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Qatar

Executive Summary

The State of Qatar is the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and has one of the highest per capita incomes in the world. A diplomatic and economic embargo of Qatar launched by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt (the Quartet) in June 2017 ended in January 2021 when the Government of Qatar and those of the Quartet signed an agreement at a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit in al-Ula, Saudi Arabia that ended airspace, naval, and land embargos and laid the foundation for restoring diplomatic and commercial relations between Qatar and the Quartet countries. Despite a decrease in gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 and 2020, which stemmed from depressed hydrocarbon prices and sales (the latter partially due to the Covid-19 pandemic), Qatar’s real GDP is forecasted to grow by 2.7 percent in 2021 according to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) projections. This positive outlook is largely driven by Qatar Petroleum’s ambitious plans to expand LNG production by more than 60 percent over the next five years. Determined to maintain high-level government spending on projects ahead of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, Qatar projects a $9.5 billion budget deficit in 2021, based on a conservative oil price assumption of $40 per barrel. Qatar’s real GDP contracted by 4.5 percent in the third quarter of 2020, compared to the same period in 2019.

The government remains the dominant actor in the economy, though it encourages private investment in many sectors and continues to take steps to encourage more foreign direct investment (FDI). The dominant driver of Qatar’s economy is the energy sector, which has attracted tens of billions of dollars in FDI. In line with the country’s National Vision 2030 plan’s goal of establishing a knowledge-based and diversified economy, the government of Qatar has recently introduced reforms to its foreign investment and foreign property ownership laws that allow up to 100 percent foreign ownership of businesses in most sectors and real estate in newly designated areas. In 2020, the government also enacted legislation to regulate and promote Public-Private Partnerships.

There are significant opportunities for foreign investment in infrastructure, healthcare, education, tourism, energy, information and communications technology, and services. The government allocated $15 billion for new projects in these sectors over the next three years. Measured by the amount of inward FDI stock, manufacturing, mining and quarrying, finance, and insurance are the primary sectors that attract foreign investors. The government provides various incentives to attract local and foreign investments, including exemptions from customs duties and certain land-use benefits. The World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report ranked Qatar third globally in terms of favorable taxation regimes, and first in the category of ease of registering property. The corporate tax rate is 10 percent for most sectors and there is no personal income tax. One notable exception is the corporate tax of 35 percent on foreign firms in the extractive industries, including but not limited to those in natural gas extraction.

The government has created an effective regulatory regime that enables various government agencies (the Transparency Authority, the National Competition Protection Authority, and the Anti-Monopoly Committee) to curb corruption and anti-competitive practices. To improve transparency, the government streamlined its procurement processes in 2016 creating an online portal for all government tenders.

In recent years, Qatar has begun to invest heavily in the United States through its sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) and its subsidiaries, notably Qatari Diar. QIA has pledged to invest $45 billion in the United States. QIA opened an office in New York City in September 2015 to facilitate these investments. The September 2020 third annual U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue further strengthened strategic and economic partnerships and addressed obstacles to investment and trade. The fourth round of strategic talks is expected to take place in Doha in 2021.

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 30 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2020 70 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings
Global Innovation Index 2020 70 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 USD 14,198 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/
World Bank GNI per capita 2019 USD 61,180 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

Over the past few years, the government of Qatar enacted reforms to incentivize foreign investment. As Qatar finalizes major infrastructure developments in preparation for hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup, the government has allocated $15 billion for new, non-oil sector projects to be awarded between 2021 and 2023, including for developing new residential land, setting up drainage networks, and building new public hospitals. As of 2021, the government plans to increase LNG production by 64 percent by 2027 and Qatari government officials expect significant investment opportunities for international companies in the upstream and downstream sectors. In 2019, Qatar’s national oil and gas company, Qatar Petroleum, announced localization initiative “Tawteen,” which provides incentives to local and foreign investors willing to establish domestic manufacturing facilities for oil and gas sector inputs. The government established in 2019 the Investment Promotion Agency to further attract foreign direct investment to Qatar. These economic spending and promotion plans should create additional opportunities for foreign investors.

In 2019, the government enacted a new foreign investment law (Law 1/2019) to ease restrictions on foreign investment. The law’s executive regulations permit full foreign ownership of businesses in most sectors with the possibility of fully repatriating the foreign owner’s profits, protecting the owner from expropriation, in addition to several other benefits. Excepted sectors include banking, insurance, and commercial agencies, where foreign capital investment remains limited to a maximum of 49 percent ownership, barring special dispensation from the Cabinet. In 2020, the government also enacted long-awaited Public-Private Partnership Law 12/2020, to further develop the domestic private sector and improve the government’s ability to manage and finance projects. The government is currently in the process of publishing regulations for the implementation of this new law, which should include rules governing foreign participation. Qatar’s primary foreign investment promotion and evaluation body is the Invest in Qatar Center within the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Qatar is also home to the Qatar Financial Centre, Qatar Science and Technology Park, and the Qatar Free Zones Authority, all of which offer full foreign ownership and repatriation of profits, tax incentives, and investment funds for small- and medium-sized enterprises.

The government extends preferential treatment to suppliers who use local content in their bids on government contracts. Participation in tenders with a value of QAR five million ($1.37 million) or less is limited to local contractors, suppliers, and merchants registered with the Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Higher-value tenders sometimes in theory do not require any local commercial registration; in practice, certain exceptions exist.

Qatar maintains ongoing dialogue with the United States through both official and private sector tracks, including the annual U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue and official trade missions. Qatari officials have repeatedly emphasized a desire to increase both American investments in Qatar and Qatari investments in the United States.

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

The government recently reformed its foreign investment legal framework. As noted above, full foreign ownership is now permitted in all sectors except for banking, insurance, and commercial agencies. Law 1/2019 on Regulating the Investment of Non-Qatari Capital in Economic Activity (replacing Law 13/2000) grants foreign investors the ability to invest either through partnership with a Qatari investor owning 51 percent or more of the enterprise, or by applying to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for up to 100 percent foreign ownership. The Invest in Qatar Center within the Ministry of Commerce and Industry is the entity responsible for vetting full foreign ownership applications. The law includes provisions on the protection of foreign investment from expropriation, the exemption of some foreign investment projects from income tax and customs duties, and the right to transfer profits and ownership without delay.

Law 16/2018 on Regulating Non-Qatari Ownership and Use of Properties allows foreign individuals, companies, and real estate developers freehold ownership of real estate in 10 designated zones and ‎usufructuary rights up to 99 years in 16 other zones. Foreigners may also own villas within residential complexes, as well as retail outlets in certain commercial complexes. Foreign real estate investors and owners are eligible for residency in Qatar for as long as they own their property. The Ministry of Justice created a Committee on Non-Qatari Ownership and Use of Real Estate in December 2018 to regulate non-Qatari real estate ownership and use.

Other FDI incentives exist, including ones extended by the Qatar Financial Centre, the Qatar Free Zones Authority, and the Qatar Science and Technology Park. A Public-Private Partnership legislation (Law 12/2020) was enacted in May 2020 to facilitate direct foreign investment in national infrastructure development (currently focused on hospitals, land development, and drainage networks). In part due to these reforms, Qatar’s World Bank’s Doing Business ranking improved in 2020 from 83rd to 77th position. Nonetheless, Qatar’s World Bank ranking in more than half of its annual categories continues to be lower than 100th, including in the categories of starting a business, getting credit, protecting minority investors, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, and resolving insolvency.

U.S. investors and companies are not disadvantaged by existing ownership or control mechanisms, sector restrictions, or investment screening mechanisms more than other foreign investors.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

Qatar underwent a World Trade Organization (WTO) policy review in April 2014. Qatar is due for another review in 2021. The reviews may be viewed on the WTO website: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp396_e.htm 

Business Facilitation

Recent reforms have further streamlined the commercial registration process. Local and foreign investors may apply for a commercial license through the Ministry of Commerce and Industry’s (MOCI) physical “one-stop shop” or online through the Invest in Qatar Center’s portal. Per Law 1/2019, upon submission of a complete application, the Ministry will issue its decision within 15 days. Rejected applications can be resubmitted or appealed. For more information on the application and required documentation, visit: https://invest.gov.qa 

The World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report estimates that registering a small-size limited liability company in Qatar can take eight to nine days. For detailed information on business registration procedures, as evaluated by the World Bank, visit: http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/qatar/ 

For more information on business registration in Qatar, visit:

Outward Investment

Qatar does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. According to the latest foreign investment survey from the Planning and Statistics Authority, Qatar’s outward foreign investment stock reached $109.9 billion in the second quarter of 2019. In 2018, sectors that accounted for most of Qatar’s outward FDI were finance and insurance (40 percent of total), transportation, storage, information and communication (33 percent), and mining and quarrying (18 percent). As of 2018, Qatari investment firms held investments in about 80 countries; the top destinations were the European Union (34 percent of total), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC, 24 percent), and other Arab countries (14 percent).

2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties

Qatar has 59 bilateral investment treaties (BITs), according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Twenty-six BITs are in force, namely with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Egypt, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Jordan, Montenegro, Morocco, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, and Turkey. The most recent BIT was signed with Rwanda in November 2018 but has not yet come into force. A full list of current BITs with the State of Qatar can be found at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/171/qatar 

While Qatar has not entered into a bilateral investment or trade treaty with the United States, the two nations established a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in 2004. Additionally, as part of the GCC, Qatar has signed 12 treaties with investment provisions (TIPs), including one between the GCC and the United States in 2012, but this treaty has not yet entered into force.

Qatar does not have a double taxation treaty with the United States. In 2015, Qatar became the first GCC country to sign a Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) intergovernmental agreement with the United States. In total, Qatar has over 80 agreements for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, including, most recently, with Somalia (2020), Morocco (2020), and China (2020).

Qatar has recently improved its taxation regime. In 2019, the government established the General Tax Authority as the central tax collection and compliance body of the government. In the same year, the government implemented the GCC 2016 Excise Tax Framework Agreement, imposing consumption-based excise taxes on select goods deemed harmful to human health, including tobacco (100 percent excise tax), sweetened carbonated drinks (50 percent), energy drinks (100 percent), and “special-category goods,” including alcoholic beverages (100 percent), and pork (100 percent). The decision was promulgated in Law 25 of 2018 and applies to both locally produced and imported goods in those categories. On April 1, the government of Qatar removed the excise tax from “special purpose goods.” As a GCC member state, Qatar has agreed to introduce a common value-added tax (VAT) of five percent. In 2017, Qatar approved a draft law on the proposed VAT, but has not committed to an implementation timeline.

3. Legal Regime

Transparency of the Regulatory System

The World Trade Organization recognizes Qatar’s legal framework as conducive to private investment and entrepreneurship and enabling of the development of an independent judiciary system. Qatar has taken measures to protect competition and ensure a free and efficient economy. In addition to the National Competition Protection and Anti-Monopoly Committee, regulatory authorities exist for most economic sectors and are mandated to monitor economic activity and ensure fair practices.

Nonetheless, according to the World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance, Qatar lacks a transparent rulemaking mechanism, as government ministries and regulatory agencies do not share regulatory plans or publish draft laws for public consideration. An official public consultation process does not exist in Qatar. Laws and regulations are developed by relevant ministries. The 45-member Shura Council (which should statutorily have at least 30 publicly elected officials, is in practice comprised solely of direct appointees by the Amir) must reach consensus to pass draft legislation, which is then returned to the Cabinet for further review and to the Amir for final approval. Shura Council elections are planned for October 2021. The text of all legislation is published online and in local newspapers upon approval by the Amir. All Qatari laws are issued in Arabic and eventually translated to English. Qatar-based legal firms provide translations of Qatari legislation to their clients. Each approved law explicitly tasks one or more government entities with implementing and enforcing legislation. These entities are clearly defined in the text of each law. In some cases, the law also sets up regulatory and oversight committees consisting of representatives of concerned government entities to safeguard enforcement. Qatar’s official legal portal is http://www.almeezan.qa .

Qatar’s primary commercial regulator is the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Commercial Companies’ Law 11/2015 requires that publicly traded companies submit financial statements to the Ministry in compliance with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the International Accounting Standards (IAS). Publicly listed companies must also publish financial statements at least 15 days prior to annual general meetings in two local newspapers (in Arabic and English) and on their websites. All companies are required to prepare accounting records according to standards promulgated by the IAS Board.

The Qatar Central Bank (QCB) is the main financial regulator that oversees all financial institutions in Qatar, per Law 13/2012. To promote financial stability and enhance regulatory coordination, the law established a Financial Stability and Risk Control Committee, which is headed by the QCB Governor. According to Law 7/2005, the Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) Regulatory Authority is the independent regulator of the QFC firms and individuals conducting financial services in or from the QFC, but the QCB also oversees financial markets housed within QFC. QFC regulations are available at http://www.qfcra.com/en-us/legislation/ .

The government of Qatar is transparent about its public finances and debt obligations. QCB publishes quarterly banking data, including on government external debt, government bonds, treasury bills, and sukuk (Islamic bonds).

International Regulatory Considerations

Qatar is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a political and economic regional union. Laws based on GCC regulations must be approved through Qatar’s domestic legislative process and are reviewed by the Qatari Cabinet and the Shura Council prior to implementation. Qatar has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1996 and usually notifies its draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).

Legal System and Judicial Independence

Qatar’s legal system is based on a combination of civil and Islamic Sharia laws. The Constitution takes precedence over all laws, followed by legislation and decrees, and finally ministerial resolutions. All judges are appointed by the Supreme Judicial Council, under Law 10/2003. The Supreme Judicial Council oversees Qatari courts and functions independently from the executive branch of the government, per the Constitution. Qatari courts adjudicate civil and commercial disputes in accordance with civil and Sharia laws. International agreements have equal status with Qatari laws; the Constitution ensures that international pacts, treaties, and agreements to which Qatar is a party are respected.

Qatar does not currently have a specialized commercial court, but in 2019, the Cabinet approved a draft decision to set up a court for investment and trade disputes. Pending the establishment of the new court, domestic commercial disputes continue to be settled in civil courts. Contract enforcement is governed by the Civil Code Law 22/2004. Decisions made in civil courts can be appealed before the Court of Appeals, or later the Court of Cassation.

Companies registered with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry are subject to Qatari courts and laws—primarily the Commercial Companies’ Law 11/2015—while companies set up through Qatar Financial Center (QFC) are regulated by commercial laws based on English Common Law and the courts of the QFC Regulatory Authority, per Law 7/2005. The QFC legal regime is separate from the Qatari legal system—with the exception of criminal law—and is only applicable to companies licensed by the QFC. Similarly, companies registered within the Qatar Free Zones Authority are governed by specialized regulations.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

Over the past few years, the Amir enacted Law 1/2019 on Regulating the Investment of Non-Qatari Capital in Economic Activity and Law 16/2018 on Regulating Non-Qatari Ownership and Use of Properties. These aim to encourage greater foreign investment in the economy by authorizing, incentivizing and protecting foreign ownership.

The MOCI’s Invest in Qatar Center is the Ministry’s main investment promotion body. It has a physical “one-stop-shop” and an online portal. It gives preference to investments that add value to the local economy and align with the country’s national development plans. For more information on investment opportunities, commercial registration application and required documentation, visit: https://invest.gov.qa .

Separate laws and regulations govern foreign direct investment at the Qatar Financial Centre ( http://www.qfc.qa/ ), the Qatar Free Zones Authority ( https://fza.gov.qa/ ), the Qatar Science and Technology Park ( https://qstp.org.qa/ ), and Manateq ( https://www.manateq.qa/ ).

Competition and Antitrust Laws

Certain sectors are not open for domestic or foreign competition, such as public transportation, as well as fuel distribution and marketing. In those sectors, semi-public companies maintain a predominant role. Law 19/2006 for the Protection of Competition and Prevention of Monopolistic Practice established the Competition Protection and Anti-Monopoly Committee in charge of receiving complaints about anti-competition violations. The law protects against monopolistic behavior by entities outside the state, if it is deemed they would impact the Qatari market; instead, the law affords state institutions and government-owned companies full or predominant role in those sectors.

Qatari laws allow international law firms with at least 15 years of continuous experience in their countries of origin to operate in Qatar, however, they can only be licensed in Qatar if Qatari authorities deem their fields of specialization useful to Qatar. Cabinet Decision Number 57/2010 stipulates that the Doha office of an international law firm can practice in Qatar only if its main office in the country of origin remains open.

Expropriation and Compensation

Under current legislation (Law 1/2019 and Law 16/2018), the government protects foreign investment and property from direct or indirect expropriation, unless for public benefit, in a non-discriminatory manner, and after providing adequate compensation. The same procedures are applied to expropriated property of Qatari citizens. Law 13/1988 covers the rules of expropriation for public benefit.

There were no Cabinet-approved expropriation decisions in 2020, and one decision in 2019. Expropriation is unlikely to occur in the investment zones in which foreigners may purchase or obtain rights to property, although the law does not restrict the power to expropriate in these areas.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

Qatar has been party to the 1958 New York Convention since 2011 and a member of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) since 2002. Qatar enforces foreign arbitral decisions concluded in states that are party to the New York Convention.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

The government accepts binding international arbitration in the event of investment disputes; nevertheless, Qatari courts will not enforce judgments or awards from other courts in disputes emanating from legal proceedings or arbitrations made under the jurisdictions of other nations/systems.

According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, over the past 10 years, Qatar was involved in 10 investment disputes, nine of which were initiated by Qatari investors against foreign governments. Three of the 10 disputes have been discontinued, and the remaining seven are still outstanding.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

The Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) features an Alternative Dispute Resolution Center. Although primarily concerned with hearing commercial matters arising within the QFC itself, the QFC has expanded the center’s jurisdiction to accept other disputes at its discretion. The Qatar International Court and Dispute Resolution Center adjudicates disputes brought by firms associated with the QFC in accordance with English common law.

Qatar’s arbitration law (Law 2/2017) based on the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law gives Qatar’s International Court and Dispute Resolution Centre the jurisdiction to oversee arbitration cases in Qatar in line with recent local and international developments. The purpose of this law is to stimulate and strengthen Qatar’s investment and business environment.

There is no set duration for dispute resolution and the time to obtain a resolution depends on the case. The Qatar International Court and Dispute Resolution Centre publishes past judgments on its website ( https://www.qicdrc.com.qa/the-courts/judgments ).

In order to protect their interests, U.S. firms are advised to consult with a Qatari or foreign-based law firm when executing contracts with local parties.

Bankruptcy Regulations

Two concurrent bankruptcy regimes exist in Qatar. The first is the local regime, the provisions of which are set out in Commercial Law 27/2006 (Articles 606-846). The bankruptcy of a Qatari citizen or a Qatari-owned company is rarely announced, and the government sometimes plays the role of guarantor to prop up domestic businesses and safeguard creditors’ rights. The law aims to protect creditors from a bankrupted debtor whose assets are insufficient to meet the amount of the debts. Bankruptcy is punishable by imprisonment, but the length of the prison sentence depends on violations of other penal codes, such as concealment or destruction of company records, embezzlement, or knowingly contributing to insolvency.

The Qatar Central Bank (QCB) established the Qatar Credit Bureau in 2010 to promote credit growth in Qatar. The Credit Bureau provides QCB and the banking sector with a centralized credit database to inform economic and financial policies and support the implementation of risk management techniques as outlined in the Basel II Accord.

The second bankruptcy regime is encoded in QFC’s Insolvency Regulations of 2005 and applies to corporate bodies and branches registered within the QFC. There are firms that offer full dissolution bankruptcy services to QFC-registered companies.

The World Bank’s Doing Business Report for 2020 gave Qatar a score of 38 out of 100 on its Resolving Insolvency Indicator (123rd in the world) due to the high cost associated with the process and the long time it takes to complete foreclosure proceedings (2.8 years, on average).

4. Industrial Policies

Investment Incentives

Qatar does not impose a personal income tax and the new foreign investment law (Law 1/2019) offers a variety of other incentives to foreign investors, which may include the following:

  • Exemption from 10 percent corporate tax for a period of up to 10 years.
  • Exemption from customs duties on imports of necessary machinery and equipment.
  • Exemption from customs duties on imports of raw materials or half-manufactured goods necessary for production and not available in the local market, for industrial projects.
  • Up to 100 percent foreign ownership and no limit on repatriation.

Legislation provides for the establishment of some industrial projects in designated industrial zones under the Qatar Free Zones Authority; those projects receive the following incentives:

  • Exemption from 10 percent corporate tax for a period of up to 20 years.
  • Zero custom duties on imports.
  • Potential access to a $3 billion government-backed fund.
  • 100 percent foreign ownership and no limit on repatriation.
  • Opportunities for joint ventures with local companies.
  • Potential access to a backed investment fund.

Qatar Petroleum determines the amount of foreign equity and the extent of incentives for industrial energy-related projects; Law 8/2018 regulates the process.

In February 2020, and in line with the government’s efforts to improve the ease of doing business and enhance the investment environment for owners of small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), MOCI, in partnership with Qatar Development Bank, launched the ‘Land and Industrial Loan’ initiative, offering loans and industrial land to SMEs.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

Qatar has several free zones and business facilitation options, namely the Qatar Financial Center, Qatar Science and Technology Park, and Qatar Free Zones Authority:

  • Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) is an onshore business platform that allows international financial institutions and professional service companies to establish offices in Qatar with 100 percent foreign ownership and full repatriation of profits. Locally sourced profits are subject to a 10 percent corporate tax. The QFC has its own independent regulatory regime based on English common law. The QFC Regulatory Authority acts as the regulator for financial firms operating the QFC’s umbrella. The QFC Regulatory Tribunal and Qatar International Court hear and adjudicate cases. Judgments issued though these bodies are only of value if enforced by Qatari courts against persons and/or Qatar-based assets. Goldman Sachs International, Mastercard Gulf, Uber, and Oracle are among the companies registered with QFC.
  • The Qatar Science and Technology Park (QSTP) is a hub designed to conduct research and development and facilitate the transfer of expertise and technology. The hub offers grants and incubators to foreign and local innovators. QSTP permits licensed foreign companies to own up to 100 percent and full capital and income repatriation. Companies operating at the QSTP can import goods and services duty free and export goods produced at the park tax-free. Firms at the park are also exempt from all taxes, including the 10 percent income tax. The property of these businesses cannot be seized under any circumstance, but capital and other cash may be seized on the orders of a local court. Microsoft, ExxonMobil, GE, Cisco, and ConocoPhillips are among QSTP member companies.
  • The Qatar Free Zones Authority (QFZ) oversees two free zones in Qatar: Ras Bufontas near the country’s international airport and Um Alhoul adjacent to the country’s largest commercial seaport. Companies operating in these free zones are permitted 100 percent foreign ownership, corporate tax exemption for 20 years, full repatriation of profits, custom duties exemption on all imports, and a range of other incentives. Google, DHL, and Volkswagen are notable examples of multinational companies operating at the QFZ.

In May 2020, the Amir approved Law 12/2020 on Organizing the Partnership between the Public and Private Sector. This law is the government’s most recent attempt to further attract foreign investors and develop the private sector.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

There are no laws that obligate the private sector to hire Qatari nationals, but the public sector and institutions working closely with the government on projects and joint ventures (such as energy companies operating in Qatar) are required to hire Qatari nationals. Workforce localization policy (known as “Qatarization”) in the public sector is a main focus of the country’s National Vision 2030 and foreign investors wishing to operate fully owned companies will be required to submit a “Qatarization” plan. In 2020, the Cabinet approved a new Ministerial Decree that will mandate that Qataris should make up at least 60 percent of the workforce of state-owned companies or companies where the government is a majority investor. Children of Qatari women are considered Qataris for purposes of calculating this localization ratio. The new provision also states that Qataris should make up 80 percent of the human resources workforce in state-owned companies. The government allocates employers visa slots for hiring nationals of specific countries based on preset quotas; such slots are non-transferable without obtaining approval from the Ministry of Administrative Development, Labor, and Social Affairs.

While Qatar does not follow a forced localization policy, the government provides preferential treatment to suppliers that use local content in bids when competing for government contracts. The government of Qatar also gives a 10 percent price preference to goods produced with Qatari content. As a rule, participation in government tenders with a value of QAR 5,000,000 or less (equivalent to approximately $1.37 million) is limited to local contractors, suppliers, and merchants registered with the Qatar Chamber of Commerce; tenders involving higher valuations do not in theory require any local commercial registration; however, in practice, certain exceptions exist.

In 2019, Qatar’s national oil and gas company, Qatar Petroleum, announced a localization initiative, Tawteen, which, among other things, would require all Qatar Petroleum suppliers, as well as bidders for select contracts, to undergo assessment by a third-party auditor to determine their In-Country Value (ICV) score. Qatar Petroleum and its subsidiary companies would assess bidders’ ICV score in addition to technical and commercial criteria when evaluating bids. The formula for calculating a company’s ICV score can be found at https://www.tawteen.com.qa/In-Country-Value-Policy/ICV-Formula-Calculation .

No specific performance requirements exist for Qatar-based-foreign investment. While disclosure of financial and employment data is required, proprietary information is not. There are no known formalized requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to the authorities for surveillance. The information and communications technology (ICT) sector is regulated by Qatar’s Communications Regulatory Authority, established as an independent body by Amiri Decree 42/2014, under the Ministry of Transport and Communications. Qatar is the first Gulf nation to enact a Data Protection Law 13/2016, which requires companies to comply with restrictions related to the collection, disclosure, and safekeeping of personal data. The regulator responsible for enforcing the Data Protection Law is the Ministry of Transport and Communications.

5. Protection of Property Rights

Real Property

A set of laws, ministerial decrees, and resolutions make up the country’s jurisprudence on property rights and ownership. Law 16/2018 designates 10 zones in which foreign investors, companies, and real estate developers are permitted full property ownership. The law also allows foreign investors usufructuary right of real estate of up to 99 years in 16 other zones. Additionally, foreigners may own villas within residential complexes, as well as retail outlets in certain commercial complexes. In October 2020, the government announced that more zones will be open to foreign ownership in the near future. The government will grant non-Qatari real estate owners’ residency in Qatar for as long as they own their properties. Following the release of the law, the Ministry of Justice formed a committee to regulate foreign real estate ownership and use.

Law 6/2014 regulates real estate development and stipulates that non-Qatari companies should have at least 10 years of experience and be headquartered in Qatar as a precondition for carrying out real estate development activities at selected locations.

The government of Qatar enforces property leasehold rights. Qatar’s Rent Law 4/2008 tends to extend more protections to the lessee while regulating lessors. The government grants a number of enforceable rights to the lessee, including protection from rent hikes during the lease period and enforcement of the terms of the lease contract should the lessor transfer ownership. The government protects lessors against tenants’ violations of lease agreements. Qatar’s Leasing Dispute Settlement Committee enforces these regulations. The committee hears and issues binding decisions and requires all lessors register their lease agreements with this committee. The Ministry of Municipality and Environment oversees the preparation of all records related to the selling, leasing, waiver, and bequeathing of real estate. A reliable electronic database exists to check for encumbrances, including liens, mortgages, and restrictions, as well as keeping all titles and deed records in digital format.

The World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report ranked Qatar first globally under the Ease of Registering Property’s category http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/qatar#registering-property 

Intellectual Property Rights

While Qatar’s intellectual property (IP) legal regime is still under development, it is robust and includes a wide range of legislation that protects different types of IP rights. Qatar has signed many international IP treaties, and Qatari laws and regulations guarantee the implementation of those treaties. Qatar’s IP legislation includes the Trademark and Copyright Law (enacted in 2002), the Protection of Trade Secrets and Protection of Layout Design law (2005), the Patent Law (2006), and most recently, the Protection of Industrial Design law (2020). These laws grant foreign applicants the same rights as Qataris, provided they are nationals of a state that grants Qatar reciprocal treatment.

Intellectual property owners can apply for IP rights at MOCI, which is mandated, by Law 20/2014, to enforce IP laws and regulations. Within the ministry, an IP Protection Department has been set up with offices focusing on trademarks, copyrights, patents, industrial designs, and innovations. The following are the periods of validity for the different types of registered IP:

  • Patents: Valid for 20 years from date of filing.
    • The Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) requires the registration of all imported pharmaceutical products and refuses to register unauthorized copies of products patented in other countries. Qatar also recognizes GCC patents on pharmaceutical products.
    • The GCC Patent Office used to provide an affordable and efficient option for companies seeking intellectual property protection throughout the six GCC member states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE). Effective January 2021, the office stopped accepting new patent filings. The decision will force companies seeking patent registration in the GCC region to file separate applications in each country, pay six separate fees, and endure substantial waiting period before their patents are registered in all six states.
  • Copyrights: Protected for 50 years after the author’s death.
    • Per Qatari law, failure to register at MOCI will not affect protection of the copyright. While the law does not protect unpublished works and does not criminalize end-user piracy, Qatar is party to the Berne and Paris Conventions and abides by their mandates regarding unpublished works. The IP Protection Department works with law enforcement authorities to prosecute resellers of unlicensed video and software.
  • Trademarks: Valid for 10 years but can be renewed indefinitely; trademarks unused for five consecutive years are subject to cancellation.
    • The GCC Customs Union, the GCC approved a common trademark law; Qatar is taking steps to enact it.
  • Industrial Designs: Valid for five years from submission date but can be renewed twice more.
    • This law covers the visual design rather than the functional or technical aspects of an original product. Law 10/2020 on the Protection of Industrial Design was enacted in May 2020.

The law on Intellectual Property Border Protection (Law 17/2011) forbids the importation of any products that infringe on any intellectual property rights protected in Qatar and obligates the General Authority of Customs to take measures to prevent the entry of infringing products into Qatar. The law also permits IP right holders to block the release of imported products that infringe on their rights, given sufficient evidence. In 2017, the General Authority of Customs launched an electronic system to detect counterfeit goods coming into the country. The system is accredited by the World Customs Organization and has been introduced to limit importation of counterfeit goods.

The existing Penal Code imposes hefty fines on individuals dealing in counterfeit products and prescribes prison terms for offenders convicted of counterfeiting, imitating, fraudulently affixing, or selling products, or offering services of a registered trademark, or other IP violations. The General Authority of Customs, the Consumer Protection and IP Protection Departments at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Ministry of Interior conduct surveys, search shops, and seize and destroy counterfeit products.

The United States Trade Representative Office (USTR) does not consider Qatar a market that engages in, turns a blind eye to, or benefits from piracy and counterfeit products, nor is Qatar listed in USTR’s Special 301 Report.

Qatar is a member of the World Trade Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and is a signatory of several WIPO treaties. For additional information on national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ .

Resources for Rights Holders

U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
Regional IP Attaché
Peter C. Mehravari, Intellectual Property Attaché for the Middle East & North Africa
U.S. Department of Commerce Foreign Commercial Service, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
U.S. Embassy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
+965 2259 1455
Peter.mehravari@trade.gov 
Web: https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-policy/intellectual-property-rights-ipr-attach-program/intellectual 

United States Trade Representative
IPR Direc
tor for the GCCJacob Ewerdt
+1-202-395-3866
Jacob.p.ewerdt@ustr.eop.gov 
Web: http://www.ustr.gov 

Companies and individuals seeking assistance on pursuing IP protections and enforcement claims in Qatar can consult a list of local attorneys posted on the U.S. Embassy Doha website: https://qa.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/attorneys/

6. Financial Sector

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

The government of Qatar has permitted foreign portfolio investment since 2005. There are no restrictions on the flow of capital in Qatar. Qatar Central Bank (QCB) adheres to conservative policies aimed at maintaining steady economic growth and a stable banking sector. It respects IMF Article VIII and does not restrict payments or transfers for international transactions. It allocates loans on market terms, and essentially treats foreign companies the same way it does local ones.

Existing legislation currently limits foreign ownership of Qatari companies listed on the Qatar Stock Exchange to 49 percent. The law permits foreign capital investment up to 100 percent in most sectors upon approval of an application submitted to MOCI’s Invest in Qatar Center. Foreign portfolio investment in national oil and gas companies or companies with the right of exploration of national resources cannot exceed 49 percent.

Almost all import transactions require standard letters of credit from local banks and their correspondent banks in the exporting countries. Financial institutions extend credit facilities to local and foreign investors within the framework of standard international banking practices. Creditors typically require foreign investors to produce a letter of guarantee from their local sponsor or equity partner.

In accordance with QCB guidelines, banks operating in Qatar give priority to Qataris and to public development projects in their financing operations. Additionally, banks usually refrain from extending credit facilities to single customers exceeding 20 percent of the bank’s capital and reserves. QCB does not allow cross-sharing arrangements among banks. QCB requires banks to maintain a maximum credit ratio of 90 percent.

Qatar has become an important banking and financial services hub in the Gulf region. Qatar’s monetary freedom score is 80.7 out of 100 (“free”) and ranks third in the Middle East and North Africa region (after the United Arab Emirates and Israel) in terms of economic freedom.

Money and Banking System

There are 17 licensed banks in Qatar, seven of which are foreign institutions. Qatar also has 20 exchange houses, six investment and finance companies, 16 insurance companies, and 17 investment funds. Other foreign banks and financial institutions operate under the Qatar Financial Center’s platform, but they are not licensed by QCB; they are regulated by the Qatar Financial Center Regulatory Authority and are not allowed to have retail branches in Qatar. Qatar National Bank is the largest financial institution by assets in the Middle East and Africa, with total assets exceeding $259.5 billion. To open a bank account in Qatar, foreigners must present proof of residency.

As the main financial regulator, QCB continues to introduce incentives for local banks to ensure a strong financial sector that is resilient during times of economic volatility. QCB manages liquidity by mandating a reserve ratio of 4.5 percent and utilizing treasury bonds, bills, and other macroprudential measures. Banks that do not abide by the required reserve ratio are penalized. QCB uses repurchase agreements, backed by government securities, to inject liquidity into the banks. According to QCB data, total domestic liquidity reached $164.8 billion in December 2020, and only 2.2 percent of Qatar’s bank loans in 2019 were nonperforming. International ratings agencies have expressed confidence in the financial stability of the country’s banks, given liquidity levels strong earnings and the support of the Central Bank to the banking industry.

Cryptocurrency trading is illegal in Qatar, per a 2018 Qatar Central Bank circular. In January 2020, the Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority (QFCRA) announced that firms operating under QFC are not permitted to provide or facilitate the provision or exchange of crypto assets and related services.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

Due to minimal demand for the Qatari riyal outside Qatar and the national economy’s dependence on gas and oil revenues, which are priced in dollars, the government has pegged the riyal to the U.S. dollar. The official peg is QAR 1.00 per $0.27 or $1.00 per QAR 3.64, as set by the government in June 1980 and reaffirmed by Amiri decree 31/2001.

Per the provisions of Law 20/2019 on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing and following the issuance of Cabinet Resolution 41/2019, starting February 2020, travelers to or from Qatar are required to complete a declaration form upon entry or departure, if carrying cash, precious metals, financial instruments, or jewelry, valued at QAR 50,000 or more ($13,736).

Remittance Policies

Qatar neither delays remittance of foreign investment returns nor restricts transfer of funds associated with an investment, such as return on dividends, return on capital, interest and principal payments on private foreign debt, lease payments, royalties, management fees, proceeds generated from sale or liquidation, sums garnered from settlements and disputes, and compensation from expropriation to financial institutions outside Qatar.

In accordance with Law 20/2019 on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, QCB requires financial institutions to apply due diligence prior to establishing business relationships, carrying out financial transactions, and performing wire transfers. Executive regulations for this law promulgate that originator information should be secured when a wire transfer exceeds QAR 3,500 ($962). Similarly, due diligence is required when a customer is completing occasional transactions in a single operation or several linked operations of an amount exceeding QAR 50,000 ($13,736).

Qatar is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Qatar is currently undergoing its second round FATF Mutual Evaluation and is tentatively scheduled to have its onsite assessment in summer 2021. In July 2017, Qatar signed a counterterrorism Memorandum of Understanding with the United States, which provides for information sharing, joint training, enhanced cooperation, and other deliverables related to combating money laundering and terrorism financing.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

The Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund, was established by Amiri Decree 22/2005. Chaired by the Amir, the Supreme Council for Economic Affairs and Investment oversees QIA, which does not disclose its assets (independent analysts estimate QIA’s holdings to be around $295 billion). QIA pursues direct investments and favors luxury brands, prime real estate, infrastructure development, and banks. Various QIA subsidiaries invest in other sectors, as well. In 2015, QIA opened an office in New York City to facilitate its $45 billion commitment of investments in the United States. QIA’s real estate subsidiary, Qatari Diar, has operated an office in Washington, D.C. since 2014.

QIA was one of the early supporters of the Santiago Principles, and among the few members that drafted the initial and final versions of the principles and continues to be a proactive supporter of their implementation. QIA was also a founding member of the IMF-hosted International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds. QIA supported the establishment of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds and helped create the Forum’s constitution.

7. State-Owned Enterprises

The State Audit Bureau oversees state-owned enterprises (SOEs), several of which operate as monopolies or with exclusive rights in most economic sectors. Despite the dominant role of SOEs in Qatar’s economy, the government has affirmed support for the local private sector and encourages small and medium-sized enterprise development as part of its National Vision 2030. The Qatari private sector is favored in bids for local contracts and generally receives favorable terms for financing at local banks. The following are Qatar’s major SOEs:

Energy and Power:

  • Qatar Petroleum (QP), its subsidiaries, and its partners operate all oil and gas activities in the country. QP is wholly owned by the government. Non-Qataris can invest in its stock exchange listed subsidiaries, but shareholder ownership is limited to two percent and total non-Qatari ownership to 49 percent.
  • Qatar General Electricity and Water Corporation (Kahramaa) is the main utility provider in the country and is majority-owned by Qatari government entities. To privatize the sector, the Qatar Electricity and Water Company (QEWC) was established in 2001 as a separate and private provider that sells its desalinated water and electricity to Kahramaa. Other privatization efforts included the Ras Laffan Power Company, established in 2001, and 55 percent owned by a U.S. company.

Aerospace:

  • Qatar Airways is the country’s national carrier and is wholly owned by the state.

Services:

  • Qatar General Postal Corporation is the state-owned postal company. Several other delivery companies compete in the courier market, including Aramex, DHL Express, and FedEx Express.

Information and Communication:

  • Ooredoo Group is a telecommunications company founded in 2013. It is the dominant player in the Qatari telecommunications market and is 70 percent owned by Qatari government entities. Ooredoo (previously known as Q-Tel) dominates both the cell and fixed line telecommunications markets in Qatar and partners with telecommunications companies in 13 markets in the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia. Ooredoo Group is listed on the Qatari Stock Exchange.
  • Vodafone Qatar is the only other telecommunications operator in Qatar, with the quasi-governmental entity Qatar Foundation owning 62 percent of its shares. Other Qatari government entities and Qatar-based investors own the remaining 38 percent. Vodafone Qatar is listed on the Qatari Stock Exchange.

Qatari SOEs may adhere to their own corporate governance codes and are not required to follow the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance. Some SOEs publish online corporate governance reports to encourage transparency, but there is no general framework for corporate governance across all Qatari SOEs. SOEs listed on the stock exchange must publish financial statements at least 15 days before annual general meetings in two local newspapers (in Arabic and English) and on their websites. When an SOE is involved in an investment dispute, the case is reviewed by the appropriate sector regulator (for example, the Communications Regulatory Authority for the information and communication sector).

Privatization Program

There is no ongoing official privatization program for major SOEs.

8. Responsible Business Conduct

There is a general awareness in Qatar of responsible business conduct. In 2007, Qatar created the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Network, a research and reporting entity that publishes annual reports highlighting best practices and honoring CSR leaders in the country. Many companies in Qatar publicize their CSR initiatives.

Sustainability is the focus of the National Development Strategy 2018-2022, released in March 2018; it is also an important goal of the National Vision 2030. Law 30/2002 is the main legislation protecting the environment. It prohibits the use of polluting equipment, machineries, and vehicles, and restricts the dumping and treatment of liquid or solid wastes to certain designated areas. The law also limits emissions of harmful vapors, gases, and smoke by the energy sector. This applies to all companies working in exploration and production of crude oil and natural gas.

The Ministry of Commerce and Industry has a dedicated Consumer Protection and Combating Commercial Fraud Department which has intensified its efforts in recent years by increasing the monitoring of records and inspection of stores and factories that sell or manufacture counterfeit goods. The ministry prosecutes business misconduct and announces these violations publicly. The government of Qatar maintains a reporting regime for suspicious transactions and requirements for consumer due diligence and record keeping.

As an economy dependent on extractive industries, Qatar participates in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Nonetheless, the Qatari government has not improved transparency regarding its management of the petroleum industry, as no regulatory body oversees resources extraction or revenue management. Moreover, Qatar has no freedom of information law.

Qatari law prohibits all forms of forced or compulsory labor and reserves two percent of jobs in government agencies and public institutions for persons with disabilities. The law also prohibits employment of children under 16 years of age. The Ministry of Administrative Development, Labor, and Social Affairs (MADLSA), the Ministry of Interior, and the National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) conduct training sessions for migrant laborers to educate them on their rights while in Qatar. International media and human rights organizations continue to allege numerous abuses against foreign workers, including forced or compulsory labor, withheld wages, unsafe working conditions, and poor living accommodations.

In January 2018, the United States and Qatar signed a government-to-government memorandum of understanding on exchanging expertise and fostering capacity building in combating human trafficking. In March 2019, the Department of Labor and MADLSA signed a Memorandum of Understanding on labor, which focused on two pillars: labor inspections and protecting domestic workers’ rights in Qatar. Some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Qatar focus on labor rights and often work in conjunction with the government. Researchers from international NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch continue to visit and report on the country with limited interference from authorities. International labor NGOs have been able to send researchers to Qatar under the sponsorship of academic institutions and quasi-governmental organizations such as the NHRC.

Private security companies cannot operate in Qatar without an appropriate license granted by the Ministry of Interior, per Law 19/2009 on Regulating the Provision of Private Security Services. As of 2009, Qatar has been signatory to the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies.

Additional Resources

Department of State

Department of Labor

9. Corruption

Corruption in Qatar does not generally affect the conduct of business, although the power of personal connections plays a major role in business culture. Qatar ranked as the second least corrupt country in the Middle East and North Africa, according to Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index and ranked 30th out of 180 nations globally with a score of 63 out of 100, with 100 indicating full transparency.

Qatari law imposes criminal penalties to combat corruption by public officials and the government actively implements these laws. In recent years, corruption and misuse of public money has been a focus of the executive office. Decree 6/2015 restructured the Administrative Control and Transparency Authority, granting it juridical responsibility, its own budget, and direct affiliation with the Amir’s office. The objectives of the authority are to prevent corruption and ensure that ministries and public employees operate with transparency. It is also mandated with investigating alleged crimes against public property or finances perpetrated by public officials.

Law 22/2015 imposes hefty penalties for corrupt officials and Law 11/2016 grants the State Audit Bureau more financial authority and independence, allowing it to publish parts of its findings (provided that confidential information is removed), a power it did not have previously. Individuals convicted of embezzlement are subject to prison terms of no less than five and up to ten years. The penalty is extended to a minimum term of seven and a maximum term of fifteen years if the perpetrator happens to be a public official in charge of collecting taxes or exercising fiduciary responsibilities over public funds. Qatar State Security Bureau and the Office of the Public Prosecutor handle investigations of alleged corruption. The Criminal Court makes final judgments.

Bribery is a crime in Qatar, and the law imposes penalties on public officials convicted of taking action in return for monetary or personal gain, and on other parties who take actions to influence or attempt to influence a public official through monetary or other means. The current Penal Code (Law 11/2004) governs corruption law and stipulates that individuals convicted of bribery may be sentenced up to ten years in prison and a fine equal to the amount of the bribe but no less than $1,374.

To promote a fairer, more transparent, and more expeditious public-sector tendering process, the government issued Procurement Law 24/2015, which abolished the Central Tendering Committee and established in its stead a Procurement Department within the Ministry of Finance that has oversight over the majority of government tenders. The new department has an online portal that consolidates all government tenders and provides relevant information to interested bidders, facilitating the process for foreign investors ( https://monaqasat.mof.gov.qa ).

Qatar is not a party to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. However, Qatar ratified the UN Convention for Combating Corruption (by Amiri Decree 17/2007) and established a National Committee for Integrity and Transparency (by Amiri Decree 84/2007). The permanent committee is headed by the Chairman of the State Audit Bureau. In 2013, Qatar opened the Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law Center in Doha in partnership with the United Nations. The purpose of the center is to support, promote, and disseminate legal principles to fight corruption (https://rolacc.qa/).

Despite these efforts, some American businesses continue to cite lack of transparency in government procurement and customs as recurring issues when operating in the Qatari market. U.S. investors and Qatari nationals who happen to be agents of U.S. firms are subject to the provisions of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

Resources to Report Corruption

The Public Prosecution’s Anti-Corruption Office encourages the public to report on corruption and bribery cases, and vows to protect the confidentiality of submitted information:

Public Prosecution
Anti-Corruption Office
+974-3353-1999 and +974-3343-1999
aco@pp.gov.qa 

The Administrative Control and Transparency Authority is also responsible for receiving complaints regarding transparency within the public sector:

Administrative Control and Transparency Authority
Al Bida St., Al Dafna, Doha
+974-40008088, +974-44648010, and +974-44648011
info@acta.gov.qa 

To file complaints: http://actadev.wpengine.com/en/complaints/ 

10. Political and Security Environment

Qatar is a politically stable country with low rates of crime. There are no political parties, labor unions, or organized domestic political opposition. The U.S government rates Qatar as medium for terrorism, which includes threats from transnational actors.

The State Department encourages U.S. citizens in Qatar to stay in close contact with the U.S. Embassy in Doha for up-to-date threat information. The Department invites U.S. visitors to Qatar to enroll in its State Department’s Smart Traveler Enrollment Program to receive further information on safety conditions in Qatar: https://step.state.gov/step/.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

Qatar has one of the world’s highest migrant workers to indigenous population ratios, with foreigners making up nearly 90 percent of the country’s population. Qatar’s resident population is estimated at 2.7 million as of December 2020, doubling in the last decade. Qatari citizens are estimated to number approximately 300,000 – around 11 percent of the total population. Qatar’s labor force consists primarily of expatriate workers. The largest group of foreign workers comes from the Indian sub-continent. Males make up around 72 percent of the population.

Unemployment rates in Qatar are among the lowest in the world, with 0.1 percent unemployment rate for men and 0.4 percent unemployment rate for women, as of 2019. In 2020, the Cabinet approved a new Ministerial Decree to Law 14/2004, mandating that Qataris shall make up 60 percent of the employees of state-owned enterprises, or companies where the government is a majority investor. Children of Qatari women are considered Qataris for purposes of calculating this localization ratio. The new provisions also mandate that Qataris constitute 80 percent of the human resources workforce in state-owned enterprises.

MADLSA regulates the recruitment of expatriate labor. Labor Law 14/2004 largely governs employment in Qatar and allows the terminating party to terminate employment without providing reasons. The law requires employers to pay employees due wages and other benefits in full, provided they have performed expected work duties during the notice period, which varies based on years of employment. Companies registered with QFC are governed by the English common law, and labor issues are administered by QFC’s Regulation 10/2006.

Law 12/2004 on Private Associations and Foundations and subsequent regulations grant Qatari citizens the right to form workers’ committees in private enterprises with more than 100 Qatari citizen workers. Qatari citizens employed in the private sector also have the right to participate in approved strikes, but the restrictive conditions imposed by the law make the likelihood of an approved strike remote. There are no labor unions in Qatar. Non-citizens are not eligible to form worker committees or go on strike, though according to an agreement between MADLSA and the International Labor Organization (ILO), joint worker committees including 50-50 representation of workers and employers exist in a small number of cases for all medium to large-sized companies. Individuals working in the public sector, regardless of nationality, are prohibited from joining unions. Over three-quarters of Qatari citizens are employed by the government. Workers at labor camps occasionally go on strike over non-payment or delayed payment of wages, however, this practice is technically illegal.

Local courts handle disputes between workers and employers though the process is widely regarded as inefficient. In an effort to speed up the process of resolving labor disputes, the government established Labor Disputes Settlement Committees headed by a judge and representatives from MADLSA. As of March 2018, there are three such committees, all of which operate outside of the traditional Supreme Judicial Committee structure and are required to address any complaints within three weeks.

In October 2020, Qatar enacted Law 17/2020 which set the minimum basic wage for works and domestic works at $275 per month, in addition to $220 for lodging and meals if not provided by the employer. To combat the problem of late and unpaid wages, the government issued Law 1/2015 amending certain provisions of Labor Law 14/2004 on wage protection and mandating electronic payment to all employees subject to the local labor law. The government requires all employers to open bank accounts for their employees and pay wages electronically through a system subject to audits by an inspection division at the MADLSA; this requirement, however, does not apply to domestic workers. Employers who fail to pay their workers face penalties of $550 – $1,650 per case and possible prison sentences. Those penalties, however, are rarely implemented. The system currently applies to over 1.4 million workers.

In an effort to eliminate forced labor, the government issued Law 19/2020 on August 2020 enabling employees to switch employers, without requiring employer’s permission. This new legislation compliments Law 13/2018, which allows workers covered by the Labor Law to leave the country without requiring exit permits from their employers. The Labor Law prohibits the withholding of workers’ passports by employers and stiffens penalties for transgressors.

To protect workers from fraudulent employment contracts, the Ministry of Interior signed an agreement with a Singaporean company in 2017 to establish Qatar Visa Centers (QVCs) with the goal of simplifying residency procedures for expat workers from India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. In partnership with both MOI and MADLSA, contracted companies established QVCs in these countries to facilitate biometric enrollment, medical records verification, and signing work contracts before contracted workers enter Qatar.

Qatar is a member of the ILO and maintains that its labor law meets ILO minimum requirements. In 2017, Qatar made commitments to address some ILO complaints by launching a comprehensive three-year ILO technical cooperation program. In 2018, the ILO opened a Doha office.

In 2018, the Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs signed a labor-related MOU with the Department of State during the U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue. The MOU laid out plans for cooperation in combating trafficking-in-persons, including strengthening the labor sector to reduce instances of forced labor. In 2019, MADLSA signed a new MOU with the Department of Labor to enhance cooperation in the fields of labor inspection and protecting domestic workers rights.

13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $164,647 2019 $175,838 www.worldbank.org/en/country
Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2018 $79 2019 $14,198 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/
Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2017 $2,452 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/
direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data
Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2018 $17.7 2019 16.37% UNCTAD data available at https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/EconomicTrends/
Fdi.html
    

Source for Host Country Data: Qatar’s Planning and Statistics Authority https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions)
Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment
Total Inward $33,874 100% Total Outward $40,330 100%
Other American Countries $10,952 32% European Union $13,709 34%
European Union $10,220 30% Gulf Cooperation Council $9,670 24%
United States of America $7,995 24% Other Arab Countries $5,632 14%
Asia (excluding Gulf Cooperation Council) $2,473 7% Other Asian Countries $3,214 8%
Other $2,335 7% Other $8,104 20%
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.

Source: 2018 Data form Qatar’s Planning and Statistics Authority https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

14. Contact for More Information

Economic Specialist
U.S. Embassy, Doha
22nd February Street, Al Luqta District, P.O. Box 2399, Doha, Qatar
+974-4496-6000
EskandarGA@state.gov

Russia

Executive Summary

The Russian Federation remained in 28th place out of 190 economies in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 Report, reflecting modest incremental improvements in the regulatory environment in prior years. The World Bank paused the publication of the Doing Business 2021 report to assess a number of irregularities that have been reported, therefore no updates since last report are available. However, fundamental structural problems in Russia’s governance of the economy continue to stifle foreign direct investment throughout Russia. In particular, Russia’s judicial system remains heavily biased in favor of the state, leaving investors with little recourse in legal disputes with the government. Despite on-going anticorruption efforts, high levels of corruption among government officials compound this risk.

Throughout 2020, a prominent U.S. investor, who was arrested in February 2019 over a commercial dispute, remained under modified house arrest.  Moreover, Russia’s import substitution program gives local producers advantages over foreign competitors that do not meet localization requirements. Finally, Russia’s actions since 2014 have resulted in EU and U.S. sanctions – restricting business activities and increasing costs.

U.S. investors must ensure full compliance with U.S. sanctions, including sanctions against Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine, election interference, other malicious cyber activities, human rights abuses, use of chemical weapons, weapons proliferation, illicit trade with North Korea, support to Syria and Venezuela, and other malign activities. Information on the U.S. sanctions program is available at the U.S. Treasury’s website: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/default.aspx . U.S. investors can utilize the “Consolidated Screening List” search tool to check sanctions and control lists from the Departments of Treasury, State, and Commerce: https://www.export.gov/csl-search .

Russia’s Strategic Sectors Law (SSL) established an approval process for foreign investments resulting in a controlling stake in one of Russia’s 46 “strategic sectors.” The law applies to foreign states, international organizations, and their subsidiaries, as well as to “non-disclosing investors” (i.e., investors not disclosing information about beneficiaries, beneficial owners, and controlling persons).

Since 2015, the Russian government has had an incentive program for foreign investors called Special Investment Contracts (SPICs). These contracts, managed by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, allow foreign companies to participate in Russia’s import substitution programs by providing access to certain subsidies to foreign producers who establish local production. In August 2019, the Russian government introduced “SPIC-2.0,” which incentivizes long-term private investment in high-technology projects and technology transfer in manufacturing.

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 129 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2019* 28 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings * last year’s ranking due to the WB putting a pause on issuing the 2021 DB Report
Global Innovation Index 2020 47 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator 
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 $14,439 https://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal 
World Bank GNI per capita 2019 $11,260 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

The Ministry of Economic Development (MED) is responsible for overseeing investment policy in Russia. The Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) was established in 2011 to facilitate direct investment in Russia and has already attracted over $40 billion of foreign capital into the Russian economy through long-term strategic partnerships. In 2013, Russia’s Agency for Strategic Initiatives (ASI) launched an “Invest in Russian Regions” project to promote FDI in Russian regions. Since 2014, ASI has released an annual ranking of Russia’s regions in terms of the relative competitiveness of their investment climates and provides potential investors with information about regions most open to foreign investment. In 2021, 40 Russian regions improved their Regional Investment Climate Index scores (https://asi.ru/investclimate/rating). The Foreign Investment Advisory Council (FIAC), established in 1994, is chaired by the Prime Minister and currently includes 53 international company members and four companies as observers. The FIAC allows select foreign investors to directly present their views on improving the investment climate in Russia and advises the government on regulatory rulemaking.

Russia’s basic legal framework governing investment includes 1) Law 160-FZ, July 9, 1999, “On Foreign Investment in the Russian Federation;” 2) Law No. 39-FZ, February 25, 1999, “On Investment Activity in the Russian Federation in the Form of Capital Investment;” 3) Law No. 57-FZ, April 29, 2008, “Foreign Investments in Companies Having Strategic Importance for State Security and Defense (Strategic Sectors Law, SSL);” and 4) the Law of the RSFSR No. 1488-1, June 26, 1991, “On Investment Activity in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR),” and (5) Law No. 69-FZ. April 1, 2020, “On Investment Protection and Promotion Agreements in the Russian Federation.” This framework of laws nominally attempts to guarantee equal rights for foreign and local investors in Russia. However, exemptions are permitted when it is deemed necessary to protect the Russian constitution, morality, health, human rights, or national security or defense, and to promote its socioeconomic development. Foreign investors may freely use the profits obtained from Russia-based investments for any purpose, provided they do not violate Russian law.

The new 2020 Federal Law on Protection and Promotion of Investments applies to investments made under agreements on protection and promotion of investments (“APPI”) providing for implementation of a new investment project. APPI may be concluded between a Russian legal entity (the organization implementing the project established by a Russian or a foreign company) and a regional and/or the federal government. APPI is a private law agreement coming under the Russian civil legislation (with exclusions provided for by the law). Support measures include reimbursement of (1) the costs of creating or reconstructing the infrastructure and (2) interest on loans needed for implementing the project. The maximum reimbursable costs may not exceed 50 percent of the costs actually incurred for supporting infrastructure facilities and 100 percent of the costs actually incurred for associated infrastructure facilities. The time limit for cost recovery is five years for the supporting infrastructure and ten years for the associated infrastructure.

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Russian law places two primary restrictions on land ownership by foreigners. The first is on the foreign ownership of land located in border areas or other “sensitive territories.” The second restricts foreign ownership of agricultural land, including restricting foreign individuals and companies, persons without citizenship, and agricultural companies more than 50-percent foreign-owned from owning land. These entities may hold agricultural land through leasehold rights. As an alternative to agricultural land ownership, foreign companies typically lease land for up to 49 years, the maximum legally allowed.

In October 2014, President Vladimir Putin signed the law “On Mass Media,” which took effect on January 1, 2015. The law restricts foreign ownership of any Russian media company to 20 percent (the previous law applied a 50 percent limit to Russia’s broadcast sector). U.S. stakeholders have raised concerns about similar limits on foreign direct investments in the mining and mineral extraction sectors and describe the licensing regime as non-transparent and unpredictable. In December 2018, the State Duma approved in its first reading a draft bill introducing new restrictions on online news aggregation services. If adopted, foreign companies, including international organizations and individuals, would be limited to a maximum of 20 percent ownership interest in Russian news aggregator websites. The second, final hearing was planned for February 2019, but was postponed. To date, this proposed law has not been passed.

Russia’s Commission on Control of Foreign Investment (Commission) was established in 2008 to monitor foreign investment in strategic sectors in accordance with the SSL. Between 2008 and 2019, the Commission received 621 applications for foreign investment, 282 of which were reviewed, according to the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS). Of those 282, the Commission granted preliminary approval for 259 (92 percent approval rate), rejected 23, and found that 265 did not require approval (https://fas.gov.ru/news/29330). International organizations, foreign states, and the companies they control are treated as single entities under the Commission, and with their participation in a strategic business, are subject to restrictions applicable to a single foreign entity. There have been no updates regarding the number of applications received by the Commission since 2019. Due to COVID-19, the Commission met only twice since then, in December 2020 and February 2021.

Pursuant to legal amendments to the SSL that entered into force August 11, 2020, a foreign investor is deemed to exercise control over a Russia’s strategic entity even if voting rights in shares belonging to the investor have been temporarily transferred to other entities under the pledge or trust management agreement, or repo contract or a similar arrangement. According to the FAS, the amendments were aimed to exclude possible ways of circumventing the existing foreign investments control rules by way of temporary transfer of voting rights in the strategic entity’s shares.

In an effort to reduce bureaucratic procedures and address deficiencies in the SSL, on May 11, President Putin signed into law a draft bill introducing specific rules lifting restrictions and allowing expedited procedures for foreign investments into certain strategic companies for which strategic activity is not a core business.

Since January 1, 2019, foreign providers of electronic services to business customers in Russia (B2B e-services) have new Russian value-added tax (VAT) obligations. These obligations include VAT registration with the Russian tax authorities (even for VAT exempt e-services), invoice requirements, reporting to the Russian tax authorities, and adhering to VAT remittance rules.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

The WTO conducted the first Trade Policy Review (TPR) of the Russian Federation in September 2016. The next TPR of Russia will take place in October 2021, with reports published in September. (Related reports are available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp445_e.htm ).

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) issues an annual World Investment Report covering different investment policy topics. In 2020, the focus of this report was on international production beyond the pandemic ( https://unctad.org/en/Pages/Publications/WorldInvestmentReports.aspx ). UNCTAD also issues an investment policy monitor ( https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IPM ).

Business Facilitation

The Federal Tax Service (FTS) operates Russia’s business registration website: www.nalog.ru . Per law (Article 13 of Law 129-FZ of 2001), a company must register with a local FTS office, and the registration process should not take more than three days. Foreign companies may be required to notarize the originals of incorporation documents included in the application package. To establish a business in Russia, a company must register with FTS and pay a registration fee of RUB 4,000. As of January 1, 2019, the registration fee has been waived for online submission of incorporation documents directly to the Federal Tax Service (FTS).

The publication of the Doing Business report was paused in 2020, as the World Bank is assessing its data collection process and data integrity preservation methodology.

The 2019 ranking acknowledged several reforms that helped Russia improve its position. Russia made getting electricity faster by setting new deadlines and establishing specialized departments for connection. Russia also strengthened minority investor protections by requiring greater corporate transparency and made paying taxes easier by reducing the tax authority review period of applications for VAT cash refunds. Russia also further enhanced the software used for tax and payroll preparation.

Outward Investment

The Russian government does not restrict Russian investors from investing abroad. Since 2015, Russia’s “De-offshorization Law” (376-FZ) requires that Russian tax residents notify the government about their overseas assets, potentially subjecting these assets to Russian taxes.

While there are no restrictions on the distribution of profits to a nonresident entity, some foreign currency control restrictions apply to Russian residents (both companies and individuals), and to foreign currency transactions. As of January 1, 2018, all Russian citizens and foreign holders of Russian residence permits are considered Russian “currency control residents.” These “residents” are required to notify the tax authorities when a foreign bank account is opened, changed, or closed and when funds are moved in a foreign bank account. Individuals who have spent less than 183 days in Russia during the reporting period are exempt from the reporting requirements and restrictions using foreign bank accounts. On January 1, 2020, Russia abolished all currency control restrictions on payments of funds by non-residents to bank accounts of Russian residents opened with banks in OECD or FATF member states. This is provided that such states participate in the automatic exchange of financial account information with Russia. As a result, from 2020 onward, Russian residents will be able to freely use declared personal foreign accounts for savings and investment in wide range of financial products.

3. Legal Regime

Transparency of the Regulatory System

While the Russian government at all levels offers moderately transparent policies, actual implementation is inconsistent. Moreover, Russia’s import substitution program often leads to burdensome regulations that can give domestic producers a financial advantage over foreign competitors. Draft bills and regulations are made available for public comment in accordance with disclosure rules set forth in the Government Resolution 851 of 2012.

Key regulatory actions are published on a centralized web site which also maintains existing and proposed regulatory documents: www.pravo.gov.ru . (Draft regulatory laws are published on the web site: www.regulation.gov.ru . Draft laws can also be found on the State Duma’s legal database: http://asozd.duma.gov.ru/ ).

Accounting procedures are generally transparent and consistent. Documents compliant with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), however, are usually provided only by businesses that interface with foreign markets or borrow from foreign lenders. Reports prepared in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are required for the consolidated financial statements of all entities who meet the following criteria: entities whose securities are listed on stock exchanges; banks and other credit institutions, insurance companies (except those with activities limited to obligatory medical insurance); non-governmental pension funds; management companies of investment and pension funds; and clearing houses. Additionally, certain state-owned companies are required to prepare consolidated IFRS financial statements by separate decrees of the Russian government. Russian Accounting Standards, which are largely based on international best practices, otherwise apply.

International Regulatory Considerations

As a member of the EAEU, Russia has delegated certain decision-making authority to the EAEU’s supranational executive body, the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). In particular, the EEC has the lead on concluding trade agreements with third countries, customs tariffs (on imports), and technical regulations. EAEU agreements and EEC decisions establish basic principles that are implemented by the member states at the national level through domestic laws, regulations, and other measures involving goods. The EAEU Treaty establishes the priority of WTO rules in the EAEU legal framework. Authority to set sanitary and phytosanitary standards remains at the individual country level.

U.S. companies cite SPS technical regulations and related product-testing and certification requirements as major obstacles to U.S. exports of industrial and agricultural goods to Russia. Russian authorities require product testing and certification as a key element of the approval process for a variety of products, and, in many cases, only an entity registered and residing in Russia can apply for the necessary documentation for product approvals. Consequently, opportunities for testing and certification performed by competent bodies outside Russia are limited. Manufacturers of telecommunications equipment, oil and gas equipment, construction materials and equipment, and pharmaceuticals and medical devices have reported serious difficulties in obtaining product approvals within Russia. Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) issues have also arisen with alcoholic beverages, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices. Certain SPS restrictions on food and agricultural products appear to not be based on international standards.

In April 2021, Russia adopted amendments to Article 1360 of the Civil Code that significantly simplified the mechanism of issuing compulsory licenses in the pharmaceutical industry. Under the adopted amendments, compulsory licenses are allowed “in the interest of life and health protection.” The use of the compulsory license mechanism and the lack of certainty for right holders regarding the calculation of compensation could negatively affect the investment attractiveness of Russia for pharmaceutical companies producing original drugs.

Russia joined the WTO in 2012. Although Russia has notified the WTO of numerous SPS technical regulations, it appears to be taking a narrow view regarding the types of measures that require notification. In 2020, Russia submitted 16 notifications under the WTO TBT Agreement, up from six notifications submitted in 2029. However, they may not reflect the full set of technical regulations that require notification under the WTO TBT Agreement. Russia submitted 38 SPS notifications in 2020, up from 16 in 2019. (A full list of notifications is available at: http://www.epingalert.org/en).

Legal System and Judicial Independence

The U.S. Embassy advises any foreign company operating in Russia to have competent legal counsel and create a comprehensive plan on steps to take in case the police carry out an unexpected raid. Russian authorities have exhibited a pattern of transforming civil cases into criminal matters, resulting in significantly more severe penalties. In short, unfounded lawsuits or arbitrary enforcement actions remain an ever-present possibility for any company operating in Russia.

Critics contend that Russian courts, in general, lack independent authority and, in criminal cases, have a bias toward conviction. In practice, the presumption of innocence tends to be ignored by Russian courts, and less than one-half of one percent of criminal cases end in acquittal. In cases that are appealed when the lower court decision resulted in a conviction, less than one percent are overturned. In contrast, when the lower court decision is “not guilty,” 37 percent of the appeals result in a finding of guilt.

Russia has a code law system, and the Civil Code of Russia governs contracts. Specialized commercial courts (also called “Arbitrage Courts”) handle a wide variety of commercial disputes.

Russia was ranked by the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report as 21st in contract enforcement, down three notches compared to the 2019 report. Source: https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/r/russia/RUS.pdf

Commercial courts are required by law to decide business disputes efficiently, and many cases are decided on the basis of written evidence, with little or no live testimony by witnesses. The courts’ workload is dominated by relatively simple cases involving the collection of debts and firms’ disputes with the taxation and customs authorities, pension funds, and other state organs. Tax-paying firms often prevail in their disputes with the government in court. As with some international arbitral procedures, the weakness in the Russian arbitration system lies in the enforcement of decisions and few firms pay judgments against them voluntarily.

A specialized court for intellectual property (IP) disputes was established in 2013. The IP Court hears matters pertaining to the review of decisions made by the Russian Federal Service for Intellectual Property (Rospatent) and determines issues of IP ownership, authorship, and the cancellation of trademark registrations. It also serves as the court of second appeal for IP infringement cases decided in commercial courts and courts of appeal.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

The 1991 Investment Code and 1999 Law on Foreign Investment (160-FZ) guarantee that foreign investors enjoy rights equal to those of Russian investors, although some industries have limits on foreign ownership. Russia’s Special Investment Contract program, launched in 2015, aims to increase investment in Russia by offering tax incentives and simplified procedures for dealings with the government. In addition, a new law on public-private-partnerships (224-FZ) took effect January 1, 2016. The legislation allows an investor to acquire ownership rights over a property. The SSL regulates foreign investments in “strategic” companies. Amendments to Federal Law No. 160-FZ “On Foreign Investments in the Russian Federation” and Russia’s Strategic Sectors Law (SSL), signed into law in May 2018 by President Putin, liberalized access of foreign investments to strategic sectors of the Russian economy and made the strategic clearance process clearer and more comfortable. The new concept is more investor-friendly, since applying a stricter regime can now potentially be avoided by providing the required beneficiary and controlling person information. In addition, the amendments expressly envisage a right for the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia (FAS) to issue official clarifications on the nature and application of the SSL that may facilitate law enforcement.

Federal Law № 69-ФЗ on the Protection and Promotion of Investment, entered into force in April 2020, requires that a contract be concluded between public entities and private investors, either domestic or foreign and contain stabilization clauses relating to import customs duties, measures of state support, rules regulating land use, as well as ecological and utilization fees and taxes.

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

The Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) implements antimonopoly laws and is responsible for overseeing matters related to the protection of competition. Russia’s fourth and most recent anti-monopoly legislative package, which took effect January 2016, introduced a number of changes to Russia’s antimonopoly laws. Changes included limiting the criteria under which an entity could be considered “dominant,” broadening the scope of transactions subject to FAS approval and reducing government control over transactions involving natural monopolies. Over the past several years, FAS has opened a number of cases involving American companies. In February 2019, the FAS submitted to the Cabinet the fifth anti-monopoly legislative package devoted to regulating the digital economy. It includes provisions on introducing new definitions of “trustee,” and a definition of “price algorithms,” empowering the FAS to impose provisions of non-discriminated access to data as a remedy. It also introduced data ownership as a set of criteria for market analysis, etc. The legislative package is still undergoing an interagency approval process and will be submitted to the State Duma once it is approved by the Cabinet. As of March 2021, it was supported by the FAS Public Council, but the review by the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media was largely negative.

FAS has also claimed the authority to regulate intellectual property, arguing that monopoly rights conferred by ownership of intellectual property should not extend to the “circulation of goods,” a point supported by the Russian Supreme Court.

Expropriation and Compensation

The 1991 Investment Code prohibits the nationalization of foreign investments, except following legislative action and when such action is deemed to be in the public interest. Acts of nationalization may be appealed to Russian courts, and the investor must be adequately and promptly compensated for the taking. At the sub-federal level, expropriation has occasionally been a problem, as well as local government interference and a lack of enforcement of court rulings protecting investors.

Despite legislation prohibiting the nationalization of foreign investments, investors in Russia – particularly minority-share investors in domestically-owned energy companies – are encouraged to exercise caution. Russia has a history of indirectly expropriating companies through “creeping” and informal means, often related to domestic political disputes, and other treatment of investors leading to investment disputes. Some examples of recent cases include: 1) The privately owned oil company Bashneft was nationalized and then “privatized” in 2016 through its sale to the government-owned oil giant Rosneft without a public tender; 2) In the Yukos case, the Russian government used allegedly questionable tax and legal proceedings to ultimately gain control of the assets of a large Russian energy company; 3) In February 2019, a prominent U.S. investor was jailed over a commercial dispute and currently remains under house arrest. Other examples of Russia expropriation include foreign companies allegedly being pressured into selling their Russia-based assets at below-market prices. Foreign investors, particularly minority investors, have little legal recourse in such instances.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

Russia is party to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. While Russia does not have specific legislation providing for enforcement of the New York Convention, Article 15 of the Constitution specifies that “the universally recognized norms of international law and international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of [Russia’s] legal system. If an international treaty or agreement of the Russian Federation fixes other rules than those envisaged by law, the rules of the international agreement shall be applied.” Russia is a signatory but not a party, and never ratified the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID).

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

According to available information, at least 14 investment disputes have involved an American and the Russian government since 2006. Some attorneys refer international clients who have investment or trade disputes in Russia to international arbitration centers in Paris, Stockholm, London, or The Hague. A 1997 Russian law allows foreign arbitration awards to be enforced in Russia, even if there is no reciprocal treaty between Russia and the country where the order was issued, in accordance with the New York Convention. Russian law was amended in 2015 to give the Russian Constitutional Court authority to disregard verdicts by international bodies if it determines the ruling contradicts the Russian constitution.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

In addition to the court system, Russian law recognizes alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, i.e., domestic arbitration, international arbitration, and mediation. Civil and commercial disputes may be referred to either domestic or international commercial arbitration. Institutional arbitration is more common in Russia than ad hoc arbitration. Arbitral awards can be enforced in Russia pursuant to international treaties, such as the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the 1958 New York Convention, and the 1961 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, as well as domestic legislation. Mediation mechanisms were established by the Law on Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedure with participation of the Intermediary in January 2011. Mediation is an informal extrajudicial dispute resolution method whereby a mediator seeks mutually acceptable resolution. However, mediation is not yet widely used in Russia.

Beginning in 2016, arbitral institutions were required to obtain the status of a “permanent arbitral institution” (PAI) in order to arbitrate disputes involving shares in Russian companies. The requirement ostensibly combats the problem of dubious arbitral institutions set up by corporations to administer disputes in which they themselves are involved. The PAI requirement applies to foreign arbitral institutions as well. Until recently there were only four arbitral institutions – all of them Russian – which had been conferred the status of PAI. In April 2019, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) became the first foreign arbitral tribunal to obtain PAI status in Russia. In June 2019, the Vienna International Arbitration Center became the second foreign institution licensed to administer arbitrations in Russia. On May 19, 2021, the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) received from the Russian Ministry of Justice the right to act in Russia as PAIs. The London Court of International Arbitration, and the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce are occasionally chosen for administering international arbitrations seated in Russia, despite the fact that none of them has PAI status. Arbitral awards rendered by tribunals constituted under the rules of these institutions can be recognized and enforced in Russia.

Bankruptcy Regulations

Russia established a law providing for enterprises bankruptcy in the early 1990s. A law on personal bankruptcy came into force in 2015. Russia’s ranking in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 Report for “Resolving Insolvency” is 57 out of 190 economies, down two notches compared to 2019. Article 9 of the Law on Insolvency requires an insolvent firm to petition the court of arbitration to declare the company bankrupt within one month of failing to pay the bank’s claims. The court then convenes a meeting of creditors, who petition the court for liquidation or reorganization. In accordance with Article 51 of the Law on Insolvency, a bankruptcy case must be considered within seven months of the day the petition was received by the arbitral court.

Liquidation proceedings by law are limited to six months and can be extended by six more months (art. 124 of the Law on Insolvency). Therefore, the time dictated by law is 19 months. However, in practice, liquidation proceedings are extended several times and for longer periods. The total cost of insolvency proceedings is approximately nine percent of the value of the estate.

In July 2017, amendments to the Law on Insolvency expanded the list of persons who may be held vicariously liable for a bankrupted entity’s debts and clarified the grounds for such liability. According to the new rules, in addition to the CEO, the following can also be held vicariously liable for a bankrupt company’s debts: top managers, including the CFO and COO, accountants, liquidators, and other persons who controlled or had significant influence over the bankrupted entity’s actions by kin or position, or could force the bankrupted entity to enter into unprofitable transactions. In addition, persons who profited from the illegal actions by management may also be subject to liability through court action. The amendments clarified that shareholders owning less than 10 percent in the bankrupt company shall not be deemed controlling unless they are proven to have played a role in the company’s bankruptcy. The amendments also expanded the list of people who may be subject to secondary liability and the grounds for recognizing fault for a company’s bankruptcy.

Amendments to the Law on Insolvency approved in December 2019 gave greater protection, in the context of insolvency of a Russian counterparty, to collateral arrangements and close-out netting in respect of over-the-counter derivative, repurchase, and certain other “financial” transactions documented under eligible master agreements.

4. Industrial Policies

Investment Incentives

Since 2005, Russia’s industrial investment incentive regime has granted tax breaks and other government incentives to foreign companies in certain sectors in exchange for producing locally. As part of its WTO Protocol, Russia agreed to eliminate the elements of this regime that are inconsistent with the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) Agreement by July 2018. The TRIMS Agreement requires elimination of measures such as those that require or provide benefits for the use of domestically produced goods (local content requirements), or measures that restrict a firm’s imports to an amount related to its exports or related to the amount of foreign exchange a firm earns (trade balancing requirements). Russia notified the WTO that it had terminated these automotive investment incentive programs as of July 1, 2018. In 2019, the Ministry of Industry and Trade introduced a new points-based system to estimate vehicle localization levels to determine Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)’s eligibility for Russian state support. The government provides state support only to OEMs whose finished vehicles are deemed to be of Russian origin, which will depend upon them scoring at least 2,000 points under the new system to get some assistance and 6,000 point to enjoy a full range of support measures. Points will be awarded for localizing the supply of certain components. Localized engines or transmissions used in vehicle assembly, for instance, are worth 40 points. OEMs running a research and development business in Russia score an additional 20 points; and a further 20 points are granted to those using localized aluminum or electronic systems in their vehicles. In May 2021, the government introduced a points-based system to assess localization levels in the shipbuilding industry to determine Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)’s eligibility for Russian state support in a move to facilitate the development of shipbuilding industry and import substitution.

The government also introduced Special Investment Contracts (SPICs) as an alternative incentive program in 2015. On December 18, 2017, the government changed the rules for concluding SPICs to increase investment in Russia by offering tax incentives and simplified procedures for government interactions. These contracts allow foreign companies in Russia access to import substitution programs, including certain subsidies, if they establish local production. In principle, these contracts may aid in expediting customs procedures, however, in practice, reports suggest companies that sign such contracts find their business hampered by policies biased in favor of local producers.

In August 2019, the Government created “SPIC-2,” which aimed to increase long-term private investment in high-technology projects and introduce advanced technology for local content in manufacturing products. The Ministry of Industry and Trade also extended the maximum SPIC term to 20 years, depending on the amount of investment. The key criteria for evaluating bids are speed of introducing technology, the volume of manufacturing, and the level of technology in local manufacturing processes.

The Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) was established in 2011 as a sovereign wealth fund to operate with long-term and strategic investors and by offering co-financing for foreign investments directed at the modernization of the Russian economy. To date, foreign partners of the RDIF have invested RUB 1.9 trillion ($26 billion) in Russia, with the RDIF having co-invested RUB 200 billion ($2.7 billion). The RDIF has also attracted over $40 billion of foreign capital into the Russian economy through long-term strategic partnerships. The RDIF, in conjunction with the Gamaleya National Center for Microbiology and Epidemiology, financed the development and marketing of Russia’s Sputnik V and Sputnik Light vaccines.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

Russia continues to promote the use of high-tech parks, special economic zones (SEZs), and industrial clusters, which offer additional tax and infrastructure incentives to attract investment. “Resident companies” can receive a broad range of benefits, including exemption from profit tax, value-added tax, property tax, import duties, and partial exemption from social fund payments. Russia currently has 27 SEZs ( http://www.russez.ru/oez/ ). A Russian Accounts Chamber (RAC) investigation of SEZs in February 2020 found they have had no measurable impact on the Russian economy, despite RUB 136 billion ($1.7 billion) investment from the federal government from 2006-2018. In 2015, the Russian government created a separate but similar program – “Territories of Advanced Development” – with preferential tax treatment and simplified government procedures in Siberia, Kaliningrad, and the Russian Far East.

Performance and Localization Requirements

Russian law generally does not impose performance requirements, and they are not widely included as part of private contracts in Russia. Some have appeared, however, in the agreements of large multinational companies investing in natural resources and in production-sharing legislation. There are no formal requirements for offsets in foreign investments. Since approval for investments in Russia can depend on relationships with government officials and on a firm’s demonstration of its commitment to the Russian market, these conditions may result in offsets.

In certain sectors, the Russian government has pressed for localization and increased local content. For example, in a bid to boost high-tech manufacturing in the renewable energy sector, Russia guarantees a 12 percent profit over 15 years for windfarms using turbines with at least 65 percent local content. Russia is currently considering local content requirements for industries that have high percentages of government procurement, such as medical devices and pharmaceuticals. Russia is not a signatory to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement. Consequently, restrictions on public procurement have been a major avenue for Russia to implement localization requirements without running afoul of international commitments.

Russia’s data storage law (the “Yarovaya law”) took effect on July 1, 2018, requiring providers to store data in “full volume” beginning October 1, 2018. The law requires domestic telecoms and ISPs to store all customers’ voice calls and texts for six months; ISPs must store data traffic for one month. The Yarovaya law initially required longer retention with a shorter implementation window, which companies criticized as costly and unworkable. Until recently there were no special liabilities for violations of the data localization requirement. In December, President Putin signed into law legislative amendments establishing significant fines ranging from RUB 1 million ($15,600) to RUB 18 million ($282,000) for legal entities and from RUB 100,000 ($1,560) to RUB 800,000 ($12,500) for company CEOs. Amendments to the “Plan for Achieving Russia’s National Development Goals until 2024 and for the Planning Period until 2030 call for a one-year postponement of some implementation timelines set in Russia’s data storage law (the “Yarovaya law”) that took effect on July 1, 2018. Specifically, the requirement to move Russian citizens’ data onto servers located in Russia was pushed back from October 31, 2021 to October 30, 2022.

On November 21, 2019, Russia adopted the law on mandatory preinstallation of Russian-produced software for smartphones, computers, and other electronic devices, in the sale of certain types of technically complex goods. Starting from July 31, 2021, the regulators will apply fines for the sale of any electronics without preinstalled Russian software.

On September 16, 2020, the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control (FSTEC) published the order on the amendments to the Requirements for ensuring the security of significant objects of the Russian critical information infrastructure (CII). The changes require using predominantly domestic software and equipment for Russian CII to ensure its technological independence and safety, and create the conditions for promotion of the Russian-made products abroad.

The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) has imposed caps on the percentage of foreign employees in foreign banks’ subsidiaries. The ratio of Russian employees in a subsidiary of a foreign bank is set at less than 75 percent. If the executive of the subsidiary is a non-resident of Russia, at least 50 percent of the bank’s managing body should be Russian citizens.

5. Protection of Property Rights

Real Property

Russia placed 12th overall in the 2020 World Bank Doing Business Report for “registering property,” which analyzes the “steps, time and cost involved in registering property, assuming a standardized case of an entrepreneur who wants to purchase land and a building that is already registered and free of title dispute,” as well as the “the quality of the land administration system.”

The Russian Constitution, along with a 1993 Presidential Decree, gives Russian citizens the right to own, inherit, lease, mortgage, and sell real property. The state owns the majority of Russian land, although the structures on the land are typically privately owned. Mortgage legislation enacted in 2004 facilitates the process for lenders to evict homeowners who do not stay current in their mortgage payments.

Intellectual Property Rights

Russia remained on the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Priority Watch List in 2020 and had several illicit streaming websites and online markets reported in the 2019 Notorious Markets List. Particular areas of concern include copyright infringement, trademark counterfeiting/hard goods piracy, and non-transparent royalty collection procedures. Stakeholders continue to report significant piracy of video games, music, movies, books, journal articles, and television programming. Mirror sites related to infringing websites and smartphone applications that facilitate illicit trade are also a concern. Russia needs to direct more action to rogue online platforms targeting audiences outside the country. In December 2019, for the first time in Russia, the owner of several illegal streaming sites received a two-year suspended criminal sentence for violating Russia’s IP protection legislation. This case has set an important precedent for enforcing IPR laws in Russia.

Online piracy continues to pose a significant problem in Russia. Russia has not upheld its commitments to protect IPR, including commitments made to the United States as part of its WTO accession. Nevertheless, there are indications that the Russian internet piracy market is declining. According to Group-IB, a global cyber threat intelligence company, total revenue of the Russian video piracy market in 2020 reached $59 million. The market has been shrinking for several years in a row. In 2020, the market declined by 7 percent, compared to a 27 percent drop registered in 2019.

Despite Russia’s 2018 ban on virtual private networks (VPNs), the ban has not been fully enforced. Since 2017, search engines, including Google and Yandex, have been required to block IPR-infringing websites and “mirror” sites, as determined by federal communications watchdog Roskomnadzor. As a result of increased scrutiny, internet companies Yandex, Mail.Ru Group, Rambler, and Rutube signed an anti-piracy memorandum with several domestic right holders, which is valid through the end of 2021. From January to November 2020, Roskomnadzor blocked over 10,000 piracy websites and “mirror sites,” compared to over 6,000 in 2019.

Modest progress has been made in the area of customs IPR protection since the Federal Customs Service (FTS) can now confiscate imported goods that violate IPR. From January to November 2020, the FTS seized 12.8 million counterfeited goods, compared with 11 million in 2019. Over the same time period, the FTS prevented the infringement and damages to copyright holders amounting to RUB 4.6 billion ($64 million), and identified 11.8 million units of counterfeit industrial products in Russia, almost double compared to 2019. The turnover of counterfeit non-food consumer goods in Russia is estimated at around RUB 5.2 trillion ($70 billion), or 4.5 percent of Russia’s GDP.

In May 2020, the State Duma approved amendments to the Federal Law “On Information, Information Technologies and the Protection of Information” to allow blocking mobile applications with illegal content. The Law enables the Russian regulator (“Roskomnadzor”) to mandate app owners and app platforms such as AppStore, Google Play and Huawei AppGallery to delete the IP infringing content.

6. Financial Sector

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

Russia is open to portfolio investment and has no restrictions on foreign investments. Russia’s two main stock exchanges – the Russian Trading System (RTS) and the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX) – merged in December 2011. The MICEX-RTS bourse conducted an initial public offering on February 15, 2013, auctioning an 11.82 percent share.

The Russian Law on the Securities Market includes definitions of corporate bonds, mutual funds, options, futures, and forwards. Companies offering public shares are required to disclose specific information during the placement process as well as on a quarterly basis. In addition, the law defines the responsibilities of financial consultants assisting companies with stock offerings and holds them liable for the accuracy of the data presented to shareholders. In general, the Russian government respects IMF Article VIII, which it accepted in 1996. Credit in Russia is allocated generally on market terms, and the private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. Foreign investors can get credit on the Russian market, but interest rate differentials tend to prompt investors from developed economies to borrow on their own domestic markets when investing in Russia.

Money and Banking System

Banks make up a large share of Russia’s financial system. Although Russia had 396 licensed banks as of March 1, 2020, state-owned banks, particularly Sberbank and VTB Group, dominate the sector. The top three largest banks are state-controlled (with private Alfa Bank ranked fourth). The top three banks held 51.4 percent of all bank assets in Russia as of March 1, 2020. The role of the state in the banking sector continues to distort the competitive environment, impeding Russia’s financial sector development. At the beginning of 2019, the aggregate assets of the banking sector amounted to 91.4 percent of GDP, and aggregate capital was 9.9 percent of GDP. By January 2020 and 2021, the aggregate assets of Russian banks reached 92.2 and 97.2 percent, respectively. Russian banks reportedly operate on short time horizons, limiting capital available for long-term investments. Overall, the share of retail non-performing loans (NPLs) to total gross loans slightly increased from 4.4 percent of total gross retail loans in January 2020 to 4.5 percent in April 2021, while corporate NPLs declined from 7.5 percent to 6.5 percent in the same period, according to the Central Bank of Russia. ACRA-Rating analytical agency expects an increase in retail NPLs to 6.0 percent and corporate NPL – to 8.8 percent by the end of 2021.

Foreign banks are allowed to establish subsidiaries, but not branches within Russia and must register as a business entity in Russia.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

While the ruble is the only legal tender in Russia, companies and individuals generally face no significant difficulty in obtaining foreign currency from authorized banks. The CBR retains the right to impose restrictions on the purchase of foreign currency, including the requirement that the transaction be completed through a special account, according to Russia’s currency control laws. The CBR does not require security deposits on foreign exchange purchases. Otherwise, there are no barriers to remitting investment returns abroad, including dividends, interest, and returns of capital, apart from the fact that reporting requirements exist and failure to report in a timely fashion will result in fines.

Currency controls also exist on all transactions that require customs clearance, which, in Russia, applies to both import and export transactions, and certain loans. As of March 1, 2018, the CBR no longer requires a “transaction passport” (i.e., a document with the authorized bank through which a business receives and services a transaction) when concluding import and export contracts. The CBR also simplified the procedure to record import and export contracts, reducing the number of documents required for bank authorization. The government has also lifted the requirement to repatriate export revenues if settlements under a foreign trade contract are set in Russian rubles effective January 1, 2020.

Remittance Policies

The CBR retains the right to impose restrictions on the purchase of foreign currency, including the requirement that the transaction be completed through a special account, according to Russia’s currency control laws. The CBR does not require security deposits on foreign exchange purchases. To navigate these requirements, investors should seek legal expert advice at the time of making an investment. Banking contacts confirm that investors have not had issues with remittances and in particular with repatriation of dividends.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

In 2018, Russia combined its two sovereign wealth funds to form the National Welfare Fund (NWF). The fund’s holdings amounted to $165.4 billion, or 12.0 percent of GDP as of April 1, 2020 and grew to $185.9 billion, or 12.0 percent of GDP as of May 1, 2021. The Ministry of Finance oversees the fund’s assets, while the CBR acts as the operational manager. Russia’s Accounts Chamber regularly audits the NWF, and the results are reported to the State Duma. The NWF is maintained in foreign currencies, and is included in Russia’s foreign currency reserves, which amounted to $563.4 billion as of March 31, 2020. In June 2021, Russia’s Ministry of Finance announced plans to completely divest the $41 billion worth of NWF U.S. dollar holdings within a month, replacing them with RMB (Chinese Yuan), Euros and gold by July 2021.

7. State-Owned Enterprises

Russia does not have a unified definition of a state-owned enterprise (SOE). However, analysts define SOEs as enterprises where the state has significant control, through full, majority, or at least significant minority ownership. The OECD defines material minority ownership as 10 percent of voting shares, while under Russian legislation, a minority shareholder would need 25 percent plus one share to exercise significant control, such as block shareholder resolutions to the charter, make decisions on reorganization or liquidation, increase in the number of authorized shares, or approve certain major transactions. SOEs are subdivided into four main categories: 1) unitary enterprises (federal or municipal, fully owned by the government), of which there are 692 unitary enterprises owned by the federal government as of January 1, 2020; 2) other state-owned enterprises where government holds a stake of which there are 1,079 joint-stock companies owned by the federal government, as of January 1, 2019 – such as Sberbank, the biggest Russian retail bank (over 50 percent is owned by the government); 3) natural monopolies, such as Russian Railways; and 4) state corporations (usually a giant conglomerate of companies) such as Rostec and Vnesheconombank (VEB).  There are six functioning state corporations directly chartered by the federal government, as of March 2021. By 2020, the number of federal government-owned “unitary enterprises” declined by 44 percent from 1,247 in 2017; according to the Federal Agency for State Property Management, the number of joint-stock companies with state participation declined only by 33.6 percent in the same period.

SOE procurement rules are non-transparent and use informal pressure by government officials to discriminate against foreign goods and services. Sole-source procurement by Russia’s SOEs increased to 45.5 percent in 2018, or to 37.7 percent in value terms, according to a study by the non-state “National Procurement Transparency Rating” analytical center. The current Russian government policy of import substitution mandates numerous requirements for localization of production of certain types of machinery, equipment, and goods.

Privatization Program

The Russian government and its SOEs dominate the economy. The government approved in January 2020 a new 2020-22 plan identifying 86 “federal state unitary enterprises” (100 percent state-owned “FGUPs”) (12.3 percent of all FGUPs), sell its stakes in 186 joint stock companies (“JSCs”) (16.5 percent of all JSCs with state participation) and in 13 limited liability companies (“LLCs”) for privatization. The plan would also reduce the state’s share in VTB, one of Russia’s largest banks, from over 60 percent to 50 percent plus one share and in Sovkomflot to 75 percent plus one share within three years. On October 7, 2020, Sovcomflot sold the government’s 17.2 percent stake through an IPO at the Moscow Exchange. The government’s stake in Sovcomflot will remain at 82.8 percent. The government raised about $550 million through the sale. Other large SOEs might be privatized on an ad hoc basis, depending on market conditions. The Russian government still maintains a list of 136 SOEs with “national significance” that are either wholly or partially owned by the Russian state and whose privatization is permitted only with a special governmental decree, including Aeroflot, Rosneftegaz, Transneft, Russian Railways, and VTB. While the total number of SOEs has declined significantly in recent years, mostly large SOEs remain in state hands and “large scale” privatization, intended to help shore up the federal budget and spur economic recovery, is not keeping up with implementation plans. The government expects that “small-scale privatization” (excluding privatization of large SOEs) will bring up to RUB 3.6 billion ($58 million) to the federal budget annually in 2020-2022.

The government’s previous 2017-2019 privatization program has substantially underperformed its benchmarks. Only 24.8 percent of the 581 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) slated to be privatized were actually privatized in 2017-2019, according to a May 27, 2021 report by the Russian Accounts Chamber (RAC). As a result, total privatization revenues received in 2018 reached only RUB 2.44 billion ($39 million), down 58 percent compared to 2017. In 2019, privatization revenues (excluding large SOEs) reached RUB 2.2 billion ($35 million), down 40.5 percent compared to the official target of RUB 5.6 billion ($86.5 million).

8. Responsible Business Conduct

While not standard practice, Russian companies are beginning to show an increased level of interest in their reputation as good corporate citizens. When seeking to acquire companies in Western countries or raise capital on international financial markets, Russian companies face international competition and scrutiny, including with respect to corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards. As a result, most large Russian companies currently have a CSR policy in place, or are developing one, despite the lack of pressure from Russian consumers and shareholders to do so. CSR policies of Russian firms are usually published on corporate websites and detailed in annual reports, but do not involve a comprehensive “due diligence” approach of risk mitigation that the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises promotes. Most companies choose to create their own non-government organization (NGO) or advocacy outreach rather than contribute to an already existing organization. The Russian government is a powerful stakeholder in the development of certain companies’ CSR agendas. Some companies view CSR as merely financial support of social causes and choose to support local health, educational, and social welfare organizations favored by the government. One association, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), developed a Social Charter of Russian Business in 2004 in which 269 Russian companies and organizations have since joined, as of April 1, 2020.

According to a joint study conducted by Skolkovo Business School and UBS Bank, in 2017 corporate contributions to charitable causes in Russia reached an estimated RUB 220 billion (USD 3.8 billion). RSPP reported that as many as 185 major Russian companies published 1,038 corporate non-financial reports between 2000 and 2019, including on social responsibility initiatives.

Additional Resources 

Department of State

Department of Labor

9. Corruption

Despite some government efforts to combat it, the level of corruption in Russia remains high. Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) puts Russia at 129th place among 180 countries – eight notches up from the rank assigned in 2019.

Roughly 24 percent of entrepreneurs surveyed by the Russian Chamber of Commerce in October and November 2019 said they constantly faced corruption. Businesses mainly experienced corruption during applications for permits (35.3 percent), during inspections (22.1 percent), and in the procurement processes (38.7 percent). The areas of government spending that ranked highest in corruption were public procurement, media, national defense, and public utilities.

In March 2020, Russia’s new Prosecutor General, Igor Krasnov, reported RUB 21 billion ($324 million) were recovered in the course of anticorruption investigations in 2019. In December 2019, Procurator General’s Office Spokesperson Svetlana Petrenko reported approximately over 7,000 corruption convictions in 2019, including of 752 law enforcement officers, 181 Federal Penitentiary Service (FPS) officers, 81 federal bailiffs and 476 municipal officials.

Until recently, one of the peculiarities of Russian enforcement practices was that companies were prosecuted almost exclusively for small and mid-scale bribery. Several 2019 cases indicate that Russian enforcement actions may expand to include more severe offenses as well. To date, ten convictions of companies for large-scale or extra large-scale bribery with penalty payments of RUB 20 million ($320,000) or more have been disclosed in 2019 – compared to only four cases in the whole of 2018. In July 2019, Russian Standard Bank, which is among Russia’s 200 largest companies according to Forbes Russia, had to pay a penalty of RUB 26.5 million ($420,000) for bribing bailiffs in Crimea in order to speed up enforcement proceedings against defaulted debtors.

Still, there is no efficient protection for whistleblowers in Russia. In June 2019, the legislative initiative aimed at the protection of whistleblowers in corruption cases ultimately failed. The draft law, which had been adopted at the first reading in December 2017, provided for comprehensive rights of whistleblowers, and responsibilities of employers and law enforcement authorities. Since August 2018, Russian authorities have been authorized to pay whistleblowers rewards which may exceed RUB 3 million ($50,000). However, rewards alone will hardly suffice to incentivize whistleblowing.

Russia adopted a law in 2012 requiring individuals holding public office, state officials, municipal officials, and employees of state organizations to submit information on the funds spent by them and members of their families (spouses and underage children) to acquire certain types of property, including real estate, securities, stock, and vehicles. The law also required public servants to disclose the source of the funds for these purchases and to confirm the legality of the acquisitions.

In July 2018, President Putin signed a two-year plan to combat corruption. The plan required public discussion for federal procurement worth more than RUB 50 million ($660,000) and municipal procurement worth more than RUB 5 million ($66,000). The government also expanded the list of property that can be confiscated if the owners fail to prove it was acquired using lawful income. The government maintains an online registry of officials charged with corruption-related offences, with individuals being listed for a period of five years. The Constitutional Court gave clear guidance to law enforcement on asset confiscation due to the illicit enrichment of officials. Russia has ratified the UN Convention against Corruption, but its ratification did not include article 20, which deals with illicit enrichment. The Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption reported in 2019 that Russia had implemented 18 out of 22 recommendations of the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) (nine fully implemented, nine partially implemented, and four recommendations have not been implemented), according to a Compliance Report released by GRECO in August 2020. GRECO made 22 recommendations to Russia on further combatting corruption developments: eight concern members of the parliament, nine concern judges, and five concern prosecutors.

In 2020, overall damage from the corruption crimes entailing criminal cases in Russia exceeded RUB 63 billion ($ 836.7 million). The number of detected corruption-related crimes in January-February 2021 increased by 11.8 percent to 7,100 up from 6,300 in the same period of 2020, according to the Prosecutor General’s Office. The number of bribery cases increased by 21 percent year-on-year in the same period to reach 3,500. The damage caused by corruption increased from RUB 7.2 billion ($ 98.2 million) in January-February 2020 to RUB 13 billion ($ 177.4 million) in the same period of 2021.

U.S. companies, regardless of size, are encouraged to assess the business climate in the relevant market in which they will be operating or investing and to have effective compliance programs or measures to prevent and detect corruption, including foreign bribery. U.S. individuals and firms operating or investing in Russia should become familiar with the relevant anticorruption laws of both Russia and the United States to comply fully with them. They should also seek the advice of legal counsel when appropriate.

Resources to Report Corruption

Andrey Avetisyan
Ambassador at Large for International Anti-Corruption Cooperation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
32/34 Smolenskaya-Sennaya pl, Moscow, Russia +7 499 244-16-06
+7 499 244-16-06

Anton Pominov
Director General
Transparency International – Russia
Rozhdestvenskiy Bulvar, 10, Moscow
Email: Info@transparency.org.ru

Individuals and companies that wish to report instances of bribery or corruption that impact, or potentially impact their operations, and to request the assistance of the United States Government with respect to issues relating to issues of corruption may call the Department of Commerce’s Russia Corruption Reporting hotline at (202) 482-7945, or submit the form provided at http://tcc.export.gov/Report_a_Barrier/reportatradebarrier_russia.asp .

10. Political and Security Environment

Political freedom continues to be limited by restrictions on the fundamental freedoms of expression, assembly, and association and crackdowns on political opposition, independent media, and civil society. Since July 2012, Russia has passed a series of laws giving the government the authority to label NGOs as “foreign agents” if they receive foreign funding, greatly restricting the activities of these organizations. To date, more than 77 NGOs have been labelled foreign agents. A May 2015 law authorizes the government to designate a foreign organization as “undesirable” if it is deemed to pose a threat to national security or national interests. As of June, 2021, 34 foreign organizations were included on this list. (https://minjust.ru/ru/activity/nko/unwanted)

According to the Russian Supreme Court, 7,763 individuals were convicted of economic crimes in 2019; the Russian business community alleges many of these cases were the result of commercial disputes. Potential investors should be aware of the risk of commercial disputes being criminalized. Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan and neighboring regions in the northern Caucasus have a high risk of violence and kidnapping.

Public protests continue to occur intermittently in Moscow and other cities. Russians protested in support of opposition leader Alexey Navalny after his return from Germany and detention in Moscow in January 2021. Rallies were held in almost 200 cities, the largest taking place in the capital. During these protests, authorities detained thousands and initiated several criminal cases against the participants; the number of detainees was record setting. Moscow saw the largest protests since 2011 in the summer of 2019 as many Muscovites were unhappy that opposition candidates had been banned from running in the September municipal elections.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

The Russian labor market remains fragmented, characterized by limited labor mobility across regions and substantial differences in wages and employment conditions. Earning inequalities are significant, enforcement of labor standards remains relatively weak, and collective bargaining is underdeveloped. Employers regularly complain about shortages of qualified skilled labor. This phenomenon is due, in part, to weak linkages between the education system and the labor market and a shortage of highly skilled labor. In 2019, the minimum wage in Russia was linked to the official “subsistence” level, which as of June 2021, was RUB 12,792 ($178).

The 2002 Labor Code governs labor standards in Russia. Normal labor inspections identify labor abuses and health and safety standards in Russia. The government generally complies with ILO conventions protecting worker rights, though enforcement is often insufficient, as the Russian government employs a limited number of labor inspectors. Employers are required to make severance payments when laying off employees in light of worsening market conditions. 12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Other Investment Insurance Programs

13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics

Please note that the following tables include FDI statistics from three different sources, and therefore will not be identical. Table 2 uses BEA data when available, which measures the stock of FDI by the market value of the investment in the year the investment was made (often referred to as historical value). This approach tends to undervalue the present value of FDI stock because it does not account for inflation. BEA data is not available for all countries, particularly if only a few US firms have direct investments in a country. In such cases, Table 2 uses other sources that typically measure FDI stock in current value (or, historical values adjusted for inflation). Even when Table 2 uses BEA data, Table 3 uses the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) to determine the top five sources of FDI in the country. The CDIS measures FDI stock in current value, which means that if the U.S. is one of the top five sources of inward investment, U.S. FDI into the country will be listed in this table. That value will come from the CDIS and therefore will not match the BEA data.

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($trillion USD) 2020 $1.423 2019 $1.699 www.worldbank.org/en/country 
Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data: BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 $5,092 2019 $14,439 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/
direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-
comprehensive-data
 

CBR data available at https://cbr.ru/statistics/macro_itm/svs/
Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 $7,362 2019 $4,371 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/
direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-
comprehensive-data
 
Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 $33.4% 2019 27.4% UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/
Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx
 

* Source for Host Country Data: FDI data – Central Bank of Russia (CBR); GDP data – Rosstat (GDP) (Russia’s GDP was RUB 110,046 billion in 2019, according to Rosstat. The yearly average RUB-USD- exchange rate in 2019, according to the CBR, was RUB 64.7362 to the USD).

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (as of January 1, 2021)
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions)
Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment
Total Inward 537,118 100% Total Outward 470,098 100%
Cyprus 153,355 28.6% Cyprus 200,435 43%
Bermuda 47,991 8.9% Netherlands 33.839 7.2%
Netherlands 46,712 8.7% Austria 29,702 6.2%
UK 41,961 7.8% UK 25,126 5.3%
Luxemburg 32,250 6% Switzerland 21,923 4.7%
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.
Table 4: Portfolio Investment
Portfolio Investment Assets (as of October 1, 2020)
Top Five Partners (Millions, US Dollars)
Total Equity Securities Total Debt Securities
All Countries 98,918 100% All Countries 14,131 100% All Countries 84,786 100%
Ireland 26,108 29% United States 6,844 48.4% Ireland 25,246 29.8%
Luxemburg 17,455 22% Cyprus 1,000 7.1% Luxemburg 16,913 19.9%
U.S. 11,422 11% Netherlands 951 6.7% UK 10,306 12.2%
UK 10,984 7% Ireland 863 6.1% Netherlands 6,201 7.3%
Netherlands 7,152 6% UK 678 4.8% Cyprus 4,752 5.6%

14. Contact for More Information

Embassy of the United States of America
Economic Section
Bolshoy Deviatinsky Pereulok No. 8
Moscow 121099, Russian Federation
+7 (495) 728-5000 (Economic Section)
Email: MoscowECONESTHAmericans@state.gov 

Saudi Arabia

Executive Summary

In 2020, the Saudi Arabian government (SAG) continued its ambitious socio-economic reforms, collectively known as “Vision 2030.” Spearheaded by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Vision 2030 provides a roadmap for the development of new economic sectors, including tourism and entertainment, and for a significant transformation toward a digital, knowledge-based economy. The reforms are aimed at diversifying the Saudi economy away from its reliance on oil and creating more private sector jobs for a young and growing population.

To help accomplish these goals, the Saudi Arabian government (SAG) took additional steps in 2020 to improve the Kingdom’s investment climate, attract increased foreign investment, and encourage greater domestic and international private sector participation in its economy. To accelerate development and facilitate investment, the SAG elevated two Saudi authorities to full ministries in 2020: the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority became the Ministry of Investment, and the Saudi Commission for Tourism and National Heritage became the Ministry of Tourism. On March 30, 2021, the SAG also announced the new Shareek program, an initiative designed to generate $3.2 trillion of domestic investment from the SAG, the sovereign wealth Public Investment Fund, and the private sector into Saudi Arabia’s economic development.

The Saudi Arabian government and its new stand-alone intellectual property rights (IPR) agency, the Saudi Authority for Intellectual Property (SAIP), have taken important steps since 2018 to improve IPR protection, enforcement, and awareness. In 2020, SAIP continued its inspection campaigns and seized millions of items that violated IPR protection. However, despite making measurable progress, the continued lack of effective protection of IPR in the pharmaceutical sector remains a significant concern. Several U.S. and international pharmaceutical companies allege the SAG violated their IPR and the confidentiality of trade data by licensing local firms to produce competing generic pharmaceuticals without approval. Industry attempts to engage the SAG on these issues have not led to satisfactory outcomes for the affected companies, while legal recourse and repercussions for IPR violations remain poorly defined. Primarily for these reasons, the U.S. Trade Representative included Saudi Arabia on its Special 301 Priority Watch List for the second consecutive year.

Infrastructure development remains a priority component of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 aspiration to become the most important logistics hub in the region, linking Asia, Europe, and Africa. By establishing new business partnerships and facilitating the flow of goods, people, and capital, the country seeks to increase interconnectivity and economic integration with other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Improvements to transportation, such as the $23 billion Riyadh metro, are intended to support this plan. In addition, Saudi Arabia continues to create and expand “economic cities” – including plans for special economic zones – throughout the Kingdom as hubs for petrochemicals, mining, logistics, manufacturing, and digital industries. The Kingdom also continued its early-stage work on infrastructure for NEOM, a futuristic city in northwest Saudi Arabia that Saudi officials have said will cost $500 billion to develop.

Saudi Arabia is launching an $800 billion project to double the size of Riyadh city in the next decade and transform it into an economic, social, and cultural hub for the region. The project includes 18 “mega-projects” in the capital city to improve livability, strengthen economic growth, and more than double the population to 15-20 million by 2030. The SAG is seeking private sector financing of $250 billion for these projects with similar contributions from income generated by its financial, tourism, and entertainment sectors. While specific details of a new initiative announced in February 2021 to attract multinational companies’ regional headquarters offices to Saudi Arabia have not been finalized, senior SAG officials have said publicly that beginning in 2024, government contracts will only be awarded to companies whose regional headquarters are located in the Kingdom. “Saudization” polices requiring certain businesses to employ a quota of Saudi workers have led to disruptions in some private sector activities.

In recognition of the progress made in its investment and business climate, Saudi Arabia’s rankings on several world indexes improved between 2019 and 2021. The country jumped 13 places on the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2019, the biggest gain of any country surveyed, and increased two more spots in 2020 to 24th place, supported by improvements to government and business efficiency. The World Bank ranked Saudi Arabia the world’s top reformer and improver in its Doing Business 2020 report. The Kingdom rose 30 places, from 92nd to 62nd, and improved in 9 out of 10 areas measured in the report. World Economic Forum’s 2020 Global Competitiveness Report Special Edition ranked Saudi Arabia among the top 10 countries in the world for digital skills. The report attributed this progress to a number of factors including the adoption of information and communication technology, flexible work arrangements, national digital skills, and the legal digital framework.

On the social front, the removal of guardianship laws and travel restrictions for adult women, the introduction of workplace protections, and recent judicial reforms that provide additional protection have enabled more women to enter the labor force. From 2016 to 2020, the Saudi female labor participation rate increased from 19 percent to 33 percent.

Development of the Saudi tourism sector is also a priority under Vision 2030, with plans to develop tourist attractions that meet the highest international standards and develop potential UNESCO World Heritage Sites. In addition to introducing a new tourism visa in 2019 for non-religious travelers, the SAG no longer requires that foreign travelers staying in the same hotel room provide proof of marriage or family relations. Construction of several multi-billion dollar giga-projects focused on tourism, including Qiddiya, the Red Sea Project, and Amaala, continue to progress. The SAG is seeking private investments through its Tourist Investment Fund, which has initial capital of $4 billion, and the Kafalah program, which provides loan guarantees of up to $400 million. In addition, the Tourism Fund signed MOUs with local banks to finance projects valued up to $40 billion in an effort to stimulate tourism investment and increase the sector’s contribution to GDP. Due to the global pandemic, the SAG paused its Saudi Seasons initiative comprised of 11 annual tourism ‘seasons’ held in each region of the country, but has announced the program will resume in November 2021.

The Saudi entertainment and sporting events sector is growing rapidly. AMC, Vox, and other cinema companies continue to develop hundreds of movie theaters. The SAG is seeking to sign agreements for film production studios in Saudi Arabia for end-to-end film production. Saudi film festivals, like the Red Sea Film Festival, are being developed to meet the SAG’s Vision 2030 Quality of Life objectives. The SAG has also hosted several world class sporting events including the European Tour, Diriyah ePrix, Dakar Rally, Saudi Formula One Grand Prix, Diriyah Tennis Cup, WWE Crown Jewel, and Supercoppa. In addition, several festivals and concerts have demonstrated strong demand for a variety of art and culture content.

Investor concerns persist, however, over the rule of law, business predictability, and political risk. Although some have recently been released, the continued detention and prosecution of activists, including prominent women’s rights activists, remains a significant concern, while there has been little progress on fundamental freedoms of speech and religion. Pressure on Saudi Arabia’s fiscal situation from the sharp downturn in oil prices and demand in 2020, as well as the unexpected spending needed to respond to COVID-19, will likely dampen some of the SAG’s ambitious plans. Despite budget cuts imposed in 2020 and the possibility that further spending reductions may be forthcoming, companies working on the SAG’s giga-projects reported the ongoing availability of funding in 2020. Revenues generated by the tripling of Saudi Arabia’s value-added tax rate from 5 to 15 percent in July 2020 have helped ease fiscal stress.

The pressure to generate non-oil revenue and provide more jobs for Saudi citizens have prompted the SAG to implement measures that may weaken the country’s investment climate going forward. Increased fees for expatriate workers and their dependents, as well as “Saudization” polices requiring certain businesses to employ a quota of Saudi workers, have led to disruptions in some private sector activities and may lead to a decrease in domestic consumption levels.

Finally, while some U.S. companies, including those with significant experience in Saudi Arabia, continue to experience payment delays for SAG contracts, many were paid in full from late 2020 through the beginning of 2021. The SAG has committed to speed up its internal payment process and pay companies in a timely manner.

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 52 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2020 62 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings
Global Innovation Index 2020 66 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 $10,826 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/
World Bank GNI per capita 2019 $22,840 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

The SAG seeks foreign investment that explicitly promotes economic development, transfers foreign expertise and technology to Saudi Arabia, creates jobs for Saudi nationals, and increases Saudi Arabia’s non-oil exports. As part of Vision 2030, the SAG targets increasing foreign investments in Saudi Arabia to $3 trillion. The government encourages investment in nearly all economic sectors, with priority given to chemicals, industrial, and manufacturing; transport and logistics; information and communication technology; healthcare and life sciences; water and waste management; energy; education; tourism, entertainment and sports; real estate; financial services; and mining and metals. In March 2021, the SAG announced it is seeking to attract $420 billion in foreign investments over the next 10 years in the infrastructure and transportation sectors alone.

The Ministry of Investment of Saudi Arabia (MISA), formerly the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), governs and regulates foreign investment in the Kingdom, issues licenses to prospective investors, and works to foster and promote investment opportunities across the economy. Established originally as a regulatory agency, MISA has increasingly shifted its focus to investment promotion and assistance, offering potential investors detailed guidance and a catalogue of current investment opportunities on its website (https://investsaudi.sa/en/sectors-opportunities/).

MISA promotes efforts to improve the Kingdom’s attractiveness as an investment destination: e-licenses to provide a more efficient and user-friendly process; an online “instant” license issuance or renewal service to foreign investors that are listed on a local or international stock market and meet certain conditions; a reduction in the license approval period from days to hours; a reduction in required customs documents; 100 percent foreign ownership in most sectors; a reduction in customs clearance period from weeks to hours; the launch of Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration; and an increase in the investor license period to five years. MISA’s reforms appear to be yielding results: Saudi Arabia jumped 30 places to 62nd place in the 2020 World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Report.

In a country where most public entertainment was once forbidden, the SAG now regularly sponsors and promotes entertainment programming, including live concerts, dance exhibitions, sports competitions, and other public performances. Significantly, the audiences for many of those events are now gender-mixed, representing a larger consumer base. In addition to reopening cinemas in 2018, the SAG has hosted Formula E races, professional golf tournaments, a world heavyweight boxing title match, and a professional tennis tournament. Saudi Arabia launched the Saudi Seasons initiative in 2019 with tourism and cultural events in each of the 11 regions of the country. The Riyadh Season included first-ever car exhibition and auction in Riyadh, which attracted 350 U.S. exhibitors. Saudi Arabia’s General Entertainment Authority announced it plans to launch the second iteration of Saudi Seasons in November 2021 after a COVID pause.

The SAG is proceeding with “economic cities” and new “giga-projects” that are at various stages of development and is seeking foreign investment in them. These projects are large-scale and self-contained developments in different regions focusing on particular industries, e.g., technology, energy, logistics (airports, railways, ports, and warehouses), tourism, entertainment, and institutional (education; medical; government entities, post offices and fire stations; religious buildings, and dams and reservoirs). Principal among these projects are:

  • Qiddiya, a new, large-scale entertainment, sports, and cultural complex near Riyadh;
  • King Abdullah Financial District, a commercial center development with nearly 60 skyscrapers in Riyadh;
  • Red Sea Project, a massive tourism development on the archipelago of islands along the western Saudi coast, which aims to create 70,000 jobs and attract one million tourists per year;
  • Amaala, a wellness, healthy living, and meditation resort on the Kingdom’s northwest coast, projected to include more than 2,500 luxury hotel rooms and 700 villas; and
  • NEOM, a $500 billion long-term development project to build a futuristic “independent economic zone” in northwest Saudi Arabia. In November 2020, the SAG announced The Line; a new, 100 mile-long, $100-$200 billion development at NEOM that will have no cars, no streets, and no carbon emissions. The project aims to create 380,000 jobs and contribute $48 billon to domestic GDP by 2030.

The long term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and sustained downturn in oil prices in 2020 on these giga-projects is not clear. While some companies working on the projects reported the ongoing availability of funding in 2020, others reported that budget cutbacks had begun to impact their operations.

In June 2020, the SAG approved a new mining investment law that aims to boost investments in the sector. The law will facilitate the establishment of a mining fund to provide sustainable finance, support geological survey and exploration programs, and optimize national mineral resources valued at $1.3 trillion. The law could increase the sector’s contribution to GDP by $64 billion, reduce imports by $9.8 billion, and create 200,000 direct and indirect jobs by 2030.

Structural impediments to foreign investment in Saudi Arabia remain.

Foreign investors must contend with increasingly strict localization requirements in bidding for certain government contracts, labor policy requirements to hire more Saudi nationals (usually at higher wages than expatriate workers), an increasingly restrictive visa policy for foreign workers, and gender segregation in business and social settings (though gender segregation is becoming more relaxed as the SAG introduces socio-economic reforms). The General Authority for Military Industries, for example, will require that all military procurements have fifty percent local content by 2030.

The SAG implemented new taxes and fees in 2017 and early 2018, including significant visa fee increases, higher fines for traffic violations, new fees for certain billboard advertisements, and related measures. On July 1, 2020, the SAG increased the value-added tax (VAT) from five percent to 15 percent.

The SAG implemented new taxes and fees in 2017 and early 2018, including significant visa fee increases, higher fines for traffic violations, new fees for certain billboard advertisements, and related measures. On July 1, 2020, the SAG increased the value-added tax (VAT) from five percent to 15 percent.

In February 2021, MISA and the Royal Commission for Riyadh City (RCRC) announced a new directive that companies that want to contract with the SAG must establish their regional headquarters in Saudi Arabia – preferably in Riyadh – by 2024. Companies that relocate their regional headquarters to Riyadh will receive tax breaks and other incentives. Saudi officials have confirmed that offices cannot be headquarters “in name only” but, rather, must be legitimate headquarters offices with C-level executive staff in Riyadh overseeing operations and staff in the rest of the region. Companies choosing to maintain their regional headquarters in another country will not be awarded public sector contracts – including contracts from Saudi Aramco – beginning in 2024.

Foreign investment is currently prohibited in 10 sectors on the Negative List, including:

  1. Oil exploration, drilling, and production;
  2. Catering to military sectors;
  3. Security and detective services;
  4. Real estate investment in the holy cities, Mecca and Medina;
  5. Tourist orientation and guidance services for religious tourism related to Hajj and umrah;
  6. Printing and publishing (subject to a variety of exceptions);
  7. Certain internationally classified commission agents;
  8. Services provided by midwives, nurses, physical therapy services, and quasi-doctoral services;
  9. Fisheries; and
  10. Poison centers, blood banks, and quarantine services.

In addition to the negative list, older laws that remain in effect prohibit or otherwise restrict foreign investment in some economic subsectors not on the list, including some areas of healthcare. At the same time, MISA has demonstrated some flexibility in approving exceptions to the “negative list” exclusions.

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Saudi Arabia fully recognizes rights to private ownership and the establishment of private business. As outlined above, the SAG excludes foreign investors from some economic sectors and places some limits on foreign control.

With respect to energy, Saudi Arabia’s largest economic sector, foreign firms are barred from investing in the upstream hydrocarbon sector, but the SAG permits foreign investment in the downstream energy sector, including refining and petrochemicals. There is significant foreign investment in these sectors. ExxonMobil, Shell, China’s Sinopec, and Japan’s Sumitomo Chemical are partners with Saudi Aramco (the SAG’s state-owned oil firm) in domestic refineries. ExxonMobil, Chevron, Shell, and other international investors have joint ventures with Saudi Aramco and/or the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) in large-scale petrochemical plants that utilize natural gas feedstock from Saudi Aramco’s operations. The Dow Chemical Company and Saudi Aramco are partners in the $20 billion Sadara joint venture with the world’s largest integrated petrochemical production complex.

Saudi Aramco also maintains several contractors under its Long-Term Agreement (LTA) group for a series of offshore jobs that include engineering, procurement, construction, and installation. LTA firms are prioritized for offshore contracts typically ranging between $100 to $800 million in value. Saudi Aramco also maintains a smaller group of contractors to provide hook-up, commissioning and maintenance, and modifications and operations jobs for its offshore oil and gas infrastructure. These refurbishment contracts are usually valued under $100 million and tendered exclusively to this smaller group.

With respect to other non-oil natural resources, Saudi Arabia’s mining sector continues to expand. With an estimated $1.3 trillion of mineral resources, the sector expects to have significant opportunities in exploration and development projects. Saudi Arabia’s mining sector laws were recently updated to allow foreign companies to enter the mining sector and invest in the Kingdom’s vast mining resources. Saudi Arabia’s national mining company, Ma’aden, has a $12 billion joint venture with Alcoa for bauxite mining and aluminum production and a $7 billion joint venture with the leading American fertilizer firm Mosaic and SABIC to produce phosphate-based fertilizers.

Joint ventures almost always take the form of limited liability partnerships in Saudi Arabia, to which there are some disadvantages. Foreign partners in service and contracting ventures organized as limited liability partnerships must pay, in cash or in kind, 100 percent of their contribution to authorized capital. MISA’s authorization is only the first step in setting up such a partnership.

Professionals, including architects, consultants, and consulting engineers, are required to register with, and be certified by, the Ministry of Commerce. In theory, these regulations permit the registration of Saudi-foreign joint venture consulting firms. As part of its WTO commitments, Saudi Arabia generally allows consulting firms to establish a local office without a Saudi partner. Foreign engineering consulting companies, however, must have been incorporated for at least 10 years and have operations in at least four different countries to qualify. Foreign entities practicing accounting and auditing, architecture and civil planning, or providing healthcare, dental, or veterinary services, must still have a Saudi partner.

In recent years, Saudi Arabia has opened additional service markets to foreign investment, including financial and banking services; aircraft maintenance and repair; computer reservation systems; wholesale, retail, and franchise distribution services; both basic and value-added telecom services; and investment in the computer and related services sectors. In 2016, Saudi Arabia formally approved full foreign ownership of retail and wholesale businesses in the Kingdom. While some companies have already received licenses under the new rules, the restrictions attached to obtaining full ownership – including a requirement to invest over $50 million during the first five years and ensure that 30 percent of all products sold are manufactured locally – have proven difficult to meet and precluded many investors from taking full advantage of the reform.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

Saudi Arabia completed its third WTO trade policy review in March 2021, which included investment policies ( https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp507_e.htm ).

Business Facilitation

In addition to applying for a license from MISA, foreign and local investors must register a new business via the Ministry of Commerce (MOC), which has begun offering online registration services for limited liability companies at: https://mc.gov.sa/en/ . Though users may submit articles of association and apply for a business name within minutes on MOC’s website, final approval from the Ministry often takes a week or longer. Applicants must also complete a number of other steps to start a business, including obtaining a municipality (baladia) license for their office premises and registering separately with the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development, Chamber of Commerce, Passport Office, Tax Department, and the General Organization for Social Insurance. From start to finish, registering a business in Saudi Arabia takes about three weeks. The country placed at 38 of 190 countries for ease of starting a business, according to the World Bank (2020 rankings). Also, improved protections for minority investors helped Saudi Arabia tie for third place globally on that World Bank indicator.

Saudi officials have stated their intention to attract foreign small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to the Kingdom. To facilitate and promote the growth of the SME sector, the SAG established the Small and Medium Enterprises General Authority in 2015 and released a new Companies Law in 2016, which was amended in 2018 to update the language vis-à-vis Joint Stock Companies (JSC) and Limited Liability Companies (LLC). It also substantially reduced the minimum capital and number of shareholders required to form a JSC from five to two. Additionally, as of 2019, women no longer need a male guardian to apply for a business license.

Outward Investment

Private Saudi citizens, Saudi companies, and SAG entities hold extensive overseas investments. The SAG has been transforming its Public Investment Fund (PIF), traditionally a holding company for government shares in state-controlled enterprises, into a major international investor and sovereign wealth fund. In 2016, the PIF made its first high-profile international investment by taking a $3.5 billion stake in Uber. The PIF has also announced a $400 million investment in Magic Leap, a Florida-based company that is developing “mixed reality” technology, and a $1 billion investment in Lucid Motors, a California-based electric car company. In 2020 and early 2021, the PIF made a number of new investments, including in Facebook, Starbucks, Disney, Boeing, Citigroup, LiveNation, Marriott, several European energy firms, Carnival Cruise Lines, Reliance Retail Ventures Limited (RRVL), and Hambro Perks Ltd’s Oryx Fund, but liquidated its position in many of these within a few months. Saudi Aramco and SABIC are also major investors in the United States. In 2017, Saudi Aramco acquired full ownership of Motiva, the largest refinery in North America, in Port Arthur, Texas. SABIC has announced a multi-billion dollar joint venture with ExxonMobil in a petrochemical facility in Corpus Christi, Texas.

3. Legal Regime

Transparency of the Regulatory System

Saudi Arabia received the lowest score possible (zero out of five) in the World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance Report, which places the Kingdom in the bottom 13 countries among 186 countries surveyed ( http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/ ). Few aspects of the SAG’s regulatory system are entirely transparent, although Saudi investment policy is less opaque than other areas. Bureaucratic procedures are cumbersome, but red tape can generally be overcome with persistence. Foreign portfolio investment in the Saudi stock exchange is well-regulated by the Capital Markets Authority (CMA), with clear standards for interested foreign investors to qualify to trade on the local market. The CMA has progressively liberalized requirements for “qualified foreign investors” to trade in Saudi securities. Insurance companies and banks whose shares are listed on the Saudi stock exchange are required to publish financial statements according to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) accounting standards. All other companies are required to follow accounting standards issued by the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants.

Stakeholder consultation on regulatory issues is inconsistent. Some Saudi organizations are diligent in consulting businesses affected by the regulatory process, while others tend to issue regulations with no consultation at all. Proposed laws and regulations are not always published in draft form for public comment. An increasing number of government agencies, however, solicit public comments through their websites. The processes and procedures for stakeholder consultation are not generally transparent or codified in law or regulations. There are no private-sector or government efforts to restrict foreign participation in the industry standards-setting consortia or organizations that are available. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by NGOs or private-sector associations.

International Regulatory Considerations

Saudi Arabia uses technical regulations developed both by the Saudi Arabian Standards Organization (SASO) and by the Gulf Standards Organization (GSO). Although the GCC member states continue to work towards common requirements and standards, each individual member state, and Saudi Arabia through SASO, continues to maintain significant autonomy in developing, implementing, and enforcing technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures in its territory. More recently, Saudi Arabia has moved towards adoption of a single standard for technical regulations. This standard is often based on International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standards, to the exclusion of other international standards, such as those developed by U.S.-domiciled standards development organizations (SDOs).

Saudi Arabia’s exclusion of these other international standards, which are often used by U.S. manufacturers, can create significant market access barriers for industrial and consumer products exported from the United States. The United States government has engaged Saudi authorities on the principles for international standards per the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Committee Decision and encouraged Saudi Arabia to adopt standards developed according to such principles in their technical regulations, allowing all products that meet those standards to enter the Saudi market. Several U.S.-based standards organizations, including SDOs and individual companies, have also engaged SASO, with mixed success, in an effort to preserve market access for U.S. products, ranging from electrical equipment to footwear.

A member of the WTO, Saudi Arabia must notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade.

Legal System and Judicial Independence

The Saudi legal system is derived from Islamic law, known as sharia. Saudi commercial law, meanwhile, is still developing. In 2016, Saudi Arabia took a significant step in improving its dispute settlement regime with the establishment of the Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration (see “Dispute Settlement” below). Through its Commercial Law Development Program, the U.S. Department of Commerce has provided capacity-building programs for Saudi stakeholders in the areas of contract enforcement, public procurement, and insolvency.

The Saudi Ministry of Justice oversees the sharia-based judicial system, but most ministries have committees to rule on matters under their jurisdictions. Judicial and regulatory decisions can be appealed. Many disputes that would be handled in a court of law in the United States are handled through intra-ministerial administrative bodies and processes in Saudi Arabia. Generally, the Saudi Board of Grievances has jurisdiction over commercial disputes between the government and private contractors. The Board also reviews all foreign arbitral awards and foreign court decisions to ensure that they comply with sharia. This review process can be lengthy, and outcomes are unpredictable.

The Kingdom’s record of enforcing judgments issued by courts of other GCC states under the GCC Common Economic Agreement, and of other Arab League states under the Arab League Treaty, is somewhat better than enforcement of judgments from other foreign courts. Monetary judgments are based on the terms of the contract – e.g., if the contract is calculated in U.S. dollars, a judgment may be obtained in U.S. dollars. If unspecified, the judgment is denominated in Saudi riyals. Non-material damages and interest are not included in monetary judgments, based on the sharia prohibitions against interest and against indirect, consequential, and speculative damages.

As with any investment abroad, it is important that U.S. investors take steps to protect themselves by thoroughly researching the business record of a proposed Saudi partner, retaining legal counsel, complying scrupulously with all legal steps in the investment process, and securing a well-drafted agreement. Even after a decision is reached in a dispute, enforcement of a judgment can still take years. The U.S. government recommends consulting with local counsel in advance of investing to review legal options and appropriate contractual provisions for dispute resolution.

In a February 8, 2021 statement, the Crown Prince announced draft legal reforms impacting personal status law, civil transactions law, evidence law, and discretionary sentencing that aim to increase predictability and transparency in the legal system, facilitating commerce and expanding protections for women. The draft proposals, expected to be approved later in 2021, would begin to codify Saudi law to introduce transparency and help ensure consistency in court rulings and improve oversight and accountability. Details remain unclear, but if implemented effectively, the reforms would be a major step in modernizing the Saudi legal system.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

In January 2019, the Saudi government established the Foreign Trade General Authority (FTGA), which aims to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s non-oil exports and investment, increase the private sector’s contribution to foreign trade, and resolve obstacles encountered by Saudi exporters and investors. The new authority monitors the Kingdom’s obligations under international trade agreements and treaties, negotiates and enters into new international commercial and investment agreements, and represents the Kingdom before the World Trade Organization. The Governor of the Foreign Trade General Authority reports to the Minister of Commerce.

Despite the list of activities excluded from foreign investment (see “Policies Toward Foreign Direct Investment”), foreign minority ownership in joint ventures with Saudi partners may be allowed in some of these sectors. Foreign investors are no longer required to take local partners in many sectors and may own real estate for company activities. They are allowed to transfer money from their enterprises out of the country and can sponsor foreign employees, provided that “Saudization” quotas are met (see “Labor Section” below). Minimum capital requirements to establish business entities range from zero to 30 million Saudi riyals ($8 million), depending on the sector and the type of investment.

MISA offers detailed information on the investment process, provides licenses and support services to foreign investors, and coordinates with government ministries to facilitate investment. According to MISA, it must grant or refuse a license within five days of receiving an application and supporting documentation from a prospective investor. MISA has established and posted online its licensing guidelines, but many companies looking to invest in Saudi Arabia continue to work with local representation to navigate the bureaucratic licensing process.

MISA licenses foreign investments by sector, each with its own regulations and requirements: (i) services, which comprise a wide range of activities including IT, healthcare, and tourism; (ii) industrial, (iii) real estate, (iv) public transportation, (v) entrepreneurial, (vi) contracting, (vii) audiovisual media, (viii) science and technical office, (ix) education (colleges and universities), and (x) domestic services employment recruitment. MISA also offers several special-purpose licenses for bidding on and performance of government contracts. Foreign firms must describe their planned commercial activities in some detail and will receive a license in one of these sectors at MISA’s discretion. Depending on the type of license issued, foreign firms may also require the approval of relevant competent authorities, such as the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Tourism.

An important MISA objective is to ensure that investors do not just acquire and hold licenses without investing, and MISA sometimes cancels licenses of foreign investors that it deems do not contribute sufficiently to the local economy. MISA’s periodic license reviews, with the possibility of cancellation, add uncertainty for investors and can provide a disincentive to longer-term investment commitments.

MISA has agreements with various SAG agencies and ministries to facilitate and streamline foreign investment. These agreements permit MISA to facilitate the granting of visas, establish MISA branch offices at Saudi embassies in different countries, prolong tariff exemptions on imported raw materials to three years and on production and manufacturing equipment to two years, and establish commercial courts. To make it easier for businesspeople to visit the Kingdom, MISA can sponsor visa requests without involving a local company. Saudi Arabia has implemented a decree providing that sponsorship is no longer required for certain business visas. While MISA has set up the infrastructure to support foreign investment, many companies report that despite some improvements, the process remains cumbersome and time-consuming.

Competition and Antitrust Laws

The General Authority for Competition (GAC) reviews merger transactions for competition-related concerns, investigates business conduct, including allegations of price fixing, can issue fines, and can approve applications for exemptions for certain business conduct.

The Competition law, as amended in 2019, applies to all entities operating in Saudi Arabia, and has a broad application covering all activities related to the production, distribution, purchase, and sale of commodities inside the Kingdom, as well as practices that occur outside of Saudi Arabia and that have an impact on domestic competition.

The competition law prohibits anti-competitive practices and agreements, which have as their object or effect the restriction of competition. This may include certain aspects of vertically-integrated business combinations. Consequently, companies doing business in Saudi Arabia may find it difficult to register exclusivity clauses in distribution agreements, but are not necessarily precluded from enforcing such clauses in Saudi courts.

Certain merger transactions must be notified to the GAC, and each entity involved in the merger is obligated to notify the GAC. GAC may approve, conditionally approve, or reject a merger transaction.

Expropriation and Compensation

The Embassy is not aware of any cases in Saudi Arabia of expropriation from foreign investors without adequate compensation. Some small- to medium-sized foreign investors, however, have complained that their investment licenses have been cancelled without justification, causing them to forfeit their investments.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ratified the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 1994. Saudi Arabia is also a member state of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention (ICSID), though under the terms of its accession it cannot be compelled to refer investment disputes to this system absent specific consent, provided on a case-by-case basis. Saudi Arabia has yet to consent to the referral of any investment dispute to the ICSID for resolution.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

The use of any international or domestic dispute settlement mechanism within Saudi Arabia continues to be time-consuming and uncertain, as all outcomes are subject to a final review in the Saudi judicial system and carry the risk that principles of sharia law may potentially supersede a judgment or legal precedent. The U.S. government recommends consulting with local counsel in advance of investing to review legal options and contractual provisions for dispute resolution.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

Traditionally, dispute settlement and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia have proven time-consuming and uncertain, carrying the risk that sharia principles can potentially supersede any foreign judgments or legal precedents. Even after a decision is reached in a dispute, effective enforcement of the judgment can be lengthy. In several cases, disputes have caused serious problems for foreign investors. In cases of alleged fraud or debt, foreign partners may also be jailed to prevent their departure from the country while awaiting police investigation or court adjudication. Courts can in theory impose precautionary restraint on personal property pending the adjudication of a commercial dispute, though this remedy has been applied sparingly.

The SAG has demonstrated a commitment to improve the quality of commercial legal proceedings and access to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Local attorneys indicate that the quality of final judgments in the court system has improved, but that cases still take too long to litigate. The Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration (SCCA) offers comprehensive arbitration services to domestic and international firms. The SCCA reports that both domestic and foreign law firms have begun to include referrals to the SCCA in the arbitration clauses of their contracts. However, it is currently too early to assess the quality and effectiveness of SCCA proceedings, as the SCCA is still in the early stages of operation. Awards rendered by the SCCA can be enforced in local courts, though judges remain empowered to reject enforcement of provisions they deem noncompliant with sharia law.

In December 2017, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) recognized Saudi Arabia as a jurisdiction that has adopted an arbitration law based on the 2006 UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law. UNCITRAL took this step after Saudi judges clarified that sharia would not affect the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. In May 2020, Saudi Arabia ratified the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, also known as the “Singapore Convention on Mediation,” becoming the fourth state to ratify the Convention. As a result of Saudi Arabia’s ratification, international settlement agreements falling under the Convention and involving assets located in Saudi Arabia may be enforced by Saudi Arabian courts.

Bankruptcy Regulations

In August 2018, the SAG implemented new bankruptcy legislation which seeks to “further facilitate a healthy business environment that encourages participation by foreign and domestic investors, as well as local small and medium enterprises.” The new law clarifies procedural processes and recognizes distinct creditor classes (e.g., secured creditors). The new law also includes procedures for continued operation of the distressed company via financial restructuring. Alternatively, the parties may pursue an orderly liquidation of company assets, which would be managed by a court-appointed licensed bankruptcy trustee. Saudi courts have begun to accept and hear cases under this new legislation.

4. Industrial Policies

Investment Incentives

MISA advertises a number of financial advantages for foreigners looking to invest in the Kingdom, including custom duty drawback and exemption on selected materials, equipment and machinery; the lack of personal income taxes; and a corporate tax rate of 20 percent on foreign companies’ profits (the lowest among G20 countries). MISA also lists various SAG-sponsored regional and international financial programs to which foreign investors have access, such as the Saudi Export Program, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Arab Trade Financing Program, and the Islamic Development Bank.

On March 30, 2021, the Crown Prince announced the Shareek (Arabic for partner) program to encourage local investment. To participate in the program, companies must commit to investing a minimum of $5.2 billion by 2030 and have the ability to invest at least $106 million in each additional project. Participating companies will be eligible for loans, grants, and co-investment from the Shareek program as well as special support from the SAG on regulatory and other issues.

The Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF), a government financial institution established in 1974, supports private-sector industrial investments by providing medium- and long-term loans for new factories and for projects to expand, upgrade, and modernize existing manufacturing facilities. The SIDF offers loans of 50 to 75 percent of a project’s value, depending on the project’s location. Foreign investors that set up manufacturing facilities in developed areas (Riyadh, Jeddah, Dammam, Jubail, Mecca, Yanbu, and Ras al-Khair), for example, can receive a 15-year loan for up to 50 percent of a project’s value; investors in the Kingdom’s least developed areas can receive a 20-year loan for up to 75 percent of the project’s value. The SIDF also offers consultancy services for local industrial projects in the administrative, financial, technical, and marketing fields. (The SIDF’s website is https://www.sidf.gov.sa/en/Pages/default.aspx .)

The SAG offers several incentive programs to promote employment of Saudi nationals in certain cases. The Saudi Human Resources Development Fund (HRDF) ( https://www.hrdf.org.sa/ ), for example, will pay 30 percent of a Saudi national’s wages for the first year of work, with a wage subsidy of 20 percent and 10 percent for the second and third year of employment, respectively (subject to certain limits and caps). “Tamheer” is an on-the-job training program through which the SAG provides Saudi graduates with a SAR 3,000 monthly stipend plus occupational hazard insurance for a period of three to six months.

American and other foreign firms are able to participate in SAG-financed and/or -subsidized research-and-development (R&D) programs. Many of these programs are run though the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST), which funds many of the Kingdom’s R&D programs.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

Saudi Arabia does not operate free trade zones or free ports. However, as part of its Vision 2030 program, the SAG has announced it will create special zones with special regulations to encourage investment and diversify government revenues. The SAG is considering the establishment of special regulatory zones in certain areas, including at NEOM and the King Abdullah Financial District in Riyadh. During the G20 Leaders Summit in November 2020, the SAG announced plans to launch special economic zones in 2022 that will be focused on greenfield investment in various sectors including pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and digital industries. These zones will have a special legislative environment and include attractive incentives, according to the SAG.

Saudi Arabia has established a network of “economic cities” as part of the country’s efforts to reduce its dependence on oil. Overseen by MISA, these four economic cities aim to provide a variety of advantages to companies that choose to locate their operations within the city limits, including in matters of logistics and ease of doing business. The four economic cities are: King Abdullah Economic City near Jeddah, Prince AbdulAziz Bin Mousaed Economic City in north-central Saudi Arabia, Knowledge Economic City in Medina, and Jazan Economic City near the southwest border with Yemen. The cities are in various stages of development, and their future development potential is unclear, given competing Vision 2030 economic development projects.

The Saudi Industrial Property Authority (MODON in Arabic) oversees the development of 35 industrial cities, including some still under development, in addition to private industrial cities and complexes. MODON offers incentives for commercial investment in these cities, including competitive rents for industrial land, government-sponsored financing, export guarantees, and certain customs exemptions. (MODON’s website is https://www.modon.gov.sa/en/Pages/default.aspx .)

The Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu (RCJY) was formed in 1975 and established the industrial cities of Jubail, located in eastern Saudi Arabia on the Persian Gulf coast, and Yanbu, located in north western Saudi Arabia on the Red Sea coast. A significant portion of Saudi Arabia’s refining, petrochemical, and other heavy industries are located in the Jubail and Yanbu industrial cities. The RCJY’s mission is to plan, promote, develop, and manage petrochemicals and energy intensive industrial cities. In connection with this mission, RCJY promotes investment opportunities in the two cities and can offer a variety of incentives, including tax holidays, customs exemptions, low-cost loans, and favorable land and utility rates. More recently, the RCJY has assumed responsibility for managing the Ras Al Khair City for Mining Industries (2009) and the Jazan City for Primary and Downstream Industries (2015). (The RCJY’s website is https://www.rcjy.gov.sa).

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

The government does not impose systematic conditions on foreign investment. In line with its bid to diversify the economy and provide more private sector jobs for Saudi nationals, the SAG has embarked on a broad effort to source goods and services domestically and is seeking commitments from investors to do so. In 2017, the Council of Economic and Development Affairs (CEDA) established the Local Content and Private Sector Development Unit (NAMAA in Arabic) to promote local content and improve the balance of payments. NAMAA is responsible for monitoring and implementing regulations, suggesting new policies, and coordinating with the private sector on all local content matters. In December 2018, a royal decree was issued to establish the Local Content and Government Procurement Authority (LCGPA) to develop local content and to improve government procurement operation. The LCGPA is mandated to set local content requirements for individual contracts, track the amount of local content used by contractors, and obtain and audit commitments by contractors to use local content.

Government-controlled enterprises are also increasingly introducing local content requirements for foreign firms. Saudi Aramco’s “In-Kingdom Total Value Added” (IKTVA) program, for example, strongly encourages the purchase of goods and services from a local supplier base and aims to double Aramco’s percentage of locally-manufactured energy-related goods and services to 70 percent by 2021.

In the defense sector, Saudi Arabia’s military is in the process of reforming its procurement processes and policies to incorporate new ambitious goals of Saudi employment and localized production. The SAG has shifted over the last two years away from offsets in favor of “localization” of purchases of goods and services and “Saudization” of the labor force. Previously, the government required offsets in investments equivalent to up to 40 percent of a program’s value for defense contracts, depending on the value of the contract. The SAG is currently mandating increasingly strict localization requirements for government contracts in the defense sector.

In 2017 the General Authority for Military Industries (GAMI) was established by the Saudi Council of Ministers to develop Saudi Arabia’s national military manufacturing capabilities. GAMI’s mandate is to localize 50 percent of Saudi Arabia’s military spending over the next decade.

Another key player in the defense sector is Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) – a wholly-owned subsidiary of the PIF launched in 2017. SAMI aims to be among the top 25 military industries companies in the ‎world by 2030 and supports the Kingdom’s localization goals by forming joint ventures to locally manufacture defense articles.

The government encourages recruitment of Saudi employees through a series of incentives (see section 11 on “Labor Policies” for details of the “Saudization” program) and limits placed on the number of visas for foreign workers available to companies. The Saudi electronic visitor visa system defaults to five-year visas for all U.S. citizen applicants. “Business visas” are routinely issued to U.S. visitors who do not have an invitation letter from a Saudi company, but the visa applicant must provide evidence that he or she is engaged in legitimate commercial activity. “Commercial visas” are issued by invitation from Saudi companies to applicants who have a specific reason to visit a Saudi company.

The cost of a single-entry business visit visa is $533. In January 2018, the SAG implemented new fees for expatriate employers ranging between $80 and $107 per employee per month and increased levies on expatriates with dependents to a $54 monthly fee for each dependent (see section 11 on “Labor Policies”). In January 2019, fees on expatriate employees increased to between $133 to $160 per month, and levies on expatriate dependents increased to $80 per month. These fees increased again in 2020 to between $186 to $212, but no additional increases are announced beyond 2020.

Data Treatment

Due to the demands of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Saudi Arabia substantially accelerated its Vision 2030 digital transformation reform to move its economy to an e-services platform. Also in 2020, infrastructure supporting the information and communications technology sector and 5G network expanded significantly. Concerns about cybersecurity and data treatment regulations increased in 2020, driven in part by the roll-out of healthcare and travel applications during the pandemic that collect and track individuals’ data.

In 2020, the National Data Governance Interim Regulations were issued to deal mainly with government-related data. However, part 5 of the National Data Regulations addresses personal data protection and applies to all entities in Saudi Arabia that process personal data in whole or in part, as well as entities outside the Kingdom that possess personal data related to individuals residing in Saudi Arabia. It remains unclear if the National Data Regulations are being enforced, as no sanctions for a potential breach are specified. Personal data is also protected under general provisions of Saudi law that impose strict obligations on businesses in relation to how, who, and when personal data can be collected, used, and stored.

Saudi Arabia’s Medical Practitioners’ Law of 2005 safeguards information obtained during medical practice, including personal data. It is unclear if personal data safeguards on government software applications rolled out during the COVID-19 pandemic provide the same level of personal data protection.

The Saudi E-Commerce Law of 2019, together with its 2020 implementing regulations, covers data protection of consumers’ personal information and applies to all e-commerce providers (domestic and international) that offer goods and services to customers based in Saudi Arabia. Its provisions regulate e-commerce business practices, requiring transparency and consumer protection, as well as protection of customers’ personal data, with the goal to enhance cybersecurity and trust in online transactions. Data retention is also restricted; service providers are not allowed to retain personal data any longer than required to complete business transactions for which data was collected. Also, sharing of data and customer information with third-party providers is prohibited without express permission. In March 2021, the General Authority of Zakat and Tax released guidelines for VAT registration for store owners engaged in e-commerce activities.

With increased emphasis on data-driven technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, cloud computing, blockchain, automation and robotics, the internet of things (IoT), and smart mobility, among others, it is anticipated that further developments will occur in the data protection space in the near- to mid-term. Under its Vision 2030 National Transformation Program strategy, Saudi Arabia is relying on data-driven “leapfrog” technologies to drive its 21st century economy. In 2020, Saudi Arabia announced two lynchpin policies aimed at advancing data mining to meet its ambitious digital transformation goals: the National Digital Economy Policy, and the National Strategy for Data and Artificial Intelligence (NSDAI). Recognizing the need for new data protection and cybersecurity laws and regulations for its evolving digital economy, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Communications and Information Technologies (MCIT) has indicated it is willing to take a more pragmatic approach to its data localization regulations, such as the 2018 Essential Cybersecurity Controls – and would provide incentives for big tech joint ventures. Saudi Arabia aims to be the region’s high-technology hub.

Saudi Arabia’s Cloud Computing Regulatory Framework (CCRF), issued in 2018 and amended in 2019 by the Saudi Communication and Information Technology Commission (CITC), applies to any cloud service provided to cloud customers with a home or business address in Saudi Arabia. The Framework governs the rights and obligations of cloud service providers, customers, businesses, and government entities, and includes data protection principles. Unless expressly allowed by Saudi law, CCRF regulations do not allow cross-border data flows by cloud service providers or customers of sensitive business content, or of highly-sensitive and secret content belonging to government agencies and institutions.

Saudi Arabia’s IOT Regulatory Framework regulates the use of all IoT services and includes data security, privacy, and protection requirements. IoT providers and implementors must comply with existing and future published laws, regulations, and requirements concerning data management, which will likely continue to focus on cybersecurity and data security. The IoT Regulatory Framework specifies data security measures, such as limited retention and data localization for IoT services and networks, which are also regulated by the CITC.

Saudi Arabia’s Electronic Transactions Law imposes obligations on internet service providers (ISPs) to maintain confidentiality of business information and personal data in electronic transactions.

Saudi Arabia’s Anti-Cyber Crime Law seeks to protect the national economy by deterring cybercrimes such as destruction or alteration of data, illegal access to bank or credit information, interruption of computer and information network transmissions, and other disruptions to ICT infrastructure. The law also requires consent from individuals whose personal data or documents are to be disclosed.

In 2018, the Saudi National Cybersecurity Authority (NCA) developed, and continues to update, the country’s Essential Cyber Controls (ECC) regulation with input from multiple Saudi cybersecurity and ICT authorities. For the first time, large American cloud, ISP, and ICT industry representatives have also provided feedback on how to protect consumer data while still enabling innovation and growth of the digital economy and cross-border trade. The ECC sets the minimum cybersecurity requirements for national organizations that are within its scope of ECC implementation.

There are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to encryption. Other than a requirement to retain records locally for ten years for tax purposes, there is no requirement regarding data storage or access to surveillance.

5. Protection of Property Rights

Real Property

The Saudi legal system protects and facilitates acquisition and disposition of all property, consistent with the Islamic practice of upholding private property rights. Non-Saudi corporate entities are allowed to purchase real estate in Saudi Arabia in accordance with the foreign-investment code. Other foreign-owned corporate and personal property is protected by law. Saudi Arabia has a system of recording security interests, and plans to modernize its land registry system. Saudi Arabia ranked 19th out of 190 countries for ease of registering property in the 2020 World Bank Doing Business Report.

In 2017, the Saudi Ministry of Municipal, Rural Affairs, and Housing implemented an annual vacant land tax of 2.5 percent of the assessed value on vacant lands in urban centers in an attempt to spur development. Additionally, in January 2018, in an effort to increase Saudis’ access to finance and stimulate the mortgage and housing markets, Saudi Arabia’s central bank lifted the maximum loan-to-value rate for mortgages for first-time homebuyers to 90 percent from 85 percent, and increased interest payment subsidies for first-time buyers. This further liberalized stringent down-payment requirements that prevailed up to 2016, when the central bank raised the maximum loan-to-value rate from 70 percent to 85 percent.

Intellectual Property Rights

Saudi Arabia has been on the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Report “Priority Watch List” since 2019. In the U.S. Chamber International IP Index 2021 report, Saudi Arabia ranked 37th out of 53 countries surveyed.

In 2018, Saudi Arabia established the Saudi Authority for Intellectual Property (SAIP) to regulate, support, develop, sponsor, protect, enforce, and upgrade IP fields in accordance with the best international practices. In 2020, SAIP worked to consolidate IP protection competence, including creating a government-wide IPR respect program, establishing a specialized IP court, launching online and in-market enforcement programs, continuing market raids against counterfeit and pirated goods, and conducting significant pro-IPR awareness campaigns. SAIP has cooperated with USTR and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), including the signing of a Cooperation Arrangement in October 2018 between SAIP and USPTO. Saudi Arabia Customs Authority has significantly enhanced its IP enforcement efforts and capacity, seized and destroyed 2 million counterfeit items across all ports during 2020 in coordination with SAIP, partnered closely with trademark and copyright owners, and systematically notified right holders of suspected shipments.

Since 2016, the Saudi Arabia Food and Drug Authority (SFDA), which the Minister of Health oversees, has granted marketing approval for pharmaceuticals to domestic companies relying on another company’s undisclosed test or other data for products despite the protection provided by Saudi regulations.

The United States government also continues to remain concerned about reportedly high levels of online piracy in Saudi Arabia, particularly through illicit streaming devices (ISDs), which right holders report are widely available and generally unregulated in Saudi Arabia. Industry reported in December 2020 that 32.6 percent of the 510,000 worldwide users of livehd7, a popular streaming website that violates IP laws, were from Saudi Arabia. However, in August 2019, beoutQ, a Saudi-based rampant satellite and online piracy service, ceased operations. In June 2020, the SAIP announced that it had disabled access to 231 websites that had been disseminating infringing content.

U.S. software firms report that the Saudi government continues to use unlicensed and “under-licensed” (in which an insufficient number of licenses is procured for the total number of users) software on government computer systems in violation of their copyrights. Other concerns include the lack of seizure and destruction of counterfeit goods in enforcement actions, and limits on the ability to enter facilities suspected of involvement in the sale or manufacture of counterfeit goods, including facilities located in residential areas.

In 2020, SAIP launched a copyright enforcement campaign in 2020 in Riyadh, Mecca, Jeddah, Dammam, and al-Ahsa. During the campaign, SAIP inspected 359 shops and seized 9,137 counterfeit and illicit items in marketplaces. In collaboration with the Ministry of Media, SAIP confiscated and destroyed over 3.5 million counterfeit and illicit items in 2020, including CDs, computers, and TV receivers.

For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ .

Resources for Rights Holders

Embassy point of contact:

Darin Christensen
Economic Officer+966 11 488-3800 Ext. 4097
christensends2@state.gov

Regional IPR Attaché:

Pete C. Mehravari
U.S. Intellectual Property Attaché for Middle East and North Africa
Patent Attorney
U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi | U.S. Department of Commerce
Office: +965 2259-1455 | Cell: +965 9758-9223 | WhatsApp: +1 404-429-9986
Peter.mehravari@trade.gov 

6. Financial Sector

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

Saudi Arabia’s financial policies generally facilitate the free flow of private capital and currency can be transferred in and out of the Kingdom without restriction. Saudi Arabia maintains an effective regulatory system governing portfolio investment in the Kingdom. The Capital Markets Law, passed in 2003, allows for brokerages, asset managers, and other nonbank financial intermediaries to operate in the Kingdom. The law created a market regulator, the Capital Market Authority (CMA), established in 2004, and opened the Saudi stock exchange (Tadawul) to public investment.

Since 2015, the CMA has progressively relaxed the rules applicable to qualified foreign investors, easing barriers to entry and expanding the foreign investor base. The CMA adopted regulations in 2017 permitting corporate debt securities to be listed and traded on the exchange; in March 2018, the CMA authorized government debt instruments to be listed and traded on the Tadawul. The Tadawul was incorporated into the FTSE Russell Emerging Markets Index in March 2019, resulting in a foreign capital injection of $6.8 billion. Separately, the $11 billion infusion into the Tadawul from integration into the MSCI Emerging Markets Index took place in May 2019. The Tadawul was also added to the S&P Dow Jones Emerging Market Index.

Money and Banking System

The banking system in the Kingdom is generally well-capitalized and healthy. The public has easy access to deposit-taking institutions. The legal, regulatory, and accounting systems used in the banking sector are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. In November 2020, the SAG approved the Saudi Central Bank Law, which changed the name of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) to the Saudi Central Bank. Under the new law, the Saudi Central Bank is responsible for maintaining monetary stability, promoting the stability of and enhancing confidence in the financial sector, and supporting economic growth. The Saudi Central Bank will continue to use the acronym “SAMA” due to its widespread use.

SAMA generally gets high marks for its prudential oversight of commercial banks in Saudi Arabia. SAMA is a member and shareholder of the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland.

In 2017, SAMA enhanced and updated its previous Circular on Guidelines for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. The enhanced guidelines have increased alignment with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 Recommendations, the nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. Saudi Arabia is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA-FATF). In 2019, Saudi Arabia became the first Arab country to be granted full membership of the FATF, following the organization’s recognition of the Kingdom’s efforts in combating money laundering, financing of terrorism, and proliferation of arms. Saudi Arabia had been an observer member since 2015.

The SAG has authorized increased foreign participation in its banking sector over the last several years. SAMA has granted licenses to a number of new foreign banks to operate in the Kingdom, including Deutsche Bank, J.P. Morgan Chase N.A., and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). A number of additional, CMA-licensed foreign banks participate in the Saudi market as investors or wealth management advisors. Citigroup, for example, returned to the Saudi market in early 2018 under a CMA license.

Credit is normally widely available to both Saudi and foreign entities from commercial banks and is allocated on market terms. The Saudi banking sector has one of the world’s lowest non-performing loan (NPL) ratios, roughly 2.0 percent in 2020. In addition, credit is available from several government institutions, such as the SIDF, which allocate credit based on government-set criteria rather than market conditions. Companies must have a legal presence in Saudi Arabia to qualify for credit. The private sector has access to term loans, and there have been a number of corporate issuances of sharia-compliant bonds, known as sukuk.

The New Government Tenders and Procurement Law (GTPL) was approved in 2019. The New GTPL applies to procurement by government entities and works and procurements executed outside of Saudi Arabia. The Ministry of Finance has a pivotal role under the new GTPL by setting policies and issuing directives, collating and distributing information, maintaining a list of boycotts, and approving tender and prequalification forms, contract forms, performance evaluation forms, and other documents. In 2018, the Ministry of Finance launched the Electronic Government Procurement System (Etimad Portal) to consolidate and facilitate the process of bidding and government procurement for all government sectors, enhancing transparency amongst sectors of government and among competing entities.

In 2021, SAMA introduced the new Instant Payment System (Sarie) to facilitate instant, 24/7 money transfers across local banks.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

There is no limitation in Saudi Arabia on the inflow or outflow of funds for remittances of profits, debt service, capital, capital gains, returns on intellectual property, or imported inputs, other than certain withholding taxes (withholding taxes range from five percent for technical services and dividend distributions to 15 percent for transfers to related parties, and 20 percent or more for management fees). Bulk cash shipments greater than $10,000 must be declared at entry or exit points. Since 1986, when the last currency devaluation occurred, the official exchange rate has been fixed by SAMA at 3.75 Saudi riyals per U.S. dollar. Transactions typically take place using rates very close to the official rate.

Remittance Policies

Saudi Arabia is one of the largest remitting countries in the world, with roughly 75 percent of the Saudi labor force comprised of foreign workers. Remittances totaled approximately $39.9 billion in 2020. There are currently no restrictions on converting and transferring funds associated with an investment (including remittances of investment capital, dividends, earnings, loan repayments, principal on debt, lease payments, and/or management fees) into a freely usable currency at a legal market-clearing rate. There are no waiting periods in effect for remitting investment returns through normal legal channels.

The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development is progressively implementing a “Wage Protection System” designed to verify that expatriate workers, the predominant source of remittances, are being properly paid according to their contracts. Under this system, employers are required to transfer salary payments from a local Saudi bank account to an employee’s local bank account, from which expatriates can freely remit their earnings to their home countries.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

The Public Investment Fund (PIF, www.pif.gov.sa ) is the Kingdom’s officially designated sovereign wealth fund. While PIF lacks many of the attributes of a traditional sovereign wealth fund, it has evolved into the SAG’s primary investment vehicle.

Established in 1971 to channel oil wealth into economic development, the PIF has historically been a holding company for government shares in partially privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including SABIC, the National Commercial Bank, Saudi Telecom Company, Saudi Electricity Company, and others. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is the chairman of the PIF and announced his intention in April 2016 to build the PIF into a $2 trillion global investment fund, relying in part on proceeds from the initial public offering of up to five percent of Saudi Aramco shares.

Since that announcement, the PIF has made a number of high-profile international investments, including a $3.5 billion investment in Uber, a commitment to invest $45 billion into Japanese SoftBank’s VisionFund, a commitment to invest $20 billion into U.S. Blackstone’s Infrastructure Fund, a $1 billion investment in U.S. electric car company Lucid Motors, and a partnership with cinema company AMC to operate movie theaters in the Kingdom. Under the Vision 2030 reform program, the PIF is financing a number of strategic domestic development projects, including: “NEOM,” a planned $500 billion project to build an “independent economic zone” in northwest Saudi Arabia; “The Line,” a $100-$200 billion project to build an environmentally friendly, carless, zero-carbon city at NEOM; “Qiddiya,” a new, large-scale entertainment, sports, and cultural complex near Riyadh; “the Red Sea Project”, a massive tourism development on the western Saudi coast; and “Amaala,” a wellness, healthy living, and meditation resort also located on the Red Sea.

At the end of 2020, the PIF reported its investment portfolio was valued at nearly $400 billion, mainly in shares of state-controlled domestic companies. In an effort to rebalance its investment portfolio, the PIF has divided its assets into six investment pools comprising local and global investments in various sectors and asset classes: Saudi holdings; Saudi sector development; Saudi real estate and infrastructure development; Saudi giga-projects; international strategic investments; and an international diversified pool of investments.

In 2021, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman launched a new five-year strategy for the PIF. The 2021-2025 strategy will focus on launching new sectors, empowering the private sector, developing the PIF’s portfolio, achieving effective long-term investments, supporting the localization of sectors, and building strategic economic partnerships. Under the new strategy, by 2025, the PIF will invest $267 billion into the local economy, contribute $320 billion to non-oil GDP, and create 1.8 million jobs. The Crown Prince also stated that the SAG would increase the size of the PIF more than five-fold to $2 trillion by 2030. The SAG declared it is investing nearly $220 billion through PIF, the National Development Fund, and the Royal Commission for Riyadh to transform Riyadh into a global city with 15 to 20 million inhabitants by 2030 (from its current population of about 7.5 million), and expects to attract a similar amount of investment from the private sector. The PIF also plans to establish a new major airline that will complement the state-owned Saudia (formerly Saudi Arabian Airlines) and compete with other major aviation companies in the region.

The Ministry of Finance announced in 2020 that $40 billion was being transferred from the Kingdom’s foreign reserves, held by the central bank SAMA, to the PIF to fund investments. In addition to previous investments in Uber, Magic Leap, Lucid Motors, Facebook, Starbucks, Disney, Boeing, Citigroup, LiveNation, Marriott, several European energy firms, and Carnival Cruise Lines, the PIF made a number of new investments in the latter half of 2020 including equity investments in CloudKitchens, Activision Blizzard, Electronic Arts, and Take-Two Interactive Software.

In practice, SAMA’s foreign reserve holdings also operate as a quasi-sovereign wealth fund, accounting for the majority of the SAG’s foreign assets. SAMA invests the Kingdom’s surplus oil revenues primarily in low-risk liquid assets, such as sovereign debt instruments and fixed-income securities. SAMA’s foreign reserves fell from $502 billion in January 2020 to $450 billion in January 2021. SAMA’s foreign reserve holdings peaked at $746 billion in mid-2014.

Though not a formal member, Saudi Arabia serves as a permanent observer to the International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds.

7. State-Owned Enterprises

SOEs play a leading role in the Saudi economy, particularly in water, power, oil, natural gas, petrochemicals, and transportation. Saudi Aramco, the world’s largest exporter of crude oil and a large-scale oil refiner and producer of natural gas, is 98.5 percent SAG-owned, and its revenues typically contribute the majority of the SAG’s budget. Four of the eleven representatives on Aramco’s board of directors are from the SAG, including the chairman, who serves concurrently as the Managing Director of the PIF. In December 2019, the Kingdom fulfilled its long-standing promise to publicly list shares of its crown jewel – Saudi Aramco, the most profitable company in the world. The initial public offering (IPO) of 1.5 percent of Aramco’s shares on the Saudi Tadawul stock market on December 11, 2019 was a cornerstone of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 program. The largest-ever IPO valued Aramco at $1.7 trillion, the highest market capitalization of any company at the time, and generated $25.6 billion in proceeds, exceeding the $25 billion Alibaba raised in 2014 in the largest previous IPO in history.

During the annual Future Investment Initiative conference held in January 2021, the Crown Prince announced that Saudi Aramco would launch a second offering of shares as a continuation of the historical initial public offering of 2019, but did not provide additional details. Proceeds from a second floatation will be transferred to the PIF and will be reinvested domestically and internationally.

In March 2019, Saudi Aramco signed a share purchase agreement to acquire 70 percent of SABIC, Saudi Arabia’s leading petrochemical company and the fourth largest in the world, from the PIF in a transaction worth $69.1 billion. Five of the nine representatives on SABIC’s board of directors are from the SAG, including the chairman and vice chairman. The SAG is similarly well-represented in the leadership of other SOEs. The SAG either wholly owns or holds controlling shares in many other major Saudi companies, such as the Saudi Electricity Company, Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia), the Saline Water Conversion Company, Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Ma’aden ), the National Commercial Bank, and other leading financial institutions.

Privatization Program

Saudi Arabia has undertaken a limited privatization process for state-owned companies and assets dating back to 2002. The process, which is open to domestic and foreign investors, has resulted in partial privatizations of state-owned enterprises in the banking, mining, telecommunications, petrochemicals, water desalination, insurance, and other sectors.

As part of Vision 2030 reforms, the SAG has announced its intention to privatize additional sectors of the economy. Privatization is a key element underpinning the Vision 2030 goal of increasing the private sector’s contribution to GDP from 40 percent to 65 percent by 2030. In April 2018, the SAG launched a Vision 2030 Privatization Program that aims to: strengthen the role of the private sector by unlocking state-owned assets for investment, attract foreign direct investment, create jobs, reduce government overhead, improve the quality of public services, and strengthen the balance of payments. (The full Privatization Program report is available online at http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/ncp .)

The program report references a range of approaches to privatization, including full and partial asset sales, initial public offerings, management buy-outs, public-private partnerships (build-operate-transfer models), concessions, and outsourcing. While the privatization report outlines the general guidelines for the program and indicated 16 targeted sectors, it does not include an exhaustive list of assets to be privatized. The report does, however, reference education, healthcare, transportation, renewable energy, power generation, waste management, sports clubs, grain silos, and water desalination facilities as prime areas for privatization or public-private partnerships

In 2017, Saudi Arabia established the National Center for Privatization and Public Private Partnerships, which will oversee and manage the Privatization Program. (The Center’s website is http://www.ncp.gov.sa/en/pages/home.aspx .) The NCCP’s mandate is to introduce privatization through the development of programs, regulations, and mechanisms for facilitating private sector participation in entities now controlled by the government.

In March 2021, Saudi Arabia approved the Private Sector Participation (PSP) Law. The PSP law aims to increase private sector participation in infrastructure projects and in providing public services by supporting Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) and privatization of public sector assets.

8. Responsible Business Conduct

There is a growing awareness of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Saudi Arabia. The King Khalid Foundation issues annual “responsible competitiveness” awards to companies doing business in Saudi Arabia for outstanding CSR activities. In March 2021, the SAG approved the formation of a committee on corporate social responsibility in the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development.

Additional Resources

Department of State

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/);

Trafficking in Persons Report (https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-reporabilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings );

List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor (https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods);

Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World (https://www.dol.gov/general/apps/ilab) and;

Comply Chain (https://www.dol.gov/ilab/complychain/).

9. Corruption

Foreign firms have identified corruption as a barrier to investment in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has a relatively comprehensive legal framework that addresses corruption, but many firms perceive enforcement as selective. The Combating Bribery Law and the Civil Service Law, the two primary Saudi laws that address corruption, provide for criminal penalties in cases of official corruption. Government employees who are found guilty of accepting bribes face 10 years in prison or fines up to one million riyals ($267,000). Ministers and other senior government officials appointed by royal decree are forbidden from engaging in business activities with their ministry or organization. Saudi corruption laws cover most methods of bribery and abuse of authority for personal interest, but not bribery between private parties. Only senior Oversight and Anti-Corruption Commission (“Nazaha”) officials are subject to financial disclosure laws. The government is considering disclosure regulations for other officials, but has yet to finalize them. Some officials have engaged in corrupt practices with impunity, and perceptions of corruption persist in some sectors, but combatting corruption remains a priority.

Nazaha, originally established in 2011, is responsible for promoting transparency and combating all forms of financial and administrative corruption In December 2019, King Salman issued royal decrees consolidating the Control and Investigation Board and the Mabahith’s Administrative Investigations Directorate under the National Anti-Corruption Commission, and renamed the new entity as the Oversight and Anti-Corruption Commission (“Nazaha”). The decrees consolidated investigations and prosecutions under the new Nazaha and mandated that the Public Prosecutor’s Office transfer any ongoing corruption investigations to the newly consolidated commission. Nazaha reports directly to King Salman and has the power to dismiss a government employee even if not found guilty by the specialized anti-corruption court.

Since its reorganization, Nazaha has not shied away from prosecuting influential players whose indiscretions may previously have been ignored. Throughout 2020, Nazaha published monthly press releases detailing its arrests and investigations, often including high-ranking officials, such as generals and judges, from every ministry in the SAG. The releases are available on the Nazaha website ( http://www.nazaha.gov.sa/en/Pages/Default.aspx ).

SAMA, the central bank, oversees a strict regime to combat money laundering. Saudi Arabia’s Anti-Money Laundering Law provides for sentences up to 10 years in prison and fines up to $1.3 million. The Basic Law of Governance contains provisions on proper management of state assets and authorizes audits and investigation of administrative and financial malfeasance.

The Government Tenders and Procurement Law regulates public procurements, which are often a source of corruption. The law provides for public announcement of tenders and guidelines for the award of public contracts. Saudi Arabia is an observer of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)

Saudi Arabia ratified the UN Convention against Corruption in April 2013 and signed the G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan in November 2010. Saudi Arabia was admitted to the OECD Working Group on Bribery in February 2021.

Globally, Saudi Arabia ranks 52 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2020.

Resources to Report Corruption

The National Anti-Corruption Commission’s address is:

National Anti-Corruption Commission
P.O. Box (Wasl) 7667, AlOlaya – Ghadir District
Riyadh 2525-13311
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Fax: 0112645555
E-mail: info@nazaha.gov.sa 

Nazaha accepts complaints about corruption through its website www.nazaha.gov.sa  or mobile application.

10. Political and Security Environment

Saudi Arabia is a monarchy ruled by King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud. The King’s son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has assumed a central role in government decision-making. The Department of State regularly reviews and updates a travel advisory to apprise U.S. citizens of the security situation in Saudi Arabia and frequently reminds U.S. citizens of recommended security precautions. In addition to a Global Travel Advisory due to COVID-19, the Department of State has a current travel advisory for Saudi Arabia that was updated in August 2020. The Travel Advisory urges U.S. citizens to exercise increased caution when traveling to Saudi Arabia due to terrorism and the threat of missile and drone attacks on civilian targets and to not travel within 50 miles of the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border.

Please visit www.travel.state.gov  for further information, including the latest Travel Advisory.

Due to risks to civil aviation operating within the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman region, including Saudi Arabia, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has issued an advisory Notice to Airmen (NOTAM).

11. Labor Policies and Practices

The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development (MHRSD) sets labor policy and, along with the Ministry of Interior, regulates recruitment and employment of expatriate labor, which makes up a majority of the private-sector workforce. About 76 percent of total jobs in the country are held by expatriates, who represent roughly 38 percent of the total population of approximately 34.2 million. The largest groups of foreign workers come from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, the Philippines, and Yemen. Saudis occupy about 93 percent of government jobs, but only about 24 percent of the total jobs in the Kingdom. Roughly 46 percent of employed Saudi nationals work in the public sector.

Saudi Arabia’s General Authority for Statistics estimates unemployment at 7.4 percent for the total population and 12.6 percent for Saudi nationals (Q4 2020 figures), but these figures mask a high youth unemployment rate, a Saudi female unemployment rate of 24.4 percent, and low Saudi labor participation rates (51.2 percent overall; 33.2 percent for women). With approximately 60 percent of the Saudi population under the age of 35, job creation for new Saudi labor market entrants will prove a serious challenge for years.

The SAG encourages Saudi employment through “Saudization” policies that place quotas on employment of Saudi nationals in certain sectors, coupled with limits placed on the number of visas for foreign workers available to companies. In 2011, the Ministry of Labor and Social Development (the forerunner of MHRSD) laid out a sophisticated plan known as Nitaqat, under which companies are divided into categories, each with a different set of quotas for Saudi employment based on company size.

The SAG has taken additional measures to strengthen the Nitaqat program and expand the scope of Saudization to require the hiring of Saudi nationals. The MHRSD has mandated that certain job categories in specific economic sectors only employ Saudi nationals, beginning with mobile phone stores in 2016. The ministry has likewise mandated that only Saudi women can occupy retail jobs in certain businesses that cater to female customers, such as lingerie and cosmetics shops. In 2017, Saudi Arabia began to phase in rules forbidding employment of foreigners in retail sales positions in 12 sectors, including: watches, eyewear, medical equipment and devices, electrical and electronic appliances, auto parts, building materials, carpets, cars and motorcycles, home and office furniture, children’s clothing and men’s accessories, home kitchenware, and confectioneries. Many elements of Saudization and Nitaqat have garnered criticism from the private sector, but the SAG claims these policies have substantially increased the percentage of Saudi nationals working in the private sector over the last several years and has indicated that there is flexibility in implementation for special cases.

In 2017, the SAG launched the latest phase of an ongoing campaign to deport illegal and improperly documented workers. The combination of Saudization and Nitaqat policies, new expatriate fees, increased visa and entry/exit permit fees, the increased VAT, and the COVID-19 pandemic has prompted approximately 2.2 million expatriates to depart the Kingdom over the past few years. These measures have also significantly increased labor costs for employers, both Saudi and foreign alike.

Saudi Arabia’s labor laws forbid union activity, strikes, and collective bargaining. However, the government allows companies that employ more than 100 Saudis to form “labor committees” to discuss work conditions and grievances with management. In 2015, the SAG published 38 amendments to the existing labor law with the aim of expanding Saudi employees’ rights and benefits. In March 2021, MHRSD implemented its Labor Reform Initiative (LRI) which allows foreign workers greater job mobility and freedom to exit Saudi Arabia without the need for the employer’s prior permission. Domestic workers are not covered under the provisions of either the 2015 regulations or the LRI; separate regulations covering domestic workers were issued in 2013, stipulating employers provide at least nine hours of rest per day, one day off a week, and one month of paid vacation every two years.

Saudi Arabia has taken significant steps to address labor abuses, but weak enforcement continues to result in credible reports of employer violations of foreign employee labor rights. In some instances, foreign workers and particularly domestic staff encounter employer practices (including passport withholding and non-payment of wages) that constitute trafficking in persons. The Department’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report details concerns about labor law enforcement within Saudi Arabia’s sponsorship system is available at: https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.

Overtime is normally compensated at time-and-a-half rates. The minimum age for employment is 14. The SAG does not adhere to the International Labor Organization’s convention protecting workers’ rights. Non-Saudis have the right to appeal to specialized committees in the MHRSD regarding wage non-payment and other issues. Penalties issued by the ministry include banning infringing employers from recruiting foreign and/or domestic workers for a minimum of five years.

13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount  
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $700,118  2019 $792,967 www.worldbank.org/en/country
Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $10,826 BEA data available at
https://apps.bea.gov/
international/factsheet/
Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $6,220 BEA data available at
https://www.bea.gov/international/
direct-investment-and-multinational-
enterprises-comprehensive-data
Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2019 29.8% UNCTAD data available at
https://stats.unctad.org/
handbook/EconomicTrends/Fdi.html

* Source for Host Country Data: Saudi General Authority for Statistics   

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

According to the 2020 UNCTAD World Investment Report, Saudi Arabia’s total FDI inward stock was $236.2 billion and total FDI outward stock was $123.1 billion (in both cases, as of 2019).

Detailed data for inward direct investment (below) is as of 2010, which is the latest available breakdown of inward FDI by country.

Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions)
Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment
Total Inward $169,206 100% Total Outward N/A N/A
Kuwait $16,761 10% Country #1 N/A N/A
France $15,918 9% Country #2 N/A N/A
Japan $13,160 8% Country #3 N/A N/A
United Arab Emirates $12,601 7% Country #4 N/A N/A
China, P.R. $9,035 5% Country #5 N/A N/A
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.

*Source: IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (2010 – latest available complete data)

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Portfolio Investment Assets
Top Five Partners (Millions, current US Dollars)
Total Equity Securities Total Debt Securities
All Countries $308,806 100% All Countries $231,500 100% All Countries $77,306 100%
United States $108,474 35% United States $94,132 41% United States $14,342 19%
Cayman Islands $37,101 12% Cayman Islands $33,281 14% U.A.E $10,550 14%
Japan $20,827 7% China P.R $16,091 7% Turkey $7,284 9%
China P.R. $16,501 5% Japan $13,813 6% Japan $7,014 9%
U.A.E $15,464 5% Switzerland $8,964 4% Egypt $5,543 7%

Source: IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS); data as of June 2020.

14. Contact for More Information

Economic Section and Foreign Commercial Service Offices
Embassy of the United States of America
P.O. Box 94309
Riyadh 11693, Saudi Arabia
Phone: +966 11 488-3800

Turkey

Executive Summary

Turkey experienced strong economic growth on the back of the many positive economic and banking reforms it implemented between 2002 and 2007, and it weathered the global economic crisis of 2008-2009 better than most countries, establishing itself as a relatively stable emerging market with a promising trajectory of reforms and a strong banking system.  However, over the last several years, economic and democratic reforms have stalled and by some measures, regressed.  GDP growth was 2.6 percent in 2018 as the economy entered a recession in the second half of the year.  Challenged by the continuing currency crisis, particularly in the first half of 2019, the Turkish economy grew by only 0.9 percent in 2019.   Turkey’s expansionist monetary policy and spending of over USD 100 billion in central bank foreign reserves caused Turkey’s economy to grow by 1.8 percent in 2020 despite the pandemic, though high inflation and persistently high unemployment have been exacerbated.  This year growth is expected to be around 3.5 percent with significant downside risks.

Despite recent growth, the government’s economic policymaking remains opaque, erratic, and politicized, contributing to long-term and sometimes acute lira depreciation.  Inflation in 2020 was 14.6 percent and unemployment 13.2 percent, though the labor force participation rate dropped significantly as well. 

The government’s push to require manufacturing and data localization in many sectors and the introduction of a 7.5 percent digital services tax in 2020 have negatively impacted foreign investment into the country.  Other issues of import include tax reform and the decreasing independence of the judiciary and the Central Bank.  Turkey hosts 3.6 million Syrian refugees, which creates an additional economic burden on the country as the government provides them services such as education and healthcare.  

Recent laws targeting the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector have increased regulations on data, social media platforms, online marketing, online broadcasting, tax collection, and payment platforms.  In particular, ICT and other companies report Government of Turkey (GOT) pressure to localize data, which it views as a precursor to greater GOT access to user information and source code.  Law #6493 on Payment and Security Systems, Payment Services and e-money Institutions, also requires financial institutions to establish servers in Turkey in order to localize data.  The Turkish Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK) is the authority that issues business licenses as long as companies 1) localize their IT systems in Turkey, and 2) keep the original data, not copies, in Turkey.  Regulations on data localization, internet content, and taxation/licensing have resulted in the departure of several U.S. tech companies from the Turkish market, and has chilled investment by other possible entrants to the e-commerce and e-payments sectors.  The laws potentially affect all companies that collect private user data, such as payment information provided online for a consumer purchase.    

The opacity and inconsistency of government economic decision making, and concerns about the government’s commitment to the rule of law, have led to historically low levels of foreign direct investment (FDI).  While there are still an estimated 1,700 U.S. businesses active in Turkey, many with long-standing ties to the country, the share of American activity is relatively low given the size of the Turkish economy.  Increased protectionist measures add to the challenges of investing in Turkey, which saw 2019-2020 investment flows from the world drop by 3.5 percent, although investment flows from the United States increased by 135 percent.

Turkey’s investment climate is positively influenced by its favorable demographics and prime geographical position, providing access to multiple regional markets.  Turkey is an island of relative stability in a turbulent region, making it a popular hub for regional operations.  Turkey has a relatively educated work force, well-developed infrastructure, and a consumption-based economy.   

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings 

Measure  Year  Index/Rank  Website Address 
TI Corruption Perceptions Index  2020  86 of 180  https://www.transparency.org/cpi2019 
World Bank’s Doing Business Report  2020  33 of 190  http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings 
Global Innovation Index  2020  51 of 131  https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator 
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions)  2019  3,333  https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/dici0720_0.pdf  
World Bank GNI per capita  2019  9,690 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment  

Turkey acknowledges that it needs to attract significant new foreign direct investment (FDI) to meet its ambitious development goals.  As a result, Turkey has one of the most liberal legal regimes for FDI among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members.  According to the Central Bank of Turkey’s balance of payments data, Turkey attracted a total of USD 5.67 billion of FDI in 2020, almost USD 200 million down from USD 5.87 billion in 2019.  This figure is the lowest FDI figure for Turkey in the last 16 years, and likely reflects a need to improve enforcement of international trade rules, ensure the transparency and timely execution of judicial awards, increase engagement with foreign investors on policy issues, and to implement consistent monetary and fiscal economic policies to promote strong, sustainable, and balanced growth.  Turkey also needs to take other political measures to increase stability and predictability for investors.  A stable banking sector, tight fiscal controls, efforts to reduce the size of the informal economy, increased labor market flexibility, improved labor skills, and continued privatization of state-owned enterprises would, if pursued, have the potential to improve the investment environment in Turkey.

Most sectors open to Turkish private investment are also open to foreign participation and investment.  All investors, regardless of nationality, face similar challenges:  excessive bureaucracy, a slow judicial system, relatively high and inconsistently applied taxes, and frequent changes in the legal and regulatory environment.  Structural reforms that would create a more transparent, equal, fair, and modern investment and business environment remain stalled.  Venture capital and angel investing are still relatively new in Turkey.

Turkey does not screen, review, or approve FDI specifically.  However, the government has established regulatory and supervisory authorities to regulate different types of markets.  Important regulators in Turkey include the Competition Authority; Energy Market Regulation Authority; Banking Regulation and Supervision Authority; Information and Communication Technologies Authority; Tobacco, Tobacco Products and Alcoholic Beverages Market Regulation Board; Privatization Administration; Public Procurement Authority; Radio and Television Supreme Council; and Public Oversight, Accounting and Auditing Standards Authority.  Some of the aforementioned authorities screen as needed without discrimination, primarily for tax audits.  Screening mechanisms are executed to maintain fair competition and for other economic benefits.  If an investment fails a review, possible outcomes can vary from a notice to remedy, which allows for a specific period of time to correct the problem, to penalty fees.  The Turkish judicial system allows for appeals of any administrative decision, including tax courts that deal with tax disputes.

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment  

There are no general limits on foreign ownership or control.  However, there is increasing pressure in some sectors for foreign investors to partner with local companies and transfer technology, and some discriminatory barriers to foreign entrants, on the basis of “anti-competitive practices,” especially in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector or pharmaceuticals.  In many areas Turkey’s regulatory environment is business-friendly.  Investors can establish a business in Turkey irrespective of nationality or place of residence.  There are no sector-specific restrictions that discriminate against foreign investor access, which are prohibited by World Trade Organization (WTO) Regulations.

Other Investment Policy Reviews 

The OECD published an Environmental Performance Review for Turkey in February 2019, noting the country was the fastest growing among OECD members.  Turkey’s most recent investment policy review through the World Trade Organization (WTO) was conducted in March 2016.  Turkey has cooperated with the World Bank to produce several reports on the general investment climate that can be found at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/research. 

Business Facilitation  

The Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Investment Office is the official organization for promoting Turkey’s investment opportunities to the global business community and assisting investors before, during, and after their entry into Turkey.  Its website is clear and easy to use, with information about legislation and company establishment. (http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/investmentguide/investorsguide/Pages/EstablishingABusinessInTR.aspx).  The website is also where foreigners can register their businesses.

The conditions for foreign investors setting up a business and transferring shares are the same as those applied to local investors.  International investors may establish any form of company set out in the Turkish Commercial Code (TCC), which offers a corporate governance approach that meets international standards, fosters private equity and public offering activities, creates transparency in managing operations, and aligns the Turkish business environment with EU legislation as well as with the EU accession process.

Turkey defines micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises according to Decision No. 2018/11828 of the Official Gazette dated June 2, 2018:

  • Micro-sized enterprises: fewer than 10 employees and less than or equal to 3 million Turkish lira in net annual sales or financial statement.
  • Small-sized enterprises: fewer than 50 employees and less than or equal to 25 million Turkish lira in net annual sales or financial statement.
  • Medium-sized enterprises: fewer than 250 employees and less than or equal to 125 million Turkish lira in net annual sales or financial statement.

Outward Investment

The government promotes outward investment via investment promotion agencies and other platforms.  It does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad.

2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties

Since 1962, Turkey has negotiated and signed agreements for the reciprocal promotion and protection of investments.  As of 2020, Turkey has 81 bilateral investment agreements in force with: Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

Turkey has a bilateral taxation treaty with the United States.

3. Legal Regime

Since 1962, Turkey has negotiated and signed agreements for the reciprocal promotion and protection of investments.  As of 2020, Turkey has 81 bilateral investment agreements in force with: Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

Turkey has a bilateral taxation treaty with the United States.

4. Industrial Policies

Investment Incentives

Turkey’s regional incentives program divides the country into six different zones, providing the following benefits to investors:  corporate tax reduction; customs duty exemption; value added tax (VAT) exemption and VAT refund; employer’s share social security premium support; income tax withholding allowance; land allocation; and interest rate support for investment loans.  The program was launched in 2012; more detailed information can be found at the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Investment Office website:  https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/investmentguide/pages/incentives-guide.aspx.   In a policy speech delivered on March 12, 2021, President Erdogan stated that Turkey will prioritize incentives for high-tech FDI and provide long-term loan support to investments in Turkey’s less developed southeast region (Zones 5 and 6).  Additional measures may be forthcoming.

The incentives program gives priority to high-tech, high-value-added, globally competitive sectors and includes regional incentive programs to reduce regional economic disparities and increase competitiveness.  The investment incentives’ “tiered” system provides greater incentives to invest in less developed parts of the country, and is designed to encourage investments with the potential to reduce dependency on the importation of intermediate goods seen as vital to the country’s strategic sectors.  Other primary objectives are to reduce the current account deficit and unemployment, increase the level of support instruments, promote clustering activities, and support investments to promote technology transfer.  The map and explanation of the program can be found at:  www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/Maps/Pages/InteractiveMap.aspx

Foreign firms are eligible for research and development (R&D) incentives if the R&D is conducted in Turkey.  However, investors, especially in the technology sector, say that Turkey has a retrograde brick-and-mortar definition of R&D that overlooks other types of R&D investments (such as in internet platform technologies).  Turkey is seeking to foster entrepreneurship and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  Through the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Organization (KOSGEB), the Government of Turkey provides various incentives for innovative ideas and cutting-edge technologies, in addition to providing SMEs easier access to medium and long-term financing.  There are also a number of technology development zones (TDZs) in Turkey where entrepreneurs are given assistance in commercializing business ideas.  The Turkish Government provides support to TDZs, including infrastructure and facilities, exemption from income and corporate taxes for profits derived from software and R&D activities, exemption from all taxes for the wages of researchers, software, and R&D personnel employed within the TDZVAT, corporate tax exemptions for IT-specific sectors, and customs and duties exemptions.

Turkey’s Scientific and Technological Research Council (TUBITAK) has special programs for entrepreneurs in the technology sector, and the Turkish Technology Development Foundation (TTGV) has programs that provide capital loans for R&D projects and/or cover R&D-related expenses.  Projects eligible for such incentives include concept development, technological research, technical feasibility research, laboratory studies to transform concept into design, design and sketching studies, prototype production, construction of pilot facilities, test production, patent and license studies, and activities related to post-scale problems stemming from product design.  TUBITAK also has a Technology Transfer Office Support Program, which provides grants to establish Technology Transfer Offices (TTO) in Turkey.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

There are no restrictions on foreign firms operating in any of Turkey’s 21 free zones.  The zones are open to a wide range of activities, including manufacturing, storage, packaging, trading, banking, and insurance.  Foreign products enter and leave the free zones without imposition of customs or duties if products are exported to third country markets.  Income generated in the zones is exempt from corporate and individual income taxation and from the value-added tax, but firms are required to make social security contributions for their employees.  Additionally, standardization regulations in Turkey do not apply to the activities in the free zones, unless the products are imported into Turkey.  Sales to the Turkish domestic market are allowed with goods and revenues transported from the zones into Turkey subject to all relevant import regulations.

Taxpayers who possessed an operating license as of February 6, 2004, do not have to pay income or corporate tax on their earnings in free zones for the duration of their license.  Earnings based on the sale of goods manufactured in free zones are exempt from income and corporate tax until the end of the year in which Turkey becomes a member of the European Union.  Earnings secured in a free zone under corporate tax immunity and paid as dividends to real person shareholders in Turkey, or to real person or legal-entity shareholders abroad, are subject to 10 percent withholding tax.  See the Ministry of Trade’s website:  https://www.ticaret.gov.tr/serbest-bolgeler.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements  

The government mandates a local employment ratio of five Turkish citizens per foreign worker.  These schemes do not apply equally to senior management and boards of directors, but their numbers are included in the overall local employment calculations.  Foreign legal firms are forbidden from working in Turkey except as consultants; they cannot directly represent clients and must partner with a local law firm.  There are no onerous visa, residence, work permits or similar requirements inhibiting mobility of foreign investors and their employees.  There are no known government-imposed conditions on permissions to invest.

Recent laws targeting the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector have increased regulations on data, social media, online marketing, online broadcasting, tax collection, and payment platforms.  In particular, ICT and other companies report GOT pressure to localize data, which it views as a precursor to greater GOT access to user information and source code.  Law #6493 on Payment and Security Systems, Payment Services and e-money Institutions, also requires financial institutions to establish servers in Turkey in order to localize data.  The Turkish Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK) is the authority that issues business licenses as long as companies 1) localize their IT systems in Turkey, and 2) keep the original data, not copies, in Turkey.  Regulations on data localization, internet content, and taxation/licensing have resulted in the departure of several U.S. tech companies from the Turkish market, and has chilled investment by other possible entrants to the e-commerce and e-payments sectors.  The laws potentially affect all companies that collect private user data, such as payment information provided online for a consumer purchase.

Turkey enacted the Personal Data Protection Law in April 2016.  The law regulates all operations performed upon personal data including obtaining, recording, storage, and transfer to third parties or abroad.  For all data previously processed before the law went into effect, there was a two-year transition period.  After two years, all data had to be compliant with new legislation requirements, erased, or anonymized.  All businesses are urged to assess how they currently collect and store data to determine vulnerabilities and risks in regard to legal obligations.  The law created the Data Protection Authority (KVKK), which is charged with monitoring and enforcing corporate data use.

There are no performance requirements imposed as a condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding investment in Turkey.  GOT requirements for disclosure of proprietary information as part of the regulatory approval process are consistent with internationally accepted practices, though some companies, especially in the pharmaceutical sector, worry about data protection during the regulatory review process.  Enterprises with foreign capital must send their activity report submitted to shareholders, their auditor’s report, and their balance sheets to the Ministry of Trade, Free Zones, Overseas Investment and Services Directorate, annually by May.  Turkey grants most rights, incentives, exemptions, and privileges available to national businesses to foreign business on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis.  U.S. and other foreign firms can participate in government-financed and/or subsidized research and development programs on a national treatment basis.

Offsets are an important aspect of Turkey’s military procurement, and increasingly in other sectors, and such guidelines have been modified to encourage direct investment and technology transfer.  The GOT targets the energy, transportation, medical devices, and telecom sectors for the usage of offsets.  In February 2014, Parliament passed legislation requiring the Ministry of Science, Industry, and Technology, currently named the Ministry of Industry and Technology, to establish a framework to incorporate civilian offsets into large government procurement contracts.  The Ministry of Health (MOH) established an office to examine how offsets could be incorporated into new contracts.  The law suggests that for public contracts above USD 5 million, companies must invest up to 50 percent of contract value in Turkey and “add value” to the sector.  In general, labor, health, and safety laws do not distort or impede investment, although legal restrictions on discharging employees may provide a disincentive to labor-intensive activity in the formal economy.

5. Protection of Property Rights

Real Property 

Secured interests in property, both movable and real, are generally recognized and enforced, and there is a reliable system of recording such security interests.  For example, real estate is registered with a land registry office.  Turkey’s legal system protects and facilitates acquisition and disposal of property rights, including land, buildings, and mortgages, although some parties have complained that the courts are slow to render decisions and are susceptible to external influence.  However, following the July 2016 coup attempt, the GOT confiscated over 1,100 companies as well as significant real estate holdings for alleged terrorist ties.  Although the seizures did not directly impact many foreign firms, it nonetheless raises investor concerns about private property protections.   

The Ministry of Environment and Urbanization enacted a law on title-deed registration in 2012 removing the previous requirement that foreign purchasers of real estate in Turkey had to be in partnership with a Turkish individual or company that owns at least a 50-percent share in the property, meaning foreigners can now own their own land.  The law is also much more flexible in allowing international companies to purchase real property.  The law also increases the upper limit on real estate purchases by foreign individuals to 30 hectares and allows further increases up to 60 hectares with permission from the Council of Ministers.  As of March 2020, a valuation report, based upon real market value, must be prepared for real estate sales transactions involving buyers that are foreign citizens.  To ensure that land has a clear title, interested parties may inquire through the General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre (www.tkgm.gov.tr).  The World Bank’s Doing Business Index gave Turkey a rank of 27 out of 190 countries for ease of registering property in 2019.  See: http://doingbusiness.org/en/rankings. 

Intellectual Property Rights 

Turkey continues to implement its intellectual property rights (IPR) law, the Industrial Property Code No. 6769, which entered into force in 2017.  The law brings together a series of “decrees” into a single, unified, modernized legal structure.  It also greatly increases the capacity of the country’s patent office (TurkPatent) and improves the framework for commercialization and technology transfer.  Turkey is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and party to many of its treaties, including the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.

However, while legislative frameworks are improving, IPR enforcement remains lackluster.   Turkey remains on USTR’s Special 301 Watch List for 2021.  Concerns remain about policies requiring local production of pharmaceuticals, inadequate protection of test data, and a lack of transparency in national pricing and reimbursement.  IPR enforcement suffers from a lack of awareness and training among judges and officers, as well as a lack of prioritization relative to terrorism and other concerns.  Law enforcement officers do not have ex-officio authority to seize and destroy counterfeit goods, which are prevalent in the local markets.  Software piracy is also high.  The Istanbul Grand Bazaar in Turkey is included in USTR’s 2020 Notorious Markets List. 

Additionally, the practice of issuing search-and-seizure warrants varies considerably.  IPR courts and specialized IPR judges only exist in major cities.  Outside these areas, an application for a search warrant must be filed at a regular criminal court (Courts of Peace) and/or with a regular prosecutor.  The Courts of Peace are very reluctant to issue search warrants.  Although, by law, “reasonable doubt” is adequate grounds for issuing a search-and-seizure order, judges often set additional requirements, including supporting documentation, photographs, and even witness testimony, which risk exposing companies’ intelligence sources.  In some regions, Courts of Peace judges rarely grant search warrants, for example in popular tourist destinations.  Overall, according to some investors, it is difficult to protect IPR and general enforcement is deteriorating.  For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en.  

6. Financial Sector

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

The Turkish Government encourages and offers an effective regulatory system to facilitate portfolio investment.  Since the start of 2020, a currency crisis that has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, and high levels of dollarization have raised liquidity concerns among some commentators.  Existing policies facilitate the free flow of financial resources into product and factor markets.  The government respects IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.  Credit is generally allocated on market terms, though the GOT has increased low- and no-interest loans for certain parties, and pressured state-owned, and even private banks to increase their lending, especially for stimulating economic growth and public projects.  Foreign investors are able to get credit on the local market.  The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments.

The Turkish banking sector, a central bank system, remains relatively healthy.  The estimated total assets of the country’s largest banks were as follows at the end of 2020:  Ziraat Bankasi A.S. – USD 127.09 billion, Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi – USD 93.04 billion,  Halk Bankasi – USD 91.64 billion, Is Bankasi – USD 79.92 billion, Garanti Bankasi– USD  66.31 billion, Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi – USD 61.86 billion, Akbank – USD 60.11 billion. (Conversion rate: 7.42 TL/1 USD).  According to the Turkish Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK), the share of non-performing loans in the sector was approximately 4.08 percent at the end of 2020.  The only requirements for a foreigner to open a bank account in Turkey are a passport copy and either an identification number from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or a Turkish Tax identification number.

The Turkish Government adopted a framework Capital Markets Law in 2012, aimed at bringing greater corporate accountability, protection of minority-shareholders, and financial statement transparency.  Turkish capital markets in 2020 drew growing interest from domestic investors, according to data from the Central Registry Agency (MKK).  In 2020, the number of local real investors reached 2 million, up an average of 65,200 per month, with the total portfolio value reaching USD 28.31 billion.

The BDDK monitors and supervises Turkey’s banks.  The BDDK is headed by a board whose seven members are appointed for six-year terms.  Bank deposits are protected by an independent deposit insurance agency, the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF).  Because of historically high local borrowing costs and short repayment periods, foreign and local firms frequently seek credit from international markets to finance their activities.  Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in the country.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

Turkish law guarantees the free transfer of profits, fees, and royalties, and repatriation of capital.  This guarantee is reflected in Turkey’s 1990 Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States, which mandates unrestricted and prompt transfer in a freely-usable currency at a legal market-clearing rate for all investment-related funds.  There is little difficulty in obtaining foreign exchange in Turkey, and there are no foreign-exchange restrictions, though in 2019, the GOT continued to encourage businesses to conduct trade in lira.  An amendment to the Decision on the Protection of the Value of the Turkish Currency was made with Presidential Decree No. 85 in September 2018 wherein the GOT tightened restrictions on Turkey-based businesses  conducting numerous types of transactions using foreign currencies or indexed to foreign currencies.  The Turkish Ministry of Treasury and Finance may grant exceptions, however.  Funds associated with any form of investment can be freely converted into any world currency.  The exchange rate is heavily managed by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.  Turkish banking regulations and informal government instructions to Turkish banks limit the supply of Turkish lira to the London overnight swaps market.  Turkey took a variety of measures to prop up the lira in 2020, including the imposition of withdrawal limits and time delays, mostly for private individuals owning FX deposit accounts.  In March 2020, the bank insurance and transaction tax introduced in 2019 was increased from 0.2 percent to 1 percent for purchases of FX and gold.  Running down its FX reserves and freezing international banks out of its FX market provided short-term relief during June and July, but reduced these reserves to dangerously low levels.  The BDDK raised the limits for swap, forward, option and other derivative transactions that Turkish lenders can execute with nonresidents.  Previously, swap limits with foreigners were lowered to levels of 1 percent, 2 percent, and 10 percent for weekly, monthly and annual terms, respectively.  Then the limits were raised from 2 percent to 5 percent of bank equity for trades with seven days to maturity; from 5 percent to 10 percent  for those with 30 days to maturity; and from 20 percent to 30 percent for one-year to maturity transactions.

There is no limit on the amount of foreign currency that may be brought into Turkey, but not more than 25,000 Turkish lira or €10,000 worth of foreign currency may be taken out without declaration. Although the Turkish Lira (TL) is fully convertible, most international transactions are denominated in U.S. dollars or Euros due to their universal acceptance.  Banks deal in foreign exchange and do borrow and lend in foreign currencies.  While for the most part, foreign exchange is freely traded and widely available, a May 2019 government decree imposed a settlement delay for FX purchases by individuals of more than USD 100,000, while as mentioned above there is also a 0.2 percent tax on FX purchases.  Foreign investors are free to convert and repatriate their Turkish Lira profits.

The exchange rate was heavily managed by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) with a “dirty float” regime until November 2020, when a new central bank governor assumed responsibility.  After several months of increased policy rates, tight monetary policy, and a more stable Turkish Lira, the governor was fired, as a result of which the lira quickly depreciated by 10 percent.  It is still too early to predict the medium to long-term effects of the recent changes to the CBRT on currency and macroeconomic stability.

The BDDK announced on April 12, 2020 new limits to FX transactions.  The agency cut the limit for Turkish banks’ FX swap, spot and forward transactions with foreign entities to 1 percent of a bank’s equity, a move that effectively aims to curtail transactions that could raise hard currency prices.  The limit had already been halved to 25 percent in August 2018, when the currency crisis hit.  These moves to shield the lira have meant a de facto departure from Turkey’s official policy of a floating exchange rate regime over the past year.

Remittance Policies

In Turkey, there have been no recent changes or plans to change investment remittance policies, and indeed the GOT in 2018 actively encouraged the repatriation of funds.  The GOT announced “Assets Peace” in May 2018 which incentivized citizens to bring assets to Turkey in the form of money, gold, or foreign currency by eliminating any tax burden on the repatriated assets.  The Assets Peace has been extended until June 30, 2021.  There are also no time limitations on remittances.  Waiting periods for dividends, return on investment, interest and principal on private foreign debt, lease payments, royalties, and management fees do not exceed 60 days.   There are no limitations on the inflow or outflow of funds for remittances of profits or revenue.

According to the Presidential Decree No. 1948 published in the Official Gazette No. 30994 dated December 30, 2019, the above-mentioned notification and declaration periods for activities related to the “Asset Peace Incentive” defined in Paragraphs 1, 3 and 6 of Temporary Article 90 of Income Tax Code have been extended for six more months following the previous expiration dates.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

The GOT announced the creation of a sovereign wealth fund (called the Turkey Wealth Fund, or TVF) in August 2016.  Unlike traditional sovereign wealth funds, the controversial fund consists of shares of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and is designed to serve as collateral for raising foreign financing.  However, the TVF has not launched any major projects since its inception.  In September 2018, the President became the Chair of the TVF.  Several leading SOEs, such as natural gas distributor BOTAS, Turkish Airlines, and Ziraat Bank have been transferred to the TVF, which in 2020 became the largest shareholder in domestic telecommunications firm Turkcell.  Critics worry management of the fund is opaque and politicized.  The fund’s consolidated financial statements are available on its website (https://www.tvf.com.tr/en/investor-relations/reports), although independent audits are not made publicly available.    Firms within the fund’s portfolio appear to have increased their debt loads substantially since 2016.  International ratings agencies consider the fund a quasi-sovereign.  The fund was already exempt from many provisions of domestic commercial law and new legislation adopted April 16 granted it further exemptions from the Capital Markets Law and Turkish Commercial Code, while also allowing it to take ownership of distressed firms in strategic sectors.  As part of its response to the COVID-19 pandemic, in 2020 Turkey allowed the TVF to take equity positions in private companies in distress.

7. State-Owned Enterprises

As of 2020, the sectors with active State-owned enterprises (SOEs) include mining, banking, telecom, and transportation.  The full list can be found here: https://www.hmb.gov.tr/kamu-sermayeli-kurulus-ve-isletme-raporlari.  Allegations of unfair practices by SOEs are minimal, and the U.S. Mission is not aware of any ongoing complaints by U.S. firms.  Turkey is not a party to the World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement.  Turkey is a member of the OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatization Practices, and OECD’s compliance regulations and new laws enacted in 2012 by the Turkish Competitive Authority closely govern SOE operations.

Privatization Program

The GOT has made some progress on privatization over the last decade.  Of 278 companies  that the state once owned, 210 are fully privatized.  According to the Ministry of Treasury and Finance’s Privatization Administration, transactions completed under the Turkish privatization program generated USD 609 million in 2019 and USD 677 in 2020.  See: https://www.oib.gov.tr/.

The GOT has indicated its commitment to continuing the privatization process despite the contraction in global capital flows.  However, other measures, such as the creation of a sovereign wealth fund with control over major SOEs, suggests that the government currently sees greater benefit in using some public assets to raise additional debt rather than privatizing them.   Accordingly, the GOT has shelved plans to increase privatization of Turkish Airlines and instead moved them and other SOEs into the TVF.  Additional information can be found at the Ministry of Treasury and Finance’s Privatization Administration website: https://www.oib.gov.tr/.

8. Responsible Business Conduct

In Turkey, responsible business conduct (RBC) is gaining traction.  Reforms carried out as part of the EU harmonization process have had a positive effect on laws governing Turkish associations, especially non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  However, recent democratic backsliding has reversed some of these gains, and there has been increasing pressure on civil society since the coup attempt.  Despite OECD Membership and adherence to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Turkey has not yet established a National Contact Point, or central coordinating office to assist companies in their efforts to adopt a due-diligence approach to responsible conduct.  Rather, the topic of RBC is handled by various ministries.  Some U.S. companies have focused traditional ‘corporate social responsibility’ activities on improving community education.

NGOs that are active in the economic sector, such as the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) and the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSIAD), issue regular reports and studies, and hold events aimed at encouraging Turkish companies to become involved in policy issues.  In addition to influencing the political process, these two NGOs also assist their members with civic engagement.  The Business Council for Sustainable Development Turkey (http://www.skdturkiye.org/en) and the Corporate Social Responsibility Association in Turkey (www.csrturkey.org), founded in 2005, are two NGOs devoted exclusively to issues of responsible business conduct.  The Turkish Ethical Values Center Foundation, the Private Sector Volunteers Association (www.osgd.org) and the Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (www.tusev.org.tr) also play an important role.

Additional Resources

Department of State

Department of Labor

Comply Chain (https://www.dol.gov/ilab/complychain/).

9. Corruption

Corruption remains a concern, a reality reflected in Turkey’s sliding score in recent years in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index, where it ranked 86 of 180 countries and territories around the world in 2020.  Government mechanisms to investigate and punish alleged abuse and corruption by state officials remained inadequate, and impunity remained a problem.  Though independent in principle, the judiciary remained subject to government, and particularly executive branch, interference, including with respect to the investigation and prosecution of major corruption cases.  (See the Department of State’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for more details:  https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/).  Turkey is a participant in regional anti-corruption initiatives such as the G20 Anti-Corruption working group.  Under the new presidential system, the Presidential State Supervisory Council is responsible for combating corruption.

Public procurement reforms were designed in Turkey to make procurement more transparent and less susceptible to political interference, including through the establishment of an independent public procurement board with the power to void contracts.  Critics claim, however, that government officials have continued to award large contracts to firms friendly with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), especially for large public construction projects.

Turkish legislation outlaws bribery, but enforcement is uneven.  Turkey’s Criminal Code makes it unlawful to promise or to give any advantage to foreign government officials in exchange for their assistance in providing improper advantage in the conduct of international business.

The provisions of the Criminal Law regarding bribing of foreign government officials are consistent with the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 of the United States (FCPA).  There are, however, a number of differences between Turkish law and the FCPA.  For example, there is no exception under Turkish law for payments to facilitate or expedite performance of a “routine governmental action” in terms of the FCPA.  Another difference is that the FCPA does not provide for punishment by imprisonment, while Turkish law provides for punishment by imprisonment from 4 to 12 years.  The Presidential State Supervisory Council, which advises the Corruption Investigations Committee, is responsible for investigating major corruption cases brought to its attention by the Committee.  Nearly every state agency has its own inspector corps responsible for investigating internal corruption.  The Parliament can establish investigative commissions to examine corruption allegations concerning cabinet ministers; a majority vote is needed to send these cases to the Supreme Court for further action.

Turkey ratified the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Public Officials and passed implementing legislation in 2003 to provide that bribes of foreign, as well as domestic, officials are illegal.  In 2006, Turkey’s Parliament ratified the UN Convention against Corruption.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption:
ORGANIZATION: Presidential State Supervisory Council
ADDRESS: Beştepe Mahallesi, Alparslan Türkeş Caddesi, Devlet Denetleme Kurulu, Yenimahalle
TELEPHONE NUMBER: Phone: +90 312 470 25 00  Fax : +90 312 470 13 03

NAME: Seref Malkoc
TITLE: Chief Ombudsman
ORGANIZATION: The Ombudsman Institution
ADDRESS: Kavaklidere Mah. Zeytin Dali Caddesi No:4 Cankaya ANKARA
TELEPHONE NUMBER: +90 312 465 22 00
EMAIL ADDRESS: iletisim@ombudsman.gov.tr

10. Political and Security Environment

The period between 2015 and 2016 was one of the more violent in Turkey since the 1970s.   However, since January 2017, Turkey has experienced historically low levels of violence even when compared to past periods of calm, and the country has greatly ramped up internal security measures.  Turkey can experience politically-motivated violence, generally at the level of aggression against opposition politicians and political parties.  In a more dramatic example, a July 2016 attempted coup resulted in the death of more than 240 people, and injured over 2,100 others.  Since the July 2015 collapse of the cessation of hostilities between the government and the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), along with sister organizations like the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK), have regularly targeted security forces, with civilians often getting injured or killed, by PKK and TAK attacks.  (Both the PKK and TAK have been designated as terrorist organizations by the United States.)

Other U.S.-designated terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) and the leftist Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) are present in Turkey and have conducted attacks in 2013, 2015, 2016, and early 2017.  The indigenous DHKP/C, for example, which was established in the 1970s and designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. in 1997, is responsible for several attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Ankara and the U.S. Consulate General Istanbul in recent years, including a suicide bombing at the embassy in 2013 that killed one local employee.  The DHKP/C has stated its intention to commit further attacks against the United States, NATO, and Turkey.  Still, widespread internal security measures, especially following the failed July 2016 coup attempt, seem to have hobbled its success.  In addition, violent extremists associated with ISIS and other groups transited Turkey en route to Syria in the past, though increased scrutiny by government officials and a general emphasis on increased security has significantly curtailed this access route to Syria, especially when compared to the earlier years of the conflict.

There have been past instances of violence against religious missionaries and others perceived as proselytizing for a non-Islamic religion in Turkey, though none in recent years.  On past occasions, perpetrators have threatened and assaulted Christian and Jewish individuals, groups, and places of worship, many of which receive specially-assigned police protection, both for institutions and leadership.  Anti-Semitic discourse periodically features in both popular rhetoric and public media, and evangelizing activities by foreigners tend to be viewed suspiciously by the country’s security apparatus.  Still, government officials also often point to religious minorities in Turkey positively, as a sign of the country’s diversity, and religious minority figures periodically meet with the country’s president and other senior members of national political leadership.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

Turkey has a population of 83.6 million, with 22.8 percent under the age of 14 as of 2020.  Ninety-three percent of the population lives in urban areas.  Official figures put the labor force at 30.9 million in December 2020.  Approximately one-fifth of the labor force works in agriculture (17.6 percent) while another fifth works in industrial sectors (20.5 percent).  The country retains a significant informal sector at 30.6 percent.  In 2020, the official unemployment rate stayed at 13.2 percent, with 25.3 percent unemployment among those 15-24 years old.  Turkey provides twelve years of free, compulsory education to children of both sexes in state schools.  Authorities continue to grapple with facilitating legal employment for working-age Syrians, a major subset of the 3.6 million displaced Syrian men, women, and children—unknown numbers of which were working informally—in the country in 2020.

Turkey has an abundance of unskilled and semi-skilled labor, and vocational training schools exist at the high school level.  There remains a shortage of high-tech workers.  Individual high-tech firms, both local and foreign-owned, typically conduct their own training programs.  Within the scope of employment mobilization, the Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Services, Turkish Employment Agency (ISKUR) and Turkey Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) has launched the Vocational Education and Skills Development Cooperation Protocol (MEGIP).  Turkey has also undertaken a significant expansion of university programs, building dozens of new colleges and universities over the last decade.

The use of subcontracted workers for jobs not temporary in nature remained common, including by firms executing contracts for the state.  Generally ineligible for equal benefits or collective bargaining rights, subcontracted workers—often hired via revolving contracts of less than a year duration— remained vulnerable to sudden termination by employers and, in some cases, poor working conditions.  Employers typically utilized subcontracted workers to minimize salary/benefit expenditures and, according to critics, to prevent unionization of employees.

The law provides for the right of workers to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes.  A minimum of seven workers is required to establish a trade union without prior approval.  To become a bargaining agent, a union must represent 40 percent of the employees at a given work site and one percent of all workers in that particular industry.  Certain public employees, such as senior officials, magistrates, members of the armed forces, and police, cannot form unions.  Nonunionized workers,  such as migrant  seasonal agricultural laborers, domestic servants, and those in the informal economy, are also not covered by collective bargaining laws.

Unionization rates generally remain low.  Independent labor unions—distinct from their government-friendly counterpart unions—reported that employers continued to use threats, violence, and layoffs in unionized workplaces across sectors.  Service-sector union organizers report that private sector employers sometimes ignore the law and dismiss workers to discourage union activity.  Turkish law provides for the right to strike but prohibits strikes by public workers engaged in safeguarding life and property and by workers in the coal mining and petroleum industries, hospitals and funeral industries, urban transportation, and national defense.  The law explicitly allows the government to deny the right to strike for any situation it determines a threat to national security.  Turkey has labor-dispute resolution mechanisms, including the Supreme Arbitration Board, which addresses disputes between employers and employees pursuant to collective bargaining agreements. Labor courts function effectively and relatively efficiently.  Appeals, however, can last for years.  If a court rules that an employer unfairly dismissed a worker and should either reinstate or compensate him or her, the employer generally pays compensation to the employee along with a fine.

Turkey has ratified key International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions protecting workers’ rights, including conventions on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize; Rights to Organize and to Bargain Collectively; Abolition of Forced Labor; Minimum Age; Occupational Health and Safety; Termination of Employment; and Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor.  Implementation of a number of these, including ILO Convention 87 (Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize) and Convention 98 (Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively), remained uneven.  Implementation of legislation related to workplace health and safety likewise remained uneven.  Child labor continued, including in its worst forms and particularly in the seasonal agricultural sector, despite ongoing government efforts to address the issue.  See the Department of State’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for more details on Turkey’s labor sector and the challenges it continues to face.

12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Other Investment Insurance and Development Finance Programs

The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) replaced the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in December 2019, and continues to offer programs in Turkey, including political risk insurance for U.S. investors, under its bilateral agreement.  Since 1987, Turkey has been a member of the Multinational Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), most recently financing a public hospital project in 2019. 

13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

Host Country Statistical source* USG or 

international statistical source

USG or International Source of Data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $717,049 2019 $761,425 www.worldbank.org/en/country

www.turkstat.gov.tr

Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 $3,112 2019 $3,333 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data

* https://evds2.tcmb.gov.tr/index.php?/evds/dashboard/4944

Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 $3,185 2019 $2,340 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data

https://evds2.tcmb.gov.tr/index.php?/evds/dashboard/4898

Total inbound stock of FDI as  percent host GDP 2019 19.9% 2019 21.9% UNCTAD data available at

https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World percent20Investment percent20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx  

www.tcmb.gov.tr

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data (2019)
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions)
Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment
Total Inward 103,648 100% Total Outward 49,980 100%
Qatar 21,553 21% Netherlands 18,232 36%
Netherlands 16,296 16% UK 3,649 7%
Germany 7,730 7% United States 3,449 7%
UAE 6,189 6% Jersey 2,546 5%
Azerbaijan 5,967 6% Austria 2,026 4%
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.

IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) data available at: http://data.imf.org/?sk=40313609-F037-48C1-84B1-E1F1CE54D6D5&sId=1482331048410

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

 

Portfolio Investment Assets (June, 2020)
Top Five Partners (Millions, US Dollars)
Total Equity Securities Total Debt Securities
All Countries 1,367 100% All Countries 530 100% All Countries 898 100%
United States 611 45% United States 365 69%  United States 246 27%
Cayman Islands 206 15% UK 29 5% Cayman Islands 193 21%
UK 121 9% Germany 28 5%   Luxembourg 102 11%
Luxembourg 108 8% France 14 3% UK 92 10%
Azerbaijan 87 6% Russia 13 3%  Azerbaijan 87 10%

“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.

IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) data available at: http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=60587804

14. Contact for More Information

Economic Specialist 
American Embassy Ankara 
110 Atatürk Blvd. 
Kavaklıdere, 06100 Ankara – Turkey 
Phone: +90 (312) 455-5555 
Email:  Ankara-ECON-MB@state.gov 

United Arab Emirates

Executive Summary

The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is urgently pursuing economic diversification to promote private sector development as a complement to the historical economic dominance of the state, to lessen its reliance on an unsustainable hydrocarbon industry, and to strengthen the country’s economic resilience amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

The UAE serves as a major trade and investment hub for the Middle East and North Africa, and increasingly South Asia, Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  Multinational companies cite the UAE’s political and economic stability, excellent infrastructure, developed capital markets, and a perceived absence of systemic corruption as positive factors contributing to the UAE’s attractiveness to foreign investors.

The UAE and the country’s seven constituent emirates have passed numerous initiatives, laws, and regulations to attract more foreign investment.  Notable reforms introduced since 2020 include amendments to the UAE’s citizenship law, which allow foreign investors, members of certain professions, those with special talents, and their families to acquire long-term residency, Emirati passports, and citizenship.  The UAE issued Federal Decree-Law Number 26 in 2020, relaxing restrictions on foreign ownership of commercial companies.  The decree also annulled the requirement that commercial companies must be majority-owned by Emirati nationals, must have a majority-Emirati board, or must maintain an Emirati agent.  This effectively allowed majority or full foreign ownership of onshore companies in many sectors.  The decree granted licensed foreign investments the same treatment as national companies within the limits permitted by the legislation in force and provided better protection for minority shareholders. The new decree is unlikely to apply to state-owned entities and companies operating in strategically important sectors, such as oil and gas, defense, utilities, and transport.

While the UAE implemented an excise tax on certain products in October 2017 and a five percent Value-Added Tax (VAT) on most products and services beginning in January 2018, many investors continue to cite the absence of corporate and personal income taxes as a strength of the local investment climate relative to other regional options.

Foreign investors expressed concern over a lack of regulatory transparency, as well as weak dispute resolution mechanisms and insolvency laws.  In 2020, the federal Cabinet approved a resolution aimed at combating commercial fraud.  This resolution established a unified federal mechanism to deal with commercial fraud across the UAE and outlined a process for removal and destruction of counterfeit products.  Labor rights and conditions, although improving, continue to be an area of concern as the UAE prohibits both labor unions and worker strikes.

Free trade zones (FTZs) form a vital component of the local economy and serve as major re-export centers to other markets in the Gulf, South Asia, and Africa.  While the new decree allowing 100 percent foreign business ownership neutralizes one of the most important advantages FTZs offer foreign investors, U.S. and multinational companies indicate that these zones tend to have stronger and more equitable legal and regulatory frameworks for foreign investors than onshore jurisdictions.  FTZ-based firms also enjoy 100 percent import and export tax exemptions, 100 percent exemptions from commercial levies, and may repatriate 100 percent of capital and profits.  Goods and services delivered onshore by FTZ companies are subject to the five percent VAT.

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 21 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2020 16 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings
Global Innovation Index 2020 34 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 $17.2 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/
World Bank GNI per capita 2019 $43,470 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 

The UAE actively seeks FDI, citing it as a key part of its long-term economic development plans.  The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated government efforts to attract foreign investment to promote economic growth.  A letter issued by Dubai ruler Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum (MbR) on January 4, 2020 outlined the ruler’s vision for the next 50 years, pledging increased government accountability and a push for greater government efficiency.  In 2015, Dubai’s Department of Economic Development launched the Dubai Investment Development Agency (Dubai FDI), an agency that provides essential information and invaluable support to foreign businesses looking to invest in Dubai’s thriving economy and take advantage of its global strategic importance.  The government of Abu Dhabi continues implementing its Economic Vision 2030, which aims at building an open, efficient, effective, and globally integrated economy.  In 2018, Abu Dhabi’s Department of Economic Development launched the Abu Dhabi Investment Office to attract foreign investments in the local economy by providing investors with clear data and information regarding the investment environment and the competitive edge of the emirate.

Federal Decree Law No. 26 of 2020 repealed the FDI Law (Federal Law No. 19 of 2018) effective January 2, 2021 and amended significant provisions of the Commercial Companies Law (Federal Law No. 2 of 2015).  As a result, onshore UAE companies are no longer required to have a UAE national or a GCC national as a majority shareholder.  UAE joint stock companies no longer must be chaired by an Emirati citizen or have the majority of its board be comprised of Emirati citizens.  Local branches of foreign companies are no longer required to have a UAE national or a UAE-owned company act as an agent.  An intra-emirate committee will recommend to the Cabinet a list of strategically important sectors requiring additional licensing restrictions, and companies operating in these sectors, likely including oil and gas, defense, utilities, and transportation, will remain subject to the above-described restrictions.  Analysts expect this list will be similar to the list of economic sectors in which foreign investment is barred under the recently abolished FDI Law.  The decree also grants emirate-level authorities powers to establish additional licensing restrictions.  These amendments will become effective six months after the publication of the law in the official gazette and require the publication of the Strategic Impact List to be implementable.  Until this happens, existing requirements for UAE or GCC majority shareholding still apply.

Federal Decree Law No. 26 of 2020 introduced provisions to protect the rights of minority shareholders.  It lowered the ownership threshold required to call for a general assembly and introduce agenda items.  It expedited the process for shareholders to assist a company in financial distress.  It extended mandates of external auditors.  It added additional flexibility in the IPO process to allow new investors to participate.  It also calls for additional regulations from the Ministry of Economy to address governance and related-party transactions.

Federal Law No. 11 of 2020 amended the Commercial Agencies Law (Federal Law No. 18 of 1981), which allowed UAE companies not fully owned by Emirati citizens to act as commercial agents.  These companies must still be majority-owned by Emirati citizens.

Non-tariff barriers to investment persist in the form of visa sponsorship and distributorship requirements.  Several constituent emirates, including Dubai, have recently introduced new long-term residency visas and land ownership rights to attract and retain expatriates with sought-after skills in the UAE.  In October 2020, Ras Al Khaimah Real estate developer Al Hamra, in partnership with Ras Al Khaimah Economic Zone, began offering investors a 12-year residence visa and a business license when they purchased a residential property in Al Hamra Village or Bab Al Bahr.

 Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment  

As documented above, Federal Decree-Law Number 26 annulled the requirement commercial companies be majority-owned by Emirati citizens, have a majority-Emirati board, or maintain an Emirati agent effectively allowing majority or full foreign ownership of onshore companies in many sectors.  The annulment will not apply to companies operating in strategically important sectors.

Neither Embassy Abu Dhabi nor Consulate General Dubai (collectively referred to as Mission UAE) has received any complaints from U.S. investors that they have been disadvantaged relative to other non-GCC investors.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

The UAE government underwent a World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Policy Review in 2016.  The full WTO Review is available at:  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s338_e.pdf

Business Facilitation  

UAE officials emphasize the importance of facilitating business investment and tout the broad network of free trade zones as attractive to foreign investors.  The UAE’s business registration process varies by emirate, but generally happens through an emirate’s Department of Economic Development.  Links to information portals from each of the emirates are available at https://ger.co/economy/197.  At a minimum, a company must generally register with the Department of Economic Development, the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization, and the General Authority for Pension and Social Security, with a notary required in the process. In response to the pandemic, UAE authorities temporarily reduced fees, permits, and licenses to stimulate business formation in the onshore and free zone sectors.

In February 2021, Dubai launched the Invest in Dubai platform, a “single-window” service enabling investors to obtain trade licenses and launch their business quickly.  In August 2020, the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) introduced a new license for startups, entrepreneurs, and technology firms, starting at $1,500 per year.  In October 2019, Dubai introduced a ‘Virtual Business License’ for non-resident entrepreneurs and freelancers in 101 countries.  In 2019, the Dubai Free Zone Council allowed companies to operate out of multiple free zones in Dubai through a single license under the “one free zone passport” scheme.  In 2017, Dubai’s Department of Economic Development introduced an “Instant License” program, under which investors can obtain a license valid for one year in minutes without a registered lease agreement.   In November 2020, the Abu Dhabi Department of Economic Development issued a resolution permitting non-citizens to obtain freelancer licenses allowing them to engage in 48 economic activities.  The licenses were previously limited to UAE nationals only.  In 2018, Abu Dhabi announced the issuance of dual licenses enabling free zone companies to operate onshore and to compete for government tenders.  In 2018, Sharjah announced that foreigners may purchase property in the emirate without a UAE residency visa on a 100-year renewable land lease basis.

Outward Investment  

The UAE is an important participant in global capital markets, primarily through its sovereign wealth funds, as well as through several emirate-level, government-related investment corporations.

3. Legal Regime

Transparency of the Regulatory System  

The onshore regulatory and legal framework in the UAE generally favors local Emirati investors over foreign investors.

The Trade Companies Law requires all companies to apply international accounting standards and practices, generally the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  The UAE does not have local generally accepted accounting principles.

Generally, legislation is only published after it has been enacted into law and is not formally available for public comment beforehand.  Government-friendly press occasionally reports details of high-profile legislation.  The government may consult with large private sector stakeholders on draft legislation on an ad hoc basis.  Final versions of federal laws are published in Arabic in an official register “The Official Gazette,” though there are private companies that translate laws into English.  The UAE Ministry of Justice (MoJ) maintains a partial library of translated laws on its website.  Other ministries and departments inconsistently offer official English translations via their websites.  The emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah publish official gazettes online in Arabic.  Regulators are not required to publish proposed regulations before enactment, but may share them either publicly or with stakeholders on a case-by-case basis.

International Regulatory Considerations 

The UAE is a member of the GCC, along with Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.  It maintains regulatory autonomy, but coordinates efforts with other GCC members through the GCC Standardization Organization (GSO).  In 2020, the UAE submitted 72 notifications to the WTO committee, including notifications of emergency measures and issues relating to Intellectual Property Rights.

Legal System and Judicial Independence  

Islam is identified as the state religion in the UAE constitution, and serves as the principal source of domestic law.  The legal system of the country is generally divided between a British-based system of common law used in offshore FTZs and onshore domestic law.  Domestic law is a dual legal system of civil and Sharia laws – the majority of which has been codified.  Most codified legislation in the UAE is a mixture of Islamic law and other civil laws such as Egyptian and French civil laws.

Common law principles, such as following legal precedents, are generally not recognized in the UAE, although lower courts commonly follow higher court judgments.  Judgments of foreign civil courts are typically recognized and enforceable under local courts.  The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York signed a memorandum with Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) courts providing companies operating in Dubai and New York with procedures for the mutual enforcement of financial judgments.  The Abu Dhabi-based financial free zone hub Abu Dhabi Global Financial Market (ADGM) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Abu Dhabi Judicial Department in February 2018 allowing reciprocal enforcement of judgments, decisions, orders, and arbitral awards between ADGM and Abu Dhabi courts.

The UAE constitution stipulates each emirate can set up a local emirate-level judicial system (local courts) or rely exclusively on federal courts.  The Federal Judicial Authority has jurisdiction over all cases involving a “federal entity” with the Federal Supreme Court in Abu Dhabi, the highest court at the federal level.  Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in seven categories of cases:  disputes between emirates; disputes between an emirate and the federal government; cases involving national security; interpretation of the constitution; questions over the constitutionality of a law; and cases involving the actions of appointed ministers and senior officials while performing their official duties.  The federal government administers the courts in Ajman, Fujairah, Umm al Quwain, and Sharjah, including vetting, appointing, and paying judges.  Judges in these courts apply both local and federal law, as appropriate.  Dubai, Ras Al Khaimah, and Abu Dhabi administer their own local courts, hiring, vetting, and paying local judges and attorneys.  Local courts in Dubai, Ras al Khaimah, and Abu Dhabi have jurisdiction over all matters not specifically reserved for federal courts in the constitution.  Abu Dhabi operates both local (the Abu Dhabi Judicial Department) and federal courts in parallel.

Family Law:  In November 2020, the UAE government issued Federal Law Number 8 (2019), amending to the UAE Family Law.  The reforms liberalized laws related to cohabitation by unmarried couples, divorce and separation, custody, execution of wills and asset distribution, use of alcohol, suicide, and the protection of women.  The amendments stipulated that in a divorce taking place in the UAE by a couple married abroad, the legal proceedings would be governed by the laws of their home country.  The reforms also decriminalized alcohol consumption and removed the licensing requirement to purchase alcohol.

Probate:  The UAE Government announced in November 2020 that in the absence of a will, probate laws of the deceased’s country of citizenship would prevail.  Prior to this reform, Sharia law inheritance provisions determined the disposal of a UAE non-national resident’s assets on his or her death in most cases.  The new Federal decree-law no. 29 of 2020 allows each emirate to maintain a registry for non-UAE national wills.

Employment Law:  Employment in the private sector outside of financial free zones is regulated by Federal Law No. 8 of 1980.  The Labor Law defines working hours, leave entitlements, safety, and healthcare regulations.  There is no minimum wage defined by the law and trade unions, strikes, and collective bargaining is prohibited.  Expatriates’ legal residence in the UAE is tied to their employer (kafala system), but skilled labor usually has more flexibility in transferring their residency visa.  In 2009, the UAE Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization (MOHRE) introduced a Wages Protection System (WPS) to ensure unbanked workers were paid according to the terms of their employment agreement.  Most domestic workers remain uncovered by the WPS.  In 2019, the UAE government launched a WPS pilot program for domestic workers and announced plans to extend WPS protection to include domestic workers in the future.

The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religion, race, and national origin.  Labor Law gives national preference in employment to Emirati citizens.  Federal Law No. 06 of 2020 stipulates equal wages for women and men in the private sector.  The decree came into force in September 2020.

The DIFC Employment Law No. 2 of 2019, which took effect in August 2019, addressed key issues such as paternity leave, sick pay, and end-of-service settlements.  ADGM also issued new employment regulations with effect in January 2020, which allowed employers and employees more flexibility in negotiating notice periods and introduced protective provisions for employees age 15-18.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment  

There are four major federal laws affecting investment in the UAE:  the Federal Commercial Companies Law, the Trade Agencies Law, the Federal Industry Law, and the Government Tenders Law.

Federal Commercial Companies Law:  As noted above, Federal Decree-Law Number 26 annulled the default requirement for commercial companies to be majority-owned by Emirati citizens, have a majority-Emirati board, or maintain an Emirati agent effectively allowing majority or full foreign ownership of onshore companies in most sectors.

Trade Agencies Law:  The Trade Agencies Law currently requires that foreign firms without a local UAE subsidiary to distribute their products in the UAE through trade agents who are either UAE nationals or through companies majority-owned by UAE nationals.  Federal Law No. 11 of 2020 amended the Trade Agencies Law, removing the requirement that UAE companies be fully owned by Emirati citizens to act as commercial agents.  However, those companies still need to be majority-owned by Emirati citizens. The Ministry of Economy handles registration of trade agents.  A foreign principal can appoint one agent for the entire UAE, or for a particular emirate or group of emirates.  It is difficult and expensive to sever a commercial agency agreement.  Federal Law No. 5 of 1985 (Civil Code) governs unregistered distribution agreements.

Federal Law No. 11 of 2020 will also allow family-owned companies to convert to public joint stock companies; to open shareholding to foreign investors; and to establish rules of governance and protection against default.  The changes also encourage UAE nationals to engage in business activities and invest in public companies and their commercial agents.  The changes offer protections for small shareholders and owners of SMEs acting as agents, granting them statutory protection in cases of termination or non-renewal of agreements without “material reasons.”

In August 2020, the Dubai ruler issued Law No. 9 (2020) regulating family-owned businesses in Dubai.  The Law enables family members with a common interest to jointly own moveable or immoveable property (other than shares in public joint-stock companies) on the tailored terms of a Family Property Contract that ensures the continuity, development, and smooth transition of family property from one generation to another.

Federal Industry Law:  Federal Law No. 1 (1979) regulates industrial projects in the UAE. Under this law, an industry advisory committee shall be established to examine issues pertaining to most industrial projects.  The law excludes projects which meet specific requirements, including projects related to petroleum exploration and mining industry; projects with fixed capital, not exceeding $68,064 or that do not have more than ten people, or that use a motor power of no more than five horses; concession projects; and projects implemented by the federal government.

Other Relevant Legislation:  According to the Central Bank Law, a bank incorporated in the United Arab Emirates must be 60 percent owned by UAE nationals.  The limit on foreign ownership of local banks is subject to approval by regulators on a case-by-case basis.  Some major banks have reached the maximum foreign ownership of 40 percent in recent years.  Foreign banks are licensed in the UAE as branches of foreign banks, with a maximum of eight local branches allowed per bank.

The Federal Industry Law stipulates industrial projects must have 51 percent UAE national ownership.  The law also requires that projects either be managed by a UAE national or have a board of directors with a majority of UAE nationals.  Exemptions from the law are provided for projects related to the extraction and refining of oil and natural gas and select hydrocarbon projects governed by special laws or agreements.

To register with the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange, go to: https://www.adx.ae/English/Pages/Members/BecomeAMember/default.aspx

To obtain an investor number for trading on Dubai Exchanges, go to:  http://www.nasdaqdubai.com/assets/docs/NIN-Form.pdf

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws  

The Ministry of Economy’s Competition Regulation Committee reviews transactions for competition-related concerns.

Expropriation and Compensation  

Mission UAE is not aware of foreign investors subjected to any expropriation in the UAE in the recent past.  There are no federal rules governing compensation if expropriations were to occur.   Individual emirates would likely treat expropriations differently.  In practice, authorities would be unlikely to expropriate unless there were a compelling development or public interest need to do so.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention  

The UAE is a contracting state to the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and a signatory to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral awards (1958 New York Convention).

Investor-State Dispute Settlement  

Mission UAE is aware of several substantial investment and commercial disputes over the past few years involving U.S. or other foreign investors and government and/or local businesses.  There have also been multiple contractor/payment disputes with the government as well as with local businesses.  Onshore dispute resolution can be difficult and uncertain, and payment following settlements is often slow.  Disputes are generally resolved by direct negotiation and settlement between the parties themselves, arbitration, or recourse within the legal system.  Firms avoid escalating payment disputes through civil or arbitral courts, particularly disputes involving politically connected local parties to preserve access to UAE markets.  Legal or dispute-resolution mechanisms that can take months or years to reach resolution, leading some firms to exit the UAE market instead of pursuing claims.  Arbitration may commence by petition to the UAE federal courts based on mutual consent (a written arbitration agreement), independently (by nomination of arbitrators), or through referral to an appointing authority without recourse to judicial proceedings.  Mechanisms for enforcing ownership of property through either offshore or domestic courts are generally effective.  There have been no confirmed reports of government interference in the court system affecting foreign investors.  Domestic courts are generally perceived as favoring Emirati nationals over foreigners.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts  

The UAE government acceded to the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in November 2006.  An arbitration award issued in the UAE is now enforceable in all 138 member states, and any award issued in another member state is directly enforceable in the UAE.  The Convention supersedes all incompatible legislation and rulings in the UAE.  Mission UAE is not aware of any U.S. firm attempting to use arbitration under the UN convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  Some analysts have raised concerns about delays and procedural obstacles to enforcing arbitration awards in the UAE.

In June 2018, Federal Law No. 6 (2018) on Arbitration came into force.  The Federal Law on Arbitration is based on the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.  The new law is expected to bolster confidence in the UAE’s arbitration regime.  In October 2020, DIFC courts set up a new arbitration working group to accommodate the rising number of arbitration-related cases.  On December 23, 2020, ADGM enacted amendments to its arbitration regulations to establish itself as a venue for arbitration; codify international best practices; and accommodate the changing needs of various stakeholders to arbitration.  The amendments also allowed greater flexibility in the way the arbitration process can be conducted, particularly with the introduction of explicit provisions accommodating virtual hearings and electronic submissions.

Bankruptcy Regulations  

The bankruptcy law for companies, Federal Decree Law No. 9 (2016), was first applied in February 2019.  The law covers companies governed by the Commercial Companies Law, most FTZ companies, sole proprietorships, and companies conducting professional business.  It allows creditors owed $27,225 or more to file insolvency proceedings against a debtor 30 business days after written notification to the debtor.  The law decriminalized “bankruptcy by default,” ending a system in which out-of-cash businesspeople faced potential criminal liability, including fines and potential imprisonment, if they did not initiate insolvency procedures within 30 days.  In October 2020, the UAE Cabinet approved amendments to the law and added provisions regarding “Emergency Situations” that impinge on trade or investment, to enable individuals and business to overcome credit challenges during extraordinary circumstances such as pandemics, natural and environmental disasters, and wars.  Under the amendments, a debtor may request a grace period from creditors, or negotiate a debt settlement for a period up to 12 months.

The bankruptcy law for individuals, Insolvency Law No. 19 (2019) came into effect in November 2019.  It applies only to natural persons and estates of the deceased.  The law allows a debtor to seek court assistance for debt settlement or to enter into liquidation proceedings as a result of the inability to pay for an extended period of time.  Under this law, a debtor facing financial difficulties may apply to the court for assistance and guidance in the settlement of his financial commitments through one or more court-appointed experts, or through a court-supervised binding settlement plan.  If a debtor fails to pay any of his due debts for a period exceeding 50 consecutive business days, he shall apply to the court to commence proceedings for the liquidation of his assets.  The law offers only limited protection to individuals, and non-payment of debt remains a criminal offense.

DIFC enacted a New Insolvency Law on May 30, 2019.  The law, which applies only to DIFC companies, introduces methods to deal with insolvency situations, including a new debtor in possession regime, appointment of an administrator in cases of mismanagement, and adoption of UNCITRAL Model Law, consistent with globally recognized best practices.  In July 2020, ADGM also announced amendments to its regulations to provide greater clarity on the prescribed form and content in procedural matters and to better align with the ADGM Courts platform.

In June 2020, the UAE’s federal export credit Company, Etihad Credit Insurance (ECI) reaffirmed its commitment to support companies operating in the UAE to recover from COVID implications.  ECI has recently helped a UAE manufacturer recover payments from a U.S. firm that filed for bankruptcy.

The Federal Government’s Al Etihad Credit Bureau (AECB) is the only credit rating agency that assesses the financial strength of individuals in the UAE.  It also provides risk measures for various entities.  The AECB partnered with local institutions to collect data that assist in assessing credit risk and improve capital market efficiency.  A credit rating allows investors to make better-informed lending decisions and apply appropriate risk premiums to borrowers.  A credit report from AECB can unburden borrowers from scrutiny each time they take a loan.

4. Industrial Policies

Investment Incentives  

All FTZs offer incentives to foreign investors.  In 2020, the UAE introduced economic incentives to stimulate the economy and attract foreign investments, as part of the Covid-19 stimulus package, including cutting and freezing fees on certain government services, waiving fines, offering fee payment on an installment basis, and licensing businesses without physical locations for up to two years.  Outside the FTZs, the UAE provides no incentives, although the ability to purchase property as freehold in certain prime developments could be considered an incentive to attract foreign investment.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation  

There are numerous FTZs throughout the UAE.  Foreign companies generally enjoy the same investment opportunities within those zones as Emirati citizens.  All FTZs provide 100 percent import and export tax exemptions, 100 percent exemptions from commercial levies, 100 percent repatriation of capital and profits, multi-year leases, easy access to ports and airports, buildings for lease, energy connections (often at subsidized rates), and assistance in labor recruitment.  In addition, FTZ authorities provide extensive support services, such as visa sponsorship, worker housing, dining facilities, and physical security.

FTZs have their own independent authorities with responsibility for licensing and helping companies establish their businesses.  Investors can register new companies in an FTZ, or license branch or representative offices.  All Abu Dhabi FTZs as well as several Dubai FTZs offer dual licensing in cooperation with local Department of Economic Development.  A dual license enables an LLC established in an FTZ to obtain an onshore license allowing the company to conduct onshore business in that emirate without partnering with an Emirati national, recruiting extra staff using the services of an onshore labor office, or to rent extra office space onshore.  FTZs offering dual licenses include ADGM, Abu Dhabi Airports Free Zone (ADAFZ), Khalifa Industrial Zone Abu Dhabi (KIZAD), Twofour54, and Masdar in Abu Dhabi; and Dubai Design District (D3), Dubai Airport Free Zone (DAFZA), DIFC, and Dubai Multi Commodities Centre (DMCC) in Dubai.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements  

The Emiratization Initiative is a federal incentive program to increase Emirati employment in the private sector.  Requirements vary by industry, but the Vision 2021 national strategic plan aims to increase the percentage of Emiratis working in the private sector from five percent in 2014 to eight percent by 2021; in 2019 the UAE reached 3.64 percent.  In August 2020, the Emirates Job Bank (EJB), a government-facilitated job portal for UAE nationals, obliged government and onshore private employers to provide an explanation for interviewed UAE citizens were not hired, before allowing the employer to hire a non-citizen.  Most Emirati citizens are employed government-related entities (GREs).

All foreign defense contractors with over $10 million in contract value over a five-year period must participate in the Tawazun Economic Program, previously known as the UAE Offset Program.  This program also requires defense contractors that are awarded contracts valued at more than USD 10 million to establish commercially viable joint ventures with local business partners, which would be projected to yield profits equivalent to 60 percent of the contract value within a specified period, usually seven years.

The UAE does not force foreign investors to use domestic content in goods or technology or compel foreign IT providers to turn over source code, but it strongly encourages companies to utilize local content.  In February 2018, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) launched the In-Country Value (ICV) strategy, which gives preference in awarding contracts to foreign companies that use local content and employ Emiratis.  In February 2020, the Abu Dhabi Department of Economic Development and ADNOC signed an agreement to standardize ADNOC’s ICV certification program across the Abu Dhabi Government’s procurement process.  Following this agreement, businesses can make a one-time application for a unified ICV certificate that will now be applicable across the Abu Dhabi government’s procurement programs.  UAE government officials have indicated plans to expand the ICV program to other sectors of the economy and to other emirates in the coming years.  In 2019, Abu Dhabi Department of Economic Development introduced the Abu Dhabi Local Content (ADLC) initiative as part of Ghadan 21, an accelerator program to encourage private sector participation in Abu Dhabi government tenders.

5. Protection of Property Rights

Real Property  

The UAE federal government allows individual emirates to decide the mechanisms through which ownership of land may be transferred within their borders.  Abu Dhabi has generally limited land ownership to Emiratis or other GCC citizens, who may then lease the land to foreigners.  The property reverts to the owner at the conclusion of the lease.  However, in 2019, the Abu Dhabi Government issued Law No. 13 (2019) amending the rules on foreign ownership of real estate in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.  Under the law, foreign individuals and companies wholly or partially owned by foreigners are allowed to own freehold interests in land located within certain investment areas of Abu Dhabi for an unrestricted time period.  The law also extends the right for public joint stock companies to own a freehold interest in land and property anywhere in Abu Dhabi provided that at least 51 percent of the company is owned by UAE nationals.  Prior to the issuance of this law, foreign owners’ interest in land was limited to a “Musataha,” a long-term lease of up to 99 years, renewable upon the agreement of both parties.

Although Dubai has restricted ownership to UAE nationals in certain older, more established neighborhoods, traditional freeholds, also known as outright ownership, are widely available, particularly in newer developments.  Freehold owners own the land and may sell it on the open market.  The contract rights of lienholders, as well as ownership rights of freeholders, are generally respected and enforced throughout the UAE, which in some cases has employed specialized courts for this purpose.

Mortgages and liens are permitted with restrictions, and each emirate has its own system of recordkeeping.  In Dubai, for example, the system is centralized within the Dubai Land Department, and is considered extremely reliable.

In December 2020, Dubai’s ruler issued new legislation on unfinished and cancelled real estate projects in Dubai.  Law No. (19) of 2020 states that if a developer did not initiate construction on a real estate project for reasons beyond his control, or if the project was cancelled due to a decision issued by government regulators, the developer must refund the entire deposit paid by purchasers.

The World Bank Ease of Doing Business Report notes that not all privately-held land plots in the economy are formally registered in an immovable property registry.  Much of the country is unregistered desert; such land is generally owned by emirate-level governments.  Land not otherwise allocated or owned is the property of the emirate and may be disposed of at the will of its ruler who generally consults with his advisors prior to disposition.  The UAE does not have a securitization process for lending purposes.

Intellectual Property Rights 

The UAE has established a legal and regulatory framework for intellectual property rights (IPR) protection.  Moreover, in recent years IPR holders have seen marked improvement in the protection and enforcement of intellectual property.  In April 2021, the UAE was removed from the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 Report “Watch List.”  Recent UAE government changes include enhancing IP protections for the innovative pharma and biotech industry; lowering previously prohibitive trademark fees; increasing transparency in the outcomes of counterfeit seizures; significantly increasing notifications, seizures, and public destructions by Dubai Customs; and creating intergovernmental and quasi-governmental groups responsive to USG and U.S. industry concerns.  While concrete steps are needed to remedy problems with music licensing and IPR enforcement in FTZs, the UAE government has taken the concerns of rights holders seriously.

The 2019-2020 Global Competitiveness Report issued by the World Economic Forum ranked the UAE 19th globally on IPR protection, up from 26th in 2018-2019.  The UAE’s legal framework for IPR is generally considered compliant with international obligations.  Emirate-level authorities such as economic development authorities, police forces, and customs authorities enforce IPR-related issues, while federal authorities manage IPR policy.

Before January 2021, inventors could receive patent protection in UAE through either the UAE national patent office or the regional Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Patent Office.  On January 5, 2021, the GCC Patent Office stopped accepting new patent applications as the regional patent system undergoes significant reforms.  While GCC patent applications filed before January 5th will continue to be processed, inventors will need to rely on the national UAE patent office to seek patent rights until the new regional GCC system is established.

Resources for Intellectual Property Rights Holders:

Peter Mehravari

Patent Attorney

Intellectual Property Attaché for the Middle East & North Africa

U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi | U.S. Department of Commerce U.S. Patent & Trademark Office

Tel: +965 2259 1455 Peter.Mehravari@trade.gov

For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/

6. Financial Sector

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment  

UAE government efforts to create an environment that fosters economic growth and attracts foreign investment resulted in:  i) no taxes or restrictions on the repatriation of capital; ii) free movement of labor and low barriers to entry (effective tariffs are five percent for most goods); and iii) an emphasis on diversifying the economy away from oil, which offers a broad array of investment options for FDI.  Key non-hydrocarbon drivers of the economy include real estate, renewable energy, tourism, logistics, manufacturing, and financial services.

The UAE issued investment fund regulations in September 2012 known as the “twin peak” regulatory framework designed to govern the marketing of investment funds established outside the UAE to domestic investors and the establishment of local funds domiciled inside the UAE.  This regulation gave the Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA), rather than the Central Bank, authority over the licensing, regulation, and marketing of investment funds.  The marketing of foreign funds, including offshore UAE-based funds, such as those domiciled in the DIFC, require the appointment of a locally licensed placement agent.  The UAE government has also encouraged certain high-profile projects to be undertaken via a public joint stock company to allow the issuance of shares to the public.  Further, the UAE government requires any company carrying out banking, insurance, or investment services for a third party to be a public joint stock company.

The UAE has three stock markets:  Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange, Dubai Financial Market, and NASDAQ Dubai.  SCA, the onshore regulatory body, classifies brokerages into two groups:  those that engage in trading only while the clearance and settlement operations are conducted through clearance members, and those that engage in trading clearance and settlement operations for their clients.  Under the regulations, trading brokerages require paid-up capital of $820,000, whereas trading and clearance brokerages need $ 2.7 million.  Bank guarantees of $367,000 are required for brokerages to trade on the bourses.

In June 2020, the SCA amended the decision on issuing and offering Islamic securities, to ensure SCA legislation is in line with the principles of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).  In July 2020, SCA embarked on a project to restructure the legislative system for broker classification to keep pace with global practices and enhance the confidence of domestic and foreign investors.  According to the restructuring project, the following five licensing categories were introduced:  dealing in securities, dealing in investments, safekeeping, clearing and registration, credit rating, and arrangement and counseling.

The SCA’s decision on Capital Adequacy Criteria of Investment Manager and Management Company stipulates that the investment manager and the management company must allocate capital to constitute a buffer for credit risk, market risk, or operational risk, even if it does not appear as a line item in the balance sheet.

On the issue of Real Estate Investment Fund control, the SCA stipulates that a public or private real estate investment fund shall invest at least 75 percent of its assets in real estate assets.  According to the SCA, a real estate investment fund may establish or own one or more real estate services companies provided that its investment in the ownership of each company and its subsidiaries shall not be more than 20 percent of the fund’s total assets.

Credit is generally allocated on market terms, and foreign investors can access local credit markets.  Interest rates usually closely track those in the United States since the local currency is pegged to the dollar.  However, there have been complaints that GREs crowd out private sector borrowers to the detriment of mostly local SMEs.

Money and Banking System  

The UAE has a robust banking sector with 48 banks, 21 of which are foreign institutions, and six are GCC-based banks.  The number of national bank branches declined to 541 by the end of 2020, compared to 656 at the end of 2019, due to bank mergers and the transition to online banking.

Non-performing loans (NPL) comprised 6.2 percent of outstanding loans in 2019, compared with 5.7 percent in 2018, according to figures from the Central Bank of the UAE (CBUAE). Under a new reporting standard, the NPL ratio of the UAE banking system for the year-end 2018 stood at 5.6 percent, compared to 7.1 percent under the previous methodology.  The CBUAE recorded total sector assets of USD 868 billion as of December 2020.

The banking sector remains well-capitalized but has experienced a decline in lending and a rise in NPL as a result of the pandemic.  These factors have significantly reduced reported profits as banks have made greater provisions for non-performing loans.  On March 15, 2020, the CBUAE announced the USD $ 27.2 billion Targeted Economic Support Scheme (TESS) stimulus package, which included USD $13.6 billion in zero-interest, collateralized loans for UAE-based banks, and USD $13.6 billion in funds freed up from banks’ capital buffers.  In November 2020, The CBUAE extended The TESS to June 2021.

There are some restrictions on foreigners’ ability to establish a current bank account, and legal residents and Emiratis can access loans under more favorable terms than non-residents.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances  

Foreign Exchange Policies  

According to the IMF, the UAE has no restrictions on making payments and transfers for international transactions, except security-related restrictions.  Currencies trade freely at market-determined prices.  The UAE dirham has been pegged to the dollar since 2002.  The mid-point between the official buying and selling rate for the dirham (AED or Dhs) is fixed at AED 3.6725 per USD.

Remittance Policies  

The Central Bank of the UAE initiated the creation of the Foreign Exchange & Remittance Group (FERG), comprising various exchange companies, which is registered with the Dubai Chamber of Commerce & Industry.  Unlike their counterparts across the world that deal mainly in money exchange, exchange companies in the UAE are primary conduits for transferring large volumes of remittances through official channels.  According to migration and remittance data from the World Bank, in 2019, the UAE had migrant remittance outflows of USD $44.9 billion.  Exchange companies are important partners in the UAE government’s electronic salary transfer system, called the Wage Protection System.  They also handle various ancillary services ranging from credit card payments to national bonds, to traveler’s checks.

As part of its focus on improving Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) systems within the UAE, in September 2020, the CBUAE introduced a mandatory registration framework for Hawala providers or informal money transfer service providers that operate in the UAE.

Sovereign Wealth Funds  

Abu Dhabi is home to four sovereign wealth funds—the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) and Mubadala Investment Company are the largest—with estimated total assets of approximately USD $814.6 billion as of February 2020.  Each fund has a chair and board members appointed by the Ruler of Abu Dhabi.  President Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan is the chair of ADIA and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan is the chair of Mubadala.  Other rapidly expanding Abu Dhabi sovereign funds include: ADQ, with investment portfolios in food and agriculture, aviation, financial services, healthcare, industries, logistics, media, real estate, tourism and hospitality, transport and utilities; and EDGE, which covers  weapons, cyber defense and electronic warfare and intelligence, among others.  Emirates Investment Authority, the UAE’s federal sovereign wealth fund, is modest by comparison, with estimated assets of about USD 44 billion.  The Investment Corporation of Dubai (ICD) is Dubai’s primary sovereign wealth fund, with an estimated USD $301 billion in assets according to ICD’s June 2020 financial report.

UAE funds vary in their approaches to managing investments.  ADIA generally does not actively seek to manage or take an operational role in the public companies in which it invests, while Mubadala tends to take a more active role in particular sectors, including oil and gas, aerospace, infrastructure, and early-stage venture capital.  According to ADIA, the fund carries out its investment program independently and without reference to the government of Abu Dhabi.

In 2008, ADIA agreed to act alongside the IMF as co-chair of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, which eventually became the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF).  Comprising representatives from 31 countries, the IFSWF was created to demonstrate that sovereign wealth funds had robust internal frameworks and governance practices, and that their investments were made only on an economic and financial basis.

7. State-Owned Enterprises

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are a key component of the UAE economic model.  There is no

published list of SOEs or GREs, at the national or individual emirate level.  Some SOEs, such as the influential Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), are strategically important companies and provide a major source of revenue for the government.  Mubadala established Masdar in 2006 to develop renewable energy and sustainable technologies industries.  Some SOEs, such as Emirates Airlines and Etisalat, the largest local telecommunications firm, have in recent years emerged as internationally recognized brands.  Some, but not all, of these companies have competition.  In some cases, these firms compete against other state-owned firms (Emirates and Etihad airlines, for example, or telecommunications company Etisalat against du).  While they are not granted full autonomy, these firms leverage ties between entities they control to foster national economic development.  Perhaps the best example of such an economic ecosystem is Dubai, where SOEs have been used as drivers of diversification in sectors including construction, hospitality, transport, banking, logistics, and telecommunications.  Sectoral regulations in some cases address governance structures and practices of state-owned companies.  The UAE is not party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement.

Privatization Programs  

There is no privatization program in the UAE.  There have been several listings of portions of SOEs, on local UAE stock exchanges, as well as some “greenfield” IPOs focused on priority projects.  However, several state-owned enterprises have allowed partial foreign ownership in their shares.  For example, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company for Distribution, many national banks, some utility operators and the telecom operators, Etisalat and du, now allow minority foreign ownership.

8. Responsible Business Conduct

There is a general expectation that businesses in the UAE adhere to responsible business conduct standards, and the UAE’s Governance Rules and Corporate Discipline Standards (Ministerial Resolution No. 518 of 2009) encourage companies to apply social policy towards supporting local communities.  In February 2018, the UAE issued Cabinet Resolution No. 2 regarding Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), which encourages voluntary contributions to a National Social Responsibility Fund.  In January 2021, the CSR UAE Fund announced that it will launch an Index as an annual performance measurement tool for CSR & Sustainability practices in the UAE.  The Emirate of Ajman made annual CSR contributions of USD $417 mandatory for all businesses.  Many companies maintain CSR offices and participate in CSR initiatives, including mentorship and employment training; philanthropic donations to UAE-licensed humanitarian and charity organizations; and initiatives to promote environmental sustainability.  The UAE government actively supports and encourages such efforts through official government partnerships, as well as through private foundations.  The 2015 Commercial Companies Law requires managers and directors to act for the benefit of the company and voids any company provisions exempting directors and managers from personal liability.

In April 2015, the Pearl Initiative and the United Nations Global Compact held their inaugural Forum in Dubai.  The Pearl Initiative is an independent, non-profit organization founded by Sharjah-based Crescent Enterprises working across the Gulf region to encourage better business practices.  The UAE has not subscribed to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and has not actively encouraged foreign or local enterprises to follow the specific United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.  The UAE government has not committed to adhere to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas, nor does it participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.  The Dubai Multi-Commodities Center (DMCC), however, passed the DMCC Rules for Risk-Based Due Diligence in the Gold and Precious Metals Supply Chain, which it claims are fully aligned with the OECD guidance.

Additional Resources

Department of State

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

Trafficking in Persons Report

Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities and;

North Korea Sanctions & Enforcement Actions Advisory

Department of Labor

Findings on the Worst forms of Child Labor Report

List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor

Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World  and;

Comply Chain

9. Corruption 

The UAE has strict laws, regulations, and enforcement against corruption and has pursued several high-profile cases.  For example, the UAE federal penal code and the federal human resources law criminalize embezzlement and the acceptance of bribes by public and private sector workers.  The Dubai financial fraud law criminalizes receipt of illicit monies or public funds.  There is no evidence that corruption of public officials is a systemic problem.  The State Audit Institution and the Abu Dhabi Accountability Authority investigate corruption in the government.  The Companies Law requires board directors to avoid conflicts of interest.  In practice, however, given the multiple roles occupied by relatively few senior Emirati government and business officials, conflicts of interest exist.  Business success in the UAE also still depends much on personal relationships.

The monitoring organizations GAN Integrity and Transparency International describe the corruption environment in the UAE as low-risk and rate the UAE highly on anti-corruption efforts both regionally and globally.  Some third-party organizations note, however, that the involvement of members of the ruling families and prominent merchant families in certain businesses can create economic disparities in the playing field, and most foreign companies outside the UAE’s free zones rely on an Emirati national partner, often with strong connections, who retains majority ownership.  The UAE has ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption.  There are no civil society organizations or NGOs investigating corruption within the UAE.

Resources to Report Corruption  

Contact at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption:

Dr. Harib Al Amimi
President
State Audit Institution
20th Floor, Tower C2, Aseel Building, Bainuna (34th) Street,
Al Bateen, Abu Dhabi, UAE
+971 2 635 9999
info@saiuae.gov.ae , reportfraud@saiuae.gov.ae

10. Political and Security Environment

There have been no reported instances of politically motivated property damage in recent years.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

Despite a pandemic-induced economic slowdown in 2020, unemployment among UAE citizens remains low.  Labor force participation was only 47.6% among UAE citizens in 2019.  Despite significant departures of foreign workers during the pandemic, expatriates represent over 88.5 percent of the country’s 9.6 million residents, accounting for more than 95 percent of private sector workers.  As a result, there would be large labor shortages in all sectors of the economy if not for expatriate workers.  Most expatriate workers derive their legal residency status from their employment.

A significant portion of the country’s expatriate labor population consists of low-wage workers who are primarily from South Asia and work in labor-intensive industries such as construction, manufacturing, maintenance, and sanitation.  In addition, several hundred thousand domestic workers, primarily from South and Southeast Asia and Africa, work in the homes of both Emirati and expatriate families.  Federal labor law does not apply to domestic, agricultural, or public sector workers.  In 2014, the federal government implemented a law mandating a standard contract for all domestic workers.  In 2017, the UAE issued a domestic workers law, which regulates their rights and contracts.  Various regulations require businesses in certain sectors such as financial services to employ minimum quotas of Emiratis.

Under UAE labor law, employers must pay severance to workers who complete one year or more of service except in cases of termination under certain conditions described in Article 120 of the federal labor law, which relate to misconduct by workers.  Expatriate workers do not receive UAE government unemployment insurance.  Termination of UAE nationals in most situations requires prior approval from the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization.

The guest worker system generally guarantees transportation back to country of origin at the conclusion of employment.  Repatriation insurance costs USD 16 per year per employee.  Most employees are not subject to excessively onerous visa, residence, work permit, or similar requirements inhibiting mobility.  Recent legislation increased an employee’s ability to voluntarily leave a job and switch employers thereby making it harder for employers to pressure workers to remain in a job by using their sponsorship of the employee to limit his or her options.

Five-year residence visas are available for investors who purchase property worth USD 1.4 million or more, and 10-year residence visas are available for individuals who invest USD 2.8 million in a business.  The government also provides visas for entrepreneurs and specialized talent in science, medicine, and specialized technical fields.  Employees who live in the UAE on a sponsored work visa can undertake part-time jobs and to work for multiple employers simultaneously to earn additional income.

In September 2020, Dubai Tourism in collaboration with the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners Affairs (GDRFA-Dubai), introduced “Retire in Dubai,” a global retirement program that offers resident expatriates and foreigners aged 55 and above the opportunity to live in Dubai.  Eligible applicants receive a Retirement Visa, renewable every five years.  The retiree can choose between one of three financial requirements for eligibility:  a monthly income of approximately USD $5,500; savings of USD $275,000; or property in Dubai worth USD $550,000.

In October 2020, Dubai launched a visa that enables remote working professionals to live in Dubai, while serving their employers in their home country. The visa is valid for one year, costs $287 plus medical insurance and processing fees per person.  Eligibility requirements include a one-year employment contract, and a minimum salary of USD $5,000 per month.

In January 2021, the UAE Cabinet approved a measure permitting foreign university students in the UAE to sponsor their families, provided they have the financial means to do so and can afford suitable housing.

In February 2021, Abu Dhabi Department of Culture and Tourism launched the Creative Visa for individuals working in cultural and creative industries, including heritage, performing arts, visual arts, design and crafts, gaming and e-sports, media, and publishing.

Although UAE federal law prohibits the payment of recruitment fees, many prospective workers continue to make such payments in their home countries.  In 2018, the UAE government launched Tadbeer Centers, publicly regulated but privately operated agencies to improve recruitment regulation and standards.  Tadbeer Centers are meant to replace recruitment agencies by 2020.

There is no minimum wage in the UAE; however, article 63 of the federal labor law allows the minister of labor to suggest an overall minimum wage level or to a specific area or profession.  MHRE unofficially mandates an AED 5,000 (USD $1,360) minimum wage for locals at job fairs and requires job titles offered for Emiratis to be socially acceptable.  Some labor-sending countries require their citizens to receive certain minimum wage levels as a condition for allowing them to work in the UAE.  In January 2020, the UAE government introduced a salary requirement for residents seeking to directly sponsor a domestic worker, raising the minimum monthly income for the individual or entire family from USD $1,630 to $6,810, inclusive of all allowances.

Federal Law No. 8 of 1980 prohibits labor unions.  The law also prohibits public sector employees, security guards, and migrant workers from striking, and allows employers to suspend private sector workers for doing so.  In addition, employers can cancel the contracts of striking workers, which can lead to deportation.  According to government statistics, there were approximately 30 to 60 strikes per year between 2012 and 2015, the last year for which data is available.  In December 2019, construction workers in Abu Dhabi engaged in an hours-long strike, claiming they had not been paid in months and that each was owed over USD $3,400.  The police intervened to defuse the protests and arrested some of the workers for resisting.  Mediation plays a central role in resolving labor disputes.  The federal Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization and local police forces maintain telephone hotlines for labor dispute and complaint submissions.  MOHRE manages 11 centers around the UAE that provide mediation services between employers and employees.  Disputes not resolved by the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization move to the labor court system.

The MOHRE inspects company workplaces and company-provided worker accommodations to ensure compliance with UAE law.  Emirate-level government bodies, including the Dubai Municipality, also carry out regular inspections.  The MOHRE also enforces a mid-day break from 12:30 p.m. – 3:00 p.m. during the extremely hot summer months.  The federally-mandated Wages Protection System (WPS) monitors and requires electronic transfer of wages to approximately 4.5 million private sector workers (about 95 percent of the total private sector workforce).  There are reports that small private construction and transport companies work around the WPS to pay workers less than their contractual salaries.  In 2020 the UAE began a pilot program to begin integrating domestic workers into the WPS.  Currently, less than one percent of domestic workers are enrolled in WPS.

Following the promulgation of similar legislation in Abu Dhabi, Dubai’s government fully implemented Law No. 11 in May 2017, which mandates employers provide basic health insurance coverage to their employees or face fines.  Dubai’s mandatory health insurance law covers 4.3 million people and applies to employees residing in other emirates but working in Dubai.

The multi-agency National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking is the federal body tasked with monitoring and preventing human trafficking, including forced labor.  Child labor is illegal and rare in the UAE.  The UAE continues to participate in the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, engage in the Colombo Process, and partner with other multilateral organizations such as the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime regarding labor exploitation and human trafficking.

Section 7 of the Department of State’s Human Rights Report (http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt) provides more information on worker rights, working conditions, and labor laws in the UAE.  The Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report (https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2018/index.htm) details the UAE government’s efforts to combat human trafficking.

13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics

 

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($B USD) 2019 $421.1 2019 $421.1 www.worldbank.org/en/country
Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
U.S. FDI in partner country ($B USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $17.2 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/
Host country’s FDI in the United States ($B USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2019 $5.1 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data
Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2019 3.4% UNCTAD data available at

https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report 

* Source for Host Country Data: Economic Report, Ministry of Economy

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI  

Data from the Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Center indicates that the real GDP for 2019 in constant prices (base year 2010) were approximately USD $404.6 billion, while the nominal GDP at current prices was about USD $421.1 billion in 2019.

The UAE Ministry of Economy’s Annual Economic Report 2019, cited UNCTAD statistics that net annual FDI inflows to the UAE in 2018 were $10.385 billion, compared to USD $10.354 billion in 2017.  The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR)  reported that according to the CBUAE statistics, the net annual FDI inflows to the UAE in 2019 were approximately USD $13.78 billion.  The largest investors in the UAE were:  India, United States, UK, Japan, China, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Kuwait, France, and the Netherlands.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

14. Contact for More Information

Paul Prokop
Economic Officer
First Street, Umm Hurair -1
Dubai UAE
+971 (0)4 309 4918
prokoppg@state.gov

United Kingdom

Executive Summary

The United Kingdom (UK) is a top global destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) and imposes few impediments to foreign ownership.  The United States is the largest source of direct investment into the UK.  Thousands of U.S. companies have operations in the UK.  The UK also hosts more than half of the European, Middle Eastern, and African corporate headquarters of American-owned firms.  The UK government provides comprehensive statistics on FDI in its annual inward investment  report:   https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/department-for-international-trade-inward-investment-results-2019-to-2020.

Following a drop in inward investment each year since 2016 that mirrored global declines, and amidst a historically sharp but temporary recession related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the UK government established the Office for Investment in November 2020.  The Office is focused on attracting high-value investment opportunities into the UK which “align with key government priorities, such as reaching net zero [carbon emissions], investing in infrastructure, and advancing research and development.  It also aims to drive inward investment into “all corners of the UK through a ‘single front door.’”

The UK’s National Security and Investment Act, which came into effect in May 2021, significantly strengthened the UK’s existing investment screening powers.  Investments resulting in foreign control generally exceeding 15 percent of companies in 17 sectors pertaining to national security require mandatory notifications to the UK government’s Investment Security Unit

The UK formally withdrew from the EU’s political institutions on January 31, 2020, and from  the bloc’s economic and trading institutions on December 31, 2020.  The UK and the EU concluded a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) on December 24, 2020, setting out the terms of their future economic relationship.  The TCA maintains tariff-free trade between the UK and the EU but introduced a number of new non-tariff, administrative barriers.   On January 1, 2021, the UK began reviewing cross-border activities with a UK-EU nexus in parallel to the European Commission.

The United States and the UK launched free trade agreement negotiations in May 2020, which were paused with the change in U.S. Administration.  The United States and UK have enjoyed a “Commerce and Navigation” Treaty since 1815 which guarantees national treatment of U.S. investors.  A Bilateral Tax Treaty specifically protects U.S. and UK investors from double taxation.

On April 8, 2021, the UK established the Digital Markets Unit, a new regulatory body that will be responsible for implementing upcoming changes to competition rules in digital markets.  The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), the UK’s competition regulator, has indicated that it intends to scrutinize and police the digital sector more thoroughly going forward.   The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) no longer applies to the UK.  Entities based in the UK must comply with the Data Protection Act (DPA) 2018, which incorporated provisions of the EU GDPR directly into UK law

In April 2020  a two percent digital services tax (DST) came into force that targets certain types of digital activity attributable to UK users. The in-scope digital services activities are: social media services; Internet search engines; and online marketplaces.  If an activity is ancillary or incidental to an in-scope digital services activity, its revenues may also be subject to the DST.

In March 2021, The UK government identified eight sites as post-Brexit freeports to spur trade, investment, innovation and economic recovery.  The eight sites are: East Midlands Airport, Felixstowe and Harwich, Humber region, Liverpool City Region, Plymouth, Solent, Thames, and Teesside.  The designated areas will offer special customs and tax arrangements and additional infrastructure funding to improve transport links.

HMG brought forward new immigration rules on January 1, 2021. The new rules have wide-ranging implications for foreign employees, students, and EU citizens.  The new rules are points-based, meaning immigrants need to attain a certain number of points in order to be awarded a visa.  The previous cap on visas has been abolished.  EU citizens who arrived before December 31, 2020, will not have to apply for a visa, but instead are eligible to apply for “settled” or “pre-settled” status, which allows them to live and work in the UK much the same as they were before the UK left the EU.  EU citizens arriving to the UK after January 1, 2021, must apply for the relevant visa.

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 11 of 180 www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
World Bank’s Doing Business Report “Ease of Doing Business” 2020 8 of 190 www.doingbusiness.org/rankings
Global Innovation Index 2020 4 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-economy  
U.S. FDI in partner country (M USD, stock positions) 2019 $851,400 www.bea.gov/international/factsheet/
World Bank GNI per capita 2019 $49,040 data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 

Currency conversions have been done using XE and Bank of England data.

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

Market entry for U.S. firms is facilitated by a common language, legal heritage, and similar business institutions and practices.  The UK is well supported by sophisticated financial and professional services industries and has a transparent tax system in which local and foreign-owned companies are taxed alike.  The pound sterling is a free-floating currency with no restrictions on its transfer or conversion.  There are no exchange controls restricting the transfer of funds associated with an investment into or out of the UK.

UK legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international standards.  The UK legal system provides a high level of investor protections.  Private ownership is protected by law and monitored for competition-restricting behavior.  U.S. exporters and investors generally will find little difference between the United States and the UK in the conduct of business, and common law prevails as the basis for commercial transactions in the UK.

The UK actively encourages inward FDI.  The Department for International Trade, including through its newly created Office for Investment, actively promotes inward investment and prepares market information for a variety of industries.  U.S. companies establishing British subsidiaries generally encounter no special nationality requirements on directors or shareholders.  Once established in the UK, foreign-owned companies are treated no differently from UK firms.  The UK government is a strong defender of the rights of any British-registered company, irrespective of its nationality of ownership.

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Foreign ownership is limited in only a few private sector companies for national security reasons, such as Rolls Royce (aerospace) and BAE Systems (aircraft and defense).  No individual foreign shareholder may own more than 15 percent of these companies.  Theoretically, the government can block the acquisition of manufacturing assets from abroad by invoking the Industry Act of 1975, but it has never done so.  Investments in energy and power generation require environmental approvals. Certain service activities (like radio and land-based television broadcasting) are subject to licensing.

The UK requires that at least one director of any company registered in the UK be ordinarily resident in the country.

The UK’s National Security and Investment Act, which came into effect in May 2021, significantly strengthened the UK’s existing investment screening powers.  Investments resulting in foreign control generally exceeding 15 percent of companies in 17 sectors pertaining to national security require mandatory notifications to the UK government’s Investment Security Unit (see https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/965784/nsi-scope-of-mandatory-regime-gov-response.pdf for details).  The regime operates separately from competition law.  The bill provides authority to a newly created Investment Security Unit to review investments retroactively for a period of five years.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

The Economist Intelligence Unit, World Bank Group’s “Doing Business 2020,” and the OECD’s Economic Forecast Summary (December 2020) have current investment policy reports for the United Kingdom:

http://country.eiu.com/united-kingdom

http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/united-kingdom/

https://www.oecd.org/economy/united-kingdom-economic-snapshot/  

Business Facilitation

The UK government has promoted administrative efficiency to facilitate business creation and operation.  The online business registration process is clearly defined, though some types of companies cannot register as an overseas firm in the UK, including partnerships and unincorporated bodies.  Registration as an overseas company is only required when the company has some degree of physical presence in the UK.  After registering their business with the UK governmental body Companies House, overseas firms must separately register to pay corporation tax within three months.  On average, the process of setting up a business in the UK requires 13 days, compared to the European average of 32 days, putting the UK in first place in Europe and sixth in the world.

As of April 2016, companies have to declare all “persons of significant control.”  This policy recognizes that individuals other than named directors can have significant influence on a company’s activity and that this information should be transparent.  More information is available at this link: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guidance-to-the-people-with-significant-control-requirements-for-companies-and-limited-liability-partnerships.  Companies House maintains a free, publicly searchable directory, available at https://www.gov.uk/get-information-about-a-company.

The UK offers a welcoming environment to foreign investors, with foreign equity ownership restrictions in only a limited number of sectors covered by the World Bank’s Investing Across Sectors indicators.

https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-international-trade

https://www.gov.uk/set-up-business

https://www.gov.uk/topic/company-registration-filing/starting-company

http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/united-kingdom/starting-a-business

Special Section on the British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies

The British Overseas Territories (BOTs) comprise Anguilla, British Antarctic Territory, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, Pitcairn Islands, St. Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, Turks and Caicos Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, and Sovereign Base Areas on Cyprus.  The BOTs retain a substantial measure of authority for their own affairs.  Local self-government is usually provided by an Executive Council and elected legislature.  Governors or Commissioners are appointed by the Crown on the advice of the British Foreign Secretary, and retain responsibility for external affairs, defense, and internal security.

Many of the territories are now broadly self-sufficient.  The UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Department (FCDO), however, maintains development assistance programs in St. Helena, Montserrat, and Pitcairn. This includes budgetary aid to meet the islands’ essential needs and development assistance to help encourage economic growth and social development in order to promote economic self-sustainability.  In addition, all other BOTs receive small levels of assistance through “cross-territory” programs for issues such as environmental protection, disaster prevention, HIV/AIDS, and child protection.

Seven of the BOTs have financial centers:  Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.  These territories have committed to the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for the automatic exchange of taxpayer financial account information.  They have long exchanged information with the UK, and began exchanging information with other jurisdictions under the CRS from September 2017.

Of the BOTs, Anguilla is the only one to receive a “non-compliant” rating by the Global Forum for Exchange of Information on Request, putting it on the EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions.  The Global Forum has rated the other six territories as “largely compliant.”  Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, and the Turks and Caicos Islands have committed in reciprocal bilateral arrangements with the UK to hold beneficial ownership information in central registers or similarly effective systems, and to provide UK law enforcement authorities with near real-time access to this information.

Anguilla:  Anguilla has no income, capital gains, estate, profit or other forms of direct taxation on either individuals or corporations, for residents or non-residents of the jurisdiction.  The territory has no exchange rate controls.  Non-Anguillan nationals may purchase property, but the transfer of land to an alien includes a 12.5 percent tax on the assessed value of the property or the sales proceeds, whichever is greater.

British Virgin Islands:  The government of the British Virgin Islands offers a series of tax incentive packages aimed at reducing the cost of doing business on the islands.  This includes relief from corporation tax payments over specific periods, but companies must pay an initial registration fee and an annual license fee to the BVI Financial Services Commission.  Crown land grants are not available to non-British Virgin Islanders, but private land can be leased or purchased following the approval of an Alien Land Holding License.  Stamp duty is imposed on transfers of real estate and the transfer of shares in a BVI company owning real estate in the BVI at a rate of four percent for belongers (i.e., residents who have proven they meet a legal standard of close ties to the territory) and 12 percent for non-belongers.  There is no corporate income tax, capital gains tax, branch tax, or withholding tax for companies incorporated under the BVI Business Companies Act.  Payroll tax is imposed on every employer and self-employed person who conducts business in BVI.  The tax is paid at a graduated rate depending upon the size of the employer.  The current rates are 10 percent for small employers (those which have a payroll of less than $150,000, a turnover of less than $300,000 and fewer than seven employees) and 14 percent for larger employers.  Eight percent of the total remuneration is deducted from the employee, the remainder of the liability is met by the employer.  The first $10,000 of remuneration is free from payroll tax.

Cayman Islands:  There are no direct taxes in the Cayman Islands.  In most districts, the government charges stamp duty of 7.5 percent on the value of real estate at sale, but certain districts, including Seven Mile Beach, are subject to a rate of nine percent.  There is a one percent fee payable on mortgages of less than KYD 300,000, and one and a half percent on mortgages of KYD 300,000 or higher.  There are no controls on the foreign ownership of property and land.  Investors can receive import duty waivers on equipment, building materials, machinery, manufacturing materials, and other tools.

Falkland Islands:  Companies located in the Falkland Islands are charged corporation tax at 21 percent on the first £1 million ($1.4 million) and 26 percent for all amounts in excess of £1 million ($1.4 million).  The individual income tax rate is 21 percent for earnings below £12,000 ($16,800) and 26 percent above this level.

Gibraltar:  With BREXIT, Gibraltar is not currently a part of the EU, but under the terms of an agreement in principle reached between the UK and Spain on December 31, 2020, it is set to become a part of the EU’s passport-free Schengen travel area.  The UK and EU are set to begin negotiations on a treaty on the movement of people and goods between Gibraltar and the bloc.  Gibraltar has a buoyant economy with a stable currency and few restrictions on moving capital or repatriating dividends.  The corporate income tax rate is 20 percent for utility, energy, and fuel supply companies, and 10 percent for all other companies.  There are no capital or sales taxes.

Montserrat:   Foreign investors are permitted to acquire real estate, subject to the acquisition of an Alien Land Holding license, which carries a fee of five percent of the purchase price.  The government also imposes stamp and transfer fees of 2.6 percent of the property value on all real estate transactions.  Foreign investment in Montserrat is subject to the same taxation rules as local investment and is eligible for tax holidays and other incentives.  Montserrat has preferential trade agreements with the United States, Canada, and Australia.  The government allows 100 percent foreign ownership of businesses, but the administration of public utilities remains wholly in the public sector.

St. Helena:  The  government offers tax-based incentives, which are considered on the merits of each project – particularly tourism projects.  All applications are processed by Enterprise St. Helena, the business development agency.

Pitcairn Islands:  The Pitcairn Islands have approximately 50 residents, with a workforce of approximately 29 employed in 10 full-time equivalent roles.  The territory does not have an airstrip or a commercially viable harbor.  Residents exist on fishing, subsistence farming, and handcrafts.

The Turks and Caicos Islands:  Through an “open arms” investment policy, the government commits to a streamlined business licensing system, a responsive immigration policy to give investment security, access to government-owned land under long-term leases, and a variety of duty concessions to qualified investors.  The islands have a “no tax” policy, but property purchasers must pay a stamp duty on purchases over $25,000.  Depending on the island, the stamp duty rate may be up to 6.5 percent for purchases up to $250,000, eight percent for purchases $250,001 to $500,000, and 10 percent for purchases over $500,000.

The Crown Dependencies:  The Crown Dependencies are the Bailiwick of Jersey, the Bailiwick of Guernsey, and the Isle of Man.  The Crown Dependencies are not part of the UK but are self-governing dependencies of the Crown.  This means they have their own directly elected legislative assemblies, administrative, fiscal and legal systems, and their own courts of law.  The Crown Dependencies are not represented in the UK Parliament.  The following tax data are current as of April 2021:

Jersey’s standard rate of corporate tax is zero percent.  The exceptions to this standard rate are financial service companies, which are taxed at 10 percent; utility companies, which are taxed at 20 percent; and income specifically derived from Jersey property rentals or Jersey property development, taxed at 20 percent.  A five percent VAT is applicable in Jersey.

Guernsey has a zero percent rate of corporate tax.  Exceptions include some specific banking activities, taxed at 10 percent; utility companies, which are taxed at 20 percent; Guernsey residents’ assessable income is taxed at 20 percent; and income derived from land and buildings is taxed at 20 percent.

The Isle of Man’s corporate standard tax is zero percent.  The exceptions to this standard rate are income received from banking business, which is taxed at 10 percent, and income received from land and property in the Isle of Man, which is taxed at 20 percent.  In addition, a 10 percent tax rate also applies to companies which carry on a retail business in the Isle of Man and have taxable income in excess of £500,000 ($695,000) from that business.  A 20 percent rate of VAT is applicable in the Isle of Man.

Outward Investment

The UK is one of the largest outward investors in the world, undergirded by numerousbilateral investment treaties (BITs) .  The UK’s international investment position abroad (outward investment) increased from £1,453 billion ($1,938) in 2018 to £1,498 ($1,912) by the end of 2019.  The main destination for UK outward FDI is the United States, which accounted for approximately 25 percent of UK outward FDI stocks at the end of 2019.  Other key destinations include the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and Spain which, together with the United States, account for a little under half of the UK’s outward FDI stock.  Europe and the Americas remain the dominant areas for UK international investment positions abroad, accounting for eight of the top 10 destinations for total UK outward FDI.

2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties

The UK has concluded 105 bilateral investment treaties, which are known in the UK as Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (IPPAs).  These include:  Albania, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, China SAR, Hungary, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea Republic of, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tanzania, United Republic of Tanzania, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

For a complete current list, including actual treaty texts, see:  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/221#iiaInnerMenu

3. Legal Regime

International Regulatory Considerations

The UK’s withdrawal from the EU may result in a period in which the future regulatory direction of the UK is uncertain as the UK determines the extent to which it will either maintain and enforce the current EU regulatory regime or deviate towards new regulations in any particular sector.  The UK is an independent member of the WTO and actively seeks to comply with all WTO obligations.

Transparency of the Regulatory System

U.S. exporters and investors generally will find little difference between the United States and UK in the conduct of business.  The regulatory system provides clear and transparent guidelines for commercial engagement.  Common law prevails in the UK as the basis for commercial transactions, and the International Commercial Terms (INCOTERMS) of the International Chambers of Commerce are accepted definitions of trading terms.  As of 1 January 2021 firms in the UK must use the UK-adopted international accounting standards (IAS) instead of the EU-adopted IAS in terms of accounting standards and audit provisions. .  The UK’s Accounting Standards Board provides guidance to firms on accounting standards and works with the IASB on international standards.

Statutory authority over prices and competition in various industries is given to independent regulators, primarily the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA).  Other sector regulators with some jurisdiction over competition include, the Office of Communications (Ofcom), the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat), the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), the Rail Regulator, and the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA).  The PRA was created out of the dissolution of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in 2013.  The PRA reports to the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) in the Bank of England.  The PRA is responsible for supervising the safety and soundness of individual financial firms, while the FPC takes a systemic view of the financial system and provides macro-prudential regulation and policy actions.  The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) acts as a single integrated regulator focused on enforcement of the UK’s competition laws.  The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is a regulator that addresses financial and market misconduct through legally reviewable processes.  These regulators work to protect the interests of consumers while ensuring that the markets they regulate are functioning efficiently.  Most laws and regulations are published in draft for public comment prior to implementation.  The FCA maintains a free, publicly searchable register of their filings on regulated corporations and individuals here: https://register.fca.org.uk/

The UK government publishes regulatory actions, including draft text and executive summaries, on the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy webpage listed below.  The current policy requires the repeal of two regulations for any new one in order to make the business environment more competitive.

https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/business-regulation

https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/regulatory-delivery

Legal System and Judicial Independence

The UK is a common-law country.  UK business contracts are legally enforceable in the UK, but not in the United States or other foreign jurisdictions.  International disputes are resolved through litigation in the UK Courts or by arbitration, mediation, or some other alternative dispute resolution (ADR) method.  The UK has a long history of applying the rule of law to business disputes.  The current judicial process remains procedurally competent, fair, and reliable, which helps position London as an international hub for dispute resolution with over 10,000 cases filed per annum.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

Outside of national security reviews of investment in the 17 sectors deemed to be central to national security per the National Security and Investment Act, few statutes govern or restrict foreign investment in the UK.  The procedure for establishing a company in the UK is identical for British and foreign investors.  No approval mechanisms exist for foreign investment, apart from the process outlined in Section 1.  Foreigners may freely establish or purchase enterprises in the UK, with a few limited exceptions, and acquire land or buildings.  As noted above, the UK is currently reviewing its procedures and has proposed new rules for restricting foreign investment in those sectors of the economy with higher risk for adversely impairing national security.

Alleged tax avoidance by multinational companies, including by several major U.S. firms, has been a controversial political issue and subject of investigations by the UK Parliament and EU authorities.  Foreign and UK firms are subject to the same tax laws, however, and several UK firms have also been criticized for tax avoidance.  Foreign investors may have access to certain EU and UK regional grants and incentives designed to attract industry to areas of high unemployment, but these do not include tax concessions.  Access to EU grants ended on December 31, 2020.

The UK flattened its structure of corporate tax rates in 2015, toa flat rate of 19 percent for non-ring-fenced companies, with marginal tax relief granted for companies with profits falling between £300,000 ($420,000) and £1.5 million ($2.1 million).   There are different Corporation Tax rates for companies that make profits from oil extraction or oil rights in the UK or UK continental shelf.  These are known as “ring fence” companies.  Small ”ring fence” companies are taxed at a rate of 19 percent for profits up to £300,000 ($420,000), and 30 percent for profits over £300,000 ($420,000).  A special rate of 20 percent is given to unit trusts and open-ended investment companies.

On March 3, 2021, Chancellor of the Exchequer Rishi Sunak announced that, starting in 2023, UK corporate tax would increase to 25 percent for companies with profits over £250,000 ($346,000).  A small profits rate (SPR) will also be introduced for companies with profits of £50,000 ($69,000) or less so that they will continue to pay Corporation Tax at 19 percent.  Companies with profits between £50,000 ($69,000) and £250,000 ($346,000) will pay tax at the main rate reduced by a marginal relief providing a gradual increase in the effective Corporation Tax rate.

Tax deductions are allowed for expenditure and depreciation of assets used for trade purposes.  These include machinery, plant, industrial buildings, and assets used for research and development.

The UK has a simple system of personal income tax.  The marginal tax rates for 2020-2021 are as follows: up to £12,500 ($17,370), 0 percent; £12,501 ($17,370) to £50,000 ($69,481), 20 percent; £50,001 ($69,481) to £150,000 ($208,444), 40 percent; and over £150,000 ($208,444), 45 percent.

UK citizens also make mandatory payments of about 12 percent of income into the National Insurance system, which funds social security and retirement benefits.  The UK requires non-domiciled residents of the UK to either pay tax on their worldwide income or the tax on the relevant part of their remitted foreign income being brought into the UK.  If they have been resident in the UK for seven tax years of the previous nine, and they choose to pay tax only on their remitted earnings, they may be subject to an additional charge of £30,000 ($42,000).  If they have been resident in the UK for 12 of the last 14 tax years, they may be subject to an additional charge of £60,000 ($84,000).

The Scottish Parliament has the legal power to increase or decrease the basic income tax rate in Scotland, currently 20 percent, by a maximum of three percentage points.

For further guidance on laws and procedures relevant to foreign investment in the UK, follow the link below:

https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/investment-in-the-uk-guidance-for-overseas-businesses

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

UK competition law prohibits anti-competitive behavior within the UK through Chapters I and II of the Competition Act of 1998 and the Enterprise Act of 2002.  The UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is responsible for implementing these laws by investigating potentially anti-competitive behaviors, including cases involving state aid, cartel activity, or mergers that threaten to reduce the competitive market environment.  While merger notification in the UK is voluntary, the CMA may impose substantial fines or suspense orders on potentially non-compliant transactions.  The CMA has no prosecutorial authority, but it may refer entities for prosecution in extreme cases, such as those involving cartel activity, which carries a penalty of up to five years imprisonment.  The CMA is also responsible for ensuring consumer protection, conducting market research, and coordinating with sectoral regulators, such as those involved in the regulation of the UK’s energy, water, and telecommunications markets.

On January 1, 2021, the UK began reviewing cross-border activities with a UK-EU nexus in parallel to the European Commission.  On April 8, 2021, the UK established the Digital Markets Unit, a new regulatory body that will be responsible for implementing upcoming changes to competition rules in digital markets.

UK competition law requires:

1) the prohibition of agreements or practices that restrict free trading and competition between business entities (this includes in particular the repression of cartels);

2) the banning of abusive behavior by a firm dominating a market, or anti-competitive practices that tend to lead to such a dominant position (practices controlled in this way may include predatory pricing, tying, price gouging, refusal to deal and many others); and,

3) the supervision of mergers and acquisitions of large corporations, including some joint ventures.

Any transactions which could threaten competition also fall into scope of the UK’s regulators.  UK law provides for remedies to problematic transactions, such as an obligation to divest part of the merged business or to offer licenses or access to facilities to enable other businesses to continue competing.  In addition to the CMA, the Takeover Panel, the Financial Conduct Authority, and the Pensions Regulator have principal regulatory authority:

  • The Takeover Panel is an independent body, operating per the City Code on Takeover and Mergers(the “Code”), which regulates takeovers of public companies,  centrally managed or controlled in the UK, the Isle of Man, Jersey, and Guernsey.  The Code provides a binding set of rules for takeovers aimed at ensuring fair treatment for all shareholders in takeover bids, including requiring bidders to provide information about their intentions after a takeover.
  • The Financial Conduct Authority administers Listing Rules, Prospectus Regulation Rules, and Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules, which can apply to takeovers of publicly-listed companies.
  • The Pensions Regulator has powers to intervene in investments in pension schemes.

Expropriation and Compensation

The UK is a member of the OECD and adheres to the OECD principle that when a government expropriates property, compensation should be timely, adequate, and effective.  In the UK, the right to fair compensation and due process is uncontested and is reflected in all international investment agreements.  Expropriation of corporate assets or the nationalization of industry requires a special act of Parliament.  In response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the UK government nationalized Northern Rock Bank (sold to Virgin Money in 2012) and took major stakes in the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds Banking Group.

Dispute Settlement

As a member of the World Bank-based International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the UK accepts binding international arbitration between foreign investors and the State.  As a signatory to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the UK provides local enforcement on arbitration judgments decided in other signatory countries.

London is a thriving center for the resolution of international disputes through arbitration under a variety of procedural rules such as those of the London Court of International Arbitration, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, the American Arbitration Association International Centre for Dispute Resolution, and others.  Many of these arbitrations involve parties with no connection to the jurisdiction, but who are drawn to the jurisdiction because they perceive it to be a fair, neutral venue with an arbitration law and courts that support competent and efficient resolution of disputes.  They also choose London-based arbitration because of the general prevalence of the English language and law in international commerce.  A wide range of contractual and non-contractual claims can be referred to arbitration in this jurisdiction including disputes involving intellectual property rights, competition, and statutory claims.  There are no restrictions on foreign nationals acting as arbitration counsel or arbitrators in this jurisdiction.  There are few restrictions on foreign lawyers practicing in the jurisdiction as evidenced by the fact that over 200 foreign law firms have offices in London.

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

In addition to its membership in ICSID, the UK is a signatory to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.  The latter convention has territorial application to Gibraltar (September 24, 1975), Hong Kong (January 21, 1977), Isle of Man (February 22, 1979), Bermuda (November 14, 1979), Belize and Cayman Islands (November 26, 1980), Guernsey (April 19, 1985), Bailiwick of Jersey (May 28, 2002), and British Virgin Islands (February 24, 2014).

The United Kingdom has consciously elected not to follow the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.  Enforcement of an arbitral award in the UK is dependent upon where the award was granted.  The process for enforcement in any particular case is dependent upon the seat of arbitration and the arbitration rules that apply.  Arbitral awards in the UK can be enforced under a number of different regimes, namely:  The Arbitration Act 1996, The New York Convention, The Geneva Convention 1927, The Administration of Justice Act 1920 and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, and Common Law.

The Arbitration Act 1996 governs all arbitrations seated in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, both domestic and international.  The full text of the Arbitration Act can be found here: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/data.pdf.

The Arbitration Act is heavily influenced by the UNCITRAL Model Law, but it has some important differences.  For example, the Arbitration Act covers both domestic and international arbitration; the document containing the parties’ arbitration agreement need not be signed; an English court is only able to stay its own proceedings and cannot refer a matter to arbitration; the default provisions in the Arbitration Act require the appointment of a sole arbitrator as opposed to three arbitrators; a party retains the power to treat its party-nominated arbitrator as the sole arbitrator in the event that the other party fails to make an appointment (where the parties’ agreement provides that each party is required to appoint an arbitrator); there is no time limit on a party’s opposition to the appointment of an arbitrator; parties must expressly opt out of most of the provisions of the Arbitration Act which confer default procedural powers on the arbitrators; and there are no strict rules governing the exchange of pleadings.  Section 66 of the Arbitration Act applies to all domestic and foreign arbitral awards.  Sections 100 to 103 of the Arbitration Act provide for enforcement of arbitral awards under the New York Convention 1958.  Section 99 of the Arbitration Act provides for the enforcement of arbitral awards made in certain countries under the Geneva Convention 1927.

UK courts have a good record of enforcing arbitral awards.  The courts will enforce an arbitral award in the same way that they will enforce an order or judgment of a court.  At the time of writing, there are no examples of the English courts enforcing awards which were set aside by the courts at the place of arbitration.

Under Section 66 of the Arbitration Act, the court’s permission is required for an international arbitral award to be enforced in the UK.  Once the court has given permission, judgment may be entered in terms of the arbitral award and enforced in the same manner as a court judgment or order.  Permission will not be granted by the court if the party against whom enforcement is sought can show that (a) the tribunal lacked substantive jurisdiction and (b) the right to raise such an objection has not been lost.

The length of arbitral proceedings can vary greatly.  If the parties have a relatively straightforward dispute, cooperate, and adopt a fast-track procedure, arbitration can be concluded within months or even weeks.  In a substantial international arbitration involving complex facts, many witnesses and experts and post-hearing briefs, the arbitration could take many years.  A reasonably substantial international arbitration will likely take between one and two years.

There are two alternative procedures that can be followed in order to enforce an award.  The first is to seek leave of the court for permission to enforce.  The second is to begin an action on the award, seeking the same relief from the court as set out in the tribunal’s award.  Enforcement of an award made in the jurisdiction may be opposed by challenging the award.  The court may also, however, refuse to enforce an award that is unclear, does not specify an amount, or offends public policy.  Enforcement of a foreign award may be opposed on any of the limited grounds set out in the New York Convention.  A stay may be granted for a limited time pending a challenge to the order for enforcement.  The court will consider the likelihood of success and whether enforcement of the award will be made more or less difficult as a result of the stay.  Conditions that might be imposed on granting the stay include such matters as paying a sum into court.  Where multiple awards are to be rendered, the court may give permission for the tribunal to continue hearing other matters, especially where there may be a long delay between awards.

Most awards are complied with voluntarily.  If the party against whom the award was made fails to comply, the party seeking enforcement can apply to the court.  The length of time it takes to enforce an award which complies with the requirements of the New York Convention will depend on whether there are complex objections to enforcement which require the court to investigate the facts of the case.  If a case raises complex issues of public importance the case could be appealed to the Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court.  This process could take around two years.  If no complex objections are raised, the party seeking enforcement can apply to the court using a summary procedure that is fast and efficient.  There are time limits relating to the enforcement of the award.  Failure to comply with an award is treated as a breach of the arbitration agreement.  An action on the award must be brought within six years of the failure to comply with the award or 12 years if the arbitration agreement was made under seal.  If the award does not specify a time for compliance, a court will imply a term of reasonableness.

Bankruptcy Regulations

The UK has strong bankruptcy protections going back to the Bankruptcy Act of 1542.  Today, both individual bankruptcy and corporate insolvency are regulated in the UK primarily by the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Insolvency Rules 1986, regulated through determinations in UK courts.  The World Bank’s Doing Business Index ranks the UK 14 out of 190 for ease of resolving insolvency.

Regarding individual bankruptcy law, the court will oblige a bankrupt individual to sell assets to pay dividends to creditors.  A bankrupt person must inform future creditors about the bankrupt status and may not act as the director of a company during the period of bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy is not criminalized in the UK, and the Enterprise Act of 2002 dictates that for England and Wales bankruptcy will not normally last longer than 12 months.  At the end of the bankrupt period, the individual is normally no longer held liable for bankruptcy debts unless the individual is determined to be culpable for his or her own insolvency, in which case the bankruptcy period can last up to 15 years.

For corporations declaring insolvency, UK insolvency law seeks to distribute losses equitably between creditors, employees, the community, and other stakeholders in an effort to rescue the company.  Liability is limited to the amount of the investment.  If a company cannot be rescued, it is liquidated and assets are sold to pay debts to creditors, including foreign investors.  In March 2020, the UK government announced it would introduce legislation to change existing insolvency laws in response to COVID-19.  The new measures seek to enable companies undergoing a rescue or restructuring process to continue trading and help them avoid insolvency.

4. Industrial Policies

Investment Incentives

The UK offers a range of incentives for companies of any nationality locating in depressed regions of the country, as long as the investment generates employment.  DIT works with its partner organizations in the devolved administrations – Scottish Development International, the Welsh Government and Invest Northern Ireland – and with London and Partners and Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) throughout England, to promote each region’s particular strengths and expertise to overseas investors.

Local authorities in England and Wales also have power under the Local Government and Housing Act of 1989 to promote the economic development of their areas through a variety of assistance schemes, including the provision of grants, loan capital, property, or other financial benefit.  Separate legislation, granting similar powers to local authorities, applies to Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

In March 2021, The UK government identified eight sites as post-Brexit freeports to spur trade, investment, innovation and economic recovery.  The eight sites are: East Midlands Airport, Felixstowe and Harwich, Humber region, Liverpool City Region, Plymouth, Solent, Thames, and Teesside.  The designated areas will offer special customs and tax arrangements and additional infrastructure funding to improve transport links.

The cargo ports and freight transportation ports at Liverpool, Prestwick, Sheerness, Southampton, and Tilbury used for cargo storage and consolidation are designated as Free Trade Zones.  No activities that add value to commodities are permitted within the Free Trade Zones, which are reserved for bonded storage, cargo consolidation, and reconfiguration of goods.  The Free Trade Zones offer little benefit to exporters or investors.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

The UK does not mandate “forced localization” of data and does not require foreign IT firms to turn over source code.  The Investigatory Powers Act became law in November 2016 addressing encryption and government surveillance.  It permitted the broadening of capabilities for data retention and the investigatory powers of the state related to data.

The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) no longer applies to the UK.  Entities based in the UK must comply with the Data Protection Act (DPA) 2018, which incorporated provisions of the EU GDPR directly into UK law.  The UK GDPR sits alongside the DPA 2018 with some technical amendments so that it works in a UK-only context.

On February 19, 2021, the European Commission launched the process towards the adoption of two data adequacy decisions for transfers of personal data to the UK, one under the GDPR and the other for the Law Enforcement Directive.  The decisions, once adopted, would ensure personal data transfers from the European Economic Area (EEA) to the UK continue without the restrictions that the European Commission would ordinarily require on transfers to non-EEA countries.  The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) allows these transfers to continue on an interim basis until the data adequacy decisions are adopted.

HMG brought forward new immigration rules on January 1, 2021. The new rules have wide-ranging implications for foreign employees, students, and EU citizens.  The new rules are points-based, meaning immigrants need to attain a certain number of points in order to be awarded a visa.  The previous cap on visas has been abolished.  Applicants will need to be able to speak English and be paid the relevant salary threshold by their sponsor. This will either be the general salary threshold of £25,600 ($35,800) or the going rate for their job, whichever is higher.  If applicants earn less – but no less than £20,480 ($28,700) – they may still be able to apply by ”trading” points on specific characteristics against their salary.  For example, if they have a job offer in a shortage occupation or have a PhD relevant to the job.  More details are available here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/899755/UK_Points-Based_System_Further_Details_Web_Accessible.pdf

EU citizens who arrived before December 31, 2020, will not have to apply for a visa, but instead are eligible to apply for “settled” or “pre-settled” status, which allows them to live and work in the UK much the same as they were before the UK left the EU.  EU citizens arriving to the UK after January 1, 2021, must apply for the relevant visa.

5. Protection of Property Rights

Real Property

The UK has robust real property laws stemming from legislation including the Law of Property Act 1925, the Settled Land Act 1925, the Land Charges Act 1972, the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, and the Land Registration Act 2002.

Interests in property are well enforced, and mortgages and liens have been recorded reliably since the Land Registry Act of 1862.  The Land Registry is the government database where all land ownership and transaction data are held for England and Wales, and it is reliably accessible online, here: https://www.gov.uk/search-property-information-land-registry.  Scotland has its own Registers of Scotland, while Northern Ireland operates land registration through the Land and Property Services.

Long-term physical presence on non-residential property without permission is not typically considered a crime in the UK.  Police take action if squatters commit other crimes when entering or staying in a property.

Intellectual Property Rights

The UK legal system provides a high level of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, and enforcement mechanisms are comparable to those available in the United States.  The UK is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).  The UK is also a member of the following major intellectual property protection agreements: the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Universal Copyright Convention, the Geneva Phonograms Convention, and the Patent Cooperation Treaty.  The UK has signed and, through implementing various EU Directives, enshrined into UK law the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), known as the internet treaties.

The Intellectual Property Office (IPO) is the official UK government body responsible forIPR, including patents, designs, trademarks, and copyright.  The IPO web site contains comprehensive information on UK law and practice in these areas.  https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/intellectual-property-office 

According to the Intellectual Property Crime Report for 2019/20, imports of counterfeit and pirated goods to the UK accounted for as much as £13.6 billion ($18.8 billion) in 2016 – the equivalent of three percent of UK imports in genuine goods.

The U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR’s) 2020 Notorious Markets Report includes amazon.co.uk, based in the UK, due to high levels of counterfeit goods on the platform, but the report also notes the UK has blocking orders in place for a number of torrent and infringing websites.  The 2020 report further details the “innovative approaches to disrupting ad-backed funding of pirate sites” taken by the London Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit (PIPCU) and IPO.

For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at https://www.wipo.int/directory/en/.

6. Financial Sector

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

The City of London houses one of the largest and most comprehensive financial centers globally.  London offers all forms of financial services:  commercial banking, investment banking, insurance, venture capital, private equity, stock and currency brokers, fund managers, commodity dealers, accounting and legal services, as well as electronic clearing and settlement systems and bank payments systems.  London is highly regarded by investors because of its solid regulatory, legal, and tax environments, a supportive market infrastructure, and a dynamic, highly skilled workforce.

The UK government is generally hospitable to foreign portfolio investment.  Government policies are intended to facilitate the free flow of capital and to support the flow of resources in product and services markets.  Foreign investors are able to obtain credit in local markets at normal market terms, and a wide range of credit instruments are available.  The principles underlying legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent, and  are consistent with international standards.  In all cases, regulations have been published and are applied on a non-discriminatory basis by the Bank of England’s Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA).

The London Stock Exchange is one of the most active equity markets in the world.  London’s markets have the advantage of bridging the gap between the day’s trading in the Asian markets and the opening of the U.S. market.  This bridge effect is also evidenced by the fact that many Russian and Central European companies have used London stock exchanges to tap global capital markets.

The Alternative Investment Market (AIM), established in 1995 as a sub-market of the London Stock Exchange, is specifically designed for smaller, rapidly expanding companies.  The AIM has a more flexible regulatory system than the main market and has no minimum market capitalization requirements.  Since its launch, the AIM has raised more than £68 billion ($95 billion) for more than 3,000 companies.

Money and Banking System

The UK banking sector is the largest in Europe and represents the continent’s deepest capital pool.  More than 150 financial services firms from the EU are based in the UK.  The financial and related professional services industry contributed approximately 10 percent of UK economic output in 2020, employed approximately 2.3 million people, and contributed the most to UK tax receipts of any sector.  The long-term impact of Brexit on the financial services industry is uncertain at this time.  Some firms have already moved limited numbers of jobs outside the UK in order to service EU-based clients, but the UK is anticipated to remain a top financial hub.

The Bank of England serves as the central bank of the UK.  According to its guidelines, foreign banking institutions are legally permitted to establish operations in the UK as subsidiaries or branches.  Responsibilities for the prudential supervision of a foreign branch are split between the parent’s home state supervisors and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA).  The PRA, however, expects the whole firm to meet the PRA’s threshold conditions.  The PRA expects new foreign branches to focus on wholesale and corporate banking and to do so at a level that is not critical to the UK economy.  The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is the conduct regulator for all banks operating in the United Kingdom.  For foreign branches the FCA’s Threshold Conditions and conduct of business rules apply, including areas such as anti-money laundering.  Eligible deposits placed in foreign branches may be covered by the UK deposit guarantee program and therefore foreign branches may be subject to regulations concerning UK depositor protection.

There are no legal restrictions that prohibit foreign residents from opening a business bank account; setting up a business bank account as a non-resident is in principle straightforward.   In practice, however, most banks will not accept applications from overseas due to fraud concerns and the additional administration costs.  To open a personal bank account, an individual must at minimum present an internationally recognized proof of identification and prove residency in the UK.  This can present a problem for incoming FDI and American expatriates.  Unless the business or the individual can prove UK residency, they will have limited banking options.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

The pound sterling is a free-floating currency with no restrictions on its transfer or conversion.  Exchange controls restricting the transfer of funds associated with an investment into or out of the UK are not exercised.

Remittance Policies

Not applicable.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

The United Kingdom does not maintain a national wealth fund.  Although there have at time been calls to turn The Crown Estate – created in 1760 by Parliament as a means of funding the British monarchy – into a wealth fund, there are no current plans to do so.  Moreover, with assets of just under $20 billion, The Crown Estate would be small in relation to other national funds.

7. State-Owned Enterprises

There are 20 partially or fully state-owned enterprises in the UK at the national level.  These enterprises range from large, well-known companies to small trading funds.  Since privatizing the oil and gas industry, the UK has not established any new energy-related state-owned enterprises or resource funds.

Privatization Program

The privatization of state-owned utilities in the UK is now essentially complete.  With regard to future investment opportunities, the few remaining government-owned enterprises or government shares in other utilities are likely to be sold off to the private sector when market conditions improve.

8. Responsible Business Conduct

Businesses in the UK are accountable for a due-diligence approach to responsible business conduct (RBC), or corporate social responsibility (CSR), in areas such as human resources, environment, sustainable development, and health and safety practices – through a wide variety of existing guidelines at national, EU, and global levels.  There is a strong awareness of CSR principles among UK businesses, promoted by UK business associations such as the Confederation of British Industry and the UK government.

The British government fairly and uniformly enforces laws related to human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protection, and other statutes intended to protect individuals from adverse business impacts.

The UK government adheres to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.  It is committed to the promotion and implementation of these Guidelines and encourages UK multinational enterprises to adopt high corporate standards involving all aspects of the Guidelines.  The UK has established a National Contact Point (NCP) to promote the Guidelines and to facilitate the resolution of disputes that may arise within that context.  The NCP is part of the Department for International Trade.  A Steering Board monitors the work of the UK NCP and provides strategic guidance.  It is composed of representatives of relevant government departments and four external members nominated by the Trades Union Congress, the Confederation of British Industry, the All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region of Africa, and the NGO community.  The results of a UK government consultation on CSR can be found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/300265/bis-14-651-good-for-business-and-society-government-response-to-call-for-views-on-corporate-responsibility.pdf.

Information on UK regulations and policies relating to the procurement of supplies, services and works for the public sector, and the relevance of promoting RBC, are found here: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/public-sector-procurement-policy.

9. Corruption

Although isolated instances of bribery and corruption have occurred in the UK, U.S. investors have not identified corruption of public officials as a challenge in doing business in the UK.

The Bribery Act 2010 amended and reformed UK criminal law and provided a modern legal framework to combat bribery in the UK and internationally.  The scope of the law is extra-territorial.  Under the Act, a relevant person or company can be prosecuted for bribery if the crime is committed abroad.  The Act applies to UK citizens, residents and companies established under UK law.  In addition, non-UK companies can be held liable for a failure to prevent bribery if they do business in the UK.

Section 9 of the Act requires the UK government to publish guidance on procedures that commercial organizations can put in place to prevent bribery on their behalf.  It creates the following offenses: active bribery, described as promising or giving a financial or other advantage, passive bribery, described as agreeing to receive or accepting a financial or other advantage; bribery of foreign public officials; and the failure of commercial organizations to prevent bribery by an associated person (corporate offense).  This corporate criminal offense places a burden of proof on companies to show they have adequate procedures  in place to prevent bribery (http://www.transparency.org.uk/our-work/business-integrity/bribery-act/adequate-procedures-guidance/).  To avoid corporate liability for bribery, companies must make sure that they have strong, up-to-date and effective anti-bribery policies and systems.  It is a corporate criminal offense to fail to prevent bribery by an associated person.  The briber must be “associated” with the commercial organization, a term which will apply to, amongst others, the organization’s agents, employees, and subsidiaries.  A foreign corporation which “carries on a business, or part of a business” in the UK may therefore be guilty of the UK offense even if, for example, the relevant acts were performed by the corporation’s agent outside the UK.  The Act does not extend to political parties and it is unclear whether it extends to family members of public officials.

The UK formally ratified the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery in 1998 and ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption in 2006.

Resources to Report Corruption

UK law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government routinely implements these laws effectively.  The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) is an independent government department, operating under the superintendence of the Attorney General with jurisdiction in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.  It investigates and prosecutes those who commit serious or complex fraud, bribery, and corruption, and pursues them and others for the proceeds of their crime.

All allegations of bribery of foreign public officials by British nationals or companies incorporated in the United Kingdom—even in relation to conduct that occurred overseas—should be reported to the SFO for possible investigation.  When the SFO receives a report of possible corruption, its intelligence team makes an assessment and decides if the matter is best dealt with by the SFO itself or passed to a law enforcement partner organization, such as the Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit of the City of London Police (OACU) or the International Corruption Unit of the National Crime Agency.  Allegations can be reported in confidence using the SFO’s secure online reporting form: https://www.sfo.gov.uk/contact-us/reporting-serious-fraud-bribery-corruption/.

Details can also be sent to the SFO in writing:

SFO Confidential
Serious Fraud Office
2-4 Cockspur Street
London, SW1Y 5BS
United Kingdom

10. Political and Security Environment

The UK is politically stable but continues to be a target for both domestic and global terrorist groups.  Terrorist incidents in the UK have significantly decreased in frequency and severity since 2017, which saw five terrorist attacks that caused 36 deaths.  In 2019, the UK suffered one terrorist attack resulting in three deaths (including the attacker), and another two attacks in early 2020 caused serious injuries and resulted in the death of one attacker.  In November 2019, the UK lowered the terrorism threat level to substantial, meaning the risk of an attack was reduced from “highly likely” to “likely.”  UK officials categorize Islamist terrorism as the greatest threat to national security, though officials identify a rising threat from racially or ethnically motivated extremists, which they refer to as “extreme right-wing” terrorism.  Since March 2017, police and security services have disrupted 19 Islamist and seven extreme right-wing plots.

Environmental advocacy groups in the UK have been involved with numerous protests against a variety of business activities, including: airport expansion, bypass roads, offshore structures, wind farms, civilian nuclear power plants, and petrochemical facilities.  These protests tend not to be violent but can be disruptive, with the aim of obtaining maximum media exposure.

Brexit has waned as a source of political instability.  Nonetheless, the June 2016 EU referendum campaign was characterized by significant polarization and widely varying perspectives across the country.  Differing views about the future UK-EU relationship continue to polarize political opinion across the UK.  Scottish political leaders have indicated that the UK leaving the EU may provide justification to pursue another Referendum on Scotland leaving the UK.  Implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement has contributed to heightened political and sectarian tensions in Northern Ireland.

The UK formally departed the bloc on January 31, 2020, following the ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement, and completed its transition out of the EU on December 31, 2020.

The Conservative Party, traditionally the UK’s pro-business party, was, until the COVID-19 pandemic, focused on implementing Brexit, a process many international businesses opposed because they anticipated it would make trade in goods, services, workers, and capital with the UK’s largest trading partners more challenging and costly, at least in the short term.  The Conservative Party-led government implemented a Digital Services Tax (DST), a two percent tax on the revenues of predominantly American search engines, social media services and online marketplaces which derive value from UK users, and has additionally legislated for an increase in the Corporation Tax rate from 19 percent to 25 percent.

The Labour Party’s leader, Sir Keir Starmer, is widely acknowledged to be more economically centrist than his predecessor.  In his first major economic speech following his election as Labour Party leader, Starmer declared his intention to repair and improve the party’s relationship with the business community, but has proposed few policies beyond the focus of the COVID-19 crisis.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

The UK’s labor force comprises more than 41 million workers.  The employment rate between November 2020 and January 2021 was 75 percent, with 28.3 million workers employed.  There were 1.7 million workers unemployed in January 2021, or five percent, one percent higher than at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The most serious issue facing British employers is a skills gap derived from a high-skill, high-tech economy outpacing the educational system’s ability to deliver work-ready graduates.  The government has placed a strong emphasis on improving the British educational system in terms of greater emphasis on science, research and development, and entrepreneurial skills, but any positive reforms will necessarily deliver benefits with a lag.

As of 2018, approximately 23.5 percent of UK workers belonged to a union.  Public-sector workers represented a much higher share of union members at 52.5 percent, while the private sector was 13.2 percent.  Manufacturing, transport, and distribution trades are highly unionized. Unionization of the workforce in the UK is prohibited only in the armed forces, public-sector security services, and police forces.  Union membership has risen slightly in recent years, despite a previous downward trend.

In the 2019, 234,000 working days were lost from 35 official labor disputes.  The Trades Union Congress (TUC), the British nation-wide labor federation, encourages union-management cooperation.

On April 1, 2021, the UK raised the minimum wage to £8.91 ($12.33) an hour for workers ages 25 and over.  The increased wage impacts about 2 million workers across Britain.

The 2006 Employment Equality (Age) Regulations make it unlawful to discriminate against workers, employees, job seekers, and trainees because of age, whether young or old.  The regulations cover recruitment, terms and conditions, promotions, transfers, dismissals, and training.  They do not cover the provision of goods and services.  The regulations also removed the upper age limits on unfair dismissal and redundancy.  It sets a national default retirement age of 65, making compulsory retirement below that age unlawful unless objectively justified.  Employees have the right to request to work beyond retirement age and the employer has a duty to consider such requests.

13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (M USD) 2018 $2,710,000 2019 $2,829,000 https://data.worldbank.org/
country/united-kingdom
Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
U.S. FDI in partner country (M USD, stock positions) 2019 $527,000 2019 $851,414 BEA data available at
https://apps.bea.gov/
international/factsheet/ 
Host country’s FDI in the United States (M USD, stock positions) 2019 $524,000 2019 $505,088 https://www.selectusa.gov/
country-fact-sheet/United-Kingdom 
Total inbound stock of FDI as percent host GDP 2018 25.3% 2019 11.3% Calculated using respective GDP and FDI data
Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI 
Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy 
 From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (USD, Billions)
Inward Direct Investment 2019 Outward Direct Investment 2018
Total Inward 2,155.9 Proportion Total Outward 2,060 Proportion
USA 527.8 24.5% USA 525.2 25.3%
Netherlands 231.3 10.7% Netherlands 215.4 10.4%
Luxembourg 185.9 8.6% Luxembourg 132.6 6.4%
Belgium 161 7.5% France 104 5.0%
Japan 125.2 7.4% Spain 104 5.0%
 Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Portfolio Investment Assets
Top Five Partners (Millions, current US Dollars)
Total Equity Securities Total Debt Securities
All Countries 100% All Countries 100% All Countries 100%
United States 1,077,839 32% United States 549,159 30% United States 528,680 34%
Ireland 422,939 13% Ireland 340,790 19% France 131,552 8%
Luxembourg 184,953 6% Luxembourg 144,231 8% Germany 101,282 7%
France 171,948 5% Japan 81,081 5% Int’l Orgs 96,055 6%
Germany 146,051 4% China, P.R Mainland 49,373 3% Ireland 82,148 5%

14. Contact for More Information

U.S. Embassy London
Economic Section
33 Nine Elms Ln
London SW11 7US
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20-7499-9000
LondonEconomic@state.gov