance approved 63, and 76 were pending. Religious groups did not report any excessive delays in the processing of registration applications. The ministry reported it had denied one application due to the group’s lack of required documents.

Catholic and evangelical Protestant leaders, leaders of other Christian denominations, as well as statisticians and criminology researchers, continued to state that clergy could sometimes not reach their respective congregations in MS-13 and Barrio 18 gang-controlled territory throughout the country due to fear of crime and violence. An evangelical Protestant pastor said that he faced problems from gangs in Sonsonate and had received an increasing number of petitions from his parishioners asking for his support in moving parishes due to gang violence. In certain sections of the country, gang members controlled access in and around communities, and there were reports that they displaced church leaders and charity groups with religious affiliations. There were also reports that gang members engaged in the extortion of organizations with known funding streams, including religious groups, demanding a “tax” in order to operate in some territories.

The government enforced security legislation passed in 2016 restricting nongovernmental access to prisons, including access of priests and pastors. This legislation was a response to increasing reports of gang members who were also evangelical pastors gaining entrance to prisons and functioning as couriers between incarcerated gang leaders and gang members outside the prisons. Religious leaders, former gang members, and independent studies also noted that gang leaders would sometimes permit members to leave the gangs if they became strict adherents to a religious group; the former gang would then monitor the departing gang member’s adherence to the religion. Gang members asking permission to leave the gang for religious reasons, but later found to be in violation of the tenets of that religion, were reportedly sometimes killed by members of their former gang. For example, members of their former gang might kill a gang member who joined a Protestant church that prohibits consumption of alcohol if he continued to drink alcohol.

Religious leaders continued to participate in the government-led National Security Plan, including in the monitoring and implementation of the plan. This effort linked community leaders, law enforcement personnel, and government officials in 26 municipalities throughout the country with the highest levels of violence to prevent and reduce that violence through joint efforts to improve education, social assistance, economic development, and security. Religious leaders participated as important members of civil society, along with local leaders of the media, unions, academics, and others, in the municipal and national councils to help with efforts to improve security in their communities by addressing community needs.

On March 1, a teacher at a private, secular French school in San Salvador forced Catholic students who attended the Ash Wednesday Mass to remove the ash crosses from their foreheads. Mothers of the students demanded an apology, and on March 2, the school issued a press release underscoring that the teacher’s actions were not in keeping with the school’s values of tolerance and respect.

According to representatives of the Lutheran Church, interfaith groups continued to meet throughout the year and helped reinforce what they said was commonly held societal respect for the contributions of the country’s religious communities. The Religions for Peace collective, comprising Catholic, evangelical Protestant, Jewish, indigenous, and Muslim representatives, worked together on the Pastoral Initiative for Life and Peace, focusing on reintegration programs for all prisoners, regardless of religious affiliation, after release from incarceration.

Embassy officials frequently discussed with the new ombudsman for human rights the importance of government officials’ carrying out their official duties to protect the rights of all individuals regardless of the officials’ personal religious affiliation or beliefs.

Embassy officials discussed internal displacement and restriction of movement of religious groups because of gang activity with the faith-based NGO Cristosal, academic researchers, and the University of Central America’s Institute of Public Opinion, a Jesuit institution. Embassy officials stressed with religious groups the importance of filing complaints with law enforcement agencies and the ombudsman for human rights regarding the impact of gang activity on religious practice. Embassy officials also met with members of the Jewish and Bahai communities. Embassy officials also spoke with members of the interdenominational Religions for Peace collective, who discussed their joint efforts to promote tolerance throughout the year.

The U.S. government estimates the country’s total population at 778,000 (July 2017 estimate). The most recent local census, conducted in 2015 in collaboration with the United Nations, puts the total population at 1.2 million. According to the most recent estimate, 88 percent of the population is Roman Catholic and 5 percent is Protestant. Many Christians reportedly practice some aspects of traditional indigenous religions as well. Two percent of the population is Muslim (mainly Sunni). The remaining 5 percent adhere to animism, the Bahai Faith, and other beliefs.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion and worship and prohibits political parties based on religious affiliation. The law states the country has no national religion and individuals are free to change religions. Christians converting to Islam are permitted to add Muslim names to their Christian names on their official documents.

Regulations establish an official preference for the Roman Catholic Church and the Reformed Church of Equatorial Guinea. Neither group is required to register with the MJRAPI. The only religious group to receive state funding for operating educational institutions is the Roman Catholic Church.

Some long-standing religious groups such as Methodists, Muslims, and Bahais hold permanent authorizations and are not required to renew their registrations with the MJRAPI. Newer groups and denominations may be required to renew their registration annually. To register, religious groups at the congregational level must submit a written application to the MJRAPI director general of religion. Those seeking to register must supply detailed information about the leadership (e.g., curriculum vitae) and members of the group; construction plans of religious buildings; property ownership documents, accreditations, and religious mandate; and a fee of 100,000 Central African francs (CFA) ($180). The director general of religion adjudicates these applications and may order an inspection by the MJRAPI before processing. The government may fine or shut down unregistered groups. The law requires a permit for door-to-door proselytism.

An MJRAPI decree specifies that any religious activities taking place outside the hours of 6 a.m. to 9 p.m. or outside of registered places of worship require pre-authorization from the MJRAPI. The decree prohibits religious acts or preaching within private residences if those acts involve persons who do not live there. Foreign religious representatives or authorities must obtain advance permission from the MJRAPI to participate in religious activities. The decree exempts the Catholic Church.

The government recognizes official documents issued by authorized religious groups, such as birth certificates and marriage certificates.

The constitution states individuals are free to study religion in schools and may not be forced to study a faith other than their own. Catholic religious classes are part of the public school curriculum, but such study may be replaced by non-Catholic religious study or by a recess with a note from a leader of another religious group.

All foreigners, including foreign evangelical missionaries, are required to obtain residency permits to remain in the country.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

While the government routinely granted religious groups permission for activities outside of places of worship, except in private homes, it usually denied permits to hold activities outside of the prescribed hours of 6 a.m. to 9 p.m., according to religious leaders. All religious groups, including a small number of Bahai and Jewish groups, were allowed to hold services as long as they finished before 9 p.m. and did not disturb the peace. Evangelical Christian groups continued to hold activities outside the prescribed period with no repercussions from law enforcement. Religious leaders said authorities routinely issued permits for proselytism and door-to-door proselytism occurred without incident.

Evangelical Christians reported residency permits were prohibitively expensive at 400,000 CFA ($700), leading some missionaries to risk the consequences of not obtaining or renewing such permits. The local police reportedly enforced the requirement with threatened deportation and requested a small bribe as an alternative. There were no deportations reported. The residency permit fee for foreign missionaries was the same as for all other foreigners; however, if the missionary coordinated with the MJRAPI, the residency permit could be obtained for free, provided missionary status could be proven and the requisite security checks were passed. The residency permits were not required for Catholic missionaries.

Protestant groups, including the Reformed Church, Seventh-day Adventists, Assemblies of God, Methodists, Baptists, and other Christians, operated primary and secondary schools. These schools had to be registered with the government and fulfill standard curriculum requirements.

Catholic masses were a normal part of all major ceremonial functions, such as National Day on October 12 and the President’s Birthday on June 5. Catholic leaders were the only religious leaders to meet publicly with government officials. Catholic and Reformed Church leaders were often seated in preferred locations at official functions.

On April 2, Minister of Justice, Religious Affairs, and Penitentiary Institutions Evangelina Filomena Oyo Ebule opened celebrations to mark the National Day of Prayer, which included representatives from all major faiths. In her speech, the minister emphasized the need of all religious faiths to continue to work together to promote peace and security.

Some non-Catholics who worked for the government continued to report that their supervisors strongly encouraged participation in religious activities related to their government positions, including attending Catholic masses. Government officials stated that it was expected that they attend the president’s birthday Mass at the Catholic Church.

Unlike in previous years, the government allowed the Islamic community to celebrate the festival of Eid al-Adha in the Malabo Stadium. Hundreds of Muslims gathered in the stadium from 8 a.m. to 12 p.m. on September 4.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

U.S. embassy officials met with the director general of religion to discuss religious freedom and the ability of individuals to practice any religion free of discrimination.

The embassy also met with the Imam for Malabo, the Archbishop of Malabo, evangelical Christian pastors, Protestant leaders, and a representative of the Bahai Faith to acquire their insights as well as to discuss the need to promote mutual understanding, tolerance, and respect for all religious groups, especially for minority religious groups.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5.9 million (July 2017 estimate). There are no reliable figures on religious affiliation. Government, religious, and local UN sources estimate the population is approximately 48-50 percent Christian and 48-50 percent Sunni Muslim. The Christian population is predominantly Eritrean Orthodox. Catholics, Protestants, and other Christian denominations, including the Greek Orthodox Church, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Pentecostals, are less than 5 percent of the Christian population. Some estimates suggest 2 percent of the population is animist, and there is a Bahai community of approximately 200 members. Only one Jew reportedly remains in the country.

Legal Framework

The law and unimplemented constitution prohibit religious discrimination and provide for freedom of thought, conscience, and belief and the freedom to practice any religion.

Proclamation 73/1995 calls for separation of church and state; outlines the parameters to which religious organizations must adhere, including foreign relations and social activities; establishes an Office of Religious Affairs; and requires religious groups to register with the government or cease activities. Members of religious groups that are unregistered or otherwise not in compliance with the law are subject to penalties under the provisional penal code. Such penalties may include fines and prison terms. The Office of Religious Affairs has authority to regulate religious activities and institutions, including approval of the applications of religious groups seeking official recognition. Each application must include a description of the religious group’s history in the country, an explanation of the uniqueness or benefit the group offers compared with other religious groups, names and personal information of the group’s leaders, detailed information on assets, a description of the group’s conformity to local culture, and a declaration of all foreign sources of funding.

The government recognizes and has registered four religious groups: the Eritrean Orthodox Church, Sunni Islam, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Eritrea (affiliated with the Lutheran World Federation). A 2002 decree required all other religious groups to submit registration applications and to cease religious activities and services until these applications were approved. Since 2002, the government has not approved the registration of additional religious groups.

The government appoints the heads of the Eritrean Orthodox Church and the Sunni Islamic community.

Religious groups may print and distribute documents only with the authorization of the Department of Religious Affairs, which has only approved requests from the four officially registered religious groups.

Religious groups must obtain government approval to build facilities for worship.

While the law does not specifically address religious education in public school, Proclamation 73/1995 outlines the parameters to which religious organizations must adhere, and education is not included as an approved activity. Government attempts to enforce the proclamation have been sporadic over the years, occurring in 1998, 2007, 2001, and in October.

By law, all citizens between 18 and 50 must perform national service, with limited exceptions, including for health reasons such as physical disability or pregnancy. A compulsory citizen militia requires persons not already in the military, including many who were demobilized, elderly, or otherwise exempted from military service in the past, to carry firearms and attend militia training. Failure to participate in the militia or national service could result in detention. Militia duties mostly involve security-related activities, such as airport or neighborhood patrolling. Militia training primarily involves occasional marches and listening to patriotic lectures. The law does not provide for conscientious objector status for religious reasons, nor are there alternative activities for persons willing to perform national service but unwilling to engage in military or militia activities.

The law prohibits any involvement in politics by religious groups.

All citizens must obtain an exit visa prior to departure. The application requests the applicant’s religious affiliation, but the law does not require that information.

The law limits foreign financing for religious groups. The only contributions legally allowed are from local followers, the government, or government-approved foreign sources.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: There were reports of deaths of members of minority religious groups imprisoned for their religious beliefs as well as physical mistreatment of persons in custody. In October the government’s enforcement of its ban on religious groups operating schools sparked demonstrations that led to the arrest of an Islamic school director and at least 40 other persons. In May international NGOs reported the government arrested approximately 210 Christians in house-to-house raids, and they remained imprisoned, reportedly under harsh conditions. The patriarch of the Eritrean Orthodox Church made his first public appearance since 2006, and he reportedly remained under house arrest. According to international NGO Human Rights Watch, members of all religious groups, to varying degrees, continued to be subject to government restrictions. Observers stated the government continued to impose restrictions on proselytizing, accepting external funding from NGOs and international organizations, groups selecting their own religious leaders, gathering for worship, constructing places of worship, and teaching religious beliefs to others. The government’s lack of transparency and intimidation of sources continued to make it difficult to obtain accurate information on specific cases. The government did not make available information on how many registrations for religious groups were pending.

In February the Jehovah’s Witnesses news service, JW News, and Human Rights Concern Eritrea, reported that Tsehaye Tesfamariam, a Jehovah’s Witness, who was arrested in 2009 and imprisoned at the Me’eter Prison Camp until 2015, died in November 2016 from an illness contracted while in prison that authorities reportedly refused to treat.

According to Erimedrek News, on March 17, two Pentecostal Christians died after staging a hunger strike to protest their alleged abuse while imprisoned in the Wi’ia Military Camp. Their bodies reportedly showed signs of sexual abuse.

According to CSW, since May the government arrested approximately 210 evangelical Christians in house-to-house raids throughout the country, reportedly for belonging to an unregistered group, and sent them to a prison on Nakura Island, where they were reportedly imprisoned under harsh conditions. According to CSW’s June report to the UN Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea, authorities detained 122 Christians: 45 in Adi-Quala, 15 in Ghinda, and 45 and 17 in two separate incidents in Asmara. In August Human Rights Concern Eritrea reported that Fikadu Debesai, a mother of four who was among those reportedly arrested in May, died in prison. Her husband and 18-year-old son were reportedly held in the Merkel Abiet Prison and Gergera Labor Camp, respectively.

On October 27, authorities arrested Al Diaa Islamic School board president Hajji Musa Mohamed Nur, who had opposed government efforts to close the school. On October 31, demonstrators gathered in Asmara to protest his arrest. Security forces dispersed the protesters with gunfire and arrested approximately 40 persons. Nur remained in prison at year’s end. According to diaspora opposition groups, the government’s effort to close the school was part of an effort to enforce a 1995 proclamation banning religious groups from operating religious schools and an unwritten 2014 Ministry of Education policy to secularize schools and follow the ministry’s curriculum. The government issued similar orders to the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches to close the Eastern Orthodox Edna-Mariam School and the Roman Catholic Medhanie Alem Secondary School. The Edna-Mariam School complied with the order while the Medhanie Alem School refused. In response, authorities arrested and later released the Medhanie Alem School’s director, a priest, and its secretary, a nun. Other schools across the country run by religious groups did not receive such orders.

It remained very difficult to determine the number of persons imprisoned for their religious beliefs given the lack of government transparency and reported intimidation of those who might come forward with such information.

Arrests and releases often went unreported. Information from outside the capital was extremely limited. Independent observers stated many persons remained imprisoned without charge. International religious organizations reported authorities interrogated detainees about their religious affiliation and asked them to identify members of unregistered religious groups.

On July 17, Eritrean Orthodox Church Patriarch Abune Antonios attended Mass at Enda Mariam Orthodox Church, his first public appearance since 2006. Authorities placed Antonios under house arrest in 2006 for protesting government interference in Church affairs and subsequently prevented him from engaging in religious activities or appearing in public. Authorities also removed him as patriarch and replaced him with a government-chosen leader. Church leaders, international NGOs, and foreign governments raised concern about his poor health and called for his release. The government refuted claims that Antonios was under house arrest, stating that church leaders imposed his seclusion from the public. CSW and other observers characterized the patriarch’s brief appearance as a government attempt to counter international concern about his detention and stated government-backed Eritrean Orthodox Church leaders and Antonios had reconciled their differences.

The government continued to detain without due process persons associated with unregistered religious groups, occasionally for long periods, and sometimes on the ground of threatening national security, according to minority religious group members.

The government continued to single out Jehovah’s Witnesses for particularly harsh treatment because of their blanket refusal to vote in the 1993 referendum on Eritrean independence and subsequent refusal to participate in National Service. According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, 53 of their members were in detention as of February for their conscientious objection to military service, including three men imprisoned without charge for 22 years. Other NGO sources corroborated these reports. The government continued to hold Jehovah’s Witnesses and other religious prisoners for failure to follow the law or for national security reasons. Prisoners held for national security reasons were not allowed visitors, and families often did not know where they were being held. Authorities generally permitted family members to visit prisoners detained for religious reasons only. Former prisoners who had been held for their religious beliefs continued to report harsh detention conditions, including solitary confinement, physical abuse, and inadequate food, water, and shelter.

Jehovah’s Witnesses continued to report members were unable to obtain official identification documents, which meant they were generally unable to study in government institutions, find employment, or obtain an exit visa to leave the country. Authorities collectively stripped Jehovah’s Witnesses of citizenship in 1994 after their refusal to participate in the independence referendum. The government continued to withhold documents and entitlements such as passports, national identification cards (required for employment), and ration cards. The government also required all customers to present a national identification card in order to use computers at private internet cafes, where most individuals access the internet. This identification requirement rendered Jehovah’s Witness members generally unable to use the internet.

Official attitudes toward members of unregistered religious groups worshipping in homes or rented facilities differed. Some local authorities reportedly tolerated the presence and activities of unregistered groups, while others attempted to prevent them from meeting. Local authorities sometimes denied government coupons (which allowed shoppers to make purchases at discounted prices at certain stores) to Jehovah’s Witnesses and members of Pentecostal groups.

Diaspora groups noted authorities controlled virtually all activities of the four formally recognized groups. The leaders of the four groups continued to state their officially registered members did not face impediments to religious practice, but there were private reports of restrictions on import of religious items used for worship. It was unclear whether authorities used these restrictions to target religious groups, since import licenses remained generally restricted. There were also reports of restrictions on clergy meeting with foreign diplomats.

Most religious facilities not belonging to the four officially registered religious groups remained publicly closed to worship. The government allowed only the practice of Sunni Islam and banned all other practice of Islam. Religious structures used by unregistered Jewish and Greek Orthodox groups continued to exist in Asmara. The government protected the historic Jewish synagogue building, maintained by an individual reported as the country’s last remaining Jew. Other structures belonging to unregistered groups, such as Seventh-day Adventists and the Church of Christ, remained shuttered. The government allowed the Bahai center to remain open, and, according to reports, the members of the center had access to the building except for prayer meetings. The Greek Orthodox Church remained open, but there were no services. There were services held in the Anglican Church building, but only under the auspices of the Evangelical Lutheran Church.

Some church leaders continued to state the government’s restriction on foreign financing reduced church income and religious participation by preventing churches from training clergy or building facilities.

Government control of all mass media continued to restrict the ability of unregistered religious group members to bring attention to government repression against them, according to observers. Restrictions on public assembly and freedom of speech severely limited the ability of unregistered religious groups to assemble and conduct their worship, according to group members.

The sole political party, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) led by the president, appointed both the mufti of the Sunni Islamic community and the patriarch of the Eritrean Orthodox Church, as well as some lower-level officials for both communities. PFDJ-appointed lay administrators managed some operations of the Eritrean Orthodox Church, including disposition of donations and seminarian participation in national service.

The government continued to permit a limited number of Sunni Muslims, mainly the elderly and those not fit for military service, to take part in the Hajj, travel abroad for religious study, and host clerics from abroad. The government generally did not permit Muslim groups to receive funding from governments of nations where Islam was the dominant religion on grounds that such funding threatened to import foreign “fundamentalist” or “extremist” tendencies.

The government continued to grant some visas permitting Catholic dioceses to host visiting clergy from Rome or other foreign locations. Catholic clergy were permitted to travel abroad for religious purposes and training, although not in numbers Church officials considered adequate; they were also discouraged from attending certain religious events while overseas. Students attending the Roman Catholic seminary, as well as Catholic nuns, did not perform national service and did not suffer repercussions from the government, according to Church officials. Some Catholic leaders stated, however, national service requirements prevented adequate numbers of seminarians from completing theological training in Rome or other locations, because those who had not completed national service were not able to obtain passports or exit visas.

While three ministers and at least one senior military leader were Muslims, foreign diplomats reported that individuals in positions of power, both in government and outside, often expressed reluctance to share power with Muslim countrymen and distrusted foreign Muslims.

Some Eritrean Orthodox clergy operating outside the country continued to state the government sought control over Eritrean Orthodox churches in foreign countries, including through pressure on adherents abroad designed to influence family members still inside the country.

Government control of all media, expression, and public discourse made it difficult to observe any societal actions linked to religious freedom. Churches and mosques are located in close proximity and reportedly most citizens congratulated members of other religions on various holidays and even celebrated them with neighbors and friends.

Some Christian leaders reported that Muslim leaders and communities were willing to collaborate on community projects. There were unsubstantiated reports that Christians joined the October protests of the arrest of a Muslim school board president. Others reported government pressure not to cooperate with members of other religious groups has increased over the last few years, whereas previously there had been joint events, such as common worship during church festivals. Ecumenical and interreligious committees did not exist, and while local leaders met informally, there were no public displays of ecumenism.

U.S. embassy representatives met with government officials to raise religious freedom concerns, including advocating for the release of Jehovah’s Witnesses and alternative service for conscientious objectors refusing to bear arms for religious reasons. Embassy officials raised issues of religious freedom with a wide range of discussion partners, including visiting international delegations, Asmara- and regionally-based diplomats accredited to the government, and UN and other international organization representatives.

Embassy staff met with clergy, leaders, and other representatives of most religious groups, including unregistered groups. Staff also attended religious celebrations, weddings, and funeral ceremonies of the four registered faiths as invitees of the government or of religious leaders and on an ad hoc basis. Some Embassy requests via the government to meet with religious leaders went unanswered, however.

Since 2004, Eritrea has been designated as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. On December 22, 2017, the Secretary of State redesignated Eritrea as a CPC and identified the following sanction that accompanied the designation: the existing ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(a) pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act. Restrictions on U.S. assistance resulting from the CPC designation remained in place.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.3 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2011 census, 29 percent of the population is religiously affiliated, 54 percent does not identify with any religion; and 17 percent does not state an affiliation. According to January 1 data from the Council of Churches, the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church has 180,000 members (13.8 percent of the population), while the Estonian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate (EOCMP) has 170,000 members (13.1 percent). The Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church has 30,000 members (2.3 percent). The Union of Free Evangelical and Baptist Churches of Estonia and the Roman Catholic Church in Estonia both have over 6,000 members (0.9 percent each). Other Christian groups, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pentecostals, Methodists, and Seventh-day Adventists, and Russian Old Believers collectively constitute 1.1 percent of the population. According to the 2011 census, there are small Jewish and Muslim communities of 2,500 members and 1,500 members, respectively. Most religious adherents among the Russian-speaking population belong to the EOCMP and reside mainly in the capital or the northeastern part of the country. According to census data, most of the country’s community of Russian Old Believers lives along the west bank of Lake Peipsi in the eastern part of the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares there is no state church and stipulates freedom for individuals to belong to any religious group and practice any religion, both alone and in community with others, in public or in private, unless doing so is “detrimental to public order, health, or morals.” The constitution also prohibits incitement of religious hatred, violence, or discrimination. The law states that violations are punishable by fines or up to three years in prison. The constitution recognizes the right to refuse military service for religious reasons but requires conscientious objectors to perform alternative service as provided by law.

The law regulates the activities of religious associations and religious societies. Religious associations are defined as churches, congregations, unions of congregations, and monasteries. Churches, congregations, and unions of congregations are required to have a management board; only citizens and legal residents who are eligible to vote in local council elections may be members of the board. The elected or appointed superior of a monastery serves as the management board for the monastery. Religious societies are defined as voluntary organizations whose main activities include religious or ecumenical activities relating to morals, ethics, culture, and social rehabilitation activities outside the traditional forms of religious rites of a church or congregation and need not be connected with a specific church or congregation.

The registration office of the Tartu County Court registers religious associations and religious societies.

In order to register, a religious association must have at least 12 members, and its management board must submit a notarized or digitally signed application, the minutes of its constitutive meeting, and a copy of its statutes. The law treats registered religious associations as nonprofit entities entitled to some tax benefits if they apply for them, such as a value-added tax exemption. There are more than 550 religious associations registered with the government.

The law does not prohibit activities by unregistered religious associations. Unregistered religious associations, however, may not act as legal persons. Unlike registered religious associations, unregistered associations are not eligible for tax benefits.

Religious societies are registered according to the law governing nonprofit associations and are entitled to the same tax benefits as religious associations. In order to register as an NGO, a religious society must have a founding contract and statutes approved by its founders, who may be physical or legal persons. The minimum number of founders is two. The society must submit its registration application either electronically or on paper to the Tartu County Court registry department.

The law requires the commanding officer of each military unit to provide its members the opportunity to practice their religion. Prison directors must also provide the opportunity for inmates to practice their religious beliefs. The state funds police and border guard, military, and prison chaplains, who may belong to any registered religious denomination and must guarantee religious services for individuals of all faiths.

Optional basic religious instruction is available in public and private schools, funded by the state. All schools must provide religious studies at the primary and secondary levels if students request these studies. The courses offer a general introduction to different faiths. Religious studies instructors may be lay teachers or clergy provided by religious groups. There are also private religious schools. All students, regardless of their religious affiliation or nonaffiliation, may attend religious schools. Attendance at religious services at religious schools is voluntary. The majority of students attending a private religious school are not associated with the school’s religious affiliation. Most congregations have Sunday schools.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to the NGO register, at least two religious associations registered during the year, including evangelical Protestant groups.

The government increased its allocation of funds to the Estonian Council of Churches by approximately 50,000 euros ($60,000) to 710,000 euros ($852,000) from 646,000 euros ($776,000) in 2016. The council, which comprises 10 Christian churches – including the Lutheran Church and both Orthodox churches – continued to serve as an organization joining the country’s largest Christian communities. Funds provided by the state were given to the Council of Churches for ecumenical activities, including ecclesiastical programs aired on the Estonian Broadcasting Company, youth work by churches, activities promoting interreligious dialogue, and religious publishing. The government did not play a role in determining how the council distributed the funds.

The Conservative People’s Party of Estonia’s (EKRE) platform for local elections in Tallinn included a promise not to allow the construction of a mosque in the capital city.

A political candidate from EKRE posted a platform for the 2019 European Parliament elections that included decriminalizing Holocaust denial and implementing the “correct teaching of the history of the Third Reich.” Although his statements received coverage from international media, he received only 91 votes (0.6 percent of the total votes cast in the district in which he competed) in October local elections and was not supported by his party.

On January 27, the government held its annual commemoration for International Holocaust Remembrance Day at the Rahumae Jewish Cemetery in Tallinn. Schools throughout the country also participated in commemorative activities. The Ministry of Education and Research, in cooperation with the Unitas Foundation, Estonian NATO Association, and Jewish community, sponsored a seminar for history and civics teachers from across the country to introduce them to best practices in the classroom for teaching about the Holocaust.

On September 19, the president of the parliament, Eiki Nestor, laid a wreath to commemorate approximately 1,800 to 2,000 persons, mostly Jews, killed at the Nazi concentration camp at Klooga. In his remarks, Nestor said it was necessary to continue to “commemorate the innocent people that had been murdered” and to recognize that “the evil that murdered people had not disappeared from the world.”

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

In 2016, the latest year for which data was available, police registered six hate crime cases involving religion.

Embassy officials discussed the continued appearance of anti-Muslim sentiment on social media with officials from the ministries of internal, social, and foreign affairs and engaged the government on promoting religious tolerance.

Embassy officials met with members of the Jewish community, representatives of the Council of Churches, and NGOs to discuss religious tolerance. In January the Ambassador hosted religious group leaders to a commemoration of U.S. National Religious Freedom Day, where he urged them to engage in more interreligious dialogue to help increase religious tolerance.

In November the Ambassador hosted a follow-up meeting with religious leaders and government officials to further discuss respect for religious diversity and pluralism in honor of the International Day of Tolerance.

The embassy again joined with the Ministry of Education to fund the travel of two teachers to a summer teacher-training program on Holocaust education in the U.S. The teachers said they had incorporated what they had learned into the Holocaust education portion of the national curriculum.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 105.4 million (July 2017 estimate). The most recent census, conducted in 2007, estimated 44 percent of the population adheres to the EOC, 34 percent are Sunni Muslim, and 19 percent belong to Christian evangelical and Pentecostal groups. The EOC predominates in the northern regions of Tigray and Amhara, while Islam is most prevalent in the Afar, Oromia, and Somali Regions. Established Protestant churches are strongest in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region, Gambela, and parts of Oromia. Groups together constituting less than 5 percent of the population include Eastern Rite and Roman Catholics, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, and practitioners of indigenous religions. There is also a Rastafarian community, numbering approximately 1,000, whose members migrated from the Caribbean in the 1950’s and reside in Addis Ababa and in the town of Shashemene in Oromia Region.

Legal Framework

The constitution requires the separation of state and religion, establishes freedom of religious choice and practice, prohibits religious discrimination, and stipulates the government shall not interfere in the practice of any religion, nor shall religion interfere in state affairs. It permits limitations on religious freedom as prescribed by law in order to protect public safety, education, and morals, as well as to guarantee the independence of government from religion. The law criminalizes religious defamation and incitement of one religious group against another. The law permits sharia courts to adjudicate personal status cases, provided both parties are Muslim and consent to the court’s jurisdiction.

The SOE, which was put in place in October 2016 and affected religious activities, was lifted on August 4.

Registration and licensing of religious groups fall under the mandate of the Directorate of Faith and Religious Affairs of the MoFPDA, which requires unregistered religious groups to submit a founding document, the national identity cards of its founders, and the permanent address of the religious institution and planned regional branches. The registration process also includes an application letter, information on the board members, meeting minutes, information on the founders, financial reports, offices, name, and symbols. Religious group applicants must have at least 50 individuals for registration as a church, and 15 for registration as a ministry or association. During the registration process, the government publishes the religious group’s name and logo in a local newspaper and, if there are no objections, registration is granted.

Unlike other religious groups, the EOC is not registered by the MoFPDA but obtains registration through a provision in the civil code passed during the imperial era that is still in force. Registration with the ministry confers legal status on a religious group, which gives the group the right to congregate and to obtain land to build a place of worship and a cemetery. Unregistered groups do not receive these benefits. Religious groups must renew their registration at least every five years; failure to do so may result in a fine.

Registered religious organizations are required to provide annual activity and financial reports. Activity reports must describe evangelical activities and list new members, newly ordained clergy, and new houses of worship.

Under the constitution the government owns all land; religious groups must apply to both the regional and local governments for land allocation, including for land to build places of worship.

The constitution prohibits religious instruction in schools, whether public or private, although both public and private schools may organize clubs based on shared religious values. The law permits the establishment of a separate category of religious schools under the auspices of churches and mosques. The Charities and Societies Agency, an agency of the government accountable to the federal attorney general, and the Ministry of Education regulate such religious schools, which provide both secular and religious instruction. The Ministry of Education oversees the secular education provided by religious schools.

The law prohibits the formation of political parties based on religion.

The Charities and Societies Proclamation prohibits certain charities, societies, and associations, including those associated with faith-based organizations that engage in rights-based advocacy, and prevents civil society organizations from receiving more than 10 percent of their funding from foreign sources. Rights-based advocacy includes activities promoting human and democratic rights or equality of nations, nationalities, peoples, genders, and religions; protecting the rights of children or persons with disabilities; advancing conflict resolution or reconciliation; and enhancing the efficiency of the justice system or law enforcement services. Religious groups undertaking development activities are required to register their development arms as charities with the Charities and Societies Agency and follow legal guidelines originating from the Charities and Societies Proclamation.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On January 26, the Federal High Court found all 13 Muslim defendants guilty of crimes of terrorism for their role in the 2012 killing of an imam in Dessie, Amhara Region. The group received prison terms ranging from three years and eight months to 16 years.

In April the EHRC reported to the parliament on its investigations into the dozens of deaths at the October 2016 Irreecha festival, a large Oromo religious and cultural celebration. The commission recommended the government hold local and regional officials of Oromia accountable for failing to stop the festival in advance. The commission attributed blame for the deaths to the Oromo Media Network, a diaspora-based media outlet, for fueling the unrest leading to the incident. The government filed terrorist charges against the network (in absentia) in March for allegedly rendering support to terrorists, which was listed as a crime under the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation and punishable by imprisonment from 10 to 15 years. The trial continued as of year’s end.

A court-ordered EHRC report documented what it stated was the authorities’ torture of 16 inmates, which included targeting of Muslim inmates, in a federal prison. Inmates told the EHRC prison officials in Shoa Robit Prison subjected them to various forms of torture during a three-month period in 2016 and holding them in what was described by the report as inhumane conditions for five months in 2017. Muslim inmates reported the officers shouted anti-Muslim language and further harassed, threatened, and intimidated them based on their religious beliefs. Inmates criticized the EHRC for not extending its findings of torture by prison officials to cover the 176 other inmates they alleged were tortured, objected to the report’s failure to hold prison officials or Federal Police officers who carried out the torture accountable for their actions, and requested an independent investigation be conducted.

In January an NGO reported the Supreme Court had acquitted three Protestants who had been sentenced to nine years in prison by a lower court judge in 2014 for allegedly burning down an EOC church. The ruling left the three still liable for paying for the damage to the church, but a separate court order in May released them from that responsibility. According to the NGO account, the three maintained they had been falsely convicted and had offered witnesses in support of their innocence, but the lower court judge had ignored their testimony.

According to NGO reports, in June authorities ordered the Full Gospel Church in Tikil Dingaye, a Pentecostal church in Amhara Region, to stop meeting in a residential area in the wake of a mob attack on the church. The attackers had assaulted some of the church members and then destroyed the church’s meeting hall, offices, and the accommodations of a church worker. After the attack, according to the NGO, a church member was arrested for “illegal activities” that “incited religious clashes,” and when the church officials asked authorities in Gondar for protection against further attacks, they received a letter informing them they were no longer allowed to conduct religious services there. According to media accounts, the attackers were believed to be members of the student association Mahibere Kidusan, an organization established under the auspices of the EOC to support and preserve EOC traditions. Representatives of Mahibere Kidusan denied involvement in the attack, saying no members of their association had been questioned or charged by police in connection with the attack.

The SOE made protests illegal for most of the year, and there were no reports of religious communities engaging in protests either before or after the lifting of the SOE.

Muslim community members continued to assert the government had co-opted religious leaders to impose Al-Ahbash, a Sufi religious movement rooted in Lebanon and different from indigenous Islam, on local Islamic religious practice, despite government statements made in previous years saying it no longer supported a program to impose Al-Ahbash. Reports from the Muslim community suggested the government continued to arrange for the dissemination of Al-Ahbash teachings, and, consequently, Friday prayers still conformed to Al-Ahbash teachings.

In June during Ramadan, Muslims in the town of Adwa, Tigray Region, reported authorities denied them access to their mosques, alleging the community supported a movement for religious freedom for the country’s Muslims.

Muslim community members reported widespread sentiment in their community that the government exercised excessive influence over the EIASC, which remained the lead religious organization for the country’s Muslims, managing religious activities in the approximately 40,000 mosques and annual Hajj pilgrimages to Mecca. Some Muslim community members also reported continued governmental interference in religious affairs.

The Directorate for Registration of Religious Groups within MoFPDA reported it had registered 1,600 religious groups and associations as of 2016.

Members of some religious groups continued to state the EOC exemption from the registration requirement for all other religious groups constituted an unfair double standard.

Although holding religious services inside public institutions remained banned per the constitutionally required separation of religion and state, the government continued to mandate public institutions take a two-hour break from work on Fridays for workers to attend Islamic prayers. Private companies were not required to follow this policy.

Protestants continued to report local officials discriminated against them with regard to religious registration and the allocation of land for churches and cemeteries.

In July the media reported a government announcement saying it would issue national identity cards to the nearly 1,000 Rastafarians who had been living in the country for many years as stateless persons. The measure reportedly would grant the Rastafarians residency but would not give them citizenship.

Two opposition parties (the All Ethiopian Unity Party and Blue Party), in what the media characterized as an attempt to embarrass the government, reported government officials in the town of Legetafo Legedadi, Oromia, had demolished a church belonging to the EOC and confiscated sacred items on August 7. The town’s administration told the media that authorities had demolished the church because it was built illegally, thereby violating the master development plan of the town.

The MoFPDA continued to work with the EIASC and civil society groups to sponsor workshops and training of religious leaders, elders, and community members with the stated purpose of decreasing the potential for sectarian violence.

According to NGO reports, on July 16, a group of local Muslims attacked with machetes a Christian man at his home in Hirna, a rural town east of Addis Ababa. The gang who attacked the man was reportedly angry because he was proselytizing. The gang had first attacked the local Full Gospel Church and partly damaged its roof and a wall before going to the man’s house. The man required lifesaving surgery.

In contrast with the previous year, there were no reports of attacks on places of worship in Oromia Region, although there were reports that some of the previously destroyed places of worship and affiliated facilities, such as health centers, had not been rebuilt. The annual Irreecha festival was peaceful, although the main ceremony ended much earlier than in recent years and, in a break with tradition, neither the Abba Geddas (the traditional leaders/elders who organized the event) nor government officials offered remarks or blessings.

The IRCE, an organization established by seven religious institutions and operating independently from the government throughout the country, reported the major faith communities in most of the country respected each other’s religious observances and practices while permitting intermarriage and conversion. NGOs continued to report some Protestants and Orthodox Christians accused one another of heresy and of actively working to convert adherents from one faith to the other; observers stated these mutual recriminations increased tensions between the groups.

The EIASC expressed continued concern about what it said was the influence of foreign Salafist groups within the Muslim community. The EIASC said it continued to hold these foreign groups responsible for the exacerbation of tensions between Christians and Muslims and within the Muslim community.

Embassy officers continued to engage with the MoFPDA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on religious tolerance. Embassy representatives held meetings with religious leaders, including the Office of the Patriarch of the EOC, the president of the EIASC, and the cardinal heading the Catholic Church in the country, to discuss the role of faith-based organizations in improving religious tolerance within society. U.S. embassy representatives observed the trial of Muslims accused of terrorism charges and attempting to overthrow the government.

Embassy officials engaged with members of the IRCE to discuss religious tolerance and attacks on places of worship in Oromia Region. The embassy’s dialogue with the IRCE sought to strengthen the IRCE’s capacity to reduce religious violence through increased dialogue among religious communities and to assist the IRCE in achieving its stated goal of creating a platform to unify disparate religious groups around common interests and promote interreligious harmony.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 104,000 (July 2017 estimate). According to government statistics, approximately 99 percent of the population identify as Christian. Several Protestant denominations, as well as the Roman Catholic Church, are present in every state. According to government statistics, 55 percent of long-term residents are Roman Catholic and 42 percent are Protestant. The United Church of Christ is the main Protestant denomination. Other Christian groups include Baptists, Assemblies of God, the Pentecostal Church, the Apostolic Church, the Salvation Army, Mormons, Seventh-day Adventists, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Other religious groups exist in small numbers, including approximately 20 Ahmadi Muslims, with a variable expatriate population of Bahais, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, and other Muslims. According to a 2014 Pew Research Center report, 2.7 percent follow folk religions.

In Kosrae State, 90 percent of the population is Protestant, with the Congregational Church the most prominent. In Pohnpei State, the population is evenly divided between Protestants and Catholics – more Protestants live on the western side, while more Catholics live on the eastern side. In Chuuk State, an estimated 60 percent is Catholic and 40 percent is Protestant. In Yap State, an estimated 80 percent of the population is Catholic and the remainder is Protestant. Religious affiliation often follows clan lines.

The majority of foreign workers are Filipino Catholics, who number approximately 850.

Legal Framework

The constitution forbids the establishment of a state religion or governmental restrictions on freedom of religion, although the government may fund nonreligious activities in religiously affiliated schools. The constitution provides for the free exercise of religion. It also provides that the traditions of the country may be protected by statute and, if such statue is challenged as violating rights provided in the constitution, protection of the tradition “shall be considered a compelling social purpose warranting such governmental action.”

There are no registration requirements for religious groups.

There is no religious education in public schools, but religion is taught in private religious schools in addition to the curriculum established by the Department of Education.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

During the year, Ahmadi Muslims continued to experience denial of services, including refusal to provide postal access. After approximately two years of denial of access to water in Malem, Kosrae, the national government provided a grant to extend water service to Ahmadiyya Muslim families and the Islamic Center, using existing water connections. An Ahmadi imam reported there continued to be a slow police response to threats of physical assault and incidents of vandalizing graffiti, particularly in the predominantly Protestant Kosrae State.

The government issued a new imam, a Canadian citizen, a limited visa that allowed travel to only two of the four states.

The government continued to provide grants to private, church-affiliated schools. The government continued to make no distinction between public and private schools in its grants programs.

National and state government events routinely opened and closed with a prayer, invocation, or benediction from a Protestant or Catholic clergy member, and often one from each group.

Some Christians on social media advocated amending the constitution to prohibit the presence of non-Christian religious groups, and some pastors opposed allowing non-Christians to practice openly. Government leaders have neither publicly supported nor opposed these positions.

The Inter-Denominational Council (of Christian churches) in Pohnpei continued to convene monthly to address social problems and promote official cooperation among its member Christian groups. Examples of the council’s activities included a youth leadership program for secondary-level students and a Thanksgiving service to support Christian unity. Other groups, including Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses, said the council’s charter was not inclusive and that they would be forced to reject their own beliefs in order to join.

Ahmadi Muslims again reported incidents of vandalism, including graffiti and stone throwing, at their religious center in Kosrae and homes in Kosrae and Pohnpei. Anti-Muslim rhetoric – some advocating violence – continued to increase on social media.

Ahmadis said they continued outreach through youth after-school sports and homework programs, in addition to adult evening faith programs. In February Ahmadi Muslims held a “peace conference” in the State of Kosrae with approximately 30 attendees from various religions, including a former Ahmadi Muslim mayor of the municipality of Malem.

The U.S. embassy discussed religious freedom and held regular meetings with the Department of Foreign Affairs, senior cabinet officials, and state government officials. Embassy officials stressed the primacy of the constitution over local laws or practices that potentially privilege one religious group over others.

In Kosrae State, embassy officials regularly met with local religious leaders to discuss religious tolerance based on the constitution.

Embassy officials conducted direct educational outreach on religious diversity to students, women’s groups, and local leaders, and in meetings with faith-based NGOs.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy personnel participated in an Ahmadiyya Muslim informational event in Pohnpei to demonstrate U.S. support of religious tolerance.

The embassy continued to promote religious tolerance through social media highlighting U.S. religious diversity.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 921,000 (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2007 census, approximately 64.5 percent of the population is Christian, 28 percent Hindu, and 6.3 percent Muslim. The largest Christian denomination is the Methodist church, which comprises approximately 34.6 percent of the population. Other Protestant denominations account for 10.4 percent of the population, Roman Catholics 9.1 percent, and other Christian groups 10.4 percent. There are small communities of Bahais and Sikhs.

Religious affiliation runs largely along ethnic lines. According to the 2007 census, most iTaukei (indigenous Fijian) citizens, who constitute 57 percent of the population, are Christian. The majority of the country’s traditional chiefs belong to the Methodist church, which remains influential among indigenous people, particularly in rural areas where 49 percent of the population lives. Most Indian Fijians, who account for 37 percent of the total population, are Hindu, while roughly 20 percent are Muslim and 6 percent Christian. Approximately 60 percent of the small Chinese community is Christian. The small community of mixed European and Fijian ancestry is predominantly Christian.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes a secular state and protects freedom of religion, conscience, and belief. The government may limit these rights by law to protect the freedoms of others, or for reasons of public safety, order, morality, health, or nuisance. The constitution also mandates the separation of religion and state. Citizens have the right, either individually or collectively, in public and private, to manifest their religion or beliefs in worship, observance, practice, or teaching. The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religious affiliation, and laws make inciting hatred or “disaffection” against religious groups a criminal offense. The constitution provides that individuals may not assert religious belief as a reason for disobeying the law. The constitution places limits on proselytizing on government premises and at government functions.

By law, religious groups must register with the government through trustees who may then hold land or property for the groups. To register, religious bodies must submit applications to the registrar of titles office. Applications must include names and identification of the trustees, signed by the head of the religious body to be registered, a copy of the constitution of the proposed religious body, land title documents for the land used by the religious body, and a registration fee of 2.30 Fiji dollars ($1.14). Registered religious bodies may receive an exemption from taxes after approval from the national tax agency, on the condition they operate in a nonprofit and noncompetitive capacity. By law, religious bodies that hold land or property must register their houses of worship, including their land, and show proof of title. There is no mention in the law of religious organizations that do not hold land.

Permits are required for any public meeting on public property, outside of regular religious services and houses of worship, organized by religious groups.

There is no required religious instruction under the law. Private or religious groups sometimes own or manage school properties but the Ministry of Education administers and regulates the curriculum. The law allows religious groups the right to establish, maintain, and manage places of education, whether or not they receive financial assistance from the state, provided the institution maintains educational standards prescribed by law. The law permits noncompulsory religious instruction in schools, enabling schools owned and operated by various religious denominations but receiving government support to offer religious instruction. Schools may incorporate religious elements, such as class prayer, as long as they do not force teachers to participate, and students may be excused should their parents request it. The government provides funding and education assistance to public schools, including schools owned and operated by religious organizations, on a per pupil basis. Some schools maintain their religious and/or ethnic origin, but they remain open to all students. According to the law, the government ensures free tuition for primary and secondary schools.

The country is not party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

While senior Methodist church leaders reported improved relations with the government over the past two years, at times the prime minister continued to criticize the church in parliament for what he characterized as support for the majority opposition political party. Since religion, ethnicity, and politics are closely linked, it was difficult to categorize the government’s actions as being solely based on religious identity.

On April 27, the Republic of Fiji Military Forces issued a media statement warning the Methodist church that an April 22 report by church administrators to the Ministry of Indigenous Affairs calling for the country to become a Christian state, could spark societal tension. Shortly thereafter, senior church leaders, including the Methodist church president, distanced themselves from the report and reassured the prime minister of the church’s political neutrality. Heads of other Christian faiths and the head of an interreligious organization comprised of Christians, Muslims, and Hindus also publicly affirmed their nonpolitical stance.

The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions amended the charges against three staff members of the Fiji Times newspaper and the author of a letter to the editor, from violating the decree that prohibits publishing articles that incite and cause dislike, hatred, and antagonism toward any community, to sedition. Sedition carries a lower maximum imprisonment term of seven years. The charges stemmed from a letter to the editor published in 2016 in the Fiji Times’ indigenous language edition that prosecutors originally said incited communal antagonism against the Muslim community. The trial, postponed from December 5, is scheduled for April 2018. The court granted the postponement to allow the two accused men the opportunity to seek legal counsel after they were left without representation when the state subpoenaed their counsel to become a state witness.

Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama continued to emphasize religious tolerance during public addresses at home and overseas, stating the country is a multifaith nation with religious freedom guaranteed in the constitution.

On December 16, vandals broke into a Hindu temple in Nadi and desecrated the property with graffiti and painted racial slurs. Police officers were still investigating the case at year’s end.

In December a proliferation of anti-Muslim comments generated nationwide controversy after an Indian cleric posted on Facebook how he was celebrating the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday in the country. On Facebook, people stated concerns about the perceived increase of Muslim influence in the country. According to the Fiji Sun, a former acting director of public prosecutions criticized such anti-Muslim discourse during an annual attorney general’s conference.

Bahais celebrated the faith’s bicentennial in October by hosting several interfaith gatherings.

The Catholic Church, Anglican and Methodist churches, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormon) and Seventh-day Adventist Church, as well as Hindu and Muslim groups operated numerous schools, including secondary schools, which were eligible for government subsides based on the size of the student population.

U.S. embassy officials emphasized the importance of religious tolerance in meetings with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Embassy officials met with Christian, Muslim, and Hindu religious leaders to discuss the importance of respect for religious freedom as a universal human right. For example, embassy officials met with the Methodist church’s head of communications in June to discuss the importance of religious pluralism.

The embassy used social media to highlight the Ambassador’s actions respecting the country’s religious diversity.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5.5 million (July 2017 estimate). The government statistics office and the Ministry of Education and Culture estimate approximately 72 percent of the population belongs to the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland (ELC), 1.1 percent to the Finnish Orthodox Church, and 25.3 percent do not identify as members of any religious group. Census results combine the other minority religious communities, including Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Roman Catholics, Muslims, Pentecostals, Seventh-day Adventists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jews, and the Free Church of Finland, which together account for 1.6 percent of the population.

Although there are no accurate statistics, according to a 2016 estimate from the Ministry of Education and Culture, there are approximately 65,000 Muslims, of whom approximately 80 percent are Sunni and 20 percent Shia. With the exception of Tatars, most Muslims are immigrants or descendants of immigrants who arrived in recent decades from Somalia and North Africa, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Syria, Turkey, and Iran.

Legal Framework

The constitution bars discrimination based on religion “without an acceptable reason.” It stipulates freedom of religion and conscience, including the right to profess and practice a religion, to express one’s convictions, and to be a member or decline to be a member of a religious community. It states no one is under the obligation to participate in the practice of a religion. The law criminalizes the “breach of the sanctity of religion,” which includes blaspheming against God, publicly defaming or desecrating to offend something a religious community holds sacred, and disturbing worship or funeral ceremonies. Violators are subject to fines or imprisonment for up to six months. Authorities have rarely applied the law, most recently in 2009.

The law explicitly prohibits religious discrimination and prescribes a nondiscrimination ombudsman responsible for supervising compliance with the law. The ombudsman investigates individual cases of discrimination and has the power to levy fines on violators, offers counseling and promotes conciliation, and lobbies for legislation, among other duties and authorities. Individuals alleging discrimination may alternatively pursue legal action through the National Non-Discrimination and Equality Tribunal or through the district court system. The decisions of the tribunal and the district court system may be appealed to the higher Administrative Court.

Individuals and groups may exist, associate, and practice their religion without registering with the government. In order to be eligible to apply for government funds, however, religious groups must register with the Patent and Registration Office as a religious community. To register as a community, a group must have at least 20 members, have as its purpose the public practice of religion, and be guided in its activities by a set of rules. A registered religious community is a legal entity that may employ persons, purchase property, and make legal claims. Nonprofit associations, including registered and unregistered religious groups, are generally exempt from taxes. According to the Ministry of Education and Culture, there are approximately 130 registered religious communities, most of which have multiple congregations. Persons may belong to more than one religious community.

All citizens who belong to either the ELC or Orthodox Church pay a church tax, collected together with their income tax payments. Congregations collectively decide the church tax amount, now set at between 1 to 2 percent of member income. Those who do not want to pay the tax must terminate their ELC or Orthodox congregation membership. Members may terminate their membership by contacting the official congregation or the local government registration office, either electronically or in person. Local parishes have fiscal autonomy to decide how to use funding received from taxes levied on their members.

Registered religious communities other than the ELC and Orthodox Church are also eligible to apply for state funds. The law states registered religious communities that meet the statutory requirements (a minimum of 20 members and the ability to collect fees) may receive an annual subsidy from the government budget in proportion to the religious community’s percentage of the population.

The ELC is required to maintain public cemeteries and account for the spending of government funds. Other religious communities and nonreligious foundations may maintain their own cemeteries. All registered religious communities may own and manage property and hire staff, including appointing clergy. The law authorizes the ELC and Orthodox Church to register births, marriages, and deaths for their members in collaboration with the government Population Register Center. State registrars do this for other persons.

Parents may determine their child’s religious affiliation if the child is under 12 years of age. The parents of a child between the ages of 12 and 17 must pursue specific administrative procedures with their religious community and the local population registration officials to change or terminate religious affiliation.

All public schools provide religious teaching in accordance with students’ religion. All classes may include information about ethics and world religions. Schools must provide religious instruction in religions other than the Lutheran faith if there is a minimum of three pupils representing that faith in the municipal region, the religious community in question is registered, and the students’ families belong to the religious community. Students who do not belong to a religious group or belong to a religious group for which special instruction is not available, may study ethics. Students age 18 or older may choose to study either the religious courses pertaining to their religion or ethics. If a student belongs to more than one religious community, the parents decide in which religious education course the student participates.

Religious education focuses on familiarizing students with their own religion, other religions, and general instruction in ethics. Although teachers of religion must have the required state-mandated training for religious instruction, the state appoints them and they are not required to belong to any religious community. The National Board of Education provides a series of textbooks about Orthodox and Lutheran Christianity, Catholicism, Judaism, and Islam, as well as a textbook on secular ethics.

The government allows conscientious objectors to choose alternative civilian service instead of compulsory military service; only Jehovah’s Witnesses are specifically exempt from performing both military and alternative civilian service. Other conscientious objectors who refuse both military and alternative civilian service may be sentenced to prison terms of up to 173 days, one-half of the 347 days of alternative civilian service. Regular military service ranges between 165 and 347 days.

The law bans certain types of animal slaughter, requiring that animals be stunned prior to slaughter or be killed and stunned simultaneously.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In March the National Police Board filed a suit against the PVL with the Pirkanmaa District Court. According to national broadcaster Yle, the police accused the PVL of being “violent and racist” and aimed to outlaw the group and ban it from demonstrating, recruiting, or disseminating material. Court proceedings began on August 29. On November 30, the court ruled in favor of the police. It was the first such court-ordered ban on an organization since the 1970s. The PVL appealed the ruling, and the appeal remained pending at year’s end.

The Helsinki police created a 10-person unit with a mandate specifically to address crimes that involved infringements of the right of individuals to practice their religion. Nationwide, municipal police departments designated and trained 42 officers to become anti-hate crime instructors, and the National Bureau of Investigation created five new positions to investigate hate speech online.

According to the Ministry of Defense, there were 38 objectors to both military and alternative civilian service during 2016, the most recent year for which complete statistics were available. The ministry did not indicate how many of these individuals objected to service for religious reasons.

Leaders of the Jewish and Muslim communities continued to raise concern about the long-standing ban against certain types of animal slaughter, which they said prevented them from killing the animals in a religiously prescribed manner. Because the animals could not be slaughtered in a religiously approved manner domestically, members of these communities imported meat at higher prices. Government officials stated a provision in the law allowing simultaneous stunning and slaughter of animals was meant to accommodate religious slaughter.

Ministry of Social Affairs and Health guidelines discouraged circumcision of males, including through dialogue with religious communities, and continued to withhold public healthcare funding for such procedures. In its guidelines, the ministry stated that nonmedical circumcision of boys should only be performed by licensed physicians, a child’s guardians should be informed of the risks and irreversibility of the procedure, and it should not be carried out on boys old enough to understand the procedure without their consent. There was no formal legislation prohibiting circumcision of boys and no criminal liability for individuals who did not follow the ministry’s guidelines. Religious communities, including members of Muslim and Jewish communities, expressed disagreement with the guidelines; however, the ministry stated it had not received any protest from religious representatives regarding the requirement that only a licensed doctor perform circumcision.

There were at least two incidents in which politicians made discriminatory remarks aimed at Muslims on social media. In January a district court in Jyvaskyla found Member of Parliament Teuvo Hakkarainen (from the opposition Finns Party) guilty of incitement of racial hatred for a post he wrote on Facebook in 2016 that stated, “All Muslims are not terrorists but all terrorists are Muslims.” The court ordered Hakkarainen to pay a 1,160 euro ($1,400) fine and required him to remove the Facebook post. On multiple occasions, Juusi Halla-aho, Chair of the Finns Party, posted public comments on his Facebook profile criticizing Muslims in the country.

According to a September reporting by Yle, more than 400 (mostly Lutheran) priests signed a petition requesting the immigration service consult with them during the asylum application process regarding applicants who had converted to Christianity (Yle estimated in July that several hundred Muslim asylum seekers had converted to Christianity in “recent years”). The priests stated they feared asylum applicants who converted to Christianity while in the country could face persecution if returned to some majority-Muslim countries of origin. Additionally, media reports and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) raised concerns that some officials at the immigration service who conducted asylum interviews lacked adequate knowledge about the converts’ religions. The Finnish Ecumenical Council, an organization that described itself as aiming to promote unity among Christian denominations, established a dialogue with the Finnish Immigration Service on this issue, which it characterized as “constructive.”

News reporting and NGOs also stated there was a need for improved interpreting services for asylum seekers, particularly during interviews that included religious terminology. In response, the immigration service published press releases in June and July titled “How does converting to Christianity affect asylum applications?” and “Converting to Christianity will not automatically result in the granting of asylum.” The press releases highlighted the country’s commitment to freedom of religion and stated officials examined each asylum application individually.

The government again allocated 114 million euros ($136.85 million) to the ELC and 2.5 million euros ($3 million) to the Orthodox Church. The Ministry of Education and Culture allotted 524,000 euros ($630,000) to 28 religious organizations for various projects.

In May the Ministry of Education and Culture awarded a total of 80,000 euros ($96,000) to promote interfaith dialogue. Four organizations received funding for their projects: The National Forum for Cooperation of Religions in Finland (CORE); Filoksenia, an organization promoting cultural tolerance; Fokus, an interfaith and intercultural organization; and Ad Astra, a multicultural organization for youth.

Prime Minister Juha Sipila and all of the parliamentary party chairs signed a joint statement on September 6 that condemned terrorism, hate speech, including speech motivated by discrimination against religion, and violence.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

From January through June (the latest period for which data were available), the nondiscrimination ombudsman’s office received 34 complaints of religious discrimination, compared with 23 complaints during the same period in 2016. The number of complaints for all of 2016 was 37. According to a police report on hate crimes in 2016, police recorded 149 suspected hate crimes related to religion or belief – 14 percent of all hate crimes – compared with the 133 cases recorded a year earlier. Anti-Muslim sentiment accounted for slightly less than half of the 2016 incidents. In the announcement for the 2016 hate crime statistics, the report’s authors stated the increase in hate speech incidents in 2016 might have been greater if the police had had more resources to address the rapid rise in hate speech online.

The PVL made statements promoting discrimination or violence against persons based on their religion and maintained an active online presence through its website and social media. The second priority of its political platform read, “With all means possible work towards reconquering power from the global Zionist elite.” The PVL continued to post anti-Semitic content on its social media pages and published other online materials glorifying Adolf Hitler. The PVL wrote on its homepage Vastarinta.com it was “a news site that stands out and dares to challenge the old, often Jewish-owned and/or -controlled mass media empires.” In April the site published the article “Who brought Muslims to Europe?” stating Jews brought Muslims to Europe and asserting that Finns must become informed about racial violence against white persons and diseases spread by Muslim immigrants. Based on its social media posts, the group appeared to have organized small-scale training camps and rallies throughout the country. The PVL had local branches in Helsinki, Turku, Tampere, Pori, Jyvaskyla, and Oulu, with an estimated 200 people taking part in its activities and events. In October 200 PVL members marched in the city of Tampere to protest a court case underway in which the prosecutor’s office was seeking to outlaw the PVL as an organization that advocated violence. On Independence Day, December 6, the PVL again organized a march though Helsinki. With approximately 450-500 participants, the march was significantly larger than the PVL’s 2016 Independence Day march, which attracted 150 participants.

The Soldiers of Odin maintained an active online presence, but the group’s public activities were limited. According to local and international media reports, leaders of the Soldiers of Odin said they organized the group in response to a security threat posed by incoming asylum seekers. Reuters reported members of the group blamed “Islamist intruders” for an increase in crime and carried signs with slogans such as “Migrants not welcome.” The group’s Facebook page included language reading “No more [expletive] mosques.” The Soldiers of Odin’s main activities included voluntary street patrols.

Minority religious communities continued to report discrimination. According to Deputy Non-Discrimination Ombudsman Rainer Hiltunen, representatives of Muslim immigrant communities continued to report workplace discrimination, such as in hiring decisions. According to law enforcement officials, members of Muslim communities in Helsinki worried about becoming targets of racist or xenophobic attacks.

According to the European Union (EU) Agency for Fundamental Rights’ Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey, 38 percent of 198 Muslims surveyed in the country, all of whom had sub-Saharan African backgrounds, believed religious discrimination was very or fairly widespread in the country. Thirteen percent said they believed they had experienced discrimination because of their religion in the previous five years. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity. The same EU survey found 45 percent of Muslim respondents from sub-Saharan Africa in the country reported harassment due to their ethnic or immigrant background at least once in the previous year, the second-highest percentage among 15 EU countries surveyed. On the other hand, the Muslim respondents reported the highest sense of attachment to the country of (4.6 points out of five) of any of the 15 countries surveyed.

The website Magneettimedia, known for its anti-Semitic content, continued to post discriminatory statements online. In May and July it posted articles entitled “Zionist bank cartel damages Finnish mining industry” and “International drug trafficking in the hands of the Jewish elite” respectively. The former owner of Magneettimedia, Juha Karkkainen, continued to publish anti-Semitic editorials in the newspaper KauppaSuomi, a periodical available through his large chain of department stores. An editorial from April stated, “In the Finnish school system the most important ‘anti-racist’ authority has for decades been the Jew Karmela Liebkind. The primary source of Liebkind’s race theories is the ‘anthropologist’ Israel Ehrenburg [sic], who later in life changed his name to Ashley Montagu – a name attracting considerably less attention. The legacy of Israel Ehrenburg is eroding the Finnish education system not only through Karmela Liebkind but also through UNESCO.”

U.S. embassy staff met with officials from the Ministry of Education and Culture, Ministry of Justice, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, parliament’s Human Rights Center, and the nondiscrimination ombudsman’s office to discuss the promotion of religious freedom. Embassy staff discussed religious intolerance, religious instruction in schools, the rights of conscientious objectors, and restrictions on ritual animal slaughter.

Embassy staff met with religious leaders, including representatives from the Jewish and Muslim communities, the Finnish Ecumenical Council, and other minority religious groups, as well as researchers focusing on religious communities, to discuss the state of religious freedom in the country. Topics discussed with members of the Jewish and Muslim communities included their shared concerns about the impact of the ban against certain types of animal slaughter on their religious practices and the government guidelines discouraging ritual male circumcision. Embassy staff also discussed anti-Muslim discrimination with members of the Muslim community.

Embassy staff posted on social media to highlight how the U.S. celebrated Religious Freedom Day on January 16.

The embassy hosted a video conference in May between high-level national police officials and U.S. law enforcement colleagues on effective community policing programs. Among the subjects covered were how to increase religious literacy among officers and how to cope with xenophobic and other hate crimes, including those based on religion.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 67.1 million (July 2017 estimate). The French government does not maintain official statistics on religious affiliation, but government studies occasionally provide estimates. As a result, statistics on religious affiliation are intermittently available and the statistical results can be inconsistent, depending on what criteria survey organizations use.

According to the most recent study by the National Institute for Demographic and Economic Studies, conducted in 2008 and published in 2010, 45 percent of respondents aged 18-50 reported no religious affiliation, while 43 percent identified as Roman Catholic, 8 percent as Muslim, 2 percent as Protestant, and the remaining 2 percent as Orthodox Christian, Buddhist, Jewish, or other.

A 2012 poll by the private firm Conseil, Sondage et Analyse found 56 percent of respondents older than 18 years identify as Catholic.

According to an Ipsos study published in the Protestant online news daily Reforme on October 26, 57.5 percent of respondents identify as Catholic, 3.1 percent as Protestant, 3.5 percent with other religions, 35 percent with no religion, and 1 percent preferred not to respond. The report estimated there are 600,000 Lutheran, 600,000 evangelical, and 800,000 nondenominational members in the Protestant community. Many evangelical churches primarily serve African and Caribbean immigrants.

The MOI estimates 8-10 percent of the population is Muslim. The Muslim population consists primarily of immigrants from former French colonies in North and sub-Saharan Africa and their descendants. According to a Pew Research Center study published in November, Muslims comprise 8.8 percent of the total population, numbering 5.72 million persons.

A 2016 report by Berman Jewish Data Bank estimated there are 460,000-700,000 Jews in the country, depending on the criteria chosen. According to the study, there are more Sephardic than Ashkenazi Jews.

The Buddhist Union of France estimates there are one million Buddhists in the country, mainly Chinese and Vietnamese immigrants and their descendants. Other religious groups estimate their numbers as follows: Jehovah’s Witnesses, 120,000; Orthodox Christians, most of whom are associated with the Greek or Russian Orthodox Churches, 80,000-100,000; The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), 66,000; Church of Scientology, 45,000; and Sikhs, who are largely concentrated in the Parisian suburbs, 30,000.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the country as a secular republic and states it “shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law,” regardless of religion, and respect all beliefs. The law provides for the separation of religion and state and guarantees the free exercise of religious worship except to maintain public order.

The law, as well as international and European covenants, which carry the force of law in the country, protects the freedom of individuals to choose, change, and practice their religion. Interference with the freedom of religion is subject to criminal penalties, including a fine of 1,500 euros ($1,800) and imprisonment of one month. Individuals who are defendants in a trial may challenge the constitutionality of any law they say impedes their freedom of religion.

Laws increase the penalties for acts of violence or defamation when they are committed because of the victim’s actual or perceived membership or nonmembership in a given religious group. Penalties for acts of violence that courts determine are religiously motivated are three to five years’ imprisonment and fines of 45,000-75,000 euros ($54,000-$90,000), depending on the severity of the victims’ injuries. For religiously motivated acts of public defamation, the penalties are one year’s imprisonment and/or a fine of 45,000 euros ($54,000). The government may expel noncitizens for inciting discrimination, hatred, or violence against a specific person or group of persons based on religion.

Although the law does not require it, religious groups may apply for official recognition and tax-exempt status. Religious groups may register under two categories: associations of worship, which are exempt from taxes; and cultural associations, which normally are not exempt. Associations in either category are subject to fiscal oversight by the state. An association of worship may organize only religious activities, defined as liturgical services and practices. Although not tax-exempt, a cultural association may engage in for-profit as well as nonprofit activity and receive government subsidies for its cultural and educational operations. Religious groups normally register under both of these categories. For example, Mormons perform religious activities through their association of worship and operate a school through their cultural association.

Religious groups must apply at the local prefecture (the administrative body representing the central government in each department) for recognition as an association of worship and tax-exempt status. Once granted, the association may use the tax-exempt status nationwide. In order to qualify, the group’s sole purpose must be the practice of religion, which may include religious training and the construction of buildings serving the religious group. Among excluded activities are those purely cultural, social, or humanitarian in nature. The government does not tax associations of worship on donations they receive. If the prefecture determines an association is not in conformity with its tax-exempt status, however, the government may change that status and require the association to pay taxes at a rate of 60 percent on past, as well as future, donations until it regains tax-exempt status. According to the MOI, approximately 109 Protestant, 100 Catholic, 50 Jehovah’s Witnesses, 30 Muslim, and 15 Jewish associations have tax-exempt status.

The law states “detained persons have the right to freedom of opinion, conscience, and religion. They can practice the religion of their choice…without other limits than those imposed by the security needs and good order of the institution.”

On October 18, parliament passed counterterrorism legislation to succeed the state of emergency law, which had been in effect since 2015 and expired on November 1. The legislation incorporated several provisions of the emergency law. In particular, it grants prefects (representatives of the central government) in each department the authority to close a place of worship for a maximum of six months if they find comments, writings, or activities in the place of worship “provoke violence, hatred or discrimination or the commission of acts of terrorism or praise such acts of terrorism.” The management of the place of worship has 48 hours to appeal the closure decision to an administrative court. Noncompliance with a closure decision carries a six-month prison sentence and a fine of 7,500 euros ($9,000).

The law prohibits covering one’s face in public places, including public transportation, government buildings, and other public spaces, such as restaurants and movie theaters. If police encounter a person in a public space wearing a face covering such as a mask or burqa, they are legally required to ask the individual to remove it to verify the individual’s identity. Police officials may not remove it themselves. If an individual refuses to remove the garment, police may take the person to the local police station to verify his or her identity. Police may not question or hold an individual for more than four hours. Refusing a police instruction to remove a face-covering garment carries a maximum fine of 150 euros ($180) or attendance at a citizenship course. Individuals who coerce another person to cover his or her face on account of gender by threat, violence, force, or abuse of power or authority are subject to a fine of 30,000 euros ($36,000) and may receive a sentence of up to one year in prison. The fine and sentence are doubled if the victim is a minor.

By law, the government may not directly finance religious groups to build new places of worship. The government may, however, provide loan guarantees or lease property to groups at advantageous rates. The law also exempts places of worship from property taxes. The state owns and is responsible for the upkeep of most places of worship, primarily Catholic, built before 1905. The government may fund cultural associations with a religious connection.

There are three classes of territories where the law separating religion and state does not apply. Because Alsace-Lorraine was part of Germany when the law was enacted, Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, and Jews there may choose to allocate a portion of their income tax to their religious group. Local governments in the region may also provide financial support for constructing religious buildings and paying the salaries of local religious leaders. The overseas department of French Guiana, which is governed under 19th century colonial laws, may provide subsidies to the Catholic Church. Other overseas departments and overseas territories, which include island territories in the Caribbean and the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, and several sub-Antarctic islands, may also provide funding for religious groups. This provision also applies to the portion of Antarctica the government claims as an overseas territory.

Public schools are secular. The law prohibits public school employees and students from wearing “conspicuous religious symbols,” including the Muslim headscarf, Jewish skullcap, Sikh turban, and large Christian crosses. Public schools do not provide religious instruction, except in Alsace-Lorraine and overseas departments and territories. Public schools, however, do teach information about religious groups as part of the history curriculum. Parents who wish their children to wear conspicuous religious symbols or to receive religious instruction in school may homeschool or send their children to a private school. Homeschooling and private schools must conform to the educational standards established for public schools.

By law, the government subsidizes private schools, including those affiliated with religious organizations. In 98 percent of private schools, in accordance with the law, the government pays the teachers’ salaries, provided the school accepts all children regardless of an individual child’s religious affiliation. The law does not address the issue of religious instruction in government-subsidized private schools or whether students must be allowed to opt out of such instruction.

Missionaries from countries not exempted from entry visa requirements must obtain a three-month tourist visa before traveling to the country. All missionaries wishing to remain longer than 90 days must obtain long-duration visas before entering the country. Upon arrival, missionaries must provide a letter from their sponsoring religious group to apply to the local prefecture for a temporary residence card.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: The government reported deploying 7,000 security forces to provide reinforced security throughout the country at sensitive sites, including religious ones. At year’s end, 11 of 19 Muslim religious sites the government had deemed “radical” and closed over the previous two years, remained closed. The Collective Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF), a French Muslim NGO, said the state of emergency the government ended on November 1 had disproportionately targeted Muslims, and the law that replaced it made the discrimination permanent. The government continued to enforce the ban on full-face coverings in public. The city of Lorette added “headscarves” to the list of banned clothing by bathers in a public swimming pool, and immigration authorities required a U.S. citizen to remove her headscarf to enter the country. Jehovah’s Witnesses reported 20 incidents in which authorities interfered with the door-to-door religious proselytizing of its members. The mayor of Clichy-la-Garenne, a suburb of Paris, did not renew the lease on a city-owned space used as a mosque and encouraged its members to use a new mosque the city had helped open in May 2016. The members of the closed mosque protested the mayor’s decision by praying in front of city hall. The military increased the number of Muslim chaplains by 25 percent, to 270. The president and other government officials condemned anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim, and anti-Christian acts and “Islamist extremism.” In October the prime minister announced a national plan to combat anti-Semitism. Authorities expelled a Swiss Muslim preacher, saying he posed a risk to public order.

According to statistics released by Interior Minister Gerard Collomb and Defense Minister Florence Parly on September 14, the government deployed 7,000 security forces throughout the country to protect sensitive sites, including vulnerable Catholic, Jewish, and Muslim sites and other places of worship.

The Paris public prosecutor’s office concluded there was “sufficient evidence” against Lebanese Canadian academic Hassan Diab to justify a trial. Authorities charged Diab with bombing a synagogue in Paris during Sabbath prayers in 1980, killing four persons and injuring 40 others. The prosecutor’s decision meant the court would decide on whether Diab was in fact in the country at the time of the attack, according to media reports on December 13. An investigating magistrate was scheduled to make the final decision on whether the case would go to trial on charges of murder, attempted murder, and destruction of property as part of a criminal conspiracy. On November 14, according to media reports, Paris’ Court of Appeals extended his pretrial detention for another six months.

On February 1, then-Interior Minister Bruno Le Roux issued a statement crediting a decline in reports of religiously motivated incidents in 2016 to the results of the government’s action plan to fight racism, anti-Semitism, and all forms of discrimination linked to origin or religion. Le Roux cited the effectiveness of measures for protection of places of worship introduced in January 2015 and the successful mobilization of the country’s institutions, especially its schools, after the attacks of 2015 and 2016. According to Le Roux, “Faced with racism, anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim and anti-Christian acts, we must not relax the guard, on the contrary … we continue, and will always continue to fight against those absolutely intolerable acts which tarnish the Republic.”

According to the Ministry of Justice, as of May the penitentiary system employed the following number of chaplains: 700 Catholic (compared with 690 in 2016), 350 Protestant (349 in 2016), 270 Muslim (217 in 2016), 50 Jewish, and 50 Orthodox Christian. The most recent figures from other groups were from January 2015, when there were 111 Jehovah’s Witness and 10 Buddhist chaplains, and 50 from other religious groups. In the general detainee visiting area, any visitor could continue to bring religious objects to an inmate or speak with the prisoner about religious issues but could not pray. Policies remained in place allowing prisoners to pray individually in their cells, with a chaplain in designated prayer rooms, or, in some institutions, in special apartments where they could receive family for up to 48 hours.

Jehovah’s Witnesses officials reported 20 cases of authorities interfering with the community’s public proselytizing. In all of these instances, the Jehovah’s Witnesses continued with their proselytizing. In nine of the incidents, according to Witnesses, local police and mayors banned the community’s public proselytizing. For example, on June 20, in the region of Bourgogne-Franche-Comte, a mayor prohibited Witnesses from preaching door-to-door, saying he was concerned about the security of the town’s citizens. The group’s lawyer wrote to the mayor, stating the law did not prohibit such activity, and the Witnesses continued their religious activity. In two other occurrences, municipalities enacted ordinances prohibiting or restricting door-to-door proselytizing. In the nine other cases, town mayors and local police required Jehovah’s Witnesses to obtain authorization for door-to-door proselytizing and to show their identity cards as soon as they arrived in the community. For example, on April 15 in Saint-Ambroix, Centre-Val de Loire, according to Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Gendarmerie asked them to obtain authorization from the mayor to participate in their door-to-door canvassing. The mayor also stated he did not want the Witnesses to proselytize within his community. The lawyer for the Witnesses wrote to the chief of staff of the Gendarmerie and to the mayor, stating the activities of the Jehovah’s Witnesses were legal. Neither the mayor nor the Gendarmerie responded.

On October 6, the administrative appeals court of Nantes ruled the annual installation of a nativity scene in the hall of the General Council of the Vendee was a festive “local cultural use” of more than 20 years and thus did not violate the principle of secularism. In November 2016, the Council of State, the country’s highest administrative court, had ruled nativity scenes were permissible in town halls and other public buildings if the intent was “cultural, artistic, or festive.”

On June 16, an American citizen said security agents at Nice Airport required her to remove her headscarf, despite her objections, in order to enter the country. The woman said authorities held her in an airport security room until she consented to removing her headscarf in front of a female security agent. In response to the incident, French Ambassador to the United States Gerard Araud said the woman should take legal action to allow a French court to assess her charges of harassment based on her religious identity. The Nice border police office and Nice Airport authorities declined to comment on the incident. The woman reportedly filed suit in a French court, according to media reports.

According to media reports, the city of Lorette issued rules prohibiting full-body swimwear and veils that partially or totally concealed the face at a new public outdoor swimming pool opened on June 23. The rules required a woman to wear a one-piece or two-piece bathing suit to access the pool. According to media outlets, Aldo Oumouden, the Spokesperson for the Grand Mosque in the nearby city of Saint Etienne, said, “The mayor does not realize that this decision will further increase stigma. It is not only unnecessary but also devastating for community harmony.”

On October 6, the MOI reported that, since November 2015, authorities had closed 19 mosques or prayer rooms it deemed “radical” under the state of emergency, 11 of which remain closed.

In November 2016, the Council of State upheld a lower court’s decision to allow the town of Clichy-la-Garenne near Paris not to renew a lease for a space the Union of Clichy Muslim Associations (UAMC) was using as a mosque, according to media reports. The UAMC refused to vacate the space and continued to use it until March. On March 22, town officials changed the locks to the space, and worshipers could no longer enter it, according to press reports. During a March 24 demonstration against the closure, media outlets reported one of the imams of the former mosque said, “We demand from the mayor a dignified [prayer] space and a durable solution.” Mayor Remi Muzeau said he planned to transform the closed prayer space into a library and told the UAMC and worshippers they could use a new 1,500-square-meter (16,000 square-foot) Muslim cultural and religious center, opened in May 2016, near the old location, run by a different Muslim association. The UAMC, however, stated the new space was too far from the town center, could not accommodate a sufficient number of worshippers, and was not easily reachable via public transportation, although the city established a bus stop in front of the mosque.

Throughout the year, according to media reports, the UAMC led street prayers on Fridays in front of city hall to protest the mayor’s decision not to renew the lease. On November 10, media reported approximately 100 lawmakers, singing the national anthem and wearing tricolor sashes of office, marched on a street and disrupted approximately 200 Muslim men from praying in a road. Police kept the two sides apart and made no arrests. Valerie Pecresse, President of the Ile-de-France Regional Council and a protest organizer, said, “Public space cannot be taken over in this way.” Mayor Muzeau stated, “I want to assure the tranquility and freedom of the people of my city,” and called on the government to “ban street prayers.” On November 19, Interior Minister Gerard Collomb, referring to the November 10 incident, stated, “We will prevent street praying,” but added, “Muslims must have a place to pray.”

On October 25, the Council of State ordered the removal of a cross from a 25-foot-tall statue of Saint Pope John Paul II on public land in Ploermel, a town in Brittany. The court ruled the statue could remain but the cross must be removed within six months because it violated the religion-state separation law. The National Federation of Free Thought, a grouping of humanist associations, and two residents of the town brought the case to court. Some Christians and politicians criticized the decision, calling it another example of efforts to erase the country’s Christian heritage.

In August a Dijon administrative court ruled that schools must provide an alternative to pork school lunches in the interest of Muslim and Jewish children who do not eat pork. The Muslim Legal Defense League (LDJM) had brought the case against a town council in the Burgundy region that stopped providing a choice for school lunches in 2015. The LDJM stated the town’s decision to stop providing nonpork meals was “illegal, discriminatory, and a violation of freedom of conscience and religion.” The administrative court stated it did not accept the LDJM’s argument about religious freedom but considered the “greater interest of the child.” The judge stated the town previously had provided alternative nonpork meals since 1984 “with no argument whatsoever.”

In March a primary school in the town of Malicornay in the central part of the country suspended a teacher after he reportedly read Bible passages to his students. A group of parents requested an investigation to determine if the teacher was attempting to proselytize his students or violating the country’s secular principles.

The CCIF stated the state of emergency in effect until November 1 had disproportionally targeted Muslims, conflating fighting terrorism with promoting anti-Muslim policies. In response to the legislation succeeding the state of emergency, the CCIF issued a statement on November 2 saying the new security legislation made the abuses permitted under the state of emergency a permanent element of the law.

On April 7, the Observatory for Secularism, a body comprised of 15 senior civil servants, parliamentarians, legal experts, and intellectuals who advise the government on the implementation of the “principle of secularism,” released its fourth annual report evaluating secularism in schools, public spaces, and hospitals. The report urged media and elected representatives to cover religious matters responsibly and not sensationalize them. The Observatory also recommended greater financial transparency for religious associations.

On December 21, President Macron received leaders of major religious communities to discuss secularism, theology degrees in universities, and the placement of religious chaplains in hospitals, the military, schools, and prisons. Protestant and Jewish representatives stressed the importance of welcoming migrants.

On January 5, at an annual New Year’s meeting with religious leaders, then- President Francois Hollande thanked a group of seven religious leaders, including Christian, Muslim, Jewish, and Buddhist leaders, for calling for unity following a difficult year marked by terrorist attacks in Nice and Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray. Hollande warned of the threat of radicalization from traditional and online platforms and said it was necessary “to eliminate at the outset any amalgam between the religion of peace practiced by the Muslims of France and the odious uses of Islam by the assassins sponsored by Da’esh.” He also praised the work of religious-inspired organizations that brought “solidarity with the most deprived and also with the migrants who reach our soil after having survived terrible ordeals.”

On October 2, at an annual event celebrating the Jewish New Year at the country’s largest synagogue, Prime Minister (PM) Edouard Philippe announced a new national plan (2018-2020) to combat anti-Semitism. According to PM Philippe, the government would work closely with civil society and Jewish organizations to develop and implement the plan. He stated “a sustainable fight against anti-Semitism” must use all available preventive tools, including convention of the country’s largest Jewish umbrella organization, the culture and education. He said the plan would address online anti-Semitic activities and postings such as those that had “overrun social media.” On December 10, at the eighth Representative Council of Jewish Institutions of France (CRIF), PM Philippe said the government was protecting 822 Jewish schools in the country, as well as religious sites.

On March 10, the Republican Party (LR) published on Twitter an anti-Semitic caricature of then-presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron showing him with a long hooked nose, wearing a top hat, and using a sickle to cut a cigar. The image resembled anti-Semitic propaganda from World War II (WWII), when the country’s Vichy government collaborated with the Nazis and their deportation and extermination of Jews, according to media reports. After heavy criticism, the LR removed the tweet. A day after the tweet, LR presidential candidate Francois Fillon denounced the “unacceptable” cartoon, saying he would not tolerate dissemination of caricatures with markers of “anti-Semitic propaganda” and calling it “totally contrary to our values.” Then-president of the NGO International League Against Anti-Semitism and Racism Alain Jakubowicz also condemned the tweet, saying, “It is absolutely terrifying. I don’t know if I want to scream, cry, or give up.” Macron filed a complaint in March against the LR for publishing the tweet; however, the Paris prosecutor abandoned the case on June 13 on grounds the case was an “insufficiently characterized offense.” Although the LR launched an internal investigation, the identity of the publisher remained unknown.

On April 25, the Paris Criminal Court fined Mayor Robert Menard of Beziers 2,000 euros ($2,400) for inciting hatred and discrimination by making anti-Muslim comments. The court convicted Menard for comments he made in a September 2016 interview when he stated the number of Muslim children in Beziers was “a problem” and for tweeting in the same month his regret at witnessing “the great replacement,” an allusion to a term used by writer Renaud Camus to describe the country being overtaken by foreign-born Muslims. The fine was higher than the 1,800 euros ($2,200) initially sought by the public prosecutor. The court also ordered the mayor to pay damages of up to 1,000 euros ($1,200) to each of the seven antiracism organizations that had originally filed the suit against him.

On January 9, then-Minister of Interior Le Roux attended a memorial ceremony outside a Paris kosher supermarket, where two years earlier a gunman had killed four Jews and held 15 others hostage.

Former President Hollande, President Macron, and government ministers on many occasions condemned anti-Semitism and declared support for Holocaust education. These occasions included the February 22 annual CRIF dinner; the March 19 commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the killings of three Jewish children and their teacher by Mohammed Merah in Toulouse; the April 30 Holocaust Remembrance Day commemoration; the June 1 French Judaism Day observance; and the July 21 anniversary of the Velodrome d’Hiver roundup of Jews during WWII. At the July 21 event, President Macron said, “We will never surrender to the messages of hate; we will not surrender to anti-Zionism because it is a reinvention of anti-Semitism.”

On September 13-14 in Paris, government officials and their Israeli counterparts held their third annual bilateral working group meeting to review efforts and best practices to counter anti-Semitism in France. Ambassador-at-Large for Human Rights François Croquette led the country’s delegation, which included the head of the Interagency Delegation to Counter Racism, Anti-Semitism, and Anti-LGBT Hatred (DILCRAH) and Ministry of Education and CRIF representatives.

On June 20, President Macron and Interior Minister Collomb attended an iftar hosted by the CFCM. At the event, President Macron met with CFCM leaders Ahmet Ogras and Anouar Kbibech, as well as Rector of the Great Mosque of Paris Dalil Boubakeur. In his remarks, President Macron, the first president to attend a CFCM iftar since 2007, said the country must counter individuals who twisted the Muslim faith to justify terrorist acts, better integrate Muslims, and strive to train imams domestically to ensure they represented and conveyed values of the country. Macron encouraged the CFCM’s leaders to focus on increased dialogue with the different domestic Muslim communities. He also praised what he called the strong cooperation among the MOI, CFCM, and DILCRAH in countering anti-Muslim hate crimes.

As part of an established exchange program, the government continued to host 30 Moroccan, 120 Algerian, and 151 Turkish imams to work temporarily in the country to promote religious tolerance and combat violent extremism within Muslim communities, according to the latest available data published in a 2016 French Senate report. The report said the imams’ countries of origin paid their salaries.

On October 2, PM Philippe said the government would not question the practice of ritual slaughter. His announcement followed the creation of a commission formed by Muslim and Jewish community leaders in 2016 to protect the practice of religious slaughter, which they said was under threat.

On April 8, authorities expelled Swiss Muslim preacher Hani Ramadan for posing a serious threat to public order, according to an MOI statement. Authorities escorted him from the eastern city of Colmar, where he was participating in a conference, to the Swiss border. The statement said Ramadan had in the past adopted behavior posing a threat to the country and that “the forces of law and order … will continue to fight ceaselessly against extremism and radicalization.” Press reports said authorities had cancelled several of Ramadan’s conferences in the country during the year, notably in Roubaix in January.

In March Mayor of Montpellier Philippe Saurel joined Mayors United against Anti-Semitism, an international initiative calling on municipal leaders to publicly address and take concrete actions against anti-Semitism. As members of this initiative, mayors “pledge to pursue a zero-tolerance policy on anti-Semitism, ensure that anti-Semitic incidents are thoroughly investigated, raise public awareness of the problem, and make the physical security of Jewish communities a priority.” Other participating cities in the country included Paris, Toulouse, Strasbourg, Bordeaux, Nice, Sarcelles, and Nancy.

In June the government announced the Pithiviers train station would become a Holocaust educational and memorial site. The station was the country’s first concentration camp during WWII, housing approximately 3,500 Jews in May 1941 before their deportation to Nazi death camps.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

Summary paragraph: There were crimes and other religiously motivated incidents against Christians, Jews, and Muslims, including killings, attempted killings, other violence, hate speech, and vandalism. In one incident in which a Muslim man defenestrated and killed a Jewish woman, Sarah Halimi, Jewish groups criticized the government’s delay in filing an indictment and initially excluding anti-Semitism as a motive. Other violent incidents included the killing of a Jewish woman, a home invasion where a Jewish family was beaten and threatened with death, five separate assaults against Jehovah’s Witnesses, assaults against two Jewish brothers, and an attempt to drive a car into a group of people gathered in front of a mosque. According to the MOI, anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic crimes declined during the year, but violent crimes increased against both groups.

The MOI reported that total registered anti-Muslim crimes (threats or violence) declined 35 percent, to 121 from 185, in 2016, while total registered anti-Semitic crimes (threats or violence) fell 7 percent, to 311 from 335. Despite the overall decline, due to a significant drop in threats, there was an upsurge in violent crimes compared with 2016. Violent acts against Jews increased from 77 to 97, and those against Muslims rose from 67 to 72. Anti-Semitic threats dropped from 258 in 2016 to 214, and anti-Muslim threats fell from 118 to 49.

In October the National Observatory against Islamophobia (ONCI), a part of the CFCM, cited “institutional discrimination against Muslims in schools, by the police, and by local authorities” as cause for concern. The CCIF stated victims were “reticent” to report anti-Muslim acts due to lack of confidence in the justice system. According to ONCI, the decline in reported anti-Muslim incidents did not mean anti-Muslim sentiment in the country had decreased. The CFCM cautioned against equating the decrease in reported acts with increased tolerance for Muslims.

On April 4, a French Malian man, Kobili Traore, killed his 65-year-old Jewish neighbor, Sarah Halimi. Neighbors heard Traore beating Halimi while reciting the Koran and shouting “Allahhu akbar” (“God is great”) and calling her Satan before throwing her from the third-story window of her apartment. On July 10, authorities arrested Traore and charged him with voluntary homicide and forcible confinement. On September 27, the prosecutor added the charge of anti-Semitism to the indictment. CRIF and the NGO National Bureau for Vigilance against Anti-Semitism (BNVCA) criticized the prosecutor for the delay in filing an indictment and not including anti-Semitism as a motive for the murder from the beginning. The case continued at year’s end.

On November 2, a criminal court in Paris found Abdelkader Merah, brother of Mohamed Merah, who killed seven persons in 2012, including a rabbi and three children outside a Jewish school in Toulouse, guilty of criminal terrorist conspiracy in connection with the 2012 killings. The court sentenced him to 20 years in prison. The court’s panel of judges found Abdelkader Merah not guilty of complicity in the killings, a charge for which the prosecution was seeking life in prison. The court also sentenced another individual in the case, Fettah Malki, to 14 years in prison for criminal association in a terrorist operation and weapons charges. Lawyers of the victims’ families, according to media reports, said they were satisfied with the verdicts; however, some family members were disappointed the court did not find Abdelkader Merah complicit in the murders.

On September 7, four men and one woman took part in an attack on a Jewish family in Livry Gargan, a northern suburb of Paris. They confined, beat, and threatened to kill the family of three, according to BNVCA. Following the attack, Interior Minister Collomb issued a statement saying, “everything will be done to identify and arrest those who carried out this cowardly attack [which] appears directly linked to the victims’ religion.” Judicial sources reported authorities arrested and detained five individuals, a 50-year-old male with a criminal record, three younger males, and a 19-year-old female, on November 28. On December 1, authorities charged them with armed robbery, illegal detention, and extortion with violence, motivated by the religious affiliation of the victims.

In October BNVCA reported to the Ministry of Education that students at a public school in Paris had assaulted a 10-year-old girl on several occasions because she was Jewish. After one assault, the girl was taken to a hospital with contusions to her stomach and rib cage, requiring 10 days to recover. Ministry of Education officials met with the mother to discuss the incident. BNVCA said the girl was transferring to another school.

On February 21, unidentified assailants assaulted two yarmulke-wearing brothers in Bobigny, a northeastern suburb of Paris. The two victims, aged 29 and 17, said their attackers yelled anti-Semitic insults and forced them to stop their vehicle in front of a cafe, from where other individuals came out to join the assailants. According to the preliminary investigation, one of the assailants attacked the victims with a hacksaw, injuring the hand of the elder brother. The younger brother suffered an injury to the shoulder. The two victims filed a complaint against the unidentified assailants, who remained at large. The investigation continued at year’s end.

Jehovah’s Witnesses officials reported five separate incidents in which individuals kicked, punched, or slapped members. On February 18 in Montagnac, Occitanie, a man invited a Witness who was proselytizing door to door onto his property and kicked him in the back twice, injuring him and causing him to lose two days of work. On February 20, in the town of Sens, a woman slapped an 87-year-old Witness distributing religious literature from a mobile cart. The Witness sustained injuries to her face, requiring three days of medical treatment. The victims filed criminal complaints in all five incidents. Police dismissed two of the cases and were investigating the three others at year’s end.

On June 29, police arrested a man who attempted to drive his car over roadside barriers into a group of people gathered in front of a mosque in the Paris suburb of Creteil. According to the Paris Police Prefecture, a man tried several times to drive through the cones and barriers protecting the mosque and, failing to get through, fled the scene. No one was injured. The 43-year-old driver had previously received psychological counseling. The press reported the man said he wanted to “avenge the [terrorist attacks on the] Bataclan and the Champs-Elysees.” Interior Minister Collomb issued a statement of solidarity with the Muslim community and said the “exact motives” of the attacker were under investigation.

In June authorities upheld the charge of anti-Semitism in the indictment against five assailants for an attack committed in 2014 against a young Jewish couple in Creteil. One of the five attackers was charged with rape and another with complicity in the rape; other charges against the five suspects included theft or attempted theft, extortion and false imprisonment with a weapon, or complicity.

On March 14, the European Court of Justice ruled a company could prohibit an employee from wearing a religious symbol if it had an internal rule banning the wearing of “any political, philosophical or religious sign.” The decision was a final ruling in a case involving a Muslim woman the firm Metropole had dismissed in 2009 for failing to remove her headscarf when meeting with clients.

The annual report of the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights, an advisory body to the prime minister, released in March, included the results of a poll conducted in October 2016 by the Ipsos Institute, a research and consulting company, involving face-to-face interviews with a representative sample of more than 1,000 residents over the age of 18. According to the poll, 35 percent of the respondents believed Jews “have a particular relationship with money,” and 22 percent thought Jews had too much power in the country. The same poll found 31 percent of respondents had a negative image of Islam and 46 percent of them considered it a threat to national identity. The report also cited what it said was persistent societal rejection of Islamic religious practices, such as prayer and women wearing a veil. According to the report, there was a decrease in anti-Semitic and racist acts and a slight rise in tolerance, “despite an environment favorable to the rejection of the other, notably marked by terrorism and the arrival of refugees.”

According to Israeli news outlet Ynetnews, 3,500 French Jews moved to Israel in 2017, compared with 5,000 in 2016.

On November 7, according to media reports, a female dentist in the town of Grigny (southwest of Lyon), refused to treat a female patient wearing a veil. The doctor reportedly also told the patient she would refuse to treat the patient’s daughter at an appointment scheduled for November 9, even though the daughter was not wearing a veil. The patients reported the dentist’s behavior to SOS Racism, a collection of NGOs dedicated to countering racism, and the dentists’ association.

In March one of the writers of the popular Bondy blog, Mehdi Meklat, was discovered to be the author, under the pseudonym Marcelin Deschamps, of anti-Semitic tweets, including, “Bring on Hitler to kill the Jews,” tweeted during the Cesars, the French equivalent of the Oscars ceremony.

On March 19, the interfaith community held events in Toulouse and Montauban to commemorate Jewish and military victims killed by Mohammed Merah in 2012. Then-Interior Minister Le Roux attended the ceremony and said “the Republic will not forget” the victims.

The MOI reported a drop of 8 percent in incidents directed against religious buildings and graves during the year, the first decline since the government began collecting such data in 2008. The overall number of incidents was 978, compared with 1,057 in 2016. Incidents against Christian sites fell by 8 percent, to 878 (949 in 2016), those against Muslims sites declined by 15 percent, to 72 (85), and those against Jewish sites increased by 22 percent, to 28 (23).

In August unknown individuals vandalized a plaque commemorating victims from the Children’s Home of Izieu, who were deported to Auschwitz in 1944. President Macron condemned the “shameful and cowardly act that won’t go unpunished.”

In September a juvenile court in Alsace sentenced five youths, who had vandalized a Jewish cemetery in 2015 when they were aged 15-17, to eight to 18 months in prison and 140 hours of community service. Shortly after issuing its decision, the court suspended the prison sentences. The defendants destroyed more than 300 graves and damaged a Holocaust memorial.

In November vandals defaced a plaque in a park in the Paris suburb of Bagneux commemorating Ilan Halimi, a Jew whom a gang kidnapped, tortured, and killed in 2006. The plaque was covered with anti-Semitic graffiti, including “Hitler,” a swastika, and “Free Fofana,” a reference to the leader of the gang that carried out the killing. Interior Minister Collomb called the vandalism “cowardly and odious,” and promised “everything will be done to identify the perpetrators.”

Jehovah’s Witnesses officials reported 11 cases of vandalism and arson at their houses of worship. Between March 15 and 23, vandals repeatedly damaged two Kingdom Halls in Bordeaux, spraying oil on the facade, tagging the buildings with graffiti, and attempting to set them on fire. The vandals also damaged cars belonging to Jehovah’s Witnesses. The local Witness association and the car owners filed a criminal complaint for each incident. The complaints for all nine cases of vandalism were pending at year’s end.

On April 23, authorities charged a woman with vandalizing a religious bas-relief at a Catholic church in Rennes-le-Chateau in Languedoc. After psychiatrists judged her mentally competent, she was arrested, tried, and convicted. On November 24, a Carcassonne criminal court sentenced the defendant to a two-month suspended prison term and ordered her to pay 17,718 euros ($22,000) in fines for the damage.

On August 19, unidentified individuals vandalized a Catholic church in Marseille for a second time with graffiti and swastikas. District Mayor Bruno Gilles condemned the act of vandalism and said authorities might file charges.

An Ipsos study commissioned by the Catholic media group Bayard cited a new category of believers: “committed Catholics,” persons who did not necessarily attend church but identified with the Catholic Church through philanthropy, family life, or social involvement. According to the study, this group comprised 23 percent of the country’s population.

On April 26, the Coordination of Associations of Muslims in Strasbourg organized a series of interfaith roundtables in that city on the topic “Citizenship: Education for Living Together.” Participants included local representatives of religious communities and associations, representatives of the city and local councils, and Anouar Kbibech, then-president of CFCM. Representatives of religious communities said French citizenship was a shared bond among the country’s diverse religious groups. The participants discussed the need to teach the region’s primary and secondary school students about the history and practices of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism, the major religions in the country.

On May 13, the CFCM hosted a symposium entitled “Being Female in France Today,” which brought together Muslim leaders, scholars, and local activists to discuss religious issues, secularism, and Islam. Participants debated about societal and workplace discrimination that targeted Muslim women, the role of media in perpetuating stereotypes, and the need for more visible, credible Muslim female voices in the media. Some expressed frustration with the lack of opportunities for women to speak for themselves. For example, they said that when controversy broke out in 2016 over the conservative women’s bathing garment known as the “burkini,” most commentators invited to speak about the issue on television and radio were men.

On May 21, Strasbourg celebrated the tenth anniversary of its interfaith dialogue initiative. The initiative, launched at the request of the regional government, continued to bring together religious leaders from Protestant, Jewish, Catholic, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist faiths to promote interfaith dialogue and to “foster friendship and a better understanding of others.”

In June the Conference of Catholic Bishops’ National Service for Relations with Islam again hosted an annual interfaith event with Muslims leaders from throughout the country. According to the bishops, the purpose of the event was to maintain regular contacts with Muslim associations and promote religious tolerance and understanding between Catholics and Muslims.

On November 5, Christian, Muslim, and Jewish organizations and individuals convened in Marseille as part of an initiative promoting interfaith tolerance and understanding. At the gathering, youth from the different communities played sports together. From November 10-12, Jewish and Muslim community leaders engaged in interfaith dialogue through visiting mosques and synagogues. According to organizers, these interreligious initiatives sought to facilitate communication, religious tolerance, and understanding among the communities.

The Council of Christian Churches, composed of 10 members from the Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, and Armenian Apostolic Churches, continued to serve as a forum for dialogue. One observer represented the Anglican Communion on the council.

The U.S. Ambassador, Charge d’Affaires, and other staff from the U.S. embassy, consulates general, and APPs discussed issues pertaining to religious freedom and tolerance with relevant government officials, including at the religious affairs offices of the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs. In March and August the Charge d’Affaires met with Ambassador-at-Large for Human Rights and Holocaust Issues Francois Croquette. Topics discussed included religious tolerance, anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim acts, the role of religious freedom in lessening violent extremism, and bilateral cooperation on these issues.

The U.S. Ambassador hosted an interfaith reception with leaders of local religious organizations and interfaith groups in January. The reception welcomed local imams, rabbis, and priests, as well as leaders of religious associations and civil society representatives, to promote interfaith dialogue and tolerance and highlighted the vital role of freedom of religion in democratic and prosperous societies.

The Charge d’Affaires hosted an iftar in June attended by leaders of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian communities at which she emphasized U.S. support for interfaith dialogue, religious tolerance, and nondiscrimination. In her remarks, the Charge d’Affaires stressed the iftar represented “the importance of tolerance, dialogue, and friendship.” In September the Charge d’Affaires attended a Yom Kippur observance with the Jewish community, where he stressed the importance of religious freedom, tolerance, and the importance of countering anti-Semitism.

The Charge d’Affaires met in Paris with Grand Rabbi of France Haim Korsia, Rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris Dalil Boubakeur, the Rector of Notre-Dame Cathedral of Paris Patrick Chauvet, CRIF president Francis Kalifat, president Joel Mergui of the Central Consistory (the leading Jewish institution administrating Jewish religious affairs), and CFCM president Ahmet Ogras and vice president Anouar Kbibech, as well as with religious leaders in other parts of the country, to discuss their views on religious freedom and tolerance. Through these meetings, the Charge d’Affaires stressed the United States government’s commitment to promoting freedom of religion, the benefits of interfaith dialogue in promoting peace and countering radicalization, and the importance of collectively countering anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment.

Staff from the embassy and the consulates general and APPs met regularly with religious community leaders, activists, and ordinary citizens throughout the country to discuss issues of discrimination and to advocate tolerance for diversity. Embassy officials discussed religious freedom, anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim sentiment, and interfaith dialogue and tolerance with private citizens, senior Christian, Muslim and Jewish representatives and NGOs. They also hosted meetings with CRIF, the Consistory, the CFCM, and Catholic priests working on interfaith dialogue. As part of embassy engagement with Muslim community contacts outside of Paris, embassy officials traveled to Rennes in March, Toulouse in September, and Strasbourg in October and December.

On March 24, APP Rennes and embassy officials met with members of two Rennes-based Islamic cultural organizations to discuss the status of the Muslim community in the Brittany region. The conversations focused on the organizations’ outreach efforts to the local community, as well as challenges the organizations have faced, such as limited access to prayer space, resistance from neighbors to the construction of new mosques, and concerns about the conflation of terrorism and Islam.

In October staff from the APP in Bordeaux took part in a panel discussion on the separation of church and state as part of the City Hall of Bordeaux’s annual “Two Weeks of Equality” series. The year’s topic focused on managing diversity and nationalism. In November as part of outreach programs around an American speaker on inclusion in sports, APP Bordeaux staff met with Jewish and Muslim youth leaders to discuss the possibility of supporting youth sports initiatives to unite religious communities.

The embassy awarded small grants to various NGOs across the country to support projects that aimed to advance religious tolerance and integration. One program worked to help integrate children of newly arrived immigrants from different ethnic and religious backgrounds into the social fabric of the country through storytelling and local social engagement. Another program, a documentary film project, explored issues of diversity, inclusion, and religious tolerance in schools in the Marseille, Rennes, and Paris regions.

In March the embassy coordinated the visit of a Los Angeles city government delegation that exchanged best practices with religious leaders, NGO representatives, local government (the mayor of Sevran), and local police representatives on fostering integration and inclusion in minority communities.

The embassy organized and funded visits for two groups of government officials, religious leaders, and NGO representatives to the United States on building community resilience to radicalization and violent extremism and youth outreach programs that included elements of interfaith dialogue. The first program included sessions on interfaith dialogue and higher education, faith-based outreach for immigrants and refugees, and interfaith models for community building. The second program included interfaith activities focusing on youth as a primary topic.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.7 million (July 2017 estimate). Demographic studies do not track religious affiliation, and estimates from religious leaders and government agencies vary widely. The Episcopal Conference of Gabon estimates approximately 80 percent of the population is Christian. Of the Christian population, approximately two-thirds are Roman Catholic and one-third Protestant. The High Council of Islamic Affairs estimates approximately 10 percent is Muslim, including many noncitizen residents with origins in West Africa. The remaining 10 percent of the population practices animism exclusively or does not identify with any religious group. Many individuals practice a syncretic faith that combines elements of Christianity with traditional indigenous faiths, Voodoo, or animism. There is a very small Jewish community.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the state as secular and establishes separation of religion and state. It prohibits religious discrimination and holds all citizens equal before the law, regardless of religion. The constitution provides for freedom of conscience, the free practice of religion, and the right to form religious communities that may govern and manage their affairs independently, “consistent with public order.” The constitution stipulates religious communities whose activities are contrary to law or promote conflict among ethnic groups may be banned.

The law requires all associations to register, including religious groups. Registered groups are eligible for exemptions from fees for land use and construction permits. To register, a group must present to the MOI copies of its founding statutes and internal rules, a letter attesting to publication of these documents in the applicable local administrative bulletin, a formal letter of request for registration addressed to the minister of interior, a property lease, the police records of the group’s leaders, and the group’s bank statements. The registration fee is 10,000 CFA francs ($18). Registered religious groups must also provide the MOI with proof of nonprofit status to receive exemptions from local taxes and customs duties on imports. The MOI maintains an official registry of religious groups.

The constitution states parents have the right to choose their children’s religious education. The state provides for public education based on “religious neutrality.” Public schools are secular and do not provide religious instruction. Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant groups operate primary and secondary schools, in which representatives of religious groups give religious instruction. These schools must register with the Ministry of Education, which ensures they meet the same standards as public schools.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The MOI reported it generally processed registration requests from religious groups within one month and estimated it rejected more than 40 such applications in 2016 and 2017. Ministry officials described the religious groups it rejected as often “one-man operations,” practicing a mixture of Christianity and traditional animist beliefs. Their difficulty with registration usually concerned gathering the appropriate documents, according to ministry officials. The MOI emphasized the necessity for all groups to register and no longer allowed unregistered groups to operate freely.

On December 16, a Niger citizen stabbed two Danish journalists and allegedly shouted “Allahu akbar.” The man, a long-time resident, reportedly told police he acted in retaliation for what he called U.S. attacks against Muslims, as well as U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. The defense minister denounced the isolated act and assured that the perpetrator and any accomplices would be punished to the full extent of the law. The president also responded this incident would not mar the harmonious relations that the country has with its foreign residents who respect the country’s laws and institutions.

Leaders of all three faiths met regularly, attended each other’s major festivals, and worked together to promote religious tolerance. The interfaith dialogues and activities included discussion of religious issues.

In October political activists prevented Muslims from entering a mosque near an opposition leader’s home for prayers and also posted threatening messages on social media. To avoid escalation, the imam cancelled activities on that day. Other faith leaders immediately and publicly denounced the actions. Activities at the mosque resumed the following day.

U.S. embassy staff met with senior MOI officials to encourage continued respect for religious freedom, to discuss registration issues, and to encourage government officials to continue their outreach to religious communities to discuss religious freedom.

Embassy staff encouraged Muslim, Protestant, and Catholic leaders to continue their interfaith dialogue and activities promoting interreligious tolerance and understanding, such as regular meetings among religious leaders of different faiths.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 4.9 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2014 census, GOC members constitute 83.4 percent of the population, followed by Muslims at 10.7 percent and members of the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) at 2.9 percent. According to the census, Roman Catholics, Yezidis, Greek Orthodox, Jews, growing numbers of “nontraditional” religious groups such as Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pentecostals, the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, and individuals who profess no religious preference constitute the remaining 3 percent of the population.

There is a strong correlation between ethnicity, religious affiliation, and region of residence. Most ethnic Georgians affiliate with the GOC. A small number of mostly ethnic Russians are members of several Orthodox groups not affiliated with the GOC, including the Molokani, Staroveriy (Old Believers), and Dukhoboriy (Spirit Wrestlers). Ethnic Azerbaijanis are predominantly Shia Muslims and form the majority of the population in the southeastern region of Kvemo-Kartli. Other Muslim groups include ethnic Georgian Muslims in Adjara and Chechen Kists in the northeast, both of which are predominantly Sunni. Ethnic Georgian Sunni Muslims, originally from Adjara, migrated to Samtskhe-Javakheti in the 1980s. Ethnic Armenians belong primarily to the AAC and constitute the majority of the population in Samtskhe-Javakheti.

According to a census reportedly conducted in 2011 by the de facto government of Abkhazia, there are 241,000 residents of Abkhazia. A survey reportedly conducted in 2003 by the de facto government listed 60 percent of respondents as Christian, 16 percent Muslim, 8 percent atheists or nonbelievers, 8 percent followers of the pre-Christian Abkhazian religion, and 1 percent Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, or adherents of other religions. The remaining 7 percent list no preference.

According to a 2015 census reportedly conducted by the de facto government of South Ossetia, there are 53,000 residents of South Ossetia. Estimates indicate the majority of the population practices Christianity, followed by Islam and the “Right Faith,” a revival of the pre-Christian ethnic Ossetian religion.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits persecution based on religion and prohibits compelling anyone to express his or her opinion about religion. The constitution also prohibits public and political associations that create religious animosity. The law provides for freedom of religious belief, denomination, and conscience, including the right to choose and change religious affiliation.

The constitution recognizes the special role of the GOC in the country’s history, but stipulates the GOC shall be independent from the state, and relations between the GOC and the state shall be governed by a constitutional agreement (also called a concordat). The concordat grants rights not given to other religious groups, including legal immunity for the GOC patriarch, exemption of GOC clergy from military service, and a consultative role in government, especially in education. The concordat states some of its provisions require additional legislation before they may be implemented, including the GOC’s consultative role in education.

A religious group may register with the government’s National Agency of the Public Registry (NAPR) as a Legal Entity of Public Law (LEPL) or as a nonprofit organization, both of which offer essentially the same benefits, including legal recognition when conducting activities, partial tax exemptions, and the right to own property and open bank accounts. Unregistered religious groups may conduct religious activities but do not receive the legal status or benefits conferred on registered groups.

To acquire LEPL status, the law requires religious organizations to register with the government. To register, organizations must have historic ties to the country and recognition from Council of Europe member states as a religious organization. In addition, an organization registering for LEPL status must submit to the NAPR information regarding its objectives and procedures and a list of its founders and governing body. The civil code defines the activities and rights of denominations registered under LEPL status. Groups registering as nonprofit religious organizations do not have to demonstrate historic ties to the country or recognition by Council of Europe members but must submit to the NAPR similar information on their objectives, governing procedures, and names of founders and members of their governing body.

The tax code does not consider religious activities to be economic activities, and grants registered religious groups’ partial tax exemptions for donations. Religious groups other than the GOC, however, pay profit tax on the sale of religious products, value added taxes on the provision or importation of religious products, and taxes on activities related to the construction, restoration, and maintenance of religious buildings.

Religious groups, except for the GOC, also pay property tax. According to the law on state property, no religious organization registered as an LEPL, except the GOC, may acquire nonagricultural state property through a direct sale. A denomination registered as a nonprofit organization may purchase state property. The law also grants the GOC the right to acquire state-owned agricultural land free of charge, while other religious groups must pay for land.

The criminal code prohibits interference with worship services, persecution of a person based on religious faith or belief, and interference with the establishment of a religious organization, although the code provides no definition for “establishment.” Violations are punishable by fines, imprisonment, or both. Violations committed by a public official are considered abuses of power and are punishable by fines or longer terms of imprisonment if committed by force or arms or by insulting the dignity of a victim. In cases of religious persecution, the perpetrator may face imprisonment for up to three years depending upon the use or threat of violence, his or her official position, and damages caused. In cases of unlawful interference in the right to perform religious rituals involving the use or threat of violence, offenders may face imprisonment for up to two years; in cases where the offender holds an official position, offenders may face up to five years in prison. Interference in the establishment of a religious organization is punishable by fine, correctional work for up to one year, or imprisonment for up to two years.

By law, the Chief Prosecutor’s Office (CPO) prosecutes human rights violations involving religious intolerance. The CPO’s human rights unit monitors the protection of religious freedom, while the PDO serves as the country’s human rights ombudsman and monitors complaints of restrictions on religious freedom. The PDO’s Tolerance Center coordinates the PDO’s Council of Religions and Ethnic Minorities, carries out educational activities, and monitors and analyzes cases of religious and ethnic discrimination and xenophobia.

SARI distributes the government’s compensation to Islamic, Jewish, Roman Catholic, and AAC religious organizations registered as LEPLs for “the material and moral damages inflicted upon them during the Soviet period.” According to SARI, its mandate is to promote and ensure a peaceful coexistence based on principles of equality and tolerance. According to its website, SARI’s stated responsibilities include researching the existing religious situation and reporting to the government; preparing recommendations and draft legal acts for the government; and serving as a consultative body and intermediary for the government in disputes arising between religious associations. SARI also issues recommendations to relevant state institutions on the construction of religious buildings, determination of their locations, and transfer of such properties to religious organizations.

Although the law states public schools may not be used for religious indoctrination, proselytizing, or forcible assimilation, the concordat accords the GOC the right to teach religious studies in public educational institutions and authorizes the state to pay for GOC religious schools. The law states students may pursue religious study and practice religious rituals in schools “of their own accord” to receive e religious education, but only after school hours. The law includes no special regulations for private religious schools. Outside instructors, including clergy, may only attend or direct student religious education or activities if students invite them to do so; school administration and teachers may not be involved in this process.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: During the year, the ruling party passed amendments to the constitution that generated controversy for appearing to limit freedom of religion on national security grounds. Parliament later re-amended the controversial amendments in response to civil society and international expert concerns of potential limitations to freedom of religion. The changes were expected to go into effect in 2018. Although the CPO reported it had investigated seven cases involving crimes potentially based on religious intolerance, similar to previous years, NGOs and the PDO stated the government was ineffective in its investigation of crimes motivated by religious hatred. NGOs and minority religious groups continued to express concern over government actions, at both the national and local levels, including resisting the construction of places of worship for minority religious groups and showing what they said was favoritism toward the GOC in the restitution of buildings confiscated by the state in the Soviet era. They also criticized SARI’s distribution of compensation funds for Soviet-era damages. Despite reported government resistance, there were some court rulings favoring the right of minority religious groups to build places of worship and schools. The GOC continued to be the only religious group allowed to have chapels in prisons. As part of the government’s human rights action plan, SARI organized activities and taught courses on religious nondiscrimination for members of the national and local governments and law enforcement. Some NGOs and the PDO said the government inadequately addressed acts of religious intolerance and discrimination favoring the GOC in public schools.

During the year, the ruling party, Georgian Dream (GD), proposed a series of constitutional amendments that included changes to the constitution’s article on the freedom of belief and conscience. The proposed amendments allowed the government to “interfere” in religious affairs based on national security. In its review of the draft amendments, the Council of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) stated that, according to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), “the State cannot use the need to protect national security as the sole basis for restricting the exercise of the right of a person or a group of persons to manifest their religion.” NGOs and local religious organizations also said the amendments posed a potential threat to religious freedom. In September parliament adopted the amendments, in a one party vote, to the constitution’s article on freedom of religion and belief. In November parliament reinitiated a new constitutional amendment process, including a correction to the language on freedom of religion more in line with the constitution’s language prior to the September amendments. NGOs approved of the new language that removed permission for the government to interfere in religious affairs based on national security. Parliament held its first two votes on the November amendments in December and was expected to hold its final vote in 2018. Similar to the initial amendment process, parliament approved the changes without opposition support.

The ECtHR ruled the government violated a religious freedom clause of The European Convention on Human Rights during a religiously motivated mob’s violent raid on a Jehovah’s Witnesses annual convention in 2001. After negotiations failed, the case was brought to the ECtHR in 2005. The ECtHR ruled there had been a breach of the right of the Jehovah’s Witnesses to practice their religion freely in meetings. The government agreed to pay 800 euros ($960) per plaintiff and 2,000 euros ($2,400) collectively to the Jehovah’s Witnesses as a group.

The CPO investigated seven cases involving alleged religiously motivated hate crimes during the year. Of the seven cases, one involved beating, four persecution, one damage or destruction of property together with persecution, and one abuse of official authority. According to the CPO, three of the cases of persecution were prosecuted for crimes based on religious intolerance; none of the seven cases was terminated.

As part of the government’s human rights action plan, SARI developed and taught courses on religious tolerance to more than 200 participants from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and local law enforcement and civil service officials.

The NGO Tolerance and Diversity Institute (TDI) again stated there was a lack of effective investigation into crimes motivated by religious hatred. The PDO’s December report stated it received three accounts of violence on the ground of religious intolerance during the year, which the PDO said showed a downward trend in such crimes. The PDO noted, however, that cases from previous years remained largely unresolved.

According to NAPR’s website, it approved two religious organization registration requests and denied two other requests submitted during the year. NAPR stated it denied the registration requests because they did not comply with the regulations. NAPR’s website did not specify how many registration requests it received and which religious organizations it denied registration. According to NAPR’s website, 46 religious organizations were registered as LEPLs.

Most prisons reportedly continued to have GOC chapels but no areas for nondenominational worship. According to SARI, Roman Catholic, AAC, Baptist, Muslim, and Jewish groups, services remained available upon request in the military and in prisons. According to the Tolerance Center, non-GOC religious organizations continued to face government resistance when attempting to obtain construction permits for churches. The center continued to attribute the resistance to what it termed a general societal bias in favor of the GOC.

According to TDI, although the law provides for equal treatment for applicants seeking construction permits, representatives of religious minority groups were often subject to discrimination. Construction permits are issued by local self-governing bodies, and according to TDI, “often due to the discriminatory approaches of municipalities toward religious minorities, the latter face obstacles.” TDI also noted the “problematic role” of SARI in the process, which “without a legitimate purpose and legal basis” interfered with the authority of local self-governance.

The AAC continued to request restitution of five churches in Tbilisi and one in Akhaltsikhe, all of which had been registered as state property and claimed by both the AAC and the GOC. The AAC reported it operated 57 churches in the country but did not own any of them. The AAC petitioned SARI for ownership and/or right of usage of 20 of the churches in 2015 and for the remaining churches during the year. SARI’s response remained pending at year’s end.

NGOs and some Muslim community leaders stated the government continued to exert influence over the NGO All Muslims of All Georgia (AMAG), including the appointment of AMAG religious leaders.

Muslim community members said there was a lack of government transparency around government decisions on mosques and their construction. The Muslim community continued to dispute the government’s ownership of mosques in Kvemo Kartli, Adigeni, and Adjara. Muslim community leaders and local and central government authorities remained unable to reach a mutually agreeable solution to address overcrowding in the state-owned mosque in Batumi.

In February a local Adjara organization called the New Mosque Construction Fund petitioned Batumi City Hall for permission to build a new mosque. According to the NGO Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center (EMC), some members of the Batumi Muslim community began raising funds for the construction of a mosque in 2016 and purchased a piece of land from a private owner in installments. The fund also paid for architectural plans for the mosque. In May the Mayor and Batumi City Hall refused to issue the first construction permit (approval of the terms of use of land for the construction), stating that it was a predominantly residential area and that the area’s future development must be residential. The EMC responded the city hall’s decision was “illegal, unjustified, and gives ground to assume discrimination,” and in June filed a lawsuit over the city hall’s refusal to issue a permit. The court admitted the case; however, as of December, the court had not held a hearing on the complaint. In May some members of the Muslim community began conducting prayer services on the purchased piece of land and erected a temporary structure on the site. The same month Batumi City Hall ordered an immediate suspension of construction, imposed a 3,000 lari ($1,100) fine, and ordered the land be returned to its initial condition. EMC and TDI appealed city hall’s order to demolish the temporary structure; as of December the local court had not held a hearing on the appeal. Some members of the Adjara Muslim community opposed expansion of the existing mosque in Batumi (as opposed to building a new one), which they claim would still be too small to accommodate the local Muslim population. In December the PDO said building of a new mosque in Batumi remained unresolved.

In May the SARI commission, created in 2014 to resolve the ownership dispute over a religious building in the village of Mokhe in Samtskhe-Javakheti, recommended transfer of ownership of the building to the National Agency for Cultural Heritage Preservation and the provision to the local community of an alternative plot of land to construct a mosque. Local Muslims claimed ownership of the building as a 20th century mosque, while the GOC also claimed ownership as the site of a former GOC church. At year’s end construction of the new mosque continued; however, according to a SARI report, the disputed building had been fenced off and protected as a cultural heritage monument. The PDO stated the SARI commission failed to accomplish its goal of establishing the origin and ownership of the building.

The government continued to pay subsidies for the restoration of religious properties it considered national cultural heritage sites. The Ministry of Culture and Protection of Monuments allocated 977,344 lari ($374,000) during the year for the restoration of religious monuments, including 156,000 lari ($59,800) for design drafts and 821,344 lari ($315,000) for rehabilitation, conservation, and infrastructure development.

In June the Supreme Court said it would not review the Kutaisi Court of Appeal’s September 2016 ruling that residents of Kobuleti had discriminated against Muslims in 2014 by nailing a pig’s head to the front door of a planned Muslim boarding school and by erecting a cross near the property. The court ruled the individuals involved in the vandalism were obligated to provide compensation. In April the Kutaisi Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s decision not to rule on whether the Ministry of Internal Affairs had engaged in discriminatory behavior toward Muslims in the 2014 incident when it did not stop the actions of the Kobuleti residents. The EMC appealed the court’s decision to the Supreme Court, which had not decided whether to hear the case by year’s end. At year’s end, the boarding school had not opened.

NGOs continued to report cases of religious discrimination in schools, including incidents involving the promotion of GOC theology in religion courses, GOC prayers conducted in classrooms, and the display of icons and other religious symbols in schools, despite the law’s prohibition of proselytization. The Ministry of Education’s general inspection department continued to be responsible for dealing with complaints of inappropriate teacher behavior. According to a TDI report, while the law governing general education provides for religious neutrality and nondiscrimination, religious education in public schools persisted.

According to TDI, the Constitutional Court admitted part of a case in February submitted by a group of religious organizations alleging discrimination by the government in transferring state property to the GOC. The case was originally submitted in August 2016 by the Union of All Muslims of Georgia (an NGO), Evangelical Baptist Church of Georgia, Pentecostal Church of Georgia, Evangelical Lutheran Church of Georgia, and Redeemed Christian Church of God in Georgia (represented by the Tbilisi Free University Law Clinic and TDI).

In July the Constitutional Court held its main hearing on an October 2015 case submitted by the Caucasus Apostolic Administration of Latin Rite Catholics, Evangelical Baptist Church of Georgia, Union of All Muslims of Georgia, Pentecostal Church of Georgia, Trans-Caucasian Union of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, Word of Life Church of Georgia, Holy Trinity Church, and Church of Christ to obtain equal tax status for all religious organizations. The court had previously postponed deliberations in 2016, reportedly due to the absence of a relevant expert. TDI, which represented the claimants along with the Constitutional Law Clinic of the Free University, said the court had not ruled on the case by year’s end.

The government distributed 25 million lari ($9.58 million) to the GOC in compensation for “material and moral damages” inflicted upon it during the Soviet period. In addition, in accordance with a 2014 parliamentary resolution allowing the government to compensate Islamic, Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Armenian Apostolic religious organizations registered as LEPLs, SARI disbursed compensation funds totaling 4.5 million lari ($1.72 million) to those four religious groups in coordination with the Ministry of Finance. NGOs continued to question the criteria the government used to select the four denominations and to criticize the exclusion of other religious groups.

SARI reported the year’s government disbursements as follows: 2.75 million lari ($1.05 million) to the Muslim community, represented by the AMAG; 550,000 lari ($211,000) to the RCC; 800,000 lari ($307,000) to the AAC; and 400,000 lari ($153,000) to the Jewish community. In making the disbursements, SARI again stated the compensation was “partial and of symbolic character,” and stated the government continued to take into account levels of damage and “present day negative conditions” of denominations during the selection process.

There was no progress in the government’s investigation into two November 2015 shooting incidents at the Jehovah’s Witnesses Kingdom Hall in Vazisubani, a Tbilisi suburb. No individuals were harmed in either incident. According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Kingdom Hall in Vazisubani suffered damage in December 2015. Local police were notified and criminal proceedings initiated. None of these three cases were resolved by year’s end.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained outside the control of the central government, and reliable information from those regions continued to be difficult to obtain. According to the de facto “constitution” adopted in Abkhazia, all persons in these regions are equal before the law regardless of religious beliefs and everyone enjoys freedom of religion. Forming associations or parties aimed at sowing religious discord is forbidden.

According to media sources in South Ossetia, the de facto “Supreme Court” issued a decision outlawing Jehovah’s Witnesses, while the de facto government in Abkhazia continued to impose a ban on the group. The de facto government was also reportedly considering the introduction of legislation to impose fines from 50,000 to 100,000 rubles ($860 to $1,700) on individuals renting property to religious groups.

According to media and online accounts, religious figures in Abkhazia made efforts to make the region’s churches autocephalous, although some local religious officials wished to resubordinate the GOC churches in the region to the Russian Orthodox Church, while others wished to resubordinate the churches to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. In November the GOC and the Russian Orthodox Church announced a working group to address these divisions.

The de facto authorities in Abkhazia’s Gali District reportedly did not permit GOC clergy to travel to Abkhazia to conduct religious services, and ethnic Georgians were unable to attend services in their own language. According to a SARI report, the district’s ethnic Georgian population was obliged to travel to Georgian-controlled territory to celebrate religious holidays.

According to a SARI report, no monitoring of religious monuments in South Ossetia could be conducted, and the status of most monuments in the territory was unknown.

In January Russian military units in Abkhazia reportedly destroyed a 19th century church and cemetery in order to construct a Russian military firing range.

The Jehovah’s Witnesses reported continued interference with their religious activity, including 10 physical assaults. On April 5, according to the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ country report, two Jehovah’s Witnesses were sharing their religious beliefs when a man came out of his yard, verbally insulted and physically assaulted them, and threatened to rape them. The Witnesses fled the scene. After the individual followed them, swearing and shouting “sectists” and “satanists,” the victims called police.

Criminal proceedings continued in connection with the 2016 attack on two female Jehovah’s Witnesses who were sharing Bible verses in Alexandre’s Garden in Tbilisi. Court hearings also continued at year’s end.

Representatives of minority religious groups continued to report what they termed a widespread societal belief that minority religious groups posed a threat to the GOC and to the country’s cultural values. Minority religious communities, including Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Catholics, and Protestants, continued to report resistance to their establishing places of worship and religious schools.

In July thousands of individuals marched through downtown Tbilisi to call for an end to illegal immigration, including from some predominantly Muslim countries; greater restrictions on granting residency permits to foreigners; a ban on foreign funding of civil society organizations; and the implementation of a more restrictive immigration law. Organizers of the march were a loose alliance of leaders of several nationalist groups, including a former deputy state minister for diaspora issues under the Georgian Dream government.

From January to October, the most recent period for which data was available, the MDF documented at least 92 instances of religiously intolerant statements on television, online, and in printed media by media representatives, political parties, clergy, public organizations, and others. The instances included 49 “Islamophobic” or “Turkophobic” statements related to the construction of new mosques, four anti-Catholic statements, 24 statements against Jehovah’s Witnesses, two against the Evangelical Baptist Church of Georgia, one against Armenians, and six against other religious groups. For instance, some statements included references to Muslims as terrorists and pedophiles.

Jehovah’s Witnesses reported two cases of damage to their property and vandalism. On June 17, at a Jehovah’s Witnesses Kingdom Hall, members found insulting inscriptions in English on a window, and also a cross painted upside down and a swastika painted on the facade of the building. The incident was reported to police, who started an investigation.

The Ambassador and other U.S. embassy officials regularly met with officials from the government, including SARI, the prime minister’s adviser on human rights and gender equality, and the president’s adviser on national minorities to advocate for freedom of religion for all. They also continued to meet with the PDO and with officials in its Tolerance Center on these issues.

Embassy staff continued to meet with NGOs concerned with religious freedom issues, including the Center for Development and Democracy, EMC, TDI, and 21st Century Union, as well as with religious community leaders, to promote religious tolerance and the integration of religious minorities into society.

The Ambassador and other embassy officials met with leaders from traditional and nontraditional denominations. They also visited the Pankisi Gorge, Akhalkalaki, Kvemo Kartli, and Adjara regions on several occasions to meet with local religious leaders from the Sunni Muslim, Armenian Apostolic, and Shia Muslim communities. In the meetings, embassy officials advocated for interfaith understanding, dialogue, respect, and the peaceful coexistence of all religions.

The Ambassador met with GOC Patriarch Ilia II on multiple occasions. In their meetings, the Ambassador stressed the importance of the church’s role in promoting religious diversity and tolerance.

In September the embassy sponsored the participation of four GOC representatives in a program in the United States on religious freedom and interfaith issues. The visit included topics related to U.S. laws on the separation of church and state, religious freedom, religious property ownership, and interreligious dialogue. In March embassy officials visited the Muslim community in Mokhe to learn more about the community’s religious freedom concerns. In April embassy officials visited the predominantly Muslim region of Khulo and the Kobuleti boarding school to hear the communities’ religious freedom concerns.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 80.6 million (July 2017 estimate). Unofficial estimates and figures provided by religious groups indicate approximately 30 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, and 27 percent belongs to the EKD – a confederation of Lutheran, Reformed (Calvinist), and United (Prussian Union) Protestant regional churches. Other Protestant denominations (including the New Apostolic Church, Baptist communities, and nondenominational Christians) combined account for less than 1 percent of the population. Orthodox Christians represent almost 3 percent of the population.

According to government estimates, 5.5 percent of the population is Muslim, of which 65 percent is Sunni, 12.5 percent Alevi, and 5.6 percent Shia; the remainder identifies simply as “Muslim.” According to intelligence officials, there are approximately 11,000 Salafist Muslims in the country. According to the Ministry of the Interior, approximately 25 percent of Muslims are recent immigrants; between 2011 and 2015, an estimated 1.2 million refugees immigrated from predominately Muslim countries. Estimates of the Jewish population vary widely; the Central Council of Jews estimates it at 250,000, and the religious NGO REMID at 100,000. According to REMID, groups that together constitute less than 1 percent of the population include Buddhists (270,000); Jehovah’s Witnesses (222,000); The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) (40,000); Hindus (100,000); Yezidis (100,000); Sikhs (15,000); and COS (5,000-10,000). Approximately 36 percent of the population either have no religious affiliation or are members of unrecorded religious groups.

Legal Framework

The constitution (also known as the basic law) prohibits discrimination on the basis of religious opinion and provides for freedom of faith and conscience and the freedom to profess a religious or philosophical creed and to practice one’s religion. The constitution also prohibits an official state church. It stipulates people shall not be required to disclose their religious convictions or be compelled to participate in religious acts. The constitution states religious instruction shall be part of the curriculum in public schools and that parents have the right to decide whether children shall receive religious instruction. It recognizes the right to establish private denominational schools. The constitution guarantees the freedom to form religious societies and states that groups may organize themselves for private religious purposes without constraint. It allows registered religious groups with PLC status to receive public subsidies from the states and to provide religious services in the military, at hospitals, and in prisons.

Religious groups wishing to qualify as nonprofit associations with tax-exempt status must register. State-level authorities review registration submissions and routinely grant tax-exempt status; if challenged, their decisions are subject to judicial review. Religious groups applying for tax-exempt status must provide evidence through their statutes, history, and activities that they are a religious group.

A special partnership exists between the states and religious groups with PLC status, as outlined in the constitution. Any religious group may request PLC status, which, if granted, entitles the group to levy tithes (averaging 9 percent of income tax) that each state collects on its behalf, separately from income taxes, but through the state’s tax collection process. PLCs pay fees to the government for the tithing service, but not all groups utilize the service. PLC status also allows for tax exemptions (larger than those given to groups with nonprofit status), representation on supervisory boards of public television and radio stations, and the right to special labor regulations, for example, requiring employees in hospitals, kindergartens, or NGOs run by a religious group be members of that group. State governments subsidize institutions with PLC status providing public services, such as religious schools and hospitals.

According to the constitution, the decision to grant PLC status is made at the state level. Individual states base PLC status decisions on a number of varying qualifications, including an assurance of the group’s permanence, size, and respect for the constitutional order and fundamental rights of individuals. An estimated 180 religious groups have PLC status, including Catholics, EKD, Bahais, Baptists, Christian Scientists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, Mennonites, Methodists, Mormons, Salvation Army, and Seventh-day Adventists. Ahmadi groups have PLC status in the states of Hesse and Hamburg; no other Muslim communities have PLC status. The COS does not have PLC or nonprofit status in any state.

According to a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court, general headscarf bans for teachers at public schools are a violation of religious freedom, but implementation is left to the states to determine if special circumstances apply. For example, Bavaria and Saarland render decisions on a case-by-case basis. NRW changed its laws to enable headscarf-wearing women to work as teachers. Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, and Bremen do not prohibit headscarves for teachers. A law in Berlin bans visible signs of religious affiliation for police, lawyers, judges, law enforcement staff, and primary and secondary public school teachers. The Berlin law permits teachers at some categories of institutions, such as vocational schools, to wear headscarves. Other states use other laws to restrict religious attire in certain circumstances.

In May the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg passed a law that prohibits judges, state prosecutors, and judicial trainees from wearing religious symbols such as kippahs and headscarves in court. Jurors are exempt from the law.

In April the federal parliament approved a law which prohibits civil servants and soldiers from wearing a full-face veil; the law took effect in June. The law further specifies that faces of all individuals must be visible during identity checks.

In August the Lower Saxony state parliament unanimously approved banning full face veils for teachers and students at schools in the state.

The federal criminal code prohibits calling for violence or arbitrary measures against religious groups or their members or inciting hatred against them. It also prohibits assaulting the human dignity of religious groups or their members by insulting, maliciously maligning, or defaming them. The federal criminal code prohibits disturbing religious services or acts of worship. Infractions are punishable by up to five years in prison and a fine. The law bans Nazi propaganda, Holocaust denial, and fomenting racial hatred.

All states offer religious instruction and ethics courses in public schools. Religious communities with PLC status (or a special agreement with the state that grants them this right despite the lack thereof) appoint religion teachers and work with the states to set the basic curriculum in line with the constitution; the states pay the teachers’ salaries. Most public schools offer the option of Protestant and Catholic religious instruction in cooperation with those churches, as well as instruction in Judaism if enough students (usually 12, although regulations vary state to state) express an interest. The states of Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, NRW, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saarland also offer some religious instruction in Islam. Students who do not wish to participate in religious instruction may opt out; in some states those who opt out may substitute ethics courses. State authorities generally permit religious groups to establish private schools as long as they meet basic curriculum requirements. Schooling is constitutionally mandated, and homeschooling, including for religious reasons, is prohibited.

The law permits the federal government to characterize “nontraditional” religious groups as “sects,” “youth religions,” and “youth sects,” and allows the government to provide “accurate information” or warnings about them to the public. The law does not permit the government to use terms such as “destructive,” “pseudo-religious,” or “manipulative” when referring to these groups. Several court decisions have ruled the government must remain neutral towards a religion and can provide a warning to the public only if an “offer” by a religious group would endanger the basic rights of an individual or place the individual in a state of physical or financial dependence.

Some federal and state laws affect religious practices. Federal animal protection laws prohibit the killing of animals without anesthesia, including when part of halal and kosher slaughter practices, although some exceptions exist. For example, pursuant to a federal administrative court decision, trained personnel may kill animals without anesthesia in a registered slaughterhouse under observation of the local veterinary inspection office, if the meat is for consumption only by members of religious communities requiring slaughter without anesthesia.

According to federal law, religious groups may appoint individuals with special training to carry out circumcision of males under the age of six months. After six months, the law states circumcisions must be performed in a “medically professional manner” and without unnecessary pain.

Legislation barring hate speech, including religiously motivated hate speech, in social media, became effective on October 1. The law requires operators of social networks, including Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, to delete or block “obviously illegal content” within 24 hours after notification or, in more complex cases, within seven days. Operators must name a representative in the country who can react to complaints within 48 hours. Operators who fail to comply systematically are subject to fines of up to 50 million euros ($60 million).

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: A report commissioned by the federal parliament stated Jews in the country felt increasingly threatened. The report also recommended establishing a federal commissioner on anti-Semitism. In December senior government officials from the two largest political parties expressed support for creating such a position, and Rhineland-Palatinate announced it would establish an anti-Semitism commissioner at the state level in early 2018. Police established “anti-Muslim” and “anti-Christian” as separate categories of hate crime; anti-Semitic hate crime already had its own category. Authorities continued to monitor the COS and some Muslim groups and closed a Berlin mosque they linked to terrorism. In February NRW became the final state to grant the Jehovah’s Witnesses PLC status. The COS continued to report instances of government criticism and employment discrimination. In Bavaria, a preschool/kindergarten dismissed a COS member after the state government threatened to withhold public funding, and a Munich museum dismissed a long-time employee after his COS membership became public. A court upheld the dismissal of a Muslim caregiver in Mannheim for refusing to wash male patients due to her religion. Various courts upheld restrictions on wearing religious garb or symbols at schools and in courtrooms or for safety reasons, but a Berlin labor court awarded monetary damages to two teachers not hired because they wore headscarves. Some senior government officials condemned anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment. The interior minister said burqas contradicted European custom. AfD politicians used anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic rhetoric, including during the national election campaign in August and September. One AfD leader called the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin “a monument of shame,” and the party’s election platform included a section titled “Islam Is Not Part of Germany.” The state of Berlin initiated cooperation on Holocaust education with Israel’s Yad Vashem. The federal government accepted the IHRA’s definition of anti-Semitism, and state governments continued to provide funds to support Jewish organizations and synagogues and other properties.

In April an “Independent Experts Group on Antisemitism,” composed of scientists and NGO representatives, constituted by the federal parliament in December 2014, presented its report on current developments in anti-Semitism in the country. The report stated Jews had felt increasingly threatened during the previous five years, and this could possibly be due to the growing centrality of social media as platforms for hate speech and anti-Semitic rhetoric. It also stated Jews were increasingly concerned for their safety due to everyday experiences of anti-Semitism, such as “provocations, vulgar comments, threats, and insults” which they seldom reported, and that law enforcement often did not recognize such incidents as anti-Semitic. The report cited concern about anti-Semitism by Muslims, especially among refugees and migrants. It did not provide statistics about anti-Semitic incidents. It called for improved documentation and punishment of anti-Semitic crimes, better advisory services for those affected by anti-Semitism, and a federal commissioner on anti-Semitism. The government had not implemented the report’s recommendations by year’s end.

In December Federal Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere told the media he supported the establishment of an anti-Semitism commissioner, and the Deputy Chairman of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) caucus in the parliament, Gitta Connemann, said that she and CDU parliament caucus Chairman Volker Kauder supported the idea of establishing an anti-Semitism commissioner right after the formation of the next government. In December Integration and Migration Commissioner Aydan Ozoguz of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) also expressed support for the position’s creation.

In December Rhineland-Palatinate Minister President Malu Dreyer announced her state would establish an anti-Semitism commissioner in early 2018, the first such state-level position in the country. Dreyer said the decision was a clear signal the country would not tolerate an increase in anti-Semitic crimes.

Beginning in January police added “anti-Muslim” and “anti-Christian” as separate categories of hate crime to their criminal statistics. “Anti-Semitism” was already a category of hate crime.

In February NRW granted the Jehovah’s Witnesses PLC status, giving the group PLC status in all 16 German states.

In April NRW granted PLC status to a Hindu Temple based in Hamm.

According to reports from the federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (OPC) – the domestic intelligence service – and state OPCs and COS members, the federal and state OPCs in Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, NRW, and Thuringia continued to monitor the activities of the COS, reportedly by evaluating Scientology publications and members’ public activities to determine whether they violated the constitution. According to the OPC’s 2016 report, “Scientology aspires to a society without general and fair elections and rejects the democratic legal system.” At least four major political parties (the CDU, the Christian Social Union (CSU), the SDP, and the Free Democratic Party (FDP)) continued to exclude Scientologists from party membership.

Federal and state OPCs continued to monitor a number of Muslim groups, including Salafist movements, ISIS, Hezbollah, Hamas, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Tablighi Jama’at, and Milli Gorus. The website of the NRW OPC stated the Muslim Brotherhood “rejects democracy.” According to the federal OPC, the Muslim Brotherhood had more than 1,040 members in the country. The federal OPC 2016 report also stated the Milli Gorus Islamic Community, an organization of the Turkish diaspora, undertook reforms and had become “less connected to extremism.” As a result, the report stated the group’s members “are no longer to be classified as belonging to the extremist scene.” The group’s membership dropped significantly from approximately 31,000 in 2013 to an estimated 10,000, possibly in response to these reforms, according to the report.

Groups under OPC observation said the monitoring could trigger police investigations, and their status as meriting OPC scrutiny implied they were extremist and constrained their ability to apply for publicly funded projects.

In February authorities shut down the “Fussilet 33” mosque in Berlin, which they called a center for radicalizing Muslims and collecting funds for terrorist activities. More than 400 police officers took part in 24 raids connected to activities at the mosque. Anis Amri, who carried out a bombing attack on a Berlin Christmas market in December 2016, had reportedly frequented the mosque.

In January the Osnabruck Administrative Court in Lower Saxony rejected a teacher’s claim for compensation after the Lower Saxony school department withdrew her job offer in 2013 upon learning she intended to teach wearing a headscarf. The administrative court found the department’s 2013 decision could not have taken into account a later verdict by the Constitutional Court that a general headscarf ban for teachers contradicted the constitution.

In March a female Muslim caregiver from Mannheim in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg was fired from her job because she refused to wash men due to her religious principles. She filed a lawsuit against her employer at the Mannheim labor court; the court found she had violated her work contract and her dismissal was justified.

In April a school in Berlin instructed a teacher not to wear a necklace with a cross when in the school, citing the state law prohibiting public school teachers from wearing religious symbols at work. The woman removed the cross from her necklace.

A May decision by the higher administrative court in the state of Hesse confirmed that judicial trainees were not permitted to wear headscarves while appearing in public courts. In July the Federal Constitutional Court confirmed the Hesse court decision, stating the prohibition was a “temporary infringement” on religious freedom.

In May federal Interior Minister de Maiziere told the media he believed it appropriate for churches to play a role in religious freedom discussions: “I would like to see churches become involved in controversial issues … including what an enlightened European Islam should look like and where religious freedom ends.” In the same interview, he said the burqa “contradicts our European customs of showing the face.”

In July a judge of the Luckenwalde local court in Brandenburg ordered a Syrian refugee to remove her headscarf while attending a court hearing about her divorce. The woman’s lawyer challenged the order, stating his client was not a civil servant and the law barring headscarves in court therefore did not apply to her. In August the judge was dismissed from the case for bias; the new judge, the director of the court, allowed the woman to wear a headscarf.

In September an administrative court in Mannheim in Baden-Wuerttemberg ruled that a Sikh from Konstanz must wear a helmet when riding a motorcycle and that the man’s religious freedom to wear a turban was not of greater importance than ensuring the safety of all road users. The man had sued the city of Konstanz for denying him an exception on religious grounds.

In Berlin, three female teachers filed separate lawsuits accusing Berlin schools of not hiring them because they wore headscarves. In February one defendant received 8,680 euros ($10,420) after the Berlin labor court concluded the school had violated equal opportunity laws. In July the Berlin labor court awarded the second defendant 7,000 euros ($8,400). The third case was pending. The schools had invoked the Berlin law prohibiting teachers from wearing religious symbols at work. The labor court said it would consider the law and the merits of each lawsuit on a case-by-case basis.

The federal government provided 6.0 million euros ($7.2 million) and 2.5 million euros ($3.0 million), respectively, in support of the Augsburg and Luebeck synagogues and 2.0 million euros ($2.4 million) for the enlargement of the Chabad Lubawitsch Jewish educational center in Berlin. The federal government and the state of Saxony provided 3.7 million euros ($4.4 million) for the renovation of the Goerlitz synagogue. According to the Federal Agency for Civic Education, the construction of mosques was usually financed by Muslim organizations and associations themselves.

The government continued to subsidize some Jewish groups. Based on an agreement between the federal government and the Central Council of Jews in Germany, the federal government provided 10 million euros ($12 million) annually to help maintain Jewish cultural heritage, restore the Jewish community, and support integration and social work. In addition, the federal government provided financial support to the Institute for Jewish Studies in Heidelberg, the Rabbi Seminar at the University of Potsdam, and the Leo Baeck Institute, an international research group on the history and culture of German Jewry.

State governments provided funds to Jewish communities and organizations in various amounts, for such purposes as the renovation and construction of synagogues. The federal government continued to cover 50 percent of maintenance costs for Jewish cemeteries. State and local police units continued to provide security for synagogues and other Jewish institutions.

In May Stuttgart Airport opened a prayer booth that featured 300 prayers from various religions in 65 languages.

In May the University of Essen-Duisburg, NRW, in response to a Muslim student group’s appeal for a prayer room, established “a room of silence” open to students of any religion at both its campuses for a trial period of several years.

Unlike Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish groups, the Muslim community did not have a sole representative body to work with states to plan curricula for religious education classes. Some states, such as Baden-Wuerttemberg, formed advisory councils with representation from several Muslim groups to assist in planning the curriculum for Islamic classes. The Alevi Muslim community continued to offer separate religious lessons in schools in seven federal states for approximately 1,500 students.

In February an administrative court in Muenster, NRW, upheld a 2012 lower court ruling against the Jewish community in Essen for its refusal to allow a non-Jewish woman to be buried in a local cemetery. The woman and her Jewish husband had purchased a burial plot together at the cemetery, which later changed its statutes to restrict burials only to Orthodox Jews.

The COS continued to report governmental discrimination. “Sect filters,” signed statements by potential employees to confirm they had no contact with the COS, remained in use in the public and private sectors.

According to a COS spokesperson, in the summer a preschool/kindergarten in Munich dismissed a nurse who was a member of the COS after the city government announced it would cut the kindergarten’s public funding due to the employee. The COS reported the House of Art, a public art museum in downtown Munich, dismissed a long-time employee in March after his COS membership became publicly known. The COS reported the former employee filed a complaint at the Munich labor court. Information on the status of the case was unavailable at year’s end. The media reported the House of Art began using sect filters for new employees in April.

The COS said firms owned or operated by its members also suffered discrimination. According to the COS, some of its members who suffered discrimination refrained from taking legal action because they felt a trial would be time-consuming and because they feared being stigmatized and losing business contracts.

Opposition parties, internet companies, and civil rights groups criticized the law restricting online hate speech. At a parliamentary hearing in March, eight out of 10 experts testifying about the law raised constitutional concerns, particularly the provision assigning responsibility for deciding on the legality of content to content operators. Although operators could refer difficult cases to an independent commission for adjudication, critics said details on the commission or the process remained unclear. They stated the uncertainty and the high fines for noncompliance would lead to “overblocking” out of an abundance of caution and thus would limit freedom of expression.

In January Bjorn Hoecke, the AfD’s state leader in Thuringia, denounced the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin as a “monument of shame.” The comment sparked national debate about anti-Semitism and free speech. Then-SPD party leader and Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel said, “Hoecke despises the Germany I am so proud of. Never, never, ever must we leave the demagogic comments by Hoecke without objection.” A member of parliament from the Left Party filed legal charges against Hoecke that the Dresden public prosecutor’s office dropped in March. Hoecke received some criticism from within his party but remained an active member. Leaders of the CDU/CSU, SDP, Greens, and Left Party denounced the remarks.

In April deputy AfD chairman Albrecht Glaser said during a speech at an AfD party convention in Oestrich-Winkel, Hesse that “Islam is a construct that neither knows nor respects religious freedom itself…Who treats a basic right in this manner needs to be excluded from this basic right.” Glaser was elected to parliament in September, and the AfD caucus nominated him as its candidate for vice president of parliament. According to parliamentary procedure, normally each party in parliament is allotted at least one vice presidential position. In this case, however, all other parties expressed concerns about Glaser’s nomination due to his remarks on Islam, and he failed to get the necessary majority of parliamentary votes in three ballots in October. At year’s end, the AfD’s vice presidential position in parliament remained unfilled.

In its election platform for the September federal parliamentary elections, the AfD called for abolishing Islamic theology at universities and Islamic classes at schools. One section of the party platform was titled, “Islam is not part of Germany.” Justice Minister Heiko Maas commented that parts of the AfD election platform violated the constitution.

In September just after the federal parliamentary elections, the Central Council of Jews expressed fears about the success of the AfD and its entry into the federal parliament for the first time. The council’s president said, “A party that tolerates right-wing extremist thinking in its ranks and incites hatred against minorities … will now be represented in parliament and nearly all state legislatures … I expect our democratic forces to expose the true nature of the AfD and its empty, populist promises.”

During the final federal cabinet meeting before the September elections, the government officially acknowledged the IHRA definition of anti-Semitism: “Anti-Semitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of anti-Semitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” The Central Council of Jews welcomed this decision as an important step towards combating anti-Semitism. The Ministry of Interior stated on its website that it hoped the definition would be used to educate teachers, police, and legal experts. Interior Minister de Maiziere stated, “We Germans are particularly vigilant when our country is threatened by an increase in anti-Semitism. History made clear to us, in the most terrible way, the horrors to which anti-Semitism can lead.”

During festivities that celebrated the 100th anniversary of a synagogue in Augsburg, Bavaria in June, Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier called upon Germans to fight anti-Semitism. He stated anti-Semitism was present not only as demagogic slogans but also in side conversations between intellectuals, adding that one should not accept “immigrants from Muslim countries importing their concepts of the enemy.”

In June Berlin announced it would become the 11th state to cooperate on Holocaust education with the Yad Vashem World Holocaust Remembrance Center in Israel. Berlin Senator for Education Sandra Scheeres said anti-Semitism and right-wing extremism were issues in Berlin schools and vowed to send 20 teachers to Israel annually for training on Holocaust education. State officials were to develop new teaching materials jointly with Yad Vashem’s International School for Holocaust Studies.

In April the Cologne Labor Court in NRW dismissed a lawsuit brought by two imams against the Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB). A Turkish ministerial decree in 2016 had ordered the imams to leave their positions and return to Turkey. The court found the government of Turkey employed the imams and the DITIB was therefore not liable.

In May Foreign Minister Gabriel hosted a meeting of 100 religious leaders from 53 countries to establish “long-term and trusting relations between religious representatives around the globe” and to “showcase positive examples of active peace work by religious communities,” according to the foreign ministry’s website.

The country is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

Summary Paragraph: There were numerous anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim, and anti-Christian incidents, including physical and verbal attacks, death and other threats, online hate speech, arson, burglary, and vandalism. In December Jewish representatives expressed security concerns following protests, some of which were anti-Semitic, about the U.S. decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. In response to the protests, senior government officials condemned anti-Semitism, and some politicians warned Muslims not to engage in anti-Semitism. According to a preliminary government report to parliament, police recorded 1,453 anti-Semitic crimes during the year. An NGO stated anti-Semitism was “latently present” in society, and an academic study found 75 percent of Jews felt anti-Semitism had increased over the previous five years. Civil society groups said most anti-Semitic incidents were carried out by right-wing groups, but they cited growing concern over potential anti-Semitism by Muslim groups. The federal OPC report categorized 31 violent incidents in 2016 as “anti-Semitic motivated by right-wing extremism.” One NGO study found widespread anti-Semitism among recent Middle Eastern immigrants, and another cited anti-Semitism among Muslim students in Berlin. In many anti-Christian incidents, Muslim migrants acted against migrant converts. In September migrants stabbed a Christian convert twice. In January a court sentenced a man to life in prison for killing his roommate after writing he was sorry he could not kill more Christians. In March two men kicked a Muslim girl. In July a speaker at a protest against a proposed mosque called the Prophet Muhammad a pedophile. An EU survey found 16 percent of Muslims reported experiencing religious discrimination over the previous five years. PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) continued to organize weekly demonstrations against immigration and expressing anti-Muslim sentiment. There were demonstrations against what participants called radical Islam. DTIB reported 115 attacks on mosques in 2016. The Catholic Church and the EKD continued to oppose the COS publicly.

In September two Muslim migrants in Berlin attacked a Christian convert from Afghanistan. After asking him why he had changed his religion, the attackers tore off the convert’s cross necklace, repeatedly punched him in the face, and stabbed him twice in the upper body. The state prosecution office launched an investigation, which was ongoing at year’s end.

In March two men attacked a 14-year-old Syrian girl standing at a bus stop in Hoerstel in NRW. They asked her if she was Muslim, tore off her headscarf, pushed her to the ground and kicked her. The suspects fled by car. At year’s end, police had not reported any arrests in the case.

In January the district court in Freiburg, Baden-Wuerttemberg, convicted a man of the 2016 killing of his roommate, a Christian, and sentenced him to life in prison. Three days before the crime, the man had written a text saying he was sorry he could not kill more Christians.

In September the public prosecutor in Dresden filed charges in connection with the bombing of a mosque in 2016. The investigation identified the suspect as one of the speakers at a 2015 PEGIDA demonstration. There were no injuries in the bombing. The suspect remained in police custody at year’s end.

In April the local court in Dusseldorf, NRW fined a refugee 400 euros ($480) for threatening to kill another refugee living in the same shelter because he had converted from Islam to Catholicism, according to press reports. He appealed the judgment to the regional court.

In September the media reported an Afghan refugee fled his shelter in Berlin after Muslim refugees threatened him when he said he was not fasting during Ramadan because he was Christian. As the man fled, other refugees reportedly shouted they would kill him if he came back. The man reportedly found shelter in a church.

In June Berlin Muslims opened a mosque that organizers said they hoped would bring “modern and liberal Muslims” together. One of the main organizers received death threats for opening the mosque. Police officers were investigating and provided protection to the organizer.

In December Jewish representatives expressed security concerns following protests in various cities about the U.S. decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and said they had increased security at synagogues and Jewish schools. In Mulheim, NRW in December, the Jewish community cancelled a Hanukkah event, citing security concerns. In December the head of the Thuringia OPC, Stephan Kramer, told Der Spiegel magazine that many Jews no longer felt safe to show they were Jewish.

According to preliminary statistics the government provided to parliament in response to a specific request by a member, the police recorded 1,453 anti-Semitic crimes during the year, including 32 cases of violence, 160 cases of property damage, and 898 cases of hate speech.

The media widely reported one case of a Jewish woman who in March removed her son from a high school, which reportedly had a large proportion of Turkish and Arab students, after months of bullying and physical violence. The school told media it would report the attacks to the police. The London-based Jewish Chronicle stated the case highlighted concerns of parents and educators about anti-Semitic harassment of Jewish students, particularly by children of Arab and Turkish descent. The newspaper quoted Aaron Eckstaedt, principal of the privately run Moses Mendelssohn Jewish High School in Berlin, as saying the school received six to 10 applications every year from parents wanting to move their children out of schools where they experienced anti-Semitic harassment. According to Eckstaedt, in most cases families complained about the relative lack of response to the problem from state schools. The media also cited a report by Deutschlandfunk Radio, which featured Jewish teachers from throughout the country who said they were afraid to identify themselves as Jewish to students. According to the report, one teacher said a student told him that if he saw a Jew he would “immediately kill him.” The teacher added, “And he meant it.”

In December police arrested a man after he harassed a Jewish restaurateur outside his Israeli restaurant in Berlin. The man told the restaurateur, “everything is about money with you,” and “No one will protect you … you can all go to the gas chamber.” Commenting on the incident, head of the Central Council of Jews Josef Schuster said the “disgusting attack brings home the point that ant-Semitism has become mainstream, where it is expressed openly and bluntly.” According to press reports, an online video of the incident was viewed more than 600,000 times. Police released the suspect and were conducting an investigation at year’s end.

The Catholic Church and the EKD continued to oppose COS publicly. “Sect commissioners” of the EKD and the Catholic Church investigated “sects and cults” and publicized what they considered to be the dangers of these groups. EKD “sect commissioners” warned the public about what they said were the dangers posed by the COS, the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), Bhagwan-Osho, Transcendental Meditation, and Universal Life. “Sect commissioners” continued to produce print and internet literature portraying these groups unfavorably.

In April head of the Central Council of Jews Schuster told the media he did not think a general headscarf ban was compatible with the constitution. Government employees should “be able to wear religious symbols as long as they come to neutral decisions and act neutrally,” he added.

In July two separate groups in Sulzbach, Saarland, Burgerinitiative “Sulzbach wehrt sich” (Citizen’s Initiative “Sulzbach Fights Back”) and Die Freien Wahler Sulzbach (The Free Voters Sulzbach) protested the construction of a planned mosque by the Muslim Community Saarland, a group with approximately 60 members that was monitored by the OPC. At one of the protests, a speaker called the Prophet Muhammad a pedophile and advocated the closing of borders and against construction of the mosque “so that Sulzbach remains a German village.”

An AJC nonrepresentative survey of 27 Berlin teachers at 21 schools – conducted in 2015-16 with the support of the Berlin State Senate and presented in July during a joint press conference of the AJC and Berlin Education Senator Sandra Scheeres – found some Muslim students acted as “moral guardians,” who rebuked other Muslim students for secular views and pressured them to adopt Islamic dress and a conservative religious image. These “guardians,” whom the survey stated were trained by Salafists, also monitored teachers’ statements. One third of the teachers surveyed reported conflict between the religious beliefs of some students and basic democratic values. Teachers reported cases of pupils crossing out Israel in maps and atlases.

A study by the Bertelsmann Foundation released in August stated that, although Muslims in the country had higher employment rates than in other western European countries and approximately the same employment rate as non-Muslim Germans, in part because of a strong economy, devout Muslims faced discrimination in the labor market. According to the study, it was more difficult for these Muslims to find jobs that matched their qualifications, and their salaries were lower than those of nonpracticing Muslims.

According to a survey released by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights in September, 16 percent of Muslims in Germany stated they had experienced discrimination because of their religion over the previous five years. Discrimination appeared to have a racial as well as a religious component, as Muslims of Turkish origin reported experiencing much lower levels of discrimination for any reason (33 percent over the previous five years and 18 percent over the previous 12 months) than Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa (65 percent and 50 percent, respectively). In addition, 8 percent of Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa said they had experienced physical violence over the previous 12 months due to their ethnic or immigrant background, the highest rate of any Muslim group in the 15 EU countries surveyed. Muslims’ feeling of attachment to the country was just below the average for the countries surveyed, 4.0 on a five-point scale.

In April a bus driver in Emden, Lower Saxony, refused to let a pregnant woman wearing a full-face veil onto his bus on three occasions, citing “security concerns.” Local authorities were examining the case, according to the city spokesperson.

In April Patrick Siegele, head of the Anne Frank Center in Berlin and a member of the Independent Experts Group on anti-Semitism, told parliament right-wing individuals were the biggest source of anti-Semitism in the country, although Muslims were often portrayed as the main source of anti-Semitism. Participants at a December conference of Jewish researchers, journalists, activists, and artists in Berlin expressed similar views and cited annual interior ministry statistics that attributed the “vast majority” of anti-Semitic crimes to right-wing offenders.

According to a study issued in April titled “Jewish perspectives on Anti-Semitism,” by Professors Andreas Zick of the University of Bielefeld and Julia Bernstein of the Frankfurt University of Applied Sciences, approximately 75 percent of Jews felt anti-Semitism had somewhat or strongly increased over the previous five years. The same percentage of respondents, however, said they felt at ease in the country. A 2016 study by Leipzig University found more than 10 percent of respondents agreed that Jews had too much influence, and 9.5 percent agreed with the statement that “Jews use bad tricks more than other people to reach their aims.”

A joint study by Indiana University and the University of Potsdam for the AJC, which consisted of interviews with 68 refugees from Syria and Iraq in December 2016, stated that “anti-Semitic ways of thinking and stereotypes were very widespread” among new arrivals from Syria and Iraq, participants had inaccurate views of the Holocaust, and almost all of the interviewed immigrants had “a fundamentally negative image of Israel and questioned its right to exist.” The study concluded that imported anti-Semitic ideologies created “a potential for anti-Semitic acts that could be mobilized by radicalization or political activity.” The study cited the need for further research through representative polling.

In a report on anti-Semitism during the period 2016-17, the NGO the Amadeu Antonio Foundation wrote, based on its own work and its review of studies of other organizations such as the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation and Hamburg University, that anti-Semitism was latently present in society as a whole and that AfD voters were four times more likely to agree with anti-Semitic statements than were voters of parties then represented in the federal parliament. The most common anti-Semitic acts, according to the foundation, were threats and hate speech, much of it online.

The U.S. decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in early December prompted at least a dozen demonstrations in front of U.S. diplomatic facilities and smaller demonstrations elsewhere across the country. Protesters numbered from several hundred to well over a thousand. According to press reports, some participants burned Israeli flags, displayed Hamas symbols, and chanted anti-Semitic slogans. For example, some protesters chanted in Arabic, “Jews, remember Khaybar, the army of Muhammad is returning,” a reference to a battle in which Muslims defeated Jews in the year 628. Police detained a number of protesters. The government reacted swiftly to condemn anti-Semitic actions and language at several of these events. Chancellor Merkel told the press on December 11 she condemned “this violation of fundamental principles of the rule of law” and expressed opposition to “any form of anti-Semitism.” Speaking at the Israeli embassy, President Frank-Walter Steinmeier expressed dismay that anti-Semitism had not yet been overcome in the country, and said he was “shocked and shamed” by the acts and sentiments. Foreign Minister Gabriel, Justice Minister Maas, and Interior Minister de Maiziere also publicly condemned anti-Semitism. Government spokesman Steffen Seibert said, “One has to be ashamed when hatred of Jews is put on display so openly on the streets of German cities.”

In response to the demonstrations, other political leaders directed warnings at Muslim protesters. Parliamentarian and head of the CDU youth organization Paul Ziemak told the media that Muslim organizations should accept Israel’s right to exist and pledge to combat anti-Semitism or they would lose the possibility to apply for public funding. Green party cochair Cem Ozdemir warned migrants not to participate in anti-Israel protests. CDU parliamentarian Armin Schuster told the media that foreigners living in the country should be extradited if they burned Israeli flags.

According to the Central Council of Muslims (ZMD), political parties increasingly distanced themselves from Islamic associations because they were concerned that foreign nations and organizations could influence Muslims with money and by sending radical imams to mosques in the country. In September the council published 30 questions of interest to Muslims and answers by the political parties, as a decision-making tool for Muslim voters in the federal elections.

PEGIDA continued to organize weekly demonstrations in Dresden. Amid calls to curb immigration, PEGIDA supporters regularly expressed anti-Muslim sentiments during the rallies. Journalists reported being pushed and threatened when reporting on the demonstrations. The number of participants at PEGIDA marches remained constant at approximately 1,500-2,000 protesters per rally, according to several media reports.

In May a women’s march in Hamburg to protest radical Islam and right-wing extremism had 300 participants instead of the 3,000 organizers said they expected. According to press reports, some organizations planning to participate in the event cancelled their participation after organizers published on their website, “We do not think that emancipation and feminism are compatible with a headscarf.”

In June approximately 1,000 persons gathered in Cologne under the theme “Not With Us – Muslims and Friends Against Violence and Terror” to condemn terrorism, hate, and violence in the name of Islam. The ZMD in Germany, the Turkish Community in Germany, and various organizations from political parties, labor unions, charities, and churches supported the demonstration.

In April DITIB reported 115 attacks on mosques in 2016, the most recent year for which data were available, compared with 99 from the previous year. In 2016, there were six cases of arson (seven in 2015), 16 threatening letters (nine in 2015), 24 cases of burglary and vandalism (21 in 2015), six of incitement to hatred (13 in 2015), eight of damage to property (0 in 2015), and 10 of depositing pig heads or pork meat (three in 2015).

In February residents of the neighborhood of a Bosniak mosque in Bielefeld, NRW, called the fire brigade after they heard windows being smashed and saw fire coming from inside the building. There were no injuries. An arson investigations by police was in progress at year’s end.

In May pig carcasses were discovered at the site of Erfurt’s Ahmadiyya Muslim community’s future mosque. Thuringia Minister of State Bodo Ramelow called the attack “disgusting” and tweeted the attackers had “no respect for issues of belief and freedom of religion.” State security was investigating at year’s end.

In June unidentified vandals spray painted several gravestones in a Jewish cemetery in Gotha, Thuringia, with swastikas and Nazi slogans. The mayor and members of the city council publicly condemned the crimes and ordered the cleaning of the gravestones. Police officers were investigating at year’s end.

In June the NGO RIAS reported that unidentified individuals vandalized multiple gravesites at a cemetery in Stahnsdorf, Brandenburg. The vandals placed insults on an information slab at the gravesite of actor Joachim Gottschalk, who had refused to separate from his Jewish wife and child under the Nazi regime, and demolished the flower decoration at a Jewish gravesite. Police officers were investigating at year’s end.

The media reported some refugees had chosen to convert to Christianity but stated reliable numbers on this issue were not available. Deutschlandfunk Radio cited Thomas Schirrmacher, a sociologist of religion, as stating in February that the EKD, Protestant churches that were not part of EKD, and the Catholic Church had each seen approximately 1,000 conversions – more than during all of the previous 50 years, he said. Deutschlandfunk linked this to the rising number of refugees. It also stated “sects” used refugees’ fear of deportation to promote conversions and incentivized them by offering accelerated baptism, free lunch, and transportation costs.

A pastor at the Dreieinigkeits Church in Berlin said he baptized 500 refugees in 2016, and he believed his congregants were being baptized for legitimate reasons; not simply to gain protected status. He stated at his church the baptism class was a serious months-long commitment. According to the pastor, more than 90 percent of the church’s converts were former Shia Muslims, some of whom converted to Christianity prior to arriving in the country.

In March social workers from the Central Council of Jews, the Central Welfare Office for Jews in Germany, and the ZMD met to discuss the integration of refugees through education. At the conference, Central Council of Jews head Schuster said despite differences, Jewish and Muslim communities often faced similar challenges as minorities needing the support of society, particularly “in times of growing anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.”

The U.S. embassy and the five consulates general continued to closely monitor the government’s responses to incidents of religious intolerance. The embassy officers regularly met with the MFA Commissioner for Relations with Jewish Organizations and anti-Semitism Issues, expressed concern about anti-Semitism in the country and discussed issues such as accepting the IHRA definition of anti-Semitism.

Embassy and consulate general representatives met with members and leaders of numerous local and national religious and civil society groups about their concerns related to freedom of worship. Topics of discussion with Jewish groups included concerns of anti-Semitism being imported by refugees into the country. Embassy and consulate general representatives also discussed issues pertaining to religious freedom and tolerance with the Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Evangelical Churches; COS; ZMD; Association of Islamic Cultural Centers; Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany; Alevi Muslims; Council of Religions Frankfurt; Konrad Adenauer Foundation; and human rights NGOs.

The U.S. embassy and consulates general sponsored eight state-level education policymakers on a visit to the United States to learn how NGOs counter radicalization and violent extremism, including anti-Semitism. Another U.S.-sponsored program involved the participation of two individuals to study programs to advance minority rights. The program included a meeting with the Coalition Against Hate Crimes – an organization started by the AJC. A former participant of U.S. government-funded leadership exchange programs, Sawsan Chebli, a senior official in Berlin’s city government and daughter of Palestinian refugees, founded a working group against anti-Semitism at the Berlin Senate in November and publicly called for Muslims to speak up against anti-Semitism.

The Charge d’Affaires gave remarks on tolerance, nondiscrimination, and respect for ethnic and religious diversity at an embassy reception to mark Hanukkah, in advance of an annual menorah lighting ceremony in central Berlin. The embassy and consulates general supported programs in support of religious tolerance, such as Jewish Cultural Days in Halle, Jewish Week in Leipzig, and Yiddish Summer in Weimar. These events featured music, dancing, film screenings, exhibitions, and speakers that raised awareness about the Jewish community and culture.

In February the Charge d’Affaires hosted a gathering of religious and ethnic community leaders to discuss interreligious understanding. The Charge d’Affaires encouraged the approximately 100 guests to promote religious tolerance and condemn anti-Semitism. In addition to government leaders, guests included representatives from various levels of the Muslim, Christian, Bahai, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormon, and Jewish communities, as well as selected government, law enforcement, and NGO representatives engaged in integration, countering rightwing extremism, and combating anti-Semitism. Leaders of Turkish and Arab descent in business, politics, and civil society also participated, as did minority youth leaders. Participants stated it was the only event of its kind in the country. A particular focus was on religious organizations and civil society NGOs that were committed to managing the refugee situation in Berlin.

On October 27 – International Religious Freedom Day – the embassy hosted members of the Berlin diplomatic community to discuss religious freedom and share best practices in engaging the host government and religious groups to promote religious freedom in the country.

In connection with the 500th anniversary of the Protestant Reformation, the Charge d’Affaires visited national exhibits in May in Weimar and Eisenach, both in Thuringia. There he discussed with several religious leaders, including Heinrich Bedford-Strohm, chairman of the EKD, the importance of religious diversity and tolerance. He also attended the October 31 ceremony in Wittenberg to commemorate the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther posting his 95 Theses.

In May the Hamburg Consul General hosted the “Young Islam Conference,” a dialogue forum for young people of all faiths, to hear their concerns about anti-Muslim sentiment and discuss interfaith dialogue.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 27.5 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2010 government census (the most recent estimate available), approximately 71 percent is Christian, 18 percent is Muslim, 5 percent adheres to indigenous or animistic religious beliefs, and 6 percent belongs to other religious groups or has no religious beliefs. Smaller religious groups include the Bahai Faith, Buddhism, Judaism, Hinduism, Shintoism, Eckankar, and Rastafarianism.

Christian denominations include Roman Catholic, Methodist, Anglican, Mennonite, Presbyterian, Evangelical Presbyterian Church, African Methodist Episcopal Zion, Christian Methodist Episcopal, Evangelical Lutheran, Eden Revival Church International, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormon), Seventh-day Adventist, Pentecostal, Baptist, African independent churches, the Society of Friends (Quaker), and numerous nondenominational Christian groups.

Muslim communities include Sunni, Ahmadiyya, Shia, and Sufi (Tijaniyah and Qadiriyya orders).

Many individuals who identify as Christian or Muslim also adhere to some aspects of indigenous beliefs. There are syncretic groups that combine elements of Christianity or Islam with traditional beliefs. Zetahil, a belief system unique to the country, combines elements of Christianity and Islam.

There is no significant link between ethnicity and religion, but geography is often associated with religious identity. Christians reside throughout the country; the majority of Muslims reside in the northern regions and in the urban centers of Accra, Kumasi, and Sekondi-Takoradi; and the majority of the followers of traditional religious beliefs reside in rural areas.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and stipulates individuals are free to profess and practice any religion and manifest such practice. These rights may be limited for stipulated reasons, which include “restrictions that are reasonably required in the interest of defense, public safety, public health or the running of essential services, on the movement or residence within Ghana of any person or persons generally, or any class of persons.”

Religious groups must register with the Office of the Registrar General in the Ministry of Justice to receive formal government recognition and status as a legal entity, but there is no penalty for not registering. The registration requirement for religious groups is the same as for nongovernmental organizations. In order to register, groups must fill out a form and pay a fee. Most indigenous religious groups do not register.

According to the law, registered religious groups are exempt from paying taxes on nonprofit ecclesiastical, charitable, and educational activities. Religious groups are required to pay progressive taxes, on a pay-as-earned basis, on for-profit business activities.

The Ministry of Education includes compulsory religious and moral education in the national public education curriculum. There is no provision to opt out of these courses, which incorporate perspectives from Islam and Christianity. There is also an Islamic education unit within the ministry responsible for coordinating all public education activities for Muslim communities. The Ministry of Education permits private religious schools; however, they must follow the prescribed curriculum set by the ministry. International schools are exempt from these requirements.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Muslim leaders continued to report that some publicly funded Christian mission schools required female Muslim students to remove their hijabs and required Muslim students to participate in Christian worship services, despite a Ministry of Education directive prohibiting these practices. For example, Muslim leaders reported that Wesley Girls Senior High School in Cape Coast required Muslim students to participate in church services, saying they were compulsory school gatherings. Similarly, there were continued reports that some publicly funded Muslim mission schools required female Christian students to wear the hijab. There were reports that nursing students were either pressured or ordered to remove their hijabs due to uniform requirements, for example, at Krobo Nursing Training College in Techiman.

Government officials leading meetings, receptions, and state funerals offered Christian and Muslim prayers and occasionally traditional invocations. The president and vice president continued to emphasize the importance of peaceful religious coexistence in public remarks. For example, in March the media reported President Nana Akufo-Addo said, “Let us continue to stay as one different people, different religion, and different beliefs but united as Ghanaians and united in our vision of developing our country as a free, prosperous nation that is governed according to the rule of law and where human rights are respected.”

Muslim and Christian leaders reported continued regular dialogue between their respective governing bodies and the National Peace Council, an independent, statutory institution with religious reconciliation as part of its mandate. In May the media reported that a representative of the national chief imam emphasized the importance of fostering interfaith communication in an event in Wa focused on religious tolerance. In September a cross section of religious leaders from the Upper West Region inaugurated the Wa Christian-Muslim Dialogue Committee as a forum to mitigate conflict and promote interfaith understanding. Traditional leaders emphasized the importance of religious freedom and tolerance in their public statements. For example, the media reported the paramount chief of Asante Asokore highlighted the importance of religious freedom in remarks in March, noting that religious intolerance fostered sectarian conflict and instability.

Embassy representatives discussed with officials from the Ministry of Chieftaincy and Religious Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, and the Ghana Education Service the importance of mutual understanding, religious tolerance, and respect for all religious groups. The embassy urged the government to restart dialogue with religious communities regarding concerns about religious accommodations in publicly funded, religiously affiliated schools. Embassy officials also discussed these subjects with a broad range of other actors, including Muslim civil society organizations and Christian groups.

In June the Ambassador hosted an iftar with religious leaders from various faiths during which he emphasized the importance of nurturing interfaith understanding and protecting religious freedom as foundations of peace and security.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 10.8 million (July 2017 estimate), of whom it estimates 98 percent are Greek Orthodox, 1.3 percent Muslim, and 0.7 percent other religions. According to a 2015 poll by Kappa Research Firm, a local private research firm, 81.4 percent of the population self-identifies as Greek Orthodox, 2.9 percent identifies with other religious groups, and 14.7 percent is atheist.

Muslims constitute a number of distinct communities including, according to the Council of Europe’s European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, approximately 100,000-120,000 individuals in Thrace descending from the Muslim minority officially recognized in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. According to local religious leaders and migrant activists, approximately 150,000 Muslim immigrants and foreign workers from Southeastern Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa continue to reside mostly in and around Athens, clustered together based on their countries of origin. Additionally the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that approximately 49,000 recently arrived migrants and asylum seekers remained in the country at year’s end – mostly from Muslim-majority countries.

Other religious communities report that their members combined constitute between 3 and 5 percent of the population. These include Old Calendarist Orthodox, atheists and agnostics, Roman Catholics, Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, members of polytheistic Hellenic religions, Scientologists, Bahais, Mormons, Sikhs, Seventh-day Adventists, Buddhists, and members of the International Society of Krishna Consciousness (ISKON).

Legal Framework

The constitution recognizes Greek Orthodoxy as the “prevailing religion.” The constitution states freedom of religious conscience is inviolable and provides for freedom of worship under the protection of the law with some restrictions. The constitution prohibits proselytizing, and no rite of worship may “disturb public order or offend moral principles.” The constitution allows prosecutors to seize publications that offend Christianity or other “known religions.” The law prohibits offenses against “religious peace,” including blasphemy and religious insult, which are punishable by prison sentences of up to two years. Blasphemy cases may be brought before civil and criminal courts. Development of religious conscience among citizens is listed as one of the goals of state education according to the constitution. Greek Orthodox priests and government-appointed muftis and imams in Thrace receive their salaries from the Greek government but are not considered to be state officials.

The constitution stipulates ministers of all known religions shall be subject to the same state supervision and the same obligations to the state as clergy of the Greek Orthodox Church. It also states individuals shall not be exempted from their obligations to the state or from compliance with the law because of their religious convictions.

The Greek Orthodox Church, the Jewish community, and the Muslim minority of Thrace have long-held status as official religious legal entities. The Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, two evangelical Christian groups, and the Ethiopian, Coptic, Armenian Apostolic, and Assyrian Orthodox Churches automatically acquired the status of religious legal entities under a 2014 law. The same law also provides for groups seeking recognition to become religious legal entities under civil law. The recognition process involves filing a request at the civil court, providing documents proving the group has open rituals and no secret doctrines, supplying a list of 300 signatory members who do not adhere to other religious groups, demonstrating that there is a leader who is legally in the country and is otherwise qualified, and showing that their practices do not pose a threat to public order. Once the civil court recognizes the group, it sends a notification to the Secretariat General for Religions.

With legal status, the religious group may legally transfer property and administer houses of prayer and worship, private schools, charitable institutions, and other nonprofit entities. Some religious groups have opted to retain their status as civil society nonprofit associations that they acquired through court recognition prior to the 2014 law. Under this status, religious groups may operate houses of prayer and benefit from real estate property tax exemptions, but they may face administrative and fiscal difficulties in transferring property and operating private schools, charitable institutions, and other nonprofit entities.

The law allows religious communities without status as legal entities to appear before administrative and civil courts as plaintiffs or defendants.

A religious group that has obtained at least one valid permit to operate a place of prayer is considered a “known religion” and thereby acquires legal protection, including a tax exemption for property used for religious purposes. Membership requirements for house of prayer permits differ from the requirements for religious legal entities. The granting of house of prayer permits is subject to approvals from local urban planning departments attesting to the compliance of a proposed house of prayer with local public health and safety regulations, and the application requires at least five signatory members of the group. Once a house of worship receives planning approvals, a religious group must submit a file including documents describing the basic principles and rituals of the religious group, as well as a biography of the religious minister or leader; the file must be approved by the Ministry of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs. The leaders of a religious group applying for a house of prayer permit must be Greek citizens, European Union nationals, or legal residents of the country and must possess other professional qualifications, including relevant education and experience. A separate permit is required for each physical place of worship.

The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne gives the recognized Muslim minority of Thrace the right to maintain mosques and social and charitable organizations (auqafs). Government-appointed muftis are allowed to practice sharia and render religious judicial services in the area of family law for those members of the Muslim community in Thrace who opt to use the services of a mufti instead of civil courts. The government, in consultation with a committee of Muslim leaders, appoints three muftis in Thrace to 10-year terms of office, with the possibility of extension. Civil courts in Thrace routinely ratify the family law decisions of the muftis. The muftis also appoint imams to serve in the community’s mosques.

The law protects an individual’s right to predetermine his or her form of funeral service and burial location in the presence of a notary. Individuals are allowed to designate the location and the method of funeral service under conditions that relate to public order, hygiene, or moral ethics, as well as a person responsible for the execution of funeral preferences. On July 28, the parliament amended existing legislation to allow private citizens and municipal authorities to apply for permits to operate crematory facilities to benefit those whose religious beliefs do not permit burial in Greek cemeteries. On October 18, the parliament passed an amendment changing the use of land in Eleonas region, in central Athens, thus paving the way for the construction by the local municipality of a crematory facility.

All religious groups are subject to taxation on their property used for nonreligious purposes. Property used solely for religious purposes remains exempt from taxation, as well as municipal fees, for groups classified as religious legal entities or “known religions.”

A law passed by parliament on August 8 exempts monasteries on the peninsula of Mount Athos from paying pending property tax on any properties owned inside or outside Mount Athos.

Home schooling is not permitted for children. The law requires all children to attend nine years of compulsory education in state or private schools and one year of compulsory preschool education in accordance with the official school curriculum. Greek Orthodox religious instruction in primary and secondary schools is included in the curriculum. School textbooks focus mainly on Greek Orthodox teachings; however, they also include some basic information on some other “known” religions – ones the courts define as having “open rituals and no hidden doctrines.” Students may be exempted from religious instruction upon request, but parents of students registered as Greek Orthodox in school records must state the students are not Greek Orthodox believers in order to receive the exemption. There are no private religious schools, although certain foreign-owned private schools and individual churches may teach optional religious classes on their premises, which students may attend on a voluntary basis. The law provides for optional Islamic religious instruction in public schools in Thrace for the recognized Muslim minority and optional Catholic religious instruction in public schools on the islands of Tinos and Syros.

A law passed on August 4, effective for the 2017-2018 school year, enables members from the Muslim minority and Catholic communities who teach in state schools to retain these positions if they are also called to serve as muftis or bishops. The law also provides for excused absences for Muslim students in primary and secondary school for Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha and the following day.

The government operates secular Greek-Turkish bilingual schools and two Islamic religious schools in Thrace. The law in Thrace provides for Islamic religious instructors to teach Islam to the Muslim minority in Greek-language public schools in lieu of mandatory twice weekly Greek Orthodox religious courses. Muslim students in Thrace wishing to study the Quran may also attend after-hours religious classes in mosques.

The law establishes an annual 0.5 percent quota for admission of students from the recognized Muslim minority to universities, technical institutes, and civil service positions. Two percent of students entering the national fire brigade school and academy should be from the Muslim minority in Thrace. On February 14, the parliament amended existing legislation to standardize and simplify the certification process for teaching staff from the Muslim minority in Thrace.

The law provides for alternative forms of mandatory service for religious conscientious objectors in lieu of the nine-month mandatory military service. Conscientious objectors are required to serve 15 months of alternate service in state hospitals or municipal and public services.

The law prohibits discrimination and criminalizes hate speech on the grounds of religion. Individuals or legal entities convicted of incitement to violence, discrimination, or hatred on the basis of religion, among other factors, may be sentenced to prison terms of between three months and three years and fined 5,000 to 20,000 euros ($6,300 to $24,000). Violators convicted of other crimes motivated by religion may be sentenced to an additional six months to three years, with fines doubled. The law criminalizes approval, trivialization, or malicious denial of the Holocaust and “crimes of Nazism” if that behavior leads to incitement of violence or hatred, or has a threatening or abusive nature towards groups of individuals. The National Council against Racism and Xenophobia, an advisory body under the Ministry of Justice, Transparency, and Human Rights, is charged with preventing, combating, monitoring, and recording racism and intolerance and protecting individuals and groups targeted on several grounds, including religion. The National Commission for Human Rights, comprised of government and nongovernmental organization (NGO) members, serves as an independent advisory body to the government on all human rights issues.

An amendment passed by the parliament on March 28, allows the descendants of deceased Greek Jews born in the country prior to May 9, 1945 to obtain Greek citizenship.

The law requires all civil servants, including cabinet and parliament members, to take an oath before entering office; individuals are free to take a religious or secular oath in accordance with their beliefs. Witnesses in trials must also take oaths before testifying in court, and can also select between a religious and a secular oath in both civil and criminal cases.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: The government continued enforcing the blasphemy laws, leading to the arrests of at least five citizens in four separate cases. All blasphemy cases during the year related to statements against Orthodox Christianity. Charges against six of the organizers of the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex (LGTBI) group Thessaloniki Pride for malicious blasphemy were dropped, but the case remained open as authorities continued to search for the individuals who created the artwork cited in the complaint. A soccer player was suspended for several games because he “cursed the divine.” An appeals court annulled the sentence of a blogger convicted in 2014 of “habitual blasphemy and offense of religion.” The criminal trial of 69 party members and supporters from the GD political party, widely considered anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim by scholars, media, and other observers, on charges including murder, membership in a criminal organization, conspiracy, weapons possession, and racist violence, continued through the end of the year. Some of the victims were Muslim migrants. A court granted legal recognition to the Ethiopian Orthodox Christian community. The government approved, for the first time, a permit to operate a prayer house for the Supreme Council of Ethnic Greeks (YSEE). Two religious groups – an Old Calendarist and an evangelical Christian – applied to courts seeking legal recognition. Religious groups without religious entity status and no house of prayer permits were still able to function as registered nonprofit civil law organizations. The government continued to provide funding and other benefits to the Greek Orthodox Church and, to a lesser extent, the Muslim community of Thrace and the Catholic Church. Muslim leaders continued to criticize the lack of Islamic cemeteries outside of Thrace and the absence of a mosque in Athens. Deputy Foreign Minister Ioannis Amanatidis issued a statement on May 25 supporting the opening of an Athens mosque. GD MPs made anti-Semitic references, portraying Jewish individuals as those with the most decision-making and economic power.

In January police announced the arrest of two individuals in Epirus who each accused the other of committing multiple crimes, including malicious blasphemy. In April police in Volos reported that a suspect refused to comply with police instructions. He was charged with resisting arrest, insulting an officer, and malicious blasphemy, and sentenced to a 17-month suspended prison sentence, only to be served if he repeats the offense within three years. According to police statistics, another individual in central Greece was charged with malicious blasphemy in March; additional details were not available in this case. In May, according to local press reports, coast guard officials in Rafina charged a 17-year-old with resisting arrest, criminal threats, physical injury to an officer, and malicious blasphemy. In February a soccer player was suspended for four games by the soccer association in northern Greece because he “cursed the divine.” On March 2, an appeals court annulled the 10-month sentence of a blogger convicted in 2014 of “habitual blasphemy and offense of religion” for creating a satirical page on social media mocking a dead Orthodox monk who was later proclaimed a saint. The acquittal was the result of a legal provision that cleared a backlog of misdemeanor offenses committed up until March 31, 2016.

According to research conducted by the Greek Helsinki Monitor (GHM), in 2016 the Hellenic (national) Police opened 254 cases for malicious blasphemy involving 328 defendants, 312 of whom were Greeks and 16 foreigners. The Hellenic Police arrested 159 of these suspects; in the vast majority of cases, malicious blasphemy was not the only charge. Additionally, in 2016 police opened 43 cases for disturbing the religious peace; 46 individuals were arrested in these cases.

In October, according to GHM, authorities dropped malicious blasphemy charges against the organizers of Thessaloniki Pride after concluding that the group was not responsible for producing the poster cited in the case. In 2016 Metropolitan of Kalavryta Amvrosios and five private citizens had filed separate police complaints for malicious blasphemy and offending religion against a group of six individuals involved in the organization of the Thessaloniki Pride. The complaint centered on an unofficial version of the 2016 Thessaloniki Pride poster, which featured an artistic depiction of Jesus on a cross with the text, “He was crucified for us too.” At the end of the year, the case remained open and had been referred to the cyber police to identify the creators of the poster.

The criminal trial of 69 GD party members and supporters, including 18 of its current and former MPs, continued through the end of the year, with the examination of witnesses. The charges were related to a string of attacks, including against Muslim migrants and Greeks; they included murder, conspiracy, weapons possession, and membership in a criminal organization.

On April 12, the media reported that the national police took precautionary measures to protect the three Coptic churches in Athens following attacks against Copts in Egypt. Measures included adding undercover police, frequent patrolling around the churches’ locations, and contacting the churches’ leaders to urge them to establish direct communication with police if they noticed something unusual or suspicious.

Early in the year a court granted legal recognition to the Ethiopian Orthodox Christian community as a religious entity. Two religious groups – an Old Calendarist and an evangelical Christian – applied to courts seeking legal recognition as religious entities. Rulings for these two applications were pending at year’s end.

Religious groups without religious entity status and no house of prayer permits, including Scientologists and the ISKCON, were still able to function as registered nonprofit civil law organizations. The government did not legally recognize weddings conducted by members of those religious groups, whose only option was a civil marriage.

The government approved permits for 18 houses of prayer, including the first prayer house for the YSEE, a polytheistic group revering the ancient Hellenic gods. The government did not deny any applications for permits during the year. The government granted 12 permits to Jehovah’s Witnesses. It also granted a permit to a group of Muslims from Bangladesh and three permits to Pentecostals. The government revoked one permit at the request of a small religious community that no longer wished to operate its house of prayer. There were no pending applications at year’s end.

The government continued to provide funding for religious leaders’ salaries and other benefits to the Greek Orthodox Church and, to a lesser extent, to the Muslim community of Thrace and the Catholic Church. The government also supported seminars for teachers to raise awareness of the Holocaust among students and funding for educational visits for students to Auschwitz.

The government continued to provide direct support to the Greek Orthodox Church, including for religious training of clergy and funding for religious instruction in schools. Greek Orthodox priests continued to receive their salaries from the state. Some Greek Orthodox officials stated this direct support was given in accordance with a series of legal agreements with past governments, and in exchange for religious property previously expropriated by the state. The Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs continued to partially fund retirement pensions of Orthodox monks and monitor vocational training for Orthodox clergy.

The government continued to state that Muslims not part of the recognized minority created by the Treaty of Lausanne were not covered by that treaty and therefore did not have the rights related to it, such as the right to bilingual education, special quotas for university entry and jobs in the public sector, the optional use of sharia in family and inheritance matters, and optional Islamic religious classes in public schools.

Some members of the Thrace Muslim community continued to object to the government’s practice of appointing muftis, pressing for direct election of muftis by the Muslim community. The government continued to state that government appointment was appropriate because the muftis had judicial powers and the constitution requires the government to appoint all judges. Academics and activists said the ability of courts in Thrace to provide judicial oversight of muftis’ decisions was limited by the lack of translation of sharia into Greek and lack of familiarity with sharia in general. On November 13, the prime minister announced the government’s plans to make the use of sharia in Thrace optional and consensual by all parties. The Ministry of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs subsequently issued a draft legislative amendment and an explanatory framework. The bill was approved in principle by the relevant parliamentary committee on December 21 and scheduled for a plenary vote after the end of the year.

On November 13, the media reported that a Thessaloniki Misdemeanor Court convicted the unofficial mufti in Xanthi of impersonating a public authority and an unofficial local imam of disturbing the peace for unlawfully and violently preventing the official mufti from performing the funeral service for a Muslim soldier in Glafki village in 2016. The sentences were suspended for three years, only to be served if the defendants commit a repeat offense during this time. The defendants appealed the decision.

On March 28, the minister for education, research and religions issued a decision establishing a working group on the upgrading and modernization of the muftiates in Thrace. The group comprised four employees of the Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs – three from the Directorate for Religious Administration under the Secretariat General for Religions and one from the General Directorate of the ministry’s Financial Services. The minister tasked the working group with drafting an analytical report on the existing situation and compiling recommendations for operational improvements. The decision also called for assistance from other individuals, including the head of the Directorate for Minority Education and the school advisor for the minority program in minority schools, a member of the Muslim minority. The group was granted full access to all archives, information, books, and financial data kept in the muftiates, with guarantees to respect data protection laws.

Some members of the Muslim minority in Thrace continued to criticize the appointment by the government, rather than the election by the Muslim community, of members entrusted with the administration of the auqafs, which oversee endowments, real estate, and charitable funds of the minority community. Muslim leaders also continued to criticize the lack of Muslim cemeteries outside of Thrace, stating this obliged Muslims to transport their dead to Thrace for Islamic burials. They also continued to state that municipal cemetery regulations requiring exhumation of bodies after three years because of shortage of space contravened Islamic religious law. Several MPs supported the Muslim leaders’ complaints. On May 19, 34 MPs from the ruling political party SYRIZA submitted a question in the parliament asking about the delayed implementation of a 2016 decision by the Holy Synod of the Greek Orthodox Church, which had been made at the request of the government, to grant 20,000 square meters (215,000 square feet) inside an existing cemetery at Schisto, in greater Athens, for the burial of Muslims. The MPs also inquired about the status of a similar government proposal to the Holy Synod for the granting of land inside the cemetery of Evosmos, in Thessaloniki. At least three sites continued to be used unofficially on an ad hoc basis for the burial of Muslim migrant and asylum seekers on Lesvos Island, in Schisto, and near the land border with Turkey in Evros.

At year’s end, there were still no crematories in the country. In 2016, three municipalities – Athens, Thessaloniki, and Patras – had initiated the process to establish crematories by searching for suitable land and seeking approval of the necessary municipal committees. The cities of Athens and Patras reportedly had identified suitable plots of land. The latter had also requested the issuance of a presidential decree pre-certifying the land transfer as constitutional in an effort to deter potential legal complaints.

The Ministry of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs continued to have three Islamic experts assigned to offer religious services in camps hosting Muslim refugees and migrants in the region of central and eastern Macedonia. The three included an imam from Xanthi, the director of one of the two Islamic religious schools in Thrace, and a scholastic expert in Islamic law and studies. Government authorities again issued directives to managers of reception facilities hosting migrants and refugees, instructing them to alter food distribution times and the type of food served to allow Muslims to observe the Ramadan fast.

A law passed by parliament on May 30 provided for the establishment of an “administrative committee for the Athens Islamic Mosque” as a nonprofit legal entity under private law, supervised by the minister of education, research and religions. Media and government sources reported progress on the construction of an official mosque in Athens, originally expected to be completed in August, but the mosque was not operational at year’s end. GD held protests against the mosque in January and throughout the year. MP Ilias Panagiotaros said at the January rally that GD would step up protests, and that “this mosque will not have a good end.”

Deputy Foreign Minister Amanatidis issued a statement on May 25 supporting the opening of the Athens mosque, commenting that such a measure would allow Greeks and other EU Muslims to perform their religious duties unhindered. He encouraged to vote in favor of the draft education bill with provisions for the operation of the mosque, which he said would enhance the country’s international image with respect to human rights. Passed on May 25, the law provided for the establishment of a seven-member administrative committee for the Athens Mosque as a nonprofit legal entity under private law, to be supervised by the minister of education, research, and religions and to include at least two Muslim community representatives. Committee members were officially named on August 21 and began their work soon after. The administrative committee was tasked with selecting the imams who will preach at the mosque, de-conflicting requests from various communities to use the space, and overseeing the general administration of the property.

On September 8, the Migration Ministry transferred 82 Yazidi Kurds from the Yiannitsa Migrant Center to an all-Yazidi migrant camp located at a former agricultural training facility in Serres. Yazidis at Yiannitsa had stated Syrian Sunni Arabs were harassing them because of the Yazidis’ religious beliefs. According to the NGO The Liberation of Christian and Yazidi Children, as of September 7, there were 2,535 Yazidis migrants in the country, with the majority living in an open air camp at the base of Mount Olympus.

On April 3, the Ministries of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs; Environment and Energy; and Culture and Sports issued a joint circular codifying the process for construction, expansion, repair, and demolition of existing or new mosques in Thrace. The government stated this codification was necessary to provide an accessible, transparent, unified, and coherent framework. Some religious groups, including Muslims, reiterated complaints from previous years that the house of prayer permit process – for example, requirements that buildings used for prayer have fire exits – constrained freedom of religion by making it difficult to find a suitable location.

Central and local government authorities continued to provide public space free of charge to groups of Muslims whose members requested places of worship during Ramadan and for other religious occasions.

On June 27, following discussions between the Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs and the Greek Orthodox Church, the Standing Holy Synod of the Church of Greece approved guidelines provided by the ministry in 2016 on religious instruction. According to the guidelines, religious education should not be based solely on the official textbook, which primarily covers Greek Orthodox doctrine. The government stated students needed to become more familiar with other religions present in the country and the world. Some Greek Orthodox Church leaders had objected to the new guidelines, stating the government was disrespectful to the constitution and to the faith of the majority of the country’s citizens.

The government continued to provide funding to the Muslim minority in Thrace to select and pay salaries of teachers of Islam in state schools and the salaries of the three official muftis and some imams, in accordance with Greece’s obligations under the Lausanne Treaty. It also continued to fund Catholic religious training and teachers’ salaries in state schools on the islands of Syros and Tinos, as well as to fund awareness raising activities and trips for non-Jewish students to Holocaust remembrance events, and for Holocaust education training for teachers.

Some leaders of the recognized Muslim minority continued to press for fully bilingual kindergartens in Thrace, modeled after the already operating bilingual primary schools. Government authorities historically asserted that Greek-language kindergartens helped students to better integrate into the larger society, and that kindergarten classes are not mentioned in the Lausanne Treaty. In response to the Muslim community’s concerns, the Institute for Educational Policy, an agency supervised by the minister for education, research, and religious affairs, announced in March a plan to fund, under a pilot project, assistant teachers in kindergarten classrooms fluent in the child’s native language to facilitate the children’s integration into school life. This program had not yet begun at year’s end.

Some religious groups and human rights organizations continued to state the discrepancy between the length of mandatory alternate service for conscientious objectors (15 months) and for those serving in the military (nine months) was discriminatory. Jehovah’s Witnesses reported that in several instances, government committees, tasked with examining requests for exemption from military service as conscientious objectors on religious grounds, denied requests for unbaptized members of their community. The committees, consisting of two army officials, one psychologist, and two academics, decided that unbaptized individuals, despite studying the Bible and attending sessions jointly with Jehovah’s Witnesses, “are not yet ready to fully embrace their teachings.” The committees ordered the immediate conscription of those individuals into the armed forces and did not allow the applicants to defend their cases in person to the committee.

The Union of Atheists filed a complaint on August 1 with the Data Protection Authority and the ombudsman objecting to the listing of students’ religion on school transcripts; the inclusion of religion in the administrative school databases and university records; and the need for parents to officially declare and justify their request to have their children exempted from religion classes. The union argued that religious and philosophical beliefs constitute sensitive personal data and should not be recorded.

GD MPs, as well as the GD official website and weekly newspaper, continued making references to conspiracy theories portraying Jewish individuals as those with the most decision-making and economic power. On October 5, GD MP Elias Panagiotaros stated during an interview on the web-based television channel “Eleftheri Ora” that nonperforming business and household loans in the country would be administered by a company headed by the President of the Jewish Community in Athens, whom he incorrectly categorized as the President of the Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece (KIS). Panagiotaros also said the company was successful because of the Jewish community’s connections to the minister of finance.

There continued to be numerous instances of anti-Semitism online. In May the European Jewish Press estimated there were at least 48 active anti-Semitic blogs in the country and called GD, which had issued more than 30 cases of anti-Semitic speeches and multiple anti-Semitic articles, “one of the most dangerous neo-Nazi parties in Europe.”

On July 18, the secretaries general for human rights and for religious affairs each independently referred the case of an excommunicated Old Calendarist monk, Father Kleomenis, to the public prosecutor, the racist crimes department of the police, and the cybercrime police department for investigation. The monk had posted a video on July 17 on social media showing him in front of the Jewish Martyrs Holocaust Monument in Larissa, cursing the Jews, denying the Holocaust, spitting, kicking, and throwing eggs at the monument, and calling for its destruction. The Holy Synod of the Greek Orthodox Church and the local Metropolitans of Larisa and Tyrnavos issued statements disassociating themselves from Kleomenis and condemning his actions. The Municipality of Larissa also issued a statement denouncing the attack. On July 19, the prosecutor in Larissa filed charges against Kleomenis and three more individuals for vandalizing the Holocaust memorial and for violating the law against racism.

On May 2, GHM announced it had filed a lawsuit against Greek Orthodox Metropolitan Bishop Seraphim of Piraeus on hate speech grounds. GHM’s lawsuit also referred to legislation about “aggravating” conditions when a “state official” commits a hate speech offense. The lawsuit was in response to a statement Seraphim publicized on the official website of the Archdiocese of Piraeus on April 28, in which he complained he had been selected by the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece to light the holy light of Easter at the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem, but that he was replaced because Israel declared him as persona non grata. In the statement, he quoted the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and referred to Freemasonry and other organizations as “the arms used by Zionism to secure infiltration and state manipulation.” He accused Israel of interfering with the Church’s issues. The KIS denounced Seraphim’s statement.

On January 26, the minister of education, research, and religious affairs, the president of the Jewish Museum of Greece, and the president of Yad Vashdem cosigned a memorandum of understanding regarding the implementation of programs on the teaching of Holocaust. One program entailed a July 9-12 seminar for 39 public high school teachers. The seminar was organized by the Olga Lengyel Institute for Holocaust Studies and Human Rights in cooperation with the Jewish Museum of Greece, under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs.

On January 27, the minister for education, research, and religious affairs unveiled in a school in Athens an honorary plaque in memory of the Greek Jewish children killed in concentration camps during World War II. During the German occupation, German troops had ordered the school’s closure, and the pupils, along with their parents, had been arrested and sent to concentration camps in central Europe. Also on January 27, the Department for Preschool Education of the University of Thessaly, the local Jewish community, and the Piraeus Bank Foundation organized an event entitled “Approaching the Holocaust in the School and in the Museum.”

The head of the central board of Jewish communities, David Saltiel, welcomed the amendment passed in March allowing all descendants of deceased Greek Jews, mostly Holocaust survivors, to apply for citizenship as “a moral victory” and a “fresh step forward in the recognition of the history of the Holocaust and of Greek Jews.” The GD, the fourth largest party in the parliament, voted against the legislation.

On January 21, opposition MP Adonis Georgiadis posted on social media the following announcement: “In the past I’ve coexisted with and tolerated the views of people who showed disrespect to Jewish co-patriots, and for this reason I feel the need to apologize to the Jewish Community. I feel even sorrier for supporting and promoting the book of Kostas Plevris, which is insulting for the Jews. The Holocaust of the Jewish people constitutes the greatest disgrace of our contemporary culture and its sacrifice strengthened democracy, anti-racism, and the belief in the equality and freedom of nations.”

The Secretariat General for Religious Affairs funded in May an annual commemorative trip to Auschwitz for 82 high school students and 10 teachers from schools throughout the country. The students took part in a contest organized by the Ministry of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs, which involved producing a video on “The Kid and the Holocaust.” Participating schools were from the Athens, Thessaloniki, Chania, Arcadia, Aetoloakarnakia, and Evrytania regions.

On March 22, the minister for education, research, and religious affairs issued a statement expressing his sorrow for the damages caused to a mosque of historic significance in Thrace from a fire. The minister committed to take steps for the prompt investigation of the fire’s causes and to restore the mosque. Although no official report was made public, firefighters on the scene told local press that electric welding during restoration likely caused the fire.

The Inter-Orthodox Center of the Greek Orthodox Church organized a training program under the auspices of the Ministry of Education and funded by the German government entitled, “Getting to know and teaching Judaism through the coexistence of Christians and Jews in Greece.”

On September 8, in the garden of a former middle school in Thessaloniki and the location of the cultural foundation of the National Bank of Greece, a metal commemorative plate was placed in memory of 40 Jewish students sent to concentration camps in 1943.

On September 27, the Aristotle University Law School, the Aristotle University School of Theology, and the Religious Studies Institute of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople organized a conference on “Church and the Constitution: The issue of Constitutional Reform.” Participants discussed Greek Orthodox Church relations with the state, including whether constitutional reform should encompass continued reference to Orthodox Christianity as the official and dominant religion; whether the state should be involved with administrative matters of the Greek Orthodox Church; whether state officials should appoint priests or determine their number; and whether the Church should be involved with civil issues it opposes, such as the cremation of the dead.

From October 19-21, the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, in cooperation with the Ministry of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs, the Jewish community in Thessaloniki, the Holocaust Memorial of the Jews in Skopje, and the Memorial de la Shoah in Paris, organized a training seminar on Holocaust education. The seminar, entitled “The Holocaust as a Starting Point: Comparing and Sharing” involved 40 teachers.

On October 29 and 30, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized for the second time an international summit on the protection of religious communities and civilizations in the Middle East, hosted by the minister of foreign affairs, with the participation of the Archbishop of Athens and all Greece, several Greek Orthodox metropolitans, representatives of Jewish, Catholic, Protestant communities from abroad, and two Muslim muftis from Thrace.

Summary paragraph: Incidents of anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim discrimination and hate speech, including against immigrants, continued. The Racist Violence Recording Network and the GHM reported several incidents of vandalism against religious property, including Holocaust memorials and a Greek Orthodox church. Jehovah’s Witnesses reported instances of societal discrimination when preaching or while distributing and displaying information and religious material in public. On October 23, hundreds of demonstrators, including members of parents and ecclesiastical associations, theologians, and clergy, nuns, and monks, gathered outside the Ministry of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs to protest against the reforms to the government-mandated religious course. The protestors objected to five new chapters referring to Judaism and Islam.

Police statistics for 2016, the most recent year available, showed 84 potentially racially motivated incidents, 24 of which were believed to be linked to the victim’s religion. On September 28, the Ministry of Education published a report on acts against religious sites in 2016. According to the report, there were 209 incidents against Christian sites including vandalism, robberies, and arson attacks. The previous year the ministry recorded 147 such incidents. All targeted Greek Orthodox churches and cemeteries, except one incident against a Catholic site.

The report also recorded five incidents of vandalism against Jewish sites and one against a Muslim site.

The linking of “international Zionism” with alleged plans for the “country’s Islamization,” that was related to the ongoing construction of an official mosque in Athens, continued on ultranationalist blogs. During a May 21 protest, a group of Old Calendarist Orthodox followers, opposing the building of the mosque, chanted anti-Islamic and anti-Semitic slogans such as, “Islam out” and “Resist the plans of Jewish Zionists who want you servants in the world empire of the anti-Christ.”

On May 3, the Heinrich Boell Foundation, in cooperation with the Seat for Jewish Studies at the Aristotle University in Thessaloniki, presented a study on anti-Semitism in Greece. The study showed that despite the small percentage of Jews in the country (approximately 0.05 percent) vandalism recorded against Jewish monuments and sites was proportionally higher than vandalism directed at other religious groups. The study found more than six out of 10 Greeks held anti-Semitic attitudes. Sixty-five percent of respondents in the study’s questionnaire “agreed” or “absolutely agreed” with the statements “Jews have been using the Holocaust to receive better treatment from the international decision-making centers” and “Israel treats Palestinians exactly like Nazis did the Jews.” When asked whether “Jews enjoy much greater power in the world of business,” more than 92 percent of respondents “agreed” or “absolutely agreed.” According to the findings, 64.3 percent of those surveyed believed that the proposed Holocaust Museum in Thessaloniki should be built by private funding, while 72.1 percent of respondents believed a Pontian (Greek-Russian) refugee museum should be built with government funding. The survey also indicated a large percentage of individuals were indifferent to the concept of a Holocaust museum and 11.3 percent opposed the idea altogether. The mayor of Thessaloniki said he was concerned about how to ensure future operating costs, given societal indifference to and rejection of the project.

Some metropolitan bishops of the Greek Orthodox Church made anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim statements and statements against Jehovah’s Witnesses in public letters and on social media, while others said Catholicism was heresy. On June 15, in a letter addressed to Metropolitan of Argolida, the Metropolitan of Gortynia in the Peloponnese stated Orthodox followers believed that Catholicism and ecumenism were heresies and that Christians should stay away from Jehovah’s Witnesses.

The KIS continued to voice concerns about anti-Semitic comments by some journalists in the media and some Greek Orthodox Church leaders. The KIS also reiterated its concerns that political cartoons and images in the media mocked political controversies through the use of Jewish sacred symbols and comparisons to the Holocaust or through drawing parallels among “Jews,” “Zionists,” and “Nazis,” equating the first with the latter. On May 16, the KIS denounced journalist and cartoonist Stathis (Stavropoulos) for his May 10 article published on the news site “enikos.gr.” The article, entitled “In Bloody Ink,” stated it is impossible to criticize Israel because doing so would be interpreted as anti-Semitism. The article included a cartoon depicting Israel killing free opinion.

On an Alpha television channel morning show on January 12, journalist Dimos Verykios stated, “Global finance is concentrated in three centers: they are actually dominating the planet. One center is the banks, the global banking system. Through this banking system, two main centers are ruling the game. One of these centers is the Jewish lobby, powerful, extremely powerful in America and elsewhere! In all big deals, one will meet a Jew! Or a Mason!”

Academics, activists, and journalists stated the Greek Orthodox Church continued to exercise significant social, political, and economic influence. Members of non-Orthodox religious groups reported incidents of societal discrimination, including being told by Orthodox followers that they were “heretics” or “not truly Greek.” Jehovah’s Witnesses reported incidents of societal discrimination while preaching or when distributing informational and religious material in Athens and in other cities. In five separate cases, the excommunicated Old Calendarist monk, Father Kleomenis, attacked and completely destroyed Jehovah’s Witnesses’ information carts. Kleomenis’ partners filmed the incidents for later posting on social media. The Jehovah’s Witnesses in response asked for police intervention. Charges were pending but no hearing had taken place by year’s end.

On March 30, the KIS reported vandalism of the Holocaust monument in Arta, western Greece, noting that the incident happened “only a few days after the remembrance events organized by the municipality of Arta for the deportation and extermination of the city’s Jews in the Nazi concentration camps.”

On June 27, an anarchist group called “Nuclear FAI-IRF” set fire to Saint Basil Church in central Athens. In its statement claiming responsibility, the group cited “the sexism that the Church perpetuates, the Church’s opposition to homosexuality, and the fact that Christianity treats bodily satisfaction and sexuality as non-sacred” as reasons for the attack. The group also stated it “deliberately targeted a profitable business, as the Church owns land and untaxed wealth which is hidden behind charities to supposedly promote its humanist profile.” On August 3, anarchists threw paint on the exterior walls of Saint Basil Church and broke the windows of the nearby Zoodochou Pigi Church. There was no government reaction to any of these incidents. The main opposition party, New Democracy, issued a statement accusing the government of treating anarchists in a lenient way.

On July 7, human rights activists reported on social media that unknown perpetrators had vandalized the Athens Holocaust monument by writing with a marker “Hi, my name is death!” On July 11, police reported the arrest of four male individuals for shattering the marble facade of the Holocaust monument in Kavala in the northern part of the country on March 30. By April 5, the city of Kavala had restored the monument. The city of Kavala, government officials, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and various political parties condemned the attack.

On September 15, the media reported on the application filed by a parent in Mytilene, Lesvos, requesting his child be exempted from the teaching of certain chapters of the restructured course of religious teaching in the official curriculum. The parent listed five chapters referring to Judaism and Islam, stating that the content “did not match his family’s religious beliefs” and objecting to the teaching of “prayers from other religious traditions” to his child. According to media, several parents in other schools also filed similar requests, and they returned the course’s new folder and book to the Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs as “unacceptable.” On October 23, hundreds of demonstrators, including members of parents and ecclesiastical associations, theologians, clergymen, nuns and monks, gathered outside the headquarters of the Ministry of Education, Research, and Religions to protest against the new way the religious course was taught, arguing it was unconstitutional, anti-Orthodox, and antipedagogical.

On September 24, vandals desecrated a large banner advertising a cultural event in Thessaloniki entitled “Sacred Places” and bearing the symbols of the Jewish star, Muslim crescent, and Christian cross. The banner was spray-painted with the slogan “Jews Out,” and the Jewish star was ripped in half. The perpetrator was not identified by year’s end.

On December 1, unknown vandals stripped the inscriptions from two of the panels on the Athens Holocaust memorial. The secretary general for religious affairs and the city of Athens “’strongly condemned the attack.”’ The city of Athens said it would contribute to the monument’s restoration.

The Ambassador, visiting officials, and embassy and consulate representatives met with officials and representatives from the Ministry of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs, including the minister of education and the secretary general for religious affairs. They discussed access for minority communities to establish houses of worship, and government initiatives that affect the Muslim minority in Thrace and immigrants. U.S. officials expressed concerns about anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim acts and rhetoric.

On September 7, the Consul General in Thessaloniki visited a new Yazidi Kurd migrant camp in Seres, in which the government segregated the Yazidis from other migrant groups for their protection.

Embassy officials met with religious leaders, including the archbishop and other representatives of the Greek Orthodox Church, as well as members of the Catholic, Muslim, Jewish, Bahai, Mormon, and Jehovah’s Witness communities to promote interfaith dialogue, religious tolerance, and diversity, as well as to express concern about anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim acts and rhetoric. Through these meetings, the embassy monitored the ability of religious minority groups to freely practice their religion and the extent of societal discrimination against both indigenous religious minorities and newly arrived migrants from religious minorities. The embassy sponsored two participants for a U.S. government exchange program on minority migrant integration and tolerance. The embassy also promoted religious tolerance via social media, using several platforms to promote the Ambassador’s remarks at the Conference on Religious Pluralism and Peaceful Coexistence in the Middle East, in which he emphasized tolerance, cultural and religious pluralism, and peaceful coexistence.

The Ambassador met with representatives from the Greek Orthodox Church, including Patriarch Bartholomew, Metropolitan Anthimos of Thessaloniki, Metropolitan Anthimos of Alexandroupolis, Metropolitan Iakovos of Lesvos, Metropolitan Markos of Chios, Metropolitan Dorotheos of Syros, and Deputy Metropolitan of Rhodes Ioannis. In all meetings with religious leaders and other members of the communities, the Ambassador discussed the role of the Greek Orthodox Church in responding to the needs of 49,000 asylum-seekers, mostly from Muslim-majority countries, remaining in Greece. The Ambassador also discussed with Greek Orthodox leaders the importance of religious tolerance and dialogue.

In March an embassy official met with Greek Orthodox and Catholic leaders on the island of Syros to emphasize the importance of interfaith dialogue and religious tolerance. On August 17, the Ambassador met separately with the local Orthodox Metropolitan and the former Roman Catholic Bishop in Syros, discussing the communities’ peaceful coexistence and mutual acceptance.

On July 10, the Ambassador delivered opening remarks on the Holocaust in Greece to 39 public school teachers at a seminar on teaching about the Holocaust. In his remarks he emphasized tolerance. The Ministry of Education, in cooperation with the Olga Lengyel Institute for Holocaust Studies, organized the seminar.

The Ambassador also met with representatives from the Athens and Thessaloniki Jewish communities, and the president and curator of the Jewish Museum in Athens, to discuss preserving Jewish history in Greece, combating anti-Semitism, and other concerns of the community. On January 27, the Ambassador laid a wreath at the Holocaust Monument in Athens in honor of the Day of Commemoration of the Greek-Jewish Martyrs and Heroes of the Holocaust.

The Thessaloniki Consul General participated in Holocaust Memorial ceremonies in Larissa, a wreath-laying in Hortiatis village, the National Day of Remembrance of the Greek Victims of the Holocaust in Thessaloniki, the Memorial Holocaust Walk in Thessaloniki, and a Holocaust Memorial event at the Thessaloniki Synagogue. On April 24, the Thessaloniki Consul General and her staff briefed members of the Jewish community and others about the killing by the Nazis of David Tiano, a Greek staff member of the consulate, and the need to never forget the Holocaust. She highlighted the new Human Rights and Holocaust Memorial Museum to break ground in 2018. In June the Thessaloniki Consul General attended a dinner to honor the longest living Thessalonikian Jew, Heinz Kounio, who survived the concentration camps.

In September the Thessaloniki Consul General attended a panel discussion at an exhibition which highlighted mixed religious communities that have coexisted throughout history. In her remarks, the Consul General highlighted the importance of societal respect of the freedom to worship.

On October 30, the Ambassador delivered introductory remarks for a video message from the special advisor for religious minorities in the Near East and South/Central Asia at the Second Athens International Conference on Religious and Cultural Pluralism and Peaceful Coexistence in the Middle East. In his introduction, the Ambassador highlighted the role religious freedom plays in combatting instability, human rights abuses, and religious extremism. The special advisor’s videotaped remarks further commented on the importance of protecting religious diversity.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 112,000 (July 2017 estimate). According to the U.S. government (2011 estimate), 49.2 percent of the population identifies as Protestant (includes Pentecostal 17.2 percent; Seventh-day Adventist 13.2 percent; Anglican 8.5 percent; Baptist 3.2 percent; Church of God 2.4 percent; evangelical Protestant 1.9 percent; Methodist 1.6 percent; and other 1.2 percent). Approximately 36 percent identifies as Roman Catholic; 1.2 percent as Jehovah’s Witnesses; 1.2 percent as Rastafarian; 5.5 percent as other; 5.7 percent as none; and 1.3 percent as unspecified. Smaller groups include Brethren, Bahais, Hindus, Moravians, Muslims, Mennonites, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and members of The Salvation Army. There is also a small Jewish community.

Legal Framework

The constitution protects “freedom of conscience, including freedom of thought and of religion.” It guarantees the right to change one’s religion and to manifest and propagate it. The constitution prohibits forced participation in any religious ceremony or instruction.

The government allows religious head coverings of certain types, including the hijab and the Rastafarian head wrap, in photographs for national identity documents, provided the face is visible and not shadowed. The criminal code prohibits written blasphemous language; however, the government does not enforce the law.

The government subsidizes all existing denominational private schools, which are managed by a board of directors and staffed by the faith-based organization to which they are aligned. The government also funds public schools administered by religious groups, including the Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Seventh-day Adventists, and Mennonite communities. There are no non-Christian denominational schools. In accordance with the constitution’s protections for freedom of conscience and religion, students at such schools may attend religion classes and may use credits from those classes towards completion of the Caribbean Secondary Education Certificate.

To qualify for customs and tax exemptions, the government must recognize a religious group as a nongovernmental organization (NGO). The group must also register with the Corporate Affairs and Intellectual Property Office (CAIPO) and with the Inland Revenue Office in the Ministry of Finance and provide a letter of request to the ministry. The attorney general grants final approval, and the ministry grants the applications for tax exemptions. Applications are routinely granted. Recognition as an NGO requires the group to submit details to CAIPO regarding the organization, including information about its directors, as well as a description of the NGO’s general activities and the location of these activities.

Foreign missionaries require a worker’s permit costing 1,000 to 5,000 East Caribbean dollars ($370 to $1,900) or a waiver costing 100 East Caribbean dollars ($37) from the Ministry of Labor. They must demonstrate prior experience, and a registered religious group must sponsor them.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Ministry of Youth, Sports, and Religious Affairs organized joint meetings with all faith-based organizations to discuss areas for collaboration with the government to “improve national society.”

The government’s official declarations, speeches, and activities often included religious references; denominational and ecumenical Christian worship services were part of official festivities on national holidays. The governor general, prime minister, other senior government officials, members of clergy and civil society, and members of the public participated in an official service of thanksgiving, organized by the Grenada Council of Churches, to mark the anniversary of the U.S. intervention and the fall of the country’s revolutionary government on October 25, 1983.

Members of non-Christian congregations said they were able to worship openly. Members of the Muslim and Jewish communities stated they met regularly in their respective places of worship and celebrated their religious holidays. The Conference of Churches Grenada, an ecumenical body, continued to serve as a forum to promote mutual understanding between religious organizations and hosted interfaith speakers at meetings. In October a visiting imam from the United Kingdom addressed the group on his work to foster greater understanding among Jews, Christians, Muslims, and other religions. The imam also spoke about his school/institute, an interfaith school where they teach children tolerance for other religions from an early age.

The Ambassador and the Principal Officer engaged the government on the importance of respect for religious diversity, freedom, and tolerance.

The Principal Officer participated in denominational, ecumenical, and Muslim and Jewish community events to emphasize the importance of respect for religious diversity, tolerance, and equality under law, as well as participating in and giving remarks at an official service of thanksgiving, organized by the Grenada Council of Churches.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 15.5 million (July 2017 estimate). According to a 2015 survey by ProDatos, approximately 45 percent of the population is Catholic and 42 percent Protestant. Approximately 11 percent of the population professes no religious affiliation. Groups that together constitute less than 3 percent of the population include Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, Jews, and adherents of the Mayan, Xinca, and Afro-Indigenous Garifuna religions.

Christian groups include the Full Gospel Church, Assemblies of God, Central American Church, Prince of Peace Church, numerous independent evangelical Protestant groups, Baptists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Episcopalians, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Russian Orthodox, and Seventh-day Adventists.

Catholics and Protestants are present throughout the country, with adherents among all major ethnic groups. According to leaders of Mayan spiritual organizations, as well as Catholic and Protestant clergy, many indigenous Catholics and some indigenous Protestants practice some form of syncretism with indigenous spiritual rituals, mainly in the eastern city of Livingston and in the southern region.

Approximately 1,500 Jews and 1,200 Muslims of mostly Palestinian origin reside primarily in Guatemala City.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion, including the free expression of all beliefs and the right to practice a religion or belief, in public and private. The constitution recognizes the distinct legal personality of the Catholic Church.

The constitution does not require religious groups to register for the purpose of worship, but non-Catholic religious groups must register for legal status in order to conduct activities such as renting or purchasing property and entering into contracts, and to receive tax-exempt status and tax exemptions for properties used for worship, religious education, and social assistance. To register, a group must file a copy of its bylaws, which must reflect an intention to pursue religious objectives, and a list of its initial membership, with at least 25 members, with the Ministry of Government. The ministry may reject applications if the group does not appear to be devoted to a religious objective, appears intent on undertaking illegal activities, or engages in activities that appear likely to threaten public order. All religious groups must obtain the permission of the respective municipal authorities for construction and repair of properties and for holding public events, consistent with requirements for nonreligious endeavors.

The constitution protects the rights of indigenous groups to practice their traditions and forms of cultural expression, including religious rites. The law permits Mayan spiritual groups to conduct religious ceremonies at Mayan historical sites on government-owned property.

The criminal code penalizes violation of the freedom of religious celebration and sentiment and the desecration of burial sites or human remains; however, charges are seldom filed under these laws.

According to the constitution, no member of the clergy of any religion may serve as president, vice president, government minister, or as a judge.

A Catholic priest and a nondenominational pastor serve as prison chaplains.

The constitution permits, but does not require, religious instruction in public schools. There is no national framework for determining the nature or content of religious instruction. In general, public schools have no religious component in the curriculum. Private religious schools are allowed and can be found in all areas of the country.

The government requires foreign missionaries to obtain tourist visas, which authorities issue for renewable periods of three months. After renewing their tourist visas once, foreign missionaries may apply for temporary residence for up to two years.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In April a court found the former mayor of San Juan La Laguna, Antonio Adolfo Perez y Perez, guilty of threatening to expel a community of ultraorthodox (Haredi) Jews in 2014 and sentenced him to one year in prison.

Although the law permits Mayan spiritual groups to conduct religious ceremonies at Mayan historical sites on government-owned property, some Mayan leaders stated the government continued to limit their access to some religious sites and require them to pay to access the sites. The government maintained that there were no limitations to access; however, anyone seeking access to the sites must pay “processing fees.” Many Mayan religious and archeological sites are national parks or protected areas where the national government charges admission fees to all visitors. According to leaders from the Committee on the Designation of Sacred Sites, practitioners of Mayan spirituality generally were generally only able to obtain free access to sites only if they were accredited and issued an identification card by certain indigenous organizations as spiritual guides and had received written permission from the culture ministry 15 days before the scheduled ceremony/religious practice. Mayan leaders stated that written permission included long paperwork completed in Spanish. They said the process was difficult and expensive because it required travel to the capital, as well as fluency in Spanish, which many indigenous persons do not speak. The Presidential Commission against Discrimination and Racism (CODISRA), however, said it provided interpreters upon request to facilitate the process. Mayan advocates stated they should have access, within reasonable parameters, to all sacred sites (an estimated 2,000 locations on both public and private land).

Missionaries continued reporting they chose to remain on tourist visas to avoid what they called a complicated procedure to apply for temporary residence.

The Ministry of Education continued to consult with religious groups on a national values program called Living Together in Harmony (Vivamos Juntos en Harmonia) that integrated the groups’ shared values, such as honesty, fraternity, responsibility, and respect, without citing religion or religious teachings, into school curricula.

Some Catholic clergy continued to report threats and harassment against them because of their association with environmental protection work. Some private owners of land in locations, such as in Tikal National Park, considered sacred by Mayan religious groups, including caves, lagoons, mountains, and forests, continued to deny access to Mayans, according to Mayan spiritual groups.

U.S. embassy officials regularly met with the human rights ombudsman, CODISRA, and members of congress to discuss religious freedom issues, including threats against Catholic clergy and the reported lack of access for Mayans to Mayan spiritual sites.

U.S. embassy officials met with leaders of major religious groups and representatives of faith-based nongovernmental organizations to discuss the importance of religious diversity. Embassy officials continued outreach to religious leaders, including the Catholic archbishop’s offices; the Evangelical Alliance (the largest organization of Protestant churches, representing more than 30,000 individual churches); the Jewish community; representatives from the Commission for the Designation of Sacred Places for the Maya, Xinca, and Garifuna communities; and other organizations to strengthen understanding of religious freedom issues.

In December the embassy posted on Facebook a note on the importance of appreciating freedom of religion, including worship, in addition to emphasizing the right of all individuals to follow their conscience in how they pray.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 12.4 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the SRA, approximately 85 percent of the population is Muslim, 8 percent is Christian, and 7 percent adheres to indigenous religious beliefs. Much of the population incorporates some indigenous rituals into its religious practices. Muslims are generally Sunni; however, Sufism is also present. Christian groups include Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, and several evangelical groups. There is a small Bahai community. There are also small numbers of Hindus, Buddhists, and adherents of traditional Chinese religious beliefs among foreign residents.

Muslims constitute a majority in all four regions of the country. Christians are most numerous in Conakry, large cities, the south, and the eastern Forest Region. Adherents of indigenous religious beliefs are most prevalent in the Forest Region.

Legal Framework

The constitution states the state is secular, prohibits religious discrimination, and provides for the right of individuals to choose and profess their religious faith. It recognizes the right of religious institutions and groups to establish and manage themselves freely. It bars political parties that identify with a particular religious group. These rights are subject only to “those limits that are indispensable to maintain the public order and democracy.”

By law, the SRA must approve all religious groups. Groups must provide a written constitution and application to the SRA along with their address and a fee of 250,000 Guinean francs (GNF) ($28). The SRA then sends the documents to the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization for final approval and signature. Once approved, the group becomes an officially recognized religion. Each registered religious group must present to the government a report on its affairs every six months. Registration entitles religious groups to value-added tax (VAT) exemptions on incoming shipments and select energy subsidies.

Unregistered religious groups are not entitled to VAT exemptions and other benefits. By law, the government may shut down unregistered groups and expel foreign group leaders. There is limited opportunity for legal appeal of these penalties.

Religious groups may not own radio or television stations.

The compulsory primary school curriculum does not include religious studies.

The imams and administrative staff of the principal mosque in Conakry and the principal mosques in the main cities of the four regions are government employees. These mosques are directly under the administration of the government. Other mosques and some Christian groups receive government subsidies for pilgrimages.

The SRA secretary general of religious affairs appoints six national directors to lead the Offices of Christian Affairs, Islamic Affairs, Pilgrimages, Places of Worship, Economic Affairs and the Endowment, and Inspector General. The SRA is charged with promoting good relations among religious groups and coordinates with other members of the informal Interreligious Council, which is composed of Muslims and members from Catholic, Anglican, and other Protestant churches as well as the SRA.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The SRA continued to issue mandatory weekly themes for inclusion in Friday sermons at mosques and Sunday sermons in churches. The stated purpose of the weekly guidance was to harmonize religious views in order to prevent radical or political connotations in sermons. Although the SRA did not monitor sermons at every mosque and church, its inspectors were present in every region and responsible for ensuring that mosque and church sermons were consistent with SRA directives. Clerics whom the SRA judged to be noncompliant were subject to disciplinary action. Discrepancies were often reported in the various sermons at mosques and other Islamic events, but the SRA had difficulty imposing disciplinary sanctions. The new secretary general met the imams of the capital, as well as leaders of communal and regional leagues, aiming to warn imams for any breach of the principles of Islam; he said imams who speak about politics, attack the president, or preach division between citizens would be subject to sanctions.

Saudi Arabia increased the country’s quota of pilgrims to 9,000 from 6,000 in 2016 and limited the age of travelers to Mecca to under 70. The SRA facilitated and organized the travel of 7,000 pilgrims who each paid approximately 40 million GNF ($4,400) toward the cost of travel.

The government subsidized the travel of Christians on pilgrimages to the Holy Land, Greece, and Italy, providing 3.5 billion GNF ($389,000) compared to 2 billion GNF ($222,000) in 2016. The government decided in 2016 to rotate the benefits to different Christian groups in each subsequent year with Anglicans, Catholics, and Adventists receiving support for their 2017 pilgrimages.

According to the SRA, several unregistered religious groups operated freely but did not receive the tax and other benefits received by registered groups. The small Jehovah’s Witnesses community reportedly proselytized from house to house without interference, although neither it nor the Bahai community requested official recognition. Some groups stated they preferred not to have a formal relationship with the SRA.

Islamic schools were prevalent throughout the country and remained the traditional forum for religious education. Some Islamic schools were wholly private, while others received local government support. Islamic schools, particularly common in the Fouta Djalon region, taught the compulsory government curriculum along with additional Quranic studies. Private Christian schools, which accepted students of all religious groups, existed in Conakry and most other large cities. They taught the compulsory curriculum but did not receive government support and held Christian prayers before school.

The government allocated free broadcast time on state-owned national television for Islamic and Christian programming, including Islamic religious instruction, Friday prayers from the central mosque, and church services. Muslim programs received more broadcast time, while different Christian groups received broadcast time on Sundays on a rotating basis. The government permitted religious broadcasting on privately owned commercial radio.

The General Secretariat of Religious Affairs, through the National Directorate of Christian Affairs, initiated for the first time a conference of Christian religious leaders. The conference aimed to bring Christians of different denominations together to improve working relations and share information related to the work of churches and missions in the country. Another goal was to get the different Christian denominations to agree on a common program of awareness and prayer within the framework of the strengthening of national unity, which continued to be an important theme in the country.

In some parts of the country such as the middle and the upper regions, particularly strong familial, communal, cultural, social, or economic pressure discouraged conversion from Islam.

Members of the Bahai Faith again reported being discriminated against and shunned by their families because of their religious beliefs.

In March in Dabadou, Upper Guinea, a land conflict between Muslims and Christians about the ownership of a parcel of land adjacent to the local Catholic church resulted in physical altercations between the communities, injuring 11, and the burning of the church. Security forces arrested 18 individuals, including three women, in connection with the damage. In April the court charged eight of those arrested with “destruction of public buildings, intentional assault, and obstruction of the free exercise of religion.” Most of the sentences were six months suspended with the payment of a fine of 500,000 GNF ($56).

In the city of Labe in Middle Guinea, Islamic intrafaith rivalries between the majority Tidjani and the minority Wahhabi communities continued to exist, but according to French-language media, local religious and administrative authorities largely resolved these local conflicts by peaceful means.

The Kalima Catholic Mission still had not begun construction of a church despite authorization by the government in 2015. The Muslim community reportedly continued to lobby against the project. Religious authorities of both sides continued to work on resolving this issue.

Many Muslim students not enrolled in private Islamic schools received religious education at madrassahs, some of which were associated with mosques and others supported by local communities. Unlike the Islamic schools, the madrassahs did not teach the compulsory primary school curriculum. Although the government did not recognize the madrassahs or require them to register, it allowed them to operate freely. They focused on Quranic studies and instruction was in Arabic rather than French. Funds from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf states supported some madrassahs. Most students in madrassahs also attended public or private schools teaching the compulsory curriculum, which did not include religious studies.

In February The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints opened a new branch in Conakry.

The Ambassador met several times with the secretary of religious affairs and the grand imam of Conakry. He also met with the grands imams of Labe and Kankan. Each time, he delivered messages of religious tolerance. In addition, he organized an iftar that brought together religious leaders and senior politicians from the ruling coalition and the opposition to underscore religious tolerance.

Embassy officials consulted closely with the SRA and religious leaders, including the grand imams of Conakry, Kankan, and Labe; Catholic and Anglican bishops; and Islamic and Christian clergy. Embassy officers advocated for religious tolerance. Embassy officials also participated in several iftar celebrations nationwide to promote good relations and mutual understanding among religious groups and to relay a message of respect for religious freedom and national reconciliation, including religious acceptance, among groups.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.8 million (July 2017 estimate). Estimates of the religious composition of the population vary widely, but according to a 2010 study by the Pew Research Center, approximately 45 percent is Muslim, 31 percent follows indigenous religious practices, and 22 percent is Christian. There are small communities of Buddhists, Hindus, and Jews, many of whom are foreign citizens.

The Fula (Peuhl or Fulani) and Mandinka (Malinke) ethnic groups are the most numerous followers of Islam. Muslims generally live in the north and northeast, and most Muslims are Sunni; Shia communities exist but do not maintain a high public profile. Adherents of indigenous religious beliefs generally live in all but the northern parts of the country. The Christian population, including Roman Catholics and Protestants, are primarily from the Pepel, Manjaco, and Balanta ethnic groups and are concentrated in Bissau and along the coast. Catholics represent more than half of the Christian population, while Brazilian Protestant and other Protestant denominations maintain a significant number of congregations and missions throughout the country. Large numbers of Muslims and Christians hold indigenous beliefs as well.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates the state shall be separate from religious institutions and shall respect and protect legally recognized religious groups, whose activities shall be subject to the law. It holds freedom of conscience and religion as inviolable, even if the state declares a state of siege, and provides for freedom of worship as long as it does not violate the fundamental principles cited in the constitution. It establishes that all citizens are equal under the law with the same rights and obligations, irrespective of their religion. Political parties and labor unions are barred from affiliating with a particular religious group. The constitution recognizes the freedom of religious groups to teach their faith.

The government requires religious groups to obtain licenses. The formal process, which is not often followed, entails providing the name, location, type, and size of the organization to the Ministry of Justice. Under the law, religious groups are recognized as associations and benefit from tax exemptions.

In accordance with the constitution, there is no religious instruction in public schools. The Ministry of Education regulates and enforces the decree against religious teaching in public schools. There are some private schools operated by religious groups.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

There were no reports of significant government actions affecting religious freedom.

Some Muslim community members reported concerns about what they termed “stricter” Islamic practices taught by foreign imams to the local Muslim population.

Religious group representatives reported a general atmosphere of mutual respect. For instance, Catholic, Protestant, and Islamic leaders held meetings during the year to discuss the long-running political crisis affecting the country and participated in dialogue with political leaders in an attempt to resolve the impasse. Different religious confessions also promoted respect for different religions.

There is no permanent U.S. diplomatic presence in the country. Representatives from the U.S. Embassy in Dakar, Senegal, discussed religious freedom with government officials, such as the minister of justice and the attorney general, in the presence of foreign Christian and Muslim missionaries in the country.

Embassy representatives also met with representatives of religious groups to discuss religious freedom. In September the Ambassador separately met and discussed religious activity and freedom with representatives of the National Union of Imams and the auxiliary bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Guinea-Bissau.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 738,000 (July 2017 estimate). According to the country’s 2012 census, 64 percent of the population is Christian, 25 percent Hindu, 7 percent Muslim (mainly Sunni), and less than 1 percent belong to other religious groups. Among Christians, Pentecostals comprise 23 percent of the national population; Roman Catholics, 7 percent; Anglicans, 5 percent; Seventh-day Adventists, 5 percent; Methodists, 1 percent; and other Christians, 21 percent. The 21 percent includes Christians who belong to the Assembly of God Church, Church of Christ, and African Episcopal Methodist Zion Church, among others. Groups that together constitute less than 1 percent of the population include Rastafarians and Bahais. An estimated 3 percent of the population does not profess a religious affiliation.

The membership of most religious groups includes a cross section of ethnic groups, although nearly all Hindus are of Indian descent and most Rastafarians are of African descent.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion and worship, including the right to choose and change one’s religion. An unenforced law prescribes a prison term of one year for a blasphemous libel conviction; however, the law exempts religious expression made in “good faith and decent language.”

There is no official system for formal registration of a religious group, but to receive government recognition, all places of worship must register through the deeds registry. The deeds registry requires an organization to submit a proposed name and address for the place of worship, as well as the names of executive group members or congregation leaders. Once formally recognized, a place of worship falls under legislation governing nonprofit organizations, allowing the organization to conduct financial operations, buy property, and receive tax benefits in its name.

Foreign religious workers require a visa from the Ministry of Citizenship. Religious groups seeking to enter an Amerindian village for the purpose of proselytizing must apply for and obtain the permission from the village council. An application to a village council must include the name of the group, the names of its members who will be going to the village, their purpose, and estimated date of arrival.

There are both public and private religiously affiliated schools. Private schools are operated entirely by private groups and are not funded by the state. Students of private schools must pay fees to attend, and the state does not control those fees. Religious education is compulsory in all private schools with a religious affiliation. All students attending a private school of religious affiliation must participate in religious education, regardless of a student’s religious beliefs. There is no religious education in public schools, whether religiously affiliated or not. Most public schools’ religious affiliations are Anglican or Methodist.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Created in 2015, the government’s Ministry of Social Cohesion’s mandate includes promoting interfaith harmony and respect for diversity. In February President David Granger said the state was responsible for ensuring social cohesion and interfaith harmony is not left to chance, the main reasons his government had established the ministry. In March the ministry held several “harmony villages” across the country to promote tolerance of various cultures and ethnic and religious identities. In May the ministry launched a five-year strategic plan to promote social cohesion.

Representatives of the Rastafarian community said that a law criminalizing the possession of 15 grams or more of marijuana infringed on their religious practices. A representative of the Rastafari Council said some members of his community faced extra scrutiny from law enforcement officials who believed Rastafaris carried marijuana on their person. According to the same representative, the Rastafari community perceived they were employed at lower rates than other citizens. The council petitioned the government to legalize the use of small amounts of marijuana for religious purposes, but authorities reportedly did not consider the proposal, saying that reviewing drug legislation was not a state priority at that time. On August 17, the Alliance For Change, a faction of the coalition government, said that it would advance the concerns of the Rastafarian group at parliament.

The government continued to maintain regulations limiting the number of visas for foreign representatives of religious groups based on historical trends, the relative size of the group, and the president’s discretion; however, religious groups continued to report the visa quotas the government allotted to them did not adversely affect their activities, as the visa limitation rule was rarely applied.

In March foreign Christian missionaries proselytized in some urban public schools. Representatives of the Hindu community stated that proselytizing in public schools is unconstitutional and the government should denounce it. In April the government stated that proselytizing in public schools is prohibited, and it disciplined the administrators of three public schools for permitting religious proselytizing by the foreign Christian missionaries in the three schools.

The Guyana Defense Force (GDF) continued to coordinate with civilian religious groups to provide military personnel with access to religious services. Leaders of the three major religious groups – Christian, Hindu, and Muslim – conducted prayer services and counseling on GDF bases.

Government representatives met with leaders of various religious groups to promote social cohesion and discuss tolerance of diversity. Government officials also participated regularly in the observance of Christian, Muslim, and Hindu religious holidays throughout the year.

In February the president, first lady, and government ministers participated in an interfaith ceremony, whose stated purpose was to celebrate the country’s religious freedom and diversity.

The government continued to declare holy days of the country’s three major religious groups as national holidays.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom. Interfaith efforts conducted by the Inter-Religious Organization of Guyana led to oral pledges to promote social cohesion and respect for ethnic and religious diversity.

U.S. embassy officials joined the Ministry of Social Cohesion on several occasions throughout the year at interfaith and religious events. After these events, embassy officials engaged in social media discussions on religious tolerance in the country’s pluralistic society.

On November 15, in observance of United Nation’s International Day of Tolerance, the embassy convened a panel of Muslim, Christian, Rastafari, and Hindu representatives to highlight and promote tolerance among various religious groups. The panel comprised leaders from the Central Islamic Organization, Council of Churches, Rastafari Council, and Pandits Council, representing local Hindu temples. The audience, which included civil society leaders and members of various faith communities, engaged with panelists and made comments on the role that religious tolerance played in the country. The panelists pledged to hold regular interreligious dialogues and continue collaborating on humanitarian projects to maintain their peaceful coexistence. Embassy representatives met with representatives of the Hindu, Muslim, and Christian religious groups and discussed issues relating to religious tolerance. Embassy representatives attended various religious events hosted by the Muslim and Hindu communities. Embassy officials also attended interfaith functions hosted by the government to support and advance religious tolerance and inclusion. At these events, embassy officials spoke on acceptance, tolerance, and harmony in a multifaith cultural context. The embassy amplified its activities through discussions on social media about religious tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 10.6 million (July 2017 estimate). The U.S. government estimates that 55 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 29 percent Protestant (15 percent Baptist, 8 percent Pentecostal, 3 percent Adventist, 1.5 percent Methodist, and 0.7 percent other Protestant); 2.1 percent Voodoo (Vodou), 4.6 percent other, and 10 percent none. Groups present in small numbers include The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslims, Bahais, Rastafarians, Scientologists, and atheists. According to societal leaders, an estimated 50 to 80 percent of the population practices some form of Vodou, often blended with elements of other religions, usually Christianity. Muslim leaders estimate their community at approximately 10,000. There are fewer than 100 Jews.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the free exercise of all religions and establishes laws to regulate the registration and operation of religious groups. The constitution protects against being compelled to belong to a religious group contrary to one’s belief. The MFA is responsible for monitoring and administering laws relating to religious groups; within the MFA, the Bureau of Worship is responsible for registering churches and other religious buildings, clergy, and missionaries of various religious denominations.

Although Roman Catholicism has not been the official state religion since the 1987 constitution, an 1860 concordat between the Holy See and the state according some preferential treatment to the Catholic Church remains in effect. The concordat gives the Vatican power to approve and select a specific number of bishops in the country with government consent. Under the concordat, the government provides a monthly stipend to Catholic priests. The government does not provide stipends to Episcopalian clergy, although both Catholic and Episcopalian bishops have official license plates and carry diplomatic passports. No other religious groups receive stipends for their clergy.

By law, religious institutions must register with the MFA in order to operate in the country and receive government benefits; however, there is no penalty for operating without registration, and many religious groups continue to do so. Registration affords religious groups standing in legal disputes, provides tax-exempt status, and extends civil recognition to documents such as marriage certificates and baptismal certificates. The government recognizes these certificates as legal documents only when prepared by government-certified clergy. Baptismal certificates are identifying documents with similar legal authority as birth certificates. The government does not tax registered religious groups, and it exempts their imports from customs duties. Requirements for registration include information on the qualifications of the group’s leader, a membership directory, and a list of the group’s social projects. Registered religious groups must submit annual updates of their membership, projects, and leadership to the MFA. Foreign missionaries are required to submit registration paperwork to operate privately funded clinics, schools, and orphanages. Foreign religious groups do not have special visa requirements.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Houngans (male) and mambos (female) priests said the government continued its practice of not issuing them government-recognized documents for marriage and baptismal ceremonies, even though Vodou is a registered religion. The MFA said it was working with the Vodou community to develop a certification process in accordance with the Vodou belief system.

The MFA still did not act on a request dating from the 1980s to register Muslims as a religious group. The government continued to request financial documentation as a prerequisite to complete registration. Muslims said they continued to obtain civil marriage licenses as their only legal option.

The government continued to provide financial support for the maintenance of Catholic churches and some Catholic schools. Negotiations between the Protestant Federation and the MFA continued regarding Protestant access to government funding; however, the Protestant Federation said in November that government financial support was still unavailable to Protestants. The government said it had no plans to extend public funding to any non-Catholic religious groups.

Government sources stated that limited institutional capacity continued to restrict their ability to provide for the religious needs of Muslim prisoners throughout the country, namely offering meals in compliance with Islamic dietary restrictions and arranging access to Muslim clerics. Prisoners could request to see a Muslim cleric; however, not all prisons were close enough to a Muslim institution that could provide such services. Volunteers provided religious services in some prisons. Muslim prisoners could pray freely.

Protestant and Catholic clergy continued to report largely positive working relationships with the government, citing good access to government officials.

Vodou community leaders said Vodou practitioners continued to experience some social stigmatization for their beliefs and practices. They said members of the public often accused Vodou practitioners of using “occult powers” to commit violent crimes. For example, a man from the southwestern department of Grand-Anse was arrested in November for using “magic” to poison another man to use his corpse in a Vodou ceremony. At year’s end, the accused was in prison awaiting trial.

According to some Muslim leaders, members of the Muslim community experienced societal stigmatization and alienation, especially Muslim women wearing hijabs. Muslims also reportedly faced discrimination when seeking public and private sector employment.

U.S. embassy officials met with government officials, including the minister of foreign affairs and religious denominations, to advocate for fair and equal treatment for all religious groups, as well as to advocate for registration of religious groups that have completed the requisite registration procedures.

Embassy officials met with faith-based NGOs and religious leaders in the Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, and Vodou communities to discuss religious freedom, societal stigmatization of some religious minorities, the importance of religious tolerance, and challenges some groups faced in obtaining the registration of their group and clergy.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 9 million (July 2017 estimate). The Catholic Church states it has approximately 6.85 million adherents, constituting 77 percent of the population. According to a 2016 survey by a local marketing research and public opinion company, 48 percent of respondents self-identified as evangelical Protestants, 41 percent as Catholics, 3 percent as other, and 8 percent as unaffiliated.

In the 2015 Latinobarometro regional public opinion survey, 43.6 percent of respondents identify as Catholic, 42.1 percent as evangelical Protestant, 1.8 percent as other, and 12.4 percent as unaffiliated. Other religious groups, with their stated number of adherents, include Seventh-day Adventists (144,000); The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) (165,000); the Evangelical Moravian Church (35,960); Jehovah’s Witnesses (23,500); and a variety of Anabaptist and Mennonite groups (18,000). Additionally there are small communities of Episcopalians, Lutherans, Orthodox Christians, Muslims, Jews, and Bahais. Evangelical Protestant churches include the Church of God, Assemblies of God, Abundant Life Church, Living Love Church, International Christian Center, and various Great Commission churches. A number of evangelical Protestant churches have no denominational affiliation. The Moravian Church has a broad presence in the La Mosquitia Region in the eastern part of the country. Some indigenous groups and African-Hondurans practice African and Amerindian faiths or incorporate elements of Christianity, African, and Amerindian religions into syncretistic religious practices and beliefs.

A representative of the Muslim community states that it has 2,500 members, of which 90 percent are converts. The Jewish community states it has approximately 200 members.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the free exercise of all religions as long as that exercise does not contravene other laws or public order. The constitution prohibits religious leaders from holding public office or making political statements. The law distinguishes among legally recognized religious organizations, religious organizations registered as NGOs, and nonregistered religious organizations. The government does not require religious groups to register. By law, only the legislature has the authority to confer status as a legally recognized group; only the Catholic Church has received such recognition. Those recognized by law receive benefits such as tax-exempt status for staff salaries and church materials.

Religious organizations not individually recognized by law may register as NGOs. The government does not significantly distinguish between religious and nonreligious NGOs. To register as an NGO, organizations must have a board of directors and juridical personality. Associations seeking juridical personality must submit an application to the Secretariat of State for Human Rights, Justice, Governance, and Decentralization describing their internal organization, bylaws, and goals. The Office of the Solicitor General reviews applications for juridical personality and renders a constitutional opinion. Approved organizations must submit annual financial and activity reports to the government to remain registered. They may apply to the Ministry of Finance to receive benefits such as tax exemptions and customs duty waivers. Unregistered religious organizations are unable to obtain tax-exempt status or other benefits.

The constitution states public education is secular and allows for the establishment of private schools, including schools run by religious organizations. Various religious organizations run schools, including the Catholic Church, Seventh-day Adventist, and evangelical churches. Parents have the right to choose the kind of education their children receive, including religious education. The government dictates a minimum standardized curriculum for all schools. Some private religious affiliated schools require participation in religious events to graduate.

The government is a party to the Ibero-American Convention on Young People’s Rights, which recognizes the right to conscientious objection to obligatory military service.

The government requires foreign missionaries to obtain entry and residence permits, and mandates a local institution or individual sponsor a missionary’s application for residency and submit it to immigration authorities. The government has agreements with members of the CEH, the Mormons, and the Seventh-day Adventists, among others, to facilitate entry and residence permits for their missionaries. Groups with which the government does not have written agreements are required to provide proof of employment and income for their missionaries.

Foreign religious workers may request residency for up to five years. To renew their residence permits, religious workers must submit proof of continued employment with the sponsoring church at least 30 days before their residency expires. The law prohibits the immigration of foreign missionaries who practice religions that use witchcraft or satanic rituals, and allows the deportation of foreigners who practice witchcraft or “religious fraud.” According to the immigration law, individuals who “fraudulently exercise their [religious] profession or office, or commit fraud against the health or religious beliefs of citizens of the country, or the national patrimony,” may be fined or face other legal consequences.

The criminal code protects clergy authorized to operate in the country from being required to testify by the court or the attorney general’s office about privileged information obtained in confidence during a religious confession. The law does not require vicars, bishops, and archbishops of the Catholic Church and comparably ranked individuals from other legally recognized religious groups to appear in court if subpoenaed. They are required, however, to make a statement at a location of their choosing.

The official regulations for the penal system state that penitentiaries guarantee the free exercise of religion without preference of one specific religion, as long as that worship is not against the law or public order.

Religious officials face fines of 50,000-100,000 lempiras ($2,100-$4,300) and legal bans on performing religious duties for four to six years if they perform a marriage without a civil marriage license.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Some religious organizations, including the Inter-Ecclesiastical Forum, an interfaith NGO representing dozens of religious groups, continued to criticize what they said was government preference for the Catholic Church and for religious groups belonging to the evangelical Protestant umbrella organization CEH. Among the criticisms were that the legal recognition of non-Catholic religious groups as NGOs or as unregistered religious organizations accorded them fewer rights and privileges than to the Catholic Church. The groups also objected to the existing application of one uniform set of registration rules for all nonprofit organizations, including all non-Catholic religious groups. Many non-Catholic groups stated that the government should recognize them as religious groups rather than NGOs. The Inter-Ecclesiastical Forum said the current legal and policy framework discriminated against all non-Catholic religious groups. The Inter-Ecclesiastical Forum also noted exclusive benefits for the CEH included continual tax exemptions and waivers on imports. According to the Inter-Ecclesiastical Forum, minority religious groups were often restricted from organizing religious assembly in public squares or parks. According to some forum members, government entities in charge of authorizing the use of such spaces were “influenced by pressures” from the Catholic Church, which they said was “concerned” about the exponential growth of some religious minority organizations.

The official NGO registry office – Unidad de Registro y Seguimento de Asociaciones Civiles (URSAC) – in the Ministry of Governance received 586 applications for new NGO registration during the year in comparison to 1,228 in 2016. This included 235 applications from religious associations (189 in 2016). Cumulatively, the URSAC has registered approximately 2,500 religious associations, of which 1,385 updated their board of directors and legal documents in 2017. The Ministry of Governance rejected applications that did not fit within the legal categories for which the ministry had legal authority.

Some religious organizations, expressed concern at what they said was unequal treatment by municipal authorities issuing permits to distribute religious material or hold events in public areas.

Representatives of several churches said they were concerned about possible corrupt and other criminal practices by government officials that damaged churches or their interests. One evangelical Protestant church expressed continued concern about the government’s handling of a long-standing internal division within its church. In 2016, a court dismissed charges brought by the church against the head of the official NGO registration office for registering a board of directors in 2013 that the church had excommunicated. Some church members said the excommunicated group had links to criminal elements; threatened members of the church, including by setting fire to member’s homes; confiscated or damaged church property; appointed different pastors; and, closed some of the church’s centers of worship. Church authorities stated that government officials refused to take action against the illegal board for criminal actions, possibly due to government corruption or links with criminal networks. The church’s appeal to the 2016 court decision was still pending at year’s end.

Although the constitution prohibits religious leaders from holding political office, the Inter-Ecclesiastical Forum said some Protestant pastors, elected in 2013, continued to hold elected office despite a Supreme Court ruling that a 2011 law under which they had been elected was unconstitutional.

Some civil society organizations criticized evangelical Protestant groups, and to a lesser degree, the Catholic Church, for what they said was political activism and close ties to the government. These activities included Protestant pastors holding public office; CEH members serving on the government advisory bodies, including the Police Purge Commission, which makes recommendations for police reform; and the inclusion of Catholic and Protestant prayers at government events.

Some Christians reported facing dismissal if they did not adhere to a dress code, such as requiring women to wear pants, in government workplaces, even if the code did not conform to their religious beliefs. Religious leaders reported that some teachers in public schools pressured students to participate in the religious rituals of the teachers’ faith.

Representatives of the Seventh-day Adventist Church reported continued religious freedom concerns at both private and public schools, from the elementary through the university level. Seventh-day Adventist representatives said their students faced continued problems obtaining permission to be absent from class or excused from taking exams on Saturdays for religious reason from the National Autonomous University of Honduras, the National Teachers University, and public schools in the cities of San Pedro Sula, Baracoa, Santa Barbara, Santa Rosa de Copan, and two private universities. Teachers in the Department of Ocotepeque also said they had problems obtaining permission not to work on Saturdays, notwithstanding a letter issued by the secretary of education excusing members of the Seventh-day Adventist Church from Saturday school attendance.

Non-Catholic religious groups continued to criticize the government for not recognizing them as churches and their inability to receive benefits, including tax exemptions for clergy salaries and imported religious materials. A representative of the Jewish community said the community was required to apply for tax-exempt status at the municipal level every year.

The Catholic Church and some other religious groups continued to press the government to recognize weddings performed by religious clergy without the legally required civil marriage certificate.

The government routinely invited Catholic and evangelical Protestant leaders to lead prayers at government events and to participate in official functions, committees, and other joint government-civil society activities. Several religious organizations, including a Muslim religious group, criticized a perceived bias by the government in favor of the Catholic Church and evangelical Protestant churches that were members of the CEH.

A rule drafted in 2010 requiring Jehovah’s Witnesses to sing the national anthem, salute the national flag, and participate in other patriotic events still remained in the Secretariat of Education’s school guidelines, despite a 2014 ruling by the secretariat’s legal director that the rule was not enforceable. Representatives of the Jehovah’s Witnesses articulated their concern over continuing reports of public school officials pressuring Jehovah’s Witnesses to participate in public celebrations and other school events that run counter to their beliefs.

The government continued to facilitate missionaries’ residency status, including through agreements with some religious groups to facilitate visas for missionaries.

Leaders of the Jewish community reported frequent expressions of anti-Semitism in political discourse and events by political opposition figures, ranging from swastikas spray-painted on public buildings to hate speech in political speeches. The spouse of an opposition presidential candidate publicly lauded Adolf Hitler’s legacy, later issuing a public apology for her statements.

In March the CEH presented a study that found that between 2005 and 2015, 30 percent of members of evangelical Protestant and Catholic congregations stated they had been victimized by criminals, reflective of the high levels of general violence and criminality in the country. The report found that during this period at least 31 evangelical pastors were victims of homicides during robberies or kidnappings, or for refusing to pay extortion payments to gangs, among other reasons. The majority of the study’s participants stated they believed their faith and religious practices increased their likelihood of being targeted by criminals, and speculated that the public role and prominence of religious leaders increased the likelihood of their being victimized. Other religious group reported being victims of generalized violent crime.

In December Jesuit priest Ismael “Padre Melo” Moreno Coto publicly reported receiving threats due to his management of a radio station and NGO, as well as his opposition to the re-election of President Juan Orlando Hernandez in November.

Some Christians said they faced dismissal if they did not adhere to a dress code in private workplaces, such as requiring women to wear pants, even if in conflict with their religious beliefs.

Some Muslim women reported that some banks asked them to remove their hijab when passing through bank security. They said they were usually able to resolve the issue after explaining that the attire was part of their religious practice. Seventh-day Adventists reported the continued refusal of certain private institutions, including places of employment and schools, to permit them to observe Saturday as a day of rest.

Religious leaders reported that some teachers in private schools pressured students to participate in religious rituals of the teachers’ faith, or in the case of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, to participate in activities counter to their beliefs.

The Inter-Ecclesiastical Forum said it had received some complaints from individuals that some religious leaders discouraged their congregations from participating in interfaith engagements, and noted that some religious leaders in the media referred to other beliefs as sects or made other disparaging remarks.

The Inter-Ecclesiastical Forum, which includes representatives from more than 90 religious and civil society groups, continued its efforts to counter intolerance, discrimination, and the imposition of one religion over others. Religious groups reported working together to develop better relations and cooperate on projects, including between evangelical Protestant groups and the Catholic Church, and the Jewish community and various Christian groups.

Jewish community leaders, representing the two synagogues in the country, said there were cases of anti-Semitic messages in social media and swastikas painted on public buildings. They also said they were concerned that some Christian churches had “adopted” Jewish and Israeli symbolism, some even defining themselves as “Jewish congregations.” The Jewish leaders said some evangelical Protestant groups had issued statements defending or otherwise speaking on behalf of Israel, which the Jewish leaders said had created some tensions between the Jewish community and other religious groups.

Members of the Muslim community said they received some hate messages on their social media sites; however, they stated that they did not believe these messages reflected a broad societal view.

U.S. embassy officials engaged the vice minister of human rights and justice and the minister of social inclusion and development on the importance of equal treatment for members of all religious groups. Embassy officials said a positive step would be for the government to modify the religious organization registration law to accord all religious groups the same rights and privileges as the Catholic Church. The U.S. government continued to support a development program with the Ministry of Governance to modify registration processes for civil society organizations by creating an online application and renewal process aimed at reducing the burden for NGOs, including religious organizations, to register and file required reports.

Embassy officials continued discussions with religious leaders and other members of religious communities, including evangelical Protestant, Moravian, and Orthodox Christians, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, Muslims, Bahais, and the Inter-Ecclesiastical Forum. These groups said they continued to be concerned over what they stated was the government’s unequal treatment of religious groups, including the absence of a registration law according all religious groups the same rights and privileges as the Catholic Church.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 9.9 million (July 2017 estimate). The Hungarian government does not collect official data on religious affiliation; however, the 2011 national census included an optional question on religious affiliation. Of the 73 percent who responded, 51 percent identified as Roman Catholic, 16 percent as Hungarian Reformed Church (Calvinist), 3 percent as Lutheran, 2 percent as Greek Catholic, and less than 1 percent as Jewish; 23 percent reported no religious affiliation, and 2 percent indicated they were atheists. Other religious groups together constituting less than 5 percent of the population include Greek Orthodox, the Faith Congregation (a Pentecostal group), the COS, Russian and other Orthodox Christian groups, other Christian denominations, Buddhists, and Muslims. The Jewish population is largely concentrated in the capital, while other religious groups are distributed around the country.

Legal Framework

The Fundamental Law, the country’s constitution, provides for freedom of conscience and religion, including freedom to choose or change religion or belief, and freedom – alone or in community with others and in public or in private – to manifest religion or belief through religious acts or ceremonies, or in any other way, in worshipping, practice, and observance. It prohibits religious discrimination as well as speech “aimed at violating the dignity” of any religious community.

The constitution’s preamble states that “We recognize the role of Christianity” in preserving the nation and “value the various religious traditions” in the country. The constitution stipulates separation between religious communities and state and the autonomy of religious groups. According to the constitution, the state may, at the request of religious communities, cooperate with them on community goals.

Implementing legislation provides for a dual system of religious communities, consisting of “incorporated churches” with which the state cooperates on community goals as outlined in the constitution, and “organizations engaged in religious activity” (religious organizations). Neither category is limited to Christian organizations.

Religious organizations acquire incorporated church status through an application submitted to the MHC and, if found eligible, by a subsequent two-thirds vote of parliament. The church is then by law entered onto a list of incorporated churches. The MHC has 60 days following the initial application to assess whether the group fulfills all the administrative criteria, which include a variety of documentation and qualification requirements. To qualify for incorporated church status, a religious group must have existed as a religious organization in the country for 20 years, in which case it must have a membership of 0.1 percent of the total population, (approximately 10,000 persons) or be registered as a religious organization and have existed for at least 100 years internationally, in which case its foreign affiliation must be certified by at least two other churches of “similar doctrine” recognized in foreign countries. Its activities must not conflict with the constitution or other laws or violate the rights and freedoms of other communities. A group must also prove that its primary purpose is to conduct religious activity; have a formal statement of faith and rites, bylaws and internal rules, and elected or appointed administrative and representative bodies; and officially declare that its activities are not in violation of the laws or the freedom of others. The MHC is obligated to consult with a qualified lawyer, historian of religions, scholar of religions, or sociologist with an academic degree prior to issuing its decision. Applicants may appeal the MHC’s decision in the Budapest Public Administration and Labor Court and, ultimately, to the Curia, the country’s highest judicial authority.

Following a favorable MHC decision on the applicant’s eligibility, the MHC submits the application to parliament’s Judiciary Committee, which has 60 days to invite the applicant to a public hearing and to submit an assessment to parliament on the group’s compliance with additional criteria. These criteria include an assessment that the group poses no threat to national security (provided by parliament’s National Security Committee), that it does not violate the right to physical and mental health or the protection of life and human dignity, and that the group is suitable for long-term cooperation with the state in promoting community goals based on its founding documents, number of members, network of institutions providing public services, and access by larger societal groups to such services.

Approval of a request for incorporated church status requires a two-thirds majority vote by parliament, which must take place within 60 days of a motion by parliament’s Judiciary Committee. If a religious group receives such parliamentary approval, the state must grant specific licenses to the group to support its participation in tasks to achieve community goals. If parliament rejects the application, a detailed explanation is required and the applicant may challenge parliament’s decision in the Constitutional Court within 15 days. The law does not prescribe any consequences if parliament does not act within the 60-day period, nor is there opportunity for appealing parliamentary inaction.

A 2011 law on religion automatically deregistered more than 300 religious groups and organizations which had previously had incorporated church status. Those organizations are required to reapply if they wish to regain incorporated church status; their applications are also subject to the approval of a two-thirds majority of parliament.

The law lists 27 incorporated churches, including the Catholic Church, a variety of Protestant denominations, a range of Orthodox Christian groups, other Christian denominations such as The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Seventh-day Adventists, the Salvation Army, several Jewish groups, and the Hungarian Society for Krishna Consciousness, the sole registered Hindu organization. The list also includes Buddhist and Muslim umbrella organizations, each encompassing a few individual groups, bringing the total number on the registered list of incorporated churches to 32.

The law authorizes the Budapest Metropolitan Court to register a group as a religious organization if it has at least 10 founding individual members whose primary objective is to conduct religious activities that do not violate the constitution, other laws, or the rights and freedom of other communities. The organization’s membership may consist only of individuals; no “legal persons” such as corporations or other associations may be members. The court must approve applications that meet all of these criteria. Applicants must submit the name and address of the organization, names and addresses of founding members, identifying information on the group’s legal representative and the term of his or her appointment, the founding documents of the group, and a statement that the primary objective of the organization is to conduct religious activities. If the court rejects an organization’s application, the decision is subject to appeal to the Budapest Metropolitan Court of Appeals.

Every registered (but not unregistered) religious community may use the word “church” in its official name regardless of whether it is officially recognized by parliament as an “incorporated church.” Officials from both incorporated churches and registered religious organizations not recognized by parliament are not obligated to disclose information shared with them in the course of their faith-related service, such as during rites of confession.

The Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU) reports that unregistered religious organizations enjoy protection for faith-related services. Unregistered groups are allowed to function and to worship but lack legal status and the rights and privileges granted exclusively to registered religious communities.

By law, no state office may determine or supervise a registered religious community’s faith-based activities. Their doctrines, internal regulations, and statutes are not subject to state review, modification, or enforcement. Their names, symbols, and rites are protected by copyright law, while buildings and cemeteries are protected by criminal law. Unregistered groups, according to HCLU, enjoy copyright and at least some other protections, but the law is unclear about the extent of those other protections.

The constitution establishes a unified system for the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights (ombudsman). The ombudsman investigates cases related to violations of fundamental rights – including religious freedom – and initiates general or specific measures for their remedy.

Incorporated churches have certain privileges not available to religious organizations, such as greater access to state funding and exemption from state oversight of their financial operations connected to religious activities. Incorporated churches and their associated institutions (classified as “internal religious legal entities”) that provide public services, such as healthcare, education, or other social services, are automatically eligible for full state subsidies (a subsidy based on the number of persons receiving services coupled with a supplementary subsidy) for all their public service activities. Religious organizations may also take over or establish public service institutions and are entitled to receive a per capita state subsidy to cover the wages of the staff employed by these institutions. They may also apply for additional funding from an additional budgetary allocation.

For incorporated churches and religious organizations that operate their own schools, the state provides subsidy, based on the number of students enrolled, for employee wages, but only incorporated churches automatically receive a supplementary subsidy for the schools’ operating expenses. According to the law, religious organizations may apply to the MHC for a supplementary operational subsidy covering approximately 30 percent of their total costs for schools, and the MHC decides on a case-by-case basis whether to grant it.

Taxpayers may allocate 1 percent of their personal income taxes to a nongovernmental organization (NGO), including a religious organization, and another 1 percent to an incorporated church (but not to any other religious organization), and the church then receives additional matching funds from the government. On July 14, the Constitutional Court ruled the provision prohibiting taxpayers from making an additional 1 percent allocation to unincorporated religious organizations was unconstitutional. According to the decision, all religious communities – including unincorporated religious organizations – should be eligible to collect the 1 percent personal income tax donations for churches. The court did not clarify whether its decision covered unregistered religious groups. The court set a deadline for parliament to modify the law by December 31. The Constitutional Court said the state can differentiate between religious communities and make its own decision about which ones it wants to support; however, it may not force its decision on citizens and constrain their religious choices. The ruling was a result of a citizen’s suit against the National Tax Authority.

Both incorporated churches and religious organizations are free to use taxpayer donations as they wish. Only officials of incorporated churches are exempt from personal income tax under certain conditions. Land owned by a religious group deregistered in 2011 may be retained by the religious organization that is the deregistered group’s legal successor. Both religious organizations and incorporated churches are prohibited from purchasing agricultural land. Incorporated churches, but not religious organizations, may acquire new agricultural land as a gift or an inheritance.

If incorporated churches or religious organizations cease to exist (e.g., by dissolving themselves) and have no legal successor, their assets become state property that must be used to finance public services. This may also occur if, upon the initiative of the government, the Constitutional Court issues an opinion that the activity of the incorporated church violates the constitution, and parliament confirms the decision by a two-thirds majority vote. The Constitutional Court also issues opinions upon the request of the Budapest Metropolitan Court on whether a religious organization is in violation of the constitution.

Treaties with the Holy See regulate relations between the state and the Catholic Church, including financing of public services and religious activities and the settlement of claims for property seized by the state during the Communist era. These treaties serve as a model for regulating state relations with other religious groups, although there are some differences in the rights and privileges the state accords to each of the religious groups with which it has agreements. The state has also concluded formal agreements with the Hungarian Reformed Church, the Hungarian Lutheran Church, the Federation of Jewish Communities in Hungary (MAZSIHISZ), and four Orthodox Churches.

Military and law enforcement personnel may freely practice their religion in private and also at their workplaces if their religious practice does not violate their mandatory service duties. The Catholic Church, the Reformed Church, the Lutheran Church, and Jewish congregations receive automatic authorization to provide chaplain services to the military; other incorporated churches and religious organizations must seek permission.

Penitentiaries generally allow inmates free practice of religion, including providing them with special diets, such as kosher, vegetarian, and pork-free meals. All incorporated churches and religious organizations must seek permission to offer pastoral services in prisons. Rejection of access requests may be appealed to the National Prison Service, the prosecutor’s office, or the ombudsman. Detainees have the right to participate in communal religious services three times a week and to contact without supervision representatives of incorporated churches or religious organizations having permission to access the facility. Detainees in special security regimes may only receive individual spiritual care and are excluded from community spiritual programs. In the case of pretrial detainees, during the course of the criminal investigation a public prosecutor or judge may restrict personal interaction with a religious representative but not participation in communal religious services.

Incorporated churches receive automatic authorization to provide pastoral services in hospitals, while religious organizations must seek permission.

One-hour-per-week faith-and-ethics or ethics-only education is mandatory through the first eight grades of public school. Students and their parents choose between the faith-and-ethics class provided by an incorporated church of their choice or a generic ethics course taught by public school teachers. Religious groups are entitled to prepare their own textbooks and determine curricula for their faith-and-ethics classes. Private schools are not obligated to introduce faith-and-ethics or ethics classes. Unincorporated religious organizations are not entitled to provide religious education as part of the mandatory curricula in public schools, but they may offer extracurricular, optional religious education in public schools if requested by students or parents.

Incorporated churches and religious organizations have the right to open their own schools. In addition, the law affords incorporated churches and religious organizations the right to assume operation of public schools through a formal agreement with the MHC. In these cases, the government continues to fund the schools. Religious communities, school teachers, the affected parents, or the operator of the school may initiate such transfers, but they can only be executed if the designated religious community is able to collect the signatures of more than 50 percent of the parents and adult students enrolled at the school. Whether newly established or converted from public status, religious schools are free to conduct their own religious teaching without government input and to make faith education mandatory and not substitutable with an ethics class. The government inspects both religious and public schools every two years to ensure they conform to government standards.

The constitution prohibits speech that violates the dignity of any religious community. The law includes a prohibition of “calling for violence” – in addition to inciting hatred – against a religious community or its members, punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment. The law provides a maximum punishment of three years in prison for impeding someone else through violence or threats from freely exercising his or her religion. Abusing an individual because of his or her religious affiliation is punishable by up to three years in prison.

Physical assault motivated by the victim’s actual or suspected religious affiliation is a felony punishable by one to five years in prison. Violence against a member of the clergy is classified as violence against an “individual providing public service” and is similarly punished with a prison sentence of one to five years. Any person who engages in preparation for the use of force against any member of a religious community is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment not exceeding two years.

The law prohibits public denial, expression of doubt, or minimization of the Holocaust, genocide, and other crimes against humanity committed by the National Socialist or Communist regimes, punishing such offenses with a maximum sentence of three years in prison. The criminal code makes wearing, exhibiting, or promoting in public the swastika, the logo of the Nazi SS, or the arrow cross in a way that harms the human dignity or the memory of victims a misdemeanor, punishable by detention for a period ranging from five to 90 days.

The law provides for the lifting of official immunity of a member of parliament (MP) who incites hatred against religious communities or publicly denies crimes of the Communist or National Socialist regimes. No MP has been the subject of such a proceeding.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph. By year’s end parliament had not amended the law as mandated by the Constitutional Court in July to allow individuals to donate a portion of their taxes to religious organizations in the same way they could to incorporated churches. The government paid a fine to a religious group as ordered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) as compensation for losses incurred by the government’s revocation of the group’s status as an incorporated church. Parliament also did not vote on any of 14 pending applications by religious groups previously found eligible for incorporation, despite a legal obligation to do so. The government launched a criminal investigation of the COS and denied for a second time permission for the group to move into headquarters in Budapest. The Constitutional Court ruled an Asotthalom law banning burqas and restricting the activities of muezzins was unconstitutional. Incorporated churches reported their reliance on financial support from the government inhibited their ability to speak out on matters of public concern. Muslim groups complained about anti-Muslim statements by PM Orban and other government officials. Jewish groups expressed concerns about PM Orban’s praise for a World War II (WWII)-era politician who signed anti-Jewish laws. The government continued its campaign and public messaging against a prominent Jewish Hungarian American business executive, which Jewish leaders said could incite anti-Semitic acts.

By year’s end, parliament had not complied with the July ruling by the Constitutional Court to amend the provisions of the religion law which the court found unconstitutional that allowed individuals to allocate an additional 1 percent of their income tax to incorporated religious groups but not to unincorporated ones. In addition, parliament again failed to revise other provisions of the religion law the Constitutional Court had previously found unconstitutional in 2015, namely that the short (four months) and peremptory legal deadline for religious groups to fulfill requirements for a change of legal status violated religious freedom. Separately in 2015, the Constitutional Court had also ruled, in agreement with a 2014 ECHR decision, that the law’s criteria for incorporated church eligibility related to the minimum membership (0.1 percent of the population) and length of operation (20 years domestically or 100 years internationally) of a religious organization violated the ECHR’s finding of an obligation of neutrality and impartiality.

In December 2016, the government’s Data Protection Authority (DPA) launched a data protection investigation of the COS. According to the COS, the DPA seized various documents and files from its offices in Budapest and Nyiregyhaza, including “preclear folders” (PCs) containing what the COS called confidential communications between penitents and their minister. The COS stated the seizure of the PCs constituted a violation of privacy and of members’ right to freedom of religion. In the same month the Church filed a legal complaint contesting the seizures, and individual COS members filed complaints with the ombudsman. On October 17, the DPA issued a report which, according to the COS, portrayed the Church’s spiritual practices as mind manipulation, a portrayal which the COS denied.

According to the COS, the DPA then filed a complaint against the Church, alleging criminal abuse of personal data, and turned over its seized materials to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On October 18, 60 NBI agents raided the COS headquarters in Budapest, seizing documents and sealing off the building. On October 19, the criminal section of the tax office, investigating possible financial crimes, executed search warrants and seized documents at COS offices in Budapest and 15 other locations. According to the COS, the authorities also froze the Church’s bank accounts and placed a lien on its Budapest headquarters. The Church’s spokesperson called the search “religious suppression under the guise of data protection.” State authorities said their actions stemmed from concerns with methods of personal information collection and storage, and not from the COS’s religious views. The COS said Church members demonstrated in front of the DPA, the tax office, and parliament following the raid. The government did not recognize the COS as an incorporated church but had approved its registration as a religious organization.

On April 25, the ECHR ordered the government to pay 3 million euros ($3.6 million) to the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship (MET) as compensation for losses in 2012-14 resulting from the government revocation of MET’s incorporated church status. The government and MET had failed to reach agreement on compensation by December 28, 2016, as ordered by the ECHR. The government made the payment on October 16, before the ECHR’s October 25 deadline.

Parliament failed again to vote on any of the 14 applications by religious groups which the MHC had previously found eligible for incorporation, despite the 60-day legal deadline for action on an MHC referral. On December 20, the Constitutional Court ruled parliament’s failure to act within the 60-day legal deadline for action violated the constitution. The MHC reported no religious groups submitted new applications for incorporated church status during the year.

The Constitutional Court ruled in April that the ban passed in 2016 by the town of Asotthalom on the wearing of burqas and chadors and on the call to prayer by muezzins was unconstitutional. The court said local authorities could not pass regulations directly affecting a basic right or restricting it.

In January the government denied for the second time a COS application for a certificate of occupancy for its headquarters and place of worship in Budapest. The government had denied the first application in May 2016 and subsequently issued an order requiring the COS to vacate the building. In January the COS challenged the denial of the certificate of occupancy in the Administrative and Labor Court of Budapest and requested a stay of the order to vacate the site. On October 12, the court denied the request for a stay of the order. The Church appealed the denial, and the appeal was pending at year’s end. COS lawyers said they believed the city of Budapest was acting “in bad faith” and that the Church remained gravely concerned the city could take away its headquarters and place of worship.

The government continued to provide approximately 94 percent of its total financial support to incorporated churches and other religious groups to the Roman Catholic Church, the Hungarian Reformed Church, the Lutheran Church, and the Jewish community, which it considered to be the country’s four “historical” religious groups, an unofficial designation the media also used. The government said more than 94 percent of citizens who reported a religious affiliation were affiliated with the four historical religious groups.

As of November 9, the government had provided 59.2 billion forints ($229 million) to incorporated churches for a range of activities, including maintenance of buildings, support for religious instruction and culture, support for community programs and investments, and wages of church employees. The government allocated additional funding for churches providing public educational and social services. Of this amount, the Catholic Church received 38.7 billion forints ($150 million), the Reformed Church 9.4 billion forints ($36.4 million), the Lutheran Church 2.9 billion forints ($11.2 million), MAZSIHISZ 2.7 billion forints ($10.4 million), and the Unified Hungarian Jewish Congregation (EMIH) 762 million forints ($2.95 million). The government support for incorporated churches also included funding to a dozen churches for renovating their buildings and organizing community programs. As part of this support the government made two allocations totaling 2.4 billion forints ($9.3 million) to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), which according to census data had approximately 2,400 members. Press reports speculated that members of the ROC, who did not have a place to worship in the western part of the country, would be able to build their own church in the town of Heviz.

Some incorporated churches expressed concern that if they spoke out on issues of public importance, the government would withdraw some of its financial support, which in many cases constituted two thirds or more of the churches’ total funding.

On December 27, the government awarded an additional 88 billion forints ($340.5 million) to some incorporated churches and religious organizations, with the Reformed Church receiving almost 59 billion forints ($228.3 million) of this total.

According to tax authorities tracking the 1 percent tax allocations designated to incorporated churches, all major churches suffered significant losses both in terms of the value and number of donations. Donations to the Catholic Church decreased from 2.6 billion forints ($10.1 million) in 2016 to 2.2 billion forints ($8.5 million). The three large historic churches – Catholic, Reformed, and Lutheran – combined lost almost 450 million forints ($1.7 million) and 120,000 tax contributors. Church leaders expressed fears that if this trend continued, the dependence of churches on the state might increase, weakening their religious autonomy. The government modified the law during the year so that, effective January 1, 2018, these declarations would not have to be submitted by individuals on a yearly basis but would be valid until the taxpayer changed them.

The number of church-run schools slightly increased. Of elementary and secondary schools, 14.3 percent were operated by incorporated churches and 0.1 percent by religious organizations in the 2016-17 school year. Of preschools (ages 3-7), 7.2 percent were operated by incorporated churches and 0.1 percent by religious organizations. Approximately 207,600 students studied at preschools and elementary and secondary schools operated by registered religious communities (incorporated churches and religious organizations), compared to 204,000 in the 2015-16 school year. Approximately half of these students were in schools operated by the Catholic Church.

Religious entities provided social services to 107,918 persons and child protection services to 8,992 persons over the year (32.4 percent by the Catholic, 27.1 percent by the Reformed, and 12.96 percent by the Hungarian Baptist churches).

On September 14, the ECHR dismissed a 2009 complaint by a former pastor, whom the Hungarian Reformed Church had dismissed for disciplinary reasons, alleging that Hungarian courts had failed to deal with a monetary claim by the pastor against the Reformed Church. The pastor had filed a suit and subsequent appeals in 2007-09, which ended with a Supreme Court finding that the dispute involved ecclesiastical law and was outside of the court’s jurisdiction. The ECHR ruled that the domestic courts’ conclusion that the case was governed by ecclesiastical rather than domestic law was not unreasonable.

There were numerous reports of perceived anti-Muslim rhetoric by government officials and politicians, including at the highest levels. Muslim groups criticized as anti-Muslim the government’s statements portraying asylum seekers and migrants, most of whom were Muslim, as dangerous for the future of the country and Europe and unable to integrate into European society. On November 3, governing Fidesz Party parliamentary group leader Gergely Gulyas said, “There will be no mosques in Hungary; that is how we respond” to acts of terrorism. In response to this comment, Zoltan Bolek, President of the Hungarian Islamic Community (HIC) issued a statement reading in part, “We have been experiencing Islamophobia for years and it is regrettable that … other churches did not stand by us against statements directed against us!”

In his remarks in Baile Tusnad, Romania on July 22, PM Orban said Europe was being de-Christianized and that “European Union leaders … are seeking a new, mixed, Muslimized Europe.” HIC President Bolek, whose members he said were almost all citizens, attributed public hostility toward the community largely to the anti-Muslim and antimigrant rhetoric of senior government officials and some media outlets. Jewish groups expressed fear that public discourse targeting certain societal groups, in this case migrants and Islam, could spread to include other minorities or religious groups.

At the European Parliament in May, PM Orban described a Jewish Hungarian-born Holocaust survivor, U.S. citizen, and business executive as a “financial speculator attacking Hungary” who had “destroyed the lives of millions of Europeans.” Frans Timmermans, Vice President of the European Commission, stated he found that language anti-Semitic, after which Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto stated the government’s disputes with the businessman had “absolutely nothing to do” with his Jewish origins.

In July the government launched a billboard campaign featuring a picture of this businessman, with text stating he should not be allowed to “have the last laugh.” MAZSIHISZ President Andras Heisler called on PM Orban in an open letter to end the campaign, which he said was not anti-Semitic, but could lead to anti-Semitic acts. Vandals spray painted a bus stop and bench with the words “Die, rotten Jews” followed by the businessman’s name, and billboards in Budapest and elsewhere were defaced with the graffiti “stinking Jew” written on the businessman’s face; images of the graffiti circulated widely on the internet and social media. The graffiti recalled the “dark periods of Hungarian history,” Heisler declared.

At a June 21 ceremony, PM Orban called WWII Regent and Hitler ally Miklos Horthy, who signed anti-Jewish laws into effect in the interwar period, an “exceptional statesman.” MAZSIHISZ President Heisler said in a statement that due to the era of anti-Semitism that was associated with Horthy’s name and his responsibility for the deaths of 600,000 Hungarian Jews and tens of thousands of Hungarian soldiers in the Don army, his era “cannot be put as an example for future generations.”

On July 18, during a visit of Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu, PM Orban declared Hungary’s failure to protect its Jewish citizens during WWII was a crime. He again stated the country had “zero tolerance towards anti-Semitism.” During his visit to the Dohany Street synagogue (the largest synagogue in Europe and the second largest in the world) with PM Orban and PM Netanyahu, MAZSIHISZ President Heisler welcomed Orban’s remarks about the country’s war-time collaboration with the Nazis, but commented there were still “two-faced assessments of the Holocaust.”

On February 14, PM Orban met with Heisler following demonstrations earlier that month in Budapest and elsewhere by extreme-right groups that included neo-Nazis. Heisler called the demonstrations “unacceptable,” and the PM agreed the government should seek a legal solution to stop them. The two men also reportedly discussed possible government assistance to rebuild the Zuglo Synagogue in Budapest, which burned down in 2016.

Speaking at the 150th anniversary of the act on the political and civil emancipation of Jewry on November 21, Under Secretary for Social and Heritage Protection and Special Cultural Investment Projects Csaba Latorcai said Jewish culture was undergoing a renaissance in the country, and the government regarded the more-than-5,000-year-old intellectual and spiritual heritage of Jews as valuable. According to Latorcai, “The survival and strengthening of Europe, and Hungary in it, should be sought in the depths of the faith rooted in the Jewish-Christian traditions and in sincere dialogue.”

On July 5, the Chabad-affiliated EMIH presented a new Hungarian translation of the Talmud to the public. EMIH Rabbi Slomo Koves thanked the government for its “support and cooperation in preserving spiritual heritage.” MHC State Secretary Miklos Soltesz urged a return to religious and cultural traditions, referencing the flourishing Jewish cultural life in the country and enumerating political and financial support for the reconstruction of many synagogues.

In July Minister of Agriculture Sandor Fazekas officiated at the opening in Csongrad County of Europe’s largest kosher slaughterhouse for geese.

In an interview on December 15, Jobbik Party Chairman Gabor Vona stated that he had pushed his party in a more centrist direction, and that it would not return to its far-right origins or to making anti-Semitic remarks. According to Vona, “The kind of anti-Semitic expressions which took place in Jobbik earlier are impossible to imagine. Or if they did, they would naturally draw the most severe sanctions.”

The government again took no action to advance the plan to open a new Holocaust museum and education center, the House of Fates; the project remained pending, although the physical infrastructure of the museum had been completed by the end of 2016. Some Jewish groups and historians criticized the museum as an attempt to obscure the involvement of Hungary and Regent Horthy in the Holocaust and stress instead the role of Hungarian rescuers. Senior government officials repeatedly issued assurances that the museum would be opened only if Jewish community representatives reached a consensus agreement on the content of museum exhibits.

The country is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

The number of physical and verbal anti-Muslim incidents increased, while the level of anti-Semitic incidents remained largely unchanged compared with the previous year, according to accounts by the respective communities. Incidents against the two groups included assault, discriminatory treatment, hate speech, and vandalism.

The Brussels Institute, founded by the NGO TEV, registered 16 incidents of anti-Semitic hate speech and two of anti-Semitic vandalism from January to June. The group reported 48 anti-Semitic incidents in 2016, compared with 52 cases in 2015 and 37 in 2014. Incidents in 2016 consisted of one threat, 10 cases of vandalism, including the painting of swastikas and other Nazi symbols, and 37 instances of hate speech, much of it on social media.

HIC, one of two existing Muslim groups, with a membership of 5,000-10,000, reported a continued increase in anti-Muslim public sentiment, although it did not cite statistics. The HIC and Organization of Muslims in Hungary cited fear among community members of physical and verbal attacks and harassment. Zoltan Sulok, head of the Organization of Muslims in Hungary, said his group’s members experienced a negative impact from antimigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric. Many members, he added, did not bother to report incidents because they did not believe doing so would lead to any effective action by authorities. Muslim organizations said individuals often associated Muslims with terrorists, and women could be threatened for wearing headscarves.

According to HIC President Bolek, frequent verbal attacks and comments on social media, such as a Jihad Watch Facebook site, incited hatred and sometimes urged action against the Muslim community. He stated the community reported that Muslim women wearing headscarves were spat upon or verbally harassed daily, but they generally did not report these incidents to the police because the police did not respond sympathetically to such complaints. Bolek called on the churches and other religions to express solidarity with Muslims and act against hate speech.

A poll of approximately 1,000 persons conducted by Zavecz Research in April found 60 percent of respondents considered Muslims to be very dangerous for the future of the country and 22 percent as slightly dangerous. Twenty-seven percent of respondents perceived Jews as very dangerous and 21 percent as slightly dangerous.

In April TEV published its 2016 annual report on domestic anti-Semitism, based on a survey conducted by the Median Opinion and Market Research Institute. The report concluded that approximately one third of citizens harbored anti-Semitic views. The study cited “cognitive” anti-Semitism (receptivity to stereotypes, misconceptions, and conspiracy theories) and “affective” anti-Semitism (emotional rejection of Jews). Between 2015 and 2016, the proportion of the population that researchers categorized as “strongly anti-Semitic” and “moderately anti-Semitic” remained consistent (20 percent and 13 percent, respectively). Eleven percent of respondents said there were no gas chambers in the concentration camps (up from 7 percent in 2006), 18 percent said Jews had “made up” a large part of the history of the Holocaust, and 24 percent said the number of Jewish victims in the Holocaust was much less than generally stated.

On November 29, Jewish leaders, politicians, and security experts discussed anti-Semitism at a TEV-organized conference titled, “Is there a Future for Jews in Europe?” Some speakers described Islamic immigrants as “dangerous” and criticized the Jobbik Party for contributing to anti-Semitism. The speakers included a representative from the American Jewish Committee and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, who praised the government for measures taken to decrease anti-Semitism, raised concerns about Jewish safety and security in Europe, addressed potential links between Islamic migration and anti-Jewish attitudes, and said some nationalist movements had elements of anti-Semitism. He also stated recent efforts to alter and distort history – including attempts to rehabilitate and erect statues to WWII-era anti-Semitic Hungarian leaders and attempts to construct the new Holocaust museum – damaged the country’s international reputation. Two other speakers faulted the government for using anti-Semitic code words in its media campaign against a Jewish businessman. Ministry of Foreign Affairs State Secretary for Security Policy and International Cooperation Istvan Mikola cited the need to “continue to fight against all forms of anti-Semitism and to ensure that everyone was free to practice their religion …”

In March HIC opened a cultural center and prayer house in one of Budapest’s districts and named it after Gyula Germanus, a 20th century professor of oriental studies and an expert on Islam. According to District Deputy Mayor Zoltan Rozgonyi (Fidesz Party), many local residents expressed concerns about the new center. Referring to the European City Charter on safeguarding the rights to safe and violence-free living conditions, he said the municipality was responsible for guaranteeing the safety of the local community. District Mayor Gergely Karacsony (opposition Dialogue Party) called the issue a matter of private real estate in which the local municipality had no say and no obligation to provide an opinion and information. He added administrative measures could only be taken if HIC breached the rules. Speaking to the press, HIC President Bolek called the building “a house of peace” and stressed there would be no place for extremism or violence there. HIC also publicly assured the mayor the HIC intended to abide by the law.

On February 6, approximately 600 members of extreme right organizations, including neo-Nazis and sympathizers of the country’s WWII-era, Nazi-collaborationist Arrow Cross Party, rallied in a prominent park in Budapest and other cities around the country for a Day of Honor commemoration of the victims of a failed attempt by German and Hungarian troops to break through Soviet lines besieging Budapest in 1945. At the Budapest rally, the former leader of the militant fascist group Army of Highwaymen, Zsolt Tyirityan, praised a Nazi paramilitary group, shouting, “Appreciation and my respect to the Waffen SS! Glory to the Waffen SS!”

On December 9, Scientologists protested in Budapest in support of religious freedom for Scientology and other faiths and to protest the law on religion that deregistered hundreds of religious groups, including the Church of Scientology. Local press estimated the number of protesters at approximately 100, while the COS said more than 1,500 persons participated. “We have come to a crossroad for religious freedom in Hungary,” said Attila Miklovicz, Director of Public Affairs of the COS Budapest. Another Scientologist, Timea Vojtilla, stated, “We want the government to ensure true religious freedom, and not let certain agencies hinder the free exercise of our religion.” The demonstration ended with the reading of the Creed of the Church of Scientology.

The Attila Hotel and Restaurant in Budapest’s 3rd District unveiled a bust in tribute to WWII Regent Horthy in its courtyard on June 17. The mayor and village council of Perkata approved another bust of Horthy in May but, due to protests, revoked their approval; that bust was instead placed in a private castle in Kaloz.

Numerous extreme ethnic nationalist websites, run by groups such as Kurucinfo, the Army of Highwaymen, Ero es Elszantsag, and HunHir, continued to publish anti-Semitic articles.

On June 1, anti-immigration activists spray painted a circle with a line drawn through a bomb and the medieval Christian Crusader motto “Deus vult!” (“God wills it!”) on the pavement in front of the HIC mosque in Debrecen. The group also published a video in which its activists – without showing their faces – said they did not want to live on a continent where “foreign cultures can crush our several-thousand-years-old heritage,” and urged people “to say no to Islamization!” HIC President Bolek called the incidents “outrageous” and “stupid.” He added that HIC was a peaceful community, and just because they were Muslims, they should not be confused with terrorists. The HIC declined to file a police report but the Hajdu-Bihar County police launched a vandalism investigation. Approximately 1,000 Muslims living around Debrecen, most of them foreign students, prayed at the mosque.

A monument commemorating Jewish slave workers killed in the Holocaust was defaced in Balf, west of Budapest, in August. A government spokesman issued a “strong condemnation” of the act. Police investigated but did not identify the perpetrators.

In frequent meetings with cabinet ministers, state secretaries and deputy state secretaries in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and other government officials, including in the Office of the Prime Minister and MHC, U.S. embassy representatives continued to advocate religious freedom and urge reconsideration of the religion law to amend those provisions that resulted in discrimination against minority religious groups. U.S. officials also voiced concerns regarding the government’s anti-Islamic rhetoric and the COS investigation.

The U.S. Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues visited the country May 17-20 and, accompanied by embassy officials, met with officials at the Office of the Prime Minister and representatives of Jewish communities, the Holocaust Memorial Center, and the House of Terror Museum. The Special Envoy encouraged government officials to intensify their efforts to restitute now-heirless property seized from Jews during the Holocaust and to develop an inventory of the heirless property that had yet to be restituted. In a press conference, he urged people to avoid using words that acquired anti-Semitic context during the 1930s and 1940s.

Embassy and visiting State Department officials met with representatives of the Jewish community to discuss anti-Semitism and the challenges of promoting tolerance education and historical truth, issues related to its legal status and relationship with the government, restitution issues, and commemoration of the Holocaust.

Embassy officials maintained regular contact with leaders of religious communities, including the four historical groups, as well as Baptists, Muslims, MET, and COS, to understand their issues of concern, encourage religious freedom and tolerance, and discuss the effects of the religion law and anti-Islamic rhetoric.

On September 25, the Charge d’Affaires hosted an interfaith breakfast with leaders of the Catholic, Reformed, Evangelical-Lutheran, and Jewish religious communities, as well as with the leaders of the HIC and the Hungarian Baptist Church to discuss the legal status of religious groups, the financial dependence of their communities on the government, and the importance of interfaith tolerance.

On April 11, in a show of support for the Bet Orim Reform Jewish Congregation, which lost its incorporated church status due to the 2011 law, the Charge d’Affaires attended a seder hosted by that group. On April 19, he participated at the commemoration of the Hungarian victims of the Holocaust at the Pava Street Holocaust Memorial Center.

The Charge d’Affaires attended and delivered remarks at the opening of the Gyula Germanus Islamic Cultural Center on March 31, where he said the purpose of the center was to share good ideas which could serve as an antibody to fear, hatred, and prejudice. On June 14, the HIC awarded the embassy the Gul Baba Award for its continuous support of the Muslim community in the country over the previous 10 years.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 340,000 (July 2017 estimate). According to the government national statistical institute, approximately 70 percent of the population belongs to the ELC, 5.8 percent to Lutheran Free churches, and 18.3 percent to other religious and “life-stance” groups. The largest non-Lutheran group is the Roman Catholic Church, with 3.8 percent of the population, 80 percent of whom are foreign born, mostly from Poland, other European countries, and the Philippines. Approximately 6.1 percent do not identify with any religious or life-stance group. The Association of Muslims in Iceland estimates there are 1,000 to 1,500 Muslims, primarily of immigrant origin from Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere. The Jewish community reports there are approximately 100 Jews.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes the ELC as the national church and stipulates the government shall support and protect it. The constitution states all individuals have the right to form religious associations and practice religion in accordance with their personal beliefs, as long as nothing is “preached or practiced which is prejudicial to good morals or public order.” It stipulates everyone has the right to remain outside religious associations and no one shall be required to pay personal dues to any religious association of which he or she is not a member. The constitution also specifies individuals may not lose their civil or national rights and may not refuse to perform civic duties on religious grounds. The constitution bans only religious teachings or practices harmful to good morals or the public order. The law further specifies the right of individuals to choose or change their religion.

The law grants the ELC official legal status, and the government directly funds it from the state budget. The state treats the ELC bishop and vice bishop and 136 other ELC ministers as civil servants under the MOJ and pays their salaries and retirement benefits as well as the operating costs of the bishop’s office. The ELC also receives indirect funding from church taxes, as do other registered religious and life-stance groups.

The penal code establishes fines of no specified amount and up to two years’ imprisonment for hate speech, including mocking, defaming, denigrating, or threatening an individual or group by comments, pictures, or symbols based on religion.

Religious groups, other than the ELC, and life-stance organizations may apply for recognition and registration to a district commissioner’s office (at present, designated as the district commissioner of Northeast Iceland), who forwards the application to a four-member panel, whom the minister of justice appoints by law, to review applications. A university faculty of law nominates the chairman of the panel, and the University of Iceland’s Departments of Social and Human Sciences, Theology and Religious Studies, and History and Philosophy, respectively, nominate the other three members. The district commissioner then approves or rejects the application in accordance with the panel’s decision. Applicants may appeal rejections to the MOJ. The applicant may resubmit his/her application, and if the resubmission provides new information, the district commissioner will review it again.

To register, a religious group must “practice a creed or religion” and a life-stance organization must operate in accordance with certain ethical values, and “deal with ethics or epistemology in a prescribed manner.” The law does not define “certain ethical values” or the prescribed manner in which groups must deal with ethics or epistemology. Religious groups and life-stance organizations must also “be well established,” “be active and stable,” “not have a purpose that violates the law or is prejudicial to good morals or public order,” and have “a core group of members who participate in its operations, support the values of the organization in compliance with the teachings it was founded on, and pay church taxes in accordance with the law on church taxes.” The law does not define “well established” or “active and stable.”

According to the district commissioner’s office of Northeast Iceland, any unregistered religious group or organization may work in the same way as any company or association, provided it has, as these other organizations do, a social security number. Unregistered religious groups may, for example, open bank accounts and own real estate. They are free to worship and practice their beliefs without restriction, as long as their activities do not cause a public disturbance, incite discrimination, or otherwise conflict with the law. Religious ceremonies carried out by religious groups, such as marriages, are not legally recognized unless the group is registered. Unregistered groups are not eligible to receive state funds.

The law specifies the leader of a religious group or a life-stance organization must be at least 25 years of age and fulfill the general requirements for holding a public position. These include being physically and mentally healthy and financially independent, not having been sentenced for a criminal offense as a civil servant, and possessing the general and specialized education legally required for the position. Unlike the requirements for most public positions, the religious or life-stance group leader need not be a citizen, but he or she must have legal domicile in the country. All registered religious groups and life-stance organizations must submit an annual report to a district commissioner’s office (currently the district commissioner’s office of Northeast Iceland) describing the group’s operations during the previous year. Religious groups and life-stance organizations are required to perform state-sanctioned functions such as marriages and the official naming of children and preside over other ceremonies such as funerals.

The law provides state subsidies to registered religious groups and life-stance organizations. For each individual 16 years of age and older who belongs to any one of the officially registered and recognized religious groups or life-stance organizations, the government allocates an annual payment of 11,040 ISK ($110) out of income taxes, called the “church tax,” to the individual’s respective, registered organization. The government allocates the payment regardless of whether the individual pays any income tax.

By law, a child’s affiliation or nonaffiliation with a registered religious or life-stance group is as follows: (1) if the parents are married or in registered cohabitation and both belong to either the same registered organization or no organization, then the child’s affiliation shall be the same as its parents; (2) if the parents are married or in registered cohabitation, but have different affiliations or if one parent is nonaffiliated, then the parents shall make a joint decision on what organization, if any, the child should be affiliated with; until the parents make this decision, the child shall remain nonaffiliated; (3) if the parents are not married or in registered cohabitation when the child is born, the child shall be affiliated with the same registered organization, if any, as the parent who has custody over the child. Change in affiliation of children under age 16 requires the consent of both parents if both have custody; if only one parent has custody, the consent of the noncustodial parent is not required. The law requires parents to consult their children about any changes in the child’s affiliation between age 12 and 16. After turning 16, children may choose affiliation on their own.

By law, schools must operate in such a manner as to prevent discrimination on the basis of religion. Grades one through 10 (ages six to 15) in public and private schools must provide instruction, by regular teaching staff, in social studies, which includes subjects such as Christianity, ethics, and theology. The law specifies the curriculum for these classes must adopt a multicultural approach to religious education, encompassing a variety of beliefs. The law also mandates that “the Christian heritage of Icelandic culture, equality, responsibility, concern, tolerance, and respect for human value” shape general teaching practices.

Parents wishing to exempt pupils from compulsory instruction in Christianity, ethics, and theology must submit a written application to the school principal. The principal may request additional information, if necessary. The principal then registers the application as a “special case” and writes an official response to the parents, accepting or denying the request. School authorities are not required to offer other religious or secular instruction in place of these classes.

Of the 12 largest municipalities in the country, eight have adopted guidelines or rules governing the interaction between public schools and religious/life-stance groups. The Reykjavik City Council prohibits religious and life-stance groups from conducting any activities, including the distribution of proselytizing material, in municipal preschools and compulsory schools (grades one through 10) during school hours or during afterschool programs. Reykjavik school administrators, however, may invite the representatives of religious and life-stance groups to visit the compulsory classes on Christianity, ethics, and theology, and on life skills. These visits must be under the guidance of a teacher and in accordance with the curriculum. Any student visits to the gathering places of religious and life-stance groups during school hours must be under the guidance of a teacher as part of a class on religion and life-stance views. During such classes or visits, students may only observe rituals, not participate in them. The municipality of Hafnarfjordur has similar rules governing the interaction between schools and religious/life-stance organizations. The other six municipalities have either adopted or adapted guidelines on these interactions that the Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture has set. The ministry’s guidelines are broadly similar to those of Reykjavik and Hafnarfjordur.

Private schools must follow the same curriculum as public schools, including the Christianity, ethics, and theology taught in social studies classes. Private schools are free, however, to offer additional classes not in the public school curriculum, including classes in specific religious faiths.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government approved the registration of two groups that had submitted applications in the previous year, the Islamic Foundation of Iceland in February and the Society of Tibetan Buddhists in June. In August the government acknowledged receipt of a new application by a life-stance organization, Ananda Marga, after the government rejected the original application in 2016, on grounds the group was not “well established.”

In November the MOJ provided a training session on hate speech, including religiously motivated hate speech, for prosecutors aimed at increasing their awareness and expertise.

In April a former teacher brought a suit against the municipality of Akureyri in the District Court of North Iceland, alleging it had unfairly dismissed him in 2012 after he posted on his personal blog language justifying his views against homosexuality based on his understanding of the Bible. The court ruled in November that the municipality should pay him 6.5 million ISK ($62,400) in compensation for wrongful termination in 2012. In 2016, the Supreme Court had upheld a lower court’s decision that the teacher’s dismissal was illegal.

According to the MOJ, in 2016, the latest year for which data were available, the government provided the ELC with approximately 6 billion ISK ($57.64 million), consisting of direct subsidies from the state budget as well as indirect funding from church taxes. The church tax also provided a total of 410.5 million ISK ($3.94 million) to the other 46 recognized religious and life-stance groups.

The ELC operated all cemeteries, and all religious and life-stance groups had equal access to them. At least one cemetery had a special area designated for burials of Muslims and people of other faiths.

Some disagreed with the church tax, since individuals who were not members of registered organizations were still required to pay it, and the government retained their contribution.

The ELC and the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at the public University of Iceland continued to train theology students for positions within the ELC.

State radio broadcast Lutheran worship services every Sunday morning as well as a daily morning devotion.

According to government policy, individuals who applied for a passport at a district commissioner’s office needed to present proof of religion from a religious organization if they wished to receive an exemption on religious grounds allowing them to wear a head covering for their passport photographs.

According to the MOJ, there were eight preliminary reports of religious hate speech during the year, six against Islam and two against religion in general. Specifics on these incidents were still pending public release at year’s end, but the MOJ said most cases of religious hate speech occurred online.

In January the Reykjanes District Court convicted a man and a woman for hate speech against individuals on the basis of their religion. In online comments posted in 2014 about the prospective construction of a mosque in Reykjavik, the two individuals had called for the chairman of the Association of Muslims in Iceland and other Muslims to be killed. The man was ordered to pay a fine of 100,000 ISK ($960) and the woman was ordered to pay a fine of 30,000 ISK ($290).

The Forum for Interfaith Dialogue and Cooperation, whose membership consisted of a large number of registered religious groups, including the ELC, Protestant, Catholic, and other Christian groups, Muslims, and Buddhists continued to meet every two months.

In some cases, ELC ministers and parishes, on a voluntary basis, served immigrant communities and helped recent arrivals of all religious groups integrate into society. Other religious groups were also free to serve immigrant communities on an informal and voluntary basis; the Islamic Foundation of Iceland organized community information and integration programs for Muslim migrants.

U.S. embassy officials met with representatives from the MOJ and the district commissioner’s office of Northeast Iceland to discuss the role of religious equality and religious tolerance in the country. Specific topics included the status and rights of religious groups in the country, including one group refused registration in the previous year, and the incidence of religiously motivated hate crimes and the prosecution of those crimes.

Embassy officials also maintained regular contact with representatives of religious groups and life stance organizations, such as the ELC, the Islamic Foundation of Iceland, the life stance organization Sidmennt, and the Norse pagan association Asatruarfelagid, to discuss such issues as their relations with the government, religious tolerance, the extent of interfaith dialogue and cooperation and efforts to expand it, and the role of religious groups in education and refugee resettlement.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.28 billion (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2011 national census, the most recent year for which disaggregated figures are available, Hindus constitute 79.8 percent of the population, Muslims 14.2 percent, Christians 2.3 percent, and Sikhs 1.7 percent. Groups that together constitute less than 1 percent of the population include Buddhists, Jains, Zoroastrians (Parsis), Jews, and Bahais. The Ministry of Tribal Affairs officially classifies more than 104 million members of Scheduled Tribes – indigenous groups historically outside the caste system who often practice animism and indigenous religious beliefs – as Hindus in government statistics. Approximately one-third of Christians also are listed as part of Scheduled Tribes.

According to government estimates, there are large minority Muslim populations in the States of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Telangana, Karnataka, and Kerala. Muslims constitute 68.3 percent of the population in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the only state in which they constitute a majority. Slightly more than 85 percent of Muslims are Sunni; most of the rest are Shia. Christian populations are found across the country but in greater concentrations in the northeast, as well as in the southern States of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Goa. Three small northeastern states have large Christian majorities: Nagaland (90 percent of the population), Mizoram (87 percent), and Meghalaya (70 percent). Sikhs constitute 54 percent of Punjab’s population. The Dalai Lama’s office estimates there are significant resettled Tibetan Buddhist communities in Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Uttarakhand, and Delhi. According to a 2009 parliamentary report, the MHA estimates the total number of Tibetan Buddhists to be 110,000.

Legal Framework

Subject to considerations of public order, morality, and health, the constitution provides for freedom of conscience and the right of all individuals to profess, practice, and propagate religion freely, and mandates a secular state. It prohibits government discrimination based on religion, including with regard to employment, as well as any religion-based restrictions on individuals’ access to public or private facilities or establishments open to the general public. The constitution states religious groups have the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, manage their own affairs in religious matters, and own, acquire, and administer property. It prohibits compelling anyone to pay taxes to promote or maintain any specific religion. National and state laws make freedom of religion “subject to public order, morality, and health.” The constitution stipulates the state shall endeavor to create a uniform civil code applicable to members of all religions across the country.

Federal law empowers the government to ban religious organizations that provoke intercommunal tensions, are involved in terrorism or sedition, or violate laws governing foreign contributions.

Eight of the 29 states have legislation restricting religious conversion: Arunachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, and Rajasthan. Five of these states enforce the laws. There is no implementing legislation for the anticonversion law in Arunachal Pradesh. Rajasthan passed a bill in 2006 that has yet to be signed into law. In August Jharkhand also passed an anticonversion bill, which was pending the governor’s approval at year’s end. Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh prohibit religious conversion by the use of “force,” “allurement,” or “fraudulent means” and require district authorities be informed of any intended conversions one month in advance. Violators, including missionaries and other religious figures who encourage conversion, are subject to fines and other penalties, such as prison sentences of up to three years in Chhattisgarh and up to four years in Madhya Pradesh if the converts are minors, women, or members of government-designated, historically disadvantaged groups (known as Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes). Gujarat mandates prior permission from the district magistrate for any form of conversion and punishes forced conversions with up to three years’ imprisonment and a fine up to 50,000 rupees ($780). In Himachal Pradesh penalties are up to two years’ imprisonment and/or fines of 25,000 rupees ($390). Punishments for conversions involving minors, Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe members, or, in the case of Odisha, women, may consist of jail sentences rather than fines. Himachal Pradesh and Odisha maintain similar prohibitions against conversion through “force,” “inducement,” or “fraud” and bar individuals from abetting such conversions. Odisha requires individuals wishing to convert to another religion and clergy intending to officiate in a conversion ceremony to submit formal notification to the government.

According to the Supreme Court, converting from Hinduism to another religion ordinarily “operates as an expulsion from the caste” since caste is a structure affiliated with Hindu society. Societal definitions of caste affiliation are determinative of a person’s eligibility for government benefits based on caste.

Under Andhra Pradesh and Telangana law, authorities may prohibit proselytizing near another religion’s place of worship. Punishment for violations can include imprisonment for up to three years and fines up to 5,000 rupees ($78).

The federal penal code criminalizes “promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion” and “acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony,” including acts causing injury or harm to religious groups and members. The penal code also prohibits “deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs.” Violations of any of these provisions are punishable by imprisonment for up to three years, a fine, or both. If the offense is committed at a place of worship, imprisonment may be for up to five years.

There are no requirements for registration of religious groups, although federal law requires religiously affiliated organizations to maintain audit reports on their accounts and a schedule of their activities and to provide these to state government officials upon request.

A federal law, known as the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA), regulates foreign contributions to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including faith-based organizations. Organizations with “definite cultural, economic, educational, religious or social programs” must receive a federal government certificate of registration to receive foreign funds. The federal government may also require that certified organizations obtain prior permission before accepting or transferring foreign funds. The federal government may reject an application for a certificate of registration or a request for prior permission to transfer funds if it judges the recipient to be prejudicially affecting “harmony between religious, racial, social, linguistic, regional groups, castes, or communities.”

The constitution states any reference to Hindus in law is to be construed as containing a reference to followers of Sikhism, Jainism, and Buddhism, meaning they are subject to laws regarding Hindus, such as the Hindu Marriage Act. Subsequent legislation passed throughout the 1950s continues to use the word Hindu to include Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and others, but clarifies these are separate religions whose followers are included under this legislation.

Federal law provides minority community status to six religious groups: Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Parsis, Jains, and Buddhists. State governments may grant minority status to religious groups that are minorities in a particular region and designate them as minorities under state law. Minority status makes these groups eligible for several government assistance programs. The constitution states the government will protect the existence of religious minorities and encourage conditions for the promotion of their individual identities.

Personal status laws are applicable only to certain religious communities in matters of marriage, divorce, adoption, and inheritance. The government grants significant autonomy to personal status law boards in drafting these laws. Law boards are selected by community leaders; there is no formal process, and selection varies across communities. One personal law board governs all the denominations and sects within a particular religious community. Hindu, Christian, Parsi, and Islamic personal status laws are legally recognized and judicially enforceable. These laws, however, do not supersede national- and state-level legislative powers or constitutional provisions. If the law boards cannot offer satisfactory solutions, the case is referred to the civil courts.

Federal law permits interreligious couples to marry without religious conversion. Interreligious couples, as is the case for all couples marrying in a civil ceremony, are required to provide public notice 30 days in advance, including addresses, photographs, and religious affiliation, for public comment. Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, or Jains who marry outside their religions, however, face the possibility of losing their property inheritance rights under those communities’ personal status laws.

The law recognizes the registration of Sikh marriages. There are no divorce provisions for Sikhs under personal status laws, however, and other Sikh personal status matters fall under Hindu codes. Under the law, any person, irrespective of religion, may seek a divorce in civil court.

The constitution prohibits religious instruction in government schools. The law permits private religious schools.

Twenty-four of the 29 states apply partial to full restrictions on bovine slaughter. Penalties vary among states, and also may vary based on whether the animal is a cow, calf, bull, or ox. In the majority of the 24 states where bovine slaughter is banned, punishments include imprisonment for six months to two years and a fine of 1,000 to 10,000 rupees ($16 to $160). Rajasthan, Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, and Jammu and Kashmir penalize cow slaughter with imprisonment of two to 10 years. On March 31, the Gujarat government passed a law increasing the penalties for killing cows, selling beef, and illegally transporting cows or beef. The new law mandates a minimum 10-year sentence (the punishment for some counts of manslaughter) and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment (the punishment for premeditated murder of humans) for these offenses.

The National Commission for Minorities, which includes representatives from the six designated religious minorities and the National Human Rights Commission, investigates allegations of religious discrimination. The Ministry of Minority Affairs may also conduct investigations. These bodies have no enforcement powers but launch investigations based on written complaints by plaintiffs charging criminal or civil violations and submit their findings to law enforcement agencies for action. Eighteen of the country’s 29 states and the National Capital Territory of Delhi have state minorities commissions, which also investigate allegations of religious discrimination.

The constitution allows for a form of affirmative action for Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe communities, and the “Other Backward Class” – a category for groups deemed to be socially and educationally disadvantaged. Since the constitution specifies only Hindus, Sikhs, or Buddhists shall be deemed a member of a Scheduled Caste, the only means through which Christian and Muslim individuals may qualify for affirmative action benefits as members of religious communities is if they are considered members of the “backward” classes due to their social and economic status.

The government requires foreign missionaries of any religious group to obtain a missionary visa.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: Authorities often did not prosecute violence by vigilantes against persons, mostly Muslims, suspected of slaughtering or illegally transporting cows or trading in or consuming beef. Members of civil society and religious minorities said, under the current government, religious minority communities felt more vulnerable to Hindu nationalist groups engaging in violence against non-Hindu individuals and places of worship. Religious minority communities stated, while the national government sometimes spoke out against incidents of violence, local political leaders often did not, and at times made public remarks that individuals could interpret as condoning violence. Some long-standing legal cases involving religiously motivated violence and riots continued to advance slowly. In May the Kerala High Court annulled a marriage between a Hindu woman and a Muslim man based on third-party allegations the woman was forcibly converted to Islam, despite her denial she was forced to do so. On August 22, the Supreme Court ruled the practice through which a Muslim man could divorce his wife instantly by saying the word “talaq” (Arabic for divorce) three times was unconstitutional. On May 23, the government banned the sale of cattle for slaughter through animal markets. In July the Supreme Court stayed the implementation of the order across the country for three months; the government was expected to withdraw the ban after receiving negative feedback from state-level agricultural sectors but had not done so by year’s end. The government continued its challenge to the minority status of Muslim educational institutions in the Supreme Court. Minority status afforded these institutions independence in hiring and curriculum decisions.

According to media, on June 27, the Gujarat High Court granted bail to Atul Vaidya, a VHP leader who was one of 24 convicted in the 2002 anti-Muslim “Gulberg Society” killings. In June 2016, a Gujarat special court convicted 24 individuals (11 of whom received sentences of life imprisonment) and acquitted 36 others for their role in the mob killing of 69 persons in the Gulberg Society neighborhood during the 2002 Gujarat riots. This incident was one of 10 mass killings in 2002 in Gujarat, which perpetrators of the violence said was in retaliation for the burning to death of 59 Hindu pilgrims on a train on February 27, 2002. According to media, on October 5, the Gujarat High Court dismissed an appeal submitted by Zakia Jafri, one of the Gulberg Society survivors. Jafri requested a new investigation into 58 individuals, including then-Chief Minister (and now prime minister) Narendra Modi, for conspiracy in the 2002 riots. According to press reports, the High Court stated Jafri could approach either the trial court or the Apex Court to seek a reinvestigation into her allegations challenging a 2013 ruling by a Supreme Court-appointed panel that stated there was insufficient evidence to prosecute the 58 individuals

In September the Allahabad High Court granted bail to the 18 individuals charged with participating in the September 2015 mob lynching of Mohammad Akhlaq Saifi in Dadri, Uttar Pradesh, for allegedly slaughtering a cow. In September 2016, investigating officials concluded there was no evidence to prove Akhlaq or his family ever slaughtered a cow. In October 2017 media reported a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) state legislator in Uttar Pradesh was working to help the 18 charged individuals out on bail secure employment and the family of one of the accused that died in jail would receive 800,000 rupees ($12,500).

In September the Rajasthan High Court granted bail to five of the seven individuals arrested for killing Pehlu Khan, a Muslim dairy farmer from Haryana, on the basis of a video of the attack gone viral. In September authorities also closed an investigation into six other individuals whom Khan had identified as participants in the attack. On April 1, a group of 200 so-called “cow vigilantes” had attacked Khan in Alwar while he was transporting two cows and two calves in the back of his truck; Khan died two days later.

On March 22, a National Investigation Agency (NIA) Special Court sentenced two workers from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu nationalist organization, to life imprisonment for the 2007 explosion at the shrine of Sufi mystic Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti in Ajmer, Rajasthan. The blast, which occurred just before an iftar, killed three persons.

On April 9, a member of Telangana’s legislative assembly, T. Raja Singh Lodh, reportedly stated he would behead those opposing the construction of the Ram temple at a disputed site in Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh. Media outlets widely perceived his comments as targeting Muslims, whom the media expected to oppose the construction of a Hindu temple over the site where a mosque stood during the Mughal Empire. The Hyderabad police charged Lodh for taking deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs. On May 13, police charged Lodh and Mohammed Abdul Majid, of the Islamic Darsgah-Jihad-O-Shahadath (DJS) organization, for promoting enmity between different groups on the basis of religion. The charges were based on alleged statements related to maintaining private armies to defend Hinduism and Islam, respectively. On July 27, the Telangana Law Department permitted police to prosecute Lodh for hate speech for inflammatory remarks he delivered at a “cow protection” rally in September 2013.

On July 13, Prime Minister Narendra Modi condemned a rise in deadly mob attacks on cattle traders, consumers of beef, and dairy farmers, and said killing persons in the name of protecting cows was unacceptable. On July 21, in response to a petition filed by social activist Tehseen Poonawala asking authorities to take action against “cow vigilantes,” Solicitor General Ranjit Kumar stated the federal government did not support “cow vigilantism” but that actions to curb such incidents needed to be taken at the state level.

On April 14, the Punjab government announced the formation of a commission, led by retired Justice Ranjit Singh, to investigate the October 2015 police shootings during widespread Sikh protests, which killed two and injured 80 protesters. Sikhs protested in five districts after reports a Sikh holy book had been desecrated by unknown persons. The state government formed the new commission after several Sikh organizations said the sacrilege case was “compromised” by the previous commission, led by former Press Council of India Chairman and retired Supreme Court Justice Markandey Katju, which had investigated the incident at the behest of several human rights NGOs. On June 28, the new commission recommended charges against the police officers involved for “unwarranted firing,” and compensation of 2.5 million rupees ($39,200) and regular employment to family members of Gujreet Singh and Krishan Bhagwan Singh, both killed in the shootings. By year’s end, authorities had not paid compensation to the victims.

Press reports noted the Supreme Court formed a new Special Investigation Team (SIT) to assess 186 cases related to anti-Sikh riots in Delhi and Punjab in 1984. Reports said the SIT would include a retired High Court judge, a police officer of the rank of inspector general, and a serving police officer of the rank of superintendent. Previously, on August 16, the court had appointed a supervisory panel made up of two retired judges to examine a previous SIT’s decision to close 241 cases due to lack of evidence. The court asked the supervisory panel to produce a report on their finding in three months. The supervisory panel determined 186 cases out of the 241 should be investigated further.

On May 4, the Bombay High Court upheld the conviction of 11 individuals sentenced to life imprisonment in January 2008, for participating in the gang rape of pregnant 19-year-old Bilkis Bano during the 2002 communal riots in Gujarat. The twelfth individual convicted for the crime died before the May ruling. The court also set aside the previous acquittal by a lower court of seven other individuals – five police officers and two doctors – accused of participating in the rape and convicted of failing to perform their duties and tampering with evidence. The court rejected the Criminal Bureau of Investigation’s request to change the penalties of the three “main perpetrators” from life sentences to death penalties.

Members of civil society and religious minorities stated that under the current BJP government religious minority communities felt more vulnerable due to Hindu nationalist groups engaging in violence against non-Hindu individuals and places of worship. Religious minority communities stated, while the national government sometimes spoke out against incidents of violence, local political leaders often did not, and at times made public remarks individuals could interpret as condoning violence. On April 2, Chhattisgarh’s BJP Chief Minister Raman Singh told reporters anyone killing a cow in his state would be hanged. In a speech at University of Bangalore on August 7, then-Vice President of India Hamid Ansari said Dalits, Muslims, and Christians were feeling increasingly insecure. In an August 10 interview, Ansari stated there was a feeling of “unease” and “insecurity creeping in” among Muslims in the country. His remarks drew criticism from the BJP and Hindu nationalist groups.

On May 21, Madhya Pradesh police arrested six Christians for allegedly kidnapping 72 minors with the intention of forcibly converting them to Christianity. The children’s parents stated they were already Protestants and had given consent for their children to attend a summer Vacation Bible School (VBS) camp in Nagpur under the care of the arrested Christians. Police stated the children’s families had not provided proof they had already converted to Christianity. According to the Christian NGO Morning Star News (MSN), on June 12, the state high court denied bail to the six VBS volunteers: Ameya Jaal, Alkesh Ganava, Pandu Singh Vasuniya, Nitin Mandod, Lalu Babore, and Vijay Meda, a 17-year-old minor. Authorities reportedly held one of the VBS attendees, 15-year-old Akash Gundia, in juvenile detention center for nearly a month before releasing him on June 20. Gundia said children as young as six years old were also in police custody until police released them when their parents arrived. His father, Singh Gundia, told MSN, “I got to know from the police station that police had not intended to file the case, but that there was pressure from RSS [a self-defined Hindu nationalist group] and Bajrang Dal activists, because of whom my child spent 25 days in judicial custody.” NGO Human Rights Without Frontiers (HRWF)’s Prisoners List 2017 stated, although it was reported police released the children to their parents, there was no precise information on the status of the 71 children besides Gundia.

Media reported police arrested seven Christian pastors – Stanley Jacob, Vijay Kumar, Sumit Varghese, David from New Delhi, Amit from Mathura, Anita from Hathras, and Dinesh from Rajasthan – on December 4 while they were holding a prayer meeting in a private home. The following day a court sentenced them to 14 days in judicial custody for carrying out a forcible conversion campaign. Family members of the seven pastors said local residents were upset because some individuals were converting to Christianity.

According to news sources, on March 12, the Ghaziabad police arrested four men after the anti-Muslim video they uploaded on WhatsApp went viral. Authorities charged Ajay Chaprana, Prakash Dubey, Nakul Nagar, and Mukesh Yadav, all under the age of 25, with using inappropriate language, fanning communal hatred, making abusive comments against a community, and uploading the video to various social media. The video was deleted and the accused men were sent to judicial custody. No updates were available at year’s end.

MSN reported police arrested Christian teenager Karan Anthony on August 23 for promoting enmity between classes. His former classmate and friend Sathin Gaur had filed a police complaint that Anthony posted anti-Hindu comments on Facebook. Anthony denied the charge, saying he had not used Facebook in months because whenever he posted something about Christianity, his classmates started sending abusive comments to him. Anthony told MSN, “It was my good friend who falsely framed me by joining hands with Rudra Sena [a self-defined Hindu nationalist group] activists.” Police held Anthony in jail for 12 days, and then released him on bail on September 3.

On March 28, media reported Madhya Pradesh police arrested Dr. Aatik Khan after an individual objected to his sharing an image on social media of a sadhu (Hindu ascetic) standing near a meat shop. Police reportedly said the post mocked the closure of illegal slaughterhouses in Uttar Pradesh and, as directed by Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath, charged Khan for making statements conducive to “public mischief.”

On June 15, the government railway police forced a Catholic nun, three women, and a minor to disembark from a train in Satna, Madhya Pradesh, after Matrushakti, the women’s wing of VHP, accused the nun of forcible conversion. Police released the detainees but later charged Sister Bina Joseph for abduction of a minor after the child’s parent filed a complaint. Prior to the incident, Father Stephen P. Maria, the public relations officer of the Catholic Diocese of Madhya Pradesh, had submitted a statement to railway police reporting harassment of Christian missionaries traveling by train in the region.

The media reported on May 25 that the Kerala High Court annulled a marriage between a Hindu woman and a Muslim man, based on third-party allegations the woman was forcibly converted to Islam. Acting upon a petition from the woman’s father, the court ordered the woman to return to her parents’ home. She denied that she was forced to convert. On July 6, the husband appealed the Kerala High Court ruling to the Supreme Court, arguing his wife had consented to conversion. The Supreme Court accepted the case and referred it to the NIA, which stated the case of the woman converting from Hinduism to Islam was not an isolated one and it could be part of a larger plot by Muslim men to convert Hindu women. Following this statement, the Supreme Court ordered the NIA to investigate the allegations of forced conversion in this case. On November 27, after the wife appeared before the Supreme Court, it ruled she could leave her parent’s custody and return to her college in Kerala under the supervision of the school’s superintendent. Media reported that on December 9, she reunited with her husband at the college for the first time in more than a year.

On May 23, the central government issued a regulation banning the sale of cattle for slaughter through animal markets. Some observers reportedly expressed concern that the ban would most negatively impact Muslims, who dominate the country’s quarter trillion rupee ($3.9 billion) buffalo meat export industry. In July the Supreme Court stayed the implementation of the order for three months. According to media reports, the ban resulted in major protests from farmers, beef-consuming states, and an adverse order from the Supreme Court. On November 30, a senior official at the Ministry of Environment, Forest, and Climate Change said the government was “considering certain changes, which will make rules more acceptable” but no updates were available by the end of the year.

On August 25, the Supreme Court clarified its verdict declaring privacy a fundamental right would also have a bearing in matters related to the possession of beef in Maharashtra. Earlier that month the Supreme Court agreed to hear a Maharashtra government appeal of the May 2016 Bombay High Court ruling that a portion of the state’s 2015 beef ban was unconstitutional. The Bombay High Court stated Maharashtra could not prohibit possession of beef from cows slaughtered outside the state because doing so would violate the right of citizens to possess and consume food of their choice. The Supreme Court had not heard the appeal by year’s end. Consumers, butchers, and sellers in Maharahstra State said they remained vulnerable to prosecution in court because the burden of proof the cow was not slaughtered in Maharashtra rested on the accused.

On September 6, the Supreme Court directed all state governments to appoint a senior police officer in each district to prevent and respond effectively to incidents of “cow vigilantism.” A three-judge panel also directed the chief secretaries of all state governments to report on actions taken to prevent incidents of “cow vigilantism.”

On August 22, the Supreme Court ruled the provision of Muslim personal law permitting a Muslim man to divorce his wife instantly by saying the word “talaq” (Arabic for divorce) three times was unconstitutional. The court preserved all other aspects of Muslim personal law, including other forms of divorce. The ruling came in response to a petition a Muslim woman, Shayara Banu, filed in 2016.

On September 8, the Jammu and Kashmir State government imposed restrictions in parts of Srinagar limiting protests against Burmese treatment of its Muslim Rohingya population. The restrictions included a ban on Friday Islamic prayers. The Muttahida Majlis-e-Ulema (MMU), a Kashmiri council of Muslim leaders and scholars, had called for protests following Friday prayers to express solidarity with Rohingya, and authorities placed under house arrest MMU leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq. An MMU spokesperson stated “the government continues to follow the policy of oppression, and disallowing Friday prayers is a direct interference in religious activity.”

In March the U.S. faith-based organization Compassion International, which the government had placed on its prior approval list, closed its operations in the country because it could not transfer funds to its local implementing partners. Compassion International maintained that the government used the law to restrict the work of Christian charitable organizations.

In July the Maharashtra Prohibition of People from Social Boycott (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act became law – the first law of its kind in the country to punish social excommunication and abuses by extrajudicial caste and community courts. Pune city resident Umesh Rudrap filed the first complaint in Maharashtra against his community council, the Telugu Madelwar Parit Community, after it sanctioned a social boycott following his intercaste marriage. The boycott prevented him from attending religious ceremonies in his community.

The Chhattisgarh Christian Forum reported that on July 14, in Belwapar village of Sukma District, a mob attacked 18 Christian families and vandalized property while the families attended a prayer meeting at a local Christian’s home. The forum stated police did not press charges against the assailants, and that the Christian families were subsequently under threat of social boycott in the village and of being arrested as Maoist insurgents. The Forum reported local police did not investigate incidents of a similar nature occurring in 22 villages in southern Chhattisgarh during the year.

MSN reported police detained six Christians on June 27 for unlawful assembly, defined as knowingly joining or continuing in any assembly of five or more persons after being commanded to disperse. Pastor Asha Ram Sahni said Station House Officer Aravind Kumar berated and slapped him multiple times for reading the Bible instead of Hindu texts. Another detainee, Gurudeen, said Kumar told him, “You instigate people and convert them to Christianity, and you consume beef too. You will spend your life in jail.” Gurudeen said the inspector reportedly sent police officers to his house to harass his wife for four days during his incarceration. The other four detainees were Chote Lal, Ram Naresh, Gobrey Nishad, and Lal Bihari Verma. HRWF reported all six were granted bail and released on July 5.

On September 28, the Maharashtra State government announced that “neo-Buddhists” (Dalits who adopted Buddhism in the mid-twentieth century) were eligible for minority welfare benefits in the state. Members of Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, Sikh, Parsi, and Jain minority communities continued to be eligible for minority welfare benefits in the state.

On March 19, more than 100 persons, many of whom stated they were “cow protectors,” protested in front of a hotel owned by a Muslim in Jaipur and alleged that the hotel was serving beef, which is banned in Rajasthan. The Jaipur Municipal Corporation, an urban-level government body, reportedly shut down the hotel following the protests, triggering nationwide condemnation. One media report stated the community was primarily upset about the manner in which the hotel was disposing nonvegetarian foods, which were subsequently eaten by the nearby cows. On May 9, police stated forensic examination of meat samples seized from the hotel ruled out the possibility that it was from a cow. The hotel reopened on June 1, after having remained closed for 74 days.

Summary paragraph: There were reports of hundreds of religiously motivated killings, assaults, riots, restrictions on the right to practice religion and proselytize, discrimination, and attacks on property. Groups most frequently targeted were Muslims and Christians. Cow protection groups, many of whose members believed cow slaughter and eating beef were an attack on the Hindu deities representing motherhood, carried out several violent attacks, including killings, beatings, harassment, and intimidation against consumers of beef or those involved in the beef industry.

According to the MHA 2016-17 Annual Report, from January through May, there were 296 conflicts between religious communities, resulting in 44 deaths and 892 injuries. MHA reported 703 “communal incidents” in 2016, resulting in 86 deaths and 2,321 injuries, compared with 751 such incidents in 2015, resulting in 97 deaths and 2,264 injuries. MHA defined “communal incidents” as violent conflicts involving religious communities on the issues of organizing religious congregations, desecration of religious symbols, and the ownership of community properties and facilities.

According to media data project IndiaSpend, 63 incidents of cow-linked violence occurred between 2010 and June 2017, leading to 28 deaths. Ninety-seven percent of those incidents occurred between 2014 and 2017, and 86 percent of those killed were Muslim. There were 11 deaths related to “cow vigilantes” during the year, the highest toll since 2010, when IndiaSpend began collecting data.

The Religious Liberty Commission of the Evangelical Fellowship of India (EFI-RLC) documented at least 351 cases of violence and attacks against Christians and churches during the year, compared with 300 in 2016 and 177 in 2015. It noted the year had been one of the most traumatic for the Christian community. The EFI-RLC urged the government to intervene and uphold the rule of law to restore community confidence in the government. EFI general secretary Vjayesh Lal remarked the instances of attacks on churches on Sundays and other important days of worship – Palm Sunday, Good Friday, Easter, and Christmas – had increased, and Hindu nationalists attacked “even private worship,” “violating the privacy and sanctity of an individual or a family and trampling upon their constitutional rights.” An analysis of the year’s data showed Tamil Nadu with the highest incidence of violence against Christians, with 52 cases, followed by Uttar Pradesh with 50; Chhattisgarh, 43; Madhya Pradesh, 36; and Maharashtra, 38. Six cases were reported in Delhi.

According to the Union of Catholic Asian News (UCAN), Persecution Relief, an interdenominational Christian NGO, recorded 736 attacks on Christians during the year, compared with 348 in 2016. The report stated Hindu attacks on Christians doubled as part of an unprecedented trend to portray Christians as acting against the state, the country’s religious tolerance, and the national ethos. Most police complaints filed against Christians reportedly accused them of crimes, including committing sedition, working against religious tolerance, discriminating against others, acting against integration, defiling places of worship, and insulting other religions. The founder of Persecution Relief told UCAN, “In 99 percent of cases, [Hindus] bring false witnesses and charge victimized Christians with serious offenses like sedition.” He added, if sedition charges were proved, the accused could be sentenced to life in prison.

On June 22, assailants stabbed to death 16-year-old Junaid Khan on a train in Haryana during an argument over a seat. According to the press and eye-witness accounts, the perpetrators accused Khan of being a “beefeater,” fatally stabbed him, and threw him off the train. Two of Khan’s brothers were injured in the incident. Haryana police arrested six accused in connection with the incident, including Naresh Kumar and Rameshwar Dass. By August local courts had reportedly granted bail to four of the six after police dropped charges of rioting, unlawful assembly, and common intention (intent to commit murder). Authorities continued to investigate the railway police officer’s reported failure to intervene. On June 28, in response to this incident and recent “cow vigilante” attacks, civil society groups organized countrywide protests. Known as the Not In My Name campaign, thousands of participants in more than 10 cities condemned cow-vigilante violence and called for the government to take more decisive action.

On December 6, media reported a Hindu man, Shambhulal Regar, hacked, burned alive, and killed a Muslim laborer whose burned body police found the next morning. The attacker filmed himself leading the victim to a secluded spot, attacking him with a weapon, and setting on fire the unconscious man. Then he faced the camera to warn against “love jihad,” “or else you will meet the fate of this man.” In a press conference, a police spokesperson called the incident a brutal crime, and announced a special investigation team, the arrest of the attacker, and beginning an investigation.

Authorities in Tamil Nadu charged six Muslim youths with murder for the March 17 killing in Coimbatore of H. Farooq, who had reportedly posted material supporting atheism on social media. Their trial began in October; no update was available at year’s end.

On July 15, two unidentified men on a motorcycle shot and killed Sultan Masih, the pastor of an independent church in Punjab. Punjab Chief Minister Amarinder Singh said the killers would be brought to justice and promised 500,000 rupees ($7,800) to Masih’s widow and a job with local police for one of Masih’s sons. On December 1, media reported the NIA arrested two men who had ties to Sikh violent extremist elements. Ramandeep Singh and Hardeep Singh reportedly admitted involvement in eight murders and attempted murders in Punjab since 2016, including Masih’s. Their trial was ongoing at year’s end.

On July 17, in Muzaffarnagar District, Uttar Pradesh, Naseem Khan was killed by members of his wife’s family two years after she converted to Islam and married him against her family’s wishes. The police filed initial charges against four members of the wife’s family, who remained in custody awaiting trial at year’s end.

Media reported on September 25 that a 28-year-old Hindu woman registered a complaint with the Kerala High Court that she was detained by her father and other family members and taken to the Yoga and Charitable Trust center where she was confined for 22 days for marrying a Christian man. The woman said while she was held captive along with 65 others, they were physically assaulted by five individuals and taught the “evils of Christianity and Islam.” She said they were also subjected to sexual assault. According to the woman, her family pressured her to marry a Hindu, and she left the center on August 21 after pretending to agree with her family’s demands. The Udhayamperur police registered a case against six individuals, including the woman’s brother-in-law, Manoj Guruji, who ran the yoga center with four others. Following the complaint, police issued a notice seeking immediate closure of the center because it did not have a license. The center counselor said the allegations of torture and sexual assault were baseless and the woman had attended yoga and counseling to treat her depression.

On April 25 in Reasi, Jammu and Kashmir State, a group of “cow vigilantes” attacked a Muslim family, leaving at least seven persons injured. The family members were transporting a herd of cattle when the individuals attacked them. Media report that police charged 11 individuals involved in the incident with attempted murder. Police also charged the Muslim family with transporting cattle without permission.

Media reported a group of 10 unidentified members of the Hindu nationalist organization Jagaran Vedike physically attacked and smeared black oil on the face of writer Yogesh Master in Davangere, Karnataka on March 12. Master said the group threatened to kill him for writing against Hindu gods. Police arrested two attackers and reportedly continued to search for the remaining eight.

Multiple media reports stated communal riots took place on July 3, approximately 30 miles outside Kolkata in two Muslim-majority areas of West Bengal’s North 24 Parganas District after a Hindu teenager made a Facebook post that some Muslims said was offensive. Muslim and Hindu mobs attacked the police, ransacked shops and homes, and blocked the highway leading to Bangladesh. West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee blamed the BJP for inciting violence. BJP leaders blamed Bangladeshi Muslims, while Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress Party held Hindu nationalists responsible. There were no reported injuries or deaths.

EFI reported at least five incidents on April 9, targeting Christians in Madhya Pradesh, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu. In Kaithal, Haryana, local Hindus reportedly disrupted a church meeting and accused worshippers of attempting to induce locals to convert to Christianity. Police detained the pastor and worshippers but later released them. In Sri Ganganagar, Rajasthan, Hindus disrupted a Church of God service; police subsequently arrested the church’s pastor and seven worshippers for reportedly converting local villagers. Police released them after local Christian leaders intervened.

On May 6 and 7, media reports and others stated VHP and Bajrang Dal activists confronted a group of Muslims in the town of Utnoor in Adilabad District, Telangana. Following the confrontation, Hindu activists attacked local police. The attackers injured 10 police officers and damaged property. The incident followed the circulation of a WhatsApp audio clip members of the Hindu community considered offensive. Hindu activists filed a complaint with police upon discovering the audio clip, but when they believed police did not act quickly enough, they attacked Muslim-owned properties. Muslim groups retaliated by pelting stones at the Hindu activists. Police intervened and the Muslim groups withdrew, but the Hindu activists pelted stones at police. Police arrested some individuals involved in the incident and the case continued through year’s end.

On June 7, during Ramadan, a mob demolished a mosque under construction in New Delhi. Two days later a mob assaulted and handed over to police Basit Malik, a Kashmiri Muslim freelance journalist who had gone to the neighborhood to investigate the demolition. On June 7, media reported police charged seven individuals with trespassing and mischief causing damage. Malik reportedly declined to file a police complaint.

On August 25, communal clashes occurred after a cow carcass was spotted near Muslim households in Adauli village in Uttar Pradesh. The following day police reportedly arrested five individuals and detained 10 others for interrogation. The senior superintendent of police told a news agency they registered three cases for cow slaughter, stone pelting, and damaging two mosques in the village.

On February 24, a mob of approximately 200 Hindus attacked a group of 1,700 Christians who had gathered at a peace festival organized by 12 churches from the Delhi and National Capital Region in Badarpur, Delhi. According to EFI, the mob assaulted persons in seats and on stage, and vandalized property, resulting in a significant financial loss of the organizers. Global Christian News (GCN) said many were injured, including a pastor who bled from his nose and mouth for several hours after 10-15 assailants beat him. The next day police filed charges against the attackers. No updates were available at year’s end.

On April 6 and 7, violence broke out in the town of Bhadrak in Odisha after three Muslim youths reportedly posted comments on Facebook against Hindu deities. The district administration imposed a curfew, shut down internet service for 48 hours, and deployed additional police forces. The unrest included incidents of arson and damage to an estimated 500 commercial and residential properties. A government estimate put the total loss at 90 million rupees ($1.4 million). Civil society activists blamed the district administration for contributing to an escalation in tensions by permitting a bikers’ rally that reportedly displayed pro-Pakistan slogans. An activist pointed to the failure of the state and district administrations to follow the Ministry of Home Affairs’ standard operating procedure for maintaining communal harmony. Police arrested 146 persons and announced compensation ranging from 15,000 rupees ($240) to 200,000 rupees ($3,100) to the owners of damaged properties.

Media reported a March 25 dispute between two Hindu and Muslim high school students in Vadavali village in the Patan district of Gujarat escalated into a mob attack on the village’s Muslim residents. The mob set homes and vehicles on fire, ransacking around 50 houses and many vehicles. Two persons died, one of them in police firing, and ten others were injured.

Media reported that, on August 20, police arrested 39 Wisdom Global Islamic Mission (WGIM) members in Paravoor, Kerala State, on charges of “disrupting communal harmony” for attempting to distribute pamphlets. Muslim leaders stated the arrests were made at the behest of Hindu activists and said Hindus had physically attacked the WGIM members at the police station prior to the arrests. According to media reports, Kerala Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan told the state legislative assembly the pamphlets distributed by the WGIM members criticized polytheists and idol worshippers. A local court granted bail to the arrested WGIM members and stated they were exercising their constitutional rights.

In February students of Government First Grade College in the Uttara Kannada District of Karnataka protested against three guest faculty members from the Muslim community wearing burqas, according to College principal professor Manjula. Some protesters in turn triggered a threat of action from a Muslim organization, Tanjim, against the faculty members should the faculty members not wear burqas to the school. The protest ended after Manjula told students they would face legal consequences if they continued to create problems. At year’s end, one of the guest faculty members remained at the college and continued wearing a burqa.

On September 21, media reported members of Hindu nationalist political party Shiv Sena forced more than 500 meat shops to shut down in Gurugram, Haryana, during Navratri, a Hindu festival observed twice a year when many Hindus abstain from eating meat. On March 28, 200 Shiv Sena activists reportedly forced all meat shops in Gurugram to close during Navratri.

MSN reported that on January 21, VHP members threatened K.A. Swamy and took him to the police station to prevent him from distributing copies of the Bible to passersby in Hyderabad. GCN said video clips went viral on social media showing six men using derogatory language against him, his wife, and his children. They reportedly forced him to put his Bible on his head and swear that he would no longer distribute Bibles. Afterwards, they took him to the police station where police reportedly questioned and released him without charge. According to GCN, on his ride home Swamy suffered a brain hemorrhage and a paralytic stroke – most likely due to hypertension, according to MSN. He went into a coma but eventually recovered; his wife told MSN he was discharged from the hospital and doing better, as of May 9. The VHP denied that its members had physically harassed Swamy and stated its activists only verbally confronted Swamy when he was offending Hindu deities. Following a complaint filed by Swamy’s wife, police arrested three VHP activists.

Media reported VHP’s joint general secretary on October 9 told Christian missionaries to leave the country and said VHP would hold a rally called “Quit India.” He added VHP would not allow a single Christian missionary to remain in the country.

On June 9, the Christian community in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, protested the publication of a Hindi language textbook they said characterized Jesus Christ as a “devil” (the textbook used the Hindi word “haivan”), prompting the Gujarat State School Textbook Board (GSSTB) to remove the word in online versions of the book on June 10. Similarly, another GSSTB textbook defined the Muslim practice of fasting during Ramadan as “cholera.” The GSSTB chair said both were “printing errors” and promised to correct them in later editions.

On June 17 in Goa, at the sixth All India Hindu convention organized by Hindu Janajagruti Samiti, a Hindu nationalist organization, an estimated 132 Hindu organizations resolved to establish the country as a Hindu state by 2023, ensure a ban on cattle slaughter, declare the cow as the country’s national animal, and ban all religious conversions.

In September the Gujarat High Court directed Junagadh police to protect an interfaith couple following the petition of the Hindu woman’s father to the court objecting to his daughter’s marriage to a Muslim man. The couple stated they were being threatened by Hindu organizations and pressured to separate. The court also ordered the father to return all identification documents to his daughter.

Throughout the year representatives from the embassy and its consulates general met government officials, civil society, and religious leaders to discuss issues including Islamic divorce and the challenge of protecting personal religious laws in accordance with the constitution, the minority status of universities, beef bans, and religiously motivated political violence. In April the Charge d’Affaires hosted a roundtable lunch for women interfaith leaders at her residence. The theme of the lunch was interfaith and religious diversity; they also discussed the role of women in religious institutions.

The embassy and consulates general continued to meet with religious organizations, missionary communities, and NGOs of all religious backgrounds to discuss religious freedom concerns and U.S. government responses. They discussed concerns related to a perceived increase in attacks against religious minorities and the perceived diminishing space for religious freedom. Interlocutors included the Cardinal of the Syro-Malankara Catholic Church, Metropolitan Bishop of the Mar Thoma Church, Imam of Jama Masjid, leaders of several mosques, Hindu priests of Akshardham Temple, priests of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, as well as representatives of the India Islamic Cultural Center, All India Imams’ Organization, the Catholic Bishops Conference of India, the Church of North India, the Delhi Catholic Archdiocese, the Paris community, the Buddhist-dominated Kushinagar, the Bharatiya Sant Samiti, the Chinmaya Mission, the Bahai community, and Sikh leaders. Representatives from most of these organizations were also present at the interfaith iftar dinner the Charge d’Affaires hosted in June.

In May the Charge d’Affaires inaugurated a traveling art exhibit called “Keeping Faith: Indian Religions in the United States.” She emphasized religious tolerance and interfaith diversity as a strength of both the United States and India. The exhibition included a total of 37 framed photographs and showcased the religious diversity of the Indian American diaspora, and the effect this community had on American culture. The exhibit traveled to several Indian cities and became a platform for embassy personnel to discuss issues of religious tolerance and diversity.

The Consulate General in Mumbai organized a “faith walk” in Mumbai’s Mahim neighborhood in March, visiting an Islamic shrine, a Catholic church, and a Hindu temple to promote interfaith dialogue and religious diversity. Members from each religious community participated in the walk. In May the Consul General, together with Catholic Archbishop Felipe Neri Ferrao of the Archdiocese of Goa and Daman, organized a roundtable in Goa to discuss the Catholic community’s concerns about antiminority rhetoric and rising religious intolerance.

The Consulate General in Kolkata engaged in outreach to a range of community leaders and religious establishments. The Consul General visited Belur Math – headquarters of the Hindu order Ramakrishna Mission founded by Swami Vivekananda – and discussed religious harmony and tolerance with senior monks. The Consul General visited the Kamakhya temple, a Hindu pilgrimage site in Assam. He met with the Imam of Nakhoda Masjid, the largest mosque in Kolkata, and with the leaders of the Ahmadi Muslim community. In Patna city in Bihar, he visited the gurudwara marking the birthplace of Guru Gobind Singh, the last Sikh guru. In Bihar’s Buddhist religious site of Bodh Gaya, he visited the Maha Bodhi temple. During his outreach, the Consul General delivered a message of tolerance and actively promoted the need to work across religious communities to achieve common objectives. During the discussion the Consul General, senior Hindu and Buddhist monks, an imam, a Christian priest, and Sikh and Jewish community leaders expressed the need for interfaith dialogue and tolerance.

The embassy and consulates general hosted celebrations marking major religious holidays, including Ramadan, Holi, Eid al-Fitr, and Easter to bring together leaders from different religious groups. During these events, representatives of the embassy or consulates general and interfaith guests raised religious freedom and tolerance in speeches and informal discussions. Embassy and consulate general officials continued to monitor cases involving reports of religious persecution, intolerance, and religiously motivated attacks.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 260.6 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2010 census, approximately 87 percent of the population is Muslim, 7 percent Protestant, 3 percent Roman Catholic, and 1.5 percent Hindu. Those identifying with other religious groups, including Buddhism, traditional indigenous religions, Confucianism, and other Christian denominations, and those who did not respond to the census question comprise approximately 1.3 percent of the population.

The Muslim population is overwhelmingly Sunni. An estimated one to three million Muslims are Shia. Many smaller Muslim groups exist; estimates put the total number of Ahmadi Muslims at 200,000 to 400,000.

An estimated 20 million people, primarily in Java, Kalimantan, and Papua, practice various traditional belief systems, often referred to collectively as aliran kepercayaan. There are approximately 400 different aliran kepercayaan communities throughout the archipelago. Many religious groups incorporate elements of Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, making it difficult to disaggregate the exact number of followers.

There is a Sikh population estimated at between 10,000 and 15,000, primarily in Medan and Jakarta. There are very small Jewish communities in Jakarta, Manado, Jayapura, and elsewhere. The Bahai Faith and Falun Dafa (or Falun Gong) community report thousands of members, but independent estimates are not available. The number of atheists is also unknown, but the group Indonesian Atheists states it has more than 700 members.

The province of Bali is predominantly Hindu, and the provinces of Papua, West Papua, East Nusa Tenggara, and North Sulawesi are predominantly Christian.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees the right to practice the religion of one’s choice and specifies that freedom of religion is a human right that may not be limited. The constitution states, “The nation is based upon belief in one supreme God,” but guarantees all persons the right to worship according to their own religion or belief. The law restricts citizens from exercising these rights in a way that impinges on the rights of others, oversteps common moral standards and religious values, or jeopardizes security or public order.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA) extends official recognition to six religious groups: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism. The government maintains a longstanding practice of recognizing Sunni Islam as the official version of Islam of Indonesian Muslims, though the constitution has no such stipulation. The law prohibits deliberate public statements or activities that insult or defame any of the six official religious groups, or have the intent of preventing an individual from adhering to an official religion. The law also stipulates that in any case of defamation of the six officially recognized religions, the MOHA, the MRA, and the Attorney General’s Office must first warn the individual in question before he or she can be charged. The law also forbids the dissemination of information designed to spread hatred or dissension among individuals and/or certain community groups based on ethnicity, religion, or race. Individuals may be prosecuted for blasphemous, atheistic, or heretical statements under either of these provisions or under the laws against defamation, and can face a maximum jail sentence of five years. The law on electronic information and transactions forbids the electronic dissemination of the same types of information, with violations carrying a maximum four-year sentence.

The government defines a religion as having a prophet, holy book, and deity, and being recognized internationally. The six officially recognized religions are deemed to have met these requirements. Organizations representing one of the six recognized religions listed in the blasphemy law are not required to obtain a legal charter if they are established under a notary act and obtain approval from the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. Religious organizations other than the six recognized religions listed in the blasphemy law must obtain a legal charter as a civil society organization from the MOHA. Both ministries consult with the MRA before granting legal status to religious organizations. By law, all religious groups must be registered in some form. Under the law, civil society organizations are required to uphold the national ideology of Pancasila, which encompasses the principles of belief in one God, justice, unity, democracy, and social justice, and they are prohibited from committing blasphemous acts or spreading religious hatred. Violations of the law could result in a loss of legal status, dissolution of the organization, and arrest of members under the blasphemy law or other applicable laws. Indigenous religious groups may also register with the Ministry of Education and Culture as aliran kepercayaan.

A joint ministerial decree bans both proselytizing by the Ahmadi Muslim community and vigilantism against the group. Violations of the Ahmadi proselytizing ban carry a maximum five-year prison sentence on charges of blasphemy. No Ahmadi has been charged with blasphemy, but Ahmadi sources say provincial and local regulations based on this decree place tighter restrictions on Ahmadis than on the six religions recognized in the blasphemy law.

The government requires all officially registered religious groups to comply with directives from the MRA and other ministerial directives on issues such as construction of houses of worship, foreign aid to domestic religious institutions, and propagation of religion.

According to a joint ministerial decree, religious groups may not hold services in private residences, and those seeking to build a house of worship are required to obtain the signatures of at least 90 members of the group and 60 persons of other religious groups in the community stating they support the construction. Local governments are in charge of implementing the decree, and local regulations, implementation, and enforcement vary widely. The decree also requires approval from the local interfaith council, the Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB). Government-established FKUBs exist at the city or district level and comprise religious leaders from the six official groups. They are responsible for mediating interreligious conflicts.

The law requires religious instruction in public schools. Students have the right to request religious instruction in any one of the six official religions, but teachers are not always available to teach the requested religion classes. Individuals are not allowed to opt out of religious education requirements.

Under the terms of a 2005 peace agreement that ended a separatist conflict, Aceh Province has unique authority to implement sharia regulations. The law allows for provincial implementation and regulation of sharia, and extends the jurisdiction of religious courts to economic transactions and criminal cases. Sharia does not apply to non-Muslims, foreigners, or Muslim Indonesians who are not permanent residents of Aceh. Aceh’s provincial sharia regulations criminalize homosexual activities, adultery, gambling, consumption of alcohol, and proximity to members of the opposite sex outside of marriage for Muslim residents of the province. An Aceh governor’s decree forbids women from working in or visiting restaurants unaccompanied by their spouse or a male relative after 9:00 p.m. A Banda Aceh mayoral decree forbids women from working in coffee shops, internet cafes, or sports venues after 10:00 p.m. Female Muslim residents of Aceh are prohibited from wearing tight pants in public and must wear headscarves. One district in Aceh prohibits women from sitting astride motorcycles when riding as passengers, but this reportedly is rarely enforced. The maximum penalties for violations of sharia regulations include imprisonment and public caning. There are also regulations limiting the amount of force that may be applied during a caning.

Many local governments outside of Aceh have enacted regulations based on religious considerations. Most of these are in majority Muslim areas, although local governments in non-Muslim majority areas also have enacted regulations based on religious considerations. Many of these regulations relate to matters such as religious education and only apply to a specific religious group. Some religiously inspired local regulations in effect, however, apply to all citizens. For instance, some local regulations require restaurants to close during Ramadan fasting hours, ban alcohol, or mandate the collection of zakat (Islamic alms). Other local regulations forbid or limit the religious activities of religious minorities, especially Shia and Ahmadi Muslims.

The marriage law does not explicitly forbid interfaith marriage, but it contains an article stipulating that a marriage must be performed according to the rituals of a religion that is shared by both the bride and groom. A man and woman of different religions who seek to marry may have difficulties finding a religious official willing to perform a wedding ceremony. Some couples of different religions select the same religion on their KTPs in order to marry legally.

The law allows a Muslim man to have up to four wives, provided he is able to support each equally. For a man to take a second, third, or fourth wife, he must obtain court permission and the consent of the first wife. These conditions, however, are not always met in practice.

The marriage law makes polygamy illegal for civil servants, except in limited circumstances. Government regulations require Muslim male civil servants to receive permission from a government official and their first wives prior to marrying a second, third, or fourth wife, and prohibit female civil servants from becoming second, third, or fourth wives.

The law requires the leader of an aliran kepercayaan group to demonstrate group members live in at least three regencies, which are administrative designations one level below a province, before the leader is permitted to officiate legally at a wedding. This constraint effectively bars believers of some smaller groups without such geographic presence from receiving official marriage services from a member of their faith, although groups can aid each other and facilitate marriages by a group with a similar faith tradition and rituals.

The Constitutional Court struck down on November 7 two articles that required citizens to choose on their KTPs either one of the six recognized religions listed in the blasphemy law, or leave the religion column blank.

A joint ministerial decree requires domestic religious organizations to obtain approval from the MRA to receive funding from overseas donors and forbids dissemination of religious literature and pamphlets to members of other religious groups as well as going door to door for the purposes of converting others.

Foreign religious workers must obtain religious worker visas, and foreign religious organizations must obtain permission from the MRA to provide any type of assistance (in-kind, personnel, or financial) to local religious groups.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary Paragraph: There were arrests, charges, and convictions for blasphemy and insulting religion, including the conviction and imprisonment of the former governor of Jakarta for blaspheming against Islam and three senior leaders of the banned Gafatar religious group for “contradicting and offending” the religious values of the majority of citizens. In Aceh there were public canings by local officials for sharia violations, including the first ever punishments for homosexual activities and the first case of Buddhists choosing to be punished under sharia rather than civil procedures. There were reports of government attempts of forced conversions of Ahmadi Muslims to Sunni Islam. There were instances in which local governments and police acceded to the demands of “intolerant groups,” such as the FPI, FUI, FJI, and MMI, to close houses of worship for permit violations, or otherwise restrict the rights of minority religious groups. For example, local authorities closed three house churches in Bogor, West Java, by using national regulations in a joint ministerial decree that forbid congregations from holding services in private residences. Komnas HAM reported the government at both the national and local levels at times failed to prevent or appropriately address intimidation and discrimination against individuals based on their religious beliefs. Reportedly, some people who left the religion portion of their identity card blank were denied public services.

The Setara Institute, a domestic nongovernmental organization (NGO) that conducts advocacy and research on religious and political freedom, again stated the central government made efforts to reaffirm constitutional guarantees of religious freedom, promote tolerance, and prevent religiously motivated violence. It also stated the central government did little to intervene at the local level or solve past religious conflicts through its mandate to enforce court rulings, override unconstitutional local regulations, or otherwise uphold the constitutional and legal protections afforded to minority religious groups. Local governments selectively enforced blasphemy laws, permitting regulations, and other local regulations in ways that affected various religious groups.

According to religious groups and NGOs, government officials and police sometimes failed to prevent “intolerant groups” from infringing on others’ religious freedom and committing other acts of intimidation. Police did not always actively investigate and prosecute crimes by members of “intolerant sectarian groups.” During the year, police worked with human rights activists and NGOs to provide tolerance-training sessions to religious leaders and local police.

The Setara Institute reported 24 cases of government abuses of religious freedom between January and November, compared to 44 cases in the first eleven months of 2016. Abuses cited included the closures of, and protests against, houses of worship and statements by public officials that condoned violence towards minorities, especially towards Ahmadi Muslims.

On March 7, the East Jakarta District Court convicted and sentenced for blasphemy three senior leaders of the banned religious group, Gafatar. The court found that the leaders committed blasphemy because the group’s blending of Christian, Jewish, and Islamic doctrine “contradicts and offends Islamic values held by most Indonesian citizens.” The founder of the movement, Ahmad Moshaddeq, and its President Mahful Muis Tumanurung received five-year prison sentences, and the Vice President, Andri Cahya, received a three-year sentence. Authorities arrested them in May 2016, two months after the government officially banned Gafatar in reaction to local residents forcing thousands of Gafatar members from their homes and communal farms in West Kalimantan. Moshaddeq was previously convicted and imprisoned for blasphemy in 2008 because he declared himself a prophet from the now banned al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah group. The central government relocated most of former Gafatar members to Java, where they reported they still faced discrimination, including when seeking employment. Because they are not followers of one of the country’s six officially recognized religions, some former members had difficulty obtaining new KTPs. During their relocation, some former members also reported that officials forced them to undergo re-education programs or mandatory all-day “patriotic education,” which pressured them to identify with one of the six recognized religions.

On May 9, a panel of judges for the North Jakarta District Court found the Governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (known as “Ahok”), guilty of blasphemy against Islam and sentenced him to two years in jail. In September 2016, Ahok, the first Christian governor of Jakarta in more than 50 years, told a crowd that it was wrong to manipulate verses from the Quran for political gain. The FPI, the Indonesia Ulema Council (MUI), and other Muslim groups criticized the governor’s speech and filed a police complaint, resulting in an investigation. Ahok apologized but stated he did not commit blasphemy, saying that he did not intend to insult the Quran and that his comments were directed at his political opponents, not Islam. MUI officials actively participated as expert witnesses during Ahok’s five-month trial. The court’s lengthy ruling referenced these testimonies and MUI’s October 2016 fatwa (religious opinion) stating Ahok’s remarks were blasphemous as factors leading the judges to conclude that Ahok was guilty of blasphemy.

On August 21, a court in Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara Province, sentenced Siti Aisyah to 30 months in prison for spreading “deviant” Islamic teachings. The court found Aisyah, the owner of an independent Quranic school, guilty of violating the blasphemy law and the law on electronic information and transactions. Aisyah stated she began to study an Indonesian translation of the Quran in 2013 because it was difficult to study in Arabic. She said she came to believe the Quran was perfect in its own right, making the hadiths (the Prophet Muhammad’s deeds and sayings) and other tenets of mainstream Islam superfluous. In November 2016, she founded a school and began teaching her interpretation of Islam to local youth. In January a Facebook video of her activities was widely disseminated on the internet. West Nusa Tenggara Governor Zainul Majdi subsequently ordered the closure of the school and the local branch of the MUI issued an edict declaring her teaching blasphemous. The police arrested her.

On September 28, a military court sentenced a soldier serving in Papua, a Christian-majority province, to two-and-a-half years in prison for blasphemy after the soldier, possibly inadvertently, burned several copies of the Bible. In May the Bibles were reportedly burned, along with other items, as the soldier discarded boxes from a storage shed at a military installation near Papua’s provincial capital, Jayapura. The authorities also dismissed the soldier from his position in the military. Following the incident, which sparked a small but violent protest, Papua Military Commander Major General George Elnadus Supit publicly apologized for the soldier’s actions and asked community members to respect the legal process. Papuan Christian leaders immediately issued a statement to quell tensions, calling for restraint and respect for the law.

On September 25, a court sentenced Johanda (one name only) to life in prison for the November 2016 attack on a church in Samarinda, East Kalimantan, that killed a two-year-old girl and injured three other children. He was associated with the pro-ISIS group, Jamaah Ansharut Daulah. Four other codefendants received sentences between six to seven years. Johanda was previously convicted for his involvement in attempted bombings in West Java in 2011. In February 2012 he was sentenced to three-and-a-half years but received a remission and was released in 2014 for good behavior.

The proselytizing ban did not prohibit Ahmadi Muslims from worshipping or continuing to practice within their community, but “intolerant groups” invoked the ban to justify their intimidation of Ahmadi communities or to decline to issue KTPs to Ahmadi if they attempt to register as Muslims. On September 11, the Constitutional Court began a judicial review of the blasphemy law at the request of Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI), an advocacy organization, which argued the law was used to discriminate against Ahmadis. The judicial review continued at the end of the year.

Government and sharia officials stated non-Muslim residents of Aceh could choose to be punished under sharia law or civil court procedures, but Muslim residents of Aceh must be punished under sharia law, although some local authorities interpreted the law to apply also to Muslims visitors to Aceh. On March 10, two Buddhists were caned in Aceh for cockfighting and gambling, marking the first time Buddhists chose to be punished under sharia rather than face civil procedures. Cockfighting and gambling are illegal under both sharia and provincial civil law. On May 23, two gay men, convicted of violating an article of Aceh’s sharia code banning homosexual acts, were each publicly caned 85 times. Both men were reportedly Muslims. This was the first instance in which individuals were convicted and punished for homosexuality under sharia in Aceh, although homosexuality was not illegal under national law. On September 8, sharia officials publicly caned an unmarried man and woman in Lhokseumawe, Aceh Province after a court convicted them of adultery for being found alone together in private. On September 11, sharia officials publicly caned two women and nine men in Banda Aceh. Six were convicted of adultery and five were convicted of gambling. According to the Institute for Criminal Justice Reform, authorities in Aceh caned 350 individuals in 2016.

The MRA maintained its authority at both the national and local level to conduct “development” of religious groups and believers, including efforts to convert minority religious groups to Sunni Islam. In several West Java regencies, local governments continued efforts to force or encourage conversion of Ahmadi Muslims with a requirement that Ahmadis sign forms renouncing their beliefs in order to register their marriages or participate in the Hajj. According to JAI, on July 14, approximately 1,500 Ahmadis in Kuningan, West Java, signed an agreement to renounce Ahmadi teachings in order to obtain KTPs from the local government. According to an Ahmadi spokesperson, the individuals who signed the agreement did not receive KTPs by the end of the year despite assurances from the local government that the issue would be resolved by August.

On February 23, local officials in Depok, West Java, shuttered the Al-Hidayah Mosque, marking the sixth time since 2011 that the Ahmadi mosque was closed by authorities. Ahmadis reported that local groups complained to Depok officials that the mosque, which received a house of worship permit in 2007 and served a community of approximately 400 members, was disturbing the public. On February 24, hundreds of people, including FPI members, protested in front of the mosque, calling for the disbandment of the Ahmadi congregation and the demolition of the mosque. Representatives from the Ahmadi community said the group coexisted peacefully with neighbors of all faiths, rejecting the accusation that they had disturbed public order. Spokespersons for the community complained they were not consulted prior to the closure and reported the incident to the president’s office and Komnas HAM on April 24. As of December, the local government continued to enforce the mosque’s closure, although Komnas HAM urged the local government to protect the Ahmadis.

On March 9, local officials forced three house churches of different denominations (Batak Protestant, Catholic, and Methodist) in Bogor, West Java, to end religious services after local MRA and MUI representatives, in consultation with police and neighborhood leaders, issued a “status quo agreement” forbidding the congregations from holding religious services in private residences. The agreement was based on a 2006 MRA-MOHA joint decree stipulating that private residences could not be used for religious services or as headquarters for religious congregations. The decision to halt religious services at the residential venues came after a crowd comprised of 11 Islamic organizations gathered on March 5 to protest the approximately 800 congregants gathered at a housing complex for Sunday services. According to the congregations, police dispersed the crowd, but congregants were too intimidated to resume their activities. The congregations have struggled to secure houses of worship following the sub-district government’s demolition in 2000, for alleged permit violations, of a shared complex constructed in 1997. The congregations have subsequently met in private residences.

More than 300 Shia from Madura remained displaced on the outskirts of Surabaya, East Java, after communal violence forced them from their homes in 2012. Approximately 200 Ahmadis remained internally displaced in cramped apartments in Mataram, the capital of West Nusa Tenggara, after a mob expelled them from their Lombok village in 2006.

Across the country, minority religious groups, including Muslim groups in non-Muslim majority areas, continued to state that the official requirement for a specific number of supporters to build or renovate a house of worship served as a barrier to construction, either because governments did not issue permits when the requisite numbers were obtained or because neighbors were pressured not to approve. In many local cases, a few vocal opponents from the local majority religious affiliation were reportedly sufficient to stop construction approvals. State-recognized religious leaders in government-supported interfaith forums reportedly found ways to block aliran kepercayaan believers from constructing places of worship, largely through stringent house of worship permit requirements. Aliran kepercayaan adherents said they were fearful of being accused of atheism were they to fight this treatment in court. Other religious minorities, such as Ahmadis, Shia Muslims, and Christians, faced problems even when seeking approval to move to temporary facilities while a primary place of worship underwent renovation.

Local governments, police, and religious organizations reportedly tried to close religious minority groups’ houses of worship for permit violations, often after protests from “intolerant groups,” even if the minority groups had a proper permit. Many congregations could not obtain the requisite number of nonmember signatures supporting construction of a house of worship and often faced protest from “intolerant groups” during the application process, making permits nearly impossible to obtain. Even when permits were issued, some houses of worship were forced to close or halt construction after facing legal challenges and public protests. Protestant and Catholic churches also reported that “intolerant groups” forced them to pay protection money to continue operating without a permit. Some houses of worship that were established before the joint ministerial decree on house of worship construction came into effect reportedly were still obligated to meet the requirements or face closure. NGOs estimated, however, that as many as 85 percent of houses of worship, the majority of which are Sunni mosques, were operating without a permit. Many houses of worship operated without permits in office buildings, malls, private homes, and shops.

Legal uncertainty among local officials and police, anonymous threats of violence, insufficient police protection, and fear of publicity were barriers to reopening Ahmadi mosques that were previously shut down, including mosques in Sukabumi, West Java, and Tulungagung, East Java that were closed in 2016, and a South Jakarta mosque closed in 2015. Ahmadis reported, however, that police and local government were taking positive actions to protect a mosque in Kendal, Central Java that was vandalized by unknown perpetrators in May 2016. The local government facilitated mediation between the Ahmadi community and its neighbors, and the Ahmadis agreed to halt reconstruction of the mosque pending a police investigation. Following the police investigation, the local village leader initiated a community effort to reconstruct the mosque, and police publicly stated they would protect the Ahmadis’ right to worship in the community.

Construction moved forward on the Santa Clara Catholic Church in Bekasi, West Java. The congregation had waited over 15 years for the approval of its construction permit until it was granted in 2015, and “intolerant groups” regularly targeted the construction site for protests. On March 24, police disrupted a crowd gathered at the construction site to protest the building of the Church. Following the protest, the Bekasi mayor assured the congregation that it would be able to finish construction by December, but construction was not complete at the end of the year.

An Indonesian Christian Church congregation in Bogor, West Java, continued negotiations related to its building permit after local authorities, responding to public pressure, closed its church in 2010. The national ombudsman previously tried unsuccessfully to convince Bogor Mayor Bima Arya to uphold a Supreme Court ruling in favor of the congregation in its dispute with the local government over the building permit. Arya attended the church’s 2016 Christmas service where he announced plans, which were still in negotiation, to allow the congregation to build a church in a complex with a mosque in order to facilitate interfaith harmony, a solution he formulated with the Presidential Chief of Staff’s Office. The congregation regularly held services outside the Presidential Palace in Jakarta, and it had not obtained a permanent complex by the end of the year.

Civil rights activists said locally implemented sharia-based regulations violated the constitution and called on the central government to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to revoke or review these regulations. On April 5, the Constitutional Court ruled that MOHA did not have authority to revoke local regulations once in force, even if regulations are religiously inspired, such as bans on opening food stalls in the daytime during Ramadan. MOHA, however, retained review authority during the drafting process of local regulations. This ruling invalidated a 2014 law that reaffirmed MOHA’s authority to revoke local regulations concerning religious matters that violated the constitution or national law, although MOHA reportedly never exercised this authority.

Although the MUI’s fatwas lacked legal standing, government figures used them to make legal and policy decisions.

In April female Muslim leaders held a meeting titled, The Indonesian Women’s Ulama Congress, and produced fatwas recommending the criminalization of marital rape and raising the minimum age of marriage for females from 16 to 18. Minister of Religious Affairs Lukman Hakim Saifuddin pledged to present these recommendations to the government.

In January National Police Chief Tito Karnavian publicly reminded police officers that MUI fatwas did not constitute national law and that officers had the responsibility to enforce the constitution, not MUI edicts. On May 25, Karnavian issued a directive forbidding “intolerant groups” from conducting sweeps of food stalls open for business before sundown during Ramadan.

Aliran kepercayaan followers continued to say they were pressured to send their children to a religious education class of one of the six officially recognized religions. Minority religious groups not listed in the blasphemy law said schools often allowed their children to spend religious education time in study hall, but parents were required to sign documents stating their children received official religious education. Ahmadi Muslim students reported religion classes for Islam only focused on Sunni teachings.

Civil servants who openly professed an adherence to an indigenous belief system continued to say they had difficulty getting promoted.

Although the government generally allowed citizens to leave the religion column blank on their KTPs, individuals continued to report difficulties accessing government services and experiencing other forms of discrimination if they did so. NGOs reported that local officials occasionally did not issue KTPs to people who wanted to leave the religion column blank. The lack of a KTP led to issues ranging from an inability to register for health insurance to problems applying for mortgages. Faced with this problem, many religious minority members reportedly chose to identify as a member of a religion listed in the blasphemy law close to their beliefs or reflecting the locally dominant religion. According to researchers, this practice obscured the real number of adherents to any particular religious group in government statistics. The government continued to allow aliran kepercayaan believers to omit religious information on their identity cards, but when accessing basic social services, other government forms did not always permit leaving this section blank.

NGOs and religious advocacy groups continued to urge the government to remove the religion field from KTPs. Religious minorities reported they sometimes faced discrimination after others saw their religious affiliation on their KTPs. Members of the Jewish community said they felt uncomfortable stating their religion in public and often chose to state that they were Christians or Muslims depending on the dominant religion where they lived, out of concern that local communities did not understand their religion.

On May 8, MOHA and the Ministry of Law and Human Rights provided written support for including local aliran kepercayaan on the KTP religion column at a Constitutional Court judicial review. Aliran kepercayaan communities petitioned the Constitutional Court to consider the legality of including local aliran kepercayaan on KTPs. On November 7, the Constitutional Court subsequently struck down two articles that required citizens to either choose on their KTPs one of the six recognized religions listed in the blasphemy law or leave the religion column blank. Data from an NGO showed approximately 42,000 followers of several traditional faiths were denied basic civil registry documentations such as KTPs, birth certificates, and marriage licenses, and approximately 80,000 could not access public services. MOHA reported on November 17 that it received 138,791 requests from individuals who wanted to add aliran kepercayaan to their KTPs after the Constitutional Court’s ruling. MOHA stated that members of indigenous religions were entitled to the same access to basic services, regardless of what they did or did not declare as their religion on their KTP, and discrimination against them based on their KTP religion column was a violation of the law.

Minority Muslim groups, including Ahmadis and Shia, also continued to report resistance when they tried to apply for KTPs as Muslims, effectively denying them access to public services if they could not secure KTPs. Minority religious groups, including Shia and Ahmadi Muslims, continued to report discrimination in the administration of public services, such as procuring marriage licenses or receiving healthcare, if they chose to leave the religion column blank on their KTPs. Many local officials reportedly were unaware of the option to leave the religion section blank and refused to issue such KTPs.

Both the central and local governments included elected and appointed officials from minority groups. For example, the Governor of West Kalimantan and the Mayor of Solo were Catholic, and a leading Shia figure held a seat in the House of Representatives, elected from a majority Sunni district in Bandung, West Java. As of December President Widodo’s 34-member cabinet included five members of minority faiths.

Foreign religious workers from many religious groups continued to state they found it relatively easy to obtain visas. Despite laws restricting proselytizing, some foreign religious groups reported little government interference with preaching or religious conversions.

Police provided special protection to some churches in major cities during Sunday services and Christian holidays.

Although the MUI’s fatwas lacked legal standing, “intolerant groups,” including those that mobilized against former Jakarta Governor Ahok, used them to justify actions against religious minorities and other vulnerable groups. Individuals affiliated at the local level with the MUI used rhetoric religious minorities considered intolerant, including fatwas declaring Shia and Ahmadi as deviant sects. Shia and Ahmadi Muslims reported feeling under constant threat from “intolerant groups.” Anti-Shia rhetoric was common in some online media outlets and on social media.

“Intolerant groups” accused of using religion to justify criminal activity and vigilantism, continued to take actions against minority religious groups, including intimidation, extortion, vandalism, and protests that lead to the closure of houses of worship, such as the Ahmadi mosque in Depok, which closed in February. “Intolerant groups” reportedly accept bribes to advance corrupt political and business interests through their protests and actions.

Komnas HAM stated there was a decrease in cases of religiously inspired violence, with 11 cases occurring between January and March, compared to 20 cases occurring during the same period in 2016.

On February 11, an estimated 200,000 people attended a mass prayer at Jakarta’s national mosque organized by members of the FPI and other groups who urged Muslims to vote for a Muslim candidate, and not Ahok, in the February 14 Jakarta gubernatorial election. Protests and mass prayers in November and December 2016, organized by the FPI and other groups calling for Ahok’s arrest for blasphemy, drew crowds ranging from 100,000 to 500,000 people.

On July 29, a Jakarta-based NGO demanded the demolition of a 100-foot-high statue of Guan Yu, a Chinese general revered by some as a deity, at the Confucian Kwan Sing Bio temple in Tuban, East Java. The NGO objected to the statue’s size because it is larger than a Jakarta statue of General Sudirman, a respected Indonesian military commander. Additionally, local media said the temple reportedly did not secure the proper permit for the statue from the local government. The topic spread rapidly on social media, with the statue portrayed as anti-Indonesian and disrespectful to Islam due to its location at the birthplace of one of the nine nationally revered Muslim saints, or Wali Sanga, credited with spreading Islam in Java and throughout the country. As of December there were no plans to demolish the statue, although it remained covered as temple leaders sought to limit further controversy.

Religious minorities in Bali continued to state that the close association of Balinese traditional culture with Balinese Hinduism created problems for Balinese who converted to Christianity, Islam, or another religion. Leaders of religious minorities reported Balinese women could maintain their family and social ties after converting to a new religion under laws articulating the rights of inheritance and custody, but these laws were ignored in practice. Balinese men who converted to a new religion faced social banishment and loss of inheritance rights.

Many individuals in the media, civil society, and the general population were vocal and active in protecting and promoting tolerance and pluralism. The largest and most influential religious groups and NGOs, including the two largest Islamic groups in the country – Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, with some 40 and 30 million members, respectively – officially endorsed and advocated for tolerance, pluralism, and the protection of minority groups. NU, for example, hosted a conference in November attended by the president and vice president, and produced recommendations for the president’s administration on how to prevent the politicization of religion. Religious groups cooperated with each other and with other organizations on interfaith conferences and events, advocating for respect and tolerance, and speaking out against violence. Leaders of different religious groups regularly held interfaith meetings with the president to promote tolerance and pluralism. The International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development, Komnas HAM, and the Office of the President held a conference in December that focused on local administrations’ roles in preventing intolerance and extremism. NGOs reported large numbers of Christian-to-Muslim and Muslim-to-Christian conversions, particularly in urban centers and the province of West Java, although many people who converted faced discrimination.

The U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, the Consulate General in Surabaya, and the Consulate in Medan regularly engaged with all levels of government on specific religious freedom issues, such as actions against religious minorities; closures of places of worship; convictions for blasphemy and defamation of religion; the undue influence of “intolerant groups” and the importance of the rule of law; the application of sharia to non-Muslims; religious registration requirements on KTPs; the importance of education and interfaith dialogue in promoting tolerance; the equal protection of all citizens regardless of their religion; and promotion of tolerance in international forums. During his April visit, the U.S. Vice President met senior government officials, including President Widodo, and called for the equal protection of all people regardless of religious affiliation. The Vice President also met with representatives of the six recognized religions listed in the blasphemy law to discuss the importance of promoting religious freedom, tolerance, pluralism, and protecting the rights of all.

The Ambassador visited Aceh Province in April and raised issues of religious freedom and tolerance with the governor-elect, the vice mayor, the head of provincial police, and the Wali Nanggroe, a cultural leader of Aceh.

Representatives of the embassy, consulate general, and consulate spoke publicly about the importance of religious tolerance and protecting minorities from acts of violence, including the Ambassador who spoke at Islamic boarding schools. Embassy staff at all levels met frequently with religious leaders, representatives of social organizations, and human rights advocates to discuss religious tolerance, condemn blasphemy laws, and promote respect for religion. Embassy and consulate officials also met with members of minority religious groups who were victims of religious intolerance, including Shia and Ahmadi Muslims, house church congregations, and Gafatar members.

The U.S.-Indonesia Council on Religion and Pluralism regularly convened a diverse group of experts, academics, and religious and civil society leaders to promote interfaith dialogue, pluralism, and tolerance. The council also facilitated public lectures and discussions on religious freedom issues. The United States-Indonesia Society, a nonprofit organization endorsed by the U.S. and Indonesian governments, collaborated with Indonesian and U.S. religious leaders to launch the nongovernmental council in 2016.

The embassy held numerous events at U.S. government-sponsored venues throughout the country that directly and indirectly supported religious freedom. For example, the embassy hosted a discussion with high school students on Religious Freedom Day in January and emphasized every individual has a role in promoting religious tolerance.

Embassy and consulate staff appeared on a number of nationally televised programs to discuss themes related to religious tolerance and diversity. Previous participants in U.S. government-funded student exchange programs appeared with embassy and consulate officials to provide accounts of their experiences in the United States including religious tolerance. Embassy and consulate personnel also led discussions and gave presentations at venues throughout the country, conveying the importance of diversity and religious tolerance to thousands of high school, Islamic boarding school, and university students. Collectively, these outreach activities carried messages of religious tolerance and religious freedom to tens of millions of viewers.

During Ramadan, embassy and consulate staff held numerous events and outreach activities throughout the country that promoted religious tolerance. Embassy-hosted iftars advocated tolerance and pluralism through remarks and discussions that included a wide cross-section of society, such as political figures, civil society representatives, and students. The Consulate General in Surabaya hosted an event on Islam in the United States, led by an Ahmadi Muslim U.S. Foreign Service Officer, which included discussion about the rights of religious minority communities.

Embassy and consulate staff conducted extensive print, TV, and digital outreach, including a guest appearance by the Ambassador on the highest-rated national soap opera, in which he promoted religious tolerance and understanding; the Ambassador’s and Consul General’s Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr greeting videos; and other religious pluralism initiatives that reached millions of individuals throughout the country. The embassy continued to promote religious freedom, diversity, and pluralism on its social media platforms, including a regular English language-learning column titled “Miss Understanding.”

The embassy, consulate general, and consulate sponsored professional and academic exchanges and other civil society programs focused on religious pluralism and tolerance, including programs for rising leaders and scholars. Three such projects focused on Muslim life in the United States at local, state, and national levels; religious education and its relationship with various government and private institutions; and cooperation between faith-based organizations, civil society organizations, and government entities. Likewise, the Consulate General in Surabaya sponsored a program for leading professors at one of the largest Islamic universities to travel to the United States to study community-based social services, meet experts in their field, and experience religious diversity and tolerance in America.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 82 million (July 2017 estimate). According to U.S. government estimates and other statistical reports, including Global Security and Iran Press Watch, Muslims constitute 99.4 percent of the population; 90-95 percent are Shia and 5-10 percent Sunni (mostly Turkmen, Arabs, Baluchis, and Kurds living in the northeast, southwest, southeast, and northwest, respectively). Afghan refugees, economic migrants, and displaced persons also make up a significant Sunni population but accurate statistics on the breakdown of the Afghan refugee population between Sunni and Shia are unavailable. There are no official statistics available on the number of Muslims who practice Sufism, although unofficial reports estimate several million.

According to U.S. government estimates and other statistical estimates, including those from Global Security, Iran Press Watch, and Iran Primer, groups constituting the remaining less than 1 percent of the population include Bahais, Christians, Jews, Sabean-Mandaeans, Zoroastrians, and Yarsanis. The three largest non-Muslim minorities are Bahais, Christians, and Yarsanis.

According to Human Rights Watch (HRW) data, Bahais number at least 300,000.

According to World Christian Database statistics, there are approximately 350,000 Christians, although some estimates suggest there may be many more Christians than actually reported. While the government Statistical Center of Iran reports there are 117,700 Christians, Elam Ministries, an Iranian Christian organization, estimates that there could be between 300,000 and one million Christians. The majority of Christians are ethnic Armenians concentrated in Tehran and Isfahan. Estimates by the Assyrian Church of the total Assyrian and Chaldean Christian population put their combined number at 7,000. There are also Protestant denominations, including evangelical groups, but there is no authoritative data on their numbers. Christian groups outside the country estimate the size of the Protestant community to be less than 10,000, although many Protestants and other converts to Christianity from Islam reportedly practice in secret.

There is no official count of Yarsanis, but the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) estimates there are up to two million. Yarsanis are mainly located in Loristan and the Kurdish regions.

According to Zoroastrian groups and the Statistical Center of Iran, the population includes approximately 25,000 Zoroastrians.

According to the Tehran Jewish Committee, the population includes approximately 9,000 Jews, while a British media report estimated their number at 18,000-20,000.

The population reportedly includes 5,000-10,000 Sabean-Mandaeans.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the country as an Islamic republic and designates Ja’afari Shia Islam as the official state religion. The constitution stipulates all laws and regulations must be based on “Islamic criteria” and official interpretation of sharia. The constitution states citizens shall enjoy all human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, “in conformity with Islamic criteria.”

The constitution prohibits the investigation of an individual’s ideas, and states no one may be “subjected to questioning and aggression for merely holding an opinion.” The law prohibits Muslim citizens from changing or renouncing their religious beliefs. The only recognized conversions are from another religion to Islam. Apostasy from Islam is a crime punishable by death. Under the law, a child born to a Muslim father is Muslim.

By law, non-Muslims may not engage in public persuasion or attempted conversion of Muslims. These activities are considered proselytizing and punishable by death. In addition, citizens who are not recognized as Christians, Zoroastrians, or Jews may not engage in public religious expression, such as worshiping in a church, or wearing religious symbols such as a cross. Some exceptions are made for foreigners belonging to unrecognized religious groups.

The penal code specifies the death sentence for moharebeh (enmity against God), fisad fil-arz (“corruption on earth,” which includes apostasy or heresy), and sabb al-nabi (“insulting the prophets” or “insulting the sanctities”). According to the penal code, the application of the death penalty varies depending on the religion of both the perpetrator and the victim.

The constitution states the four Sunni (Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki, and Hanbali) and the Shia Zaydi schools of Islam are “deserving of total respect” and their followers are free to perform religious practices. It states these schools may follow their own jurisprudence in matters of religious education and certain personal affairs, including marriage, divorce, and inheritance.

The constitution states Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians are the only recognized religious minorities. “Within the limits of the law,” they have permission to perform religious rites and ceremonies and to form religious societies. They are also free to address personal affairs and religious education according to their own religious canon. Any citizen who is not a registered member of one of these three groups, or who cannot prove that his or her family was Christian prior to 1979, is considered Muslim.

Since the law prohibits citizens from converting from Islam to another religion, the government only recognizes the Christianity of citizens who are Armenian or Assyrian Christians, since the presence of these groups in the country predates Islam, or of citizens who can prove they or their families were Christian prior to the 1979 revolution. The government also recognizes Sabean-Mandaeans as Christian, even though the Sabean-Mandaeans do not consider themselves as such. The government often considers Yarsanis as Shia Muslims practicing Sufism, but Yarsanis identify Yarsan as a distinct faith (known as Ahle Haq or Kakai). Yarsanis may also self-register as Shia in order to obtain government services. The government does not recognize evangelical Protestants as Christian.

Citizens who are members of one of the recognized religious minorities must register with the authorities. Registration conveys certain rights, including the use of alcohol for religious purposes. Failure of churchgoers to register and attendance at churches by unregistered individuals may subject a church to closure and arrest of its leaders by the authorities. Individuals who convert to Christianity are not recognized as Christian under the law. They may not register and are not entitled to the same rights as recognized members of Christian communities.

The supreme leader oversees extrajudicial Special Clerical Courts, not provided for by the constitution. The courts, headed by a Shia Islamic legal scholar, operate outside the judiciary’s purview and are charged with investigating offenses committed by clerics, including political statements inconsistent with government policy and nonreligious activities. The courts also issue rulings based on independent interpretation of Islamic legal sources.

The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and the MOIS monitor religious activity. The IRGC also monitors churches.

The constitution provides for freedom of the press except when it is “harmful to the principles of Islam or the rights of the public.”

The Ministry of Education determines the religious curriculum of public schools. All school curricula, public and private, must include a course on Shia Islamic teachings, and all pupils must pass this course in order to advance to the next educational level through university. Sunni students and students from recognized minority religious groups must take and pass the courses on Shia Islam, although they may also take separate courses on their own religious beliefs.

Recognized religious minority groups, except for Sunni Muslims, may operate private schools. The Ministry of Education supervises the private schools operated by the recognized minority religious groups and imposes certain curriculum requirements. The ministry must approve all textbooks used in coursework, including religious texts. These schools may provide their own religious instruction and in languages other than Farsi, but authorities must approve those texts as well. Minority communities must bear the cost of translating the texts into Farsi so the authorities can review them. Directors of such private schools must demonstrate loyalty to the official state religion. This requirement, known as gozinesh review, is an evaluation to determine adherence to the government ideology and system as well as knowledge of the government interpretation of Shia Islam.

The law bars Bahais from founding their own educational institutions. A Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology order requires universities to exclude Bahais from access to higher education or expel them if their religious affiliation becomes known. Government regulation states Bahais are only permitted to enroll in universities if they do not identify themselves as Bahais. To register for the university entrance examination, Bahai students must answer a basic multiple-choice question and identify themselves as followers of a religion other than Bahai (e.g., Muslim, Christian, Jewish, or Zoroastrian). To pass the entrance examination, university applicants must pass an exam on Islamic, Christian, or Jewish theology based on their official religious affiliation.

According to the constitution, Islamic scholars in the Assembly of Experts, an assembly of 86 popularly elected clerics whose qualifications include piety and religious scholarship, elect the supreme leader, the country’s head of state. To “safeguard” Islamic ordinances and to ensure the compatibility with Islam of legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (i.e., the parliament or Majlis), a Guardian Council composed of six Shia clerics appointed by the supreme leader, and six Shia legal scholars nominated by the judiciary, must review and approve all legislation. The Guardian Council also vets all candidates for the Assembly of Experts, president, and parliament and supervises elections for those bodies.

The constitution bans the parliament from passing laws contrary to Islam and states there may be no amendment to its provisions related to the “Islamic character” of the political or legal system or to the specification of Shia Ja’fari Islam as the official religion.

Non-Muslims may not be elected to a representative body or hold senior government, intelligence, or military positions, with the exception of five of the 290 parliament seats reserved by the constitution for recognized religious minorities. There are two seats reserved for Armenian Christians, one for Assyrian and Chaldean Christians together, one for Jews, and one for Zoroastrians.

The constitution states, in regions where followers of one of the recognized Sunni schools constitute the majority, local regulations are to be in accordance with that school within the bounds of the jurisdiction of local councils and without infringing upon the rights of the followers of other schools.

According to the constitution, a judge should rule on a case on the basis of the codified law, but in a situation where such law is absent, he should deliver his judgment on the basis of “authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatwas [religious edicts].”

The constitution specifies the government and all Muslims are “required to treat non-Muslims in conformity with the principles of Islamic justice and equity, and to respect their human rights, as long as those non-Muslims have not conspired or acted against Islam and the Islamic Republic.

The law authorizes collection of “blood money” or diyeh as restitution to families for the death of Muslims and members of recognized religious minorities. Bahai families, however, are not entitled to receive diyeh. This law also reduces the diyeh for recognized religious minorities and women to half that of a Muslim man.

By law, non-Muslims may not serve in the judiciary, the security services (separate from regular armed forces), or as public school principals. Officials screen candidates for elected offices and applicants for public sector employment based on their adherence to and knowledge of Islam and loyalty to the Islamic Republic (gozinesh requirements), although members of recognized religious minorities may serve in the lower ranks of government if they meet these gozinesh requirements. Government workers who do not observe Islamic principles and rules are subject to penalties and may be fired or barred from work in a particular sector.

The government bars Bahais from all government employment and forbids Bahai participation in the governmental social pension system. Bahais may not receive compensation for injury or crimes committed against them and may not inherit property. A religious fatwa from the supreme leader encourages citizens to avoid all dealings with Bahais.

The government does not recognize Bahai marriages or divorces but allows a civil attestation of marriage to serve as a marriage certificate, which allows for basic recognition of the union but does not offer legal protections in marital disputes. Bahai activists report this often leaves women without legal protections of government-recognized marriage contracts.

Recognized religious groups issue marriage contracts in accordance with their religious laws.

The constitution permits the formation of political parties based on Islam or on one of the recognized religious minorities, provided the parties do not violate the “criteria of Islam,” among other stipulations.

The constitution states the military must be Islamic, must be committed to Islamic ideals, and must recruit individuals who are committed to the objectives of the Islamic revolution. In addition to the regular military, the IRGC is charged with upholding the Islamic nature of the revolution at home and abroad. The law does not provide for exemptions from military service based on religious affiliation. The law forbids non-Muslims from holding positions of authority over Muslims in the armed forces. Members of recognized religious minorities with a college education may serve as officers during their mandatory military service, but may not continue to serve beyond the mandatory service period to become career military officers.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but at ratification entered a general reservation “not to apply any provisions or articles of the Convention that are incompatible with Islamic Laws and the international legislation in effect.”

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: The government convicted and executed dissidents, political reformers, and peaceful protesters on charges of moharebeh and anti-Islamic propaganda. The Revolutionary Court of Tehran sentenced Mohammad Ali Taheri, founder of the spiritual doctrine of “Interuniversalism” and the Erfan-e Halgheh group, to death for a second time on August 27. The Supreme Court rejected Taheri’s death sentence in December and ordered him retried. On March 12, a court sentenced Marjan Davari, a translator, researcher, and writer, to death on charges of blasphemy. Human rights organizations reported in April the self-immolation of two Yarsani brothers in Kermanshah, which they attributed to the government’s ongoing discrimination against the Yarsani community. The head of the country’s judiciary reportedly ordered Sunni prisoners convicted of drug smuggling to be executed as soon as possible so that they would not be subject to a parliament bill proposing the elimination of the death penalty for certain prisoners. Residents of provinces with large Sunni populations reported continued government repression, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest, and torture in detention, as well as discrimination, suppression of religious rights, and denial of basic government services. CHRI reported that authorities released Christian convert Maryam (Nasim) Naghash Zargaran from Evin Prison on August 1, after serving more than four years for engaging in Christian missionary activities. Zargaran told CHRI that prison authorities forced her and some female prisoners to take unnecessary antipsychotic medications while in prison. On August 13, security and plainclothes agents arrested and reportedly beat Sunni Arabs for publicly praying in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province. Baluchi journalists and human rights activists, largely Sunni, continued to face arbitrary arrest, physical abuse, and unfair trials. The government pressured families of imprisoned Baluchis to remain silent and threatened them with retaliation for speaking out about cases. Shia religious leaders who did not support government policies reportedly continued to face government intimidation and arrest. Authorities continued to harass, interrogate, and arrest Bahais. The government also continued to regulate Christian religious practices closely to enforce the prohibition on proselytizing and conversion. Security officials continued to raid and demolish existing prayer sites belonging to Sunnis, and reportedly barred the construction of new Sunni mosques. In February courts sentenced four Sunni individuals to five years in prison each for jogging, with authorities claiming that it was part of organized activities against national security.

According to Amnesty International (AI) and other international human rights NGOs, the government convicted and executed dissidents, political reformers, and peaceful protesters on charges of moharebeh and anti-Islamic propaganda. According to a report by the Iran Human Rights NGO, authorities executed four prisoners on the same day at Rajai Shahr Prison on December 20, for moharebeh. The Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA) reported the execution of four men charged with waging “war on God” in Kerman province on September 17. The government incarcerated numerous prisoners on varying charges related to religion. The Iran Prison Atlas, compiled by the U.S.-based NGO United for Iran, stated at least 102 members of minority religious groups remained imprisoned for their religious activities, 174 individuals on charges of moharebeh, 23 on charges of “insulting Islam” and 21 for “corruption on earth,” a term, according to the Oxford Dictionary of Islam, from the Quran meaning “corrupt conditions, caused by unbelievers or unjust people, that threaten social and political wellbeing.” Shia religious leaders who did not support government policies reportedly continued to face intimidation and arrest.

The Revolutionary Court of Tehran sentenced Mohammad Ali Taheri, founder of the spiritual doctrine Interuniversalism and the Erfan-e Halgheh group, to death by on August 27, charged with “spreading corruption on earth.” Taheri’s death sentence drew widespread international condemnation, including from human rights organizations, NGOs, and the UN special rapporteur. According to AI, the verdict stated that Taheri had “corrupt[ed] the thoughts and beliefs of tens of thousands of Muslim citizens across the country” by the founding of Erfan-e Halgheh. AI stated that prior to Taheri’s first court hearing, state television aired a program called “Satan’s Ring,” which introduced Taheri as the leader of a “perverse sect” and showed alleged “survivors” of his teachings calling for his death. According to press, the Supreme Court rejected Taheri’s death sentence in December, citing a faulty investigation, and ordered him retried.

AI reported that this was the third time the government sought the death penalty against Taheri, all for the same activities. AI also said that authorities had held Taheri in solitary confinement for more than six years. According to other reports, authorities arrested and detained dozens of Taheri’s followers throughout the year, including teachers of the Erfan-e Halgheh doctrine. Various reports by human rights organizations stated the government subjected Taheri’s followers to unannounced raids on their homes and places of business or teaching by security forces, including confiscation of personal belongings such as laptop computers, cellphones, and identification cards.

International media reported and numerous NGOs protested the March 12 death sentence of Marjan Davari for blasphemy. Davari, a translator, researcher, and writer, mostly of books of a metaphysical nature, also worked as a teacher of metaphysics at the Rah-e Ma’refat (Road of Wisdom) Institute. According to CHRI, the institute was officially registered and legally operated under the ownership of Davari’s husband, Karim Zargar, whom authorities also subsequently arrested. In addition to blasphemy, the government accused Davari of “conspiracy against the regime;” being a member of Eckenkar (an international spiritual movement founded in the 1960s), “spreading corruption on earth;” and having a love affair. Davari received an additional 16-month prison sentence for insulting Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Authorities initially arrested Davari at her father’s home in September 2015, and held her for three months in solitary confinement in Ward 209 of Evin Prison, controlled by the MOIS, before transferring her to the women’s ward. CHRI reported that authorities prevented Davari’s lawyer from reading her case file, and denied the lawyer’s requests for bail. While imprisoned, Davari reportedly suffered from health issues including severe pain in the joints of her legs for which she was denied appropriate medical treatment.

Human rights organizations reported in April the self-immolation of two Yarsani brothers – Mehdi and Ehsan Fozoni – in Kermanshah, which they attributed to the government’s ongoing discrimination and related economic problems facing the Yarsani community.

Christian news website Mohabat News stated that in February, Molavi Abdolhamid Ismaeelzahi, the country’s leading Sunni cleric and Friday prayer leader of Zahedan, wrote a letter to Supreme Leader Khamenei expressing concern over a report by Amadnews.com on discrimination against Sunnis. The report stated that the head of the judiciary, Ayatollah Sadegh Larijani, ordered Sunni prisoners convicted of drug smuggling to be executed as soon as possible so that they would not be subject to a parliament bill proposing the elimination of the death penalty for certain prisoners convicted of drug-related offenses. The report also stated at least 50 Sunni prisoners could be executed as a result of Larijani’s alleged secret order. While Ismaeelzahi noted that the veracity of the report could not be determined, he said it had increased fears among the Sunni population, which, according to Mohabat News, made up a disproportionately large proportion of those on death row. CHRI reported that Ismaeelzahi said in February that he had been banned from traveling outside of Zahedan by government officials.

Residents of provinces with large Sunni populations, including Kurdistan, Khuzestan, and Sistan and Baluchistan, reported continued repression by judicial authorities and members of the security services, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest, and torture in detention, as well as discrimination, including suppression of religious rights, lack of basic government services, and inadequate funding for infrastructure projects. The UN special rapporteur highlighted in her March and August reports the large number of executions of mainly Sunni Kurdish prisoners on moharebeh charges, as well as the “indiscriminate and blind use of lethal force” against Kurdish couriers. Human rights NGOs, including HRANA, reported throughout the year on the extremely poor conditions inside Ardabil Prison, including reports of Shia guards routinely torturing Sunni prisoners. Sunnis reported it was sometimes difficult to distinguish whether the cause of government discrimination against them was religious or ethnic, since most Sunnis were also members of ethnic minority groups.

According to Baluchi rights activists, Baluchi journalists and human rights activists continued to face arbitrary arrest, physical abuse, and unfair trials. Baluchi rights activists reported that authorities often pressured family members of those in prison to remain silent. In October CHRI quoted the director of the Baloch Activists Campaign saying that every year, police extrajudicially killed between 100-200 “bandits” (predominantly Sunni Muslims) in Sistan and Baluchestan Province.

In October CHRI reported that authorities changed to life-in-prison earlier sentences of lifetime internal exile for Mohammad Ali Shamshirzan and Hamid Arayesh of the Gonabadi Dervishes Sufi order. According to CHRI, four other dervishes who had similarly been sentenced to exile were said to be facing five to seven years in prison. CHRI reported that authorities indicated they would drop these sentences and free the men if they “repented.” According to the report, authorities arrested the six men in Kowar, Fars Province, in 2011 when Shia Muslim seminary students attacked their Sufi religious gathering. Apparently because of the men’s religious beliefs, the revolutionary court in Shiraz convicted them in 2015 of “waging war against the state” and for following “a deviant sect.” CHRI reported that Shamshirzan began his exile in Bandar Abbas in the spring of 2016, but was imprisoned in January after checking in with the local police station. Shamshirzan was hospitalized twice during the year for medical problems, but each time authorities quickly returned him to prison despite doctors’ recommendations that he remain in the hospital.

Activists and NGOs reported Yarsani activists and community leaders continued to be subject to detention or disappearance for engaging in awareness raising regarding government practices or discrimination. The Kurdistan Human Rights Network reported security forces arrested Hossein Mansouri, a Yarsani activist, in August and transferred him to an unknown location. According to another report, a female Yarsani activist was detained for two days and reportedly committed suicide upon her release.

In December media reported police arrested several Jews on unknown charges; the arrests were widely believed to be related to their religious affiliation. The arrests followed reports of attacks on two synagogues in Shiraz over consecutive nights. In the first instance, attackers broke into the Kenisa’eh Hadash (New Synagogue) and the Hadash Synagogue and desecrated two Torah scrolls and more than100 prayer books, destroyed furnishings, tefillin, and prayer shawls, and stole silver.

There continued to be reports of arrests and harassment of Sunni clerics and congregants. CHRI reported in October that security forces detained more than 100 Sunnis following June 7 terrorist attacks at the parliament building and on former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini’s mausoleum, which killed 17 people. Authorities accused those arrested of being linked to the attacks, for which ISIS claimed credit. CHRI reported that CSTI, representing Sunni clerics based in the northwestern Kurdish-populated provinces, suspended its operations on July 13 following intimidation by MOIS officials (both predating and following the terrorist attack on parliament). CHRI reported that after the previous CSTI conference at the al-Nabi Mosque in Sanandaj in October 2016, MOIS officials had summoned and threatened nearly half of the more than 400 Sunni theologian participants.

CHRI reported that authorities released Christian convert Maryam (Nasim) Naghash Zargaran from Evin Prison on August 1; she had been imprisoned for engaging in Christian missionary activities. Authorities arrested Zargaran in 2012 and accused her of seeking to buy property for a Christian orphanage. She was denied access to a lawyer. A Revolutionary Court sentenced Zargaran to four years in prison in 2013 for “assembly and collusion against national security.” After her release, authorities banned Zargaran from leaving the country for six months without explanation. In an interview with CHRI, Zargaran stated that prison officials prescribed unnecessary antipsychotic medications to female prisoners. She stated she had been “paralyzed” by the pills given to her during her incarceration, experienced difficulty standing, and fell down stairs several times.

The Special Court for the Clergy in Hamadan tried cleric Hassan Amini, CSTI’s secretary general, on June 29, on charges of “propaganda against the state” after he criticized the execution of more than 20 Sunni prisoners in Rajai Shahr Prison in 2016. As of July, he was still awaiting a verdict, and no further updates were available at year’s end.

CHRI reported in August that security and plainclothes agents beat and arrested 13 Sunni Arabs for publicly praying in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province, in a traditional Sunni group prayer. Authorities took the men, ranging from 20-27 years old, into custody on August 11. According to CHRI, authorities gave family members of those arrested conflicting information regarding their whereabouts, and the families were not able to locate them.

CHRI reported that on April 10, authorities released on 1.12 billion rials ($31,000) bail Molavi Fazl al-Rahman Kouhi, a Sunni cleric in Sistan and Baluchistan Province and Friday prayer leader of Peshamag. MOIS agents in Zahedan had questioned him in custody for a week prior to his release. According to the report, Kouhi had issued a fatwa against fighting in the Syrian conflict, and had accused the IRGC of “taking advantage of poor Sunni youths” by sending them as soldiers to fight in Syria. According to CHRI, on April 5, Zahedan prosecutor Ali Movahdi Rad said Kouhi had been summoned after being given “several warnings about minding national solidarity.” Authorities accused Kouhi of “making angry speeches against internal and external security issues” and “inviting people to join terrorist groups.”

HRANA reported in February that a court sentenced four Sunni residents of Boukan to five years in prison for jogging. According to the report, the same judge who tried the case had also previously jailed 12 others for jogging. The report stated that the judge said jogging was part of organized activities that were against national security. HRANA reported that the sentencing followed coordinated raids by security forces on houses in Boukan in October 2016, resulting in beatings and arrests of local Sunni imams and their students by the security forces, and were widely viewed as targeting Sunnis on the basis of their beliefs.

In January HRANA reported on Solaiman Pairoti, a Sunni prisoner held in Rajai Shahr Prison, who had been hospitalized following a second heart attack in November 2016. According to HRANA, the agents overseeing Pairoti introduced the prisoner to other people at the hospital as a “dirty Da’esh,” referring to members of ISIS. Agents reportedly tied Pairoti to his hospital bed with handcuffs and shackles and he was beaten and spat on. Pairoti reportedly could not move or speak, with half of his body paralyzed, and was in a state of shock.

Iran Human Rights reported in June that since the start of Ramadan, approximately 90 case files had been opened in the city of Qazvin for individuals who had been caught eating or drinking during fasting hours. The Qazvin prosecutor stated that 20 individuals were sentenced to be flogged and the punishments were said to have been carried out on the same day.

Christian World Watch Monitor reported on the arrest or imprisonment of at least 193 Christians for their religious affiliation or activities in 2016. Authorities continued to arrest members of unrecognized churches for operating illegally in private homes or on charges of supporting and accepting assistance from “enemy” countries. Many arrests reportedly took place during police raids on religious gatherings and included confiscations of religious property. News reports stated that Christians who were arrested were subject to severe physical and psychological mistreatment by authorities, which at times included beatings and solitary confinement. Mohabat News, citing local media reports, reported that authorities arrested several Christians in Tehran, Rey, and Pardis and that later, the IRGC released a video showing dozens of Bibles, textbooks, theological notes, and CDs; it is not known, however, if the arrests and confiscations were connected. Christian World Watch Monitor characterized the confiscation and IRGC press release as a “publicity stunt” to deter Christians from meeting. The IRGC accused the “large network” of Christians of “attempting to undermine the Abrahamic religions, disturbing public opinion, and distraction of public and cyberspaces using the excuse of promoting Christianity and holding house churches.”

According to the NGO Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW), on July 3, a revolutionary court in Tehran sentenced Christian converts Hadi Asgari and Amin Afshar Naderi to 10 years imprisonment; Naderi received an additional five years for blasphemy. Both will be forbidden to travel abroad for two years after their prison terms end. The government charged the two with “violating national security by hosting house churches and promoting Christianity.” Authorities announced the charges following a reported eight months of custodial interrogation. Mohabat News reported that Naderi went on a hunger strike in January while in solitary confinement in Evin Prison. Naderi and Asgari, along with Amir Saman Dashti, Mohammad Dehnavi, and Ramil Bet-Tamraz, were arrested in August 2016 in a private garden in Firouzkooh for possessing Bibles. Four of the five were Christian converts. According to Mohabat News, security forces also beat Naderi for resisting arrest.

According to media reports, two men stabbed Farhang Amiri, a Bahai, to death in September 2016, outside his residence in Yazd. Authorities released them on bail in June after they confessed to killing Amiri because of his faith. BIC reported that the two men subsequently disclosed that they were prompted to kill Amiri by their religious beliefs and statements made by clerics that Bahais are against Islam.

According to the Bahai International Community (BIC), between January and September, authorities arrested at least 84 Bahais, and there were at least 97 Bahais in prison as of September. BIC stated that all arrests and detentions were directly linked to the individual’s professed faith and religious identity. In April the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention ruled that the detention of 24 Bahais, who were among the 84 arrested since January, was arbitrary and that their arrest and detainment violated their rights. Charges brought against Bahais included “insulting religious sanctities,” “corruption on earth,” “propaganda against the system,” and actions against national security. They were also arrested for their involvement with the Bahai Institute for Higher Education (BIHE), a university-level educational institution the government considered illegal.

According to CHRI, a court sentenced three Bahai students, who had been barred from university, to five years in prison for being Bahai. Authorities had barred Rouhieh Safajoo, Sarmad Shadabi, and Tara Houshmand from enrolling in university because of their religious beliefs, despite the high marks they had received on their 2013 entrance exams. The three wrote letters to the president, the Ministry of Science, the parliament, and the judiciary to complain about violation of their human rights. On November 4, a court convicted them of “membership in the anti-state Bahai cult” and “publishing falsehoods.”

International media and human rights organizations reported widely on the sudden transfer in August of numerous inmates, including at least 15 Bahais, held in the Rajai Shahr (Gohardasht) Prison to another section of the prison. The reports stated that the new section was equipped with added security features, including surveillance cameras and microphones in toilets and showers, and that prison officials prevented the prisoners from taking personal belongings such as medicine and clothes with them. Prison officials also initially denied family visits, and there were reports of worsening health conditions of those imprisoned. Observers said they believed the authorities imposed these measures because of the prisoners’ faith.

According to BIC, on September 18, the government released Mahvash Sabet following 10 years in prison. Sabet was one of the seven leaders of the Yaran, a group tending to the social and spiritual needs of the Bahai community with the knowledge and approval of the government. In 2008, authorities arrested the seven individuals and sentenced them to 20 years in prison for “disturbing national security,” “spreading propaganda against the regime,” and “engaging in espionage.” The other six leaders – Fariba Kamalabadi, Jamaloddin Khanjani, Afif Naeimi, Saeid Rezaie, Behrouz Tavakkoli, and Vahid Tizfahm – remained in detention as of year’s end. It is widely believed that authorities targeted these individuals because of their religious affiliation.

According to CHRI, MOIS agents arrested Bahai singer Behnam Rohani-Fard on September 4 when he returned from a European concert tour. Authorities accused him of holding concerts to celebrate the life of Bahai founder Baha’u’llah, and charged him with “propaganda against the state,” “disturbing public opinion” and “membership in the illegal Bahai organization.” Security officials reportedly interrogated Rohani-Fard at least 20 times for three to four hours on each occasion during his subsequent month-long solitary confinement in Ward 209 of Evin Prison, controlled by the MOIS. Rohani-Fard had previously spent nine months in a prison in Yazd in 2010 for his song “Zendani” (Prisoner), said to be composed in solidarity with the imprisoned Yaran Bahai leaders.

Although the exact number was not known, according to reports by Iran Wire and other sources, authorities arrested and otherwise harassed numerous Bahais, including through raids on homes and businesses, in the run-up to the bicentennial of the birth of the Bahai founder in late October. The MOIS and the IRGC reportedly conducted raids throughout the country, including in Tehran, Isfahan, and Mashhad.

Many Bahais reportedly continued to turn to online education at BIHE despite government censorship through use of internet filters and blocking of websites and the arrests of teachers associated with the program. Since the BIHE’s online and offline operations were illegal, students and teachers faced the risk of arrest for participation. BIHE instructor Azita Rafizadeh remained in prison serving a four-year sentence for teaching at the institution. Rafizadeh’s husband, Peyman Koushk-Baghi, continued serving a five-year sentence. According to Payam News, officials arrested Koushk-Baghi in March 2016 while visiting his wife at Evin Prison.

There were reports of authorities placing restrictions on Bahai businesses or forcing them to shut down after they had temporarily closed in observance of Bahai holidays or of authorities threatening shop owners with potential closure, even though businesses could legally close without providing a reason for up to 15 days a year. BIC stated in September that since President Hassan Rouhani took office in 2013, there were at least 645 incidents of “economic oppression” by authorities against Bahai-owned businesses, ranging from intimidation and threats to their closure. In July authorities sealed 16 Bahai-owned shops in Khuzestan Province after the owners closed for a Bahai holy day, and in April the government sealed 18 Bahai-owned shops for similar reasons. According to BIC, the government continued to raid Bahai homes and businesses and confiscate private and commercial property, as well as religious materials.

The government continued to hold many Bahai properties it had seized following the 1979 revolution, including cemeteries, holy places, historical sites, and administrative centers. The government also continued to prevent Bahais from burying their dead in accordance with their religious tradition. On April 18, according to BIC, security officers told the caretaker for the Bahai cemetery of Tehran that a Bahai woman had died in Gilavand. The caretaker discovered the woman had actually died four months before and was initially buried in the Bahai cemetery of Gilavand, but had subsequently been disinterred. According to the report, the security officials told the man, “You have no right to bury your deceased in the Gilavand cemetery.” The authorities similarly exhumed the body of another deceased Bahai who had also died four months earlier and had been buried in the Gilavand cemetery. According to a BIC report, the woman’s remains had been removed from the coffin and were missing.

The Iran Human Rights Documentation Center reported in July that supervisors of Vadi Rahmat, Tabriz’s largest government-run cemetery, had since 2011 denied burial in the cemetery to at least 44 Bahais. According to the report, Bahai families of the deceased, in cooperation with ambulance services, sometimes prepared the body at home following religious injunctions.

Christians, particularly evangelicals and converts from Islam, continued to experience disproportionate levels of arrests and detention, and high levels of harassment and surveillance, according to Christian NGO reports. Numerous Christians remained imprisoned at year’s end on charges related to their religious beliefs. Prison authorities reportedly continued to withhold medical care from prisoners, including some Christians, according to human rights groups. According to human rights NGOs, the government also continued to enforce the prohibition on proselytizing.

According to CHRI, in July Judge Mashallah Ahmadzadeh of Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court issued long prison sentences to at least 11 Christian converts in a period of fewer than two months, all on allegedly specious charges. On July 6, Ahmadzadeh sentenced Azerbaijani nationals Yusif Farhadov, Eldar Gurbanov, and Bahram Nasibov, along with Iranian national Nasser Navard Goltapeh, to 10 years in prison for being “Zionist Christians” who “acted against national security with the intention of overthrowing the state in a soft war” in a trial reportedly lacking due process. Security forces arrested the individuals at a Christian reception in Andisheh in June 2016.

On June 24, Judge Ahmadzadeh also sentenced Pastor Youcef Nadarkhani, Mohammad Reza Omidi, Mohammad Ali Mosibzadeh, and Zaman Fadaei, all Christian converts, to 10 years in prison each for “assembly and collusion against national security,” organizing home churches, and preaching “Zionist Christianity.” The judge sentenced Nadarkhani and Omidi to two additional years in internal exile following the completion of their prison terms. MOIS agents arrested the men while they were performing Christian rituals at the house of a friend in Rasht in May 2016. According to CSW, authorities arrested Omidi, Mosibzadeh, and Fadaei for drinking communion wine.

On June 11, Judge Ahmadzadeh sentenced Victor Bet Tamraz, the former leader of Iran’s Assyrian Pentecostal Church, along with Christian converts Hadi Asgari and Kavian Fallah Mohammadi, to 10 years in prison. The judge sentenced Christian convert Amin Afshar Naderi to 15 years in prison. MOIS agents allegedly arrested these converts for participating in Christian activities or rituals.

Mohabat News reported that authorities summoned Sevada Aghasar, a member of the Armenian Orthodox Christian community, to Evin Prison on July 4, to begin serving a five-year prison sentence for violating national security through collusion and underground church gatherings. The government initially arrested Aghasar in 2013 along with two other Christians, and charged him with promoting Christianity on Facebook and contacting Persian speaking Christians. A revolutionary court in Tehran ultimately sentenced him in 2015.

Authorities continued to hold Ebrahim Firouzi, a former Muslim who converted to Christianity, in Rajai Shahr Prison since 2013, convicted of “collusion against national security” for converting to and practicing Christianity, and related missionary activities. As of year’s end, he was serving a five-year prison sentence that was upheld following multiple appeals. Mohabat News reported that after serving his prison sentence, Firouzi would be exiled to Sarbaz village in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. In August Mohabat Newsreported that Firouzi was one of the many prisoners of conscience abruptly transferred to a new ward in Rajai Shahr Prison, and that he had commenced a hunger strike to protest the prison’s deplorable conditions. While in prison, Firouzi’s health reportedly rapidly deteriorated, and prison authorities denied him permission to receive appropriate medical care.

CHRI reported that the government had prosecuted Firouzi three times since 2010 for converting from Islam to Christianity and organizing Christian religious meetings. After initially arresting Firouzi in January 2010, interrogators offered him freedom if he declared himself a Muslim. Firouzi refused to do so, and the revolutionary court in Karaj subsequently convicted him of “propaganda against the state.” After Firouzi was freed in 2011, authorities arrested him again in 2012 for “attempting to create a website teaching about Christianity” and charged him again with “propaganda against the state.” During interrogations following his third arrest in 2014, Firouzi was reportedly pressured to issue a false statement in exchange for freedom but again refused. According to the latest decision by the Appeals Court, Firouzi will remain in prison until at least 2019.

In her August 17 report, the UN special rapporteur highlighted the case of Catholic converts Anoohe Rezabakhsh and her son Sohail (Augustin) Zargarzadeh, who were arrested on February 20 in their home by the IRGC in Oroumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province. According to CHRI, two plainclothes intelligence agents entered their home without prior notice and searched the premises, seizing personal items such as religious books. There was no subsequent information on the case.

According to human rights organizations, Christian advocacy groups, and NGOs, the government continued to regulate Christian religious practices. Official reports and the media continued to characterize Christian house churches as “illegal networks” and “Zionist propaganda institutions.” Christian community leaders stated that if the authorities found Armenian or Assyrian churches were baptizing new converts or preaching in Farsi, they closed the churches. Authorities also reportedly barred unregistered or unrecognized Christians from entering church premises, closed churches that allowed them to enter, and arrested Christian converts.

Christian advocacy groups stated the government, through pressure and church closures, had eliminated all but a handful of Farsi-language church services, thus restricting services almost entirely to the Armenian and Assyrian languages. Security officials monitored registered congregation centers to perform identity checks on worshippers to confirm non-Christians or converts did not participate in services. In response, many citizens who had converted to Protestantism or other Christian faiths reportedly practiced their religion in secret. Other unrecognized religious minorities such as Bahais and Yarsanis were also forced to gather in private homes to practice their faith in secret.

The government barred Christian practices at cemeteries. In August Mohabat News reported that the local municipality had blocked the entrance to the historic Christian graveyard in Kermanshah and had increasingly taken over parts of the cemetery. It also reported that “extremist” elements had destroyed gravestones over the past several years. Families of the Christians buried there could no longer visit. Human rights organizations reported in September that security forces in Tehran arrested a Christian couple accused of participating in a Christian funeral in Behesht-e Zahra, Tehran’s largest cemetery.

The government continued to monitor the statements and views of senior Shia religious leaders. Shia religious leaders who did not support government policies or Supreme Leader Khamenei’s views reportedly continued to face intimidation, arrest, and imprisonment on charges related to religious offenses.

Critics stated the extrajudicial Special Clerical Courts were used to control non-Shia Muslim clerics, as well as to prosecute Shia clerics who expressed controversial ideas and participated in activities outside the sphere of religion, such as journalism or reformist political activities.

According to CHRI, security officials detained prominent cleric Hojjatoleslam Ahmad Montazeri on February 21, to begin a six-year prison sentence for “endangering national security” and “leaking secrets of the Islamic system.” He was then granted a furlough and released the next day, reportedly following the direct intervention of the supreme leader. In August 2016, local media reported the Qom branch of the Special Clerical Court interrogated Montazeri for posting audio recordings of his father, the late cleric Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri. In the recorded speech, the grand ayatollah condemned a 1988 mass execution of political prisoners. Authorities subsequently arrested Ahmad Montazeri in September 2016, and in November 2016, sentenced him to 21 years in prison, 15 of which were suspended. He remained out of prison at year’s end.

According to AI, Shia cleric Ayatollah Hossein Kazemeini Boroujerdi, who was serving an 11-year sentence after his initial conviction in 2007 on charges including moharebeh and “abusing his clerical flock,” was released from prison on temporary medical leave in January. Activists report the underlying charges related to his espousal of religious beliefs that differed from those propagated by the government. Following his release, Special Clerical Court officials placed Boroujerdi under house arrest and 24-hour surveillance. Court officials reportedly threatened to return him to prison and to kill him for speaking to the media, in violation of the terms of his release. Authorities banned him from writing and distributing publications, delivering speeches, continuing his teachings, and organizing ideological or doctrinal meetings. AI reported that Boroujerdi remained in poor health, suffering from heart disease and kidney problems, which were said to have been exacerbated by the denial of adequate care during his imprisonment.

According to a September 17 report by Radio Farda, the Special Clerical Court sentenced Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Nekounam, a Shia religious instructor in Qom originally arrested in 2015, to five years in prison and an undisclosed number of lashes. The court also stripped Nekounam of his right to clerical office. The court reportedly said it would not disclose any details about the case to “protect” the status of the clergy and Nekounam’s reputation. Sources stated the arrest was related to Nekounam’s indirect criticism of other clerics. It was said he indirectly criticized Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi’s opposition to fast internet services and also criticized an incident in Isfahan in which acid was thrown on women to punish them for improper hijabs. In an interview, Nekounam stated, “The one who throws acid [at others] is the most violent person.”

Authorities reportedly continued to deny the Sabean-Mandaean and Yarsan religious communities access to higher education and government employment unless they declared themselves as Christian or Muslim, respectively, on their application forms.

The government continued to require women of all religious groups to adhere to “Islamic dress” standards in public, including covering their hair and fully covering their bodies in loose clothing – a manteau (overcoat) and a rousari (headscarf) or, alternatively, a chador(full body length semicircle of fabric worn over both the head and clothes). Although the government at times eased enforcement of rules for such dress, it also punished “un-Islamic dress” with arrests, lashings, fines, and dismissal from employment. Authorities also deemed activities such as Zumba dancing and instruction “un-Islamic,” leading to arrests and harassment. In August for example, media reported on the arrest of six individuals for teaching Zumba dancing, trying to “change lifestyles” and not adhering to the hijab dress code.

In September BIC reported that Bahai schoolchildren at all levels continued to be monitored and slandered by administrators and teachers in schools, including being threatened with expulsion. According to the report, religious studies teachers insulted Bahai beliefs, and sometimes when Bahai students attempted to clarify them, they were threatened with expulsion for “teaching” their faith.

Public and private universities continued to deny Bahais admittance and to expel Bahai students once their religion became known. BIC reports stated that the government also blocked Bahai students’ examination results and declared their files “incomplete,” thereby preventing their admission to university. In September Iran Wire reported that at least 115 Bahais were banned from universities during the year. The report also stated that Bahai students who passed entrance exams were told by officials that they might be able to study, but that they would need to write a letter and disavow their faith in order to do so. CHRI reported on the June expulsion of Farzad Safaei who, according to the report, was one semester away from earning a bachelor’s degree at the Islamic Azad University in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province, when the university’s security director summoned him and asked about his religious affiliation. According to a report in Iran Press Watch, Laeya Shaerzadeh, an undergraduate student, was similarly expelled in September after three terms of study at the University of Hafez in Shiraz. Many Bahais reportedly did not try to enroll in state-run universities because of the Bahai Faith’s tenet not to deny one’s faith.

According to BIC, government regulations continued to ban Bahais from participating in more than 25 types of work, many related to food industries, because the government deemed Bahais “unclean.”

The website of the Mosques Affairs Regulating Authority reported in 2015 that there were nine Sunni mosques operating in Tehran and 15,000 across the country. These numbers, however, were disputed by the Sunni community who said the vast majority of these were simply prayer rooms or rented prayer spaces. International media and the Sunni community continued to report that authorities prevented any new Sunni mosques from being built in Tehran. According to the official website of the Sunni imam leading Friday prayers in Azadshahr, intelligence agents sealed Yaft-Abad Sunni Mosque in south Tehran on June 2. According to the report, more than 1,000 Sunnis had regularly prayed at the mosque.

Sunnis reported the number of mosques in the country did not meet the demands of the population. Because the government barred them from building or worshiping in their own mosques, Sunni leaders said they relied on ad hoc, underground prayer halls, or namaz khane, to practice their faith. Security officials continued to raid these unauthorized sites.

Intelligence and security services reportedly continued to harass Sufis and Sufi leaders. Media and human rights organizations reported that on July 10, authorities blocked access to the Gonabadi order’s Mazar Soltani websites, which contained speeches by the order’s leader, Nour Ali Tabandeh, and articles on mysticism. CHRI reported that the Taskforce to Determine Instances of Criminal Content,, the country’s principal internet filtering body, had blocked access to the websites. CHRI quoted the order’s lawyer as saying that state authorities were attempting to erase the group’s presence online. Tabandeh, who was arrested in 2007 in his hometown of Bidokht and subsequently exiled to Tehran and held under virtual house arrest, stated that he often felt the authorities were trying to eliminate him.

According to CHRI, in May more than 3,000 students from various universities in the country signed a petition condemning discriminatory university policies against Gonabadi dervishes after university officials expelled Mostafa Daneshjou, a formerly imprisoned lawyer and Gonabadi dervish, from the Islamic Azad University of Tehran. Daneshjou was completing his second term and reportedly was not provided with an explanation for his expulsion. The petition said that Iranian people of any belief and religion should have equal access to higher education and learning, and its signatories called upon the government to stop viewing religious and ethnic minorities as security threats.

Mohabat News in June reported that advertising agencies affiliated with state security institutions published an anti-Christian propaganda book entitled, “Christian Zionism in the geography of Christianity,” highlighting “the menace of Christianity to the Islamic Republic.” This was reportedly one of many such publications and online materials the government used to spread anti-Christian messages and deter the practice of or conversion to Christianity.

According to members of the Sabean-Mandaean and Yarsan religious communities, authorities continued to deny them permission to perform religious ceremonies in public and to deny them building permits for places of worship.

Yarsanis reported continued discrimination and harassment in the military and school systems. They also continued to report that the birth registration system prevented them from giving their children Yarsani names. Without providing details, Yarsanis in exile reported thousands of community members remained missing after arrests by security forces. The UN special rapporteur’s August report stated that groups such as the Gonabadi order and Yarsanis continued to face a range of human rights violations, including attacks on their places of worship, the destruction of community cemeteries, and arrests and torture of community leaders. CHRI reported in May that the majority of Yarsani candidates seeking seats in the local elections had been disqualified on the basis of their religion.

According to the Tehran Jewish Committee, five Jewish schools and two kindergartens continued to operate in Tehran, but authorities required their principals to be Muslim. The government reportedly continued to allow Hebrew language instruction but limited the distribution of Hebrew texts, particularly nonreligious texts, making it difficult to teach the language, according to the Jewish community. The government reportedly required Jewish schools to remain open on Saturdays, in violation of Jewish religious law, to conform to the schedule of other schools.

Government restrictions on published religious material continued. Mohabat News reported in August that in addition to closing numerous churches throughout the country, the government had restricted publication of anything related to Christianity. Mohabat News also reported that officials confiscated books about Christianity already on the market, although government-sanctioned translations of the Bible were said to exist. Government officials still frequently confiscated Bibles and related non-Shia religious literature, pressuring publishing houses printing unsanctioned non-Muslim religious materials to cease operations. Books about the Yarsan religion remained banned. Books published by religious minorities, regardless of their topic, were required to carry labels on the cover denoting their non-Shia Muslim authorship.

Sunni leaders reported authorities banned Sunni religious literature and teachings from religion courses in some public schools, even in predominantly Sunni areas. Other schools, notably in the Kurdish regions, included specialized Sunni religious courses for the students. Assyrian Christians reported the government continued to permit their community to use its own religious textbooks for use in schools, after the government reviewed and authorized their content. Unrecognized religious minorities, such as Yarsanis and Bahais, reported they were unable to legally produce or distribute religious literature. The UN special rapporteur’s August 14 report said, “Adherents of recognized religions also continue to face severe restrictions and discrimination, and are reportedly prosecuted for peacefully manifesting their religious beliefs.”

The Guardian Council, assigned by the constitution to confirm the eligibility of candidates for the presidency, deemed only Shia Muslim males eligible for the presidency. In the May presidential election, from a total pool of 1,636 individuals who had registered, the Guardian Council allowed only six to run, all of whom were Shia Muslim.

Local and international media reported that on September 4, the Yazd Court of Administrative Justice, citing vague reasons, called for the suspension of Sepanta Niknam, the Zoroastrian member of the Yazd City Council. HRW said that an effort by the Guardian Council to bar non-Muslims from running for city and village council in areas with a majority Muslim population was behind the action. Niknam, the head of the Yazd Zoroastrian Association, had first been elected to the council in 2013 and had already served a four-year term without incident before being reelected in local council elections by an even greater margin. CHRI reported that the head councilman of Yazd, Gholamali Sefid, refused to carry out the court order suspending Niknam. Sefid quoted, “In my mind and in my religion, I know this ruling is not consistent with religion, freedom, or logic.” On October 18, Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani affirmed that removing Niknam from his elected seat because he was not Muslim was illegal. Larijani referred the case on October 23 to the Expediency Discernment Council, an entity that resolves disagreements between the branches of government. On October 24, Tasnim News quoted Ayatollah Yazdi, a member of the country’s Guardian Council and Assembly of Experts that Niknam’s suspension was “final and irreversible,” and that a non-Muslim could not make decisions on behalf of a Muslim majority. Many international observers were highly critical and saw this development as a move by the unelected Guardian Council to vet candidates for local elections, traditionally the purview of parliament, further circumscribing the rights of minority communities.

Sunnis reported continued underrepresentation in government-appointed positions in the provinces where they formed a majority, such as Kurdistan and Khuzestan, as well as an inability to obtain senior government positions. An April CHRI report observed that while there were 21 Sunni representatives in parliament (of a total of 290), no Sunni had served in a ministerial position since the founding of the Islamic Republic despite comprising a significant percent of the population. A separate CHRI report stated that, according to senior Sunni cleric Molavi Abdolhamid Ismaeelzahi, more than six million Sunnis supported President Rouhani’s re-election in May. Many members of the Sunni Muslim community were therefore reportedly disappointed by President Rouhani’s decision to exclude religious minority members from his new cabinet, while others said there had not been much progress in minority religious rights since the supreme leader’s appeal in September for equal treatment or President Rouhani’s pledges to end discrimination. The UN special rapporteur noted that Sunnis continued to assert “authorities do not appoint members of their communities to employ them in high-ranking government positions.”

Sunni activists reported that throughout the year, and especially during Moharam, the government sent hundreds of Shia missionaries to areas with large Sunni Baluch populations to try to convert the local population.

Deutsche Welle and other international media quoted Jewish community representatives such as Siamak Morsadegh, the sole Jewish member of parliament, as stating that there continued to be government restrictions and discrimination against Jews as a religious minority, but that there was little interference with Jewish religious practices. According to the Tehran Jewish Committee, there were 31 synagogues in Tehran, more than 20 of them active, and 100 synagogues throughout the country. Jewish community representatives said they were free to travel in and out of the country, and the government generally did not enforce a prohibition against travel to Israel by Jews, although it enforced the prohibition with other citizens.

Government officials continued to employ anti-Semitic rhetoric in official statements and sanction them in media outlets, publications, and books. In a February speech, Supreme Leader Khameini said that there was a “Zionist plot” to sow instability in the region and that Israel was a “cancerous tumor.” Government-sponsored rallies continued to include chants of “death to Israel” and accused other religious minorities, such as Bahais and Christians, of collusion with Israel. Local newspapers carried editorial cartoons that were anti-Semitic in nature, often focusing on developments in Israel or elsewhere in the region.

According to human rights activists, the government maintained a legal interpretation of Islam that required citizens of all faiths to follow strict rules based on the government’s interpretation of Shia jurisprudence, creating differentiation under the law between the rights granted to men and women. The government continued to enforce gender segregation and discrimination throughout the country without regard to religious affiliation.

The government continued to maintain separate election processes for the five seats reserved for representatives of the recognized religious minority communities in parliament.

The government continued to allow recognized religious minority groups to establish community centers and certain self-financed cultural, social, athletic, and/or charitable associations.

Bahais, and those who advocated for their rights, reported that Bahais continued to be major targets of social stigma and violence, and that perpetrators continued to act with impunity or, even when arrested faced, diminished punishment following admissions that their acts were based on the religious identity of the victim.

There continued to be reports of non-Bahais dismissing or refusing employment to Bahais, sometimes in response to government pressure, according to BIC and other organizations monitoring the situation of Bahais in Iran.

BIC reported that since August 2016, more than 220 influential figures, including clerics, religious figures, academics, editors, and government representatives, publicly issued speeches, articles, or written declarations against the Bahais. According to BIC, anti-Bahai rhetoric had increased markedly in recent years.

Yarsanis outside the country reported that widespread discrimination against Yarsanis continued. They stated Yarsani children were socially ostracized in school and shared community facilities. Yarsani men, recognizable by their particular mustaches, often faced employment discrimination. According to reports, Shia preachers often encouraged such social discrimination against Yarsanis.

According to CSW and others, converts from Islam to Christianity faced ongoing societal pressure and rejection by family or community members. Christian World Watch Monitor and CSW reported in September that Christian children in Rasht and Shiraz, all members of the Church of Iran, were told to either study Shia Islam or leave school. As part of a minority faith community recognized by the constitution, the law permitted the students to have access to the religious teaching of their own community, as approved by the Ministry of Education. Furthermore, until recently, according to the report, the children had been exempted from studying Islam provided they could present a signed letter from their denomination. Authorities, however, began to reject these letters on the grounds the church was an “illegal organization.” The report said the message to the Christian community was clear, “convert or leave.”

According to reports from CHRI, HRANA and Iranwire, unidentified assailants vandalized two synagogues in Shiraz on December 24-25. Prayer books were reportedly thrown into toilets and Torah scrolls ripped up. Valuable religious items such as silver candleholders were reportedly stolen.

Shia clerics and prayer leaders reportedly continued to denounce Sufism and the activities of Sufis in both sermons and public statements.

Sunni students reported professors routinely continued to insult Sunni religious figures in class.

The U.S. has no diplomatic relations with the country, and therefore did not have regular opportunities to raise concerns directly with the government over its religious freedom abuses and restrictions.

The U.S. government continued to call for the government to respect religious freedom and continued to condemn its abuses of religious minorities in a variety of ways and in different international forums. This included public statements by senior U.S. government officials and reports issued by U.S. government agencies, support for relevant UN and NGO efforts, diplomatic initiatives, and sanctions. Senior U.S. government officials publicly reiterated calls for the release of prisoners held on grounds related to their religious beliefs.

In August the Secretary of State called attention to the fact that members of the Bahai community were in prison simply for abiding by their beliefs, and denounced the continued sentencing to death of individuals on vague apostasy laws. In September a Department of State spokesperson condemned the second death sentence of Mohammad Ali Taheri, founder of the Erfan-e Halgheh spiritual movement, along with the ongoing arbitrary arrests of several of Taheri’s followers. In May a Department of State spokesperson condemned the unjust imprisonment of the seven Bahai leaders being held for exercising the freedoms of religion, association, and expression. In other statements, U.S. government officials, including the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, called attention to the situation of Bahais and Christians in the context of supporting religious freedom for members of all minority religious groups in the country.

The U.S. again supported an extension of the mandate of the UN special rapporteur in a vote at the UN Human Rights Council. The U.S. also voted in November and December in the General Assembly in favor of resolutions expressing concern over Iran’s human rights practices, including the continued persecution of religious minorities.

Since 1999, Iran has been designated as a CPC under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. On December 22, the Secretary of State announced the redesignation of Iran as a CPC and identified the existing sanctions as ongoing travel restrictions based on serious human rights abuses under section 221(a)(1)(C) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 39 million (July 2017 estimate). According to 2010 government statistics, the most recent available, 97 percent of the population is Muslim. Shia Muslims, predominantly Arabs but also including Turkmen, Faili (Shia) Kurds, and others, constitute 55 to 60 percent of the population. Sunni Muslims are approximately 40 percent of the population. Of Sunnis, Sunni Kurds constitute 15 percent, Sunni Arabs 24 percent, and Sunni Turkmen the remaining 1 percent. Shia, although predominantly located in the south and east, are the majority in Baghdad and have communities in most parts of the country. Sunnis form the majority in the west, center, and north of the country.

Christian leaders estimate there are fewer than 250,000 Christians remaining in the country, with the largest population – at least 200,000 – living in the Ninewa Plain and the IKR. The Christian population has declined over the past 15 years from a pre-2002 population estimate of between 800,000 and 1.4 million persons. Approximately 67 percent of Christians are Chaldean Catholics (an eastern rite of the Roman Catholic Church), and nearly 20 percent are members of the Assyrian Church of the East. The remainder are Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Armenian Apostolic, and Anglican and other Protestants. There are approximately 3,000 evangelical Christians in the IKR.

Yezidi leaders report most of the 600,000-750,000 Yezidis in the country reside in the north, with more than 350,000 still living in camps in the IKR. Estimates of the size of the Sabean-Mandean community vary. According to Sabean-Mandean leaders, 10,000 remain in the country, mainly in the south with small pockets in the IKR and Baghdad. Bahai leaders report fewer than 2,000 members, spread throughout the country in small groups. The Shabaks include about 350,000-400,000 persons, two-thirds to three-fourths of whom are Shia and the rest Sunni; most are located in Ninewa. Armenian leaders report a population of around 7,000. According to Kaka’i (also known as Yarsani) activists, their community has approximately 120,000-150,000 members, traditionally located in the Ninewa Plain; others live in villages southeast of Kirkuk, as well as in Diyala, Erbil, and Karbala. The Jewish representative in the KRG Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs (MERA) reports 430 Jewish families reside in the IKR. According to a Baghdad Jewish community leader, there are nine adult members of the local Jewish community.

Due to four years of intensive combat, 5.8 million civilians remained displaced within the country. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), by year’s end 3.3 million individuals had returned home, leaving 2.5 million IDPs within the country. Population movements are multi-directional, with some persons fleeing their homes and others returning home. According to the IOM, as of November, approximately 67 percent of the IDP population is Arab Sunni, 8 percent Yezidi, 9 percent Turkmen Shia, 6 percent Kurdish Sunni, 3 percent Arab Shia, 3 percent either Syriac, Chaldean, or Assyrian Christians, 2 percent Shabak Shia, and less than 1 percent Turkmen Sunni, Shabak Sunni, or Kurdish Shia.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes Islam as the official religion of the state, and a “foundation source” of legislation. It states no law may be enacted contradicting the “established provisions of Islam,” but also states no law may contradict the principles of democracy or the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in the constitution.

The constitution protects the “Islamic identity” of the Iraqi people, although it makes no specific mention of Sunni or Shia Islam. The constitution also guarantees the freedom of religious belief and practice for Christians, Yezidis, and Sabean-Mandeans, but does not explicitly protect followers of other religions, or atheists. According to the penal code, Jews are not allowed to hold jobs in state enterprises or join the military. The law prohibits the practice of the Bahai Faith and the Wahhabi branch of Sunni Islam.

The constitution states each individual has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and belief. Followers of all religions are free to practice religious rites and manage religious endowment affairs and religious institutions. The constitution guarantees freedom from religious coercion, and states all citizens are equal before the law without regard to religion, sect, or belief.

Personal status laws and regulations prohibit the conversion of Muslims to other religions, and require administrative designation of minor children as Muslims if either parent converts to Islam, or if one parent is considered Muslim, even if the child is born as a result of rape.

The following religious groups are recognized by the personal status law and thereby registered with the government: Islam, Chaldean, Assyrian, Assyrian Catholic, Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholic, Armenian Apostolic, Armenian Catholic, Roman Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Latin-Dominican Rite, National Protestant, Anglican, Evangelical Protestant Assyrian, Adventist, Coptic Orthodox, Yezidi, Sabean-Mandean, and Jewish. Recognition allows groups to appoint legal representatives and to perform legal transactions such as buying and selling property. All recognized religious groups have their own personal status courts responsible for handling marriage, divorce, and inheritance issues. According to the Yezidi-affiliated NGO Yazda, however, there is no personal status court for Yezidis.

There are three diwans (chambers) responsible for administering matters for the recognized religious groups within the country: the Sunni Endowment Diwan, the Shia Endowment Diwan, and the Endowment of the Christian, Yezidi, and Sabean-Mandean Religions Diwan. The three endowments operate under the authority of the Prime Minister’s Office to disburse government funds to maintain and protect religious facilities.

Outside of the IKR, the law does not provide a mechanism for a new religious group to obtain legal recognition. The law allows punishment for anyone practicing the Bahai Faith with 10 years’ imprisonment. For unrecognized religious groups other than Bahai – e.g., Wahhabi Muslim, Zoroastrian, and Kaka’i (Yarsani) – the law does not specify penalties for practicing; however, contracts signed by institutions of unrecognized religious groups are not legal or permissible as evidence in court.

In the IKR, religious groups obtain recognition by registering with the KRG Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs (MERA). To register, a group must have a minimum of 150 adherents, provide documentation of the sources of its financial support, and demonstrate it is not anti-Islam. Eight faiths are registered with the KRG MERA: Islam, Christianity, Yezidi, Judaism, Bahai, Sabean-Mandean, Zoroastrian, and Kaka’i.

In addition to the Christian denominations recognized by the government, the KRG has registered nine evangelical Protestant churches: Rasolia Church, Baptist Church, Kurd-Zaman Church, United Evangelical Church, Mushikha Evangelical Church, Ashti Evangelical Church, International Church, al-Nahda Church, and Evangelical Free Church.

In the IKR, Christian groups may register separately with the Council of Iraqi Christian Church Leaders, an independent group formed by church leaders, consisting of representatives from Christian churches, including six evangelical Protestant churches. Registration with the Council of Iraqi Christian Church Leaders provides Christian churches and leaders with access to the KRG MERA and to the KRG’s Christian endowment.

The KRG MERA operates endowments that pay salaries of clergy and fund construction and maintenance of religious sites for Sunni Muslims, Christians, and Yezidis.

The law requires the government to maintain the sanctity of holy shrines and religious sites and guarantee the free practice of rituals for recognized religious groups. The penal code criminalizes disrupting or impeding religious ceremonies and desecrating religious buildings. The penal code imposes up to three years’ imprisonment or 300 Iraqi dinars (IQD) (25 cents) for such crimes.

By law the government provides support for Muslims outside the IKR desiring to perform the Hajj and Umrah, organizing travel routes and immunization documents for entry into Saudi Arabia. The Sunni and Shia endowments accept Hajj applications from the public and submit them to the Supreme Council for the Hajj. The council, attached to the Prime Minister’s Office, organizes a lottery process to select pilgrims for official Hajj visas. According to the law, the commission offers 3.5 million IQD ($3,000) for Hajj travel by land, and 4.2 million IQD ($3,600) for travel by air.

In the IKR, the KRG MERA organizes Hajj and Umrah travel, carrying out a lottery to choose the pilgrims for official Hajj visas allotted to the IKR.

The constitution guarantees minority groups the right to educate children in their own languages. While it establishes Arabic and Kurdish as official state languages, it makes Syriac, typically spoken by Christians, and Turkmen official languages only in the administrative units in which those groups “constitute density populations.” The constitution provides for a Federal Supreme Court made up of judges, experts in Islamic jurisprudence, and legal scholars. The constitution leaves the method of regulating the number and selection of judges to legislation that requires a two-thirds majority in the Council of Representatives (COR) for passage.

The constitution guarantees citizens the right to choose which court (civil or religious) will adjudicate matters of personal status, including marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, and endowments. Islam takes precedence when one of the parties to the dispute is from an unrecognized faith. The law states civil courts must consult the religious authority of a non-Muslim party for its opinion under the applicable religious law and apply the religious authority’s opinion in court. In the IKR, the Personal Status Court adjudicates personal disputes between Muslims, and the Civil Status Court handles all other cases.

National identity cards denote the bearer’s religion. The only religions that may be listed on the national identity card are Christian, Sabean-Mandean, Yezidi, and Muslim; there is no distinction between Shia and Sunni Muslim, nor a designation of Christian denominations. Individuals practicing other faiths may only receive identity cards if they self-identify as Muslim, Yezidi, Sabean-Mandean, or Christian. Without an official identity card, non-Muslims and those who convert to faiths other than Islam may not register their marriages, enroll their children in public school, acquire passports, or obtain some government services. Passports do not specify religion.

The law provides constitutional guarantees for the reinstatement of citizenship to individuals who gave up their citizenship for political or sectarian reasons; however, this law does not apply to Jews who emigrated and gave up their citizenship under a 1950 law.

Civil laws provide a simple process for a non-Muslim to convert to Islam, but conversion by a Muslim to another religion is forbidden by law.

The law in the IKR formally recognizes the Bahai, Zoroastrian, and Sabean-Mandean faiths, promotes equal political, cultural, societal, and economic representation of all minority groups and forbids “religious, or political, media speech individually or collectively, directly or indirectly that brings hate and violence, terror, exclusion, and marginalization based on national, ethnic, or religious or linguistic claims.”

Of the 329 seats in the national Council of Representatives, the law reserves nine seats for members of minority communities: five for Christian candidates from Baghdad, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Dohuk; one for a Yezidi; one for a Sabean-Mandean; one for an ethnic Shabak; and one for a Faili Kurd from Wasit. The Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament reserves 11 of its 111 seats for minorities: five for Christians, five for Turkmen, and one for an Armenian.

Islamic education, including study of the Quran, is mandatory in primary and secondary school, except in the IKR. Non-Muslim students are not required to participate in Islamic studies. The government provides Christian religious education in public schools in some areas where there are concentrations of Christian populations, and there is a Syriac curriculum directorate within the Ministry of Education.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: There were continued reports that ISF and Shia militia killed ISIS detainees and their alleged collaborators. NGOs reported the government continued to use the antiterrorism law as a pretext for detaining individuals without timely access to due process. International human rights groups said the government still failed to investigate and prosecute ethnosectarian crimes, including those carried out by armed groups in areas liberated from ISIS. Sunni Arabs continued to report some government officials used sectarian profiling in arrests and detentions and used religion as a determining factor in employment decisions. Some Yezidi and Christian leaders reported continued occurrences of harassment and abuse by the KRG Peshmerga and Asayish forces. According to various NGOs, the Asayish-imposed security permitting and check point requirements impeded the movement of Yezidis to and from the Sinjar area, resulting in a de facto blockade. Christians reported harassment and abuse at numerous checkpoints operated by various PMF and Peshmerga units that impeded movement in and around several Christian towns on the Ninewa Plain. Media and government officials reported the Peshmerga and PMF prevented displaced Sunni Arabs, Yezidis, Turkmen, and others from returning to their homes in some areas liberated from ISIS. Community leaders continued to state that forced conversion was the de facto result of the national identity card law, mandating the listing of children with only one Muslim parent as Muslim, even if that child was born as a result of rape. Representatives of minority religious communities continued to report that while the central government did not generally interfere with religious observances, and even provided security for places of worship and other religious sites, including churches, mosques, shrines, and religious pilgrimage sites and routes, minority groups continued to face harassment, including sexual assault, and restrictions from local authorities in some regions. Because religion, politics, and ethnicity were often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

There were continued reports that ISF, including the PMF and Peshmerga, and Shia militia killed Sunni detainees. International and local NGOs said the government continued to use the antiterrorism law as a pretext for detaining individuals without timely access to due process. For example, Arab residents stated that Shia Turkmen PMF units arrested, kidnapped, or killed Sunni Turkmen and Arabs in Tal Afar after the ISF liberated the city from ISIS rule in August. None of those responsible within PMF units were brought to justice by year’s end.

Yezidi community leaders reported that Yezidi captives of ISIS who were repeatedly raped and bore children were forced to register those children as Muslims and convert to Islam themselves in order to obtain ID cards, passports, and other governmental services. A Yezidi physician who provided psychosocial support services to numerous Yezidi women and children who were survivors of ISIS captivity for more than three years said more than 25 children of ISIS fathers and Yezidi mothers were relinquished by their rescued mothers and given to government authorities. All of those children were listed as Muslim. Christian leaders said, in some cases, Christian families formally registered as Muslim but privately practicing Christianity or another faith were forced to choose to register their child as a Muslim or to have the child remain undocumented, which would affect eligibility for government benefits such as school enrollment and ration card allocation for basic food items, which depends on family size. Larger families with legally registered children received higher allotments than those with undocumented children.

Representatives of minority religious communities said that while the central government did not generally interfere with religious observances, and even provided security for places of worship and other religious sites, including churches, mosques, shrines, and religious pilgrimage sites and routes, minority groups continued to face harassment, including sexual assault, and restrictions from local authorities in some regions. Christian religious leaders continued to publicly accuse the Iranian-backed Shabak Shia PMF militia 30th Brigade, controlled by Iraqi parliament member Hanin Qado and his brother Waad, of harassment and sexual assaults on Christian women in Bartalla and in Hamdanyah District. A Syriac Orthodox priest and the mayor of Hamdanyah attested to these repeated incidents. Arab Sunni leaders in Hamdanyah made similar allegations.

Some Yezidi and Christian leaders continued to report harassment and abuse by KRG Peshmerga and Asayish forces in the portion of Ninewa Province controlled by the KRG or contested between the central government and the KRG. According to various NGOs, the Asayish imposed security permitting and checkpoint requirements that impeded the movement of Yezidis from Dohuk Province to and from the Sinjar area. Local sources reported the Asayish required clearance letters for anyone to cross the main bridge from Dohuk to Ninewa. PMF units in the area also threatened Yezidi returnees and impeded their movement. Christians reported harassment, abuse, and delays at numerous checkpoints operated by various PMF units, which impeded movement in and around several Christian towns on the Ninewa Plain, including the 30th Brigade in Bartalla and the 50th Brigade in Bashiqa and Tel Kayf.

According to international human rights organizations, some Shia militias, including some under the PMF umbrella, committed abuses and atrocities. The groups participated in operations against ISIS as part of the PMF and were implicated in several attacks on Sunni civilians, allegedly to avenge ISIS crimes against Shia. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported in June that 52 civilians (22 men, 20 women, and 10 children) from the Sunni Imteywit tribe disappeared while in the custody of Yezidi fighters from the Ezidkhan Brigades, associated with the PMF. Yezidi officials alleged that Imteywit and Jahaysh tribal members participated in ISIS atrocities against Yezidis in 2014, allegations the tribal members denied.

Some government forces and militia groups forced alleged ISIS sympathizers from their homes in several governorates. For example, there were reports the PMF militia group Kata’ib Hizballah kidnapped and intimidated local Arab Sunni residents in Diyala and Babil Governorates and prevented Arab Sunni IDPs from returning to their places of origin.

According to HRW, beginning in August authorities detained approximately 1,400 foreign women and children who surrendered with ISIS fighters and then transferred them to overcrowded and exposed temporary facilities without sufficient access to information or freedom of movement. Sites included Ninewa’s Hamam al-Alil humanitarian transit camp, a repurposed school in Tel Kayf, and a prison in the Rusafa district of Baghdad. Families suspected of ISIS affiliation in Salah al-Din’s al-Shahama camp were also denied freedom of movement. In September HRW reported that Shia PMF fighters affiliated with the Badr Organization detained and beat at least 100 male villagers and allegedly shot and killed four who self-identified as ISIS-affiliated during counter-ISIS operations outside Hawija.

In August Shabak Shia PMF attacked and assaulted a delegation from U.S. and Canadian churches during its visit to Christian areas recently liberated from ISIS in the Ninewa Plain, according to first-hand accounts from KRG officials and the delegation. The delegation was accompanied by Khalid Jamal Alber, Director of Christian Affairs of the KRG MERA and Peshmerga. The delegation was stopped by the Shabak Shia PMF at a checkpoint between Qaraqosh and Bartalla, two Christian towns. According to the report, the PMF insulted the delegation and gunfire was exchanged between the Peshmerga and the PMF. The Peshmerga and ISF rescued the delegation after the KRG’s Ministry of Interior and the Prime Minister’s Office intervened.

The KRG continued to actively support and fund the rescue of captured Yezidis and provide psychosocial support services at a center in Dohuk Province. According to the KRG Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs director general for Yezidi affairs, since 2014, KRG authorities have funded the rescue from ISIS of more than 3,100 kidnapped Yezidis including 1,735 children, but more than 3,000 Yezidis captured by ISIS were still missing at year’s end. Rescued captives reported being sold multiple times, subjected to forced conversions to Islam, sexual exploitation, and violence.

In May a Yezidi COR member reported the KRG had paid more than 5.8 billion IQD ($5 million) in ransom to secure the release of 3,004 Yezidis from ISIS, and more than 69.9 million IQD ($59,900) to middlemen to arrange safe passage to IKR-controlled areas.

Yezidi groups said the presence of armed affiliates of the PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, PMF militias in Sinjar, and the KRG’s imposition of security restrictions on movements into and out of the district continued to hinder the return of IDPs.

According to Yazda, Yezidis in the IKR were discriminated against when they refused to self-identify as Kurdish and Muslim; only those Yezidis who considered themselves Kurdish and Muslim could obtain senior positions in the IKR leadership. In the IKR, those not identifying as Kurdish and Muslim said actions such as obtaining a residency card or a driver’s license were challenging. The KRG continued to offer support and funding to some non-Muslim minorities, but other minorities in the IKR, such as evangelical Christians, said they continued to face difficulties registering and proselytizing.

In some parts of the country, non-Muslim religious minorities, as well as Sunni and Shia in areas where they formed the minority, continued to face harassment and restrictions from authorities.

Nabaz Ismael, a spokesperson of the KRG MERA, said MERA was planning to reduce the number of mosques where Friday sermons were delivered by combining mosques located in the same neighborhoods. The spokesperson said the primary goal was to reduce the opportunities for extremist messages on Fridays and to prevent mosques from being used for political purposes.

Members of a Kurdish family from Ranya District in Sulimaniyah Governorate who had converted to evangelical Christianity in 2000 said they had to hide their religion and move frequently to avoid harassment, including from some of their own family members. Several members of the family were physically assaulted in incidents where their conversion to Christianity from Islam and their public distribution of Bibles were mentioned by the attackers. Family members said they received no assistance from local police, ostensibly because of their religion. The family moved to Turkey later in the year.

According to the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM) – a group politically opposed to the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party – the Peshmerga looted houses of Christians and public service infrastructure, including electric cables, water pumps, and water pipes in Bashiqa, Teleskof, and Batnaya. Also the ISF and PMF looted Christian property and public service infrastructure in Tel Kayf, Qaraqosh, and Bartalla during their liberation. Yezidi properties were looted in Bashiqa.

In July Christian civil society organizations reported the Assyrian Christian mayors in Al Qosh and Tel Kayf were replaced, reportedly due to corruption, with KDP members who also were Christian. At the direction of the mayor, security forces in Al Qosh arrested and threatened a group who publicly protested this decision. Christian groups stated this was part of a “Kurdization” of their towns.

In May Syriac Orthodox Archbishop Dawood Matti Sharf accused the ISF and PMF of destroying the second century CE tomb in Qaraqosh of religious notable Youhana al-Delimi and filed a lawsuit against ISF and PMF commanders assigned to the area.

In July the KRG used official funds to open a new church in the Ankawa neighborhood of Erbil for Christian IDPs on 1,000 square meters (10,800 square feet) of land donated by the KRG at a cost of 3.55 billion IQD ($3.9 million).

Advocacy groups and religious minority representatives reported continued emigration. Estimates ranged from 10 to 22 Christian families leaving the country, including the IKR, every day. Several Christian MPs said 20-22 Christian families were leaving the country daily. Some Yezidis and Christians formed their own protection militias. Some of these received support from Baghdad through the PMF, while others received assistance from KRG Peshmerga units. Some representatives of religious minority groups, such as Yezidi and Sabean-Mandean MPs, stated they must have a role in their own security and requested government support to create armed groups from their own communities; others asked to join regular law enforcement units.

According to the Jewish leader in Baghdad, in addition to the prohibition by law for Jews to hold government jobs or to serve in the military, there was widespread discrimination against Jews, causing the remaining Jews to avoid publicly self-identifying for fear of violence.

NGOs continued to state that constitutional provisions on freedom of religion should override laws banning the Bahai Faith and the Wahhabi branch of Sunni Islam, but there continued to be no court challenges lodged to invalidate them, nor was legislation proposed to repeal them.

The KRG and the central government continued to provide increased protection to Christian churches during the Easter and Christmas holidays. Bahais reported they continued to celebrate the festivals of Naw-Ruz and Ridvan in the IKR without government interference or intimidation. Provincial governments also continued to designate these as religious holidays in their localities. Followers of the Bahai and Yezidi faiths reported the KRG allowed them to observe their religious holidays. Yezidis used Kurdish, one of the languages officially sanctioned by the constitution, in their worship services.

Government policy continued to require Islamic instruction in public schools, but non-Muslim students were not required to participate. In most areas of the country, primary and secondary school curricula included three classes per week of Islamic education, including study of the Quran, as a graduation requirement for Muslim students. Syriac and Christian religious education was included in the curricula of at least 150 public schools in Baghdad, Ninewa, and Kirkuk. Private Islamic religious schools continued to operate in the country, but had to obtain a license from the director general of private and public schools and pay annual fees.

In the IKR, private schools were required to pay a registration fee of 750,000 to 1,500,000 IQD ($640 to $1,300) to the Ministry of Education or Ministry of Higher Education, depending on the type of school. To register with the KRG, private schools needed to provide information on the school’s bylaws, number of students, size, location, facility and safety conditions, financial backing, and tax compliance, and undergo an inspection. In October the Catholic University in Erbil, which opened in 2016 with KRG approval, received accreditation from the Ministry of Higher Education. The Catholic University remained open to students of all faiths.

While the government did not require non-Muslim students to participate in religious instruction in public schools, some non-Muslim students continued to report pressure to do so from teachers and classmates. There were also continued reports that some non-Muslim students felt obliged to participate because they could not leave the classroom during religious instruction. Christian and Yezidi leaders outside the IKR reported continued discrimination in education and lack of minority input on school curricula and language of instruction. By year’s end schools still had not universally adopted the 2015 Ministry of Education curriculum incorporating lessons of religious tolerance. Many Christians who spoke the Syriac language said it was their right to use and teach it to their children as a matter of religious freedom. Seeking to establish private Christian schools, the Chaldean church in Basrah said local authorities mandated the inclusion of Islamic religious instruction in their curricula for the Muslim students enrolled.

The KRG Ministry of Education continued to fund the religion curriculum for Islam and Christian classes for students of those faiths. The KRG Ministry of Education continued to fund Syriac-language public elementary and secondary schools, which was intended to accommodate Christian students; the curriculum did not contain religious or Quranic studies.

There were reports of KRG authorities discriminating against minorities, including Turkmen, Arabs, Yezidis, Shabaks, and Christians, in the disputed territories. For example, courts rarely upheld Christians’ legal complaints against Kurds regarding land and property disputes.

Christian leaders reported the KRG continued to provide land and financial support for construction of new and renovation of existing structures for use as educational facilities, although budget cuts halted some projects. The KRG said it planned to allocate land for a Jewish cultural center in Erbil and for a Bahai religious and cultural center near Erbil. According to Bahai and Jewish representatives, MERA had “committed” to providing land for construction of community centers for those faiths. According to KRG MERA Director of Co-Existence Amir Othman, his ministry’s recommendation for lands was passed to the Ministry of Municipalities, which reviews such recommendations and allocates appropriate public land parcels. Both recommendations remained pending at year’s end.

While there remained no legal bar to ministerial appointments for members of religious minorities, in practice there were few non-Muslims in the Iraqi Council of Ministers (COM) or the KRG COM. Members of minority religious communities continued to hold senior positions in the national parliament and central government, although minority community leaders said they were still underrepresented in government appointments, in elected positions outside the COR, and in public sector jobs, particularly at the provincial and local levels. Minority community leaders continued to say this underrepresentation limited minorities’ access to government-provided economic opportunities. The Federal Supreme Court’s nine members included Sunni and Shia Muslims and one Christian.

Some Sunni Muslims continued to say they perceived a campaign of “revenge” by Shia government officials in retribution for the Sunnis’ favored status and abuses against Shia during the Saddam Hussein regime. Sunnis said they faced discrimination in public sector employment as a result of de-Baathification, a process originally intended to target loyalists of the former regime. According to Sunnis and local NGOs, the government continued the selective use of the de-Baathification provisions of the law to render many Sunnis ineligible for government employment, but did not do so to render former Shia Baathists ineligible.

Human rights NGOs and Yezidi leaders stated KRG authorities discriminated against organizations providing humanitarian assistance to Yezidis. KRG authorities continued their blockade, started in April 2016, of goods into Sinjar District that, together with the volatile security situation in Sinjar, prevented the return of most Yezidi families. The KRG said the blockade was designed to constrain the PKK, which maintained an established presence in the Sinjar area. Security forces restricted items such as food, medicines, and farming supplies needed for local livelihoods. Yazda reported the deaths of several Yezidi women in Sinjar because of lack of access to medicine and medical care. Since the October 16 withdrawal of Peshmerga from the Sinjar area, it was possible, though not necessarily safe, to access Sinjar from central government-controlled areas.

Sabean-Mandeans and Christians said they continued to face discrimination that limited their economic opportunities, such as their inability to sell alcohol following the central government’s implementation of its alcohol ban in many parts of the country. Basrah, Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Muthanna Provinces continued to prohibit the import, sale, or transport of alcohol, although southern Iraqis were still allowed to legally consume and own alcohol. The KRG stated the ban would not be applied or enforced within the IKR. According to a Deutsche Welle article, minority communities considered the prohibition of alcohol an affront to religious freedom. In the article a Christian member of parliament stated, “The ban on alcohol is part of a war against religious minorities that aims to force them out of the country through exclusion, marginalization, and harassment policies.” According to a 2017 report sponsored by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Iraq’s ban on alcohol sales imposed “massive restrictions on Christians, Yazidis and Sabaean Mandaeans who sell spirits, since it affects their choice of livelihood and effectively leads to their financial ruin.”

The 2015 national identity card law, adopted by the COR, did not clarify whether the national identity card would continue to identify the bearer’s religion. The law continued to prevent Yezidis, many of whom consider themselves to be a distinct ethnic group as well as a religious group, and Shabaks from self-identifying with their religious and ethnic group and from official government recognition through official documentation.

According to HRW, since June KRG forces expelled at least four Yezidi families and threatened others because of their relatives’ participation in the IDF or the PMF. The KRG’s security forces, Asayish, returned the displaced families to Sinjar, where access to basic goods and services was very limited. According to the Yezidi International Human Rights Organization, at the end of July the number of Yezidi IDPs expelled to Sinjar in this manner was more than 150.

The KRG MERA Director General for Christians confirmed that a 2016 Dohuk court decision returning lands to Christians had not yet been implemented.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

On December 9, Prime Minister al-Abadi announced that after more than three years of combat, all territories were finally liberated from ISIS control. Throughout the year, however, ISIS continued to target victims on the basis of their religious identity, killing and subjecting persons of all faiths to violence, abductions, and intimidation. Media reported the security situation remained precarious as a result of ISIS occupation of territory and the escalation of fighting between ISIS and government forces in Ninewa and Kirkuk; although the Iraqi military and progovernment forces retook large amounts of territory in both provinces, clearance operations continued in some areas. In areas under its control, ISIS continued to commit individual and mass killings, and engaged in rape, kidnapping, and detention, including mass abductions and enslavement of women and girls from minority religious communities. ISIS also continued to engage in harassment, intimidation, robbery, and destruction of personal property and religious sites. ISIS continued to enforce strict rules on dress, behavior, and movement on the inhabitants who remained in areas it controlled, and severely punished infractions. Its fighters carried out execution-style public killings and other punishments, including after its “courts” condemned individuals for transgressing its rules or its interpretation of Islamic law. In areas not under ISIS control, it continued suicide bombings and VBIED attacks against civilians.

November UNAMI reports listed 3,112 civilian deaths and an additional 4,375 wounded as a result of acts of terrorism, violence, and armed conflict, mostly in Baghdad and in the northern and western provinces. ISIS claimed responsibility for the majority of these bombings. ISIS continued to target all religious minorities who refused to convert to Islam or who opposed the terrorist group. ISIS also targeted Sunni civilians who cooperated with the ISF. The country’s High Commission for Human Rights reported cases of ISIS killing women for not wearing an abaya. According to multiple reports from international NGOs and the local press, ISIS fighters continued to question members of detained groups to determine if they were Sunni, and then killed or abducted the non-Sunnis. According to the NGO Shlomo Organization for Documentation, ISIS abducted 150 Christians from the Batnaya, Qaraqosh, and Tel Kayf areas in 2014; their fate remained unclear at year’s end of the year. On February 15, the NGO reported the discovery of a mass grave west of Mosul containing 150 sets of human remains, possibly of Christian civilians from the area. At year’s end it was unclear if they were the remains of the Christians abducted in 2014.

Coordinated ISIS bomb attacks continued to target Shia neighborhoods, markets, mosques, and funeral processions, as well as Shia shrines. On May 30, a coordinated bomb attack on an ice cream parlor in the mainly Shia district of Karrada in Baghdad resulted in the deaths of more than 22 and injuries to more than 30. ISIS struck again hours later in the same district, detonating a bomb outside a government pension office, killing 14 and wounding 34. ISIS fighters continued their practice of claiming responsibility for these attacks via social media postings.

Large celebrations of Ashura in Najaf and Karbala were violence-free, in part because of extensive security efforts.

According to the mayor of Sinjar and several local media outlets, on October 3, a mass grave was found in Sinjar containing remains of seven Yezidis killed by ISIS. Nearly 40 mass graves, believed to contain at least 1,000 bodies of Yezidis, were discovered in Sinjar. According to the KRG MERA, more than 3,000 Yezidis captured by ISIS were missing as of December.

The Yezidi Organization for Documentation again reported cases of rape, forced labor, forced marriage, forced religious conversion, material deprivation, and battery by ISIS.

According to the Iraqi-Kurdish news agency Rudaw, a 14-year-old Yezidi girl was kidnapped, tortured, and raped by members of ISIS. She reported during an interview in October after her rescue and return to Iraq that she was trafficked to Raqqa, Syria and forced to marry more than 13 ISIS fighters, consecutively.

NGOs reported ISIS continued to kidnap religious minorities for ransom. According to officials from the Turkmen Women’s Association, ISIS militants had kidnapped and held 500 Turkmen women and children from Tal Afar and Mosul since June 2014. A Shabak member of the Ninewa Provincial Council said ISIS held more than 250 Shabaks (most of whom are thought to be Shia) captive, and had executed three of them in October. UNAMI reported that between October 27 and the beginning of November, ISIS had relocated between 64 and 70 abducted Yezidi women from Aaliyah subdistrict of Tal Afar, Muhalabiya subdistrict of Mosul, and from Qayrawan subdistrict of Sinjar, to the Seventeen-Tamouz area in Mosul city. On November 4, 2016, ISIS reportedly brought an unspecified number of Yezidi women to Tal Afar and placed them in one of the schools. ISIS reportedly gave some of the women to its militants and sent others to Raqqa, Syria. After the liberation of Tal Afar and Raqqa, the whereabouts of these women remained unknown. ISIS forced children to serve as informants, checkpoint staff, and suicide bombers in areas under its control. Yazda reported ISIS continued to force Yezidi children into combat roles, including sending young boys to conduct suicide attacks against the ISF in Mosul.

According to religious leaders, killings, forced conversion, threats of violence, and intimidation continued to motivate many minorities to leave ISIS-controlled areas. Yezidi civil rights activists reported 360,000 Yezidis displaced to Dohuk Province in the IKR because of ISIS in 2014 largely remained in place due to the chaotic and confused security situation in Sinjar, where multiple state and nonstate armed groups controlled different areas. A limited number of Yezidi and Kaka’i IDPs returned to liberated areas of Ninewa.

Although the government declared victory over ISIS on December 9, ISIS continued to target non-Muslims and Muslims after that date, including through threats, restrictions, looting, and attacks on and seizures of religious sites. In Mosul, ISIS fighters reportedly continued to threaten with death local residents who did not convert to Islam. They also continued to punish those who failed to adhere to the group’s strict interpretation of sharia. ISIS continued to impose severe restrictions on women’s movement and dress, and enforcement patrols by ISIS forces were reportedly routine. ISIS fighters continued to attack mosques and other holy sites, including Sunni religious sites, rendering many of them unusable. They converted Christian churches into mosques, and looted and destroyed religious and cultural artifacts. The NGO Shlomo reported in 2014 that ISIS burned the majority of Christian houses in the areas of the Ninewa Plain that it occupied and accused the PMF and ISF of burning some Christian houses after the liberation of Christian cities from ISIS during the year. Shlomo also reported that 22 of 24 churches in the Ninewa Plain had been looted and destroyed. A Catholic social organization conducted a survey of several historically Christian towns and found 1,233 houses destroyed, 3,520 houses burned, and 8,217 partially damaged. The same organization reported that as of September 3, only 200 Christian families from a pre-ISIS population of 19,000 families had returned to the Ninewa Plain; Christian IDPs in several Ninewa Plain villages under PMF control reported the PMF imposed arbitrary checkpoints and detained and harassed civilians without legal authority to do so.

As coalition forces advanced towards Mosul in June, ISIS destroyed with explosives the al-Nuri Mosque in Mosul, which had dominated the skyline for eight centuries. In July authorities announced UNESCO had started the first stage of the restoration of the ancient city of Nimrud. The city was liberated from ISIS in November 2016, and is associated with the Assyrian civilization dating from the 13th century B.C. Additionally, in November UNESCO hosted a meeting with the minister of culture in attendance where an agreement was reached over the reconstruction of the fourth century Mar Behnam Monastery and the Mar Mattai Monastery, founded more than 1,600 years ago.

There were continued reports of societal violence, mainly by sectarian armed groups, in many parts of the country, but few reports of religious violence in the IKR. Non-Muslim minorities reported continued abductions, threats, pressure, and harassment to force them to observe Islamic customs. Sabean-Mandean leaders continued to report threats, abuses, and robberies. In regular Friday sermons, Shia religious and government leaders urged PMF volunteers not to commit these abuses.

In January a 19-year-old Yezidi man, Namat Ismail, from Sinjar was found dead on a road in Sulaimaniya Province. His family said he had engaged in a dispute regarding religion with Muslim co-workers.

In February the Zoroastrian representative in the IKR filed a legal complaint against a Kurdish Islamic preacher, Mala Hasib, who reportedly issued a decree that all converts to Zoroastrianism had to be killed if they did not repent within days. In December an imam in Mosul delivered a nonsanctioned Friday sermon in which he decried Christians as infidels. Upon receiving complaints about the imam, the Sunni endowment removed him from the mosque.

In July in Baghdad unidentified gunmen fired upon and killed two Yezidis in their stores that sold alcoholic beverages. Yezidis and Christians, the main importers and sellers of alcohol, continued to be subject to harassment or attacks and were often forced to pay “protection” money to local authorities. Public reaction to a new national law banning the sale, import, and production of alcoholic beverages without any exception for liturgical uses was overwhelmingly negative. Opponents declared it violated language in the constitution that guaranteed the personal freedoms of minority groups.

Media reported criminal networks and some militia groups seized Christian properties in Baghdad, as well as areas of Anbar, Babil, Basrah, Diyala, and Wasit, with relative impunity, despite pledges by the Prime Minister’s Office to open investigations into the seizures.

In December the St. Gorgis Chaldean Catholic Church rededicated its church in the town of Teleskof in the Ninewa Plain, which during its occupation ISIS had looted and burned after beheading members of the congregation on its altar.

Christians in the south and those in PMF-controlled towns on the Ninewa Plain and Sabean-Mandeans in Basrah, Dhi Qar, and Maysan Governorates reported they continued to avoid celebrating their religious festivals when they coincided with Islamic periods of mourning. There were continued reports that non-Muslim minorities felt pressured by the Muslim majority to adhere to certain Islamic practices, such as wearing the hijab or fasting during Ramadan. Non-Shia Muslims and non-Muslim women continued to feel societal pressure to wear hijabs and all-black clothing during Muharram, particularly during Ashura, to avoid harassment. According to representatives of Christian NGOs, some Muslims continued to threaten women and girls, regardless of their religious affiliation, for refusing to wear the hijab, for dressing in Western-style clothing, or for not adhering to strict interpretations of Islamic norms governing public behavior. Numerous women, including Christians and Sabean-Mandeans, said they opted to wear the hijab after continual harassment.

Minority religious leaders continued to report pressure on minority communities to cede land rights to their businesses unless they conformed to a stricter observance of Islamic precepts.

Leaders of non-Muslim communities said corruption, uneven application of the rule of law, and nepotism in hiring practices throughout the country by members of the majority Muslim population continued to have detrimental economic effects on non-Muslim communities and contributed to their emigration.

Christians in the Ninewa Plain complained of Shabak business owners monopolizing the purchase of businesses to the detriment of Christians. They said these actions resulted in decreased job opportunities for Christians as the Shabak owners preferred to employ other Shabaks.

Sunni Muslims reported continued discrimination based on a public perception the Sunni population sympathized with terrorist elements, including ISIS. Some Sunni Muslims said Sunnis were often passed over for choice government jobs or lucrative contracts from the Shia-dominated government because the Sunnis were allegedly accused of being Ba’athists who sympathized with ISIS ideology.

During the year, civil society and religious institutions held numerous conferences and workshops to promote religious tolerance. Hardwired, an NGO focused on religious freedom and reconciliation, held workshops in Erbil in July. Participants included Yezidis, Christians, and Muslims from Sinjar, Mosul, Hamdaniya, Sulaimaniyah, and Dohuk.

The U.S. government continued to address at the highest levels a full range of religious freedom concerns in the country through frequent meetings with senior government officials, including Prime Minister Abadi, and through speeches and coordination groups such as the Stabilization and Humanitarian Assistance Working Group. The latter managed interagency efforts throughout the country, including in areas with religious minority populations. The Ambassador and other embassy and consulates general officials continued to meet regularly with national and regional Ministries of Education, Justice (which includes the functions of the former Ministry of Human Rights), Labor, and Social Affairs, the Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights, as well as members of parliament, parliamentary committees, and minority group representatives serving in government positions, to emphasize the need for full inclusion of religious minorities and protection of their rights.

On August 15, the Secretary of State declared ISIS responsible for genocide against groups in areas under its control, including Yezidis, Christians, and Shia Muslims. He also declared ISIS was responsible for crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing against these same groups and, in some cases, against Sunni Muslims, Kurds, and other minorities. The Secretary stated “The protection of these groups and others subject to violent extremism is a human rights priority for the Trump administration.” The embassy continued to support programs that documented ISIS atrocities.

The U.S. government continued to develop, finance, and manage projects to support all religious communities, with special emphasis on assistance to IDPs. On October 25, the Vice President announced the U.S. government would expand its funding beyond its contributions to the UN to include direct support for new programs addressing the country’s persecuted and displaced religious minority communities.

On September 11-13, the Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South/Central Asia visited religious minority communities in the north. He met with KRG and municipal officials, religious leaders, NGOs, and representatives of Christian political parties, and participated in a ribbon-cutting ceremony for a recently rebuilt Yezidi temple. At the ceremony, the Special Advisor expressed U.S. government support for the Yezidi people and its commitment to advance their religious freedom and protection in their ancestral homeland. He also visited with senior government officials and minority members of parliament in Baghdad in November to discuss justice, security, and protection of religious and cultural heritage.

Following the liberation of the Ninewa Plain in early March, in mid-March the Ambassador, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, and the Consul General in Erbil traveled to Bashiqa to visit destroyed churches, Mar Matta Monastery, and a Yezidi temple, and to meet with Yezidi religious leaders and activists and Christian and Yezidi families in several minority IDP camps. On August 23, the Ambassador, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, and the Consul General in Erbil visited Teleskof , which was controlled by ISIS August 7-18, 2014, and whose population of 4,000 is almost 100 percent Chaldean Catholic. The delegation reiterated U.S. government support for Christians and other minorities. In December senior embassy officials visited Bashiqa and Sheikhan to meet with Christian and Yezidi leaders as well as Christian, Yezidi, and Shabak IDPs, while attending the opening ceremony of a restored church in Teleskof. The Erbil Consul General visited Yezidi leaders in Sinjar and al-Qosh. Members of the Bahai Faith met with embassy officials in November to urge U.S. government support and advocacy on their behalf to the Iraqi government to officially acknowledge the religion.

U.S. officials in Baghdad, Basrah, and Erbil also continued to hold regular discussions with government officials, endowment leaders, and UN officials coordinating international assistance to IDPs to address problems identified by religious groups with overall humanitarian aid distribution. The Ambassador and the Consuls General in Erbil and Basrah met leaders of minority religious groups and civil society groups to address their concerns, particularly regarding security and protection. Embassy officials met religious leaders on a regular basis to demonstrate U.S. interest in and support for resolving issues with the provision of humanitarian assistance. In particular, they met with Yezidi, Christian, Shabak, Turkmen, Jewish, and other religious and minority leaders to promote reconciliation within their communities and to advocate more effectively for religious minority needs with the government.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5 million (July 2017 estimate). The 2016 census indicates the population is approximately 78 percent Roman Catholic, 3 percent Church of Ireland (Protestant), 2 percent other, 1 percent Muslim, 1 percent Orthodox Christian (including Greek, Russian, and Coptic Orthodox), and 1 percent unspecified Christian, while 10 percent stated no religious affiliation and 3 percent did not specify their religion. There are small numbers of Presbyterians, Hindus, Apostolic Pentecostals, Pentecostals, and Jews. The census estimates the Jewish population to be approximately 2,500. The number of Christians and Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa, Muslims from North Africa and the Middle East, Muslims and Hindus from South Asia, and Orthodox Christians from Eastern Europe continues to grow, especially in larger urban areas.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees the free profession and practice of religion, subject to public order and morality. The constitution references “the Most Holy Trinity” and “our divine Lord, Jesus Christ,” and stipulates the state shall hold the name of God in reverence and honor and respect religion. It prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief and guarantees not to endow any religion. The constitution stipulates every religious denomination has the right to manage its own affairs, own and acquire property, and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes. It states legislation providing for government aid to schools shall not discriminate among schools under the management of different religious denominations nor affect the right of a child to attend any school receiving public money without attending religious instruction at that school.

The constitution makes blasphemy a punishable offense, although the government last prosecuted such a case in 1855. The law defines blasphemy as uttering or publishing language “grossly abusive or insulting in relation to matters held sacred by any religion,” when the intent and result are “outrage among a substantial number of the adherents of that religion.” Violations are punishable by a fine of up to 25,000 euros ($30,000).

There is no legal requirement for religious groups to register with the government, nor is there any formal mechanism for government recognition of a religious group. Religious groups may apply to the Revenue Commissioners (the tax authority) and register as a charity or an NGO to receive tax exemptions. To qualify, groups must operate exclusively for charitable purposes. Constituted organizations that operate for exclusively charitable purposes and provide a clear public benefit may register as charities. The law requires all charitable organizations carrying out activities in the country to register with and to provide certain information relating to their organization to the Charities Regulator, a government-appointed independent authority. The Regulator maintains a public register of charitable organizations and ensures their compliance with the law. Organizations must apply their income and property solely toward the promotion of their main charitable object, as set out in their governing instruments (such as constitution, memorandum and articles of association, deed of trust, or rules).

Under the constitution, the Department of Education and Skills provides funding to “national” schools, which are privately owned and managed. The government pays most of the building and administrative costs, teachers’ salaries, and a set amount per pupil. In funding schools, the constitution stipulates the state shall have due regard “for the rights of parents, especially in the matter of religious and moral formation.”

Almost all primary schools and approximately half of secondary schools (vocational schools are state run and nonreligious) are religiously affiliated. At the primary level, 90 percent of all schools are Catholic, 6 percent Church of Ireland, 2 percent multidenominational,1 percent other religious groups, and 1 percent not religiously affiliated. Patrons, who are usually members of the religious groups and affiliated with religious organizations with which the school is affiliated, manage the school themselves or appoint a board of management to do so. Patrons often provide land for schools and contribute to building and administrative costs. The law permits schools with a religious patron to use religion as a basis for admissions, even if it is not oversubscribed.

The government permits, but does not require, religious instruction, faith-based classes, or general religion classes, in “national” schools. Although religious instruction is part of the curriculum of most schools, parents may exempt their children from such instruction. Religious schools teach about their religion but multidenominational schools generally teach about religion in a broader context. Students may opt out and sit in another classroom. The government funds salaries for those teachers who teach religion classes in “national” schools.

The Workplace Relations Commission (WRC), an independent statutory body, hears cases of reported workplace discrimination, including claims based on religion. The WRC may refer cases for mediation, investigate these cases, or decide the case itself. If the adjudication officer finds there has been discrimination, he or she can order compensation for the effects of discrimination and/or corrective action. Litigants may appeal WRC decisions in the courts.

The Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission is an independent public body accountable to parliament, whose purpose is to protect and promote human rights and equality and to build a culture of respect for human rights, including religious freedom. The commission works at the policy level to review the effectiveness of human rights and equality law, as well as public policy and practice. It also works with communities, including religious groups, and other civil society groups to monitor and report on the public’s experiences of human rights, religious freedom, and equality.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In September Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Leo Varadkar confirmed the country would hold a constitutional referendum in October 2018 on the question of whether to revoke the constitutional provision making blasphemy a punishable offense.

In January Education Minister Richard Bruton announced new plans aimed at increasing the number of multidenominational and nonreligious primary schools from 109 to 400 by 2030 by encouraging nonreligious or multidenominational patrons to open new schools and through an “accelerated process” of divestment – one by which religiously affiliated patrons of denominational schools transfer ownership to nondenominational or multidenominational patrons. In July Catholic Archbishop of Dublin Diarmuid Martin said the process of divestment was too slow and there was “a stubborn reluctance” within the Church to divest. He also stated he believed it was inappropriate for school enrollment to depend on a baptismal certificate.

The government continued to encourage patrons to open more schools with nonreligious or multidenominational patronage. The government’s New Schools Establishment Group advised Bruton on the patronage of the new schools, but no new schools were established during the year.

School patrons, generally affiliated with religious denominations, continued to define the ethos of schools and to determine the development and implementation of the religious education curriculum in primary schools. Curricula varied by school and could include teaching about the patron’s religion, the religious history of the country, or an overview of world religions.

Parents of unbaptized children continued to report difficulty enrolling their children in some local, religiously based schools that were oversubscribed and gave priority admissions to children of that religion. In rural areas, parents said finding alternatives to schools with Catholic patrons was especially difficult. The NGO Equate released the results of a survey conducted during the year in which 72 percent of respondents agreed the government should change the law so baptism could no longer be a requirement for school admission in state-funded schools. According to the survey, 24 percent of parents who baptized their children reported they would not have done so if it had not been a requirement for school admission.

Several state agencies, including the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (IHREC) and the Garda (national police) Racial and Intercultural Office (GRIO), continued to enforce equality legislation and work on behalf of minority religious groups. These agencies organized community events to include individuals of diverse faiths. The IHREC reviewed and made recommendations to draft legislation to ensure drafts met human rights and equality standards. The GRIO’s liaison officers continued to engage with immigrant minority religious groups on a regular basis to inform them of police services and educate them on their rights.

On January 29, Foreign Minister Charles Flanagan, Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform Paschal Donohoe, Minister for Children and Youth Affairs Katherine Zappone, and other senior government officials participated in the national Holocaust Day Memorial commemoration. The event was organized by the NGO Holocaust Education Trust Ireland in association with the Department of Justice and Equality, the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration, and Dublin City Council.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

NGOs, including the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, Immigrant Council of Ireland, Anti-Racism Network Ireland, the National Steering Group Against Hate Crime, and the European Network Against Racism Ireland, again lobbied for legislation against hate crimes, including religiously motivated hate crimes, and to ensure prejudice was taken into account as an aggravating factor in sentencing criminals.

According to the newspaper Irish Independent, Shmael Heirouche, a Dutch citizen living in the country, was sentenced on May 31 in Cork Circuit Criminal Court to five years’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to the charge of threatening to kill or cause serious harm. In November 2016, Heirouche had threatened his two French housemates, praised the Islamic State, and told police if he had a sword he would behead Jews.

In March the NGOs Muslim Sisters of Eire and the European Network Against Racism organized a protest outside the European Parliament’s offices in Dublin in response to an ECJ ruling stating workplaces had the legal right to prohibit women from wearing hijabs to work.

According to media reports in August, moderators of the country’s largest internet forum had their personal information leaked online after they banned users who had posted content that broke rules banning hate speech and racism. Twelve moderators on the website Boards.ie who had removed content from posters attacking Islam, among other comments, had their names, addresses, and phone numbers posted on other websites.

On June 5, unknown assailants attacked a mosque in Galway. The assailants threw rocks at the mosque, shattering windows during evening prayers. There were no injuries. The mosque imam said he believed a terrorist attack in London earlier that week had sparked the Galway incident, because one of the accused men in the London attack had previously resided in and been married in Ireland before returning to Britain.

U.S. embassy officials discussed the integration of religious minorities and incidents of discrimination with representatives of the Human Rights Unit of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Education and Skills, and the Garda.

Embassy representatives discussed with Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, and Christian groups and religious and education-focused NGOs the importance of promoting religious tolerance and diversity. They also discussed with these groups the challenges of religious minorities, including crime, integration, education admissions policy, and securely practicing their faith.

In November the Charge d’Affaires hosted an interfaith Thanksgiving reception, bringing together key religious leaders for a discussion and exchange of ideas. The Charge highlighted the importance of religious freedom and honored a Holocaust survivor and an advocate for reconciliation and peace.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 8.3 million (July 2017 estimate), which includes residents and citizens living in the Golan Heights, as well as 201,000 Israelis in East Jerusalem (2014 estimate). According to the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) classification system, approximately 75 percent of the population is Jewish, 18 percent Muslim, 2 percent Christian, and 1.6 percent Druze. The remaining 4 percent consists of those the CBS classifies as “other” – mostly persons, including many immigrants from the former Soviet Union, who identify themselves as Jewish but do not satisfy the Orthodox Jewish definition of “Jewish” the government uses for civil procedures – as well as relatively small communities of Samaritans, Karaites, Ahmadi Muslims, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. The majority of non-Jewish citizens are of Arab origin. This includes 134,000 out of 170,000 Christians, according to an April 3 report from the Knesset Research and Information Center. In addition, according to the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, there are approximately 65,000 noncitizen Christian laborers in the country, mostly from Asia. There are also approximately 27,500 Christian “irregular” migrants from Eritrea and approximately 79,000 persons who overstayed tourist visas, mostly Christians from Ukraine and Georgia.

According to a poll by the local NGO Hiddush published in September, 59 percent of Jewish Israelis do not affiliate with any religious stream, 18 percent are “Zionist Orthodox,” 11 percent “ultra-Orthodox” (including 2 percent who chose “Zionist ultra-Orthodox”), 6 percent chose “Reform,” and 5 percent “Conservative.” There is also a community of approximately 20,000 Messianic Jews, as reported by the Messianic Jewish community.

Bedouin Muslim communities are concentrated in the Negev and many majority Druze, Christian, and Muslim communities are located in the Galilee region, some of which are homogenous and others a mix of these groups. There are several Druze communities in the Golan Heights, as well as an Alawite community in Ghajar.

According to government statistics, as of September 30, there were 86,870 legal foreign workers in the country, 74,212 Palestinian legal workers, and 18,555 undocumented workers (not including Palestinians). The government did not have information on the number of undocumented Palestinian workers. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, there are approximately 38,000 African migrants and asylum seekers residing in the country. Foreign workers and migrants include Protestants, Roman Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, and Muslims.

Legal Framework

There is no constitution. The Basic Law describes the country as a “Jewish and democratic state” and references the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, which promises freedom of religion and conscience and full social and political equality, regardless of religious affiliation.

According to Supreme Court rulings, the Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty protects freedom to practice or not practice religious beliefs, including freedom of conscience, faith, religion, and worship, regardless of an individual’s religion. The law incorporates religious freedom provisions of international human rights covenants into the country’s body of domestic law.

The Chief Rabbinate retains the authority to issue certificates of conversion to Judaism within the country under Orthodox interpretations of Jewish law. The Council of the Chief Rabbinate consists of Orthodox rabbis chosen by an assembly consisting of rabbis, local government leaders, government ministers, and laypersons appointed by the government.

The government provides funding for both Orthodox and non-Orthodox conversion programs. Relatives of Jewish converts may not receive residency rights, except for the children of male or female converts born after the parent’s conversion is complete. A law which took effect in May authorizes local rabbinates to determine who can use their mikvahs, potentially preventing Reform and Conservative Jews from using these facilities for conversions.

The law recognizes Judaism, Christianity, Islam, the Druze, and the Bahai Faith. Christian religious communities recognized according to the adopted Ottoman millet (court) system include: Eastern Orthodox, Latin (Roman Catholic), Gregorian-Armenian, Armenian Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Chaldean (Chaldean Uniate Catholic), Greek Catholic Melkite, Maronite, Syrian Orthodox, and Evangelical Episcopal. The Anglican and Bahai communities are recognized through a British Mandate-era law adopted by the government. The government does not recognize other religious communities, including major Protestant denominations with a presence in the country, as distinct ethnoreligious communities. There are two legal pathways to formal recognition, according to laws adopted from the British Mandate period: through a government declaration in response to a petition to the Prime Minister’s Office according to the Order in Council, or by petitioning the Ministry of Interior (MOI) for recognition. Groups may appeal rejected applications to the Supreme Court.

Recognized religious communities are exempt from taxation of places of worship and may have separate courts to apply their religion’s personal status law. Some nonrecognized religions, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, receive a property tax exemption on their houses of worship, although others, such as Buddhism and Scientology, do not. The government has stated that tax collection from nonrecognized religions is conducted by local authorities in accordance with the law, but has not stated why some nonrecognized religions receive a property tax exemption and others do not. While members of recognized religious communities only require approval for resident visas from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, visas for members of nonrecognized religious communities also require MOI approval for stays longer than five years.

Legislation establishes religious councils for Jewish communities and for the Druze. The Ministry of Religious Services (MRS) has jurisdiction over the country’s 133 Jewish religious councils, which oversee the provision of religious services for Jewish communities. The government finances approximately 40 percent of the religious councils’ budgets, and local municipalities fund the remainder. The MOI Department of Non-Jewish Affairs has jurisdiction over religious matters concerning non-Jewish groups and oversees the religious council for the Druze. The Department of Non-Jewish Affairs convenes an interreligious council of all recognized religions, including Judaism, which serves as a discussion forum for recognized religious communities.

The law criminalizes willfully and unjustly disturbing any meeting of persons lawfully assembled for religious worship or assaulting someone at such a meeting. It also criminalizes intentionally destroying, damaging, or desecrating any object held sacred by any group of persons, with punishment of three years’ imprisonment.

The law requires individuals to obtain a permit from the minister of interior or the prime minister for travel to “hostile” countries, including Saudi Arabia, which is the destination for those participating in the Hajj. Illegal travel is punishable by a prison sentence or fine if the traveler does not request prior approval.

Proselytizing is legal, although it is illegal to proselytize to a person under 18 years of age without the consent of both parents. The law prohibits offering a material benefit in the course of proselytizing.

The law criminalizes the damage, destruction, or desecration of religious sites (subject to seven years’ imprisonment) and actions to “harm the freedom of access” of worshippers to religious sites (subject to five years’ imprisonment). Certain religious sites considered antiquities are provided further protection under the antiquities law. The Ministry of Tourism is responsible for the protection and upkeep of non-Jewish religious sites, while the MRS protects and maintains Jewish religious sites. The law also provides for up to five years’ imprisonment for actions “likely to violate the feelings of the members of the different religions” with regard to their religious sites. The law grants the government, not the courts, the authority to decide the scope of the right to worship at certain religious sites, and the Supreme Court has upheld this governmental authority.

The government provides separate public schools for Jewish children, conducted in Hebrew, and Arab children, conducted in Arabic. For Jewish children there are separate public schools available for religious and secular families. Individual families may choose a public school system for their children to attend regardless of ethnicity or religious observance. By law, the state provides the equivalent of public school funding to two systems of ultra-Orthodox religious schools, the United Torah Judaism-affiliated Independent Education System and the Shas-affiliated Fountain of Torah Education System.

The law provides the right for any Jew, or any child or grandchild of a Jew, to immigrate to the country from a foreign country with his or her spouse and children. The minor children of a grandchild of a Jew are granted humanitarian status, but are not automatically granted citizenship. Non-Jews have no such route to immigration. Under the Law of Return those who completed an Orthodox conversion inside or outside the country are entitled to immigration, citizenship, and registration as Jews in the civil population registry. Those who completed conversion to Judaism outside the country, regardless of affiliation, are eligible for these benefits even if they are not recognized as Jewish by the Chief Rabbinate; this would include Reform, Conservative, and other affiliations of Judaism. Immigration rights (including citizenship) under the Law of Return are also extended to those who complete private (non-Rabbinate) Orthodox conversions in Israel. Descendants of Jews qualify for immigration under the Law of Return regardless of the religious beliefs with which they were raised, although the law considers those who as adults convert to other religious groups, including Messianic Judaism, to no longer be eligible for benefits under the Law of Return.

According to the law, persons are classified as “lacking religion” if they do not belong to one of the recognized religions as recorded in the National Registry. This includes approximately 322,000 immigrants and their children, primarily from the former Soviet Union, who gained Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return but are not recognized as Jewish by the Chief Rabbinate, which applies the Orthodox definition of matrilineal descent.

The Chief Rabbinate determines who may be buried in Jewish state cemeteries, limiting this right to individuals considered Jewish by Orthodox standards. The law provides for the right of any individual to be buried in a civil ceremony, and requires that civil cemeteries be established in various areas around the country. The law criminalizes the intentional desecration of, or trespass on, places of burial, which is punishable by three years’ imprisonment.

Laws inherited from the Ottoman Empire and British Mandate periods establish the legal authority of religious courts operated by officially recognized religious communities over their members in matters of marriage, divorce, and burial. The law allows for civil registration of two persons as a married couple outside of the religious court system only if they married outside the country, or if the partners are of different religions and their respective religious courts do not object to a civil registration, or if both partners are listed as “lacking religion” in the population registry. A 1951 law on women’s equality explicitly excludes issues of marriage and divorce and appointments to religious positions.

The law imposes a two-year prison sentence on those who conduct a Jewish wedding but fail to officially register it, i.e., conduct a Jewish wedding outside the Rabbinate’s authority.

Religious courts have exclusive jurisdiction over divorce cases in which a husband and wife are registered with the same recognized religion. Members of religious groups not permitting divorce, such as Catholics, may not obtain a divorce unless they convert to a different religion that authorizes divorce. Paternity cases among Muslim citizens are the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts. Civil courts have jurisdiction over personal status cases when religious courts lack jurisdiction, as in cases of mixed-religion and same-sex couples.

Matters stemming from divorce proceedings, including alimony, child support, child custody, guardianship, and property division, are under parallel jurisdiction of both religious courts and civil courts, and the first court to receive a case acquires exclusive jurisdiction over it. A 2014 law requires spouses to meet with the Family Assistance Unit, a dispute-resolution body promoting settlement outside of courts, before filing such lawsuits in either court system.

In accordance with halacha, a Jewish woman whose husband refuses to give her a get (Jewish-legal writ of divorce) may not legally remarry in the country. While a rabbinical court may order a husband to give a get, it does not have the power to terminate the marriage if he refuses. In February the Supreme Court upheld the authority of rabbinical courts to impose community-based punishments, such as avoiding financial dealings with a get-refuser, excluding him from community activities, and advertising these decisions to the public. The Supreme Court, however, rejected a prohibition on giving a get-refusing man a Jewish burial, since his death would already have terminated the marriage.

Secular courts have primary jurisdiction over questions of inheritance, but parties may file such cases in religious courts by mutual agreement. Decisions by these bodies are subject to Supreme Court review. The rabbinical courts, when exercising their power in civil matters, apply religious law, which varies from civil law, including in matters relating to the property rights of widows and daughters.

Military service is compulsory for Jewish citizens, male citizens who are Druze, and male citizens in the Circassian community (Muslims originally from the northwestern Caucasus region who migrated in the late 19th century). On September 12, the Supreme Court struck down the existing arrangement to exempt ultra-Orthodox men from military service, and it set a deadline of one year to pass new legislation to reduce inequality in the burden of military service between ultra-Orthodox and other Jews. Orthodox Jewish women and Arab Christian and Muslim citizens remain exempt from mandatory military service, although some voluntarily enlist.

Membership in a recognized religion is recorded in the National Registry and generally passed from parents to children, unless a person changes it through a formal conversion. Those who identify as Jewish but do not meet the Chief Rabbinate’s criteria as “Jewish” under Jewish religious law, as well as members of religious groups that are not recognized, are recorded as “lacking religion.” All citizens who meet the Chief Rabbinate’s criteria as “Jewish” are recorded as Jewish, whether Orthodox or not (unless they convert to something else).

The law criminalizes calling for, praising, supporting, or encouraging acts of violence or terrorism where such actions are likely to lead to violence, including calls for violence against religious groups.

The law criminalizing statements demeaning or degrading or showing violence toward someone on the basis of race provides an exception for statements citing a religious source, unless intent to incite racism is proven.

There is no legal requirement regarding personal observance or nonobservance of the Jewish Sabbath (Shabbat), from sunset on Fridays until sunset on Saturdays, and on Jewish holidays. A 1951 law, however, declares in the context of labor rights that Shabbat and Jewish holidays are national days of rest, while permitting non-Jewish workers alternate days of rest. The law criminalizes those who open their businesses and employ Jews on Shabbat, but not the workers, except those who are self-employed. There are exceptions, however, for essential infrastructure and the hospitality, culture, and recreation industries. Following a series of political crises relating to train infrastructure work on Shabbat, the Knesset passed a law on December 25 instructing the labor and welfare minister to take into account “Israel’s tradition,” among other factors, when considering whether to approve permits to work on Shabbat. Municipalities and regional councils may pass bylaws relating to commercial activity on Shabbat, with the consent of the minister of interior. Halachaprohibits the use of motorized vehicles on Shabbat. A 1991 law states that public transportation may not operate on Shabbat, with exceptions for vehicles bringing passengers to hospitals, remote localities, and non-Jewish localities, and for vehicles essential to public security or maintaining public transportation services.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with a reservation stating that matters of personal status are governed by the religious law of the parties concerned, and the country reserves the right to apply that religious law when inconsistent with its obligations under the Covenant.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: Three Muslim citizens shot and killed two Israeli police officers, both of whom were Druze, near the entrance to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif on July 14, and then escaped to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif where other Israeli police officers shot and killed them. On August 15, Israeli police arrested the head of the banned Northern Islamic Movement, Sheikh Raed Salah, on suspicion of incitement and supporting the activities of an illegal organization. On June 25, following ultra-Orthodox parties’ objections to elements of a January 2016 agreement with non-Orthodox Jewish groups that offered symbolic recognition to the Conservative and Reform movements, the cabinet voted to “freeze” the agreement. Media reported that on September 19, Prime Minister Netanyahu expressed support for greater religious pluralism for Jews in Israel, but stated that he “won’t solve” the disparity between halacha-based laws and public practice by the non-Orthodox majority which largely eschews them. Those who self-identify but are not recognized by the Chief Rabbinate as Jewish, including Reform and Conservative converts to Judaism and others without Jewish matrilineage, remained prohibited from accessing official Jewish marriage, divorce, and burial services in the country, although some Orthodox and non-Orthodox rabbis officiated at these ceremonies outside of the Rabbinate (i.e., they did not register it officially). The government maintained its policy not to accept applications for official recognition by evangelical Christian churches and Jehovah’s Witnesses, while stating that members of nonrecognized religious groups remained free to practice their religion. Government resources available for religious or heritage studies to Arab and non-Orthodox Jewish public schools remained significantly fewer than those available to Orthodox Jewish public schools.

Three Muslim citizens shot and killed two Israeli police officers, both of whom were Druze, near the entrance to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif on July 14. The attackers escaped to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, where other Israeli police officers shot and killed them. On September 17, authorities arrested two Arab citizens, including a 16-year-old, on suspicion of planning another terrorist attack at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif.

On August 15, Israeli police arrested the head of the banned Northern Islamic Movement, Sheikh Raed Salah, on suspicion of incitement and supporting the activities of an illegal organization. A statement from the police characterized several speeches Salah made as inflammatory, reportedly including a speech at the funeral of the three terrorists who killed two policemen at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif on July 14. In that speech, Salah quoted a verse from the Quran regarding “those who have been killed in the cause of Allah.”

MK Ahmad Tibi compared Salah’s statements with those of rabbis such as Chief Rabbi of Safed Shmuel Eliyahu, which Tibi said “incite to murder and incite to killing Arabs,” with no response from the police. A petition to the Supreme Court by the Israel Religious Action Center to initiate disciplinary hearings against Eliyahu was pending as of September 26. On June 14, authorities indicted Rabbi Yosef Elitzur for incitement to violence, based on two articles he published in 2013.

Some religious minority groups complained of police apathy when investigating attacks against them. Data from the NGO Tag Meir and media reports indicated authorities had indicted few suspects despite 35 attacks on religious sites in the country since 2010.

At the end of the year there were multiple versions of a draft basic law to define the country as a Jewish state. Proponents said such a law was needed because the Basic Law on Human Dignity had led courts to give preference to individual human rights and freedoms over policies that perpetuated Israel as a Jewish state. The version backed by Prime Minister Netanyahu would define Israel as the “nation-state of the Jewish people,” and as a “Jewish and democratic state,” according to press reports. Civil society organizations and some political leaders expressed concern that such a law could lead to discrimination against non-Jewish minorities.

Busloads of Muslim worshippers routinely traveled from different parts of the country to Jerusalem for prayers at the Al-Aqsa Mosque, but the government refused some buses entry to the site on July 21, in the midst of the crisis that began with the July 14 terrorist attack.

Israeli authorities in some instances barred specific individuals from the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif site, including Jewish activists believed to have violated rules against non-Muslim prayer, Muslims believed to have acted violently against non-Muslim visitors to the site, and public figures, including members of the Knesset, whose presence authorities feared would inflame tensions.

Many Jewish leaders, including the government-appointed Rabbi of the Western Wall, continued to say Jewish law prohibited Jews from entering the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, a view the ultra-Orthodox community supported. Increasing numbers of the self-identified “national religious” Zionist community stated they found meaning in setting foot on the site. Some government coalition MKs, such as Yehuda Glick, called for reversing the policy of banning non-Islamic prayer at the site in order to provide equal religious freedom for all who find the site holy. MK Bezalel Smotrich called for “implementing Jewish sovereignty” there. Glick and some Jewish NGOs, such as the Temple Institute and Temple Mount Faithful, continued to call on the government to implement a time-sharing plan at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif to set aside certain hours for Jewish worship, similar to the practice at the Tomb of the Patriarchs/Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron. Muslim authorities continued to oppose this idea. Some Jewish and non-Jewish MKs condemned the government’s ban on all MKs from ascending the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. Prime Minister Netanyahu allowed MKs to enter the compound for one day in August, and two Jewish MKs did so. One Jewish MK also entered on October 25. On April 2, the Supreme Court rejected a request by Temple Mount activists to sacrifice sheep near the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif for Passover.

Prime Minister Netanyahu reiterated his support for the status quo arrangement at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, for example, in remarks to reporters on July 16.

The government continued to permit persons of all faiths to pray at the main Western Wall plaza, the place of worship nearest the holiest site in Judaism, but with separation of women and men, and with the women’s section being less than half the size of the men’s section. On June 25, following ultra-Orthodox parties’ objections to elements of a January 2016 agreement with non-Orthodox Jewish groups that offered symbolic recognition to the Conservative and Reform Judaism movements, the cabinet voted to “freeze” the agreement. At the same time, Prime Minister Netanyahu ordered the government to expedite construction to upgrade the temporary egalitarian prayer space, a platform for Reform and Conservative Jewish services south of the main Western Wall plaza, but the non-Orthodox movements stated that upgrading the prayer space alone would not fulfill the agreement. In response to a Supreme Court case on the issue, the government stated in September it would not raise the agreement for another government decision, and the court had no grounds to impose an agreement. The case was pending at the end of the year, with the next hearing scheduled for January 2018.

Authorities continued to prohibit anyone from bringing private Torah scrolls to the main Western Wall plaza and to prohibit women from accessing the public Torah scrolls or giving priestly blessings at the site. The authorities permitted women to pray with tefillin and prayer shawls pursuant to a 2013 Jerusalem District Court ruling stating it was illegal to arrest or fine them for such actions. The police continued to allow the group Women of the Wall to enter the women’s area of the main Western Wall plaza for its monthly service, but the media reported that security guards conducted intrusive body searches on some women while searching for Torah scrolls under their clothes on August 23, despite a January 11 injunction by the Supreme Court prohibiting such searches.

Authorities continued to allow use of a temporary platform south of the Mughrabi ramp and adjacent to the Western Wall, but not visible from the main Western Wall plaza, for non-Orthodox Jewish prayers. Authorities designated the platform for members of the Conservative and Reform movements of Judaism, including for religious ceremonies such as bar and bat mitzvahs.

In September ultra-Orthodox MK Yisrael Eichler described the non-Orthodox movements who were party to the Western Wall agreement as “enemies of the Jewish religion,” while Sephardi Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem Shlomo Amar described them as “accursed evil people” and compared them to Holocaust-deniers, according to press reports. Prime Minister Netanyahu condemned Amar’s remarks. Also in September media reported that opposition MK Haneen Zoabi stated the country’s “fascist laws” make it “suitable to compare, logical to compare, Israel … with Germany in the [19]30s.”

Ultra-Orthodox parties continued to be against legal changes to the status quo regarding issues of halacha and state, which opponents said raised religious freedom concerns. For example, the only in-country marriages the government recognized for Jews were those performed by the Chief Rabbinate, which continued to refuse to perform marriages involving citizens without maternal Jewish lineage, because the Chief Rabbinate did not consider them Jewish according to halacha. Likewise, men with ancestry in the Jewish priesthood (cohanim) were not allowed to marry converts or divorcees, in accordance with halacha. On September 19, media reported Prime Minister Netanyahu expressed support for greater religious pluralism for Jews in Israel, but stated that he “won’t solve” the disparity between halacha-based laws and public practice by the non-Orthodox majority which largely eschews them. Analysts in media and civil society ascribed Netanyahu’s position to the reality of his political coalition with ultra-Orthodox parties.

According to the think tank Israel Democracy Institute, hundreds of thousands of Israeli Jews worked illegally on Shabbat, but the government made little effort to enforce the ban on Jews’ employment on Shabbat, while credit card companies reported 25 to 30 percent of all consumer activity occurred on Shabbat. Four consecutive ministers of interior refused to act on a bylaw allowing 164 grocery stores and kiosks to operate on Shabbat passed by the Tel Aviv-Jaffa Municipality in 2014. The Supreme Court ruled on April 19, and again on October 26, that the protracted nondecision of the ministers of interior was unlawful, and the bylaw could take effect. On September 11, non-Orthodox Jewish groups withdrew a petition to the Supreme Court that had argued the Shabbat ban on public transportation adversely impacted those of low socioeconomic status, after the judges noted their petition was lacking an aggrieved public transportation operator. The petitioners stated they would establish such an operator and apply for a license from the Transportation Ministry to operate on Shabbat, then return to the Supreme Court if the government denied its application. The NGO Hiddush reported in September that 73 percent of Jewish Israelis supported full or partial public transportation on Shabbat, up from 58 percent in 2010.

Following three years of hearings on a petition by women’s rights organizations to appoint a female director-general to the rabbinical courts, the Supreme Court ruled August 15 that since the position was inherently administrative, not religious, it must be open to anyone licensed as a rabbinic pleader, including women. In June the Rabbinical Courts Administration named a female deputy director-general for the first time. Since only men can become rabbis under Orthodox interpretations of Jewish law, there were no female judges in rabbinical courts, although some women have acted as rabbinic pleaders (equivalent to lawyers) since 1995.

A June hearing in the Knesset Committee for Distributive Justice discussed the inaccessibility of Jewish mikvah ritual baths to disabled women.

The MOI continued to rely on the guidance of the Jewish Agency, a parastatal organization, to determine who qualified to immigrate as a Jew or descendant of a Jew. The government continued to deny applications from individuals whom the government said became ineligible when they converted to another religion, including those holding Messianic or Christian beliefs.

Those who self-identify but are not recognized by the Chief Rabbinate as Jewish, including Reform and Conservative converts to Judaism and others without Jewish matrilineage, were prohibited from accessing official Jewish marriage, divorce, and burial services in the country, although some Orthodox and non-Orthodox rabbis did officiate at these ceremonies outside of the Rabbinate. Ha’aretz reported on September 18 that the Chief Rabbinate had changed the registration status of 900 persons from Jewish to non-Jewish or “pending clarification” in 2015 and 2016, after the highest rabbinical court approved the Chief Rabbinate’s power to revoke Israelis’ Jewish status in December 2016. The NGO ITIM petitioned the Supreme Court against this practice, and the case was ongoing at year’s end.

A group of Orthodox rabbis continued to operate a private conversion court for children of families whose Judaism was not recognized by the state or the rabbinical courts. A ruling by the Supreme Court in 2016 expanded immigration rights under the Law of Return to those who completed private (non-Rabbinate) Orthodox conversions in the country. The Chief Rabbinate continued not to recognize non-Orthodox converts to Judaism as Jews, although they continued to be accepted for the purpose of immigration under the Law of Return. A Supreme Court case to grant immigration rights to those who completed Reform or Conservative conversions was pending at year’s end.

In June the Association for Civil Rights in Israel filed a petition in the Supreme Court against what it said was the IDF’s practice of pressuring soldiers who were not recognized as Jewish by the Chief Rabbinate to convert to Judaism through an expedited Orthodox Jewish conversion course. In its September 17 response to the court, the government stated it changed its procedures to allow soldiers to sign a waiver upon arrival at the course affirming they did not wish to participate. The court scheduled the next hearing for July 2018.

The MRS listed 23 Jewish cemeteries with plots for civil burial, managed by the National Insurance Institute, and 21 dedicated cemeteries for persons the government defined as “lacking religion.” Additionally, 13 cemeteries in 10 agricultural localities were authorized to conduct civil burial for these localities and nearby residents. Some persons, however, who sought a civil burial reported several civil cemeteries near Tel Aviv were unusable because they were full or restricted to local residents.

Pursuant to a 2013 Supreme Court ruling on easing the funding conditions for activities by the Reform and Conservative Jewish communities, the government continued to pay the salaries of 12 non-Orthodox rabbis serving regional councils. The Ministry of Housing continued to provide funding to build non-Orthodox Jewish religious institutions, which it designated “seminaries,” according to the Israel Religious Action Center.

In August the government cable and satellite broadcasting regulator fined Channel 20, the “Heritage Channel,” 100,800 shekels ($29,000) for excluding the Reform and Conservative Jewish movements from its programming, since its license describes the outlet as a platform for all streams of Judaism. Channel 20 appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, and the case was ongoing at year’s end.

Those exempt from compulsory military service continued to have the option to join the National Service, a civilian alternative in which volunteers work for two years to promote social welfare in schools, hospitals, or NGOs. On August 3, the education ministry supervisor of Jewish religious public high schools testified to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that educators in those schools discouraged girls from enlisting based on a religious ruling from the Chief Rabbinate.

The government maintained its policy not to accept applications for official recognition by evangelical Christian churches and Jehovah’s Witnesses. The government stated members of nonrecognized religions remained free to practice their religion, and that some leaders of these religions were invited and participated along with the leaders of recognized religions at official events or ceremonies.

The only domestic marriages which had legal standing and could be registered were marriages performed according to the religious statutes of recognized religious communities. Members of other nonrecognized groups could attempt to process their personal status documents, including marriage licenses, through the authorities of one of the recognized religious communities if those authorities agreed. The government allowed civil registration of marriages held outside the country. The Interior Ministry continued to register same-sex marriages conducted abroad.

Some church leaders stated a law preventing a spouse from the West Bank or Gaza from obtaining resident status was especially challenging for Christian Israelis because their small population made it difficult to find a spouse within the community in Israel.

The government operated a special police unit of 60 officers for the investigation of “ideologically-based offenses” in Israel and the West Bank, including “price tag” attacks (violence by Jewish individuals and groups against non-Jewish individuals and property with the stated purpose of exacting a “price” for actions the government had taken that the Jewish group opposed, actions by the government against members of the group committing the violence, or violent attacks by other Palestinians).

President Reuven Rivlin attended an interfaith ceremony to mark the completion of the restoration of the Church of the Multiplication in Tabgha on February 12. In 2015 arsonists burned a large section of the church and scrawled on the building’s stone walls sections of the Jewish prayer book that in this context denigrated Christians. In July a court convicted one person of charges including arson and defacing real estate with a hostile motive, and acquitted a second suspect. In January the government paid 1.5 million shekels ($432,000) for the restoration of the church.

The government provided separate public schools for Jewish children, conducted in Hebrew, and Arab children, conducted in Arabic. Government resources available for religious or heritage studies to Arab and non-Orthodox Jewish public schools remained significantly less than those available to Orthodox Jewish public schools.

For Jewish children there continued to be separate public schools for religious and secular families. Individual families were able to choose a public school system regardless of ethnicity or religious observance. Public Hebrew-language state schools taught Jewish history, culture, and some basic religious texts. By law, the state provided the equivalent of public school funding to two systems of ultra-Orthodox religious schools, the United Torah Judaism-affiliated Independent Education System and the Shas-affiliated Fountain of Torah Education System. Public and private Arabic-speaking schools continued to teach religion classes on the Quran and the Bible to both Muslim and Christian Arab students. A few independent mixed Jewish-Arab schools also offered religion classes. For example, the curriculum at the nonprofit school Hand-in-Hand: Center for Jewish-Arab Education, which received a third of its funding from the government, emphasized commonality and similar storylines in the holy writings of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Minors had the right to choose a public secular school instead of a religious school regardless of parental preference.

Many ultra-Orthodox religious schools continued not to offer a basic humanities, math, and science curriculum, and in 2015 a group of formerly ultra-Orthodox students who graduated from these schools sued the state for allowing them to graduate without the requisite knowledge to participate in the economy. They said they were denied basic education and left lagging far behind secular Israelis in topics such as science, math, history, English, and geography. After the government responded to the court that the bearers of the responsibility are parents and educational institutions, and the statute of limitations should apply, a Jerusalem District Court judge dismissed the case.

A May report from the State Comptroller criticized the education ministry for failing to respond effectively to discrimination in educational institutions, including discrimination against girls in ultra-Orthodox schools. In September 2016 the media reported municipal authorities denied at least 50 school girls entry into ultra-Orthodox schools to which they had been assigned because of their lack of “spiritual suitability” stemming from their Sephardic heritage. The government stated approximately 25 girls were denied entry. Reportedly, the Ministry of Education effectively used its control of the budget to persuade schools to change their policy towards some of these students, but in January the newspaper Yediot Ahronot reported 14 cases remained unresolved. In May the education ministry issued new regulations banning demand for a particular “spiritual authority” at home as an admissions criterion.

Christian church representatives stated that government budget cuts to private Christian schools categorized as “recognized but not official” schools could cause their schools to begin closing in five to 10 years. The government offered to fully fund the Christian schools if they became part of the public school system, but the churches rejected this option, stating they would lose control over hiring teachers, admitting students, and using school property. Following a strike in 2015, the government pledged to transfer an additional 50 million shekels ($14.4 million) to the schools, of which church leaders received one-quarter in 2016 and the remainder in 2017. Church leaders stated this transfer helped reduce their debts from 2015, but did not resolve their annual deficits nor the financial disparity with the ultra-Orthodox schools, which were also categorized as “recognized but not official” but which received full government funding.

On July 31, the education ministry published a report showing its per-student annual budget for Jewish religious high schools in 2016-17 was 33,016 shekels ($9,500), 22 percent higher than for Jewish secular high schools and 54 percent higher than Arab high schools, whose students were predominantly Muslim. The amount for Druze high schools was comparable to Jewish secular schools. The report also found the ministry’s per-student budget in Jewish religious elementary schools was 19 percent higher than secular elementary schools and 4 percent higher than Arab elementary schools.

The Custody of the Holy Land, a priory of the Franciscan order, reported local municipalities, such as Tel Aviv and Haifa, continued to charge property tax on monastery property, such as friars’ residences, parish halls, and other buildings that are part of the monasteries and do not conduct business activity. Church officials said they paid part of these disputed taxes during the year and the remainder was under negotiation. The government stated only properties mainly used for worship and having no business activities were exempt from property tax under the law, while religious organizations were obligated to pay taxes on other property and assets.

Christian leaders reported little difficulty obtaining visas for clergy to serve in the country. Church officials, however, noted the clergy visa did not allow the bearer access to basic social benefits such as disability insurance or national health insurance, even for those who have served in the country for more than 30 years.

The government continued to approve annual “delays” of conscription to military service for individual Jehovah’s Witnesses upon presentation of documentation of their continued affiliation with their religious community, although without acknowledgment of their right to conscientious objection. Since members of the community were not exempt from military service, they could not participate in the national civil service program as an alternative service.

A Supreme Court petition by the organization Yesh Gvul called to change the criteria for exemptions from military service based on conscientious objection to be equivalent to the criteria for exemptions based on religious beliefs. The government’s preliminary response stated the two exemptions are based on different sections of the law for different circumstances, and requested dismissal for lack of cause. The court scheduled the next hearing for June 2018.

Since September 2014, the government has allowed Christians and individuals who spoke Aramaic to register with their national or ethnic group listed as Aramean instead of Arab. A report published on April 3, by the Knesset Research and Information Center, found only 16 persons had changed their registration to Aramean as of February.

The MOI trained Druze and Muslim clerical employees of the state on how to work with government ministries. Approximately half of the Druze and Muslim clerics in Israel were appointed and funded by the MOI. Muslim leaders alleged the MOI routinely monitored and summoned for “talks” those whom the ministry suspected of opposing government policies. The other Israeli Druze and Muslim clerics were nonstate employees due to either the preference of the local community or lack of MOI budget, according to the government. Muslim leaders stated sharia court judges, who were Ministry of Justice employees, were their preferred religious leaders. There remained no Islamic seminaries in the country, and students of Islam traveled to other countries, primarily Jordan or the West Bank, to study.

According to the NGO Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality (NCF), in recent years the government approved plans for the establishment of 15 new towns and settlements in the Negev region, the vast majority intended for the Jewish population. Authorities approved plans for settlements named Hiran, Daya, and Neve Gurion to replace existing Bedouin villages. Authorities planned Daya to replace the unrecognized village al-Qatamat, and Neve Gurion was to replace some houses in the recognized village of Bir Haddaj.

During a police action on January 18 to demolish homes in the unrecognized Bedouin village of Umm al-Hiran, in preparation to replace it with a Jewish settlement called Hiran, police shot local resident Yaqub Musa Abu al-Qian, and Abu al-Qian’s car subsequently struck and killed one police officer. Abu al-Qian died of his wounds shortly thereafter. Village leaders expressed openness to almost any option that would allow them to remain in place, including living side-by-side with Jewish neighbors in an expanded community. The NGO Adalah wrote a letter to the National Planning and Building Council on August 7, objecting to bylaws drafted by the Hiran cooperative association that would allow only Orthodox Jews to live in Hiran, stating the government intended to replace the Muslim residents of Umm al-Hiran. A group of 35 Jewish families sponsored by the OR Movement, which advocates internal settlements, remained in the forest outside Umm al-Hiran, living in mobile homes donated by the Jewish National Fund, while waiting to obtain the land. The group included an estimated 175 children.

Some former mosques and cemeteries, belonging to the defunct prestate Waqf (different from the Jordanian-administered Waqf of the Haram al-Sharif) until confiscated by the state after the 1948 War of Independence, remained sealed and inaccessible, even to Muslims. Other former mosques continued to be used for secular purposes. Muslim community leaders reported no difficulties obtaining municipal approval for construction of mosques in Muslim-majority localities. They noted, however, that Be’er Sheva’s Muslim population of approximately 10,000 continued to travel to nearby Bedouin towns to pray, since they could not use an Ottoman-era Be’er Sheva mosque the government converted to a museum of Islamic culture following a 2011 Supreme Court ruling, and the government would not authorize the construction of another mosque.

The IDF continued to have only Orthodox Jewish chaplains; the government employed civilian non-Jewish clergy as chaplains at military burials when a non-Jewish soldier died in service. The MOI continued to provide imams to conduct military funerals according to Islamic customs. In June the IDF issued new regulations allowing secular military funerals.

In some ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods, “modesty signs” posted by private organizations demanded women obscure themselves from public view so as not to distract devout men, which NGOs stated they perceived as an infringement on women’s equality and human dignity. The local municipality of Beit Shemesh failed to comply with court orders from January 2015 and January 2016 to take down the signs, leading the Jerusalem District Court on June 7 to rule the municipality would face a fine of 10,000 shekels ($2,900) for each day the signs remained up after July 6. The municipality appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which scheduled a hearing on the case for March 2018.

The Jerusalem Magistrate’s Court ruled June 21 that requests by airline staff to female passengers to change seats when an ultra-Orthodox man objected to sitting next to a woman were discriminatory. According to the Israel Religious Action Center, asking a passenger to change seats because of her gender would be no different from asking someone to move because of their race or religion. The court awarded 6,500 shekels ($1,900) to an octogenarian plaintiff who brought a case against El Al after she changed seats at the request of a flight attendant in 2015.

A Supreme Court ruling on September 12 reaffirmed the Chief Rabbinate had sole legal authority to issue certificates of kashrut, which certify a restaurant’s adherence to Jewish dietary laws. It broadened, however, the allowance for alternative non-Rabbinate certification, such as that of the independent Orthodox organization Hashgacha Pratit, stating restaurants without a kashrut certificate were allowed to present “a true presentation regarding the standards it observes and the manner of supervising their observance.” The media reported on September 27 that the Chief Rabbinate levied a 2,000 shekel ($580) fine on a Jerusalem restaurant for displaying a new certificate by Hashgacha Pratit, which the organization stated conformed to the September 12 Supreme Court ruling. A May report from the State Comptroller called for comprehensive reform of the kashrut regulation system and criticized the MRS, Chief Rabbinate, and local religious councils for structural failures that enabled fraud, waste, poor supervision, and nepotism.

In March the NGO Adalah withdrew a petition from the Supreme Court that objected to a law banning meat imports without a kashrutcertificate from the Chief Rabbinate after the judges indicated they did not perceive the law treating secular Jews and non-Jews differently.

Sources stated that some non-kosher restaurants that opened on the Sabbath paid fines that varied according to local laws.

Religious identification was listed in the National Registry, but not on official identity cards.

Because religion and ethnicity were often closely linked, it was often difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

According to missionary organizations, societal attitudes toward missionary activities and conversion to other religions continued to be negative. Some Jews continued to oppose missionary activity directed at Jews, saying it amounted to religious harassment, and reacted with hostility toward Jewish converts to Christianity, such as Messianic Jews. Jehovah’s Witnesses described violent attacks, such as a July 20 assault by a woman on a Jehovah’s Witness in Tel Aviv, hitting her face and legs. On June 29, Jehovah’s Witnesses received a letter from the state prosecutor’s office stating it refused to reopen an investigation into an attack on a June 2016 Bible lecture in Rishon Lezion, after police had closed the case without charge in August 2016. At the time, according to Jehovah’s Witnesses, police had said they could not identify the attackers, whom they had failed to arrest at the time of the incident, despite video evidence. Jehovah’s Witnesses reported some municipalities refused to rent public halls to them, such as in Holon on June 21.

Ultra-Orthodox Jews at the Western Wall continued to harass verbally visitors and Jewish worshippers who did not conform to Jewish Orthodox traditions, such as modest dress or gender segregation at the Western Wall Plaza. Members of the Jewish Conservative and Reform movements continued to criticize gender segregation and rules governing how women pray at the Western Wall. Representatives of the egalitarian prayer group Women of the Wall complained of a lack of effort by police or ushers from the Western Wall Heritage Foundation, which administers the Western Wall site, to intervene when ultra-Orthodox women and men disrupted their monthly prayer service with screaming, whistling, and pushing. On February 27, the Liba Center, an Orthodox Jewish organization working closely with the Chief Rabbinate, bused in more than 1,000 schoolgirls to oppose the monthly prayer service, according to media reports. Women of the Wall filed a petition to the Supreme Court in March to require ushers and police to prevent disruption to their services. The court scheduled a hearing for January 14, 2018.

Tension continued between the ultra-Orthodox community and other Israelis, including concerns related to service in the IDF, housing, public transportation, and participation in the workforce. The media reported attacks and threats by ultra-Orthodox assailants against soldiers and those encouraging ultra-Orthodox men to enlist in the military, including throwing stones at Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman on August 8, posting signs threatening IDF Human Resources Branch Director Major General Moti Almoz in May and June, and burning effigies of IDF soldiers on May 13. In November the Ramle Magistrates Court ordered ultra-Orthodox activists to pay an ultra-Orthodox IDF officer 650,000 shekels ($187,000) compensation for defamation, according to media reports. Clashes and protests between secular and ultra-Orthodox residents occurred in the southern city of Arad in September, reportedly originating from conflicts over budgeting and the use of public buildings.

There continued to be reports of ultra-Orthodox men spitting at those wearing Christian clerical clothing, according to church leaders. Muslim activists reported hijab-wearing women experienced harassment by non-Muslims on public buses in Tel Aviv-Jaffa.

Drivers who operated motor vehicles in or near ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods on the Jewish Sabbath (Friday night to Saturday night) in Jerusalem reported incidents of harassment, such as slurs or spitting, by ultra-Orthodox Jewish residents in those neighborhoods.

Although the Chief Rabbinate and rabbis of many denominations continued to discourage Jewish visits to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif site, some Orthodox rabbis continued to say entering the site was permissible. Groups such as the Temple Mount Faithful and the Temple Institute continued to call for increased Jewish access and prayer there, as well as the construction of a third Jewish temple on the site.

The Northern Islamic Movement, which the government declared illegal in November 2015, continued to speak of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif as “under attack” due to what it regarded as a large number of Jewish visitors and the government’s temporary installation of security measures after a July 14 terrorist attack at the site.

Ultra-Orthodox opposition to LGBTI pride parades outside of Tel Aviv sometimes led to threats and attacks. On June 22, police arrested an ultra-Orthodox man with a knife near the Be’er Sheva pride parade.

Activists who testified at a February Knesset hearing on LGBTI youths reported that some minors who expressed their sexual preferences in religious communities faced expulsion from their homes and stigmatization from rabbis as suffering from mental illness, leading some to attempt suicide.

Jewish groups that oppose conversion of Jews to other religions, such as Yad L’Achim, urged Jewish women not to date non-Jewish men, for example with posts on social media encouraging women romantically involved with men from “a minority” to call the group’s 24-hour hotline. It continued to offer assistance to Jewish women and their children to “escape” cohabitation with Arab men, sometimes by “launching military-like rescues from hostile Arab villages,” according to Yad L’Achim’s website.

Lehava, described by the press as a radical right-wing Jewish group opposing romantic relationships between Jews and non-Jews, faced criminal charges for violence against Arab men whom they said they perceived to be consorting with Jewish women. Following a petition to the Supreme Court by the Israel Religious Action Center, authorities notified Lehava leader Ben-Tzion Gopstein on November 13 that he could be indicted on charges of incitement to violence, racism, terrorism, and obstruction of justice, pending a hearing.

According to sources who conducted Jewish weddings outside of the Rabbinate’s authority (i.e., did not register it), the vague wording of the law that deals with those who conduct such weddings and the government’s nonenforcement of the law, enabled non-Rabbinate Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jewish weddings to occur openly, usually as an act of protest against the Rabbinate’s authority. Most Jewish Israelis, including those who are secular, continued to use Rabbinate-approved Orthodox rabbis to conduct their weddings. The only mechanism for Jews to gain state recognition of a non-Orthodox wedding remained to wed outside the country and then register the marriage with the MOI. Approximately 11 percent of marriages registered with the MOI in 2015, the most recent year available, occurred abroad, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics.

The Reform Movement, Conservative Movement, and the secular Jewish organization Be Free Israel started an “Equal Wedding” radio campaign in summer 2016, followed by billboards and street signs in April to raise awareness among Jews of options to wed outside the Chief Rabbinate, although the weddings would not receive government recognition. The campaign, which points the public toward the three non-Orthodox Jewish movements (Conservative, Reform, and secular) for wedding alternatives, led to anger in ultra-Orthodox communities and an objection from the Chief Rabbinate to the government regulator of commercial broadcasts. Vandals tore down some of the campaign’s billboards in Jerusalem.

Thousands of Jewish women were trapped in various stages of informal or formal get refusal, especially in the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox communities, according to Bar Ilan University’s Rackman Center for the Advancement of the Status of Women. In June, following issuance of new guidelines from the state attorney in November 2016, rabbinical courts in Jerusalem and Haifa approved requests to open criminal proceedings with the State Prosecutor’s Office against two get-refusers for the first time. This change would enable extradition requests of husbands living overseas, who account for over 80 percent of the rabbinical courts’ open cases, according to media reports. According to the government, the new guidelines change get-refusal from a private, civil matter to an issue of public concern, which would help to eliminate get-refusal from society. The two criminal investigations continued as of November.

The Rackman Center stated that in some instances a woman’s husband made granting a get contingent on his wife conceding to extortionate demands, such as those relating to property ownership or child custody. A child born to a woman still married to another man would be considered a mamzer (child of an unpermitted relationship) under Jewish law, which would restrict the child’s future marriage prospects in the Jewish community. The rabbinical courts reported on June 19 that they succeeded in obtaining 211 gets in 2016, and media reported the courts had approximately 150 open cases.

Following the July 14 killing of two Druze Israeli policemen by three Muslim Israeli assailants, unknown suspects fired shots and threw stun grenades at mosques in the mixed Druze-Muslim-Christian city of Maghar, hometown of one of the July 14 victims, in separate incidents on July 16 and 17. Muslim and Druze religious leaders took actions to lower tensions, such as a visit by Muslim leaders to the mourning Druze families, but expressions of resentment and fear between the two groups persisted in the wake of the crisis, especially on social media. In August media reported a Muslim imam in the village of Kafr Qara led a successful public campaign to block the selection of a Druze headmaster to a Muslim high school because of the man’s religion.

Caretakers at a Muslim cemetery in Jaffa discovered several smashed gravestones on April 23. Also in April, media reported unidentified criminals inscribed satanic symbols with black and silver paint on the wall of a Russian Orthodox church in Haifa. According to the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, on September 20, vandals shattered stained-glass windows and committed other acts of vandalism in St. Stephen’s Church at the Beit Gemal Monastery near Beit Shemesh. The Jerusalem District prosecutor indicted an ultra-Orthodox man on September 4 for painting graffiti and death threats against Reform Jewish leaders on a reform synagogue in Ra’anana in November 2016.

More than 1,000 Christian Israelis visited Christian holy sites in Lebanon on organized tours during the year, following mediation by Christian clergy with the Israeli and Lebanese governments, according to press reports.

A variety of NGOs continued to try to build understanding and create dialogue among religious groups and between religious and secular Jewish communities, including Neve Shalom-Wahat al-Salam, the Abraham Fund Initiative, Givat Haviva, the Hagar and Hand-in-Hand bilingual schools, Hiddush, the Israeli Religious Action Center of the Reform Movement, Mosaica, and Interfaith Encounters.

The NGO Tag Meir continued to organize visits to areas where “price tag” attacks occurred and sponsored activities to promote tolerance in response to the attacks. One such attack occurred on May 9, in the Arab village of Na’ura, where anonymous vandals slashed the tires of nine vehicles and wrote anti-Muslim graffiti on a nearby wall, according to press reports.

During a visit in May, the President met with the prime minister and other government officials. Discussions included combating religious-based violence, overcoming religious division, and building a future of trust, harmony, tolerance, and respect for members of all faiths. He visited religious sites and the Yad Vashem memorial for Holocaust victims in Jerusalem.

Following heightened tensions at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in the wake of the July 14 terrorist attack at the site, the Ambassador and embassy officers spoke with government officials and Knesset leaders about the importance of maintaining the agreed-upon status quo at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and not escalating tensions through provocative actions or statements. In meetings with government officials, visiting high-level U.S. government officials and embassy officers also stressed the importance of religious pluralism and respect for all religious groups, such as in the Ambassador’s June 27 speech at an event sponsored by B’nai B’rith.

In July the Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South/Central Asia visited Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Nazareth for discussions with government officials and religious minority groups, including Muslims, Christians, Druze, and Bahais, as well as Jewish Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform representatives. They discussed a wide range of concerns related to religious minority groups, equal treatment, and instances of religiously motivated violence.

Embassy-supported initiatives focused on interreligious dialogue and community development, and advocated a shared society for Arab and Jewish populations, including conferences at which embassy officers spoke out in support of the right of persons of all faiths to practice their religion peacefully, while also respecting the beliefs and customs of their neighbors.

Embassy officers participated in religious events organized by Jewish, Muslim, Druze, Christian, and Bahai communities and used embassy social media platforms to express U.S. support for tolerance and the importance of openness to members of other religious groups.

Embassy-hosted events included an interfaith Ramadan iftar, an interfaith Rosh Hashanah reception, and an interfaith Thanksgiving dinner. The embassy also promoted the reduction of tensions between religious communities and an increase in interreligious communication and partnership within society by bringing together representatives of many faith communities to advance shared goals and exchange knowledge and experience. Embassy programs supported mixed Jewish-Arab educational and community initiatives to reduce societal tensions and violence, including a project by the Citizens Accord Forum that brought together ultra-Orthodox and Arab citizens to create a shared civic agenda and implement activities related to social issues of common concern in their communities, in addition to a project supporting dialogue between religious Jewish and Arab women.

The embassy provided grants to organizations advocating religious tolerance among different groups, such as a project by the Leo Baeck Education Center for an interfaith celebration of Christmas and Hanukkah, which was held December 20 in a mixed Jewish-Arab neighborhood of Haifa. More than 250 Arab and Jewish children and their parents experienced different ways to celebrate religious traditions as a cohesive community.

The embassy supported a project by the NGO Tsofen to mitigate interreligious and intercommunal tensions between the country’s Arab and Jewish citizens through economic integration of the two communities and the creation of sustainable cycles of intergroup collaboration. The project’s activities promote the participation of Arab citizens in Israel’s high-technology industry, diversifying work environments, and facilitating intergroup collaboration. In addition, the embassy supported a project to bring together Jewish, Muslim, and Christian female artists in Haifa, Jerusalem, and Lod to foster economic empowerment and encourage interfaith dialogue.

READ A SECTION: ISRAEL AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS (ABOVE) | WEST BANK AND GAZA

The U.S. government estimates the Palestinian population at 2.7 million in the West Bank and 1.8 million in the Gaza Strip (July 2017 estimates). According to U.S. estimates, the Palestinian residents of these territories are predominantly Sunni Muslims. The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) estimates 536,600 Jewish Israelis live in Jerusalem – including areas in East Jerusalem which Israel captured in the 1967 War and unilaterally annexed in 1980 – accounting for approximately 61 percent of the city’s total population of 882,652. According to CBS, an estimated 332,600 Palestinians reside in Jerusalem, of whom approximately 12,000 are Palestinian Christians, and approximately another 2,000 residents who are non-Palestinian Christians. The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics reported an estimated 400,000 Jewish Israelis reside in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. According to various estimates, approximately 50,000 Christians reside in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and according to media reports, there are approximately a thousand Christians residing in Gaza. According to local Christian leaders, Palestinian Christian emigration has continued at rapid rates. A majority of Christians are Greek Orthodox; the remainder includes Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics (Melkites), Syrian Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholics, Copts, Maronites, Ethiopian Orthodox, Episcopalians, Lutherans, and other Protestant denominations. Christians are concentrated primarily in East Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Nablus; smaller communities exist elsewhere. Approximately 360 Samaritans (practitioners of Samaritanism, which is related to but distinct from Judaism) as well as a small number of evangelical Christians and Jehovah’s Witnesses reside in Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Legal Framework

The inhabitants of the different portions of the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip are subject to the jurisdiction of different authorities. Israelis and Palestinians living in Jerusalem are subject to Israeli civil and criminal law. Israelis living in West Bank settlements are nominally subject to military law but Israeli authorities apply Israeli civil and criminal law to them in practice. Palestinians living in the portion of the West Bank designated as Area C in the Oslo II Accord fall under Israel’s military legal system for criminal and security issues as well as civil issues, while Palestinians who live in Area B fall under PA civil law and Israeli military law for criminal and security issues. Although per the Oslo II Accord, only PA civil and security law applies to Palestinians living in Area A of the West Bank, Israel applies Israeli military law whenever its military enters Area A. The Gaza Strip officially comes under the jurisdiction of an interim PA government, although Hamas exercises de facto authority over it.

An interim Basic Law applies in the areas under PA jurisdiction. The Basic Law states Islam is the official religion, but calls for respect of “all other divine religions.” It provides for freedom of belief, worship, and the performance of religious rites unless they violate public order or morality. The Basic Law also proscribes discrimination based on religion and stipulates all citizens are equal before the law. The Basic Law states the principles of sharia shall be the main sources of legislation.

There is no specified process by which religious organizations gain official recognition; each religious group must negotiate its own bilateral relationship with the PA. Nineteenth century status quo arrangements reached with the Ottoman authorities, which are observed by the PA, recognize the presence and rights of the Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Assyrian, Coptic, Ethiopian Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Syrian Orthodox Churches. Later agreements with the PA recognized the rights of the Episcopal (Anglican) and Evangelical Lutheran Churches. Legally recognized religious groups are empowered to adjudicate personal status matters, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. They may establish ecclesiastical courts to issue legally binding rulings on personal status and some property matters for members of their religious communities.

Churches not officially recognized, but with unwritten understandings with the PA based on the basic principles of the status quo agreements, including the Assemblies of God, the Nazarene Church, and some evangelical Christian churches, may operate freely. Some may perform some official functions such as issuing marriage licenses. Churches not recognized by the PA generally must obtain special one-time permission from the PA to perform marriages or adjudicate personal status matters if these groups want the actions to be recognized by and registered with the PA. These churches may not proselytize. There are a small number of such churches which became active within the last decade and whose legal status remains uncertain.

By law, Islamic institutions and places of worship receive financial support from the government.

Religious education is part of the curriculum for students in grades one through six in public schools the PA operates. There are separate courses on religion for Muslims and Christians. Students may choose which class to take but may not opt out of religious courses. Recognized churches operate private schools in the West Bank which include religious instruction. Private Islamic schools also operate in the West Bank. Churches also operate “recognized but unofficial” (a form of semiprivate) schools in East Jerusalem, and the Jerusalem Islamic Waqf operates private schools in East Jerusalem; both include religious instruction.

Islamic or Christian religious courts handle legal matters relating to personal status, including inheritance, marriage, dowry, divorce, and child support. For Muslims, sharia determines personal status law, while various ecclesiastical courts rule on personal status matters for Christians. Legally, members of one religious group may submit a personal status dispute to a different religious group for adjudication if the disputants agree it is appropriate to do so.

Palestinian law provides that in the 132-member Palestinian Legislative Council (that has not met since 2007) six seats be allocated to Christian candidates, who also have the right to contest other seats. There are no seats reserved for members of any other religious group. A presidential decree requires that Christians head nine municipal councils in the West Bank (including Ramallah, Bethlehem, Birzeit, and Beit Jala) and establishes a Christian quota for 10 West Bank municipal councils.

PA land laws prohibit Palestinians from selling Palestinian-owned lands to “any man or judicial body corporation of Israeli citizenship, living in Israel or acting on its behalf.” Under Israeli law, the Israel Land Administration (ILA), which manages 93 percent of Israel’s land, may not lease land to foreign nationals.

Government Practices

Summary Paragraph: Violence between Palestinians and Israeli security forces continued. Since religion and ethnicity or nationality are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize much of this violence as being solely based on religious identity. On July 14, three Muslim Israeli Arab attackers shot and killed two Druze INP officers and injured a third at an entrance to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount compound, prompting Israeli police to close the compound and cancel Muslim Friday prayers. Following the compound’s reopening, the INP erected new security measures at entrances used by Muslim worshippers. The Jerusalem Islamic Waqf rejected the measures, characterizing them as a violation of the status quo understanding between Israeli and Jordanian authorities. Following protests in Jerusalem and the West Bank, the INP removed the equipment. In accordance with status quo arrangements with the Waqf, the Israeli government continued to prohibit non-Muslim prayer and other religious practices at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, but Israeli police became more permissive of silent Jewish prayer and other religious rituals performed on the site, according to the Waqf and multiple NGO observers. Citing security concerns, the Israeli government also imposed access restrictions on Muslim worshippers in what the Waqf said was a breach of the status quo, including temporary blanket age restrictions on several days during the year. Visits by Jewish Temple Mount activists increased again during the year to record levels, and especially during Jewish and Israeli national holidays. Some Israeli NGOs and Members of Knesset (MKs) said the status quo arrangement restricted Jews’ freedom of worship. The Israeli government continued to permit both Muslims and Christians to pray at the Western Wall, although Israeli police frequently limited access to Palestinians to the Western Wall Plaza for what they stated were security reasons. Various Israeli and PA political and religious leaders continued to condemn ideologically-motivated violence. Israeli police and the IDF reported investigating known instances of religiously motivated attacks and making arrests where possible, although NGOs, religious institutions, and media continued to state that those arrests rarely led to successful prosecutions. The Israeli government criticized the designation by UNESCO in July of the old city of Hebron, including the Ibrahimi Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs, as an endangered World Heritage site in Palestinian territory. The Israelis stated that UNESCO’s approval of a Palestinian motion to recognize Hebron as a heritage site was a deliberate attempt to diminish Jewish and Israeli connections to the area.

On July 14, three Israeli Arab attackers shot and killed two INP officers and injured a third at the Bab al-Hutta entrance to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount compound. Citing security concerns, Israeli police closed the compound and cancelled Muslim Friday prayers for the first time since 1969, when an Australian visitor set fire to the pulpit inside Al-Aqsa Mosque. The INP reopened the Haram Al-Sharif/Temple Mount on July 16 to residents of the Old City but erected new security screening equipment, including metal detectors, at entrances to the site used by Muslim worshippers. The Waqf rejected these measures, characterizing them as a violation of the status quo. Muslim worshippers refused to enter the site pending full reversal of all newly imposed security measures. Protests included “days of rage,” sit-ins, and prayers. Clashes between Israeli security forces and Palestinian protestors were reported in East Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank through July 27. Tensions subsided July 27, and Muslims returned to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount when the INP removed the last of the newly installed equipment.

The Israeli government continued to control access to Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. The INP continued to be responsible for security, with police officers stationed both inside the site and outside each entrance. Israeli police conducted routine patrols on the outdoor plaza and regulated pedestrian traffic in and out of the site. Fatah and other Palestinian political factions organized protests (often using the term “days of rage”) throughout the year and called on Palestinians to defend the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount.

The Chief Rabbinate continued to rule that Jewish visits to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount were prohibited on religious grounds for reasons of ritual purity. Visits by Jewish Temple Mount activists facilitated by Israeli authorities to the site, however, increased again during the year to record levels. The Waqf expressed concern over these activists’ increased attempts to pray on the site in violation of the status quo, as well as over continuing calls by some activists to destroy the Al-Aqsa Mosque and replace it with the Third Jewish Temple. According to the Jerusalem Islamic Waqf, activists associated with the Temple Mount movement conducted 25,628 visits to the site during the year, compared to approximately 14,800 in 2016. Visits reached a single-day record of 1,079 on Tisha b’Av (August 1), a day which commemorates multiple tragedies in Jewish history, including the destruction of the Jewish temples. The increase in visits on Tisha b’Av prompted criticism from Israel’s Sephardi chief rabbi, who reiterated that walking on the site is forbidden by Jewish law. According to Temple Mount movement groups and the Waqf, during the week-long Jewish holiday of Sukkot, activists conducted 2,266 visits, a 40 percent increase over the comparable period in 2016. The INP permitted multiple groups to visit the site concurrently, expanding the permitted size of each groups to more than 70 persons, according to the Waqf, Temple Mount activist groups, and media reports. In accordance with previously instituted practices, Israeli police announced a temporary closure of the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount to non-Muslim visitors during the last 10 days of Ramadan; however, on several occasions the INP permitted non-Muslim visits to the site during that period.

The status quo understandings pertaining to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount prohibit non-Muslim worship on the compound, which some Israeli NGOs and MKs said restricted Jews’ freedom of worship. Some Jewish groups escorted by Israeli police, however, performed religious acts such as prayers, weddings, and prostration. The incidence of such acts at the site represented an increase from previous years, according to local NGOs, media, and Jewish Temple Mount movement groups, who also reported that changes in relations between the police and the Temple Mount movement created a more permissive environment for silent prayer. In some cases, Israeli police acted to prevent individuals from praying and removed them, but in other cases, some of which were documented on social media in photos and videos, police appeared not to notice the acts of prayer. Some Jewish Temple Mount activists toured the site in bare feet, consistent with their interpretation of Jewish tradition at the times of the two Jewish temples, to which the Waqf raised objections. Israeli authorities sometimes barred individual Jewish Temple Mount activists who had repeatedly violated rules against non-Muslim prayer on the site, including Temple Mount movement leaders.

Some government coalition Knesset members continued to call on the Israeli government to implement time-based division at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount to set aside certain days or hours for Jewish access and/or worship, similar to the arrangement used at the Ibrahimi Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron. The Knesset Lobby for Strengthening the Jewish Connection to the Temple Mount, headed by MK Yehuda Glick and Chairman of the Jewish Home faction MK Shuli Moalem-Refaeli, organized a conference in December to urge the Chief Rabbinate to remove its religious ruling that Jewish visits to Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount were prohibited. MK Yehuda Glick and other members of the Temple Mount movement continued to advocate to reverse the status quo prohibition on non-Muslim prayer at the site, describing it as a restriction on religious freedom.

Israeli police continued to screen non-Muslims for religious paraphernalia. Israeli police continued to have exclusive control of the Mughrabi Gate entrance – the only entrance through which non-Muslims could enter the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount – and allowed visitors through the gate during set visiting hours, although police sometimes restricted this access due to what they stated were security concerns. Israeli police maintained checkpoints outside other gates to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, preventing non-Muslims from entering these other areas, but did not coordinate with Waqf guards inside.

The Waqf continued to restrict non-Muslims who visited the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount from entering the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. It also lodged objections with Israeli police concerning non-Muslim visitors wearing religious symbols or religious clothing, such as Jewish prayer shawls. The INP sometimes acted upon these objections and/or enforced the restrictions of its own accord.

Waqf officials repeated previous years’ complaints over what they said were violations by Israeli police of the status quo arrangements regarding control of access to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount and Waqf’s administrative authorities on the site. Waqf officials stated Israeli police did not coordinate with the Waqf on decisions to allow non-Muslim visitors onto the site or to restrict access to broad categories of Muslim worshippers or to individual Palestinians whom police suspected could disrupt the non-Muslim visits. Waqf employees remained stationed inside each gate and on the plaza but Waqf officials said they were able to exercise only a reduced oversight role. They reportedly could object to the presence of particular persons, such as individuals dressed immodestly or causing disturbances, but lacked the authority to remove such persons from the site. Waqf officials also stated Israeli police challenged the Waqf’s authority by restricting its administration of the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, particularly by prohibiting building and infrastructure repairs. For example, Israeli police prevented the Waqf from carrying out routine repairs without advance approval and oversight from the Israeli Antiquities Authority, and refused to permit the entry of most maintenance equipment onto the site, according to the Waqf. Waqf officials stated these restrictions impacted its ability to repair leaking water pipes and address electrical problems inside the Dome of the Rock and other buildings; in addition, these restrictions prevented the Waqf from pursuing approximately 20 major renovation projects. Waqf officials also reported Israeli police on occasion detained Waqf employees (typically guards) or expelled them from the site and from the vicinity of visiting Jewish activist groups.

According to media reports and the Waqf, Israeli authorities in some instances barred specific individuals from the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount site, including Jewish activists whom the INP had previously removed from the site for violating rules concerning non-Muslim prayer, Muslims believed to have acted violently against non-Muslim visitors to the site, and public figures whom authorities feared would inflame tensions. During the year, Prime Minister Netanyahu continued to instruct police to bar sitting government ministers and MKs from visiting the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. For the first time since 2015, however, he ordered police to permit MK visits for one day on August 29, and subsequently permitted MK Yehuda Glick to visit the site on October 25, according to the Waqf. Israeli police continued to enforce “black lists” barring at least 50 Muslim men and women they accused of verbally harassing Jewish visitors to the site. Israeli police said some of these banned Muslims had objected to what they perceived as attempts by Jewish Temple Mount activists to break the status quo injunction against non-Muslim prayer on the site.

The Israeli government and the PA sometimes prevented Jewish Israelis from visiting Jewish religious sites in PA-controlled territory in the West Bank for security reasons. Palestinians threw stones and clashed with IDF escorts during visits of Jewish groups to Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus (located in Area A) on several days during the year. The IDF used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse Palestinian protesters, to secure the site, and/or to evacuate Jewish worshippers.

According to Christian religious, political, and civil society leaders, a combination of factors continued to provide the impetus for increased Christian emigration from Jerusalem and the West Bank, including political instability; the limited ability of Christian communities in the Jerusalem area to expand due to building restrictions maintained by the municipality in Jerusalem or Israeli authorities in Area C; the difficulties Christian clergy experienced in obtaining Israeli visas and residency permits; Israeli government family reunification restrictions; loss of confidence in the peace process; and economic hardships created by the establishment of the security barrier and the imposition of travel restrictions.

Jerusalem-based Christian religious leaders expressed concern about the continuing decline of Christian population in Jerusalem, and in particular, about the departure of young Palestinian Christian families, which impacted the long-term viability of Jerusalem parishes. These Christian leaders noted that, of the approximately 14,000 Christians residing in Jerusalem, many were already married. As such, the pool of eligible marriage partners remained limited, compelling Palestinian Christians to search for spouses in the nearby Christian communities of Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and others, located in the West Bank. In 2003, however, the Knesset passed a law freezing, in most cases, the family unification process for Jerusalem permanent residents. Over the past 15 years, this order has effectively denied Palestinians from East Jerusalem, who are permanent residents of Israel, the possibility of living in East Jerusalem with spouses from the West Bank or Gaza, and denied their children born in Gaza or the West Bank permanent residency status in Jerusalem. Christian leaders stated that this measure has forced many East Jerusalem Christians and Muslims to relocate to Jerusalem neighborhoods outside Israel’s security barrier, the West Bank, or emigrate. Palestinians not leaving East Jerusalem due to this policy or for other reasons risked losing their permanent residency and the attendant social welfare benefits.

While under Israeli law the ILA could not lease land to foreigners, in practice, foreigners have been allowed to lease if they could show that they would qualify as Jewish under the Law of Return. The application of ILA restrictions historically limited the ability of Palestinian Muslim and Christian residents of Jerusalem who are not citizens of Israel to purchase property built on state land, including in parts of East Jerusalem. In recent years, however, an increasing number of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem have been able to acquire property built on ILA-owned land.

Religious organizations providing education, health care, and other humanitarian relief and social services to Palestinians in and around East Jerusalem continued to state that the security barrier, particularly south of Jerusalem in the West Bank, impeded their work. Clergy members stated the barrier and additional checkpoints restricted their movements between Jerusalem and West Bank churches and monasteries, as well as the movement of congregants between their homes and places of worship. Christian leaders continued to state the barrier hindered Bethlehem-area Christians from reaching the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem. They also said it made visits to Christian sites in Bethlehem difficult for Palestinian Christians who lived on the west side of the barrier. Foreign pilgrims and religious aid workers also reported difficulty or delays accessing Christian religious sites in the West Bank because of the barrier. The Israeli government previously stated it constructed the barrier as an act of self-defense, and that it has been highly effective in preventing attacks in Israel.

Bethlehem-based Christian leaders stated construction of the security barrier also impacted the Christian community residing in the area by inhibiting economic growth and limiting employment-related movement. In addition, Bethlehem residents asserted that political instability affected tourism, Bethlehem’s key economic sector. During the year, Bethlehem had the highest unemployment rate among West Bank cities, which sources stated was a factor compelling many young Christians to emigrate.

On September 25, representatives of Palestinian Christian churches raised concerns before the Human Rights Council in Geneva over the impact of the security barrier on the Christian community of Beit Jala, according to media reports. The security barrier runs through the Cremisan Valley on land owned by 58 Christian Palestinian families, close to a monastery and its sister convent and school. The construction of the barrier has restricted farmers’ access to their lands.

Nonrecognized churches, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and some evangelical Christian groups, face a continued ban on proselytization but stated they were able to conduct most other functions unhindered by the PA. The PA, however, continued to refuse to recognize personal status legal documents issued by some of these nonrecognized groups, which the groups said made it difficult for them to register newborn children under their fathers’ names or as children of married couples. For example, Jehovah’s Witnesses representatives reported the PA issued birth certificates for their members but would not issue marriage licenses, resulting in children born to these couples listed as having been born out of wedlock, which complicated inheritance claims. Many nonrecognized churches advised members with dual citizenship to marry or divorce abroad in order to register the action officially in the second location.

The PA continued to implement its policy of providing imams with themes they were required to use in weekly Friday sermons in West Bank mosques and prohibited them from broadcasting Quranic recitations from minarets prior to the call to prayer.

The PA Ministry of Waqf (Islamic religious endowments) and Religious Affairs continued to pay for construction of new mosques, maintenance of approximately 1,800 existing mosques, and salaries of most Palestinian imams in the West Bank. The ministry also continued to provide limited financial support to some Christian clergy and Christian charitable organizations.

Although the PA removed the religious affiliation category from Palestinian identity cards in 2014, older identity cards continued to circulate, listing the holder as either Muslim or Christian.

The Israeli government continued to permit both Muslims and Christians to pray at the Western Wall, the place of worship nearest the holiest site in Judaism, although Israeli police frequently limited access to Palestinians to the Western Wall Plaza for what they stated were security reasons.

The Israeli government continued to prohibit Israeli citizens in unofficial capacities from traveling to the parts of the West Bank under the civil and security control of the PA (Area A). While these restrictions in general prevented Jewish Israelis from visiting several Jewish religious sites, the IDF provided special security escorts for Jews to visit religious sites in Area A, particularly Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus – a site of religious significance to Jews, Christians, and Muslims which is located near Balata refugee camp. Some Jewish religious leaders said this policy prevented Jewish Israelis from freely visiting several Jewish religious sites in the West Bank, including Joseph’s Tomb, because they were denied the opportunity to visit the site on unscheduled occasions or in larger numbers than may be permitted through IDF coordination. IDF officials said requirements to coordinate Jewish visits to Joseph’s Tomb were needed to ensure Jewish Israelis’ safety. On June 25, Israeli security forces arrested 20 Israelis for attempting to enter Joseph’s Tomb illegally, without prior coordination with Israeli authorities. The suspects were released on bail. On October 11, clashes erupted when the ISF escorted a group of approximately 1,000 worshippers to Joseph’s Tomb.

According to local Palestinian political leaders and local press, Israeli authorities continued to prevent most Palestinians from accessing Rachel’s Tomb, a Bethlehem shrine of religious significance to Jews, Christians, and Muslims under Israeli jurisdiction in Area C, but continued to allow relatively unimpeded access to Jewish visitors. Israeli police closed the site to all visitors on Saturdays, for the Jewish Sabbath (Shabbat).

The IDF continued to limit access to the Ibrahimi Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, another site of significance to Jews, Christians, and Muslims as the tomb of Abraham. Muslim leaders continued to oppose publicly, in statements to local media, the IDF’s control of access, citing Oslo-era agreements which gave Israel and the PA shared responsibility for the site. The IDF again restricted Muslim access on 10 days corresponding to Jewish holidays and Jewish access on 10 days corresponding to Islamic holidays. The IDF restricted Muslims to one entry point with IDF security screening. The IDF granted Jews access to several entry points without security screening. The IDF also periodically closed roads approaching the site, and since 2001 has permanently closed Shuhada Street to Palestinian pedestrians, citing security concerns. Both Muslims and Jews were able to pray at the site simultaneously but in separate spaces. Israeli authorities continued to implement frequent bans on the Muslim call to prayer from the Ibrahimi Mosque, saying it disturbed Jewish settlers in the surrounding areas or posed a security concern. The Israeli government criticized the designation by UNESCO in July of the old city of Hebron, including the Ibrahimi Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs, as an endangered World Heritage site in Palestinian territory. The Israelis stated that UNESCO’s approval of a Palestinian motion to recognize Hebron as a heritage site was a deliberate attempt to diminish Jewish and Israeli connections to the site.

Religiously intolerant and anti-Semitic material continued to appear in official PA media. In July PA TV reportedly broadcast a video clip characterizing Jewish Israelis as “evil” and “satans,” and glorified armed resistance. Following the December 6 United States government declaration on Jerusalem, an official PA television program featured a poem that contained anti-Semitic language. Another video program broadcast on PA TV in December featured children stating that Jewish people poisoned the late Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat.

Civil society organizations alleged problematic content in Palestinian textbooks, including inappropriately militaristic and adversarial examples directed against Israel as well as the absence of Judaism alongside Christianity and Islam when discussing religion.

Israeli police and the IDF reported investigating known instances of religiously motivated attacks and making arrests where possible. In June the GOI indicted Rabbi Yosef Elitzur, a rabbi in a West Bank settlement, for incitement to violence against Palestinians. Elitzur is also coauthor of the controversial book, “The King’s Torah,” which attempts to justify in religious terms the killing of non-Jews in certain circumstances. In December an Israeli court sentenced Yitzhar settlement resident Eliraz Fein to five months’ community service for social media posts calling for violent acts against Palestinians and Israeli soldiers. The court gave Fein a 10-month suspended prison sentence and a 2,000 shekel ($575) fine for comments she made in an email forum in which Yitzhar residents mulled the legality under Jewish law of attacking, and even killing, IDF soldiers “under certain circumstances.” In general, however, NGOs, religious institutions, and media continued to state that arrests in religiously motivated crimes against Palestinians rarely led to indictments and convictions. Israeli NGO Yesh Din also reported Palestinian victims generally feared reprisals by perpetrators or their associates. Both of these factors increased Palestinian victims’ reluctance to file official complaints, according to Yesh Din. In response to these reports, the Israeli government stated the special unit it established in 2013 in the West Bank to combat nationalistic crimes continued to face evidentiary challenges. Those challenges included long delays before Palestinians filed complaints, submission of complaints by NGOs rather than plaintiffs, lack of cooperation by witnesses, and challenges in coordinating with the PA. The Israeli government reported this unit opened 142 cases and filed 66 new indictments in 2017.

NGOs monitoring archaeological practices in Jerusalem and the West Bank continued to state the Israel Antiquities Authority, an Israeli government entity, exploited archaeological finds to bolster Jewish claims, while overlooking other historically significant archaeological finds of other religions or the needs of Palestinian residents at these sites. In March the Israeli High Court of Justice ruled against a petition filed by Emek Shaveh, a Jerusalem-based Israeli archaeological NGO, seeking to nullify the Israel Ministry of Religious Services’ declaration of the Western Wall tunnels as an exclusively Jewish holy site, since excavations also unearthed a Christian chapel, an Islamic school, and Islamic Mamluk-era buildings. The court rejected the petition, but ruled that the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Western Wall Heritage Foundation must ensure that those sections of the tunnels significant to Muslims and Christians were properly managed to protect the antiquities and to ensure access and enable worship for members of other religions. Under Israeli Antiquities Law, excavations within a sacred site require the approval of a ministerial committee, which includes the Minister of Culture, the Minister of Justice, and the Minister of Religious Affairs. Based on this provision, Emek Shaveh submitted another petition to the High Court of Justice in June requesting a halt to Western Wall tunnels excavations pending the necessary approvals by the ministerial committee. The Western Wall Heritage Foundation continued to promote ongoing archaeological excavations in the vicinity of the Western Wall Plaza, including tunnels underneath the Old City’s Muslim Quarter, which the Waqf stated were altering the religious landscape of the area around the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount.

The Israeli government retained its previous regulations regarding visa issuance for foreigners to work in Jerusalem and the West Bank, which Christian institutions said impeded their work by preventing many foreign clergy from entering and working. The Israeli government continued to limit Arab Christian clergy serving in the West Bank or Jerusalem to single entry visas, which local parish leaders in the West Bank said complicated needed travel to other areas under their pastoral authority outside the West Bank or Jerusalem, such as Jordan. Clergy, nuns, and other religious workers from Arab countries said they continued to face long delays before they received visas, and reported periodic denials of their visa applications. The Israeli government stated visa delays or denials were due to security processing. Officials from multiple churches expressed concerns that non-Arab visa applicants and visa renewal applicants also faced long delays.

According to some church officials, Israel continued to prohibit some Arab Christian clergy from entering Gaza, including bishops and other senior clergy seeking to visit congregations or ministries under their pastoral authority. Israel facilitated visits by clergy, including bishops from non-Arab countries, to Gaza on multiple occasions, including delegations from Europe, North America, and South Africa.

Three PA ministries (Finance, Economy and Tourism) were headed by Christians at year’s end.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and other militant and terrorist groups were active in Gaza. Hamas remained in de facto political control.

Hamas, PIJ, and other extremist groups disseminated anti-Semitic materials and incited to violence via traditional and social media channels, as well as during rallies and other events. In January thousands of Hamas activists and supporters participated in a protest organized at the Jabalya refugee camp in Gaza to rally against Israel and praise the terrorist ramming attack in Jerusalem that killed four IDF soldiers. Speaking at the rally, a Hamas official voiced support “for every jihadi who carries out an attack that puts an end to the acts of the Zionist enemy.”

Hamas also continued to enforce restrictions on Gaza’s population based on its interpretation of Islam and sharia.

Christian groups reported Hamas generally tolerated the small Christian presence in Gaza and did not force Christians to abide by Islamic law. According to media accounts, Hamas continued neither to investigate nor prosecute Gaza-based cases of religious discrimination, including reported anti-Christian bias in private sector hiring and in police investigations of anti-Christian harassment.

Some Muslim students continued to attend schools run by Christian institutions or NGOs in Gaza.

There were incidents of deadly violence that perpetrators said was justified at least partly on religious grounds. Because religion and ethnicity or nationality were often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize much of this violence as being solely based on religious identity. Actions included killings, physical and verbal attacks on worshipers and clergy, and vandalism of religious sites. There was also harassment by members of one religious group of another, social pressure to stay within one’s religious group, and anti-Semitic media items.

In June three armed Palestinian assailants arrived at the Old City’s Damascus Gate; one of the assailants fatally stabbed Hadas Malka, a border police officer. On July 21, a Palestinian stabbed and killed three Israeli citizens – a father, son, and daughter – in the West Bank settlement of Halamish. Some of these attackers cited specific religious motivations on social media before perpetrating the attacks. For example, prior to carrying out the attack in Halamish, the assailant commented on Facebook that he would take actions to “defend” the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. Israeli authorities arrested the assailant, and demolished his house on August 16.

Palestinians threw stones and Molotov cocktails and committed other acts of violence against Jewish visitors to Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus. On August 29, the IDF shot and wounded two Palestinians while the soldiers were providing protection to a group of Jewish worshipers visiting the Joseph’s Tomb holy site, Palestinian media reported. The IDF confirmed that during the incident, soldiers “identified an armed suspect and opened fire on him.”

According to multiple media reports, Jewish groups harassed and attacked Muslim and Christian Palestinians. The Jewish Israeli antiassimilation organization Lehava continued to protest social and romantic relationships between Jews and Palestinians, made anti-Christian and anti-Muslim statements, and reportedly assaulted Palestinians in West Jerusalem. The Israeli police remanded Lehava leader Bentzi Gopstein to house arrest October 22, following allegations he made threats against Arabs in romantic relationships with Jewish women. The Jerusalem Magistrate’s Court sentenced Gopstein to five days house arrest. Of the 14 other members of the group arrested at the same time for making similar threats, the court extended the house arrest of two by two days, and released the remaining 12, Hebrew-language media reported. According to local human rights groups and media, Israeli authorities rarely prosecuted Jewish attacks against Muslims and Christians successfully, failing to open investigations or closing cases for lack of evidence.

Local Christian clergy said some Jewish Israelis in Jerusalem continued to subject them to nonphysical abuse, including insults and spitting. These incidents often occurred in the Old City and near the shared holy site of the Cenacle (devotional site of the Last Supper)/David’s Tomb near the Old City.

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses and evangelical Christians, established Christian groups opposed their efforts to obtain official recognition from the PA because of their proselytizing.

Jewish proponents of accessing and performing religious rituals at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount site, such as Return to the Mount, the Temple Mount Faithful, and the Temple Institute, continued to call for increased Jewish access and prayer at the site, while almost all ultra-Orthodox rabbis and some National Religious Orthodox rabbis continued to discourage Jewish visits. Some small Jewish groups continued to call for the destruction of the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque to enable the building of a third Jewish temple. Political and religious groups in the West Bank and Gaza continued to call on members to “defend” the Al-Aqsa mosque.

According to Palestinian sources, most Christian and Muslim families in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip pressured their children, especially their daughters, to marry within their respective religious groups. Couples who challenged this societal norm, particularly Palestinian Christians or Muslims who sought to marry Jews, encountered considerable societal and family opposition. Families sometimes disowned Muslim and Christian women who married outside their faith.

Independent Palestinian media outlets continued to broadcast anti-Semitic programming. Multiple social and traditional media sites glorified attacks against Jewish Israelis, referring to the assailants as “martyrs.”

According to local press and social media, some Israeli settlers in the West Bank continued to justify their attacks on Palestinian property, such as the uprooting of Palestinian olive trees or “price tag” attacks (property crimes and violent acts by extremist Jewish individuals and groups against Palestinians), as necessary for the defense of Judaism.

During his May visit to Bethlehem, the U.S. President publicly called for “a more peaceful, safe, and far more tolerant world.” Officials from the U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem met with Palestinian officials to discuss religious tolerance. These discussions included continued requests to remove religiously intolerant material or language glorifying violence from traditional and social media. During meetings with Palestinian religious authorities, consulate general officials also discussed religious tolerance as well as other issues such as the Muslim religious leaders’ perceptions of detrimental changes to the status quo of religious sites, including concerns about Israeli restrictions on Muslim access to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. Consulate general officials also expressed concerns about UNESCO resolutions sponsored by the PA that minimized or ignored the Jewish religious and historical connection to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount and Western Wall as well as to Hebron and the Ibrahimi Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs. Consulate general officers raised with local authorities the views and concerns expressed by both majority and minority religious groups. In meetings with PA officials, consulate general officers objected to instances of intolerant and anti-Semitic material in PA and Fatah party media and social media as well as inappropriate material in Palestinian textbooks.

During a visit in October, the Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South/Central Asia met with politicians and local religious and civil society leaders to discuss religious tolerance, anti-Semitism, interfaith relations, and the need for cooperation against religious prejudice. He also met with a broad range of Christian religious, social, and political leaders to discuss key factors driving Palestinian Christian emigration. In addition, the Special Advisor met with local Palestinians to hear their concerns that construction of Israel’s security barrier in the Cremisan Valley impeded access to the Catholic convent and school and agricultural lands near Beit Jala and Bethlehem, as well as with representatives of churches not recognized by the Palestinian Authorities.

The Consul General and consulate general officers met regularly with representatives of a large range of religious groups from Jerusalem, the West Bank, and when possible, the Gaza Strip. This included meetings with the Waqf and Muslim leaders in Jerusalem and throughout the West Bank; meetings with Orthodox, ultra-Orthodox, and Reform rabbis, as well as representatives of various Jewish institutions; regular contacts with leaders of the Council of Religious Institutions of the Holy Land (an interfaith group promoting communication and respect among religious communities), and the Greek Orthodox, Latin (Roman Catholic), and Armenian Orthodox patriarchates; and meetings with the Holy See’s Custodian of the Holy Land, leaders of the Anglican and Lutheran Churches, and leaders of evangelical Christian groups. These meetings included discussions of the groups’ concerns about religious tolerance, access to religious sites, respect for clergy, and attacks on religious sites and houses of worship. Consulate general officers spoke to local Christians concerned about impeded access to their agricultural lands and local monastery due to the construction of the Israeli separation barrier in the Cremisan Valley, and to Waqf officials concerned about Israeli police restrictions on Muslim access to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount and on Waqf renovation projects there.

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The U.S. government estimates the total population at 62.1 million (July 2017 estimate). According to a 2017 survey by the Pew Research Center, approximately 77 percent of all residents identify as Roman Catholic. Religious groups together accounting for less than 10 percent of the population include other Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Bahais, and Buddhists. Non-Catholic Christian groups include Eastern Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Assemblies of God, the Confederation of Methodist and Waldensian Churches, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and a number of smaller Protestant groups. The remaining 13 percent have no religious affiliation. According to estimates by the Foundation for Initiatives and Studies on Multiethnicity, an independent research center, of the approximately five million resident foreigners, there are 1.6 million Muslims, 1.6 million Eastern Orthodox Christians, one million Roman Catholics, and 250,000 Protestants. The government estimates the Jewish population at 30,000.

According to the MOI and the national agency for statistics, the Muslim population is composed of native-born citizens, immigrants, and resident foreigners, but most of its growth comes from large numbers of immigrants from Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, the majority of whom live in the north. Moroccan and Albanian immigrants are the two largest groups. The MOI reports Muslims are overwhelmingly Sunni.

Legal Framework

The constitution states all citizens are equal before the law regardless of religion and are free to profess their beliefs in any form, individually or with others, and to promote them and celebrate rites in public or in private, provided they are not offensive to public morality. According to the constitution, each religious community has the right to establish its own institutions according to its own statutes as long as these do not conflict with the law. It stipulates the state may not impose special limitations or taxes on the establishment or activities of groups because of their religious nature or aims. The constitution specifies the state and the Catholic Church are independent of each other, and their relations are governed by treaties, which include a concordat between the government and the Holy See.

The law considers insults against any divinity to be blasphemy, a crime punishable by a fine ranging from 51 to 309 euros ($61-$370). The government generally does not enforce the law against blasphemy.

The constitution states all religious groups are equally free and relations between the state and non-Catholic groups are governed by law based on agreements (“accords”) between them. Representatives of a non-Catholic faith requesting an accord must first submit their request to the Office of the Prime Minister. The government and the group’s representatives then negotiate a draft agreement, which the Council of Ministers must approve. The prime minister then signs and submits the agreement to parliament for final approval. Once parliament approves the implementing legislation, the accord governs the relationship between the government and the religious group, including state support. Groups with an accord include the Confederation of Methodist and Waldensian Churches, Seventh-day Adventists, Assemblies of God, Jews, Baptists, Lutherans, Mormons, the Orthodox Church of the Constantinople Patriarchate, the Italian Apostolic Church, the Buddhist Union, Soka Gakkai Buddhists, and Hindus.

The law provides religious groups with tax-exempt status and the right to recognition as legal entities, as long as they have completed a registration process with the MOI. Legal recognition is a prerequisite for any group seeking an accord with the government. A religious group may apply for recognition of its legal status by submitting to a prefect, the local representative of the MOI, a request including the group’s statutes; a report on its goals and activities; information on its administrative offices; a three-year budget; certification of its credit status by a bank; and certification of the Italian citizenship or legal residency of its head. To be approved, a group’s statutes must not conflict with the law. If approved, the group must submit to MOI monitoring. The MOI may appoint a commissioner to administer the group if it identifies irregularities in its activities. The Catholic Church is the only legally recognized group exempted from MOI monitoring, in accordance with the concordat between the government and the Holy See.

An accord grants clergy automatic access to state hospitals, prisons, and military barracks; allows for civil registry of religious marriages; facilitates special religious practices regarding funerals; and exempts students from school attendance on religious holidays. Any religious group without an accord may request these benefits from the MOI on a case-by-case basis. An accord also allows a religious group to receive funds collected by the state through a voluntary 0.8 percent set-aside on taxpayer returns. Taxpayers may specify to which eligible religious group they would like to direct these funds. The government set aside 986 million euros ($1.18 billion) via this mechanism in 2017; of that total, more than 81 percent went to the Catholic Church.

On June 27, the Veneto regional council adopted a regulation banning the use of burqas and niqabs in public institutions such as hospitals.

The law allows the Catholic Church to select teachers, paid by the state, to provide instruction in weekly “hour of religion” courses taught in public schools. The courses are optional, and students who do not wish to attend may study other subjects or, in certain cases, leave school early with parental consent. Church-selected instructors are lay or religious, and the instruction includes material determined by the state and relevant to non-Catholic religious groups. Government funding is available only for these Catholic Church-approved teachers. If a student requests a religion class from a non-Catholic religious group, that group must provide the teacher and cover the cost of instruction, but it is not required to seek government approval for the content of the class. Some local laws provide scholarship funding for students to attend private religiously affiliated schools, usually but not always Catholic, that meet government educational standards.

Hate crimes, including those motivated by religious hatred, are punishable by up to four years in prison. The law applies also to denial of genocide or crimes against humanity.

All missionaries and other foreign religious workers must apply for special religious activity visas before arriving in the country.

This country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: The government and groups representing 70 percent of the country’s Muslims signed a text pledging cooperation to combat radicalism and promote social cohesions and integration among Muslims, to include training of imams to manage funds transparently and deliver sermons in Italian. In a precedent-setting decision, the country’s highest court upheld the conviction of a Sikh man for carrying a kirpan (a ceremonial knife), who had defended the action due to its religious significance. Muslims continued to encounter difficulties obtaining permits for new or existing mosques. The city council of Sesto San Giovanni blocked construction of an Islamic cultural center and mosque, and Milan municipal officials continued to withhold authorization to construct two new mosques, as well as a Protestant church. Mestre and Rome each closed a Bangladeshi “garage” mosque, and a citizens’ group sought a referendum to block construction of a new mosque in Pisa. In Rome, a regional court in Lazio ordered authorities to reopen five garage mosques police had shut down 2016. In Bologna, for the first time in 20 years, authorities barred Muslims from using the local stadium to celebrate Eid al-Adha. Politicians from several parties made statements criticizing Islam, and one called for the expulsion of an imam for statements he made about women.

Although the government had reportedly negotiated draft agreements with the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Romanian Orthodox Church, and the Episcopal Church governing its relations with those groups, the government did not submit the draft agreements to parliament for approval.

Muslim groups had also not reached an accord specifying their relations with the state. In February the MOI reached a preliminary agreement with Muslim groups but failed to finalize an accord, reportedly due to the absence of a single legal group representing all Muslim communities. Paolo Naso, an academic and independent advisor who acted as chairman of the committee that drafted the agreement, stated it was an important step toward a formal accord between the government and the Muslim community. There was no further progress on a final accord after the preliminary agreement. As a result, mosques remained ineligible for state funding through the taxpayer set-aside program available to religious groups with such agreements, and Muslim employees were not guaranteed the right to take the day off on religious holidays. According to government and other officials, a formal accord was unlikely to be finalized absent the establishment of one umbrella group representing all the Muslim associations. At year’s end, the only Muslim group legally recognized as a religious entity by the MOI was the Cultural Islamic Center of Italy, which ran the Great Mosque of Rome. Other Muslims groups were recognized as nonprofit organizations.

On February 1, Minister of Interior Marco Minniti and nine Islamic federations and associations, including the three largest federations – the Union of Italian Muslim Communities, Italian Islamic Confederations, and Italian Muslim Youth Community, collectively representing almost 70 percent of Muslims in the country – signed an agreement to jointly combat radicalism and advance social cohesion and integration of Muslims, especially the second generation. It included provisions for training imams to deliver sermons in Italian, but without specifying who would fund the training, and stipulated that communities must transparently manage funds and donations from domestic followers and from abroad.

On May 15, the Cassation (Supreme) Court upheld the conviction of a Sikh man, an Indian citizen, for carrying a kirpan. The defendant, who had been sentenced to pay a 2,000 euro ($2,400) fine, argued that wearing a knife, like wearing a turban, amounted to respecting a religious precept sacred to Sikhs. In what judicial analyst Alessandro Negri said was an important, precedent-setting decision, the court disagreed, arguing that a “multiethnic society is a necessity, but cannot be conducive of conflicting cultural visions, as in the cultural and judicial context of a country [Italy] where public security is a general goal to protect by means of banning arms.”

Muslims continued to encounter difficulties acquiring permission from local governments to construct mosques. As of November there were five officially recognized mosques, one each in Ravenna, Rome, Colle Val D’Elsa, Milan, and Forli (inaugurated in May), compared with more than 800 unofficial, informal places of worship for Muslims, known colloquially as “garage” mosques. Local officials, who were entitled to introduce rules on planning applicable to places of worship, continued to cite a lack of zoning plans allowing for the establishment of places of worship on specific sites as a reason for denying construction permits. Although municipalities, such as Milan, could and did withhold construction permits for other religious groups, the shortage of formal places of worship appeared to be most acute for Muslims. Local politicians from the Northern League Party, including Jacopo Alberti, a Lombardy regional councilor, expressed concerns for Muslim communities that hoped to build their own mosques.

On October 10, the city council of Sesto San Giovanni near Milan blocked the construction of an Islamic cultural center and mosque, on the grounds that the center did not comply with all the requirements stipulated in two documents signed in 2013 and 2015. In particular, the council said the center failed to allot funds to build parking and other services, as previously agreed.

On September 1, local authorities in Bologna prohibited the use of a stadium for the celebration of Eid al-Adha. The President of the Islamic Cultural Center, Boubakeur Gueddouda, expressed his regret and disappointment, stating the Muslim community had used the arena to celebrate Eid al-Adha for the previous 20 years.

On March 20, Milan Mayor Giuseppe Sala stated the Lombardy regional law requiring strict construction standards for places of worship, as part of urban planning codes, significantly limited the possibility of municipal authorities to authorize new mosques.

On April 7, the Constitutional Court upheld the provision of a 2016 Veneto regional law restricting the location of new places of worship to urban peripheries. The court overturned another provision of the same law that required use of the Italian language during religious services, ruling the provision affected freedom of worship.

In Florence, Mayor Dario Nardella and Imam Izzeddin Elzir continued discussions but did not identify a suitable location to construct a mosque for the Muslim community. The estimated 30,000 local Muslims continued to pray in three small locations across the city, which were not large enough to accommodate demand. In June the mayor proposed to the local Muslim community that they could establish a mosque in a former barracks on the outskirts of the city in Scandicci, but the local authorities there blocked the initiative. The local Muslim community was also looking into raising private funds for acquisition of space for use as a mosque, but the community leaders stated lack of authorization remained the main impediment to mosque construction. On December 22, Archbishop of Florence Giuseppe Betori signed an agreement with Imam Elzir for the construction of a mosque on land the Church sold to the Muslim community in Sesto Fiorentino, outside of the Florence city limits. According to press reports, if built, the mosque, with a capacity for several hundred worshippers, would not be able to accommodate all of greater Florence’s Muslim community, which numbered approximately 30,000 persons.

The city of Milan continued to withhold authorization, as it had in 2016, to build two new mosques and a Protestant church, citing limited capability to identify proper venues, as required by Lombardy regional law under which local governments may apply urban planning rules to restrict the location of places of worship.

The Muslim community of Thiene in the Veneto region began the construction of a mosque for which they had received a building permit in 2015 in accordance with the region’s legal requirements. The mosque was still under construction at year’s end.

Citing a lack of construction permits or inadequate safety standards, the city of Mestre, on April 5, and the city of Rome, on October 6, each closed down a garage mosque run by a Bangladeshi religious community. Community representatives organized public demonstrations of 100-200 persons in Mestre and Rome in October, stating they had no legal means of establishing new places of worship. The city of Mestre pledged to authorize the community to open a new mosque elsewhere but had not done so by year’s end.

In separate decisions, a Lazio regional court ordered Rome authorities to reopen five garage mosques police had closed in 2016 because they lacked proper authorization. The mosques reopened.

Local governments continued to rent out public land at discounted rates to religious groups, usually Catholic, for constructing places of worship. Government funding also helped preserve and maintain historic places of worship, which were almost all Catholic.

An association of local citizens requested a referendum on the construction of a new mosque in Pisa on the grounds that there was already an Islamic place of worship and “the money for the new mosque might come from Qatar, which funds the Muslim Brotherhood.” The referendum request was pending at year’s end.

On April 29, Veneto Regional Council member Elena Donazzan of the Forza Italia Party called for the expulsion from the country of Nuhi Krasniqi, an imam and head of the Sunna Muslim association in Bassano del Grappa, after Krasniqi called for the submission of women to God and the Prophet Muhammad during a television interview. Referring to Krasniqi, Donazzan said, “If the imam does not like the idea that a woman … can stroll on the streets of her city without a veil, he can pack up his bags and go back to where he came from.”

Politicians from several political parties, including the Northern League, Brothers of Italy, and CasaPound, made statements critical of Islam. Interviewed by the daily newspaper Die Welt on January 3, Northern League leader Matteo Salvini said, “The culture of Islam is backward, and not compatible with our society.” CasaPound organized a September 27 march in Rome calling for the closure of garage mosques. Giorgia Meloni, President of the Brothers of Italy Party, tweeted on October 9, “We can’t deny there is a process of Islamization going on in Europe.”

The government held a series of events in commemoration of the liberation of the Auschwitz concentration camp on Holocaust Remembrance Day, January 27. President Sergio Mattarella hosted a ceremony in which he stressed the need “to learn, study, and think. Nothing can stop our will to remember.” On January 18 and 19, Minister of Education Valeria Fedeli accompanied a group of 100 students to visit Auschwitz in cooperation with the Union of Italian Jewish Communities (UCEI). She also signed an agreement with the union to promote training for teachers and programs for students to preserve the memory of the Holocaust. On January 19, Mayor Sala led a ceremony by the Milan city government to dedicate a stolpersteine, a commemorative cobblestone for Holocaust victim Dante Coen, the first of six such commemorative cobblestones for Italian Holocaust victims.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

In 2016, the most recent year for which data were available, the contact center of UNAR received approximately 240 calls concerning cases of discrimination based on religion, compared with 28 calls in the previous year. UNAR did not report details on the types of incidents or the religious groups targeted. UNAR attributed the large increase in the number of reported cases to an increased awareness on how to report discrimination. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

An OSCE report on hate crimes in the country in 2016, which relied on data reported by international organizations, civil society, and the Holy See, cited 32 incidents involving bias against Christians, 11 anti-Semitic incidents, and eight anti-Muslim incidents. Most incidents were against property, but there were two attacks against Jews, two against Muslims, and one threat against Muslims. In one of the incidents of violence against Jews, a group insulted and attacked a Jewish youth wearing a kippah, and in the other, a group assaulted another group of visibly Jewish students as they left a soccer field. In one of the incidents against Muslims, a Muslim woman wearing a veil and her daughter were insulted and the daughter slapped when she responded to the insult. In the other, a Muslim woman was insulted and spat upon while walking her children to school. In the third case, the OSCE reported a bullet was left as a threat in a Muslim prayer room.

CDEC’s Anti-Semitism Observatory recorded 109 incidents of anti-Semitism during the year, compared with 130 incidents in 2016. Reports of anti-Semitic incidents published on CDEC’s website included discrimination, online and verbal harassment, particularly at soccer matches and other sporting events, and derogatory graffiti. Internet hate speech and bullying were the most common forms of anti-Semitic attacks, according to CDEC, which continued to operate an anti-Semitism hotline for victims of, and witnesses to, anti-Semitic incidents. Noemi Di Segni, President of the Union of the Italian Jewish communities and Ruth Dureghello, President of Rome’s Jewish community, stated they were disheartened and concerned about the anti-Semitic incidents but encouraged the government was taking the incidents seriously. Di Segni reported she was unnerved by the rise of “sophisticated” anti-Semitism.

On April 12, police in Bologna confronted a man shouting curses in Arabic, who yelled, “You are Jews; I will kill you all,” and then wounded two police officers with a knife.

A survey issued in September by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, which looked at discrimination reported by Muslims living in 15 EU member states, found that 25 percent of Muslims in Italy reported feeling discriminated against because of their religion over the previous five years – the second highest percentage among the 15 countries surveyed – and only 16 percent said they had knowledge of at least one organization offering support in cases of discrimination. Muslims in the country tied for the lowest levels of trust in the police reported among the 15 nations. They also reported the lowest levels of attachment to their country of residence (3.3 on a five-point scale) of any of the countries surveyed.

On July 4, journalist Stefano Cassinelli and Orthodox priest and former Member of Parliament (MP) Alessandro Meluzzi founded the Milan-based Anti-Islamization Party. The party platform emphasized informing the public of what it described as risks associated with the growth of Islamic communities.

In September MP Massimo Corsaro, member of a political faction that broke away from the Forza Italia Party, targeted Jewish MP Emanuele Fiano, who proposed the criminalization of Holocaust denial, by asking on a Facebook post if Fiano had bushy eyebrows in order to “cover the marks of the circumcision.” Corsaro reportedly denied any anti-Semitic intent – only that he intended to insult Fiano with an offensive slur.

There were continued reports of anti-Semitism at sporting events involving the Lazio soccer team. On February 7, a Rome court acquitted two Lazio fans filmed in 2013 chanting “yellow-red Jew” and “Jewish Roma supporter” at a match in Rome of charges of incitement and racial hatred. (Yellow and red are the colors of Lazio soccer rival AS Roma.) The court ruled the chants did not rise to the level of a crime as they were “made in the context of a sports rivalry.” Rome Jewish community President Dureghello stated in a letter protesting the dismissal of the charges that it was a “dangerous precedent for justice,” as it “lends legitimacy to using the word ‘Jew’ in its most negative form.”

On October 23, national police and soccer authorities opened investigations after an October 22 soccer match between AS Roma and Cagliari. Authorities stated they believed Lazio fans were responsible for posting anti-Semitic stickers of Holocaust victim Anne Frank wearing the jersey of city rivals AS Roma and writing anti-Semitic slogans such as “Roma fans are Jews” on glass barriers, walls, and bathrooms in a section of Rome’s Olympic Stadium used by Lazio supporters. Rome Jewish Community President Dureghello tweeted, “This is not football, this is not sport. Anti-Semites out of the stadiums,” and posted a picture of the stickers. She also reportedly said, “Stadiums cannot be places that are beyond the law and places where anti-Semitic, racist, and homophobic people can find a place to show themselves.”

In response, the national soccer federation governing body, after consulting with Minister of Sport Luca Lotti and UCEI, issued a statement announcing that a passage from “The Diary of Anne Frank” would be read aloud before all games for the following week to “condemn the recent episodes of anti-Semitism and to continue to remember the Holocaust.” Lazio executives also expressed their disappointment and regret, and club President Claudio Lotito laid a wreath of white and blue flowers (the team’s colors) outside the Great Synagogue of Rome. Lotito announced the team would send 200 youths to Auschwitz every year to educate them about the Holocaust. The team later wore T-shirts depicting Anne Frank that said, “No Anti-Semitism.”

In July press reported police raided a beach near Venice, which had “No Entry, Gas Chambers” on one of the doors. The Venice prefect ordered “any references to fascism” to be removed. UCEI President Noemi Di Segni expressed outrage at the insult to the memory of the victims of the Holocaust.

On December 18, a Milan appeals court acquitted Maurizio Belpietro, the former editor of the daily newspaper Libero, of “instigating racial hatred,” overturning a 2016 conviction by a lower court. The lower court had sentenced Belpietro to almost 11 months in prison for publishing an opinion piece under the headline “Muslim Bastards” in 2015 after the Bataclan terrorist attack in Paris. Belpietro had been free while appealing his case.

CDEC stated there were 44 books in circulation containing anti-Semitic language, 21 new books and 23 reprints of older publications. The groups did not identify the titles of the books they said were anti-Semitic.

The press reported examples of anti-Semitic graffiti and posters including depictions of swastikas on walls, anti-Semitic stereotypes, and praise of neo-Nazi groups in cities, including Rome, Milan, and Reggio Calabria. On September 3, authorities found swastikas and anti-Semitic slogans reading “No Jews” at a bus stop near a Jewish school in Milan. On July 27, authorities found swastika graffiti exalting Hitler on benches in front of the Shoah Memorial in Milan. In Milan on January 21, the daughter of Holocaust victim Dante Coen found black paint defacing a commemorative cobblestone honoring him that had been installed two days earlier. On January 28, thousands of persons marched to protest the vandalism, linked together by a red cord, which organizers said symbolized their link to “the chain of memory” of Holocaust victims. Milan Mayor Sala and Minister of Justice Andrea Orlando joined the march, and media quoted Orlando as saying, “A quick and immediate reaction is important, so that whoever intends to eliminate the signs of the past may achieve the opposite result.”

On April 4, the leaders of the Islamic community of Bologna found graffiti reading, “You are not welcome” and a cross near the entrance of the local mosque.

According to the OSCE report on hate crimes in 2016, all 32 anti-Christian incidents were against property and almost all against the Catholic Church. Incidents consisted of theft, desecration of graves, vandalism, and graffiti. There was also one incident of arson against a Catholic church. There were several incidents of vandalism against Jehovah’s Witnesses’ kingdom halls.

The OSCE report cited nine anti-Semitic incidents against property in 2016. They involved the writing of neo-Nazi or other anti-Semitic graffiti, theft, and vandalism. In one incident, a Jewish cemetery was vandalized and religious items stolen or damaged. In another incident, hackers added anti-Semitic content to a Jewish group’s website.

The OSCE reported five anti-Muslim incidents involving property in 2016. There was an arson attack against a Muslim-owned butcher shop and a pig’s head left next to a Pakistani-owned kebab shop. The other incidents involved vandalism and the writing of anti-Muslim graffiti.

In January the Catholic Archbishop of Palermo, Corrado Lorefice, transferred to the Jewish community a Church-owned facility built atop the ruins of the Great Synagogue of Palermo.

Representatives from the U.S. embassy and consulates general met with national and local government officials in Rome, Sicily, Naples, Milan, Turin, Bologna, Florence, Modena, Reggio Emilia, and Colle Val d’Elsa to encourage religious tolerance. During these meetings, embassy officials and government officials also discussed integration of asylum seekers and migrants, many of whom were Muslim. Embassy officials met with the MOI and the presidency of the Council of Ministers on the issue of establishing an agreement formalizing relations between the Muslim community and the government.

U.S. embassy and consulates general officials continued to meet with representatives of civil society groups including Caritas, Sant’Egidio, Integra, and Anolf, as well as Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish leaders in cities throughout the country. The U.S. officials urged the social inclusion of immigrants, many of whom were Muslim, and dialogue among various religious groups, and monitored groups’ ability to practice their religion freely. Embassy officials met with Jewish community leaders to discuss anti-Semitism among soccer fans. The embassy continued to host speakers and events focused on integrating newly arrived, largely Muslim migrants and second-generation immigrants.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 3 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the most recent census in 2011, 26 percent of the population belongs to various branches of the Church of God; 12 percent is Seventh-day Adventist; 11 percent Pentecostal; 7 percent Baptist; 3 percent Anglican; 2 percent Roman Catholic; 2 percent United Church; 2 percent Methodist; 2 percent Jehovah’s Witnesses; 1 percent Moravian; and 1 percent Brethren. Two percent declined to state a religious affiliation. Other religious groups constitute 8 percent of the population, including approximately 29,000 Rastafarians, 1,500 Muslims (Muslim groups estimate their numbers at 6,500), 1,800 Hindus, 500 Jews, and 270 Bahais. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) estimates approximately 5,000 members. The census reports 21 percent have no religious affiliation. There is no census data on adherents to Obeah and Myalism, since those belief systems are outlawed.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of thought and religion, including the freedom to change one’s religion or belief either alone or in community with others, both in public and in private, and to manifest and propagate one’s religion or belief in worship. It prohibits discrimination based on belief. The constitution provides that rights and freedoms are protected to the extent they do not “prejudice the rights and freedoms of others.”

A law criminalizing Obeah and Myalism, religious practices with West African influences, remains in effect, with possible imprisonment of up to 12 months for practicing or consulting a practitioner of Obeah or Myalism. Authorities have rarely enforced the law since the country became independent in 1962, and there were no reported arrests or prosecutions of Obeah practitioners during the year.

Registration with the government is not mandatory for religious groups, but registered groups obtain incorporated group status and gain benefits, including the ability to hold land, to enter into legal disputes as an organization, and for clergy to visit members in prison. Groups may seek incorporated status by applying to the Companies Office, an executive agency. The Companies Office application comprises a standard form and a fee of 24,500 Jamaican dollars ($190). NGOs register via the same form and fee structure to gain incorporated status. Groups incorporated through this process must subsequently submit annual reports and financial statements to the Companies Office.

Alternatively groups may petition the parliament to be incorporated by parliamentary act. Such groups receive similar benefits to those incorporating through the Companies Office, but parliament does not require annual reports or regulate the organizations it incorporates.

Regardless of incorporation status, religious groups seeking tax-exempt transactions must register as charities. To be considered a charity, an organization must apply to the Cooperatives and Friendly Societies Department in the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, Agriculture, and Fisheries. Once registered, groups must submit their registration to the customs department in the Ministry of Finance and the Public Service or apply to the tax administration to be considered for tax-free status.

The constitution states religious groups have the right to provide religious instruction to members of their communities. No individual may be required to receive religious instruction or participate in religious observances contrary to his or her beliefs. The public school curriculum includes nondenominational religious education, which focuses on the historical role of religion in society and philosophical thought and includes group visits to Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Hindu houses of worship. Students may not opt out of religious education; however, religious devotion or practice during school hours is optional. Churches operate a number of private schools. Churches also run some public schools; they receive funding from the government and must abide by Ministry of Education rules. Religious schools are not subject to any special restrictions; they do not receive special treatment from the government based on their religious or denominational affiliation. Most religious schools are affiliated with Catholic or Protestant churches; the Islamic Council of Jamaica runs two schools. Immunizations are mandatory for all children attending both public and private schools.

Foreign religious workers traveling to the country to perform religious work, like all foreign visitors, require an entry visa. The entry visa may be obtained upon arrival or in advance, depending on the nationality of the traveler and the length of stay. Religious workers, regardless of affiliation, who visit the country to work with a religious organization, require a work permit from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On April 4, Prime Minister Andrew Holness officially apologized in parliament on behalf of the government for the 1963 police operation in St. James Parish, referred to as the Coral Gardens incident, which led to the deaths of at least three Rastafarians and the imprisonment of many others. Calling the incident “a grave injustice,” Holness announced the establishment of a 10 million Jamaican dollar ($78,100) trust fund to benefit survivors and designated land for a Rastafarian heritage site near the location of the first Rastafarian village. Some Rastafarians said the prime minister’s apology for the Coral Gardens incident was insufficient and said the government should allocate a larger amount for the survivors’ trust fund and provide more land for the planned Rastafarian heritage site. The government provided an avenue for feedback from Rastafarian groups but did not increase the amount of funding or land.

Muslim and Rastafarian groups stated the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) enabled them to regularly visit prisons to provide readings, teaching, and counseling to inmates. Rastafarians also said prison authorities did not interfere with Rastafarian inmates who chose to grow dreadlocks. The DCS Chaplaincy consisted of several full-time Christian chaplains, and the DCS allowed outside organizations to visit correctional facilities after completing a standard application process.

Rastafarians continued to say the 2015 passage and attendant enforcement of the law legalizing limited marijuana usage for religious purposes had allowed them to practice their religion according to their beliefs. Rastafarians said law enforcement officials on rare occasions still profiled, stopped, and searched Rastafarians for possession of marijuana over the decriminalized limit, but they were no longer concerned about being detained for carrying marijuana to religious ceremonies for use as a sacrament.

Rastafarians continued to state their religious opposition to immunization, a requirement for children to register and attend school; however, according to Rastafarian sources, most Rastafarian students could obtain a doctor’s note excusing them from the required immunizations. A Supreme Court case challenging the immunization requirement remained pending. Rastafarians also stated discrimination against Rastafarian children at schools was very rare and generally occurred only in rural areas.

On October 8, the government began its annual National Heritage Week festivities with an interfaith religious service organized by the Ministry of Culture, Gender, Entertainment, and Sport in cooperation with the NGO Jamaica Council for Interfaith Fellowship. The service included readings by representatives of Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Rastafarian, Bahai, Buddhist, and Hindu groups and was attended by the country’s governor general. A cultural development commission official said the interfaith service was a true reflection of the country’s “Out of Many One” heritage.

Rastafarians continued to state some elements of their religious observances, such as wearing dreadlocks and smoking marijuana, limited their ability to find private-sector employment and achieve professional status. For example, Rastafarian professionals described being “typecast” as marijuana dealers, approached by suspicious security guards in public places due to their appearance, and told they could have more success in corporate careers if they “cleaned up.” They stated, however, such discrimination continued to diminish, as evidenced by Rastafarians in highly regarded professional, government, and academic positions, in part because their style of dress and music was gaining wider societal acceptance.

Seventh-day Adventists said they continued to face difficulties in finding or keeping private sector employment because of their observance of the Sabbath from sunset on Friday to sunset on Saturday. They said some businesses were still reluctant to hire employees who could not work Saturdays even though the parliament had passed a “flexi-work” law in 2014 granting employees the right to negotiate working hours.

Christian, Jewish, and Muslim groups said society was tolerant of religious diversity and pointed to their continued involvement, along with other faiths, in the Jamaica Council for Interfaith Fellowship. The interfaith council included representatives from the Rastafari Innity Council Sanatan Dharma Mandir United Church, Unification Church, National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahais, United Congregation of Israelites, Islamic Council, and Soka Gakkai International. Other organizations sometimes participated in council events. The council continued to coordinate public educational events, including annual interfaith awareness days. The Islamic Council of Jamaica said large groups of secondary school students visited one of the council’s 13 mosques as part of the government’s religious education syllabus. Ninety percent of the students in the council’s two schools were non-Muslim.

Local media outlets continued to provide a forum for extensive coverage and open dialogue on religious matters through radio and television shows, such as the program Religious Hardtalk on Television Jamaica, and on opinion pages and letters to the editor in newspapers such as The Gleaner and The Jamaica Observer. Topics of discussion in the media included Christian theological debates, the criminalization of Obeah, society’s treatment of atheists, and religious groups’ views on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex individual rights.

U.S. embassy officials engaged senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade in August to discuss the status of religious freedom in the country and in September to discuss the two governments’ respective positions pertaining to religious freedom issues in multilateral institutions. Embassy officials met regularly with leaders of religious groups, including Christians, Jews, Muslims, and Rastafarians, to discuss the importance of religious tolerance and social inclusion, citizen security concerns of religious groups, and the freedom of expression and assembly in relation to religious freedom. Embassy officials also discussed the religious organizations’ roles in combating violence and criminality.

The Ambassador and other embassy officials included references to the value of religious tolerance in speeches and other official communications.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 126.5 million (July 2017 estimate). A report by the government Agency for Cultural Affairs (ACA) indicates that membership in religious groups totaled 188 million as of December 31, 2015. This number, substantially more than the country’s population, reflects many citizens’ affiliation with multiple religions. For example, it is common for followers of Buddhism to participate in religious ceremonies and events of other religions, such as Shinto, and vice versa. According to the ACA, the definition of follower and the method of counting followers vary with each religious organization, and religious affiliation includes 89 million Shinto followers, 88 million Buddhists, and 1.9 million Christians, while 8.7 million follow other religions. The category of “other” and nonregistered religious groups includes Islam, the Bahai Faith, Hinduism, and Judaism. The indigenous Ainu people mainly practice an animist faith and are concentrated in northern Honshu and Hokkaido with smaller numbers in Tokyo. Most immigrants and foreign workers practice religions other than Buddhism or Shinto, according to a nongovernmental organization (NGO) in close contact with foreign workers. A scholar estimated there are 100,000 non-Japanese Muslims and 10,000 Japanese Muslims. Approximately 300 Rohingya Muslims are mostly concentrated on Gunma Prefecture, north of Tokyo, according to Rohingya representatives. According to the Jewish Community of Japan (JCJ), 100-110 Jewish families belong to the JCJ, but the total Jewish population is unknown.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees freedom of religion and requires the state to refrain from religious education or any other religious activity. It states that the people shall not abuse these rights and shall be responsible to use these rights for the public welfare.

The government does not require religious groups to register or apply for certification, but certified religious groups with corporate status do not have to pay income tax on donations and religious offerings used as part of the groups’ operational and maintenance expenses. The government requires religious groups applying for corporate status to prove they have a physical space for worship, and that their primary purpose is disseminating religious teachings, conducting religious ceremonies, and educating and nurturing believers. An applicant is required to present in writing a three-year record of activities as a religious organization, a list of members and religious teachers, the rules of the organization, information on the method of making decisions about managing assets, statements of income and expenses for the past three years, and a list of assets. The law stipulates that prefectural governors have jurisdiction over groups that seek corporate status in their prefecture, and registration must be made with prefectural governments. Exceptions are granted for groups with offices in multiple prefectures, which may register with the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) minister. After the MEXT minister or a prefectural governor confirms an applicant meets the legal definition of a religious organization, the law requires the applicant formulate administrative rules pertaining to its purpose, core personnel, and financial affairs. Applicants become religious corporations after the MEXT minister or governor approves their application and they register.

The law provides the government with some authority to supervise certified religious corporations. The law requires certified religious corporations to disclose their assets, income, and expenditures to the government. The law also empowers the government to investigate possible violations of regulations governing for-profit activities. Authorities have the right to suspend a religious corporation’s for-profit activities for up to one year if the group violates these regulations. The law stipulates that worship performed by an inmate alone in penal institutions shall not be prohibited.

The law states that schools established by the national and local governments must refrain from religious education or other activities in support of a specific religion. The law also states that an attitude of religious tolerance and general knowledge regarding religion and its position in social life should be valued in education. Both public and private schools must develop curricula in line with MEXT standards. These standards are based on the law, which says that schools should give careful consideration when teaching religion in general to junior and high school students.

Labor law states a person may not be disqualified from union membership on the basis of religion.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The MOJ Human Rights Bureau made its existing hotline for human rights inquiries available in six different languages – English, Chinese, Korean, Tagalog, Portuguese, and Vietnamese – starting in April. In May the MOJ reported that in 2016, its human rights division received 274 inquiries related to potential religious freedom violations (compared with 300 in 2015). It confirmed 32 cases (compared with 51 in 2015) as highly likely to be religious freedom violations, out of 20,705 suspected human rights violations, and assisted potential victims in 11 cases (compared with 27 in 2015), by mediating between the parties, calling on human rights violators to rectify their behavior, or referring the complainants to competent authorities for legal advice. These MOJ measures, however, were not legally binding.

According to the ACA, approximately 182,000 religious groups had been certified as religious groups with corporate status by the central and prefectural governments as of February. The large number reflected local units of religious groups registering separately. The government certified corporate status for religious groups when they met the requirements, according to the Japanese Association of Religious Organizations (JAORO), an interfaith NGO of Kyoha Shinto, Buddhism, Christianity, Shrine Shinto, and new religions groups.

A civil organization reported on information it obtained that suggested the government placed Muslims under surveillance.

In May the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) published a case stating that, in 2014, Tochigi Prison officials confiscated a prayer scarf from a Bangladeshi female Muslim inmate, offered inadequate alternative clothing, and failed to properly serve her food during Ramadan. According to the JFBA, the prison officials responded that they legally seized her scarf to prevent it from being used for suicide or escape; presented alternative clothing with consideration for her religious faith; and would have served a meal of equivalent nutritional value to three meals in one sitting had the inmate not informed the prison on the first day of Ramadan that she would not be observing it.

The independent inspection committees for penal facilities said a chief warden at one prison did not allow mainly death row convicts to access chaplain services. The warden responded that decisions about inmates’ access to religious services were made based on limited available resources.

According to the MOJ, penal institutions continued to give inmates access to 8,707 religious groups, and there were 5,822 individual religious observances and/or counseling sessions by civil volunteer chaplains in 2015. There were an estimated 1,864 volunteer chaplains from Shinto, Buddhist, Christian, and other religious groups available to prisoners as of January 2017, according to the National League of Chaplains, a public interest incorporated foundation that trains chaplains.

The MOJ stated it consistently instructed detention facilities to consider detainees’ religions in providing food and access to clergy and places to worship in a timely manner.

An NGO and press reported the Osaka Regional Immigration Bureau served meals containing pork twice respectively to Sudanese and Egyptian Muslims.

According to a MOJ press release, the ministry granted refugee status, based on the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its protocol, to at least one applicant who had a well-founded fear of being persecuted for religious reasons. Twenty-eight applicants were granted refugee status in 2016.

The government continued to grant special status to Chinese nationals self-identifying as Falun Gong practitioners, allowing them to remain in the country, while also allowing overseas artists, many of who were Falun Gong devotees, to enter the country in conjunction with performances. Municipalities permitted the artists to give performances in their halls.

The government continued to grant special permits to stay on humanitarian grounds or temporary stay visas for many of the approximately 300 Rohingya Muslims who came to the country on the basis of ethnic and religious persecution in Burma. Most of these individuals had resided in the country for more than five years, and some for more than 15 years. In prior years, the government granted refugee status to 18 Rohingya Muslims. Others still remained undocumented and were not associated with any formal resettlement program. Their temporary visas required frequent renewal by regional immigration offices. While temporary status carries some legal risk of deportation, no Rohingya Muslims from Burma were deported during the year. Representatives of the Rohingya population said the government was reluctant to grant refugee status to Rohingya who feared religious persecution in Burma. The MOJ said it equally applied its criteria for granting refugee status to Rohingya Muslims as it did to any other applicant.

The JCJ reported a small group protested in front of the JCJ building against U.S. citizens because the protesters apparently equated Jews with U.S. citizens. The JCJ reported it did not receive reports of anti-Semitic activity during the year.

East Japan Railway Company launched an open all-year-round prayer room in Tokyo Station for practitioners of any religious faith, reportedly mainly in response to increasing numbers of inbound Muslim tourists.

The press reported on the arrests of vandals in shrines and temples. JAORO said it did not consider these acts of vandalism to be religious freedom abuses pending more information on the motives of the perpetrators.

Access to halal food continued to expand in many communities. On August 9, the Muslim World League and the Tokyo Organizing Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games reportedly discussed the provision of halal food to Muslim athletes in the 2020 games. Rohingya Muslims representatives reported on amicable coexistence with local communities and interactions with other religious groups.

A visiting officer from the Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, together with a U.S. embassy representative, discussed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and MOJ religious freedom and tolerance in the country. In interactions with the ACA, the embassy emphasized interfaith respect and coexistence.

Embassy personnel engaged minority religious groups, including the Muslim, Jewish, and Falun Gong communities, and foreign workers, in particular. Embassy officers met with representatives of a Buddhist group, Soka Gakkai, to underscore U.S. promotion of respect for religious freedom. They also met with Rohingya Muslims who sought refugee status in the country to discuss the needs of the Rohingya.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 10.2 million (July 2017 estimate). According to U.S. government estimates, Muslims make up 97.2 percent of the population and Christians 2.2 percent. Groups together constituting less than 1 percent of the population include Buddhists, Bahais, Hindus, and Druze. These estimates do not include migrant workers or Syrian refugees. According to the Ministry of Labor, there are approximately 670,000 migrant workers in the country, mostly from Egypt, South and East Asia, and Africa. Migrant workers from Africa and South and East Asia are often Hindu or Christian. There are approximately 660,000 Syrian refugees in the country registered with UNHCR. The Syrian refugee population is mostly Sunni Muslim.

Christians tend to live in urban areas such as Amman, Fuhais, and Madaba.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares Islam the religion of the state. According to the constitution, the state shall safeguard the free exercise of all forms of worship and religious rites in accordance with the customs observed in the kingdom, unless those are inconsistent with public order or morality. The constitution stipulates there shall be no discrimination in the rights and duties of citizens on grounds of religion. It states the king must be a Muslim.

The constitution does not address the right of Muslims to convert to another faith, nor are there penalties under civil law for doing so. The constitution and the law accord primacy to sharia, however, which prohibits Muslims from converting to another religion. Under sharia, converts from Islam are still considered Muslims but regarded as apostates. The penal code contains articles criminalizing acts such as incitement of hatred, blasphemy against Abrahamic faiths, and undermining the regime, or portraying Jordanians in a manner that violates their dignity, according to government statements. Neither the penal code nor the criminal code specifies a penalty for apostasy. Sharia courts, however, have jurisdiction over marriage, divorce, and inheritance, and individuals declared to be apostates may have their marriages annulled or be disinherited, except in the presence of a will that states otherwise. Any member of society may file an apostasy complaint against such individuals before the newly established Sharia Public Prosecution.

Individuals who proselytize Muslims may be prosecuted in the State Security Court under the penal code’s provisions against “inciting sectarian conflict” or “harming the national unity.” Both of these offenses are punishable by imprisonment of up to two years or a fine of up to 50 Jordanian Dinars (JD) ($71).

Islamic religious groups are granted recognition through the constitution and do not need to register. Non-Islamic religious groups must obtain official recognition through registration. If registered as “denominations,” they may administer rites such as marriage (there is no provision for civil marriage). They may also own land, open bank accounts, and enter into contracts. Religious groups may also be registered as “associations” and if so, they must work through a recognized denomination on matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance, but may own property and open bank accounts. They must obtain government approval to accept foreign funding. Recognized non-Islamic religious groups are tax exempt but do not receive the government subsidies granted to Islamic religious groups.

Nonrecognized religious groups lack legal status and may not undertake basic administrative tasks such as opening bank accounts, purchasing real estate, or hiring staff. These groups may designate an individual to exercise these functions on their behalf.

To apply for registration, a religious group must submit its bylaws, a list of its members, its budget, and information about its religious doctrine. In determining whether to register or recognize Christian groups, the prime minister confers with the minister of the interior and the Council of Church Leaders (CCL), a government advisory body. The government also refers to the following criteria when considering recognition of Christian groups: the group’s teachings must not contradict the nature of the constitution, public ethics, customs, or traditions; the Middle East Council of Churches, a regional body comprising four families of churches (Catholic, Orthodox, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestant/Evangelical), must recognize it; its religious doctrine must not be antagonistic to Islam as the state religion; and the group’s membership must meet a minimum number of citizens, although a precise figure is not specified.

The law lists 11 officially recognized Christian denominations: Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Melkite Catholic, Anglican, Maronite Catholic, Lutheran, Syrian Orthodox, Seventh-day Adventist, United Pentecostal, and Coptic. Five Christian groups are not recognized as denominations by the government but are registered (and recognized) as associations: the Free Evangelical Church, Nazarene Church, Assemblies of God, Christian and Missionary Alliance, and Baptists. The government has continued to deny official recognition to some religious groups, including The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) and Jehovah’s Witnesses.

The CCL consists of the heads of the country’s 11 officially recognized Christian denominations and serves as an administrative body to facilitate tax and customs exemptions, as well as the issuance of civil documents (marriage or inheritance). In other matters, such as issuing work permits or purchasing land, the denominations interact directly with the relevant ministries. Groups recognized as associations do not have representatives on the CCL and handle administrative tasks through the ministry with which they are registered as nonprofit organizations, or the ministry relevant to the task. Nonrecognized Christian groups do not have representatives on the CCL and have no legal status as entities and must have individual members of their groups conduct business with the government on their behalf.

According to the constitution, a special provision of the law regulates the activities and administration of finances of Muslim awqaf (religious endowments). Per this provision of the law, the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs manages Islamic institutions and mosque construction. It also appoints imams, pays mosque staff salaries, manages Islamic clergy training centers, and subsidizes certain mosque-sponsored activities, such as holiday celebrations and religious observances.

According to the law, Muslim clergy who do not follow government policy may be suspended, issued a written warning, banned from delivering Friday sermons for a certain period, or dismissed from Ministry of Awqaf employment. In addition to these administrative measures, a preacher who violates the law may be imprisoned for a period of one week to one month, or given a fine not to exceed 20 JD ($28). The government also amended the law to forbid any Islamic cleric from providing a fatwa (formal religious guidance) unless officially authorized.

The law prohibits the publication of media items that slander or insult “founders of religion or prophets” or are deemed contemptuous of “any of the religions whose freedom is protected by the constitution,” and imposes a fine on violators of up to 20,000 JD ($28,200).

By law, public schools provide Islamic religious instruction as part of the basic national curriculum, although non-Muslim students are allowed to opt out. Private schools may offer alternative religious instruction. The constitution provides “congregations” (a term not defined in the constitution, but legally including religious groups recognized as denominations and associations) with the right to establish their own schools provided “they comply with the general provisions of the law and are subject to the control of government in matters relating to their curricula and orientation.” In order to operate a school, religious institutions must receive permission from the Ministry of Education, which ensures the curriculum meets national standards. The Ministry of Education does not oversee religious courses if religious groups offer them at their places of worship. In several cities, recognized Christian groups – including Baptists, Orthodox, Anglicans, and Roman Catholics – operate private schools and are able to conduct classes on Christianity. The schools are open to adherents of all religions.

Knowledge of the Quran is required by law for Muslim students in both public and private schools, but it is optional for non-Muslims. Every student, however, must pass an exam in his or her final year of high school that includes mastery of some verses of the Quran in relation to the Arabic language. Islamic religion is an optional subject for university entrance exams for non-Muslim students following the standard curriculum or for Muslim students following international curricula.

The constitution specifies the judiciary shall be divided into civil courts, religious courts, and special courts, with religious courts divided into sharia courts and tribunals of other religious communities. According to the constitution, matters concerning personal status, which include religious affiliation, marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance, are under the jurisdiction of religious courts. Matters of personal status in which the parties are Muslim fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the sharia courts. A personal or family status case in which one party is Muslim and the other is non-Muslim is heard by a civil court unless both parties agree to use a sharia court. Per the constitution, matters of personal status of non-Muslims whose religion the government officially recognizes are under the jurisdiction of denomination-specific courts of religious communities. Such courts exist for the Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Melkite Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Coptic, Syrian Orthodox, and Anglican communities. According to the law, members of recognized denominations lacking their own courts must take their cases to civil courts, which, in principle, follow the rules and beliefs of the litigants’ denomination in deciding cases, unless both parties to a case agree to use a specific religious court. There are no tribunals for atheists or adherents of nonrecognized religious groups. Such individuals must request a civil court to hear their case.

The Office of the Supreme (Sharia) Justice appoints sharia judges, while each recognized non-Muslim religious community selects the structure and members of its own tribunal. The law stipulates the cabinet must ratify the procedures of each Christian ecclesiastical court. All judicial nominations must be approved by a royal decree.

According to the constitution, sharia courts also exercise jurisdiction with respect to cases concerning “blood money” (Diya) in which the two parties are Muslims or one of the parties is not a Muslim and the two parties consent to the jurisdiction of the sharia courts. Sharia courts also exercise jurisdiction with regard to matters pertaining to Islamic awqaf, or endowments. Muslims are also subject to the jurisdiction of sharia courts on civil matters not addressed by civil status legislation.

Sharia courts do not recognize converts from Islam as falling under the jurisdiction of their new religious community’s laws in matters of personal status. Sharia court judges may annul the marriages of converts, transfer child custody to a nonparent Muslim family member or declare the children “wards of the state,” and convey an individual’s property rights to Muslim family members.

According to sharia, marriages between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man are not permitted; the man must convert to Islam for the marriage to be considered legal. If a Christian woman converts to Islam while married to a Christian man, her husband must also convert for their marriage to remain legal. There is no legal provision for civil marriage or divorce for members of nonrecognized religious groups. Members of nonregistered Christian groups, as well as members of groups registered as associations, may obtain marriage certificates from the Anglican Church (or from another Christian church), which they then may take to the Civil Status Bureau to receive their government marriage certificates.

Sharia governs all matters relating to family law involving Muslims or the children of a Muslim father. If a Muslim husband and non-Muslim wife are divorced, the wife loses custody of the children when they reach seven years of age. Minor children of male citizens who convert to Islam are considered Muslims and are not legally allowed to reconvert to their father’s prior religion or convert to any other religion. In accordance with sharia, adult children of a man who has converted to Islam become ineligible to inherit from their father if they do not also convert to Islam, unless the father’s will states otherwise. All citizens, including non-Muslims, are subject to Islamic legal provisions regarding inheritance if no equivalent inheritance guidelines are codified in their religion or if the state does not recognize their religion.

National identification cards issued since May 2016 do not list religion, but religious affiliation is contained in records embedded in the card’s electronic chip and remains on file in other government records. Passports are no longer issued listing religion. Atheists and agnostics must list the religious affiliation of their families as their own. Per the ban on conversion from Islam under sharia, converts from Islam to Christianity are not allowed to change their religion on the electronic records. Converts from Christianity to Islam may change their religion on their civil documents such as family book, and on electronic records.

According to the electoral law, Christians are allotted nine of the 130 seats in parliament (6.9 percent). Christians may not run for the remaining 121 seats. No seats are reserved for adherents of other minority religious groups. The government classification of Druze as Muslims permits them to hold office.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Converts to Christianity from Islam continued to report security officials interrogated them about their religious beliefs and practices as part of the government’s effort to place obstacles to conversion from Islam. Some converts to Christianity from Islam reported they continued to worship in secret to avoid scrutiny by security officials. Multiple converts from Islam to Christianity reported government officials generally refused to change religion on official documents from Islam to any other religion. Accordingly, the converts’ religious practice did not match their official religion, opening them up to claims of apostasy and personal status issues, including marriage, divorce, and inheritance.

Members of religious groups who were unable to obtain religious divorces continued to convert to another Christian denomination or to Islam to divorce legally, according to reports from religious leaders and the Ministry of Justice. The chief of the Office of the Supreme (Sharia) Justice reportedly continued to try to ensure that Christians wanting to convert to Islam did not have a pending divorce case at the Christian tribunal courts to prevent them from converting for the sole purpose of obtaining a legal divorce. The department reportedly imposed an interview requirement for converts to Islam to determine whether their conversion reflected a genuine religious belief.

The government continued to monitor sermons at mosques and to require preachers to refrain from political commentary, which the government deemed could instigate social or political unrest, and to counter radicalization. During the year, the authorities began disseminating themes and recommended texts for sermons for all imams. Imams who violated these rules continued to risk fines and a ban from preaching. There continued to be unofficial mosques operating outside Ministry of Awqaf control in many cities, as well as imams outside of government employment who preached without Ministry of Awqaf supervision.

During the year, the Office of the Supreme (Sharia) Justice recorded one apostasy complaint, which was filed in a sharia court but immediately dismissed when the court found the allegations were based on a family dispute without evidence of apostasy.

The government policy of not recognizing the Bahai Faith continued, but the government continued to allow Bahais to practice their religion and included them in interfaith events. Sharia courts and the courts of other recognized religions continued not to issue to Bahais the marriage certificates required to transfer citizenship to a foreign spouse or to register for government health insurance and social security. The Department of Civil Status and Passports also continued not to recognize marriages conducted by Bahai assemblies, but it issued family books (a national registration record issued to every head of family) to Bahais, allowing them to register their children, except in cases of marriages between a Bahai man and a Bahai woman erroneously registered as Muslim. In those cases, the children were considered illegitimate and were not issued birth certificates or included in the family and subsequently were unable to obtain citizenship or register for school.

In October the Governor of Amman cancelled a Bahai-hosted event because of stated concerns the event might incite terrorist attacks against the Bahai community. According to Bahai statements, the event was part of a worldwide bicentennial event and honoring “Harmony Among Religions,” scheduled on private property, and the guest list included senior government officials.

Other nonrecognized religious groups reported they continued to operate schools and hospitals, and hold meetings if they were low profile.

According to observers, religious groups with the rights and privileges associated with membership in the CCL guarded this status, and fostered a degree of competition among other religious groups hoping to attain membership. Despite efforts to alter their status, some evangelical Christian groups remained unrecognized either as denominations or as associations. Leaders from some CCL-affiliated churches expressed concerns over “recruitment efforts” against their members by evangelical churches.

Security forces confirmed they devoted extra resources to protect Christian neighborhoods and churches for holidays and special events. Christian leaders said they regarded this presence part of the government effort to provide additional security at public gathering places, including security for religious worshippers. The church leaders stated they especially appreciated the extra protection during religious holidays and large events.

Some Christian leaders continued to express concern the CCL did not meet regularly and lacked the capacity to manage the affairs of both recognized and nonrecognized Christian groups effectively and fairly, especially in relation to their daily lives. Most CCL leaders remained based in Jerusalem.

Druze continued to worship at mosques and at social halls belonging to the Druze community. Druze continued to report discrimination in reaching high positions in government and official departments. A Druze community representative did not consider the January appointment of a Druze foreign minister in the current government as adequate inclusion of Druze in the government. No Druze person reached a military rank higher than brigadier.

Members of non-Muslim religious groups continued to report occasional threats by the government to arrest them for violating the public order if they proselytized Muslims. Security officials refused to renew residency permits for some foreign religious leaders living in the country after raising concerns their activities could incite extremist attacks.

The government continued to permit non-Muslim members of the armed forces to practice their religion.

There continued to be two recognized Bahai cemeteries registered in the name of the Bahai Faith through a special arrangement previously agreed between the group and the government. Bahai leaders reported they continued to be unable to register other properties under the name of the Bahai Faith but remained able to register property under the names of individual Bahais. In doing so, the Bahai leaders said, they continued to have to pay new registration fees whenever they transferred property from one person to another at the death of the registered owner, a process constituting a large financial burden.

The Ministry of Education rolled back revisions to the school curriculum after widespread complaints from teachers unions, parents groups, and Muslim organizations. In 2016 the Ministry of Education announced revisions to the school curriculum at the beginning of the academic year, which included pictures of women without head coverings and mention of the coexistence of Islam with other religions in textbooks. The media reported the changes were part of a government strategy to combat radical Islam, but parents’ and teachers’ groups stated the changes were distancing students from Islamic values and asserted it “promoted normalization of relations with Israel.” Education reform advocates said the revisions did not go far enough towards promoting tolerance and inclusion. The new curriculum continued the past practice of not including mention of the Holocaust.

The government continued to record Druze as Muslims on civil documents identifying the bearer’s religious community, without public objection from the Druze.

Four Christians served as ministers in the 29-member cabinet. A few Christians also achieved the rank of general in the military, but Muslims continued to hold most senior security positions.

Interfaith religious leaders reported an increase in online hate speech directed towards religious minorities and those who advocated religious moderation, frequently through social media. Authorities detained two individuals for allegedly posting threats on social media against liberal columnists who were receiving continuous threats after the killing of writer Nahed Hattar in 2016. The cases remained pending at the end of the year. The harshest criticism targeted converts from Islam to other religions. Religious minorities expressed concerns some Muslim leaders preached intolerance. Christians reported they self-segregated into Christian enclaves to escape social pressure and threats. A Christian leader from Karak said many Christians were choosing to move to Amman.

Converts from Islam to Christianity reported continued social ostracism, threats, and physical and verbal abuse, including beatings, insults, and intimidation, along with government surveillance. Some converts from Islam to Christianity reported they continued to worship in secret because of the social stigma they faced as converts. Some converts from Islam reported persistent and credible threats from family members concerned with protecting traditional honor.

Church leaders continued to report incidents of violence and discrimination against religious converts and individuals in interfaith romantic relationships. A convert from Islam to Christianity fled the country after she received credible threats from family members. Individuals in interfaith romantic relationships continued to report ostracism and, in some cases, feuds among family members and violence toward the individuals involved.

Following a terrorist attack in January at a nightclub in Istanbul in which Jordanians were killed, social media commentators stated the victims should not be honored as martyrs because they visited an establishment some considered immoral. In contrast to some political and societal leaders, the country’s religious leaders largely did not condemn the attack. Authorities arrested online commentators who criticized the victims, and media outlets underscored the risk of prosecution under provisions of the cybercrimes law and terrorism law for condemning the victims.

Riyad Ismail Abdullah was convicted of murder in December 2016 for the September 2016 killing of writer Nahed Hattar and executed in March. Abdullah shot Hattar when he appeared at an Amman courthouse to face charges of inciting sectarian strife and insulting religion. Hattar had shared a Facebook post (which he had not authored) with a cartoon personifying God. A public memorial service was held for Hattar in September on the one-year anniversary of his killing. Following Hattar’s killing, the press reported there was a spike in sectarian rhetoric in online postings by the public. Some of the postings referred to Hattar’s Christian heritage and were directed against the Christian community. Media reports stated the Public Security Directorate referred dozens of cases of spreading hate speech related to the cartoon and Hattar’s killing to the judiciary for prosecution under the cybercrimes law and the terrorism law. The media reported police arrested at least 16 individuals, two of whom were individuals who allegedly posted threats on social media against liberal columnists who were receiving continuous threats after Hattar’s death. These cases were pending at year’s end.

Editorial cartoons, articles, and postings on social media continued to present negative images of Jews and to conflate anti-Israel sentiment with anti-Semitic sentiment. The government continued not to take action with regard to anti-Semitic material appearing in the media, despite laws that prohibit such material.

The Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies (RIIFS), Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre, Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute, Interfaith Coexistence Research Center, Community Ecumenical Center, and Catholic Center for Media Studies continued to sponsor initiatives promoting collaboration between religious groups. In September RIIFS hosted a week-long seminar on “Moses in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam,” convening scholars from around the world. Bahais continued to be included by other religious groups in interfaith conferences, religious celebrations, and World Interfaith Harmony Week in February, which included activities across the governorates and the armed forces.

The Ambassador, Charge d’Affaires, and other embassy officers continued to engage with government officials at all levels, including the minister of awqaf, to raise the rights of religious minorities, the protection of cultural resources, and the inclusion of interfaith tolerance in the new educational curriculum. In October the Department of State Special Advisor on Minority Communities in Near East and South and Central Asia met with religious leaders from the Christian, Druze, Bahai, and Muslim communities to discuss their concerns. During meetings with representatives of the National Committee for Human Rights, Prince Hassan bin Talal, and the Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies, he discussed inclusive education reform, ways to address tensions among religious communities, and registration challenges for new Christian churches.

The Ambassador met with Muslim scholars and Christian leaders in January to encourage greater interfaith dialogue, the protection of the rights of religious minorities, and the promotion of interfaith tolerance in the education system. Embassy officers continued to meet frequently with representatives of religious communities, nonrecognized groups, religious converts, and interfaith institutions such as the Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies to discuss their ability to practice their religion freely.

The embassy continued its sponsorship of the participation of religious scholars, teachers, and leaders in exchange programs in the United States designed to promote religious tolerance and a better understanding of the right to practice one’s faith as a fundamental human right and source of stability.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 18.5 million (July 2017 estimate). The national census reports approximately 70 percent of the population is Muslim, most of whom adhere to the Sunni Hanafi school. Other Islamic groups include Shafi’i Sunni, Shia, Sufi, and Ahmadi Muslims.

The CRA estimates 26 percent of the population is Christian, the majority of whom are Russian Orthodox, but which also includes Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Seventh-day Adventists, Methodists, Mennonites, Pentecostals, Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and Christian Scientists.

Other religious groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Jews, Buddhists, members of the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Bahais, members of the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), and Scientologists.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the country as a secular state and provides for freedom of religion and belief, as well as for the freedom to decline religious affiliation. These rights may be limited only by laws and only to the extent necessary for protection of the constitutional system, public order, human rights and freedoms, and the health and morality of the population.

The MRCSA is in charge of religious issues for the government, facilitating government and civil society engagement, as well as overseeing religious issues. It implements its responsibilities for religious issues via the CRA.

According to law, the MRCSA is responsible for the formulation and implementation of state policy on religious freedom. It also considers issues of potential violations of the laws on religious activity and extremism. The MRCSA drafts legislation and regulations, conducts analysis of religious materials, and makes decisions on censorship. All religious groups are required to submit all religious materials for approval before dissemination. The MRCSA cooperates with law enforcement to ban religious groups and sanction individuals who violate the religion law, coordinates actions of local government to regulate religious issues, and provides the official interpretation of the religion law.

Under the constitution, everyone has the right to follow their religious or other convictions, take part in religious activities, and disseminate their beliefs. These rights, however, are in practice limited to “traditional” or registered religious groups. The counterterrorism law requires religious organizations to secure their buildings of worship against potential terrorist attacks; the government may take action against religious organizations for failure to do so. The law states the government shall not interfere with the choice of religious beliefs or affiliation of citizens or residents, unless those beliefs are directed against the country’s constitutional framework, sovereignty, or territorial integrity.

The law prohibits coercion to force a person’s conversion to any religion or to force a person’s participation in a religious group’s activities or in religious rites.

The criminal and administrative codes include additional penalties for unauthorized religious activity, which includes the arrangement of and participation in activities of unregistered religious groups, participation in religious activities outside permitted areas, unlicensed distribution of religious materials or training of clergy, sale of religious literature without government approval or in places not approved by the government, and discussion of religion for the purpose of proselytization without the required missionary registration.

The criminal code prohibits the “incitement of interreligious discord,” which includes “propaganda of exclusivity, superiority, or inferiority of citizens according to their relation to religion [and other] origin.” It also criminalizes the creation and leadership of social institutions that proclaim religious intolerance or exclusivity, which is punishable with imprisonment from three to seven years.

The extremism law, which applies to religious groups and other organizations, gives the government discretion to identify and designate a group as an “extremist organization,” ban a designated group’s activities, and criminalize membership in a banned organization. The law defines “extremism” as the organization and/or commission of acts in pursuit of violent change of the constitutional system; violation of the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the country; undermining national security; violent seizure or retention of power; armed rebellion; incitement of ethnic, religious, or other forms of social discord that are accompanied by calls to violence; or the use of any religious practice that causes a security or health risk. An extremist organization is a “legal entity, association of individuals and (or) legal entities engaged in extremism, and recognized by the court as extremist.” The law provides streamlined court procedures for identifying a group as “terrorist or extremist,” reducing the time necessary for a court to render and act on a decision to 72 hours. After a legal finding of a violation, the law authorizes officials to revoke immediately the organization’s registration, thus ending its legal existence, and to seize its property. Prosecutors have the right to inspect annually all groups registered with state bodies.

The administrative code prohibits “spreading the creed of religious groups unregistered” in the country, an offense punishable by a fine of 226,900 tenge ($680). A foreigner or stateless person found guilty may also be deported.

A religious organization may be designated “national,” “regional,” or “local.” In order to register at the local level, religious groups must submit an application to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), listing the names and addresses of at least 50 founding members. Communities may only be active within the geographic limits of the locality in which they register, unless they have sufficient numbers to register at the regional or national level. Regional registration requires at least two local organizations, each located within a different oblast (province), and each local group must have at least 250 members. National registration requires at least 5,000 total members and at least 300 members in each of the country’s 14 oblasts and the cities of Astana and Almaty. Only groups registered at the national or regional level have the right to open educational institutions for training clergy.

The law allows the government to deny registration to religious groups based on an insufficient number of adherents or inconsistencies between the religious group’s charter and any national law, as determined by an analysis conducted by the CRA. According to the administrative code, individuals participating in, leading, or financing an unregistered, suspended, or banned religious group may be fined between 113,450 tenge ($340) and 453,800 tenge ($1,400).

The administrative code mandates a 453,800 tenge ($1,400) fine and a three-month suspension from conducting any religious activities for registered groups holding religious gatherings in buildings that are not approved for that purpose; importing, producing, or disseminating religious materials not approved by the CRA; systemically pursuing activities that contradict the charter and bylaws of the group as registered; constructing religious facilities without a permit; holding gatherings or conducting charity events in violation of the law; or otherwise defying the constitution or laws. Private persons engaged in these activities are subject to a fine of 113,450 tenge ($340). Police may impose these fines without first going to court. The fines may be appealed to a court.

If an organization, its leaders, or its members engage in activities not specified in its charter, it is subject to a warning and/or a fine of 226,900 tenge ($680). Under the administrative code, if the same violation is repeated within a year, the legal entity is subject to a fine of 340,350 tenge ($1,000) and a three- to six-month suspension of activities.

According to the administrative code, if a religious group engages in a prohibited activity or fails to rectify violations resulting in a suspension, an official or the organization’s leader is subject to a fine of 453,800 tenge ($1,400), the entity is subject to a fine of 1,134,500 tenge ($3,400), and its activities are banned.

The law prohibits coercive religious activities that harm the health or morality of citizens, residents, force them to end marriages, or family relations, violate human rights and freedoms, or force citizens to evade performance of duties specified in the constitution and legislation. The law prohibits methods of proselytizing that take advantage of a potential convert’s dependence on charity. The law also prohibits blackmail, violence or the threat of violence, or the use of material threats to coerce participation in religious activities.

The law states in cases when a prisoner seeks the help of an imam, pastor, or other clergy to perform a religious rite, he or she may invite a clergy member of a formally registered religious group to a detention facility, as long as this access complies with the internal regulations of the prison. The law bans construction of places of worship within prison territory. Pursuant to the law, religious organizations may participate in monitoring prisons, including creating and implementing programs to improve the correctional system and developing and publicly discussing draft laws and regulations as they relate to the prison system. Religious groups may identify, provide, distribute, and monitor the use of humanitarian, social, legal, and charitable assistance to prisoners. They may provide other forms of assistance to penitentiary system bodies, as long as they do not contradict the law. According to the law, prisoners may possess religious literature, but only if approved after a religious expert analysis conducted by the CRA.

The law defines “religious tourism” as a “type of tourism where people travel for performance of religious rites in a country (place) of temporary residence” and requires the MRCSA to regulate it and oversee the process by which individuals participate in the Hajj.

The law prohibits religious ceremonies in government buildings, including those belonging to the military or law enforcement.

The law states production, publication, and dissemination of religious literature and information materials of religious content is allowed only after receiving a positive expert opinion from the CRA. The law limits to one copy per publication an exemption from expert review for importing religious materials for personal use.

The law states the government shall not interfere with the rights of parents to raise their children consistent with their religious convictions, unless such an upbringing harms the child’s health or infringes upon the child’s rights.

The law requires organizations to “take steps to prevent involvement or participation of anyone under the age of 18 in the activities of a religious association,” if one of the parents or other legal guardians have objections. The law bans religious activities, including proselytizing, in children’s holiday, sport, creative or other leisure organizations, camps, or sanatoria. The extent to which organizations must prevent underage persons’ involvement in religious activity is not specifically outlined and has not been further defined by authorities.

The law prohibits religious instruction in public schools, colleges, or universities. Homeschooling for religious reasons is also prohibited. The law allows for after-school and other supplemental religious instruction as long as it is provided by a registered religious group. A decree mandates that schoolchildren wear school uniforms that comply with the secular nature of education and prohibits inclusion of any elements that could indicate religious affiliation, such as head coverings.

The election law prohibits political parties based on religious affiliation.

The criminal code prohibits creating, leading, or actively participating in a religious or public association whose activities involve committing acts of “violence against citizens or the causing of other harm to their health or the incitement of citizens to refuse to carry out their civil obligations, as well as the creation or leadership of parties on a religious basis.” The code punishes such acts with a fine of up to 12.7 million tenge ($38,300) or up to six years’ imprisonment.

In order to perform missionary or other religious activity in the country, a foreigner must obtain a missionary or religious visa. These visas allow a person to stay for a maximum of six months with the possibility to apply to extend the stay for another six months. To obtain missionary visas, applicants must be invited by a religious group formally registered in the country. The letter of invitation must be approved by the CRA. Applicants must obtain consent from the CRA each time they apply. The CRA may reject missionary visa applications based on a negative assessment from CRA religious experts, or if it deems the missionaries represent a danger to the country’s constitutional framework, citizens’ rights and freedoms, or any person’s health or morals. The constitution requires foreign religious groups to conduct their activities, including appointing the heads of local congregations, “in coordination with appropriate state institutions,” notably the CRA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Foreigners may not register religious groups.

Local and foreign missionaries are required to register annually with the local executive body of an oblast or the cities of Astana and Almaty and provide information on their religious affiliation, intended territory of missionary work, and time period for conducting that work. Missionaries must submit all literature and other materials intended to support their missionary work together with their registration application. Use of materials not vetted during the registration process is illegal. A missionary must produce registration documents and a power of attorney from the sponsoring religious organization in order to work on its behalf. The local executive body of an oblast or the cities of Astana and Almaty may refuse registration to missionaries whose work “constitutes a threat to the constitutional order, social order, the rights, and freedoms of individuals, or the health and morals of the population.”

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary Paragraph: The government continued punitive actions against members of “nontraditional” faiths, including Muslims who practiced a version of Islam different from the officially recognized Hanafi school of Sunni Islam, and Protestant groups. Authorities continued to arrest, detain, and imprison members of religious groups, criminalize speech “inciting religious discord,” raid believers’ private homes to stop unregistered religious activities, question congregation members about their choice of faith, punish individuals for “illegal missionary activity,” and label “nontraditional” religious groups as “destructive sects” in the media. In June the president signed a strategy document outlining government religion policy for the 2017-20 period, affirming the country’s secular orientation, and stating the government would focus on the prevention of “destructive” religious teachings and tighten control over religious activity.

According to Forum 18, authorities brought administrative charges against 279 individuals, religious communities, charities, and companies during the year for attending worship meetings, offering or importing religious literature and pictures, sharing or teaching faith, posting religious material online, praying in mosques, bringing a child to a religious meeting, maintaining inadequate security measures at places of worship or failing to pay earlier fines. Of these, authorities sanctioned 259 individuals with punishments including fines, jail terms, bans on religious activity, deportations, and religious literature seizures. During the year, authorities convicted 23 individuals for practicing their religion: 20 Sunni Muslims, two Jehovah’s Witnesses, and one Baptist. Of these, courts sentenced 20 to prison terms and three to house arrest.

On January 18, authorities arrested two members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, Teymur Akhmedov and Asaf Guliyev, in Astana and charged them with incitement of religious discord. The men met with a group of young men who presented themselves as university students and participated in discussions about their faith. The conversations were recorded and later used as evidence against the defendants. Guliyev reached a plea bargain, admitted his involvement, and testified against Akhmedov. On February 24, the court sentenced Guliyev to five years’ probation for his cooperation in the case. The 60-year-old Akhmedov, however, refused to admit to wrongdoing. On May 2, a court found him guilty of “incitement of religious discord and propaganda of one faith’s superiority over the others” and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. The court also banned him from any form of religious preaching. On June 20, the Astana city court rejected his appeal.

According to local and international observers such as the NGO Association for Religious Organizations of Kazakhstan (AROK) and Forum 18, the authorities intensified punitive actions against any Muslims who professed forms of Islam different from the officially recognized Hanafi school of Sunni Islam. Forum 18 reported that courts convicted 20 Sunni Muslims of such offenses during the first nine months of the year and sentenced 19 to prison terms and one to probation.

Authorities of the Kyrgyz Republic detained Nariman Seitzhanov, a graduate of the Medina Islamic University in Saudi Arabia in December 2016 and deported him to Kazakhstan, where police opened a criminal investigation on charges of incitement of religious discord. According to investigators, Seitzhanov accompanied Kazakh pilgrims to Mecca in October 2016. His preaching and discussions about Islam were recorded and posted on social media, and authorities used the recordings as evidence against him. On June 9, a court in Kokshetau sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment.

According to the Karaganda Region Department of Internal Affairs, on October 30, authorities detained six members of the banned Tablighi Jamaat missionary movement in Karaganda for alleged recruitment of members. Authorities directed three of them to sign a written pledge agreeing to halt recruitment activities and instructed them not to leave the area. Authorities placed the remaining three in a pretrial detention facility.

On May 11, an Almaty district court found Muslim preacher Denis Korzhavin guilty of incitement of religious discord. Korzhavin, an ethnic Russian who converted to Islam, studied in Saudi Arabia. Upon his return to the country in 2011, authorities alleged he engaged in the active dissemination of Salafism. Despite a court ban in 2014 of certain religious books, he posted a Russian translation of the banned “The Three Fundamentals” on social media. Korzhavin reached a plea bargain and the court sentenced him to five years’ probation.

In April police arrested Shukhrat Kibirov in Almaty and charged him with incitement of religious discord. According to his attorney, several social media posts with Arabic language religious songs allegedly posted from Kibirov’s phone served as grounds for the criminal case. Government religious experts who analyzed the songs said they contained elements of incitement of religious discord. A number of media sources, including Radio Azattyk, Vlast, and Today.kz reported on Kibirov’s case. On November 27, a court in Almaty sentenced him to six years and eight months in prison for incitement of religious discord and terrorist propaganda.

On June 28, the president signed a strategy document outlining government religion policy for the 2017-20 period. The document affirmed the country’s secular orientation, and stated the government would focus on the prevention of “destructive” religious teachings and tighten government control over religious activity. At an August 28 press briefing, Minister of Religious Affairs and Civil Society Nurlan Yermekbayev stated that the new strategy would strengthen control over “religious propaganda” and expand government oversight of the activities of religious organizations. Government representatives stated the new strategy was driven by security concerns over “religious extremism.” The government stated implementation of the new strategy would involve amendments to existing legislation on religion. The proposed amendments would establish new controls on religious teaching, religious literature, religious speech, and worship. Civil society representatives and religious experts, however, stated they feared the government’s efforts to more closely police religious activity would further infringe on religious freedom, including through prohibition of religious symbols and attire and a further crackdown on religious literature.

The Council of Baptist Churches stated it continued to refuse on principle to register under the law. Baptists reported several police raids on adherents’ residences and churches during the year. Community representatives reported 55 police incidents involving Baptists during the year, most of which resulted in administrative fines. In January police raided an Almaty pastor’s house and allegedly made threats to hold him criminally liable for holding religious services without proper documentation, since his religious community is not registered.

On January 23, police raided a local Baptist community leader’s house in Urdzha in the eastern part of the country, videotaped all participants who attended the service, detained several individuals (mainly elderly women), and took them to the police station with the alleged intent to intimidate them. Community members reported police subsequently fined and released the women.

Police charged two members of the Council of Churches of Evangelical Christians – Baptists Mikhail Milkin and Alexander Ventsel – with illegal dissemination of religious literature in a shopping center in the town of Stepnyak in the Akmola Region. On June 27, the court convicted them of illegal dissemination of religious literature outside of specifically designated places of worship and imposed administrative fines of 108,000 tenge ($330) on each of them.

In March a court in Uralsk imposed an administrative fine of 108,000 tenge ($330) on Serkali Kumargaliev of the unregistered Council of Baptist Churches for illegally distributing religious booklets in front of West Kazakhstan State University. The booklets also contained the address where followers of the religious group gathered for prayer services. Some of the students to whom Kumargaliev distributed the booklets allegedly reported him to authorities, who then took action.

In January authorities searched the office of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Astana and confiscated approximately 15 books. On October 3, the specialized interdistrict administrative court of Astana initiated a case against Dmitry Bukin, leader of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Astana, for possessing nonapproved literature. Following “expert analysis” by CRA officials of the seized literature, authorities also charged him with incitement of religious discord and superiority of one faith over another. On October 17, the judge dismissed the case.

On April 25, authorities in Yesil detained several members of the Evangelical Baptist Christian Church for singing songs and illegally distributing religious literature at the local cemetery. Police warned the individuals they were violating the law and allegedly made two of them – Victor Leven and Andrei Block – write statements explaining their actions. Authorities also seized copies of the religious books for “expert analysis.” On July 25, a court in Yesil imposed an administrative fine of 108,000 tenge ($330) on Block for the illegal distribution of religious literature.

On March 4, authorities fined four Muslims in Zhanaozen in the western part of the country for breaking the rules regarding religious services in mosques issued by the SAMK, considered mandatory for all worshipers. Galym Nurpeisov, the attorney for the four men, said that they were punished for saying the word “Amen” aloud, which is banned under the SAMK rules. The court convicted the four men of disrupting religious services and imposed administrative fines of 108,000 tenge ($330) on each.

Courts continued to fine individuals convicted of illegal missionary activity. According to AROK, local law enforcement continued to interpret and label any religious discussions that took place outside of a registered religious building as “illegal missionary activity,” including invitations to religious services and discussions, especially by “nontraditional” groups such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and evangelical Christians. During the year, there were 608 missionaries officially registered in the country – 290 Catholic, 105 Russian Orthodox, 42 Mormon, 40 Muslim, 35 New Apostolic Church, 34 Pentecostal Church, 25 Presbyterian Church, 14 Baptist, 7 Seventh Day Adventist, 5 Jehovah’s Witness, 4 Society of Krishna Consciousness, 3 Jewish, 2 Buddhist, and 2 Lutheran – including 491 foreigners and 117 citizens.

In February police detained two Jehovah’s Witnesses, Karlygash Zholomanova and Fariza Iskakova, in Satpayev for talking about their faith to another woman. The women were charged and subsequently found guilty of conducting religious activity without registration as missionaries. On February 27 and March 9, in two separate hearings, the local court imposed fines of 226,900 tenge ($680) on each.

A court fined a Jehovah’s Witness approximately 198,000 tenge ($600) for illegal missionary activity in the Mangistau Region. The woman was not officially registered as a missionary and was walking through the neighborhood, proselytizing door-to-door.

In June a court in Shakhtinsk fined the leader of the local Jehovah’s Witnesses community for failure to prevent the involvement of children in religious services without parental permission. The court imposed an administrative fine of approximately 108,000 tenge ($330).

Jehovah’s Witnesses held a large convention in Almaty June 23-25, which drew nearly 4,500 participants from a number of countries. Although the convention was able to proceed, there were some reports of police delaying some attendees en route to the convention on the first two days.

On October 3, the Astana specialized interdistrict administrative court began a hearing on Oleg Bondarenko, a Seventh-day Adventist pastor charged with failure to prevent the involvement of a minor in the group’s religious activities over a parent’s objection. According to Radio Azattyk, Aizhan Abzhanova submitted a complaint to the local authorities that her husband took their son Medet to the Seventh-day Adventist church without her permission – she said the father tried to convert the child to Christianity. The husband stated that he attended the church only twice and did so out of curiosity. Bondarenko explained to the court that he did not know the Abzhanovs and thus could not take any actions with regard to their family or child. He further stated that the church services were open to anyone, including those who attended simply out of curiosity once or twice. On October 18, the administrative court in Astana dismissed the case against Bondarenko.

The government launched at least 22 administrative cases against Muslims for praying in mosques in a manner not in accordance with the state-backed Muslim Board’s rules. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community remained unregistered, after authorities denied the group reregistration in 2016, when CRA experts concluded the community’s teaching was not Islamic and needed to remove the word “Muslim” from its registration materials. Community members reported that, due to lack of registration, they had to cease all official religious activity but pledged to continue efforts to obtain reregistration.

The Church of Scientology continued to function as a registered public association rather than as a religious organization. The government allowed the church, as a public association, to maintain resource centers/libraries where members may read or borrow books and host discussions or meetings, but did not allow the church to engage in religious activity.

Government-controlled media continued to depict “nontraditional” religions as disruptive to society. In April and May, several national TV broadcasts ran thematic programs on “destructive sects,” among them Jehovah’s Witnesses and Scientologists. In an April 30 “Portrait of the Week” program hosted by Artur Platonov on private broadcaster KTK, a segment from then-acting CRA chairman Bakhytzhan Kulekeyev discussed an alleged “26 complaints against Jehovah’s Witnesses” received by the CRA from ordinary concerned citizens. In an April 30 “Analytics” news show on 1st Channel “Eurasia,” the program addressed multiple complaints the CRA allegedly received from citizens about Jehovah’s Witnesses. A May 12 talk show on “Eurasia” devoted 40 minutes to “destructive sects,” concentrating mainly on “destructive Islamic movements” and Scientology. Another May 12 talk show on “Khabar” included a similar 40-minute program concentrating on Jehovah’s Witnesses, in which Yulia Denisenko, the head of the government-affiliated Association of Centers for Religious Studies, made a number of accusations against Jehovah’s Witnesses.

According to reports, the government continued to recognize as legitimate and legal only those mosques registered with the SAMK. The MRCSA and the SAMK maintained an official agreement on cooperation, and NGOs noted this led to the government effectively exercising control over the nominally independent SAMK. By joining the SAMK, Muslim communities relinquished the right to appoint their own imams, subjected themselves to SAMK approval over any property actions (such as sales, transfers, or improvements), and were required to pay 30 percent of the mosque’s income to the SAMK.

According to the CRA, there were 3,692 registered religious associations or branches thereof in the country during the year, compared to 3,636 in 2016. The SAMK continued to control the activities of all 2,591formally registered Muslim groups affiliated with the Sunni Hanafi school and had authority over construction of new mosques, appointment of imams, and administration of examinations and background checks for aspiring imams. The SAMK was responsible for authorizing travel agencies to provide Hajj travel services to citizens. According to the SAMK, Saudi Arabian authorities allocated a quota of 2,500 spots for the Hajj, and 2,450 pilgrims made the Hajj. The MRCSA worked closely with the SAMK on the training of imams, upgrading madrasahs to the status of degree-granting colleges, and controlling Hajj pilgrimages. The SAMK permitted imams to enroll in baccalaureate, Masters, or PhD programs offered at Nur Mubarak University’s Islamic Studies and Religious Studies departments based on their prior education levels. Overall, sources reported that the MRCSA supported 11 schools for Sunni Hanafi imams, one school for Roman Catholic clergy, and one school for Russian Orthodox clergy.

The Ministry of Education continued enforcement of its ban on headscarves in schools. On September 9, the Atyrau regional department of education reported a significant increase in the number of schoolgirls wearing hijabs to school compared to the previous year. Media also reported a number of incidents in other regions and school districts in which school administrators and local authorities sent girls home because they refused to take off their headscarves. Several parents who supported their daughters wearing headscarves stated local authorities pressured them to remove the headscarves or risk large fines and possible termination of parental rights.

MRCSA Minister Yermekbayev stated the ministry trained and guided teams of religious experts and clergymen to work with individuals they said were vulnerable to radical religious teachings. According to Yermekbayev, the government facilitated the “conversion” of approximately 300 individuals back to more “traditional” forms of faith.

MRCSA officials continued to monitor the internet, collecting information on internet sites with “destructive” content, applying expedited procedures for the evaluation of such materials by religious experts, and obtaining court authorizations for immediate closures of internet sites it deemed unacceptable. During the first seven months of the year, the MRCSA examined 3,000 websites and blocked 1,500 for containing what it concluded was illegal and harmful information. The MRCSA also worked with the Ministry of Information and Communication to identify which individuals posted the content in question.

The MRCSA and other authorities regularly inspected religious facilities to review compliance with security requirements as mandated by the counterterrorism law. Several religious groups said they considered this harassment. On January 24, the Almaty interdistrict specialized court ruled the Christian Center of Jehovah’s Witnesses violated the requirements of the counterterrorism law on securing its premises and imposed an administrative fine of 453,800 tenge ($1,400). On June 5, local authorities executed a follow-up inspection and found the center still failed to comply with security requirements. On June 29, the court issued more severe penalties, imposing an administrative fine of 680,700 tenge ($2,100) and a three-month suspension of the center’s activities.

In September local authorities in Astana conducted a surprise inspection of the grounds of Grace Presbyterian Church, and found violations related to the antiterrorism law. On October 18, an Astana court imposed an administrative fine of 429,000 tenge ($1,300) on the church for failure to abide by the technical requirements of the antiterrorism law: lack of approval for its antiterrorist plan; lack of training for staff; and failure to maintain surveillance camera records as required by the law.

An AROK representative said the government continued to seek to control religious expression and proselytizing in what the organization said were efforts to counter Islamic radicalism.

In June the minister of internal affairs issued an order adding a position of “religious specialist” to prison staff as part of the State Program for Counteraction against Terrorism and Religious Extremism. According to the Penitentiary Committee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the new staff would work with prisoners to prevent their radicalization.

According to the Association of Centers for Religious Studies in Astana, a growing number of individuals made complaints on its hotline against Jehovah’s Witnesses, especially after the Russian government banned the group in the spring. Complainants reportedly requested the country also adopt such a ban.

Several media outlets published articles about a female Jehovah’s Witness who refused a blood transfusion for her four-year-old daughter because of her faith. The girl, who suffered from liver cancer, died on July 16. The articles quoted an official of the National Maternity and Children’s Center who blamed the mother for the girl’s death and accused Jehovah’s Witnesses representatives of pressuring doctors to replace blood transfusions with less effective alternatives.

NGOs continued to report individuals were wary of “nontraditional” religious groups, particularly those that proselytized or whose dress indicated “nontraditional” beliefs.

The U.S. Ambassador, other senior U.S. government officials, and embassy officers met with senior government officials in the MFA, the MRCSA, and the CRA, and advocated the importance of respecting religious freedom, underscoring that bilateral cooperation on economic and security issues was a complement to, not a substitute for, meaningful progress on religious freedom. In a regular and recurring dialogue with the ministry and CRA, U.S. officials raised concerns over the restrictive effects of the government’s implementation of the religion law and criminal and administrative codes on religious freedom. They also raised concerns about the inconsistent application of the religion law and the criminal and administrative codes with regard to “nontraditional” versus “traditional” religious groups.

U.S. officials continued to encourage the government to respect individuals’ rights to peaceful expression of religious belief and practice. They expressed concern about vaguely written laws that were broad in scope and lacked specific definition of legal terms, enabling authorities, particularly at the local level, to apply them in an arbitrary manner. They also stated that any amendments to the law on religions must not constrain the ability of believers to practice their faith. They underscored the importance freedom of religion plays in countering violent extremism and expressed concern about further restrictions on religious freedom. The Ambassador and other U.S. officials met with the MRSCA to reiterate the importance of enabling all citizens to worship freely, regardless of registration status.

U.S. diplomatic officials visited houses of worship in several regions of the country and maintained contact with a wide range of religious communities, their leaders, and religious freedom advocates. In addition, embassy officials participated in roundtable discussions and speaker series dealing with religious freedom. They underscored the importance freedom of religion plays in countering violent extremism, expressed concern about further restrictions on religious freedom, and encouraged reform of relevant laws and guidelines so all citizens could conduct peaceful religious activities freely, whether or not they are part of registered religious groups.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 47.6 million (July 2017 estimate), of which approximately 83 percent is Christian and 11 percent Muslim. Groups constituting less than 2 percent of the population include Hindus, Sikhs, and Bahais. Much of the remaining 4-5 percent of the population adheres to various traditional religious beliefs. Non-evangelical Protestants account for 48 percent of the population, Roman Catholics 23 percent, and other Christian denominations, including evangelical Protestants and Pentecostals, 12 percent. Most of the Muslim population lives in the northeast and coastal regions, where religion and ethnicity (Somali and Mijikenda ethnic groups) are often linked. There are approximately 243,000 refugees and asylum seekers in the Dadaab refugee camps, most of whom are ethnic Somali Muslims. There are approximately 182,000 refugees in the Kakuma refugee camp, including Somalis, South Sudanese, and Ethiopians, who practice a variety of religions.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates there shall be no state religion and prohibits religious discrimination. It provides for freedom of religion and belief individually or in communities, including the freedom to manifest any religion through worship, practice, teaching, or observance. The constitution also states individuals shall not be compelled to act or engage in any act contrary to their belief or religion. These rights shall not be limited except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society.”

The constitution requires parliament to enact legislation recognizing a system of personal and family law adhered to by persons professing a particular religion. It specifically provides for qadi courts to adjudicate certain types of civil cases based on Islamic law, including questions relating to personal status, marriage, divorce, or inheritance in cases in which “all the parties profess the Muslim religion.” The country’s secular High Court has jurisdiction over civil or criminal proceedings, including those in the qadi courts, and accepts appeals of any qadi court decision.

According to the law, new religious groups, institutions or places of worship, and faith-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) must register with the Registrar of Societies, which reports to the Attorney General’s Office. Indigenous and traditional religious groups are not required to register, and many do not. In order to register, applicants must have valid national identification documents and pay a fee. Registered religious institutions and places of worship may apply for tax-exempt status, including exemption from paying duty on imported goods. The law also requires that organizations dedicated to advocacy, public benefit, or the promotion of charity or research register with the NGO Coordination Board.

All public schools have religious education classes taught by government-funded teachers. The national curriculum mandates religious classes, and students may not opt out. Some public schools offer religious education options, usually Christian or Islamic studies, but they are not required to offer both.

A 2014 law creating fees for multiple steps in the marriage process applies to all marriages, religious or secular. For example, all officiants are required to purchase an annual license, and all public marriage venues must be registered.

The Ministry of Information, Communications, and Technology must approve regional radio and television broadcast licenses, including for religious organizations.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: There were reports by human rights groups that government agents, including members of counterterrorism entities, committed extrajudicial killings and disappearances of Muslims. On October 17, authorities in Malindi charged Christian televangelist Paul Makenzi and his wife with radicalizing children. An appeal by the Methodist Church regarding female students wearing hijabs as part of their school uniforms remained pending at year’s end. Muslim groups said the government linked the entire Muslim community with the terrorist group al-Shabaab and discouraged, through intimidation, Muslim community members from reporting police misconduct. Muslim community leaders also stated they faced difficulties obtaining official identification documents, which they needed for voting and access to government and financial services. Since religion and ethnicity are closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

Human rights groups and prominent Muslim leaders stated the government targeted Muslims for extrajudicial killing, torture and forced interrogation, arbitrary arrest, detention without trial, and denial of freedom of assembly and worship. A December 2016 report by the Mombasa-based NGO HAKI Africa entitled What do we tell the families? implicated police and counterterrorism entities in the extrajudicial killings or disappearances of 81 Muslims – primarily youth – in the coastal region over a five-year period in an antiterror campaign. The report detailed 31 extrajudicial killings, 22 deaths resulting from police use of excessive force, four deaths in police custody, and 24 enforced disappearances of individuals last seen in police custody. Imams in mosques or Islamic schools where youth had previously been arrested for alleged links with al-Shabaab reported they and their colleagues were frequently targeted for questioning, arbitrary arrests, and, in some cases, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. In October Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International published a report on rights violations by security forces following the August 8 general election.

According to international reports, on November 2, Islamic preacher Khalid Mohamed Ali was acquitted of four terrorism charges by the Mombasa Principal Magistrate after the prosecution failed to prove its case against him. Authorities charged Ali as a member of al-Shabaab in 2015 after arresting him reportedly in possession of bomb making materials and a military hand grenade.

On October 17, authorities in the coastal city of Malindi in Kilifi County charged Christian televangelist Paul Makenzi and his wife with radicalizing children by teaching them to reject medical care, enticing them to drop out of school, and teaching them formal education is evil. According to multiple press reports, police raided Makenzi’s church and rescued children who had abandoned their homes and schools to follow Makenzi’s ministry. The prosecution was pending at year’s end.

On October 31, a court in Nairobi held the first hearing on the May 2016 suspension by the attorney general of the registration of the Atheists in Kenya Society (AIK). The suspension followed complaints by some religious leaders over AIK’s registration. They argued AIK’s beliefs were not consistent with the constitution, stating the constitution “recognizes Kenya as a country that believes in God.” A court ruling was expected in January 2018.

Muslim leaders engaged in discussions with the National Environment Management Authority about how to balance compliance with noise pollution regulations and the religious requirement for the morning call to prayer.

Religious leaders reported the government sought to circumvent a legal prohibition on taxing religious organizations by applying certain regulations to both religious and secular institutions, such as requiring licensing fees for marriage officiants and venues for large social meetings. Religious leaders stated the fee regulations were unevenly enforced, although not in a discriminatory manner.

An appeal by the Methodist Church was pending at year’s end regarding a September 2016 ruling by the Court of Appeal that Muslim female students be allowed to wear a hijab as part of their school uniforms. The ruling overturned a 2015 High Court verdict that declared hijabs were discriminatory because they created disparity among students. In arguments before the Supreme Court in September, the attorney general supported the right to wear the hijab in schools. Religious leaders reported public schools complied with the Court of Appeals’ ruling, while some private schools – particularly religious ones – continued to insist students remove the hijab. Schools applied the ruling to members of the Akorino religious group, which combines Christian and African styles of worship and requires adherents to cover their heads with turbans for men (referred to as headgear) and veils for women.

Muslim leaders continued to state that police often linked the whole Muslim community to al-Shabaab. The Independent Policing Oversight Authority, a civilian government body that investigates police misconduct, reported it received numerous complaints from predominantly Muslim communities, particularly in the Eastleigh neighborhood of Nairobi, of intimidation, arbitrary arrest, and extortion by police. Some complainants stated police accused them of being members of al-Shabaab.

Muslim leaders reported Muslim citizens continued to face difficulties acquiring national identification from the National Registration Bureau and passports from the Immigration Department. Identification cards are required by law and are a prerequisite for voting and access to certain government and financial services. Failure to register is a crime. Muslim communities – including ethnic Somali communities, coastal Muslim communities, the Nubian community in Nairobi, and the Galjeel community around the Tana River – reported they were often subjected to more requirements than other groups in order to register. These requirements included presentation of birth certificates and citizenship documents of their fathers, grandfathers, and great-grandfathers. They stated they were also required to make special appearances at specified police stations and endure long waiting periods. The government stated the additional scrutiny was necessary to deter illegal immigration and to fight terrorism, and that such scrutiny was not intended to discriminate against certain ethnic or religious groups. In July the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims complained publicly that the extended passport application process for Muslims prevented more than 100 individuals from obtaining travel documents in time to attend the Hajj.

The revised Religious Societies Rules had not been finalized at year’s end. In January 2016 the government withdrew proposed Religious Societies Rules in response to religious leaders’ objections after a meeting between President Uhuru Kenyatta and religious leaders. Religious leaders reported the attorney general proposed the rules to make leaders of religious organizations more accountable for financial dealings and radical or violent teachings. The government agreed religious leaders and the public would be consulted and allowed to provide input on a new draft. In the interim, new religious organizations were not able to register with the Registrar of Societies. According to the Alliance of Registered Churches & Ministries Founders, more than 4,400 religious group applications were pending as of year’s end.

There were multiple reports of terrorist attacks in the northeast by al-Shabaab that targeted non-Muslims. According to media reports and religious advocacy organizations, in Lamu County on July 5 and 8, al-Shabaab terrorists targeted Christians in two separate attacks, killing three police officers and nine civilians, respectively.

According to Morning Star News, on May 31, suspected al-Shabaab terrorists invaded the town of Fafi in Garissa County and killed a Christian schoolteacher while she taught class, and abducted and killed a Christian and a Muslim teacher who tried to defend him.

Christian Solidarity Worldwide reported on July 7, al-Shabaab terrorists beheaded nine men in Jima and Pandanguo villages. Survivors reported non-Muslim men were targeted. Al-Shabaab remained the focus of government antiterror and police efforts throughout the northeast and coastal region

There were continued reports of threats of violence towards individuals based on religious attire and expressions of intolerance towards members of other faiths. Since religion and ethnicity are closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being based exclusively on religious identity.

According to NGO sources, some Muslim community leaders and their families were threatened with violence or death, especially some individuals who had converted from Islam to Christianity, particularly those of Somali ethnic origin.

Interreligious NGOs and political leaders said tensions remained high between Muslim and Christian communities because of terrorist attacks in recent years. Non-Muslims reportedly harassed or treated persons of Somali origin, who were predominantly Muslim, with suspicion. Police officers often did not serve in their home regions, and therefore officers in some Muslim majority areas were largely non-Muslim. Religious leaders suggested, anecdotally, that some Muslim youths responded to reported police abuses by largely non-Muslim police forces by vandalizing properties of local Christians.

Religious leaders representing interfaith groups, including Anglican, Catholic, evangelical Protestant, Muslim, and Hindu communities, engaged with political parties and the IEBC leading up to the August and October presidential elections and in their aftermath. Representatives of a number of religious organizations participated in weekly Dialogue Reference Group meetings to promote community understanding and communication between the two major political parties. The group released press statements before the August 8 election and the October 26 repeat presidential election, calling on police to adhere to the rule of law and identifying specific actions the parties and the IEBC should take to ensure a peaceful and fair process. The polarized election process also revealed interfaith community rifts as divergent views emerged about how best to ensure greater inclusivity in government in order to prevent further crises.

U.S. embassy officials emphasized the importance of respecting religious freedom in meetings with government officials, including senior police officials and local governments in the coastal region, especially emphasizing the role of interfaith dialogue in stemming religious intolerance and countering religiously based violent extremism.

The Ambassador and embassy staff met frequently with religious leaders and groups, including the Inter-Religious Council of Kenya, Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics, Interfaith Council of Kenya, Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya, Hindu Council of Kenya, National Muslim Leaders Forum, Alliance of Registered Churches & Ministries Founders, and National Council of Churches of Kenya. Topics of discussion included the importance of religious groups in countering religiously based extremism, seeking guidance from religious leaders on human rights issues, and working together to resolve the country’s electoral issues.

The Ambassador supported interfaith efforts to defuse political and ethnic tensions, including efforts to resolve disputes related to the preparations, conduct, and outcome of the national elections. Along with the Ambassador and other embassy officials, senior religious figures played a prominent role in efforts to arrange a national political dialogue following the presidential elections.

In August the Ambassador met with coastal interreligious leaders to discuss challenges of religious tolerance and cooperation in the country. He met periodically throughout the year with Muslim leaders in Nairobi. The Ambassador hosted iftars during Ramadan with Muslim, Christian, and Hindu leaders in Nairobi, and a senior embassy official hosted an all-women’s iftar that included representatives of all faiths. The embassy also assisted efforts to promote intra-Muslim dialogue on freedom and tolerance.

Embassy officials met individually with religious and civic leaders to urge them to continue to work across sectarian lines to reaffirm the importance of religious freedom, tolerance, and diversity. During the year’s election cycle, embassy officials regularly held meetings with religious leaders to encourage positive engagement by religious communities in political and reconciliation processes. The embassy encouraged faith communities and other societal figures to see religious diversity as a national strength rather than a source of strife and division.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 108,000 (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2015 census, approximately 57 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 31 percent belongs to the Kiribati Uniting Church (formerly known as the Kiribati Protestant Church), and 5 percent belongs to The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include the Bahai Faith (2 percent), the Seventh-day Adventist Church (2 percent), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Assembly of God, and Muslims. The Mormon Church states its membership exceeds 12 percent of the population. Persons with no religious affiliation account for less than 1 percent of the population. Members of the Catholic Church are concentrated in the northern islands, while Protestants constitute the majority in the southern islands.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of conscience (including religion), expression, assembly, and association. These rights may be limited by law “which is reasonably required” in the interests of public defense, safety, order, morality, or health, or to protect the rights of others.

By law, any religious group with adult members representing no less than 2 percent of the total population (according to the most recent census) must register with the government. The religious organization submits a request to the Ministry of Women, Youth, and Social Affairs, signed by the head of the group and supported by five other members of the organization. Also required in the request is information regarding proof of the number of adherents and the religious denomination and name under which the group wishes to be registered. Although the law requires a religious organization representing 2 percent of the population to register, there are no legal consequences for not registering.

There is no mandated religious education in public schools. Public schools in the country allow a variety of religious groups, including Catholics, Methodists, Seventh-day Adventists, and Mormons, to provide religious education in schools. Students who opt out of religious education must participate in a supervised study period.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Most governmental meetings and events began and ended with an ordained minister or other church official delivering a Christian prayer.

In July the president hosted a national dialogue, including religious organizations in addition to the two largest groups, the Catholic and Kiribati Uniting Churches, to promote cooperation among the different churches and the protection of religious freedom in the country.

The government continued to administer a small grants program for development projects administered by nongovernmental organizations and registered religious organizations.

The population of two islands – Arorae and Tamana – remained largely members of the Protestant Kiribati Uniting Church, at 98 percent and 96 percent respectively, according to the 2015 census, although a small number of Catholic, Seventh-day Adventist, Mormon, and Bahai adherents were also present. The residents of these islands continued their “one-church-only” tradition, which they stated was in deference to Protestant missionaries who came to the islands in the 1800s, according to government reports. On these islands, residents of other religions worshipped in their own homes. Religious groups outside the Kiribati Uniting Church were discouraged by villagers from proselytizing or holding meetings. The Ministry of Women, Youth, and Social Affairs reported receiving no complaints from other groups regarding the tradition.

The U.S. Ambassador to Fiji was accredited to the government. Representatives of the Embassy in Fiji also visited the country, contacted minority religious groups, and discussed religious tolerance and practices on the treatment of minority groups with government representatives and Mormon leaders. The embassy utilized social media to promote religious plurality and tolerance, such as posts highlighting diverse religious traditions.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.9 million (July 2017 estimate). Census data from 2011 identifies 95.6 percent of the population as Muslim, 2.2 percent as Roman Catholic, and 1.4 percent as Serbian Orthodox. According to the SOC, a boycott of the census by ethnic Serbs resulted in a significant undercounting of SOC members. The SOC estimates there are 120,000 Serbian Orthodox believers in Kosovo, or 6.3 percent. Other religious communities, including the Tarikats and Protestants, also contest the census data. Protestant leaders and those without a religious affiliation state some members of their communities were classified incorrectly as Muslims by census takers. According to the census regulation, census takers did not inquire if citizens are Protestant. The Protestant community estimates 20,000 followers throughout the country, or 1.1 percent of the population. Census categories for “other,” “none,” or “no response” each constitute less than 1 percent.

The majority of the Muslim population belongs to the Hanafi Sunni school, although a number follow Sufi or Shia traditions and are part of the Tarikat school or the Bektashi order. Tarikat leaders state that Bektashis are one of nine Tarikat orders, but the Bektashis self-identify as a separate Islamic order.

Most SOC members reside in the six majority ethnic Serb municipalities in the south of the country or in four northern Serb-majority municipalities. The largest Catholic communities are in Gjakove/Djakovica, Janjeve/Janjevo, Kline/Klina, Pristina, and Prizren. Evangelical Protestant populations are located throughout the country and concentrated in Pristina and Gjakove/Djakovica. There are small numbers of Jews in Prizren and Pristina.

Religion and ethnicity are often linked. The majority of ethnic Albanians are Muslim, while some are Catholic and Protestant; almost all ethnic Serbs belong to the SOC. The majority of ethnic Ashkalis, Bosniaks, Egyptians, Goranis, Roma, and Turks are also Muslim, while most ethnic Montenegrins and some Roma belong to the SOC. Almost all ethnic Croats belong to the Catholic Church.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of conscience and religion for all residents, including the right to change, express, or not express religious belief; to practice or abstain from practicing religion; and to join or refuse to join a religious community. These rights are subject to limitations for reasons of public safety and order or for the protection of the health or rights of others. The constitution provides for the separation of religious communities from public institutions, including the right of religious groups to regulate independently their own organizations, activities, and ceremonies, and the right to establish religious schools and charity institutions. It guarantees equal rights for all religious communities, stipulates the country is secular and neutral with regard to religion, declares the state shall ensure the protection and preservation of the country’s religious heritage, and prohibits discrimination based on religion. The constitution stipulates the law may limit freedom of expression to prevent provocation of violence and hostility on grounds of race, nationality, ethnicity, or religion. It allows courts to ban organizations or activities that encourage racial, national, ethnic, or religious hatred.

The constitution stipulates communities traditionally present in the country, including religious communities, shall have specific rights, including maintaining, developing, and preserving their religion; using their own language; establishing and managing their own private schools with financial assistance from the state; and having access to public media. Additional rights include establishing and using their own media, maintaining unhindered peaceful contacts with persons outside the country with whom they share a religious identity, and having equitable access to public employment. The constitution guarantees 20 of 120 seats in the national assembly to ethnic minority communities. It also stipulates that the adoption, amendment, or repeal of all laws pertaining to religious freedom and cultural heritage require approval by a majority of the deputies representing minority communities, as well as by a majority of all the deputies.

The constitution provides for the Ombudsperson’s Institution, which is responsible for monitoring religious freedom among other human rights and recommending actions to correct violations. It stipulates the state shall take all necessary measures to protect individuals who may be subject to threats, hostility, discrimination, or violence because of their religious identity.

The law does not provide a legal mechanism or specific guidance for religious groups to obtain legal status through registration or other means. The law does not require groups to register; however, without legal status, religious groups may not own property, open bank accounts, employ staff, access the courts, or perform other administrative tasks in their own name.

The law stipulates there is no official religion, but it lists five “traditional” religious communities: the BIK, SOC, Catholic Church, Hebrew (Jewish) community, and evangelical (Protestant) Church. The law provides extra protections and benefits to these five groups, such as reduced taxes and relief from water tariffs. According to the law, religious buildings belonging to these five communities, but not their administrative offices, are eligible for waivers of water utility fees. Religious institutions must apply with the public water provider to obtain the waiver.

The law provides safeguards for religious and cultural Special Protection Zones (SPZs), based on religious and cultural significance, by restricting nearby activities that could damage the surrounding historical, cultural, or natural environment. According to the law, the Implementation and Monitoring Council (IMC) arbitrates disputes between the government and the SOC concerning SPZs and other matters related to protecting the SOC’s religious and cultural heritage. The IMC is a special body that stems from the Comprehensive Plan for Kosovo and the SPZ law. It became operational in 2010. Its mandate includes safeguarding SOC heritage as included in the law on Velika Hoca/Hoce e Madhe village and the law on Prizren’s historic center. The IMC includes the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning (MESP) (as cochair); the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sport (MCYS); the SOC; the Special Representative of the European Union (as cochair); and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Municipalities hold titles to all public cemeteries, including those for religious communities, and by law must maintain them.

According to the law, “public education institutions shall refrain from teaching religion or other activities that propagate a specific religion.”

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: The government took steps to counter radicalization and violent extremism related to religion. In February the Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) filed an indictment at the Basic Court of Pristina against Shefqet Krasniqi, the former head imam of the Grand Mosque in Pristina, for inciting terrorism. Parliament considered a government-recommended bill that would allow religious groups to register and acquire legal status so they would be able to conduct business. Parliament approved the law at a first reading on November 29; it expected to hold a second reading in early 2018. Some school officials applied a mandatory administrative instruction prohibiting students from wearing religious garb on school property. According to some religious communities, the government continued to respond to societal violence and vandalism against several religious minority communities. Religious minorities, particularly Protestants, however, said municipalities failed to act on requests to build churches and cemeteries and to assist them with zoning issues. Several long-standing disputes over ownership of religious property remained unresolved. The police unit for the Protection of Religious and Cultural Heritage continued to provide countrywide security to religious and cultural sites; however, theft and vandalism continued at some SOC sites. The government continued to provide some funding to Islamic education in BIK madrassahs; it did not fund religious education for any other religious group. Most ethnic Serbs attending Serbian-language public schools elected to enroll in Serbian Orthodox religious classes. The Serbian government funded salaries of all teachers in Serbian-language schools, including religious instructors, and the Kosovo government supplemented the salaries of some teachers and staff in these schools. The BIK reported incidents of employment discrimination against devout Muslims, especially in the education sector, citing the March dismissal of a public school teacher in Prizren who refused to remove her headscarf at work. Muslim community leaders reported discriminatory practices in government hiring; stating applicants for civil service jobs were sometimes rejected based on religious belief. The government continued its Interfaith Kosovo program, and officials and representatives from all of the principal religious communities attended the consecration of the Catholic St. Theresa Cathedral in Pristina.

On February 27, the SPRK filed an indictment at the Basic Court of Pristina against Shefqet Krasniqi, the former head imam of the Grand Mosque in Pristina. The SPRK charged Krasniqi with inciting terrorism and propagating national, racial, and religious intolerance. According to the statement issued by the SPRK, Krasniqi used his sermons and social media to urge individuals to travel to conflict zones in Syria and Iraq and to commit acts of terror. Krasniqi was originally arrested in 2014 and was dismissed from the Grand Mosque in 2015. Despite his dismissal from the Grand Mosque, Krasniqi continued to preach his messages on television, radio, and social media.

In December the Pristina Basic Court heard testimony in the trial of four imams, two charged with committing terrorist acts and two charged with “inciting national, racial, religious, or ethnic hatred.” Media observers expected a ruling in 2018.

Religious leaders continued to advocate adoption of a draft law that would provide a legal mechanism through which religious groups could gain legal status. This would allow them to conduct business and legal matters with the state and private entities. The Bektashi community also requested such a law state it is a community constituting part of the historical heritage and cultural and social life of the country. Although representatives of many religious groups said they had found alternative methods to conduct some of their business affairs, most reported difficulties in registering property and vehicles, opening bank accounts, and paying taxes on employee salaries. Some religious communities opened bank accounts that were not in their communities’ names, and the Kosovo Protestant Evangelical Church received a tax accounting number from the government in order to pay taxes as if it were a business. Some communities said it was difficult to undertake basic financial tasks and they were taxed as for-profit businesses.

Some school officials continued to apply a mandatory administrative instruction previously issued by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology that prohibits primary and secondary students from wearing religious garb on school property. According to the BIK and other Muslim community leaders, public schools occasionally sent home students who insisted on wearing headscarves while attending classes. Members of the BIK reported some public schools forced girls to remove headscarves in order to study in these schools. The Ombudsperson Institution did not receive any reports of a school barring students wearing religious garb, such as headscarves, from attending classes.

In December the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) paid back rent to the SOC for the ACA’s long-standing use of an SOC-owned building and parking lot in Pristina. This ended a six-year stalemate in which the ACA had refused to implement a prime ministerial decision mandating payment.

Religious groups again said government authorities did not take steps to ensure municipalities treated religious organizations equally on property issues, in particular with regard to churches and cemeteries. Although the law specifies that municipalities hold title to cemeteries and are responsible for their upkeep, in practice, some municipalities allowed religious groups to take de facto possession of public cemeteries.

Protestants said most municipalities had not granted land for cemeteries nor addressed most of their requests to build churches on land the community owned. The Gllogovc/Glogovac Municipality granted land to the Protestant community for a cemetery and a church, and the community was working with the municipality to implement the decision.

Pristina’s city council created the country’s first dedicated cemetery for members of the Kosovo Protestant Evangelical Church (KPEC) on April 24. The vote affirmed the council’s initial February 15 decision permitting the cemetery, which the MESP had sought to block on procedural grounds. The municipal assembly’s agreement includes the provision of trees and fencing on six hectares (15 acres) of public land adjacent to the city’s Jewish cemetery. Prior to this decision, the city’s several thousand KPEC members were buried in the municipal cemetery. Although a public entity, the BIK unofficially controlled the municipal cemetery. The BIK did not allow Christian crosses on graves, charged a fee to non-Muslims for burial services, and in some cases blocked Christian funeral rites. Pristina’s Catholic and Orthodox Christian communities continued to use separate public cemeteries.

Existing Jewish cemeteries were reportedly in disrepair. Members of the Jewish community said they lacked the resources to maintain their cemeteries and local authorities did not maintain these public sites as required by law. The Serbian Orthodox cemetery in Pristina was reportedly also in disrepair and not maintained by municipal authorities. The SOC cited member displacement from the area as a reason for its inability to care adequately for the cemetery. In both cases, the Municipality of Pristina denied these cemeteries were in disrepair.

Although the Municipal Assembly of Pristina agreed in November 2016 to issue a building permit to the Messiah Evangelical Church for a house of worship on land the church had purchased, the MESP had not issued a final permit by year’s end. Municipal authorities had denied a permit to the church for more than a decade.

By the end of the year, the government still had not created the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities, which was supposed to decide on the reconstruction of a mosque in Mitrovica/Mitrovice North. BIK leadership continued to advocate for the reconstruction of the mosque, which Serb forces destroyed in 1999.

On July 25, the Pristina Municipal Assembly reaffirmed the validity of a 2012 permit for the construction of a “grand mosque” in the city. The decision overturned a 2015 stay on the permit following citizen complaints that the plans did not match the Dardania neighborhood’s existing aesthetic as required by local regulations. In the July meeting, the assembly described the 2015 decision as an invalid reading of local statute. The mosque would be the largest in the Balkans, according to plans.

In 2016 the Pristina Municipality approved a request by the Beit Israel nongovernmental organization (NGO) to provide assistance in constructing a synagogue. By October 20, however, the municipality had not provided the assistance, and Beit Israel criticized it for not following through on its approval.

A 2016 MCYS permit denial for the reconstruction of St. Nicholas Church in the Holy Archangels Monastery in Prizren remained in place, although MCYS Minister Kujtim Gashi pledged to address the issue according to the law. The monastery’s only church was destroyed in 1999, and the St. Nicholas Church was destroyed at the end of the 16th century. According to some IMC members, former MCYS Minister Kujtim Shala’s refusal to issue the permit for reconstruction prompted the SOC to stop participating in the IMC. Although the IMC’s charter calls for meetings every two months concerning safeguarding religious and cultural sites, the group did not formally meet during the year. Due to the lack of a permit, municipal inspectors ordered the SOC to halt construction on several occasions in 2016. The SOC stated the institute’s denial of the permit came after a legal deadline, after which the municipality should have allowed the construction to proceed automatically. Notwithstanding the application, the SOC had full discretion to manage its property based on Annex V of the Ahtisaari Plan for Kosovo, which covers religious and cultural heritage issues.

The Pristina Municipality, citing the lack of a construction permit, continued to prevent Serbian Orthodox monks from cleaning and making light repairs at the unfinished St. Saviors Church after vandals set fire to it in 2016. Pristina officials continued to question SOC ownership of the property and to claim a construction permit was necessary to undertake any work inside the church, including painting over graffiti.

Decan/Decani municipal officials continued to refuse to implement a 2016 Constitutional Court decision confirming the Supreme Court’s 2012 ruling that more than 24 hectares (59 acres) of land should be returned to the SOC’s Visoki Decani Monastery. The ruling legally ended the SOC’s dispute with a defunct state-owned enterprise from the Yugoslav era and the municipality of Decan/Decani. The Constitutional Court’s decision rejected the 2015 finding of the Supreme Court’s Appellate Panel that had sought to return jurisdiction of the case to the Basic Court in Decan/Decani. The Mayor of Decan/Decani, Rasim Selmanaj, continued throughout the year to refer to the decision as unacceptable. The judicial system did not hold him or other municipal officials to account for failing to implement the Constitutional Court decision. The Kosovo Cadastral Agency agreed to hear an appeal of the case, which legal experts said was illegal since the Constitutional Court had already issued a ruling. Italian Kosovo Force troops continued to provide fixed security at the monastery.

On June 30, the Kosovo Privatization Agency’s Board of Directors removed two properties belonging to Visoki Decani Monastery from its list of former state-owned enterprises slated for privatization. The decision was in keeping with the Constitutional Court’s ruling confirming the monastery’s ownership of the property.

In November the Appeals Court of Pristina upheld a lower court decision to dismiss the University of Pristina’s 2012 request to annul a 1991 land donation by the Serbian government to the SOC, which would have enabled demolition of Christ the Savior Church on the university’s campus. The court ruled only on procedure, not on the merits of the complaint. The university filed another lawsuit soon after the Appeals Court ruling.

An appeal by the Municipality of Pristina of the Basic Court’s 2015 ruling that the Catholic Church owned property adjacent to the Mother Teresa Cathedral remained pending at year’s end.

The SOC expressed concern that the MCYS did not consult with it on a draft law on cultural heritage that it said could annul the SOC’s legally guaranteed autonomy and preclude it from independently deciding upon the restoration and renovation of its buildings. At year’s end, the MCYS had not finished drafting the law. In August the MCYS had issued an administrative instruction that the SOC believed could compromise property rights protected in Annex V of the Ahtisaari Plan.

During the year, the MCYS completed development of the new cultural heritage strategy for 2017-27. The SOC said the strategy strengthened the statutory basis for cooperation between the government and the SOC.

The police unit for specialized protection of cultural and religious heritage sites continued to provide countrywide security to religious and cultural sites, providing 24-hour security at 24 sites around the country. Despite this protection, theft and vandalism continued at SOC sites, primarily outside the SPZ, where police did not provide special protection. The Ministry of Culture said it requested increased support from local governments on protection of religious heritage sites. According to the SOC and the Protestant community, however, local governments sometimes failed to implement laws or court verdicts protecting the rights of religious groups.

The central government continued to provide some funding to Islamic education in BIK madrassahs in Pristina, Prizren, and Gjilan/Gnjilane. Some members of other religious groups and secular representatives said they were concerned because the government did not provide funding for religious education to any other religious group.

The government worked with the BIK and civil society groups to combat violent extremism. As part of the government’s strategy, the BIK held sessions in its madrassahs and Islamic studies facilities that urged students not to fall prey to extremism.

Ethnic Serbs, Gorani, Croatians, and some Roma attended Serbian-language public schools that followed a curriculum designed by the Serbian government, based on municipal education laws and in coordination with the education ministry. Restrictions on religious education did not apply to these public schools. Most ethnic Serbs elected to enroll in Serbian Orthodox religious classes instead of civic education. The Serbian government funded the salaries of all teachers in Serbian-language schools, including religious instructors. The Kosovo government supplemented the salaries of some teachers and staff in Serbian-language schools.

The media reported pressure from the Turkish government to close schools associated with Muslim cleric Fethullah Gulen, but the government refused to do so. Citing a lack of evidence, the government refused an October request by the Turkish government to extradite a Gulenist follower on charges related to the attempted 2016 coup in Turkey.

The Water Regulatory Agency continued to waive water utility fees for religious buildings belonging to the five “traditional” religious communities, in accordance with the law. As in past years, the agency failed to grant a waiver to the Protestant community, with no explanation.

The BIK reported incidents of employment discrimination against devout Muslims, particularly in the education sector.

On July 29, nationalist party Vetevendosje (VV) mayoral candidate Fisnik Korenica posted on Facebook that Israel would soon be “vanished from the earth” in response to incidents in Jerusalem. After receiving domestic and international criticism, including from President Hashim Thaci, Prime Ministerial Advisor Halil Matoshi, and VV President Visar Ymeri, he deleted the post and apologized.

Despite a decision by the president announced in November 2016 to prohibit the sale and distribution of anti-Semitic books, by the end of the year the government had taken no administrative action to implement the decision.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs cancelled the 2017 International Interfaith Conference in favor of a larger event in 2018 to coincide with the 10-year anniversary of the country’s independence. The most recent Interfaith Conference was in 2016.

On September 5, high-level government officials and representatives from the principal religious communities attended the consecration of St. Theresa Catholic Cathedral in Pristina. President Thaci called the cathedral a symbol of religious tolerance.

In an example of government engagement with religious groups, in January the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) donated bedding for the Serbian Orthodox Church to distribute to local families in need. The KSF promised such support, regardless of the beneficiaries’ religion and ethnicity, would continue. In March the NGO Beit Israel, in partnership with the KSF and Public Enterprise Hortikultura, cleaned the graves at the Jewish cemetery in Pristina.

There were instances of religious-based violence, interference with religious pilgrimages, hate speech, and vandalism. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it is difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

On January 6 (Orthodox Christmas Eve), approximately a dozen VV activists protested the visit of 50 displaced ethnic Serb pilgrims to the Serbian Orthodox church in Gjakove/Djakovica, alleging war criminals were among the group. Protesters threw stones and red paint at the visitors’ bus, damaging one window, and spray-painted “murderer” on the church’s outer wall. Police dispersed protesters and arrested seven for disobeying police orders and vandalism. The police later released all seven. The pilgrims took part in services and safely departed. Gjakove/Djakovica Mayor Mimoza Kusari-Lila issued a public statement calling for freedom of movement, the right to protest publicly, and for justice for victims of war crimes rather than violence. Minister of Communities and Returns Dalibor Jevtic likewise condemned the violence. VV representatives said the pilgrimage was a provocation and called for justice for the families of war victims.

In June at least 100 Muslims gathered near the site of the proposed mosque in Mitrovica/Mitrovice to celebrate Eid al-Fitr, including Mitrovica/Mitrovice South Mayor Agim Bahtiri. Some ethnic Serb representatives stated they saw the event as incitement by ethnic Albanians, while the BIK described it as nonpolitical. On August 4, approximately 20 mostly ethnic Albanian individuals gathered again at the mosque site for Friday prayers. Police denied a permit request prior to the gathering, citing the potential for clashes between ethnic Serb and ethnic Albanians. The gathering proceeded without a permit. Police monitored the gathering and reported no incidents. A similar gathering took place on August 18.

The media reported representatives of Shia communities in the country gathered on March 18 to separate the Shia Tarikats from the BIK. The latter objected to including the Tarikats as a sixth religious entity in the draft law on religious freedom, stating the BIK was the country’s only Islamic community representative. The Tarikats community said it would act based on its law, statute, and tradition of peaceful and authentic interpretation of Islam.

The SOC criticized the media for contributing to a climate of intolerance. The BIK said the media generally portrayed Muslims in a negative light.

The national police reported 44 incidents targeting religious sites of incidents involving property damage, theft, and graffiti during the year. These targeted the Islamic community (21), Serbian Orthodox Church (20), and Roman Catholic Church (3) sites.

On January 18, 15-20 members of “Demokracia Studentore” (Students’ Democracy, a group affiliated with VV), displayed pictures of alleged war crimes committed by the Serbian military next to the unfinished Christ the Savior Serbian Orthodox Church in Pristina. Police prevented them from hanging the photographs on the church’s wall. The protesters said the church would function as “a museum of war crimes committed by Serbian criminals.”

On February 14, a group of 20 ethnic Albanians chanted anti-Serb slogans and sprayed anti-Serb graffiti in an ethnic Serb area of Gjilan/Gnjilane, including on the Serbian Orthodox church and a Serbian-language school’s outer walls. Graffiti included “Kill Serbs,” a swastika, and “UCK – Kosovo Liberation Army,” which is associated with ethnic Albanian nationalism.

On April 11, Students’ Democracy denounced “clandestine works” it alleged were conducted at Christ the Savior Church on the University of Pristina grounds. The group said a “politicized Serb group with the support of some priests” was “inciting hatred against Albanians through the religious building of the Orthodox church.” The group threatened to protest unless the responsible institutions acted to prevent access to and construction in the church. A Pristina municipality spokesperson said the municipality had banned all construction activities because of inadequate documentation.

On April 15, police arrested an ethnic Serb for attacking a mosque in Llabjan village, Novo Brdo Municipality. Ethnic Serb leaders condemned the attack.

On August 1, mosque opponents sprayed graffiti attacking President Hashim Thaci, Mayor Shpend Ahmeti, and the Grand Mufti Naim Ternava on Pristina University’s compound. Slogans included “there will be no Turkish mosque in Dardania,” and “death to (Grand Mufti) Naim Ternava and Hashim the Turk.” On August 2, additional graffiti appeared on two other mosques in Pristina, both restored through Turkish funding. The BIK condemned the graffiti as hate speech and called on students to avoid violence or expressions of intolerance. Police arrested one suspect and investigated others.

Leaders of different religious groups reported generally good relations with one another and participated in numerous interfaith discussions on property rights, legislative priorities, and local community issues. The OSCE continued to coordinate some activities among religious groups, including meetings with municipal mayors, to discuss issues such as access to graveyards and permits to build religious buildings.

The Ambassador and other U.S. embassy representatives met frequently with government officials, including the president, prime minister, and speaker and other members of parliament to urge passage of legislation that would allow religious institutions to function without impediments and to support full implementation of the law on SPZs. Embassy officials urged increased dialogue between ethnic Albanian members of the government and civil society with SOC members. The embassy urged government officials to resolve the land dispute involving St. Nicolas Chapel in the Holy Archangels Monastery in Prizren and the government’s lack of rent payments owed to the SOC for the ACA’s use of the property in Pristina. The embassy advocated at all levels for the implementation of the 2016 Constitutional Court decision in favor of Visoki Decani Monastery, urging the government and the judiciary to hold local officials to account. The embassy discussed the property issues of other religious groups with government officials on numerous occasions and urged officials to settle the issues based on law.

Embassy officials regularly discussed religious tolerance with leaders of all major religious groups. The embassy hosted an interreligious iftar in Prizren, discussing the importance of countering violent extremism, resolving SOC property disputes, providing cemetery space for all communities, and raising the importance of religious freedom in the country, including the draft law on religious freedom. Embassy officials met with BIK imams to discuss efforts to promote tolerance and counter violent extremism and discussed draft laws on religious freedom and cultural heritage with religious leaders. Embassy officials met with religious leaders on multiple occasions to discuss their human rights and legal concerns. The embassy often posted messages on social media in support of religious freedom. Responding to violence by VV activists against Serbian Orthodox pilgrims in January, the Ambassador tweeted that violence had no place in protests.

A visiting State Department official met in March with leaders of KPEC, BIK, SOC, the Union of Kosovo Tarikats, and the bishop of the Kosovo Catholic Church, as well as with members of the Bektashi and Jewish communities, to discuss the challenges they faced and their concerns regarding religious freedom. The official also met with members of parliament regarding the draft religious freedom law and with the mayor of Gjakove/Djakovica and deputy mayor of Pristina on treatment of religious groups, including cemetery space and building permits for houses of worship. The official also met with Islamic studies faculty members and NGOs to discuss religious freedom in education and in the country.

On October 12, the Ambassador visited the newly consecrated St. Theresa Cathedral in Pristina. In his remarks, the Ambassador reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to protecting religious freedom in the country.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 2.9 million (July 2017 estimate). The Public Authority for Civil Information (PACI), a local government agency, reports there are 1.3 million citizens and 3.1 million noncitizens. The national census does not distinguish between Shia and Sunni Muslims. The PACI reported estimates indicate approximately 70 percent of citizens adhere to the Sunni branch of Islam, while the remaining 30 percent is comprised of Shia Muslims (including Ahmadis and Ismailis, which the government counts as Shia). Community leaders have indicated there are 267 Christian citizens and a handful of Bahai citizens.

In June the PACI released statistics indicating that 63 percent of expatriates are Muslim, 27 percent Christian, and 10 percent from non-Abrahamic faiths. Sources in various expatriate communities further reported that approximately 5 percent of the expatriate Muslims are Shia, while Buddhists and Hindus account for half of the non-Abrahamic faith population. Informal estimates by members of different faiths indicate that there are approximately 25,000 Bohras, 10,000 Sikhs, and 400 Bahais.

While some areas have high concentrations of either Sunnis or Shia, there is relatively uniform distribution of the two groups throughout most of the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares Islam to be the religion of the state and the freedom of belief to be “absolute.” It guarantees the state will protect the freedom to practice all religions, provided such practice is “in accordance with established customs, and does not conflict with public policy or morals.”

The constitution declares sharia to be a main source of legislation and all individuals are equal before the law regardless of religion. It declares the emir shall be Muslim (the emir and ruling family are Sunni) and the state shall safeguard the heritage of Islam. The Higher Advisory Committee on Completion of the Application of Islamic Sharia Provisions in the Emiri Diwan (office of the emir) makes recommendations to the emir on ways to bring laws into better conformity with sharia. The committee is an eight-member advisory body to the Emiri Diwan, led by the president of the committee. The Council of Ministers appoints members, who serve three-year terms. Traditionally, five of the members are religious scholars (jurisprudence and sharia experts) and two specialize in economics and law. The committee functions in an advisory role and has no authority to implement or enforce its recommendations.

The law states apostates lose certain legal rights, including the right to inherit property from Muslim relatives or spouses, but it does not specify any criminal penalty. The marriage of a Muslim man is annulled if he converts from Islam. A Muslim woman may have her marriage annulled if her Muslim husband converts to another religion.

The law prohibits the defamation of the Abrahamic religions, denigration of Islamic and Judeo-Christian religious figures, and prescribes a punishment of up to 10 years in prison for each offense.

A national unity law prohibits “stirring sectarian strife,” promoting the supremacy of one religious group, instigating acts of violence based on the supremacy of one group, or promoting hatred or contempt of any group. Acts of violence are punishable by up to seven years’ imprisonment and/or a fine of 10,000 to 100,000 Kuwaiti dinars (KD) ($33,200 to $332,000). Repeated crimes carry double penalties. If a group or an organization violates the law, the fine may be as much as 200,000 KD ($665,000).

The law allows citizens to file criminal charges against anyone they believe has defamed any one of the three Abrahamic religions or harmed public morals.

The law criminalizes publishing and broadcasting content, including on social media, which the government deems offensive to religious “sects” or groups, providing for fines ranging from 10,000 to 200,000 KD ($33,200 to $665,000) and up to seven years’ imprisonment. Noncitizens convicted under this law are also subject to deportation.

There is no promulgated process outlining what religious groups need to submit to register with the government. In practice, groups navigate the process themselves without much stated guidance provided by government offices. Although all religious groups must apply in writing for a license from their municipality to establish an official place of worship and to gain the full benefits from being a registered religion with the central government, it is not transparent what criteria must be met for a registration application to be approved. To obtain an official license, groups must first register with the MAIA. If the registration application is granted, further approvals are required by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MOSAL) and the MOI. Once these three ministries approve the registration application, the municipality must give final approval/license, which requires the community leaders to obtain written permission from all the immediate neighbors occupying the properties around the proposed place of worship. In practice, applicants often do not know about the status of their registration, or if they are rejected at any point. There is no recourse to appeal the decision as it is considered a “sovereign act” that cannot be challenged in court.

There are seven officially registered and licensed Christian churches: the National Evangelical (Protestant), Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic (Melkite), Coptic Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, and Anglican. There are no officially recognized synagogues.

A religious group with a license to establish a place of worship may hire its own staff, sponsor visitors to the country, open bank accounts, and import texts needed for its congregation. Nonregistered religious groups do not have access to any of these facilities (although some registered religious groups agree to assist nonregistered groups in these matters). Additionally, nonregistered groups may not purchase property or sponsor workers and must rely on volunteers from their community for resources. They may, however, practice their religion in homes, hotel facilities, rented villas, and other private or commercial spaces as long as they do not disturb their neighbors or violate laws regarding assembly and proselytizing.

The law prohibits practices the government deems to be inconsistent with Islamic law, including anything the government deems to be sorcery or black magic, which under the penal code constitutes “fraud and deception” and carries a maximum penalty of three years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both.

The law prohibits non-Muslims from proselytizing.

The law prohibits eating, drinking, and smoking in public between sunrise and sunset during Ramadan, including for non-Muslims, with a prescribed maximum penalty of up to 100 KD ($330) and/or one month’s imprisonment.

It is illegal to possess or import pork products and alcohol. Importing alcohol carries a penalty of up to 10 years’ imprisonment; consuming alcohol may result in a fine of up to a 1,000 KD ($3,300).

The law requires Islamic religious instruction in public schools for all Muslim students and in private schools with one or more Muslim students enrolled, regardless of whether the student is a citizen or not. Non-Muslim students are not required to attend these classes, and there is no penalty for not doing so. The law prohibits organized religious education in public high schools for faiths other than Islam. All Islamic education courses use the Sunni interpretation of Islam.

The law prohibits the naturalization of non-Muslims but allows male citizens of any religion to transmit citizenship to their descendants. The law forbids marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men, but Muslim men may marry women of other Abrahamic faiths. The law requires that children of such marriages be raised in their father’s faith, and the father’s religion governs the settlement of marital disputes. The determining factor for the couple’s religious status in a court case is whether the marriage certificate is Sunni or Shia. A Shia notary must authenticate a Shia marriage certificate. Christian couples who are part of a registered church may marry and divorce as per their religious customs, and local authorities and courts recognize their religious documents. Members of nonregistered religions may have their foreign wedding certificates recognized, but may not get married in Kuwait.

If a religious group wishes to purchase land, a citizen must be the primary buyer, and the citizen must submit a request for approval to the local municipal council, which may allocate land at its discretion. Citizens may also rent or donate land to religious groups.

According to the constitution, sharia governs inheritance. Religious courts administer personal status law. Courts may follow Shia jurisprudence in matters of personal status and family law for Shia at the first instance and appellate levels. If the case proceeds beyond the appellate level to the Court of Cassation, the case is adjudicated via Sunni personal status law. An independent Shia waqf (trust) administers Shia religious endowments. Based on the religious community of the man, cases are assigned either to Sunni or Shia judges. In the case of a man married to a non-Muslim woman, the husband’s religious practice is followed. If a couple is from one of the registered churches, the settlement offered by the church may be taken into consideration; however, if the dispute is not settled Sunni sharia is applied. For members of other nonregistered religions Sunni sharia is applied in the courts in matters of personal status and family law.

An individual’s religion is not included on passports or national identity documents, with the exception of birth and marriage certificates, on which it is mandatory. On birth certificates issued to Muslims, there is no distinction between Sunni and Shia. Members of non-Abrahamic faiths are not able to list their religion on their birth certificate and a dash (-) is denoted in place of their religion. Members of non-Abrahamic faiths may not be married within the country and issued marriage certificates since local courts and authorities do not accept their religion.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government pursued several cases against Salafist cleric Othman Al-Khamees for allegedly insulting Shia doctrine during a television interview and in social media messages dating back to 2015. In January an appeals court overturned a criminal court ruling that had fined Al-Khamees 20,000 KD ($66,400). The Court of Cassation further upheld the acquittal in April. In the same month, the criminal court also acquitted Al-Khamees in another case in which he was accused of insulting Shia doctrine.

In March an appeals court upheld a lower court’s April 2016 acquittal of Sara al-Drees after she was sued by several private citizens for social media postings questioning the tenets of Islamic practice.

According to press reports, in November the court of misdemeanors convicted journalist and secular activist Abdul Aziz Abdullah al-Qenaei in a blasphemy case for “contempt of Islam” and “slander of sharia” and sentenced him to six-months imprisonment with labor and immediate effect. Al-Qenaei’s sentence was suspended pending the appeal process in the higher courts.

The MOI and the MAIA continued to caution imams to ensure their sermons were consistent with the general law on political speech and to avoid discussion of political issues in their sermons or at any other time while in the country. As per MAIA policy, the government continued to appoint all new Sunni imams and to monitor and provide the text of weekly sermons preached at Sunni mosques. Sunni imams were able to add to the content of the sermon but needed to ensure their content adhered to the laws on political speech and avoided stoking sectarianism. The government vetted every Sunni imam to ensure compliance with the government’s view of moderate and tolerant religious preaching and sermons. The government also funded Sunni religious institutions, including mosques. In contrast, Shia clerics were usually not officially monitored and had the freedom to write their own sermons as long as they did not violate existing laws or instigate sectarianism. The Shia community also had the freedom to pick its own clerics without government oversight but generally did not receive funding from the state for religious institutions and mosques. Some Shia mosques, however, requested government assistance and received funds to pay for salaries and maintenance of their facilities.

In June the government took steps to block religious figures on a terrorist list, issued by four Arab states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt) involved in a diplomatic dispute with Qatar, from entering the country. Most of the religious figures that faced travel bans were Salafists and members of the Muslim Brotherhood residing in Qatar. Sources in religious groups indicated in August that the MOI and the MAIA were devising a new mechanism to issue entry visas for religious leaders and clerics.

In September news outlets reported three visiting Shia clerics, one from Saudi Arabia and two from Iraq, were invited to speak at Ashura events but were prohibited from delivering sermons and ordered to leave the country by the MOI. The two Iraqi clerics were sponsored by local Shia mosques while the Saudi cleric did not need sponsorship to enter the country. Upon their arrival, current and former members of parliament tweeted that the clerics were on record for previously insulting the Prophet’s wives and companions. As the news circulated in social media, it came to the attention of the MOI, which took action.

The MAIA interviewed several imams whom sources said were considered to have made provocative statements harmful to national unity. Some imams were fined and received temporary suspensions while others were cleared of misconduct. In February the court of appeals overturned the Criminal Court’s September 2016 acquittal of Shia cleric Hussain al-Matooq on charges that he had spoken disparagingly about the government in one of his Friday sermons in 2015, and fined him 20,000 KD ($66,400).

Religious groups were required to obtain licenses from their respective municipalities for commemorations, and the municipal government retained the right to withdraw the license of any husseiniyas (a Shia hall for religious commemorations) not complying with the municipality’s rules.

Citing security concerns, the government kept in place the ban on outdoor religious observances, instituted following the bombing of the Imam al Sadeq Mosque in 2015, which killed 27 persons. All Ashura activities for the Shia community were required to be conducted inside closed structures rather than at outside locations. The government did not permit public reenactments of the martyrdom of Hussein or public marches in commemoration of Ashura. The government continued to station security forces outside some Sunni Mosques and all Shia and Christian religious venues during times of worship throughout the year as a deterrent to possible further attacks. The government also continued to provide security to Shia neighborhoods during Muharram and Ashura.

Authorities continued to prohibit churches from displaying exterior signs, such as a cross or the congregation’s name.

Some Shia leaders said discrimination continued to prevent Shia from obtaining training for clerical positions as well as leadership positions in public sector organizations, including the police force and the military/security apparatus.

The government continued to prevent the establishment of Shia religious training institutions. Shia who wanted religious training had to seek training and education abroad. The College of Islamic Law at Kuwait University, the country’s only institution to train imams, provided some Shia jurisprudence courses but did not permit Shia professors on its faculty.

The government continued to permit registered Christian churches to import religious materials for use by their congregations under the condition that none of the content insulted Islam. Congregations who needed material in languages other than Arabic or English reported no problems importing their materials on their own. Members of other religious groups also stated they did not face any major issues importing religious materials for their congregations as long as they were doing so privately and did not try to sell the materials in public stores; no public shops could legally import, display, or sell non-Islamic religious literature.

The MOI provided security and protection for licensed places of worship, the MOSAL issued visas for clergy and other staff, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the municipality of Kuwait handled building permits and land issues. The government said it received no applications for construction of new churches from religious groups during the year. The Armenian Orthodox church successfully bought a new property and started operating from the new church during the year. The Greek Orthodox Church successfully negotiated the purchase of 38 percent ownership of its property, but church leadership still feared expulsion from the property. They highlighted that if the current owner died, the inheritors stood to make more money by redeveloping the property than by continuing to rent it to the church.

Some religious groups without a licensed place of worship stated they could conduct worship services without government interference provided they did not disturb their neighbors or violate laws regarding assembly and proselytizing. The government continued to allow such groups to operate in rented villas, private homes, or the facilities of registered churches. Citing security concerns, authorities stated they would take action against unlicensed mosques. The government tasked the MAIA, the MOI, the municipality of Kuwait, and other agencies with finding solutions to end the use of illegal mosques. During the year, the government raided makeshift mosques in remote areas and shut them down for operating without proper licenses.

Shia Muslims reported a continued lack of facilities for worship and difficulties obtaining permission to construct new facilities, caused by the government’s delay in approving repairs to existing mosques or constructing new ones. They said the government had granted licenses and approved the construction of fewer than 10 new Shia mosques since 2001. According to the government, there were 51 Shia mosques, with one new Shia mosque having opened during the year. There were also 20-30 husseiniyas registered with MOI and thousands of smaller Shia gatherings that took place in private homes. Similar to Shia mosques, the MAIA did not monitor the husseiniyas and the private gatherings.

The Ministry of Education continued to ban the use as instructional material of any fiction or nonfiction books and textbooks referring to the Holocaust or Israel. The ministry permitted public schools to teach and celebrate only Islamic holidays. The government did not interfere with informal religious instruction inside private homes and on church compounds.

The National Evangelical Church (NEC) requested accreditation for its school, which would enable students to receive religious education while fulfilling Kuwaiti requirements, and allow school graduates to move on to higher education. The NEC had not received a response to their request from the authorities by year’s end. The Bohra community opened an accredited school for its community. Other groups conducted religious studies in their places of worship, but have either not requested accreditation or did not receive a response to their request.

Some Muslim clerics continued to express disapproval of the celebration of non-Islamic holidays and called for more government action to restrict public expression of these holidays; no legislation to limit public expression was initiated during the year.

While Shia community members expressed gratitude for the added security provided by authorities for their events, they stated that an effort by law enforcement to capture fugitive members of the Abdali Cell, a group that the government had charged with spying for Iran and Lebanese Hizballah to carry out aggression against the country, put undue hardship on the Shia community. These included random security checks and intrusions into their homes by law enforcement authorities. In August authorities arrested 12 of the 14 members of the cell who had fled; two remained at large. Shia sources stated the authorities’ actions were construed by the Shia community as placing blame on the entire community for the acts of a few criminals.

Even though the Shia make up an estimated 30 percent of the population, they remained underrepresented in all segments of government: six of 50 members in parliament, one of 16 cabinet members, one of six Amiri Diwan advisors, and disproportionately lower numbers of senior officers in the military and police force. Shia community leaders repeatedly complained about a glass ceiling in promotions and difficulties in getting jobs, as well as the lack of new places to worship, which they said created an oppressive environment for their community.

According to Shia leaders, the lack of Shia imams continued to limit their ability to staff Shia courts, causing a backlog of personal status and family cases. To address the backlog and shortage of staff, an ad hoc council created by the government under the regular marital issues court to apply Shia jurisprudence continued to function. The establishment of a Shia Court of Cassation, approved in 2003, remained delayed, according to Shia leaders, because appropriate training for Shia to staff it was unavailable.

Although the law does not prohibit apostasy, the government continued its policy of not issuing new official documents for recording a change in religion. When asked if there were any cases of conversion, religious leaders from some non-Muslim religious groups said they had not heard of any case of a Muslim desiring to change religion, while others said they would not convert a Muslim in Kuwait. All leaders, regardless of faith, stated they were free to practice their religion and that their sole mission was to take care of their existing community. A few leaders refused to speak about conversion.

The government continued to impose quotas on the number of clergy and staff of licensed religious groups entering the country but the government granted additional slots upon request. The government continued to require foreign leaders of unregistered religious groups to enter the country as nonreligious workers. They then had to minister to their congregations outside the regular hours of their nonreligious employment.

Members of non-Abrahamic faiths stated that they remained free to practice their religion in private, but faced harassment and potential prosecution if they practiced their faith in public. Expatriates of non-Abrahamic religions could not have public places of worship nor marry in Kuwait, and they remained subject to sharia if family matters were taken to court. Most members of these communities indicated they were able to practice their faith within their communities, but practiced a discreet form of self-censorship that allowed them to avoid conflict with authorities. In many cases, members of these religious groups stated they resolved conflict internally within their community rather than take legal action in the courts where they would be subject to sharia.

In an attempt to keep a low profile, minority religious communities stated they did not request permission for public celebrations from authorities (which would be rejected if applied for) and refrained from discussing issues such as proselytizing (which is part of their religious doctrine but considered illegal by the law). They said they were selective in the religious materials they imported and even more selective of the persons who were given access to them. They said they did not allow these materials to be circulated outside their congregations. Many of these groups did not advertise religious events or gatherings publicly to avoid unwanted attention to their organizations both from the public and government authorities. Representatives of registered churches stated the government was generally tolerant and respectful of their faith.

There continued to be societal pressure against conversion from Islam, according to minority religious leaders and citizens. Some foreign residents as well as citizens who converted to Christianity reported their families harassed them for their conversion.

Observers reported hotels, stores, and other businesses continued to acknowledge non-Muslim holidays such as Christmas, Easter, and Diwali. For example, during the Christmas season, Christmas trees and lights appeared in stores, malls, and homes, and Christmas music played in public places, including songs with Christian lyrics. The news media continued to print information about religious holiday celebrations, including material on the religious significance of Christmas.

The NEC also continued to allow 85 other (unregistered) congregations to use its facilities.

An Anti-Defamation League global survey of anti-Semitism sentiment ranked Kuwait among the top 10 most anti-Semitic countries, with 82 percent of respondents endorsing negative stereotypes concerning Jews.

The Ambassador and other embassy officers met with leaders and representatives of minority religious groups and with NGOs involved with religious issues to discuss the challenges religious minorities faced and their interaction with the government, such as difficulties obtaining places of worship.

The Ambassador and other embassy officers hosted an event for leaders of various registered churches and provided a venue for discussion of religious tolerance. The Ambassador spoke with each leader to find out how his or her congregation was affected by government policy, and how the situation compared to previous years. Additionally, the embassy directly heard the needs of the various groups, which continued to include more space for worship, lack of transparency to register new churches, and permission to get religious school accreditation. In general, attendees of registered churches praised the government and people of the country as being tolerant and respectful of their faith

Embassy officials worked closely with minority religious groups and supported religious events that raised awareness of religious tolerance and diversity. Officials attended the observation of Ashura, Christmas Mass, the 200th anniversary of Baha’u’llah’s birth, and the second anniversary of the Imam Al-Sadeq Mosque bombing to highlight the importance of religious tolerance.

The embassy worked throughout the year to promote religious freedom and tolerance through a series of visitors’ programs. One program explored government and nongovernment efforts to promote the culture of tolerance, and the role of interfaith dialogue in promoting tolerance and peace. A second highlighted work of a local NGO in promoting freedom of religion and the role of religious organizations in advancing civil rights. A third program discussed U.S. government and international initiatives to promote civic engagement to protect human rights and international religious freedom.

The embassy sponsored speakers who also took part in a Ministry of the Interior’s regional conference on protecting children from social media threats, which included embassy-sponsored talks on religious tolerance. Newspaper interviews and social media coverage of embassy-sponsored speakers focused on the importance of interfaith dialogue in countering radicalization and extremism.

Embassy officers participated in an interview with Kuwait Radio that discussed religious freedom in the United States, religious tolerance, and the integration of the Muslim community in the larger U.S. society.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5.8 million (July 2017 estimate). According to government estimates, approximately 90 percent of the population is Muslim, the vast majority of whom are Sunni. The government estimates Shia make up less than 1 percent of the Muslim population. According to an international organization, there is also a small Ahmadiyya Muslim Community not reflected in government figures and estimated at 1,000 individuals. According to government estimates, approximately 7 percent of the population is Christian, including an estimated 3 percent Russian Orthodox. Jews, Buddhists, Bahais, and unaffiliated groups together constitute approximately 3 percent of the population.

According to the National Statistics Committee, ethnic Kyrgyz make up approximately 73 percent of the population, while ethnic Uzbeks make up an estimated 15 percent. Ethnic Uzbeks are most numerous in the south, constituting approximately half the population of the southern city of Osh, for example. Both ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks are primarily Muslim, making Islam the main religion in both urban and rural areas. Ethnic Russians are primarily adherents of the Russian Orthodox Church or one of several Protestant denominations. Members of the Russian Orthodox Church and other non-Muslim religious groups live mainly in major cities.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees freedom of conscience and religion, the right to practice or not practice a religion, individually or jointly with other persons, and the right to refuse to express one’s religious views. It bans actions inciting religious hatred.

The constitution establishes the separation of religion and state. It prohibits the establishment of religiously based political parties and the pursuit of political goals by religious groups. The constitution prohibits the establishment of any religion as a state or mandatory religion.

The law states all religions and religious groups are equal. It prohibits “insistent attempts to convert followers of one religion to another (proselytism)” and “illegal missionary activity,” defined as missionary activity of groups not registered with the SCRA. The law also prohibits the involvement of minors in organized, proselytizing religious groups, unless a parent grants written consent.

The law requires all religious groups, and religiously affiliated schools, to register with the SCRA, which is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the law’s provisions on religion. The law prohibits activity by unregistered religious groups. Groups applying for registration must submit an application form, organizational charter, minutes of the organizing meeting, and a list of founding members. Each congregation of a religious group must register separately and must have at least 200 resident founding citizens. Foreign religious organizations are required to renew their registrations with the SCRA annually.

The SCRA is legally authorized to deny the registration of a religious group if it does not comply with the law or is considered a threat to national security, social stability, interethnic and interdenominational harmony, public order, health, or morality. The SCRA may also deny or postpone the certification of a particular religious group if it deems the proposed activities of the group are not religious in character. Denied applicants may reapply at any time or may appeal to the courts. The law prohibits unregistered religious groups from actions such as renting space and holding religious services. Violations may result in an administrative fine of 500 soms ($7).

After the SCRA has approved a group’s registration as a religious entity, the group must register with the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) to obtain status as a legal entity so it may own property, open bank accounts, and otherwise engage in contractual activities. The organization must submit an application to the MOJ that includes a group charter with an administrative structure and a list of board and founding members. If a religious group engages in a commercial activity, it is required to pay taxes. By law, religious groups are designated as nonprofit organizations exempt from taxes on their religious activities.

The law gives the SCRA authority to ban a religious group as long as the SCRA delivers written notice to the group stating the group does not comply with the law. The group may appeal the decision in the courts.

The constitution prohibits religious groups from “involvement in organizational activities aimed at inciting ethnic, racial, or religious hatred.” A conviction for inciting ethnic, racial, or religious hatred may lead to a prison term of three to eight years, while a conviction for creating an organization aimed at inciting ethnic, racial, or religious hatred may lead to a term of five to 10 years. Conviction for murder committed on the grounds of religious hatred is punishable by life imprisonment.

The law mandates separate prison facilities for prisoners convicted of terrorism and extremism, and it strips the citizenship of any Kyrgyz national convicted of those offenses. The law defines “extremist activity” as including the violent overthrow of the constitutional order; undermining the security of the country; violence or inciting violence on racial, national, or religious grounds; propagating the symbols or paraphernalia of an extremist organization; carrying out mass riots or vandalism based on ideological, political, racial, national, or religious hatred or enmity; and hate speech or hostility toward any social group.

According to the law, only individuals representing registered religious organizations may conduct missionary activity. If a foreign missionary represents an organization approved by the SCRA, the individual foreign missionary must apply for a visa with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Visas are valid for up to one year, and a missionary is allowed to work three consecutive years in the country. All religious foreign entities, including missionaries, must operate within these restrictions and must reregister annually. Representatives of religious groups acting inconsistently with the law may be fined or deported. Violations of the law may result in fines in the amount of 1,000 soms ($14), and deportation in the case of foreign missionaries.

The law provides for the right of religious groups to produce, import, export, and distribute religious literature and materials in accordance with established procedures, which could include examination by state experts. The law does not require government examination of religious materials (such as literature and other printed or audio or video materials), and it does not define the criteria for religious experts. The law prohibits the distribution of religious literature and materials in public locations or in visits to individual households, schools, and other institutions. The law specifies fines based on the nature of the violations.

The law allows public secular schools an option to offer religion courses that discuss the history and character of religions, as long as the subject of such teaching is not religious doctrine and does not promote any particular religion. Private religious schools need to register with SCRA to operate as such.

According to the law, religion is grounds for conscientious objection to and exemption from military service. Conscientious objectors must pay a fee of 18,000 soms ($260) to opt out of military service. Draft-eligible males must pay the fee before turning 27 years of age. Failure to pay by the age limit requires the person to perform 240 hours of community service or pay a fine of up to 20,000 soms ($290). Draft-eligible men who evade military service and do not fall under an exemption are subject to a fine or imprisonment of up to two years. There is no option to perform alternative service; community service is imposed only in cases of a conscientious objector failing to pay the 18,000 soms ($260) fee.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary Paragraph: Authorities maintained bans on 21 “religiously oriented” groups they considered “extremist” and arrested hundreds of individuals they accused of participating in “extremist” incidents. Authorities pursued a criminal case against one of the police officers accused of attacking participants at a 2015 Jehovah’s Witnesses gathering. A parliamentary committee approved draft amendments to the 2009 religion law that would impose additional restrictions on religious freedom, such as an expansive ban on proselytizing and an increased number of members required to register as a religious organization. Minority religious groups, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, continued to face difficulties in registering, and there were cases of government interference in Jehovah’s Witnesses meetings. Some unregistered groups said they continued to be able to hold religious services without government interference. The SCRA announced a policy to divide public cemeteries by religion. This came in response to reports that non-Muslim religious minorities continued to face difficulties arranging for burial of their dead in public cemeteries, including one case in 2016 in which villagers and imams twice exhumed the body of a deceased Protestant woman without any intervention by local authorities. In September a Bishkek city court overturned the four-year prison term of journalist Zulpukar Sapanov and instead released him with a two-year suspended sentence. Several weeks earlier Sapanov had been convicted on charges of inciting interreligious conflict for authoring a book that examined the pre-Islamic beliefs of the Kyrgyz people. Twice during the year, President Almazbek Atambaev expressed concern about foreign cultures, including from the Middle East, influencing the practice of Islam in the country.

The government continued to maintain bans on 21 “religiously oriented” groups it considered to be “extremist,” including al-Qaida, the Taliban, Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkistan, Kurdish Peoples’ Congress, Organization for the Release of Eastern Turkistan, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), Union of Islamic Jihad, Islamic Party of Turkistan, Unification (Mun San Men) Church, Takfir Jihadist, Jaysh al-Mahdi, Jund al-Khilafah, Ansarullah, At-Takfir Val Hidjra, Akromiya, ISIS, Djabhat An Nusra, Katibat al-Imam al-Buhari, Jannat Oshiqlari, and the Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. Authorities also continued the ban on all materials or activities connected to A.A. Tihomirov aka Said Buryatsky. On June 15, a Bishkek district court ruled Yakyn Incar, a splinter group of Tablighi Jamaat, to be an extremist organization.

The media reported that on October 20, Authorities arrested the leader of Yakyn Incar for possessing extremist materials. A district court ordered his detention for two months, and a criminal case was pending at year’s end.

Law enforcement authorities stated they had recorded 597 “extremist” incidents for the year. They opened criminal cases in 229 instances. Extremist incidents included membership in a banned “religiously oriented” organization, possession of literature associated with a banned organization, and proselytizing on behalf of or financing a banned organization. In comparison, the authorities recorded 441 extremist incidents in 2016, for which they opened 180 criminal cases. According to September 8 press reports, the vice-chairman of the Kyrgyz State Penitentiary Service stated at a public forum there were more than 185 individuals convicted of extremism and terrorism housed in separate prisons in order to prevent the spread of extremist religious ideology among the prison population. There were no reports of citizens being stripped of citizenship for terrorism or extremism. According to NGOs, in the course of conducting counterterrorism measures against extremists, authorities arrested dozens of citizens for possession of vaguely defined “extremist” materials. In addition, ethnic Uzbeks claimed to have been arrested and imprisoned on extremism-related charges, usually tied to possession of banned literature or support of banned organizations, based on false testimony or planted evidence.

The government did not enforce the provision of the law that prohibits the involvement of minors in organized, proselytizing religious groups.

On June 1, the Prosecutor General’s Office requested the Osh regional prosecutor to consider filing criminal charges concerning the 2015 police assault on Jehovah’s Witnesses at a gathering in Osh. In July 2016, the Prosecutor General’s Office opened a criminal case against one of the police officers accused of participating in the attack, after the Osh city prosecutor declined to initiate criminal proceedings against the officer.

On May 30, the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal of two Jehovah’s Witnesses, a mother and daughter, on charges of defrauding local residents while engaged in religious activities. A new trial had been scheduled for April 2016, after the Supreme Court granted an appeal filed by the Osh city prosecutor contesting the acquittal of the defendants, but lawyers for the women successfully argued the three-year statute of limitations had passed. The Osh city prosecutor then appealed the April 2016 ruling. According to the NGO Forum 18, in 2014 the original trial court, in acquitting the two women, stated they had been targeted by the Osh Department of Internal Affairs and Osh City Prosecutor’s office solely because of their religion.

On January 22, authorities raided a Jehovah’s Witnesses meeting in Kemin. After the meeting officials summoned three elders to court and charged them with administrative violations. On May 19, a court dismissed the case against the elders, but a representative from the SCRA reportedly told local Jehovah’s Witnesses that they would monitor all Jehovah’s Witnesses meetings in the country. On January 24, in Osh, SCRA officials accompanied by local police entered a Jehovah’s Witnesses meeting and charged one of the elders with engaging in religious activity without local registration.

On May 29, the Parliamentary Committee on Social Issues, Education, Science, Culture, and Health approved draft amendments to the 2009 religion law. The amendments, which remain pending in parliament, included an expansive ban on proselytizing (particularly door-to-door proselytism), stricter censorship of religious literature, an increased number of members required to register as a religious organization (from 200 to 500 members), and a requirement to notify the government prior to undertaking religious education abroad. If adopted, the amendments would also grant the SCRA additional oversight and enforcement powers over religious organizations. According to Forum 18, the only religious community that submitted comments on the bill was the Spiritual Administration of Muslims, known as the “muftiate,” which supported the proposed restrictions; one committee member acknowledged that other religious communities were likely afraid to comment publicly on the bill. In meetings with government officials, Jehovah’s Witnesses noted concerns with the draft amendments to the religion law, stating that elements of the law would have a negative impact on their ability to share their faith with others, register local congregations, and import religious literature.

On January 27, the Jehovah’s Witnesses filed a complaint with the UN Human Rights Committee regarding the SCRA’s refusal to register communities in Osh, Naryn, Jalal-abad and Batken. In February 2016, the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the Jehovah’s Witnesses to overturn the SCRA’s continuing refusal to register these communities. Representatives of the Jehovah’s Witnesses stated the refusal to register them was in contravention to a 2014 Supreme Court Constitutional Chamber decision declaring unconstitutional the section of the religion law regarding registration requirements. Jehovah’s Witnesses leaders reported authorities continued to deny registration to groups if they did not have 200 resident founding citizens in each region. Church leaders asserted the SCRA’s policy continued to create difficulties for them because without the required minimum number of members, groups could not register, and without registration, they could not meet and recruit members to fulfill the minimum registration requirement. The lawyer representing the Church stated the SCRA had refused the application, “by arguing that although Article 10(2) of the Religion Law had been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Chamber, Parliament had not yet amended the Law.”

Although the government continued not to list the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community as a banned organization, a representative of the group confirmed it still had not obtained registration. The community initially registered in 2002, but the SCRA has declined to approve its reregistration since 2012.

Religious groups continued to report the SCRA registration process was cumbersome, taking anywhere from one month to several years to complete. Some unregistered groups continued to report they were able to hold regular religious services without government interference, especially foreign religious organizations that had been registered in the past and had an annual application for reregistration pending. According to Forum 18, Protestant pastors stated there were many new churches in the country that would like to register, but did not have the 200 founders required for registration, or were afraid to give the names of their members to the police. The SCRA reported it registered one Jehovah’s Witnesses, four Catholic, and four Protestant organizations during the year.

According to Forum 18, non-Muslim religious minorities continued to face difficulties arranging for burial of their dead in public cemeteries. On March 13, the SCRA announced a policy to divide the country’s cemeteries into separate sectors by religion. On January 12 and February 27, the Ala-Buka district court sentenced four persons involved in the October 2016 exhumations of a Protestant woman from two public cemeteries, while imams, local officials, police officers, and National Security Committee officers reportedly looked on but did not interfere. The defendants received three-year suspended sentences. The authorities reportedly did not charge the imams who had incited the exhumations, the officials who had not prevented the exhumations, or members of the mobs that carried out the exhumations. Regional officials reportedly stated they then buried the woman in a third, undisclosed location.

On September 28-29, President Atambaev hosted an international conference on “Islam in a Modern Secular State.” At the conference, international religious experts and academics discussed ways of countering religious radicalization to violence and effective government practices in the religious sphere. At the end of the event, participants adopted the “Bishkek Declaration,” which expressed a desire to “find a balance between observance of human rights and freedoms, including freedom of conscience and religion, and ensuring security.”

On November 29-30, the SCRA held a forum on interfaith dialogue that included Muslim, Russian Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, and Bahai participants, as well as civil society representatives. Topics discussed included “Islam and tolerance,” “the role of tolerance in a multifaith society,” and “questions in multifaith relations.”

The government did not provide religious materials to prisoners charged with affiliation with banned religious groups, according to NGOs, but the government continued to allow them to practice their religion and conduct prayers in prison.

The SCRA reported that, while the law did not mandate expert review of religious literature, its practice was to examine imported religious materials submitted for review by religious organizations. There continued to be no specific procedure for hiring or evaluating the experts performing the examination of religious literature that groups wished to distribute within their places of worship. According to religious studies academics, the SCRA continued to choose its own employees or religious scholars with whom the agency contracted to serve as the experts. Attorneys for religious groups continued to say the experts chosen by the SCRA were biased in favor of prosecutors and were not formal experts under the criminal procedure code. Under current law the SCRA is allowed, but not required, to review religious materials. According to the SCRA, its practice is to examine imported religious materials provided by religious organizations.

On September 19, an attorney for the Jehovah’s Witnesses stated he would file a complaint with the UN Human Rights Committee contesting a February 6 Supreme Court ruling which upheld a lower court decision to bar the importation of the November 2015 issue of the Jehovah’s Witnesses publication Awake!. In March 2016, the Bishkek Interdistrict Court rejected a suit filed by the Jehovah’s Witnesses after the SCRA denied permission to import the publication. The lower court stated it was not competent to overrule the evaluation conducted by the SCRA.

On September 29, a Bishkek city court overturned the four-year prison term of journalist Zulpukar Sapanov and instead released him with a two-year suspended sentence. On September 12, a Bishkek district court convicted Sapanov of “inciting interreligious conflict” and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment for statements in his book Kydyr Sanjyyrasi (Kydr’s Namesake), which examined the pre-Islamic beliefs of the Kyrgyz people and questioned the role of clerics in imposing Islam. Local newspapers published excerpts of his book, which prompted religious leaders to call on the government to investigate Sapanov. The ombudsman, who called the original verdict “a return to the Inquisition,” requested the court to reconsider its decision and attended the appellate trial.

On July 21, at the opening of a center for nomadic civilization near Lake Issyk-Kul, President Atambaev called for the separation of foreign culture from religion. With respect to the increasing number of Kyrgyz women wearing hijabs, the president noted traditionally Kyrgyz women never had the custom of covering their faces, as practiced in other Islamic countries. On August 29, during a visit to Yntymak, President Atambaev urged his audience not to confuse Islam and foreign culture, including the wearing of long beards.

According to representatives of religious groups, refusal either to serve or to pay a fee to opt out of military service continued to subject a conscientious objector to hardship, because military service continued to be a prerequisite for employment in the government and with many private employers.

The muftiate, the highest Islamic administrative body in the country, continued to oversee all Islamic entities, including institutes, madrassahs, and mosques. Although an independent entity per the constitution, NGOs stated the government continued to exert influence over the office, including the mufti selection process.

The SCRA and the Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture held a teacher-training course in August as part of an expanded 56-school pilot program to teach a secular course on the “History of Religious Culture” for ninth grade students in secondary schools in six regions across the country. In June 2016, the SCRA, the muftiate, and the ministry established a working group to implement a concept plan for religious education reform in line with state educational standards.

According to an NGO, on May 19, the Kara-Su District Court sentenced 10 men to between 14 years and life imprisonment for their roles in the September 2015 attempted killing of an Ahmadi Muslim and the December 2015 killing of another Ahmadi Muslim in Kashgar Kyshtak village, Osh Oblast. The men stated they acted on the instructions of a radical former resident of Kashgar Kyshtak who had left the country but called via social media for the killing of Ahmadis.

On June 22, a Bishkek court sentenced Yryskul Beishenaliyev to 18 years’ imprisonment for attempted murder in connection with the November 2015 attempted killing of Kadyr Malikov, a theologian and Director of the Religion, Law, and Politics Analytical Center, a Bishkek think tank and research center. Turkey extradited Beishenaliyev on March 3. In June 2016, a Bishkek court sentenced Beishenaliyev’s suspected accomplice, Tilek Uulu, to life in prison for attempted murder, a sentence that later was reduced to 20 years’ imprisonment.

According to an August 2 report from the NGO World Watch Monitor, unknown persons vandalized a church in the northern city of Tokmak. Sources said “local Islamic radicals” broke into the church building, damaged furniture, and wrote in Russian, “We will kill you,” “Don’t teach our children,” and “Allah” across walls and a window of the church. There were no arrests in connection with the incident. According to civil society activists, incidents of harassment of minority religious groups typically occurred in small towns and villages with majority Kyrgyz populations.

In July the Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture licensed the Hazreti Umar Islamic University as a degree-granting institution, making it the first Islamic educational institute in the country to receive state licensing. The university, an affiliate of the muftiate, remained responsible for overseeing the work of all Islamic schools, including madrassahs and secondary schools. The licensing allowed the university to grant state diplomas, expanding occupational and educational opportunities for its graduates.

The Ambassador and other embassy officers met regularly with government officials, including the SCRA chief and deputy, the grand mufti, and the deputy to the grand mufti. They met to discuss proposed revisions to the religion law, registration of independent religious groups, efforts to promote religious tolerance through exchange visits, and programs to improve the qualifications of religious teachers and the quality of education at religious institutions.

Embassy officers also continued to engage with representatives of the muftiate, leaders of minority religions, NGOs, and civil society representatives to discuss the law on terrorism and extremism, the ability of independent religious groups to register, and the rights of religious minorities.

The embassy sponsored a group of prominent religious leaders on a U.S. government program to exchange views on the role of religion in U.S. and Kyrgyz societies. In September the embassy hosted a visiting Muslim cleric from the United States to participate in an international conference sponsored by the Kyrgyz president on the role of Islam in a secular society state. The embassy continued its sponsorship of English language classes and vocational training at local madrassas to enable students in remote areas to obtain better access to information on religious tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 7.1 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2015 national census, 64.7 percent of the population is Buddhist, 1.7 percent Christian, 31.4 percent has no religion, and the remaining 2.1 percent identify as other or having a nonlisted religion. Theravada Buddhism is the dominant religion of the ethnic or “lowland” Lao, who constitute 53.2 percent of the overall population. According to the LFNC and MOHA, the remainder of the population comprises at least 48 ethnic minority groups, most of which practice animism and ancestor worship. Animism is predominant among Sino-Thai groups, such as the Thai Dam and Thai Daeng, and the Mon-Khmer and Burmo-Tibetan groups. Among lowland Lao, many pre-Buddhist animist beliefs are incorporated into Theravada Buddhist practice, particularly in rural areas. Roman Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Bahais, Mahayana Buddhists, and followers of Confucianism in total constitute less than 3 percent of the population.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the right and freedom to believe or not believe in any religion and states citizens are equal before the law regardless of their beliefs or ethnic group. The government officially recognizes four religious umbrella groups – Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and the Bahai Faith. It generally requires other religious groups to affiliate with one of these four groups in order to operate legally. The constitution also states the government respects and protects all lawful activities of Buddhists and followers of other religions, and “mobilizes and encourages Buddhist monks and novices as well as the priests of other religions to participate in activities that are beneficial to the country and people.” It prohibits all acts that create division between religious groups and classes of persons.

A 2016 decree with the stated intent of clarifying rules for religious practice extends registration requirements to Buddhist groups, which had previously enjoyed a de facto exemption, and defines the government’s role as the final arbiter of permissible religious activities. The decree also sets forth regulations for religious practice; the government implemented and sent instructions on the decree in the capital and to all provinces during the year. The decree reiterates the constitution’s priority that religious practice should serve national interests by promoting development and education and by instructing believers to be good citizens. The decree’s stated purpose is to set the principles, regulations, and laws concerning the governance and protection of religious activities for clergy, teachers of religion, believers, and religious groups in order to preserve and promote national culture, increase solidarity among members of religious groups, and “preserve and develop the nation.”

The 2016 decree states nearly all aspects of religious practice – such as congregating, holding religious services, building houses of worship, modifying existing structures, and establishing new congregations in villages where none existed – require permission from a local MOHA branch office, regardless of whether a group is recognized or registered nationally. Some cases require approval from the central-level MOHA. The decree empowers MOHA to order the cessation of any religious activities or beliefs not in agreement with policies, traditional customs, laws, or regulations within its jurisdiction. It may stop any religious activity threatening national stability, peace, and social order, causing serious damage to the environment, or affecting national solidarity or unity between tribes and religions, including threats to the lives, properties, health, or reputations of others. The decree also requires MOHA to collect information and statistics on religious operations, cooperate with foreign countries and international organizations regarding religious activities, and report religious activities to the government.

The 2016 decree prohibits individuals, organizations with a legal personality, and social establishments from causing division among ethnic groups and religions.

The 2016 decree requires any religious groups operating in the country to register with MOHA. The decree and implementing regulations do not mention the government’s official recognition of four umbrella religious groups – Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and the Bahai Faith – under which all religious groups have historically been advised to operate. Neither the decree nor implementing regulations mention that government-recognized Christian denominations are limited to the Catholic Church, the Laos Evangelical Church (LEC), and the Seventh-day Adventist Church, or the government instruction that all other Christian denominations wishing to be recognized register as part of the LEC, instead of receiving separate recognition.

The same decree stipulates that religious groups must present information on elected or appointed officeholders in committees of responsibility to national, provincial, and district and village level MOHA offices for review, consideration, and certification. MOHA and the related lower-level offices also have authority to issue certificates for religious groups.

Religious groups operating in multiple provinces must obtain national MOHA approval; groups operating in multiple districts are required to obtain provincial level approval; and groups operating in multiple villages are required to obtain district level approval. If a religious group wishes to operate beyond its local congregation, approvals at the corresponding level are required. A religious occurring outside a religious group’s property requires village authority approval. Activities in another village require approval from district authorities, from provincial authorities for activities in another district, and from national authorities for activities in another province. Religious groups must submit annual plans of all activities other than routine events in advance for local authorities to review, investigate, and approve.

All houses of worship must register under the law and applicable regulations. Any maintenance, restoration, and construction activities at religious facilities must receive MOHA approval from all levels. Local authorities may provide opinions regarding building, care, and maintenance of religious facilities, present their findings to their respective provincial governors and city mayors for consideration, and subsequently ask the minister of home affairs to investigate, consider, and approve activities conducted in religious facilities.

Individuals entering the clergy for more than three months require approval from district and village authorities, agreement from the receiving religious establishment, and agreement from a guardian or spouse, if applicable. For a period less than three months, the village authority, as well as a guardian or spouse, if applicable, must approve. The shorter period stipulations are particularly relevant to Buddhists, as every Buddhist male is expected to enter the monkhood at least once in his life, often for fewer than three months.

The Ministry of Education and Sports (MOES) and MOHA must approve the travel of clergy and religious teachers traveling abroad for specialist studies. Generally, any students going abroad for study require approval from the MOES. Religious organizations conducting religious activities overseas must receive approval from the appropriate geographical MOHA level in Laos.

The LFNC may educate and meet with religious leaders, clergy, teachers, and members to ensure compliance with laws and regulations, aim to reduce ethnic and religious tensions, and “contribute to the development of the nation.” LFNC officials may listen to opinions and concerns of religious communities in order to work with police or other authorities to investigate and resolve problems.

The government controls written materials for mass consumption, including for religious use. The 2016 decree regulates the importation and printing of religious materials and production of books, documents, icons, and symbols of various religions. MOHA may require the relevant religious group to certify the imported materials are truly representative of their religion, to address issues of authenticity, and to ensure imported materials comport with values and practices in the country. The law prohibits the import or export of unapproved printed or electronic religious materials.

The 2016 decree states the government may continue to sponsor Buddhist facilities, incorporate Buddhist rituals and ceremonies in state functions, and promote Buddhism as an element of the country’s cultural and spiritual identity and as the predominant religion of the country.

The 2016 decree requires Buddhist clergy to have identification cards, and clergy of other religions are required to have certificates to prove they have received legitimate religious training.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with a reservation that Article 18 on freedom of religion shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any activities to directly or indirectly coerce or compel an individual to believe or not to believe in a religion or to change his or her religion or belief, and that all acts that create division and discrimination among ethnic groups and religious groups are incompatible with the article.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: There were reports authorities subjected some religious minority members to attempted forced renunciations, imprisonment, arrest, detention, and fines. Leaders of the recognized minority religions said they were aware of fewer of these types of incidents among villagers who had converted to Christianity than in previous years; in most cases, those arrested were fined and/or released. Persons arrested or detained received little protection under the law and could be held for lengthy periods without trial and then released, according to reports. In some cases local officials reportedly threatened Protestants with arrest or expulsion from their villages if they did not comply with certain orders. For example, a district-level official in Houaphan Province expelled 26 recently converted Hmong Christians from their village and advised they could return to their village only if they renounced Christianity. Some local officials withheld required documentation, such as titles to land usage rights, from Christians to force them to renounce their faith, or denied issuance of travel documents. NGOs stated the relatively decentralized nature of the government structure contributed to abuses by local officials, some of whom reportedly were unaware of laws and policies protecting religious freedom or unwilling to implement them. Religious groups stated that most, if not all, instances of abuse occurred in remote villages. Local authorities in many areas considered group worship in homes illegal, while Protestant groups reported they sometimes could not obtain permission to build new churches. As many as three-fourths of the LEC congregations throughout the country did not have permanent church structures and conducted worship services in homes.

In February officials detained five Christian pastors in Attapeu Province for traveling beyond their village limits to proselytize without prior authorization and for crossing the Vietnamese border, and returning, without valid travel documents, religious leaders in Vientiane reported. Authorities released the pastors after a few weeks, after the group paid a “fine” totaling 57.4 million kip ($6,900).

In October in Phonxay District of Luang Prabang Province, officials detained for less than one day four Christians at the district public security office for their beliefs, according to religious leaders in Vientiane. Officials elsewhere in Luang Prabang Province tried to pressure a recovered drug addict in remote, ethnically Khmu, Huyano Village to renounce Christianity or face drug charges. Officials detained him for three weeks until he paid a fine of 3.5 million kip ($420). Elders in the same village tried to pressure three other Christians to renounce their religion, while four others reportedly renounced under pressure in the past year. By year’s end provincial and central government officials had failed to act on local Christian leaders’ requests for assistance; local officials continued to enforce the will of village elders.

In December religious leaders reported a number of incidents that occurred during the Christmas season involving detentions of Christians traveling without permission to attend religious events outside of their normal locales. In some incidents, government officials reprimanded Christians for holding small gatherings in private homes to celebrate Christmas without receiving prior authorization. In Vientiane Province, local police arrested six Christians for traveling without permission for religious purposes. Although central authorities requested provincial officials release the six detainees after payment of a small court fee, those authorities had not released the detainees by year’s end. Provincial authorities required each detainee to pay six million kip ($730) in fines to provincial authorities as a condition of release. Religious leaders reported various incidents throughout the country related to the issue of lack of prior travel permission; most other cases were resolved within hours of occurrence.

In February religious leaders in Vientiane reported that in Houy Poong and Hinpan villages in Luang Prabang Province, local officials told ethnic Khmu and Hmong families to abandon their Christian practices or be evicted from the village. When the families refused to do so, officials initially told them to move to another province, but other officials then stopped the families at the provincial border. They ordered the families to return to their village, but subsequently officials prevented them from accessing their farmland to plant crops. In each case, officials confiscated titles to land usage rights to attempt to force their renunciations, but allowed them to keep their household registration documents so they could move elsewhere. Eventually, most of the affected families chose to resettle in other villages in the province, and one family renounced Christianity. In a separate incident near Luang Prabang, authorities arrested a village’s first convert to Christianity, pushing him to renounce his new religion. After Christian leaders in Vientiane intervened with the government, authorities released the individual.

In February in Son District, Houaphan Province, a district-level official expelled 26 Hmong Christians from their village and advised they could return only if they renounced Christianity, according to religious leaders in Vientiane. The official also confiscated the individuals’ land usage rights documents. The local level LFNC provided the group with temporary shelter in the district capital for several months, but at year’s end, the Christians remained unable to return to their village. Provincial officials, including provincial assembly members, reportedly tried to persuade village elders to allow these Christians to return.

According to religious groups, in April 2016 in Khamkeut District, Bolikhamxay Province, village leaders forced 10 Christian families to leave for allegedly creating conflict and disrupting village harmony by dividing the village into followers of more than one religion. During the year local officials in the village to which the Christian families had fled allowed them to purchase land rights to set up homes, farm, and send their children to local schools; however, household registration papers for new properties had not been issued by local authorities by the end of the year.

Government officials said the country was open to all religions, although authorities continued to provide official recognition to only four groups. The LEC continued to serve as an umbrella group for all registered Christian denominations other than Catholics or Seventh-day Adventists, as religious leaders reported applications for new Christian groups were too difficult to have recognized. Several unregistered Christian denominations attempted to register independently from the LEC due to differences in doctrinal beliefs; their applications were still pending at year’s end.

Although the law prohibits members of religious groups not registered with MOHA or the LFNC from practicing their faith, several reportedly did so quietly without interference. Christian groups seeking official recognition separate from the LEC continued to be targets of restrictions, and authorities in several provinces insisted independent congregations join the LEC. In many areas, however, local authorities allowed unauthorized churches to conduct services unhindered.

Religious leaders continued to indicate Christians appeared to be the fastest growing religious community, and Christians reported facing the most difficulties with local authorities and the general population. Their growth was most evident in rural areas, which led to frequent reports of conflicts with local communities and local authorities.

According to religious groups, both local and central government officials referred to the constitution, the former and current prime ministerial decrees, and social harmony as reasons for restricting and monitoring religious activity, especially the activities of new or small Christian organizations among minority ethnic groups.

According to Muslim community leaders, Muslims were able to practice openly at the two active mosques in Vientiane, the only mosques in the country. According to the Muslim Association, its leaders met regularly with LFNC and MOHA officials and maintained an effective working relationship with the government. The government permitted individuals from Thailand to conduct Tabligh teachings.

While animists generally reported little governmental interference, the government actively discouraged animist practices that it deemed outdated, dangerous, or illegal, such as the practice in some tribes of killing children born with defects or burying the bodies of deceased relatives beneath homes.

Representatives of Bahai communities in Vientiane, Savannakhet, and Luang Prabang reported that local authorities generally did not interfere with or restrict their activities. In October Bahais held a public event at the LFNC’s training offices, which was attended by high-ranking officials from various ministries and included representatives of nearly all recognized religious communities.

Religious leaders said authorities enforced a ban on proselytizing in public, although this did not generally impede individuals from speaking about their beliefs to others in private settings or among friends. Authorities enforced rules requiring that programs or activities conducted outside houses of worship receive prior approval from local or higher officials.

Authorities sought to control the importation of religious materials from outside the country. MOHA officials said they were concerned that imported religious materials and texts might include content that differed from domestic practices, and enforced such controls “to avoid misunderstandings.”

Provincial, district, and local officials, as well as the MOHA Department of Ethnic and Religious Affairs, LFNC representatives, and local Protestant leaders and community leaders did not meet again following 2016 negotiations concerning confiscations of churches in prior years, including one property in Vientiane Capital and fewer than eight properties in Savannakhet Province. The pending cases were unresolved at year’s end.

Due to difficulties obtaining building permits from local authorities, as many as three-fourths of the LEC congregations throughout the country did not have permanent church structures and conducted worship services in homes. The LFNC Religious Affairs Department continued to urge that house churches be replaced with designated church structures whenever possible; local authorities in many areas considered group worship in homes illegal. Religious group representatives said the building permit process began at the local level and then required district, provincial, and ultimately central-level LFNC and MOHA permission. They said local officials used the process to block construction of new churches.

Many religious leaders said they experienced lengthy delays in obtaining permits for church construction, and generally received no response to requests. According to the LFNC, many of the delays involved legal matters concerning construction, or in some cases, a cluster of Christian families in a village wished to build two or three churches in their village, which would result in more churches than local authorities thought the number of Christians would justify. The LFNC said this led to conflict with other religions in the village that often had an equal number of temples, and therefore local authorities did not permit the construction of additional churches. The LFNC cited counter examples in which a Catholic church, a Protestant church, and several Buddhist temples existed in harmony.

According to MOES, there was no Buddhist curriculum taught as religion in any public schools. The government, however, promoted the teaching of Buddhist practices in public schools as part of national culture. Mandatory cultural sessions included lessons taught in Buddhist temples and, to advance to the next grade level, educational authorities required all students to pray in Buddhist temples. Christian students reported discomfort with the requirement. MOES said it allowed parents to remove their children from the classes if they were dissatisfied with the program. In several provinces, however, lessons in Buddhism were still mandatory to pass to the next grade level, reportedly sometimes as a form of punishment of Christian students. This was especially true in areas where temples provided education because the government was unable to support a public school. A number of private schools affiliated with various religious groups existed throughout the country and accepted students from any religious denomination.

Religious groups stated they were aware of no openly non-Buddhist or nonanimist government officials in higher-level posts at provincial or national levels.

In cases that came to officials’ attention, the government strictly enforced a prohibition on proselytizing by foreigners, which reportedly continued to be widespread although conducted mainly in small private settings. Christian leaders from foreign countries reported local congregations often requested they not preach from the pulpit to avoid the perception that foreigners were proselytizing citizens. In May security officials briefly detained a tour guide in Luang Prabang when foreign members of his tour group distributed religious materials to some villagers. The tourists left the country before authorities could question them.

With advance permission and no open proselytizing, government authorities permitted Lao and expatriate Christians to organize a public, open-air religious music event for the first time. The Vientiane International Gospel Music Festival took place October 27-29 at the night market of That Luang Lake Specific Economic Zone, with performances by local and foreign artists and bands.

Religious groups said provincial government officials asked religious leaders not to report grievances to foreigners in exchange for greater religious freedom. According to religious groups, the central government continued efforts to keep individuals who had been arrested, banished, punished, marginalized, or had otherwise been the victim of abuses due to their religious beliefs out of sight of international observers.

In dealing with local conflicts regarding religious problems, officials at MOHA reported they first waited for the provinces to resolve the issue before getting involved. Government officials from MOHA and LFNC officials again acknowledged some local officials were on occasion incorrectly applying regulations or in fact creating their own regulations contrary to national law.

The LFNC and MOHA stated they continued to visit occasionally areas where abuses of religious freedom had reportedly taken place to instruct local officials on government policy and law. LFNC and MOHA officials said they frequently traveled to the provinces to encourage religious groups to practice in accordance with the country’s laws and regulations. They also hosted training workshops for local officials to explain officials’ obligations under the constitution and the right to believe or not to believe in religion. During these sessions, central authorities provided training to provincial LFNC and MOHA officials on the 2016 decree and other laws governing religion and held seminars that reviewed the basic tenets of Buddhism, Christianity, the Bahai Faith, and Islam from religious leaders. With support from an international NGO, MOHA and/or the LFNC held workshops and seminars in Vientiane Capital and Xaysomboun Province in January; Vientiane Province in February and August; and in Xiengkhuang, Phongsaly, and Savannakhet Provinces in September, October, and November, respectively. They also held a seminar in December in Ngoi District, Luang Prabang Province, where several problems has arisen early in the year. The national government funded a workshop in mid-2017 in Houaphanh Province.

Observers said the government approved implementation guidelines for the 2016 decree much more quickly than it did for other new decrees. The officially recognized religious groups supported the government’s dissemination efforts by printing and distributing the decree and its implementation guidelines.

In collaboration with the LFNC, an international NGO continued to conduct training for provincial and district officials and local religious leaders throughout the year. The training was designed to help the officials and religious leaders understand the law and each other better, and to address religious leaders’ continuing concerns about the eviction of religious minority families and the subsequent confiscation of their property in various villages.

Officials continued to state there were cases where Buddhist or animist prisoners have converted to Christianity in prison in the hope their new religious group may press for their release or a reduced sentence on religious grounds.

Christian sources reported occasional interreligious tensions among some minority ethnic groups, particularly in response to the growth of Christian congregations or disagreements over access to village resources.

The refusal by members of non-Buddhist groups, particularly Protestants, to participate in Buddhist or animist ceremonies continued to be a source of tension in rural areas. In some cases, villagers threatened Christians with expulsion from the village if they did not renounce their faith. Christian group leaders, however, encouraged their members to work out a compromise allowing them to support local Buddhist or animist ceremonies without participating in them. Members of some Christian groups said they could not make such compromises, which they said would violate their religious beliefs.

Christians said conflicts with animists regarding burial practices remained an issue throughout the year, and Christian leaders cited cases that occurred in Khammouan, Savannakhet and Xayaburi provinces. Some animists continue to be concerned about the Christian practice of burying their dead within the village boundary or nearby confines, believing that the deceased’s spirit would bring disharmony to the village and conflict with the village spirits because the body was not cremated.

Officials and press reported cases in remote villages in which animist family members reported their Christian convert children or grandchildren damaged or destroyed animist relics. Elder animists said they opposed their younger family members adopting nonanimist beliefs and threatened them via various means, including government intervention. According to both religious leaders in Vientiane and central government officials, some of these conflicts may not involve religion specifically, but rather other family or village disputes. Local officials or village elders possibly addressed these problems at face value in terms of religious differences instead of determining underlying problems. It was sometimes difficult for those in Vientiane to differentiate whether the problems reported were religious in nature.

Some religious leaders partly agreed with the government’s ‘social harmony’ rationale for monitoring and oversight of religious activities. They said misunderstandings continued to occur, which they said was due to low education levels in remote parts of the country and some local animists’ not having prior exposure to nonanimists.

Several private preschools and English-language schools received support from religious groups abroad of various denominations. Many boys received instruction in religion and other subjects in Buddhist temples, which continued to play a traditional schooling role in smaller communities where formal education was limited or unavailable. Two Buddhist colleges and two Buddhist secondary schools provided religious training for children and adults. Christian denominations, particularly the LEC and Seventh-day Adventists, conducted religious education for children and youth. Bahai groups conducted religious training for children and adult members. The Catholic Church operated a seminary in Khammouane Province for students with high school degrees to study philosophy and theology for two to 10 years. The Muslim community offered limited educational training.

Some members of ethnic groups associated with the United States during the Vietnam War era said they felt abandoned by the United States and had rejected Christianity, which they viewed as an American religion. This sentiment reportedly led to problems in remote areas where these ethnic communities placed additional pressure on Christians, including by their own families and neighbors.

U.S. embassy officials regularly advocated with a range of government officials for religious freedom and the reform of relevant laws and decrees to ensure they were consistent with international human rights standards. In frequent exchanges with MOHA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the LFNC Religious Affairs Department, embassy officials discussed the need for swift and appropriate resolution of specific cases of arrest, abuse, or harassment; and cumbersome registration procedures; and trends in abuses of religious freedom. Embassy officials also engaged the government on its management of religious practices in the provinces, including forced or threatened detentions, removal from villages, evictions, and other problems, especially for recent converts. Embassy officials regularly followed up on developments with religious leaders and government officials.

In May the embassy sponsored participation of an official from the Religious Affairs Department of the LFNC in a three-week program in the United States on Religious Freedom, Diversity and Tolerance.

The Ambassador and other embassy officials met with religious leaders and advocacy groups to address religious equality concerns. A senior Department of State official met with religious leaders in Xieng Khouang Province to understand the constraints they faced at the provincial level. Embassy officials regularly consulted registered and unregistered religious groups regarding reports of arrests of religious followers, cumbersome registration procedures, and abuses of freedom to worship, including during visits to Luang Prabang Province.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.9 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the largest denominations are Lutheran (37 percent), Roman Catholic (18 percent), and Latvian Orthodox Christian (19 percent), the latter of which are predominantly native Russian speakers; 24 percent are unaffiliated with any religious group. The Latvian Orthodox Church is a self-governing Eastern Orthodox Church under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Central Statistical Bureau reported there are 4,873 persons who identify as Jewish, and the Council of Jewish Communities believes there are between 6,000 and 8,000 persons with Jewish heritage. The Islamic community reports approximately 1,000 Muslims, while the MOJ Annual Report of Religious Organizations and their Activities lists 295 Muslim community members. Other religious groups, which together constitute less than 5 percent of the population, include Baptists, Pentecostals, Seventh-day Adventists, Old Believers, evangelical Christians, Methodists, Calvinists, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons).

Legal Framework

The constitution states everyone has the right to “freedom of thought, conscience, and religion,” and “the church shall be separate from the state.” It allows restrictions on the expression of religious beliefs in order to protect public safety, welfare, morals, the democratic structure of the state, and others’ rights. The law gives eight “traditional” religious groups – Lutherans, Catholics, Latvian Orthodox Christians, Old Believers, Baptists, Methodists, Seventh-day Adventists, and Jews – some rights and privileges not given to other religious groups, including the right to teach religion courses in public schools and the right to officiate at marriages without obtaining a civil marriage license from the MOJ. These eight groups are also the only religious groups represented on the government’s Ecclesiastical Council, an advisory body established by law and chaired by the prime minister that meets on an ad hoc basis to comment and provide recommendations on religious issues. These recommendations do not carry the force of law.

Separate laws define relations between the state and each of these eight groups. The rights and activities of other religious groups are covered by one law on religious organizations.

Although the government does not require religious groups to register, the law accords registered religious groups a number of rights and privileges, including legal status to own property and conduct financial transactions, eligibility to apply for funds for religious building restoration, and tax deductions for donors. Registration also allows religious groups to perform religious activities in hospitals, prisons, and military units and hold services in public places such as parks or public squares with the agreement of the local government. The law accords the same rights and privileges to the eight traditional religious groups, which it treats as already registered.

Unregistered groups do not possess legal status and may not own property, conduct financial transactions, or receive tax-free donations. They may not perform religious activities in hospitals, prisons, and military units, and generally may not hold worship services in public places without special permission. The law stipulates fines if an unregistered group carries out any of these activities.

The law stipulates that, in order to register as a congregation, a religious group must have at least 20 members aged 18 or older. Individuals with temporary residency status, such as asylum seekers and foreign diplomatic staff, may count as members for the purpose of registration only during the authorized period of their residency permits. To apply, religious groups must submit statutes stipulating their aims and tasks; a list of all group members (full name, identification number, and signature); the names of the persons who will represent the religious organization; minutes of the meeting founding the group; confirmation that members voted on and approved the statutes; and a list of members of the audit committee (full name, identification number, and title). The audit committee is responsible for preparing financial reports on the group and ensuring it adheres to its statutes. The MOJ determines whether to register a religious group as a congregation. The ministry may deny an application if it deems registration would threaten human rights, the democratic structure of the state, public safety, welfare, or morals. Groups denied registration may appeal the decision in court.

Ten or more congregations – totaling at least 200 members – of the same faith or denomination, each with permanent registration status, may form a religious association or church. Groups with religious association status, or status as a private society or foundation, may establish theological schools or monasteries. The law does not permit simultaneous registration of more than one religious association of a single faith or denomination, or of more than one religious group with the same or similar name. For example, the law prevents any association other than the Latvian Orthodox Church from registering with the word “orthodox” in its name. Independent Orthodox groups, such as Old Believers, are registered as separate religious associations.

The law requires religious groups registered for fewer than 10 years to reregister every year. Reregistration requires an MOJ evaluation of the group’s activities in the previous year and submission of the same documentation as first-time registrants.

According to the law, all traditional and registered religious organizations are required to submit an annual report to the MOJ by March 1 regarding their activities and goals. They must additionally provide other data, including congregation size, number of clergy, number of weddings and other ceremonies performed, and details of group governance and financial status.

The law criminalizes hate speech and the incitement of hatred on the basis of religious affiliation but requires legal proof, determined at trial, of substantial harm for conviction. Penalties range from community service to up to 10 years of imprisonment. Committing a crime for religious reasons may also be considered an aggravating factor at trial.

The government funds religion and ethics classes in public schools. The school must receive the approval of the parents of at least 10 students in order to hold religion classes; if such approval is not obtained, students take courses on general ethics. The Center for Educational Content at the Ministry of Education must review the content of the classes to verify they do not violate freedom of conscience. First through third-grade public school students must take either a class on religious beliefs of one of the eight traditional groups or an ethics class; starting in fourth grade, religious subjects are incorporated into elective ethics and social science classes. If there is demand, schools are permitted to teach classes on the history of religion. Students at state-supported national minority schools may attend classes on a voluntary basis on the religion “characteristic of the national minority.” Other nontraditional religious groups without their own state-supported minority schools may provide religious education only in private schools. Religion courses in public schools range from doctrinal instruction by church-approved government-certified instructors (usually at the lower grades), to nondenominational Christian teachings or overviews of major world religions by certified teachers who are proposed by a religious group, and approved by the Ministry of Education (usually at higher grades).

The law establishes an independent ombudsman’s office for human rights. Its mandate includes helping to resolve cases of religious discrimination through collaboration with authorities. While it does not have enforcement powers, it can issue recommendations to specific authorities. Parliament appoints the ombudsman.

The law stipulates foreign missionaries may be issued a residency permit, hold meetings, and proselytize only if a registered domestic religious group invites them to conduct such activities. Visa regulations require foreign religious workers to present letters of invitation, typically from a religious organization, and either an ordination certificate or evidence of religious education that corresponds to a local bachelor’s degree in theology.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Thirty religious groups, all of those that applied, reregistered during the year, and the MOJ approved the applications of six other religious groups that applied to register for the first time.

President Raimonds Vejonis and other senior government officials, including the prime minister’s legal advisor, the president’s legal advisors, representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and members of parliament, met with Jewish groups to discuss property restitution. Despite the talks, the government did not take any additional steps to restitute property in accordance with the 2009 Terezin Declaration, which called for measures to provide for assistance, redress, and remembrance for victims of Nazi persecution. There were differing views about the number of properties that remained to be restituted.

The new prayer center of the Islamic Cultural Centre in Latvia (ICCL) again failed to open. In 2016, the Riga City Construction Board said the center failed to meet fire and other safety requirements because of an increase in the number of persons who would use the building. The leader of the ICCL, Janis Hamza Lucins, stated the delays were unwarranted but addressing them was not a priority, and the ICCL did not act to satisfy the construction board by year’s end.

Authorities continued to monitor ICCL activities, according to the annual report of the Security Police. ICCL leader Lucins again said he did not view government monitoring of his group to be discrimination or a violation of ICCL members’ rights.

President Vejonis and other senior government officials, including Speaker of the Parliament Inara Murniece, Prime Minister Maris Kucinskis, and Minister of Defense Raimonds Bergmanis, attended or spoke at Holocaust memorial events, including International Holocaust Remembrance Day, Latvian Holocaust Memorial Day, and the Rumbula Forest Massacre Memorial.

On October 15, the Bauska County Municipality and the Council of Jewish Communities unveiled the Memorial Synagogue Garden at the site of the destroyed Bauska synagogue, burned down by the Nazis in 1941. The Jewish community reported that, after 15 years of appealing without success to former city authorities to establish the memorial, the current municipality administration fully supported and expedited the project.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

On March 16, an annual march took place commemorating Latvians who fought in the grenadier divisions of the Waffen SS against the Soviet Red Army in World War II. Approximately 250 persons, including 10-15 SS veterans and three members of parliament from the All for Latvia Party, participated. Protesters also attended. The organizers, the Daugava Hawks group, characterized the annual march as a commemoration of national identity and remembrance of those who fought for independence, rather than as a glorification of Nazism. Police arrested five persons protesting against the march. As in previous years, the march drew strong condemnations from various groups, including the Simon Wiesenthal Center. German Member of Parliament Volker Beck supported the protesters of the march in a speech at the Latvian Embassy in Berlin, stating that Holocaust victims and survivors were “repeatedly injured through this annual commemoration.”

Riga Jewish community Executive Director Gita Umanovska stated there were instances of anti-Semitic hate speech on the internet, mostly in the form of posts on social media and comments on news articles, although none were reported to police. She stated anti-Semitic hate speech centered on the assertion that Jews were taking something that did not belong to them. For example, one website posted, “Are there any Jews in Latvia? What are they doing here, and what do they want? Let them go home.” Another site, referencing Jewish restitution claims, posted, “They don’t deserve anything! No one is to blame for the fact that they missed the application deadline. All they’re doing now is thinking of their personal business. The Jews who owned something are not the same Russian Jews or [are] Jews who themselves were involved in all the repressions….”

ICCL leader Lucins also reported incidents of hate speech on the internet, mostly posts on social media and comments on news articles, which he stated were due to anti-Islamic sentiment. According to Lucins, anti-Islamic hate speech focused on the theme that Islam was incompatible with the country’s society. For example, one site carried the message, “How long are they [Muslims] going to continue with this? I’m sick and tired of all this information, how good Islam is etc.!!!! Latvia DOES NOT NEED Islam, nor do we want any Muslims here!!!” Another message read, “Personally I would not like to have my children go to the same school with her children… MY STRONG BELIEF IS THAT LATVIA DOES NOT NEED ISLAM, and whoever practices it should move to ISLAMIC COUNTRIES.” In a third instance, a poster wrote, “Islam is a cult of death, pedophilia, and totalitarianism. Muhammad slept with a 9-year-old girl, chopped off heads, and was constantly at war, and demanded total obedience, and slavery is the norm in Islam.”

The Ambassador and other U.S. embassy officers engaged in regular discussions with government officials, primarily at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Education, and with members of parliament, on the importance of restoring expropriated property to the Jewish community, religious tolerance, and Holocaust education.

Additionally, embassy staff met with leaders of the Jewish community, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Roma, Old Believers, and NGOs, including the Latvian Center for Human Rights and Safe House, to discuss their concerns with religious tolerance and acceptance in the country.

The embassy funded the visit of five history teachers who participated in the Rumbula’s Echo project, the first film documenting the killing of 25,000 Latvian Jews, to the United States for a teacher training program on Holocaust education. In January to commemorate International Holocaust Remembrance Day, the embassy funded the traveling exhibition “NOT the Last Butterfly,” a project to make a representation of a butterfly for each of the 1.5 million children killed during the Holocaust. Embassy officials went to schools to show a film about the project and help children make and paint butterflies while they learned about the deceased children’s stories. Embassy officials also spoke with high school students about the country’s own Holocaust history.

The embassy funded publication of the second edition of the book “I Survived Rumbuli,” a first-person account of the Rumbula Forest massacre, in which Nazi SS troops and Latvian auxiliaries killed approximately 25,000 Jews over two nonconsecutive days in 1941.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 6.2 million (July 2017 estimate). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other organizations estimate the total population includes approximately 4.5 million citizens and an estimated 1.5 million refugees fleeing the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, as well as a Palestinian refugee population present in the country for nearly 70 years. Statistics Lebanon, an independent firm, estimates 57.7 percent of the citizen population is Muslim (28.7 percent Sunni, 28.4 percent Shia, and smaller percentages of Alawites and Ismailis).

Statistics Lebanon estimates that 36.2 percent of the population is Christian. Maronite Catholics are the largest Christian group, followed by Greek Orthodox. Other Christian groups include Greek Catholics (Melkites), Armenian Orthodox (Gregorians), Armenian Catholics, Syriac Orthodox (Jacobites), Syriac Catholics, Assyrians (Nestorians), Chaldeans, Copts, Protestants (including Presbyterians, Baptists, and Seventh-day Adventists), Latins (Roman Catholics), and members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons).

According to Statistics Lebanon, 5.2 percent of the population is Druze and is concentrated in the rural, mountainous areas east and south of Beirut. There are also small numbers of Jews, Bahais, Buddhists, and Hindus.

The government estimates there are approximately 1.5 million refugees from Syria, who are largely Sunni, but include Shia and Christians as well. There are between 250,000 and 300,000 Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank still living in the country as UN-registered refugees, and they are largely Sunni. A census of Palestinians, conducted jointly by the Lebanese and Palestinian statistics authorities, under the auspices of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee, counted 174,535 Palestinian refugees in the country.

The Jewish Community Council, which represents the Lebanese Jewish community, estimates that approximately 100 Jews remain in the country.

Refugees and foreign migrants also include largely Sunni Kurds; Sunni and Shia Muslims and Chaldeans from Iraq; and Coptic Christians from Egypt and Sudan. According to the secretary-general of the Syriac League, an NGO that advocates for Syriac Christians in the country, approximately 10,000 Iraqi Christians of all denominations and 3,000 to 4,000 Coptic Christians reside in the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution states there shall be “absolute freedom of conscience” and declares the state will respect all religious groups and denominations, as well as the personal status and religious interests of persons of every religious group. The constitution guarantees free exercise of religious rites provided they do not disturb the public order, and declares the equality of rights and duties for all citizens without discrimination or preference.

By law, an individual is free to convert to a different religion if a local senior official of the religious group the person wishes to join approves the change. The newly joined religious group issues a document confirming the convert’s new religion, and allowing the convert to register her or his new religion with the Ministry of Interior’s Personal Status Directorate. The new religion is included thereafter on government-issued civil registration documents, along with mention of the original religion.

Citizens have the right to remove the customary notation of their religion from government-issued civil registration documents or change how it is listed. Changing the documents does not require approval of religious officials (although the religious act of conversion does require such permission).

The penal code stipulates a maximum prison term of one year for anyone convicted of “blaspheming God publicly.” It does not provide a definition of what this entails.

The penal code also criminalizes defamation and contempt for religion, and stipulates a maximum prison term of three years.

By law, religious groups may apply to the government for official recognition. To do so, it must submit a statement of its doctrine and moral principles to the cabinet, which evaluates whether the group’s principles are in accord with the government’s perception of popular values and the constitution. Alternatively, an unrecognized religious group may apply for recognition by applying to a recognized religious group. In doing so, the unrecognized group does not gain recognition as a separate group, but becomes an affiliate of the group through which it applies. This process has the same requirements as applying for recognition directly with the government.

There are 18 officially recognized religious groups. These include four Muslim groups (Shia, Sunni, Alawites and Ismaili), 12 Christian groups (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, and 10 smaller groups), Druze, and Jews. Groups the government does not recognize include Bahais, Buddhists, Hindus, and several Protestant groups.

Official recognition of a religious group allows baptisms and marriages performed by the group to receive government sanction. Official recognition also conveys other benefits, such as tax-exempt status and the right to apply the religious group’s codes to personal status matters. By law, the government permits recognized religious groups to administer their own rules on family and personal status issues including marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. Shia, Sunni, recognized Christian, and Druze groups have state-appointed, government-subsidized clerical courts to administer family and personal status law.

Religious groups perform all marriages and divorces; there are no formalized procedures for civil marriage or divorce. The government recognizes civil marriage ceremonies performed outside the country irrespective of the religious affiliation of each partner in the marriage.

Nonrecognized religious groups may own property and may assemble for worship and perform their religious rites freely. They may not perform legally recognized marriage or divorce proceedings and they have no standing to determine inheritance issues. Members of these groups do not qualify for certain government positions, including ministerial, parliamentary, secretary-general, and director general positions.

The government requires Protestant churches to register with the Evangelical Synod, a self-governing advisory group overseeing religious matters for Protestant congregations, and representing those churches to the government.

The law allows censorship of religious publications under a number of conditions, including if the government deems the material incites sectarian discord or threatens national security.

According to the constitution, recognized religious communities may have their own schools, provided they follow the general rules issued for public schools, which stipulate schools must not incite sectarian discord or threaten national security. Approximately 70 percent of students attend private schools, which despite many having ties to confessional groups, are often open to children of other religions as well. The Ministry of Education does not require or encourage religious education in public schools.

The constitution states “sectarian groups” shall be represented in a “just and equitable balance” in the cabinet and high-level civil service positions, which includes the ministry ranks of secretary-general and director general. It also states these posts shall be distributed proportionately among the recognized religious groups. This distribution of positions among religious groups is based on the unwritten 1943 National Pact, which used religious affiliation data from the 1932 census (the last conducted in the country), and also applies to the civil service, the judiciary, military and security institutions, and public agencies at both the national and local levels of government. Parliament is elected on the basis of “equality between Christians and Muslims.” Druze and Alawites are included in this allocation with the Muslim communities.

The constitution also states there is no legitimacy for any authorities that contradict the “pact of communal existence,” thereby giving force of law to the unwritten 1943 National Pact, although that agreement is neither an official component of the constitution nor a formally binding agreement. According to the pact, the president shall be a Maronite Christian, the speaker of parliament shall be a Shia Muslim, and the prime minister shall be a Sunni Muslim.

The Taef Agreement, which ended the country’s 15-year civil war in 1989, also mandates equal Muslim and Christian representation in parliament, but makes changes to the powers of the Maronite Christian presidency, including subjecting the designations of the prime minister and other cabinet ministers to consultations with parliament. In addition, the agreement endorses the constitutional provision of appointing most senior government officials according to religious affiliation, including senior positions within the military and other security forces. The Taef Agreement mandates a cabinet with seats allocated equally between Muslims (to include Druze and Alawites) and Christians. The Taef Agreement’s stipulations on equality of representation between members of different confessions do not apply to citizens who do not list a religious affiliation on their national registration, and thus may not hold a seat designated for a specific confession.

On June 14, parliament approved a new electoral law replacing the country’s winner-take-all system for parliamentary elections with a proportional vote. The law does not affect the Christian-Muslim proportionality of parliament.

By law, the synod of each Christian group elects its patriarchs; the Sunni and Shia electoral bodies elect their respective senior clerics; and the Druze community elects its sheikh al-aql. The government council of ministers must endorse the nomination of Sunni and Shia muftis, as well as the Druze sheikh al-aql, and pay their salaries. The government also appoints and pays the salaries of Muslim and Druze clerical judges. By law, the government does not endorse Christian patriarchs and does not pay the salaries of Christian clergy and officials of Christian groups.

The government issues religious workers a one-month visa; in order to stay longer, a worker must complete a residency application during the month. Religious workers also must sign a “commitment of responsibility” form before receiving a visa, which subjects the worker to legal prosecution and immediate deportation for any activity involving religious or other criticism directed against the state or any other country, except Israel. If the government finds an individual engaging in religious activity while on a tourist visa, the government may determine a violation of the visa category has occurred and deport the individual.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government continued to enforce laws against defamation and contempt for religion, but there were no cases of imprisonment under the laws. On November 28, police arrested Ahmad Sbeity, a poet in the southern part of the country, for a Facebook post that reportedly insulted the Virgin Mary. His case was in progress at year’s end. For the second year in a row, there was no judicial action on the lawsuit filed in 2015 by Member of Parliament Ziad Aswad of the Free Patriotic Movement against “You Stink” activist Assad Thebian for “defamation and contempt of religion” for comments he made about Christianity.

Some members of unregistered religious groups, such as Bahais and members of nonrecognized Protestant faiths, continued to list themselves as belonging to recognized religious groups in government records in order to ensure their marriage and other personal status documents remained legally valid. For instance, many Bahais said they chose to list themselves as Shia in order to effectively manage civil matters officially administered by Shia institutions.

The government’s refusal to approve a request from the Jewish community to change its official name to the Jewish Community Council from the Israeli Communal Council remained in place.

Minority non-Maronite Christian groups continued to state the government made little progress toward the Taef Agreement’s goal of eliminating political sectarianism in favor of “expertise and competence.” Members of these groups, which include Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholics, and Chaldeans, among others, stated their lack of representation in the cabinet, and the fact the government allotted them only one of the 64 Christian seats in parliament, constituted government discrimination. The Syriac League continued to call for more representation for minority Christians in parliament and high-level civil service positions.

Some Maronite Christian politicians, including members of the Free Patriotic Movement party, said Maronites remained marginalized despite filling their quota of designated government seats. They called for a new electoral law with the aim of having predominantly Christian areas voting for Christian-allotted seats. Parliament addressed these concerns with the passage of the new electoral law in June.

During the year, there was no movement on the 30 or more cases of civil marriage that awaited registration with the Ministry of Interior since 2013. The cases remained unresolved, with no evidence of forthcoming action.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

The Shia organization Hizballah, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, continued to exercise authority over territory, particularly the southern suburbs of Beirut and southern areas of the country, both of which are predominantly Shia, where it provided a number of basic services, such as health care, education, food aid, infrastructure repair, and internal security. There continued to be reports of Hizballah controlling access to the neighborhoods and localities under its control.

Leaders of Sunni, Shia, and Christian groups continued to condemn extremism and violence perpetrated in the name of religion following terrorist attacks by both ISIS and Jabhat Fath al-Sham (JFS, formerly al-Nusra Front) in countries in the region. For example, Sheikh Abdul Latif Derian, the country’s Sunni grand mufti, publicly condemned April 9 bomb attacks against two Coptic Orthodox Christian churches in Egypt. In his condemnation, the grand mufti offered his condolences to the pope of the Coptic Orthodox Church in Egypt and said the attacks were an attempt to “ignite confessional strife between Muslims and Christians.”

Religious leaders stated that relationships among individual members of different religious groups remained amicable. At a July 1 conference at Notre Dame University Louaize in Zouk Mosbeh, Christian and Muslim leaders, along with government representatives, agreed the country should be held up as an example of peaceful coexistence, noting, “The deepening of democracy in Lebanon sends a message of hope to the Arabs, and to the world.” The participants, headed by Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Mar Bechara Boutros Rai, issued a joint statement calling for establishing the country as an official international center of dialogue among religions, cultures, and civilizations “to serve the Arab world and Christian-Muslim relations of the world.” President Michel Aoun later reiterated this statement in his September 21 remarks to the UN General Assembly.

Christian and Muslim religious leaders from the major denominations continued to participate in interfaith dialogues throughout the year and to call for unity against extremism. On November 14, Patriarch Rai became the first Lebanese Christian Patriarch to visit Saudi Arabia where, according to an official Saudi press statement, the patriarch and King Salman “stressed the importance of the role of various religions and cultures in promoting tolerance, and renouncing violent extremism and terrorism.” In his July 25 Eid al-Fitr remarks, the Sunni grand mufti urged all citizens of the country to focus on “boosting national unity, the national state, and coexistence.”

While the country’s small remaining Jewish community stated it generally enjoyed a respectful relationship with the greater population, the Jewish Community Council reported continued acts of vandalism at the Jewish cemetery in Beirut during the year. The council’s 2011 lawsuit against individuals who constructed buildings in the Jewish cemetery in Tripoli was continuing, pending additional court-ordered analysis of the site, and had not been resolved by year’s end. Additionally, the Jewish community faced difficulty importing material for religious rites, such as wine and Torahs, as customs agents were reportedly wary of allowing imports containing the Hebrew script.

The Ambassador and other embassy officers continued to engage government officials on the need to encourage tolerance, dialogue, and mutual respect among religious groups.

The Ambassador and other embassy officers met with individual politicians representing different religious groups to discuss the views of their constituents and to promote religious tolerance. The Ambassador met with the leadership of the Sunni, Shia, Druze, and many Christian communities to promote interfaith dialogue and to urge them to take steps to counter violent extremism. Embassy officers met with civil society representatives to convey similar messages. The Ambassador and other embassy officers continued to work with local religious and community leaders to support their efforts to reduce sectarian tensions spilling over from the violence in Syria.

Other embassy outreach and assistance programs continued to emphasize tolerance for all religious faiths. The embassy supported an interreligious academy, which trained youth on tolerance, religious freedom, and counteracting religious extremism. The embassy continued to support the Alwan project, which aimed to build students’ knowledge and understanding of religious diversity and improve their critical thinking skills through activities on religious pluralism. The embassy again selected five students to participate in an annual summer exchange program in the United States focused on religious pluralism and interfaith dialogue. The embassy also sponsored a workshop and other programs on countering violent extremism related to religion for local government officials and civil society actors. The embassy funded a project that disseminated moderate messages of peace and tolerance through social media, mainly on Facebook, to counter extremist online messaging. The project included the formation of an advisory board of Sunni and Shia religious leaders along with academics to design the framework of the tolerance messages.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 2.0 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the CCL, which is an umbrella organization of five Christian churches, approximately 90 percent of the population is Christian. Other sources estimate the Christian population to be 95 percent or higher. Protestants, including Anglicans, evangelical Christians, Methodists, members of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, and Pentecostals, represent 45 percent of the population, and Roman Catholics represent 45 percent. The remaining 10 percent is Muslim, Hindu and Bahai, belongs to indigenous or other religious groups, or is atheist. Many Christians practice traditional indigenous rituals in conjunction with Christianity. There is a small number of Jews, most of whom are not citizens. Muslims live primarily in the northern area of the country. There is no significant correlation between religious affiliation and ethnicity.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and provides for freedom of conscience, thought, and religion, including the freedom to change religion or belief, and to manifest and propagate one’s religion. These rights may be limited by laws in the interests of defense, public safety, order, morality, or protecting the rights of other persons, provided the limitations are the minimum necessary.

The government has no established requirements for recognition of religious groups. By law, any group, religious or otherwise, may register as a legal entity with the government, regardless of its purpose, as long as it has a constitution and a leadership committee. Most religious groups register, but there is no penalty for those that do not. Registration gives a group legal standing, formalizes its structure under the law, and provides exemption from income tax. In the absence of registration, religious organizations may operate freely and tend to business as they see fit, but without any of the legal standing or protections of registered organizations.

The education ministry pays and certifies all teachers at government-funded schools, including religious schools, and requires a standard curriculum for both secular and religious schools. The government does not officially mandate religious education in schools, and the constitution exempts students at any educational institution from requirements to receive instruction or attend any ceremony or observance associated with a religion that is not their own. The minister of education must approve all curricula, including for religious education classes.

The country is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Churches owned and operated approximately 80 percent of all primary and secondary schools. The Roman Catholic Church, Lesotho Evangelical Church, Anglican Church, and, to a lesser extent, Methodist Church were the primary operators of religious schools, which were publicly funded. In practice, in any school offering religious education – including all religious schools and some secular schools – the subject was mandatory. Children continued to be permitted to attend schools run by a religious group other than their own, and some families chose this option. Others went to public schools or secular private schools.

The government continued to invite the CCL regularly to open government ceremonies and meetings.

The CCL initiated a dialogue that culminated in May, with all major political parties signing a pledge to honor the constitution and laws of the country, observe the electoral code of conduct, honor governance institutions, uphold peace and harmony during campaigns, and accept the June 3 general election outcome.

The U.S. embassy discussed religious freedom with the government, typically in the context of broader discussions about human rights. The embassy also maintained regular contact with religious leaders, including with representatives of the CCL, to engage on a number of human rights topics.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 4.6 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2008 National Population and Housing Census, the population is 85.6 percent Christian, 12.2 percent Muslim, 0.6 percent adherents of indigenous religious beliefs, 1.4 percent persons who claim no religion, and less than 1 percent members of other religious groups, including Bahais, Hindus, Sikhs, and Buddhists. Unofficial reports and surveys estimate Muslims constitute up to 20 percent of the population. Many members of religious groups incorporate elements of indigenous beliefs into their religious practices. Christian groups include United Methodists, Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Baptists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and members of the African Methodist Episcopal (AME), AME Zion, and a variety of Pentecostal churches.

Christians reside throughout the country. Muslims belonging to the Mandingo and Fula ethnic groups reside throughout the country, while Muslims of the Vai ethnic group live predominantly in the west. Traditional practitioners include the secret Sande and Poro societies, seen both as religious and cultural practitioners and highly influential in the northern, western, and central regions of the country. Other secret cultural or religious societies exist in the southeastern counties, including the Kui Society and Bodio priests.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the separation of religion and state and stipulates all persons are entitled to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. It states no one shall be hindered in the exercise of these rights except as required by law to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the rights of others. It also provides for equal protection under the law and prohibits political parties that exclude citizens from membership based on religious affiliation.

The government requires all religious groups, except for indigenous ones that generally operate under customary law, to register their articles of incorporation and their organizations’ statements of purpose.

Local religious organizations register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and pay a one-time fee of 6,900 Liberian dollars (LD) ($55) to file their articles of incorporation and an annual fee of 3,600 LD ($29) for registration and a registration certificate. Foreign religious organizations pay 50,100 LD ($400) for registration annually and a one-time fee of 62,600 LD ($500) to file their articles of incorporation. Religious organizations also pay 1,000 to 2,000 LD ($8 to $16) to the Liberia Revenue Authority for notarization of articles of incorporation to be filed with the MFA and an additional 1,000 LD ($8) to receive a registered copy of the articles. The Ministry of Finance and Development Planning issues proof of accreditation for the articles of incorporation. There is also an option of completing the same process at the Liberia Business Registry, where each of the other offices has representation.

Registered religious organizations, including missionary programs, religious charities, and religious groups, receive tax exemption on income taxes and duty-free privileges on goods brought into the country, privileges not afforded unregistered groups. Registered groups may also appear in court as a single entity.

The law requires high-level government officials to take an oath ending with the phrase, “So help me God,” when assuming office. Christians kiss the Bible and Muslims the Quran on those occasions.

Public schools offer nonsectarian religious and moral education as an elective in all grades.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Some religious groups continued to pursue a constitutional amendment declaring the country a “Christian nation,” an effort begun in 2015. President Sirleaf, along with Catholic, Episcopal, Baptist, Lutheran, and Muslim communities, continued to oppose the initiative, while some evangelical Christian pastors, political parties and leaders, and members of the national legislature supported it. Muslim organizations, including the NMCL and NICL, continued to express concern about what they said was the implied prejudice of the proposal. They also expressed concern over the refusal of government to recognize major Muslim religious holidays while major Christian holidays were public holidays, as well as the imbalance of religious group representation in government roles. For example, the president has an official (Christian) religious advisor working for her as part of her staff, while other religions are not officially represented. The NICL stated it was concerned that some political parties called for making the country a “Christian nation” during election campaign-related events and interviews. In May the leader of the UPP told a group of Christian leaders in Ganta, Nimba County, that he would make Liberia a Christian state if elected. He also criticized the IRCL for having a Muslim leader, calling him unrepresentative of the country, particularly in international forums where he said it was unacceptable to have a Muslim representing the interests of Christians. The IRCL chair rotates every three years between a Muslim and a Christian as directed by the founding charter. According to the NMCL, political parties were also prejudiced against the selection of Muslim candidates as potential vice presidential picks due to fear that, upon the death of the president, a Muslim would become president.

The Liberia Muslim Women Network (LMW-NET) and NICL reported National Elections Commission workers refused to allow some Muslim women to register to vote because the women refused to remove their hijabs for voter ID photographs. LMW-NET representatives said that women were forced to choose between registration and going against their religious beliefs and reported that women offered to uncover their ears for the photograph, but NEC workers rejected the proposed compromise. LMW-NET members stated women wearing traditional head wraps and Catholic nuns were allowed to wear head coverings in their voter ID photographs.

In April Imam Ali Krayee of the NICL called on the government to make Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha national holidays. Imam Krayee said the country “no longer has the luxury of time” to give Muslims their full rights “like their Christian brothers and sisters.” The request to make Eid al-Fitr a national holiday has been pending since 1995.

Although enforcement of the registration requirement was lax, according to religious groups, most religious groups registered, since unregistered groups risked being shut down by the government and did not qualify for tax-free status.

The government, through city ordinances and presidential proclamations, required businesses and markets, including Muslim-owned or -operated businesses and shops, to remain closed on Sundays for municipal street cleaning and on Christmas, a national holiday. Muslim-owned businesses stated they viewed the regular Sunday street cleaning as an excuse for the government to force their businesses to close to honor the Christian Sabbath. According to both the NICL and NMCL, the ordinances and proclamations were a violation of the constitution and a threat to the peace. The NMCL reported that it brought action in court seeking redress for the forced closures (which remained unresolved). Since penalties – consisting of fines of up to 200 LD ($2) – were not strictly enforced, some Muslim-owned or -operated shops opened for limited hours on Sundays. Both the NICL and NMCL continued to say they would not have a problem with the closing of Muslim-owned businesses on Christmas if the end of Ramadan was also observed as a national holiday.

Government ceremonies commonly included opening and closing prayers. The prayers were usually Christian but occasionally were both Christian and Muslim. In Lofa County, where a large number of Muslims reside, opening and closing prayers were alternately Christian and Muslim. The NICL, NMCL, and IRCL noted that government health facilities increasingly observed a period for Christian prayer at the start of workday.

Muslim groups, including the NICL, were concerned that more Christian chaplains than Muslim imams were appointed to serve in a religious capacity in government institutions and that the government paid more pastors than imams to teach religious education in public schools. The government subsidized private schools, most of which were affiliated with either Christian or Muslim organizations, and subsidies were provided proportionally based on the number of students. Muslim leaders complained that the academic calendar developed by the Ministry of Education favored Christians, as schools were closed for Christmas and Easter (which fell during spring break), but were not closed for the Muslim holidays of Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha. As a result, Muslim children were likely to miss class time and exams.

In October after the president met with a foreign Muslim cleric, whose views many considered controversial, her office released a statement emphasizing the country’s policy of equality for all and of nondiscrimination.

In September Musah Ballot, NICL deputy spokesperson, implored Muslims to avoid voting for candidates deemed “anti-Islamic.” Although he did not specify which candidates fell into the category, he said Muslims knew to whom he was referring. Some Christian leaders stated they found the statements divisive, while other Muslim leaders said politics and religion should remain completely separate.

During the year, followers of a traditional society destroyed the roof of a local mosque in Careysburg, Montserrado County, after a Muslim man refused to leave the area where they were holding traditional activities. The man was not a member of the traditional society. A local politician and an area businessperson paid for the repair of the damaged roof of the mosque, and the situation was resolved.

A UNICEF representative stated the organization continued to have concern about the number of cases of children accused of witchcraft and/or demonic possession. UNICEF and the Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Protection conducted awareness raising campaigns and worked to reunite children accused of witchcraft with their parents and guardians in River Gee, Grand Gedeh, and Maryland counties. As a result of the campaign, the ministry reported the number of children living in “prayer camps” was reduced to approximately 68 in the three counties, while the number of prayer camps decreased from five to three. Ministry social workers also conducted follow-up visits to ensure the wellbeing of children removed from the prayer camps. The United Nations labeled certain religious practices harmful, including trial by ordeal, cleansing or exorcism rituals, and forced initiation into secret societies through kidnapping.

Sporadic local quarrels between religious and traditional groups occurred in remote parts of the country, but because religion and ethnicity were often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity. In April religious and traditional society leaders held a conference on reconciliation and conflict prevention between residents of Nimba and Grand Gedeh counties. Religious and traditional leaders organized the community-based initiative with the assistance of state security officers, including the Liberia National Police.

The LMW-NET reported that a hospital forced a nurse to leave her position because she wore a hijab. The organization also reported women who attended a local vocational skills training school were dissuaded from pursuing teaching careers because they were required to remove the hijab to be hired as teachers.

Some employers continued to excuse Muslims from employment or classes to attend Friday prayers, although there was no legal requirement to do so.

In response to the continued campaign to declare the country a “Christian nation” and to preempt possible religious tensions during the national elections in October, the U.S. Ambassador and embassy staff engaged with government officials, including officials from the Ministry of Justice’s human rights division, members of the legislature, and others to stress the U.S. government’s support of religious freedom and tolerance. The embassy encouraged peaceful dialogue from all parties.

The embassy also met with a variety of civil society and religious figures, including representatives of a variety of Christian, Muslim, and traditional religious groups. In discussions with religious leaders, the Ambassador emphasized the separation of state and religion in both the U.S. and Liberian constitutions. The embassy also worked with religious leaders to emphasize peaceful reconciliation practices and build upon existing networks to de-escalate any religious tensions brought about by the legislative and presidential elections. During Ramadan, embassy outreach to two Muslim communities in Kakata and Clara Town included delivery of President Trump’s and Secretary Tillerson’s Ramadan messages and a discussion about tolerance and cooperation among religious groups to preserve peace. Embassy officials also held a roundtable with predominantly Muslim religious youth leaders to discuss peace, tolerance, and the importance of working together to build bridges between persons of different backgrounds and improve the lives of those around them. During the year, embassy personnel held several events and met with Christian and Muslim religious leaders to discuss tolerance and the importance of religious leaders and adherents working to bring communities together.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 6.7 million (July 2017 estimate). Sunni Muslims represent 97 percent and the remaining 3 percent includes Ibadi Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Bahais, Ahmadi Muslims, Buddhists, and Jews. Many members of the Amazigh ethnic minority are Ibadi Muslims; nearly all other non-Sunni Muslims are foreign residents.

Small Christian communities consist almost exclusively of sub-Saharan African and Egyptian migrants and a small number of U.S. and European foreign residents. The most recent recorded estimates indicated there are 50,000 Coptic Christians, most of whom are Egyptian foreign residents. According to media reports, however, the number of Christians has decreased since the outbreak of armed conflict in 2014. Small numbers of Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Greek and Russian Orthodox, and nondenominational Christians, many of whom are foreign workers, remain in the country. No reliable surveys have been conducted on the number of foreign workers remaining in the country due to the intermittent western diplomatic presence in Tripoli since July 2014.

There are no reliable estimates of the small Jewish population.

Legal Framework

The constitutional declaration of 2011 functions as the interim constitution. It states Islam is the state religion and sharia is the principal source of legislation, but accords non-Muslims the freedom to practice their religion. The interim constitution also states “there shall be no discrimination among Libyans on the basis of religion or sect” with regard to legal, political, and civil rights. The GNA remains bound by the constitutional declaration until a new constitution is passed by the House of Representatives and a public referendum held. The laws governing religious practice predate the internal conflict and provide a national legal framework for religious freedom.

There is no law providing for individuals’ right to choose or change their religion or to study, discuss, or promulgate their religious beliefs, nor is there a law prohibiting conversion from Islam to another religion or prohibiting proselytizing. The law prohibits “instigating division” and insulting Islam or the Prophet Muhammad, charges that carry a maximum sentence of death.

The Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs (MEIA) administers mosques, supervises clerics, and has primary responsibility for ensuring all religious practices conform to state-approved Islamic norms. Religious instruction in Islam is required in public and private schools. Attendance at religious instruction is mandatory for all students with no recourse to opt out.

Sharia governs family matters for Muslims, including inheritance, divorce, and the right to own property. Under sharia, a non-Muslim woman who marries a Muslim man is not required to convert to Islam; however, a non-Muslim man must convert to Islam to marry a Muslim woman. The MEIA administers non-Muslim family law issues, although there is no separate legal framework governing non-Muslim family law. The ministry draws upon neighboring countries’ family law precedents for non-Muslims.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The internationally recognized GNA remained in office, but did not control the entire country. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya reported that courts in the area controlled by the GNA continued to sentence defendants to corporal punishment in accordance with its interpretation of sharia, including flogging for adultery and amputations for theft.

The United Nations Development Program reported that the judicial system was functioning, albeit at different levels depending on the location of the courts within the country. Religious matters were handled at courts of first instance, where sharia was applicable. A variety of groups – revolutionary brigades, tribal militias, and local strongmen – supported security around court areas. The GNA delegated control of several of these groups to the Ministry of Interior, but its authority over these groups remained limited, and its response to instances of violence against members of minority religious groups was limited to condemnations.

The role of Islam in policymaking remained a major point of contention among members of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly, the elected body in charge of drafting the new constitution. A draft of the constitution defines sharia is defined as “the source of legislation.”

The MEIA provided texts for Friday services to imams, often including political and social messages. The government permitted religious scholars to form organizations, to issue fatwas, and to provide advice to followers. The fatwas did not have legal weight. The GNA, however, did not have effective administrative control of mosques and supervision of clerics outside the limited areas under its control. According to media reports, the Libya National Army appointed several Salafi leaning imams in areas of its control throughout eastern Libya. Political opponents of the GNA stated its administrative apparatus charged with overseeing religious affairs did not take measures against imams and other officials who supported ISIS and other violent extremist organizations.

RADA SDF was involved in a number of arrests and detentions of individuals whom it accused of violating Islamic law. On November 5, a RADA SDF unit disrupted a comic book convention in Tripoli, arresting approximately 20 attendees and organizers, and closing the three-day convention early. Released individuals reported physical abuse as well as religious lectures while in custody. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), a religious scholar with ties to the Sufi community said RADA SDF deliberately destroyed a 700-year-old Sufi shrine in October during clashes in the area of the shrine, although RADA has denied the allegations.

According to HRW, in July the MEIA issued a religious edict against Ibadi Muslims, accusing the group of deviance and following an infidel doctrine.

There were reports the military governor in the east increased the restrictions on movement of women without male guardians.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

Nonstate actors and militias continued to operate and control territory throughout the country, including the cities of Benghazi, Tripoli, and Derna, where there were numerous reports of armed groups restricting religious practices, enforcing compliance with sharia according to their interpretation, and targeting those viewed as violating their standards.

U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations such as Ansar al-Sharia, al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM), and ISIS continued to operate within the country during the year. Ansar al-Sharia operated branches in Benghazi and Derna and maintained connections with extremists in other parts of the country, including AQIM. Following expulsion from Sirte in December 2016, ISIS suffered setbacks elsewhere in Libya. Despite these setbacks, ISIS still maintained the capability to conduct attacks in Libya and had limited capability to facilitate attacks elsewhere in North Africa. In Tripoli, some militias imposed restrictions on women’s dress and movement and punished men for behavior they deemed “un-Islamic.” In October authorities uncovered a mass grave of 21 Coptic Christians beheaded by ISIS in 2015 near Sirte. The victims were kidnapped between December 2014 and January 2015 and decapitated on a Libyan beach, shown in a video released in February 2015. The remains of the Egyptians were scheduled to be returned to Egypt.

The eastern city of Derna was controlled by the Shura Council of Mujahideen in Derna, an umbrella organization consisting of Salafist groups opposed to ISIS, including Ansar al-Sharia. This group was widely reported to have restricted Sunni Muslims’ freedom to worship.

On October 30, the press reported that among the 36 bodies found bound and shot outside Benghazi was 71-year-old Sufi Sheikh Muftah al-Bakoosh el-Werfalli, allegedly executed because he was Sufi. According to the United Nations Secretary General’s Special Representative for Libya, the corpses showed signs of having been tortured before they were executed. No group claimed responsibility for the massacre.

Multiple sources, including international media, continued to report a restrictive social environment, particularly in Tripoli. This included a continuation of government officials at airports throughout the country preventing women from traveling alone outside the country, although no law or government regulation restricts such travel. NGOs and the UN attributed that environment to increasingly Salafist interpretations of sharia. NGOs with local staff reported women often had male relatives accompany them to the airport and carried written permission from their male guardians to enable them to leave the country.

Following an October suicide bombing attack by ISIS on a court complex in Misrata that killed four persons and injured 41, former Grand Mufti Sadeq Al-Ghiryani stated, “the bombings are retaliation by God Almighty who is angry at us because the [prosecutor] general office has neglected thousands of cases in the court system.”

Unidentified assailants attacked two historic Sufi mosques in Tripoli. On November 28, the eve of a feast marking the birthday of Prophet Mohammed, assailants set fire to the Sufi mosque, Zawiyat Sheikha Radiya, causing extensive damage. On October 20, assailants destroyed the Sidi Abu Gharara Mosque, according to HRW. There were no reported arrests related to the attacks on the Sufi mosques by year’s end.

According to a human rights activist, a military force from a Salafi group arrested 10 religious leaders from the east because of their Sufi backgrounds.

Following the U.S. embassy evacuation from Tripoli and suspension of operations in July 2014, U.S. diplomats of the Libya External Office have operated out of Tunis. There remained limited opportunities for high-level engagement on religious freedom with Libyan interlocutors due to the lack of permanent presence and access to discussion partners in country. The U.S. government discussed religious freedom on a number of occasions with a variety of local and national leaders, particularly in the context of confronting violent extremist groups such as ISIS, and made public statements condemning acts of physical mistreatment and destruction of property.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 38,000 (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2015 census, religious group membership is as follows: 73.4 percent Roman Catholic, 6.3 percent Protestant Reformed, 5.9 percent Muslim, 1.2 percent Lutheran, 1.3 percent Christian Orthodox, 1.8 percent other religious groups, 7 percent no religious affiliation, and 3.3 percent unspecified.

The great majority of Muslims are Sunni, predominantly from Turkey, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia. The Jewish community consists of approximately 30 individuals. Immigrants, which make up approximately one third of the population, come mainly from Switzerland and Austria and predominantly belong to the same religious groups as native-born citizens.

Legal Framework

The constitution states all persons shall have the freedom to choose their faith and the state shall be responsible for ‘‘protecting the religious…interests of the People.” The constitution specifies Roman Catholicism is the state religion, which “shall enjoy full protection from the state.” The constitution stipulates other religions may practice their beliefs and hold religious services “within the bounds of morality and public order.”

Municipalities provide the Catholic Church with certain unique benefits that vary by municipality, including financial support and state maintenance of buildings and grounds owned by the Church.

There is no law requiring the registration of religious groups. Religious groups other than the state-sponsored Catholic Church may organize themselves as private associations, which enables registration in the commercial registry, and must do so to receive government funding for such activities as providing religious education in schools or carrying out projects to promote social integration of religious minorities. To register an association in the commercial registry, the association must submit an official letter of application to the Office of Justice, including the organization’s name, purpose, board members, and head office location, as well as a memorandum of association based on local law, a trademark certification, and a copy of the organization’s statutes.

The law prohibits the slaughter of animals without anesthetization, making the ritual slaughter of animals for kosher and halal meat illegal. Importation of such meat is legal.

The criminal code prohibits any form of public incitement to hatred or discrimination against or disparagement of any religion or its adherents by spoken, written, visual, or electronic means. The criminal code also prohibits the denial, trivialization, and justification of genocide and other crimes against humanity by spoken, written, visual, or electronic means. Penalties may include a prison sentence of up to two years. The criminal code prohibits refusing service to a person or group of persons based on religious affiliation as well as membership in any association that aims to promote discrimination against a person or persons based on religious affiliation.

The law requires religious education be included in the curriculum in public schools, both at the primary and secondary levels. Catholic or Protestant Reformed religious education is compulsory in all primary schools; exemptions are available for children whose parents request them from the Office of Education. Parents are not required to give a reason for exemptions. In August a revised decree entered into force that grants the Office of Education the right to organize and finance Islamic education as an elective in public primary schools. The three religious groups provide the teachers for religious instruction, and the Office of Education pays for some or all of their salaries. The Catholic Church determines the Catholic curriculum, with minimal supervision from municipalities. Other religious groups registered as associations may provide teachers for optional religious classes if there is a demand for them and may apply for partial funding of the teachers’ salaries from the government’s integration budget.

At the secondary school level, parents and students may choose between a course on Catholic religious education, which the government finances and the Catholic religious community organizes, and a general course in religion and culture taught from a sociological perspective.

To receive residency permits, foreign religious workers must have completed theological studies, command a basic level of German, belong to a nationally known religious group, and be sponsored by a resident clergy member of the religious group.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Funding for religious institutions continued to derive mainly from the municipalities, according to parliamentary or municipal decisions. The government provided Catholic and Protestant Reformed Churches annual contributions in proportion to membership. Smaller religious groups could apply for state funding if registered as private associations. They were eligible to apply only for grants for societal integration projects, such as language courses for foreigners or religious classes in schools. All religious groups were exempt from certain taxes but not from fees.

In August the UN Human Rights Committee issued its concluding observations after reviewing the country’s second periodic report on the measures taken to implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The committee welcomed efforts by the government to reorganize its relationship with religious groups to ensure equal treatment of all denominations. It expressed concern, however, at the government’s inability to reach agreement with two remaining municipalities to amend the constitution to this end, and the effect this inability had on religious groups other than the Catholic Church. The committee recommended that the government: redouble efforts to reach agreement with municipalities so as to amend the constitution; provide funding on a basis of equality to religious organizations of all religious communities and not to limit the funding to efforts to integrate minority groups; and ensure that “the criteria for the recognition of religions guarantees the freedom of religion and belief and freedom to manifest a religion or belief either individually or in community with others, in public or in private, and in worship, observance, practice, or teaching.”

The government immigration and passport office continued to issue religious workers residency permits, valid for five years, instead of visas. The government granted the Turkish Association a residency permit for one imam and a short-term residency permit during Ramadan for an additional imam, who agreed not to allow or preach sermons inciting violence or advocating intolerance. Clergy from other religious groups were required to abide by the same rules and regulations.

All religious groups, including Muslims, were allowed to bury their dead in cemeteries owned by municipalities. In November 2016, the city authorities of Vaduz rejected a proposal to establish a Muslim cemetery on a 2.5-acre plot of land. According to the Liechtenstein Institute, societal skepticism and apprehension towards Islam were the likely reasons for rejecting the Muslim cemetery.

Public primary schools in six municipalities offered Islamic education twice each month to a total of 68 students between the ages of six and 12.

Public schools continued to include Holocaust education as part of their curriculum and held discussion forums on the Holocaust to mark the Day of Remembrance on January 27. In January the Liechtenstein Grammar School hosted a history scholar from the Liechtenstein Institute to talk about the plight of refugees to commemorate International Holocaust Remembrance Day. A high school in Eschen reflected on the lessons of the Holocaust while discussing the current European migration crisis.

According to the foreign ministry, the government’s Office for Social Services and the government-supported Liechtenstein Human Rights Association, a consortium of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), functioned as the main bodies responsible for the integration of Muslims. The foreign ministry continued to invite Muslim representatives to its annual dialogue with NGOs to address issues of concern and interest to the Muslim community. The Islamic Community and Turkish Association each continued to maintain contact with the government.

On January 25, in honor of International Holocaust Remembrance Day, Minister for Infrastructure, the Environment, and Sport, Marlies Amann-Marxer held a service with the Liechtenstein Friends of Yad Vashem to remember the victims of the Holocaust. In her remarks, she stressed the importance of respecting human rights and rejecting fanaticism, racism, anti-Semitism, and hate speech. Participants included the head of parliament.

The Liechtenstein Institute’s yearly monitoring report on extremism stated right-wing extremist groups were less active in 2016 than in previous years. As in previous years, according to the report, groups such as European Action, which in the past had called for the right to deny the Holocaust, expressed views in ways that rendered them nonpunishable in the framework of criminal law.

There were no mosques in the country; there was one Islamic prayer room run by the Turkish Association in Triesen. The Islamic Community of Liechtenstein ran another prayer room in the canton of St. Gallen in neighboring Switzerland. According to the Liechtenstein Institute, the Islamic Community was still unable to establish a prayer room in the country. The institute did not cite a reason for the Islamic Community’s inability to open a prayer room but stated that Muslims continued to face difficulties finding prayer room spaces to rent, due to society’s skepticism and wariness towards Islam.

According to a government-commissioned study on Muslim life published by the Liechtenstein Institute in October, Muslim women wearing headscarves faced discrimination in the labor market, and Muslim children experienced discrimination when applying for apprenticeships. The study also stated Muslims perceived that society regarded them with general suspicion.

According to the Liechtenstein Institute, in July 2016, unknown persons sprayed racist comments and a swastika on the facade of a house used to accommodate asylees.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, religious groups in every municipality continued to open their chapels to other denominations and faiths upon request, including to Orthodox and Islamic groups.

According to the Liechtenstein Institute, Muslim representatives called for an “active dialogue” with the Catholic and other Christian churches.

U.S. embassy staff continued to discuss religious freedom issues, such as access to religious education by different religious groups, with the foreign ministry.

Embassy staff also continued to discuss the effects of laws on religious practices and the extent of societal discrimination with the Liechtenstein Friends of Yad Vashem and the Liechtenstein Institute.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 2.8 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2011 census, of the 90 percent of the population that responded to the question about religious affiliation, 86 percent is Roman Catholic and 7 percent does not identify with any religious group. Religious groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Russian Orthodox, Old Believers, Lutherans, Reformed Evangelicals, Jews, Muslims, Greek Catholics, and Karaites. Karaites traditionally live in Trakai and in the greater Vilnius region. The Jewish population is predominately concentrated in larger cities and is estimated at 3,100. According to the census, the Sunni Muslim population numbers approximately 2,800, the majority of whom are Tatars, a community found primarily in Vilnius and Kaunas. The Muslim community also includes recent converts, migrants, refugees, and temporary workers from the Middle East and Africa, most of whom are Sunni.

According to the 2011 census, less than 1 percent of the population belongs to other religious groups. Among these, the most numerous are Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of the Full Gospel Word of Faith Movement, Pentecostals/Charismatics, Old Baltic faith communities, Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, Methodists, and members of the New Apostolic Church and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons).

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates there is no state religion and provides for the right of individuals to choose freely any religion or belief, to profess their religion and perform religious practices, individually or with others, in private or in public, and to practice and teach their beliefs. It states no one may compel another person (or be compelled) to choose or profess any religion or belief. The constitution allows limits on the freedom to profess and spread religious beliefs when necessary to protect health, safety, public order, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. It restricts freedom of expression if it incites religious hatred, violence, or discrimination. It stipulates religious belief may not serve as justification for failing to comply with laws.

The constitution acknowledges the freedom of parents or guardians to oversee the religious and moral education of their children without interference and stipulates public education shall be secular, although schools may provide religious instruction at the request of parents. The constitution grants recognition to “traditional” religious groups and provides for recognition of other religious groups if they have support in society and their teachings and practices do not conflict with law or public morals. It states the status of religious groups shall be established by agreement or law, and recognized religious groups shall be free to carry out their activities as long as they are not in conflict with the constitution or laws.

The law defines religious groups as (1) religious communities, (2) religious associations, which comprise at least two religious communities under common leadership, and (3) religious centers, which are higher governing bodies of religious associations.

The law recognizes as “traditional” those religious groups able to trace back their presence in the country at least 300 years. The law lists nine “traditional” religious groups: Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Evangelical Lutheran, Evangelical Reformed, Russian Orthodox, Old Believer, Jewish, Sunni Muslim, and Karaite. Traditional religious groups have a simplified registration procedure. They may perform marriages that are state-recognized, establish joint private/public schools, provide religious instruction in public schools, and receive annual government subsidies. Their highest ranking leaders are eligible to apply for diplomatic passports, and they may provide chaplains for the military, social care institutions, and hospitals. The state provides social security and healthcare insurance contributions for clergy, religious workers, and members of monastic orders of the traditional religious groups. Traditional religious groups are also not required to pay social and health insurance taxes for clergy and most other religious workers and members of monastic orders.

Other religious associations may apply to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) for state recognition if they have been officially registered in the country for at least 25 years. Parliament votes whether to grant this status upon recommendation from the MOJ. The Evangelical Baptist Union of Lithuania, the Seventh-day Adventist Church, the Pentecostal Evangelical Belief Christian Union, and the New Apostolic Church of Lithuania are the only state-recognized nontraditional religious groups.

Recognition entitles nontraditional religious groups to perform marriages and provide religious instruction in public schools. Unlike traditional groups, however, they are not eligible for annual subsidies from the state budget, and their clergy and theological students are not exempt from military service. The law provides recognized nontraditional religious groups with legal entity status, but they do not qualify for certain social security and healthcare contributions by the state.

The MOJ handles official registration of religious communities, associations, and centers. Unrecognized nontraditional groups must submit an application and supporting documentation to the MOJ, including their bylaws describing their religious teachings and governance, minutes of the founding meeting, and a list of the founders, at least 15 of whom must be citizens. Upon approval of its application, a religious community, association, or center is registered as a legal entity with the State Enterprise Center of Registers. Religious communities and associations associated with traditional religious groups have a simpler registration procedure, needing to submit only an application, decisions of their governing body on the appointment of their leader, and their headquarters address.

Traditional religious communities and associations are registered free of charge, while nontraditional communities pay a fee of 32 euros ($38). The MOJ may refuse to register a religious group if full data are not included in the application; the activities of the group violate human rights or public order; or a group with the same name has already registered. As of November 1, there were 1,114 traditional and 189 nontraditional religious communities, associations, and centers officially registered in the register of legal entities.

Official registration is a prerequisite for opening a bank account, owning property, and acting in a legal or official capacity as a community. The law allows all registered religious groups to own property for use as prayer houses, homes, and other functions, and permits construction of facilities necessary for religious activities. All registered groups are eligible for public funds from municipalities for cultural and social projects.

Unregistered communities have no legal status; however, the constitution allows them to conduct worship services and seek new members.

The Interministerial Commission to Coordinate Activities of Governmental Institutions that Deal with Issues of Religious, Esoteric, and Spiritual Groups coordinates investigations of religious groups if there is a concern a group’s actions may be inconsistent with what the commission perceives to be “principles that stress respect for human freedom of expression and freedom of religion.”

The Journalist Ethics Inspectorate investigates complaints under a law that bars publishing material that instigates hatred, including religious hatred. The inspectorate may levy administrative fines on newspapers under administrative law or refer cases for criminal prosecution.

Under the constitution, the government may temporarily restrict freedom of expression of religious belief during a period of martial law or a state of emergency, although it has never invoked this right.

The Soviet Union nationalized all religious buildings, some of which it redistributed, while others continued to serve religious communities. The law permits registered groups to apply to the MOJ for the restitution of, or compensation for, religious property owned before June 19, 1948. Religious communities may also register a claim for property not officially registered under their name but which they used during the Soviet period. If the ministry determines the claim is legitimate, it drafts a resolution officially returning the property to its original owner. Religious groups may appeal the decisions of the ministry in court.

A compensation fund for Jewish-owned communal property nationalized under totalitarian regimes is designed to support Jewish educational, religious, scientific, cultural, and healthcare projects with public benefits. Pursuant to the law, the government is committed to disbursing 37 million euros ($44.4 million) over the course of the decade ending March 1, 2023. Funds go to the Foundation for the Disposal of Good Will Compensation for the Immovable Property of Jewish Religious Communities, a public institution governed by national and international Jewish leaders.

The country has no law for the restitution of heirless private property.

The government allocates funds to traditional religious communities for refurbishing houses of prayer and other needs. Each traditional religion group receives 3,075 euros ($3,690) as a base fund plus a variable component that depends on the number of believers of each community. Traditional religious communities received 697,000 euros ($837,000) during the year, of which approximately 90 percent went to the Catholic Church.

The law permits and funds religious instruction in public schools for traditional and other state-recognized religious groups. Most religious instructors are regular state-employed teachers, but some are priests, seminarians, or monks. Parents may choose either religious instruction or secular ethics classes for their children. Schools decide which of the traditional religious groups will be represented in their curricula on the basis of requests from parents of children up to age 14, after which students present the requests themselves.

There are 30 private religious schools with ties to Catholic or Jewish groups, although students of different religious groups may attend these schools. All accredited private schools (religious and nonreligious) receive funding from the Ministry of Education and Science through a voucher system based on the number of pupils. This system covers only the program costs of school operation. Founders generally bear responsibility for covering capital outlays; however, per an agreement the government signed with the Holy See, the Ministry of Education and Science funds both the capital and operating costs of private Catholic schools, and the Vilnius municipality funds the Jewish gymnasium (high school), with support from the Jewish community.

The criminal code prohibits discrimination based on religion and provides penalties of up to two years in prison for violations. The code penalizes interference with religious ceremonies of recognized religious groups with imprisonment or community service and penalizes inciting religious hatred with imprisonment of up to three years.

The Office of the Equal Opportunities (OEO) ombudsperson investigates complaints of discrimination based on religion directed against state institutions, educational institutions, employers, and product and service sellers and producers.

The parliamentary ombudsperson examines whether state authorities properly perform their duties to serve the population. The law on the parliament ombudsperson specifically includes religious discrimination within the purview of the office. The OEO and parliamentary ombudspersons may investigate complaints, recommend changes to parliamentary committees and ministries regarding legislation, and recommend cases to the prosecutor general’s office for pretrial investigation.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On March 30, parliament granted the status of state-recognized religious association to the Lithuanian New Apostolic Church, which had submitted its application in 2003. The United Methodist Church of Lithuania continued to await parliamentary approval of its application for state-recognized religious association status, which it submitted in 2001.

In March the Ministry of Finance returned a Catholic monastery in Vilnius to the Franciscan Conventual Order after a four-year dispute with the former private owners and lengthy deliberations as to applicability of the law. In accordance with its 10-year agreement with the Foundation for the Disposal of Good Will Compensation for the Immovable Property of Jewish Religious Communities, the government again provided the fund with 3.62 million euros ($4.35 million) during the year. Since 2011, the foundation had received a total of 19 million euros ($22.8 million) from the government.

In October 2016, the government approved the restoration of ownership rights to seven religious buildings, three Old Believer and four Catholic, in different towns around the country. At year’s end the government had adjudicated all such claims that were submitted before the deadline of July 2015.

The government provided 697,000 euros ($837,000) to traditional religious groups to reconstruct religious buildings seized during the Nazi or Soviet eras and to support other religious community activities. As in previous years, the Roman Catholic Church received 626,500 euros ($750,000), 90 percent of the total; the Russian Orthodox community 33,000 euros ($39,600); and the remaining 36,000 euros ($43,200) was divided among the Old Believer, Evangelical Lutheran, Evangelical Reformed, Sunni Muslim, Jewish, Greek Catholic, and Karaite communities.

In August President Dalia Grybauskaite stated in response to concerns about the planned renovation of the Vilnius Sports Palace, which was built on a Jewish cemetery in Vilnius in 1971, that “decisions on Jewish cemeteries are taken together with the Lithuanian Jewish community (LJC) and the Committee for the Preservation of Jewish Cemeteries in Europe,” both of which expressed support for the renovation. Some Jews in and outside the country opposed the project and an online petition against it garnered approximately 40,000 signatures.

In September Member of Parliament Emanuelis Zingeris said it was time that the country remove monuments to citizens who had written anti-Semitic propaganda or were suspected of having collaborated with the Nazis. Members of the Jewish community stated street names and monuments honoring Kazys Skirpa and Jonas Noreika were their primary concern.

The government continued to support Jewish educational, cultural, and historical projects, including exhibitions, youth camps, such as a project in Mazeikiai for high school students to explore Jewish history in their community, and synagogue restoration, for both historical purposes and current use. In May the Martynas Mazvydas National Library opened the Judaica Research Center to study the country’s Jewish heritage and organize educational projects for the public. In September the government’s cultural heritage department organized a program of activities on the theme of “Diaspora and Heritage: the Shtetl” to mark the European Days of Jewish Culture. Tours, lectures, concerts, exhibitions, conferences and other events took place in 24 cities and towns, including Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipeda, Alytus, Jurbarkas, Kelme, Siauliai, Silale, Jonava, Joniskis, Kupiskis, Seduva, Sveksna, Ukmerge, and Zarasai. The government’s cultural heritage department allocated 448,000 euros ($538,000) for the renovation of synagogues in Vilnius, Alytus, and Ziezmariai, with local municipalities contributing 54,840 euros ($65,800) to the latter two projects.

In July the Constitutional Court ruled there were no legal grounds to exempt clergy of traditional religious groups from mandatory military or alternative service. Previously, the government had granted exemptions to clergy and theological students from the military service requirement. The decision stemmed from a court case filed by a Jehovah’s Witness, who had sought an exemption from military service on religious grounds.

Government officials took part in ceremonies to commemorate the Holocaust organized by the government’s Jewish State Museum and the Jewish community. On January 26, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Darius Skusevicius and Vice Speaker of Parliament (Seimas) Rima Baskiene participated in International Holocaust Remembrance Day with a program including a candle-lighting ceremony and the chanting of the El Malei Rachamim prayer at the Choral Synagogue of Vilnius. On February 16, President Dalia Grybauskaite gave an award to Holocaust survivor Fania Brantsovsky for her work in the field of Holocaust education. On March 22, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Skusevicius participated in an International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance event in Vilnius entitled “As Mass Murder Began: Identifying and Remembering the Killing Sites of Summer-Fall 1941.” On September 4, Minister of Culture Liana Ruokyte-Jonsson and Vilnius Mayor Remigijus Simasius gave opening remarks at a conference to discuss future plans for the Vilnius great synagogue.

On September 25, parliament held a conference on Jewish heritage, which was opened by Speaker Viktoras Pranckietis and accompanied by an exhibition on the country’s Jewish past. Prime Minister Saulius Skvernelis gave remarks at commemoration events at the Paneriai Holocaust site on April 26, and for the annual March of the Living on September 26. At the September 26 event, the prime minister stressed that Jews were integral to the country’s history and called for more discussion about how Lithuanian collaborators took part in the Holocaust, calling it the “darkest page” in the country’s history. On September 27, President Grybauskaite presented 43 non-Jews who rescued Jews during World War II with awards, thanking them for having “passed the test of humanity in the most difficult of years.” On November 16, Minister of Culture Ruokyte-Jonsson and Vilnius Mayor Simasius spoke at the opening of a museum and center for the promotion of religious and ethnic tolerance, named in honor of a Jewish artist, who survived the Holocaust in Vilnius.

The government’s cultural heritage department registered two new Jewish sites as culturally valuable: the Jewish Ghetto Library in Vilnius on March 22, and the underground remains of the Vilnius Great Synagogue on May 9. On October 13, Vilnius city municipality began a project to deliver more than 1,000 tons of Jewish gravestone fragments, which were taken from the historic Olandu and Snipiskiu cemeteries and used for construction material during the Soviet era, to the site of a former Jewish cemetery on Olandu Street in Vilnius.

The government and civil society continued to work together to promote Holocaust education and tolerance in schools with the local Jewish community and NGOs such as the Human Rights Center. Students across the country participated in Holocaust commemoration events and marches: on April 26, they marked Holocaust Memorial Day at Paneriai; on September 22, they participated in the national Day of Remembrance of the Holocaust at Paneriai, Kaunas, Panevezys, Alytus, and Siauliai and performed Jewish plays and Yiddish songs at the Sauletekio School in Vilnius. A total of 194 educational institutions took part in the Holocaust-remembrance initiative “Memory Road,” in which students carried stones bearing names of Jews who lived in their communities to commemorate the Jewish communities exterminated in the Holocaust. On April 24, the government-appointed International Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes in Lithuania and Israel’s Yad Vashem Holocaust Research Institute organized a Holocaust workshop for educators.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

In January during a television game show, while a group was singing a song popularized by a Jewish singer, one of the judges, actress and former parliamentarian Asta Baukute stood up, gave a Nazi salute and repeatedly shouted “Jew.” Following protests, the producer and host of the show issued apologies and the station, Lithuanian National Radio and Television, cancelled the show.

In January a group of students at the Laisves High School in Naujoji Vilnia, a suburb of Vilnius, protested the school principal’s dismissal of a teacher, Marius Janulevicius, who had worked with the students to produce a video commemorating Lithuanian Jews killed in the Holocaust. According to a Jerusalem Post op-ed by a senior official at the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Jerusalem, the dismissal was due to Janulevicius’ work on the video, but school officials said it was because he had spoken harshly to a janitor. Neither the Lithuanian media nor the Lithuanian Jewish community indicated that Janulevicius’ dismissal was an act of anti-Semitism, and Janulevicius never publicly stated his dismissal was due to his work on the video. Authorities subsequently reinstated Janulevicius and dismissed the school principal.

Following controversial allegations from author Ruta Vanagaite against national hero and anti-Soviet fighter Adolfas Ramanauskas-Vanagas, Vytautas Landsbergis, the country’s first head of state after its independence from the Soviet Union, called Vanagaite “Mrs. Dushanski,” a reference to a Jewish KGB officer and Holocaust survivor, who participated in Ramanauskas-Vanagas’ capture. In response, Vanagaite issued a statement calling the Dushanski reference “blatantly anti-Semitic.”

International and local Jewish organizations expressed concern over verbal attacks directed at Vanagaite. The LJC issued a statement calling upon “all sides to refrain from making rash statements leading to public discord,” and inviting “the public, professional historians, and national leaders to take measures to halt the further division of society and the spread of hate.”

NGOs, including Caritas and the Lithuanian Red Cross, reported Muslim refugees faced discrimination in their applications for housing and employment. According to a poll by the Institute for Ethnic Studies, 46 percent of respondents said they would not want Muslims as neighbors, which was the highest negative view expressed about any religious or ethnic group. Respondents also were more opposed to accepting Muslim refugees compared to non-Muslim refugees: 72 percent opposed accepting Muslims from Iraq and Syria, while 55 percent opposed non-Muslims from Iraq and 50 percent opposed Christians from Syria.

Anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim comments on the internet were common. Anti-Semitic examples included justifying the Holocaust because “all Jews collaborated with the Soviet Union” and statements that Jewish greed was destroying the country and that Jews could not be citizens. Anti-Muslim examples included equating Muslims with terrorists, statements that Muslims would kill all Christians in the country, and that it was better to have 100 dead Muslims than one dead innocent person.

On January 4, organizers of an Uzgavenes (Lithuanian Shrovetide, or Carnival) event in Naisiai village published on social media a picture of a typical anti-Semitic caricature used during Uzgavenes with the sign, “I sell fleas and lice or exchange them for real estate,” reminiscent of anti-Semitic propaganda used by the Nazis. Ruling Farmers and Greens Union Party leader Ramunas Karbauskis shared the picture in a social media invitation to the Naisiai Uzgavenes celebration. LJC President Faina Kukliansky publicly condemned Karbauskis’ post, comparing it to Nazi propaganda. Popular news outlets such as Lietuvos Zinios and Bernardinai ran articles criticizing the use of what they said were racist costumes in celebrations.

On February 16, nationalists held a march in Kaunas to commemorate the anniversary of the restoration of the country’s independence. The march attracted approximately 150 participants, compared with 250 in the previous year and 400 in 2015; some participants wore fascist symbols and carried anti-Semitic signs. The march included a banner with a picture of, and a quote by, the anti-Semite Kazys Skirpa, founder of the Lithuanian Activist Front during World War II. Participants reportedly marched near the Lietukis garage, where dozens of Jews were killed in 1941, and other Jewish execution sites. Nationalists also organized a march in Vilnius on March 11, the country’s independence day, involving approximately 500 persons, a decrease from previous years; the marchers chanted “Lithuania for Lithuanians.” According to local observers, some of the participants wore fascist symbols, gave Nazi salutes, and carried anti-Semitic signs. Lithuanian Nationalist Union Party member Arunas Eigridas read a petition during the march, calling on the government to rescind the award President Grybauskaite had presented to Holocaust survivor Fania Brantsovsky in February. Police monitored both events, and there were no reports of violence.

The U.S. embassy continued to maintain a regular dialogue with senior government officials, including in the prime minister’s office, members of parliament, and officials from the Ministries of Culture, Interior, Social Affairs, Justice, and Foreign Affairs, on the importance of religious freedom. Embassy officials continued to engage with the government on ways to promote tolerance and integration of religious minorities, including Muslim refugees, into society, combat anti-Semitism, and urge the government to address the remaining issues regarding compensation for Jewish private property seized during the Nazi and Soviet eras. U.S. officials, including the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, discussed these restitution issues and the status of Jewish heritage sites with members of parliament and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Culture. In May embassy officers met with officials from the Ministry of Social Affairs and the government refugee reception center to discuss the integration of Muslim refugees from the Middle East and North Africa.

The Ambassador and embassy staff met regularly with the Jewish community and other religious groups to discuss issues of concern, including property restitution, preservation and restoration of heritage sites, combating intolerance, and Holocaust remembrance. In December the Ambassador visited a recently renovated synagogue in Pakruojis in addition to the ‘Lost Shtetl’ project in Seduva, which included a restored cemetery, three new Holocaust memorials, and a planned museum dedicated to rural Jewish communities, with ground breaking scheduled for 2018. In November the Ambassador delivered opening remarks at a conference on fighting intolerance and anti-Semitism hosted by the Jewish community. In August the Charge d’Affaires spoke at a Holocaust commemoration event in Kaunas on the need for inclusive societies. In March the Charge d’Affaires met with an AJC delegation to discuss Jewish priorities in the country.

The embassy financially supported the establishment of a museum and center for the promotion of religious and ethnic tolerance, which opened in November. It was named in honor of a Jewish artist, who survived the Holocaust in Vilnius. Other efforts included funding for U.S. government-led noninvasive archaeological research at Jewish and Holocaust sites in Vilnius and Kaunas and a public screening of a PBS television NOVA documentary about that research and collaboration between the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research and the National Library to digitize more than a million Jewish historical documents.

In November the Ambassador met with members of the Tatar Muslim community to discuss their concerns. Embassy officers discussed ongoing Muslim refugee integration plans with NGOs and members of the refugee community. In October the embassy funded a $25,000 project to assist grassroots efforts to promote tolerance for religious diversity and integrate new, primarily Muslim, communities into society.

The U.S. government estimates the total population is 594,000 (July 2017 estimate). By law the government may not collect personal information related to religion and relies on religious communities to report the number of their adherents. These numbers are then certified by an independent accountant. The government estimates that approximately 70 percent of the population is Roman Catholic; there are approximately 10,000 Protestants, 10,000 Muslims (including those from neighboring countries who cross the border to worship in the country), 3,000 members of Orthodox Churches, 2,500 Anglicans, and 1,500 Jews. A 2011 study by the government Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (previously known as the Center for Studies of Population, Poverty, and Socio-Economic Policy) reported small numbers of Bahais, Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and members of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees freedom of religion, including the freedom to public religious practice and to manifest religious opinions, as long as no crime is committed in exercising that freedom. While the constitution guarantees the right to assemble peacefully without prior authorization, it stipulates that open-air religious or other meetings are subject to regulation by police. The constitution prohibits compulsory participation in or attendance at church services or observance of religious days of rest and stipulates that a religious marriage ceremony must be preceded by a civil marriage ceremony to be recognized by the state. The constitution provides for the regulation of relations between religious groups and the state, including the role of the state in appointing and dismissing religious clergy and the publication of documents by religious groups, through conventions between the state and individual religious groups. These conventions are subject to review by parliament.

The government has formally approved conventions with six recognized religious communities, which it supports financially based on the number of adherents of each group. The six recognized communities are: the Catholic Church; the Greek, Russian, Romanian, and Serbian Orthodox Churches as one community; the Anglican Church; the Reformed Protestant Church of Luxembourg and the Protestant Church of Luxembourg as one community; the Jewish community; and the Muslim community. To qualify for a convention with the state, a religious community must be a recognized world religion and establish an official and stable representative body with which the government can interact. Groups without signed conventions, such as the Bahai Faith, may operate freely but do not receive state funding.

Under the law, newly hired religious workers do not receive government-funded salaries and pensions, but clergy of recognized religious groups hired in 2016 or earlier continue to receive their salaries from the government and are grandfathered into the government-funded pension system.

Not counting the government-paid salaries for religious workers hired in or before 2016, the funding levels agreed to in the conventions with the six recognized religious groups are as follows: 6.75 million euros ($8.1 million) to the Catholic community; 315,000 euros ($378,000) to the Jewish community; 285,000 euros ($342,000) to the Orthodox community; 450,000 euros ($540,000) to the Protestant community; 450,000 euros ($540,000) to the Muslim community; and 125,000 euros ($150,000) to the Anglican community.

Under the conventions, government funding to a religious community may be cancelled if the government determines that the religious community is not upholding any of the three principles upon which they mutually agreed: respect for human rights, national law, and public order.

Effective in the 2016-17 academic year for secondary schools and in 2017-18 for primary schools, religious education in public schools is abolished and replaced by an ethics course called “Life and Society.” Religious instructors affected by the change may teach the new Life and Society course if they qualify under the new provisions (including holding a bachelor’s degree), agree to adhere to the new curriculum, and participate in a “reorientation” course.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Pursuant to instructions from the central government to local administrative districts known as communes, the communes and the Catholic Church negotiated agreements on the disposition of Church properties in each commune. Previously, the properties had been under the control and responsibility of local Catholic Church councils, which operated independently. Under the agreements, control was transferred to the communes or the central Church authority. The Church at the national level developed a list of buildings needed for worship, and local Church councils negotiated the disposition of each building with the communes. In some cases, the Church transferred ownership of properties it did not need to communes for a symbolic fee of one euro ($1.20); in others, the communes leased properties they owned to the Church for nominal rental fees of 1,000-2,500 euros ($1,200-$3,000) per year. The government had initially set a January 1 deadline for these agreements but later extended it to June 1, a deadline which all of the communes and Church councils met. In addition, the government and Catholic Archbishop of Luxembourg Jean-Claude Hollerich agreed that the upkeep of two historical Church properties, the Basilica of St. Willibord in Echternach and the Notre Dame Cathedral in Luxembourg, would be cofinanced by the government and the Catholic Church.

The Syndicate of Church Councils, an association representing the interests of 270 of the 285 local Catholic Church councils in the country, opposed the legislation on church properties and the property agreements signed between the Church councils and the communes. The syndicate, with the support of 118 of its Church councils, filed a lawsuit in December 2016 against Minister of Religion (also Prime Minister) Xavier Bettel, Minister of the Interior Dan Kersch, and Archbishop Hollerich. The lawsuit challenged the right of the archbishop to represent the Catholic Church in signing the 2015 convention that laid out the parameters for separating church and state and required that property ownership be negotiated between the local Church councils and the communes. The lawsuit remained pending at year’s end.

In addition to filing the lawsuit, the syndicate gathered 12,000 signatures on a petition, allowing it to gain a parliamentary hearing in January, at which it insisted it be included in the negotiation process on issues related to the separation of church and state. At the hearing, Interior Minister Kersch stated the archbishop was the government’s official negotiating partner and objections to the law advanced by the syndicate pertained to internal Church matters. The hearing ended without a vote.

On July 14, the Council of State, an advisory body of parliament, published an opinion stating Church councils, as public institutions, could be abolished by the state, and the transfer of assets from the councils to a common Catholic Church fund did not constitute an expropriation. The Council of State recommended amendments to the proposed law governing the management of church buildings, including one allowing local communes to fund renovations of church buildings that were transferred to the central Catholic Church fund. Interior Minister Kersch agreed to the Council of State’s recommended amendments and in October resubmitted the draft legislation to the council for another review. By year’s end parliament had not voted on the legislation.

On August 7, parliament passed a law outlining a framework for former religious instructors to continue working in public schools. Under the law, secondary school teachers who were formerly religious educators may teach nonreligious subjects in which they hold a bachelor’s degree after completion of a 16-hour training course. These secondary school educators are employed by the Ministry of National Education. Primary school educators who formerly taught Catholic classes and rejoin the public schools as teachers of other subjects continue to be officially employed by the Catholic Church.

Of the 140 Catholic primary teachers affected by the new law affecting former religious instructors, 100 became substitute teachers after meeting the minimum qualifications to teach elementary education; the remaining 40 were receiving training to serve as education assistants in primary schools or day-care centers.

On August 8, Minister of Justice Felix Braz presented a bill to parliament proposing the prohibition of facial coverings in public buildings and on public transportation. He stated the motivation was not religious, but rather that fellow citizens should be able to recognize each other. Although two opposition political parties, the Christian Social People’s Party and the Alternative Democratic Reform Party, had in previous years initially called for a nationwide ban only of the burqa to be enforced everywhere, they changed their position during the year to favor a ban on all facial coverings. The ruling coalition, consisting of the Democratic Party, the Liberal Socialists Workers Party, and the Greens, took a compromise position favoring a ban on facial coverings in public spaces and introduced the draft bill. By year’s end the Council of State had not yet issued an advisory opinion on the draft legislation, required prior to a parliamentary debate and vote. A total of 47 local municipalities banned facial coverings, but police did not enforce these communal bans.

According to the Assembly of the Muslim Community (the Shoura), approximately 16 women in the country wore the niqab or burqa. The Shoura criticized the proposed law banning face coverings as unnecessary, in view of the small number of women who wore burqas, and stated the debate was counterproductive in an “open and tolerant society.” The Shoura also criticized Justice Minister Braz for not consulting the affected population prior to announcing his proposal.

In October the pastor of Trinity Church, the historic Protestant church in Luxembourg City, stated mounting court costs for an ongoing civil court case could potentially bankrupt his church under the new Church funding arrangement. The pastor stated the judge should have dismissed the case, because it pertained to an internal church matter.

According to data provided by the prime minister’s office, through October the government had granted refugee status to 938 individuals, the majority of whom were Muslim. The Organization for Welcome and Integration (OLAI), an entity of the Ministry of Family and Integration, stated the government sought to be proactive in assuring refugee access to mosques, halal meals, and same-sex housing for those who requested it. OLAI reported no complaints or concerns by refugees related to the practice of their religion.

The country held the presidency of the International Tracing Service (ITS) during the year and hosted the 80th session of the International Commission of the International Tracing Service in June in Luxembourg City. The ITS is an archive and center for documentation, research, and information on Nazism, forced labor, and the Holocaust in Nazi Germany and its occupied regions.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

In September the Bar Association changed its internal regulations to ban lawyers from wearing headscarves while practicing law. The decision was made the night before the September swearing-in ceremony for new attorneys admitted to the bar, and the following morning, a female candidate was asked to remove her head covering if she wanted to be sworn in. She declined and did not participate in the ceremony. The Shoura said the action undermined religious freedom. It was analyzing the case but had not taken legal action by year’s end.

Leaders of the six recognized religious communities agreed to meet on an ad hoc basis in the Council of Recognized Religious Communities, which they established when renegotiating their status with the government. Archbishop Hollerich and Grand Rabbi Alain David Nacache served as president and vice president, respectively. According to its members, the council did not convene during the year, as there were no issues that rose to the level requiring their combined attention.

A visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State from the Bureau of European Affairs noted concern about the proposed facial covering law at a meeting with Ministry of Justice officials in November.

U.S. embassy officials discussed religious freedom issues with leaders and representatives of religious groups, including reactions to the implementation of the law that reorganized the relationship between religious communities and the state.

In November the Charge d’Affaires hosted an interfaith Thanksgiving lunch discussion in recognition of the International Day of Tolerance. Twenty-five outside guests representing 10 religious communities, as well as the government, civil society, and the press, joined embassy officials to discuss religious tolerance in contemporary society. The Charge d’Affaires gave remarks promoting tolerance and interfaith dialogue, and a guest speaker and facilitator challenged the attendees to consider ways to move beyond tolerance to a fuller understanding of and respect for other faith communities.

In October an embassy representative met with the pastor of Trinity Church to hear his concerns about a civil court case that he believed represented discrimination against his church.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 2.1 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the last national census, in 2002, an estimated 65 percent of the population is Orthodox Christian and 33 percent Muslim. The Muslim community includes a small number of Sufi orders. Other religious groups that together constitute less than 2 percent of the population include Roman Catholics, various Protestant denominations, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). The Jewish community estimates it has 200-250 members. According to an April Brima/Gallup poll, 1 percent of the population identifies as atheist.

The vast majority of Muslims are Sunni, and most live in the northern and western parts of the country. The majority of Orthodox Christians live in the central and southeastern regions. There is a correlation between ethnicity and religious affiliation: the majority of Orthodox Christians are ethnic Macedonian, and most Muslims are ethnic Albanians. Most Roma, and virtually all ethnic Turks and ethnic Bosniaks, are Muslim, and most ethnic Serbs and Vlachs are Orthodox Christian. There is also a correlation between religious and political affiliation, as political parties are largely divided along ethnic lines.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and provides for equality of rights for all citizens regardless of religious belief. It guarantees freedom of religion and the right of individuals to express their faith freely and in public, individually or with others. It guarantees the religious identity of nationalities and communities in the country. The constitution specifically cites five religious groups: the Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia, the Catholic Church, the Evangelical Methodist Church, and the Jewish Community. The law allows other religious organizations to obtain the same legal rights and status as these five groups by applying for government recognition and registration through the courts. The constitution states the five named religious groups “and other religious communities and groups” are separate from the state, equal before the law, and free to establish schools, charities, and other social institutions. The constitution bars political parties or other associations from inciting religious hatred or intolerance.

Religious organizations may apply to register as a “church,” a “religious community,” or a “religious group.” These classifications are based on group size, internal organization, and internal hierarchy. According to judicial authorities, the law treats these three categories equally, bestowing the same legal rights, benefits, and obligations on all of them. The government has recognized 35 religious organizations (consisting of 17 churches, nine religious communities, and nine religious groups). Once registered, a church, religious community, or religious group is exempt from taxes and is eligible to apply for property restitution for those properties nationalized during the communist era, government-funded projects, and construction permits for preservation of shrines and cultural sites. It may also establish schools. Failure to register does not prevent a religious group from holding meetings or proselytizing, or result in legal punishment or fines, but prevents the group from engaging in certain activities, such as establishing schools or receiving donations that are tax-deductible for the donor.

Skopje Basic Court II accepts registration applications and has 15 business days to determine whether a religious organization’s application meets the legal registration criteria. These criteria are: a physical administrative presence within the country, an explanation of its beliefs and practices that distinguish it from other religious organizations, and a unique name and official insignia. An applicant organization must also identify a supervisory body in charge of managing its finances and submit a breakdown of its financial assets and funding sources and minutes from its founding meeting. The law allows multiple groups of a single faith to register. Registered leaders or legal representatives of religious groups must be citizens of the country.

The court sends approved applications to the Committee on Relations between Religious Communities and Groups (CRRCG), a government body responsible for fostering cooperation and communication between the government and religious groups, which adds the organization to its registry. If the court denies the application, the organization may appeal the decision to the State Appellate Court. If the State Appellate Court denies the application, the organization may file a human rights petition with the Constitutional Court, the highest human rights court in the country, on grounds of denial of religious rights. If the Constitutional Court denies the petition, the organization may appeal the case to the ECHR.

The law does not permit religious organizations to operate primary schools, but allows them to operate schools at the secondary level and above. The Ministry of Education requires sixth grade students and above to take one of three elective courses, two of which have religious content: Introduction to Religions and Ethics in Religion. According to the ministry’s description, these courses teach religion in an academic, nondevotional manner. The courses are usually taught by Orthodox priests or imams, whose salaries are paid by the state. The Ministry of Education states all teachers of these subjects receive training from accredited higher education institutions taught by professors of philosophy or sociology. If students do not wish to take a course on religion, they may take the third option, Classical Culture in European Civilization.

All foreigners who seek to enter the country to carry out religious work or perform religious rites must obtain a work visa before arrival, a process that normally takes approximately four months. The CRRCG maintains a register of all foreign religious workers and may approve or deny them the right to conduct religious work within the country. Work visas are valid for six months, with the option to renew for an additional six months. Subsequent visa renewals are valid for one year. There is no limit to the number of visa renewals for which a religious worker may apply. Clergy and religious workers from unregistered groups are eligible for visas.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary Paragraph: In March a court convicted the archbishop who heads the OAO of money laundering and ruled the state could confiscate OAO land, which the state did. The ECHR ruled the government violated the OAO’s rights by refusing it registration and ordered it to pay the religious group 9,500 euros ($11,400). A court approved the registration of two religious groups, while two other applications remained pending. The government did not restitute any previously-confiscated properties during the year to religious groups. The ICM reported the government continued to block construction of a mosque in Lazhec and reconstruction of a mosque in Prilep. An unregistered preschool closed after the government investigated it in July and said it had carried out unauthorized religious activities. A school lifted a ban on the wearing of headscarves by students after intervention by the ombudsman. Smaller religious groups said the government treated them unequally, and the ICM said the government favored the MOC-OA. Civil society and smaller religious groups stated the previous government of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) politicized religion and interfered in religious matters. MOC-OA clergy participated in VMRO-DPMNE political events, and the ICM participated in support of the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) and Movement Besa parties.

According to various university professors, nongovernmental organization (NGO) leaders, and legal and political analysts, religious differences continued to play a role in criminal and civil court cases. In March Skopje Basic Court convicted Archbishop Jovan Vraniskovski, the head of the OAO, of money laundering. The court sentenced Vraniskovski to seven months in prison and acquitted two other defendants. The court also ruled the state could confiscate OAO land valued at 140,000 euros ($168,000), which it did. The court ordered Vraniskovski’s release after sentencing based on time he had served in prison after an earlier conviction on the same charge. Vraniskovski was originally convicted in a money laundering case in 2015, but the Supreme Court vacated the conviction and sent the case to the lower court for retrial. The OAO accused the government of bias in the case and stated the previous government had ordered the court to “convict Vraniskovski at any cost,” while his lawyer cited what he said were substantive and procedural irregularities in the case. These included the court’s failure to take into account the recommendations of the Supreme Court to determine the origin of the acquired property and money, political interference, and the absence of a written verdict.

Separately the OAO had been awaiting a ruling from the ECHR regarding its application to register as a recognized religious organization, which national courts had denied on grounds that it could not substantiate the difference between its name and symbols and those of the MOC-OA. On November 16, the ECHR ruled in favor of the OAO, stating that, by refusing to register the OAO (commonly referred to locally as “the Church of defrocked Bishop Jovan Vraniskovski”) as a separate religious group, the government had violated the OAO’s right of assembly and freedom of religion and conscience. The ECHR further stated the government had violated the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which includes an obligation to act in a neutral and unbiased manner towards religious groups. The ECHR ordered the government to pay 4,500 euros ($5,400) in compensation and 5,000 euros ($6,000) for court expenses to the OAO. By year’s end the government had not paid either sum.

The Bektashi Community of Macedonia (Tetovo), an Islamic Sufi order, continued to await an ECHR ruling on its 2013 appeal to overturn the Constitutional Court’s denial of its registration. The country’s Helsinki Committee stated the ECHR had not yet ruled in the Bektashi case because it was reviewing the case with three others of a similar nature before offering a ruling. The Bektashi community reported an ECHR official had visited to discuss the case during the year. The government continued to issue visas to foreign members and spiritual leaders of the Bektashi Community of Macedonia (Tetovo).

In May Basic Court Skopje II approved the registration of the Church of Scientology of Macedonia, and the Home of Prayer religious group. Applications from the Christian Community in Macedonia and the Community of Muslims remained pending.

In August the OAO issued a statement alluding to the U.S. government’s report on international religious freedom in the country for 2016, citing from the report the past imprisonment of Archbishop Vraniskovski and the Helsinki Committee’s statement the archbishop was a political prisoner. It also cited references in the report to statements by various sources that religious differences played a role in criminal and civil court cases and references by religious groups that the government favored the MOC-OA.

The government did not restitute any properties to religious groups during the year that the state had previously confiscated, and religious groups, including the Muslim and Catholic communities, reported continuing problems with property restitution. For example, the ICM stated the government had only restored 15 percent of property the state previously seized, and that it was still seeking ownership rights to the Yeni Mosque in Bitola, which the state declared a cultural monument and seized in 1950. The Catholic Church continued to call on the government to return a property the state seized before the communist era in the southern village of Paliurci, where the Church wanted to build a church and a monastery. The dispute over the Paliurci property had been continuing in the courts for 10 years.

The ICM stated the government continued to prevent construction of a mosque in the ethnically mixed village of Lazhec by denying a construction permit because of pressure from local residents opposed to the mosque. The ICM also reported the government continued to block reconstruction of the mosque in Prilep, which burned down during armed conflict in 2001. According to the ICM, the government denied a permit to rebuild the mosque on the grounds that the Prilep site was a monument of culture under the government’s jurisdiction. The ICM also said local authorities in Kriva Palanka opposed construction of a mosque there.

The MOC-OA stated the Municipality of Struga had not issued a decision on the construction of an Orthodox church in the village of Belica and that the Municipality of Tetovo refused to build a road leading to the city chapel. The application had been pending since 2013.

In July the Ministry of Social and Labor policy initiated an investigation into an unregistered Muslim religious preschool. During the first inspection, the ministry found that “both the children and two teachers confirmed that religious activities were part of the preschool’s education program,” which was not permitted by law. The ICM condemned the “abuse of children,” and said it would work to institutionally combat what it called unlawful establishments such as that one. The preschool closed without further government intervention.

In September the Committee on Protection from Discrimination, a government advisory body appointed by parliament, and the ombudsman determined Muslim elementary school students from Ohrid were discriminated against for their religious beliefs and attire after being told they could not attend class wearing headscarves. After intervention by the ombudsman, the school lifted its headscarf ban and allowed the students to attend classes.

The ICM stated the government favored the MOC-OA by granting it unique privileges, such as providing it with public properties free of charge, funding for the construction of new Orthodox churches, and exclusive invitations for its representatives to attend government functions. The MOC-OA denied allegations of favoritism, but said such a perception might exist, since it was the largest religious community in the country. Additionally, the MOC-OA denied any affiliation with the outgoing VMRO-DPMNE government and stated it did not involve itself in politics.

Smaller religious organizations, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, Evangelical Church, Bektashi Community (Tetovo), and OAO continued to state the government did not treat them as equals of the five religious organizations recognized in the constitution. For example, they stated the government excluded them from official events, such as official holiday celebration events or government building ground-breaking ceremonies, and did not grant them the same level of access to government officials. The OAO and the Bektashi said that, as unregistered communities, they often faced discrimination and intimidation.

Some civil society groups, such as the country’s Helsinki Committee, and smaller religious communities, including the Protestant Evangelical Church and the Bektashi, stated the previous VMRO-DPMNE government interfered in religious matters and often politicized religion. According to media reporting, MOC-OA clergy participated in progovernment rallies and political functions, including protests, before the formation of the new government, which assumed office on June 1, and in campaign events for the VMRO-DPMNE before October local elections. Other political parties and civil society organizations stated the MOC-OA violated the government’s ban on interference by religious communities in state affairs. Media also reported the ICM participated in events in support of DUI, an ethnic Albanian party, and, to a lesser degree, the Movement Besa party. A June field research report on the levels of religious tolerance, jointly conducted by the ZIP Institute, the Macedonian Center for International Cooperation, and Civica Mobilitas, cited abuses of religious discourse and politicization of religious components, primarily by the MOC-OA and the ICM. In addition, a joint survey by the Institute for Political Research Skopje and Germany’s Konrad Adenauer Foundation concluded that political parties, especially Movement Besa, used religion for political purposes.

A Muslim doctor from Gostivar reported border police continued to subject him to harassment and undue scrutiny, most recently in September, because of his long beard and the short pants he wore for religious reasons, which delayed his border crossings whenever he entered and exited the country.

From June to July, following the lapse of the government’s memorandum of understanding with Saudi Arabia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs facilitated negotiations between the ICM and the Saudi government to allow pilgrims to obtain visas to travel on the Hajj.

During a meeting with Prime Minister Zoran Zaev in July, representatives of the Catholic Church voiced concerns about procedural delays in obtaining visas and residence permits for foreign clergy.

The CRRCG reported it issued letters of consent to all foreign missionaries and clerics who submitted requests for religious work during the year.

The Bektashi continued to report to the police harassment by ICM-affiliated occupants of the Harabati Baba teqe (shrine) compound in Tetovo. In March the ICM claimed full ownership of the compound, and announced plans for its renovation in partnership with the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency. Bektashi representatives expressed concerns the renovation of the complex would displace them from the compound entirely. Bektashi representatives reported they and visitors to the complex were often verbally harassed, and told to leave the compound. The Bektashi could not assert a claim of ownership to the compound because they remained unregistered.

There were instances of anti-Semitic speech in social and print media. In one instance, individuals stated on social media that a prominent American Jewish businessman had collaborated with the Nazis in the extermination of Jews during World War II. In another, a January edition of the weekly Republika described the same businessman as a “Nazi Jew” in a piece titled “The Divine Lucifer.” In March the Jewish community reported that flyers with anti-Semitic content, including swastikas and the phrase “Jews Out,” were thrown in the yard of its association’s headquarters.

The Holocaust Fund of the Jews from Macedonia, an NGO, continued to work with the Ministry of Education to implement Holocaust education and Jewish history programs and promote interfaith cooperation. The project provided teachers with tools to teach secondary school students about the Holocaust and Jewish history. The Holocaust Memorial Center, a museum overseen by members of the Jewish community and the government that commemorates the 7,200 Jews sent to the Treblinka death camp, also conducted Holocaust education programs in partnership with the Ministry of Education and organized a number of regional seminars on Jewish culture, tolerance, and respect for diversity with Bulgaria, Serbia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Greece.

A Brima/Gallup poll published in April found 84 percent of citizens considered themselves to be “religious” and 10 percent “not religious.” The survey, conducted between November 25 and December 2, 2016, included 1,210 respondents aged 15 and above.

There were reports of vandalism at religious sites. MOC-OA reported acts of vandalism of Orthodox churches, including an attempt in February to burn the door of a church in Saraj. In September individuals threw stones at an Orthodox church in Cair, and unknown vandals looted a mosque and an Orthodox church in Struga. In January and November unknown perpetrators stole the bells of the Orthodox churches in Kochani and Saraj, respectively. ICM officials said they did not want to give small-scale incidents too much publicity so as not to fuel extremism or invite more trouble. In July unknown perpetrators spray painted and broke tombstones at the Orthodox cemetery in the Skopje village of Ljuboten. The ICM condemned the vandalism as “a cowardly act of provocation” intended to disturb cohabitation.

The MOC-OA reported more than a dozen robberies of Orthodox churches in various towns during the year, most often involving money from church collections. Police also reported a theft of money in September at a mosque in Struga.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy officials met with government and parliamentary representatives, including the speaker, to discuss religious freedom and tolerance. In June the Ambassador met with then-Minister of Justice Bilen Saliji to discuss draft legislation on hate speech and hate crimes, including those based on religion. The Ambassador also discussed interfaith tolerance, the importance of open dialogue, and countering religiously based violent extremism with senior government officials, including Prime Minister Zaev, Minister of Interior Oliver Spasovski, and new National Coordinator for Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism Borche Petrevski.

In June the Ambassador hosted an iftar with religious leaders, local and central government representatives, officials engaged in combating religiously-based violent extremism, and civil society activists. In his remarks the Ambassador expressed support of religious tolerance and religious freedom.

The Ambassador and other embassy officials met with the heads of the ICM and MOC-OA to discuss religious freedom issues, including charges of political interference and favoritism toward certain religious groups and efforts to combat violent extremism related to religion. In June the Ambassador met with the head of the Methodist church in Strumica to convey a public message of support for tolerance and respect for religious diversity. In June a delegation from the Department of State and embassy officials met with ICM Head Sulejman Rexhepi and imams in Skopje and Tetovo to discuss countering religiously-based violent extremism and ways of promoting religious tolerance. Embassy officials met with representatives from smaller religious communities, such as the Bektashi, Christian Evangelicals, and Mormons, and civil society, including the country’s Helsinki Committee and the NGO Balkans Institute for Faith and Culture, to discuss ways to further religious freedom and tolerance. These included the organization of a regional conference in October to commemorate the 500th anniversary of the Protestant Reformation, which brought together religious representatives, scholars, and journalists.

In March a Department of State official visited Skopje for meetings with government ministries, the ICM, MOC, religious minorities, academics, and analysts to discuss religious freedom in the country. Topics discussed included registration issues, property restitution, religious instruction in schools, government respect for and treatment of minority religious groups, and interfaith dialogue.

The embassy supported the Holocaust Fund of the Jews from Macedonia with a grant to fund a seminar for teachers on Sephardic Jewish history and the Holocaust. Forty-five primary and secondary school teachers of different ethnicities from all over the country and the region learned how to teach their students about Jewish life before the war and the Holocaust, using digital technology and social media. The seminar also provided an opportunity to share best practices for implementation of Holocaust education in schools.

The embassy covered the cost of three participants to attend an international summer academy focused on Holocaust education, 20th century Jewish history, and civil society in Budapest and Belgrade.

The embassy sponsored the participation of seven community and civil society leaders, local government representatives, and a representative from the Ministry of Interior in a visit to the United States concerning projects focusing on community-based responses to violent extremism, including the promotion of religious tolerance.

The embassy partnered with a team of journalists and film professionals to produce and broadcast a documentary series that presented a tolerant and multicultural account of the country’s ethnic, linguistic, and religious communities. The show, On the Same Side, comprised 30-minute episodes containing Macedonian and Albanian dual-language content. It featured prominent members of the religious community, academics, and citizens from locations throughout the country. The series, in its second season, aired on Sitel, the largest privately owned television station in the country.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 25 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the last national census in 1993, 52 percent adheres to indigenous beliefs, 41 percent is Christian, and 7 percent is Muslim. Muslim leaders and local scholars estimate Muslims currently constitute between 20 and 25 percent of the population. They state it is common to alternate between religious identities or to mix traditions, and many individuals hold a combination of indigenous and Christian or Muslim beliefs. Muslims predominate in the northwestern coastal areas and Christians predominate in the highlands. According to local Muslim religious leaders and secular academics, the majority of Muslims are Sunni. Citizens of ethnic Indian and Pakistani descent and Comorian immigrants represent the majority of Muslims, although there is a growing number of ethnic Malagasy converts.

Local religious groups state nearly half of the population is Christian. The four principal Christian groups are Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Anglicans, and the (Presbyterian) Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar. Smaller Christian groups include The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, and a growing number of local evangelical Protestant denominations.

There are small numbers of Hindus and approximately 360 Jews across the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religious thought and expression and prohibits religious discrimination in the workplace. Other laws protect individual religious freedom against abuses by government or private actors. The constitution states that such rights may be limited by the need to protect the rights of others or to preserve public order, national dignity, or state security. The labor code prohibits religious discrimination in labor unions and professional associations. Public schools do not offer religious education. There is no law prohibiting or limiting religious education in public or private schools.

The law requires religious groups to register with the Ministry of the Interior. By registering, a religious group receives the legal status necessary to receive direct bequests and other donations. Once registered, the group may apply for a tax exemption each time it receives a gift from abroad. Registered religious groups also have the right to acquire land from individuals to build places of worship; however, the law states landowners should first cede the land back to the state, and the state will then transfer it to the religious group. To qualify for registration, a group must have at least 100 members and an elected administrative council of no more than nine members, all of whom must be citizens.

Groups failing to meet registration requirements may instead register as “simple associations.” Simple associations may not receive donations or hold religious services, but the law allows them to conduct various types of community and social projects. Associations engaging in dangerous or destabilizing activities may be disbanded or have their registration withdrawn. Simple associations must apply for a tax exemption each time they receive a donation from abroad. If an association has foreign leadership and/or members, it may form an association “reputed to be foreign.” An association is reputed foreign only if the leader or members of the board include foreign nationals. Such foreign associations may receive only temporary authorizations, subject to periodic renewal and other conditions. The law does not prohibit national associations from having foreign nationals as members.

The government requires a permit for all public demonstrations, including religious events such as outdoor worship services.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In January the government promulgated a law amending the nationality code, mainly to address inequality between the rights of men and women to transmit nationality to their children. The new law enables a Malagasy woman to transmit her nationality to a child regardless of her marital status. According to the law, however, children born of two stateless parents remain unable to obtain Malagasy citizenship, even after several generations of residence in the country. Children with unknown parentage are evaluated based on appearance, ethnicity, and other factors. Muslim leaders continued to state that the nationality code affected the Muslim community disproportionately, as many members are descendants of immigrants and have been unable to acquire Malagasy nationality, despite generations of residence in the country. Children of ethnic Indian, Pakistani, and Comorian descent often have had difficulty obtaining citizenship, leaving a disproportionate number of Muslims stateless. A 2014 study by the NGO Focus Development and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that approximately 6 percent of individuals in the communities surveyed were stateless and of this number, more than 85 percent were born in the country. No statistics were available on the number of children born of Malagasy women able to profit retroactively from the amendment to the nationality code.

The Ministry of the Interior registered 17 new religious groups during the year, bringing the total to a reported 296 officially registered groups. Religious groups stated the government did not always enforce registration requirements and did not deny requests for registration.

Religious leaders stated that inadequate government enforcement of labor laws resulted in some employers requiring their employees to work during religious services. A Catholic priest in Antananarivo who managed a social services center catering to factory workers stated some employers failed to respect the labor code provisions requiring a 24-hour break weekly, which affected factory workers’ ability to attend worship services.

Leadership of the Muslim Malagasy Association, which states it represents all Muslims in the country, reported that some Muslims continued to report difficulty obtaining official documents such as national identity cards and passports because of their Arabic-sounding names. Some Muslims reported religious discrimination when applying for civil service positions. For example, to apply to civil service positions, applicants must provide criminal records, which some Muslims found difficult to obtain from the government.

Members of the Muslim community reported that during the administration of baccalaureate exams, some test center managers required female Muslim students to remove their headscarves for admittance to the exam rooms, which they said caused feelings of trauma and humiliation in the students.

On April 21, Minister of Education Andrianiana Rabary threatened to close 16 Islamic schools he classified as “Quranic” because they provided more than the five weekly hours of religious classes permitted by the Ministry of Education for private religious schools. Representatives of the Muslim community denied the existence of such practices and called the minister’s warning “Islamophobic.” Others defended the schools, stating they were established specifically to teach the Quran and were not to be considered ordinary primary schools. The minister defended the decision on television, stating the 16 schools were among 190 private schools identified as not complying with various administrative requirements. The minister of education further recommended setting up a national directorate of all Islamic schools (similar to those that exist for several Christian groups) to facilitate their relationship with the government. While attending a ceremony marking the start of Ramadan, Prime Minister Olivier Solonandrasana underlined the right of Quranic schools to operate if they had the proper permits, but he stated they needed to comply with the same laws as all other religious schools. As of the end of the year, there were no reports of any further reactions.

Religious leaders, especially those from smaller or minority religious groups, stated that politicians sought to use religion to improve their political image. During the year, several ceremonies organized by the Catholic, Methodist, and Lutheran Churches saw the presence of at least one, if not both, the current president and former President Marc Ravalomanana. According to some religious leaders, donations to religious groups had become a way to pressure some church leaders to help promote politicians’ ambitions rather than to fulfill church tasks.

State-run Malagasy National Television continued to provide free broadcasting to the Seventh-day Adventist Church and to Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Anglicans, and Presbyterians on weekends, along with the Muslim community once a week. During Ramadan, the Muslim community was able to purchase additional airtime. The leader of a well-known local evangelical Christian church reported his church was rarely given access to the state-run television and radio, even if it agreed to pay for the broadcast time.

The leader of the Jewish community reported a clear improvement in attitudes toward the community since the previous year, crediting multiple public interactions with the leaders of other religious groups that served as examples for the public. She said that local communities were no longer critical of the Jewish style of dress and that local schools no longer refused admission of Jewish children.

Adherents of some evangelical Christian churches, especially those celebrating their Sabbath on Saturdays, stated they were denied employment due to their religious affiliation.

U.S. embassy officials regularly engaged with the Ministry of Interior to understand and monitor the status of various religious groups. Prior to the adoption of amendments to the nationality code, U.S. embassy officials met with Ministry of Justice representatives to discuss the importance of the measure, in line with recommendations made by UNHCR. Embassy officials continued to discuss the nationality code with members of the diplomatic community and local representatives of the United Nations focused on human rights in order to undertake joint approaches to encourage the government to amend the new code to allow for naturalization of certain categories of stateless persons.

In January the embassy hosted an interfaith public discussion with five panelists from different faiths, including one representing traditional beliefs. The event sought to capitalize on the diversity of the country’s religious landscape by encouraging more contact and dialogue among faith leaders and representatives. The UN human rights advisor for Madagascar and the U.S. Ambassador opened the event, which was broadcast live on Facebook. The audience was composed of students, representatives of different faiths, other diplomatic missions, civil society, government representatives, and the media. After the event, the participants and members of the audience exchanged contact details and discussed ideas for future collaboration.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 19.2 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2016 Demographic and Health Survey, 86.9 percent of the population is Christian and 12.5 percent Muslim. Christian denominations include Roman Catholics at 18.1 percent, Central Africa Presbyterians at 17.4 percent, Seventh-day Adventist/Seventh-day Baptists (the survey groups the two into one category) at 6.9 percent and Anglicans at 2.6 percent. Another 41.9 percent fall under the “other Christians” category. Individuals stating no religious affiliation are 0.5 percent, and 0.1 percent represent other religious groups, including Hindus, Bahais, Rastafarians, Jews, and Sikhs.

The vast majority of Muslims are Sunni. Most Sunnis of African descent follow the Shafi’i school of Islamic legal thought, while the smaller community of mostly ethnic Asians mostly follows the Hanafi school. There is also a small number of Shia Muslims, mostly of Lebanese origin.

According to the 2008 census, there are two majority-Muslim districts, Mangochi (72 percent) and Machinga (64 percent). These neighboring districts at the southern end of Lake Malawi account for more than half of all Muslims in the country. Most other Muslims live near the shores of Lake Malawi. Christians are present throughout the country.

Traditional cultural practices with a spiritual dimension are sometimes practiced by Christians and Muslims. For example, the gule wamkulu spirit dancers remain of importance among Chewas, who are concentrated in the central region of the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion and provides for freedom of conscience, religion, belief, and thought. These rights may be limited only when the president declares a state of emergency.

The law states that holders of broadcast licenses “shall not broadcast any material which is…offensive to the religious convictions of any section of the population.”

Religious groups, like nonprofit organizations, must register with the government to be recognized as legal entities. Registered groups, like other legal entities, may own property and open bank accounts in the group’s name. Groups must submit documentation detailing the structure and mission of their organization and pay a fee of 1,000 kwacha ($1). The government reviews the application for administrative compliance only. According to the government, registration does not constitute approval of religious beliefs, nor is it a prerequisite for religious activities, but allows a group to acquire land, rent property in its own name, and obtain utility services such as water and electricity. Religious groups may apply to the Ministry of Finance for tax exemptions regardless of registration status.

Detainees have a right to consult with a religious counselor of their choice.

Religious instruction is mandatory in public primary schools, with no opt-out provision, and is available as an elective in public secondary schools. According to the constitution, eliminating religious intolerance is a goal of education. In some schools, the religious curriculum is a Christian-oriented “Bible knowledge” course, while in others it is an interfaith “moral and religious education” course drawing from the Christian, Islamic, Hindu, and Bahai faiths. According to the law, local school management committees, elected at parent-teacher association meetings, decide on which religious curriculum to use. Private Christian and Islamic schools offer religious instruction in their respective faiths. Hybrid “grant-aided” schools are managed by private, usually religious, institutions, but their teaching staffs are paid by the government. In exchange for this financial support, the government chooses a significant portion of the students who attend. At grant-aided schools, a board appointed by the school’s operators decides whether the “Bible knowledge” or the “moral and religious education” curriculum will be used.

Foreign missionaries are required to have employment permits.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Several Muslim women reported that Department of Road Traffic and Safety Services (DRTSS) photographers required they remove their hijab to take their driving license picture. Alerted by the Muslim Association of Malawi (MAM), the DRTSS issued a statement in May reaffirming that Muslim women were free to wear a hijab when taking pictures for official documents as long as their faces and eyes were visible. However, MAM continued to receive reports every few months of DRTSS staff asking Muslim women to remove their hijab for identification photographs.

Representatives of the Rastafarian community reported children with dreadlocks continued to be prohibited from attending certain public schools. Children are usually required by school policy to shave their heads to attend. Most Rastafarian parents relented and shaved their children’s heads, but the children of several families continued to be denied access to public school, and at least one child dropped out of school because of her dreadlocks. In September a child who through a highly competitive process had been selected to attend Malindi Secondary School in Zomba was denied enrolment because of his hair. The Malawi Human Rights Commission continued to investigate the issue of Rastafarian children’s access to education. In January the solicitor general reaffirmed in writing Rastafarian children’s constitutional rights to education, but as of the end of the year, the Ministry of Education had taken no further measures to ensure access.

Some Muslim groups continued to request the education ministry to discontinue use of the “Bible knowledge” course and use only the broader-based “moral and religious education” curriculum in primary schools, particularly in predominantly Muslim areas. The issue arose most frequently in grant-aided, Catholic-operated schools.

Muslim organizations continued to express concern about the impact of operating schools in two shifts. Due to rapidly rising enrollment, certain schools in urban areas offered classes in two shifts – one in the morning and another in the afternoon, or staggered start and end times. Muslim groups stated the shifts complicated the delivery of religious education at madrassahs in the afternoon on government school premises.

Most government meetings and events began and ended with a prayer, usually Christian in nature. At larger events, government officials generally invited clergy of different faiths to participate.

During events marking the Catholic Church’s 51st Communications Sunday on August 2, Information Minister Nicholas Dausi praised the country’s Catholic media services for their evangelization work and expressed continued government encouragement of Catholic media organizations.

In November President Mutharika gave official comments at the opening of the annual Muslim gathering where Muslims shared experiences and challenges facing their religion. President Mutharika commended the Muslim community for its contributions to the development of the country and emphasized the freedom to worship and the peaceful co-existence of religions.

Christians, Muslims, and Hindus often participated in business or civil society organizations together, including in Rotary and Lions clubs. Religious organizations and leaders regularly expressed their opinions on political issues and their statements received coverage in the media. In March the General Assembly of the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian, the country’s largest denomination, engaged with the president on the issue of unabated corruption. In October the Evangelical Association of Malawi released a statement calling on the government to table and enact the political parties’ bill, which seeks to enhance transparency in party funding, in preparation for the 2019 elections. In November the Public Affairs Committee petitioned the speaker of parliament to accelerate consideration of long-awaited electoral reform bills.

Religious groups operated at least 18 radio and 10 television stations. Approximately 80 percent of radio stations are Christian affiliated, while 20 percent are Muslim affiliated.

The embassy regularly invited leaders of religious groups to embassy events, and embassy officials engaged them regularly on issues of religious freedom. In January the Ambassador hosted an interfaith luncheon with 30 representatives of various denominations to commemorate U.S. National Religious Freedom Day and encourage intercommunal dialogue. During Ramadan, the Ambassador held an iftar dinner engaging with local Muslim leaders in discussions on community issues. Embassy officials regularly engaged local religious leaders of diverse faith traditions and faith-based organizations as allies in program planning and implementation of health and humanitarian assistance needs. Embassy officials also often met with representatives of religious groups, including an October meeting with leadership of the Muslim Association of Malawi, the largest Islamic association in the country, to discuss their organizational plans and concerns, in particular regarding removal of the hijab for government identification photographs.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 31.4 million (July 2017 estimate). Census figures from the most recent census in 2010 indicate that 61.3 percent of the population practices Islam; 19.8 percent, Buddhism; 9.2 percent, Christianity; 6.3 percent, Hinduism; and 1.3 percent, Confucianism, Taoism, or other traditional Chinese philosophies and religions. Other religious groups include animists, Sikhs, and Bahais. Ethnic Malays, who are defined in the federal constitution as Muslims from birth, account for approximately 55 percent of the population. Rural areas – especially in the east coast of peninsular Malaysia – are predominantly Muslim, while the states of Sabah and Sarawak on the island of Borneo have relatively higher numbers of non-Muslims. Reports indicate that a growing number of converts to Christianity are ethnic Chinese middle-class individuals who were originally Buddhists or Confucianists.

Legal Framework

The federal constitution states that “every person has the right to profess and practice his religion,” but gives federal and state governments the power to control or restrict proselytization to Muslims. The constitution names Islam as the “religion of the Federation,” and gives parliament powers to make provisions regulating Islamic religious affairs. Federal and state governments have the power to “control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam.” The constitution identifies the traditional rulers, also known as sultans, as the “Heads of Islam” within their respective states. Sultans are present in nine of the country’s 13 states and are the highest Islamic authority; in the remaining four states and the Federal Territories, the highest Islamic authority is the king. Sultans oversee the sharia courts and appoint judges based on the recommendation of the respective state Islamic religious departments and councils who manage the operations of the courts. In states with no sultan and in the Federal Territories, the king assumes responsibility for this process. The law allows citizens and organizations to sue the government for constitutional violations of religious freedom. Federal law has constitutional precedence over state law, except in matters concerning Islamic law. A 1996 fatwa, supported by state laws, requires the country to follow only Sunni teachings of the Shafi’i school and prohibits Muslims from possessing, publishing, or distributing material contrary to those teachings.

Muslims who seek to convert to another religion must first obtain approval from a sharia court to declare themselves “apostates.” Sharia courts seldom grant such requests and can impose penalties on apostates, including enforced “rehabilitation.” In the states of Perak, Melaka, Sabah, and Pahang, apostasy is a criminal offense punishable by a fine or jail term. In Pahang, up to six strokes of the cane may also be imposed. The maximum penalty for apostasy in the states of Kelantan and Terengganu is death. These laws have never been enforced and their legal status remains untested. Nationally, civil courts generally cede authority to sharia courts in cases concerning conversion from Islam, and sharia courts remain unwilling to allow such conversions for those who are born Muslims and reluctant to allow conversion for those who had previously converted to Islam. In some states, sharia allows one parent to convert children to Islam without the consent of the second parent.

There are laws that restrict and punish speech seen as criticizing Sunni Islam.

Sedition laws regulate and punish, among other acts, speech considered hostile to ethnic groups, which includes speech insulting Islam. Convictions can result in prison sentences of three to seven years, or up to 20 years if there is physical harm or damage to property. The law also bars speech that “promotes ill will, hostility, or hatred on the grounds of religion.”

The federal Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM) and state Islamic authorities prepare Friday sermons for congregations as well as oversee and approve the appointment of imams at mosques. JAKIM and state Islamic officials must formally approve all teachers of Islam before they may be allowed to preach or lecture on Islam in public.

There is no legal requirement for other religious groups to register, but in order to become approved nonprofit charitable organizations, all groups must register with the government’s registrar of societies (RoS) by submitting paperwork showing the organization’s leadership, purpose, and rules, and paying a small fee. Once registered, these organizations continue to be registered as long as they submit annual reports to the RoS as legally required.

Tax laws allow a tax exemption for registered religious groups for donations received and a tax deduction for the individual donors. Donors giving zakat (tithes) to Muslim religious organizations receive a tax rebate. Donors to government-approved charitable organizations (including some non-Muslim religious groups) may receive a tax deduction on the contribution rather than a tax rebate.

The law forbids proselytizing of Muslims by non-Muslims, with punishments varying from state to state, and including imprisonment and caning. The law allows and supports Muslims proselytizing others. The law does not restrict the rights of non-Muslims to change their religious beliefs and affiliation. A non-Muslim wishing to marry a Muslim must convert to Islam for the marriage to be officially recognized. A minor (under the age of 18, according to federal law) generally may not convert to another faith without the explicit permission of his or her guardian; however, some states’ laws allow conversion to Islam without permission after age 15.

All Islamic houses of worship – including mosques and surau (prayer rooms) – fall under the authority of JAKIM and corresponding state Islamic departments; officials at these departments must give permission for the construction of any mosque or surau.

Islamic religious instruction is compulsory for Muslim children in public schools; non-Muslim students are required to take nonreligious morals and ethics courses. Private schools may offer a non-Islamic religious curriculum as an option for non-Muslims.

Sharia courts have jurisdiction over Muslims in matters of family law and religious observances. A constitutional amendment provides that civil courts have no jurisdiction with respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the sharia courts. Non-Muslims have no standing in sharia proceedings, leading to some cases where sharia court rulings have affected non-Muslims who have no ability to defend their position or appeal the court’s decision, most frequently in rulings affecting custody, divorce, inheritance, burial, and conversion in interfaith families. The relationship between sharia and civil law remains largely unresolved in the legal system. Two states, Kelantan and Terengganu, have symbolically enacted hudood (the Islamic penal law) for Muslims, although the federal government has never allowed the code to be implemented. The states cannot implement these laws without amendments to federal legislation and the agreement of the sultan.

The legal age of marriage is 16 for Muslim females and 18 for Muslim males, although they may marry before reaching those ages with the permission of their parents and the sharia courts. Non-Muslims must be 18 to marry.

National identity cards specify religious affiliation and are used by the government to determine which citizens are subject to sharia. The cards identify Muslims in print on the face of the card; for members of other recognized religions, religious affiliation is only encrypted in a smart chip within the identity card. Married Muslims must carry a special photo identification of themselves and their spouse as proof of marriage.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary Paragraph: Police made little progress investigating a Christian pastor’s kidnapping by armed individuals that was caught on closed circuit television. The government continued to forbid any non-Sunni practice of Islam, arresting at least 25 Shia and detaining others for celebrating Ashura. It barred Muslims from converting to another religion, and imposed fines, detentions, and canings on those classified under the law as Muslim who contravened sharia codes. In August the ruling government coalition permitted a bill to be introduced in parliament that significantly raised current limits on sharia courts’ punishment powers, although lawmakers did not vote on the bill. It also limited proselytization by non-Muslim religious groups and restricted the distribution of religious texts. Restrictions remained on the use of the word “Allah” by non-Muslims. The government canceled a Christian prayer gathering to be held in Melaka State, saying it would upset the sensibilities of Muslims during Ramadan. Police intervened to prevent a Muslim government-supported consumer group from protesting outside the Ahmadiyya Muslim community’s headquarters. The consumer group had implied it could take violent measures against Ahmadiyya Muslims. The government prosecuted some individuals deemed to have “insulted Islam.” Since Islam, Malay ethnic identity, and the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) political party were closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

In February a group of armed individuals abducted Raymond Koh, a Christian pastor, from his vehicle on a suburban Kuala Lumpur highway. Despite closed circuit television footage of the kidnapping and eyewitness testimony, police made little progress investigating the incident, leading to widespread speculation among the public that government officials were involved in an attempt to intimidate the Christian community, a charge the police denied. The inspector general of police later announced that police would investigate reports that Koh was involved in proselytizing Muslims, adding, “It would not be fair if we only investigated Raymond’s disappearance.” Police reportedly made little progress in investigating the separate disappearances in 2016 of another Christian pastor, Joshua Hilmy, and his wife Ruth, in addition to Amri Che Mat, a Muslim activist said to be linked to Shia teachings. In May the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Regional Office for South-East Asia said in a statement, “Enforced disappearances are rare in Malaysia and it is deeply concerning that little progress has been made in these cases.” In October the Malaysian Human Rights Commission initiated a public inquiry into the disappearances; the public inquiry remained in progress at year’s end.

The government continued to monitor Shia Muslims and take action against those engaged in practicing their religious rituals, which the government continued to consider “deviant” activity. In September the Selangor State Islamic Department (JAIS) temporarily detained 200 Shia Iraqi nationals participating in an event marking the Ashura holiday. Separately, religious authorities arrested 21 Shia men in Johor State and four Shia men in Kedah State for observing Ashura. The 200 Shia Iraqi nationals were quickly released, reportedly following pressure from Iraqi authorities. Under sharia law, which differs by state, individuals convicted of “deviant” religious activity face up to three years in prison or a 5,000 ringgit (RM) ($1,200) fine for “insulting Islam.”

In September immigration authorities temporarily detained Mustafa Akyol, a Turkish journalist and visiting fellow at a U.S. university, as he attempted to board a flight departing the country. Akyol and Ahmad Farouk Musa of the Islamic Renaissance Front had previously been summoned by the Kuala Lumpur Islamic Affairs Department in relation to a speech Akyol delivered at a private club on apostasy in Islam. The Islamic Renaissance Front also canceled a speech Akyol was scheduled to give later in Kuala Lumpur on the advice of the Islamic Affairs Department. Authorities said Akyol was in violation of a law prohibiting individuals from teaching “any matter relating to the religion of Islam” without authorization. The government also banned Akyol’s book Islam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty and its Bahasa Malaysia translation, arguing it was “prejudicial to public order” and likely to “alarm the public.” In November another prominent private club in Kuala Lumpur announced it was cancelling a lecture by a visiting U.S. academic and would reject any future requests to host religion-related events on its grounds to avoid breaking government restrictions on religious forums.

JAKIM continued to implement established federal guidelines concerning what constituted deviant Islamic behavior or belief. According to the government, authorities identified 17 “deviant teachings” in the country during the year and arrested a total of 246 individuals for their involvement in practicing such beliefs. There are 56 groups that JAKIM has deemed “deviant.” State religious authorities generally followed these guidelines. Those differing from the official interpretation of Islam continued to face adverse government action, including mandatory “rehabilitation” in centers that teach and enforce government-approved Islamic practices. The government forbade individuals to leave such centers until they completed the program, which varied in length, but often lasted approximately six months. These counseling programs continued to be designed to ensure the detainee adopted the government’s official interpretation of Islam.

In March a civil appeals court ruled in the case of the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Sisters in Islam (SIS) against Selangor State Islamic Council (MAIS) authorities that the case should be heard again by the lower court, but with a different judge. In July the Federal Court allowed MAIS’ appeal of the March decision; the case remained ongoing at year’s end. The case stemmed from a 2014 fatwa with the force of state religious law labeling the NGO a “religiously deviant organization for subscribing to liberalism and pluralism.” In 2016 a lower civil court ruled that only the sharia court had the authority to decide on the validity of the fatwa.

State Islamic religious enforcement officers continued to have the authority to accompany police on raids of private premises and public establishments, and to enforce sharia, including for violations such as indecent dress, distribution of banned publications, alcohol consumption, or khalwat (close proximity to a nonfamily member of the opposite sex). In January the Federal Territories Islamic Religious Department (JAWI) arrested a married couple for close proximity despite proof of their marriage. The couple subsequently sued JAWI, accusing the agency of violently detaining them and causing injuries. The case remained pending at the end of the year. In September state religious authorities required a Muslim man to attend a “counseling session” after he was stopped for wearing shorts in public. According to some state laws, Muslims could be fined RM 1,000 ($250) if they did not attend “counseling” after being found guilty of wearing what the authorities deem to be immodest clothing.

Civil society activists said the government selectively prosecuted speech allegedly denigrating Islam and largely ignored criticisms of other faiths. In November the government stated atheism was unconstitutional and threatened to use sedition laws against anyone spreading its tenets. The government did not take any action against those issuing violent threats against nonbelievers.

In October Zamihan Mat Zin, a preacher and former JAKIM official, criticized the hygiene practices of Chinese Malaysians in a speech defending a controversial Muslim-only launderette. Police arrested him under sedition laws for criticizing the Sultan of Johor, who had ordered the launderette to reverse its policy. The preacher was not charged by year’s end.

Officials at the federal and state levels oversaw Islamic religious activities, distributed all sermon texts for mosques to follow, used mosques to convey political messages, and limited public expression of religion deemed contrary to Sunni Islam.

The government maintained restrictions on religious assembly and provisions which denied certain religious groups the ability to register as charitable organizations. Many churches and NGOs continued to find registration difficult, with the RoS denying or delaying many applications without explanation or for highly technical reasons. Representatives of religious groups continued to say the registrar had no consistent policy or transparent criteria for determining whether to register religious groups. In cases in which the government refused to register a religious group, the group could pursue registration as a company. Religious groups reported that registering as a company was generally relatively quick and provided a legal basis for conducting business, did not limit the group’s religious activities, and allowed the organization certain activities such as holding a bank account and owning property, but did not give the organization tax-exempt status or government funding. Examples of groups that continued to be registered as companies included Jehovah’s Witnesses and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons).

In June the government canceled the “Jerusalem Jubilee,” a Christian prayer gathering to be held in Melaka State, saying it would upset the sensibilities of Muslims during Ramadan. In response to the Jerusalem Jubilee event, a PAS member of parliament said Muslims must “rise up to defend the community and country from the savagery of Christian evangelists.”

The government launched an investigation into a meeting of atheists after a photo of an “Atheist Republic” event in Kuala Lumpur spread on social media in early August. A government minister was quoted in local media calling on authorities to “track them down and identify each one of them,” referring to those who appeared in the photo. In response to the incident, the Mufti of Negeri Sembilan State told the media that Islam prescribes death for Muslims who become atheists, although he added that Malaysian sharia courts could not implement such punishments.

The federal and state governments continued to forbid religious assembly and worship for groups considered to be deviant Islamic groups such as Shia, Ahmadiyya, and Al-Arqam. While Ahmadi Muslims in the country reported generally being able to maintain a worship center, government religious authorities did not allow them to hold Friday prayers as these could only be performed in an officially registered mosque. In October the Muslim Consumer Association of Malaysia (PPIM), a government-supported group, held a press conference denouncing the Ahmadiyya Muslim community and implied PPIM could take violent measures against its members. Police intervened to prevent a PPIM protest outside the Ahmadiyya Muslim community’s headquarters outside Kuala Lumpur, although PPIM remained vocal in its call for the government to close down the organization and its mosque. Local authorities have permitted billboards proclaiming “Ahmadis are not Muslims” to be placed in front of the group’s headquarters for the past several years.

Restrictions remained on the use of the word “Allah” by non-Muslims. An appeal by the Sidang Injil Borneo, an evangelical church based in Sabah and Sarawak, for the right of the church and its Malay language-speaking congregation to use the word “Allah” in Bibles and other religious publications remained ongoing. A lawyer in the attorney general’s department said in June the Home Ministry would file an expert opinion in a separate case in support of the government’s position that the word “Allah” is for the exclusive use of Muslims.

The government continued to ban books for promoting Shia beliefs, mysticism, and other beliefs the government determined “clearly deviated from the true teachings of Islam.”

State governments had exclusive authority over allocation of land for, and the construction of, all places of worship, as well as land allocation for all cemeteries. Non-Muslim groups continued to report regular difficulties in obtaining permission from local authorities to build new places of worship, leading many groups to use buildings zoned for residential or commercial use for their religious services. Observers said that this practice remained largely tolerated, but also left the religious groups vulnerable. In April the state government of Selangor stated it would suspend clauses in state guidelines and planning standards that placed restrictions on non-Muslim places of worship. The standards included the recommendation that non-Muslim places of worship not be built within 50 meters (165 feet) of a Muslim home, new places of worship be lower in height than the nearest mosque, and non-Muslim places of worship in multiracial communities would require the consent of residents within a 200-meter (650-foot) radius. According to a state government official, the guidelines were enacted in 2007, removed in 2010, and reinstated early in 2017. The same official said Johor, Melaka, and Negeri Sembilan states had similar provisions.

In March the state government of Penang announced that 32 plots of state land would be made available to non-Muslim religious groups to build churches and temples. The government said the land was made available after groups complained about the lack of suitable places to construct houses of worship.

Some government bodies, including the federal Department of National Unity and Integration, were tasked with encouraging religious harmony and protecting the rights of minority religious groups. Many faith-based organizations, however, continued to state they believed that none had the power and influence of those that regulated Islamic affairs, citing the large footprint and budget for JAKIM, compared to the more limited funding for the Department of National Unity and Integration. In the 2018 budget, the Department of National Unity and Integration was allocated approximately RM 275 million ($68 million), while RM 1 billion ($247 million) was marked for the development of Islam, including RM 811 million ($201 million) for JAKIM.

During the year, JAKIM funded a wide variety of Islamic education and mosque-related projects. There were no specifically allocated funds in the government budget for non-Muslim religious groups, although some religious groups reported continuing to receive sporadic funding for temple and church buildings and other activities.

At public schools at the primary and secondary level, student assemblies frequently commenced with recitation of an Islamic prayer by a teacher or school leader. Particularly in the peninsula of the country, community leaders and civil liberties groups said that religion teachers in public schools pressured Muslim girls to wear the tudong (Islamic head covering) at school. Some private schools required Muslim girls to wear veils covering their faces, except for their eyes. In a public school in Selangor State, the government launched an investigation after photos spread on social media of separated drinking cups for Muslims and non-Muslims. Homeschooling remained legal, but some families reported difficulty in obtaining approval from the Ministry of Education.

Lawyers, civil liberty groups, and non-Muslim religious leaders said that when civil and sharia jurisdictions intersected, civil courts continued largely to give deference to sharia courts, creating situations where non-Muslims were affected by sharia judgments. The media and lawyers continued to report that sharia courts often decided child custody cases where one parent converted to Islam while the other did not – and have historically favored the Muslim parent. When facing competing orders by civil and sharia courts regarding custody, they stated the police generally sided with the sharia decisions.

In October, in a rare public statement, the country’s Council of Rulers expressed concerns about the actions of Muslims whose views on religious practices have “gone beyond all acceptable standards of decency, putting at risk the harmony that currently exists within our multireligious and multi-ethnic society.” The statement was in response to reports of Muslim-only launderettes in two states. The owner of one launderette said he was protecting Muslims from “impurities” that could be present on non-Muslims’ clothing, such as dog fur or pork, an argument Johor’s mufti publicly supported.

In April the Mufti of Perlis published a poem that some individuals said they considered offensive to Hinduism. Authorities did not take any action against him.

The family of a Hindu man in the state of Negeri Sembilan initiated court proceedings in September against officials from the state Islamic affairs department after authorities reportedly took the body of the man, Mahat Sulaiman, from a local hospital and buried him in an Islamic cemetery against the deceased’s wishes. Religious authorities reportedly acted unilaterally because the man’s name appeared to be Muslim.

Court proceedings continued in the case of Prasana Diksa, who was abducted in 2009 by her father after he converted from Hinduism to Islam, and a federal court was expected to rule on the case in early 2018. The case involved the issues of civil court review of sharia courts’ decisions as well as whether the consent of both parents was required for the conversion of a minor child. In 2010, a civil court awarded Prasana’s mother, Indira Gandhi, custody of her daughter; however, police did not execute the civil court’s order to arrest Prasana’s father for contempt of court, nor did the police take action to locate Prasana.

After opposition from some Muslim leaders, in August the government withdrew a bill from parliament that would have prevented one parent from converting his or her child to another faith without the consent of the second parent. A government minister said the bill was withdrawn “to preserve the harmony between the races and faiths” and asked that “no party politicize” the decision.

The government continued not to recognize marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims and considered children born of such unions illegitimate. In July the Court of Appeal ruled that the National Registration Division was not bound by edicts issued by the National Fatwa Committee, a religious body, regarding when a child conceived out of wedlock could take his or her father’s name; however, the government appealed the case and successfully applied for a stay in implementing the decision. A 2003 edict by the committee declared children to be illegitimate, and therefore unable to take their father’s name if they were born fewer than six months after the marriage of their parents.

In August the ruling government coalition permitted a bill drafted by the opposition PAS to be introduced in parliament that would significantly raise existing limits on sharia courts’ punishment powers; limited proselytization by non-Muslim religious groups; and restricted the distribution of religious texts. Proceedings were suspended before lawmakers could vote on it, however. Under existing law, states must limit sharia court punishments to three years in prison; RM 5,000 ($1,200) fines; and six strokes of the cane. The most recent version of the PAS bill proposed to raise those limits to 30 years in prison; RM 100,000 ($24,700) fines; and 100 strokes of the cane. The bill generated substantial public discussion, with some Muslim groups and some official state Islamic authorities supporting the effort. Some Muslim and non-Muslim groups opposed the legislation, which they stated infringed on the country’s civil laws and represented a first step toward the eventual enforcement of hudood. Some government officials argued that non-Muslims did not have the right to criticize the legislation because it would only apply to Muslims.

In December PAS President Hadi Awang supported a Muslim-only cabinet, which he said could accept non-Muslims playing a role in professional and management positions other than in policymaking. The PAS vice president later denied that the president supported a Muslim-only cabinet.

It remained difficult for those registered as Muslims to have their religious identification changed by the authorities. In February the Federal Court agreed to hear the appeal of three converts to Islam who later said they had left Islam and wanted their identification information changed accordingly, although the court did not set a date for the hearing by the end of the year. In 2016 the Court of Appeal in Sarawak State ruled against the three converts.

In September the city of Kuala Lumpur denied an application to hold a “Better Beer Festival,” despite approving the festival in previous years, after some religious leaders and PAS complained that such an event would “lead to extremist activities” and could lead the nation’s capital to be “known to the world as Asia’s biggest vice center.” Police later said the event was canceled because of security concerns and said they had arrested three militants who planned to attack the festival.

In response to the PAS president’s Muslim-only cabinet statement in December, the country’s main nongovernmental interreligious body – The Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism, and Taoism – said “The race and religion card has been overplayed. This must end immediately. The energy of all Malaysians especially politicians should be channeled towards further developing a society filled with mutual understanding and respect.”

Local human rights organizations and religious leaders again stated that society continued to become increasingly intolerant of religious diversity. They cited some Muslim groups’ continuing public condemnation of events and activities they said were “un-Islamic,” as well as heavily publicized statements targeting non-Sunni Muslims and non-Muslim groups.

In response to a ban on non-Muslims at a launderette in the state of Johor, the NGO Sisters in Islam said in a statement, “It is becoming very alarming that week upon week we witness a growing number of incidences where there is discrimination premised on the Islamic faith…This type of simplistic interpretation of ‘what Islam requires of its Ummah’ is a danger to the racial diversity that we as Malaysians (including Malaysian Muslims) have always cherished. This is causing such great disunity in our beautiful nation.”

Religious converts, particularly those converting from Islam, sometimes faced severe stigmatization. Citing 400 conversion cases pending before sharia courts, the CEO of a government-linked human rights group called for a ban on Christian evangelism, a move he implied was necessary for “national security.” In many cases, converts reportedly concealed newly adopted beliefs and practices from their former coreligionists, including friends and relatives.

Religious identities continued to affect secular aspects of life. Muslim women who did not wear the head scarf or conform to religious notions of modesty were often subject to shaming on social media. In February a beauty pageant was forced to cancel a component of the event featuring contestants in swimwear, none of whom were Muslims, after Islamist groups protested.

U.S. embassy officials engaged with a wide variety of federal and state government officials at the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Prime Minister’s Department, among others, on religious freedom issues throughout the year. The Ambassador raised concerns about the disappearance of Pastor Raymond Koh and three other individuals and urged government officials to speak out against religious intolerance, particularly in the wake of high profile incidents such as the “Muslim-only” launderettes in two states.

Embassy officials held meetings with members of Shia and Ahmadiyya Muslim groups; the groups detailed the heavy government restrictions on their religious activities. Embassy officials also met with a variety of non-Muslim groups who reported continued difficulties registering churches and building houses of worship, and facing societal discrimination. The embassy engaged with groups of Sunni Muslims whose activities were limited by the government, such as SIS, G25, Islamic Renaissance Front, and Komuniti Muslim Universal.

The embassy broadcast messages related to religious freedom on its social media platforms on International Religious Freedom Day and throughout the year.

In March the embassy organized a visit by a leader of a U.S. Muslim community network to several states to engage with youth and promote civic consciousness, volunteerism, and religious tolerance.

In October the embassy hosted the U.S.-based director of a large religious NGO for meetings with local religious leaders and students on how interfaith groups can mitigate conflict and build community resilience.

In conjunction with the United Nations’ International Day for Tolerance, the Ambassador led a “Harmony Walk” with faith leaders to several houses of worship in Kuala Lumpur. The embassy disseminated a video of the event, which had been viewed at least 74,000 times in addition to being featured in the nation’s largest newspapers. The event emphasized the centrality of freedom of religion and interfaith dialogue in reducing intolerance, discrimination, and persecution and underscored the U.S. commitment to ensuring all individuals be able to exercise their human rights, including freedom of belief or nonbelief.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 393,000 (July 2017 estimate). The Maldives government estimates there are an additional 134,000 documented and 15,000 to 20,000 undocumented foreign workers in the country, mostly from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan. While observers state the vast majority of citizens appear to follow Sunni practices, there are no reliable estimates of actual religious affiliations. Foreign workers are predominantly Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, and Christians.

Legal Framework

The constitution states the country is a republic based on the principles of Islam and designates the state religion as Islam, which it defines in terms of Sunni teachings. It states citizens have a “duty” to preserve and protect Islam. According to the constitution, non-Muslims may not obtain citizenship.

The constitution states citizens are free to engage in activities “not expressly prohibited” by sharia, but it stipulates the Majlis (the country’s legislative body) may pass laws limiting rights and freedoms “to protect and maintain the tenets of Islam.” In making a decision about whether a limitation on a right or freedom is constitutional, the constitution states a court must take into account the extent to which the right or freedom “must be limited” to protect Islam.

The constitution makes no mention of the freedom of religion or belief. Although it contains a provision prohibiting discrimination “of any kind,” it does not list religion as a prohibited basis of discrimination. The constitution states individuals have a right to freedom of thought and expression, but only in a manner “not contrary to tenets of Islam.”

The law prohibits the conversion of a Muslim to another religion (i.e., apostasy) and specifies a violation may result in the loss of the convert’s citizenship, although a judge may impose a harsher punishment per sharia jurisprudence.

The Religious Unity Act states both the government and the people must protect “religious unity.” Any statement or action found to be contrary to this aim is subject to criminal penalty. Specific infractions include expressing religious beliefs other than Islam, working to disrupt religious unity, and having discussions or committing acts that promote religious differences. The list of infractions also includes delivering religious sermons in a way that infringes upon the independence and sovereignty of the country or limiting the rights of a specific section of society. According to the law, sentences for violators may include a fine of up to 20,000 rufiyaa (MVR) ($1,300), imprisonment for two to five years, or deportation for foreigners.

The law criminalizes speech breaking Islamic tenets, breaching social norms, or threatening national security. The law states freedom of expression is a basic right “as long as it is in line with the tenets of Islam.” It states the expression of thoughts and opinion in writing, in speech, or through another medium is protected, except in cases where such an expression “makes a mockery of Islam.” Additional exceptions include questioning the validity of Islam or one of its tenets, expressions that compromise the “religious homogeneity of Maldivians,” or acts that cause “disunity and religious polarization.” The law further states any religious preaching or efforts to teach Islam shall be in accordance with the standards set forth in the Religious Unity Act. It also states schools and universities shall carry out religious teaching in accordance with the Religious Unity Act and only with instructors authorized by the government to teach Islam.

The law authorizes the government to cut off live feeds and/or suspend a station’s license if it broadcasts content that contradicts a tenet of Islam. It states the penalty for an individual “breaking the tenets of Islam” shall be the same as those the existing penal code specifies for “criticizing Islam.” A person commits the offense of “criticizing Islam” by engaging in religious oration or criticism of Islam in public or in a public medium with the intent to cause disregard for Islam; producing, selling, or distributing material criticizing Islam; producing, selling, distributing, importing, disseminating, or possessing “idols of worship”; and/or attempting to disrupt the religious unity of the citizenry or conversing or acting in a manner likely to cause “religious segregation.” Individuals convicted of these offenses are subject to imprisonment for up to one year.

By law, no one may deliver sermons or explain religious principles in public without obtaining a license from the MIA. Imams may not prepare Friday sermons without government authorization. To obtain a license to preach, the law specifies an individual must be a Sunni Muslim, must have a degree in religious studies, and must not have been convicted of a crime in sharia court. The law also sets educational standards for imams to ensure they have theological qualifications the government considers adequate. Government regulations stipulate the requirements for preaching and contain general principles for the delivery of religious sermons. The regulations prohibit statements in sermons which may be interpreted as racial or gender discrimination; discourage access to education or health services in the name of Islam; or demean the character of, or create hatred toward, people of any other religion. The law provides for a punishment of two to five years in prison or house arrest for violations of these provisions. Anyone who assists in such a violation is subject to imprisonment or house arrest for two to four years and a fine between 5,000-20,000 MVR ($320-$1,300). The law requires foreign scholars to ensure their sermons conform to the country’s norms, traditions, culture, and social etiquette.

Propagation of any religion other than Islam is a criminal offense, punishable by two to five years in jail or house arrest. Proselytizing to change denominations within Islam is also illegal and carries the same penalty. If the offender is a foreigner, his or her license to preach in the country will be revoked, and he or she will be deported.

By law, mosques and prayer houses remain under the control of the MIA rather than the country’s island councils. The law prohibits the establishment of places of worship for non-Islamic religious groups.

The law states “non-Muslims living in or visiting the country are prohibited from openly expressing their religious beliefs, holding public congregations to conduct religious activities or involving Maldivians in such activities.” The law states those expressing religious beliefs other than Islam face imprisonment of up to five years or house arrest, fines ranging from 5,000 to 20,000 MVR ($320 to $1,300), and deportation.

By law, a Maldivian woman may not marry a non-Muslim foreigner unless he first converts to Islam. A Maldivian man may marry a non-Muslim foreigner if the foreigner is Christian or Jewish; other foreigners must convert to Islam prior to marriage.

The law prohibits importation of any items deemed contrary to Islam by the MIA, including religious literature, religious statues, alcohol, pork products, and pornographic materials. Penalties for contravention of the law range from three months to three years imprisonment. It is against the law to offer alcohol to a citizen, although government regulations permit the sale of alcoholic beverages on resort islands. Individuals may request permission to import restricted goods from the Ministry of Economic Development.

The constitution states education shall strive to “inculcate obedience to Islam” and “instill love for Islam.” In accordance with the law, the MIA regulates Islamic instruction in schools, while the Ministry of Education funds salaries of religious instructors in schools. By law, educators who teach Islamic Studies must have a degree from a university or teaching center accredited by the Maldives Qualification Authority or other religious qualification recognized by the government. By law, foreigners who wish to teach Islamic Studies may only receive authorization to do so if they subscribe to Sunni Islam. Islam is a compulsory subject for all primary and secondary school students. A curriculum introduced in 2015 incorporates Islam into all subject areas at all levels of education, specifying eight core competencies underpinned by Islamic values, principles, and practices.

The constitution states Islam forms one basis of the law, and “no law contrary to any tenet of Islam shall be enacted.” The constitution specifies judges must apply sharia in deciding matters not addressed by the constitution or by law.

The penal code prescribes flogging for a small number of crimes, including fornication. Other sharia penalties are not specified, but the code grants judges the discretion to impose sharia penalties for hudood (serious crimes) listed in the Quran and qisas (retaliatory) offenses – including murder, apostasy, assault, theft, homosexual acts, drinking alcohol, and property damage – if proven beyond all doubt. The penal code requires all appeal processes be exhausted prior to the administration of sharia punishments specific to hudoodand qisas offenses, including stoning, amputation of hands, and similar punishments.

The Supreme Council of Fatwa has the authority to issue fatwas, or legal opinions, on religious matters. The council functions under the MIA and comprises five members appointed to five-year terms. The president names three members directly and chooses a fourth from the faculty of either the Maldives National University or the Islamic University of Maldives. The minister of Islamic affairs recommends the fifth member, subject to approval by the president.

Antiterror legislation includes as a crime “unlawfully” promoting any religious, political, or other ideology.

The constitution stipulates the president, cabinet ministers, members of parliament, and judges must be Sunni Muslims.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), with a reservation stating the government’s application of the principles set out in ICCPR Article 18, which relates to religious freedom, shall be “without prejudice to the Constitution of the Republic of Maldives.”

Government Practices

Police reported they had investigated 15 cases of suspected “black magic” during the year. Although no law defined or addressed the practice of black magic, the police included it in warrants as a basis for making arrests. Police forwarded four such cases to the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO), which subsequently filed charges in each case. One charge was criminal trespass (the subject had entered someone’s home), and the other three subjects were charged with smuggling and possession of items contrary to the tenets of Islam. Additionally, the PGO formally filed charges in court in three black magic cases that police had submitted for prosecution in 2016.

In May the MIA declared Aishath Velezinee, a former member of the Judicial Service Commission living in the Netherlands, an apostate, citing allegedly blasphemous remarks she made on her Facebook page. The police subsequently issued a summons for her to return to the country for questioning without specifying the grounds for the summons. Velezinee sought asylum in the Netherlands and had not returned at year’s end.

Also in May police issued a statement calling for three bloggers who were living abroad to respond to police questioning on unspecified charges. Police warned the bloggers they would face prosecution if they failed to return to the country within two weeks. The bloggers stated they feared police were targeting them for promoting secularism in their blogs and did not respond to the summons.

According to the MIA, foreign residents such as teachers and laborers and tourists remained free to worship as they wished in private, but congregating in public for non-Islamic prayer remained illegal, as was encouraging local citizens to participate in such activities. The government continued to permit foreigners, including non-Muslims, to attend local Sunni mosques if they wished.

Courts sentenced individuals to flogging for committing fornication but did not impose sharia penalties for hudood and qisas offenses despite having the legal authority to do so.

In January and August the Ministry of Education dismissed two schoolteachers for refusing to remove their niqabs in compliance with civil service dress code guidelines. The guidelines require civil servants to be dressed in a manner that makes them easily identifiable. In February religious NGO Jamiyyatul Salaf challenged the constitutionality of the ban on the niqab for civil servants in the High Court. At year’s end, the High Court had not issued a judgment.

Customs authorities said the MIA continued to permit the importation of religious literature, such as Bibles, for personal use. The MIA also continued to allow some religious literature for scholarly research. The sale of religious items, such as Christmas cards, remained restricted by the ministry to resort islands patronized by foreign tourists. Customs officials reported 13 cases during the year involving importation of religious idols, statues, and Christian crosses, mostly by Maldivians. The authorities confiscated items in nine of these cases and issued letters of caution in the other four.

The Communications Authority of Maldives (CAM) continued to maintain an unpublished blacklist of websites containing material it deemed un-Islamic or anti-Islamic. The CAM stated it did not proactively monitor internet content, but instead relied on requests from ministries and other government agencies to block websites violating laws against criticism or defamation of Islam. The MIA controlled all matters relating to religion and religious belief and required imams to use government-approved sermons in Friday prayers. The government maintained its ownership and control of all mosques, including their maintenance and funding. The government continued to permit private donors to fund mosques as well.

During a February political rally held by the PPM, President Yameen stated, “No religion other than Islam will come within 10 miles of the Maldivian consciousness” and said strengthening Islamic education was necessary to solve social problems facing the country. During a speech in April shortly after the killing of blogger Yameen Rasheed, President Yameen stated his government would not allow anyone to post content that “mocks” Islam on social or mainstream media. In what observers said was a reference to Rasheed’s killing, Yameen said “hate speech” could cause “certain elements” within society to “do anything to these people.” Observers also stated that the president’s statements appeared to legitimize vigilantism, which they said could have a chilling effect on civil and political discourse and increase the risk of attacks against others labeled “secularists” or “apostates” on social media. In his Independence Day speech in July, Yameen said he was “waging war” against “the effort that is being made to provide space on our shores for religions other than Islam” and against “apostasy among youth.”

On December 20, President Yameen publicly stated that he would not allow any religion but Islam in the country. On December 21, Shahindha Ismail, executive director of the Maldivian Democracy Network (MDN), tweeted in response that “religions other than Islam exist in the world because Allah has made it possible.” On December 28, articles on Vaguthu, an online news site closely linked to the administration, denounced Ismail for “indirectly calling to allow other religions in the Maldives” and reported the police were investigating her “blasphemous” tweet. The same day the MIA issued a statement saying, “Allah does not accept any other religion but Islam. And he has said anyone who believes any other religion than Islam will be amongst the perishable on Judgment Day. So we remind you to reassert yourself in religion. Let’s strengthen the belief of citizens of our 100 percent Muslim country that Islam is Allah’s religion as written in the Quran. We caution and remind every Maldivian citizen to stop spreading unnecessary sayings in our society that imply giving space for any other faiths but Islam.” Ismail subsequently received death threats on social media. MDN expressed concern that the government chose to investigate Ismail’s tweet rather than the threats of violence made against her.

In a July statement, the PPM called on former foreign minister and current UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief Ahmed Shaheed to “repent” for retweeting an international news article about legalization of same-sex marriage and accused him of attempting to please foreign parties by encouraging anti-Islamic practices. Following the statement, PPM supporters on social media attacked Shaheed as an “apostate” with some calling for his killing. A religious scholar also published a Facebook post calling for the death of Muslims who support same-sex marriage. In October a regional managing director of a state-owned company posted on social media that Shaheed was an apostate who should be beheaded under sharia.

In March President Yameen launched “Tharika,” a nationwide awareness program to increase religious unity and patriotism, and created a high-level committee to oversee program activities, such as focus group discussions, essay-writing competitions, and multimedia presentations for students. The committee was composed of the ministers of education, Islamic affairs, home affairs, and defense and national security; the chief of the National Defense Force; the chancellor of the Islamic University; and the chairman and managing director of the state broadcaster Public Service Media (PSM).

In January the MIA organized a conference of local and religious scholars, who released an action plan aimed at protecting religious unity. The action plan called for scholars to work with media outlets to prevent the broadcast of content that violates Islam; for the MIA to lobby for new rules to prohibit un-Islamic practices in trade; for the creation of written rules on how tourists must conduct themselves to avoid violating Islamic culture or social norms; for increasing religious awareness among school students and the public at large; and for the MIA to hold workshops with relevant authorities to prevent “the spread of atheism.”

In May PSM signed memoranda of understanding with two religious NGOs, Jamiyyatul Salaf and Al Asr, agreeing to broadcast religious content they produced on state television. Observers criticized this agreement and said the NGOs promoted an “extremist” interpretation of Islam.

The MIA continued to conduct what it termed “awareness programs” through radio and television broadcasts in Male and on various islands to give citizens information on Islam, and it continued to provide assistance and counseling to foreigners seeking to convert to Islam. The ministry, in partnership with religious NGOs, continued to send imams to outer atolls to conduct workshops for students, youth, and other groups in schools and government buildings for the stated purpose of strengthening the islanders’ understanding and acceptance of Islam.

The National Institute of Education continued to implement a curriculum for public and private schools incorporating Islam into all subject areas. According to NGOs and other observers, passages in some of the textbooks portrayed democracy as being anti-Islam, encouraged anti-Semitism and xenophobia, glorified jihad, and demonized the West. The MIA continued to permit foreign nationals to opt out of Islamic instruction as a stand-alone subject. The MIA also stated that it continued to permit foreigners to raise their children to follow any religious teaching they wished, but only in private.

In April attackers killed blogger Yameen Rasheed, a critic of religious fundamentalism and violent extremism, in his apartment building stairwell. Earlier that month, a Facebook page had labeled Rasheed “an apostate” who disrespected Islam. Afterward, some websites publicly justified his killing on the grounds that Rasheed had committed apostasy. Police charged seven suspects of murder for Rasheed’s killing. At year’s end, their trial was ongoing. NGOs stated that religiously motivated violent extremists continued to target other individuals on social media, including employees of human rights organizations, labeling them “secularists.”

NGOs reported numerous instances of secular bloggers receiving death threats, being cyberbullied, and being followed on the street by individuals with records as criminal gang members. Victims stated they felt vulnerable because of a lack of police responsiveness to their complaints and because similar occurrences had preceded the 2014 disappearance of journalist Ahmed Rilwan. In September the Civil Court dismissed a lawsuit filed by Yameen Rasheed’s family against the Maldives Police Service for failure to take any action in response to several complaints filed by Rasheed reporting death threats he had received since 2010.

NGOs reported continued community pressure on women to wear a veil, and harassment of women who chose not to.

NGOs said they continued to see a rise in support for religiously motivated violent extremism among the populace, and that the government actively encouraged this trend.

There is no permanent U.S. diplomatic presence in the country, but the U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka is accredited to Maldives, as are many of the embassy’s staff. The U.S. embassy in Sri Lanka also maintained an American Center in Male in partnership with the National Library of Maldives. Staff of the embassy in Sri Lanka conducted all engagement with the government through travel to Maldives or interaction with Maldivian officials based in Colombo. In the wake of Yameen Rasheed’s killing and increased rhetoric on social media calling for religiously motivated violence, the embassy expressed concern to government officials about government statements and actions creating an environment conducive to the growth of societal intolerance. In addition, in meetings throughout the year, embassy officials continued to encourage the government to be more tolerant of religious traditions other than Sunni Islam, to ease restrictions preventing individuals other than Sunni Muslims from practicing their religions freely, and to cease the government’s derogatory statements about other religious traditions. Embassy officers also expressed concern regarding anti-Semitic and antidemocratic rhetoric in textbooks, and societal harassment and violent attacks on secular bloggers.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 17.9 million (July 2017 estimate). Muslims constitute an estimated 95 percent of the population. Nearly all Muslims are Sunni and most follow Sufism. Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Christians, of whom approximately two-thirds are Roman Catholic and one-third Protestant, groups with indigenous religious beliefs, and those with no religious affiliation. Groups adhering to indigenous religious beliefs reside throughout the country but mostly in rural areas. Many Muslims and Christians also adhere to some aspects of indigenous beliefs. There are fewer than 1,000 individuals in Bamako and an unknown number outside of the capital associated with the Muslim group Dawa al-Tablig.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the country as a secular state and provides for freedom of religion in conformity with the law.

According to the penal code, any act of discrimination based on religion or any act impeding the freedom of religious observance or worship is punishable with up to five years’ imprisonment or 10 years’ banishment (prohibition from residing in the country). The penal code also states any religiously motivated persecution of a group of persons constitutes a crime against humanity. There is no statute of limitations for such crimes.

The law requires registration of all public associations, including religious groups, except for groups practicing indigenous religious beliefs; however, registration confers no tax preferences or other legal benefits, and there is no penalty for failure to register. To register, applicants must submit copies of a declaration of intent to create an association, notarized copies of bylaws, copies of policies and regulations, notarized copies of a report of the first meeting of the association’s general assembly, and lists of the names of the leaders of the association with signature samples of three of the leaders. Upon review, the Ministry of Territorial Administration grants the certificate of registration.

The constitution prohibits public schools from offering religious instruction, but private schools may do so. Islamic religious schools, which are privately funded and known locally as medersas (a variant of madrassah), teach Islam but are required to adhere to the standard government curriculum. Non-Muslim students are not required to attend Islamic religious classes. Catholic schools teach the standard educational curriculum and do not require Muslim students to attend Catholic religious classes. Informal schools, known locally as Quranic schools, which some students attend in lieu of public schools, do not follow a government curriculum and offer exclusively religious instruction.

The law defines marriage as secular. Couples who seek legal recognition must have a civil ceremony, which they may follow with a religious ceremony. Under the law, a man may choose between a monogamous or polygamous marriage. The law states that the religious customs of the deceased determine inheritance rights. Civil courts consider these customs when they adjudicate such cases; however, many cases are settled informally.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

By year’s end, the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission, established in 2014, continued to make slow progress on its core functions and implementation of full-fledged operations on the ground. The commission stated it had established contact with victims of the country’s armed conflict and presented its mission and services to affected communities, including victims of religious persecution. A commission member reported that five antennes (mobile units for taking depositions) were established around the country, and victims made 6,263 depositions. The government provided compensation for commissionaires and equipment, and other donors provided additional support to the commission.

The minister of religious affairs and traditions was responsible for promoting religious tolerance and coordinating national religious activities such as pilgrimages and religious holidays for followers of all religions. The minister, a Muslim, spoke during a Catholic Mass at the national cathedral in the presence of Archbishop of Bamako Jean Zerbo in June.

On June 28, President Keita made a public statement to congratulate Archbishop Zerbo when Pope Francis elevated him to the rank of cardinal, the first Malian ever to hold the title. The president accompanied several ministers to meet Cardinal Zerbo at the Bamako international airport upon his return from Italy in a public show of congratulations.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

Throughout the country, violent armed groups, including Ansar al-Dine and its affiliate Macina Liberation Front (MLF/Katiba Macina), AQIM, and al-Mourabitoun, sometimes united under the umbrella group Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), continued to carry out targeted attacks against security forces, UN peacekeepers, civilians, and others they reportedly perceived as not adhering to their interpretation of Islam.

The Malian Episcopal Conference reported multiple incidents of harassment. In September Katiba Macina members chased Christians from the town of Bodwal and threatened to kill them if they prayed in the town’s sole church. Likewise, since April 15, Katiba Macina had forbidden Christian services in the church and the raising of pigs in the village of Djidja. On August 15, unidentified armed men believed to be Katiba Macina threatened the local population and told them Christian music and prayers were banned in the town of Djanweli. In the village of Bodwal, armed men also believed to be Katiba Macina threatened Christians and forced them to remove their church bell. On September 19, armed men believed to be Katiba Macina vandalized the church in Dobara village. The men burned all property and material inside the church and threatened to kill anyone who prayed there. In the town of Douna on October 6, unidentified armed men believed to be Katiba Macina attacked and burned everything inside the church and threatened the Christian population with death if they prayed inside it. In the same incident, the armed men also threatened the Muslim population because of the manner in which they held their hands during prayer and ordered the striking and relocation of the Toguna – a traditional public tent where elderly persons gather in the Dogon tradition – because it was too close to the mosque.

The media reported armed men believed to be Katiba Macina threatened to kidnap the village chief of Kouakourou for refusing to hand over village youths who celebrated Eid al-Adha , a Muslim holiday, with firecrackers in August.

In May media reported a group linked to al-Qaida stoned an unmarried couple to death in public in Taghilt. The group accused the couple of violating Islamic law by living together without being married.

In February armed men kidnapped a Colombian nun from Karangasso, where she worked in a health center. In July JNIM kidnappers released a video of several hostages in their custody, including the nun. She remained in captivity at year’s end.

Muslim and non-Muslim religious leaders frequently and jointly condemned extremist interpretations of Islam.

On July 13, the Malian High Islamic Council published a document that regretted “some drifts observed in the preaching in some mosques, in public places, and in the media, including social networks.” The document further demanded “immediate cessation of violence in all its forms and in all spaces” across the country, and it urged Islamic preachers to “make respectful and gentle remarks and to prioritize themes aiming at reinforcing the rapprochement of the different religious sensibilities.”

In June Catholic and Muslim religious leaders called for peace among different faiths at an Eid al-Fitr ceremony hosted by President Keita. On September 10, the president of the High Islamic Council in Mali, Mahamoud Dicko, announced the necessity for all religious leaders to work toward national unity and social cohesion. Christian and Muslim religious leaders participating in an international conference on conflict management and religious tolerance in June called for tolerance and mutual understanding among religious groups.

Members of religious groups commonly attended the religious ceremonies of other religious groups, especially baptisms, weddings, and funerals.

Embassy officers spoke with a wide range of influential religious leaders and human rights organizations, including the president and vice president of the High Islamic Council in Mali. Embassy officials called on their interlocutors to advocate for tolerance and peace among religious groups, and organized a number of activities to emphasize the importance of religious tolerance and freedom. The embassy sponsored a training program on entrepreneurship organized by the Malian Young Muslim’s Association on September 25-29 for 100 men and women, at which the minister of religious affairs and traditions, the vice president of the High Islamic Council in Mali, the U.S. Ambassador, and other embassy officials spoke publicly about religious tolerance.

A number of prominent religious leaders associated with the country’s two chief Sufi and Salafist groups participated in a U.S. government exchange program focusing on themes related to religious diversity and tolerance. The embassy maintained regular contact with Christian missionaries during the year. Some expressed concern about the increased influence of organizations they characterized as violent and extremist in remote areas, which they believed could affect their ability to continue working in the long term.

Some of the embassy’s most widely shared social media postings during the year included messages from the Ambassador on the occasions of Ramadan, Easter, Eid al-Fitr, and especially Eid al-Adha. These messages highlighted the importance of tolerance and respect for diversity.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 416,000 (July 2017 estimate). According to a March 2016 survey conducted by the newspaper Malta Today, 89 percent of respondents identified as Roman Catholic, 6 percent as members of other religious groups, and 4.5 percent as atheist or agnostic. The Islamic Call Society estimates approximately 6-7 percent of the population is Muslim, mostly consisting of foreigners. Most Muslims are Sunni or Shia, with smaller numbers of Ahmadis. Smaller religious groups include Copts, Greek Orthodox, Baptists, evangelical Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Seventh-day Adventists, members of the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), Zen Buddhists, Bahais, and adherents of indigenous African religions. There are an estimated 120 Jews, according to Jewish community leaders.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates full freedom of conscience and religious worship, subject to restrictions in the interests of public safety, order, morality, or health, or protection of the rights and freedoms of others. It prohibits discriminatory treatment on the basis of creed. The constitution establishes Catholicism as the state religion and declares the Catholic Church has “the duty and the right to teach which principles are right and which are wrong.”

The government does not require religious groups to be registered. A religious group has the option to register as a voluntary organization with the Office of the Commissioner for Voluntary Organizations. To qualify for registration, the organization must be nonprofit, autonomous, and voluntary; provide a resolution letter signed by all its committee or board members requesting registration; provide its authenticated annual accounts and annual report; and pay a 40 euro ($48) registration fee. The law does not provide registered groups with tax reductions or exemptions, but allows them to make collections without obtaining any further authorization. It also allows them to receive grants, sponsorships, and financial aid from the government and the Voluntary Organizations Fund, an entity financed through the government and the European Union. The minister of education appoints the governing council of the fund, which comprises representatives from voluntary organizations and a government official and supports enrolled voluntary organizations.

Religious groups not registered as voluntary organizations with the Office of the Commissioner for Voluntary Organizations do not receive funding from the government or the Voluntary Organizations Fund and require approval from the Commissioner of Police to collect contributions from the public. Approval is not required for collections from members or congregants. Groups that do not register as voluntary organizations otherwise have the same legal rights as registered groups.

The criminal code prohibits individuals from wearing “masks or disguises” in public, unless explicitly allowed by law; there is no specific reference – or exception – to coverings worn for religious reasons. Violations are subject to a reprimand, fine, or jail sentence.

All religious groups may own property, including buildings. Groups using property for a particular purpose, including religious worship, must obtain a permit for that purpose from the Planning Authority. All religious groups may organize and run private religious schools, and their religious leaders may perform marriages and other functions.

The constitution and law make Catholic education compulsory in public schools, although non-Catholic teachers may teach the course. Students, with parental consent if the student is under the age of 16, may opt out of these classes and instead take an ethics course if one is available. If a school does not offer an ethics course, students may still opt out of the religion class.

Students may enroll in private religious schools. The law does not regulate religious education in private schools. The law does not allow homeschooling for religious or other reasons except for physical or mental infirmity.

The law allows criticism of religious groups but prohibits incitement of religious hatred; violators are subject to imprisonment for a term of six to 18 months.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government continued its practice of not enforcing the legal ban on face coverings or disguises, including those worn for religious purposes.

During a congress in March of the European People’s Party (EPP) – a coalition of parties represented in the European Parliament – held in the town of St. Julian’s, members adopted a resolution that included a call for a ban on face veils, such as burqas and niqabs, in public places. Simon Busuttil, then-leader of the opposition Nationalist Party (PN, affiliated with the EPP), told The Malta Independent on Sunday newspaper in April that he endorsed the EPP’s resolution and favored banning face veils in public spaces. Another PN representative, Member of Parliament Clyde Puli, posted the Malta Independent article, citing Busuttil’s endorsement of a face veil ban on his Facebook page, with the comment, “Ban the Burqa.”

The Ministry of Education continued to expand a pilot program to offer ethics education in state schools as an alternative to the 6 percent of students who reportedly did not attend Catholic religious classes. During the 2016-17 school year, 1,073 primary and secondary level students, approximately 3 percent of all students, enrolled in the ethics classes, compared with 419 students in the previous year.

The government advanced plans to introduce the voluntary study of Islamic religious education in an after-school program in a number of state primary- and secondary-level schools, although the government had yet to release a specific timeline for the program’s implementation. Discussions were also underway, although not as well developed, to explore similar programs for other religious groups.

The discussions on after-school Islamic education began when Mohammed el-Sadi, the Imam of the Mariam Al-Batool Mosque, the country’s leading mosque in Paola, announced in March plans to close the Islamic Center’s Mariam Al-Batool Secondary School, citing financial reasons. El-Sadi appealed to the government to provide Islamic religious instruction to approximately 60 Muslim students who would have to transfer to state schools following the school’s closure. Minister of Education Evarist Bartolo responded there should be no problem with Muslim children receiving Islamic religious teaching, as long as it was accredited and treated equally with other subjects, including requiring students enrolled in such classes to take O level exams in Islamic studies.

Shortly after Imam el-Sadi’s request to the government to provide Islamic religious education to Muslim students, Catholic Archbishop Charles Scicluna publicly said Catholic schools would be willing to offer Islam as a subject. The archbishop’s comments generated significant public controversy, and in April the Maltese Patriots (Patrijotti Maltin) Party protested outside the archbishop’s offices against Islamic teachings in Church schools.

In July two members of the Maltese Patriots tore down a large fast food advertisement showing an altered version of Leonardo da Vinci’s The Last Supper, in which Jesus Christ and his disciples dined on pizza and hamburgers. The company declined to institute criminal proceedings. The poster had generated significant public controversy.

In October the University of Malta released a study conducted under the auspices of the EU-supported C.O.N.T.A.C.T (Creating an Online Network, Monitoring Team and Phone App to Counter Hate Crime Tactics), an antihate speech project. The study, which analyzed online reactions to local news portals and relied on questionnaires and interviews, concluded the most prevalent discriminatory attitudes in the country were against Muslim migrants, particularly those who did not have legal resident status. According to the study, there was a widespread tendency to confound religion with ethnicity, such as categorizing persons as Muslims because of their skin color or Muslims as Africans or Arabs because of their faith. The study also stated incidents of hate speech and hate crime were significantly underreported.

In March a court of appeal upheld a 2015 decision by the Court of Magistrates that dismissed a libel suit by Norman Lowell, head of the Imperium Europa Party, against Malta Today for calling Lowell a “neo-Nazi.” Lowell had publicly stated the Holocaust was a “holy hoax” and Adolf Hitler a hero.

The U.S. Ambassador and other embassy representatives met frequently with government officials, including President Marie-Louise Coleiro Preca, Prime Minister Joseph Muscat, Minister for Civil Liberties Helena Dalli, Minister for Education Bartolo, and Minister for Home Affairs and National Security Carmelo Abela to emphasize religious tolerance.

In June the Ambassador hosted an iftar for guests that included members of the Islamic Community in Malta, nongovernmental and international organizations, and members of the diplomatic corps. During opening remarks, the Ambassador and Imam el-Sadi highlighted the importance of religious tolerance in free and open societies.

Embassy representatives engaged civil society leaders, such as leaders of Drachma (a lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transvestite support group with a religious orientation), Jesuit Refugee Services, and various religious leaders – including Archbishop Scicluna and Imam el-Sadi – to discuss respect for religious freedom and issues affecting congregants.

The U.S. government estimates the total population is 75,000 (July 2017 estimate). Major religious groups, according to the last census that covered religious affiliation (1999), include the United Church of Christ (formerly Congregational), with 54.8 percent of the population; the Assemblies of God, 25.8 percent; the Roman Catholic Church, 8.4 percent; Bukot nan Jesus (also known as Assembly of God Part Two), 2.8 percent; and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), 2.1 percent. Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Full Gospel, Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, Bahais, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Iglesia ni Cristo (Church of Christ), Jews, Ahmadi Muslims, Hindus, and atheists. Almost all those native to the country are Christian, according to government statistics. Many foreign-born residents and workers are also Christian, and the majority of non-Christians are foreign born.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of thought, conscience, and belief, as well as for free exercise of religion and equal protection under the law, regardless of religious beliefs. It also provides for “reasonable restrictions” imposed by law on the “time, place, or manner of conduct” – provided they are the least restrictive necessary for public peace, order, health, or security or the rights or freedoms of others, and they do not penalize conduct based on a disagreement with the ideas or beliefs expressed. The constitution states that no law or legal action shall discriminate against any person on the basis of religion.

The constitution allows the government to extend financial aid to religiously supported institutions to provide nonprofit educational, medical, or social services, on the condition that such services do not discriminate among religious groups.

There are no requirements for the registration of religious groups, but if religious groups register as a nonprofit corporation or a cooperative, they may qualify for tax exemptions. The law states that the tax on gross revenue shall not be applied to “corporations, associations, or societies organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes.” In addition, the goods imported into the country by “churches for their own religious, educational, or charitable purposes” are exempt from import duty.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Governmental functions, by continuing custom, often began and ended with an ordained minister or other church official delivering a Christian prayer. While there was no religious education in public schools, most extracurricular school events began and ended with an interdenominational Christian prayer delivered by a minister. According to local residents, prayers before and after events were a longstanding cultural practice and part of the widely accepted tradition of the country.

The government provided funding to 15 private religious schools during the year totaling $295,000. All chartered private schools were eligible for funding. The amount of funding religious schools received depended on how much was available after ensuring the basic needs of public school system were covered first. With foreign grant funding to the government decreasing, the amount of funding provided to private schools, including religious schools, likewise decreased. The distribution of allocations were based on a combination of enrollment, performance (test results), and accreditation.

Members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community reported difficulties in gaining access to government officials, which they attributed to prejudice against Muslims, continued to contribute to government delays in approving certain humanitarian and social welfare projects sponsored by the Muslim community.

Ahmadiyya Muslim Community representatives said societal religious intolerance they encountered – distrusting stares, difficulties in developing social networks in the community – stemmed from international news reports (since there were no indigenous Muslims and few converts) that linked Islam to terrorism. The Ahmadi leaders said they sought to dispel that notion and to present Islam as a religion of peace by having their foreign missionaries and local converts seek to contribute to the general social welfare. In covering the visit of the new imam, Sajid Iqbal, to the local radio station on December 28, The Marshall Islands Journal said the Ahmadiyya Muslims conducted various humanitarian services and, although they do not observe Christmas, share the joy of giving in the holiday season.

The Ambassador spoke at the Third Annual National Conference of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at in Majuro in May about the importance of religious freedom and tolerance, including for minority groups. A Muslim lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army gave a speech at the conference dealing with religious tolerance in a pluralistic society. In March an embassy official met with a series of religious leaders, including representatives of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, the Jewish community, Protestant and Catholic churches, and the Mormons, to discuss their members’ ability to freely practice their religious beliefs as part of the embassy’s outreach to the country’s religious groups and civil society.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 3.7 million (July 2017 estimate). Sunni Muslims are estimated to be 99 percent of the population. There are very small numbers of non-Muslims, mostly Christians and a small number of Jews, almost all of whom are foreigners.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the country as an Islamic republic and recognizes Islam as the sole religion of its citizens and the state. Only Muslims may be citizens. Persons who convert from Islam lose their citizenship.

The law and legal procedures derive from a combination of French civil law and sharia. The judiciary consists of a single system of courts that uses principles of sharia in matters concerning the family and secular legal principles in all other matters.

The law prohibits apostasy. A Muslim convicted of apostasy who does not recant within three days may be sentenced to death and have his or her property confiscated. The government, however, has never applied capital punishment in this regard.

The penal code stipulates that the penalty for unmarried individuals of any gender caught engaging in sexual activity is 100 lashes and imprisonment of up to one year. The penalty of those married individuals convicted of adultery is death by stoning, although the last stoning punishment occurred more than 30 years ago. The penal code requires death by stoning for those convicted of consensual homosexual activity. These punishments only apply to Muslims.

The government does not register Islamic religious groups, but all nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including humanitarian and development NGOs affiliated with religious groups, must register with the Ministry of Interior. NGOs must also agree to refrain from proselytizing or otherwise promoting any religion other than Islam. The law requires the Ministry of Interior to authorize all group meetings, including non-Islamic religious gatherings, in advance, even those held in private homes.

By law, the MIATE is responsible for enacting and disseminating fatwas, fighting “extremism,” promoting research in Islamic studies, organizing the Hajj and Umrah pilgrimages, and monitoring mosques. The government appoints the six imams of the High Council of Islam, who advise the government on conformity of legislation to Islamic precepts. The government also appoints the High Council for Fatwa and Administrative Appeals, which has sole authority to regulate fatwa issuance and resolve related disputes among citizens and between citizens and public agencies.

The law requires members of the Constitutional Council and the High Council of Magistrates to take an oath of office that includes a promise to God to uphold the law of the land in conformity with Islamic precepts.

A ministerial decree requires public schools and private secondary schools, but not international schools, to teach four hours of Islamic studies per week. Religious instruction in Arabic is required for students seeking the baccalaureate.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On November 9, the Court of Appeals in Nouadhibou ordered the release of Mohamed Cheikh Ould Mohamed Ould Mkheytir, often known as MKheytir, a blogger who was previously sentenced to death in 2014 for apostasy after he allegedly posted statements on social media critical of the Prophet Mohammed. In March the Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals improperly sentenced MKheytir to death for apostasy, since he had properly recanted his statements. The court ruled that according to law, he should have been sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for “unbelief.” MKheytir’s trial on January 31 attracted widespread attention and crowds of approximately 4,000 protesters who called for his execution. MKheytir’s lawyers were also threatened, including Mohamed Ould Meine, whom the Mauritanian Bar Association disbarred in 2014 for his work on MKheytir’s case. In November police dispersed demonstrations in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou against the verdict with tear gas. Despite the court’s release order, at year’s end MKheytir remained detained in an unknown location, and the government filed an immediate appeal against the court’s verdict. On November 16, cabinet members proposed eliminating the legal ground allowing for a reduction of sentence for those convicted of apostasy who then recanted. If enacted, those convicted of apostasy or blasphemy in the future would be subject to execution. On November 17, four separate gatherings with between 600 and 1,500 protesters demonstrated against the court’s order to release MKheytir.

On May 30, a court in Nouakchott sentenced Toutou Mint El Ide to death by stoning after being convicted of adultery. She was then released to her family after a relative promised to guarantee her future good behavior.

The local press reported that on June 9, a Mauritanian woman and three foreign citizens from Cameroon, Ghana, and Nigeria who were distributing Christian literature were arrested for apostasy and then released without charges.

On June 16, the government banned religious and opposition political groups from using mosques to promote political agendas or propagate extremist views. The Minister of Islamic Affairs, Ahmed Ould Ehel Daoud, announced the ban to the Association of Imams of Mauritania, stating the government would not accept the exploitation of these platforms in the service of political objectives or personal purposes. The minister urged imams to spread the values of tolerance and “to close the door to anyone who aims at undermining the Mauritanian’s moderate values, and the country’s spirit of moderation.”

Local civil society leaders and NGOs criticized the traditional religious leadership for stressing a Maliki doctrine requiring believers to be loyal to the government of the day as “God-ordained” following a vote in the National Assembly on June 9 to impose a criminal penalty of between one and five years in prison against anyone who speaks in a manner “contrary or hostile” to the regionally dominant Maliki school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence. The draft statute stated its purpose was to prevent hate speech, incitement to violence, and racist crimes. According to human rights advocates, the law could be broadly interpreted to target and suppress virtually any dissent. The draft legislation is silent on its applicability to religions other than Islam.

The MIATE continued to collaborate with independent Islamic religious groups to combat extremism, radicalization, and terrorism through a series of workshops in all 15 provinces. The MIATE organized an international conference on “Violence and Extremism from Sharia’s Perspective” held on March 19. The prime minister, the minister of Islamic affairs, and international religious leaders attended the conference, which focused on challenges facing Islam, such as violence and extremism.

Authorized churches were able to conduct services discreetly within their premises but could not proselytize. Although there remained no specific legal prohibition against non-Muslims proselytizing, in practice the government prohibited such activity through the broad interpretation of the constitution stating Islam shall be the religion of the people and of the state. No public expression of religion except Islam was allowed.

An unofficial government requirement restricted non-Muslims’ worship to the few recognized Christian churches. There were Roman Catholic and other Christian churches in Nouakchott, Kaedi, Atar, Nouadhibou, and Rosso. Citizens could not attend non-Islamic religious services, which remained restricted to foreigners. The Ministry of Interior had not acted on several requests by a group of foreign Protestants for authorization to build their own place of worship. The group first sought authorization to construct a place of worship in 2006, then renewed the process in 2012 and 2016, but at year’s end was still awaiting approval.

On December 9, 2016, Essahraa, an independent news website, reported the government and the Holy See decided to establish diplomatic relations; however, by year’s end there was no progress toward that end.

The possession of non-Islamic religious materials remained legal, although the government continued to prohibit their printing and distribution. The government maintained a Quranic television channel and radio station. Both stations sponsored regular programming on themes of moderation in Islam.

The government continued to provide funding to mosques and Islamic schools under its control. The government paid monthly salaries of 50,000 ouguiyas ($140) to 200 imams who passed an examination conducted by a government-funded panel of imams and heads of mosques and Islamic schools. It also paid monthly salaries of 25,000-100,000 ouguiyas ($70-$280) to 30 members of the National Union of Mauritanian Imams, an authority established to regulate the relationship between the religious community and the MIATE.

Islamic classes remained part of the educational curriculum, but class attendance was not mandatory and not required for graduation. The results in the classes did not count significantly in the national exams that determine further placement. Additionally, many students reportedly did not attend these religious classes for various ethnolinguistic, religious, and personal reasons. The Ministry of National Education and the MIATE continued to reaffirm the importance of the Islamic education program at the secondary level; the government reportedly considered religious education a tool to protect children and society against extremism and to promote Islamic culture.

During the annual Eid al-Adha observance on September 1, Imam Ahmedou Ould Lemrabott Ould Habibou Rahman, the Imam of the Grand Mosque of Nouakchott, renewed his warning of what he called the spread and growing threat of Shia Islam in the country. The imam also stated for a second successive year that government authorities should sever ties with Iran in order to stop the spread of Iranian Shia Islam.

On April 11, the news website Sahara Media reported that the administration of SNIM authorized the conversion of the church of Zouerate into a mosque. The church was built in 1952 to serve as a place of worship for hundreds of French citizens working at the company. SNIM was initially reluctant to respond to requests to convert the church to a mosque, since it remained affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church; however, in 2016 the Roman Catholic Church authorized SNIM to use the building as it wished.

U.S. embassy representatives, including the Ambassador and visiting senior U.S. government officials, discussed religious tolerance with senior government officials, including the president and prime minister. Embassy officials raised the case of MKheytir and other apostasy and religious freedom cases with authorities on multiple occasions. The Ambassador urged authorities to ensure that judicial proceedings were transparent.

The Ambassador met regularly with religious leaders to discuss religious tolerance. On June 14, an embassy official hosted an iftar in Boghe, in the Brakna District, which was attended by the hakim, the Mayor of Boghe, journalists, traditional leaders, and civil society representatives. The Ambassador previously held an iftar attended by the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of Islamic affairs, other senior government officials, journalists, and civil society leaders. In May, Ibrahima Kane, the imam of the mosque of the Construction and Real Estate Management Company, SOCOGIM, traveled to the United States on an U.S. government exchange program to promote interfaith dialogue.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.3 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2010 local census, approximately 48 percent is Hindu, 26 percent Roman Catholic, 17 percent Muslim, and 6 percent non-Catholic Christian religious groups including Seventh-day Adventists, Anglicans, Pentecostals, Presbyterians, evangelical Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and members of the Assemblies of God. The remaining 3 percent includes Buddhists, animists, individuals who reported no religious affiliation, and others. More than 95 percent of Muslims are Sunni.

According to the 2010 local census, on the main island, the population of Port Louis is primarily Muslim and Catholic, while most of the remainder of the island’s population is Hindu. The island of Rodrigues is approximately 90 percent Catholic.

There is a strong correlation between religious affiliation and ethnicity. Citizens of Indian ethnicity are primarily Hindu or Muslim. Those of Chinese ancestry generally practice Buddhism, Anglicanism, or Catholicism. Creoles (persons of African descent) and citizens of European descent are primarily Catholic.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits discrimination based on creed and provides for freedom of thought and religion, including the right of individuals to change manifest, and propagate their religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice, and observance, alone or in community, in private or in public. These rights may be subject to limitations to protect public order, safety, morality, health, or the rights of others. The constitution also bars requiring oaths contrary to an individual’s religious belief and bars compulsory religious education or attendance at religious ceremonies in schools. It gives religious groups the right to establish schools and to provide religious instruction therein to members of that group; these institutions are open to the population in general as well. Citizens can file complaints of religious discrimination with the Equal Opportunities Commission, which can initiate investigations if it believes a citizen’s rights may have been infringed. Legislative election candidates must identify themselves as belonging to one of the four national communities cited in the constitution: Hindus, Muslims, Sino-Mauritians, or the general population.

A parliamentary decree recognizes the six religious groups that were the main ones present prior to independence: Hindus, Catholics, Muslims, Anglicans, Presbyterians, and Seventh-day Adventists. These groups receive annual lump sum payments from the finance ministry based on the number of their adherents as determined by the voluntary self-identification of individuals in the 2010 census. The registrar of associations registers new religious groups, which must have a minimum of seven members with designated leadership responsibilities. The finance ministry grants these new groups tax-exempt privileges. Although registration of religious groups is required, the law does not prescribe penalties for unregistered groups.

Religious groups must obtain both a residence permit and a work permit for each foreign missionary. The Prime Minister’s Office is the final authority on the issuance of these documents. While there are no explicit restrictions, there are unofficial limits on the overall number of missionaries per religious group who are issued the requisite visas and work permits. The government grants residence permits to missionaries for a maximum of three years with no extensions.

Religious education is allowed in public and private schools, at both the primary and high school levels. Students are permitted to opt out, and civic education classes are provided for non-Catholic students attending Catholic schools.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Some Christians and Muslims continued to state that the predominance of Hindus in the civil service resulted in “interference” in the government promotion system and prevented Christians and Muslims from reaching higher-level positions in the civil service. More generally, non-Hindus often stated they were underrepresented in government. There were no reliable statistics available on the numbers of members of different religious groups represented in the civil service; however, the Truth and Justice Commission had stated in its latest report in 2011 that employment in the civil service did not represent national ethnoreligious diversity.

There continued to be tension between Hindus and Muslims. Police investigations revealed, however, that some alleged cases of interreligious violence were in fact cases of retaliation stemming from domestic or personal issues.

On October 30, private radio station Top FM reported that unknown individuals vandalized five Hindu temples and other places of worship the previous night. The vandals destroyed deity statuettes and smeared blood on the places of worship. At year’s end, police had made no arrests.

The police investigation into the November 2016 incident in which unknown individuals vandalized two mosques and a predominantly Muslim cemetery in the Savanne District remained open at year’s end.

The police investigation into the December 2016 incident in which unknown individuals vandalized a Tamil temple in Port Louis remained open at year’s end, with no arrests made.

Authorities completed their investigation of the 2015 case in which two Muslim men vandalized a Hindu temple, and they sent the case to the Savanne court for prosecution. This was followed by retaliation by five Hindu men who vandalized a mosque in the south of the island.

The Council of Religions, a local organization composed of representatives from 18 religious groups, hosted regular religious ceremonies and celebrations to foster mutual understanding and enhance interfaith collaboration among faith communities. In October the council started the distribution of booklets entitled “Peace and Interfaith Dialogue” to local schools and institutions.

Embassy representatives continued to engage the government on religious freedom issues, advocating continued respect for religious diversity and tolerance. Embassy representatives met with law enforcement officials to discuss religious tensions related to incidents of vandalism. The Charge d’Affaires hosted an annual dinner for Muslim civil society members and religious leaders to highlight religious tolerance and ways to continue to foster it.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 124.6 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2010 census, approximately 83 percent identifies as Roman Catholic and 5 percent as evangelical Protestant. Other religious groups, including Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and Muslims, together constitute less than 5 percent of the population. More than 2 percent of the population reports practicing a religion not otherwise specified, and nearly 5 percent reports not practicing any religion. Some indigenous persons adhere to syncretic religions drawing from pre-Hispanic indigenous beliefs.

Official statistics based on self-identification during the 2010 census sometimes differ from the membership figures stated by religious groups. Approximately 315,000 individuals identify themselves as Mormons in the 2010 census. Mormon officials, however, report their membership at approximately 1.3 million. There are large Protestant communities in the southern states of Chiapas and Tabasco. In Chiapas, evangelical Protestant leaders state nearly half of the state’s 2.4 million inhabitants are members of evangelical groups, but fewer than 5 percent of 2010 census respondents in Chiapas self-identify as evangelical Protestant.

According to the 2010 census, the Jewish community totals approximately 67,500 persons, of which nearly 42,000 live in Mexico City and the state of Mexico. Nearly half of the country’s approximately 4,000 Muslims are concentrated in Mexico City and the state of Mexico. There is also a small Ahmadi Muslim population of several hundred living in Chiapas, most of whom are converts and of ethnic Tzotzil Maya origin. There are also small indigenous communities of Bahai that number in the hundreds. An estimated half of the approximately 100,000 Mennonites are concentrated in the state of Chihuahua.

Legal Framework

The constitution states all persons are free to profess their chosen religious beliefs and to engage in ceremonies and acts of worship that do not constitute a crime or offense punishable by law. Congress may not enact laws establishing or prohibiting any religion. The constitution defines the country as secular and provides for the separation of religion and state. It prohibits any form of discrimination, including on the basis of religion.

To establish a religious association, applicants must certify that the church or religious group observes, practices, propagates, or instructs a religious doctrine or body of religious beliefs; has conducted religious activities in the country for at least five years; has established domicile in the country; and shows sufficient assets to achieve its purpose. Registered associations may freely organize their internal structures and adopt bylaws or rules pertaining to their governance and operations, including the training and appointment of their clergy. They may engage in public worship and celebrate acts for the fulfillment of the association’s purpose, lawfully and without profit. They may propagate their doctrine within applicable regulations and participate in the creation, management, maintenance, and operation of private welfare, educational, and health institutions, provided the institutions are not for profit.

To operate, religious groups are not required to register with the government. Registration is required with the DGAR, however, to negotiate contracts, purchase or rent land, apply for official building permits, receive tax exemptions, or hold religious meetings outside customary places of worship. Religious associations must notify the government of their intention to hold a religious meeting outside their licensed place or places of worship. Religious associations may not hold political meetings of any kind.

The federal government coordinates religious affairs through SEGOB. Within SEGOB, the DGAR promotes religious tolerance, conducts conflict mediation, and investigates cases of religious intolerance. The National Council to Prevent Discrimination (CONAPRED) is an autonomous federal agency responsible for ensuring nondiscrimination and equal opportunity rights, including for minority religious groups. If a party presents a dispute based on allegations of religious intolerance, the DGAR is mandated to mediate a solution. If mediation fails, the parties may submit the issue to the DGAR for binding arbitration or seek judicial redress. Each of the 32 states has offices with responsibility over religious affairs.

As of October 27, there were 8,908 religious associations registered by the DGAR. These included 8,869 Christian (an increase of 171 from 2016), 13 Buddhist, 10 Jewish, two Hindu, three Islamic, and two International Society for Krishna Consciousness groups. Bahais and Ahmadi Muslims were not officially registered.

The constitution states acts of public worship are to be performed inside places of worship. Active clergy are forbidden from holding public office, advocating partisan political views, supporting political candidates, or publicly opposing the laws or institutions of the state.

The law declares that prisoners “shall enjoy all the rights provided by the constitution and international treaties to which the state is party, provided that these have not been restricted by resolution or judgement, or their exercise is incompatible with the object of these.” Prisoners are legally guaranteed dignified and equal treatment from prison staff without distinction based on religious preferences.

Religious groups must apply for permits to construct new buildings or to convert existing buildings into houses of worship. Any religious building constructed after January 27, 1992 is the property of the religious group that built it and is subject to the relevant taxes. All religious buildings erected before then are considered part of the national patrimony and owned by the state.

The constitution requires public education be secular and not include religious doctrine. Religious groups are permitted to operate private schools and to teach religion and hold religious ceremonies at their schools. Private schools affiliated with a religious group are open to all students regardless of their religious belief or nonbelief; students in these schools are exempt from participating in religious courses and activities if they are not affiliated with the school’s religious group. Homeschooling is allowed at the secondary level after completion of schooling at an accredited primary school.

A visa category exists for foreign ministers of worship and religious associates to obtain a temporary resident visa or visitor visa without permission to perform paid religious activities.

The law states religious groups may not own nor operate radio or television stations. Government permission is required for commercial radio or television to transmit religious programming.

According to the constitution, indigenous communities have the right to autonomy and may “decide their internal forms of coexistence” and have separate legal systems to “regulate and solve their internal conflicts.” The constitution also protects the right of indigenous leaders to practice their own particular “uses and customs.” These rights sometimes conflict with the general principles and fundamental rights provided by the constitution, including freedom of religion.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The country claims the following constitutional limitations to the covenant: a limitation (to Article 18) that religious acts must be performed in places of worship unless granted prior permission and a reservation (to Article 25) that religious ministers have neither a passive vote nor the right to form political associations. Professional education for ministers is not officially recognized.

Government Practices

Some evangelical groups said they did not believe the government responded adequately to their reports of abuse and discrimination by other religious groups and community leaders, especially in indigenous communities. These groups said some Protestants in mainly rural and/or indigenous areas in Chiapas and Oaxaca were pressured by local indigenous leaders operating under a special constitutionally protected legal structure of “uses and customs” to participate in Catholic cultural religious events, and some stated there was pressure to convert or return to Catholicism. According to evangelical leaders, those who refused faced forcible displacement from their communities, experienced arbitrary detention by local authorities, or had property destroyed by community leaders.

According to some legal experts and NGOs, laws intended to give indigenous communities autonomy to exercise traditional law gave local authorities the ability to harass some members of minority religious groups or force them to follow the majority religion in the area. NGOs and some religious organizations continued to state that a number of rural and indigenous communities expected inhabitants, regardless of their faith, to participate in and fund community religious gatherings, and in some cases adhere to the majority religion. There were continued reports that persons adhering to the minority religious group or coming from outside the community to proselytize faced discrimination from others within the community. Some members of minority religious groups in indigenous communities stated local authorities denied them public benefits and utilities service due to their religious affiliation.

The DGAR sometimes worked with state and local officials on criminal investigations involving religious groups. At year’s end the DGAR investigated three cases related to religious freedom at the federal level, compared with six in 2016. All of the cases investigated by the DGAR took place in the state of Chiapas. According to the DGAR, most incidents of religious discrimination were under the jurisdiction of the state government rather than the federal government. Municipal and state officials commonly mediated disputes among religious groups. Some groups said officials rarely pursued legal remedies against offending local leaders and were often unaware of the applicable laws, preferring instead to reach informal mediated solutions. The groups continued to state there were few investigations and prosecutions of crimes or abuses motivated by a victim’s belief or practice, stating this was partially a result of the lack of resources devoted to federal and state agencies and organizations working on religious freedom.

According to Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW), seven Protestant families in the Yaltzi community, Tres Lagunas village, Comitan municipality in the state of Chiapas, were forcibly displaced by village leaders in August due to the former’s beliefs. The group consisted of 30 individuals and included children. The families stated they came under pressure to contribute to a Catholic festival and help cover the travel expenses of a visiting Catholic priest who held Mass in the community. When they refused, village authorities cut off their access to water and electricity on August 14. To increase pressure, a group of villagers led by the mayor reportedly ordered the detention of the Protestants in the village jail over a weekend. CSW noted that local village leaders bound the Protestants, threatened to kill them, and denied them food and water. They placed other Protestants under house arrest. After being holding the seven families in jail or under house arrest on August 20-21, village leaders forcibly expelled them from their properties and from the Yaltzi community. CSW reported the state government took no action to resolve the case. The federal Office for Population, Migration, and Religious Affairs sent a letter to the state government requesting information regarding the state government’s actions to protect the seven families, who were not allowed to return to their homes.

According to Jalisco state officials, the Jalisco State Commission of Human Rights confirmed 75 members of religious minorities were expelled from the Tuxpan de Bolanos community on December 4. In news reports, Wixarica (aka Huichol) village leaders said they expelled Jehovah’s Witnesses and Baptist residents, who were also of the Wixarica indigenous group, for refusing to participate in some community activities for religious reasons. The secretary of the Jalisco state government said the government would guarantee assistance to the expelled members of the community. Jalisco’s Human Rights Prosecutor’s Office confirmed the state government had installed working groups to reconcile the right to follow traditions and customs of the indigenous groups with the right to religious freedom.

According to the DGAR, the federal government continued to promote dialogue with religious actors with the stated goal of ensuring the exercise of religious freedom and resolving conflicts arising from religious intolerance. According to CONAPRED the majority of religious discrimination complaints it received were related to religious attire of Muslims, anti-Muslim comments, and the refusal of some hospitals to treat Jehovah’s Witnesses due to the latter’s refusal to allow blood transfusions. CONAPRED said it assisted in conflict mediation related to these complaints.

Jewish community leaders said that while anti-Semitic attitudes remained a concern, the government took the issue seriously and collaborated closely with the country’s Jewish leadership to address hate speech and discrimination incidents.

According to NGOs and press reports, Catholic priests and other religious leaders continued to be targeted and were the victims of killings, extortion attempts, death threats, kidnappings, and intimidation by organized criminal groups. Federal government officials maintained these incidents were not a result of targeting for religious beliefs but rather incidents related to overall crime.

The CMC reported the most dangerous states for priests were Chiapas, Tabasco, Mexico City, Puebla, Tlaxcala, Hidalgo, Mexico State, Jalisco, Nayarit, Veracruz, San Luis Potosi, Colima, Culiacan, Tabasco, Michoacan, Guerrero, and Tamaulipas. The CMC reported there were four priests killed during the year, two attempted kidnappings of priests, and attacks on the Metropolitan Cathedral and the Mexican Episcopal Conference’s office. The CMC called the country the most violent country for priests in Latin America for the ninth year in a row.

In January Father Felipe Altamirano Carrillo, an indigenous priest in Nayar, Nayarit, was killed while driving. According to news reports, he was the victim of a robbery. An investigation continued at year’s end.

Police arrested and authorities charged one suspect following the May 15 assault on Father Jose Miguel Machorro, who was attacked with a knife outside his church after celebrating Mass in the Metropolitan Cathedral of Mexico City. He died of his injuries on August 3. Reports suggested the motive was criminal.

Local authorities stated the motive for the July 5 killing of Father Luis Lopez Villa in his home in Mexico State was robbery, a conclusion disputed by the CMC, which stated there was little evidence of a robbery but rather of a “brutal and premeditated murder.” Authorities arrested one suspect.

In March assailants kidnapped Catholic priest Oscar Lopez Navarro in the state of Tamaulipas. He was released the same month after an undisclosed ransom was reportedly paid.

On July 25, an unidentified man placed explosives at the headquarters of the Mexican Episcopal Conference, the principal Catholic organization in the country. The explosion caused damage to the building; no one was injured because the attack took place late at night. On August 4, a man placed a bag of explosives at the main entrance of the Mexican Episcopal Conference’s office, located adjacent to the Basilica of Guadalupe. The bag later exploded, damaging the building

In August CSW stated that teachers had forced the 13-year-old daughter of a Protestant pastor in El Mosco, Oaxaca State, to participate in Day of the Dead festivities – which mix Catholic holy days and indigenous traditions – and that the principal threatened to lower her grades if she continued to refuse to participate. At year’s end, the outcome of the incident was unclear.

Jewish community representatives reported low levels of anti-Semitic acts and good interreligious cooperation both from the government and civil society organizations in addressing what they said were rare instances of anti-Semitic acts.

U.S. embassy and consulate representatives met with government officials responsible for religious and indigenous affairs at the federal and state levels. The representatives raised concerns regarding the continued killings of Catholic priests and abuses against religious minorities, especially evangelical Protestants, by religious majority groups and local authorities.

Embassy representatives met with members of religious groups and religiously affiliated NGOs, including Libertad y Dignidad, the Central Jewish Committee, Tribuna Israelita, the Catholic Multimedia Center, Impulso 18, and Coordination of Christian Organizations, to discuss the safety of religious workers working on humanitarian issues, assess the status of religious freedom, and express support for religious tolerance.

During the annual U.S.-Mexico Human Rights Dialogue in December, officials from the Department of State underscored the importance of protecting human rights defenders, including religious leaders.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 3.47 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2014 census, the predominant religion is Orthodox Christianity, with 90 percent of the population belonging to one of two Orthodox Christian groups. Of Orthodox adherents, approximately 90 percent belong to the MOC, which is subordinate to the Russian Orthodox Church, and the remaining 10 percent belong to the Bessarabian Orthodox Church (BOC), which falls under the Romanian Orthodox Church. Nearly 7 percent of the population did not identify a religious affiliation. The largest non-Orthodox religious groups, accounting for 15,000 to 30,000 adherents each, are Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Pentecostals. Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Seventh-day Adventists, evangelical Christians, Roman Catholics, evangelical Lutherans, Muslims, Jews, and atheists.

Smaller religious groups include Bahais, Molokans, Messianic Jews, Presbyterians, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Evangelical Christian Church, Unification Church), other Christians, Falun Gong, and the International Society of Krishna Consciousness.

In the separatist Transnistria region, an estimated 80 percent of the population belongs to the MOC. Other religious groups in the region include Catholics, followers of Old Rite Orthodoxy, Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, evangelical and charismatic Christians, Jews, Lutherans, Muslims, and Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates equal treatment for all citizens regardless of religion and guarantees freedom of conscience, manifested in “a spirit of tolerance and mutual respect,” and of religious worship. It states religious groups may organize and operate according to their own statutes, independent from the state. The constitution prohibits all actions instigating religious hatred and “any manifestation of discord” between religious groups. The constitution stipulates the state shall support religious worship, including facilitating religious assistance in the army, hospitals, penitentiaries, nursing homes, and orphanages.

The law states every person has the right to belong or not belong to a religion, to have or not have individual beliefs, to change religion or beliefs, and to practice religion or beliefs independently or as a group, in public or in private, through teaching, religious practices, or rituals. According to the law, religious freedom may be restricted only if necessary to ensure public order and security, to protect public health and morality, or to protect a person’s rights and freedoms. The law also prohibits discrimination based on religious affiliation.

The law stipulates that the state recognize the “exceptional importance and fundamental role” of Orthodox Christianity, particularly that of the MOC, in the life, history, and culture of the country.

The law allows religious groups to establish associations and foundations. It permits local religious groups to change their denominational affiliation or dissolve themselves. The law exempts registered religious groups from paying real estate and land taxes.

In January a law came into force that allows individuals, but not companies or other legal entities, to redirect 2 percent of their income tax to NGOs or religious organizations. Religious groups wanting to benefit from the new provisions must register with the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), and use the amounts received only for social, moral, cultural, and/or charitable activities. The law exempts religious organizations from registration fees and from paying tax on the income received as donations under the 2 percent law.

The law provides for a registration process in which a religious group must present to the MOJ a declaration including its exact name, fundamental principles of belief, organizational structure, and scope of activities, financing sources, and rights and obligations of membership. The law also requires a group to show it has at least 100 founding members. A religious group must present proof of having access to premises where it can conduct its religious activities, but the law does not specify that the group must own this property. The MOJ is required by law to register a religious group within 30 days if the registration request is made according to law. The applicant may request this term to be extended if the government determines the documentation submitted is insufficient. At the request of the MOJ, a court may suspend the registered status of a religious group if it “carries out activities that harm the constitution or laws,” or “affects state security, public order, [or] the life and security of the people.” The law also provides for suspension or revocation of a religious group’s registration in case of violation of international agreements or for political activity.

The law does not require registration, but only registered religious groups possess status as legal entities allowing them to build churches, own land in cemeteries or other property, publish or import religious literature, open bank accounts, or employ staff. Registration also exempts them from land taxes and property taxes. Individual churches or branches of registered religious groups are not required to register with the MOJ as long as they do not carry out legal transactions and do not receive donations as local legal entities. The parent organization must exercise authority in those areas for unregistered local branches.

The law allows all religious groups to hold services at state facilities, including prisons, orphanages, hospitals, schools, and military and police institutions, at the request of individuals in such institutions, provided they obtain the approval of the institution’s administration.

Through an agreement with the MOJ, MOC chaplains have free access to detention facilities for religious assistance without prior approval of the prison administration. In addition, the MOC has a separate agreement with the Ministry of Defense, which allows MOC priests to preach to army units, bless military personnel prior to their deployment in peacekeeping missions, and distribute religious literature to libraries within the army.

The law bans religious entities from engaging in political activity and prohibits “abusive proselytism,” defined as the action of changing religious beliefs through coercion.

Although the law provides for restitution of property confiscated during the successive fascist and Soviet regimes to politically repressed or exiled persons, the provision does not apply to property confiscated from religious groups. Under previous agreement between the Ministry of Culture and the MOC, the government transferred control of most confiscated churches and monasteries to the MOC. Property disputes between the MOC and BOC churches have not been resolved. The Ministry of Culture is responsible for the remaining churches and monasteries not under the control of the MOC. Local authorities working through the Ministry of Culture may arrange with local parishes to return or lease those churches or monasteries to religious groups. Property restitution continued to be a problem for the Jewish community, and there is no law to address it.

The constitution provides for freedom of religious education and stipulates the state educational system “shall be of a lay nature.” According to the law, religion classes in state educational institutions are optional. Students submit a written request to the school’s administration to enroll in a religion class. Religion classes are offered in grades one through nine. No alternative classes are offered for those who choose not to enroll in religion classes. The religion curriculum offers two types of courses: one for Orthodox denominations and Roman Catholics, and the second for evangelical Christians and Seventh-day Adventists. The religious curriculum for Orthodox and Catholic groups derives from instructional manuals developed by the Ministry of Education with input from the MOC and includes teaching guidelines developed with the support of the BOC. Teachers and Orthodox priests teach these optional courses, which focus on Orthodox Christianity. Teachers and representatives of the Evangelical Christian Church teach the second course, which is based on translated religious manuals and literature from Romania, the United States, and Germany. Both courses teach religious doctrine as well as moral and spiritual values.

The law mandates immunization of all children before they may enroll in kindergarten. It does not provide an exception for religious reasons.

The Anti-Discrimination Council, established by law, is an independent institution charged with reviewing complaints of discrimination, including discrimination of a religious character or based on religious affiliation. Parliament chooses members through a competitive process, appointing them to five-year terms. The council does not have sanctioning powers; however, it can determine if an act of discrimination took place, offer advice on how to remedy the situation, and send requests to prosecutors to initiate criminal proceedings. It can also suggest pertinent legislative amendments or participate in working groups authoring legislative initiatives.

According to the law, citizens ages 18 to 27 have the right to choose civilian over military service if the latter runs counter to their religious beliefs. The standard duration of both alternative civilian and military service is 12 months; university graduates may choose six months of civilian service or three months of military training. Those who choose civilian service may complete it at public institutions or enterprises specializing in such areas as social assistance, health care, industrial engineering, urban planning, roads and road construction, environmental protection, agriculture or agricultural processing, town management, and fire rescue. There are no blanket exemptions for religious groups from the civilian service alternative, but higher-ranking clergy, monks, and theology students are exempted from alternative service. Refusal to enroll in civilian service is punishable by a fine up to 32,000 lei ($1,900) or between 100 and 150 hours of community service.

The law defines as “extremist” and makes illegal any document or information justifying war crimes or the complete or partial annihilation of a religious or other kind of societal group as well as any document calling for or supporting activities in pursuit of those goals.

Foreign missionaries may submit work contracts or volunteer agreements to apply for a temporary residency permit and may reside and work in a paid status or as unpaid volunteers. Only missionaries working with registered religious groups may apply for temporary residency permits. Foreign religious workers with these permits must register with the National Agency for the Occupation of the Workforce, the Bureau for Migration and Asylum, and the Ministry of Information Technology and Communications. They must present documents confirming the official status of the registered religious group for which they will work, papers confirming their temporary residence, and proof of valid local health insurance. Other foreign missionaries belonging to registered religious groups may remain for 90 days on a tourist visa.

In separatist Transnistria, Transnistrian “law” affirms the special role of the Orthodox Church in the region’s culture and spirituality. The de facto law “recognizes respect” for Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, and other religious groups historically present in the region. All religious groups, whether registered or not, officially have freedom to worship, but the law permits restrictions on the right to freedom of conscience and religion “if necessary to protect the constitutional order, morality, health, citizens’ rights and interests, or state defense and security.” Foreign citizens also have the freedom to worship. The prosecutor’s office oversees implementation of the law on religious freedom.

In March amendments to the Transnistrian “law” on religion entered into effect, prohibiting proselytizing in persons’ homes and limiting distribution of religious literature to houses of worship and special premises designated by the “authorities.”

The same “law,” passed in 2009, requires the reregistration of religious groups to operate legally in the region. The region’s self-declared “Ministry of Justice” registers religious groups and monitors their adherence to the goals and activities set forth in their statutes. Registration provides a number of advantages to religious groups, including the ability to own and build places of worship, open religious schools, and publish literature.

To register, a local religious group must present proof of activity in the region for at least 10 years; a list comprising at least 10 members ages 18 years or older with permanent residence in one of the seven administrative-territorial units in the region and Transnistrian “citizenship”; a list of founders and governing members and their personal details; the group’s charter, statutes, and minutes of its constituent assembly; basic religious doctrine; contact details of its governing body; and a receipt indicating payment of the registration fee. Local religious groups may also register as part of a centralized religious organization, which must consist of at least three local religious groups that have previously registered separately as legal entities. In that case, their application must additionally include a copy of the registration papers of the centralized organizations. The central religious organizations must inform the registration authority on a yearly basis about intentions to extend their activities.

The de facto authorities must decide to register a religious group within 30 days of the application. If they decide to conduct a religious assessment, which is a law enforcement investigation of the group’s background and activities, registration may be postponed for up to six months or denied if the investigating authorities determine the group poses a threat to the security or morality of the region, or if foreign religious groups are involved in its activities.

Foreign religious groups may not register or undertake religious activities. Foreigners may only worship individually; they may not be founders or members of religious groups.

Religious groups disband on their own decision or upon a “court’s” decision. The “prosecutor’s office” or the region’s de facto executive, city, or district authorities can request the courts to disband or suspend a religious group on multiple grounds, including disturbing public order or violating public security; conducting extremist activities; coercing persons into breaking up their families; infringing on citizens’ identity, rights, and freedoms; violating citizens’ morality and well-being, including the use of psychotropic substances, drugs, hypnosis, or perverse activities during religious activities; encouraging suicide or the refusal of medical treatment for religious reasons; obstructing compulsory education; using coercion for alienation of property to the benefit of the religious community; and encouraging refusal to fulfil civic duties.

The “law” allows the use of private homes and apartments to hold religious services. It does not, however, allow religious groups to use homes and apartments as their officially registered addresses. The “law” also allows such groups to hold religious services and rituals in public places such as hospitals, clinics, orphanages, geriatric homes, and prisons.

The authorities screen and may ban the import and export of religious printed materials, audio and video recordings, and other religious items.

According to the “law,” citizens have the right to choose alternative civilian service over military service if the latter contradicts an individual’s religion and beliefs. Alternative civilian service may be performed only at organizations under the Transnistrian authority or “other military forces,” and at institutions subordinate to the “executive bodies of the state or local administration.”

The de facto authorities do not allow religious groups to participate in elections or other political party activities or to support NGOs involved in elections.

Moldova is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: Religious minorities reported various difficulties such as lack of tolerance, verbal abuse, and discrimination when renting or purchasing property or building houses of worship. They stated that in general the central authorities were more supportive but they often encountered opposition from local authorities. In a July 3 meeting with 100 MOC priests to discuss the impact of religion on society, President Igor Dodon said, “Orthodoxy is the force uniting the majority of ethnic minorities. Consolidation of Moldovan society is only possible through a moral-spiritual foundation like the Christian Orthodox faith.” In September the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Jewish community by dismissing the claim lodged by the Agency of Public Property and upholding the Court of Appeals decision that rejected the Agency of Public Property’s claim on the Rabbi Tsirilson Synagogue and Magen David Yeshiva ruins, both purchased by the Jewish community in 2010.

The Unification Church reported no developments in the case of their two leaders’ arrest in 2015 and later release on judicial control on human trafficking charges, which remained pending at year’s end. Authorities had arrested Mihai Calestru and Oleg Savencov on human trafficking charges, saying they had recruited, transported, and harbored persons for labor exploitation. They also charged that the Church was founded as an organized criminal group. While under judicial control, the church leaders had no restrictions on worship or practice, and they moved freely throughout the country.

The MOJ registered 38 religious entities during the year, consisting of religious groups as component parts of existing religious denominations, including the Baptist Church, Old Rite Church, MOC, BOC, Evangelical Church, Seventh-day Adventists, and Union of Pentecostal Churches. It did not reject any registration applications.

During the year, 46 religious groups received 1.65 million lei ($96,800) from redirected income tax.

The Falun Gong associations’ two complaints to the European Court of Human Rights filed in 2015, after they exhausted all national court proceedings facing charges of violating the law on extremist activity by the Falun symbol incorporating five swastikas based on Buddhist and Chinese tradition, were pending at year’s end. They also had a pending case in the courts on the liquidation of the organization.

Jehovah’s Witnesses leaders reported opposition from local authorities in acquiring properties for building houses of worship. Most of their requests were slowed by refusal of local authorities to issue permits, urban building certificates, or authorizations for construction; long court proceedings; and residents protesting their presence. Police failed to prosecute individuals who threatened or verbally abused members of Jehovah’s Witnesses in rural localities, such as the failure to prosecute a priest who verbally threatened three Jehovah’s Witnesses with physical violence in Vulpesti.

In September the Ciorescu Village Council banned religious preaching and distribution of religious literature in the territory of Ciorescu, calling it “propaganda.” Following this decision, police charged two Jehovah’s Witnesses representatives with distributing religious literature in the territory on December 15. The police officer testified he was forced to fine them, according to Jehovah’s Witnesses representatives; the Jehovah’s Witnesses then filed a complaint with the court.

In March the Union of Pentecostal Churches filed a complaint with the court against the MOJ, Falesti local administration, and the court bailiff requesting compensation for nonmaterial losses suffered, due to the failure to reasonably enforce a 2010 court ruling. In 2010, after five years of litigation with the local administration in the city of Falesti, the Supreme Court issued a final ruling ordering the local mayor to change the designation of the building from a private home to a church. Local administration officials, however, refused to follow the court ruling. The case was pending at year’s end.

In September, after three years of dispute, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Jewish community by dismissing the claim lodged by the Agency of Public Property and upholding the Court of Appeals decision that rejected the Agency of Public Property’s claim on a synagogue and yeshiva. In 2010 the Jewish community had purchased the Rabbi Tsirilson Synagogue and Magen David Yeshiva ruins, later claimed by the Agency of Public Property.

Through an earlier agreement with the Ministry of Labor, Social Protection, and Family, the MOC continued to develop a network of social assistance, including opening day care centers and temporary shelters within churches and monasteries.

The authorities continued to grant greater freedom to the MOC, compared to other religious groups, to import religious materials and privileges pertaining to the restitution of church property. In addition, the government also continued to grant privileges, such as invitations to officiate at state-sponsored events, national holidays, and blessing ceremonies at schools, to MOC clergy it did not grant to other religious groups.

In August an online petition by a civic group requested the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Research to ban blessing services during an opening ceremony of the school year. The ministry declined to intervene, stating it was in the local authorities’ power to decide on the issue. The MOC decided blessing services during school opening ceremonies should be no longer than five minutes.

On July 3, President Igor Dodon met with 100 MOC priests to discuss the impact of religion on society, making a donation of 8,000 books to be used for studying Orthodox Christianity in schools. A press release quoted President Dodon as stating, “Orthodoxy is the force uniting the majority of ethnic minorities. The Christian Orthodox faith is the only moral-spiritual basis able to strengthen Moldovan society.”

The Seventh-day Adventists Reform Movement continued to report problems enrolling children in preschools as a result of their refusal to have children immunized. In response to an appeal sent to the Ministry of Health in September, the minister of education stated the refusal of mandatory immunization of children for religious reasons should not be an impediment to their enrollment in schools. According to the Ministry of Education, a health certificate should be sufficient to allow enrollment. A working group created in 2016 by the ministry tasked with ensuring access to educational facilities to children whose parents refused them immunization for religious or philosophical reasons continued to meet during the year but made no recommendations.

Representatives of the Union of Pentecostal Churches continued to report problems with the customs office, including its raising artificial barriers, as well as imperfect legislation, restricting imports of humanitarian assistance.

Minority religious groups, including Baptists, Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Muslims, reported local authorities were often reluctant to allocate land for the construction of houses of worship. Jehovah’s Witnesses stated local mayors or councilors were pressured by Orthodox priests to discriminate against Jehovah’s Witnesses, and local public officials and priests serving as local councilors refused to execute court orders allowing use of facilities by Jehovah’s Witnesses for worship.

On June 7, an appeals court overturned a 2016 lower court decision in a permit case for a building owned by Jehovah’s Witnesses. The lower court ruled in favor of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, allowing for construction to go forward. The appeals court referred the case back to the lower court on the grounds that the lower court had not conducted proper due diligence to verify the validity of the building permit. The case was pending at year’s end. Jehovah’s Witnesses reported the case began in 2016 when the mayor and local councilors in Olanesti refused to grant a zoning change that would allow the community to use its completed Kingdom Hall, for which they said they had completed all bureaucratic formalities and provided all necessary documentation.

NGOs and advocacy groups noted the government had no laws or mechanisms in place to address Holocaust-era claims of communal property restitution and reported the government had made no progress on resolution of these claims, including for foreign citizens.

The Jewish Community of Moldova continued to report state authorities failed to respond to anti-Semitic acts, including vandalism and hate speech. Community leaders continued to state police were reluctant to take action or allowed the perpetrators to escape prosecution.

In May the government approved an action plan for 2017-19 on the implementation of parliament’s 2016 endorsement of the Elie Wiesel Commission’s Report on the Holocaust. The action plan provides for a number of specific actions, including a commitment to establish a National Holocaust Museum in Chisinau; special one-hour sessions of the parliament and government to commemorate Holocaust victims on January 27, including a nationwide moment of silence; developing an optional curriculum for high schools and a general schools course: The Holocaust: History and Lessons; developing content on the Holocaust for history textbooks; and organizing guided tours to Holocaust memorial sites. The Jewish community reported limited government progress in fulfilling this plan.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

Human rights experts, including representatives from Promo-Lex, continued to report minority religious groups in Transnistria not favored by the Russian Orthodox Church, including Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists, and Pentecostals, were treated unequally as compared to the more “traditional” religious groups. Minority religious groups, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, continued to refrain from requesting registration or from engaging in any other activities due to the history of local authorities refusing to register these groups and preventing them from displaying or distributing religious literature. The Muslim community reported the Transnistria de facto authorities suggested it join the Russian Muslim community and stay away from the Moldovan Muslim community. According to minority religious groups, local security forces continued monitoring their activities.

Jehovah’s Witnesses said Transnistrian de facto authorities continued to refuse to reregister two local Jehovah’s Witnesses groups. The UN Human Rights Committee sent a complaint made by the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Tiraspol against Moldova to the Moldovan authorities for comments. In 2016 three Jehovah’s Witnesses in Tiraspol filed complaints against Moldova (which had sovereignty, but not control, over Transnistria) and the Russian Federation to the UN Human Rights Committee for refusing to reregister the religious group.

The Muslim community continued to run a cultural and an educational center in Transnistria but again did not attempt to register as a religious community. The Muslim community continued to state it avoided undertaking any overt religious activity because of previous attempts by the region’s authorities to intimidate it.

Jehovah’s Witnesses reported five incidents of societal abuse, consisting mainly of verbal intimidation, and actions impeding religious activities. For instance, on March 22, Jehovah’s Witnesses reported Ciugureanu Viorel, an Orthodox priest, prevented three Jehovah’s Witnesses from exercising their religious rights in Vulpesti village and verbally threatened to assault them. The victims filed a complaint with police, who found the priest’s actions did not break any law; police did, however, verbally warn the priest not to interfere with the religious rights of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in the future.

Jehovah’s Witnesses continued to state that in a number of villages, local Orthodox priests instigated hatred and obstructed efforts by the Jehovah’s Witnesses to either build new houses of worship or change the designation of premises they purchased.

According to the Islamic League, societal attitudes toward Muslims continued to improve, compared with previous years, but local media continued to exhibit a critical attitude and bias against Islam, portraying it in a negative light in news articles and broadcasts. The Islamic League also said media outlets described crimes as “terrorist attacks” when a Muslim was involved, while news involving a non-Muslim was reported as a “crime” or “armed attack.” Following one such report, Muslim women were mocked in the streets and called “terrorists.”

The Islamic League reported Muslims faced discrimination in renting properties for housing.

The Islamic League reported a case of public humiliation of a pupil by a Chisinau schoolteacher that occurred in November. The teacher publicly humiliated the pupil in front of his schoolmates because he was a Muslim, saying, “You are those who kill” and “Islam itself kills.” At the parents’ request, the teacher apologized and promised this would never happen again.

Leaders of the Jewish community reported two acts of vandalism, a decrease from the previous year. On August 24, the monument to Holocaust victims in Orhei was damaged the night before the opening ceremony. Leaders submitted a complaint to local police, who arrested suspects. An investigation of the incident continued as of year’s end. In April vandals set fire to plants and stray animals in the Jewish cemetery in Chisinau, causing damage to some headstones. A complaint was submitted to police, but the case remained unresolved at year’s end. Anti-Semitic discourse and attitudes were present in recurrent comments and news items in some media outlets. A writers’ association reportedly nominated Paul Goma, a Romanian author accused of writing anti-Semitic texts, for the Nobel Prize in Literature.

In Chisinau in September the ‘NEVER AGAIN’ Association, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Jewish Community of Moldova, and Oral History Institute in Chisinau organized a series of lectures and discussions framed around the recent publication of Golden Harvest: Events at the Periphery of the Holocaust by a Princeton University historian. The events featured discussion regarding relations between Christians and their Jewish neighbors during the Holocaust and after the war. Prior to the discussion on September 13, Theatre Spalatorie performed Nicoletta Esinencu’s Clear History, which deals with the Holocaust in Bessarabia.

The Ambassador regularly encouraged the prime minister to resolve the case of the Rabbi Tsirilson Synagogue and Magen David Yeshiva. Embassy officials organized events promoting religious tolerance together with the government. In a March event held at parliament, the Ambassador delivered remarks at the opening of an exhibit displaying photographs on loan from the Kedem Jewish Center and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. The Ambassador noted that the country had made significant progress in honoring the memory of those who perished at the hands of the Nazis and was taking steps to teach the young generations about these tragic events. The embassy, together with the Ministry of Culture, organized a book presentation on “The Kishinev Ghetto in 1941-1942” by a museum official, hosted by parliament on February 9. The official also traveled to Transnistria to present his book.

Embassy officials met with leaders and representatives of the MOC, BOC, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslim groups, Baptist Church, and Pentecostal Church to discuss religious freedom, societal attitudes, and government actions or inaction with regard to religious groups. Embassy representatives also continued to meet regularly with leaders of the Jewish community to discuss respect for their rights and the challenges faced by the community.

On June 19, the embassy hosted an iftar with leaders and representatives of the Muslim community. Speaking at the event, the Ambassador noted tolerance of minority religious groups and interfaith dialogue in the country had improved in recent years, adding that only a tolerant society where human rights are respected, including religious freedoms, could be truly democratic and prosperous.

According to the U.S. government, the total population is 31,000 (July 2017 estimate), of whom 7,600 are citizens. According to the 2016 census, the total population is 37,000, of whom 8,400 (22.5 percent) are citizens. The Catholic archdiocese estimates that 90 percent of the population is Catholic. Protestant officials stated that Protestants are the second largest group after Roman Catholics, representing 2 percent of the population with 200-220 families. According to the European Jewish Congress and the local Association Culturelle Israelite (Jewish Cultural Association), approximately 1,000 residents, most of whom are noncitizens, are Jewish. According to a long-time Muslim resident, there is a small Muslim community of approximately 280 people, most of whom are noncitizens from North Africa. The Jehovah’s Witnesses report they have several hundred members resident in the country. A small number of residents adhere to other religious beliefs.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees individuals the freedom of religion and public worship and protects the freedom to express opinions on all issues, provided no crimes are committed in the exercise of those freedoms. No one may be compelled to participate in the rites or ceremonies of any religion or to observe its days of rest.

The constitution states Roman Catholicism is the state religion.

Any religious group wishing to construct a place of worship in a public space must register a request with the Ministry of Interior.

Associations, including religious ones, must request formal recognition from the Ministry of the Interior, which provides a response within one month. Recognized religious groups obtain certain attendant rights and privileges, such as the ability to hire employees and possess property. The government has granted formal recognition to the Protestant and Jewish communities.

Catholic religious instruction is available in schools as an option requiring parental authorization. Private schools may provide religious instruction for religions other than Catholicism.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Catholic rituals were generally a part of state ceremonies, including annual national day celebrations.

While the government’s stated policy was to consider non-Catholic religious groups’ requests to build public places of worship on a case-by-case basis, the government reported it did not receive any requests for new sites.

In July the Supreme Court annulled a decision by Minister of State (prime minister-equivalent) Serge Telle to refuse recognition of the country’s Association of Jehovah’s Witnesses. The minister of state had refused recognition on January 8, 2016 citing “serious and legitimate doubts regarding the sectarian nature of the denomination of Jehovah’s Witnesses.” The Supreme Court called the minister’s justification for the refusal “too vague.” The court added that “freedom of association holds an especially strong legal stature… [and]…the refusal to grant recognition of a declaration duly justified is not necessarily legal.”

The only private religious schools were Catholic. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there was insufficient demand for private schools offering instruction in other religions.

A long-time Muslim resident stated there were no pending requests to the government to build a mosque, as the Muslim community could not afford to buy property for a mosque and there was a nearby mosque in Beausoleil, France, less than one kilometer (0.6 miles) away. Muslim residents also worshipped in private prayer rooms inside their own residences.

The U.S. Consulate General in Marseille queried the government about the state of religious freedom in the country. The Ministry of Interior responded in writing that there was “total freedom of worship for any religious group.”

A representative from the U.S. Consulate General in Marseille met with Protestant, Muslim, and Jewish representatives in September and December and discussed their perceptions of religious freedom in the country.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 3.1 million (July 2017 estimate). In the last official census, conducted in 2010, 53 percent of individuals ages 15 and above self-identified as Buddhist, 3 percent as Muslim, 2.9 percent as Shamanist, and 2.1 percent as Christian. Another 38.6 percent stated they had no religious identity. According to a Buddhist scholar, the majority of Buddhists are Mahayana Buddhists. Many individuals practice elements of Shamanism in combination with other religions, particularly Buddhism. The majority of Christians are Protestant; other Christian groups include The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Roman Catholic Church, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Russian Orthodox Church. Religious groups such as the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church) also have a presence.

The ethnic Kazakh community, located primarily in the northwest, is majority Muslim.

Legal Framework

The constitution lists “freedom of conscience and religion” among the enumerated rights and freedoms guaranteed to citizens. The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religion, prohibits the state from engaging in religious activity, and prohibits religious institutions from pursuing political activities. The constitution specifies, “The relationship between the State and religious institutions shall be regulated by law.” The constitution provides that, in exercising their rights, persons “shall not infringe on the national security, rights, and freedoms of others and violate public order.” The constitution says the state shall respect all religions, and religions shall honor the state. The religion law provides “the State shall respect the dominant position of Buddhism” in the country “in order to respect and uphold the traditions of the unity and civilization of the people” of the country. It furthers says, “This shall not prevent citizens from following other religions.”

The new criminal code, effective July 1, increased certain fines. If an individual is found to have used or threatened the use of force in order to hinder the activities or rituals of religious organizations, the individual is subject to a fine ranging from 450,000 to 2.7 million Mongolian Tugriks (MNT) ($185 to $1,100), a community-service obligation of 240-720 hours, or a travel ban ranging from one to six months. This law also increased fines, which now range from MNT 450,000 to 5.4 million ($185 to $2,200), and contains a travel ban ranging from six to 12 months, or six to 12 months’ imprisonment if a religious organization or religious representative, such as a priest, minister, imam, monk, or shaman, is found to have committed acts of proselytization through force, pressure, or deception or was found to have spread “cruel” religious ideology.

The new law on petty offenses, effective July 1, also increased certain fines. It contains fines of MNT 100,000 ($41) for individuals and MNT 1 million ($410) for legal entities for recruiting children to religion against their will. The new law contains a fine of MNT 100,000 ($41) for individuals and MNT 1 million ($410) for any legal entity for disclosing an individual’s religion on identity documents without their consent or interfering with the internal affairs of a religious organization unless otherwise allowed by law. The law also contains a fine of MNT 150,000 ($62) for individuals and MNT 1.5 million ($620) for legal religious entities for conducting government or political activity, or financing any such activity. A fine of MNT 300,000 ($120) for individuals and MNT three million ($1,200) for legal entities for organizing religious training or gatherings at public premises, including schools, is in the new law.

The religion law forbids the spread of religious views by “force, pressure, material incentives, deception, or means that harm health or morals or are psychologically damaging.” It also prohibits the use of gifts for religious recruitment. The law on children’s rights provides children the freedom to practice their faith.

Religious groups must register with local and provincial authorities, as well as with the General Authority for Intellectual Property and State Registration (General Authority), to function legally. National law provides little detail on registration procedures and does not stipulate the duration of registration, allowing local and provincial authorities to set their own rules. Religious groups must renew their registrations (in most cases annually) with multiple government institutions across local, provincial, and national levels.

A religious group must provide the following documentation to the General Authority when applying for registration: a letter requesting registration, a letter from the local representative assembly or other local authority granting approval to conduct religious services, a brief description of the group, the group’s charter, documentation on the group’s founding, a list of leaders, financial information, a declaration of assets (including any real estate owned), a lease or rental agreement (if applicable), brief biographic information of individuals wishing to conduct religious services, and the expected number of worshippers.

The renewal process requires a religious group to obtain a reference letter from the local administration to be submitted with the documents listed above (updated as necessary), to the local representative assembly. The relevant representative assembly issues a resolution granting the religious institution permission to continue operations, and the organization sends a copy of the resolution to the General Authority, which enters the new validity dates on the religious institution’s original registration.

All private religious schools are entitled to state funding for their secular curricula. The religious law prohibits the government from giving state funds to religious schools for religious education.

The education law prohibits educational institutions from conducting any religious training, rituals, or activities. According to Ministry of Education, Culture, Science, and Sports officials, this prohibition on all forms of religious instruction applies to both public and private schools. The government may deny registration renewals for religious groups that violate the ban on religious instruction in educational institutions.

The law regulating civil and military service specifies that all male citizens between 18 and 25 must complete one year of compulsory military service. The law provides for alternatives to military service for citizens who submit an objection based on ethical or religious grounds. Alternative service with the Border Forces, the National Emergency Management Agency, or a humanitarian organization is available to all who submit an ethical or religious objection. There is also a provision for, in lieu of service, paying the cost of one year’s training and upkeep for a soldier.

Under the labor law, all foreign organizations, including religious institutions, must hire a stipulated number of Mongolian citizens for every foreign employee hired. Groups not specified in the annual quota list (including most religious groups) must ensure 95 percent of employees are Mongolian citizens. Any unlisted group with fewer than 20 Mongolian national employees may employ one foreign worker.

The law regulating the legal status of foreign citizens prohibits foreigners from advertising, promoting, or practicing “cruel” religions that could damage the national culture. There have been no reports of any individual or organization penalized for violating this prohibition. The religion law includes a similar prohibition on religious institutions, both foreign and domestic, conducting “inhumane” or culturally damaging activities within the country.

Foreigners seeking to conduct religious activities must obtain religious visas. Only registered religious groups may sponsor foreigners for religious visas. Foreigners who enter on other classes of visas are not allowed to undertake activities that advertise or promote religion (as distinct from personal worship or other individual religious activity, which is permitted). Under the law, “engag[ing] in business other than one’s purpose for coming” constitutes grounds for deportation.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Mongolian Evangelical Alliance (MEA) reported it obtained without difficulty permission to organize an October demonstration in the city’s central square from the Ulaanbaatar city authorities. A Shamanist leader, however, reported that a local provincial authority in Zavkhan Province prevented members of his organization from participating in a ritual celebration.

Registration and renewal procedures for religious institutions reportedly varied significantly across the country, largely depending upon the practices of local government officials. Some religious groups continued to say the government inconsistently applied and interpreted regulations, changing procedures frequently and without notice. Some religious groups continued to state that the registration and renewal process was arbitrary in some instances, with no appeal mechanism for denials. A Christian group reported that an Uvs Province local assembly chairperson stated he was biased against the group.

The length of the registration process reportedly varied from several weeks to years, deterring some Christian religious groups that wished to register. Some groups reportedly did not try to register because they were unable to fulfill the legal requirements for registration due to insufficient size or lack of dedicated, regular worship sites.

Ulaanbaatar Assembly officials continued to say the registration and renewal process allowed the government to assess the activities of religious groups, monitor the number of places of worship and clergy, and know the ratio of foreigners to nationals conducting religious activities. After a religious organization filed for new registration or renewal, according to Ulaanbaatar Assembly officials, a specialized team visited the applying organization to conduct an inspection to determine whether it met specific registration requirements for religious legal entities. This inspection team was composed of individuals from relevant agencies, such as the National Police Agency, General Intelligence Agency, and General Agency for Specialized Inspection. The officials continued to say any applications for initial registration or renewal that ostensibly were “denied” were more accurately “postponed” because of incomplete documentation, poor physical conditions of the place of worship, instances of providing English language instruction in schools without an educational permit, or financial issues (e.g., failure to pay property tax or to declare financing from foreign sources). The authorities said in these cases, they instructed religious institutions to correct deficiencies and resubmit their applications. According to Ulaanbaatar Assembly officials, there were 848 religious organizations in operation nationwide, of which 380 were located in Ulaanbaatar. The officials stated that of these, 300 were officially registered and 80 were operating without valid registration.

The Ulaanbaatar Assembly limited registrations and renewals to one year from the date of issuance, although local authorities in some other areas granted registrations and renewals that were valid for two or three years. As of October, the Ulaanbaatar Assembly granted renewals for 70 religious organizations, cancelled five registrations, and suspended 23 registrations pending additional documentation, improved conditions, or other issues as determined by the inspection team. An Ulaanbaatar Assembly official said Christian groups constituted the majority of those seeking registrations or renewals; for this reason, most of the cancelled or suspended registrations were for Christian groups.

The Ulaanbaatar Assembly and other local assemblies continued to decline to recognize branch churches as affiliated with a single religious institution; instead, each individual church was required to register separately. According to Mormon leaders, the Ulaanbaatar Assembly’s position that branches of the same church required separate registrations, which had unclear status in the law, continued to cause particular problems for Christian denominations seeking to operate multiple churches under a centralized administration, although such denominations were able to register their churches individually.

Unregistered religious groups were often still able to function, although at times they experienced frequent visits by local tax officers, police, and representatives from other agencies. Some religious leaders expressed concern that unregistered status could leave their organizations vulnerable to investigation and possible legal action. Shamanist leaders expressed concerns that the requirement for a registered place of worship placed limitations on their religion because of its nature-linked practices, although a few established registered places of worship. Two Christian denominations also reported this requirement restricted their ability to hold worship services in members’ households. Unregistered churches lacked official documents establishing themselves as legal entities and as a result were unable to own or lease land, file tax returns, or formally interact with the government. Individual members of unregistered churches typically continued to own or lease property for church use in their personal capacity.

Religious leaders continued to report that religious organizations in Tuv Province experienced registration difficulties. These leaders also noted that unregistered religious organizations were able to operate.

There were no reports of registration difficulties in Darkhan-Uul Province by religious groups that previously experienced such issues.

The MEA also reported it no longer experienced barriers to registration in Khuvsgul and Dornogobi provinces.

The Administrative Court of First Instance in Ulaanbaatar ruled in favor of a Jehovah’s Witnesses congregation that filed a court petition contesting the Ulaanbaatar Assembly’s decision to cancel its registration based on the assembly’s determination that the church doctrine was potentially harmful to national security. As a result, the church was able to apply for renewal of its registration. The renewal application was pending at year’s end. There were reports that three additional Christian congregations also had their registrations cancelled for the same reason.

During an interfaith roundtable event at the U.S. embassy in September, religious leaders unanimously stated that inconsistent implementation of registration requirements posed the only barrier to the free exercise of religious practices.

In many areas, local authorities reportedly continued to place restrictions on the participation of minors in church activities. According to representatives of multiple Christian groups, government officials continued to restrict unaccompanied minors’ participation in religious services due to fears services would be used to “brainwash” them. In Uvs and many other provinces, minors under the age of 16 required written parental permission to participate in church activities. Churches are required to retain this permission in church records and make it available upon request.

Religious groups, as allowed by law, continued to experience periodic audits, usually by officers from tax, immigration, local government, intelligence, and other agencies. Buddhist, Christian, Shamanist, and Muslim religious leaders during an interfaith roundtable said that secular business entities are also subject to similar inspections and experience periodic audits. Some religious leaders in the past said such periodic audits were a form of harassment.

Government officials receive Buddhist leaders annually during the Lunar New Year.

Some foreign citizens continued to face difficulties obtaining religious visas. Since most religious groups were bound by the 95 percent local hire requirement, groups that could not afford to hire enough local employees could not sponsor additional religious visas. It was possible to pay a fee to exceed the quota restrictions, but some churches reported they could not afford this cost. Christian groups reported foreign missionaries seeking to enter the country often did nonreligious work and applied for the corresponding type of visa (such as student or business). As a result, the groups reported they could legally participate only in limited religious activities and were vulnerable to deportation because of inconsistent interpretations of the activities in which they could legally engage. The validity of religious visas is linked to the religious organization’s registration, which some Christian religious groups reported resulted in additional visa problems. Foreign citizens cannot receive or renew a religious visa unless their religious organization’s registration or renewal was already granted. The length of the religious visa’s validity corresponds with and cannot exceed that of its sponsoring organization.

Some local authorities were reported to have sought out the voluntary services of Christian groups for prison counseling, the construction of wells, and other charitable works.

The government allocated funding of MNT 840 million ($346,000) for the restoration of several Buddhist sites that it said were important religious, historical, and cultural centers. The government did not provide similar subsidies to other religious groups.

The task force established in 2016 by the minister of justice to update statistics on religious institutions and identify issues related to religious activities was disbanded following the completion of its work. No report was issued on its findings.

There were reports of local or social media-based harassment of Christians and members of other minority religious groups. For example, there were internet postings that expressed negative views about the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification after a photograph of a presidential candidate with church members appeared online during election season.

According to leaders of the MEA, overall public support for religious freedom increased. In a change from previous years, during the year there were no reports of Buddhist and Muslim leaders expressing concern over a perceived growing influence of Christianity in the country. Some Christians, however, reported that a negative perception among the general public about the growing influence of Christianity continued and, as a result, they believed they were subject to discrimination.

The Ambassador and other U.S. officials regularly discussed religious freedom and shared the U.S. government’s concerns about the uneven application of visa laws and the registration difficulties religious groups reported with government officials at the national, local, and provincial levels, including in Darkhan-Uul, Khovd, and Uvs provinces. For example, the Ambassador raised concerns about registration difficulties in a March meeting with the foreign minister. The Ambassador and other embassy officers during meetings with parliamentarians and high-level officials in the President’s Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ulaanbaatar Assembly, and provinces encouraged officials to enhance efforts to protect religious freedom and underscored the value of dialogue between the government and religious communities.

The Ambassador and other U.S. officials met frequently with religious leaders in Ulaanbaatar and across the country, both individually and in groups, to discuss registration and visa problems as well as ways to promote greater religious freedom, for example by forming an interfaith council to lobby the government to systematize registration practices nationwide. In January the Ambassador hosted a group of young societal leaders at her residence for a discussion focused on tolerance and religious freedom. The embassy invited Buddhist, Christian, Shamanist, and Muslim leaders to an embassy roundtable in September that focused on promoting respect for religious freedom, interreligious dialogue, and religious tolerance. The embassy also promoted religious freedom on social media.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 643,000 (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2011 census, approximately 72 percent of the population is Orthodox, either SOC or MOC. Local media estimate the SOC accounts for 70 percent of the Orthodox population, while the MOC makes up the remaining 30 percent. The census reports 19.1 percent of the population is Muslim, 3.4 percent Roman Catholic, and 1.2 percent atheist. Additionally, 2.6 percent of respondents did not provide a response, and several other groups, including Seventh-day Adventists (registered locally as the Christian Adventist Church), Buddhists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, other Christians, and agnostics together account for less than 1 percent of the population. According to press estimates, the Jewish community numbers approximately 350.

There is a strong correlation between ethnicity and religion: ethnic Montenegrins and ethnic Serbs are generally associated with the MOC and the SOC, respectively, ethnic Albanians with Islam or Catholicism, and ethnic Croats with the Catholic Church. Many Bosniaks (ethnic Bosnians who are Muslim) and other Muslims live along the eastern and northern borders with Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees freedom of religion as well as the right to change one’s religion. It guarantees the freedom of all individuals to express their religion in public and private, alone or collectively, through prayer, preaching, custom, or rites, and states individuals shall not be obliged to declare their religious beliefs. The constitution states the freedom to express religious beliefs may be restricted only if required to protect the life and health of the public, peace and order, or other rights guaranteed by the constitution. It specifies there is no state religion and guarantees equality and freedom for all religious communities in religious activities and affairs. The constitution permits courts to prevent propagation of religious hatred or discrimination and prohibits organizations instigating religious hatred and intolerance.

By law, it is a crime to cause and spread religious hatred, which includes publication of information inciting hatred or violence against persons on the basis of religion, the mockery of religious symbols, or the desecration of monuments, memorial tablets, or tombs. Violators may receive prison sentences ranging from six months to 10 years. If the violation is committed through the misuse of an official position or authority or leads to violence, or if the courts determine the consequences are detrimental to the coexistence of people, national minorities, or ethnic groups, the prison sentence ranges from two to 10 years.

The criminal code prescribes a fine between 200 euros ($240) and 16,000 euros ($19,200) or up to two years’ imprisonment for restricting an individual’s freedom to exercise a religious belief or membership in a religious group, or for preventing or obstructing the performance of religious rites. The code also provides for a fine of between 600 euros ($720) and 8,000 euros ($9,600) or a maximum of one year in prison for coercing another person to declare his or her religious beliefs. Any government official found guilty of these crimes may receive a sentence of up to three years in prison.

The law provides for the recognition of religious groups through registration with local and federal authorities, although religious groups that existed before 1977 are not obligated to register in order to obtain recognition. New religious groups must register with local police within 15 days of their establishment to receive the status of a legal entity, although there is no penalty specified for failing to do so. The police must then file this registration with the Ministry of Interior, which maintains a list of all religious organizations in the country. To register, a religious group must provide its name and organizing documents, the names of its officials, the address of the group’s headquarters, and the location(s) where religious services will be performed. Registration entitles groups to own property, hold bank accounts in their own name, and receive a tax exemption for donations and sales of goods or services directly related to their religious activities; however, lack of registration or recognition does not affect a group’s ability to conduct religious activities. An unregistered religious community may register as another type of organization in order to open a bank account, but may not receive the tax exemptions granted to registered religious groups.

There are 21 recognized religious groups in the country: the SOC, MOC, ICM, Roman Catholic Church, Church of Christ’s Gospel, Catholic Mission Tuzi, Christian Adventist Church, Evangelistic Church, Army Order of Hospitable Believers of Saint Lazar of Jerusalem for Montenegro, Franciscan Mission for Malesija, Biblical Christian Community, Bahai Faith, Montenegrin Community, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Montenegrin Catholic Church, Montenegrin Protestant Church, Montenegrin Demochristian Church, and Montenegrin Adventist Church, as well as the Buddhist and Jewish communities. All these groups are registered, except for the SOC, which has not applied to register.

The government has agreements with the Islamic and Jewish Communities and the Holy See further defining the legal status of the respective groups and regulating their relationship with the state. In the agreement with the Holy See, the government recognizes Catholic canon law as the Church’s legal framework and outlines the Church’s property rights. The agreements with the Islamic and Jewish Communities have similar provisions. The agreements establish commissions between each of the three religious communities and the government. There are no similar agreements with the SOC, MOC, or the other recognized religious groups.

The Directorate for Relations with Religious Communities within the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights (MHMR) regulates relations between state agencies and religious groups, and is charged with protecting the free exercise of religion and advancing interfaith cooperation and understanding. The MHMR provides some funds to religious communities and is in charge of communication between the government and the religious communities. The ministry is also in charge of drafting new legislation defining the status and rights of religious organizations.

The law allows all religious groups, including unrecognized ones, to conduct religious services and rites in churches, shrines, and other premises designated by local governments, but requires approval from municipal police for such activities at any other public locations.

The law forbids “the abuse of religious communities or their religious sites for political purposes.”

The law provides prisoners the right to conduct religious practices and have contact with clergy. Prisoners may request a diet conforming to their religious customs.

The constitution recognizes the right of members of minority national communities, individually or collectively, to exercise, protect, develop, and express “religious particularities” (i.e., religious customs unique to their minority community); to establish religious associations with the support of the state; and to establish and maintain contacts with persons and organizations outside the country who share the same religious beliefs.

By law, religion may not be taught in public primary or secondary schools. The Islamic community operates one private madrassa at the secondary school level, and the SOC operates one secondary school, both of which follow the state curriculum in nonreligious matters.

The law prohibits discrimination, including on religious grounds. Offenses are punishable by a prison term of six months to five years. The Office of the Protector of Human Rights (ombudsman) is responsible for combating discrimination and human rights violations, including those against religious freedom, by government agencies. It may investigate complaints of religious discrimination and, if it finds a violation, may request remedial measures. Failure to comply with the ombudsman’s request for corrective action within a defined period is punishable by fines of 500 to 2,500 euros ($600 to $3,000). Generally, government agencies implement the ombudsman’s recommendations, although often with delays. If necessary, the courts may enforce the recommendations.

The constitution exempts conscientious objectors, including those objecting for religious reasons, from military service. Alternative service is not required.

The constitution states foreign nationals fearing persecution in their home countries on the grounds of religion have the right to request asylum.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On October 1, police prohibited members of the MOC from performing a liturgical memorial service for the dead (parastos) for the royal Petrovic family in the Church of Mother of God in Cipur, Cetinje, citing security reasons, because SOC members were present in the church. MOC members performed a liturgy outside of the church, while SOC members performed a liturgy inside the church. On October 8, police also barred MOC members from performing religious activities inside the Church of St. Dimitrije in Podgorica, again citing security concerns. MOC priests subsequently performed a liturgy outside the church, while SOC priests were inside the church. Dozens of police officers provided security at each event, and there were no altercations. The MOC complained of a violation of members’ basic human rights and requested that the relevant state authorities allow MOC priests to practice in SOC-controlled Orthodox churches and monasteries.

Religious groups, including the Catholic Church and especially the SOC, continued to complain the law regulating their legal status was outdated and inadequate because it was drafted for conditions existing during the time of the former Yugoslavia. The government said it was continuing to revise, as it had since 2015, a draft of a new law on religious communities. By year’s end, the government had not completed the draft.

On December 5, the ECHR found for the plaintiff, Rizo Alkovic, a Montenegrin national who was a Romani Muslim, in a suit he had filed against the government for failing to adequately investigate the apparently ethnically and/or religiously motivated attacks against Alkovic and his family by neighbors in 2009 in Podgorica. According to the suit, incidents included the firing of nine or 10 gunshots in the direction of the terrace of Alkovic’s apartment. In another instance, Alkovic stated that, while he was celebrating a religious holiday with his family, individuals drew a large cross on his door with the message, “Move out or you’ll bitterly regret it.” Alkovic filed suit with ECHR after local authorities and the courts dismissed his complaints. He and his family moved out of their apartment in 2010 and were residing in Belgium at the time of the ECHR decision. The court concluded that Alkovic and his family experienced ethnically and religiously motivated attacks, such as death threats, religious slurs, and damage to their property. The ECHR concluded there had been violations of the European Convention on Human Rights and awarded Alkovic 6,000 euros ($7,200) in damages and 5,000 euros ($6,000) for expenses.

The MHMR continued to provide funding to some religious groups, which they could use to maintain religious shrines, for education or cultural projects, or to pay for social and medical insurance for clergy. Both registered and unregistered religious communities remained eligible to apply for this funding. For the first nine months of the year, the MOC received 49,015 euros ($58,800), the ICM 52,888 euros ($63,500), the SOC 30,183 euros ($36,200), the Jewish community 10,000 euros ($12,000), and the Catholic Church 4,000 euros ($4,800). Recognized religious communities also continued to receive in-kind assistance, such as property on which to build houses of worship, from other government ministries and from local governments.

The government continued its policy of not providing restitution of religious properties expropriated by the former communist Yugoslav government. Government officials said the draft law on religious communities would address restitution issues.

In October the ICM issued a statement criticizing the replacement of a cross at the top of the clock tower in Podgorica, a 17th century Ottoman landmark. Authorities had removed the cross for repairs and then reinstalled it. The ICM statement said, “Placing a cross on a monument of Islamic architecture of a civic character… is a serious attack on the contemporary concept of a civic and multireligious society.”

Disputes over the ownership of 750 Orthodox sites continued between the SOC and MOC. Each group continued to state it was the “true” Orthodox Church in the country and celebrated Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, and Easter at separate locations. Police continued to provide protection around churches for events conducted by both groups. On January 6, SOC and MOC priests and followers again organized parallel, traditional Yule log lightings for Orthodox Christmas Eve: the SOC in Podgorica and the MOC in Cetinje. According to the media, the lightings were peaceful, and no incidents occurred.

On August 19, for the eighth year in a row, police, citing concerns over potential clashes, banned members of both the MOC and SOC from celebrating the transfiguration of Christ at the Church of Christ the Transfiguration at Ivanova Korita near the historical capital of Cetinje.

The Basic Prosecutor’s Office in Kotor pressed misdemeanor charges against MOC Metropolitan Mihailo for an incident in 2015 in which he allegedly slapped an SOC supporter who had spit on him while blocking his entrance into city buildings where he was supposed to participate in a public discussion on the draft law on freedom of religion. The case was pending at the Budva Misdemeanor Court as of year’s end.

A survey published in March and carried out by the Council of Europe and the Office of the Ombudsperson, as part of the council’s “Support to the National Institutions in Preventing Discrimination in Montenegro” project, found increases in perceptions of religious discrimination since the previous study (2015) across all five areas surveyed (employment, education, health care, public services, and culture). Perceptions of discrimination based on religion were highest in relation to employment, where 45.7 percent of respondents reported experiencing religious discrimination, up from 38 percent in 2015. According to the survey, perception of discrimination were highest by a significant margin among SOC members, followed by Catholics, those with no religious affiliation, and Muslims.

The Jewish Community started building a new synagogue in Podgorica in December. In the fall, the Jewish community also welcomed its first resident rabbi.

The Ambassador and other embassy officers continued to meet with government officials responsible for religious issues at the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights and at local mayoral and municipal offices throughout the country to discuss relations between the government and religious groups.

On March 21, the Ambassador met with Catholic Bishop Ilija Janjic in Kotor to discuss interreligious relations and the status of the Catholic Church in the country. The Ambassador also met with the President of the Jewish community, Jasa Alfandari, to discuss its status. On November 7, the Ambassador visited the Christian Adventist Church in Podgorica to discuss the church’s relations with other religious communities and the government. On November 9, the Ambassador met with SOC Metropolitan of Montenegro and the Littoral Amfilohije and discussed his views on religious issues in the country. On the same day, the Ambassador met with the newly appointed rabbi of the Jewish community. The Ambassador also met with representatives of Muslim communities in Podgorica, Bijelo Polje, Rozaje, Pljevlja and other towns to discuss the issues they faced, including the potential rise of religious extremism.

In April the embassy hosted the visit of a prominent, U.S.-based Muslim scholar and lecturer on Christian, Jewish, and Muslim relations. He spoke on diversity and interfaith dialogue to groups in Rozaje, Pljevlja, Bar, Ulcinj, and Podgorica. In Tuzi, he spoke to madrassa students about youth and conflict resolution in Islam and the challenges for youth in a more radicalized world.

On June 1, the Ambassador hosted an iftar at a madrassa in Tuzi for representatives of the religious, political, cultural, and business communities and civil society, in which participants engaged in discussions on interfaith tolerance and religious moderation.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 34.0 million (July 2017 estimate) and that more than 99 percent of the population is Sunni Muslim. Less than 0.1 percent of the population is Shia Muslim’ according to U.S. government estimates. Groups together constituting less than 1 percent of the population include Christians, Jews, and Bahais.

According to Jewish community leaders, there are an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 Jews, approximately 2,500 of whom reside in Casablanca. The Rabat and Marrakech Jewish communities each have approximately 75 members. Christian leaders estimate there are between 2,000 and 6,000 Christian citizens distributed throughout the country, although some leaders state there may be as many as 50,000. Shia Muslim leaders estimate there are tens of thousands of Shia citizens, with the largest proportion in the north. In addition, there are an estimated 1,000 to 2,000 foreign-resident Shia from Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Leaders of the Ahmadi Muslim community estimate their numbers at 600. Leaders of the Bahai community estimate there are 350-400 members throughout the country.

Foreign-resident Christian leaders estimate the foreign-resident Christian population numbers at least 30,000 Roman Catholics and 10,000 Protestants, many of whom are lifelong residents of the country whose families have resided and worked there for generations but do not hold Moroccan citizenship. There is a small foreign-resident Russian Orthodox community in Rabat and a small foreign-resident Greek Orthodox community in Casablanca. Most foreign-resident Christians live in the Casablanca, Tangier, and Rabat urban areas, but small numbers of foreign Christians are present throughout the country. Many are migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.

Legal Framework

According to the constitution, the country is a Muslim state, with full sovereignty, and Islam is the religion of the state. The constitution guarantees freedom of thought, expression, and assembly, and says the state guarantees to every individual the freedom to practice his religious affairs. The constitution states the king holds the Islamic title of commander of the faithful, is the protector of Islam, and is the guarantor of the freedom to practice religious affairs in the country. The constitution prohibits the enactment of laws or constitutional amendments infringing upon its provisions relating to Islam, and also recognizes the Jewish community as an integral component of society. According to the constitution, political parties may not be based on religion and may not seek to attack or denigrate Islam as one of their objectives.

The constitution and the law governing the media prohibit any individual, including members of parliament normally immune from arrest, from criticizing Islam on public platforms, such as print or online media, or in public speeches. Such expressions are punishable by imprisonment for two years and a fine of 200,000 dirhams ($21,400).

The law penalizes anyone who “employs enticements to undermine the faith” or convert a Muslim to another faith, and provides punishments of six months to three years’ imprisonment and a fine of 200 to 500 dirhams ($21 to $53). It also provides the right to a court trial for anyone accused of such an offense. Voluntary conversion is not a crime under the law. The law permits the government to expel summarily any noncitizen resident it determines to be “a threat to public order,” and the government has used this clause to expel foreigners suspected of proselytizing.

By law, impeding or preventing one or more persons from worshipping or from attending worship services of any religion is punishable by six months to three years’ imprisonment and a fine of 200 to 500 dirhams ($21 to $53). The penal code states any person known to be Muslim who breaks the fast in public during the month of Ramadan without an exception granted by religious authorities is liable to punishment of six months in prison and a fine of 200 to 500 dirhams ($21 to $53). It is at an owner’s discretion whether to keep a restaurant open or not during Ramadan.

The High Authority for Audiovisual Communications established by the constitution requires all eight public television stations to dedicate 5 percent of their airtime to Islamic religious content and broadcast the Islamic call to prayer five times daily.

Sunni Muslims and Jews are the only religious groups recognized in the constitution as native to the country; other faiths are viewed as foreign. A separate set of laws and special courts govern personal status matters for Jews, including functions such as marriage, inheritance, and other personal status matters. Rabbinical authorities, who are also court officials, administer Jewish family courts. Muslim judges trained in the country’s Maliki-Ashari Sunni interpretation of the relevant aspects of sharia administer the courts for personal status matters for all other religious groups. According to the law, a Muslim man may marry a Christian or Jewish woman; a Muslim woman may not marry a man of another religion unless he converts to Islam. Non-Muslims must formally convert to Islam and be permanent residents before they can become guardians of abandoned or orphaned children. Guardianship entails the caretaking of a child, which may last until the child reaches 18, but does not allow changing the child’s name or inheritance rights, and requires maintaining the child’s birth religion, according to orphanage directors.

Legal provisions outlined in the general tax code provide tax benefits, land and building grants, subsidies, and customs exemptions for imports necessary for the religious activities of recognized religious groups (Sunni Muslims and Jews) and religious groups registered as associations (some foreign Christian churches). The law does not require religious groups to register to worship privately, but to conduct business on behalf of the group or to hold public gatherings, a nonrecognized religious group must register as an association. Associations must register with local Ministry of Interior (MOI) officials in the jurisdiction of the association’s headquarters in order to conduct financial transactions, have bank accounts, rent property, and address the government in the name of the group. An individual representative of a religious group that is neither recognized nor registered as an association may be held liable for any of the group’s public gatherings, transactions, bank accounts, property rentals, and/or petitions to the government. The registration application must contain the name and purpose of the association; the name, nationality, age, profession, and residential address of each founder; and the address of the association’s headquarters. The constitution guarantees civil society associations and nongovernmental organizations the right to organize themselves and exercise their activities freely within the scope of the constitution. The law on associations prohibits organizations that pursue activities the government regards as “illegal, contrary to good morals, or aimed at undermining the Islamic religion, the integrity of the national territory, or the monarchical regime, or which call for discrimination.”

Many foreign-resident Christian churches are registered as associations. Registered foreign-resident churches include the Roman Catholic, Russian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Protestant, and Anglican Churches, which maintain different forms of official status. The Russian Orthodox and Anglican Churches are registered as branches of international associations through the Russian and United Kingdom embassies, respectively. The Protestant and Catholic Churches, whose existence as foreign-resident churches predates the country’s independence in 1956, maintain a special status recognized by the government since independence.

By law, all publicly funded educational institutions must teach Sunni Islam in accordance with the teachings and traditions of the Maliki-Ashari school of Islamic jurisprudence. Foreign-run and privately funded schools have the choice of teaching Sunni Islam or of not including religious instruction within the school’s curriculum. Private Jewish schools are able to teach Judaism.

According to the constitution, only the High Council of Ulema, a group headed and appointed by the king with representatives from all regions of the country, is authorized to issue fatwas, which become legally binding only through endorsement by the king in a royal decree and subsequent confirmation by parliamentary legislation . If the king or parliament decline to ratify a decision of the Ulema, the decision remains nonbinding and unenforced.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary Paragraph: The government at times reportedly detained and questioned Christian citizens about their beliefs, some of whom reported authorities pressured converts to renounce their faith. In May Spanish media reported the minister of endowments and Islamic affairs used the term “virus” when referring to Christians and Shia Muslims in the country. On at least two occasions during the year, the government expelled foreign individuals accused of proselytism as “a threat to public order,” rather than prosecuting them under provisions of the law that prohibit “undermining the faith of a Muslim.” The government monitored, and in some cases restricted, religious activities of non-Sunni Muslims and non-Muslims. Some religious minorities, such as the Bahai community, engaged in religious practice without formal registration. In October media reported that authorities prevented the Bahai community from publicly celebrating the bicentennial of the birth of the faith’s founder, cancelling community leaders’ reservations of banquet facilities in Meknes and Tangier. The government continued to restrict distribution of non-Islamic religious materials as well as some Islamic materials it deemed inconsistent with the Maliki-Ashari school of Sunni Islam. In January the MOI banned the sale, manufacture, and import of the burqa, according to press reports, but did not ban the wearing of the garment. The government cited security reasons for its decision. The government introduced new religious textbooks following a review by the MEIA and the Ministry of Education (MOE) to remove extremist or intolerant references and promote moderation and tolerance. The MEIA continued to guide and monitor the content of sermons in mosques, Islamic religious education, and the dissemination of Islamic religious material by the broadcast media, actions it said were intended to combat violent extremism.

In July police sentenced prominent Shia leader Abdou El Chakrani to one year in prison for financial improprieties following his May 2016 arrest. Other Shia leaders said Chakrani was targeted for his religious beliefs and his attempt to register an association affiliated with known Shia leaders called Progressive Messengers. Authorities rejected the application in 2016. According to representatives of the group, the group’s goal was to defend the rights of religious minorities and to support religious, ethnic, and cultural diversity, as well as religious freedom.

On at least two occasions during the year, the government expelled foreign individuals accused of proselytism as “a threat to public order,” rather than prosecuting them under criminal law (for “undermining the faith of a Muslim”). In September authorities expelled two Dutch citizens following complaints from local citizens the couple were distributing Christian religious materials. The court ordered police from the Royal Gendarmerie to investigate. Residents informed police the two had encouraged conversions to Christianity, and police found Bibles and other Christian religious material in the home where they were staying. Upon receiving results of the Gendarmerie’s investigation, the court ordered the deportation of the two individuals under a section of law that permits the deportation of foreigners whom it deems to be a “threat to public order.”

The government allowed the operation of registered foreign-resident churches, but previously has refused requests by Shia Muslim groups to register as associations, which religious leaders and legal scholars said prevented those groups from legally gathering for religious ceremonies in public. There were no known Shia mosques. Shia representatives reported they had not attempted to register during the year.

Groups of Christian and Bahai citizens also reported they had not attempted to register with authorities, believing their requests would be denied. Nonregistered religious groups received varying treatment by authorities. Some said they had been able to practice their religion, while others reported authorities shut down their gatherings or prevented them from occurring. A number of religious groups reported they cooperated with authorities and occasionally informed them of planned large gatherings, for which authorities sometimes provided security.

In October, according to media reports, authorities prevented members of the Bahai community from publicly celebrating the bicentennial of the birth of the faith’s founder by canceling community leaders’ reservations of banquet facilities in Meknes and Tangier. The MOI stated that the group was not registered as an association and therefore did not have the legal authority to organize public gatherings.

Christian and Shia Muslim citizens continued to state fears of government harassment were one of the reasons they refrained from public worship and instead met discreetly in members’ homes. Foreign-resident Christian church officials reported Christian citizens rarely attended their churches, and the officials did not encourage them to do so, in order to avoid official accusations of proselytizing. Some Christian citizens reported authorities pressured Christian converts to renounce their faith by informing the converts’ friends, relatives, and employers of the individuals’ conversion. Christian citizens stated authorities made phone or house calls several times a year to demonstrate they had lists of members of Christian networks and monitored Christian activities. Foreigners attended religious services without restriction at places of worship belonging to officially recognized churches.

In May Spanish media reported the minister of endowments and Islamic affairs used the term “virus” when referring to Christians and Shia in the country. In a follow-up explanation, the minister explained he was using a medical metaphor to explain that the people of the country are “immunized” and resilient because of Sunni Islam, and that he did not mean to insinuate any religious practice or belief was a virus. He went on to say, “The dogma does not bother us. Only the existence of an eventual political agenda or political goals is dangerous.”

In January the MOI banned the sale, production, and import of the burqa, according to press reports. The government cited security reasons for its decision. The ban did not prevent individuals from wearing burqas or making them at home for individual use.

The MEIA remained the principal government institution responsible for shaping the country’s religious sphere and promoting its interpretation of Sunni Islam. The MEIA continued to provide government-required training and direction to imams and to shape the content of Friday mosque sermons by providing approved topics. It also monitored Quranic schools to prevent what the ministry considered to be inflammatory or extremist rhetoric and to ensure teaching followed approved doctrine. The government required mosques to close to the public shortly after daily prayer times to prevent use of the premises for what it termed unauthorized activity, such as gatherings intended to promote extremism. The construction of new mosques, including those constructed using private funds, required authorization from the MEIA. Authorization of the MOI was a requirement for the renovation or construction of churches. The MEIA employed more than 500 chief imams and more than 200 female Muslim spiritual guides (murshidat) in mosques or religious institutions throughout the country. The female guides taught religious subjects and provided counsel on a variety of matters, including women’s legal rights and family planning.

The government introduced new religious textbooks following a review by the MEIA and the MOE to promote moderation and tolerance. Modifications to the textbooks remained in progress. Jewish and Christian citizens stated elementary and high school curricula did not include mention of the historical legacy and current presence of their groups in the country. The government continued to fund the study of Jewish culture and heritage at universities. At the University of Rabat, Hebrew and comparative religion were course offerings in the Department of Islamic Studies. In September the minister of education announced that classes in the country’s schools would be suspended on Fridays from noon until 3:00 p.m. to allow teachers and students to attend Friday prayer.

The government continued to restrict the distribution of non-Islamic religious materials, as well as some Islamic materials it deemed inconsistent with the Maliki-Ashari school of Sunni Islam. Its policy remained to control the sale of all books, videotapes, and DVDs it considered extremist. The government permitted the display and sale of Bibles in French, English, and Spanish. A limited number of Arabic translations of the Bible was available for sale in a few bookshops for use in university religion courses. Authorities confiscated Bibles they believed were intended for use in proselytizing.

The government continued to disseminate information about Islam over dedicated state-funded television and radio channels. Television channel Assadissa (Sixth) programming was strictly religious, consisting primarily of Quran and hadith (authoritative sayings and deeds ascribed to the Prophet Muhammad) readings and exegesis, highlighting the government’s interpretation of Islam.

According to observers, the government tolerated social and charitable activities consistent with its view of Sunni Islam. For example, the Unity and Reform Movement, which shares some leadership with the ruling Party of Justice and Development, continued to operate without restriction, according to media reports. The Unity and Reform Movement is the country’s largest registered Islamic social organization. The Justice and Charity Organization (JCO), a Sunni Islamist social movement that rejects the king’s spiritual authority, remained banned but largely tolerated. It is the largest social movement in the country despite being unregistered. The JCO continued to release press statements, hold conferences, manage internet sites, and participate in political demonstrations, including organizing in July the largest demonstration since the 2011 Arab Spring. The government occasionally prevented the organization from meeting and restricted public distribution of JCO’s published materials.

The monarchy continued to support the restoration of synagogues and Jewish cemeteries throughout the country, efforts it stated were necessary to preserve the country’s religious and cultural heritage and to serve as a symbol of tolerance. In May the Mohammadia League of Scholars signed an agreement with the Vatican Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue to create a joint committee to promote dialogue between Muslims and Christians. According to media reports, the committee planned to hold a symposium every two years, alternating between Rabat and Rome, and addressing hate speech, extremism and violence, and the exploitation of religion for political ends. In April and May the National Council for Human Rights (CNDH), the publicly funded national human rights institution independent of the elected government, met with some Christian citizens who requested greater respect for the rights of minority religions. Media reports of the meetings said the Christians stated they did not fear the government but rather extremists. In October Prince Moulay Rachid, brother of King Mohammed VI, met with the director and representatives of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum to discuss increased cooperation within the framework of the museum’s 2007 archival exchange agreement with the national library.

At a Catholic Mass in March in honor of the fourth anniversary of the pontificate of Pope Francis, the minister of endowments and Islamic affairs addressed the diplomatic corps and government officials, conveying a message from the king.

Representatives of minority religious groups, especially Christian, Shia Muslim, and Bahai citizens, said fear of societal harassment, including ostracism by converts’ families, social ridicule, employment discrimination, and potential violence against them by “extremists,” were the main reasons leading them to practice their faiths discreetly.

In November citizen members of Christian, Shia, and Bahai communities held a public conference to call for greater legal protections for religious minorities. The conference organizers faced challenges in securing a venue willing to host the meeting and backlash from members of the ruling Party of Justice and Development (PJD), but were able to hold the conference without interference from the government.

Christian citizens reported social pressure to convert to Islam or renounce their Christian faith from non-Christian family and friends. Their leaders said young Christians who still lived with their Muslim families did not reveal their faith to them because they believed they might be expelled from their homes unless they renounced Christianity. They also reported the government did not respond to complaints about frequent societal harassment.

In the weeks following media reports of the meetings between Christian citizens and the CNDH, in online comments and editorials, reactions from the public were largely negative, with some calling the group “apostates” and others suggesting that Muslims converting to Christianity had strengthened ISIS.

In June during Ramadan, a group of youths attacked a European teenager of Moroccan descent for drinking juice in public during fasting hours. The girl’s family reportedly explained that she, like her European father, was Christian and not Muslim, and therefore not fasting.

Members of the Bahai Faith said they were open about their faith with family, friends, and neighbors, but feared extremist elements in society would try to do them harm, leading them to ask local police for protection at their gatherings.

Shia Muslims said in some areas, particularly in large cities in the north, they did not hide their faith from family, friends, or neighbors, but that many avoided disclosing their religious affiliation in areas where their numbers were smaller.

Jewish citizens said they lived and attended services at synagogues in safety. They said they were able to visit religious sites regularly and to hold annual commemorations.

The media continued to report women had difficulty finding employment, in the private sector and with the army and police, if they wore a hijab or other head covering. When they did obtain employment, women reported employers either encouraged or required them to remove their headscarves during working hours.

Muslim citizens continued to study at private Christian and private Jewish schools, reportedly primarily because these schools maintained a reputation for offering superior education. According to school administrators, Muslim students constituted a significant portion of the students at Jewish schools in Casablanca.

The U.S. Charge d’Affaires, other embassy and consulate general officers, and visiting U.S. government officials met with senior government officials, including the minister of interior and the minister of endowments and Islamic affairs, to promote religious freedom and tolerance, including the rights of minority communities. In March, the Charge attended a Catholic Mass in Rabat Cathedral to honor Pope Francis’ fourth anniversary as pope. In May the Charge attended a ceremony at the historic St. John’s Anglican Church in Casablanca with government officials, launching an expansion and renovation project that was partially funded by the king. In October embassy officials met with Jewish groups organizing a conference on religious tolerance and the history of the country’s Jewish community. Also in October a delegation from the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and consulate officials met with the country’s leaders to discuss continuing collaboration between the museum and the country’s National Library to promote religious tolerance and awareness. Museum officials extended an invitation to the king to attend a special ceremony at the museum to commemorate his late grandfather for his “courageous protection of Jews facing Vichy France persecution during World War II.” In November the Charge, the Consul General in Casablanca, and other embassy officials highlighting the history of religious tolerance during World War II. The program included official visits to the Anglican Church of Casablanca and to a Jewish synagogue damaged during the war and recently refurbished with a new museum exhibition with funding from the king. Embassy officers met regularly with Muslim religious scholars to discuss religious tolerance and education reform, and with leaders of the Jewish community, Christian foreign residents, and leaders of unregistered Christian, Shia, and Bahai groups, as well as others, to discuss issues facing the various groups. Embassy and consulate officers also regularly met with Jewish groups visiting Morocco to explore the country’s Jewish history. The embassy fostered programs designed to highlight religious tolerance and the need to fight radicalization and counter violent extremism.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 26.6 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the U.S. government, 28 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 18 percent Muslim (mostly Sunni), 15 percent Zionist Christian, 12 percent Protestant, and 7 percent other religious groups, including the Bahai Faith, Judaism, and Hinduism. Approximately 18 percent do not profess any religion or belief. According to Christian and Muslim religious leaders, a significant portion of the population adheres to syncretic indigenous religious beliefs, characterized by a combination of African traditional practices and aspects of either Christianity or Islam, a category not included in government estimates. Muslim leaders state their community accounts for 25-30 percent of the total population, a statistic frequently reported in the press.

The country conducted a census during the year that includes questions on religious affiliation. As of the end of the year, the full census was not released.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the country as a secular state. It prohibits religious discrimination, provides for the right of citizens to practice or not practice a religion, and stipulates that no individuals may be deprived of their rights because of religious faith or practice. Political parties are constitutionally prohibited from using names or symbols associated with religious groups. The constitution protects places of worship and the right of religious groups to organize, worship, and pursue their religious objectives freely and to acquire assets in pursuit of those objectives. It recognizes the right of conscientious objection to military service for religious reasons. These and other rights may temporarily be suspended or restricted only in the event of a declaration of a state of war, siege, or emergency, in accordance with the terms of the constitution.

The law requires all nongovernmental organizations to register with the Ministry of Justice, Constitutional, and Religious Affairs (MOJ). Under the law, “religious organizations” are charities or humanitarian organizations, whereas “religious groups” refer to particular denominations. Religious groups register at the denominational level or congregational level if they are unaffiliated. Religious groups and organizations register by submitting an application, providing identity documents of the local leaders, and submitting documentation of declared ties to any international religious group or organization. There are no penalties for failure to register; however, religious groups and organizations must show evidence of registration to open bank accounts, file for exemption of customs duties for imported goods, or submit visa applications for visiting foreign members.

An accord between the national government and the Holy See governs the Catholic Church’s rights and responsibilities in the country. The agreement recognizes the Catholic Church as a “legal personality” and recognizes the Church’s exclusive right “to regulate ecclesiastical life and to nominate people for ecclesiastical posts.” The agreement requires Catholic Church representatives to register with the government to benefit from the Church’s status. The accord also gives the Catholic Church the exclusive right to create, modify, or eliminate ecclesiastical boundaries; however, it stipulates that ecclesiastical territories must report to a Church authority in the country.

The law permits religious organizations to own and operate schools. The law forbids religious instruction in public schools.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On June 14, police arrested three citizens in Cabo Delgado based on their engagement in Islamic extremist activities, including distributing materials that rejected the authority of secular government authorities, advocated against modern education, and called for discrimination against women. Those arrested described themselves as followers of “Al-Shabab”; however, according to observers any direct links were unlikely. Islamic religious leaders publicly distanced themselves from these actions, stating they deemed the beliefs expressed to be inconsistent with Islam.

According to reports, on October 5, 30-50 armed persons attacked police and district government facilities in Mocimboa da Praia, in Cabo Delgado. The group was referred to locally as “Al-Shabab” or “Ahl-el-Sunnah.” Observers said that direct ties to foreign terrorist organizations were unlikely. Reports indicated that at least two police officers and significantly more attackers were killed. Local observers reported that security forces significantly increased their presence in the area and that outwardly observant Muslims feared being targeted for harassment as part of the ensuing investigation and security operation. Local Islamic religious leaders issued a formal statement condemning the attacks in Mocimboa da Praia, deeming such violent activities as inconsistent with Islam.

According to international reports, on November 20, the government ordered the closure of three mosques in Pemba after the deadly attacks in October. Provincial Official Alvaro Goncalves stated that the closures “only affect mosques that had some contact with the group involved in the events in Mocimboa da Praia.”

The MOJ registered 22 new religious groups and seven new religious organizations between January and September. There were a total of 881 religious groups and 226 religious organizations registered. There were no reports of difficulty with religious groups registering.

A Catholic Church representative said provincial authorities in certain provinces violated the 2012 accord with the Holy See by requiring local dioceses to register with local authorities separately or present some form of proof of previous registration. The Catholic Church continued to pursue the return of property the government seized following independence. There was no movement in the return of the remaining properties; however, negotiations continued at year’s end.

The Greek Orthodox Church reported no progress in its efforts to obtain the return of the Ateneu (Athenaeum), a church property in central Maputo seized by the government after independence and renamed the Palacio dos Casamentos (Wedding Palace).

In April the national director of the Tax Authority announced that organizations affiliated with religious denominations conducting activities generating profits, such as schools and day-care facilities, would be subject to taxation. Until April these activities had been tax exempt, if a religious order applied for a waiver.

In July President Filipe Nyusi questioned the line between religion and politics during a visit to the Ministry of Justice, Constitutional, and Religious Affairs, saying, “I would not like the religion of my country to be confused with politics… But if the new way of doing religion is this, we will have difficulties, as a country, reaching a conclusion.” Journalists said the remarks were intended to send a message to churches that had taken positions on political issues and were prompted by the Catholic bishops’ stand on the country’s “hidden” debt, referring to a debt scandal involving large, undeclared loans to state-owned companies. Some diplomatic observers stated they believed the president might have also had in mind the recent challenges in the north of the country, since his comments followed shortly after the arrest of the three citizens engaged in what the government stated were Islamic extremist activities, including a call to reject of the authority of secular government authorities.

The fatal 2016 shooting of Apostolic Faith Mission Pastor Joao Jofrisse during a church service in his home in the central city of Chimoio remained unsolved with no suspects identified.

In February religious leaders at a national seminar on preventing premature marriages condemned the practices of pastors of some religious congregations who encouraged the use of virgin girls as debt payments incurred by their parents, including debts to pastors or to traditional healers for services rendered. Speakers at the seminar highlighted a specific religious congregation in the central province of Zambezia that had a large number of pregnant young girls in the congregation. According to reports, religious leaders from the congregation in Zambezia were involved in the abuse, and the congregation subsequently closed.

The U.S. Ambassador and other embassy officials discussed the importance of religious freedom and the return of seized property with the justice minister and the national director of religious affairs. Through a series of outreach initiatives, the Ambassador and embassy representatives discussed the importance of religious tolerance to promote peace and security with representatives of different religious denominations. These included several iftars during Ramadan attended by members of Islamic civil and religious society. Embassy officers also discussed the status of religious freedom and expressed U.S. government support for this fundamental right with Catholic and Muslim leaders in Tete, Sofala, Nampula, and Zambezia Provinces.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 2.5 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, approximately 97 percent of the population identifies as Christian. According to church statistics and the government’s 2013 Demographic and Health Survey, approximately 50 percent identify as Lutheran and 20 percent as Catholic. Other groups, including Anglican, various Reformed denominations, Adventist, Baptist, Methodist, Pentecostal, evangelicals, charismatics, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), make up the remaining 27 percent of the population that is Christian. The number of Pentecostal and charismatic churches is growing. Some Zionist churches combine Christianity and traditional African beliefs. Muslims, Bahais, Jews, Buddhists, atheists, and other non-Christians together constitute approximately 3 percent of the population and reside primarily in urban areas.

Many members of the Himba and San ethnic groups combine indigenous religious beliefs with Christianity. Muslims are mostly Sunni and are predominantly immigrants from elsewhere in Africa, South Asia, or recent converts.

Legal Framework

The constitution specifies the country is a secular state, prohibits religious discrimination, and provides for freedom of thought, conscience, and belief, as well as the right to enjoy, practice, profess, maintain, and promote any religion. These rights may be subject to “reasonable restrictions” justified by interests such as “the sovereignty and integrity of Namibia, national security, public order, decency, or morality.”

The law allows recognition of any religious group as a voluntary association, without the need to register with the government. Religious groups may also register as nonprofit organizations (an “association without gain”) with the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Both religious groups registered as nonprofit organizations, and religious groups formed as voluntary associations are exempt from paying taxes. A welfare organization may apply to the Department of Inland Revenue to receive tax-exempt status. Once registered as a welfare organization, a religious group may seek to obtain communal land at a reduced rate, which is at the discretion of traditional authorities or town councils, based on whether they believe the organization’s use of the land will benefit the community.

The constitution permits religious groups to establish private schools provided no student is denied admission based on creed. The government school curriculum contains a nonsectarian “religious and moral education” component that includes education on moral principles and human rights and introduces students to a variety of African traditions and religions, as well as world religions such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, the Bahai Faith, and Rastafarianism.

Similar to other foreigners seeking to work in the country, religious workers must obtain an appropriate visa.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government periodically included religious leaders in discussions regarding issues affecting the country and in national events. President Hage Geingob held consultations with leaders from major religious groups in the country, including from various Christian denominations and from the Muslim community, to discuss opportunities for collaboration in fighting poverty.

The Namibian Islamic Judicial Council stated that in contrast to deportations of Muslims in 2016 for working without a work visa, there had been “no persecution” against Muslims on the part of the government during the year.

Echoing problems raised by nonreligious organizations, some religious groups noted they had difficulty in obtaining work visas for foreign coreligionists and religious workers to enter the country to engage in religious activities. According to the groups, however, the government also strictly enforced work visa requirements for nonreligious, nontourist foreign visitors, and they stated they did not believe they were targeted based on religion.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

U.S. embassy representatives met with religious leaders from the Christian, Bahai, and Muslim communities to better understand the country’s religious landscape and any potential problems of discrimination such as difficulties in obtaining visas for religious workers.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 11,000 (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2011 national census, approximately 95 percent of the population is Christian. The Nauru Congregational Church (which includes the Nauru Protestant Church) is the largest Christian group constituting 36 percent of the population, followed by the Roman Catholic Church at 33 percent, the Nauru Independent Assembly of God at 13 percent, and the Nauru Independent Church at 10 percent. Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, Baptists, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) each constitute less than 1 percent of the population. Two percent of the population reported no religious affiliation. Ethnic Chinese residents, estimated to constitute 5 percent of the population, are Confucian, Buddhist, Taoist, Christian, or nonreligious. Additionally as of December 22, approximately 130 asylum seekers and 970 refugees reside in the country, the majority of whom are Muslim.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the freedom of conscience, expression, assembly, and association. These rights may be restricted by any law which is “reasonably required” in the interests of defense or public safety, order, morality, or health.

Under the law, religious groups must register with the government to operate in an official capacity, which includes proselytizing, building houses of worship, holding religious services, and officiating at marriages. A 2014 cabinet memorandum sets out requirements for registration of new religious groups, including having at least 750 enrolled members, land and a building in the country, and leadership by a Nauruan member of the clergy, who must reside in the country. The Catholic Church, the Nauru Congregational Church, the Assemblies of God, the Nauru Independent Church, and the Seventh-day Adventist Church are officially registered.

Religious groups may operate private schools and a number do so. In public schools, the government allows religious groups to have a weekly religious education program with students during school hours, but does not require schools to offer such education. In schools where religious education is provided, students are required to attend the program led by the representative of their respective religious group. Students whose faith is not represented are required to undertake independent study during the class time devoted to religious education.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Although the law requires registration for religious groups to conduct a full range of activities, local religious leaders stated the government required such recognition only if a denomination’s clergy wished to officiate at marriages. On April 6, the Seventh-day Adventist Church, first registered in 2013, opened its first newly constructed church for its 50 members. There were no reports the government discriminated in the registration process, although leaders of churches with smaller congregations continued to express concerns that the 750-member requirement implemented in 2014 was difficult to meet. The registration application for the Baptist Church, which does not have 750 members, remained pending at the end of the year.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

The U.S. Ambassador to Fiji is accredited to the government; as the U.S. government does not maintain an embassy in Nauru. In November embassy officials discussed religious tolerance during several discussions with senior government officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and other national government officials.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 29 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2011 census, the most recent taken, Hindus constitute 81.3 percent of the population, Buddhists 9 percent, Muslims (the vast majority of whom are Sunni) 4.4 percent, and Christians (the vast majority of whom are Protestant) 1.4 percent. Other groups, which together constitute less than 5 percent of the population, include Kirats (an indigenous religion with Hindu influence), animists, adherents of Bon (a Tibetan religious tradition), Jains, Bahais, and Sikhs. According to some Muslim leaders, Muslims constitute at least 5.5 percent of the population, mostly concentrated in the south. According to some Christian groups, Christians constitute 3 to 7 percent of the population. Many individuals adhere to a syncretic faith encompassing elements of Hinduism, Buddhism, and traditional folk practices, according to scholars.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares the country to be a secular state, and defines secularism as “protection of the age-old religion and culture and religious and cultural freedom.” The constitution stipulates every person has the right to profess, practice, and protect his or her religion. While exercising this right, the constitution bans individuals from engaging in any acts “contrary to public health, decency, and morality” or which “disturb the public law and order situation.” It also prohibits persons from converting other persons from one religion to another or disturbing the religion of others, and states violations are punishable by law.

On August 8, the parliament passed a new criminal code, signed into law by the president on October 16, which reduces the punishment for converting – or encouraging the conversion of – another person or for engaging in any act, including the propagating of religion, that undermines the religion, faith, or belief of any caste, ethnic group, or community, from six years to five years’ imprisonment. The law is scheduled to take effect in August 2018. It also stipulates a fine of up to Nepali Rupees (NPR) 50,000 ($490) and subjects foreign nationals convicted of these crimes to deportation. The new criminal code also imposes punishments of up to two years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to NPR 20,000 ($200) for harming the religious sentiment of any caste, ethnic community, or class, either in speech or writing.

The legal code does not provide for registration or official recognition of religious organizations as religious institutions, except for Buddhist monasteries. It is not mandatory for Buddhist monasteries to register with the government, but doing so is a prerequisite for receiving government funding for maintenance of facilities, skills training for monks, and study tours. A monastery development committee under the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development oversees the registration process. Requirements for registration include furnishing a recommendation from a local government body, information about the members of the monastery’s own management committee, a land ownership certificate, and photos of the premises.

Aside from Buddhist monasteries, all religious groups must register as NGOs or nonprofit organizations in order to own land, operate legally as institutions, or gain eligibility for public service-related government grants and partnerships. Religious organizations follow the same registration process as other NGOs and nonprofits, including preparing a constitution and furnishing information on the organization’s objectives, as well as details on its executive committee members. To renew registration, which must be done annually, organizations must submit annual financial audit reports and activity progress reports.

The law prohibits the killing, attempted killing, and instigation of killing of female and male cattle. Violators are subject to 12 years in prison for killing, and six years for attempted killing or instigation.

A 2011 ruling by the Supreme Court requires the government to provide protection for Christian groups carrying out funeral rites in the exercise of their constitutional right to practice their religion, but also states the government is not obligated to provide land grants for this purpose. There is no law specifically addressing the funeral practices of religious groups.

The constitution establishes the government’s authority to “make law to operate and protect a religious place or religious trust and to manage trust property and regulate land management.”

The law does not require religiously affiliated schools to register, but Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim religious schools must register as religious educational institutions with local district education offices (part of the Ministry of Education) and supply information about their funding sources to receive funding at the same levels as nonreligious public/community schools. Religious public/community schools follow the same registration procedure as nonreligious public/community schools. Catholic and Protestant groups must register as NGOs to operate private schools. Christian schools are not able to register as public/community schools and are not eligible for government funding. Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim groups may also register as NGOs to operate private schools, but are not eligible for funding in that case.

The law criminalizes acts of caste‑based discrimination in places of worship. Penalties for violations are three months to three years’ imprisonment, a fine of 1,000 to 25,000 NPR ($10 to $240), or both.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In February the District Police Office in Parbat arrested five individuals for allegedly slaughtering an ox. A sixth accused person remained at large, according to police. The accused – all of whom are Dalit – said they did not kill the ox, and that the animal was dead when they found it. Police held the accused for 25 days during the initial investigation period before bringing the case to court. On March 8, the district court approved the police request for an extension of the period of legal custody and ordered the accused to return to jail pending further investigation. At year’s end, the individuals remained in custody awaiting trial. Dalit rights activists said they believed the accused were targeted because of their social status as Dalits.

According to press reports, the District Police Office in Gorkha arrested four persons in August for slaughtering a cow. At year’s end the accused – three of whom are from the Chepang indigenous community and one from another indigenous Janajati community – remained in detention.

The government did not enforce the ban on converting others, according to Christian groups and legal experts. Christian groups have interpreted this ban as including a prohibition on proselytizing. Human rights lawyers and leaders of religious minorities expressed concern that the constitution’s and new criminal code’s continuation of the ban on conversion could make religious minorities subject to legal prosecution for actions carried out in the normal course of their religious practices, and also vulnerable to persecution for preaching, public displays of faith, and distribution of religious materials. Human rights experts also expressed concern that a provision in the criminal code banning speech or writing harmful to others’ religious sentiments could be misused to settle personal scores or target religious minorities arbitrarily.

On September 22, a high court annulled the conviction of four Christians who had been sentenced in December 2016 to five years in prison and fined 50,000 NPR ($490) for “witchcraft” and “violence.” The group had been praying for a mentally troubled woman and allegedly holding her against her will, although the woman testified that she had not been mistreated or held captive.

According to the Jhapa district attorney’s office, the criminal case against four suspects accused of detonating small homemade explosive devices at three churches in Jhapa District in September 2015 continued. All four suspects were released on bail and remained free while the criminal case was pending. Police continued to search for three additional suspects; there were no additional arrests made as of year’s end.

According to legal experts and leaders of religious minority groups, the constitutional language about protecting the “age-old religion” and the prohibition on conversion were intended by the drafters to mandate the protection of Hinduism. Minority religious leaders said that some politicians’ emphasis on re-establishing the country as a Hindu state continued to negatively affect public perception of Christians and Christianity. (The country was a Hindu monarchy until 2007 when the interim constitution established a secular democracy.)

Throughout the year, political leaders and members of the parliament, including senior members of the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), the country’s fourth largest political party, made speeches calling for the re-establishment of the country as a Hindu state. In April the RPP leadership released its election manifesto, which called for strong legal action to be taken against those accused of killing cows. The party leadership also stated its intention to ban forced, organized, and planned religious conversion achieved by financial rewards or false promises.

In March the Election Commission of Nepal (ECN) rejected the inclusion of a call for a return to a Hindu state in the RPP’s party statute. In response, the RPP launched a series of public protests and introduced a constitutional amendment bill on March 9 demanding the word “secular” in the constitution be replaced with the words “Hindu state with complete religious freedom.” Christian leaders privately stated the RPP-led protests and proposed amendment aimed to influence the ECN to retract its decision on the RPP’s party statue and to gauge broader political support for abandoning secularism. In April the ECN reversed its decision on the RPP’s party statute, and the RPP ended its protests. The RPP never formally brought up the amendment bill for parliamentary discussion due to a perceived lack of support in the parliament, according to some RPP politicians, but Christian leaders expressed concern that support for a return to a Hindu state was gaining momentum.

Some Muslim leaders continued not to accept converts to Islam, saying it would violate the law according to their interpretation. Instead, they continued to recommend that individuals who sought to convert travel to India to do so.

The Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development continued to implement its June 2016 directive to all District Development Committees to deny the registration of any NGO that preaches or promotes religious conversion. Christian groups reported the directive has limited their ability to register and operate as NGOs or nonprofits. Christian groups said District Development Committees continued to occasionally ask organizations to remove religious words from their entity names and advised religious leaders registering organizations to remove their religious titles (e.g. Father, Reverend) from registration documentation to secure registration. Christian leaders expressed fears the new guidelines could potentially limit the establishment of churches, which must be registered as NGOs. Some Christians interpreted the directive as an attempt to push Christian NGOs out of the country.

In March the government led by then-Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal (“Prachanda”) announced it would no longer recognize Christmas as a public holiday. In November the government reversed the decision and reinstated the Christmas holiday for this year, reportedly under pressure from religious minorities. The government had made the same announcement in March 2016, which it stated was part of an effort to reduce the large number of public holidays, but reversed the decision on Christmas Eve under pressure from Christian groups. Although the government said it would continue to provide holiday leave for Christians working in the government, those working in the private sector would not be entitled to the day off as in some past years. Christian groups noted that the government continued to recognize dozens of Hindu holidays and a number of Muslim and Buddhist holidays, and stated they interpreted the decision as a reflection of growing anti-Christian sentiment in the country.

The government placed restrictions on Tibetans’ ability to celebrate the Dalai Lama’s birthday in July. Tibetan community leaders said government authorities generally permitted them to celebrate Buddhist holidays in private ceremonies and conduct other private ceremonies with cultural/religious significance, such as Losar, the Tibetan New Year. Tibetan leaders said they continued to mark certain anniversaries considered politically sensitive, such as Tibetan Uprising Day, with small, quiet prayer ceremonies within Tibetan settlements. Abbots of Buddhist monasteries reported monasteries and their related social welfare projects generally continued to operate without government interference.

On June 3, the local ward office in Budhanilkantha, Kathmandu, evicted the tenants of a house from which they had operated the Protestant Shiloam Tupek church for nine years, giving the tenants three days to vacate the government-owned property. According to Christian leaders, the government had allowed the tenants to use the land for several decades. On June 5, the local ward office destroyed the house, reportedly so the government could construct a public school. Christian leaders demanded the government investigate the incident and provide compensation to the tenants and church management; however, authorities had not investigated or paid compensation by year’s end.

Muslim leaders said Muslims continued to be able to participate in the Hajj. A Central Hajj Committee, made up of representatives of political parties, mosques, and civil society, under the authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs, continued to coordinate and facilitate logistics for the Hajj for all participating Muslims. The government paid for 18 committee members, compared to 10 in 2016, to travel to Saudi Arabia to carry out their work.

Christian leaders said the government-funded Pashupati Area Development Trust continued to prevent Christian burials in a common cemetery behind the Pashupati Hindu Temple in Kathmandu, while allowing burials of individuals from non-Hindu indigenous faiths. According to Christian leaders, the government continued its inconsistent enforcement of the court ruling requiring protection of congregations carrying out burials. Protestant churches continued to report difficulties gaining access to land they had bought six years prior for burials in the Kathmandu Valley in the names of individual church members. They stated local communities continued to oppose burial by groups perceived to be outsiders, but were more open to burials conducted by Christian members of their own communities. As a result, they reported, some Protestants in the Kathmandu Valley continued to travel to the countryside to conduct burials in unpopulated areas.

Catholic leaders reported almost all Catholic parishioners continued to choose cremation due to past difficulties with burials. Many Christian communities outside the Kathmandu Valley said they continued to be able to buy land for cemeteries, conduct burials in public forests, or use land belonging to indigenous communities for burials. They also said they continued to be able to use public land for this purpose.

Muslim groups stated individuals in the Kathmandu Valley continued to be able to buy land for cemeteries, but local Hindus sometimes refused to sell them land. In the southern Terai region, which is home to many Muslim-majority communities, Muslim groups said they had not encountered such problems.

According to Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim groups, the government continued to permit them to establish and operate their own community schools. The government provided the same level of funding for registered religious schools as for public schools, but private Christian schools continued not to receive government funding. Although religious education is not part of the curriculum in public schools, some public schools displayed a statue of Saraswati, the Hindu goddess of learning, on their grounds.

According to the Department of Education, which is the executive office within the Ministry of Education, 879 madrassahs were registered with district education offices, an increase from 765 from the previous year. The number of gumbas (Buddhist centers of learning) registered with the Department of Education rose from 82 in 2016 to 110 during the year. The Department had 97 gurukhuls (Hindu centers of learning) registered during the year, up from 83 in the previous year.

Some Muslim leaders stated as many as 2,500 to 3,000 madrassahs continued to be unregistered. Some Muslim leaders expressed concern that some unregistered madrassahs are promoting the spread of less tolerant interpretations of Islam. According to religious leaders, a large number of madrassahs as well as Buddhist and Hindu schools continue to be unregistered because school operators hope to avoid government auditing and the Department of Education’s established curriculum. They said some school operators also wished to avoid the registration process, which they characterized as cumbersome.

Many Christian leaders said missionary hospitals, welfare organizations, and schools continued to operate without government interference, although others reported increased scrutiny when registering as NGOs. They said the government usually did not expel foreign workers for proselytizing, but missionaries reported they attempted to keep their activities discreet. Many foreign Christian organizations had direct ties to local churches and continued to sponsor clergy for religious training abroad.

There were several reports of attacks on religious minorities. On April 16, an unidentified individual shot Santosh Khadka, an employee of the FNCN, while he was driving home from work in Lalitpur in the Kathmandu Valley. The victim survived. FNCN leaders concluded the attack was religiously motivated because it occurred on Easter Sunday, and the organization had received phone calls warning its staff to stop converting persons. The FNCN and other Christian representatives publicly called on the government to hold the perpetrators accountable and provide adequate security for the country’s Christian population. At year’s end, police continued to investigate the case but had not named any suspects or determined a motive for the attack. Christians said the incident had increased their fears of further attacks.

On April 18, arsonists attacked the Assumption Roman Catholic Cathedral, also in Lalitpur. According to church leaders who reviewed CCTV footage of the attack, several persons entered the church compound carrying containers of gasoline, which they used to set two motorcycles and a sports utility vehicle on fire. Although the building, which housed several priests, sustained significant damage, there were no injuries. Damage to windows and doors indicated the perpetrators – who left a note condemning religious conversion – also attempted to break into the church, but were unsuccessful. Christian leaders stated their belief that the attack, when coupled with the shooting of the FNCN employee, represented an effort to foment panic among the Christian community. They also expressed concern about police willingness to investigate the case thoroughly.

Hindus and Muslims clashed on October 1 in Banke District and on October 2 in Bardiya District, injuring more than 30 persons.

Police in Banke District filed charges in December 2016 against 28 individuals accused of participating in Hindu-Muslim clashes that led to the killing of two Muslims earlier that month. Twenty-five who were apprehended and arrested were subsequently released over the course of several months on bail of between 25,000 and 50,000 NPR ($240 and $490), pending their trial in the district court, which had not started as of the end of the year. Three other accused individuals remained at large. In October police arrested one of the accused, and the court released the individual on bail shortly thereafter. The remaining two fugitives remained at large. Muslim leaders expressed disappointment in the court’s decision to grant what they stated was a low amount of bail for murder charges. Separately, the District Administration Office granted one million NPR ($9,800) to each of the families of the deceased.

Minority religious leaders expressed concern about the rise of Hindu nationalism and its implications for religious harmony.

Some leaders of religious minority groups stated some converts to other religions, including Hindus who had converted to Christianity, remained willing and able to state publicly their new religious affiliation. Christian leaders also reported that a number of converts to Christianity tried to conceal their faith from their families and local communities, mainly in areas outside of Kathmandu.

According to NGOs, Hindu priests and local high-caste residents continued to prevent Dalits, as members of a lower caste, from entering temples, and sometimes prevented them from performing religious rites and participating in religious festivals. In June media reported an attack on a Dalit for entering a temple in Saptari District. The victim, who suffered a broken arm among other injuries, stated police were slow to investigate the incident and take action against the perpetrators. According to police, the case was ongoing in the district court at year’s end.

Throughout the year, the U.S. Ambassador, embassy officers, and other government representatives expressed concerns to senior government officials and political leaders over restrictions on freedom of religion, including the rights to convert and to proselytize, posed by provisions in the constitution and the new criminal code. They continued to highlight the ways in which anticonversion laws could be used to arbitrarily restrict the right to the freedoms of religion and expression. Embassy officers and visiting senior U.S. government officials also raised concerns with government officials about the government’s restrictions on Tibetan Buddhists conducting peaceful religious activities.

Following the shooting of Santosh Khadka of the FNCN and the arson attack on the Assumption Roman Catholic Cathedral, embassy officers met with police to urge them to conduct thorough investigations of both cases. Embassy officers also met with Khadka, leaders from the Assumption Church, and representatives of religious minorities in Kathmandu and throughout the country to discuss challenges they faced in the practice of their religion. Embassy officers and other U.S. government representatives discussed with civil society and religious groups their concerns about access to burial grounds, public celebration of religious holidays, the prohibition against conversion, and verbal attacks on Christian communities by Hindu politicians.

Embassy officers continued to address religious diversity and tolerance in speaking engagements with the general public. The embassy also continued to provide financial assistance for the preservation and restoration of religious sites, including three Buddhist chhortens and several Hindu temples. The embassy also continued to promote religious tolerance in a program for underprivileged youth, including Muslims and Tibetan refugees, in Kathmandu.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 17.1 million (July 2017 estimate). In a 2014 survey by the government’s Statistics Netherlands, 49 percent of the population declared no church affiliation, 24 percent self-identified as Roman Catholic, 7 percent as Reformed, 6 percent as Calvinist, 3 percent as other Protestant denominations, 5 percent as Muslim, and 6 percent as “other,” including Hindu, Jewish, Buddhist, and Bahai.

Most Muslims live in urban areas and are of Turkish, Moroccan, or Surinamese background. The Muslim population also includes recent immigrants and asylum seekers from other countries, including Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tel Aviv University’s Stephen Roth Institute, a research institute, and the Council of Europe estimate the Jewish population at approximately 30,000. A 2008 report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy identified a Hindu population of between 100,000 and 215,000, of whom approximately 85 percent are of Surinamese descent and 10 percent of Indian descent. The Buddhist community has approximately 17,000 members, according to a 2007 report by the governmental Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP), the latest estimate available.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits discrimination on religious grounds and provides for the freedom of individuals to profess their religion or belief, individually or in community with others, without affecting their responsibilities under the law. The constitution allows the government to restrict the exercise of religious beliefs outside of buildings or enclosed spaces to protect health, for traffic safety, or to prevent disorder.

The law makes it a crime to engage in public speech that incites religious hatred, and provides a penalty of imprisonment for up to two years, a fine of up to 8,100 euros ($9,700), or both. To qualify as hate speech, the statements must be directed at a group of people; the law does not consider statements targeted at a philosophy or religion, such as “Islam” as opposed to “Muslims,” as criminal hate speech.

The law permits employees to refuse to work on Sundays for religious reasons, but employers may deny employees such an exception depending on the nature of the work, such as employment in the health sector. Members of religious communities for whom the Sabbath is not Sunday may request similar exemptions.

The law does not require religious groups to register with the government. If the tax authorities determine the groups meet specific criteria, they grant the groups exemptions from all taxes, including income, value added, and property taxes. Under the tax law, institutions must be “of a philosophical or religious nature,” contribute to the general welfare of society, and be nonprofit and nonviolent to qualify for tax exemptions.

A number of national institutions, including the Council of State and the NIHR, are responsible for reviewing complaints of religious discrimination. Additionally, the NIHR advises the government on issues involving religious discrimination.

Local governments appoint antidiscrimination boards that work independently under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. These local boards provide information on how to report complaints and mediate disputes, including those pertaining to discrimination based on religion. Acceptance of mediation decisions by parties involved in disputes is voluntary.

The government provides funding to religious schools, other religious educational institutions, and religious health-care facilities. To qualify for funding, institutions have to meet government educational standards as well as minimum class size and health-care requirements. The constitution stipulates that standards required of religious or ideology-based (termed “special”) schools, financed either in part or fully by the government, shall be regulated by law with due regard for the freedom of these schools to provide education according to their religion or ideology.

The constitution stipulates public education shall pay due respect to the individual’s religion or belief, and the law permits, but does not require religious education in public schools. Regular teaching staff teach religion classes. All schools are obligated to familiarize students with the various spiritual movements in society, regardless of the school’s religious affiliation. Religion-based schools are free to shape religious education, as long as the education inspectorate agrees that such education does not incite criminal offenses.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary Paragraph: The government provided security to all Jewish institutions and to Muslims institutions upon request and established a working group to discuss mosque security. It barred religious groups from proselytizing at asylum centers. The government and Jewish and Muslim groups amended an agreement to allow for better protection of animal welfare while preserving the groups’ requirements of ritual slaughter. Party for Freedom (PVV) parliamentarian Geert Wilders continued calls for “de-Islamization” of the country. The government issued a report expressing concerns about Salafist groups. It continued to require Muslim religious leaders recruited from Islamic countries to complete an integration course before engaging in religious work in the country. The government also announced measures to combat anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic sentiment as part of an updated action plan to combat discrimination. A Muslim member of The Hague City Council called Israeli students visiting parliament “future child murderers.”

The national government established a special working group to discuss security questions concerning mosques, which included representatives of the Muslim community, National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security, police, and Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. Following a January 29 attack on a mosque in Canada, members of the working group convened and adopted a “Safe Mosque” manual. The manual helped bolster local cooperation among local government, police, and mosque officials. The mayors of Amsterdam and Rotterdam also met with representatives of various mosques in their cities to discuss security.

Local governments, in consultation with the national government, continued to provide all Jewish institutions with security and to provide security to Muslim institutions at their request. Amsterdam authorities were finalizing the replacement of 18 police-manned booths in favor of camera surveillance in Jewish sites throughout the city.

The NIHR and municipal antidiscrimination boards continued to address individual complaints of discrimination, such as the denial of internships or employment to female Muslim students who refused to remove their headscarves. The rulings generally maintained that any restriction on wearing headscarves should be limited and based on security or other carefully delineated grounds pertaining to the nature of the work, for example, applied to members of the military and medical personnel on operating floors. In practice, headscarves were permitted almost everywhere, including in schools.

According to several religious community leaders, the government did not allow religiously affiliated organizations to proselytize at asylum centers. The government agency charged with overseeing asylum centers, the Central Body for Accommodating Asylum Seekers, said it instituted this policy to avoid inflaming any tensions among different religious groups housed together in an already sensitive environment. Some members of religious groups said they had difficulty gaining access to the centers, even as volunteers. One member of an evangelical church said its members prayed in front of asylum centers but were not allowed to pray inside.

In July Jewish and Muslim organizations signed an agreement with the government and slaughterhouses amending a 2012 accord allowing ritual slaughter, to better protect animal welfare while preserving the requirements of ritual slaughter.

PVV leader and opposition parliamentarian Geert Wilders, whose party won 20 of the 150 seats in parliament in March elections, continued to call for the “de-Islamization” of the country. He advocated refusing all asylum seekers and immigrants from Islamic countries, banning the burqa in all public spaces, closing all mosques and Islamic schools, banning the Quran, and prohibiting any Islamic expression that violated public order. On November 3, Wilders called for mass protests against Islamization. He tweeted “Enough is enough. It is time to resist. Organize mass demonstrations. Reclaim our country. Fight back Islamization.”

Wilders appealed a December 2016 court conviction for inciting discrimination and insulting a racial group for his remarks about Moroccans at a 2014 rally. He argued his statements were protected free speech. The appeal hearing was scheduled for 2018.

In September the Ministry of Justice and Security’s Research and Documentation Center issued a report stating Salafist organizations were growing in the country and propagating intolerance toward others. In a letter submitting the report to parliament, then-Minister of Justice and Security Stef Blok and then-Deputy Prime Minister Lodewijk Asscher expressed concern that Salafist doctrines triggered intimidation, incited hatred against others, and undermined democratic institutions and the rule of law. The letter, however, opposed banning Salafist organizations as contrary to freedom of religion. The ministers said they were not taking a position on what individuals believed but “on preservation of an open society.” The ministers stated national and local authorities could take actions against undesirable conduct by groups such as Salafists, especially with regard to public security, while seeking interaction and dialogue with those and other groups. In the fall the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced it was working closely with its embassies abroad to ensure transparency in the foreign funding of Salafist mosques in the country.

Government ministers, including Prime Minister Mark Rutte at the annual Auschwitz and Kristallnacht commemorations, regularly spoke out against anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment in speeches. On February 3, then-Deputy Prime Minister Asscher stated, “We are working with the religious communities on a society in which everyone can practice his religion in freedom and safety.”

Then-Ministers Blok and Asscher met regularly with the Jewish community to discuss measures to counter anti-Semitism. The government worked with youth and relevant NGOs on several projects addressing anti-Semitism. These projects included making anti-Semitism a subject of discussion within the Turkish community; establishing a help desk to facilitate projects combating anti-Semitism; organizing roundtables with teachers to train them to deal with anti-Semitic prejudice and Holocaust denial; holding discussions with social media organizations on countering anti-Semitism among Islamic youth; promoting an interreligious dialogue primarily between Muslims and Jews; and renewing a public information campaign against discrimination and anti-Semitism.

In the spring, the government announced specific measures to counter anti-Semitism and anti-Islamic sentiment in the update to its national action plan to counter discrimination. The plan cited a need for more Jewish and Muslim role models from business, education, and government to promote dialogue between members of those two communities. In a June 22 letter to parliament, then-Ministers Blok and Asscher said, as part of the action plan, the government was supporting community projects to strengthen interreligious dialogue between Jews and Muslims. The ministers said six cities (which they did not identify) were assessing best practices for advancing interreligious dialogue that could serve as an example for other cities.

As part of the action plan, the government consulted the Royal Netherlands Soccer Association, local authorities, police officials, the prosecutor’s office, and soccer clubs, on ways to counter anti-Semitic chanting, salutes, and other behavior directed against religious groups during soccer matches. Participants agreed on measures to prosecute offenders or ban them from stadiums. The Anne Frank Foundation, an NGO, organized government-sponsored projects, such as the “Fan Coach” project to counter anti-Semitic chanting by educating soccer fans on why their actions were anti-Semitic, and the “Fair Play” project to promote discussion on discrimination, including religious discrimination.

To combat anti-Muslim discrimination, the national action plan focused on enhancing the readiness of the Muslim community to report incidents, reinforcing the resilience of Muslim organizations, and improving local cooperation between the Muslim community and local authorities. As part of this effort, authorities conducted regional meetings in which representatives of local governments, police, antidiscrimination bureaus, and Muslim communities discussed ways to improve collaboration.

In June the leader of the SGP, Kees van der Staaij, and the Israeli Ambassador filed complaints with the police against The Hague City Council member Abdoe Khoulani of the Islamist Party of Unity, after he characterized Israeli students visiting parliament as “Zionist terrorists” and “future child murderers.” Reacting to Van der Staaij’s complaint, Khoulani called him “a spokesman of Zionism, hypocrite to the bone, Islamophobic, Christian Zionist.” On November 8, the prosecutor’s office in The Hague announced it would not prosecute Khoulani because it concluded the statements did not constitute a criminal offense.

The government continued to require asylum seekers seeking to obtain a residence permit to sign a statement of participation in civic integration. The statement informed immigrants of their rights and obligations and of fundamental values, including freedom of religion.

According to the NGO Center for Information and Documentation on Israel (CIDI), Jewish community leaders stated the school curriculum lacked sufficient coverage of the Holocaust. On March 21, Deputy Minister for Education Sander Dekker spoke at a conference underscoring the importance of Holocaust education. He viewed schools as a safe place for children to hear “the right story,” because “we see that they [students] are taught the wrong facts and ideas in other places.” Dekker stated it could be difficult for teachers to discuss the Holocaust, especially at schools with a high percentage of minorities.

The government continued to require imams and other spiritual leaders recruited from Islamic countries to complete an integration course before preaching religion in the country. This requirement did not apply to approximately 140 Turkish imams appointed by that country’s religious affairs directorate. The government also sponsored leadership courses, with the declared intention of facilitating imam training in the Dutch language free of foreign interference.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

Summary Paragraph: The government and NGOs reported hundreds of anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic incidents in 2016, the most recent year for which figures were available. Most consisted of verbal or written harassment or insults, threats, or vandalism, and several involved violence. An EU survey found 30 percent of Muslims in the country said they had experienced religious discrimination during the previous five years, and that Muslims’ feeling of attachment to the country was the second lowest among 15 European countries surveyed. Groups regularly staged protests against Islamic institutions, and internet sites described Muslims as threats. Police registered 26 incidents of anti-Semitic chants at soccer matches in 2016, and CIDI reported use of “Jew” as a term of insult was common. There were incidents of vandalism during the year against Jewish and Muslim targets. CIDI reported 21 incidents of vandalism against Jewish sites in 2016; a report by an Amsterdam academic cited 72 attacks or threats against mosques in the same year.

There were reports of violence, threats, discrimination, verbal abuse, and vandalism against Muslims and Jews. Agencies collecting data on such incidents stated many occurrences went unreported. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

The police registered 352 incidents, including harassment, verbal abuse, and vandalism against Muslims in 2016, compared with 439 in the previous year. Antidiscrimination boards registered 250 incidents in 2016, 10 more than in 2015. The Complaints Bureau for Discrimination on the Internet (MDI), an NGO, and the government’s internet discrimination hotline (MIND) cumulatively registered 251 inflammatory statements against Muslims in 2016, compared with 472 in 2015.

The police registered 335 anti-Semitic incidents in 2016, compared with 428 incidents in 2015. Of these, 198 incidents concerned verbal harassment or insults. Many involved use of the epithet “Jew,” as a general insult.

CIDI reported 109 anti-Semitic incidents in 2016, compared with 126 in the previous year. According to CIDI, persons who were recognizable as Jewish because of dress or outward appearance, for instance wearing a yarmulke, were sometimes targets of direct confrontations. Incidents included three physical assaults in 2016. In one incident, a janitor of Moroccan origin got into a fight with a colleague, deriding his Jewish origin. CIDI registered fewer incidents (10) of bullying and verbal harassment of Jewish students because of their religion in and around schools, but an increase in total cases of verbal abuse incidents (25) and incidents in public and traditional media (four). CIDI registered fewer hate emails (seven), which it said some analysts attributed, not to a decline in hate speech on the internet, but to a shift towards more hate speech on social media. There were 21 incidents of vandalism, according to CIDI.

The NIHR reported receiving 24 complaints in 2016 about religious discrimination in the workplace.

In June the nonprofit Verwey Jonker Institute published the results of its government-commissioned research into which factors determine positive or negative perceptions of Muslims. The goal of the research was to help authorities determine how to design policies to redress anti-Muslim discrimination. The institute surveyed 3,790 youths aged 12-23 and 2,020 older adults. It found more negative views of Muslims among boys and young men (33 percent) than among girls and young women (15 percent). The most negative views of Muslims were among less-educated male youths (35 percent), many of whom had little to no contact with Muslims, often basing their opinions on media reports of Muslim crimes and Muslim cultural views towards women and others. According to the institute, these youths often viewed Muslims as a threat to national culture or the economy, and/or feared Muslims wanted to rule the country. Most of these youths, however, disapproved of physical actions against Muslims.

A September 21 survey by the EU’s Agency for Fundamental Rights reported 72 percent of the nation’s Muslims believed religious or ethnic discrimination was widespread in the country. Thirty percent of Muslims stated they had experienced discrimination because of their religion over the previous five years. Muslims’ feeling of attachment to the country (3.4 on a five-point scale) was the second lowest of the 15 EU countries surveyed. Research by the SCP from December 2016 found 60 percent of ethnic Turks and Moroccans, the two largest ethnic minorities, reported feeling connected with the country. Among ethnic Turkish and Moroccan youths, the percentage was significantly lower, with only 44 percent and 52 percent, respectively, reporting feeling connected with the country.

The PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) and Identitair Verzet (Identity Resistance) movements regularly staged protests against Islamic institutions. For example, on September 4, two activists displayed a banner in front of a new secondary Islamic school in Amsterdam saying, “those who sow Islam harvest the Sharia,” and on September 2, activists displayed banners at a building site of a new mosque in Venlo with texts such as “No mosque in our neighborhood” and “No Jihad in our street.” On September 1, six PEGIDA members protested the installation of a Muslim mayor in the town of Arnhem, stating they feared it would result in the Islamization of the provincial capital.

On January 12, the Amsterdam District Court convicted four men for offending and discriminating against Jews. They had participated in a 2016 demonstration in Amsterdam organized by the Netherlands People’s Party, carrying neo-Nazi banners and wearing anti-Semitic nose stickers. The court fined them 600 to 800 euros ($720 to $960) and sentenced them to 40-60 hours of community service.

CIDI called for more specific measures to stop anti-Semitic chanting during soccer matches. In 2016, the police registered 26 such incidents in and around the soccer field.

CIDI also expressed concern about the use of “Jew” as a general term of insult in the public sphere. For example, individuals often called police officers, in particular, “Jew.”

MDI reported 64 instances of anti-Semitic language on the internet in 2016 (7 percent of the total number of incidents of intolerance on the internet), compared with 46 incidents in 2015 (also 7 percent of the total.) MDI concluded two thirds of the expressions were not punishable under the law.

On August 24, The Hague District Court ruled that the suspension of a civil servant, Yasmina Haifi, at the Ministry of Justice and Security in 2014 for tweeting “ISIS is a premeditated plan by Zionists” was too severe a punishment, as the employee was exercising her right to free speech. The court decreed a written reprimand would have sufficed. Haifi remained employed at the Ministry of Justice in a different capacity.

Internet blogs PowNed News and GeenStijl conducted discussions on the role of Muslims and Islam in society, in which the sites described Muslims as cultural and political threats as well as sources of hatred.

In late April MIND received several complaints that the Altrechts.com website published a list of alleged “public enemies,” including citizens with a migrant background, and “Dutch Jews,” who were described as “alien organisms.” CIDI filed a complaint with police and demanded the list be removed as soon as possible. The internet service provider took the website offline, and police initiated an investigation. A government spokesperson said, “The cabinet regards the list’s publication as repugnant.”

Organizers disinvited hip-hop group Broederliefde from performing at the May 5 Liberation Day festival because a video surfaced in which a member of the group, rapper Emms, shouted anti-Semitic slogans such as “Hamas, Hamas, Jews to the gas,” during a soccer match.

In April city workers in Amsterdam removed and relocated a small plaque placed near the entrance to a residential house commemorating a Holocaust victim who had lived there. A couple living in the house sued the city to have the plaque removed altogether, saying it placed an emotional burden on them and attracted visitors, compromising their right to privacy. After public protests, the couple dropped their suit. They said the plaque reminded them too much of their deceased child, but they valued the memory of all Holocaust victims.

On December 9, police arrested a former asylum seeker, waving a Palestinian flag and a piece of wood, after he smashed several windows of a kosher restaurant in Amsterdam. In response, parliamentarians from the Liberal and Christina Union parties dined at the restaurant in a show of support.

On Liberation Day, May 5, the apartment of a Jewish woman in Apeldoorn was vandalized when the Star of David and the word “whore” were scratched on her front door.

On February 20, individuals defaced a mosque in the town of Waalwijk with obscene graffiti. Around the same time, several mosques received threatening letters with swastikas and calling Islam “a false and devilish religion.”

CIDI reported 21 incidents of vandalism in 2016. Incidents included destruction of property, such as a mezuzah, or the writing of anti-Semitic graffiti on walls, such as “Jew=Israel=Nazi,” on May 7 in Bilthoven; “Hamas, all Jews to the gas,” on May 25 in a village in North Holland Province; and “Jews should burn,” on March 25 in The Hague.

In March Ineke van der Valk, a University of Amsterdam professor, published The Third Monitor on Muslim Discrimination, which included a survey of threats, vandalism, and other acts against mosques. The report cited 72 incidents in 2016, the highest number since it began monitoring in 2005.

In Amsterdam, Muslim, Jewish, and Christian groups and a number of NGOs, including the Council of Churches, Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation, and Humanist Alliance, established the Security Pact Against Discrimination, an organization to combat anti-Muslim and other forms of discrimination.

On March 4, approximately 300 Muslims and non-Muslims gathered at the Al Kabir Mosque in Amsterdam to show support for Muslims and to counter “hateful stories” about Muslims. “Politicians, stop saying that the Netherlands is threatened by Islam,” said Adbou Menebhi of the NGO Collective against Islamophobia.

CIDI continued to conduct programs to counter prejudice against Jews and other minorities in schools. CIDI again invited 25 teachers to visit the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial in Jerusalem for a seminar on how to teach students about the Holocaust, especially in the face of prejudices by students toward the Jewish community. CIDI also led workshops for police and prosecutors at the police academy to help them recognize anti-Semitism.

The Liberal Jewish Community of Amsterdam continued with its program of reaching out to youth in the “Get to Know Your Neighbors” project, which invited students into its synagogue to introduce them to a temple and explain Jewish practices.

Multiple groups continued with existing initiatives to bring Muslims and Jews together. For example, the Salaam-Shalom NGO in Amsterdam through its “Mo&Moos” (Mohammed and Moshe) program and SPIOR (the umbrella organization of Islamic organizations in the Rotterdam region), in Rotterdam again brought together young Muslim and Jewish professionals to encourage leadership on interfaith issues. The NGO INS Platform continued to operate a website where citizens could meet “ordinary” Muslims in an effort to overcome prejudice. In Amstelveen, the Jewish-Muslim Alliance Amstelland (a collaboration between Jewish and Muslim groups and local authorities to advance understanding between Jews and Muslims), Mo&Moos, the Jewish group Bendigamos, and local political parties organized meetings to discuss safety, discrimination against Jews and Muslims, religion, and education.

The U.S. embassy emphasized in conversations with government officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Education, Justice and Security, and Social Affairs, the national police, and parliamentarians the importance of religious freedom and tolerance and discussed how the country safeguarded religious freedom. The embassy also raised these issues with local and municipal leaders, including the mayor of Rotterdam and members of the Amsterdam City Council.

The embassy and the consulate general in Amsterdam highlighted the need for religious tolerance and interfaith understanding and discussed issues of religious integration and violent extremism in outreach to youth, academics, and religious leaders from the Muslim, Jewish, and Christian faiths and community organizations such as CIDI, SPIOR, Humanity in Action, and the Anne Frank Foundation.

For National Religious Freedom Day on January 16, the embassy organized an interfaith dinner with 16 guests from the Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, Protestant, and Bahai communities to discuss religious freedom in the country. Guests praised the country as a historically tolerant society that had welcomed various faiths for centuries, but they noted an undercurrent of prejudice and discrimination in an increasingly secular society. Also in January the Consul General in Amsterdam hosted a Martin Luther King, Jr. Day celebration, where guests, including individuals from various backgrounds and faiths, discussed integration, religious tolerance, and countering discrimination. The Consul General hosted the mayor of a city in the U.S. south to discuss violent extremism and religious tolerance with Muslim and Jewish community leaders from Amsterdam.

Representatives from the embassy and consulate general met with a wide range of religious leaders, including the Liberal Jewish, Orthodox Jewish, Christian, Bahai, evangelical Christian, and Muslim communities throughout the year to highlight U.S. support for religious freedom. They attended iftars and a seder organized by the Liberal Jewish Community. Discussions at the iftars and seder involved Jewish, Muslim, and Christian leaders on their perceptions of religious freedom in the country. Refugees also attended these events and participated in discussions on integration and religious tolerance. The embassy met with religious leaders at mosques in Leiden, The Hague, Rotterdam, and Amsterdam and discussed the freedom to practice religion, religious tolerance, and diversity in the country. The embassy toured the Orthodox synagogue of The Hague and its neighboring school to discuss ways the embassy and the synagogue could cooperate to promote religious tolerance. Embassy officials visited several Christian and evangelical churches whose congregants came from a refugee background to discuss issues pertaining to integration and religious freedom.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 4.5 million (July 2017 estimate). According to 2013 census data, of those responding regarding religious affiliation, 12.6 percent are Roman Catholic, 11.8 percent are Anglican, 8.5 percent Presbyterian, 15 percent other Christian denominations (including Maori syncretic religions), 2.1 percent Hindu, 1.5 percent Buddhist, 1.2 percent Muslim, and 0.2 percent Jewish. Since 2006, the number of Muslims and Hindus has increased by 28 and 40 percent, respectively. More than 90 additional religious groups together constitute less than 1 percent of the population. The number of persons stating they had no religious affiliation increased from 34 percent to 42 percent, compared with the 2006 data; 4.4 percent of the respondents to the census question on religion stated they objected to the question.

Indigenous Maori make up approximately 15 percent of the country’s population. According to 2013 census data, of those Maori responding regarding religious affiliation, 11.2 percent are Catholic, 10.8 percent are Anglican, and 8.9 percent belong to syncretic Maori Christian groups such as Ratana and Ringatu. 46 percent stated no religious affiliation, while 6.5 percent did not respond regarding religion.

Legal Framework

The constitution, comprised of several basic laws, states that religious expression is “subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” According to the law, religious practices may not breach the peace.

The government does not require the licensing or registration of religious groups; however, if a religious group desires to collect money for any charitable purpose, including the advancement of its religion, and obtain tax benefits, it must register with the Department of Internal Affairs as a charitable trust. The registration must provide the rules of the organization showing it is a nonprofit organization and a list of officers free from conflict of interest who will not put their own interests above the organization. There is no fee for this registration.

The law provides that “teaching in every state [public] primary school must, while the school is open, be entirely of a secular character.” A public primary school, however, may close for up to one hour a week up to a total of 20 hours a year to devote to religious instruction or religious observance, to be conducted in a manner approved by the school’s board of trustees. If a public primary school provides religious instruction or observes religious customs, it must allow students to opt out. Religious instruction or observance, if provided, usually takes place outside normal school hours. Public secondary schools may provide limited religious instruction and observances within certain parameters that ensure it does not discriminate against anyone who does not share that belief.

Citizens may file complaints of unlawful discrimination, including on the basis of religious belief, to the government-funded HRC. The HRC’s mandate includes assuring equal treatment of all religious groups under the law, protecting the right to safety for religious individuals and communities, promoting freedom of religious expression and reasonable accommodation for religious groups, and promoting religious tolerance in education. In the event a complaint is not resolved satisfactorily with the assistance of HRC mediation, the complainant may proceed to the Human Rights Review Tribunal. The tribunal has the authority to issue restraining orders, award monetary damages, or declare a breach of the Human Rights Act, which is reported to parliament. Conduct prohibited by the Human Rights Act (e.g., workplace discrimination) may also be prosecuted under other applicable laws. In addition to the HRC dispute resolution mechanism, a complainant may initiate proceedings in the court system.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The HRC intervened in a number of cases, including proceedings related to the teaching of religious instruction in schools. During the year, the HRC also published the “A-Z Pre-Employment Guide to Human Rights for Employers and Employees,” a set of guidelines aimed at ensuring equality and fairness for all job applicants, regardless of a range of factors, including religion.

In May the media reported that the country had a blasphemy law on its statutes, taking government ministers and religious leaders by surprise. The law carries a prison term not exceeding one year. The press reported that it had not been applied since a failed prosecution in 1922, and it had been superseded by a more recent bill of rights. An opposition party attempt to repeal the law was defeated. The then Prime Minister, Bill English, said that although he agreed the blasphemy law should be replaced, any amendments should “go through the proper process” of an ongoing review committee examining criminal legislation, which would give the public the opportunity to express opinions on any potential change.

In April a long-running dispute over the teaching of education in schools reached the Human Rights Review Tribunal. The Secular Education Network (SEN) said that many schools ignored legal restrictions on religious instruction. Unlike previous complaints targeting individual school boards, the SEN complained of “state-sanctioned religious bias” by the Ministry of Education, lack of appropriate action from the HRC, and alleged conflicts with the Bill of Rights Act. A decision was not expected until at least April 2018, due to a backlog of new cases awaiting hearing and determination at the tribunal.

Every parliamentary session began with a Christian prayer.

The HRC received 69 complaints of unlawful discrimination on the grounds of religious belief or lack of religious belief during 2016-17, compared with 85 complaints during 2015-16.

In February a woman at a rest stop in Huntly in the rural Waikato region physically attacked and made anti-Muslim comments to a group of female Muslims wearing headscarves. The attacker was charged with common assault and pleaded guilty. She later expressed remorse, citing a history of alcohol abuse and mental illness as contributory to her actions.

In April the New Zealand Jewish Council President told reporters that anti-Semitism was increasing, with hate speech towards Jews particularly prevalent on social media. Also in April police investigated after anti-Semitic posters were placed around a college in Queenstown. Two men were later interviewed by police but not charged.

In September a University of Waikato academic used a public social media forum on workplace diversity to question the value of employees who “stop work five times per day to talk to an imaginary being.” Media and national Muslim groups criticized the comment. The university condemned discriminatory language, reiterated its commitment to diversity, and said it would investigate.

In August the pastor of a small independent Christian church in Auckland was quoted as saying he is in favor of gay marriage, “as long as a bullet goes through their head the moment they kiss.” The media and Christian leaders criticized the statement. Police sought legal advice on whether to pursue the matter but ultimately decided not to proceed, saying no criminal offense could be shown to have been committed.

Embassy officers regularly met with government officials in the HRC and Foreign Ministry to discuss interfaith action on antitrafficking and actions to encourage tolerance, diversity, and religious freedom regionally.

In July the Charge d’Affaires spoke at an embassy-funded antitrafficking-in-persons conference convened by the Anglican Church. His remarks highlighted the embassy’s support of faith communities who are among the country’s most active groups in combating trafficking, as well as the importance of encouraging tolerance, diversity, and religious freedom as safeguards against a range of human rights abuses. In September the Ambassador met with the conference convener, promising continued embassy support for the Church’s interdenominational leadership in this area.

In August the Consul General in Auckland engaged in a series of meetings with resettled refugees from diverse religious backgrounds to learn about the successes and challenges of integrating into the country. She highlighted the importance of tolerance, diversity, and religious freedom as norms in the country and vital to resettlement.

In August the Consul General in Auckland invited approximately 30 religious leaders to an interfaith event to mark World Humanitarian Day. In September she presented an Interfaith Community Grant to one of the attendees to recognize the Avondale Islamic Center for its interfaith community work with the city’s homeless. Again, her remarks stressed the importance of religious freedom and diversity.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 6 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the 2005 census (the most recent available) conducted by the Nicaraguan Institute of Statistics and Census, 59 percent of the population is Catholic and 22 percent evangelical Protestant, including Pentecostals, Mennonites, Moravian Lutherans, and Baptists. A survey conducted in June by M&R Consultants estimates Catholics compose 46 percent of the population, evangelical Protestants 33 percent, and religious believers without affiliation 14 percent. Groups that together constitute less than 4 percent of the population include Jehovah’s Witnesses, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), the Moravian Lutheran Church, Jews, Muslims, and nonbelievers. Local media reported that the size of the Jewish community more than doubled after 114 people persons converted to Judaism in July.

The Moravian Lutheran Church is largely concentrated in the country’s North and South Caribbean Coast Autonomous Regions. A majority of its members are of indigenous or Afro-Caribbean descent.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religion. It provides for freedom of belief, religion, and worship, and states no one “shall be obligated by coercive measures to declare his or her ideology or beliefs.” The constitution states there is no official religion, but the law entrusts government-controlled, community-level action groups, known as Family Committees, with the responsibility for promoting “Christian values” at the community level.

The requirements for legal recognition of religious groups are similar to those for other nongovernmental organizations. Registration requires an application, articles of association, and designation of officers. The National Assembly must approve a group’s application for legal standing. Following approval, the group must register with the Ministry of Government as an association or foundation. Groups must register to incur legal obligations, enter into contracts, or benefit from tax and customs exemptions.

Missionaries must obtain religious worker visas and provide information regarding the nature of their missionary work before the Ministry of Interior will authorize entry into the country. A locally based religious organization must provide documentation and request travel authorization from the Ministry of Government seven days prior to the arrival of the visiting religious group. The process generally takes several weeks to complete.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Catholic and evangelical Protestant leaders said government customs agents continued to retaliate against religious groups for perceived criticism of the ruling party. The leaders reported incidents of customs seizures of imported equipment, delayed import clearance for donated goods, and delayed tax exemptions applicable to religious organizations. Catholic and evangelical Protestant leaders continued to state that progovernment religious groups did not experience similar retaliation. They said, however, that these retaliatory practices decreased during the year, which they attributed to the central government’s unwillingness to alienate further sectors of society during a municipal election year.

Catholic and evangelical Protestant leaders stated the government continued its practice of providing or withholding financial support, tax exemptions, and utility subsidies for individual churches based on the political affiliation of the church’s clergy. Church leaders reported cases in which the government did not honor church tax exemptions or delayed the exemptions because the clergy had made political statements criticizing government policies. One evangelical Protestant leader stated that a delay of a routine tax exception on a donation of imported medical equipment and supplies hindered the delivery of medical assistance to his rural community after Hurricane Otto.

Government policy continued to require religious education through civics classes and participation in state-sponsored events, including processions to commemorate religious events and Catholic festivals, such as the celebration of Purisima, in which devotees commemorate the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary. Ministry of Education officials and ruling party (FSLN) political secretaries frequently selected high school students to participate in these events. According to multiple media reports, government political signs with the slogan of “Christian, Socialist, and in Solidarity” were often posted around public schools. Several sources, including the media, reported that government officials viewed teachers and families who opposed this policy as political opponents and sometimes excluded them from government assistance programs.

Catholic and evangelical Protestant leaders continued to criticize the government’s use of Catholic language, tradition, and symbols to promote its political agenda, which they said undermined their religious integrity and threatened freedom of religion. The government continued to require community participation for organizing, hosting, and staffing government-hosted religious festivities, such as Easter, Holy Week, and Purisima celebrations. The government continued to hold its own Catholic celebrations and festivals, despite the disapproval of the Catholic Church’s leadership of this practice. The government required government workers to staff the events, leaving them unable to attend the official Catholic Church celebrations. As in past years, government institutions set up 60 altars in public spaces to commemorate the Feast of the Immaculate Conception and distributed free goods funded by government budget appropriations. Senior Catholic and evangelical Protestant leaders continued to express concern about what they said was the government’s use of retired Catholic clergy and Christian religious statements and symbols to promote its ideological and political agenda and officiate at government-sponsored politico-religious events.

On November 29, Vice President Rosario Murillo announced that President Daniel Ortega had introduced a bill declaring Catholic Purisima festivities “Nicaraguan cultural patrimony” and requested emergency approval. Catholic Church officials sent a letter to the government expressing their objections, after which ruling FSLN-party National Assembly leaders said on December 4 that the proposed bill was never on the docket and would be subject to debate. The government continued to use religious language in daily press conferences in connection with official issues; government-sponsored billboards throughout the country and posters in government offices portrayed images of the president with the slogan “Christian, Socialist, and in Solidarity.”

Catholic and evangelical Protestant leaders continued to meet with representatives of the Ministries of Government and Foreign Affairs to advocate reduction of administrative requirements enacted in 2016 for individuals traveling to the country for religious purposes. According to some Catholic and evangelical Protestant leaders, the government’s 2016 policy change continued to restrict religious workers from exercising elements fundamental to their religious practices such as pilgrimage, charity, and missionary work. After several months, many members of religious organizations said they had adapted to the new travel restrictions. There were few reports of religious groups being denied entry into the country; however, authorities reportedly detained two separate Catholic missionary groups in June at the northern border and eventually denied them entry.

Catholic and evangelical Protestant leaders stated the government continued to restrict travel selectively for some applicants traveling for religious purposes based on the perceived political affiliation of the applicants. They also said ruling party officials favored FSLN-allied churches. Representatives of both groups stated religious leaders received additional scrutiny and faced selective application of laws if the government believed they posed a political threat or had not pledged their support to the ruling party. One religious leader said that since enactment of the additional immigration requirements, his organization had continued to refrain from making politically sensitive commentary, which he said might have contributed to favorable cooperation from government customs and immigration authorities.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

U.S. embassy officials met with Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials to raise issues some religious organizations faced with government-mandated travel approval requirements and to encourage the government to ensure the administrative processes for entry of foreign religious workers from abroad were uniform and efficient. Embassy officials met with members of the National Assembly to inquire about plans to pass a bill declaring Catholic Purisima festivities “Nicaraguan cultural patrimony” and its potential religious freedom implications.

Embassy representatives met regularly with a wide variety of religious groups, including Catholic leaders, officials from a diverse selection of evangelical Protestant groups, officials of the Moravian Lutheran Church, officials of the Nicaraguan Islamic Association, and Jewish community leaders. Among topics discussed were concerns about the politicization of religion, governmental retaliation against politically active religious groups, and new entry rules for religious travelers.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at19.2 million (July 2017 estimate). According to the Ministry of Interior (MOI), more than 98 percent of the population is Muslim. Approximately 95 percent of Muslims are Sunni and 5 percent Shia. Roman Catholic and Protestant groups account for less than 2 percent of the population. There are a few thousand Bahais, who reside primarily in Niamey and in communities on the west side of the Niger River. A small percentage of the population adheres primarily to indigenous religious beliefs. Some animist practices persist culturally among the Muslim majority, although they have become much less common over the past decade.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination, specifies separation of religion and state as an unalterable principle, and stipulates equality under the law for all, regardless of religion. It provides for freedom of conscience, religion, and worship and expression of faith consistent with public order, social peace, and national unity. The constitution also states no religion or faith shall claim political power or interfere in state affairs and bans political parties based on religious affiliation.

Nongovernmental organizations, including religious organizations, must register with the MOI. Registration approval is based on submission of required legal documents, such as the group’s charter, and vetting of the organization’s leaders. Although some unregistered religious organizations reportedly operate without authorization in remote areas, only registered organizations are legally recognized entities. The MOI requires clerics speaking to a large national gathering either to belong to a registered religious organization or to obtain a special permit. Nonregistered groups are not legal entities and are not permitted to operate.

Registered religious groups wishing to obtain permanent legal status must undergo a three-year review and probationary period before the Office of Religious Affairs, which is under the MOI, grants a change in legal status from probationary to permanent.

The constitution specifies the President, the prime minister, and the president of the national assembly must take an oath when assuming office on the holy book of his or her religion. By law, other senior government officials are also required to take religious oaths upon entering office.

The government prohibits full-face veils in Diffa Region under state of emergency provisions to prevent concealment of bombs and weapons.

The government prohibits open-air, public proselytization events by all religious groups due to expressed safety concerns. There is no restriction on private peaceful proselytization or conversion of an individual’s personal religious beliefs from one religious faith to another, as long as the group espousing the transition is registered with the government.

The establishment of any private school by a religious association must receive the concurrence of both the MOI and the relevant Ministry of Education (Primary, Secondary, Superior, or Vocational). Private Quranic schools, established uniquely to teach the Quran without providing other education, are unregulated. Mainstream public schools do not include religious education. The government funds a small number of special primary schools (called “French and Arabic Schools”) that include Muslim religious study as part of the curriculum.

There are no restrictions on the issuance of visas for visiting religious representatives; however, permanent residency of foreign religious representatives must be approved by the MOI.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Police detained civil society activist Sirajo Issa, President of the Youth Movement for the Emergency of Niger, on August 27. Issa was reportedly detained in connection with a leaked WhatsApp conversation that he initiated, claiming members of the Islamic Council accepted a bribe to move the date of the Eid al-Adha holiday from September 1 to September 2 to avoid holding the holiday on a Friday, which according to local tradition was unlucky. He was released without charge on September 11.

The government reported that it was responding to concerns about the unregulated practice of Islam, including the incursion of foreign Islamic groups, the inconsistent application of Islamic practices, and the possible increase of Islamic extremism, by establishing an Islamic Forum with the stated goal of standardizing the practice of Islam in the country. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (within the Ministry of Interior) initiated the forum in October with a national tour engaging Muslim representatives. The forum met in late November, with approximately 200 attendees from more than 50 organizations, and began work by discussing how creation of norms and the supervision of the practice of Islam in the country can help prevent radicalization and violent religious extremism. Future meetings were expected to address means to control mosque construction, Quranic instruction, and the content of sermons.

The government engaged Islamic leaders during the year to develop consensus on the text of a law, which Islamic leaders had publicly condemned in 2016, to require that girls remain in school through their completion of secondary school. One purpose of the law is to reduce early marriage. The cabinet approved the proposal in November as a cabinet directive.

In March the government did not publicly respond to the accusations of a group of Muslim associations that condemned government efforts to improve reproductive health and curb population growth. The clerics viewed the proposed introduction of this specific teaching as an exposure of students to pornographic material, a decline of social values, and a conspiracy against Islam.

The Directorate of Religious Affairs proposed instituting a registration system for Quranic schools, which were not regulated. According to representatives of both the government and a leading Islamic association, the desire for Quranic school regulation was motivated by concern about forced begging and poor quality education, as well as the possible incursion of extremist groups. The topic was to be discussed in the Islamic Forum inaugurated in November.

Complaints about difficulties associated with performing the Hajj continued, with the government’s Commission for the Organization of the Hajj and Umrah coming under criticism again, as in past years. Some observers criticized the commission for failing to negotiate adequately with travel companies and achieve a more organized Hajj and Umrah travel season. The commission oversaw Hajj participation for more than 13,000 pilgrims during the year.

Some Muslims were critical of the decision of the Islamic Council, a government-appointed advisory board for Islamic events and rituals, to move the Eid al-Adha holiday from September 1, when it was celebrated by most of the Muslim world, to September 2. Critics believed President Mahamadou Issoufou was too secular and too Western-leaning, and they advocated for a more traditional practice of Islam.

Islamic representatives have expressed concern for several years that Wahhabism’s presence continued to grow. There was no survey data to indicate how many Wahhabist mosques there were in the country, or to support or refute the impression of growing influence. The majority of the population adhered to the Maliki interpretation of Sunni Islam, but there were separatist branches, and representatives of Islamic Associations said some imams preached a more radical version of Islam, which they stated may have been Wahhabist.

The Muslim-Christian Interfaith Forum continued to meet, bringing together representatives of Muslim associations and Christian churches for quarterly meetings. According to representatives of both Christian and Muslim associations, there were generally good relations between Muslims and Christians; however, according to some religious leaders, a minority of Muslims rejected any rapprochement of Muslims and Christians as a corruption of the true faith and therefore resented the forum. These religious representatives believed relations between Christians and Muslims were deteriorating and the practice of observing each other’s religious holidays was decreasing.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy representatives continued to advocate for religious freedom and tolerance through meetings with government leaders. The Ambassador raised religious freedom with the minister of interior and the foreign minister, commenting on the country’s secular constitution and encouraging inclusiveness in the government’s efforts to better regulate Quranic schools and Friday sermons in the interest of preventing extremism.

The Ambassador and embassy representatives met with representatives of Muslim and Christian groups to support inter and intrafaith dialogues throughout the country. The Ambassador hosted an iftar, which included Muslim, Christian, and Bahai leaders; government officials; and members of civil society, where she delivered remarks emphasizing the importance of interfaith tolerance. The embassy also hosted an iftar in the city of Maradi in the country’s interior, providing a donation for the poor and showing a film about religious tolerance toward Muslims in the United States.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 190.6 million (July 2017 estimate). A 2012 survey by the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life estimated the population to be 49.3 percent Christian and 48.8 percent Muslim, while the remaining 2 percent belong to other or no religions. Many individuals combine indigenous beliefs and practices with Islam or Christianity. A 2010 Pew report found 38 percent of the Muslim population self-identified as Sunni and 12 percent as Shia, with the remainder declining to answer or identifying as “something else” (5 percent) or “Just a Muslim” (42 percent). Included among the Sunnis are several Sufi groups, including Tijaniyah and Qadiriyyah. There are also Izala (Salafist) minorities and small numbers of Ahmadi Muslims. Christian groups include evangelicals, Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Pentecostals, Baptists, Methodists, Presbyterians, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Other groups include Jews, Bahais, and individuals who do not follow any religion.

The Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri ethnic groups are most prevalent in the predominantly Muslim northern states. Significant numbers of Christians, including some Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri, also reside in the north, and Christians and Muslims reside in approximately equal numbers in the central part of the country and in the southwestern states, including Lagos, where the Yoruba ethnic group, whose members include both Muslims and Christians, predominates. In the southeastern states, where the Igbo ethnic group is dominant, Christian groups, including Catholics, Anglicans, and Methodists, constitute the majority. In the Niger Delta region, where the Ogoni and Ijaw ethnic groups predominate, Christians form a substantial majority, and a very small minority of the population is Muslim. Evangelical Christian denominations are growing rapidly in the central and southern regions. Ahmadi Muslims maintain a small presence in several cities, including Lagos and Abuja.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates neither the federal nor the state governments shall establish a state religion and prohibits discrimination on religious grounds. It provides for freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the freedom to change religion and to manifest and propagate religion “in worship, teaching, practice, and observance,” provided these rights are consistent with the interests of defense, public safety, order, morality, or health, and protecting the rights of others. The constitution also states it shall be the duty of the state to encourage interfaith marriages and to promote the formation of associations that cut across religious lines and promote “national integration.” It prohibits political parties that limit membership on the basis of religion or with names that have a religious connotation.

The constitution provides for state-level courts based on common or customary law systems, which have operated in the region for centuries. It specifically recognizes sharia courts of appeal in any states that require it, with jurisdiction over civil proceedings such as marriage, inheritance, and other family matters, where all the parties are Muslims. Sharia courts hear criminal cases in 12 northern states. State laws on sharia criminal courts vary, but at least one state, Zamfara, requires that criminal cases in which all litigants are Muslim be heard in sharia courts. According to state laws, sharia courts may pass sentences based on the sharia penal code, including hudood offenses (serious criminal offenses with punishments prescribed in the Quran) and prescribe punishments, such as caning, amputation, and death by stoning. State laws dictate non-Muslims have the option to try their cases in sharia courts if involved in civil or criminal disputes with Muslims. Common law courts hear the cases of non-Muslims and Muslims (in states where they have the option) who choose not to use sharia courts. Sharia courts do not have the authority to compel participation by non-Muslims. Aggrieved parties may appeal sharia court judgments to three levels of sharia appellate courts. According to the constitution, decisions by the state sharia courts of appeal (the highest level of the sharia courts) theoretically can be appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court, although none have been.

Kano and Zamfara’s state-sanctioned Hisbah Boards regulate Islamic religious affairs and preaching, distribute licenses to imams, and attempt to resolve religious disputes between Muslims in those states. The states of Bauchi, Borno, Katsina, and Yobe maintain state-level Christian and Muslim religious affairs ministries or bureaus with varying mandates and authorities, while many other state governors appoint interfaith special advisers on religious affairs.

In order to build places of worship, open bank accounts, receive tax exemptions, or sign contracts, religious groups must register with the Corporate Affairs Commission as an incorporated trustee, which involves submitting an application form, proof of public notice, a copy of the organization’s constitution, a list of trustees, and a fee of 20,000 naira ($56).

Both federal and state governments have the authority to regulate mandatory religious instruction in public schools. The constitution states schools may not require students to receive religious instruction or to participate in or attend any religious ceremony or observance pertaining to any religion other than their own. State officials and many religious leaders have stated students have the right to request a teacher of their own religious beliefs to provide an alternative to any instruction offered in a religion other than their own. The constitution also says no religious community will be prevented from providing religious instruction to students of that community in any place maintained wholly by that community.

Several states have laws requiring licenses for preachers, places of worship, and religious schools of registered religious groups. A Katsina State law establishes a board with the authority to regulate Islamic schools, preachers, and mosques, including issuing permits, suspending operations, and imprisoning or fining violators. The Katsina law stipulates a punishment of one to five years in prison and/or a fine of up to 500,000 naira ($1,400) for operating without a license.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Summary Paragraph: In November Kano State police fired tear gas and bullets, killing three members of the IMN during its annual Ashura procession. The government continued to detain Sheikh Ibraheem El-Zakzaky, leader of the IMN, the largest Shia Muslim group in the country, despite a court order that he be released by January 15. There were no reports of accountability for soldiers implicated in the December 2015 clash between the army and IMN members that, according to a Kaduna State government report, left at least 348 IMN members and one soldier dead, with IMN members buried in a mass grave. Some Christian groups reported a lack of protection by government authorities for churches and Christian communities, especially in the central and northern regions. They reported discrimination in acquiring land permits to build churches and in admission to universities in the north. Muslims living in predominantly Christian states reported discrimination by state governments against such practices as women wearing the hijab. There were continued conflicts between migrant ethnic groups, known as settlers, who were mainly Muslim, and longstanding residents or indigenes, who were mainly Christian, which the groups accused the federal government of ignoring. Farmer-herder violence remained a form of the indigene-settler conflict, since herders were generally not seen as indigenous to the land by farmers. The differences between the indigenes and settlers were frequently religious as well as ethnic and economic. State governments often granted preferential treatment, for example in access to education and jobs, to indigenes over settlers.

According to international reports, on November 5, Kano State police fired tear gas and bullets, killing three IMN members during the group’s annual Ashura procession. Police arrested 10 members. The police spokesperson stated the IMN ignored instructions from police not to hold the procession.

The government stated publicly that Sheikh Zakzaky, leader of the IMN and a prominent Shia cleric, would remain in what it said was “protective custody” pending appeal of the December 2016 decision of Federal High Court in Abuja that the government must release him. At year’s end, Zakzaky remained in prison. The court also ruled the government must provide him with a house and pay him and his wife restitution of 25 million naira ($69,600) by January 15; at year’s end, the court’s order had yet to be followed.

There were no reports of accountability for soldiers implicated in the December 2015 clash between the army and IMN members that, according to a Kaduna State government report, left at least 348 IMN members and one soldier dead. Dozens of IMN members were still being held since December 2015, charged with the death of the soldier. In August Acting President Osinbajo announced the creation of a Presidential Investigative Panel that committed to transparently and credibly investigating human rights abuses committed by the military. On August 17, the IMN publicly stated it would boycott the panel because it doubted the panel’s sincerity. Outside human rights observers also expressed concern over lack of transparency and rigor of the panel. At year’s end, the panel’s findings were not yet available.

According to local media reports, the 23rd Armored Brigade of the Nigerian Army in Yola, Adamawa State, began an investigation into the disruption of an Assemblies of God church service in March by men in military uniforms but without nametags. Media reported the church had been affected by a leadership crisis, and a clergy member representing a rival faction in the leadership struggle reportedly invited the soldiers to enter the church and remove the presiding pastor. An army spokesperson stated that the army sent no personnel to the church and would investigate whether the attackers were in fact soldiers.

Both Muslim and Christian groups said there was a lack of just handling of their mutual disputes and inadequate protection by federal, state, and local authorities, especially in central regions, where there were longstanding, violent disputes between Hausa and Fulani Muslims and Christian ethnic groups. In disputes between primarily Christian farmers and Muslim herders, herders stated they did not receive justice when their members were killed or their cattle stolen by the farming community, which they said caused them to carry out retaliatory attacks. Farmers stated security forces did not intervene when their villages were being attacked by herdsmen.

A pending bill in Kaduna State would require all preachers to obtain preaching licenses or risk fines and/or imprisonment for up to two years. The bill was introduced in 2016 in the state legislature and remained pending at year’s end. Deputy Governor of Kaduna State Barnabas Bala said the bill was proposed to protect the state from religious extremism and hate speech. The bill would also restrict playing religious recordings at certain times and places as well as prohibit “abusive” religious speech, which it did not define further. The draft bill generated widespread opposition from both Muslim and Christian groups, who cited fears that such steps would lead to broader government restrictions on religious organizations and general religious activity.

The media regularly reported on claims by Christian leaders and organizations that northern leaders, backed by the federal government, were engaged in an effort to Islamize the country. In September Caritas Nigeria stated a bill to regulate nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) would give the federal government authority to regulate churches, which are registered as incorporated trustees and thus fall under the category of NGO, and thereby provide the government authority to restrict the activity of churches and promote Islam. The National Assembly member who introduced the bill responded that the bill’s intent was to ensure transparency and accountability in the way NGOs collected and used funds, and he said the bill would not affect mosques or churches. Also in September, CAN reported that the federal government’s proposal to issue Sukuk bonds, an Islamic financial certificate, was in violation of the country’s secular constitution and an attempt to Islamize the country. The minister of information responded that the Sukuk bond issuance was an attempt at financial inclusiveness, and the difference between a Sukuk bond and other bonds was that Sukuk bonds paid no interest.

In December BBC and other media reported that Amasa Firdaus, a law graduate from Ilorin University, was denied admission to the “call to bar” ceremony because she wore a hijab to the ceremony in what her law school said was violation of its dress code.

Christian groups reported authorities in northern states continued to deny building permits to minority religious communities for the construction of new places of worship, expansion, and renovation of existing facilities, or reconstruction of buildings that had been demolished. Christian religious leaders in Adamawa complained that Christians in Yola, Adamawa State, could not obtain permits to purchase land for churches. They said that Christians built the churches anyway, but remained vulnerable when governments decided to demolish them, such as what occurred in Jigawa State. In January the Jigawa State government demolished churches belonging to the Redeemed Christian Church of God and the Lord Chosen God in the state capital, Dutse. The state government said the churches were built illegally and the churches had been given three notices to stop development. CAN said the churches did not receive a response from the government for their land permit application. In Ekiti State in April, the state government was reportedly prepared to demolish a mosque in the state capital, Ado Ekiti. After protests, the governor and Muslim leaders in the state were able to reach an agreement, and the government allowed the mosque to remain, despite not having a permit.

The Hisbah continued to arrest street beggars and prostitutes, and destroy confiscated bottles of alcohol. There were no reports of Christians being forced to use sharia courts.

Christian and Muslim groups continued to report that individual administrators of government-run universities and technical schools in several states refused to admit certain individuals or delayed the issuance of their degrees and licenses because of religion or ethnicity. For example, in Borno State, Christian religious leaders said it is very difficult for Christians to be admitted into certain schools at the University of Maiduguri, especially medicine and engineering, where Muslims make up over 90 percent of the student body. They also stated that Christianity was not offered for the religious studies courses in many public schools in Maiduguri and northern Borno, only Islam. Muslim leaders in Jos, Plateau State, complained that local governments in Plateau discriminated against Muslim residents regarding land purchases, admittance to universities, and access to government jobs. According to Christian and Muslim groups and NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, the issue was connected to the country’s indigene-settler conflict, whereby state governments granted benefits, such as access to government services, to ethnic groups considered to be indigenous to a particular state and distinguished them from ethnic groups considered to be settlers, even if their families had lived in the state for generations. In certain states, especially in the Middle Belt, the divide between Christian indigenes and Muslim settlers was religious as well as ethnic and economic.

In February the Kwara State government hosted an international conference on security and peaceful coexistence, which included Muslim and Christian religious leaders. During his remarks, the Sultan of Sokoto, Sa’ad Abubakar, the spiritual leader of Muslims in Nigeria, said “God did not make a mistake when he created us as Nigerians and put us together. We must understand that and all of us who profess to be Christians or Muslims have a guide which is either the Quran or Bible. In these two major religions there is nowhere where killing of innocent people is allowed.” In July more than 480 participants, including the Army Special Task Force, local government officials, and Christian and Muslim community leaders, met in Kafanchan to discuss establishing peace in the area and address grievances of victims of the communal violence. In January the governments of Nasarawa and Benue States worked together to enact a peace agreement between predominantly Muslim herdsmen and predominantly Christian farmers in Agatu, Benue State, after the January 2016 attack on the Christian community by herdsmen left more than 300 farmers dead.

According to press reports, in April Senate President Bukola Saraki stated: “….whatever laws we pass here, will be respectful to the religious beliefs of our people. We will not do anything that will in anyway go against that.”

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

The U.S.-designated terrorist organization Boko Haram split into two factions in 2016, one pledging allegiance to ISIS and calling itself the Islamic State of West Africa (ISIS-WA), headed by Abu Musab al Barnawi, and another headed by Abubakar Shekau and retaining the traditional Boko Haram name, the Jama’atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da’awati wal-Jihad (JASDJ). Most residents and government officials referred to both groups collectively as Boko Haram.

Boko Haram and ISIS-WA continued to attack population centers and security personnel in the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. Vulnerable populations, notably those perceived as disagreeing with the groups’ political or religious beliefs or those perceived as interfering with their access to resources, were targeted by the groups. There were multiple reports of Boko Haram killing scores of unarmed civilians. On November 21, Boko Haram blew up a mosque in Mubi, Adamawa State, resulting in the deaths of 50 worshippers.

While Boko Haram no longer controlled as much territory as it once did, the two insurgencies maintained the ability to stage forces in rural areas and launched attacks against civilian and military targets across the Northeast. On November 25, ISIS-WA militants launched an attack on Magumeri town in Magumeri local government area of Borno State, but security forces were able to repel them. From these areas of influence, the groups were still capable of carrying out complex attacks on military positions, and they deployed large numbers of roadside improvised explosive devices. According to estimates from NGO Nigeria Watch, which did not appear to differentiate between Boko Haram and ISIS-WA, 1,794 persons, including Boko Haram members, died as a result of the group’s activities during the year, compared with 2,900 killed in 2016. The Adamawa State chapter of the country’s Muslim Council reported that Boko Haram killed more than 5,247 Muslims since 2013 in Adamawa State. According to reports, Boko Haram killed more than 500 Catholics in Borno State since the insurgency began.

Approximately half of the students abducted by Boko Haram from the Chibok Government Girls Secondary School in 2014 remained in captivity. The government successfully negotiated the release of 82 of the kidnapped students in May, in addition to the 21 students released in October 2016. According to media reports, in September members of Boko Haram killed Chief Imam Ustaz Goni Bukar Tabare and four other individuals in Magumeri, Borno State. CAN reported more than 900 churches were destroyed by Boko Haram in the northeast since the insurgency began.

Summary paragraph: There were incidents of killings and other forms of violence between members of different religious groups. Many killings occurred between farmers and herders in the central Middle Belt region, where farmers are predominantly Christian and from various ethnic groups, and herders are predominantly Fulani Muslims. This violence included religious differences as a factor, according to scholars and other experts, but also involved ethnicity, politics, and increasing competition over dwindling land resources as a result of population growth, soil degradation, and internal displacement from other forms of violence and criminality occurring in the north. Participants at an April conference identified 13 triggers to farmer-herder conflicts and offered recommendations for peace. Among these triggers of violence was incitement by religious leaders and inaccurate reporting by media, which tended to divide religious communities. Among the solutions identified was to increase interfaith dialogue and initiate sensitization programs. Media reported on claims by Christian groups that northern leaders were engaged in an agenda to Islamize the country. For example, the National Christian Elders Forum issued a communique in July warning of jihad and “brazen” attempts at Islamizing the country. At a CAN-sponsored meeting of Christian leaders in November, participants issued a resolution calling for the National Assembly to withdraw the country from the Organization of Islamic Countries and other Islamic organizations.

On December 22, gunmen suspected of being Fulani herdsmen opened fire on a congregation, killing four and injuring 10 in Nindem, Kaduna State. A report from the Fulani community in southern Kaduna, however, said the attack in Nindem was not perpetrated by Fulani, but was possibly a conflict within the Nindem community. On December 24, a suspected Fulani herdsman attacked a village, Ungwan Mailafiya, in Jema’a Local Government Area and killed six persons. The same Fulani community source said the attack in Ungwan Mailafiya may have been carried out by a Fulani man whose son was killed in the village by local persons. He said authorities were still looking for the man.

On January 21, unknown gunmen opened fire on a Fulani settlement in Kaura Local Government Area of southern Kaduna, killing a pastoralist, 13-year old Yahaya Musa. In retaliation, on February 20 Fulani herdsmen attacked and killed 31 individuals in villages in the same area. In another attack later that day, suspected Fulani herdsmen attacked Zunuruk village in the same area, but were repelled by local residents, resulting in the death of some of the attackers. On February 21, a clash broke out between ethnic Hausa (predominantly Muslim) and Kanikon residents of Kafanchan, the largest city in southern Kaduna, when both groups went to claim dead bodies at the morgue, resulting in a number of deaths, including of two policemen. Some Kanikon residents reportedly assumed the Hausa residents came to claim the bodies of the attackers who were killed in the previous day’s violence. On February 22, police deployed a team of special forces to the troubled area.

According to media reports, on April 15, 12 worshippers died and many more were injured in Asso village in Kaduna state when Fulani herdsmen opened fire on an Easter Vigil service. Media said the attackers boasted about disrupting the Easter celebration.

From June 17-20, ethnic Mambilla residents of the Mambilla Plateau of Taraba State attacked dozens of Fulani settlements throughout the plateau, killing dozens of Fulanis and hundreds of cattle. On June 21, Acting President Osinbajo sent in troops to restore order. Thousands of Fulani residents of the Mambilla Plateau fled into neighboring Cameroon to seek refuge. On July 4, CAN and the Muslim Council of Nigeria brought leaders of the two communities together in a reconciliation summit, but the Fulani leaders walked out and vowed not to engage in reconciliation until those involved in the attacks were brought to justice.

From July 15-17, ethnic Fulani herdsmen and Kadara local residents clashed in Kajuru in Kaduna State, resulting in the deaths of 27 Fulani and six Kadara individuals. Media reports said the clash was the result of an incident days before when Kadara youths killed a Fulani boy who was considered to be a bandit engaged in criminal activities in the area. Fulani youths then reportedly in revenge killed six Kadara youths who were allegedly involved in the initial killing. Immediately after, Kadara youths attacked several Fulani settlements, burning tents and killing approximately 17 Fulanis. Security officials arrived to restore calm soon after, but when they departed, Kadara youths attacked other Fulani settlements and killed an estimated 10 persons. Acting President Yemi Osinbajo ordered additional security reinforcements to the area.

On September 8, Fulani herdsmen attacked villages in Bassa, Plateau State, killing 19 ethnic Irigwe residents, who are mainly Christian, and injuring five. The Plateau State commissioner of police said the attack was in retaliation for the killing of a Fulani boy on August 3. President Muhammadu Buhari condemned the attack, and the government sent a military task force to provide security to the affected community. On September 11, military personnel repelled another attack by Fulani gunmen, killing five. On November 20, ethnic Bachama local residents, who are predominantly Christian, killed more than 50 predominantly Fulani pastoralists in Numan Local Government Area of Adamawa State. The victims were women and children as the attack was carried out while the men were either in town or grazing cattle. The attack was in retaliation for the killing of a Bachama farmer by an unknown gunman, whom local residents suspected of being a Fulani herdsman.

In July a female suicide bomber killed eight individuals and wounded 18 before morning prayer at a mosque in Maiduguri. In January authorities thwarted a suicide bombing near a mosque in Maiduguri when, according to reports, a civilian self-defense force member stopped the bomber from reaching the mosque. Both died in the ensuing explosion.

In June traditional religious practitioners, known as masquerades, attacked a mosque in Moba Local Government Area of Ekiti State, injuring five worshippers, including the imam. The masquerades warned the Muslims against conducting their prayer service while the traditionalists were engaged in their festival, called Egungun.

A Lagos-based NGO, Muslim Rights Concern, said Muslim female students were not allowed to wear the hijab at Adeleke University in Osun State and Afe Babalola University in Ekiti State, both private universities.

According to international reports, in Kaduna State members of the IMN visited three churches to celebrate Christmas with Christians. The IMN advocated for religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence during the visits.

Many religious leaders publicly supported tolerance and interfaith cooperation to resolve conflicts. In January the King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Center for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue hosted a two-day conference on inclusive and sustainable interreligious dialogue. At the conference, the Sultan of Sokoto condemned what he said was increased hate preaching in the country.

In January religious and political leaders conducted a peace and reconciliation mission to southern Kaduna in an effort to stem the violence between mainly Christian farmers and mostly Muslim herders. The delegation included former Head of State General Abdulsalami Abubakar, Cardinal John Onaiyekan, Bishop Matthew Kukah, and Sultan of Sokoto Sa’ad Abubakar. General Abubakar said there is no religion that preaches violence, and criminals must be brought to justice to ensure peace.

In January 100 Christian and Muslim religious leaders came together to found the Interfaith Dialogue Forum for Peace (IDFP), a forum of Christian and Muslim representatives to address emerging interfaith issues, primarily in the troubled areas of Kaduna, Plateau, Yobe, Taraba, Borno and Adamawa States. The religious leaders selected Sultan of Sokoto Sa’ad Abubakar and Chairman of CAN Samson Ayokunle to head the IDFP. Its board of trustees includes eminent religious and traditional rulers from throughout the country.

On national hijab day on February 1, a coalition of women’s groups held a press conference in Alausa, in which the women discussed wearing of the hijab as their inalienable constitutional right that must always be protected by the government through laws.

U.S. embassy staff and visiting U.S. government officials promoted religious freedom and tolerance in discussions throughout the year with government officials, religious leaders, and civil society organizations. In February the Ambassador met with the minister of foreign affairs to express U.S. support for efforts to strengthen religious freedom and combat violent extremism, especially in the northeast. In March the Ambassador met with the Governor of Plateau State to discuss his efforts to foster peace and build trust between Muslim and Christian communities after years of intense ethnoreligious conflicts. In August a U.S. embassy official hosted a meeting for officials from the ministries of agriculture and interior, the national police, military, and the Senate and House of Representatives to discuss recommendations to reduce farmer-herder violence in the country. In October the Ambassador met with the Governor of Kano State to discuss efforts to combat violent extremism.

In January the embassy hosted a roundtable discussion with Muslim and Christian religious leaders to reiterate U.S. support for religious freedom and encourage greater interfaith coordination between leaders of the two faiths in order to strengthen unity in the country. In February the Ambassador met with the president of CAN to encourage continued efforts at interfaith dialogue between the Christian and Muslim communities. In April the embassy sponsored a farmer-herder conference that brought together farmers and pastoralists at the community level from 16 states, who discussed triggers of violence, including religious triggers. In August the Ambassador and other U.S. embassy officials held a roundtable discussion with religious leaders, including members of CAN and the Jama’atu Nasril Islam, the Islamic umbrella association, to assure U.S. support for interfaith efforts aimed at resolving tensions between religious communities.

In November the Deputy Secretary of State met with Muslim and Christian religious leaders to express U.S. support for interfaith cooperation and encourage greater efforts.

The U.S. Consul General in Lagos continued to discuss religious tolerance and interfaith relationship building with a wide range of religious leaders.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5.3 million (July 2017 estimate). The National Statistics Bureau estimates 71.0 percent of the population belongs to the Church of Norway, an evangelical Lutheran church.

The National Statistics Bureau reports membership of religious and life-stance communities outside the Church of Norway number is approximately 619,000, 11.7 percent of the population. This includes 339,000 registered members of Christian denominations, 6.4 percent of the population, of which the Roman Catholic Church is the largest, with 152,000 registered members, and 2.9 percent of the population. There are 153,000 members of Muslim congregations, 2.9 percent of the population. Pentecostal congregations have approximately 39,000 registered members. Buddhists, Sikhs, and Hindus together account for nearly 30,000 registered members. Jewish congregations have approximately 770 registered members.

The Norwegian Humanist Association, with a registered membership of approximately 93,000, accounts for nearly all those registered with life-stance organizations (nonreligious or philosophical communities with organizational ethics based on humanist values).

Immigrants comprise the majority of members of religious groups outside the Church of Norway. Immigrants from Poland and the Philippines have increased the number of Catholics, while those from such countries as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia have increased the size of the Muslim community. Catholics and Muslims generally have greater representation in cities than in rural areas. Muslims are located throughout the country, but the population is concentrated in the Oslo region. Many recent immigrants from Muslim majority countries still reside in asylum reception centers. According to Norwegian Directorate of Immigration statistics, approximately 5,600 of the 6,300 persons residing in reception centers as of October come from Muslim majority countries.

The government reported a 0.5 percent decline in the number of members of religious or life-stance communities outside the Church of Norway during the year.

Legal Framework

The constitution states all individuals shall have the right to free exercise of their religion, and all religious and philosophical communities shall be supported on equal terms. The constitution also states, “the King shall at all times profess the Evangelical-Lutheran religion,” and that national values shall remain anchored in the country’s Christian and humanistic heritage. The law further specifies the right of individuals to choose or change their religion. Any person over the age of 15 has the right to join or leave a religious community. Parents have the right to decide their child’s religion before age 15, but they must take into consideration the views of children once they reach the age of seven and give their views priority once they reach the age of 12.

A constitutional amendment, effective January 1, separates the Church of Norway from the state, but the constitution stipulates the Church of Norway shall remain the national church and as such shall be supported by the state. The government continues to provide direct financial support to the Church as a block grant in the national budget and covers the cost of salaries, benefits, and pension plans of Church employees. Municipal governments also provide direct support to individual congregations.

The penal code specifies penalties, including a fine or imprisonment for up to six months, for discrimination based on religion and for expressions of disrespect for religious beliefs or members of religious groups. In practice, the government applies penalties for disrespect for religious beliefs only in cases of incitement to violence.

All registered religious and life-stance organizations are eligible to apply for financial support from the government. Nearly 800 such organizations receive state support, based on the number of each group’s members. In order to register, a faith or life-stance organization must notify the county governor and provide its creed and doctrine, activities, names of board members, names and responsibilities of group leaders, operating rules – including who may become a member – voting rights, the process for amending statutes, and the process for dissolution. A group registers only once in one county but reports its national tally of members. If a religious group does not register, it will not receive financial support from the government, but there are no restrictions on its activities. By law, life-stance communities, but not religious groups, must have a minimum of 500 members to qualify for government funding.

Public schools continue to include a mandatory course on Christian Knowledge and Religious and Ethical Information (CKREE) for grades one through 10. State-employed instructors teach the CKREE, which covers world religions and philosophies while promoting tolerance and respect for all religious beliefs, as well as for atheism. Up to 50 percent of the CKREE course content is devoted to Christianity. Students may not opt out of this course. Schools do not permit religious ceremonies, but schools may organize religious outings, such as attending Christmas services at a local Lutheran church. Children may be exempted at their parents’ request from participating in or performing specific religious acts, such as a class trip to a church. The parents need not give a reason for requesting an exemption. Students may apply to be absent in order to celebrate certain religious holidays, such as an Eid or Passover, but there is no celebration or observance of these holidays in public schools.

The LDO reviews cases of religious discrimination. Anyone may file a complaint with the ombudsman. The ombudsman publishes nonbinding findings, which provide the basis for legal investigations and follow-up, in response to complaints that a person or organization has violated a law or regulation within the ombudsman’s mandate. The ombudsman also provides advice and guidance on antidiscrimination law.

In June parliament approved a revision of the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Act, effective January 1, 2018, which prohibits discrimination based on religion, among other factors. The law consolidates several previous statutes.

Individuals may apply for a full exemption for religious reasons from the required registration for a year of military service and are not required to perform alternative service.

According to the law, an animal must first be stunned or administered anesthetics before slaughter, making most traditional kosher and halal slaughter practices illegal. Halal and kosher meat may be imported. The IRN certifies some locally produced meat as halal upon review of applications and procedures submitted by producers or distributors that demonstrate that the stunned animal’s heart is still beating when slaughtered.

Foreign religious workers are subject to the same visa and work permit requirements as other foreign workers.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

During the year, the Ministry of Local Government and Modernization provided 3.3 million Norwegian kroner (NOK) ($403,000) for security at the DMT facility and synagogue in Oslo. This was similar to the total amount provided in 2016, which was a significant increase from 2015. The greater amounts since 2015, according to the ministry, were due to the overall threat assessment in the country and Europe. The DMT continued to maintain a dialogue with the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MOJ) and the police to ensure proper safeguarding of the DMT’s facilities.

The national police unit for combating organized and other serious crimes continued to maintain a web page for the public to contact police regarding hate crimes and hate speech, including religiously motivated incidents. The government continued to emphasize its national strategy against hate speech, including religiously motivated hate speech, which focused on improving national statistics on hate speech and associated incidents, improving awareness of hate crimes in police training, and promoting education and research on such crimes and speech on the internet.

After engagement with religious and life-stance communities, the armed forces hired humanist and Muslim chaplains for the first time. The Norwegian Humanist Association reported some hospitals also employed humanist chaplains.

The government continued to ban the wearing of religious symbols, including headgear, with police uniforms.

The government continued to permit individual schools to decide whether to implement bans on certain types of face-covering religious clothing, such as burqas or niqabs.

Many non-Christian religious and life-stance organizations, such as the Norwegian Humanist Association, continued their objections to the specific reference to “Christian Knowledge” in the title of the mandatory school course on religion, stating it promoted Christianity over other beliefs.

The Ministry of Education continued grants for school programs that raised awareness about anti-Semitism and hate speech, including religiously motivated hate speech. Schools nationwide observed Holocaust Memorial Day on January 27. High school curricula included material on the deportation and killing of Jewish citizens from 1942 to 1945. The government continued to fund a DMT program where young Jews talked to high school students about Judaism and being a Jew in the country. The government stated it would continue to fund the program through the national action plan to counter anti-Semitism.

Schools continued to support an extracurricular program that took some secondary school students to the Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp in Poland and to other Nazi concentration camps to educate them about the Holocaust. According to the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), approximately 15-20,000 students participated each year.

The Church of Norway received more than two billion NOK ($244 million) in funding from the government. The government and the Church continued to review the status of pension and other benefits for Church employees who no longer worked for the state. The MOC stated the grant to the Church would continue at a high level after the removal of its employees from the state payroll. The government provided other registered religious and life-stance organizations approximately 344 million NOK ($42 million). Some representatives from these groups, including the Norwegian Humanist Association, said the size of the grant to the Church of Norway was not based solely on the size of membership and that the Church’s privileged relationship with the state continued after the January 1 legal separation.

The Catholic Church’s civil suit alleging the government underpaid the subsidy it owed the Church based on its membership remained pending. The District Court in Oslo ruled against the Church in January, but the Church appealed the decision to the Borgarting Court of Appeal. In December the district court also found the Catholic Archdiocese of Oslo liable for financial fraud, stemming from a government investigation in 2016 that stated the Church had inflated its membership numbers, and fined it NOK 2 million ($244,000).

Consistent with previous years, the MOC provided 12 million NOK ($1.5 million) to religious umbrella organizations, such as the Christian Council of Norway and the Council for Religious and Life Stance Communities (STL), among others, to promote dialogue and tolerance among religious and life-stance organizations. Groups outside these umbrella organizations also applied to the ministry for funding for specific events and programs to support interreligious dialogue.

In October the government withdrew its longstanding support to the IRN, due, it said, largely to a loss of confidence in the organization. Minister of Culture Linda Helleland said in a press release that the ministry had “serious doubt that the IRN is capable of fulfilling its role as a bridge-builder and contributing to cooperation and a strengthening of dialogue, for which there is a great need.” The withdrawal of funding followed a series of media reports citing dysfunction in the organization, including the 2016 resignation of the entire IRN board in a leadership dispute; the controversial hiring in March of an outspoken advocate for the full-face veil as a communications officer; and criticism from dialogue partners that the IRN was not fully engaged in interfaith dialogue efforts.

The government proposed a new law governing religious life in the country, which was open for public comment until the end of the year and was scheduled for debate in parliament in 2018. For the first time, the law would require all religious as well as life-stance groups to have at least 500 members to be eligible for government funding. The existing law applied the requirement only to life-stance groups. The MOC said the law could potentially affect approximately one quarter of religious groups in the country. The proposed law would codify the legal status and funding support structures for the Church of Norway and other religious groups, following the formal separation of the Church of Norway from the government at the beginning of the year. The Church of Norway would retain financial support from the government under the proposed law, including for maintaining historic church buildings and certain administrative expenses. Religious communities and those who worked on interreligious dialogue complained the proposed law was developed without a preceding white paper on religion and life-stance policies. A white paper would normally present the policy goals behind new legislation. Some religious and life-stance communities, such as the Norwegian Humanist Association, said the new law provided preferential financial treatment for the Church of Norway.

The government continued to implement its action plan to counter anti-Semitism in society. The plan emphasized data collection, training and education programs in schools, research on anti-Semitism and Jewish life in the country, and efforts to safeguard Jewish culture. Under the plan, police must work toward including anti-Semitism as a separate category of hate crime in police statistics. The Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities (HC), an independent research and educational center, and the DMT leadership said the plan could have gone further, but they were generally positive about it, since it allocated resources to education about anti-Semitism in society and focused attention on efforts to counter it.

The LDO stated the amended antidiscrimination law should make identifying discrimination easier by consolidating several antidiscrimination statutes.

In May the Progress Party, the junior member in the governing coalition, expressed its support at a party convention for a law banning ritual circumcision of children under the age of 16. Domestic and international Jewish leaders spoke out against it, and the government stated it would not pursue the issue.

In response to the effective ban on the production of most kosher and halal meat in the country by the law on animal slaughter, the Ministry of Agriculture continued to waive import duties and provide guidance on import procedures to both the Jewish and Muslim communities.

The government continued to conduct workshops and other intervention programs targeting practitioners working with groups at risk for radicalization, including religious minority groups. The MOJ hosted an annual national conference against radicalization, which included high-level political participation.

The government is a member of the IHRA.

According to police and NGO reports and observations, religiously motivated hate speech, particularly online, remained prevalent. In 2016, the latest year for which data were available, police reported 97 religiously motivated hate crimes throughout the country, up from 79 the previous year. Police in Oslo reported 88 percent of the 24 religiously motivated hate crimes in 2016 in that district targeted Muslims, a similar percentage to the previous year. The overall number of recorded religiously motivated hate crimes in 2016 in Oslo was down 40 percent from the 40 incidents the previous year. Assault and legally impermissible hate speech constituted the bulk of what the government characterized as religiously motivated crimes. Police statistics did not cite specific examples of these crimes.

The LDO, as well as NGOs such as FRI – Association for Gender and Sexual Diversity, encouraged the government to improve consistency of data collection and reporting of hate crimes, including religiously motivated hate crimes, for police districts outside of Oslo. Police training continued, and the MOJ said it expected all police districts to have competency in investigating hate crimes by the end of the year. Beginning with hate crimes committed in 2017, statistics were to include information on cases prosecuted and final convictions.

As part of its action plan to combat anti-Semitism, the government conducted a national survey, which it said it would repeat every five years, of attitudes in the population towards Jews and other minorities. The survey results were published in December and found that while “stereotypical [prejudicial] views about Jews still prevail in Norwegian society in 2017…they are less prevalent than in 2011.” The survey concluded that the proportion of the country’s population with marked prejudices against Jews and Muslims was 8.3 percent and 34.1 percent, respectively. It concluded that attitudes toward Jews in the country were influenced by attitudes towards Israel. The survey also found that negative stereotypes of Muslims were widespread in society. It stated that 14 percent of Muslims and 11 percent of Jews had been directly subjected to harassment.

In 2016, the most recent year for which data were available, the LDO received nine complaints in which it concluded discrimination based on religion had taken place, compared with three cases in the previous year. The LDO did not indicate if these cases resulted in legal action. The LDO offered guidance on rights and the legal framework regarding religious discrimination in response to 85 additional inquiries.

The NGOs Antiracist Center and Organization Against Public Discrimination again stated members of ethnic minorities (many of whom were Muslim) experienced discrimination and that levels of anti-Islamic sentiment continued to increase, especially on social media platforms. Neither NGO cited examples.

In July media reported widespread ridicule of members of the nationalist group Fatherland First, after it posted numerous critical comments, such as “Islam is and always will be a curse,” over a photo on the group’s Facebook page. Self-described “troll” Johan Slattavik posted the photo, which members thought showed Muslims in burqas but was actually of empty bus seats, with the comment, “What do you think of this?” He said he did it “as a joke” and to “highlight the difference between legitimate criticism of immigration and blind racism.” The head of the Antiracist Center commented that people “see what they want to see – and what these people want to see are dangerous Muslims.”

The DMT again expressed concern about what it viewed as continued tolerance for anti-Semitic expression, primarily online, but provided no examples. Members of the Jewish community also reported experiencing discrimination but preferred not to cite specific cases. The DMT expressed concern over a march in Kristiansand in July of 50 self-proclaimed neo-Nazis from the group The Nordic Resistance Movement. Authorities had denied a permit for a march by the group in Fredrikstad, but police in Kristiansand allowed it to proceed without a permit when the group marched there without first informing the police. Individuals held a countermarch in Trondheim on the same day.

Dagbladet, a national daily newspaper, published in May a satirical cartoon equating Jewish and Muslim supporters of nonmedical circumcision with mentally unstable pedophiles. President of the Conference of European Rabbis Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt urged authorities to take action against Dagbladet, calling the cartoon offensive and “a blatant attack on religious freedom.” The cartoon was part of the newspaper’s coverage of the Progress Party’s support for a ban on ritual circumcision, a ban Dagbladet did not support. The President of the DMT, Ervin Kohn, said the cartoon was offensive and not a positive contribution to the circumcision debate, but that it was not out of line or anti-Semitic.

The HC continued to conduct programs against anti-Semitism with financial support from the government. For example, the HC provided instructional materials it developed on tolerance of religious diversity to high schools nationwide. It also screened materials used in public schools for anti-Semitic content.

In March Muslim organizations condemned the IRN’s appointment of a communications officer who wore a full-face veil, and several groups issued a joint press release saying they lacked confidence in the organization. Minister of Culture Helleland and Muslim Member of Parliament Abid Raja also criticized the appointment. Several mosques formally pulled out of IRN in September and October, citing a lack of trust and management issues as the main reasons for their withdrawal. Until the mosque withdrawals, IRN, the only Muslim umbrella organization in the country, represented approximately 42 congregations with 70,000 members, almost half of the total Muslim population. In late October newspapers reported that five of the mosques that had pulled out of IRN had established a new organization called the Muslim Dialogue Network Norway. In addition, in October IRN suspended its membership in the STL for a period of six months; some media outlets speculated STL would have otherwise suspended the group.

In October Nortura, one of the country’s largest meat producers, announced it would not renew the halal agreement with IRN (under which IRN certified some Nortura meat as halal) when it expired at the end of 2018. In its announcement, Nortura cited a lack of trust in IRN from the government, the Muslim community, and society as the determining factor for its decision not to renew the contract.

U.S. embassy staff met with officials from the MOC who worked on religious issues. The discussions centered on the proposed new religion law that was undergoing public review, public financing for faith and life-stance organizations, and financial preferences for the Church of Norway. Embassy staff also discussed the ministry’s role in supporting religious umbrella organizations and activities to promote interreligious dialogue, in addition to asking about the government’s position on public debates on the banning of circumcision. Embassy representatives discussed religiously motivated hate speech with the MOJ.

The Charge d’Affaires visited the ICC, a major mosque in Oslo, to engage in discussion with Muslim community representatives on religious freedom, integration of minority groups, and religious tolerance.

The Charge d’Affaires hosted a roundtable breakfast with government policy makers, researchers, and advocates from civil society to discuss the challenges and opportunities related to promoting religious freedom and the protection of religious minorities.

Embassy staff engaged religious and civil society groups to discuss their efforts to promote religious tolerance in the country, including STL, ICC, the Ahmadiyya Muslim community, and Muslim congregation Minhaj-ul-Quran Norway.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 4.6 million (July 2017 estimate). Citizens constitute 55 percent of the population. The percentage of citizens who are Ibadhi Muslims (Ibadhi Islam is the historically dominant religious group in the country and distinct from Shia and Sunni Islam) is estimated at 45 percent, according to many sources, and 75 percent, according to government estimates. Academic sources estimate Shia Muslims compose approximately 5 percent of citizens and live mainly in the capital area and along the northern coast, while another 5 percent are Hindus and Christians, mainly extended families of naturalized citizens of South Asian origin. According to academic sources, the remainder of the citizen population is Sunni Muslim.

Academic sources state the majority of non-Muslims are foreign workers from South Asia. Noncitizen religious groups include Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Bahais, and Christians. Christians are centered in the major urban areas of Muscat, Sohar, and Salalah and include Roman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestants.

Legal Framework

The Basic Law declares Islam to be the state religion and states that sharia is the basis for legislation. It protects the right of individuals to practice other religions as long as doing so does not “disrupt public order or contradict morals.” The Basic Law prohibits discrimination based on religion. According to the Basic Law, the sultan must be a Muslim.

The law prohibits a father who converts from Islam from retaining paternal rights over his children. There is no provision of the law specifically addressing apostasy, conversion, or renunciation of religious belief.

It is a criminal offense to “defame” any faith. The law provides for a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment for inciting religious or sectarian strife. The law prescribes a maximum three-year prison sentence and fine of 500 Omani Rials ($1,300) for anyone who “publicly blasphemes God or His prophets,” commits an affront to religious groups by spoken or written word, or breaches the peace of a lawful religious gathering. Using the internet in a way that “might prejudice public order or religious values” is also a crime, with a penalty of between one month and one year in prison and a fine of not less than 1,000 Omani Rials ($2,600).

All religious organizations must register with the government. The law does not specify rules, regulations, or criteria for ministerial approval. Groups seeking registration must request meeting and worship space from one of the sponsor organizations recognized by the MERA. New non-Muslim religious groups unaffiliated with a previously recognized sponsor must gain approval from the MERA before it can register. Muslim groups must register, but the government – as benefactor of the country’s mosques – serves as their sponsor. For non-Muslim groups, the ministry recognizes the Protestant Church of Oman (a partnership between the Reformed Church of America and the Anglican Church), Catholic Church in Oman, Al-Amana Center (an interdenominational Christian organization that promotes Muslim-Christian understanding), Hindu Mahajan Temple, and Anwar Al-Ghubaira Trading Company in Muscat (Sikh) as official sponsors. The sponsors are responsible for recording and submitting to the ministry the group’s religious beliefs and the names of its leaders. The MERA must also grant its approval for new Muslim groups to form.

All individuals who deliver sermons in recognized religious groups must register with the MERA. The licensing process for imams prohibits unlicensed lay members from preaching sermons in mosques, and licensed imams must follow government-approved sermons. Lay members of non-Muslim groups may lead prayers if they are specified as leaders in their group’s registration application.

The law restricts collective worship by non-Muslim groups to houses of worship on land specifically donated by the sultan for the purpose of collective worship.

The law prohibits public proselytizing by all religious groups, although the government tolerates private proselytizing within legally registered houses of worship and “Islamic propagation centers.”

The law states the government must approve construction and/or leasing of buildings by religious groups. In addition, new mosques must be built at least one kilometer (0.6 mile) from existing mosques.

Islamic studies are mandatory for Muslim students in public schools from kindergarten through 12th grade. Non-Muslim students are exempt from this requirement if they notify school administrators they do not wish to attend such instruction. The classes take a historical perspective in comparing the evolution of Islamic religious thinking, and teachers are prohibited from proselytizing or favoring one Islamic group over another. Many private schools provide alternative religious studies courses.

Civil courts adjudicate cases according to the nonsectarian civil code. The law states Shia Muslims may resolve family and personal status cases according to Shia jurisprudence outside the courts, and retain the right to transfer their cases to civil courts if they cannot find a resolution within the Shia religious tradition. The law allows non-Muslims to seek adjudication of matters pertaining to family or personal status under the religious laws of their faith or under civil law.

Citizens may sue the government for violations of their right to practice religious rites that do not disrupt public order; there are no known cases of anyone pursuing this course in court.

Birth certificates issued by the government record an individual’s religion. Other official identity documents do not do so.

Foreigners on tourist visas may not preach, teach, or lead worship. Visa regulations permit foreign clergy to enter the country to teach or lead worship under the sponsorship of registered religious groups, which must apply to the MERA for approval before the visiting clergy member’s entry.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The primary issue for religious groups continued to be opaque processes and unclear guidelines. While no published rules, regulations, or criteria existed for the registration of a new religious group, the MERA reportedly considered the group’s size, theology, belief system, and availability of other worship opportunities before granting registration, and reportedly employed the same criteria whether the group was Muslim or non-Muslim. Observers said the precise process remained vague, although there were reports of the MERA consulting with existing religious communities before ruling on the application of a new religious group. According to the MERA, there was no limit on the number of religious groups it could register. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mormons) had reportedly not received approval for registration from the MERA because it had not identified a sponsor in the Christian community, but reported its representatives had met with the MERA and were working toward a solution.

The MERA continued to monitor sermons at mosques to ensure imams did not discuss political topics. Imams were required to preach sermons within politically and socially acceptable parameters the government distributed monthly, with outlines of acceptable topics along with standardized, approved Friday sermons for Ibadhi and Sunni imams. Mosques under the purview of the Diwan (Royal Court), such as the Grand Mosque in Muscat, were not subject to this monitoring. The grand mufti, the senior Ibadhi cleric in the country and who is appointed by the government, remained the only imam able to speak publicly outside of the designated government parameters. All religious figures requesting visas to the country must be approved by the MERA. The government continued to fund the salaries of some Ibadhi and Sunni imams, but Shia or non-Muslim religious leaders are privately funded. The government provided land for all religious sites in the country.

According to NGO sources based outside of the country, Hassan Al-Basham, a former diplomat who had been sentenced to three years imprisonment in 2016 for blasphemy and criticizing the sultan, remained in prison at year’s end.

Non-Muslims who worshipped in private homes continued to say Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, and other religious groups experienced no interference from the government in their regular private worship services despite continuing legal prohibitions on worship outside of government-approved locations. Non-Muslim minority groups continued to report overcrowding at their places of worship. Space limitations also caused overcrowding at some private homes used for non-Islamic worship.

Consistent with the government’s censorship policy mandating prior review of any published material, religious groups needed to obtain approval from the MERA before publishing texts within the country or disseminating religious publications outside their membership. The government also continued to require religious groups to notify the MERA before importing religious materials and submit a copy to the MERA. The ministry did not review all imported religious material for approval. Sources said non-Muslims were often able to import literature without scrutiny.

Although the Basic Law states sharia is the basis for legislation, in practice the civil code continued to have precedence over sharia, consistent with the replacement of sharia courts by civil courts in 1999 with passage of the Judicial Authority Law. Under this law, the judicial outcomes reached under sharia jurisprudence could not contradict civil statutes.

The government, through the MERA, continued to publish Al-Tafahum, an annual periodical whose purpose, according to the government, was to broaden dialogue within Islam and promote respectful discussion with other faiths. During the year, Al-Tafahumfocused on jurisprudence – articles included one juxtaposing Islamic and Kantian principles, while another discussed Sufism’s role in civil law.

Conversion from Islam was reportedly viewed extremely negatively within the Muslim community.

The interfaith Al-Amana Center, run by a Protestant denomination, continued to sponsor programs with a goal of interreligious dialogue and understanding between Christians and Muslims. It hosted immersion courses in conjunction with the MERA to introduce Islam to Protestant seminary students from different denominations. The center also worked closely with the MERA to promote interfaith dialogue.

In July a video of a Sunni cleric describing Dhofar, a region in the southern part of the country, as a “Sunni country” was widely shared. Social media users largely condemned the cleric for being divisive and seeking to undermine the government, and they demanded government intervention. In August the cleric issued a video apology, encouraging persons to respect the authority of the government.

The Anti-Defamation League reported that a cartoon with anti-Semitic imagery was published on December 17 in the Al-Watannewspaper. According to the Simon Wiesenthal Center, on July 9, Al-Watan published an anti-Semitic column that accused Jews of murdering children in order to use their blood as part of their religious rituals during Jewish holidays.

In January the Ambassador met with the minister of endowments and religious affairs to discuss the government’s protection of religious minorities. The Ambassador visited the largest Hindu temple, attended an Anglican Church service, and hosted Jewish holiday services at his residence.

Embassy officers met with MERA officials to encourage the government to continue its outreach efforts promoting religious tolerance, and discussed its efforts to counter violent extremism related to religion. Embassy officers also raised concerns about overcrowding at minority religion compounds and encouraged the MERA to find a solution for religious groups seeking officially sanctioned space for worship. Embassy officers met with minority religious groups and supported efforts to promote interfaith understanding across all religious groups. In April the Department of State Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South/Central Asia visited the country and subsequently authored an article about religious tolerance, to be published in Al-Tafahum (Understanding), a government-run religious periodical.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 204.9 million (July 2017 estimate). According to a national census conducted in 1998, 95 percent of the population is Muslim (75 percent of the Muslim population is listed officially as Sunni and 25 percent as Shia). Per government figures, the remaining 5 percent includes Ahmadiyya Muslims, Hindus, Christians, Parsis/Zoroastrians, Bahais, Sikhs, Buddhists, Kalasha, Kihals, and Jains.

Unofficial estimates vary widely with regard to the size of minority religious groups. According to 2014 media accounts, although there are 2.9 million non-Muslims registered with the National Database and Registration Authority; media estimates of the actual number exceed 3.5 million. Religious community representatives estimate minority religious groups constitute 3 to 5 percent of the population, approximately six to 10 million citizens.

According to the 2014 government registration documents cited by the press, there are approximately 1.4 million Hindus, 1.3 million Christians, 126,000 Ahmadis, 34,000 Bahais, 6,000 Sikhs, and 4,000 Parsis. Taking account of the Ahmadi boycott of the official census, however, community sources put the number of Ahmadiyya Muslims at approximately 500,000-600,000. Estimates of the Zikri Muslim community, located in Balochistan, range between 500,000 and 800,000 individuals. Most of the historic Jewish community has emigrated.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes Islam as the state religion but states “subject to law, public order, and morality, every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice, and propagate his religion.” A 1984 amendment to the penal code restricted the rights of members of the Ahmadiyya community to propogate their faith.

According to the constitution, every citizen also shall have the right to freedom of speech, subject to “reasonable restrictions in the interest of the glory of Islam,” as stipulated in the penal code. According to the penal code, the punishments for persons convicted of blasphemy include the death sentence for “defiling Prophet Muhammad,” life imprisonment for “defiling, damaging, or desecrating the Quran,” and 10 years’ imprisonment for “insulting another’s religious feelings.” Speech or action intended to incite religious hatred is punishable by up to seven years’ imprisonment.

The constitution defines “Muslim” as a person who “believes in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad … the last of the prophets, and does not believe in, or recognize as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet after Muhammad … ” It also states “a person belonging to the Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, or Parsi community, a person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis), or a Bahai, and a person belonging to any of the scheduled castes” is a “non-Muslim.”

According to the constitution and the penal code, Ahmadis are not Muslims and may not call themselves Muslims or assert they are adherents of Islam. The penal code bans them from preaching or propagating their religious beliefs, proselytizing, or “insulting the religious feelings of Muslims.” The punishment for violation of these provisions is imprisonment for up to three years and a fine.

The penal code criminalizes “deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs” and provides for a sentence of up to 10 years in prison.

A 2015 constitutional amendment allows military courts to try civilians for terrorism, sectarian violence, and other charges; this authority was renewed in January for an additional two years. The government may also use special civilian terrorism courts to try cases involving violent crimes, terrorist activities, and acts or speech deemed by the government to foment religious hatred, including blasphemy.

The constitution states no person shall be required to take part in any religious ceremony or attend religious worship relating to a religion other than the person’s own.

The constitution provides for “freedom to manage religious institutions.” It states every religious denomination shall have the right to establish and maintain its own institutions. The constitution states no person shall be compelled to pay any special tax on the propagation or maintenance of a religion other than the person’s own. The government collects a 2.5 percent zakat (tax) from Sunni Muslims and distributes the funds to Sunni mosques, madrassahs, and charities.

The constitution mandates the government take steps to enable Muslims, individually and collectively, to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam and to promote the observance of Islamic moral standards. It directs the state to endeavor to secure the proper organization of Islamic tithes, religious foundations, and places of worship.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony is responsible for organizing participation in the Hajj and other Islamic religious pilgrimages. Authorities also consult the ministry on matters such as blasphemy and Islamic education. The ministry’s budget covers assistance to indigent minorities, repair of minority places of worship, establishment of minority-run small development projects, celebration of minority religious festivals, and provision of scholarships for religious minority students.

The law prohibits publishing any criticism of Islam, or its prophets, or insults to others’ religious beliefs. The law bans the sale of Ahmadiyya religious literature.

The provincial and federal governments have legal responsibility for certain minority religious properties abandoned during the 1947 partition of British India.

The constitution states no person attending any educational institution shall be required to attend religious instruction or take part in any religious ceremony relating to a religion other than the person’s own. It also states no religious denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for pupils of its denomination in an educational institution maintained by the denomination.

The constitution states the government shall make Islamic studies compulsory for all Muslim students in state-run schools. Although students of other religious groups are not legally required to study Islam, schools do not always offer parallel studies in their own religious beliefs, and the students may have no other option. In some schools, however, non-Muslim students may study ethics. Parents may send children to private schools, including religious schools, at the family’s expense. Private schools are free to teach or not teach religious studies.

By law, madrassahs are prohibited from teaching or encouraging sectarian or religious hatred or violence. The law requires all madrassahs to register with one of five wafaqs (independent boards) or directly with the government, to account for their sources of financing, and to accept foreign students only with valid student visas, a background check, and the consent of their governments.

The constitution states “all existing laws shall be brought into conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.” It further states no law shall be enacted which is “repugnant” to Islam. The constitution states this requirement shall not affect the “personal laws of non-Muslim citizens” or their status as citizens. Personal laws regulating marriage, divorce, and inheritance for minority communities date from pre-partition British legislation.

The constitution establishes a Federal Shariat Court (FSC) composed of Muslim judges to examine and decide whether any law or provision is “repugnant to the injunctions of Islam.” The constitution gives the court the power to examine a law of its own accord or at the request of the government or a private citizen. The constitution requires the government to amend the law as directed by the court. The constitution empowers the court to review criminal cases relating to certain crimes, including rape and those linked to Islamic morality, such as extramarital sex, alcohol use, and gambling. The court may suspend or increase the sentence given by a criminal court in these cases. The court exercises “revisional jurisdiction” (the power to review of its own accord) in such cases in lower courts, a power which applies whether the cases involve Muslims or non-Muslims. Non-Muslims may consult the FSC in other matters which affect them or violate their rights if they so choose. Decisions of the court may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

The constitution establishes a Council of Islamic Ideology to make recommendations, at the request of the parliament and provincial assemblies, as to “the ways and means of enabling and encouraging Muslims to order their lives in accordance with the principles of Islam.” The constitution further empowers the council to advise the legislative and executive branches when they choose to refer a question to the council, as to whether a proposed law is or is not “repugnant to the injunctions of Islam.”

In the absence of specific language in the law authorizing civil or common law marriage, marriage certificates are signed by religious authorities and registered with the local marriage registrar. In March the government enacted legislation codifying the legal mechanisms to register Hindu marriages and to prove the legitimacy of Hindu marriages under the law, a move which proponents state could help reduce the frequency of forced marriages and conversions of Hindus. The law allows for the termination of the marriage upon the conversion of one party to a religion other than Hinduism.

The government considers the marriage of a non-Muslim woman dissolved by the government if she converts to Islam, although a non-Muslim man may convert and his marriage remains recognized. Children born to a non-Muslim couple are considered illegitimate and ineligible for inheritance if their mother converts to Islam. The only way to legitimize the marriage and the children is for the husband also to convert to Islam. The children of a Muslim man and a Muslim woman who both convert to another religious group are considered illegitimate, and by law the government may take custody of the children.

The constitution directs the state to “safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minorities,” to secure the well-being of the people irrespective of creed, and to discourage sectarian prejudices. It forbids discrimination against any religious community in the taxation of religious institutions. The National Commission on Human Rights, an independent government-funded agency, is required to receive petitions, conduct investigations, and request remediation on human rights violations; it has quasi-judicial powers and can refer cases for prosecution but does not have arrest authority.

According to the constitution, there shall be no discrimination on the basis of religion in appointing individuals to government service, provided they are otherwise qualified.

The constitution prohibits discriminatory admission based on religious affiliation to any governmental educational institution. According to regulations, the only factors affecting admission to government schools are students’ grades and home provinces; however, students must declare their religious affiliation on application forms. This declaration is also required for private educational institutions, including universities. Students who identify themselves as Muslims must declare in writing they believe the Prophet Muhammad is the final prophet. Non-Muslims are required to have the head of their local religious communities verify their religious affiliation.

The government designates religious affiliation on passports and requests religious information in national identity card applications. Those wishing to be listed as Muslims must swear they believe the Prophet Muhammad is the final prophet, and must denounce the Ahmadiyya movement’s founder as a false prophet and his followers as non-Muslim.

The constitution requires the president and prime minister to be Muslims. All senior officials, including members of parliament, must swear an oath to protect the country’s Islamic identity. The law requires that elected officials swear an oath affirming their belief that the Prophet Muhammed is the final prophet of Islam.

There are reserved seats for religious minority members in both the national and provincial assemblies. The 342-seat National Assembly has 10 seats for religious minorities. The 104-seat Senate has four reserved seats for religious minorities, one from each province. In the provincial assemblies, there are three such reserved seats in KP; eight in Punjab; nine in Sindh; and three in Balochistan. Political parties elected by the general electorate choose the minority individuals who hold these seats; they are not elected by the minority constituencies they represent.

The country is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and maintains two reservations: first, that ICCPR Article 3 regarding equal rights of men and women would be “applied as to be in conformity with Personal Law of the citizens and Qanoon-e-Shahadat (Law of Evidence),” under which the in-court testimony of men is given greater weight than that of women; second, that ICCPR Article 25, on the equal right for citizens to take part in public service would be subject to articles of the constitution mandating that the president and prime minister be Muslims.

Government Practices

Summary paragraph: Civil society organizations continued to voice concern about the application of the country’s blasphemy laws. According to civil society reports, there were at least 50 individuals imprisoned on blasphemy charges, at least 17 of whom had received death sentences. According to data provided by CSOs, police registered at least 10 new blasphemy cases against 17 individuals. There were at least two minors imprisoned for blasphemy in Punjab Province. Civil society groups said the blasphemy laws disproportionately impacted members of religious minority communities. The Supreme Court acquitted two persons charged with blasphemy during the year; a third case was closed due to the death of the accused while awaiting trial, while other blasphemy cases continued without resolution. A high-profile government campaign against blasphemy on social media resulted in several indictments and legislation codifying the criminalization of online blasphemy. A Supreme Court hearing for the appeal of Asia Bibi, a Christian woman sentenced to death for blasphemy in 2010, remained on indefinite hold since October 2016. Several sources reported the continued practice of initiating blasphemy complaints against neighbors, peers, or business associates to intimidate them or to settle personal grievances, and said there were instances in which government entities such as the police and courts were complicit in this practice. Legal observers said authorities took steps to protect some individuals from unfounded accusations of blasphemy, although lower courts continued to fail to adhere to basic evidentiary standards in blasphemy cases. Despite an August directive from the Islamabad High Court, the parliament took no action to amend the penal code to make the penalties for false accusations of blasphemy commensurate with those for committing blasphemy. According to Ahmadiyya community leaders, the targeting and harassment of Ahmadi Muslims for blasphemy and other purported violations of law persisted. In October the president signed into law a bill that changed the electoral oath affirming belief that the Prophet Muhammed is the final prophet of Islam to a “declaration” and abolished separate voter lists for Ahmadis, sparking an uproar and weeks of protests by supporters of cleric Khadim Hussain Rizvi and his Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan political party, which said the change in the electoral oath was tantamount to blasphemy. In October and November, parliament passed legislation reversing both changes. Some government officials engaged in anti-Ahmadi rhetoric and attended events that Ahmadi Muslims said incited violence against members of their community. The government continued to prosecute counterterrorism actions under the NAP, which included an explicit goal of countering sectarian hate speech and extremism. Civil society groups expressed concern that authorities often failed to intervene in instances of societal violence against religious minorities, and police failed to arrest perpetrators of such abuses. NGOs and media outlets, however, reported police intervention helped to prevent religiously based violence on some occasions. Members of religious minority communities stated the government was inconsistent in safeguarding minority rights, and official discrimination against Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, and Ahmadiyya Muslims persisted. A bill passed by the Sindh Assembly in November 2016 criminalizing forced conversions stalled when the governor declined to ratify it, disappointing religious minority activists.

In April a mob attacked, shot, and beat university student Mashal Khan to death on the campus of Abdul Wali Khan University in Mardan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, following an accusation of blasphemy. According to university administrator statements, police who reported to the scene were unable to control the mob because there were so many students involved. A subsequent police investigation found that a group at the university had manufactured the blasphemy allegation against Khan due to his activism on campus. Members of the public and government officials, including the prime minister, condemned the killing. On September 19, an Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) indicted 57 individuals, including university employees, for their roles in the killing. The trial was ongoing at year’s end.

In January according to media reports, five secular social media activists who had criticized the government disappeared from cities around the country, triggering a public outcry against the government, which was widely believed to be responsible for the abductions. While the activists were missing, a number of Muslim clerics launched a social media campaign labeling the bloggers as blasphemers deserving of death. Four of the five activists reappeared several weeks later. In October one of the bloggers publicly stated he had been tortured by a state intelligence agency during his disappearance. As of year’s end, the whereabouts and fate of the fifth blogger, Samar Abbas, remained unknown. On December 22, the Federal Investigation Agency told the Islamabad High Court that it had found no evidence the bloggers had committed blasphemy.

According to press reports, in October Majlis Wahdat-ul-Muslimeen, a Shia political organization, launched a protest campaign in Karachi to highlight the issue of Shia activists who had been unlawfully detained or “disappeared” by authorities in recent years. Shia representatives had previously reported the government targeted Shia activists under the pretense of law enforcement actions. The Sindh chief minister denied the allegations.

According to CSOs, Indrias Masih, a Christian accused along with 41 others of lynching two Muslim men, died of gastrointestinal tuberculosis in August in Kot Lakhpat Jail in Lahore. Some organizations said prison authorities neglected Masih’s health due to his status as a minority member. An ATC indicted Masih and the other 41 on charges of murder and terrorism in September 2016. The lynching allegedly occurred after terrorists bombed two Christian churches in March 2015. The trial was ongoing at year’s end.

According to data provided by CSOs, police registered new cases against at least 17 individuals under blasphemy laws during the year, compared with 18 new cases in 2016. There were continued reports of individuals initiating blasphemy complaints against neighbors, peers, or business associates to settle personal disputes or to intimidate vulnerable persons. While the law requires a senior police official to investigate any blasphemy charge before a complaint can be filed, human rights activists said police did not uniformly follow this procedure. According to religious organizations and human rights groups, religious minorities continued to be disproportionately accused of blasphemy relative to their small percentage of the population. CSOs also stated police continued not to file charges against many individuals who made false blasphemy accusations, and if charges were filed, courts most often acquitted those accused.

On June 11, an ATC in Bahawalpur, Punjab, sentenced Taimoor Raza, a Shia Muslim, to death after he was convicted of posting blasphemous material on social media. The verdict represented the first time courts had convicted an individual for blasphemy stemming from a social media posting. The appeals process was ongoing at year’s end.

On September 14, a court in Gujrat, Punjab, sentenced Nadeem James, a Christian man, to death after he was convicted of sending blasphemous content via WhatsApp. James appealed the verdict to the Lahore High Court, and the case was pending at year’s end.

On October 12, a court in Sheikhupura, Punjab, sentenced three Ahmadis to death for blasphemy based on an incident that occurred in 2014. According to representatives of the Ahmadiyya community, the acts of blasphemy allegedly committed by the three involved their removal of posters that advocated the murder of Ahmadis with impunity due to their alleged apostasy.

In May a court in Rawalpindi sentenced Zafar Bhatti, a Christian, to life in prison for allegedly sending blasphemous text messages in 2012. Bhatti’s lawyer said he planned to appeal the case to the Lahore High Court.

In January an ATC in Lahore acquitted 115 individuals charged with burning more than 125 Christian homes in Joseph Colony in 2013, following a blasphemy allegation against a member of the Christian community. According to press reports, the courts cited a lack of evidence in the acquittal. At year’s end, no one had been convicted for the incident. The Christian whose alleged blasphemy sparked the attack remained on death row following his 2014 conviction.

In May media reported police in Hub, Balochistan, arrested Prakash Kumar, a Hindu, for sharing allegedly blasphemous material on social media. Police refused to hand Kumar over to a mob that subsequently gathered outside the station. In the violence that followed, a minor was killed and three police officers were injured. Kumar’s case was ongoing at year’s end.

The Supreme Court’s indefinite postponement of hearings regarding the case of Asia Bibi, a Christian woman sentenced to death for blasphemy in 2010, continued. Authorities arrested Bibi in June 2009 after a group of Muslim women with whom she was arguing accused her of blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad. The Supreme Court indefinitely postponed Bibi’s October 2016 appeal hearing when a member of the three-judge bench assigned to the appeal unexpectedly recused himself. Prior to the judge’s recusal, clerics affiliated with some religious organizations threatened death to anyone involved in Bibi’s release. There was no subsequent hearing during the year.